tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/identity-politics-19209/articlesIdentity politics – The Conversation2023-12-12T19:03:32Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2192022023-12-12T19:03:32Z2023-12-12T19:03:32ZLeft is Not Woke: a philosopher’s plea for universalism and ‘progress’ is a frustrating polemic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564750/original/file-20231211-17-7hfs0t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C6%2C4300%2C2851&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/people-in-black-shirts-and-black-shorts-sitting-on-bench-during-daytime-qT7fZVbDcqE">Photo by Clay Banks on Unsplash</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Some years ago I was surprised to come across a person whose politics I knew to be conservative at a Greens fundraiser. When I asked him why he was there, he said he supported any gay candidate, irrespective of party.</p>
<p>It is this emphasis on identity against values that most annoys American philosopher and writer <a href="https://www.susan-neiman.com/">Susan Neiman</a>. She could well have echoed Cate Blanchett’s character in the film Tar, an acclaimed conductor who is appalled when one of her students discards Bach’s music because he was a white, cis male. </p>
<p>Tribal identities, for Neiman, are undermining the traditional claims of the left for a universalist understanding of justice and progress. </p>
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<p><em>Left is Not Woke – Susan Neiman (Polity)</em></p>
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<p>Neiman’s book <a href="https://www.politybooks.com/search?s=Susan%20Neiman">Left is Not Woke</a> is strongest when querying the centrality of this tribalism. Elsewhere she has written movingly about the way in which German guilt about the Holocaust blocks <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2023/10/19/historical-reckoning-gone-haywire-germany-susan-neiman/">the capacity to feel empathy for Palestinians now dying in Gaza</a>. </p>
<p>In her book she defends Hannah Arendt’s use of the term “crimes against humanity” to describe the Holocaust, an expression journalist <a href="https://theconversation.com/universalism-or-tribalism-michael-gawendas-memoir-considers-what-it-means-to-be-a-jew-in-contemporary-australia-213459">Michael Gawenda has found objectionable</a> because it elides the particular experience of Jews. </p>
<p>Neiman’s defence of universalism is important and has been praised by Fintan O’Toole in a <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2023/11/02/defying-tribalism-left-is-not-woke-neiman/">powerful essay in the New York Review of Books</a> titled “Defying Tribalism”. (Despite living in Berlin, the United States is very much her focus in her book.) But nowhere does Neiman demonstrate that “woke” and “tribalism” are identical. As she claims, concern for those who are marginalised can </p>
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<p>end by reducing each to the prism of her marginalization […] The idea of intersectionality […] [has] led to a focus on those parts of identities that are most marginalized and multiplies them into a forest of trauma.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-wokeness-has-become-the-latest-battlefront-for-white-conservatives-in-america-207122">Why 'wokeness' has become the latest battlefront for white conservatives in America</a>
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<p>Her concern is that an emphasis on personal experience can easily magnify tribal grievances at the expense of a universal concern for justice. Neiman’s insistence on the importance of universalism is particularly apposite in the current emotional responses to the Gaza conflict.</p>
<p>It is true some contemporary leftists are so concerned with language at the expense of major inequalities that they forget the need for a politics of redistribution alongside a politics of recognition. But Neiman fails to demonstrate the contemporary American left is beholden to a cartoon version of identity politics, unable to recognise multiple oppressions. </p>
<p>Indeed she stresses the numbers of white Americans who rallied behind the Black Lives Matter protests of several years ago, which would seem to disprove her central assertion.</p>
<h2>The philosophers</h2>
<p>Neiman begins the book by positioning herself as left rather than liberal. She defines a leftist politics as one as concerned with social as with political rights. One assumes she would applaud the tentative attempts of the Biden administration to modify the worst excesses of American capitalism, but while she inveighs against neo-liberalism, she ignores contemporary mainstream politics, wanting instead to seek out the philosophic roots of what she sees as the current failings of many on the left.</p>
<p>Her discussion of the Enlightenment and its claims to universalism is genuinely interesting, even if she is too willing to glide over the deep contradictions in America’s favourite Enlightenment figures. Yes, philosophers like Kant and Rousseau were more aware of the limitations of Eurocentric views than is often acknowledged, but there is little evidence their appeals for universalism actually had much influence on colonial expansion.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-philosophy-of-jean-jacques-rousseau-is-profoundly-contemporary-201179">Explainer: the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau is profoundly contemporary</a>
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<p>It is interesting to note Kant condemned the expropriation of land from Indigenous owners but his writings did nothing to check colonial settlers. If any of them read philosophy they were far more influenced by John Locke’s view that only through agriculture could the right to property develop. (Interestingly historian Henry Reynolds <a href="https://www.newsouthbooks.com.au/books/truth-telling/">reads Locke rather differently</a> and quotes him in defence of unceded Indigenous sovereignty.)</p>
<p>When Neiman moves to more recent philosophers, the book becomes both polemical and unreliable. For Neiman the philosophical forbears of “woke” are apparently Michel Foucault and <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schmitt/">Carl Schmitt</a>, who between them undermined the belief in progress and altruism necessary for a decent politics of the left.</p>
<p>I doubt if one in a hundred contemporary activists could identify Schmitt, who was a Nazi apologist and has been seen as an inspiration for autocrats in the postwar world. Foucault certainly was a major intellectual influence on many activists but Neiman’s dislike for him borders on the irrational.</p>
<p>My antennae bristled when she describes him as “openly, transgressively gay”. In fact Foucault was ambivalent about his sexuality and reluctant to be open about it. Nor was he “flamboyant, courting outrage”, except perhaps in the safety of a few backroom bars. Having condemned identity as the basis for a decent politics, Neiman seems determined to link Foucault’s ideas to his sexuality.</p>
<p>The refusal to find anything useful in Foucault’s analysis of power – especially given the sanctification of Foucault in many academic circles – makes what could be an important critique seem more of an unjustified personal attack. A more generous reading of Foucault could have pointed to his scepticism about identity politics. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-ideas-of-foucault-99758">Explainer: the ideas of Foucault</a>
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<h2>A lack of specifics</h2>
<p>Neiman calls herself a socialist, although I suspect she would be very comfortable with the politics of the Australian Labor Party. She argues persuasively that if we do not believe that progress is possible, we cannot construct a meaningful politics for the left, one that creates greater equality and fairness for all.</p>
<p>In subsequent chapters other obstacles to progress are identified, particularly sociobiology and neo-liberalism. (In her reading, sociobiology suggests inequalities of class and gender are inherent in our DNA, rather than socially constructed.) This discussion of sociobiology is somewhat mystifying, as she makes no direct connection between it and “woke” politics.</p>
<p>Her argument that, in contrast to this view, humans are capable of acting out of more than self-interest is important, but hardly radical. Even the current US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin is pressuring Israel to moderate its rampage in Gaza <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/688ed77b-87ea-425a-acd3-63dd9b914633">for both strategic and moral reasons</a>.</p>
<p>As the book progresses, Neiman tends to fall back on statements of the obvious, with trite observations such as: </p>
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<p>At a time when many ten-year-olds can give you a lecture on carbon emissions, what do the masters of the universe fail to see? </p>
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<p>Had she pursued this thought to consider why her privileged belief in progress might seem illusionary to people whose lands are being obliterated by climate change, there might have been some value to this observation.</p>
<p>Left is Not Woke is a frustrating book, rich in philosophical inquiry but with a strange lack of specifics that might clarify exactly who are the leftists she is criticising. </p>
<p>She ends with a conversation with the Indian activist and writer <a href="https://harshmander.in/">Harsh Mander</a>, who, like her, is appalled by the rise of tribalism in the contemporary world. They share, she claims, a commitment to “universalism, a hard distinction between justice and power, and the possibility of progress”. To which Mander adds a commitment to doubt.</p>
<p>I, too, would like to believe in these ideals. But when I think of the people I know who share these commitments, many of them, I suspect, would be dismissed by Neiman as “too woke”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dennis Altman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some leftists today forget the need for a politics of redistribution alongside one of recognition. But a new book fails to show the left is beholden to a cartoon version of identity politics.Dennis Altman, VC Fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2170852023-11-15T19:04:35Z2023-11-15T19:04:35ZHow a new identity-focused ideology has trapped the left and undermined social justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559473/original/file-20231114-19-zpi3vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C0%2C2986%2C1500&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fizkes/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Yascha Mounk’s new book, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/712961/the-identity-trap-by-yascha-mounk/">The Identity Trap: A Story of Ideas and Power in Our Time</a>, explores a radical progressive ideology that has been taking the world by storm. From its unlikely beginnings in esoteric scholarly theories and niche online communities, this new worldview is reshaping our lives, from the highest echelons of political power to the local school classroom. </p>
<p>Mounk argues that the new identity-focused ideology is not simply an extension of prior social justice philosophies and civil rights movements; on the contrary, it rejects both. He contends that those committed to social justice must resist this new ideology’s powerful temptations – its <em>trap</em>. </p>
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<p><em>Review: The Identity Trap: A Story of Ideas and Power in Our Time – Yascha Mounk (Allen Lane)</em></p>
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<p>While The Identity Trap focuses on the political left, Mounk’s two previous books – <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674237681">The People vs. Democracy</a> (2018) and <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/665275/the-great-experiment-by-yascha-mounk/">The Great Experiment</a> (2022) – considered the dangers of the illiberal right. </p>
<p>His critique of identity-focused progressivism thus comes from a place that shares many of its values. He aims to persuade readers who are naturally sympathetic to social justice causes that those causes demand a rejection, not an embrace, of identity-focused politics.</p>
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<p>A <em>tour de force</em> of intelligent argument, The Identity Trap covers a lot of ground. Mounk explores the intellectual history of the scholarly theories that support this new worldview. He interrogates its plausibility, explains the shifts in social media and news media that have amplified it, clarifies its key commitments and raises the alarm on its likely consequences.</p>
<p>To critique this perspective, Mounk must first name it. He settles on “identity synthesis”, in an attempt to avoid the more common but contentious term “identity politics”. His term refers to its synthesis of a range of intellectual traditions, including <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodernism/">postmodernism</a>, <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/postcolonialism/v-1">postcolonialism</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/critical-race-theory">critical race theory</a>. These theories focus on ascriptive categories such as race, gender and sexual orientation. </p>
<p>One question that immediately arises is why the identity synthesis focuses heavily on some types of marginalised identities and not others. The lack of focus on <em>class</em> – that is, hierarchies built on wealth, income, education and closeness to elite institutions – is particularly surprising. After all, economic marginalisation has baked-in inequalities and power differentials. </p>
<p>As Mounk tells it, the Soviet Union’s moral and political collapse saw the concept of class struggle fall out of fashion on the scholarly left, empowering cultural concerns to take centre stage.</p>
<p>There is also a curiosity here that Mounk doesn’t dwell on, which is why this worldview requires naming at all. Most political ideologies – liberalism, socialism, libertarianism, conservatism – are reasonably well defined and understood. This is less true of the worldview that concerns Mounk. The vague term “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woke">woke</a>”, which has its origins in African American vernacular, was once used to refer to those who had woken up to their world’s systemic inequalities. But the term is now mainly used in a <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/woke">pejorative sense</a>.</p>
<p>This has given rise to the perplexing phenomenon of an ideology that dares not speak its name. Perhaps those who think of contemporary progressivism as simply <em>the truth</em> are reluctant to name it as a specific position and turn it into an “ism”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/where-woke-came-from-and-why-marketers-should-think-twice-before-jumping-on-the-social-activism-bandwagon-122713">Where 'woke' came from and why marketers should think twice before jumping on the social activism bandwagon</a>
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<h2>Core themes</h2>
<p>Capturing a nestled group of moral commitments, political views, theoretical bases, activist strategies and online practices, Mounk distils the identity synthesis into seven core themes.</p>
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<li><p><em>Scepticism about objective truth</em>: a postmodern wariness about “grand narratives” that extends to scepticism about scientific claims and universal values.</p></li>
<li><p><em>Discourse analysis for political ends</em>: a critique of speech and language to overcome oppressive structures.</p></li>
<li><p><em>Doubling down on identity</em>: a strategy of embracing rather than dismantling identities.</p></li>
<li><p><em>Proud pessimism</em>: the view that no genuine civil rights progress has been made, and that oppressive structures will always exist.</p></li>
<li><p><em>Identity-sensitive legislation</em>: the failure of “equal treatment” requires policies that explicitly favour marginalised groups.</p></li>
<li><p><em>The imperative of intersectionality</em>: effectively acting against one form of oppression requires responding to all its forms.</p></li>
<li><p><em>Standpoint theory</em>: marginalised groups have access to truths that cannot be communicated to outsiders.</p></li>
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<p>There is always a worry when commentators take it upon themselves to outline an opposing view. There are dangers of misunderstanding and simplification, and of caricature and straw-man arguments. But Mounk does his best to document the prevalence of these themes. </p>
<p>Setting out core concepts might also prove useful in allowing progressives to clarify where they depart from his characterisation.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/do-universal-values-exist-a-philosopher-says-yes-and-takes-aim-at-identity-politics-but-not-all-of-his-arguments-are-convincing-208014">Do universal values exist? A philosopher says yes, and takes aim at identity politics – but not all of his arguments are convincing</a>
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<h2>The ‘Black’ classroom</h2>
<p>Many people are committed to the identity synthesis. Many of them wield considerable power. How did this happen?</p>
<p>Mounk explains how the identity synthesis grew out of scholarly theories taught at many US universities. Graduates of these elite institutions have carried their social justice commitments – and the determination to stand up for them – into the corporations, media, NGOs and public service organisations that hired them. The result has been the spread of a wide array of identity-focused practices and policies. </p>
<p>Mounk details many of these practices. His opening anecdote tells the story of a shocked Black mother in Atlanta being told her son must be placed in the “Black” classroom. He sees the incident as part of a wider trend, whereby “educators who believe themselves to be fighting for racial justice are separating children from each other on the basis of their skin color”. Universalism, he argues, is being rejected in the name of “progressive separatism”.</p>
<p>As an ethicist, to me the most shocking of Mounk’s stories was the <a href="https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/22193679/who-should-get-covid-19-vaccine-first-debate-explained">decision-making</a> at the US Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). A public health expert from the <a href="https://www.usa.gov/agencies/centers-for-disease-control-and-prevention">Centers for Disease Control</a> (CDC) argued <em>against</em> the life-saving policy of giving the elderly priority access to COVID vaccines. In the US, the aged are more likely to be white, meaning such prioritisation would disproportionately benefit whites.</p>
<p>The “ethics” of the policy protecting the elderly was therefore given the lowest score. This was despite the fact that the alternative (and initially selected) policy would not only cost more lives overall, but more <em>Black</em> lives. As the CDC knew, elderly Black people were vastly more likely to die from COVID than young Black essential workers.</p>
<p>These accounts provoke in the reader (or in this reader, at least) a sense that <em>this can’t be right. How could things possibly have come to this</em>?</p>
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<h2>Genuine insights</h2>
<p>Mounk provides a detailed and powerful critique of the identity synthesis. Yet his analysis is not entirely unsympathetic. A recurring theme is the way the identity synthesis stemmed from scholarly research that has delivered genuine insights. </p>
<p>For example, Harvard law professor <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/09/20/the-man-behind-critical-race-theory">Derrick Bell</a> was right to realise that legally enforced school integration had done little to improve Black educational outcomes. And he was insightful in drawing attention to structural racism. Institutions could continue and even exacerbate the effects of historical injustice, despite people’s good intentions. </p>
<p>Similarly, the legal scholar <a href="https://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/kimberle-w-crenshaw">Kimberlé Crenshaw</a>, who coined the term “critical race theory”, was correct to observe that Black women could be subject to discrimination that neither white women or Black men endured. She termed this phenomenon “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersectionality">intersectionality</a>”.</p>
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<p>These important findings were, however, taken in worrying directions. Rather than concluding there were two types of racism – direct, intentional racism and structural racism – the latter became understood as the <em>only</em> type of racism. This implausibly tied racism exclusively to oppressive structures, making it impossible to make sense of (for example) hate crimes performed on one marginalised minority by another marginalised minority.</p>
<p>Rather than acknowledging that the law is a necessary but insufficient tool for social change, the conclusion drawn was that laws preferentially treating certain identity groups were necessary. Likewise, the concept of “intersectionality” has been used to justify many questionable claims, far removed from its initial meaning.</p>
<h2>Division and difference</h2>
<p>Mounk argues the identity synthesis is a “trap” because telling people to continually focus on their ascriptive identities prioritises difference, and unequal treatment only exacerbates divisions. </p>
<p>This is especially so when dominant groups, such as white people in the US, are encouraged to see themselves <em>as</em> white. Well established <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/great-experiment-9781526630155/">social science</a> <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/the-righteous-mind-9780141039169">findings</a> suggest humans are powerfully motivated to favour their own in-group, and there is a chilling capacity for cruelty against designated out-groups.</p>
<p>Recent controversies in parts of the US – especially in elite universities – in the wake of the Hamas attack of October 7 seem to back up Mounk’s concern. </p>
<p>Many people harbour grave and longstanding moral concerns about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/10/07/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-maps.html">Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians</a>. There is clear reason to fear the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-calling-the-israel-hamas-war-a-graveyard-of-children-in-an-adult-conflict-the-young-are-suffering-most-216633">harrowing civilian cost</a> of the Israeli response. </p>
<p>Basic ethics says there can never be an excuse to <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/pro-palestinian-protester-in-nyc-seen-brandishing-swastika-crowds-chant-f-the-jews-outside-sydney-opera-house/ar-AA1hVKDo">celebrate</a> an atrocity, to <a href="https://nypost.com/2023/10/10/blm-chicago-under-fire-for-pro-palestine-post-featuring-paragliding-terrorist/">applaud</a> the deliberate brutal murder of women and children, or to <a href="https://www.thefp.com/p/why-my-generation-hates-jews">blame</a> an entire ethnic or religious group for a government’s policy. Yet university students and professors have done all these things, invoking the language of postcolonialism and oppression. </p>
<p>Many Jewish progressives were shocked at universities’ reactions to the atrocity. University officials <a href="https://www.thefp.com/p/the-day-the-delusions-died-konstantin-kisin">failed to strongly condemn</a> the Hamas attack. An open letter from a coalition of student groups <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/us/harvard-students-israel-hamas-doxxing.html">claimed Israel was entirely responsible</a> for the violence, while other student organisations used a <a href="https://nypost.com/2023/10/10/california-student-groups-face-backlash-over-pro-palestine-rally-poster-featuring-paraglider/">picture of the Hamas paraglider</a> on their posters. One entry on the Sidechat app for Harvard read “<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-anguished-fallout-from-a-pro-palestinian-letter-at-harvard">LET EM COOK</a>” next to a Palestinian flag emoji.</p>
<p>Mounk’s analysis suggests these outcomes are all too predictable. According to the identity synthesis, everything must be viewed through the lens of oppressive structures. Once it is decided that Palestinian people are the <a href="https://www.thefp.com/p/john-mcwhorter-barbarism-recast-as-progress">oppressed party</a>, and Israelis the oppressors, even the deliberate murder of Jewish children can seem legitimate. Here, as elsewhere, ideology and in-group dynamics can so easily trump humanity.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-joanna-bourke-the-nsw-arts-minister-and-the-unruly-contradictions-of-cancel-culture-189377">Friday essay: Joanna Bourke, the NSW arts minister, and the unruly contradictions of cancel culture</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Insight without ideology?</h2>
<p>Mounk does not explore the possibility of an identity-focused progressivism that is detached from scholarly theories and the ideological commitments underpinning them. </p>
<p>This detachment would not be an odd phenomenon. After all, most classical liberals would, like Mounk, endorse John Stuart Mill’s arguments for free speech in <a href="https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf">On Liberty</a>, but would not necessarily subscribe to Mill’s <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill-moral-political/#PerEle">particular version</a> of <a href="https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm">utilitarianism</a>, which focuses on maximising “higher” forms of happiness. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=781&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=781&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=781&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=982&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=982&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=982&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Public Domain</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In a similar way, a progressive reader of Mounk’s work might be alarmed at some of the stated themes of the identity synthesis. For example, they might accept scientific facts regarding climate change and vaccine efficacy. They might retain their commitments to universal values such as human rights. They might care about democracy and the rule of law. </p>
<p>Yet they might still harbour enough concern for marginalised groups to support some identity-based practices, such as censoring offensive speech, calling out “white privilege” and cultural appropriation, and demanding race-sensitive policies.</p>
<p>Mounk does not explicitly address this possibility. But his arguments suggest the progressive view sketched above – which wants to be both humanist and identity-focused – is incoherent. He shows that, without the rationales of the identity synthesis, cancellation, censorship, moral intolerance and cynicism about liberal-democratic institutions are far harder to justify ethically. </p>
<p>It is inconsistent to have science when it suits and to decry it as oppressive when it doesn’t. It is hypocritical to uphold democracy, free speech and the rule of law against right-wing authoritarianism and simultaneously believe these principles are merely tools of white supremacy. </p>
<p>Worse still, it is self-defeating to embrace the divisiveness of identity separatism and to somehow expect the age-old problems of in-group tribalism not to emerge – with predictably devastating impacts on vulnerable minorities.</p>
<p>Mounk builds a powerful case that the identity synthesis is indeed a trap. Genuine insights, important realisations and progressive values lure the sympathetic. But too often those insights are developed in extreme and implausible ways, ultimately betraying the very goals they claim to value.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hugh Breakey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is social justice advanced by focusing on people’s different identities? Or is this worldview ultimately a trap?Hugh Breakey, Deputy Director, Institute for Ethics, Governance & Law. President, Australian Association for Professional & Applied Ethics., Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2080142023-08-23T20:09:47Z2023-08-23T20:09:47ZDo universal values exist? A philosopher says yes, and takes aim at identity politics – but not all of his arguments are convincing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543163/original/file-20230817-19-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C3%2C2287%2C1450&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ravi Sharma/Unsplash</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-au/Moral+Progress+in+Dark+Times%3A+Universal+Values+for+the+21st+Century-p-9781509549498">Moral Progress in Dark Times</a>, German philosopher Markus Gabriel makes a case for a new enlightenment based on universal values, arguing that the democratic law-based state is a valuable vehicle for encouraging this “moral progress”.</p>
<p>The aims of his book are admirable, but Gabriel is only partially successful in explaining what the new enlightenment might entail and how it might be implemented in democratic societies. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Review: Moral Progress in Dark Times: Universal Values for the 21st Century – Markus Gabriel (Wiley)</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>Moral realism</h2>
<p>Gabriel is a <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/">moral realist</a>. He asserts the objectivity of moral facts, their universality, and their essential knowability by human beings – although he concedes that in “dark times” they can be obscured by ideology, propaganda, psychology and manipulation.</p>
<p>According to Gabriel, moral facts are not justified by God, human reason or evolution, but “by themselves”. They are, however, “partially concealed” and require insight to be discovered in opaque circumstances.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542038/original/file-20230809-24377-pfevys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542038/original/file-20230809-24377-pfevys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542038/original/file-20230809-24377-pfevys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542038/original/file-20230809-24377-pfevys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542038/original/file-20230809-24377-pfevys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542038/original/file-20230809-24377-pfevys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542038/original/file-20230809-24377-pfevys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542038/original/file-20230809-24377-pfevys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption"></span>
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<p>Moral realism is conventionally opposed to <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/">ethical relativism</a>, which proposes that morality depends on the standards, norms and practices of particular times and places. Gabriel thus condemns “the incoherent, erroneous, and politically dangerous idea that morality is at best the expression of one’s belonging to some kind of social group or other”. </p>
<p>He maintains there are guiding moral principles for human behaviour that extend across cultures, and that their validity does not depend on their being recognised by a majority of people.</p>
<p>Evolutionary psychology is a key element of Gabriel’s argument, although later in his book he distances himself from theories that assume morality is extrapolated from instinctive behaviour. He links evolutionary psychology to our capacity to discern moral truths, without supposing an evolutionary explanation for those truths. </p>
<p>According to Gabriel, it is through socialisation that “one senses normativity”. Empathy can occur when people are together. “There is a bond of humanity that can be empirically observed,” he argues. </p>
<p>Although we are error-prone when making decisions in complex situations, the very existence of relatively stable human societies is proof that humans cannot be wholly evil. We must know and be able to do some things that are morally right. </p>
<h2>Day of Judgement</h2>
<p>Apart from wanting to avoid cultural or historical relativism, the position Gabriel wishes to adopt remains elusive. His account of moral realism is never adequately explained. The new moral enlightenment he proposes is overly optimistic and, in any attempt to implement, potentially problematic.</p>
<p>His book tries to do too much and address too many issues. It has a discursive, rambling, anecdotal style devoid of rigorous argument; its key ideas are scattered throughout. The book is replete with real-life examples that are international in scope but weighted heavily toward German society. </p>
<p>All of this leaves the reader guessing about what exactly these positions amount to and how they are supported. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543164/original/file-20230817-7412-8ve27q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543164/original/file-20230817-7412-8ve27q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543164/original/file-20230817-7412-8ve27q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=857&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543164/original/file-20230817-7412-8ve27q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=857&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543164/original/file-20230817-7412-8ve27q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=857&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543164/original/file-20230817-7412-8ve27q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1076&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543164/original/file-20230817-7412-8ve27q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1076&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543164/original/file-20230817-7412-8ve27q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1076&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Last Judgment – Joos van Cleve (c.1540)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Public domain</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The only argument Gabriel offers – which he calls a “new argument” – rests on a thought experiment termed the “Day of Judgement”. He asks us to consider what our reaction would be if we were facing God’s judgement and God commended us for all the bad things we have done and condemned us for the good. We would find this judgement incomprehensible. A god whose judgements had no continuity with our own would not be God, but a “terrible demon”. </p>
<p>This thought experiment does not, of course, assume the actual existence of God, but Gabriel suggests the scenario demonstrates that “moral facts are largely obvious; we can basically recognise, albeit often with some difficulty, what we should do”. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/english-philosophers-thought-they-had-sloughed-off-the-dead-weight-of-history-but-history-suggests-otherwise-205400">English philosophers thought they had sloughed off the dead weight of history, but history suggests otherwise</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Populism and identity politics</h2>
<p>Gabriel does make some worthwhile and insightful points. Of particular interest is his rejection of identity politics. </p>
<p>Modern social sciences, Gabriel believes, have taught us that notions of what is “normal” and “typical” are “impermissible simplifications of the social reality”. Yet because everyday life runs more smoothly on the basis of established expectations, we take familiar patterns of life as nature itself. </p>
<p>Gabriel maintains there is “no normality that applies to the whole of society”. And yet “society” is invoked by various parties, associations and activists groups to justify courses of action. </p>
<p>This is how Gabriel defines “populism”. Populism is when an assumed normality is associated with “the people”. The problem with populism is that it produces “an imaginary, distorted picture of normality”. </p>
<p>Gabriel does not associate “populism” only with the right. Left-wing attempts to give voice to minorities simply because they are minorities are deemed “equally incoherent”. Both left and right are condemned for engaging in “relativist manoeuvres in the culture war of identities”.</p>
<p>Identity politics, argues Gabriel, establishes patterns between “identities” and the distribution of material and symbolic resources. These patterns are then used to formulate political guidelines. </p>
<p>But this is the wrong way to go, because such “identities” do not really exist. Identity politics stands on the “propagation of stereotypes”. It attributes individual behaviours to identification with particular social groups. </p>
<p>As distortions of reality, stereotypes are unsuitable vehicles for negotiating conflicts. They are also dangerous, as they encourage prejudices against certain groups of people, who are deprived of resources as a result. The near-religious fervour of identity politics, Gabriel suggests, arises from stereotypical social identities becoming metaphysically “charged”.</p>
<p>Moral progress thus aims to dismantle the system of stereotypes. Identity politics must be overcome in the light of universal moral values. While it is good that people resist oppressive discrimination, those struggles should not aim at the preservation of identities. The goal is to overcome such identities, in so far as they dehumanise people. </p>
<p>“No one who fights against unjust oppression,” Gabriel argues, “should have the goal of unjustly oppressing the oppressors.” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543166/original/file-20230817-15-indv5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543166/original/file-20230817-15-indv5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543166/original/file-20230817-15-indv5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543166/original/file-20230817-15-indv5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543166/original/file-20230817-15-indv5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543166/original/file-20230817-15-indv5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543166/original/file-20230817-15-indv5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543166/original/file-20230817-15-indv5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">According to philosopher Markus Gabriel, we must dismantle stereotypes. Image: an 18th-century Dutch engraving of the peoples of the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Difference politics</h2>
<p>Against identity politics, Gabriel advocates “difference politics”. This recognises “that every person is the other (of another)”. It proposes that being different is a symmetrical relationship. Difference politics is not simply a matter of tolerating diverse identities; it requires us to understand difference as a feature of our common humanity.</p>
<p>But recognising difference is only a necessary first step towards tolerance and leniency. It remains insufficient because it retains the idea of identities.</p>
<p>This is where Gabriel’s position runs into practical difficulties.</p>
<p>Gabriel argues that if race has no biological basis, which it doesn’t, then it cannot be grounds for assigning special rights. The goal of moral progress is to achieve “colour-blindness”. Thus groups discriminated against in the past on the basis of some non-existent “race” are not morally entitled to perpetuate racism to balance the past damage. </p>
<p>While there is a role in society for commemorative cultures, we should not “turn racist nonsense into cultural stereotypes and perpetuate these under the banner of de facto non-existent cultures”. According to Gabriel, we all need to train ourselves through moral reflection to become aware of our own stereotypes and try to prevent them affecting our actions. </p>
<p>But while race does not exist, racism does. There is a “lived experience” of discrimination undergone by some groups. It is not clear how Gabriel’s argument might help us negotiate the practical political issues and entrenched material disadvantages that are the result of this historical legacy. </p>
<p>Similarly, on the economic front, Gabriel does not reject capitalism per se, although he does deem a “social market economy” superior to “morally reprehensible” US-style neoliberalism, in which the extreme wealth of the few is not used by the state to free others “from poverty, hardship and despair”. </p>
<p>The goal, he argues, should be to develop a system of just and sustainable distribution. </p>
<p>Yet Gabriel does not agree that a disadvantaged majority is entitled to set up systems that disadvantage a wealthier minority. He asserts it is wrong to attack elites if you aim to be a universalist. It would be contradictory for a universalist to attack them, he asserts, because the attackers would in fact be advocating the “statistical pseudo-universalism” of their own group identity.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-could-a-reinterpreted-marxism-have-solutions-to-our-unprecedented-environmental-crisis-199963">Friday essay: could a reinterpreted Marxism have solutions to our unprecedented environmental crisis?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Spirit</h2>
<p>What, then, is Gabriel’s universalism based on? </p>
<p>Biology and evolutionary psychology show humans are adaptable animals sharing a “survival form”. A baby of one ethnicity raised in a culture of another ethnicity will automatically learn the language and culture of their social context. This is taken to falsify racial stereotypes. </p>
<p>But humans are not only animals, according to Gabriel. What separates humans from other animals, including sentient ones, is “spirit”. For Gabriel, this amounts to an ability to exercise a kind of self-reflective free agency, wherever we happen to be situated geographically, historically, culturally and socially. </p>
<p>Our individual self-perceptions are connected to our “existential identity”. Certain things are “sacred” to us as individuals. We have an “existential, inalienable need for the meaning of life”. </p>
<p>These factors comprise what Gabriel calls an “anthropological constant”. What unites humans is that we are by nature self-definers. Different groups of people thus have far more in common than identity politics would suggest.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-socrates-know-nothing-wisdom-can-teach-a-polarized-america-202696">What Socrates' 'know nothing' wisdom can teach a polarized America</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543165/original/file-20230817-13660-84peqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543165/original/file-20230817-13660-84peqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543165/original/file-20230817-13660-84peqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543165/original/file-20230817-13660-84peqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543165/original/file-20230817-13660-84peqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543165/original/file-20230817-13660-84peqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1303&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543165/original/file-20230817-13660-84peqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1303&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543165/original/file-20230817-13660-84peqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1303&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Last Judgment – Wassily Kandinsky (1910)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Public domain</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Darkening of spirit</h2>
<p>The internet, Gabriel believes, has massively contributed to “darkening our spirit”. Moral progress is threatened by “digital distortions”, which undermine our knowledge of truth, facts, knowledge and ethics. Internet dependence can lead us to treat self-evident moral truths, such as respect for others, as null and void. </p>
<p>The response to the coronavirus pandemic crisis, however, represents moral progress. The vast majority of people accepted lockdowns for moral reasons: they believed lockdowns would protect the vulnerable and support hospital systems.</p>
<p>The pandemic also made the structures of society more visible. It brought home the importance of interpersonal contact and exposed the underfunding of health providers. </p>
<p>Gabriel believes post-pandemic progress will require societies not to revert to “compulsive consumption and the associated burnout capitalism”. He criticises neoliberalism for assuming that progress can be achieved by leaving as many decisions as possible to the market. The problems associated with free-market economics – massive social and economic inequalities, exploitative global supply chains, ecological damage – demonstrate the need for “a reordering of the social market economy”. </p>
<p>A humane market economy is deemed possible, on the grounds that people are capable of making decisions guided by mutuality and fairness. </p>
<p>But a moral form of economic management can only succeed, according to Gabriel, if it is guided by ethical principles that take into account insights from science, art, religion and life experiences. Reordering must be done in the name of “sustainability”. The goal is to advance a good and sustainable life, without declining prosperity. Prosperity itself must be redefined so it no longer amounts to the accumulation of money and goods. </p>
<p>The coronavirus responses showed that democracies are, in fact, capable of making economically difficult decisions on moral grounds. Post-pandemic, the task is for nation states to jointly develop universal values and forms of cooperation not simply based on market logic. </p>
<p>Gabriel ends his book with his vision of a new enlightenment. He appeals to ordinary people to bring about change, first in their own behaviour, then by voting with their feet. “We must all vaccinate ourselves together,” he argues, “against the spiritual poison that divides us into national cultures, races, age groups and classes and incites competition between us.”</p>
<p>On this point, his passion is unmistakable: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We must recognize that the infection chains of global capitalism, which destroys our nature and causes moral stupidity in the citizens of the nation states, turning us into full-time tourists and consumers, will ultimately kill far more people than all viruses combined.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denise Gamble does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Philosopher Markus Gabriel argues that a new enlightenment based on moral facts is necessary to overcome the darkness of our times.Denise Gamble, Visiting Research Fellow, School of Humanities, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2055862023-06-26T13:56:58Z2023-06-26T13:56:58ZMilitary interventions have failed to end DRC’s conflict – what’s gone wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533552/original/file-20230622-29-mfl86e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers on patrol in Goma, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, in November 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guerchom Ndebo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For 30 years, the Democratic Republic of Congo has suffered from communal violence, armed conflict and insecurity. Diverse actors have tried to stop it but conflict has intensified, particularly in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika. Regular armed forces and non-state armed groups have been involved in the violence. </p>
<p>In mid-April 2023, it was reported that there were <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/04/18/actualite/securite/est-de-la-rdc-266-groupes-armes-locaux-et-etrangers-recenses-par-le-p">252 local and 14 foreign armed groups</a> in the eastern Congolese provinces. </p>
<p>The Congolese state’s inability to guarantee security has created fertile ground for armed groups to emerge. Aside from violence, they engage in various illicit activities, like exploiting mineral riches. </p>
<p>Weakened by decades of kleptocratic rule and armed uprisings, the Congolese state relies on support from regional and global actors. The United Nations peacekeeping and stabilisation mission has been in the DRC for more than 20 years. In February 2023, the UN force (MONUSCO) had <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">16,316</a> men and women from 62 countries operating as intervention troops, staff officers and mission experts.</p>
<p>The East African Community completed <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2720-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-20th-extra-ordinary-summit-of-the-east-african-community-heads-of-state">its deployment of troops</a> in <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eacrf-troops-now-fully-deployed-in-drc-4191138">April 2023</a>. No sooner had they settled down than the DRC asked the Southern African Development Community to “<a href="https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2023-05/EN%20-%20Communique%20of%20the%20SADC%20Organ%20Troika%20Summit%20Plus%20SADC%20Troika%20and%20TCC%2008%20May%202023%20Final_0.pdf#page=5">restore peace and security in eastern DRC</a>”.</p>
<p>More than a decade of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Felix-Ndahinda">research</a> on identity politics, indigeneity, human rights, transitional justice and peacebuilding in the region informs my view on its prospects for peace. This revolving door of military interventions raises questions about whether domestic and international actors involved genuinely examine past failures and draw useful lessons from them. Contemporary crises often reemerge from unresolved prior crises. This is the case here. </p>
<p>I argue that the DRC is being shortsighted, driven by populist pressures and political calculations. It’s making the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23 rebel movement</a> the single convenient target of its actions, instead of resolving its deeper and broader problems. </p>
<h2>Disrupting the peacekeepers</h2>
<p>Many of the issues that the DRC government and other regional actors have undertaken to address are well known and documented. The UN <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=Democratic+Republic+of+the+Congo&field_paregion_tid%5B%5D=15">Peacemaker</a> database lists 19 agreements concluded since the Sirte Agreement of 1999. This preceded negotiations to end the second Congo war in 2003. </p>
<p>The DRC has committed to guarantee security for different communities, to resolve identity, citizenship and land issues, to oversee the return of refugees, and to a demobilisation process that addresses the concerns of belligerents. </p>
<p>The East African Community force’s <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process">mandate</a> was formulated with this in mind. The force would, in collaboration with Congolese military and administrative authorities, stabilise and secure the peace in DRC. The <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2720-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-20th-extra-ordinary-summit-of-the-east-african-community-heads-of-state">initial deployment</a> of Kenyan, Burundian, Ugandan and South Sudanese troops was projected to grow to between 6,500 and 12,000 soldiers in eastern DRC.</p>
<p>The idea was to reduce tensions by enforcing a ceasefire and a withdrawal of armed groups to initial positions. Local armed groups would be demobilised in an orderly way through a political process involving talks with Congolese authorities. Finally, foreign armed groups would be repatriated.</p>
<p>What came to be known as the <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process">Nairobi process</a> framed the resolution of the M23 crisis within a broader goal of peacemaking. All domestic and regional armed groups active in eastern DRC would be disarmed and the emphasis was on dialogue. </p>
<p>Before long, it went wrong. DR Congo president Felix Tshisekedi bluntly <a href="https://twitter.com/StanysBujakera/status/1656066871488020480">criticised</a> the East African Community force and suggested that it might be asked to leave. </p>
<p>It seems that a comprehensive peace strategy is not an immediate priority for Congolese authorities. They have an eye on elections. These are planned for December 2023, and the current president is seeking a second term. Tshisekedi’s administration has turned the fight against the M23 and its alleged backers into a tool of <a href="https://twitter.com/PatrickMuyaya/status/1600082788895449090">popular mobilisation</a> in support of its policies. Therefore, military and diplomatic success on this front remains its priority.</p>
<h2>Towards sustainable peace</h2>
<p>Authorities in the DRC have also <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/un-peacekeepers-expected-to-leave-dr-congo-in-six-months-authorities/">announced</a> that UN peacekeepers in the country would be withdrawn by December 2023. </p>
<p>Congolese authorities have criticised the East African force and the UN mission for their unwillingness to fight the M23. The M23 is seen as representing nothing more than a masked <a href="https://twitter.com/StanysBujakera/status/1572365176770535424">Rwandan</a> (and at times <a href="https://twitter.com/StanysBujakera/status/1545118793801900039">Ugandan</a>) intervention in the DRC, and as such the biggest threat to Congolese territorial integrity. </p>
<p>The DRC’s counter strategy is to recognise some local armed groups as resistant patriots (Wazalendo) to be officially supported in fighting an external aggression. Several public officials are on <a href="https://afrique.lalibre.be/76281/rdc-le-blanchissement-des-groupes-armes-par-les-autorites-congolaise-frustre-le-processus-de-nairobi-et-luand/">record</a> expressing their support for these Mai Mai-Wazalendo fighters. </p>
<p>None of the triggers of the DRC’s recurrent crises can be addressed in this atmosphere. It’s impossible to imagine scenarios where sustainable peace can be achieved without first addressing land rights, equal citizenship claims and inclusive governance institutions catering to the needs of the entire Congolese population. </p>
<p>Enforcement of a comprehensive strategy that addresses belligerence and the disarmament of all armed groups through a combined military and political dialogue strategy, as imagined under the Nairobi process, should be the main priority of any peace initiative. Peace between peoples and countries in the region requires a genuine commitment to addressing all local, regional and international dimensions of the crises in eastern DRC.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A comprehensive strategy does not seem to be an immediate priority for Congolese authorities with an eye on elections.Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Honorary Associate Professor, College of Arts and Social Sciences, University of RwandaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1928332022-11-02T16:33:55Z2022-11-02T16:33:55ZWhy the ideology of the ‘New Right’ is so dangerous<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492547/original/file-20221031-16-h5sd8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C8640%2C5755&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Giorgia Meloni gestures during the handover ceremony with outgoing Prime Minister Mario Draghi at Chigi Palace in Rome in October 2022. Meloni, whose political party with neo-fascist roots secured the most votes in Italy's national election in September, took office as the country's first far-right leader since the end of the Second World War. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andrew Medichini)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/why-the-ideology-of-the--new-right--is-so-dangerous" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The populist radical right has been on the rise for some time, with candidates and parties on the far-right fringe of the political spectrum reaching new heights across the world. </p>
<p>The electoral successes of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/09/how-did-donald-trump-win-analysis">Donald Trump</a> in the United States, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/24/emmanuel-macron-wins-french-presidential-election-say-projected-results">Marine Le Pen</a> in France, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/24/angela-merkel-fourth-term-far-right-afd-third-german-election">Alternative for Germany</a> and, most recently, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/21/giorgia-meloni-tells-italian-president-she-is-ready-to-become-pm-berlusconi-salvini">Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy</a> has put the spotlight on an ideological shift: the so-called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1979139">New Right</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/italys-election-is-a-case-study-in-a-new-phase-for-the-radical-right-92198">Italy's election is a case study in a new phase for the radical right</a>
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<p>It’s a loose network of radical right-wing activists who organize themselves in regional initiatives such as the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276421999446">Alt-Right </a> in the U.S., the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jul/03/as-macron-does-quiet-deals-with-le-pen-the-far-right-has-france-in-its-grip">Nouvelle Droite</a> in France, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2019.1700661">Neue Rechte</a> in Germany and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/feb/22/casapound-italy-mussolini-fascism-mainstream">CasaPound</a> in Italy. </p>
<p>This broad movement is aiming for an ideological renewal of right-wing politics by focusing on cultural identity and the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220600769331">politics of belonging</a>. Such an approach is called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/096394800113349">“metapolitical”</a> since it first attempts to shape how we think about and experience our daily world, playing a long game to change the political structures of our societies. </p>
<h2>Identity politics</h2>
<p>The focus on <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/STEFST-11">identity politics</a> has led to a very <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/01/the-ruthlessly-effective-rebranding-of-europes-new-far-right">successful rebranding</a> of far-right extremism. Proponents of the New Right are less committed than their predecessors to discussing natural superiority, and try to <a href="https://doi.org/10.3817/0393099099">avoid the overt racism</a> of traditional neo-Nazi groups, giving their political views a broader appeal. </p>
<p>They instead push the line that <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/white-supremacy-returned-mainstream-politics/">white people are oppressed in contemporary western societies</a>. They present themselves as “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/13/us/patriot-front-beliefs-history-explainer/index.html">patriotic activists</a>” who are simply concerned with responding to “uncontrolled immigration,” “anti-white discrimination” and the “loss of traditions.”</p>
<p>One of their main enemies <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/globalization">is globalization</a>, against which they insist on a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2011.635688">“right to difference”</a> (including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2021.1920722">Alain de Benoist</a>, one of the founders of France’s New Right movement) for each culture. </p>
<p>They reject the melding of cultures since they believe that cultures are rooted in clearly demarcated and internally uniform social groups. This stems from their key contention that humanity consists of a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310306084">plurality of distinct “ethnocultures.”</a></p>
<p>Ethnocultures are organic communities to which their members belong by birth. The family is frequently presented as the biological source of ethnocultural communities. </p>
<p>The members of a community also ostensibly share a way of life. Their communal life is characterized by specific cultural practices and moral values. A person’s individual identity is thus shaped by the ethnocultural community they belong to, according to these New Right proponents.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A vandalized campaign poster shows a candidate with a Hitler moustache." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A vandalized election campaign poster for the far-right Alternative for Germany party showing the party’s top candidate, Oliver Kirchner, with an Adolf Hitler moustache is seen in Magdeburg, Germany, in June 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Markus Schreiber)</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Passing on traditions</h2>
<p>These proponents often invoke mythical beginnings or supposedly glorious chapters of a community’s past, and emphasize the necessity of historical continuity for its survival.</p>
<p>Cultural traditions therefore must be passed on from generation to generation without significant changes. Fulfilling this task is the common destiny of the members of an ethnocultural community. </p>
<p>New Right advocates focused on identity politics believe that ethnocultures are in competition with each other and their encounters lead to clashes that threaten the collective identity of a community — a ready-made justification for violent conflicts, <a href="https://www.thepostil.com/the-return-of-the-iron-curtain/">including war</a>. The results of these struggles show the supposed inequality of the different cultures. </p>
<p>Their concept of culture readily explains why the New Right is obsessed with migration and regard it as a major threat to their political vision. Consequently, they propagate conspiracy theories, including the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/08/a-deadly-ideology-how-the-great-replacement-theory-went-mainstream">“great replacement” theory</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/white-nationalism-is-a-political-ideology-that-mainstreams-racist-conspiracy-theories-184375">White nationalism is a political ideology that mainstreams racist conspiracy theories</a>
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<p>In this pernicious view, migration is depicted as a plot organized by liberal global elites to replace the native people of western countries with foreigners. The often proclaimed “right to difference” therefore only applies to the relationships between groups. Individual members of a certain group have to conform to its overall character. </p>
<p>This segregationist agenda not only has harmful consequences for migrants, but also for those who are seen as members of an ethnoculture. Treating cultures as uniform can mask important differences between sub-groups within a culture, especially the diverging interests of the group’s elite and its non-elite members. </p>
<p>We saw this exploited in the rhetoric that British people should “<a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/perspective/eu-ref-haughton.aspx">take back control</a>” of the United Kingdom through voting for Brexit. This idea was questionable for a number of reasons, especially the false implication that all members of the group “the British” would be more powerful following Brexit.</p>
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<img alt="Three people hold pro-Brexit signs, two in Santa hats. One side reads Make Britain Great Again." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Pro-Brexit demonstrators hold banners outside Parliament in London in December 2019. (</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Kirsty Wigglesworth)</span></span>
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<h2>Dangerous</h2>
<p>The ideology of the New Right is politically dangerous. It also depicts an <a href="http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/34221">inaccurate picture</a> of how cultural life works. </p>
<p>Cultures neither have clear boundaries nor are they uniform and consistent over time. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1069397118816939">They are flexible and dynamic</a>, in constant interaction with each other.</p>
<p>These intercultural encounters can be opportunities to grow and to increase both self-understanding and an understanding of others. Think about the many formative influences that other cultures have had on Europe, including on Christianity (which comes from the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/how-christianity-spread-around-world-animated-map-2015-7">Middle East</a>) and the numerical system (which <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hindu-Arabic-numerals">comes from India</a>). </p>
<p>We should embrace the diversity of our cultural lives, and reject the New Right’s attempts to further divide us. <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9237638/brazil-election-results-bolsonar-lula/">While recent election results in Brazil</a>, and <a href="https://newsinteractives.cbc.ca/elections/us/2020/results/">in the U.S.</a> two years ago, may be hopeful signs, this is a broader fight about how we interpret the world. </p>
<p>It requires more than election victories to push back against the dangerous ethnocultural framing of social conflicts that’s often embraced by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/02/the-new-austrian-government-will-brand-itself-as-moderate-but-dont-believe-it">mainstream politicians</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, we need convincing counter-narratives that explain the causes of the economic crises we are facing and promote solidarity as a solution to the staggering social inequality that undermines all societies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johannes Steizinger received funding from the European Research Council (Project: The Emergence of Relativism, Grant No: 339382) to conduct his research on far-right ideologies. </span></em></p>The so-called New Right is aiming for an ideological renewal of right-wing politics by focusing on cultural identity and the politics of belonging. Here’s why that’s so ominous.Johannes Steizinger, Associate Professor of Philosophy, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1862442022-08-02T14:05:56Z2022-08-02T14:05:56ZHow Rwanda’s annual genocide commemoration fans the flame of ethnicity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473875/original/file-20220713-9357-jjdkei.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A billboard highlights Rwanda's 100-day commemoration of the 1994 genocide.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thierry Falise/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Each year, Rwandans at home and in the diaspora remember those <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">killed in the 1994 genocide</a>. This is not a single-day event. Kwibuka (“to remember” in the local Kinyarwanda language) consists of 100 days of official commemoration. It’s characterised by explicit acknowledgement and public discussions of ethnic identity.</p>
<p>But there’s a puzzling contradiction of state policy at play during Kwibuka. </p>
<p>In 2003, Rwanda adopted a policy of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/world/a-decade-after-massacres-rwanda-outlaws-ethnicity.html">ethnic non-recognition</a>. There are no Hutus or Tutsis; only Rwandans. The aim is to achieve national homogeneity in a country that was torn apart by ethnic genocide. </p>
<p>The policy is strictly enforced, but relaxes during the 100 days of Kwibuka. </p>
<p>This has led to seemingly opposed practices: legally erasing identity groups because of their link to conflict, contrasted against three months of saturated reminders in the form of public speeches, memorial programming, burials and commemorative signage.</p>
<p>In 2014, 20 years on, the genocide was officially renamed from the Rwandan genocide to “the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi”. This decision was recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12000.doc.htm">2018</a>. </p>
<p>The change marked a distinct shift from an inclusive naming. It also centred Tutsi people as the sole targets of genocidal violence. This, despite Rwanda and the international community historically acknowledging that moderate Hutus were victimised, too. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-rwanda-genocide-commemorations-are-infused-with-political-and-diplomatic-agendas-160283">In Rwanda, genocide commemorations are infused with political and diplomatic agendas</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/constructing-identity-through-commemoration-kwibuka-and-the-rise-of-survivor-nationalism-in-postconflict-rwanda/CFE362C810D66B522D751AC1938DCF59">My research</a> pinpointed four anomalies that were not present during the rest of the year but emerged during Kwibuka:</p>
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<li>a perceived increase in violence towards survivors</li>
<li>an increase in accusations and convictions of genocide ideology and denial</li>
<li>widespread youth involvement in identity rhetoric</li>
<li>a reported increase in prisoner confessions. </li>
</ul>
<p>These anomalies highlight how Kwibuka exacerbates social tensions. My research was done five years ago, but the <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rib-warns-against-genocide-ideology-ahead-kwibuka27">anomalies</a> I observed <a href="https://www.ktpress.rw/2022/04/kwibuka-28-killed-and-dumped-in-river-rubyiro-remembered-for-the-first-time/">persist</a>.</p>
<h2>Studying state-led commemoration</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/CFE362C810D66B522D751AC1938DCF59/S0022278X19000259a.pdf/constructing-identity-through-commemoration-kwibuka-and-the-rise-of-survivor-nationalism-in-post-conflict-rwanda.pdf">my research</a>, I examined the rhetoric coming from the Rwandan state on the 1994 genocide. I also observed nine commemoration events to see how attendees reacted to and spoke about Kwibuka.</p>
<p>I additionally conducted interviews to help me understand the differences between the commemoration period and the rest of the year. </p>
<p>I was curious to follow what effect this sudden shift from ethnic non-recognition to recognition might have on people. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the country’s leading political party, has “<a href="https://advox.globalvoices.org/2020/08/07/the-chilling-tale-of-mass-surveillance-and-spying-in-rwanda/">positioned itself</a> as the only guarantor of peace, security and development”, as Rwandan lawyer Louis Gitinywa writes. </p>
<p>My research shows this message is reinforced through commemoration programming. This commonly emphasises that only the ruling party and current political leadership stand between ordinary Rwandans and a reemergence of genocidal violence. </p>
<p>The ethnic non-recognition policy is linked to Rwandan laws against “genocide ideology” and <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ac5c4302.pdf">“sectarianism”</a>. The government claims that such laws keep Rwandans safe. However, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr47/005/2010/en/">critics</a> point out their chilling effect on legitimate political opposition and dissent. I was at times told that simply asking questions about genocide commemoration and ethnicity could be seen as being at odds with the law.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/commonwealth-leaders-gather-in-rwanda-as-uk-refugee-plan-focuses-attention-on-human-rights-185328">Commonwealth leaders gather in Rwanda as UK refugee plan focuses attention on human rights</a>
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<h2>Anomalies</h2>
<p>I discovered four anomalies that are only present during the commemoration period. </p>
<p>First, there is heightened sensitivity across the country. Survivors told me they were worried about violence against them and their property. This is not baseless. National radio and television stations report threats against survivors throughout Kwibuka. These include their livestock being tortured, property destroyed and bones mailed to memorial sites.</p>
<p>The second anomaly is the emergence of “survivor youth” and their engagement with ethnic rhetoric. Among my interviewees, “survivor” was synonymous with “Tutsi”. </p>
<p>This self-claimed identity held even among young people who have spent most of their lives in a country with an ethnic non-recognition policy. Notably, my youth interviewees identified themselves by ethnicity unprompted, and when asked if they knew any non-Tutsi who would refer to themselves as “survivors”, they all said no or were unsure.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnlg.gov.rw/index.php?id=2">National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide</a> shared data with me on accusations and convictions related to genocide denial and ideology during Kwibuka. It showed that many of these cases involved people born well after 1994. This happened despite the state’s insistence that the next generation is free of the old biases or violent inclinations that drove the genocide.</p>
<p>The third anomaly is the increase in accusations and convictions of genocide ideology, denial and sectarianism. My interview data was consistent with <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/call-unity-kwibuka27-activities-draw-closer">statistics</a> from the Rwanda Investigation Board showing that such accusations and convictions are concentrated during Kwibuka. It’s not clear why, but heightened sensitivity and the fear rhetoric promoted by the Rwandan Patriotic Front during the 100 days may be among the reasons.</p>
<p>Finally, Kwibuka always marks an increase in confessions from imprisoned génocidaires. This relates directly to an <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/genocide-over-18000-victims-exhumed-kigali-mass-graves">increase</a> in bodies of genocide victims being discovered. Confessions are made each year, even though authorities say incentives for prisoners who share information ended some time ago.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/ateliers/2019-v14-n2-ateliers05462/1071136ar/">argued</a> that this continual discovery of bodies merits further attention. Exhumation and reburial can lead to <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/publications/promoting-reconciliation-through-exhuming-and-identifying-victims-1994-rwandan-0/">closure</a> for families and communities, and is an important part of commemoration. However, a claim that prisoners confess because they are “moved by the spirit of Kwibuka” is at odds with documented <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/10/we-will-force-you-confess/torture-and-unlawful-military-detention-rwanda">coercion and human rights violations</a> in Rwandan prisons.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwandans-discuss-how-best-to-commemorate-genocide-94452">Rwandans discuss how best to commemorate genocide</a>
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<h2>Memory without exclusion</h2>
<p>My research in no way aims to promote covering up history. But there is a difference between teaching history and stoking historical social divisions. The exclusionary “us versus them” form of nationalism that emerges during Kwibuka may threaten Rwanda’s precarious peace. </p>
<p>One solution may lie in the fact that the commemoration period is highly mutable. It adapts and changes every year. This means it’s possible to have more inclusive events that favour a <a href="https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/agaciro-vernacular-memory-and-the-politics-of-memory-in-postgenocide-rwanda(2e914106-f314-4a45-a6f2-7927a68d2be6).html">balance</a> between official narratives and ordinary people’s memories.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186244/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gretchen Baldwin received funding for this research from the Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity (AC4) in 2017. She is currently a Researcher with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. </span></em></p>In 2003, Rwanda adopted a policy of ethnic non-recognition. However, for 100 days in a year, it centres ethnicity in the country’s psyche.Gretchen Baldwin, Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1875922022-07-31T06:48:58Z2022-07-31T06:48:58ZKenya’s election red flags in five essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476268/original/file-20220727-13-bgetb7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyans take to the streets in the capital, Nairobi, to call for peaceful August 2022 elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Luis Tato/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya is no stranger to highly contested elections. Several of the country’s past polls have seen high levels of conflict. The violence that broke out after the 2007 elections stands out in particular. It caused more than a thousand fatalities and led to a national crisis. This was eventually resolved through a coalition government and constitutional reform.</p>
<p>Patronage politics, a history of violent conflict and high-stakes elections increase the risks of poll violence, which often erupts along identity lines. </p>
<p>Still, Kenyans continue to turn up to vote. Elections are valued as a moment when voters can reject those they believe have failed – or will fail – to protect and promote their national, community and individual interests. In the last general election in 2017, <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/siEABKREDq.pdf#page=3">78% of registered voters</a> turned up to vote. In 2013, the voter turnout stood at 86%. </p>
<p>But this does not mean that voters don’t have concerns about the process. </p>
<h2>Fears of rigging</h2>
<p>As Kenyans approach the 9 August 2022 poll, many lack confidence in the electoral process.</p>
<p>Deviations from electoral rules – from vote buying to election disruptions – persist. Research has explored how citizens justify their participation in electoral malpractice. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fears-of-election-rigging-may-fuel-further-abuses-in-kenya-democracy-could-be-the-loser-176113">Fears of election rigging may fuel further abuses in Kenya: democracy could be the loser</a>
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<h2>Elites vs the rule of law</h2>
<p>A failed attempt to <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyan-judges-stop-presidents-reforms-as-attempt-to-dismember-the-constitution-166587">overhaul Kenya’s constitution</a> less than a year before elections illustrates the struggles between the rule of law and the crude tribal instincts of Kenya’s political elite.</p>
<p>The current pact between President Uhuru Kenyatta and presidential candidate Raila Odinga is a form of power sharing. However, it further divided society and fragmented elites by isolating Kenyatta’s deputy, William Ruto, and his supporters. </p>
<p>This situation provides evidence of the personality politics that has often driven Kenya to the precipice since independence. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-next-election-is-in-view-the-struggle-between-elites-and-rule-of-law-is-intensifying-167378">Kenya's next election is in view: the struggle between elites and rule of law is intensifying</a>
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<h2>Predictors of conflict</h2>
<p>Political leaders and aspirants have used group-based grievances to mobilise voters and, at times, violent militias.</p>
<p>Land tenure has remained closely connected to communal identity in Kenya. Regions where land conflicts are prominent – and politicians are mobilising based on these conflicts – are areas to watch for signs of violence. </p>
<p>Research has highlighted other key drivers of communal conflict that could inform efforts to predict and prevent election violence. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/drivers-of-electoral-violence-in-kenya-red-flags-to-watch-out-for-180703">Drivers of electoral violence in Kenya: red flags to watch out for</a>
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<h2>Gendered violence</h2>
<p>In the run-up to the August 2022 election, aggressive language has featured on the campaign trail. It has perpetuated patriarchal attitudes, which stand in the way of women’s participation in and engagement with politics.</p>
<p>Women face a host of obstacles, from inadequate political support from their parties to a lack of financial resources and gender-based violence. Kenya’s electoral process has often highlighted the fact that male politicians don’t shy away from aggressive confrontations in campaigns against a woman.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-election-sexist-language-shows-that-patriarchy-refuses-to-give-way-178066">Kenya election: sexist language shows that patriarchy refuses to give way</a>
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<h2>Judiciary’s role</h2>
<p>Kenya’s judiciary, however, has shown its capacity to help ensure that the elections are free, fair and credible. The country’s courts have exhibited a significant level of maturity and independence in recent years. </p>
<p>An efficient, equitable and accessible justice system is the foundation of a democracy based on the rule of law.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyas-judiciary-can-break-the-cycle-of-electoral-violence-182710">How Kenya's judiciary can break the cycle of electoral violence</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187592/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Patronage politics, a history of violent conflict and high-stakes elections increase the risks of poll violence in Kenya.Kagure Gacheche, Commissioning Editor, East AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1810132022-05-11T12:28:47Z2022-05-11T12:28:47ZUse of ‘white privilege’ makes online discussions more polarized and less constructive<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461587/original/file-20220505-13-amfjfh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=459%2C60%2C2635%2C2000&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protester holds a sign reading 'White Privilege Is The Problem' at a rally against policy brutality and racial injustice in New York on Sept. 5, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/participant-holding-a-white-privilege-is-the-problem-sign-news-photo/1228367837?adppopup=true">Erik McGregor/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A wide variety of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/17/realestate/what-is-redlining.html">historical</a>, <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2021/january/wealth-gaps-white-black-hispanic-families-2019">economic</a> and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/02/explaining-annette-lareau-or-why-parenting-style-ensures-inequality/253156/">cultural</a> forces combine to allow a larger percentage of whites to climb up the socioeconomic ladder than Blacks and Hispanics. </p>
<p>Some people call the combined effects of these forces “<a href="https://nationalseedproject.org/Key-SEED-Texts/white-privilege-unpacking-the-invisible-knapsack">white privilege</a>.” Though these words are commonly used, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0267048">research</a> by <a href="https://www.si.umich.edu/people/lia-bozarth">Lia Bozarth</a> and <a href="https://www.si.umich.edu/people/christopher-quarles">me</a> has found that use of “white privilege” on social media can actually decrease support for racially progressive policies. </p>
<p>We found that the term can increase online political polarization and lead to lower quality conversations on social media. In particular, the term drives some whites who would otherwise support efforts toward racial equality away from online conversations.</p>
<h2>Effects of using ‘white privilege’</h2>
<p>In the past decade there has been a push on college campuses to re-title buildings named after <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/learning/should-we-rename-schools-named-for-historical-figures-with-ties-to-racism-sexism-or-slavery.html">people involved with</a> slavery or discrimination. </p>
<p>We used the issue of renaming these buildings as a way to examine how language affects online conversations.</p>
<p>We recruited 924 U.S. residents from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for our experiment. Half of the research participants were given a social media post containing the following question: “Should colleges rename buildings that were named after people who actively supported racial inequality?” </p>
<p>The other half saw an identical question, except the term “racial inequality” was swapped with “white privilege.” We randomly chose which half received each question. </p>
<p>This random assignment allowed us to show causality – and gave us confidence that the choice of language created the effects we saw. </p>
<p>We asked the participants to respond to their question, and also measured how likely they were to engage with the post in the first place. We then focused on the set of people who were likely to engage with that post online. </p>
<p>The term “white privilege” had two effects.</p>
<p>The first was to decrease the quality of conversation among both whites and non-whites. There were more comments that insulted people, attacked the question itself or simply made no sense. </p>
<p>The second effect was to make the set of responses less supportive of renaming the buildings – and more polarized. </p>
<p>The people who were asked about racial inequality were, on average, very supportive. Those who thought it was a good idea to rename college buildings outnumbered opponents more than 2-to-1. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="In this illustration, a laptop user is shown typing different sorts of mean-spirited comments." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461649/original/file-20220505-23-c8lfir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461649/original/file-20220505-23-c8lfir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461649/original/file-20220505-23-c8lfir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461649/original/file-20220505-23-c8lfir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461649/original/file-20220505-23-c8lfir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461649/original/file-20220505-23-c8lfir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461649/original/file-20220505-23-c8lfir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A laptop user is shown in this illustration typing a variety of mean-spirited comments.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/cyber-bullying-concept-people-using-notebook-royalty-free-image/1170461091?adppopup=true">asiandelight/iStock via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>But the group that was asked about “white privilege” was strongly divided, with just as many opponents as supporters. This shift was caused completely by a change in some whites.</p>
<p>Use of “white privilege” caused 50% of whites who would have been supportive to become ambivalent or hostile. We don’t know which half would have changed their minds. But, due to the experimental design, we can be confident they were there.</p>
<p>In addition, we found that many of the supportive whites just chose to avoid the conversation altogether. While they might have expressed their support for stopping racial inequality, they wouldn’t join a conversation about white privilege.</p>
<p>Because the terms “white privilege” and “racial inequality” have different meanings, we performed an extra analysis to understand what caused these effects. </p>
<p>What we found was consistent with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0146167207303016">other research</a> suggesting a process called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motivated_reasoning">motivated reasoning</a>. </p>
<p>In this experiment, the different meanings of the terms “white privilege” and “racial inequality” didn’t seem to directly affect how people reasoned about renaming buildings. </p>
<p>Instead, we found evidence that the difference in language first affected whether they were supportive of renaming buildings. Only after deciding on an opinion did they find reasons to support it. </p>
<h2>Polarization or misunderstanding?</h2>
<p>Our results offer insight into <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/spiral-of-silence">one mechanism</a> underlying the polarization and vitriol we see on social media.</p>
<p>Online users who feel strongly about a topic will post about it using strong language, such as “white privilege.” </p>
<p>This language will get people riled up toward one side or another. And the people who might be good mediators – such as supportive whites in our study – are less likely to engage. </p>
<p>The people who remain are then more likely to share extreme views. They create online posts, and the cycle continues. </p>
<p>The result is social media dominated by outrage and extremism, rather than respectful discourse.</p>
<p>Some people I’ve talked to have been genuinely surprised by these results. Others thought they were obvious and not even worth researching. </p>
<p>This is notable, because it suggests that some of the conflict we see online is not caused by malice, but by a lack of understanding.</p>
<h2>Social identity dynamics</h2>
<p>In our study, the term “white privilege” changed the behavior of some whites. But the psychology behind this change is common to all humans. In fact, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.69.5.797">psychological research</a> that first examined this effect focused on Blacks’ performance in school.</p>
<p>The term “white privilege” taps into a deep-seated tendency as old as humanity. </p>
<p>As social creatures, humans are naturally inclined to split the world into “us” and “them.” This <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29869-6_1">can lead</a> to thinking of others – and sometimes ourselves – as a stereotypical member of our group. </p>
<p>Further, we are members of multiple groups simultaneously, according to our age, profession, race, politics and family roles. At any given moment, social cues affect which group is the most forefront in our minds. </p>
<p>This natural tendency to view ourselves through a <a href="https://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html">social identity</a> allowed Germanic tribes who had been warring with each other to <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/roman-empire-battle-of-teutoburg-forest-2360864">band together to drive back invading Romans</a>. </p>
<p>It enabled whites to <a href="https://www.ferris.edu/HTMLS/news/jimcrow/what.htm">view Blacks as inferior</a> throughout much of American history and <a href="https://www.history.com/news/brown-v-board-of-education-doll-experiment">led some Blacks to agree with that view</a>. </p>
<p>It <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/20-years-911-islamophobia-continues-haunt-muslims/story?id=79732049">played a role in anti-Muslim sentiment</a> after 9/11. </p>
<p>It’s involved in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034">political partisanship</a> and in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2502">protests against authoritarian regimes</a>.</p>
<p>And it’s one reason we feel more comfortable in a group of people like ourselves.</p>
<p>Phrases like “white privilege” play on this reasoning by implying that all whites are similar and have the same negative traits.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="In this illustration, a man is seen with his ears covered while another man is screaming through a megaphone." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461650/original/file-20220505-13-8rl0bi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461650/original/file-20220505-13-8rl0bi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461650/original/file-20220505-13-8rl0bi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461650/original/file-20220505-13-8rl0bi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461650/original/file-20220505-13-8rl0bi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461650/original/file-20220505-13-8rl0bi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461650/original/file-20220505-13-8rl0bi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A businessman is seen in this illustration covering his ears and ignoring the loud noise.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/businessman-covering-ears-with-fingers-royalty-free-illustration/1190328894?adppopup=true">sesame/DigitalVision Vectors via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Unsurprisingly, the accusation – even subtly implied – that everyone in your race is “bad” can create strong reactions. Some people will just <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2019.101263">disregard the speaker entirely</a>.</p>
<p>But many others will feel intense <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F13684302211018741">visceral</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00130.x">emotions</a> such as <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/media/north-carolina-dad-viral-crt-education">anger</a>, which can lead us to be more confrontational, or <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/style/white-guilt-privilege.html">shame</a>, which can cause people to withdraw. </p>
<p>When faced with the term “white privilege,” it’s not surprising that some whites will look less favorably on the speaker’s ideas. And it makes sense that the whites who are more sympathetic will tend to withdraw. </p>
<p>Of course this reaction, which psychologists call “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-identity-theory/Identity-threat">social identity threat</a>,” is not unique to white people.</p>
<p>At some point in their lives, everyone feels unwelcome or devalued because of a group they identify as part of, whether that’s being Black, white, Hispanic, young, old, female, male, Christian or atheist.</p>
<h2>A sticky problem</h2>
<p>Surveys show that an overwhelming majority of Americans <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/2011/03/11/the-elusive-90-solution/">think that everyone should get an equal shot at success</a>, and numerous studies have shown that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/27/upshot/make-your-own-mobility-animation.html">race is involved in economic opportunity and social mobility</a>. While the data is clear that racial inequality persists in America, its causes are complex and have so far proven intractable.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, social media users spend their time attacking each other, giving the impression of an <a href="https://news.yale.edu/2021/08/13/likes-and-shares-teach-people-express-more-outrage-online">outraged</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034">polarized</a> citizenry.</p>
<p>Effective communication about personal topics like race can be challenging. The careful use of inclusive language is one way to gather public support – or at least promote meaningful discussion. </p>
<p>Words matter, and our research demonstrates how phrases like “white privilege” affect the way controversial issues on race are perceived.</p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140K">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Quarles does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In this era of racial reckoning, words such as ‘white privilege’ have played a significant role in defining social problems plaguing America. But those words also have a downside.Christopher Quarles, PhD Candidate in Information, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1712392021-11-04T13:38:31Z2021-11-04T13:38:31ZSouth African voters are disillusioned. But they haven’t found an alternative to the ANC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/430245/original/file-20211104-13-1quzfr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa on the campaign trail.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gianluigi Guercia/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s historic <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-and-results/Municipal-Elections-2021">2021 local elections</a> have highlighted a deep hole in its party politics – the governing party is in decline, but most voters will not vote for its rivals.</p>
<p>The elections are historic because they are the first since democracy’s advent in 1994 in which the governing <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">African National Congress (ANC)</a> has won <a href="https://results.elections.org.za/dashboards/lge/">less than 50%</a> of the national vote. This is less earth-shaking than it sounds – the ANC vote has been in decline for over a decade and in the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Downloadable-results/Detailed-results-data--2016-Municipal-Elections/">local elections of 2016</a> it lost control of several large cities. The election of Cyril Ramaphosa as president stemmed the tide in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-saves-the-ancs-bacon-but-this-could-be-its-last-chance-116903">2019 national ballot</a> but the municipal elections show this was only a temporary reprieve.</p>
<p>But, while it was not a bolt from the blue, this milestone has been greeted with breathless excitement by media as the beginning of a new era of vigorous party competition. Since the ANC is deeply unpopular among the urban middle class from which reporters and pundits are drawn, no one seemed to notice that it might also usher in a period of political instability.</p>
<p>While the ANC is losing support, no other party is gaining anything like the numbers needed to assemble a national government. Even in its worst election showing ever, the ANC has <a href="https://results.elections.org.za/dashboards/lge/">more than double the vote</a> of the next biggest party, the Democratic Alliance. The DA has twice the support of the third biggest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which won only one in ten votes.</p>
<p>If this result is repeated in the next national elections, in 2024, the only way the ANC could be relegated to the opposition benches is if just about all other parties agreed to govern together. Since the opposition, inevitably, comprises parties of various political hues, a governing alliance between them would be just about impossible – and would not last very long if it was, by some miracle, established. The DA has, for example, insisted it <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/politics/2021-10-24-listen--well-work-with-any-party-but-the-eff-says-das-steenhuisen/">will not govern with the EFF</a> and this alone takes a united non-ANC national government off the table.</p>
<h2>Understanding voters’ choices</h2>
<p>Voters’ choices are chiefly shaped by identities – citizens support the party which they feel speaks for people like them. In most democracies, the idea of the voter as a human computer, calculating what they can get from each party, is a fiction: in very old democracies – such as the United Kingdom and the United States – voters have supported parties for decades regardless of what they offered them.</p>
<p>In South Africa, this is particularly strong. The ANC has represented the majority identity and, for many voters, to support another party is to change their identity. And so, its disaffected voters have tended not to shift to another party but to opt out of voting.</p>
<p>The ANC’s local election setback has been – accurately – laid at the door of a lower than usual voter turnout. The percentage poll dropped significantly compared to 2016 – from 57% to 48% <a href="https://elections.sabc.co.za/elections/2021-lge-news-flashes/csir-predicts-48-voter-turnout-for-2021-local-government-elections/">according to projections</a> by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. But in the suburbs, where opposition voters tend to live, the drop was small. In low-income townships, where ANC voters tend to live, it was sharp.</p>
<p>Lower turnout was not a statement by all voters – it was a message from ANC supporters.</p>
<h2>Unnecessary hand-wringing</h2>
<p>South Africans who shape the political debate enjoy hand-wringing and so the lower turnout has been widely labelled as a sign that citizens reject democracy. Not only are they staying away from polls but there has been little enthusiasm recently for registering to vote. A voter registration weekend in <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/electoral-commission-18-19-september-registration-weekend-20-sep-2021-0000">mid-September</a> failed to register anything like the expected numbers and one analyst pointed out that fewer voters are registered now than in 2019.</p>
<p>But a 48% turnout in local elections is high by <a href="https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-voter-turnout-municipal-elections.html">international standards</a> and COVID-19 may have made voter registration more difficult.</p>
<p>South African electoral democracy has defied all the dire predictions about its durability – faced with its worst result ever, the ANC reacts not by trying to abridge democracy to cling onto power: it holds discussions on how to win back voter trust.</p>
<p>Voting is also only one aspect of democracy. South Africa remains, as it has been since 1994, a country in which around one third express themselves vigorously and the rest are reduced to spectators – not by law but by the prejudices and power of the politically engaged minority. This has not changed. Increasing numbers are unhappy with party politics not because they think it does not work, but because they are disillusioned with the ANC but have no alternative.</p>
<p>This reality is likely to make the brave new world created by the end of the ANC majority messy and difficult. The new reality is not one in which another party will form stable governments in municipalities where the ANC has slipped below 50%. The gap between the ANC and its rivals will make it one of <a href="https://theconversation.com/marriages-of-inconvenience-the-fraught-politics-of-coalitions-in-south-africa-167517">unwieldy coalitions of convenience</a> in which small parties are interested less in representing voters than in looking after themselves.</p>
<p>In some places, it may mean no elected government at all because parties cannot agree. In that case, administrators may be appointed to run cities: ironically, the era of greater party competition could be one in which municipalities are run by appointed officials.</p>
<p>How might this change?</p>
<h2>Possibilities</h2>
<p>One possibility is that the ANC will reconnect with its voters and win stable majorities. But this is unlikely. It has tried to deal with its key problem – that economic realities prompt many of its politicians to look after themselves <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africas-ramaphosa-testify-inquiry-into-zuma-era-corruption-2021-04-28/">rather than voters</a> – but its leadership is <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-fails-to-show-leadership-as-difficult-and-decisive-year-looms-129762">finding this difficult</a>. Precisely because it is a symptom of stubborn realities, it may not find change any easier now. </p>
<p>Around the world, once parties which have dominated elections for decades start sliding, it is very difficult to reverse the decline, at least until they lose a national election.</p>
<p>Current opposition parties are highly unlikely to become credible challengers for the majority vote. The Democratic Alliance also lost support in this election – it <a href="https://results.elections.org.za/dashboards/lge/">dropped around six percentage points </a> compared to 2016. The EFF improved by around two percentage points, as it does at all elections. But at its current rate of growth, it will be 60 years before it can achieve a majority. If neither can win much larger chunks of the vote when the ANC is in deep trouble, we can assume that they will continue to overestimate their own importance.</p>
<p>So, South African politics will remain in limbo until a new party emerges which can convince people who voted ANC to support it rather than staying at home. How that might come about is a topic South Africans need to begin debating.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171239/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turnout was low. But not equally so across the board. Patterns show it was not a statement by all voters – it was a message from ANC supporters.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1563752021-03-11T18:03:06Z2021-03-11T18:03:06ZFriday essay: is this the end of translation?<p>In 399 CE, <a href="http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ach/article/view/52436/28063">Faxian</a> — a monk in China’s Jin Dynasty — went on a pilgrimage to the Indian subcontinent to collect Buddhist scriptures. Returning after 13 years, he spent the rest of his life translating those texts, profoundly altering Chinese worldviews and changing the face of <a href="http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/travel_records.pdf">Asian and world history</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388679/original/file-20210310-13-8z9vbs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Illustration: four monks look up at an ancient Indian palace." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388679/original/file-20210310-13-8z9vbs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388679/original/file-20210310-13-8z9vbs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=924&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388679/original/file-20210310-13-8z9vbs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=924&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388679/original/file-20210310-13-8z9vbs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=924&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388679/original/file-20210310-13-8z9vbs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1161&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388679/original/file-20210310-13-8z9vbs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1161&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388679/original/file-20210310-13-8z9vbs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1161&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Faxian illustrated as visiting the Palace of Asoka in 407 CE, in modern-day Patna, India, in the 19th century English book series, Story of the Nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://archive.org/details/hutchinsonsstory00londuoft">archive.org</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After Faxian, hundreds of Chinese monks made similar journeys, leading not only to the spread of Buddhism along the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/journey-to-the-west-the-buddhist-reimagination-of-china/">Nirvana Route</a>, but also opening up roads to medicine men, merchants and missionaries.</p>
<p>Along with the two other great translation movements — <a href="https://archive.org/details/greekthoughtarab00guta">Graeco-Arabic</a> in the Umayyad and Abbasid periods (2nd-4th and 8th-10th century) and <a href="https://associationforiranianstudies.org/content/indo-persian-translation-movement-multi-faceted-phenomenon-cultural-transmission-and-adaptat">Indo-Persian</a> (13th-19th centuries) — these events were major attempts to translate knowledge <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1482661">across linguistic boundaries in world history</a>. </p>
<p>Transcending barriers of language and space, acts of translation touched and transformed every aspect of life: from arts and crafts, to beliefs and customs, to society and politics.</p>
<p>Going by the latest casualty in the heated — but necessary — debates around representation in our creative and cultural arenas, none of this would be possible today. </p>
<p>Last month, Marieke Lucas Rijneveld, the youngest writer ever to win the International Booker Prize for <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/49374086-the-discomfort-of-evening">The Discomfort of Evening</a> (with translator Michele Hutchison), was chosen to translate 22-year-old American poet laureate Amanda Gorman’s forthcoming collection, <a href="https://www.townandcountrymag.com/society/politics/a35279603/amanda-gorman-inauguration-poem-the-hill-we-climb-transcript/">The Hill We Climb</a>, for Dutch publisher Meulenhoff. </p>
<p>Gorman selected Rijneveld herself. But amid backlash that a white prose writer was chosen to translate the work of an unapologetically Black, spoken word poet, Rijneveld <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2021/mar/01/amanda-gorman-white-translator-quits-marieke-lucas-rijneveld">resigned</a> saying, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I understand the people who feel hurt by Meulenhoff’s choice to ask me […] I had happily devoted myself to translating Amanda’s work, seeing it as the greatest task to keep her strength, tone and style. However, I realise that I am in a position to think and feel that way, where many are not.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This week, meanwhile, the poem’s Catalan translator Victor Obiols <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2021/mar/10/not-suitable-catalan-translator-for-amanda-gorman-poem-removed?CMP=twt_books_b-gdnbooks">told AFP he had been removed from the job</a> by Barcelona publisher Univers. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>They did not question my abilities, but they were looking for a different profile, which had to be a woman, young, activist and preferably black.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>We live in a world rife with controversies around <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/29/cultural-appropriation-racial-oppression-exploitation-colonialism">cultural appropriation</a> and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/religion/why-national-identity-matters/10559382">identity politics</a>. The power differentials created by the twin forces of colonialism and capitalism are being interrogated in every realm today.</p>
<p>It was only a matter of time before these burning issues ignited the art of translation. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/LZ055ilIiN4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Usually invisible and taken-for-granted, acts of translation take place around us all the time. But in the field of literary translation, questions of authorial voice and speaking position matter.</p>
<p>Marginalised creative practitioners and their growing audiences assume importance in a global publishing regime controlled by a dominant minority wielding majority power over issues of representation. </p>
<p>So it is fitting that some have drawn attention to the myriad spoken word artists eminently qualified to undertake translation in the Netherlands. And Dutch <a href="https://www.volkskrant.nl/columns-opinie/opinie-een-witte-vertaler-voor-poezie-van-amanda-gorman-onbegrijpelijk%7Ebf128ae4/?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2F">agents, publishers, editors, translators and reviewers</a> could certainly broaden their horizons and embrace diversity. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, if humans only translated the familiar, how would we ever have an inkling of the astonishing world out there that is not familiar? </p>
<p>The task of literary translation entails grappling with profound difference, in terms of language, imagination, context, traditions, worldviews. </p>
<p>None of this would enter our quotidian consciousness but for the translators who step into uncharted waters because they have fallen in love with another tongue, another world. </p>
<h2>Translation is resistance</h2>
<p>Translators ferry across the meaning, materiality, metaphysics and all the magic that may be unknown in the mediums and conventions of their own tongue. The pull of the strange, the foreign, and the alien are necessary for acts of translation.</p>
<p>It is this essential element of unknowingness that animates the translator’s curiosity and challenges her intellectual mettle and ethical responsibility. Even when translators hail from — or belong to — the same culture as the original author, the art relies on the oppositional traction of difference. </p>
<p>Through opposition and abrasion, a creative translation allows for new meaning and nuance to emerge.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.asymptotejournal.com/blog/2018/06/21/in-conversation-naoki-sakai/#:%7E:text=Translation%20is%20an%20instance%20in,our%20own%20foreigner%20or%20foreignness.">Noaki Sakai</a>, a Japanese historian and translator at Cornell University, writes about the historical complexity of this process. The practices of translation, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0263276406063778">he says,</a> are “always complicit with the building, transforming and disrupting of power differences.”</p>
<h2>Translation is domination</h2>
<p>Translation has, however, been a tool for domination in colonisation. <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/who-was-la-malinche/">La Malinche</a>, for instance, acted as an intermediary and interpreter for the conquistador, Hernán Cortés, in the 16th century Spanish conquest of the Aztec Empire. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388682/original/file-20210310-13-1a30u0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four Aztec men, a Spanish man, and an Aztec woman." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388682/original/file-20210310-13-1a30u0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388682/original/file-20210310-13-1a30u0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388682/original/file-20210310-13-1a30u0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388682/original/file-20210310-13-1a30u0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388682/original/file-20210310-13-1a30u0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388682/original/file-20210310-13-1a30u0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388682/original/file-20210310-13-1a30u0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this drawing by an unnamed Tlaxcalan artist c. 1550, La Malinche (far right) is acting as translator between Hernán Cortés and Moctezuma II, the ninth ruler of the Aztec Empire.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://bancroft.berkeley.edu/Exhibits/nativeamericans/lg25_1.html">Bancroft Library, UC Berkley</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-03-11/patyegarang-and-how-she-preserved-the-gadigal-language/12022646">Patyegarang</a> was Australia’s first teacher of Aboriginal language, to early colonist, William Dawes, and crucial for the survival of the Gamaraigal language in Eora country. At 15, and as an <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/archived/booksandarts/bangarra-dance-theatre-tell-a-sydney-story-with-patyegarang/5499910">initiated woman</a>, she was Dawes’ intellectual equal, learning English from him and negotiating a relationship of mutual translation while holding on to her own cultural legacy.</p>
<p>In each of these cases, European imperialists learnt how to survive the lands they were conquering through the processes of translation. Moreover, they used the same languages to fabricate the story of their own superior Western civilisation, at the cost of Indigenous cultures. </p>
<p>As translation theorist Tejaswini Niranjana <a href="https://www.academia.edu/2999921/Translation_Colonialism_and_Rise_of_English">explains</a>, translation:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>shapes, and takes shape within, the asymmetrical relations of power that operate under colonialism. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Translation is not a neutral activity. It functions in a complex set of socio-political relations, where parties have vested interests in the production, dissemination and reception of stories and texts.</p>
<p>Academics Sabine Fenton and Paul Moon have written about the deliberate mis-translation of the Treaty of Waitangi, a strategic example of colonial omissions and selections that achieved “<a href="http://www.jps.auckland.ac.nz/document//Volume_111_2002/Volume_111%2C_No._1/Bound_into_a_fateful_union%3A_Henry_Williams%26apos%3B_translation_of_the_Treaty_Of_Waitangi_into_Maori_in_February_1840%2C_by_Paul_Moon_and_Sabine_Fenton%2C_p_51-64/p1">the cession of Maori sovereignty to the Crown</a>.” </p>
<p>One egregious interpolation was the replacement of the word <em>mana</em> (sovereignty) with <em>kawanatanga</em> (government), which misled and induced many Maori chiefs to sign the treaty. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-significance-of-the-treaty-of-waitangi-110982">Explainer: the significance of the Treaty of Waitangi</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In situations of conflict and war — and the displacements that result from them — translation again becomes a weapon privileging the powerful, as seen in the impenetrable bureaucratic paperwork, in the dominant language, governing asylum and refugee seeker decisions.</p>
<p>In this charged context, the case of Gorman and Rijneveld becomes a lightning rod for addressing historical disempowerment and injustices. </p>
<h2>Translation is diplomatic</h2>
<p>In the absence of a level playing field for writers to have their voices heard in the global publishing market, there does need to be historical awareness and post-colonial sensitivity. </p>
<p>To Rijneveld’s credit, this sensitivity has been demonstrated. After stepping down as Gorman’s translator, they <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2021/mar/06/everything-inhabitable-a-poem-by-marieke-lucas-rijneveld">composed a poem</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>never lost that resistance, that primal jostling with sorrow and joy,</p>
<p>or given in to pulpit preaching, to the Word that says what is</p>
<p>right or wrong, never been too lazy to stand up, to face</p>
<p>up to all the bullies and fight pigeonholing with your fists</p>
<p>raised, against those riots of not-knowing inside your head</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Still, while representation is the moral imperative of the 21st century, it is my modest proposal that in the realm of literary translation, the pull of the unknown and the unfamiliar is one of the most important truisms: Rijneveld’s “riots of not-knowing.” </p>
<p>Already the world is losing a language every fortnight; as many as <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/04/15/dying_languages_scientists_fret_as_one_disappears_every_14_days.html">half of the world’s 7000 languages</a> are expected to be extinct by the end of this century. Yet it has often been argued that <a href="https://www.geographyrealm.com/linguistic-diversity/">linguistic diversity is an indicator of genetic diversity</a>, the latter being critical to the survival of the species. </p>
<p>If humans only translate what is known within their own four walls, or what is familiar to them within the boundaries of their own imaginations, something essential is lost both to translation — and to the profligate tongues that proliferate our humanity.</p>
<h2>Translation is activism</h2>
<p>We do not live in a post-racial world. We do not live in a borderless world — as brought to the fore powerfully by the COVID-19 pandemic. For translators in transnational times, it is of the essence that we break down ethno-linguistic borders, accepting the challenge of the confronting. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.monash.edu/arts/monash-indigenous-studies/literary-commons/literary-commons-participants">my own work</a>, I have collaborated on <a href="http://cordite.org.au/essays/chakraborty-maccarter/">translations of</a> Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander, and tribal & Dalit Indian poets. This has necessarily involved the hard work of understanding historical incommensurabilities. </p>
<p>Yes, structural inequalities mount by the day in the face of capitalism, which is a faithful handmaiden to the ongoing machinations of colonialism. Translators do not live in a vacuum. We are not immune to the forces of structural racism. </p>
<p>But why is it that Rijneveld had to renounce the commission as an individual? Why does this recent story become about individual actions, rather than the entrenched patterns of operation of publishing houses like Meulenhoff?</p>
<p>To achieve equity, transformation must be structural — it cannot fall on the shoulders of one translator alone, making them a fall guy for the business of books as usual.</p>
<p>The directors and CEOs of dominant global (read: Western) publishing companies are predominantly white. Which begs the familiar question: what if editorial boards reflected the multiplicity of society across the axes of class, gender, race, sexuality and ability? </p>
<p>Imagine the scenario if even one of Australia’s mainstream publishing houses was led by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/diversity-the-stella-count-and-the-whiteness-of-australian-publishing-69976">non-white</a> head and/or board? </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/diversity-the-stella-count-and-the-whiteness-of-australian-publishing-69976">Diversity, the Stella Count and the whiteness of Australian publishing</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It is precisely the duty of heads of publishing houses, literary and review magazines and cultural institutions, to invite a teeming world of translators to take charge of what needs to be done. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388671/original/file-20210310-21-c2dhos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Oil painting. A giant unwieldy tower rises towards heaven." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388671/original/file-20210310-21-c2dhos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388671/original/file-20210310-21-c2dhos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388671/original/file-20210310-21-c2dhos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388671/original/file-20210310-21-c2dhos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388671/original/file-20210310-21-c2dhos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388671/original/file-20210310-21-c2dhos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388671/original/file-20210310-21-c2dhos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The biblical story of the Tower of Babel, painted here by Pieter Bruegel the Elder in 1563, tells of how all of humanity once spoke one language and tried to build a tower to Heaven, before God acted to make the people unable to understand each other, and unable to collaborate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kunsthistorisches Museum/Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Still, a translator must attend to the demands of integrity and imagination as much as the demands of history and society. She must throw herself into the challenging task of being in another time and place, of rubbing against the grain of her own aims and assumptions.</p>
<p>Only in imagining such a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tower_of_Babel">Babelian</a> world of difference can a truly radical set of possibilities become alive.</p>
<p>This is not to argue that translators who come from similar backgrounds will not be able to engage in the task of translation in ways that wrestle with the creative resistance entailed in such a task. But the field must remain open to whoever is called to the task.</p>
<p>Literary translation is often a matter of happy accidents and passionate engagements. Han Kang’s <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/25489025-the-vegetarian">The Vegetarian</a> (2007) became a runaway success in the United Kingdom and United States in 2016, when Deborah Smith, who had been learning Korean for only six years, embarked on the task.</p>
<p>There have been <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/han-kang-and-the-complexity-of-translation">critiques of her translation</a>, but representation is not the issue. Part of the beauty of translation is that texts can be critiqued, and translated again and again.</p>
<p>Translation lore is enriched continually by examples of re-translations, such as the ten translations into English of Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina alone, or the two of Orhan Pamuk’s The Black Book. </p>
<p>The act and the art of translation requires the permission to transcend borders, the permission to make mistakes, and the permission to be repeated, by anyone who feels the tempestuous tug, and the clarion call, of the unfamiliar. </p>
<p>To rein in such liberty through categories and compartments that imprison our creativity is a disservice to the human imagination. </p>
<p>So let a thousand translations bloom: that would be a start and not an end to translation as we know it now.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Correction: this article originally said 7,000 languages are expected to be extinct by the end of this century. It is up to half of the world’s 7,000 languages.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mridula Nath Chakraborty does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If humans only translate what it is familiar to them, something essential is lost. The art of translation requires the permission to transcend borders and make mistakes.Mridula Nath Chakraborty, Monash Intercultural Lab and National Convenor of the Asian Australian Studies Research Network, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1485242020-11-05T19:07:14Z2020-11-05T19:07:14ZFriday essay: a new front in the culture wars, Cynical Theories takes unfair aim at the humanities<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367383/original/file-20201104-13-81a4a1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1262%2C3050%2C3315&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Liam Edwards/Unsplash</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2017, when a biology professor in a state college in Washington protested against a proposed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/evergreen-state-protests.html">day-long ban</a> on the presence of white students on campus, radical students shut the campus down. </p>
<p>The ban was part of a yearly college event designed to give black and minority students and staff a separate space in which to discuss the issues they face. Tensions were high that year. White nationalist groups had <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/evergreen-state-college-another-side_b_598cd293e4b090964295e8fc">invaded the campus</a>, targeting black students and members of staff. </p>
<p>The comments by the professor, Bret Weinstein, and his opposition to the colllege’s equity programs, led to campus protests against him. In protest against the failure of the college administration to quell the students, he resigned from his job. </p>
<p>Helen Pluckrose and James Lindsay, the authors of the new book <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/53052177-cynical-theories">Cynical Theories: How Universities Made Everything about Race, Gender, and Identity – and Why This Harms Everybody</a> regard Weinstein as a victim of an ideology they call Social Justice Theory. </p>
<p>They hold humanities departments responsible for bringing it into existence, and their aim is to explain why it is so pernicious.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-cultural-marxism-really-taking-over-universities-i-crunched-some-numbers-to-find-out-139654">Is 'cultural Marxism' really taking over universities? I crunched some numbers to find out</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Social Justice Theory</h2>
<p>Pluckrose, a US magazine editor who describes herself as an exile from the humanities, and Lindsay, a mathematician and writer on politics and religion, were participants in the controversial 2018 <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/10/15/17951492/grievance-studies-sokal-squared-hoax">Grievance Studies</a> project, which aimed to discredit gender and race studies by submitting hoax articles to academic journals. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366592/original/file-20201030-16-1p2ru10.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Book cover" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366592/original/file-20201030-16-1p2ru10.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366592/original/file-20201030-16-1p2ru10.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=922&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366592/original/file-20201030-16-1p2ru10.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=922&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366592/original/file-20201030-16-1p2ru10.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=922&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366592/original/file-20201030-16-1p2ru10.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366592/original/file-20201030-16-1p2ru10.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366592/original/file-20201030-16-1p2ru10.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By getting articles on bogus topics through the reviewing processes of respected journals and into print, the authors believed they were proving that studies focusing on identity issues are “corrupt” and unscientific. </p>
<p>One <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/arts/academic-journals-hoax.html">hoax article</a>, published in a journal of “feminist geography” looked at “human reactions to rape culture and queer performativity” at dog parks in Portland, Oregon; another purported to be a two-year study involving “thematic analysis of table dialogue” to explore why heterosexual men like to eat at Hooters.</p>
<p>Critics of <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/10/15/17951492/grievance-studies-sokal-squared-hoax">their hoax</a> quickly pointed out there was no scientific evidence to suggest that journals in fields focusing on identity are corrupt — indeed such hoaxes had happened in other areas of study too.</p>
<p>Pluckrose and Lindsay’s book, which grew out of the 2018 project, traces the evolution and growing influence during the late 20th century of theories about how the language we use to think and talk about the world structures our relationships. </p>
<p>The book takes aim at postmodern and post-structuralist thinkers, particularly the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault. The authors blame him for propagating the view that all discourses, including science, create relations of power and subordination. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-ideas-of-foucault-99758">Explainer: the ideas of Foucault</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367592/original/file-20201104-15-pzq6lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367592/original/file-20201104-15-pzq6lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367592/original/file-20201104-15-pzq6lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367592/original/file-20201104-15-pzq6lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367592/original/file-20201104-15-pzq6lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367592/original/file-20201104-15-pzq6lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=927&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367592/original/file-20201104-15-pzq6lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=927&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367592/original/file-20201104-15-pzq6lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=927&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Michel Foucault.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Goodreads</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the new millennium, these <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postmodernism">postmodernist</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deconstruction">deconstructionist</a> projects morphed — according to Pluckrose and Lindsay — into the political weapon they call Social Justice Theory, or simply Theory.</p>
<p>In Cynical Theories, the pair trace the march of Theory as a political ideology through post-colonial studies, queer theory, feminism, and studies of race, disability and body size.</p>
<p>In their view, Theory is a harmful, anti-scientific ideology. It divides society into the oppressed — whose subordinate identities are constructed by hierarchies of power — and the oppressors who, wittingly or not, maintain oppressive relationships through their participation in political and social discourses and institutions. </p>
<h2>Constructed identities</h2>
<p>This Theory is cynical, according to the authors, because it finds oppression everywhere — even in the best intentions of progressive people and their movements of reform. </p>
<p>And it is bad for everyone, including disadvantaged groups, they say, because it gets in the way of an empirical approach to understanding and correcting social ills. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367356/original/file-20201104-13-159d89o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protest sign reads: What lessens one of us lessens all of us" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367356/original/file-20201104-13-159d89o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367356/original/file-20201104-13-159d89o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367356/original/file-20201104-13-159d89o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367356/original/file-20201104-13-159d89o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367356/original/file-20201104-13-159d89o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367356/original/file-20201104-13-159d89o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367356/original/file-20201104-13-159d89o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Social Justice Theory, say Pluckrose and Lindsay, finds oppression everywhere.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Micheile Henderson/Unsplash</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One aim of Pluckrose and Lindsay is to defend the central liberal value of freedom of inquiry against what they regard as an attack on free speech by the rise of identity politics — spawned by Theory. </p>
<p>The application of Theory is also harmful, they say, because it provokes a backlash from people who cannot understand why being white or male puts them into the camp of racists or sexists.</p>
<p>The result, they argue, is a racial politics that becomes increasingly fraught. We hear that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>racism is embedded in culture and that we cannot escape it. We hear that white people are inherently racist. We are told that only white people can be racist. […] Adherents actively search for hidden and overt racial offences until they find them. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>According to the authors, these categories — race, sex, gender, being gay or straight, abled or disabled, fat or of normal body size — are forced onto individuals by the organising power of dominant discourses in politics, social life and science.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367358/original/file-20201104-21-1sjbta5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three people walking in queer socks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367358/original/file-20201104-21-1sjbta5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367358/original/file-20201104-21-1sjbta5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367358/original/file-20201104-21-1sjbta5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367358/original/file-20201104-21-1sjbta5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367358/original/file-20201104-21-1sjbta5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367358/original/file-20201104-21-1sjbta5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367358/original/file-20201104-21-1sjbta5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">According to Social Justice Theory, the authors write, identity determines how a person thinks, acts and what she knows.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Angela Compagnone/Unsplash</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Adherents of Theory, they say, then argue these constructed identities are, nevertheless, real and inescapable experiences. For Theory, identity determines how a person thinks, acts and what she knows. A black person is not an individual who happens to be black. Blackness is central to who he is. Being black makes him into a victim of discourses that privilege whites. </p>
<p>Respecting the standpoint of those who have a subordinate position in hierarchies created by the ways we speak and act — blacks, women, people with minority sexual identities, victims of colonial power, the disabled and the fat — is a key political demand for activists influenced by Theory.</p>
<h2>No truth, only discourse</h2>
<p>Social hierarchies exist. Prejudice can be perpetuated by the unthinking behaviour of individuals. Discriminatory treatment of women and black people is sometimes embedded in institutions. </p>
<p>Pluckrose and Lindsay do not deny this. </p>
<p>They admit legal reforms have not eliminated racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination. They recognise discriminatory treatment and prejudice can blight the lives of victims and undermine their ability to access the opportunities of their society. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367362/original/file-20201104-17-m2wv1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="1963 March on Washington" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367362/original/file-20201104-17-m2wv1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367362/original/file-20201104-17-m2wv1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367362/original/file-20201104-17-m2wv1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367362/original/file-20201104-17-m2wv1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367362/original/file-20201104-17-m2wv1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367362/original/file-20201104-17-m2wv1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367362/original/file-20201104-17-m2wv1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cynical theories acknowledges legal reforms have not stopped discrimination.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Unseen Histories/Unsplash</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What, then, is wrong with what they call Social Justice Theory?</p>
<p>The authors’ main contention is that Theory is relativist and unscientific. For its theorists, there is no objective truth — only the perspectives of people with different identities. And they demand the same respect for the standpoint of an oppressed group as for the views of scientists. </p>
<p>Pluckrose and Lindsay write:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is no exaggeration to observe that Social Justice Theories have created a new religion, a tradition of faith that is actively hostile to reason, falsification, disconfirmation and disagreement of any kind.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Because Theory is a faith, it can insulate itself from criticism, say the authors. </p>
<p>It can dismiss dissenters, like the aforementioned biology professor, as the purveyors of an oppressive discourse. </p>
<h2>‘Cancel culture’</h2>
<p>Is Social Justice Theory as pernicious as Pluckrose and Lindsay want us to believe? Their criticism gets most of its plausibility from applications of Theory that do seem harmful and even absurd.</p>
<p>Disability, for instance, is not merely a <a href="https://www.afdo.org.au/social-model-of-disability/">social construction</a>. Treating it as such may prevent the use of treatments that could make the lives of people better. </p>
<p>When doctors tell obese people they should <a href="https://theconversation.com/type-2-diabetes-losing-even-a-small-amount-of-weight-may-lower-heart-disease-risk-116566">lose weight</a> they are not engaging in an act of oppression, but in healthcare. </p>
<p>Pluckrose and Lindsay are right to point out that campaigns to expose oppressive speech and behaviour can cause unjustified harm to individuals who are called out and “cancelled” for minor misdemeanours, or for stating a view that identity activists deem unacceptable. </p>
<p>The abuse heaped on J.K. Rowling, author of the Harry Potter series, for saying that sexual differences are real and not constructed by discourse is an example. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367594/original/file-20201104-15-1bh0saf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367594/original/file-20201104-15-1bh0saf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367594/original/file-20201104-15-1bh0saf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367594/original/file-20201104-15-1bh0saf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367594/original/file-20201104-15-1bh0saf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367594/original/file-20201104-15-1bh0saf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367594/original/file-20201104-15-1bh0saf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">J.K. Rowling has been abused for her stance.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Christophe Ena/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-cancel-culture-silencing-open-debate-there-are-risks-to-shutting-down-opinions-we-disagree-with-142377">Is cancel culture silencing open debate? There are risks to shutting down opinions we disagree with</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In my opinion, however, the authors overstate both the illiberal tendencies of Theory and its influence on culture. </p>
<p>You do not have to be a relativist to think the opinions and feelings of people from minority groups ought to be respected. You are not anti-science if you think scientific research sometimes ignores the needs and perspectives of women and minorities. </p>
<p>Advocates of Theory aim to make institutions more inclusive and respectful of differences. </p>
<p>Liberals — as advocates of critical engagement — should be open to the possibility that Theory, despite faults, has detected forms of prejudice our society tends to overlook. </p>
<h2>The question of universities</h2>
<p>The most problematic aspect of Pluckrose and Lindsay’s book is the blame it heaps on humanities departments of universities for stirring up a cancel culture and the culture wars. </p>
<p>This gives ammunition to those who want to defund humanities and discourage students from taking humanities courses. </p>
<p>It gives support to the position of the Australian Federal Education Minister, Dan Tehan, who thinks that Australian universities have <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/education-minister-seeks-to-end-university-cancel-culture">succumbed</a> to a left-wing culture that “cancels” conservatives and their opinions. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367363/original/file-20201104-17-4ampgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Students studying viewed from above." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367363/original/file-20201104-17-4ampgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367363/original/file-20201104-17-4ampgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367363/original/file-20201104-17-4ampgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367363/original/file-20201104-17-4ampgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367363/original/file-20201104-17-4ampgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367363/original/file-20201104-17-4ampgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367363/original/file-20201104-17-4ampgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">There is scant evidence of a freedom of speech crisis on Australian campuses.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jordan Encarnacao/Unsplash</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This accusation, also made by conservative groups like the Institute of Public Affairs, is the reason why critics of universities want to force them to sign up to a <a href="https://ipa.org.au/publications-ipa/media-releases/free-speech-crisis-at-australias-universities-confirmed-by-new-research">free speech code</a>.</p>
<p>But according to Glyn Davis, Professor of Political Science at the Australian National University, there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/special-pleading-free-speech-and-australian-universities-108170">no evidence</a> of a meaningful or growing threat to free speech in Australian universities. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/special-pleading-free-speech-and-australian-universities-108170">Special pleading: free speech and Australian universities</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Those who emphasise the dangers of a cancel culture often ignore more serious threats to universities and an open society. The students at the Washington college were reacting to the presence of groups that threatened the safety of black students. </p>
<p>They were responding to a real threat.</p>
<h2>Combatants in the war</h2>
<p>Pluckrose and Lindsay agree that threats to free speech can come from the right as well as the left, but their preoccupation with the latter indicates where they want to put most of the blame. </p>
<p>Cynical Theories is, on one hand, a scholarly book. Pluckrose and Lindsay are well versed in the literature they criticise, as their participation in the Grievance Studies hoax indicates. </p>
<p>Their book provides an in depth discussion of the works they want to criticise. Their critique of what they call Social Justice Theory deserves to be taken seriously. </p>
<p>But by overstating their case and aiming their weapons at humanities and universities they cannot pass themselves off as objective contributors to a search for truth. </p>
<p>They are combatants in the culture wars.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Cynical Theories: How Universities Made Everything about Race, Gender, and Identity – and Why This Harms Everybody, by Helen Pluckrose and James Lindsay, is published by Swift Press.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janna Thompson has done voluntary work for the Green Party.</span></em></p>A new book by participants in the controversial ‘Grievance Studies’ hoax critiques the rise of an ideology they call Social Justice Theory. But the authors overstate their case.Janna Thompson, Professor of Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1469582020-10-01T12:59:20Z2020-10-01T12:59:20ZIdentity politics in a pandemic: why coronavirus unity disappeared and may not return for the second wave<p>The arrival of the coronavirus pandemic transformed the UK political scene in the blink of an eye. At the start of 2020, the national political discourse had been swerving between being dominated by Brexit, the Labour leadership election and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/feb/13/javid-resigned-after-johnson-pushed-him-to-sack-advisers">sudden resignation</a> of Chancellor Sajid Javid. In an instant, this was all overturned and replaced with a sole focus on battling the virus and the disease it causes: COVID-19. Tens of thousands of lives have been lost, whole sectors of the economy frozen or crushed, entire institutions reworked to defeat it.</p>
<p>Any event of this scale and tragedy is going to both draw deeply on a country’s identity and reshape it in some way. Britain’s identity was already <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-people-now-define-themselves-as-leavers-or-remainers-so-what-happens-after-brexit-130634">deeply fractured by the EU referendum of 2016</a> and it would not have been unreasonable to imagine that this divide would make its presence felt in this crisis. Given the difficulties of the years since the referendum, in which expertise was challenged at every turn, we may well have expected a large section of the UK public to distrust the initial health message of the government in March of this year.</p>
<p>Yet this is not what happened. Instead, people rallied together. Over 750,000 volunteered to help <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-52196459">relieve pressure on the NHS</a>, people volunteered to join the UK’s huge RECOVERY programme at a rate <a href="https://www.recoverytrial.net/news/recovery-team-reflect-on-international-clinical-trials-day-2020">faster than any other clinical trial in history</a> and millions came from their homes every Thursday for nine weeks to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/may/28/clap-for-our-carers-the-very-unbritish-ritual-that-united-the-nation">applaud key workers</a>. These events were not unique to Britain – but the way they were related to was. The NHS became perhaps even more central to many people’s notions of Britain than it was before. The BBC also saw <a href="https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/uk-broadcasters-reaching-record-audiences-during-coronavirus-crisis/">record TV</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2020/sounds-q2">radio</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2020/bbc-iplayer-lockdown-viewers">online audiences</a>. These two institutions formed central parts of the national response, with people orientating their reasoning for helping around them – especially the NHS.</p>
<p>This matters because the government was successfully able to appeal not just on the basis of an amorphous healthcare system, but on behalf of an institution with a clear and important role to play in people’s identities. It was not the reason people wanted to help; instead, it was <em>what</em> people wanted to help. This was reinforced by the solemn fact that the virus killed and injured without reference to politics or other signifiers that had been driving division. People saw trusted institutions that resonated with their notions of self-leading and rallied to them.</p>
<h2>What happened to ‘all in this together’?</h2>
<p>However, that was the first phase. The sense of unity has since weakened considerably – and the government’s approval has <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/government-approval">drifted consistently lower all summer</a>. While this shift pre-dates the most prominent story concerning the universality of the rules – the Dominic Cummings affair – we know that this particular scandal reinforced and strengthened that <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-asked-people-if-they-were-breaking-lockdown-rules-before-and-after-the-dominic-cummings-scandal-heres-what-they-told-us-139994">shifting attitude significantly</a>. Once people saw that top officials were breaking their own rules, the game was up. Suddenly, people weren’t being asked to cleave to a trusted institution any more – they felt they were being taken for a ride by a government more interested in itself than in their wellbeing.</p>
<p>The Cummings story is not necessarily the reason these feelings existed, but it served very clearly as an episode that crystallised existing worries or played into doubts – a shorthand for why people felt distrust of the government.</p>
<p>Now there is divergence again. On the one hand, people still identify strongly with the institutions that led the response to the first wave – and will again in the second. They saw how well people came together, and they value that greater sense of community. It resonated well with them, and informed their self-view – it was possible to bring people together, and for them to all act in a common cause. On the other hand, they see a government that considers itself above the rules. Further policy bungling over the summer – such as on <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-level-results-confusion-is-the-result-of-months-of-inertia-and-years-of-policy-144260">A-levels</a> and COVID testing – will have reinforced that scepticism.</p>
<p>The result of this is a public who feel a desire to trust politicians again, to keep the increased community spirit of early lockdown, and to overcome the pandemic to restore normality – but who also feel that the government isn’t in a position to effectively help them do it. And this is before the expected wave of high unemployment, whole economic sectors closing down for perhaps years to come, and the full impact of the winter on the NHS.</p>
<p>The government’s failure to capitalise on the activated parts of people’s identities – the institutions they cleaved to, the desires they express –has already cost it dear. It is not unreasonable to be deeply concerned about the cost for all of us in the months ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146958/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Oliver does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The British public still wants to rally round its institutions but fraying trust makes the job harder as winter approaches.Timothy Oliver, Lecturer in British Politics and Public Policy, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1413352020-06-25T12:18:56Z2020-06-25T12:18:56ZCoronavirus responses highlight how humans are hardwired to dismiss facts that don’t fit their worldview<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343846/original/file-20200624-132961-fwo33u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=165%2C285%2C4547%2C3051&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The more politicized an issue, the harder it is for people to absorb contradictory evidence.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/flanked-by-white-house-coronavirus-response-coordinator-dr-news-photo/1213154746">Drew Angerer/Getty Images News via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Bemoaning uneven individual and state compliance with public health recommendations, top U.S. COVID-19 adviser Anthony Fauci <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/18/politics/anthony-fauci-coronavirus-anti-science-bias/index.html">recently blamed</a> the country’s ineffective pandemic response on an American “anti-science bias.” He called this bias “inconceivable,” because “science is truth.” Fauci compared those discounting the importance of masks and social distancing to “anti-vaxxers” in their “amazing” refusal to listen to science. </p>
<p>It is Fauci’s profession of amazement that amazes me. As well-versed as he is in the science of the coronavirus, he’s overlooking the <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/04/denial-science-chris-mooney/">well-established science</a> of “anti-science bias,” or science denial.</p>
<p>Americans increasingly exist in highly polarized, informationally insulated ideological communities occupying their own <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/11/16/20964281/impeachment-hearings-trump-america-epistemic-crisis">information universes</a>. </p>
<p>Within segments of the political blogosphere, <a href="https://www.desmogblog.com/heartland-institute">global warming</a> is dismissed as either a hoax or so uncertain as to be unworthy of response. Within other geographic or online communities, the science of <a href="https://www.npr.org/tags/399145964/anti-vaccination-movement">vaccine safety</a>, <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/but-not-simpler/why-portland-is-wrong-about-water-fluoridation/">fluoridated drinking water</a> and <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/food/the-plate/2016/05/17/scientists-say-gmo-foods-are-safe-public-skepticism-remains/">genetically modified foods</a> is distorted or ignored. There is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-new-survey-shows-how-republicans-and-democrats-are-responding-differently-138394">marked gap in expressed concern</a> over the coronavirus depending on political party affiliation, apparently based in part on partisan disagreements over factual issues like the <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/06/03/partisan-differences-over-the-pandemic-response-are-growing/ps_2020-06-03_sci-am-trust_00-3/">effectiveness of social distancing</a> or <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/311408/republicans-skeptical-covid-lethality.aspx">the actual COVID-19 death rate</a>.</p>
<p>In theory, resolving factual disputes should be relatively easy: Just present strong evidence, or evidence of a strong expert consensus. This approach succeeds most of the time, when the issue is, say, the atomic weight of hydrogen.</p>
<p>But things don’t work that way when scientific advice presents a picture that threatens someone’s perceived interests or ideological worldview. In practice, it turns out that one’s political, religious or ethnic identity quite effectively predicts one’s willingness to accept expertise on any given politicized issue.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/motivated-reasoning">Motivated reasoning</a>” is what social scientists call the process of deciding what evidence to accept based on the conclusion one prefers. As I explain in my book, “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Truth-About-Denial-Self-Deception-Politics/dp/0190062274">The Truth About Denial</a>,” this very human tendency applies to all kinds of facts about the physical world, economic history and current events.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The same facts will sound different to people depending on what they already believe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Nightclub-Shooting-Florida/4d33732e41f34ce89a416c03d669a0b0/1/0">AP Photo/John Raoux</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Denial doesn’t stem from ignorance</h2>
<p>The interdisciplinary study of this phenomenon has made one thing clear: The failure of various groups to acknowledge the truth about, say, climate change, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/facts-versus-feelings-isnt-the-way-to-think-about-communicating-science-80255">not explained by a lack of information</a> about the scientific consensus on the subject.</p>
<p>Instead, what strongly predicts denial of expertise on many controversial topics is simply one’s political persuasion.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214558393">2015 metastudy</a> showed that ideological polarization over the reality of climate change actually increases with respondents’ knowledge of politics, science and/or energy policy. The chances that a conservative is a climate science denier is <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2008/05/08/a-deeper-partisan-divide-over-global-warming/">significantly higher</a> if he or she is college educated. Conservatives scoring highest on tests for <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2182588">cognitive sophistication</a> or <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2319992">quantitative reasoning skills</a> are most susceptible to motivated reasoning about climate science. </p>
<p>Denialism is not just a problem for conservatives. Studies have found <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2010.511246">liberals are less likely to accept</a> a hypothetical expert consensus on the possibility of safe storage of nuclear waste, or on the effects of concealed-carry gun laws.</p>
<h2>Denial is natural</h2>
<p>The human talent for rationalization is a product of many hundreds of thousands of years of adaptation. Our ancestors evolved in small groups, where <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X10000968">cooperation and persuasion</a> had at least as much to do with reproductive success as holding accurate factual beliefs about the world. Assimilation into one’s tribe required assimilation into the group’s ideological belief system – regardless of whether it was grounded in science or superstition. An instinctive bias in favor of one’s “<a href="https://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html">in-group</a>” and its worldview is deeply ingrained in human psychology. </p>
<p>A human being’s very sense of self <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280701592070">is intimately tied up with</a> his or her identity group’s status and beliefs. Unsurprisingly, then, people respond automatically and defensively to information that threatens the worldview of groups with which they identify. We respond with rationalization and selective assessment of evidence – that is, we engage in “<a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/science-choice/201504/what-is-confirmation-bias">confirmation bias</a>,” giving credit to expert testimony we like while finding reasons to reject the rest.</p>
<p>Unwelcome information can also threaten in other ways. “<a href="https://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2017/06/system-justification">System justification</a>” theorists like psychologist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Zh1vTeMAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">John Jost</a> have shown how situations that represent a perceived threat to established systems trigger inflexible thinking. For example, populations experiencing economic distress or an external threat have often turned to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/tps0000122">authoritarian leaders</a> who <a href="https://medium.com/@bardona/varieties-of-bullsh-t-6fd1cfeb102f?source=friends_link&sk=b6096254e8c3873da683a9dbbc165ac1">promise security and stability</a>.</p>
<p>In ideologically charged situations, one’s prejudices end up affecting one’s factual beliefs. Insofar as you define yourself in terms of your <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2010.511246">cultural affiliations</a>, your attachment to the social or economic status quo, or a combination, information that threatens your belief system – say, about the negative effects of industrial production on the environment – can threaten your sense of identity itself. If trusted political leaders or partisan media are telling you that the COVID-19 crisis is overblown, factual information about a scientific consensus to the contrary can feel like a personal attack. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Everyone sees the world through one partisan lens or another, based on their identity and beliefs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/3d-cinema-glasses-isolated-on-white-62373739">Vladyslav Starozhylov/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Denial is everywhere</h2>
<p>This kind of affect-laden, motivated thinking explains a wide range of examples of an extreme, evidence-resistant rejection of historical fact and scientific consensus.</p>
<p>Have tax cuts been shown to pay for themselves in terms of economic growth? Do communities with high numbers of immigrants have higher rates of violent crime? Did Russia interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election? Predictably, expert opinion regarding such matters is treated by partisan media as though evidence is itself <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2014/04/28/george_will_global_warming_is_socialism_by_the_back_door.html">inherently partisan</a>.</p>
<p>Denialist phenomena are many and varied, but the story behind them is, ultimately, quite simple. Human cognition is inseparable from the unconscious emotional responses that go with it. Under the right conditions, universal human traits like in-group favoritism, existential anxiety and a desire for stability and control combine into a toxic, system-justifying identity politics. </p>
<p>Science denial is notoriously resistant to facts because it isn’t about facts in the first place. Science denial is an expression of identity – usually in the face of perceived threats to the social and economic status quo – and it typically manifests in response to elite messaging.</p>
<p>I’d be very surprised if Anthony Fauci is, in fact, actually unaware of the significant impact of politics on COVID-19 attitudes, or of what signals are being sent by <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2020/04/21/texas-dan-patrick-economy-coronavirus/">Republican state government officials’ statements</a>, <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/pelosi-enforce-new-mask-rule-congress-republicans-committee-hearings.html">partisan mask refusal in Congress</a>, or the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-rally-in-tulsa-a-day-after-juneteenth-awakens-memories-of-1921-racist-massacre-140915">Trump rally in Tulsa</a>. Effective science communication is critically important because of the profound effects partisan messaging can have on public attitudes. Vaccination, resource depletion, climate and COVID-19 are life-and-death matters. To successfully tackle them, we must not ignore what the science tells us about science denial. </p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/humans-are-hardwired-to-dismiss-facts-that-dont-fit-their-worldview-127168">an article originally published</a> on Jan. 31, 2020.</em></p>
<p>[<em>Get our best science, health and technology stories.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-best">Sign up for The Conversation’s science newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141335/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Bardon received funding from the Humility and Conviction in Public Life project at the University of Connecticut.</span></em></p>Whether in situations relating to scientific consensus, economic history or current political events, denialism has its roots in what psychologists call ‘motivated reasoning.’Adrian Bardon, Professor of Philosophy, Wake Forest UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1271682020-01-31T13:00:32Z2020-01-31T13:00:32ZHumans are hardwired to dismiss facts that don’t fit their worldview<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312933/original/file-20200130-41554-166h57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=160%2C25%2C3928%2C2818&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">What's behind this natural tendency?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/three-wise-monkeys-mystic-apes-sacred-281368427">Zhou Eka/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>An updated version of this article was published on June 25, 2020. <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-responses-highlight-how-humans-are-hardwired-to-dismiss-facts-that-dont-fit-their-worldview-141335">Read it here</a>.</em></p>
<p>Something is rotten in the state of American political life. The U.S. (among other nations) is increasingly characterized by highly polarized, informationally insulated ideological communities occupying their own <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/11/16/20964281/impeachment-hearings-trump-america-epistemic-crisis">factual universes</a>. </p>
<p>Within the conservative political blogosphere, <a href="https://www.desmogblog.com/heartland-institute">global warming</a> is either a hoax or so uncertain as to be unworthy of response. Within other geographic or online communities, <a href="https://www.npr.org/tags/399145964/anti-vaccination-movement">vaccines</a>, <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/but-not-simpler/why-portland-is-wrong-about-water-fluoridation/">fluoridated water</a> and <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/food/the-plate/2016/05/17/scientists-say-gmo-foods-are-safe-public-skepticism-remains/">genetically modified foods</a> are known to be dangerous. Right-wing <a href="https://dailycaller.com/">media outlets</a> paint a detailed picture of how Donald Trump is the victim of a fabricated conspiracy.</p>
<p>None of that is correct, though. The reality of human-caused global warming is <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/">settled science</a>. The alleged link between vaccines and autism has been <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/autism.html">debunked</a> as conclusively as anything in the history of epidemiology. It’s easy to find <a href="https://apnews.com/893415ed7acb069604566149630abdb8">authoritative refutations</a> of Donald Trump’s self-exculpatory claims regarding Ukraine and many other issues.</p>
<p>Yet many well-educated people sincerely deny evidence-based conclusions on these matters.</p>
<p>In theory, resolving factual disputes should be relatively easy: Just present evidence of a strong expert consensus. This approach succeeds most of the time, when the issue is, say, the atomic weight of hydrogen.</p>
<p>But things don’t work that way when the scientific consensus presents a picture that threatens someone’s ideological worldview. In practice, it turns out that one’s political, religious or ethnic identity quite effectively predicts one’s willingness to accept expertise on any given politicized issue.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/motivated-reasoning">Motivated reasoning</a>” is what social scientists call the process of deciding what evidence to accept based on the conclusion one prefers. As I explain in my book, “<a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-truth-about-denial-9780190062279?lang=en&cc=us">The Truth About Denial</a>,” this very human tendency applies to all kinds of facts about the physical world, economic history and current events.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The same facts will sound different to people depending on what they already believe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Nightclub-Shooting-Florida/4d33732e41f34ce89a416c03d669a0b0/1/0">AP Photo/John Raoux</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Denial doesn’t stem from ignorance</h2>
<p>The interdisciplinary study of this phenomenon has exploded over just the last six or seven years. One thing has become clear: The failure of various groups to acknowledge the truth about, say, climate change, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/facts-versus-feelings-isnt-the-way-to-think-about-communicating-science-80255">not explained by a lack of information</a> about the scientific consensus on the subject.</p>
<p>Instead, what strongly predicts denial of expertise on many controversial topics is simply one’s political persuasion.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214558393">2015 metastudy</a> showed that ideological polarization over the reality of climate change actually increases with respondents’ knowledge of politics, science and/or energy policy. The chances that a conservative is a climate change denier is <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2008/05/08/a-deeper-partisan-divide-over-global-warming/">significantly higher</a> if he or she is college-educated. Conservatives scoring highest on tests for <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2182588">cognitive sophistication</a> or <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2319992">quantitative reasoning skills</a> are most susceptible to motivated reasoning about climate science. </p>
<p>This is not just a problem for conservatives. As researcher <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=8P7tOMAAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Dan Kahan</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2010.511246">has demonstrated</a>, liberals are less likely to accept expert consensus on the possibility of safe storage of nuclear waste, or on the effects of concealed-carry gun laws.</p>
<h2>Denial is natural</h2>
<p>Our ancestors evolved in small groups, where <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X10000968">cooperation and persuasion</a> had at least as much to do with reproductive success as holding accurate factual beliefs about the world. Assimilation into one’s tribe required assimilation into the group’s ideological belief system. An instinctive bias in favor of one’s “<a href="https://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html">in-group</a>” and its worldview is deeply ingrained in human psychology.</p>
<p>A human being’s very sense of self <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280701592070">is intimately tied up with</a> his or her identity group’s status and beliefs. Unsurprisingly, then, people respond automatically and defensively to information that threatens their ideological worldview. We respond with rationalization and selective assessment of evidence – that is, we engage in “<a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/science-choice/201504/what-is-confirmation-bias">confirmation bias</a>,” giving credit to expert testimony we like and find reasons to reject the rest.</p>
<p>Political scientists <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=9VwvxRIAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Charles Taber</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=NyoRiXkAAAAJ&hl=en">Milton Lodge</a> experimentally confirmed the existence of this <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214554758">automatic response</a>. They found that partisan subjects, when presented with photos of politicians, produce an affective “like/dislike” response that precedes any sort of conscious, factual assessment as to who is pictured. </p>
<p>In ideologically charged situations, one’s prejudices end up affecting one’s factual beliefs. Insofar as you define yourself in terms of your <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2010.511246">cultural affiliations</a>, information that threatens your belief system – say, information about the negative effects of industrial production on the environment – can threaten your sense of identity itself. If it’s part of your ideological community’s worldview that unnatural things are unhealthful, factual information about a scientific consensus on vaccine or GM food safety feels like a personal attack. </p>
<p>Unwelcome information can also threaten in other ways. “<a href="https://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2017/06/system-justification">System justification</a>” theorists like psychologist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Zh1vTeMAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">John Jost</a> have shown how situations that represent a threat to established systems trigger inflexible thinking and a desire for closure. For example, as Jost and colleagues extensively review, populations experiencing economic distress or external threat have often turned to <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Ftps0000122">authoritarian, hierarchicalist leaders</a> promising security and stability.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Everyone sees the world through one partisan lens or another, based on their identity and beliefs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/3d-cinema-glasses-isolated-on-white-62373739">Vladyslav Starozhylov/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Denial is everywhere</h2>
<p>This kind of affect-laden, motivated thinking explains a wide range of examples of an extreme, evidence-resistant rejection of historical fact and scientific consensus.</p>
<p>Have tax cuts been shown to pay for themselves in terms of economic growth? Do communities with high numbers of immigrants have higher rates of violent crime? Did Russia interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election? Predictably, expert opinion regarding such matters is treated by partisan media as though evidence is itself <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2014/04/28/george_will_global_warming_is_socialism_by_the_back_door.html">inherently partisan</a>.</p>
<p>Denialist phenomena are many and varied, but the story behind them is, ultimately, quite simple. Human cognition is inseparable from the unconscious emotional responses that go with it. Under the right conditions, universal human traits like in-group favoritism, existential anxiety and a desire for stability and control combine into a toxic, system-justifying identity politics.</p>
<p>When group interests, creeds, or dogmas are threatened by unwelcome factual information, biased thinking becomes denial. And unfortunately these facts about human nature <a href="https://www.merchantsofdoubt.org/">can be manipulated for political ends</a>. </p>
<p>This picture is a bit grim, because it suggests that facts alone have limited power to resolve politicized issues like climate change or immigration policy. But properly understanding the phenomenon of denial is surely a crucial first step to addressing it.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127168/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Bardon received funding from the Humility and Conviction in Public Life project at the University of Connecticut. </span></em></p>Whether in situations relating to scientific consensus, economic history or current political events, denialism has its roots in what psychologists call ‘motivated reasoning.’Adrian Bardon, Professor of Philosophy, Wake Forest UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1144582019-07-30T08:55:17Z2019-07-30T08:55:17ZBoris Johnson now leads a country mired in a Brexit identity crisis – here’s how he could reunite it<p>As Boris Johnson begins his term as British prime minister, he takes charge of a country facing a series of overlapping crises. Alongside the constitutional and political crises provoked by the Brexit process, are wider social and economic problems of homelessness and poor productivity. But one of the most significant challenges he faces is the UK’s current identity crisis. </p>
<p>Countries, like people, have <a href="https://theconversation.com/britain-better-fix-its-identity-crisis-fast-or-risk-a-disastrous-brexit-81227">identities</a>, and that’s remained true of Britain since the EU referendum of 2016, regardless of the divisions that have hardened since.</p>
<p>Precisely identifying what a country’s identity is can be a difficult process, but Britain certainly imagines itself to be a major international player, focused on upholding the rules-based international order. Under that overarching identity, there are a host of other identities at play – some of them longstanding, but two of significant importance that have only emerged since that referendum: Leave, and Remain.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-boris-johnson-draws-on-the-past-to-rule-in-the-present-with-a-little-help-from-myth-120863">How Boris Johnson draws on the past to rule in the present – with a little help from myth</a>
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</em>
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<p><a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/new-report-reveals-brexit-identities-stronger-than-party-identities/">Research</a> on Brexit identities published by the UK in a Changing Europe research group in January 2019, found that while Remain as an identity appeared later than Leave during the referendum campaign, they are now roughly of equal strength.</p>
<p>Roughly equal numbers of people adhere to both Remain and Leave identities, with about equivalent strength. These identities are also more powerful than other existing political identities, such as party identity. While one in five British people don’t report a party identity, only one in 16 doesn’t report either a Remain or Leave identity.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-identities-how-leave-versus-remain-replaced-conservative-versus-labour-affiliations-of-british-voters-110311">Brexit identities: how Leave versus Remain replaced Conservative versus Labour affiliations of British voters</a>
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<p>The electorate are therefore broadly divided between two powerful identity blocs, of roughly equal size. As we saw in the European parliamentary elections, they are strongly polarised – the two parties that finished top of that ballot, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/ng-interactive/2019/may/26/european-election-latest-results-2019-uk-england-scotland-wales-ni-eu-parliament">Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats</a>, represent the clearest articulation of each side of this divide.</p>
<p>These identities are deeply and sincerely held on both sides. They are defined in part by a rejection of the other identity, but also by what positive vision they hold for the future. This poses a significant challenge for politicians and civil servants seeking to lead the UK through the process of leaving the EU, and through a host of related policy issues around trade, immigration, and so on.</p>
<p>The polarisation between Leave and Remain is often commented on in dark tones. Many have said that the UK is irreparably divided and therefore dysfunctional to the point of impeding the ability of any one party to govern it effectively.</p>
<p>Others claim that the referendum and then Brexit itself created and then embedded unbridgeable divides between these two large groups of voters. This gap will be near impossible to surmount, particularly as <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Public-Opinion-2019-report.pdf">research shows these voters interpret</a> the same economic data differently.</p>
<h2>Looking for common ground</h2>
<p>But there is also reason to believe that some common ground can be found here. Both sides do hold a set of common beliefs. Both, for example, have extolled the virtues of openness. For Leavers, Britain’s membership of the EU was a barrier to being a globally connected and accessible country, for Remainers it was a means to facilitate that. </p>
<p>Both sides have also argued that Britain is an important country in global terms. While Remainers say this is, in part, due to membership of the EU which serves to amplify Britain’s voice in the world, Leavers say it’s despite the country being inside the union, and that Britain’s importance may even be enhanced by leaving. The commonalities here reflect elements of the overarching identities such as Britishness that cross both groups.</p>
<p>The downside is that these concepts might not be firm bases upon which to bring the country together. This can play out in two ways. Either neither side will recognise the other as truly sharing the value that they proclaim. Openness is a good example here. Both sides proclaim that they value openness, but that the other is in favour of being closed off from the world – either because they seek to detach the UK from the EU, or because they seek to keep the UK inside the club. </p>
<p>The other possibility is that, when a common ground issue is used to try and build a consensus, it is co-opted by one side or another, and so the bridge to common ground is lost.</p>
<p>Either way, British politicians will need to try and reunite the country. Indeed, the newly appointed prime minister made it the <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/political-parties/conservative-party/boris-johnson/news/105499/read-full-boris-johnsons">second point of his campaign list</a> – but only after delivering Brexit. Electorally, it will be difficult for him, or any party leader, to get a majority in a general election in a country that is so divided on what has become such a central issue.</p>
<p>When it comes to building public support for policies to tackle the myriad crises facing Britain – from immigration policy to regional devolution – the same problem persists: policies can be perceived radically differently by the two identity groups. Seeking to bridge that gap will be hard. </p>
<p>The way forward should centre on speaking to the common ground that does exist, but also spending more time discussing trade offs and compromise. Johnson does not appear to have adopted this strategy – the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/25/johnson-diverse-cabinet-tory-racism-ethnic-minority-ministers">immediate reaction</a> to his government appointments has been to colour it as a more, not less, divisive government, and his rhetoric on Brexit has not shown much sign of compromise.</p>
<p>Public figures from both sides of the Leave and Remain divide will have to discover more overt enthusiasm for compromising if they want to draw the venom out of the Brexit identity clash. Otherwise, governing the UK will continue to be far more challenging that it was before 2016 for some time to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114458/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Oliver does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many have said that the UK is irreparably divided and therefore dysfunctional to the point of impeding the ability of any one party to govern it effectively.Timothy Oliver, Lecturer in British Politics and Public Policy, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1154642019-04-16T09:41:27Z2019-04-16T09:41:27ZIndonesia’s elections: why do they matter and what’s at stake?<p>The world’s third largest democracy, Indonesia, is holding its fifth national election since the fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998. </p>
<p>India may organise <a href="https://theconversation.com/indias-elections-will-be-the-largest-in-world-history-114968">the biggest and most expensive elections in the world</a>, but they aren’t as complex as in Indonesia. </p>
<p>Located between the Indian and Pacific oceans, Indonesia is the fourth largest country in the world in terms of population and is the world’s biggest Muslim populated country. And its future is at stake with these elections. </p>
<p>The elections’ results will determine the stability of Indonesia as a democratic country, from both economic and security standpoints. </p>
<p>Here is what you need to know about Indonesia’s elections and what’s at stake.</p>
<h2>Five polls at once</h2>
<p>For the first time, Indonesia will hold presidential and legislative elections at the same time. The government claims the simultaneous system will <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/01/23/1954013/KPU.Pemilu.Serentak.Hemat.Anggaran">cut costs</a>. </p>
<p>So, once entering a voting booth, a voter must deal with five voting ballots at once, making it the most complex election in the world.</p>
<h2>The number</h2>
<p>There are nearly <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/04/08/21501411/jumlah-pemilih-pemilu-2019-bertambah-jadi-192866254">192.8 million</a> registered voters, with almost <a href="https://beritagar.id/artikel/laporan-khas/berebut-suara-pemilih-muda">50%</a> of them under 40. </p>
<p>On Wednesday morning, eligible voters will go to <a href="https://beritagar.id/artikel/berita/pemilu-2019-digelar-di-810329-tps">810,329</a> voting booths across the country to vote for a president and vice president and <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/explainer-will-the-2019-elections-be-fair/">almost 20,500 legislative members</a> in the national, provincial and district level, as well as 132 senators for the Regional Representative Council. At least <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/explainer-will-the-2019-elections-be-fair/">300,000</a> candidates are running for the legislative seats. </p>
<p>For the presidential seat, a voter must choose between incumbent Jokowi “Jokowi” Widodo and his rival Prabowo Subianto. </p>
<h2>What’s at stake?</h2>
<p>There are concerns about this election. Pundits are questioning the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/free-speech-and-democracy-under-threat-in-indonesia/">quality of Indonesian democracy</a>, amidst <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00074918.2018.1549918">growing repression</a>, <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/01/07/is-indonesian-democracy-up-to-the-challenge/">rising conservatism</a>, coupled with growing <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/world/asia/indonesia-election-islam.html">Islamism</a> and <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/an-anti-feminist-wave-in-indonesias-election/">anti-feminist</a> trends. </p>
<p>There are also concerns about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/opinion/joko-widodo-indonesia-military.html">the military’s growing influence</a>. One may be forgiven for thinking Indonesia might be on the brink of <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/how-polarised-is-indonesia/">civil war</a>.</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, many believe a lot is at stake in these elections. It is, in essence, a battle between <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/05/10/indonesias-president-is-neither-a-grubby-politician-nor-a-diehard-reformer">flawed technocratic reformers</a> who nevertheless represent a moderate, inclusive Indonesia, versus <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/20/indonesias-upcoming-elections-explained/">nationalist populists</a> who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/13/dont-teach-me-democracy-an-uneasy-audience-with-indonesias-prabowo">court hard-line Islamist groups with illiberal agenda</a>.</p>
<h2>Rematch between Jokowi and Prabowo</h2>
<p>The 2019 presidential election is a rematch between Jokowi, a layman and furniture seller who became a politician, and Prabowo, a former general and ex-son-in-law of former dictator Soeharto. In the 2014 presidential election, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28415536">Jokowi won the election by a small margin</a>. </p>
<p>To secure a second term, Jokowi touts his economic accomplishments under his administration. One of them is promoting rapid infrastructure development, neglected by his predecessors.</p>
<p>Jokowi’s other strategy is allying himself with Nadlatul Ulama (NU), the country’s biggest Muslim organisation by choosing Ma'ruf Amin, a senior figure in the NU, as his running mate. By taking this strategy, Jokowi is ditching his previous approach of promoting pluralism that worked for him in 2014.</p>
<p>By choosing Ma'ruf, Jokowi hopes to avoid being attacked by his rival using religious issues in a similar way to his former partner, Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama. Ahok was Jokowi’s former deputy when the latter became Jakarta governor. </p>
<p>A Chinese and Christian, Ahok was a victim of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-election-idUSKBN17K15Z">a black campaign</a> organised by conservatives to stop him from winning the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. Not only did Ahok fail to win the election, but he was also later found guilty of blasphemy charges. He was recently released from prison.</p>
<p>On the other side is Prabowo. Prabowo is running with Sandiaga Uno, one of the richest people in Indonesia.</p>
<p>Prabowo’s supporters are those who long for the stability under the authoritarian rule of Soeharto. Compared to Jokowi, Prabowo is seen as a stronger leader due to his experience in the military.</p>
<p>Prabowo’s supporters also include <a href="http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2019/03/Report_55.pdf">the conservatives who join him simply because they despise Jokowi</a>. </p>
<p>Apart from <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/qa-sandiaga-uno-on-economic-policy/">attacking Jokowi’s economic policies</a>, other strategies from Prabowo’s supporters are creating an image that Jokowi is <a href="https://coconuts.co/jakarta/news/halal-grilled-pork-legal-lgbt-president-jokowi-urges-public-stop-sharing-fake-news-online/">hostile to Muslims’ interests</a>. </p>
<p>In return, Jokowi’s supporters end up attacking Prabowo by saying he is not a good Muslim. <a href="http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2019/03/Report_55.pdf">They question Prabowo’s piety</a> by asking where he is doing his Friday prayer, which is an obligation for Muslim men. They also insinuate that Prabowo is <a href="https://tirto.id/prabowo-isu-khilafah-dan-sejarah-gerakan-islam-politik-indonesia-dkT6">supporting the establishment of an Islamic state</a>, leading to his vigorous denial during the presidential debates.</p>
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<h2>Predicting the result, whoever wins</h2>
<p>Jokowi’s victory would vindicate his economic policies and signal to the oppositions – or, rather, the candidates for the 2024 presidential election –that taking a hard-line position will not appeal to the majority of voters. </p>
<p>Of course, this does not mean that candidates can ignore the role of Islam in politics, as Ahok painfully experienced in his failed 2017 Jakarta election. Rather, it is much better to take a more moderate stance to gain support.</p>
<p>If Prabowo wins, this will indicate that identity politics remains potent and taking hard-line religious position works. Granted, this does not necessarily mean Prabowo approves such tactics. Still, the fact that those who often use religious-based attacks are mostly in his camp means that his victory would, unfortunately, be seen as a victory of identity populism politics, which will be used again in the next election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115464/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yohanes Sulaiman tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Here is what you need to know about Indonesia’s elections and what’s at stake.Yohanes Sulaiman, Associate lecturer, Universitas Jendral Achmad YaniLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1119432019-02-21T11:43:17Z2019-02-21T11:43:17ZOscars 2019: Beyond the stats, why diversity matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259979/original/file-20190220-148509-1pcfj67.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Barry Jenkins' 'If Beale Street Could Talk' has been nominated for best adapted screenplay at the 91st Academy Awards.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/91st-Academy-Awards-Nominees-Luncheon-Portraits/f460136be2824e96be004b21eda29bc9/11/0">Photo by Chris Pizzello/Invision/AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With the Academy Awards approaching, the Annenberg Inclusion Initiative released its most recent <a href="http://assets.uscannenberg.org/docs/inequality-in-1200-films-research-brief_2019-02-12.pdf">report on diversity in Hollywood</a>. </p>
<p>It documented an upward trend toward equality: The number of women and people of color in the role of lead or co-lead has risen over the last two years. Still, the film industry has yet to achieve parity, especially for people of color, whose representation is 11 percent lower than their share of the general population. </p>
<p>Statistics provide an indispensable metric to understand the big picture, what I call “creative labor” of who’s hired for particular jobs. But numbers alone can’t account for the types of characters being played – if they’re stereotypical roles or groundbreaking portrayals. Nor do numbers tell us why representations in popular culture can have such profound impact on people’s lives. </p>
<p>In my book “<a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/worldmaking">Worldmaking: Race, Performance and the Work of Creativity</a>,” I approach the issue of diversity as a cultural anthropologist, playwright and performance studies scholar. In it, I argue that cultural representation is about something deeper than parity for the sake of parity – that everyone needs to be mirrored in the public sphere in order to exist and to count as a fully dimensional human being. </p>
<h2>Visions of possibility</h2>
<p>Classic psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan <a href="https://www.sas.upenn.edu/%7Ecavitch/pdf-library/Lacan%20Mirror%20Stage.pdf">proposed the concept of the mirror stage of development</a>, which he argued was necessary for the formation of an identity. </p>
<p>He used the metaphor of infants recognizing themselves in a mirror as the first step towards seeing themselves as integrated, whole beings. While Lacan thought it was impossible to achieve “wholeness” – no one can be completely whole and integrated – he argued that identities are imagined and reinforced through this mirroring. </p>
<p>For this reason, it’s critical that people see themselves mirrored in popular culture. Identities can be formed by watching film, television, theater or sports. They’re shaped by playing video games, dancing and listening to music. The characters who appear and the roles they assume indicate whose lives matter in the public sphere, and who is erased. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259977/original/file-20190220-148536-ltx9zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259977/original/file-20190220-148536-ltx9zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259977/original/file-20190220-148536-ltx9zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259977/original/file-20190220-148536-ltx9zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259977/original/file-20190220-148536-ltx9zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259977/original/file-20190220-148536-ltx9zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=613&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259977/original/file-20190220-148536-ltx9zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=613&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259977/original/file-20190220-148536-ltx9zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=613&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Mexican actress Yalitza Aparicio was nominated for best actress for her role in ‘Roma.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/91st-Academy-Awards-Nominees-Luncheon-Portraits/2eb36f91141b4d46a5dcbda148dd9fcc/123/0">Chris Pizzello/Invision/AP</a></span>
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<p>The arts and popular culture stage what I call “visions of possibility” for what viewers and readers can become. For generations, members of the dominant culture were primarily able to see themselves on screen as leaders – the heroes of stories that are publicly recognized and celebrated. Marginalized people were relegated to more limited possibilities, and these limitations can carry over into diminished dreams and life choices.</p>
<p>That’s starting to change. A black child can now see Chadwick Boseman star as the hero of “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1825683/">Black Panther</a>,” and Storm Reid play 13-year-old protagonist Meg Murry in “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1620680/?ref_=nv_sr_1">A Wrinkle in Time</a>.” An Asian-American child can see Constance Wu command the screen in “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt3104988/?ref_=nv_sr_1">Crazy Rich Asians</a>,” while an indigenous person can see Yalitza Aparicio appear as the lead in “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt6155172/?ref_=nv_sr_1">Roma</a>.”</p>
<h2>Culture can combat the ‘slow death’ of inequality</h2>
<p>The ability of viewers to see themselves mirrored becomes especially crucial when we rethink how inequality operates. Racism, for example, is not simply a matter of spectacular violence or membership in the Ku Klux Klan. Nor is racism simply a matter of attitude or prejudice. </p>
<p>Critical geographer and social justice activist Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls racism “<a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520242012/golden-gulag">group differentiated vulnerability to premature death</a>.” </p>
<p>In other words, some groups are more likely to experience lower life expectancies, whether it’s from violence, imprisonment, exposure to environmental toxins or even the greater amount of energy it takes to get through a day. Inequalities of race, class and gender can gradually erode psychological and physical health, in what English professor Lauren Berlant calls “<a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/cruel-optimism">slow death</a>.” </p>
<p>To counter the slow death of inequality, I argue that the sort of mirroring in popular culture that affirms viewers from marginalized groups is life-giving.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259980/original/file-20190220-148509-pihcj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259980/original/file-20190220-148509-pihcj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259980/original/file-20190220-148509-pihcj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259980/original/file-20190220-148509-pihcj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259980/original/file-20190220-148509-pihcj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259980/original/file-20190220-148509-pihcj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259980/original/file-20190220-148509-pihcj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259980/original/file-20190220-148509-pihcj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Documentary filmmaker Bing Liu’s ‘Minding the Gap’ was nominated for best documentary feature.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/91st-Academy-Awards-Nominees-Luncheon-Portraits/2d607ba1074643a9b0abaf1a0e44e964/6/0">Chris Pizzello/Invision/AP</a></span>
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<p>This requires attention to creative vision. It’s not simply a matter of numbers; it’s a matter of whose stories are being told, and who is controlling the narrative. The growing number of women and people of color on screen may not signal a new, exciting creative vision if they’re cast in the conventional roles of damsel in distress, “<a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/common-black-stereotypes-in-tv-film-2834653">the black best friend</a>,” the increasingly popular <a href="https://www.dailydot.com/via/unbreakable-kimmy-schmidt-gay-friend/">gay, “fabulous” black best friend</a> or “the Asian nerd.” </p>
<h2>New voices, new stories, new understanding</h2>
<p>That’s why it’s important to shine a spotlight on all kinds of new stories, whether it’s making a superhero a star or simply highlighting everyday lives of people of different cultures, classes, races or sexualities.</p>
<p>Tales of <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1322269/">dysfunctional white families</a> and the <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1570728/?ref_=kw_li_tt">mid-life crises of straight white men</a> remain too numerous to count.</p>
<p>What can be gained by subjects and premises that are so repetitive? What about the invisible everyday lives and experiences of indigenous or Middle Eastern women? What could be learned from an Asian-American female protagonist’s midlife crisis? Or would “midlife crisis” even be an apt term for her unique experiences? Would there be a new way to imagine her story? </p>
<p>How many other stories go unseen and untold? </p>
<p>Postcolonial scholar Gayatri Spivak wrote that racism and colonialism aren’t simply a matter of overt, conscious domination. Instead, they involve what she calls “<a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/death-of-a-discipline/9780231129442">zones of sanctioned ignorance</a>.” In other words, what do people not know about the lives of those who are different from themselves? </p>
<p>Lack of diversity creates zones of sanctioned ignorance. Denying playwrights, screenwriters and directors from marginalized communities a platform for their work deprives everyone the opportunity to engage with the world in new ways. </p>
<p>What intriguing tales might await when richly specific, expansive creative visions from previously overlooked writers and directors are given the space to blossom? What fresh, fascinating stories will emerge?</p>
<p>Without a continued push for diversity, audiences will never know.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dorinne Kondo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Numbers alone don’t relay the importance of people seeing their own experiences and lives mirrored in popular culture.Dorinne Kondo, Professor of American Studies & Ethnicity and Anthropology, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1103112019-01-22T17:29:01Z2019-01-22T17:29:01ZBrexit identities: how Leave versus Remain replaced Conservative versus Labour affiliations of British voters<p>British politics was relatively stable in the post-war decades, and voters’ strong party loyalties were influenced by their place in society. More recently, there has been a marked decline in the number of people identifying with a political party, and in the strength of that attachment. </p>
<p>Now, our new research for <a href="http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Public-Opinion-2019-report.pdf">a report on Brexit and Public Opinion</a> by the UK in a Changing Europe research group, shows that Brexit has quickly and dramatically replaced the traditional party allegiances of Conservative and Labour in the hearts and minds of voters. While this “Brexit identity” has reinvigorated political involvement, it has come at a cost, cementing divisions in society at the moment when the prime minister has <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2018-12-24/time-for-britons-to-come-together-urges-theresa-may-amid-brexit-divisions/">professed a desire to heal them</a>.</p>
<p>We wanted to find out whether Leave versus Remain is now a more prominent source of identity than Conservative versus Labour, and the impact the EU referendum had on this. We did this by asking respondents in all waves of the <a href="https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/">British Election panel study</a> undertaken since spring 2016 whether: “In the EU referendum debate, do you think of yourself as closer to either the Remain or Leave side?” We then asked the same questions about respondents’ thoughts and feelings towards all of the political parties.</p>
<p>At the start of the referendum campaign in April 2016, the idea of being Leave versus Remain was, unsurprisingly, not prominent, especially for Remainers. Leavers had already developed a sense of their distinctiveness, perhaps because they were clearly outside of mainstream politics – no major party had endorsed leaving the EU. However, the number of Remainers expressing an identity grew following the referendum result and vice versa for Leavers. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255019/original/file-20190122-100288-flul30.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Partisan identity versus Brexit identity.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>Tellingly, even in mid-2018, two years after the referendum, only just over 6% of people did not identify with either Leave or Remain. Compare this with party political attachment, where the percentage with no party identity increased from 18% to 21.5% over same period – in part due to the decline of UKIP. Only one in 16 people don’t have a Brexit identity whereas more than one in five have no party identity.</p>
<h2>Remain identity strengthening</h2>
<p>At the beginning of the referendum campaign, Leave supporters tended to identify with the Leave campaign more strongly than Remainers did with the Remain one. From the last month of the campaign onwards, however, the extent to which people said they strongly identified with either side increased markedly. By the end of the campaign the two sides had almost equal strengths of identity. Most striking, however, is how the strength of the Remain identity increased dramatically following the referendum while the strength of Leave dropped slightly. Since then the average level of identification with Leave or Remain has remained higher than the strength of identification with any political party.</p>
<p>The way Leave and Remain has become embedded became even more pronounced when we looked at the social and psychological markers of identity – and we found a polarisation of identities after the referendum. </p>
<p>When asked whether: “When I speak about the Remain/Leave side, I usually say ‘we’ instead of ‘they’”, the proportion of Leavers agreeing leapt from 44% to 65% after the referendum. The proportion of Remainers agreeing rose even more substantially, from 35% to 70%. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254972/original/file-20190122-100264-h90z55.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>By comparison, when this question was asked about Labour and the Conservatives, only around 25% of people agreed with it.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254973/original/file-20190122-100292-4qlda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>It’s personal</h2>
<p>When asked whether, “When people criticise the Remain/Leave side, it feels like a personal insult”, we saw a large increase in agreement by people on both sides following the referendum – from around 20% up to 45%, remaining stable for much of the time since. For the parties, only around 20% of Conservatives and 25% of Labour identifiers tend to respond in this way. </p>
<p>When asked whether, “I have a lot in common with other supporters of the Remain/Leave side” agreement among Leavers tends to hover around 78% and Remainers 85%. Immediately after the referendum, agreement with this statement reached no less than 93% among Remainers. For parties, the percentages agreeing with this view were only in the 60s and 70s. </p>
<p>The EU referendum seems to have resulted in a classic “in-group” versus “out-group” <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Public-Opinion.pdf">response of distancing and negative stereotyping</a>, especially from Remainers. The social and emotional intensity of these Brexit identities – held by almost everybody – is far higher than those found for political parties. </p>
<p>While party identity increased a little during the 2017 general election, especially for Labour, it then subsided. Yet Brexit identities remained prevalent and consequential even two years after the referendum. This is a long way removed from the idea that the UK “has come together” to face the challenge of Brexit. The social polarisation over the UK’s relationship with the EU is pronounced and shows no sign of diminishing.</p>
<p>The UK is likely to experience a re-shaping of politics as a result, because positions on Brexit cut across the positions of the main political parties. Both Labour and the Conservatives are beset with tensions caused by the presence of large groups of pro-Leave and pro-Remain supporters in their ranks. Some Labour MPs in northern and Midlands constituencies are nervous at the thought of Labour promoting a second referendum, while many of those in London welcome it. Some Conservatives want to address the concerns of rural voters in areas with an influx of workers from the EU, while others take an internationalist position of big business and the CBI.</p>
<p>To the degree that a Brexit identity drives voters’ political attitudes and choices, there will be increasing pressure put on the old, left-wing versus right-wing, two-party politics of Labour versus the Conservatives. As political identities are usually far more enduring than attitudes towards specific issues, it’s likely that Brexit identities will be a stable source of realignment in a political world characterised by volatility. </p>
<p><em><a href="http://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-identities-how-leave-versus-remain-replaced-conservative-versus-labour-affiliations-of-british-voters/">This article</a> was also published by the UK in a Changing Europe.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110311/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geoffrey Evans receives funding from the Economic & Social Research Council</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Florian Schaffner is affiliated with Agora Think Tank. </span></em></p>The social polarisation over Brexit is pronounced and shows no sign of diminishing.Geoffrey Evans, Professor in the Sociology of Politics, Official Fellow in Politics, Nuffield College, University of OxfordFlorian Schaffner, Doctoral Candidate in Politics, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1070102018-12-20T18:52:39Z2018-12-20T18:52:39ZFriday essay: identity politics and the case for shared values<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250171/original/file-20181212-76968-1rvruh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A scene from the 1961 film West Side Story. The casting of an Australian performer as Maria in a local production of the musical was recently criticised for 'white washing' a story about a Puerto Rican immigrant.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> The Mirisch Corporation,Seven Arts Productions</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recently, a group of respected academics, including Melbourne-born philosopher Peter Singer, announced that they were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/education-46146766">launching a new academic journal called the Journal of Controversial Ideas</a>. In it, authors will have the option of remaining anonymous. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/18/setting-the-record-straight-on-the-journal-of-controversial-ideas">The editors say</a> they wish to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>enable academics – particularly younger, untenured, or otherwise vulnerable academics – to have the option of publishing under a pseudonym when they might otherwise be deterred from publishing by fear of death threats… threats to their families, or threats to their careers. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is a justification that should trouble us all, not just those of us who happen to work in and for universities. Scientific advance, as well as the health of our society and the political and cultural freedoms that underpin it, depends on our capacity to accept that ideas, when properly and rigorously argued, are capable of being judged with a reasonable degree of objectivity, regardless of who is positing them.</p>
<p>We should expect academics in particular to be willing to assess an idea on the basis of what is being argued, not who is arguing it. Failing to do this is traditionally understood as committing an <em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem">ad hominem</a></em> fallacy.</p>
<p>True, we know that all human knowledge is subject to a myriad of visible and hidden prejudices that shape how we think. But reasoned argument gives us various tools that we can use to expose these prejudices, and thus also the possibility of rising above them.</p>
<p>Thus academics are trained to judge an idea primarily on the basis of the cogency, originality and rigour of the arguments that support it. We can assess the underlying validity of those arguments by scrutinising their inherent reasoning and by comparing them against bodies of pre-existing knowledge.</p>
<p>The peer review process is one particular tool we use to uphold these standards. It involves the “blind” assessment of submissions to academic publications. The recent “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/new-sokal-hoax/572212/">grievance studies</a>” hoax, however, has drawn public attention to some of the weaknesses of the peer review system. It also helps us understand the wider context that has motivated the creation of a Journal of Controversial Ideas. </p>
<p>In this hoax, three academics <a href="https://qz.com/1422626/a-hoax-that-targeted-feminist-scholarship-accidentally-revealed-a-bigger-problem-with-academia/">concocted articles that parodied a certain style of academic argument</a>. Several of the fake articles were accepted for publication despite their dubious content. Their titles included Human Reaction to Rape Culture and Queer Performativity at Urban Dog Parks in Portland, Oregon and An Ethnography of Breastaurant Masculinity: Themes of Objectification, Sexual Conquest, Male Control, and Masculine Toughness in a Sexually Objectifying Restaurant. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250169/original/file-20181212-76983-q8am8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250169/original/file-20181212-76983-q8am8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250169/original/file-20181212-76983-q8am8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250169/original/file-20181212-76983-q8am8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250169/original/file-20181212-76983-q8am8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250169/original/file-20181212-76983-q8am8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250169/original/file-20181212-76983-q8am8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250169/original/file-20181212-76983-q8am8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One hoax article purported to be a study of Human Reaction to Rape Culture and Queer Performativity at Urban Dog Parks in Portland, Oregon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The hoaxers argue that the fact such articles were accepted for publication points to the corrupting influence of “identity politics” on academia. The righteousness of one’s personal experiences of, or feelings about, an issue (and, more broadly, the identity groups with which one identifies) are, they suggest, increasingly valued as a source of authority over abstract reasoning or generalised observation. </p>
<p>When our identity becomes the principal filter through which we understand the world, however, we can no longer presume that notions like truth and objective facts actually exist. We must instead accept that we live in a world of multiple competing truths, with no agreed consensus about how we might choose between them. </p>
<h2>Rejection of expert advice</h2>
<p>Both the election of Trump and the result of the Brexit referendum in the UK have been in part attributed to the success of political campaigns so conceived. Both involved an explicit rejection of reasoned advice from academic experts such as political scientists, climate scientists, and economists. Instead, appeals for support targeted particular sections of the electorate based on voters’ race and ethnicity - identity politics at its purest.</p>
<p>This is not a phenomenon restricted to the political right. As the New York Times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/opinion/donald-trump-identity-politics.html">observed last year</a>, the right has itself been responding to a form of political thinking already common to so-called “progressive” political movements. </p>
<p>For instance, if you happen to be white, male, cis-gendered, working class, and so on, you are likely to look for a tribal allegiance of your own. Or, as Mark Lilla put it in his 2017 book <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/34323539-the-once-and-future-liberal">The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics</a>, “as soon as you cast an issue exclusively in terms of identity you invite your adversary to do the same”. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250173/original/file-20181212-76983-15m1ov4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250173/original/file-20181212-76983-15m1ov4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250173/original/file-20181212-76983-15m1ov4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=879&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250173/original/file-20181212-76983-15m1ov4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=879&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250173/original/file-20181212-76983-15m1ov4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=879&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250173/original/file-20181212-76983-15m1ov4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1105&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250173/original/file-20181212-76983-15m1ov4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1105&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250173/original/file-20181212-76983-15m1ov4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1105&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Lilla argues that we must instead reassert the importance of appeals to a “universal democratic ‘we’” (as opposed to “I”) “on which solidarity can be built, duty instilled and action inspired”. </p>
<p>One of the reasons this is so difficult to do is that our identity <em>does</em> matter when we confront many genuine political grievances. Racism, poverty, misogyny, homophobia are, alas, very real problems. They affect us individually very differently depending on how others perceive us - or we perceive ourselves - in terms of race, gender, class, sexuality and the like. </p>
<p>To effectively solve the injustices that arise out of these social phenomena, it is necessary to recognise that the significant forms of disadvantage and discrimination they cause are not natural, but socially constructed. They need to be contested and addressed as such.</p>
<p>Lilla is right to argue, nevertheless, that we risk taking our focus on identity too far. The emergence of a Journal of Controversial Ideas is only one particular sign that our once generally accepted belief in the possibility of disinterested political, theoretical, or even scientific, knowledge may be threatened by an over-focus on identity. </p>
<p>Other signs include the rise of an “alternative facts” discourse and the now widespread lack of trust in public broadcasting and other forms of so-called “mainstream” media. </p>
<p>New forms of social media, on the other hand, are perfectly made for identity politics because they allow us easily to inhabit identity-based silos. Safe in these communities of shared background and interest, we risk never having to meet, let alone debate with, people who might think or act differently to us. </p>
<h2>Cultural value</h2>
<p>The influence of identity politics is felt in my own academic field of music. Here, questions of musical value are increasingly being understood as little more than a reflection of an individual’s contingent cultural appetites. Experience-centred methodologies such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autoethnography">autoethnography</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action_research">action research</a>, which license a researcher to make themselves the principal subject of research, lend this shift in perspective scholarly respectability. </p>
<p>But by focusing on the centrality of personal experience over shared knowledge, we can avoid having to consider a more inclusive or idealistic understanding of what our musical culture is. Or, indeed, ought to be. </p>
<p>We also risk becoming less concerned to learn about, or seek out, cultural experiences or perspectives that would seek to push us beyond the immediate limits of our own experiences and imagination. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250167/original/file-20181212-76974-us9twb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250167/original/file-20181212-76974-us9twb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250167/original/file-20181212-76974-us9twb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250167/original/file-20181212-76974-us9twb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250167/original/file-20181212-76974-us9twb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250167/original/file-20181212-76974-us9twb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250167/original/file-20181212-76974-us9twb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250167/original/file-20181212-76974-us9twb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Anna Funder (speaking here in 2012) declined to judge the Horne Prize under restrictive new guidelines which, she said, would disqualify a lot of her own work.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Honner Media</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Indeed, we start actively to avoid or suppress such perspectives altogether. The organisers of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2018/sep/24/why-i-refused-to-judge-the-horne-prize">Horne Prize</a> in effect did this when they sought to disqualify “writing that purports to represent the experiences of those in any minority community of which the writer is not a member”. Judges David Marr and Anna Funder both resigned in protest and in the end <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/sep/24/horne-essay-prize-scraps-rule-change-after-judges-resign-in-protest">the organisers backtracked</a>.</p>
<p>The protests that erupted earlier this year concerning Opera Australia’s casting of the role of Maria for its forthcoming production of West Side Story is another example. Here <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/topics/life/culture/article/2018/07/16/comment-its-time-whitewashing-west-side-story-stop">it was argued</a> Australian-born Julie Lea Goodwin, who has been cast as Maria, should instead have been of the same ethnic origin as Maria herself. This is despite the fact that West Side Story is itself a reworking of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet (c.1595) by two Jewish-American men (Leonard Bernstein and Stephen Sondheim). Maria’s identity <a href="https://www.australianbookreview.com.au/abr-arts/5029-strange-times-for-artistic-practice">will always be more complex</a> than the politics of identity would seem to allow. </p>
<p>Such a focus on identity may also distract us from considering the underlying economic forces that might be shaping particular forms of cultural or social behaviour, including identity politics itself. It is surely no coincidence that it is flourishing at the very same time we are being encouraged by online businesses to bracket ourselves by ethnicity, political affiliation, cultural tastes, sexuality, class, and so on. Just whose interests are ultimately being served? </p>
<p>To be sure, our identity unquestionably shapes (and can limit) how we interact with the world but it should not become the only foundation upon which we build our understanding of it. Claims to scholarly or political authority made on the basis of identity should also be subject to the same rigorous scrutiny and critique as any other form of public knowledge.</p>
<p>It is our rational systems of enquiry, and our underlying belief in the possibility of objective truth, that ultimately requires bolstering and defending by our universities, not narrow forms of knowing that would instead give primacy to our lived experience. </p>
<p>Without a continuing trust in such shared values we run the risk of being unable to convince people different from ourselves why they might wish to think or feel, let alone vote or act, like we do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Tregear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Our identity unquestionably shapes (and can limit) how we interact with the world. But it should not become the only foundation upon which we build our understanding of it.Peter Tregear, Honorary Principal Fellow, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1076562018-11-30T14:34:23Z2018-11-30T14:34:23ZGibraltar: how Brexit could change its sense of British identity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247928/original/file-20181129-170250-1eb2hs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gibraltar has its own kind of Britishness. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/1206050233?src=9H4uIddkf17xlSS9awWKhg-1-72&size=medium_jpg">Ben Gingell/Shutterstock </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The people of Gibraltar are famously proud to be British and still display strong loyalty to the crown and the UK. Yet Gibraltarian identity has long rested on two pillars of economic and political security the territory enjoys from its association with the UK. Brexit now threatens both of these pillars. If they are shaken, or crumble, so too may Gibraltarians’ attachment to Britain. </p>
<p>On November 24 the Spanish prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/11/26/inenglish/1543222571_685671.html">touted</a> a last-minute concession from EU leaders and British prime minister Theresa May over the future of Gibraltar ahead of final agreement on the Brexit deal. The most obvious – although contested – interpretation of what happened is that the EU recognised Spain’s interest in Gibraltar and that no future deal between the UK and the EU will cover Gibraltar without Spain’s prior consent. </p>
<p>Yet, despite <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-theresa-may-gibraltar-spain-summit-brussels-withdrawal-agreement-a8650346.html">claims</a> that May “caved in” to Spain over Gibraltar, Fabian Picardo, Gibraltar’s chief minister, responded with passion and conviction in a televised <a href="https://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/new/sites/default/files/press/2018/Press%20Releases/720-2018.pdf">address</a> in Gibraltar the same evening. He stated that: “The United Kingdom has not let us down,” adding that Gibraltar enjoys “an entirely British future that will suffer no dilution”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1066450063646429185"}"></div></p>
<p>Underpinning Picardo´s address are three longstanding elements of UK-Gibraltar relations. First, that in times of crisis Gibraltar sticks ever closer to the UK. Second, that unwavering loyalty to the UK will be returned. And third, that the UK has the political and economic power to protect Gibraltar. As historian <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03086530500411266">Stephen Constantine</a> has shown, pledging loyalty to the crown in order to finesse an economic or political advantage has been a strategy of Gibraltar’s since at least the 19th century. Brexit now puts all of these three assumptions in doubt.</p>
<h2>Less Spanish than ever</h2>
<p>As a group of researchers <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319993096">demonstrate</a> in a forthcoming book I’ve edited, there is clearly a deep attachment to Britain and British culture in Gibraltar, even as there is a growing sense of a specifically Gibraltarian British identity. There is no question these feelings are sincerely held but our research shows there there is also a pragmatism to this loyalty. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247930/original/file-20181129-170253-1x4unge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247930/original/file-20181129-170253-1x4unge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/247930/original/file-20181129-170253-1x4unge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/247930/original/file-20181129-170253-1x4unge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/247930/original/file-20181129-170253-1x4unge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/247930/original/file-20181129-170253-1x4unge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/247930/original/file-20181129-170253-1x4unge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gibraltar: a small territory, at the centre of Brexit negotations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/1206050269?src=SlJc9RW-UPNKYyt5MrxMxA-1-2&size=medium_jpg">Ben Gingell/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Today, Gibraltar is certainly more anglophone than it ever has been in its history – as my colleague Dr Edward Picardo argues in our book. Although Gibraltarians’ outlooks are not necessarily unambiguously British, they are certainly less Spanish than ever. The implacable resolve of many Gibraltarians against Spanish sovereignty is illustrated by the words of a young Gibraltarian woman I spoke to shortly before watching Picardo’s speech:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We may be a small country and connected to Spain but they still have nothing to do with us. So we voted 96% Remain to be sold off to Spain? Over my and 30,000 other dead bodies. They can try … there would be riots and I think we would actually start a war and physically fight against Spain’s politicians it if came to it.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Gibraltar is a place that brings back the Britain of yesteryear. It receives a steady stream of MPs (often invited by the Gibraltar government) and others who visit to warm themselves on the faint glow of the <a href="http://embersofempire.ku.dk/">embers of Empire</a>. MPs such as Jack Lopresti, the chair of the all-party group on Gibraltar, are fervent defenders of Gibraltar’s interests but, at the same time, passionate advocates of Britain leaving the EU.</p>
<p>Given that Gibraltar voted 96% to Remain in the EU this would seem as something of an irony. Yet because part of the Brexit momentum was fuelled by an <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/brexit-britain-may-johnson-eu/542079/">imperial nostalgia</a>, which included a vision by some in Whitehall for an “<a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/775399/empire-2-uk-improve-trade-links-african-commonwealth-nations-after-brexit-theresa-may">Empire 2.0</a>”, then Gibraltar emerges as an obvious icon of Brexit Britishness. Yet, ironically, Brexit threatens Gibraltar´s attachment to the UK.</p>
<h2>Anxiety for the future</h2>
<p><a href="http://borderingonbritishness.net/">Research</a> my colleagues and I have carried out shows that in the second half of the 20th century, Gibraltarian went from from being Spanish-speaking colonial subjects to identifying themselves as equal British citizens. This does not, however, mean that the “British forever” mentality is written in stone. Today some Gibraltarians are worried that loyalty to the crown will not be enough to protect them from Spanish claims. In recent days, a number of Gibraltarians have expressed the anxiety about being “sold out” or, as someone put it, that the UK is willing “to sacrifice the few (Gibraltar) for the many”.</p>
<p>Even as one retired teacher said to me recently: “Britain is our parent and we are the children” there are many others – not perhaps so vocal or as public – who are anxious about Picardo’s “jingoism”. One member of a labour union expressed his concern to me that Picardo’s uncompromising rhetoric gets in the way of constructive relations with Spain and reminded me that “the whole economy collapses if the Spanish worker doesn’t work here”. Others ruefully pointed out that it is a little odd to see the Gibraltarian government claiming the virtues of May’s Brexit deal when no one in the UK seems to agree with her. While others still express a concern that this closeness to the UK will “threaten” Gibraltar’s economy if it leads to “Spanish and other cross-frontier workers not being able to work here.”</p>
<p>Despite the chief minister’s assertion that the UK government is standing by Gibraltar, there is growing anxiety that Britain can not be guaranteed to do so and people point to Northern Ireland as an example of how trust in the UK Government can be misplaced. “If they do that to the Irish, what will they do to us?” as I was told. And opposition leader, Keith Azopardi, <a href="http://chronicle.gi/2018/11/azopardi-questions-euphoric-reaction-brexit-deal/">pointed out</a>: “"We must… be conscious as a community that the UK’s national interests are different to ours.” </p>
<p>This divergence of interests is one issue that is causing tremors in the Rock but much more important is surely the fact that the UK will no longer be in the EU to defend Gibraltar against Spain which was obliged to recognise British Gibraltar (and open the border Spain shut in 1969) when it joined the EEC in 1986. Brexit inverts this situation. Now it is the UK that is obliged to recognise Spain’s interest over Gibraltar, an historical irony <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/11/24/opinion/1543083223_152768.html">not lost on Spanish commentators</a>. Not only does Spain have a veto over any future trade relationship with Gibraltar after Brexit, it will also have a veto should the UK ever consider rejoining the EU. In this context, it seems likely that Spain would use its position to leverage more control over Gibraltar. </p>
<p>If it is indeed the case that Brexit means the UK is not only unwilling but unable to protect Gibraltar politically and economically, then this points to an existential crisis for Gibraltarian Britishness. Few in Gibraltar today are willing to consider ceding sovereignty to Spain. Under the Brexit scenario, however, it seems reasonable to wonder if Gibraltarian pledges of loyalty to the UK will become historical footnotes as Gibraltar is forced to seek a more pragmatic relationship with its increasingly powerful neighbour. Only time will tell whether the cry of “British Forever” will be reduced to an echo of the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107656/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Canessa received funding from the ESRC for part of the research presented here. He is a member of the Green Party. </span></em></p>Gibraltarians are famously proud to be British. But amid the uncertainty of Brexit, some are having an existential identity crisis.Andrew Canessa, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1069292018-11-19T22:58:55Z2018-11-19T22:58:55ZThe trouble with saying ‘it’s okay to be white’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246294/original/file-20181119-76147-1um2aec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The 'It's okay to be white' poster campaign, seen in the context of reacting to 'Black Lives Matter,' cannot be seen as benign.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recently, posters were <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/hate-messages-university-manitoba-campus-1.4889084">discovered</a> on several walls at the University of Manitoba with the statement, “It’s okay to be white.” Other similar incidents were reported in <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/okay-to-be-white-halifax-1.4887174">Halifax</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/it-s-okay-to-be-white-poster-pops-up-at-u-of-r-security-investigating-1.4415514">Regina</a> and elsewhere around the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-01/its-okay-to-be-white-signs-appear-outside-mps-offices/10457140">world</a>. Most who saw the paper print-outs denounced them as hate propaganda from <a href="https://www.themanitoban.com/2018/11/decolonization-white-supremacy-and-its-okay-to-be-white/35889/">white nationalists</a>.</p>
<p>Following the incident, some media outlets, including the <a href="https://www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/police-searching-for-u-of-m-poster-suspects-499723481.html"><em>Winnipeg Free Press</em></a>, received an email from the alleged poster, who claimed he was a University of Manitoba student who papered the walls. </p>
<p>The student said the posters were a “protest of racially discriminatory ideology” taught at the university. He said “many professors explicitly teach in their courses that it is not okay to be white.” He added that he felt the over-reaction to the posters proves the presence of a “white-phobia” on campus.</p>
<p>One <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/metacanada/comments/9tbt1r/cbc_took_the_bait_with_the_its_okay_to_be_white/">Reddit post</a> argued that “CBC took the bait” when reporting on the posters. To people like those commenting on the Reddit thread, the poster campaign was a benign act meant to highlight liberal bias in mainstream media. But is saying “It’s okay to be white” benign? </p>
<h2>Making myths</h2>
<p>Meaning is never produced in a vacuum. Statements have historical and cultural contexts and ideology is embedded in the language we use. Written texts can produce meaning, using rhetorical devices, like metaphor and irony. </p>
<p>Things start getting complicated when we mix up the cultural meanings of things for the literal meanings. The French philosopher <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Roland-Gerard-Barthes">Roland Barthes</a> said “myths” are created when we confuse cultural meanings for literal ones. We start to believe that culture is literal instead of made. This is known as denotation versus connotation. </p>
<p>When this happens, a statement that is filled with cultural, historical and contextual biases appears natural and ahistorical. </p>
<p>“It’s okay to be white,” appears to be a literal, or denotative, message, but when we read it in context — against the backdrop of institutionalized <a href="https://www.ubcpress.ca/the-equity-myth">Eurocentrism</a> and current anti-racist political movements like Black Lives Matter — we see that it is far from benign. </p>
<p>The poster believes that white identities are no longer accepted at the university. He believes a double standard exists in conversations of cultural diversity. This attitude is aligned with the alt-right, a U.S.-based white nationalist movement.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246288/original/file-20181119-76150-fqpfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246288/original/file-20181119-76150-fqpfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246288/original/file-20181119-76150-fqpfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246288/original/file-20181119-76150-fqpfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246288/original/file-20181119-76150-fqpfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246288/original/file-20181119-76150-fqpfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246288/original/file-20181119-76150-fqpfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">It’s okay to be white poster photographed on the University of Toronto campus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://thevarsity.ca/2017/11/08/group-spotted-putting-up-its-okay-to-be-white-posters-on-campus/">Tom Yun/The Varsity</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The culture wars</h2>
<p>I believe the self-proclaimed alt-right, an offshoot of conservatism that combines elements of racism, white nationalism and populism, is <a href="http://winnspace.uwinnipeg.ca/handle/10680/1465">a symptom of postmodern politics of transgression and subversion</a>. It is a symptom of the diffusion of rebellion into mainstream political rhetoric and discourse. My research looks into the ideologies of <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/postmodern-theory-and-blade-runner-9781501311796/">postmodern culture and the media</a> that includes examining debates about identity politics.</p>
<p><a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/">Identity politics is political or social organizing “intimately connected to the idea that some social groups are oppressed.”</a> University identity politics challenged the modern, the dominant white male narratives, that helped to shape and normalize the culture of colonialism and patriarchy. This challenge has been called <em>postmodern</em>.</p>
<p>The far right as a whole is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfHacDV-oSo">critical</a> of postmodern identity politics, but they unknowingly identify with its practices of expression. What they demonstrate is not a new rise of conservatism, but rather, according to the <em>Washington Post</em>, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/book-party/wp/2017/11/03/where-the-alt-right-wants-to-take-america-with-or-without-trump/?utm_term=.614c42690232">a co-opting of 1960s-style liberalism</a>.” </p>
<p><a href="http://www.zero-books.net/books/kill-all-normies">Angela Nagle</a> writes that the online alt-right world is not evidence of the return of conservatism but a turn away from “church-going, upstanding, button-down, family-values conservatism.” It is “the absolute hegemony of the culture of non-conformism, self-expression, transgression and irreverence for its own sake.” </p>
<h2>Consumer culture helps build rebels</h2>
<p>Postmodern identity politics have been incorporated into popular media through consumer culture. Identity is a big part of branding campaigns, diffusing the politics of new social movements into commercial demands for representation, inclusion, diversity and tolerance. </p>
<p>Consumerism also preaches an ethic of non-conformity. Non-conformists are never satisfied with the status quo, continually seeking new ways to subvert it. For the consumer society, a non-conformist creates demand for new commodities. </p>
<p>Therefore, to be a rebel, to transgress and subvert the perceived status quo, is the dominant popular mode of identity. </p>
<p>If postmodern identity politics means subverting the Eurocentric, patriarchal and capitalist ideologies, what results from the subversion of subversion? </p>
<h2>Co-opting the resistance</h2>
<p>This month’s <a href="https://regina.ctvnews.ca/maclean-s-cover-sparking-online-controversy-1.4169525">cover</a> of <em>Maclean’s</em> magazine features an image of Canadian conservative political leaders, including the premiers of Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario, along with the leader of the federal conservatives, Andrew Scheer, and the leader of the Alberta conservatives, Jason Kenney. The caption that appeared across these men read, “The resistance.”</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1060218161654628352"}"></div></p>
<p>When the left is positioned as the status quo, those opposing them appear as “resisting.” But resisting what? This “resistance” is the basis of the <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/2748-for-a-left-populism">populist moment</a> in politics.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.lacan.com/zizpopulism.htm">Populism is a conservative ideology</a> currently reigning contemporary political discourse. Its strategy is to draw attention away from the real problem and shift it onto a false enemy or intruder whose purging will bring renewed harmony. </p>
<p>In the process, the reigning power is depicted as the resistance, appearing sympathetic towards “the people” against an imagined elite. </p>
<p>In contrast, democratic socialists like Bernie Sanders or Jeremy Corbyn, described as “left populists,” oppose the prevailing neoliberal capitalism. They assign blame to the contradictions <em>within</em> the system, rather than some enemy or intruder who disrupted the harmony of the system. “Left populism” is, therefore, a misnomer. </p>
<p>Populism is the strategy of the right in the Trump era. Whether it is the “fake media,” political correctness or migrant labour, Trumpian politics always locates some enemy or intruder. This is the populist strategy of reproducing dominance <em>in the guise of resistance</em>.</p>
<p>This is what is truly troubling about the “It’s okay to be white” campaign. It creates the confusing myth that the ruling ideology is the resistance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106929/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Flisfeder does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Posters with the phrase “It’s okay to be white” were found around the campus of the University of Manitoba. What does it really mean?Matthew Flisfeder, Assistant Professor of Rhetoric and Communications, University of WinnipegLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1013862018-08-22T08:52:00Z2018-08-22T08:52:00ZRussian trolls targeted Australian voters on Twitter via #auspol and #MH17<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233019/original/file-20180822-149472-zlpnao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2724%2C1734&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Network map of accounts within #auspol tweets mentioning or linking to Russian propaganda outlets, Sputnik and RT, May 4 – July 30, 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Russia was behind an enormous effort to influence politics in the US and the UK, but was Australia targeted too? In this series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/hacking-auspol-58635">Hacking #auspol</a> we explore how covert foreign influence operates in Australia, and what we can do about it.</em></p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-were-sharing-3-million-russian-troll-tweets/">New</a> evidence shows that the infamous Russian “troll factory”, the Internet Research Agency (IRA), targeted Australian politics on social media between 2015 and 2017 – and that other Russian outlets may continue to conduct influence operations.</p>
<p>Russian intervention in the 2016 US election has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/russian-election-hacking">generated considerable attention</a> around the world. But while that attack was <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/did-obama-blow-it-on-the-russian-hacking-us-elections-vladimir-putin-donald-trump-lisa-monaco/">unprecedented</a> in scope, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/08/22/us/ap-us-facebook-investigation.html">Russia is not the only perpetrator</a> of foreign influence, and the United States is not the only target.</p>
<p>The recent passage of legislation by the Australian Parliament targeting foreign lobbyists and strengthening regulations around espionage are a response to growing concerns about <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6018">foreign influence operations in Australia</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/weaponized-information-seeks-a-new-target-in-cyberspace-users-minds-100069">Weaponized information seeks a new target in cyberspace: Users' minds</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What Russian interference in Australia looks like</h2>
<p>In its effort to aid US lawmakers <a href="https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download">investigating</a> Russian influence on US politics, Twitter identified <a href="https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ira_handles_june_2018.pdf">3,841 accounts</a> suspected of operating out of the <a href="https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/">Internet Research Agency in St Petersburg</a>. Researchers from Clemson University in the US <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-were-sharing-3-million-russian-troll-tweets/">released 3 million tweets</a> from those accounts last month. </p>
<p>Our analysis of this data set shows how these accounts targeted Australian politics – particularly in reaction to the Australian response to the downing of flight MH17. Some 5,000 tweets mention the terms “#auspol”, “Australia” or “MH17” – with “Australia” the most common of the three. </p>
<p>Examples of their interventions in #auspol include: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>@ALFREDTHREE: Tony Abbot used and manipulated terror threat as a political weapon </p>
<p>@ADRIENNE_GG #My4WordNewYearsResolution. Give The Government Hell. #AusPol. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>These are not retweets, but original tweets from IRA troll accounts, and both have an objective of undermining support for the government. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Topic coverage by Internet Research Agency human-controlled ‘troll’ Twitter accounts.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The jump in activity focusing on MH17 correlates with the Australian government’s response to the Russian missile attack on MH17, when Australia deployed fighter aircraft to operate in Syrian airspace where Russian aircraft were also operational. During this period, the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/explaining-australias-sharp-turn-to-information-warfare/">Australian Defence Force (ADF) was also confronted by Russian military cyber operations</a>. </p>
<p>The spike that occurs in February 2017 actually has nothing to do with politics and instead refers to a hashtag game. These Russian accounts encouraged people to come up with Australian names for popular US television programs. Examples include, “@AIDEN7757: Gallipoli of Thrones #MakeTVShowsAustralian”, “@ERICARUTTER: Sheila the explorer #MakeTVShowsAustralian”, and “@CALEBPAAR: American Drongo #MakeTVShowsAustralian”. </p>
<p>While this may seem like innocent fun, <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=bNQotAEACAAJ&dq=messing+with+the+enemy&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj297ucyOncAhUGW7wKHQvWAzoQ6AEILDAB">it is also a technique of spy craft</a>. “Assets”, in this case, Australian citizens, are recruited on neutral, non-political terms before they are shifted towards political topics. </p>
<h2>#auspol targeted during budget and by-elections</h2>
<p>Studies of Russian Twitter trolls show that they are distinct from other actors in that they tend to link to and promote <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.09288">official Russian propaganda outlets</a>. </p>
<p>To better understand the role played by these accounts in Australian politics, we collected tweets using the hashtag #auspol from 4 May to 30 July 2018. That period runs from the lead-up to the 2018 budget through the by-elections held the end of July. The #auspol hashtag <a href="https://eprints.qut.edu.au/90463/">has been used on Twitter to aggregate discussions about Australian politics</a> since June 2010. </p>
<p>The purpose of this research is not to identify specific troll accounts, but to identify how Russian propaganda materials are becoming involved in social media discussions about Australian politics. </p>
<p>For this analysis we focus on <a href="https://sputniknews.com/">Sputnik</a> and <a href="https://www.rt.com/">RT</a> (formerly Russia Today). We call these outlets propaganda for two reasons. Firstly, they are recognised as such by the United States Department of Justice which has recently required them to <a href="https://www.rt.com/usa/415464-sputnik-content-provider-fara/">register under the Foreign Agent Registration Act</a>. Second, these outlets <a href="https://www.rt.com/on-air/">describe themselves</a> in terms of their propaganda function with RT explaining that their purpose is to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[acquaint] an international audience with the Russian viewpoint.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Network map of accounts within #auspol tweets mentioning or linking to Russian propaganda outlets, Sputnik and RT. Data collected via Twitter’s streaming API, filtered for #auspol from 4 May until 30 July, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The above network map of #auspol tweets which mention Russian propaganda outlets, or link to their reporting, indicates that these accounts appear most commonly in discussions with News Corporation media platforms. There is also a wider international focus including <a href="https://theconversation.com/sergei-skripal-attack-russian-embassy-is-fuelling-tensions-with-some-very-undiplomatic-tweets-93407">Russian diplomatic delegations</a>.</p>
<p>These results contrast with the normal #auspol mention network, which contains a much broader range of domestic political actors and media organisations. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Network map of the top 50 Twitter handles within #auspol with accounts that mention Russian propaganda removed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Targeting the Australian right</h2>
<p>The data suggest that Russian influence operations may be targeting the political right in Australia at this time. There is also an emphasis on international topics, such as terrorism, and UK, EU, and US politics.</p>
<p>The hashtag #abledanger (and the typo #abeldanger) also figures prominently. It refers to a blog that promotes conspiracy theories about American politics.</p>
<p>The hashtag network map of #auspol without Russian propaganda references looks considerably different. It reflects domestic political concerns such as the budget or debate over My Health Record, refugee policy and districts that were holding by-elections. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">#auspol hashtag mention map without Russian propaganda mentions or links. Data collected via Twitter streaming API, filtered for #auspol from early May until 30 July.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Building relationships to sow division</h2>
<p>There are two ways to think about how information is exchanged in the public sphere. One is a rational model, where claims are backed by evidence. The other is a narrative model, where people reason through stories that resonate with them. Many contemporary theories of democracy rely on the rational model, but foreign influence operations make use of the fact that people behave more in line with the narrative model.</p>
<p>Disinformation, in this context, is not so much the distribution of falsehoods for political effect, but rather communications designed to manipulate a target audience in a manner favourable to the perpetrator. </p>
<p>In early 2015, Twitter accounts affiliated with the Internet Research Agency focused almost as much on nonpolitical topics as they did on political topics. These accounts are human-controlled accounts, so-called “trolls”, and they operate differently from bots. </p>
<p>Bots are automated to promote specific topics, hashtags, so they often lack the nuanced communication abilities of human-controlled accounts. This makes them less effective in strategically moving an audience than troll accounts run by humans. </p>
<p>By contrast, troll accounts are able to develop relationships, and it’s often through these relationships that <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/social-calculus-of-voting-interpersonal-media-and-organizational-influences-on-presidential-choices/4605211FD617AAB1F9686F774CFBC5CB">political opinions are developed and voting decisions made</a>. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/regulate-social-media-platforms-before-its-too-late-86984">Regulate social media platforms before it's too late</a>
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</p>
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<p>Adversarial actors, such as Russia, try to shift the identifications of a target audience from one political affiliation to another. <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Information-Warfare-Howard-Gambrill-Clark-ebook/dp/B076H1XRP7/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1534458201&sr=8-1&keywords=clark+and+information+warfare">One way of doing this</a> is to break identifications with governing organisations by promoting a sense of insecurity and danger. </p>
<p>For example, there was a tragic case earlier this year where a man killed himself along with several members of his family. The <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-11/seven-people-found-dead-in-margaret-river-murder-suicide/9751482">ABC reported</a> the news with the headline: “Margaret River Murder-Suicide: Seven People Found Dead at Home Near WA Holiday Town”. Meanwhile, the Russian news outlet Russia Today (RT) <a href="https://www.rt.com/news/426426-australia-mass-shooting-deaths/">reported</a> the news with the headline: “Seven People, Including 4 Children Shot Dead in Southwestern Australia”. </p>
<p>Whereas the ABC headline alerts readers that there is no ongoing threat, the RT headline leaves it open, despite having the same information as the ABC buried down in the text of the article. </p>
<p>The difference seems minor, but there is increasing evidence that repeated messaging like this can have the effect of eroding support for political authorities and institutions. It helps build a narrative that these institutions are incapable of addressing the needs of their citizens. </p>
<h2>Russian influence operations continue</h2>
<p>These data should not be overstated. Of the 632,398 #auspol tweets collected from early May until 30 July, only 119 mentioned or linked to Russian propaganda outlets. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the Russian tweets shed light on Russia’s propaganda efforts in Australia. The data set indicates that they are trying to cultivate an audience here through memes, hashtag games, and Aussie cultural references. And the network maps suggest they are trying to move Australians’ views on foreign affairs, particularly by targeting reporting on News Corporation outlets. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-researched-russian-trolls-and-figured-out-exactly-how-they-neutralise-certain-news-100994">We researched Russian trolls and figured out exactly how they neutralise certain news</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Democracies are, by their nature, open political systems. That makes them particularly vulnerable to influence efforts by foreign adversaries. The attacks on the 2016 US election have provided adversaries with a playbook to engage in operations against countries like Australia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101386/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A lot of attention has been focused on Russia’s efforts to influence American politics, but Australia has also been a target – and continues to be a target – of covert foreign influence.Tom Sear, PhD Candidate, UNSW Canberra Cyber, Australian Defence Force Academy, UNSW SydneyMichael Jensen, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/841442018-06-26T11:11:33Z2018-06-26T11:11:33ZHere’s a better way to think about identity politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224893/original/file-20180626-112641-1570vq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C3484%2C2321&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA/Victoria Jones</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Identity politics has become a phrase of common currency in recent years, yet it is often painfully, and badly, used. Generally, it is wheeled out in a negative context. Take UK environment minister <a href="https://twitter.com/SebastianEPayne/status/998478337541537792">Michael Gove</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/OxfordUnion/status/998647034126241792">Tim Farron</a>, former leader of the Liberal Democrats, for example. Both sought to distance themselves from such thinking in two separate speeches given on the same day earlier this year. Gove said “identitarians” undermine liberal politics, while Farron condemned identity politics as a “poison”.</p>
<p>In fact, it seems the term is used almost entirely negatively, by people who wish to argue against the concept. However, they rarely stop long enough to adequately, or meaningfully, define the term to a point of usefulness. We should recall George Orwell’s remark on the word “fascism” in his essay <a href="http://www.orwell.ru/library/essays/politics/english/e_polit">Politics and the English Language</a>; that it has come to mean little more than “something not desirable”. In this sense, “identity politics” has become the new fascism – or indeed the new centrism, neo-liberalism, Blairism or populism. It is simply shorthand for a concept or idea that you dislike.</p>
<p>But underlying each of these terms is something worth clearly identifying and discussing. After all, there is such a thing as fascism – there are clearly fascists. The same is true of identity politics. There is clearly something called identity out there, and it clearly plays a role in politics. But what is it, and should it be taken seriously? </p>
<p>As I’ve <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/16/british-identity-key-brexit-crisis-negotiations">argued</a>, identity is the image someone has of themselves. This image is made of different components – football teams we support, cities we live in, music we listen to, and more. This is not an effort to give a final definition, but it is an effort to give a useful one.</p>
<p>Identity politics, at face value, is a politics that speaks to our image of ourselves. Immediately, we face a trap – it’s easy to declare all politics identity politics, because everything relates to our identity. But this is to erase the other things that politics is about – such as healthcare, taxes, and other issues that concern who gets what. It risks conceding the argument to those who think that “identity politics” is a major, if not the greatest, problem with politics today, because those voices so often proclaim that “identity politics” is taking over, and destroying the space for “normal” or “good” politics. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"998647034126241792"}"></div></p>
<p>A more satisfactory position is to argue that all politics involves an element of identity. Instead of disregarding it, we should seek to understand it – but we should acknowledge that this isn’t a sufficient condition for understanding any one issue. This creates space for meaningful and interesting discussions around identity, but also an awareness that either seeking to remove or exclusively focus on identity as the aspect of politics worth discussing is ultimately going to produce incomplete answers. </p>
<p>How can we apply this practically? Take, for example, the discussion over Brexit. If we discuss Brexit purely as a matter of economics – of the allocation of resources, the openness of countries to trade, the free movement of capital, and so on – we might produce an “answer” to Brexit that seemingly reconciles all the different economic issues and produces an optimal outcome. For the sake of argument, let us imagine that is that the UK becomes rather like <a href="https://theconversation.com/britains-brexit-options-a-refresh-79364">Norway</a>, and stays in the single market. Yet, that solution proves wildly unpopular – and likely would. Why? </p>
<p>Because it would exist in tension with the identities of many people, who feel that it would be an unacceptable infringement on aspects of the country that they identify with – or the values that form a part of their identity – through the lack of control on immigration or, say, over new rules that the UK would have to follow, or so on. Those who back a Norway-style deal might, rightly in this scenario, argue that the deal they had was the most efficient in economic terms. But if it has no resonance with identities – or worse, actively is seen as being hostile to them – then it will struggle to gain ground.</p>
<p>Ultimately, identities are the images that we have of ourselves. Having that self-image challenged is incredibly disruptive and it can be very difficult for us to adapt that image in light of the challenge. Most identity changes occur over longer periods of time, and with less tension and conflict.</p>
<p>If anything, therefore, identity politics should call on us to reflect on what it is about what we do that angers others so much, and how we can reconcile the different aspects of our identities in a way that produces mutually beneficial settlements. It should be a means to see a vital aspect of all politics, and how it plays a key role in shaping how people respond to us. On that ground alone, identity politics is worth understanding.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84144/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Oliver does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Given that so many people have a strong opinion about identity politics, it is surprising how few of us have a clear idea on what it actually is.Timothy Oliver, Teaching fellow in British and Comparative Politics, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/973862018-06-03T09:21:18Z2018-06-03T09:21:18ZEthiopia’s Ahmed has inspired calm. But he must act quickly on promises<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221007/original/file-20180530-120487-y9q8ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are still lingering questions hanging over Ethiopia's Premier Abiy Ahmed.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopia has been rocked by a series of protests over the past <a href="https://www.hrw.org/tag/ethiopian-protests">four years</a>. These <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-country-history-180219130441837.html">rallied against</a> public corruption, the economic marginalisation of some ethnic groups, and youth unemployment. </p>
<p>The government responded with <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ethiopia-state-emergency-hailemariam-desalegn-siraj-fegessa-a8215271.html">a heavy hand</a>. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39619979">Hundreds</a> of lives were lost; businesses and properties were destroyed. Instead of dialogue and fundamental changes, the regime kept on deploying an odd combination of promises of <a href="https://medium.com/@amnestyusa/ethiopia-and-human-rights-reform-another-mirage-for-2018-41109e714c18">reform</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f86aec8a-be01-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080">crackdowns</a>. </p>
<p>The repressive measures gave <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0DItZOY_E0I">common ground</a> to local movements which cropped up in different regions. These included <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/13/freedom-oromo-activists-qeerroo-ethiopia-standstill">Qeerroo of Oromia</a>, <a href="https://www.borkena.com/2018/02/10/three-days-protest-planned-next-week-grenade-attack-debark-gonder/">Fanno of Amhara</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z1XHkgxl2ck">Zerma</a> of Gurague. Anchored on issues rather than personalities, the movements were able to outwit the regime with their narrative and strategy. They blocked the roads and shut businesses, undermining the regime’s ability to control and ensuring the masses were informed of looming government actions. </p>
<p><a href="https://ethsat.com/">Media</a> outlets in the diaspora, energetic <a href="https://www.opride.com/">bloggers</a> and internet savvy youth also provided alternative narratives to the regime’s. </p>
<p>The main casualty from the regime’s side was Prime Minister <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ethiopia-prime-minister-resigns-hailemariam-desalegn-protests-oromia-mass-unrest-a8212106.html">Hailemariam Desalegn</a>. His downfall, however, came with a touch of irony. He was arguably the least corrupt member of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and was keen to purge corrupt leaders. But he was outmanoeuvred and finally resigned in the hope that his departure would pave the way for genuine <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-politics/ethiopias-prime-minister-resigns-to-smooth-path-for-political-reform-idUKKCN1FZ1CP">reform</a>.</p>
<p>The interregnum between Hailemariam’s departure and the election of Abiy Ahmed was filled with foreboding. Some warned of the country’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/under-a-new-state-of-emergency-ethiopia-is-on-the-brink-of-crisis-again/2018/03/03/5a887156-1d8f-11e8-98f5-ceecfa8741b6_story.html?utm_term=.cf18f7a66716">imminent collapse</a>.</p>
<p>Ahmed’s appointment has triggered mixed reactions among the anxious establishment and citizens: trust, doubt, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-survival-ruling-eprdf-180528082306152.html">excitement – and fear</a>. </p>
<p>Amid the hope, lingering questions hover over his leadership. Ethiopia would face insurmountable problems if he fails to deliver on his promises. On the other hand, he has the opportunity to forge a new movement that can lead Ethiopia away from identity politics to the politics of ideas. </p>
<h2>Popular tide</h2>
<p>Despite being nurtured within the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, Ahmed doesn’t sound like any of its former leaders. </p>
<p>Unlike the Ethiopian politicians of the last four decades his rhetoric mimics neither <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/little-trace-of-marxism-in-africa/a-43654592">Albanian Marxism</a> nor <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=wLQFDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA63&lpg=PA63&dq=maoism+in+ethiopia&source=bl&ots=KJYpGdiB0v&sig=D7LJCBxYIfFrE6oO_-7jtdtwQE0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiNm-7R2K_bAhWpBcAKHTgcAUsQ6AEIjAEwCw#v=onepage&q=maoism%20in%20ethiopia&f=false">Maoism</a>. He has anchored his story on local cultural innovations.</p>
<p>He comes across as remarkably authentic and engaging. In addition, he has distanced himself, at least in his political outlook, from his party’s maligned old guards. </p>
<p>Amid the turmoil leading up to his election, his routine visits and open conversations with people made them feel their grievances were being heard. The nation, including opposition parties, stopped protesting and started listening.</p>
<p>He also did not hide that reconciliation was his biggest, and the most urgent, project. </p>
<p>But Ahmed remains an enigma. There are lingering doubts about him. For example, the Oromo nationalist movements dislike the that fact he’s from the establishment. At the same time they see reason to protect him because he came out in support of them during a critical period of <a href="https://www.opride.com/2018/04/15/all-that-glitters-is-not-gold-can-ethiopias-new-pm-deliver/">Qeerroo’s movement</a>.</p>
<p>The Fanno movement from Amhara are equally sceptical about him. On his visit to <a href="http://addisstandard.com/commentarythe-birth-of-amhara-nationalism-causes-aspirations-and-potential-impacts/">Gondor and Bahir Dar</a> in Northern Ethiopia he had tense exchanges with the people from the region who didn’t hold back their frustration and anger over economic marginalisation of the Amharas. </p>
<p>But they also feel he can deliver an arrangement of peaceful coexistence between ethnic groups. Ahmed’s speeches about a unitary state are music to the ears of people who have fought for national integration.</p>
<p>Finally, some Tigrayans were quick to air their doubts about his premiership. They pointed out that he wasn’t vocal enough in condemning the alleged atrocities committed against Tigrayans in different regions <a href="https://www.abyssiniadaily.net/ethiopia-residents-of-mekelle-on-abiy-ahmed_0d4dd575c.html">during the protests.</a>. Others said he lacked the experience to occupy the top position in the land. </p>
<p>But they also see him as a calming factor and the voice of <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2018/04/18/ethiopia-a-nation-in-need-of-a-new-story-abiy-ahmed-ethiopiawinet/">moderation</a> precisely because they realise things could have spiralled out of control without his conciliatory voice. </p>
<h2>After the confusion?</h2>
<p>Ahmed has portrayed himself as a great storyteller, unifier, motivator, and at times an “educator-in-chief”. Those qualities were necessary to buy Ethiopians’ patience. The nation has taken time and listened to him. </p>
<p>Now he needs to convert his vision into concrete policies. He has shown signs of resilience in bringing about reconciliation. He pardoned political prisoners including <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/andargachew-tsige-pardoned-ethiopia-180526163642586.html">Andargachew Tsige</a>, a prominent leader of an opposition party, Ginbot 7. Such decisive moves in other areas would enhance public trust in him. </p>
<p>As he moves forward, he needs constructive criticism to keep him grounded. Popular support will also ensure his efforts are not derailed by the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7b3bb0a6-325d-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498">deep state</a>. But he also needs to persuade Ethiopians, in practical terms, that the distance he created between himself and the ruling elites is genuine. Reappointing deeply unpopular members of his party or pardoning former politicians previously convicted of <a href="https://hornaffairs.com/2018/05/25/ethiopia-release-melaku-fenta-and-other-detainess/">corruption</a> would cost him his political capital and make the reform process untenable.</p>
<p>It is also well known that the Ethiopian military, security and judiciary are <a href="https://www.nazret.com/2018/05/13/the-quandary-of-ethiopias-bicephalic-government/">controlled</a> by the Tigrayans People Liberation Front (TPLF). He needs to demonstrate that he can take command of these institutions and ensure they serve the nation independently, in an ideologically neutral way. </p>
<p>His reform efforts are advancing towards the centre of power – controlling military and security. In the last few days, he has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/ethiopia-set-lift-state-emergency-months-early-180602164123443.html">lifted</a> the State of Emergency and challenged the military apparatus to transcend party politics. Such a change has a direct bearing on the freedom of speech and press freedom. Moreover, it also creates a political space to foster active civic participation and ensure accountable governance"</p>
<p>And finally, if he’s serious about forming a unitary state without undermining ethnic identities, he needs to amend the highly contested <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia_1994.pdf?lang=en">Article 39</a> of the constitution which grants all people of Ethiopia self-determination including the right to secession. This unbalanced emphasis on ethno-nationalism might lead the nation towards possible splintering and balkanisation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97386/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Girma is affiliated with British and Foreign Bible Society.</span></em></p>Ethiopia has taken time and listened to the new prime minister. Now he needs to convert his vision into concrete policiesMohammed Girma, Visiting Lecturer at London School of Theology and Research associate, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/926492018-04-20T10:36:41Z2018-04-20T10:36:41ZDemocratic Party’s pluralism is both a strength and weakness<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215284/original/file-20180417-163962-1a2g2le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sen. Chuck Schumer of N.Y., accompanied by Democratic members of the House and Senate in late 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“Democrats never agree on anything, that’s why they’re Democrats. If they agreed with each other, they’d be Republicans.”</p>
<p>Much has changed since humorist Will Rogers said that in the 1930s, but he got it mostly right. </p>
<p>To this day, the Democratic Party remains a mishmash of causes and interest groups compared to the Republicans. It’s a dynamic that has been <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/asymmetric-politics-9780190626600?cc=us&lang=en&">well-documented in recent work</a>. </p>
<p>To be sure, there is an <a href="https://www.democrats.org/party-platform">organizing principle for Democrats: the core value of equality</a>. And party activists have <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/activists-and-conflict-extension-in-american-party-politics/4E0757A0EB8E799FDD8B209047922DD6">become more ideologically rigid</a> than in the past. </p>
<p>But compared to the Republicans, the party retains considerable pluralism and flexibility in pursuing policies and organizing itself. This pluralism is both a strength and a weakness for the party.</p>
<h2>Equality unites</h2>
<p>So who are the Democrats today? </p>
<p>They retain elements of the <a href="https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/instructors/setups/notes/new-deal.jsp">New Deal coalition</a> welded together by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the 1930s and ‘40s, which included liberals, working class voters, Southern whites and ethnic urban Northerners. </p>
<p>The party still includes labor unions and liberal voters, but it has <a href="https://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/12/racially-polarized-voting-is-getting-extreme-in-the-south.html">hemorrhaged a traditional core of white voters who are rural</a>, Southern or Catholic since the 1960s. This loss of white voters accelerated as the party embraced <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/24/how-racism-explains-republicans-rise-in-the-south/?utm_term=.6171d2d5f85a">a strong platform of civil rights</a> and attracted larger constituencies of racial minorities, single women, youth and poor Americans. </p>
<p>Party adherents have been accused, from within and without, of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/democrats-have-an-identity-politics-problem/448776/">focusing heavily on “identity politics,”</a> which tends to emphasize alliances related to race, ethnicity or social background rather than broader categories of citizenship. There is some truth to that. But it is hardly a new dynamic or one that fails to help win contemporary elections.</p>
<p>Just recall how the turn-of-20th-century Irish, Italians and Poles once <a href="https://www.americanheritage.com/content/last-bosses">catapulted their brethren into office</a> against the Anglo-Saxon Brahmins. The most inspiring Democratic politicians – <a href="http://fdr4freedoms.org/wp-content/themes/fdf4fdr/DownloadablePDFs/II_HopeRecoveryReform/21_TalkingtothePeople.pdf">FDR</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/opinion/kennedys-legacy-of-inspiration.html">John F. Kennedy</a> – spoke a language that transcended identity and emphasized what unites Americans. The party leadership could do more of that in an era when partisan animosity is at record levels. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, one challenge for Democrats is how to broaden their appeal to white America without abandoning the party’s commitment to civil rights.</p>
<h2>Populists and Pragmatists</h2>
<p>The diverse constituencies in the party draw unity from a commitment to equality. If there is one thread that links party adherents today, it is <a href="http://www.jofreeman.com/polparties/polculture.htm">a view of themselves as outsiders trying to gain</a> for themselves and others a share of the fruits of American democracy and capitalism, which have been denied to them by social status. </p>
<p>The aim of greater equality has made Democrats support social change that <a href="http://www.jofreeman.com/polparties/polculture.htm">challenges hierarchies</a>. Democrats abhor deference to top-down institutions, a dynamic reflected in the desire of <a href="https://www.vox.com/a/presidential-primaries-2016-republican-democrat/1968-scandal">activists in the 1970s to let voters decide the presidential nominee</a> through primaries rather than boss-controlled party conventions. </p>
<p>Be careful what you ask for. This populist reform, <a href="https://www.vox.com/a/presidential-primaries-2016-republican-democrat/presidential-primaries-explained">embraced initially by Democrats and adopted by Republicans</a>, enabled the election of Donald Trump. On the Democratic side, the establishment candidate <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/opinion/clinton-sanders-democratic-party.html">Hillary Clinton won the nomination despite the strong populist insurgency</a> of a previously Independent politician, Bernie Sanders. <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/11/14/16640082/donna-brazile-warren-bernie-sanders-democratic-primary-rigged">Claims by Sanders’ supporters that the “system was rigged”</a> in Clinton’s favor resonated well among many Democrats due to the party’s egalitarian claims. </p>
<p>On top of bursts of anti-establishment reform, Democratic partisans since the New Deal express a commitment to equality through policies that aim to <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/09/04/us/politics/democratic-convention-words.html#Level%20playing%20field">level the playing field</a>. </p>
<p>This takes the form of government programs that <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/us-parties-republican-democrat-taxes.asp">favor taxing the wealthy</a> and <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/14/news/economy/democrats-taxes-income-inequality/index.html">spending on the less affluent</a>, including championing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/sanders-will-introduce-universal-health-care-backed-by-15-democrats/2017/09/12/d590ef26-97b7-11e7-87fc-c3f7ee4035c9_story.html?utm_term=.5bcd2415b62e">generous funding for universal health care</a>, <a href="https://democrats-budget.house.gov/publications/report/retirement-security-aging-population-requires-higher-federal-spending">Social Security</a> and <a href="https://www.democrats.org/issues/education">public education</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215379/original/file-20180418-163971-pneym2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215379/original/file-20180418-163971-pneym2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215379/original/file-20180418-163971-pneym2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215379/original/file-20180418-163971-pneym2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215379/original/file-20180418-163971-pneym2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215379/original/file-20180418-163971-pneym2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215379/original/file-20180418-163971-pneym2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt ‘spoke a language that transcended identity and emphasized what unites Americans.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Disagreement within the party is not so much about goals but means. </p>
<p>There is no question among Democrats about whether government should intervene to address social problems. The question is how much and how quickly. The Sanders and Clinton campaigns <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/centrist-democrats-begin-pushing-back-against-bernie-sanders-liberal-wing/2017/08/10/6e1ea684-7d19-11e7-83c7-5bd5460f0d7e_story.html?utm_term=.d9a8473bf199">reflected the populist versus pragmatic wings</a> in the Democratic Party. Populists tend to assert that <a href="http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2016090900">public opinion should reign supreme and bring forth immediate policy change</a>, while pragmatists prefer an <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/democratic-party-moderates-111770">incremental approach that seeks broader consensus</a>. Regardless, both Democratic populists and pragmatists aim to <a href="https://www.democrats.org/party-platform">use government as a lever to advance equality</a>.</p>
<h2>Rewards and risks of pluralism</h2>
<p>The Democratic Party draws strength from having a mish-mash of interests rather than an overriding political ideology. </p>
<p>First, the party is more likely to represent the needs of diverse citizens across the nation. Second, pluralism is good for governing because it compels a transactional politics, the kind of deal-making which is essential in a large democracy and one in which government power is divided among three branches of government. Some call the legislative process ugly “sausage-making,” but <a href="http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/Task%20Force%20Reports/Chapter3Mansbridge.pdf">without compromise and bargaining in passing laws</a>, little gets done. </p>
<p>By contrast, the ideological politics that permeates much of <a href="https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2016/9/14/12905660/primary-elections-scare-republicans">the Republican Party embraces a rigid focus on principles</a> over taking half a loaf. Hence <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/19/16911148/government-shutdown-unified-control">gridlock and government shutdowns</a> happen even when Republicans control three branches of government, as they do today. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, there are risks to pluralism. </p>
<p>Coalitions do not make it easy to come up with coherent campaign slogans. But a more profound problem of Democratic pluralism is that the party can be biased toward a few <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/12/26/14042118/donors-democrats-bernie-sanders">moneyed</a> and <a href="http://faculty.georgetown.edu/hcn4/Downloads/BCKMNZ_Perspectives.pdf">highly organized factions</a> who do not reflect the broader rank-and-file. These factions include <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=Q11">pro-environment groups</a>, <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/1/22/16919080/abortion-roe-v-wade-democrats">abortion rights organizations</a> and <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=P04">public sector unions</a>. They may champion important causes, but their dominance over the party’s agenda has a powerful impact on <a href="https://www.press.umich.edu/3745149/no_middle_ground">who runs for office as Democrats and what kinds of issues get pushed in government</a>. </p>
<h2>Moneyed elites in the lead</h2>
<p>The most influential Democratic activists <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/07/us/politics/democrats-resistance-fundraising.html">tend to be upper middle-class professionals</a>, the “progressives” who care a great deal about promoting peace, protecting the environment, separation of church and state, guarding the right to an abortion, and quality of life issues like eating locally-grown food. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215404/original/file-20180418-163998-3m4pjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215404/original/file-20180418-163998-3m4pjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215404/original/file-20180418-163998-3m4pjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215404/original/file-20180418-163998-3m4pjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215404/original/file-20180418-163998-3m4pjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215404/original/file-20180418-163998-3m4pjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215404/original/file-20180418-163998-3m4pjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Day 4 of the 2016 Democratic National Convention.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP/Dennis Van Tine/STAR MAX</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These are the cultural and economic elites of the party who dominate the circulation of ideas, lead advocacy groups and provide money – many in small donations no less! – to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712001624">favored candidates</a>. People who run for office need these elites for their ideas, money and passion to engage. This is what gives ideological activists <a href="https://www.press.umich.edu/3745149/no_middle_ground">disproportionate influence</a> in a mish-mash party. </p>
<p>But it is <a href="https://www.pearson.com/us/higher-education/program/Fiorina-Culture-War-The-Myth-of-a-Polarized-America-3rd-Edition/PGM136108.html">far from clear</a> that this group’s primary causes are the priorities of average Americans.</p>
<p>To attract more, and different, people to the party’s inner sanctum, the Democrats would need to nurture more working and middle-class organizations in their partisan network. While civil rights groups cut across class interests, the party has lost much of the social channels, via local parties and working-class labor unions, that connect the less well-off and less educated to party power brokers. </p>
<p>Technology that gives Americans so many media choices has only <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135242">increased the gap</a> between Democratic elites who are mobilized by partisan messages and rank-and-file voters who are less interested in politics and avoid political information. </p>
<p>Despite these challenges to genuine representation, the Democrats continue to embrace a pluralism that speaks to different constituencies and is electorally advantageous. </p>
<p>The victorious Democrats in recent special elections in deep red regions did not get an “A” on environmental protection, gun control or abortion. This shows that the party does not yet suffer from ideological purity tests. Among Republicans, in contrast, those not sufficiently conservative are tagged by conservative media as typhoid RINOs (Republican in Name Only). </p>
<p>There is no DINO epithet yet, but many <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/re-engineering-politicians-how-activist-groups-choose-our-politicians-long-before-we-vote/">new activist groups</a> have emerged to combat the Trump administration with an aggressive progressive agenda that could be turned against Democratic candidates who compromise or don’t fit the pure mold. </p>
<p>The future of the party will be shaped by how its leadership balances and aligns a commitment to progressive principles with the bread-and-butter interests of its diverse factions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92649/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Raymond La Raja is a registered voter with the Democratic Party. </span></em></p>The Democratic Party is a mishmash of causes and interest groups. The party’s future will be determined by how its leaders balance and align the interests of its diverse factions.Raymond La Raja, Professor of Political Science, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.