tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/intelligence-gathering-12183/articlesIntelligence gathering – The Conversation2023-02-04T14:38:10Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1992452023-02-04T14:38:10Z2023-02-04T14:38:10ZChinese spy balloon over the US: An aerospace expert explains how the balloons work and what they can see<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508173/original/file-20230205-29-5mwnzv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2651%2C1789&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Chinese surveillance balloon in U.S. airspace before it was shot down by the U.S. military.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-spy-balloon-flies-above-in-charlotte-nc-united-news-photo/1246788383">Peter Zay/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The U.S. military <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/02/04/chinese-balloon-shoot-down/">shot down</a> what U.S. officials called a Chinese surveillance balloon off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4, 2023. Officials said that the U.S. Navy <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/02/04/us/china-spy-balloon">planned to recover the debris</a>, which is in shallow water.</em></p>
<p><em>The U.S. and Canada tracked the balloon as it crossed the Aleutian Islands, passed over Western Canada and entered U.S. airspace over Idaho. Officials of the U.S. Department of Defense confirmed on Feb. 2, 2023, that the military was <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/suspected-chinese-spy-balloon-found-northern-us-rcna68879">tracking the balloon</a> as it flew over the continental U.S. at an altitude of about 60,000 feet, including over Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. The base houses the 341st Missile Wing, which operates nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles.</em></p>
<p><em>The next day, Chinese officials <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202302/t20230203_11019484.html">acknowledged that the balloon was theirs</a> but denied it was intended for spying or meant to enter U.S. airspace. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the balloon’s incursion led him to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-antony-blinken-china-314302278a5f05bdc2df146ed5b35ec6">cancel his trip to Beijing</a>. He had been scheduled to meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang on Feb. 5 and 6.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Pentagon has reported that a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/02/03/second-chinese-spy-balloon-pentagon/">second suspected Chinese balloon</a> was seen over Latin America. On Feb. 4, officials told reporters that a third Chinese surveillance balloon was operating somewhere else in the world, and that the balloons are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/02/04/chinese-balloon-shoot-down/">part of a Chinese military surveillance program</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Monitoring an adversary from a balloon dates back to 1794, when the French <a href="https://www.centennialofflight.net/essay/Lighter_than_air/Napoleon%27s_wars/LTA3.htm">used a hot air balloon</a> to track Austrian and Dutch troops in the Battle of Fleurus. We asked aerospace engineer <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?hl=en&user=0vO6w7MAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">Iain Boyd</a> of the University of Colorado Boulder to explain how spy balloons work and why anyone would use one in the 21st century.</em></p>
<h2>What is a spy balloon?</h2>
<p>A spy balloon is literally a gas-filled balloon that is flying quite high in the sky, more or less where we fly commercial airplanes. It has some sophisticated cameras and imaging technology on it, and it’s pointing all of those instruments down at the ground. It’s collecting information through photography and other imaging of whatever is going on down on the ground below it.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/WglPIjZeC58?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A high-altitude Chinese balloon drifted over the U.S., entering over Montana and moving over the central portion of the country, causing the U.S. to send fighter jets into the air and triggering an angry response from the U.S. government.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Why would someone want to use a spy balloon instead of just using spy satellites?</h2>
<p>Satellites are the preferred method of spying from overhead. Spy satellites are above us today, typically at one of two <a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/OrbitsCatalog">different types of orbit</a>.</p>
<p>The first is called <a href="https://www.space.com/low-earth-orbit">low Earth orbit</a>, and, as the name suggests, those satellites are relatively close to the ground. But they’re still several hundred miles above us. For imaging and taking photographs, the closer you are to something, the more clearly you can see it, and this applies to spying as well. The satellites that are in low Earth orbit have the advantage that they’re closer to the Earth so they’re able to see things more clearly than satellites that are farther away. </p>
<p>The disadvantage these low Earth orbit satellites have is that they are continually moving around the Earth. It takes them about 90 minutes to do one orbit around the Earth. That turns out to be pretty fast in terms of taking clear photographs of what’s going on below. </p>
<p>The second type of satellite orbit is called <a href="https://www.space.com/29222-geosynchronous-orbit.html">geosynchronous orbit</a>, and that’s much farther away. It has the disadvantage that it’s harder to see things clearly when you’re very, very far away. But they have the advantage of what we call persistence, allowing satellites <a href="https://satelliteobservation.net/2016/10/17/persistent-surveillance/">to capture images continuously</a>. In those orbits, you’re essentially overlooking the exact same piece of ground on the Earth’s surface all the time because the satellite moves in exactly the same way the earth rotates – it rotates at the exact same speed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a black-and-white view from high above a seaport showing a submarine" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A U.S. satellite photo showing a Soviet submarine in port in 1982.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/images/gambhex/Gambit_and_Hexagon_Images/300_dpi/14.jpg">National Reconnaissance Office</a></span>
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<p>A balloon in some ways gets the best of those. These balloons are much, much closer to the ground than any of the satellites, so they can see even more clearly. And then, of course, balloons are moving, but they’re moving relatively slowly, so they also have a degree of persistence. However, spying is not usually done these days with balloons because they are a relatively easy target and are not completely controllable.</p>
<h2>What types of surveillance are spy balloons capable of?</h2>
<p>I don’t know what’s on this particular spy balloon, but it’s likely to be different kinds of cameras collecting different types of information.</p>
<p>These days, imaging is conducted across different regions of the <a href="https://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/science/toolbox/emspectrum1.html">electromagnetic spectrum</a>. Humans see in a certain range of this spectrum, the visible spectrum. And so if you have a camera and you take a photograph of your dog, that’s a visible photograph. That’s one of the things spy aircraft do. They take regular photographs, although they have very good zoom capabilities to be able to magnify what they’re seeing quite a lot. </p>
<p>But you can also gather different kinds of information in other parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. Another fairly well-known one is infrared. If it’s nighttime, a camera operating in the visible part of the spectrum is not going to show you anything. It’s all going to be dark. But an infrared camera can pick up things from heat in the dark.</p>
<h2>How do these balloons navigate?</h2>
<p>Most of these balloons literally go where the wind blows. There can be a little bit of navigation, but there are certainly not people aboard them. They are at the mercy of whatever the weather is. They sometimes have guiding apparatus on them that change a balloon’s altitude to catch winds going in particular directions. According to reports, U.S. officials said the Chinese surveillance balloon <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/02/04/chinese-balloon-shoot-down/">had propellers to help steer it</a>. If this is confirmed, it means that its operator would have much more control over the path of the balloon.</p>
<h2>What are the limits to a nation’s airspace? At what altitude does it become space and anybody’s right to be there?</h2>
<p>There is an internationally accepted boundary called the <a href="https://astronomy.com/news/2021/03/the-krmn-line-where-does-space-begin">Kármán Line</a> at 62 miles (100 kilometers) altitude. This balloon is well below that, so it is absolutely, definitely in U.S. airspace.</p>
<h2>Which countries are known to be using spy balloons?</h2>
<p>The Pentagon has had programs over the last few decades studying what can be done with balloons that couldn’t be done in the past. Maybe they’re bigger, maybe they can go higher in the atmosphere so they’re more difficult to shoot down or disable. Maybe they could be more persistent. </p>
<p>The broad interest in this incident illustrates its unusual nature. Few people <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/84ca852e-8653-43ac-ae76-023f8829229c">would expect any country to be actively using spy balloons</a> these days.</p>
<p>The U.S. flew many balloons over the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s, and those were eventually replaced by the high-altitude spy airplanes, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/technology/U-2">U-2s</a>, and they were subsequently replaced by satellites. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a black and white photograph of a group of men holding ropes attached to a large balloon being inflated from the back of a truck in a desert" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Project Moby Dick was an early Cold War-era effort by the U.S. to monitor the Soviet Union using high-altitude balloons.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Moby_Dick#/media/File:Launch_of_MOBY_DICK_balloon.png">United States Air Force Public Affairs</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>I’m sure a number of countries around the world have periodically gone back to reevaluate: Are there other things we could do now with balloons that we couldn’t do before? Do they close some gaps we have from satellites and airplanes? </p>
<h2>What does that say about the nature of this balloon, which China confirmed is theirs?</h2>
<p>China has complained for many years <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3153916/us-ships-and-planes-conducted-2000-spying-missions-aimed-china">about the U.S. spying</a> on China through satellites, through ships. And China is also well known for engaging in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-accuses-china-increased-south-china-sea-provocations-2022-07-26/">somewhat provocative behavior</a>, like in the South China Sea, sailing close to other nations’ boundaries and saber-rattling. I think it falls into that category. </p>
<p>The balloon doesn’t pose any real threat to the U.S. I think sometimes China is just experimenting to see how far they can push things. This isn’t really very advanced technology. It’s not serving any real military purpose. I think it’s much more likely some kind of political message.</p>
<p><em>This article has been updated to include news that the balloon has been shot down by the U.S. military.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199245/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iain Boyd receives funding from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Energy, NASA, and Lockheed-Martin. </span></em></p>A Chinese high-altitude balloon violated U.S. airspace, a serious enough breach to nix a high-level diplomatic meeting in Beijing. The balloon itself, however, was not much of a threat.Iain Boyd, Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences, University of Colorado BoulderLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1786042022-04-04T12:31:57Z2022-04-04T12:31:57ZCyberattacks have yet to play a significant role in Russia’s battlefield operations in Ukraine – cyberwarfare experts explain the likely reasons<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455111/original/file-20220329-21-1m41k8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3766%2C2514&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There is little evidence that Russia has coordinated cyber operations with conventional military operations in Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/UCRANIA-TENSIONESVISTAZO/6fcac2c9fc97432c9669ed9335602447/photo">Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Throughout the latter half of 2021, as it became clear that Russia was massing a large portion of its conventional combat power on the eastern borders of Ukraine, analysts offered contrasting predictions about the role cyberspace would play in an armed conflict. These predictions capture an ongoing debate about whether conflict in cyberspace is destined to <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/12/putin-does-not-need-invade-ukraine-get-his-way">supplant conventional conflict</a> or exacerbate it.</p>
<p>As the war has evolved, it’s clear that analysts on both sides of the debate got it wrong. Cyber operations did not replace the military invasion, and as far as we can tell, the Russian government has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/opinion/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks.html">not yet used cyber operations</a> as an integral <a href="https://www.vox.com/2022/3/19/22986316/russia-ukraine-cyber-attacks-holding-back">part of its military campaign</a>. </p>
<p>We are political scientists who study the role of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=2jdVG2wAAAAJ&hl=en">cybersecurity</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=8zd54PAAAAAJ&hl=en">information</a> in international conflict. <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/x4xxw0wgb1jgx7f/CCO_GK_112121.pdf?dl=0">Our research</a> shows that the reason pundits on both sides of the argument got it wrong is because they failed to consider that cyber and military operations serve different political objectives. </p>
<p>Cyber operations are most effective in pursuing informational goals, such as gathering intelligence, stealing technology or winning public opinion or diplomatic debates. In contrast, nations use military operations to occupy territory, capture resources, diminish an opponent’s military capability and terrorize a population. </p>
<h2>A tactical role for cyberattacks?</h2>
<p>It’s common in modern warfare for new technologies to substitute for traditional military tactics. For example, the U.S. has made extensive use of drones, including in conflicts in Yemen and Pakistan where crewed aircraft and ground forces would be difficult or impossible to use. Because drones allow the U.S. to fight on the cheap with much less risk, they substitute for other forms of warfare.</p>
<p>In theory, cyber operations could have played a similar tactical role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the Russian government has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/opinion/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks.html">yet to use cyber operations</a> in a manner that is clearly coordinated with military units and designed to smooth the advance of ground or air forces. When Russia invaded Ukraine, hackers <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/viasat-internet-hack-ukraine-russia/">disrupted access to satellite communications</a> for thousands of people, and it was apparently a <a href="https://twitter.com/Bing_Chris/status/1503749157995094016">concern for Ukrainian defense officials</a>. But overall, Ukraine has managed to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/29/ukraine-internet-faq/">maintain internet access</a> and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-ukraine-war-keeping-phones-online-becomes-key-defense-11648123200">cellphone service</a> for most of the country.</p>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2022/02/14/russia-and-china-devote-more-cyber-forces-to-offensive-operations-than-us-says-new-report/">sophisticated</a> cyber capabilities, and its hackers have <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/">worked their way into Ukrainian networks</a> for many years. This raises the question of why Russia has not, for the most part, <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/597272-where-is-russias-cyber-blitzkrieg">used cyber operations to provide tactical support</a> for its military campaigns in Ukraine, at least until this point.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="destroyed armored vehicles fill a tree-lined street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Destroyed Russian armored vehicles attest to the Ukrainian military’s ability to match up with the Russian military on a tactical level.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-general-view-shows-destroyed-russian-armored-vehicles-news-photo/1238921487">Photo by Aris Messins/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<h2>Separate roles</h2>
<p>In recent studies, we examined whether cyber operations mostly serve as complements to, or substitutes for, conventional conflict. In <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/x4xxw0wgb1jgx7f/CCO_GK_112121.pdf?dl=0">one analysis</a>, we examined conventional <a href="https://www.isanet.org/Conferences/Toronto-2019">military campaigns around the world</a> over a 10-year period using the <a href="https://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs">Militarized Interstate Disputes</a> dataset of all armed conflicts. We also focused on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717737138">the conflicts in Syria and eastern Ukraine</a>. Our results suggest that cyber operations are generally not being used as either.</p>
<p>Instead, nations tend to use these two types of operations independently from each other because each mode of conflict serves different objectives, and cyberwarfare is most effective for gathering intelligence, stealing technology or winning public opinion or diplomatic debates.</p>
<p>In contrast, nations use traditional forms of conflict to control tangible assets, such as capturing resources or occupying territory. The various goals offered by Russian President Vladimir Putin for invading Ukraine, such as <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/russia-worried-ukrainian-military-buildup-81487170">preventing Ukraine from joining NATO</a>, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-claims-denazification-justify-russias-attack-ukraine-experts-say-rcna17537">replacing the government</a> or <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/ukraine-building-a-nuclear-bomb-dangerous-nonsense/">countering fictitious Ukrainian weapons of mass destruction</a>, require occupying territory.</p>
<p>There may be other reasons for the lack of overlap between cyber and conventional fronts in Ukraine. The Russian military could consider cyber operations ineffective for its purposes. The newness of cyber operations as a tool of war makes it <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717737138">difficult to coordinate</a> with conventional military operations. Also, military targets might not be accessible to hackers because they might lack internet connectivity. </p>
<p>In any event, <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/x4xxw0wgb1jgx7f/CCO_GK_112121.pdf?dl=0">evidence</a> that the Russian government intends to use cyber operations to <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/12/expect-shock-and-awe-if-russia-invades-ukraine.html">complement</a> military operations is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002717737138">thin</a>. Our findings suggest hacking groups in previous conflicts faced considerable difficulties in responding to battlefield events, much less shaping them.</p>
<h2>How Russia is using cyber operations</h2>
<p>The main target of Russia’s digital campaign in Ukraine is ordinary Ukrainians. To date, Russian cyber operations have sought to <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/columnist/2022/03/07/russia-disinformation-ukraine-cyber-warfare/9402421002/">sow panic and fear, destabilizing the country from within</a>, by <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/cyber-attacks-hacks-and-misinformation-the-many-fronts-of-russias-hybrid-war-in-ukraine-11645871401">demonstrating the country’s inability to defend its infrastructure</a>, for example, by defacing or disabling websites.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A smart phone screen showing text in Ukrainian, Russian and Polish" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">On Jan. 14, 2022, hackers that the Ukrainian government identified as Russian attacked Ukrainian government websites.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-photo-illustration-a-warning-message-in-ukrainian-news-photo/1237728779">Photo illustration by Pavlo Gonchar/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>In addition, Russia has been using information campaigns to attempt to win the “hearts and minds” of Ukrainians. Prior to the start of the conflict, White House press secretary Jen Psaki warned of a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/01/14/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-fema-administrator-deanne-criswell-january-14-2022/">2,000% increase from the daily average in November</a> in <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/01/14/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-fema-administrator-deanne-criswell-january-14-2022/">Russian-language social media content</a>. This suggests that the purpose of these information operations was to make the case for Russia’s intervention on <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/01/14/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-fema-administrator-deanne-criswell-january-14-2022/">humanitarian grounds</a> and to build support for intervention among the Ukrainian public. The Russian government’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-introduce-jail-terms-spreading-fake-information-about-army-2022-03-04/">domestic actions</a> emphasize the value its leadership places on information operations.</p>
<h2>A supporting role</h2>
<p>Hackers’ actions tend to occur out of the public eye, rather than in the flamboyantly violent manner favored by Hollywood cyber villains, which means it’s difficult to know for sure what’s happening. Nevertheless, the lack of overlap between cyber and conventional military operations makes sense operationally and strategically. This is not to say that the informational focus of cyber operations has no effect on military operations. Good intelligence is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2019.1611205">essential for success</a> in any military conflict. </p>
<p>We believe Russia is likely to continue conducting information campaigns to influence Ukrainians, its domestic public and international audiences. Russia is also likely to seek to further penetrate Ukrainian networks to access information that potentially assists its military operations. But because cyber operations have not been thoroughly integrated into its military campaigns so far, cyber operations are likely to continue playing a secondary role in the conflict.</p>
<p>[<em>Understand new developments in science, health and technology, each week.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=science&source=inline-science-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s science newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178604/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erik Gartzke receives funding from DoD Minerva, the Hewlett Foundation and the Charles Koch Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nadiya Kostyuk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cyberattacks can be devastating, just not on the battlefield, according to researchers who looked at 10 years of armed conflicts around the world.Nadiya Kostyuk, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of TechnologyErik Gartzke, Professor of Political Science, University of California, San DiegoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1461032020-09-14T06:50:06Z2020-09-14T06:50:06ZKeep calm, but don’t just carry on: how to deal with China’s mass surveillance of thousands of Australians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357832/original/file-20200914-18-7xrxzl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>National security is like sausage-making. We might enjoy the tasty product, but want to look away from the manufacturing. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-14/chinese-data-leak-linked-to-military-names-australians/12656668">Recent news</a> that Chinese company Zhenhua Data is profiling more than 35,000 Australians isn’t a surprise to people with an interest in privacy, security and social networks. We need to think critically about this, knowing we <em>can</em> do something to prevent it from happening again.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/china-s-social-media-warfare-database-lists-key-australians-20200910-p55u95">Reports indicate</a> Zhenhua provides services to the Chinese government. It may also provide services to businesses in China and overseas.</p>
<p>The company operates under Chinese law and doesn’t appear to have a presence in Australia. That means we can’t shut it down or penalise it for a breach of our law. Also, Beijing is unlikely to respond to expressions of outrage from Australia or condemnation by our government – especially amid recent sabre-rattling.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/journalists-have-become-diplomatic-pawns-in-chinas-relations-with-the-west-setting-a-worrying-precedent-145749">Journalists have become diplomatic pawns in China's relations with the West, setting a worrying precedent</a>
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<p>Zhenhua is <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/personal-details-of-more-than-35-000-australians-included-in-leaked-chinese-database">reported to</a> have data on more than 35,000 Australians – a list saturated by political leaders and prominent figures. Names, birthdays, addresses, marital status, photographs, political associations, relatives and social media account details are among the information extracted.</p>
<p>It seems Zhenhua has data on a wide range of Australians, including public figures such as Victorian supreme court judge Anthony Cavanough, Australia’s former ambassador to China Geoff Raby, former NSW premier and federal foreign affairs minister Bob Carr, tech billionaire Mike Cannon-Brookes and singer Natalie Imbruglia.</p>
<p>It’s not clear how individuals are being targeted. The profiling might be systematic. It might instead be conducted on the basis of a specific industry, academic discipline, public prominence or perceived political influence. </p>
<p>It’s unlikely Zhenhua profiles random members of the public. That means there’s no reason for average citizens without a China connection to be worried. </p>
<p>Still, details around the intelligence gathering elude us, so best practise for the public is to maintain as much online privacy as possible, whenever possible.</p>
<p>Overall, we don’t know much about Zhenhua’s goals. And what we do know came from a leak to a US academic <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-14/chinese-data-leak-linked-to-military-names-australians/12656668">who sensibly fled</a> China in 2018, fearing for his safety.</p>
<h2>Pervasive surveillance is the norm</h2>
<p>Pervasive surveillance is now a standard feature of all major governments, which often rely on surveillance-for-profit companies. Governments in the West buy services from <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-shady-world-of-the-data-industry-strips-away-our-freedoms-143823">big data analytic</a> companies such as <a href="https://www.palantir.com/">Palantir</a>. </p>
<p>Australia’s government gathers information outside our borders, too. Take the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/aug/10/witness-k-and-the-outrageous-spy-scandal-that-failed-to-shame-australia">bugging</a> of the Timor-Leste government, a supposed <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/timor-leste/development-assistance/Pages/development-assistance-in-timor-leste">friend</a> rather than enemy. </p>
<h2>How sophisticated is the plot?</h2>
<p>Revelations about Zhenhua have referred to the use of artificial intelligence and the “<a href="https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1527&context=faculty_scholarship">mosaic</a>” method of intelligence gathering. But this is probably less exciting than it sounds. </p>
<p>Reports indicate much of the data was extracted from online open sources. Access to much of this would have simply involved using algorithms to aggregate targets’ names, dates, qualifications and work history data found on publicly available sites. </p>
<p>The algorithms then help put the individual pieces of the “mosaic” together and fill in the holes on the basis of each individual’s relationship with others, such as their as peers, colleagues or partners. </p>
<p>Some of the data for the mosaic may come from hacking or be gathered directly by the profiler. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-14/chinese-data-leak-linked-to-military-names-australians/12656668">According to</a> the ABC, some data that landed in Zhenhua’s lap was taken from the dark web. </p>
<p>One seller might have spent years copying data from university networks. For example, last year the Australian National University <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-04/anu-data-hack-bank-records-personal-information/11176788">acknowledged</a> major personal data breaches had taken place, potentially extending back 19 years. </p>
<p>This year there was also the unauthorised (and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/sep/10/service-nsw-hack-could-have-been-prevented-with-simple-security-measures">avoidable</a>) access by cybercriminals to NSW government data on <a href="https://ia.acs.org.au/article/2020/3-8m-documents-stolen-from-nsw-govt.html">200,000</a> people.</p>
<p>While it may be confronting to know a foreign state is compiling information on Australian citizens, it should be comforting to learn sharing this information can be avoided – if you’re careful.</p>
<h2>What’s going on in the black box?</h2>
<p>One big question is what Zhenhua’s customers in China’s political and business spheres might do with the data they’ve compiled on Australian citizens. Frankly, we don’t know. National security is often a black box and we are unlikely ever to get verifiable details.</p>
<p>Apart from distaste at being profiled, we might say being watched is no big deal, especially given many of those on the list are already public figures. Simply having an AI-assisted “Who’s Who” of prominent Australians isn’t necessarily frightening. </p>
<p>However, it is of concern if the information collected is being used for disinformation, such as through any means intended to erode trust in political processes, or subvert elections. </p>
<p>For instance, a report published in June by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute detailed how Chinese-speaking people in Australia were being <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-disinformation-threat-is-real-we-need-better-defences-against-state-based-cyber-campaigns-141044">targeted</a> by a “persistent, large-scale influence campaign linked to Chinese state actors”. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357837/original/file-20200914-18-1jflzfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Illustration of surveillance camera with Chinese flag draped over." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357837/original/file-20200914-18-1jflzfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357837/original/file-20200914-18-1jflzfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357837/original/file-20200914-18-1jflzfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357837/original/file-20200914-18-1jflzfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357837/original/file-20200914-18-1jflzfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357837/original/file-20200914-18-1jflzfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357837/original/file-20200914-18-1jflzfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">In June, Prime Minister Scott Morrison did not deny claims from senior federal government sources claiming China was behind a major state-based attack against several of Australia’s sectors, including all levels of government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>Deep fake videos are another form of subversion of increasing concern to governments and academics, particularly <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2019/01/business/pentagons-race-against-deepfakes/">in the US</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/deepfake-videos-could-destroy-trust-in-society-heres-how-to-restore-it-110999">Deepfake videos could destroy trust in society – here’s how to restore it</a>
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<h2>Can we fix this?</h2>
<p>We can’t make Zhenhua and its competitors disappear. Governments think they are too useful. </p>
<p>Making everything visible to state surveillance is now the ambition of many law enforcement bodies and all intelligence agencies. It’s akin to Google and its competitors <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ugly-truth-tech-companies-are-tracking-and-misusing-our-data-and-theres-little-we-can-do-127444">wanting to know</a> (<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-accc-is-suing-google-for-misleading-millions-but-calling-it-out-is-easier-than-fixing-it-143447">and sell</a>) everything about us, without regard for privacy as a human right.</p>
<p>We can, however, build resilience.</p>
<p>One way is to require government agencies and businesses to safeguard their databases. That hasn’t been the case with the NSW government, <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/medicare-data-breach-is-the-tip-of-the-iceberg-in-the-world-of-australian-dark-web-fraud">Commonwealth</a> governments, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/millions-facebook-user-records-exposed-amazon-cloud-server/">Facebook</a>, <a href="https://www.wired.com/2015/08/happened-hackers-posted-stolen-ashley-madison-data/">dating services</a> and major hospitals. </p>
<p>In Australia, we need to adopt recommendations by law reform inquiries and establish a national right to privacy. The associated privacy tort would incentivise data custodians and also encourage the public to avoid oversharing online.</p>
<p>In doing so, we might be better placed to condemn both China and other nations participating in unethical intelligence gathering, while properly acknowledging our own <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/aug/10/witness-k-and-the-outrageous-spy-scandal-that-failed-to-shame-australia">wrongdoings</a> in Timor-Leste.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146103/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bruce Baer Arnold is affiliated with the Australian Privacy Foundation and is a member of OECD data working parties. </span></em></p>It’s not clear how individuals are being targeted. And while they’re mostly high-profile people, that doesn’t mean there’s no lesson for the average person to take away.Bruce Baer Arnold, Assistant Professor, School of Law, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/714492017-01-26T00:46:29Z2017-01-26T00:46:29ZSix myths about national security intelligence<p>President Trump has gotten off to a rough start with the intelligence community.</p>
<p>The day after being sworn in, Trump <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-cia-speech-transcript/">spoke at CIA headquarters</a> in an apparent attempt to mend his relationship with the agency. The relationship was frayed in large part due to Trump’s skepticism about an intelligence assessment that suggested <a href="http://time.com/4625301/cia-russia-wikileaks-dnc-hacking/">Russia had hacked</a> into the emails of the Democratic National Committee and Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s campaign.</p>
<p>Where did this skepticism come from? <a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/01/feds-damning-report-russian-election-hack-wont-convince-skeptics/">Trump</a> – along with some <a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/01/feds-damning-report-russian-election-hack-wont-convince-skeptics/">security experts</a> – has expressed doubt about the complexity of cyberattack <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/trump-says-u-s-intel-i-want-them-be-sure-n701961">attribution</a> and the <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/ex-cia-officers-trump-dossier-russia-2017-1">reliability of the intelligence sources</a>. This skepticism seems to be fueled by the desire for <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/12/31/russian-hacking-grizzly-steppe/">irrefutable evidence</a> of Russia interference in the election.</p>
<p>At Georgetown University, I study and teach how the intelligence community collects, analyzes and circulates sensitive information to policymakers and elected officials. I’d like to point out some of the misunderstandings about intelligence activities exhibited not only by the new president, but in the media coverage of the Russian interference in the presidential election of 2016.</p>
<p>Correcting these persistent myths is important because they set unrealistic expectations about intelligence production and analysis. These false expectations could damage the credibility of the U.S. intelligence community and its ability to fulfill its mission.</p>
<h2>Myth #1: Intelligence and evidence are the same</h2>
<p>Intelligence and evidence are <a href="http://www.rand.org/blog/2003/02/the-big-difference-between-intelligence-and-evidence.html">starkly different</a>. </p>
<p>Intelligence analysts are tasked with understanding situations that are often multifaceted, forming a judgment about that situation and informing policymakers. </p>
<p>On the other hand, law enforcement investigators produce evidence required to meet legal standards of the burden of proof. In a courtroom, direct proof of a crime – such as DNA, fingerprints, witness testimony or a confession – is the best evidence. </p>
<p>In the intelligence community, analysts have to deal with foreign intelligence agencies and terrorist groups who have the ability to use counterintelligence measures and disinformation campaigns to deceive U.S. intelligence officers and create uncertainty.</p>
<p>It would be unrealistic to expect intelligence agency to always provide “fully proved evidence” in their assessment. </p>
<p>Another reason people are skeptical of intelligence is the lack of explanation on how analysts draw their conclusions. </p>
<p>For example, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declassified <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3254241-ICA-2017-01.html#document/p1">a report</a> on Russia’s role in influencing the U.S. election in early January. In response, Robert Graham, an analyst for a cybersecurity firm, told <a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/01/feds-damning-report-russian-election-hack-wont-convince-skeptics/">Wired</a>: “Knowing what data they probably have, they could have given us more details. And that really pisses me off.” </p>
<p>Susan Hennessey, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, sent out the following tweet in response to the report. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"817479008124276736"}"></div></p>
<p>But these criticisms are misguided, in my opinion. The techniques used by the intelligence agencies must be kept secret to avoid revealing U.S. methods and analysis capabilities to our adversaries.</p>
<h2>Myth #2: Intelligence can predict the future</h2>
<p>Former President Barack Obama has been criticized for not releasing detailed intelligence assessment about the Russian hacks before the election. Some have said that the intelligence community should have warned the public – sooner and more forcefully – about the impact of Russian interference. </p>
<p>But these criticisms can be attributed to 20/20 hindsight and illustrate the myth that intelligence officials can somehow predict the future.</p>
<p>Despite all the technology available to the intelligence community, we are not yet in the scenario of the movie “<a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0181689/">Minority Report</a>,” in which special units prevent murders seconds before they happen with the help of psychics and visualization technology. </p>
<p>In fact, the intelligence community has had many failures. It failed to foresee <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/21/world/director-admits-cia-fell-short-in-predicting-the-soviet-collapse.html">the rapid collapse</a> of the Soviet Union, the rise of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/former-cia-official-cites-agencys-failure-to-see-al-qaedas-rebound/2015/05/03/d68e7292-f028-11e4-8abc-d6aa3bad79dd_story.html?utm_term=.dae1272a1d49">Arab Spring</a> and more recently <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/28/u-s-spies-said-no-invasion-putin-disagreed.html">the invasion of Crimea</a>. The intelligence community could not predict the intensity of Russian interference or how close the election would be.</p>
<p>Here’s what they can do. Intelligence agencies produce what is called “national security estimates” which represent an combination of analysts’ opinions. These are rated on <a href="https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-203.pdf">a confidence level scale</a> that varies from “almost no chance” to “almost certain.” The rating is based on the quality of information, depth of analysts’ knowledge on the issue, the credibility and reliability of the sources used to produce the intelligence and the ability to corroborate with other sources. </p>
<p>In other words, intelligence estimates are carefully weighed against rigorous criteria to ensure validity and credibility of the assessment. Even so, intelligence agencies deal with plausible scenarios, not predictions. </p>
<h2>Myth #3: Intelligence results from covert operations</h2>
<p>Perhaps surprisingly, approximately <a href="https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/aldrich/vigilant/">80 percent</a> of the intelligence used by security agencies is not secret and does not require covert operations. </p>
<p>Most intelligence is gathered through “<a href="https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/open-source-intelligence.html">open sources intelligence</a>,” like internet content; traditional mass media, including television, radio, newspapers and magazines; specialized journals, conference proceedings and think tank studies; photos; maps and commercial imagery; and publicly accessible databases.</p>
<p>There are two main challenges with “open source intelligence.” Sometimes the information needed isn’t available in digital format, and sometimes it’s not in English. </p>
<p>These limitations may sometimes trigger covert operations. But in the majority of cases, intelligence estimates are rather dry reading that includes little bombshell information.</p>
<h2>Myth #4: The intelligence community is mainly composed of spies</h2>
<p>Since intelligence requirements can be addressed through open sources, the need for spies is relatively low. </p>
<p>Only about 10 percent of the employees of the CIA are covert operatives. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2003/09/how_deep_is_cia_cover.html">Ninety percent</a> are analysts, managers, scientists and support staff. The vast majority of intelligence employees work at a desk and often possess high-level expertise in geopolitical issues, history and international relations. Very few play James Bond in a foreign country.</p>
<h2>Myth #5: Top secret intelligence is seen by small number of people</h2>
<p>In the United States, approximately <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/omb/suitsec-2014.pdf">5.1 million</a> people have security clearance to handle sensitive information. Among this group, 1.4 million received a “top secret” clearance. </p>
<p>“Top secret” is not the most secret clearance. There are also an unknown number of individuals that carry clearance above “top secret” such as “sensitive compartmental information” and “special access programs.” </p>
<p>Such “crowded intelligence environment” increases the risk that sensitive information gets released intentionally or unintentionally.</p>
<h2>Myth #6: Only presidents get presidential daily briefings</h2>
<p>During the transition period, President Trump created another precedent by delegating the so-called <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/09/politics/intelligence-briefings-trump/">“presidential daily briefing”</a> to Vice President Mike Pence. While this precedent does mean the intel community is losing a regular appointment with the president, it is not unusual for the presidential daily briefing to be read by other people.</p>
<p>It has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-the-presidents-daily-brief/2016/12/29/eeb4bbec-c862-11e6-8bee-54e800ef2a63_story.html?utm_term=.52de588b8510">reported</a> that, during the Obama administration, this document was seen by more than 30 people, including senior intelligence analysts, White House senior advisers, department secretaries and selected ranking members of Congress. </p>
<p>Despite the number of reviewers, the intelligence community had daily access to Obama for the briefing – something that, so far, President Trump has withheld from them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71449/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frederic Lemieux does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The president, the press and the public have misguided ideas about how intelligence is produced and analyzed. A Georgetown professor sets us straight.Frederic Lemieux, Professor and Program Director of the Master's degree in Applied Intelligence, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/487792015-10-08T14:55:30Z2015-10-08T14:55:30ZHow Syria is becoming a test bed for high-tech weapons of electronic warfare<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/97765/original/image-20151008-9655-iihcyd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The relationship between Russia and the West is <a href="https://theconversation.com/just-how-dangerous-are-the-skies-over-syria-48456">becoming increasingly dangerous</a> with potential flashpoints developing in both eastern Europe and Syria. After repeated incursions into Turkish airspace by Russian warplanes on bombing raids over Syria, NATO’s secretary general Jens Stoltenberg warned Moscow that it stands ready to “defend all allies”. Meanwhile Britain announced it would send troops to Baltic states to defend NATO’s eastern boundaries against possible Russian aggression beyond Ukraine.</p>
<p>Russia’s military presence in Syria has been steadily increasing over the past few months. Its warplanes are carrying out regular bombing raids against both Islamic State position and, reportedly, other rebel groups opposed to the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Its warships are <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34465425">launching cruise missiles</a> against the same targets. But the latest reports are that Russia has also deployed its most modern electronic warfare system to Syria – the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/06/spy-planes-signal-jammers-and-putins-high-tech-war-in-syria/">Krasukha-4</a> (or Belladonna) mobile electronic warfare (EW) unit.</p>
<p>The Krasukha-4 is a broad-band multifunctional jamming system designed to neutralise <a href="http://www.space.com/11771-military-space-army-tiny-spy-satellites.html">Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) spy satellites</a> such as the <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/lacrosse.htm">US Lacrosse/Onyx series</a>, airborne surveillance radars and radar-guided ordinance at ranges between 150km to 300km. The system is reported to be able to cause damage to the enemy’s EW systems and communications. The Krasukha-4 system works by creating powerful jamming at the fundamental radar frequencies and other radio-emitting sources. </p>
<p>Lt General Hodges, the commander of US Army Forces Europe, commented that Russia had <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/leaders/interviews/2015/03/27/lt-gen-ben-hodges/70573420/">demonstrated a high level of offensive EW proficiency</a> against Ukrainian forces in Donbas using a first foreign deployment of the Krasukha-4 system.</p>
<h2>Hi tech hostilities</h2>
<p>Electronic warfare (EW) was first developed in World War II by the UK to defend against Axis bomber attacks and to defend Allied bombers from enemy surveillance systems. From that time there have been major technological breakthroughs and EW is now acknowledged to be a major fighting element of armed forces worldwide. The US, Russia and Europe invest billions of dollars each year in research and development in order to be the best at this essential military art, while Asian countries, led by China, also view EW as ta vital area for research and development. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/97776/original/image-20151008-9675-1erq4z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/97776/original/image-20151008-9675-1erq4z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97776/original/image-20151008-9675-1erq4z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97776/original/image-20151008-9675-1erq4z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97776/original/image-20151008-9675-1erq4z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97776/original/image-20151008-9675-1erq4z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97776/original/image-20151008-9675-1erq4z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">E3 Sentry – NATO’s ‘eyes in the sky’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>EW is considered to include electronic attack/support, electronic intelligence and signals intelligence. In conflicts since World war II, EW has played an increasingly important role in major including Korea, Vietnam, Arab/Israeli, Balkans, Desert Storm/Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. EW is effectively employed before the hard fighting begins to deny an opponent intelligence and the use of weapon systems.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, NATO countries led by the US and directly supported by the UK have been actively gathering intelligence from countries employing EW assets including low-orbit surveillance satellites (<a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/lacrosse.htm">Lacrosse/Onyx</a> series), reconnaissance aircraft (NATO E3 Sentry (AWACS), <a href="http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/rc135wrivetjoint.cfm">USAF RC135-Rivet Joint</a>, <a href="http://www.raf.mod.uk/currentoperations/intelligence.cfm">RAF’s Sentinel R1 and Reaper drones</a>), and sharing intelligence information with the side being supported in the conflict.</p>
<p>Since the land grab by the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in both Iraq and Syria, NATO’s EW assets have been targeting IS rebel fighting units, gathering intelligence to provide tactical target information and to actively engage IS by denying rebel units radio communication and surveillance information – thus electronically blinding them. Sanitised intelligence information is shared with friendly forces including the rebel forces opposed to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.</p>
<p>Until September 2015, Russia has been supporting Assad by supplying arms and training to Syrian forces. Bolstered by what it sees as Western indecisiveness on a Syria solution and by the West’s inaction on Russia’s military intervention in the Ukraine, Russia has decided to provide direct military air support to Syria. However, Assad’s enemies comprise all rebel groups opposing his rule – not just IS.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/97777/original/image-20151008-9664-11mm5za.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/97777/original/image-20151008-9664-11mm5za.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97777/original/image-20151008-9664-11mm5za.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97777/original/image-20151008-9664-11mm5za.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97777/original/image-20151008-9664-11mm5za.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97777/original/image-20151008-9664-11mm5za.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97777/original/image-20151008-9664-11mm5za.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">RAF Sentinel 1: the UK’s eyes and ears on the battlefield.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russia is aware that NATO surveillance assets are able to monitor all Syrian-based Russian military aircraft activity including the rebel groups it is targeting, locations and weapons used. Some of these rebel groups are directly supported by the US and its allies which may result in Russia becoming in direct political conflict with NATO. To avoid being spied on, Russia needs to blind the eyes and silence the ears of NATO reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering assets so its actions are not open to close scrutiny.</p>
<h2>Cat and mouse conflict</h2>
<p>So how can the Krasukha-4 be used to cloak Russia’s operations in Syria? In words – partially effectively. Its surveillance systems will not only be able to monitor NATO aircraft movement over Syria but also the types, and from its intelligence it will know the frequencies used and signal characteristics present – Lacrosse satellites and AWACS operate in S-band, Sentinel (and similar) in X-band, and drones in J-band. Lacrosse/Onyx satellite positions are continually tracked by Russia. With this intelligence detail the Krasukha-4 can be programmed to engage in order to deny or disrupt NATO intelligence gathering. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/97779/original/image-20151008-9637-1ja43a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/97779/original/image-20151008-9637-1ja43a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97779/original/image-20151008-9637-1ja43a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97779/original/image-20151008-9637-1ja43a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97779/original/image-20151008-9637-1ja43a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97779/original/image-20151008-9637-1ja43a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/97779/original/image-20151008-9637-1ja43a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The EQ9 Reaper drone: high tech target for Krasukha-4.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But it is not all one way – US and NATO intelligence gatherers will have “<a href="http://www.radartutorial.eu/16.eccm/ja08.en.html">electronic counter counter measures</a>” (ECCM) to combat Russian EW interference – and so the cat and mouse game of the Cold War is repeated. Intelligence gathering and radar-guided munitions will suffer some disruption and mistakes may be made but operations will continue.</p>
<p>ECCM may include being frequency agile and dodging the jamming signal or pointing the receive antenna away slightly from the jamming source. There are also many tricks that can be played with signal processing that will mitigate the effects of jamming. Of course, it would also be possible for NATO to jam the Russian surveillance radar, denying them of identification and positioning of NATO aircraft – but this would really ramp up the war of words with Vladimir Putin. We must also accept that the Krasukha-4 EW system is an essential part of the defence of Russian forces at the Latakia airfield in Syria and this must not be denied them.</p>
<p>Russian military has long appreciated that “radio-electronic combat” is integral to modern warfare and accordingly that it offers a set of relatively inexpensive weapons that can potentially cripple an opponent’s ability to sense, communicate and exercise command and control within a battlespace. </p>
<p>Russia will now be able to test its new EW systems in live combat but avoiding direct conflict with NATO – it will enhance overseas sales prospects of the Krasukha-4 system. NATO will be able test its ECCM against another EW system, presumably with similar ends in mind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48779/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Stupples does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The face-off between Russia and the West in Syria is giving both sides a chance to try out their new high-tech weaponry.David Stupples, Professor of Electrical and Electronic Engineering and Director of Electronic Warfare, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/414122015-05-07T10:51:18Z2015-05-07T10:51:18ZFrance, ‘cradle of liberty’, struggles to balance anti-terrorism law and rights<p>The French National Assembly has voted through measures that would grant <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/french-parliament-approves-intrusive-surveillance-laws-after-charlie-hebdo-attack-10228206.html">sweeping surveillance powers</a> including wiretaps and secret cameras. The measures are part of counter-terrorism legislation hurried through parliament in the wake of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/charlie-hebdo-attack-this-is-not-a-clash-of-civilisations-36030">attacks on Charlie Hebdo magazine</a> in January that left 17 dead.</p>
<p>If approved by the Senate, the legislation will allow the use of wiretaps, secret cameras or other surveillance measures without a warrant from a judge. The legislation also allows security agencies to install scanning devices at telecoms firms’ premises, to allow for untargeted, sweeping surveillance.</p>
<h2>‘We are at war against terrorism’</h2>
<p>The French president, François Hollande, and his executive have prioritised the fight against terrorism. They surprised many in January 2013 when they sent French troops to Mali to provide support against “terrorist elements” and, earlier this year, when they deployed the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Gulf to fight the Islamic State.</p>
<p>The executive is concerned by the radicalisation and involvement in terrorist groups of French citizens and residents. The Ministry of Interior has flagged 1,422 persons as being involved in the Syrian conflict alone, <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/03/16/01016-20150316ARTFIG00403-plus-de-1400-francais-ou-residents-engages-dans-le-djihad.php">including 413 fighting in combat zones</a>. </p>
<p>Two counter-terrorism laws <a href="http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000029754374">have already been passed</a> by the French parliament in 2014 and anti-terror <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/21/france-anti-terror-measures-paris-attacks-manuel-valls">measures worth 940m euros</a> have been introduced since January. These include a “stop jihadism” website, training for judicial services to identify those who might be under the influence of terrorist networks, reinforced security controls such as <a href="http://www.risques.gouv.fr/menaces-terroristes/le-plan-vigipirate">plan vigipirate</a> (similar to the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/terrorism-national-emergency/terrorism-threat-levels">UK threat level</a>) and increased recruitment to the secret services, police and army.</p>
<p>But the passing of this law by the National Assembly has taken the war against terrorism in a new direction. In February 2015, a <a href="http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000030195477&categorieLien=id">decree</a> allowed authorities to block pro-terrorism websites without judicial oversight. The new legislation extends this self-authorisation to surveillance measures such as phone-tapping. It will also allow for constant collection of internet metadata and information to identify threats and persons of interest automatically – as Edward Snowden’s leaked documents revealed to be common in the US and UK. The only oversight will be provided by a panel of magistrates, politicians and communications experts – where deemed necessary.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/80735/original/image-20150506-10940-jqz0if.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/80735/original/image-20150506-10940-jqz0if.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80735/original/image-20150506-10940-jqz0if.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80735/original/image-20150506-10940-jqz0if.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80735/original/image-20150506-10940-jqz0if.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80735/original/image-20150506-10940-jqz0if.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80735/original/image-20150506-10940-jqz0if.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">France fears that it may end up with a surveillance culture, as in Britain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/35972505@N00/2416377899/">oogiboig</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Human rights in the face of terror</h2>
<p>The threat of terrorism presents a challenge for Hollande as he must find a balance between effective counter-terrorist measures and France’s values – particularly its commitment to human rights. France is not the first to face this difficulty, but the French people have learnt from the Patriot Act and others enacted in the US, and are wary of how far steps taken against terrorism in their own country could go.</p>
<p>The idea that France is the birthplace of human rights is deeply embedded. For example, in 1981 Socialist president Mitterrand explained that France was the “champion of the rights of the citizen”, referring to the French as “the sons of the French Revolution”. Likewise, Liberal president Chirac argued in his <a href="http://www.amazon.fr/M%C3%A9moires-Chaque-pas-doit-%C3%AAtre/dp/2841113930">Memoires</a> that “France is custodian of a vision, of values, of a humanist ideal”. </p>
<p>After the attacks in January, the incumbent French prime minister, <a href="http://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/3118-seance-speciale-d-hommage-aux-victimes-des-attentats-allocution-de-manuel-valls-premier-ministre">Manuel Valls</a>, referred to France as “the spirit of the Enlightenment”. He also said that although “an exceptional situation needs to be responded to with exceptional measures” he would never “infringe on the principles of law and values”.</p>
<h2>Checks and balances</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, there are concerns the legislation goes too far. NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the Mozilla Foundation that creates the Firefox web browser, and ISPs opposed the project. <a href="http://www.laquadrature.net/">Quadrature du Net</a>, an online rights campaign, declared that it “goes even further than the NSA”. French data protection agency <a href="http://www.cnil.fr/english/">CNIL</a> and the Paris Bar also oppose the legislation – Judge Marc Trévidic condemned the “exorbitant powers” it would give the surveillance agencies. Even the New York Times editorial board has warned of the consequences for the freedom of press. </p>
<p>Legislation brought forward last year that allowed authorities to access internet user data met a similar reaction. And while the Charlie Hebdo shootings might have given more leeway to the government, the French people do not seem willing to compromise their rights in the fight against terrorism. In <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualites/2015/01/15/01001-20150115QCMWWW00170-faut-il-limiter-la-liberte-d-expression-sur-internet-pour-lutter-contre-le-terrorisme.php">an informal poll</a> by the newspaper Le Figaro, only 64% agreed that freedoms should be limited to fight terrorism – less than expected, given the paper’s conservative readership and the fact that the poll took place the week after the January attacks. </p>
<p>A group of 75 MPs have declared that if the legislation is passed, they will call upon the Constitutional Council to review the constitutionality of the law. So Hollande and his government face a difficult puzzle: how to fight terrorism without compromising elements of France’s identity. This will inevitably mean addressing concerns over the legislation’s extent and the lack of judicial overview – as the bill now heads to the Senate, it remains to be seen if it stays unchanged by the upper house.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41412/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Eglantine Staunton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Legislation is passed in France that would see state surveillance powers scale towards those in the US and UK.Dr Eglantine Staunton, PhD student, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/411082015-05-06T14:14:36Z2015-05-06T14:14:36ZExplainer: does the EU need its own intelligence agency?<p>The president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4427521.ece">has called for a European Union</a> counter-intelligence agency that would protect EU institutions – the commission, council and parliament, among others – against espionage. </p>
<p>Juncker’s call came after revelations in the German media that Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/30/germany-spied-on-european-partners-on-behalf-of-us-for-years">had spied</a> not only on EU officials, but also the French foreign ministry and the Élysée Palace, before turning the information over to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).</p>
<p>What is surprising here is that Juncker’s proposed spy agency would be aimed at preventing counter-intelligence (CI) from member states within the EU itself in the first instance, though it would almost certainly have a role to play in broader CI activities. The notion of an EU intelligence countering, if not a gathering, organisation is interesting, as no other international organisation has a spy agency, per se. </p>
<p>Take for instance the United Nations, where the member states look after their own security and counter-espionage arrangements; the UN does not require a CI agency, simply because secrecy is not in the mandate of the UN itself. The EU – as a membership organisation – is arguably different and there are already areas in which some of the work of CI is likely to be happening. </p>
<p>For example, in the common policy area called security and defence. From the <a href="http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/nice_treaty_en.htm">Treaty of Nice in 2001</a>, the EU has had a common security and defence policy (updated after the Treaty of Lisbon 2007). From these initiatives, we have seen European operations all over the world – from East Timor to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The <a href="http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0026_en.htm">Common Security and Defence Policy</a> is aimed at activities outside the EU. In addition, the EU has the European Defence Agency which allows defence forces of member states to co-operate in developing shared doctrine and security strategies. </p>
<p>In non-military terms, perhaps more closely aligned with a proposed spy agency are the policy areas around <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/jha/">justice and home affairs</a> which involve member states’ civil agencies including police forces. In managing a common market with the free movement of labour and trade, there is a need to maintain a level of co-operation among member-states – but also a standard of compliance to make sure that no area of the EU leads to problems for the other. This mandates for traditional intelligence sharing – rather than gathering – especially in areas around counter-terrorism and combating international organised crime. </p>
<p>While security and defence policy largely remains the prerogative of individual member states, justice and home affairs has become an important part of the European Commission’s role in managing 28 member states in a common market. And while security and defence policy has been focused outwards, justice and home affairs has been primarily focused inwards, though the commission has provided training for non-member countries. </p>
<p>All of this is to say that the EU already does have the mandate to regulate its security profile in several ways.</p>
<p>Yet, some may see a CI agency as being far more active than either security and defence or justice and home affairs. Traditional CI means collecting intelligence in order to prevent espionage aimed at the home state. We could easily be in a place where an EU spy agency becomes less about countering intelligence and instead becomes a player in the espionage game for commission purposes. </p>
<h2>Who can trust the EU?</h2>
<p>Here lies the crux of the problem: whose intelligence is being protected in an EU spy agency? If it is to protect the member states as they go about doing business with each other through the EU’s institutions, then there is at least political room for manoeuvre – they are, in effect, pulling in the same direction against any external intelligence interference or threat. </p>
<p>However, if CI is to protect the European Commission against the intelligence agencies of the member states themselves, it is difficult to see where a mandate would come from. There is no interest among member states for deepening the commission’s agency in intelligence-gathering, especially not from member state intelligence communities.</p>
<p>The problem, though, is bigger than simply political will. On March 9, Juncker voiced support for the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31796337">development of an EU army</a>, possible under the Lisbon Treaty. Juncker was responding in his statement to the resurgence of Russia and its potential threat to EU member states, not all of which are NATO-allied states. </p>
<p>Has the president of the European Commission started on a path towards a more bellicose EU, with both a proposed spy agency and an army? The answer is more than likely no – at least, in the first instance. Juncker’s statements point towards an increasing gap between what our institutions are set up to do and how the world is changing. </p>
<p>While increased security and defence policies were seen as taboo for a very long time, especially among the UK and other more transatlantic EU member-states, this changed with the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/227598.stm">Saint Malo agreement</a> in 1998 between the British and French governments that allowed for greater military co-operation. The challenge for Juncker and member state governments is whether the current arrangements to safeguard the EU and its constituent parts is already covered – or whether we need something more, something different to tackle new challenges.</p>
<p>Let us not forget the state of the EU as it currently stands. Trust in the EU’s institutions has never been high – and in many states, not just the UK, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10586961/Trust-in-EU-at-an-all-time-low-latest-figures-show.html">trust appears to be getting lower</a>. On this basis, I cannot imagine that an EU spy agency, much less an EU army, will aid the EU in building trust in the union itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41108/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David J. Galbreath receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the Arts and Humanities Research Council. He is the Editor-in-Chief of the journal European Security. These views are his own.</span></em></p>The president of the European Commission has called for the EU to maintain its own spy agency.David J Galbreath, Professor of International Security, Editor of European Security, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/387922015-03-17T15:52:31Z2015-03-17T15:52:31ZWe are right to fear spy ‘database of everything’ if even politicians know little about it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75077/original/image-20150317-22271-o8hphx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C598%2C1360%2C1097&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">(Security) Service with a smile.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/rogersg/7944915940/in/photostream/">rogersg</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recently released Intelligence Service Committee’s report suggested an <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31845338?ns_mchannel=social&ns_campaign=bbc_breaking&ns_source=twitter&ns_linkname=news_central">overhaul of the laws</a> governing the work of the intelligence and security agencies. But beyond the headline announcement were buried details and admissions to questions that have gone unanswered for more than 40 years.</p>
<p>To find out why we must go back to 1972 when, as computerisation continued apace, concerns about the role of “data banks” grew into fears of large, centralised and intrusive databases containing details of everybody’s lives. In response the government set up the <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/1093890?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Younger Committee</a>, which introduced ten principles to guide the growing use of computers for the processing of personal data. </p>
<p>When the government <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=20S55vhgUb8C&lpg=PA26&vq=younger&pg=PA26#v=twopage&q=younger&f=false">finally responded</a> to the Younger report in 1975, it agreed that “government and private data banks should be considered and controlled together”. It also insisted that different data banks should not be linked unless “expressly sanctioned by law or agreement, or are subject to scrutiny and control” by the same authority. </p>
<p>These recommendations and the ten principles went on to underpin data protection law, from the first Data Protection Act in 1984 until today. This covers both private and public sectors, though there are exceptions for areas such as national security in this and those laws that succeeded it.</p>
<p>Fast forward to February 10, 2011 when, after almost a decade of heated debate about a UK national identity card, the hard disks that contained the partial implementation of the <a href="http://www.no2id.net/IDSchemes/whyNot.php">National Identity Register</a> database that underpinned the identity card scheme <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/government-computing-network/2011/feb/10/minister-destroys-national-identity-register">were physically destroyed</a>.</p>
<p>It’s tempting to view the next similar hardware destruction, that of The Guardian newspaper’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/jan/31/snowden-files-computer-destroyed-guardian-gchq-basement-video">computers containing Edward Snowden’s leaked files</a> in July 2013, as a somehow ironic remark by GCHQ on the previous. </p>
<p>It was obvious to anyone that copies of the files remained elsewhere at The Guardian and the other media outlets involved in the scoop. The chain of events set off by Snowden’s revelations must now make us wonder whether GCHQ still holds a copy of that National Identity Register – and much more besides.</p>
<h2>A database of everything</h2>
<p>This issue raises its head in this report of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the UK parliamentary committee that oversees the work of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. In response to the news stories based on Snowden’s leaked information in 2013, the ISC first <a href="http://isc.independent.gov.uk/news-archive/17july2013">stated</a> that GCHQ had not circumvented or attempted to circumvent UK law – a claim received with cynicism by parts of the press, but barely challenged by politicians with the exception of the <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/home-affairs-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/co-ordinating-the-fight-against-international-terrorism/">Home Affairs Committee</a> – and subsequently launched an inquiry.</p>
<p>That inquiry’s <a href="http://isc.independent.gov.uk/news-archive/12march2015">final report</a> reveals that the “database of everything” first feared in the 1970s had existed all along, in the form of Bulk Personal Datasets (BPDs) held by the intelligence agencies. Acknowledged for the first time, this strains the ISC’s earlier claims of adequate knowledge and oversight and no practices that stretch or break the law. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75079/original/image-20150317-22305-1nqpcq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75079/original/image-20150317-22305-1nqpcq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75079/original/image-20150317-22305-1nqpcq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75079/original/image-20150317-22305-1nqpcq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75079/original/image-20150317-22305-1nqpcq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75079/original/image-20150317-22305-1nqpcq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=664&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75079/original/image-20150317-22305-1nqpcq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=664&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75079/original/image-20150317-22305-1nqpcq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=664&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Not particularly enlightening.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Crown Copyright</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>BPDs are defined in the report as “large databases containing personal information about a wide range of people”, some with millions of records. What kind of information this might be appears to have been <a href="http://order-order.com/2015/03/12/gchq-builds-identity-database-of-personal-information">entirely redacted</a>. They are acquired “through overt and covert channels”, linked to other datasets where needed, and shared at will between the agencies and also with overseas partners. </p>
<p>For <a href="http://www.jrrt.org.uk/publications/database-state-full-report">every past, current</a> and future personal database (perhaps <a href="https://theconversation.com/nhs-must-think-like-google-to-make-data-project-work-27093">care.data</a>?), we should now worry whether it is linked into this database of everything accessible to the security services not just in the UK, but perhaps other allied countries with very different views on data protection.</p>
<h2>No insight, no oversight</h2>
<p>The ISC is rightly concerned that “legislation does not set out any restrictions on the acquisition, sharing and destruction of Bulk Personal Datasets, and no legal penalties exist for misuse of this information”. There is almost no oversight in how they are created and used – even the home secretary and foreign secretary do not get involved beyond general discussions about BPDs. Instead, the agencies work with them on the basis of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and Security Service Act 1989, and take unsupervised decisions on the basis of Human Rights Act’s principles of “lawful purpose, necessary and proportionate”.</p>
<p>The information security commissioner, Sir Mark Waller, does include BPDs in his review visits, though not on a statutory basis, nor with any mention in the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-of-the-intelligence-services-commissioner-for-2013">publicly accessible part of his report</a>. That the only immediate response to the ISC report from the prime minister, David Cameron, was <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/david-cameron-close-intelligence-oversight-loophole">to make BPD oversight a statutory task</a> may be viewed as an indication that BPDs are seen as important.</p>
<p>In his recent book <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674368279">Black Box Society</a> Frank Pasquale, professor of law at the University of Maryland, describes how so-called <a href="http://publicsurveillance.com/papers/FC-CJM.pdf">Fusion centres</a> were established in the US after 9/11 to support the intelligence agencies and their industrial partners. These were US equivalents of this “database of everything”, where public and private data of all kinds – tax, health, traffic tickets, utility bills, insurance – were combined and sifted. Such databases would inevitably also include information about UK residents, and so it’s likely Fusion centre databases would also be part of any sharing arrangement with UK agencies’ BPDs.</p>
<h2>Data retention</h2>
<p>The ISC report mentions many datasets throughout, such as those that include the “bulk collection” of “communications data”, or even the contents of private emails, texts and calls. In each case, the retention period is redacted. This lack of information should pose difficult questions for the agencies, considering retaining this sort of insufficiently targeted surveillance data was <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-04/cp140054en.pdf">ruled unlawful</a> by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2014. Although it seems that by simply copying data into unregulated BPDs the agencies can retain the data indefinitely.</p>
<p>Going back to the original “data bank” fears, the usual questions reappear: what happens if BPD data is incorrect? What if incorrect data leads to action against citizens? Due to the National Security exemptions on data protection, there is no right to access, no right to correction and no right to redress. How are we to know if the data is secure and how would we find out if it gets abused by an insider – an eventuality that the report <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/handful-of-uk-spies-accessed-private-information-inappropriately-isc-says">admits has already happened</a> – or hacked from outside?</p>
<p>The database of everything feared in 1972 when computer processing power was exponentially smaller than today has finally come to light in 2015, at a time when far more data and data from far wider sources can be included. If even the government itself has only a tenuous grasp on the fact this mechanism exists, let alone a thorough oversight of it, we are right to be concerned.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/38792/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eerke Boiten is a senior lecturer in the School of Computing at the University of Kent, and Director of the University's interdisciplinary Centre for Cyber Security Research. He receives funding from EPSRC for the CryptoForma Network of Excellence on Cryptography and Formal Methods. He is a member of BCS and board member of its specialist group on Formal Aspects of Computer Science. He is also a director (governor) of The John of Gaunt School, a Community Academy.</span></em></p>Committee report reveals ‘citizens dossiers’ feared but never admitted to have existed for decades.Eerke Boiten, Senior Lecturer, School of Computing and Director of Interdisciplinary Cyber Security Centre, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/367822015-01-27T15:28:52Z2015-01-27T15:28:52ZThe rise of an intelligence lobby threatens the rights of lawyers, journalists – and all of us<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70135/original/image-20150127-17550-1mr7hyd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The thin wall of decency between us and unrestrained power.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">spiber.de/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A powerful intelligence lobby made up of former defence ministers, police chiefs and intelligence commissioners has emerged in British politics, determined to push for greater powers and resources for the police and intelligence agencies. </p>
<p>The attempt to pass a “Snooper’s Charter” <a href="http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2391992/opposition-grows-to-snoopers-charter-introduced-by-the-back-door">via an amendment to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill</a> as it passes through the House of Lords – the same provisions as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-says-the-uk-is-not-a-surveillance-state-but-her-proposed-law-might-create-one-28473">Communications Data Bill</a> that were twice rejected by parliament – shows how keen they are to win greater powers before the general election. The old military-industrial complex is being replaced by a powerful political-intelligence technocracy.</p>
<p>The draft Communications Data Bill, re-inserted in full as an amendment, would require internet service providers and mobile phone companies to keep records (but not the content) of everyone’s internet browsing activity (including social media), emails, internet gaming, calls, and text messaging for a year. Introduced by the home secretary, Theresa May, in the 2012–13 session, the deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22292474">withdrew his support</a> over civil liberties grounds and the bill was blocked from being reintroduced during this parliament.</p>
<h2>Do as I say, not as I do</h2>
<p>So who are their lordships that would undermine the elected chamber in this way? They include former Conservative defence secretary Tom King, formerly chairman of the <a href="http://isc.independent.gov.uk/">Intelligence and Security Committee</a>, parliament’s intelligence oversight body, Liberal Democrat peer and reviewer of terrorism laws Alex Carlile, former Labour defence minister Alan West, and former Metropolitan Police commissioner Ian Blair.</p>
<p>Despite concerns over the rapid erosion of privacy the intelligence lobby seeks ever wider powers. Retiring GCHQ director Sir Ian Lobban <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/21/gchq-outgoing-director-sir-iain-lobban-edward-snowden-revelations">defended the work of GCHQ</a>, and his successor Robert Hannigan controversially <a href="http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press_and_media/news_and_features/Pages/Director-opinion-piece-financial-times.aspx">argued</a> that: “privacy has never been an absolute right and the debate about this should not become a reason for postponing urgent and difficult decisions.”</p>
<p>Other intelligence service bigwigs have made similar claims: after retiring as chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Sir John Sawers claimed that preventing terrorism was impossible without monitoring the internet traffic of innocent people. He <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11356645/Ex-MI6-chief-Sir-John-Sawers-We-cannot-stop-terrorism-unless-we-spy-on-innocent-people.html">said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is a dilemma because the general public, politicians and technology companies, to some extent, want us to be able to monitor the activities of terrorists and other evil-doers but they don’t want their own activities to be open to any such monitoring.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yet the regard for human rights that might see them agonising over this dilemma seems in scant supply at MI5 and MI6, judging by <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/22/cooperation-british-spies-gaddafi-libya-revealed-official-papers">recent revelations</a> detailing their involvement with the Gadaffi regime in rendition and torture.</p>
<h2>Too much safety, too little freedom</h2>
<p>So the public are uneasy; a YouGov <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/news/2012/10/31/communications-data-bill/">survey</a> regarding the Communications Data Bill found that 71% of Britons did not trust that their data would be secure and 50% believed the proposal would be poor value for money.</p>
<p>The problem is that the Conservative side of the Coalition, with the support of the intelligence lobby, are always going to play the terror card. The Charlie Hebdo murders in Paris have been used to clamour for new powers, yet ironically it is journalists – as murdered by Islamist terrorists in Paris – who are also targeted by UK intelligence agencies alongside the terrorists themselves.</p>
<p>Further recent revelations from Snowden documents reveal that GCHQ was prepared to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/19/gchq-intercepted-emails-journalists-ny-times-bbc-guardian-le-monde-reuters-nbc-washington-post">monitor journalists’ emails</a>, suggesting the agency is confident of political support for an action – infringing the freedom of the press – that would have been considered completely unacceptable in a modern democracy until quite recently. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70142/original/image-20150127-17554-unypil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70142/original/image-20150127-17554-unypil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70142/original/image-20150127-17554-unypil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70142/original/image-20150127-17554-unypil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70142/original/image-20150127-17554-unypil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70142/original/image-20150127-17554-unypil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70142/original/image-20150127-17554-unypil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Just another day at email scanning central.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balefire/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Surveillance is now so pervasive it makes the development of sources in the sector all but impossible, and consequently the press’ duty to provide critical oversight of power is reduced.</p>
<p>There is always the suspicion that threat of terrorism is a card politicians play in order to distract from other issues. No government bureaucracy has ever asked for fewer powers or resources, and taxpayers are right to be wary. Where is the proportionality? How much terrorism, how much risk is required for us to surrender our rights and freedoms? There is little real discussion but there is considerable theatre – taking off our belts and shoes and no liquids at airports. None of this tackles terrorism. Politicians are not fighting a war so much as “<a href="http://boingboing.net/2014/12/06/high-court-rules-that-english.html">throwing red meat to their base</a>”, as the writer Cory Doctorow memorably put it.</p>
<h2>Invisible spies turn out to be outspoken</h2>
<p>Laws passed after 9/11 are far more draconian than temporary measures passed during The Troubles in Northern Ireland, during which more than 3,000 people died. Many more people die of bad diets due to poverty – yet politicians are not striving for sweeping legislation that would combat inequality. </p>
<p>The British public’s lack of reaction to the Snowden revelations has caused some astonishment abroad, especially among the Germans, with still-fresh memories of the Stasi. Writing in <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-cozy-relationship-between-britain-and-its-intelligence-apparatus-a-917689.html">Der Spiegel</a>, commentator Christoph Scheuermann said it was “astonishing” to see the uncritical trust put in the UK’s intelligence service, as if GCHQ was still “a club of amiable gentlemen in shabby tweed jackets who cracked the Nazis’ Enigma coding machine in World War II”.</p>
<p>What has become clear is that the ground has shifted. From the position where the government neither confirmed or denied the existence of the spy agencies, nor the names of those that ran them, to a position where chiefs would make occasional speeches in public on matters of significant public interest, to that today, where chiefs and former chiefs speak as one – a lobby, in effect, for greater powers and resources for their organisations. The power and resources of the intelligence services should be a matter for serious public debate; instead of debate we have a monologue voiced by politicians, civil servants, police, much of the press and the intelligence agencies themselves. Disagreement is dismissed.</p>
<p>We seem to moving into what the philosopher Giorgio Agamben called a permanent “<a href="http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/009254.html">state of exception</a>”, where the safeguards of the past are discarded in the face of a risk that is unquantified. History shows repeatedly that if intelligence and security services are allowed to operate without scrutiny, the result is abuse of power. </p>
<p>Never before have government and intelligence agencies had such powers and technologies for mass surveillance – and with them the potential to control the population, investigative journalists and any who dissent. Faced with bringing down the Counter-Terrorism Bill entirely, the Lord’s amendment that would introduce the “Snooper’s Charter” was withdrawn at the 11th hour. But you can be sure that in some form or other it will be back.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36782/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Lashmar receives funding from the ESRC. I am a co-investigator on DATA PSST! Seminar Series (2015-16) will explore, from multi-disciplinary and multi-end user perspectives, how different aspects of transparency, whether state-imposed, commercially-imposed, peer-imposed, or voluntarily entered into, affect questions of privacy, security, surveillance and trust.</span></em></p>A powerful intelligence lobby made up of former defence ministers, police chiefs and intelligence commissioners has emerged in British politics, determined to push for greater powers and resources for…Paul Lashmar, Lecturer in Journalism, Brunel University LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/337172014-11-06T12:28:40Z2014-11-06T12:28:40ZIntelligence world is an onion: the more layers you strip away, the more likely you are to cry<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63779/original/42rx5rzh-1415208395.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Keeping too many secrets will come back to bite you in the end.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GlebStock/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One method for safeguarding online anonymity is <a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en">Tor</a>, “the onion router”, whose name comes from its method of adding and stripping away encryption layer by layer as messages pass from one node to another in the network en route to their destination.</p>
<p>This image of peeling back layers could equally describe the task of trying to establish whether intelligence agencies comply with the law. This is an onion that is, a few layers down under its outer shell, giving off a distinctly mouldy smell.</p>
<p>Any government intrusion into citizens’ lives that breaches their human rights should be proportionate – and only made when necessary to safeguard national security or public safety. In the days before the internet this was relatively easy to regulate. Post and telephone calls could only be intercepted in the UK on the basis of a warrant signed by a minister, or in some countries a judge. But the digitisation of practically everything has transformed this process, with the opportunity to “just collect everything” quite possible if the agencies have the will and resources to do so. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/the-nsa-files">tranche of documents</a> released to the media by whistleblower Edward Snowden has demonstrated the extent to which that will exists. </p>
<p>We knew that material could be obtained from ISPs, telephone companies or the postal service under powers granted by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). We did not know that intelligence agencies also obtain this data by directly tapping the fibre optic cables or the servers and networking equipment at exchanges and data centres – done apparently <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-prism-server-collection-facebook-google">without the companies’ knowledge</a>.</p>
<p>We do not pay for the services we use every day – Google, Facebook, Microsoft, YouTube – except with our personal information. But whether or not we “volunteer” this information knowingly to companies, this does not imply our consent to it being routinely available to governments.</p>
<p>The rapid growth of social media brings into sharp relief concerns about the misuse of personal data. A <a href="http://www.tnsglobal.com/uk/press-release/public-opinion-monitor-britons-give-safeguarding-security-higher-priority-protecting-p">TNS poll in the UK</a> found that 55% were concerned about the activities of search engines such as Google, 60% were concerned about social media such as Facebook and 43% were equally concerned about intelligence agency monitoring. And rightly so, it seems.</p>
<p>The Snowden files also give us insight into the collaboration between national intelligence agencies, especially between the five Anglophone nations within the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/25/intelligence-deal-uk-us-released">UKUSA agreement</a> from 1946, the formal basis for co-operation that began in World War II and continues into the present.</p>
<p>It has long been suspected that this co-operation was a way in which country A could get around legal restrictions on information gathering at home by receiving the information it sought from the foreign intelligence service of country B.</p>
<p>After the release of the Snowden papers, the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (<a href="http://isc.independent.gov.uk/">ISC</a>), a key part of the oversight and regulation apparatus of British intelligence, issued a statement that the allegations GCHQ had illegally accessed material gathered by the NSA were unfounded. Its claim that in every case there was a ministerial warrant failed to reassure anyone outside government, however, and the ISC eventually announced that <a href="http://isc.independent.gov.uk/news-archive/11december2013">they would inquire more widely</a> into the issues of privacy and security raised by these revelations.</p>
<p>These are the claims that have now come back to haunt the government, after <a href="https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk">Liberty</a> and <a href="https://www.privacyinternational.org">Privacy International</a> challenged the legality of GCHQ’s interception practices before the <a href="http://www.ipt-uk.com/">Investigative Powers Tribunal</a>, which hears complaints about improper use of RIPA to conduct surveillance.</p>
<p>Instead, the documents now revealed in court have exposed how false the ISC’s statement in response to the Snowden files was. In fact GCHQ can and does request and receive <a href="https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/press-releases/secret-policy-reveals-gchq-can-get-warrantless-access-bulk-nsa-data">raw unanalysed bulk data from NSA</a>, and others, with no warrant required if it were not feasible to obtain one in the UK.</p>
<p>This is not surprising to people who study international intelligence co-operation given the complexity – and secrecy – of the arrangements in place. However, this slow striptease of information indicates how inadequate the current law and system of oversight and accountability is. The senior judge with responsibility to oversee interception under RIPA describes the Act as “difficult for anyone to get their head round” and notes that “a reader’s eyes glaze over before reaching the end of Section 1, that is, if the reader ever starts.” </p>
<p>Bringing about better, clearer laws and more robust oversight of the intelligence agencies will be <a href="http://www.iocco-uk.info/docs/2013%20Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20IOCC%20Accessible%20Version.pdf">considerably more difficult</a> and cutting into this mouldy onion will be enough to induce tears.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Gill is a member of Amnesty International and Liberty</span></em></p>One method for safeguarding online anonymity is Tor, “the onion router”, whose name comes from its method of adding and stripping away encryption layer by layer as messages pass from one node to another…Peter Gill, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/300412014-09-16T04:30:24Z2014-09-16T04:30:24ZSweeping security law would have computer users surrender privacy<p>Parliament is <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbillhome%2Fs969%22">about to consider a range of changes</a> to Australia’s security laws introduced by the Abbott government during its last sitting. The most controversial measures in the <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/nslab12014440/memo_0.html">National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 (Cth)</a> include stronger <a href="https://theconversation.com/drafts/29946/edit">anti-whistleblower provisions</a> and a <a href="https://theconversation.com/drafts/29946/edit">“special intelligence operations”</a> regime that would grant ASIO officers immunity from civil and criminal liability. </p>
<p>Less attention has been paid to proposals to expand ASIO’s powers to <a href="https://theconversation.com/national-security-bill-gives-asio-more-powers-and-a-tighter-gag-29261">collect intelligence held on computers</a> and computer networks. Like the government’s proposals <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/asio-chief-malcolm-turnbull-seek-to-reassure-nation-over-data-retention-laws/story-fn59niix-1227017608824">to require the retention of metadata</a>, these measures suggest the power of intelligence agencies to invade Australians’ privacy will dramatically expand. </p>
<h2>Flinging open the door to computer access</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/asioa1979472/s25a.html">Section 25A of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979</a> (Cth) (ASIO Act) currently allows the attorney-general to issue a computer access warrant when requested by the director-general of security (the head of ASIO). The warrant may be issued if the attorney-general believes on reasonable grounds that access to data “held in a particular computer” would substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important for security. </p>
<p>ASIO officers may then undertake activities to obtain that data. These include entering private premises and doing any other thing necessary to conceal their actions.</p>
<p>“Computer” is defined in the Act as “a computer, computer system or part of a computer system”. This means that a computer access warrant gives ASIO access to only a single computer.</p>
<p>The government proposes to amend the statutory definition of computer so that a single access warrant may apply to multiple computers and networks. The ASIO Act would then define “computer” as:</p>
<p>a) one or more computers;</p>
<p>b) one or more computer systems; </p>
<p>c) one or more computer networks;</p>
<p>d) any combination of the above.</p>
<p>What this means is that wherever the word “computer” (singular) appears in the ASIO Act this should be understood as referring to any number of computers or computer networks (plural). Importantly, the legislation does not attempt to define computer network. In a peculiar feat of legislative drafting, a singular noun would refer to a potentially limitless number of electronic and telecommunication systems. </p>
<p>The only effective limitation is that the warrant must specify a particular computer, a computer located on particular premises, or a computer associated with or likely to be used by a particular person. Again, these should be read as plural. This means that ASIO could, for example, specify multiple computer networks located at a university, or other computer networks to which a person has access.</p>
<p>The Bill would also allow access to data through computers owned by third parties (friends, relatives, co-workers). This would be allowed where it is “reasonable in all the circumstances to do so”. ASIO officers would be empowered to cause material interference with computers or computer networks if necessary to execute the warrant, so long as this does not cause material loss or damage.</p>
<h2>Everyone’s privacy is at stake</h2>
<p>The government’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/there-is-a-data-deficit-in-governments-metadata-plan-30225">metadata proposals have attracted far more attention</a>, but these other changes will also dramatically expand ASIO’s ability to invade the privacy of Australian citizens.</p>
<p>At its broadest, access to multiple computer networks could plausibly entail access to all computers connected to the internet. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-wide-web-is-going-strong-after-25-years-but-the-internet-isnt-holding-up-24297">internet is a network</a> of computer networks, so there is no reason why this would not fall within the scope of the legislation. The internet is certainly “likely to be used” by the person of security interest, as the legislation requires.</p>
<p>This is not likely the intended meaning of the provision, but it shows just how little thought the government has put into placing some sensible restrictions on the warrant provisions. </p>
<p>A more realistic scenario is that ASIO would be able to access all computers located at a university where a person of security interest is studying, or at the person’s workplace. Even if the government abides by this “narrower” interpretation, the legislation will still expose large numbers of innocent persons to potentially severe invasions of their privacy. </p>
<p>One way to restrict the potential impact of these provisions would be to define “computer network” so that it encompasses only those computers located on a particular premises or associated with a particular person. This language is already contained in the Bill, although it does not restrict the scope of the powers to this degree.</p>
<p>Another method would be to specify that ASIO can only access parts of a computer or computer network where doing so is reasonably necessary to collect relevant intelligence. Yet another would be to specify that ASIO can access multiple computers only after it has exhausted other methods of obtaining the intelligence. </p>
<p>These are all viable ways to limit the potential impact of the warrant provisions. They would still allow ASIO significant scope to access data held on multiple computers. The government, however, has made no effort to include such limiting factors in the legislation. </p>
<h2>Good law should be clearly stated</h2>
<p>The lack of any clear limits on these provisions is not merely the result of the government’s attempts to expand ASIO’s powers. The government faces an incredibly difficult task of drafting legal language in such a way that it accurately describes and accounts for new and emerging technologies.</p>
<p>The government has approached this challenge by avoiding clear definitions of key terms in the Bill. On one possible view, this is a sensible solution. It gives intelligence agencies sufficient power to collect intelligence without being confined by statutory definitions that are likely to be superseded by further advances in computer technology. </p>
<p>But in doing so the government is granting ill-defined powers to intelligence agencies when the privacy of all Australian citizens is at stake. The <a href="http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/index.php/divisions/international-division/rule-of-law">law should be stated clearly</a> in advance. Vagueness and overreach are not adequate responses to difficulties in legislative drafting. </p>
<p>When Parliament considers the amendments, it should take the time to ensure that the computer access warrant powers are clearly defined and that any invasions of privacy are kept to the minimum necessary. If the period of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-politics-of-fear-why-havent-counter-terrorism-laws-changed-6016">law-making after September 11</a> taught the country anything, it is that laws enacted hastily in response to security threats are often poorly drafted and overly broad. </p>
<p>Parliament should also be careful that debate on the amendments is not overshadowed by the government’s <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/telcos-forced-to-keep-data-as-abbott-tackles-homegrown-terror/story-fn59niix-1227014309181?nk=d7ebcf0fbe91364b30ad9b3a505b424b">next tranche of national security reforms</a>. The threat to security posed by returning foreign fighters and the threat to privacy posed by data retention are certainly important issues. But granting ASIO these powers of access in their current form also poses a real threat, particularly to the privacy of individuals in workplaces and universities.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>The National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 has been referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, which will present its report during the week of the parliamentary sitting beginning September 22.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/30041/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keiran Hardy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Parliament is about to consider a range of changes to Australia’s security laws introduced by the Abbott government during its last sitting. The most controversial measures in the National Security Legislation…Keiran Hardy, PhD Researcher, Faculty of Law, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/315102014-09-10T03:35:43Z2014-09-10T03:35:43ZWhat raising Australia’s terrorism alert to high would mean for you<h2>Why does Australia have a terrorism alert system? And what does it mean if the alert level is increased?</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/NationalTerrorismPublicAlertSystem.aspx">National Terrorism Public Alert System</a> is a way of communicating to the public what the current risk of terrorism is to Australia. It has four levels:</p>
<ol>
<li>low: a terrorist attack is not expected</li>
<li>medium: a terrorist attack could occur</li>
<li>high: a terrorist attack is likely</li>
<li>extreme: a terrorist attack is imminent or has occurred.</li>
</ol>
<p>Before 2003, we had a three-point system. Following the September 11 attacks in 2001 and the Bali bombings in October 2002 the alert level was raised from low to medium. Ever since introduction of the three-point system we’ve remained on Level 2 - Medium. So to potentially go to ,“high”, or number three out of four on our current alert system, indicates a significant shift in the risk environment.</p>
<p>We would only go to the highest “extreme” level on this alert system if there was already an attack under way or specific intelligence of one being imminent.</p>
<p>While the public threat level might officially be at “medium” at the moment, inside the intelligence community they’re working on even finer gradations of risk.</p>
<p>We got a bit of a sense of that last night when <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2014/s4084420.htm">ASIO’s Director-General, David Irvine said on 7.30</a> that the threat level was “at a very elevated level of medium and I’m certainly contemplating very seriously the notion of lifting it higher”. That reflects a more calibrated approach to thinking about levels of risk within the intelligence community.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58632/original/kjsf9gq3-1410316474.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58632/original/kjsf9gq3-1410316474.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58632/original/kjsf9gq3-1410316474.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58632/original/kjsf9gq3-1410316474.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58632/original/kjsf9gq3-1410316474.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58632/original/kjsf9gq3-1410316474.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58632/original/kjsf9gq3-1410316474.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58632/original/kjsf9gq3-1410316474.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australia’s current terrorism threat level: 10 September 2014.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Should Australians be worried about David Irvine’s warning?</h2>
<p>Yes, I think we should. We shouldn’t dismiss this lightly. We’ve had this current four-point terror alert system since 2003 and it’s never been moved beyond medium.</p>
<p>But the purpose of these terrorism alerts is not to make Australians anxious; instead, the most useful thing we can all do is realise there is some urgency about this now, and feel emboldened to speak if we see something suspicious or if we have concerns about someone we know potentially being radicalised.</p>
<h2>Are you surprised by the discussion of raising it from medium to high?</h2>
<p>Not really, because we’ve heard this being foreshadowed for some time from Irvine. He’s really one of the few voices we hear from <a href="http://www.asio.gov.au/">ASIO</a> [the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation], and he’s very measured and careful. He’s been warning us of these growing dangers for the past couple of years, but particularly over the past three months since the fall of Mosul to ISIS.</p>
<p>It’s interesting that this discussion about raising our terrorism threat level didn’t happen immediately after the UK raised their threat level [<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/threat-level-from-international-terrorism-increased">from substantial to severe</a>, meaning a terrorist attack in the UK is considered “highly likely, although there is no intelligence to suggest that one is imminent”. The fact that Australia isn’t simply following suit, but has waited and is now talking about it, indicates there may be some specific intelligence relating to Australia that has prompted this discussion.</p>
<h2>Who is David Irvine? And should Australians take his warnings seriously?</h2>
<p>David Irvine is sometimes colourfully described as Australia’s most senior spy. He’s the Director-General of ASIO, he’s been in that post for five years, and he’s retiring this Friday, September 12. He’s stepping down and his replacement will be former Special Forces chief <a href="http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2014/jb_mr_140515a.aspx">Duncan Lewis</a>.</p>
<p>Irvine has always been very professional and non-partisan, and he’s not given to loose rhetoric. Also, as he is about to retire has no reason to be saying any of this to curry favour with the government or anyone else.</p>
<p>His statements to the public are always very carefully crafted. He’s one of only a handful of people in ASIO and our intelligence community who can even tell the public what they do and where they work – current legislation prevents most other ASIO staff from doing that – and he’s taken that responsibility of talking with the public very seriously. </p>
<p>As ASIO’s Director-General, he’s gone out of his way to build greater rapport with the community. For instance, in recent weeks he’s spoken with a number of Muslim media outlets and community groups, as well as on national TV and at the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-27/director-general-of-asio-david-irvine-addresses/5701320">National Press Club</a>. <em>[Editor’s note: you can read Michelle Grattan’s recent interview <a href="https://theconversation.com/grattan-on-friday-in-conversation-with-asio-chief-david-irvine-30536">with David Irvine here</a>.]</em> On every occasion, he’s tried to explain the evidence and the reasons behind the increased terrorism threat.</p>
<p>Very importantly, he’s recognised and emphasised in his <a href="https://theconversation.com/grattan-on-friday-in-conversation-with-asio-chief-david-irvine-30536">work with Australia’s Muslim community</a> that when we talk about any radical homegrown terror threat, we’re only talking about a tiny minority and sub-culture. Our 500,000 Australian Muslims are not the problem; it’s the one-in-a-thousand that are the problem. In fact, very often Muslim community members have provided some of the best leads about potential security risks and their relationship with the intelligence community is crucial.</p>
<h2>Are there particular terrorism targets in Australia that are seen as being at greatest risk?</h2>
<p>I think one of the nightmare scenarios keeping people awake at night are terrorists going for a so-called “soft target”, like a sporting venue, an entertainment venue or a public transport system. We saw that happen with public transport both in Madrid and in London.</p>
<p>We saw what can happen with those soft targets with the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westgate_shopping_mall_attack">Westgate shopping mall</a> attack in Nairobi last year. And that echoed the siege in <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Mumbai_attacks">Mumbai in November 2008</a>, where just 10 guys using assault weapons killed more than 160 people over three days of siege. </p>
<p>That kind of attack could happen easily in any Western democracy, especially now that it’s not as hard as it was in the past to obtain assault weapons. The reason it’s so difficult to deal with situations like that is that you have a large number of people, you can’t easily move all of them quickly, there’s confusion, often confusion about whether hostages might be involved. </p>
<p>If you’re talking about a shopping mall or a sports ground, you simply can’t put everyone through a metal detector or be checking every bag or doing all the security checks you can do at places like an airport, because our society would stop functioning. We’re trying to balance carefully continuing to live life as we know it with managing these risks.</p>
<p>The best security we have comes from human intelligence – and that means having the involvement of people right across the community, but particularly within communities where there’s a degree of radicalisation going on and where people are being preyed upon by radical elements.</p>
<p>That’s our best line of defence. If we rely on having an armed official to stop a terrorist, then it’s probably too late.</p>
<p>The London Olympics were an excellent example of that. There were a lot more uniformed guards in the streets, but the reason the Games went so well was not so much because they were there. Instead, it was like ducks on a pond: everything looked very calm, but what you didn’t see was the furious paddling beneath the surface - the huge amount of work, watching people of concern, listening to patterns of chatter, as well as a lot of work with community. And it went wonderfully well, thanks to all that work beneath the surface.</p>
<p>That’s why I think David Irvine was right on 7.30 last night, to point out that while Australia has been <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2014/s4084420.htm">very lucky to avoid an attack on Australian soil</a>, we have had to work hard to stop terrorist attacks occurring here in Australia. So it’s not all luck.</p>
<h2>Terrorism kills only a fraction of the people who die globally from disease and other causes. A number of readers have asked: could the motive for increasing the terrorism threat be political rather than real? Or has Australia got it right in what we’re doing and spending on terrorism?</h2>
<p>As best we can tell, I think we’ve got it about right.</p>
<p>We’ve just had a new federal government, which is very fiscally conservative, announce an extra <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2014/s4061378.htm">A$630 million for counter-terrorism</a>, including work with community groups. </p>
<p>The fact they’ve been willing to do this in the current budget environment suggests there must have been a very compelling case made to spend that money.</p>
<p>But it’s important to stress that the best counter-terrorism work is mostly done preventatively and through intelligence. Simply buying offensive weapons and equipment, as has been done by some US county sheriffs, won’t make communities safer.</p>
<h2>What’s the most useful thing Australians can do in response to any increased terrorism alert?</h2>
<p>The first thing is to recognise that Australia in a good place in terms of security because of the high degree of community solidarity that exists here. That means anything we do – especially any loose talk that rashly demonises entire communities based on their faiths or ethnicity – is a threat to our national security. </p>
<p>Trust between different ethnic and religious groups across Australia and with our security authorities is the bedrock of our security, it is of vital importance.</p>
<p>In making this announcement about possibly increasing the terrorism threat level, the hope would be to encourage more people to speak up, rather than keep their concerns to themselves. And if you do speak up and <a href="http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/WhatICanDo.aspx#_report">report those concerns</a>, you will get a more receptive response from the authorities at the moment.</p>
<p>It might be something you see on your social networks, or in the community: if your gut reaction is that something isn’t quite right, then speak up. </p>
<p>That’s <em>not</em> asking people to peek through their venetians and spy on their neighbours. It’s just asking people to be thoughtful and observant; for instance, if you see a truck on your street for a couple of days that looks out of place, you can get someone to check it out.</p>
<p>Or if you’re worried about your brother, or your son, or your friend who hasn’t seemed themselves lately – maybe they’ve broken off old friendships or suddenly changed their views. </p>
<p>People speaking up about their loved ones and friends has been the front line of defence, saving those young people – especially young men – from going overseas and likely harming themselves and possibly others. In many cases where passports have been withheld in Australia, the tip-offs have come through the community. </p>
<p>When it comes to terrorism, prevention is far better than cure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31510/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why does Australia have a terrorism alert system? And what does it mean if the alert level is increased? The National Terrorism Public Alert System is a way of communicating to the public what the current…Greg Barton, Herb Feith Research Professor for the Study of Indonesia and Director, International, of the Global Terrorism Research Centre, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.