tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/jasmine-revolution-48719/articlesJasmine Revolution – The Conversation2021-03-01T14:28:34Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1551432021-03-01T14:28:34Z2021-03-01T14:28:34ZWhy Tunisians are still out on the streets – a decade after the ‘Dignity Revolution’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383767/original/file-20210211-23-eowkth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tunisian demonstrators gather during a protest in Tunis, Tunisia on February 06, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Yassine Gaidi/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has been 10 years since nation-wide protests in Tunisia <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49752876">led to</a> the ousting of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his regime. Ben Ali led Tunisia for 23 years. Tunisia’s “Dignity Revolution” marked <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/14/arab-spring-autocrats-the-dead-the-ousted-and-those-who-survived">the first time</a> a long-standing Arab autocrat was removed by a mass uprising. </p>
<p>The protests were driven by unemployment, food inflation, corruption, lack of political freedom and poor living conditions in the country. </p>
<p>But too little has changed. Protests continued to escalate <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2018/01/12/anti-austerity-protests-in-tunisia-s-capital">after the imposition of a state of emergency in 2015</a>, purportedly in response to escalating terrorism. This year, just days before the 10th anniversary of the Dignity Revolution, the government <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/tunisia-enters-new-lockdown-muted-anniversary-uprising">suddenly announced</a> a lockdown and curfew. Undeterred, people <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/05/tunisia-police-use-violent-tactics-quash-protests">still</a> protested, and continue to do so.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2018.1482124?journalCode=fmed20">Research</a> on Tunisia’s <a href="https://www.kpsrl.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/Transitional%20justice%20in%20Tunisia%20-%20Policy%20brief.pdf">transition of power</a> and the country’s <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319690438">post-uprising trajectory</a> show that the grievances behind recent protests are the same as those that led to the Revolution. </p>
<p>Then as now, people protested for their socio-economic rights and to achieve a measure of social justice, as well as to have their political voice heard. Successive governments have increased <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/tunisia-protests/">repression of civil-political rights</a>. And corruption –- which exploits ordinary people but benefits the wealthy and influential –- remains rampant. Rather than pursuing the ‘goals of the revolution’, the government rediscovered bad old habits, ignoring, or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ct_mQ_SYJec">delegitimising dissent</a>.</p>
<p>Our research has <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030338824">also found</a> that worsening economic conditions, and increasing inequality, aren’t consequences of the Revolution but were produced by austerity measures. These were introduced by the government at the behest of the European Union and international financial institutions. </p>
<h2>Roots of disaffection</h2>
<p>Through our research, we’ve seen that Tunisians want a <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030338824">social democracy</a> that delivers both socio-economic and civil-political rights. For Tunisians, social justice and socio-economic rights <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B00E257UPM/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1">are integral</a> parts of democracy and cannot be treated as mere outcomes. </p>
<p>In interviews, we’ve heard how people express frustration that the demands of 2011 were never met. And call for “another, real revolution.”</p>
<p>Public opinion surveys since 2011 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/13510347.2019.1566903?needAccess=true">consistently show</a> Tunisians want a responsive government. They want it to provide decent public services and economic security, an end to corruption, democratic government, and social and political rights.</p>
<p>Instead – according to the Arab Barometer, a central resource for quantitative research on the Middle East – <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-v/">two-thirds of Tunisians</a> think politicians are not concerned about people’s needs. Trust in politicians, political parties, or government is extremely low. And fewer than 10% are satisfied with the government overall. They are mostly dissatisfied with the government’s job-creation record, its performance in reducing inequalities, and its fight against inflation. </p>
<p>Moreover, roughly 90% think that government is corrupt, that <a href="%E2%80%98influence%E2%80%99"><em>wasta</em></a> is necessary to find a job, and that government officials provide <em>wasta</em> <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-v/">to help their relatives</a>. </p>
<h2>Signed, sealed, but not delivered</h2>
<p>Economic grievances drove the Dignity Revolution, and have been an issue ever since. The government has failed to <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030338824">deliver economic growth, debt reduction, trade or employment</a>. Unemployment remains high, the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3020728">transition from school to employment</a> is increasingly difficult and jobs have become more precarious.</p>
<p>In addition to this, in its most recent economic assessment, the World Bank <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/publication/economic-update-october-2020">highlighted</a> a lack of investment, low private-sector productivity and exports below pre-revolution. </p>
<p>The government isn’t solely responsible for the failure to deliver on deep socio-economic reform. Our research suggests that <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030338824">international financial institutions and Western governments are also complicit</a>. They have encouraged –- sometimes pushed -– Tunisia to <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030338824">adopt neo-liberal economic policies</a> in exchange for aid and trade. <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sonew060216a">For instance</a>, structural reforms to public institutions and state-owned companies, reducing energy subsidies, and devaluation of the Tunisian dinar in line with the market-based exchange rate.</p>
<p>These policies <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030338824">reduce state expenditure</a>, which means the government cannot improve social services or income support.</p>
<h2>‘Tried-and-failed’ policies</h2>
<p>Whatever policymakers think they are doing, it has not worked. Nor has it dented popular dissatisfaction. The Tunisian government, the EU and international financial institutions need to rethink ‘tried and failed’ policies. They must adopt measures that meet people’s demands for dignity, employment, and an end to corruption.</p>
<p>The government could, for example, invest in infrastructure -– especially in the interior –- to create employment and attract both foreign and local investment. A progressive tax structure would redistribute wealth, increase internal demand, and send people a symbolically important signal. As would protection for the unemployed and a concerted fight against corruption.</p>
<p>For its part, the European Union could allow Tunisia greater access to its agricultural internal market, where Tunisian produce has a competitive advantage. They could also mitigate loan repayment conditions or indeed press for reforms making work more –- not less –- rewarding and secure. </p>
<p>This is explains why the transition is viewed as a failure. And why, just as they did 10 years ago Tunisians are calling for “<em>isqaat an-nizaam</em>”: the end not just of a particular autocrat’s rule but of an entire system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155143/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement no. 320214. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pamela Abbott received funding from the EU for the research on which this article is based.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saerom Han does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since the revolution, Tunisians’ call for “bread, freedom and social justice” have fallen on deaf ears.Saerom Han, Honorary Research Fellow, University of AberdeenAndrea Teti, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of AberdeenPamela Abbott, Director of the Centre for Global Development and Professor in the School of Education, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1224032019-08-27T13:42:42Z2019-08-27T13:42:42ZRemembering Essebsi, the late maestro of Tunisian politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289611/original/file-20190827-184207-1ajedyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">MOHAMED MESSARA/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The world’s oldest president, Tunisia’s Béji Caïd Essebsi, <a href="https://www.parismatch.com/Actu/International/Le-president-tunisien-Beji-Caid-Essebsi-est-decede-1639003">passed away in July at the age of 92</a>. He had a long legacy in Tunisian politics which has left many feeling like the father of their nation has gone. </p>
<p>Béji Caïd Essebsi’s was born in the <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/211368/archives-thematique/sidi-bou-saed-le-village-enchant/">village of Sidi Bou Saïd</a> on November 29th, 1926. He lived in the capital Tunis and Hammam-Lif, a coastal town about 20km away from Tunis. He got to know these neighbourhoods well, as he did the rural areas surrounding his parents’ farm in the Fahs region. </p>
<p>His education at the modern Sadiki college and the Paris Law Faculty consolidated his vocation as a nationalist and an activist. A brilliant lawyer, with a perfect mastery of classical Arabic and French, Essebsi could recite poetry and the Koran from memory.</p>
<p>In the lead-up to his election to the highest office in 2014, Tunisians nicknamed him <a href="https://newafricanmagazine.com/19338/">“Bajbouj”</a>, out of fondness for his wit and humour. With the gift of persuasion, he led a political career spanning over half a century and had an immense sense of nationalism.</p>
<h2>A veteran of the old regime</h2>
<p>The name “Caïd Essebsi” dates back to his illustrious ancestors. He was closely related to the Husainid Dynasty of Beys who led the country for 250 years – from 1705 until the establishment of the Tunisian republic in 1957. </p>
<p>Essebsi <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/polit_0032-342x_1957_num_22_5_2477">faithfully served</a> Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia’s first post-independence president, serving in various positions. He was Head of National Security, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Defense, Ambassador, and Minister for Foreign Affairs.</p>
<p>But when Bourguiba was proclaimed “President for life” in 1974, Essebsi joined the opposition. They called for an end to the one-party system, and for greater freedoms.</p>
<p>In 1987, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali – who was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20080428-reign-zine-el-abidine-ben-ali-tunisia">Prime Minister</a> at the time – deposed an aging Bourguiba. This came to be known as a “medical coup d’État” because Bourguiba was in such poor health he couldn’t carry out his duties. </p>
<p>Essebsi served under Ben Ali as the President of the Parliamentary Assembly, but eventually left the political stage for a while. A clever diplomat, Essebsi distanced himself from the Ben Ali regime, sharing neither its authoritarian nor mafia-like, clannish tendencies.</p>
<h2>Post-revolution legacy</h2>
<p>In an ironic quirk of history, Essebsi, a man of the “old regime”, returned to political office after the country’s <a href="http://www.lepanoptique.net/sections/politique-economie/la-revolution-tunisienne-quand-la-dignite-devient-un-instinct/">2011 “Jasmine” or “Dignity” revolution</a>. </p>
<p>He led the transition government and oversaw the organisation of Tunisia’s first free elections. These brought the Islamist Ennahdha party into power. </p>
<p>But the country was thrown into deep crisis under the leadership of the troika –- made up of the Islamists and their allies –- culminating in the assassination of three political figures; Naguedh, Belaïd and Brahmi. They became seen as martyrs of the revolution.</p>
<p>In 2012 Essebsi founded the Nidaa Tounes (“Tunisia’s Call”). The party united the opposition and won the legislative and presidential elections of 2014. </p>
<p>Essebsi had to share power with the Islamists, much to the chagrin of many voters, including around a million women who had deliverately voted for him. But, forged in Paris in 2013, the historic compromise between Essebsi and Rached Ghannouchi, the influential leader of Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda party, opened up the national dialogue and eased tensions between secularists and Islamists.</p>
<h2>Three master strokes</h2>
<p>Essebsi’s legitimacy as a leader was reinforced by three master strokes that became part of his, admittedly mixed, legacy. His task of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/tunisia-nidaa-tounes-shambles-political-turbulence-181202090020299.html">rebuilding</a> State authority was undermined by the lack of a unified political ideology, eventually leading to the implosion of the Nidaa Tounes party.</p>
<p>Essebsi’s first master stroke was reconciling Tunisia with its nationalist past. This meant putting “Tunisian-ness” above Wahhabism and political Islam. </p>
<p>Signs of this historic move include the government taking back management of places of worship, <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/491268/politique/tunisie-beji-caid-essebsi-lheritier-de-bourguiba/">the return of the statues of
Bourguiba</a> to their original locations, and the drawing up of a <a href="https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/beji-caid-essebsi-appelle-tous-les-pays-arabo-musulmans-a-adopter-legalite-dans-lheritage_mg_5c73d6e3e4b06cf6bb287d7a">bill for sex equality in inheritance
law</a>.</p>
<p>His second master stroke was refusing to <a href="https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/amendement-de-la-loi-electorale-beji-caid-essebsi-refuse-de-signer-une-loi-dexclusion-annonce-son-conseiller-politique_mg_5d3308e8e4b0419fd32d7f07">sign a proposed electoral law
amendment</a>, tabled by the government in the lead-up to the 2019 elections, that was seen as a form of political exclusion.</p>
<p>Essebsi’s subtle refusal, who opposed the Head of the Government, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/08/09/en-tunisie-le-premier-ministre-youssef-chahed-se-presente-a-la-presidentielle_5497994_3212.html">Youssef Chahed</a>, signalled the end of the hegemony of the ruling coalition represented by the new State party, <a href="https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/elections-legislatives-les-tetes-de-liste-de-tahya-tounes_mg_5d401979e4b01d8c97812d2a">Tahya Tounes</a> (“Long Live Tunisia”), and its Islamist allies, and opened the way for new political figures to lead the latest polls.</p>
<p>Essebsi’s final master stroke was his refusal to be placed on life support as he lay dying. This <a href="https://www.voaafrique.com/a/pas-de-vacances-de-pouvoir-apr%C3%A8s-l-hospitalisation-d-essebsi/4977401.html">prevented a power vacuum</a> that would have allowed the Head of Government to become President of the Republic.</p>
<p>By choosing to die naturally on 25 July 2019 –- the eve of Tunisia’s Republic Day –- “Bajbouj” ensured appropriate institutional succession and brought the nation together around the myth of a founding father.</p>
<p>Honoured with a Beylical funeral service, President Essebsi succeeded where Bourguiba had failed, going down in history as a great statesman. The military, secular organisation of his farewell ceremony, the cavalry’s guard of honour around his casket, the show of symbols, the cries of mourners and the national anthem sung in honor of the deceased are evidence of this.</p>
<p>Essebsi embodies the duality highlighted by historian <a href="https://next.liberation.fr/livres/2019/07/17/ernst-kantorowicz-historien-romanesque_1740598">Ernst
Kantorowicz</a>
in <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/polix_0295-2319_1989_num_2_6_2102"><em>The King’s Two Bodies</em></a> between “the physical body”, which perishes, and “the mystical body” that survives as a historical figure and political legacy.</p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for Fast ForWord.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122403/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed Kerrou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Essebsi made three master strokes which mean his legacy will have a lasting impact.Mohamed Kerrou, Professeur de sciences politiques, Université de Tunis El ManarLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/902452018-01-17T16:16:43Z2018-01-17T16:16:43ZTunisia is back on a knife edge – here’s why<p>While celebrating the seventh anniversary of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-years-on-tunisias-jasmine-revolution-continues-from-the-ground-up-52848">ousting of</a> president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisians <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/tunisian-government-plans-social-reforms-after-week-of-unrest">have been</a> demonstrating against their government. Thousands have been taking to the streets in Tunis and throughout the country, <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20180109-tunisia-protests-price-hikes-deadly">in some cases</a> leading to arrests and running battles with the police. </p>
<p>The focus of the protests has been the government’s <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/tunisia-protests-is-there-a-trade-off-between-a-strong-economy-and-democracy/a-42087864">austerity budget</a>, which includes hikes to the prices of basic goods and services. This, the protesters argue, will make life even more difficult for ordinary Tunisians who are already struggling to get by. </p>
<p>It is the latest of numerous demonstrations against the government and its economic policies, which <a href="https://www.hsfk.de/en/publications/publication-search/publication/the-quest-for-social-justice-in-tunisia-socioeconomic-protest-and-political-democratization-post-2/">have been increasing</a> since 2015. So what is going on, and where should the country go from here?</p>
<h2>Vive la revolution?</h2>
<p>Tunisia made international headlines in 2011 when mass demonstrations erupted, inspiring the famous wave of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482315">Arab Uprisings</a> that swept through the likes of Libya, Egypt and Syria. Over a quarter of Tunisians participated, backed by the overwhelming majority of the country’s 11m inhabitants. </p>
<p>The protesters were demanding “isqaat an-nizaam”, the downfall of the regime. This didn’t just mean the overthrow of Ben Ali and his cronies, but an end to a system shot through with corruption, leeching wealth from ordinary citizens to the rich, and denying people jobs and a decent life – all under the façade of electoral democracy. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=724&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=724&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=724&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202289/original/file-20180117-53292-36bovj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ben Ali in office.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tunisie_President_Ben_Ali.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After the revolution, moves towards truly free elections gave Tunisians some hope that they would enjoy real democracy; that politicians would finally hear and heed their needs. Indeed, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/tunisia">international commentators</a> and academics have <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm">hailed</a> the country as the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-bright-spot-in-tunisia">lone bright spot</a> in a region beset with civil wars, counterrevolutions and open conflict. </p>
<p>Tunisians’ lived experience has been rather different. By 2014, the Arab Transformations survey showed that the hopes and expectations of the revolution had turned to anger at the failure of successive governments to deliver on promises of economic reform, job creation, and responding to people’s needs. </p>
<p>Indeed, according to our <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316553681_Arab_Transformations_Project_Data_Set_SPSS_Version">ArabTransformations survey</a> from that year, Tunisians did not see their country as a democracy: few saw it as outright dictatorship (14%), but fewer still (11.5%) saw it as fully democratic. If it were fully democratic, went the prevailing view, it would heed the will of the people. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783319690438">our book</a> published this month, we trace how three years after the revolution, people still saw lack of employment and corruption as the major problems facing their country. They had little trust in government, political leaders, religious leaders, civil society, or even fellow citizens. </p>
<p>They thought that their own and the country’s economic situation had deteriorated since 2010; they were fearful of terrorism and worried about security. Half the population were worried about their employment, and 60% of young people were worried about job opportunities. Where Ben Ali’s removal had been greeted with euphoria, now there was mounting disillusion and despair. </p>
<h2>From despair to …</h2>
<p>Disillusion has since kept building, according to the <a href="http://www.arabbarometer.org/country/tunisia">2016 Arab Barometer</a>. Successive governments have either been unwilling or unable to fulfil their citizens’ demands for economic and political inclusion. </p>
<p>Economic “liberalisation” before the revolution <a href="https://www.globalpolicy.org/social-and-economic-policy/the-three-sisters-and-other-institutions/the-international-monetary-fund/51295-will-neoliberalism-make-a-comeback-in-africa-via-tunisia.html">brought praise</a> from the IMF. But measures including privatisation, public spending cuts and trade liberalisation increased unemployment, with most people seeing no benefit from economic growth. Ben Ali held on to power and corruption and crony capitalism got worse. </p>
<p>Since the revolution, Tunisia has continued to implement these failed policies – at the behest of the international financial institutions and Western governments. The IMF <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-economy-idUSKBN16508T">postponed</a> part of Tunisia’s most recent $2.8 billion (£2 billion) loan last year, only <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/tunisia-economy-imf/tunisia-ready-for-decisive-action-on-economy-imf-says-idUSL8N1OE5EW">reinstating it</a> after the government agreed to accelerate cuts to public spending. </p>
<p>These policies have continued to produce economic stagnation, increased government debt and reliance on development assistance and soft loans. Corruption <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/10/25/tunisia-s-corruption-contagion-transition-at-risk-pub-73522">remains a problem</a> and the unemployment rate <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/524516/unemployment-rate-in-tunisia/">is still</a> in double figures, <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/MNA/tunisia/breaking_the_barriers_to_youth_inclusion_eng_chap3.pdf">especially</a> among university graduates. Tourism continues to struggle after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/28/tunisia-attack-how-a-man-with-a-parasol-could-38-people-on-the-beach">terrorism of 2015</a>, even though it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-economy-tourism/foreign-tourist-numbers-up-24-percent-in-tunisia-so-far-in-2017-idUSKBN1CM1WK">has been improving</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Growth and inflation</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202297/original/file-20180117-53317-r4x78c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p><strong>Unemployment</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202298/original/file-20180117-53289-1kvdorn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>This is the environment into which the government is pitching its new <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/10/africa/tunisia-protests-intl/index.html">Finance Act</a>. It <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/tunisia-economy-budget/update-1-tunisian-parliament-approves-2018-budget-including-fiscal-reforms-idUSL8N1O90KE">includes</a> a one-point rise to VAT for many products, higher taxes on bank profits and a new 1% social security tax on employees and companies. </p>
<p>Prime minister Youssef Chahed <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/tunisia-anti-austerity-protests-turn-deadly/a-42079677">has said</a> the austerity measures will mean only one more difficult year for Tunisians, though experts <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/tunisia-protests-is-there-a-trade-off-between-a-strong-economy-and-democracy/a-42087864">are divided</a> about whether they will work. Other measures include selling off government stakes in Tunisian banks and hacking back the number of public sector employees. </p>
<p>In our view, Tunisia’s austerity has been counterproductive and will continue to be. The government should instead structurally reform the tax system to make it more redistributive; while fighting the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c4d721dc-d9cf-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482">major problems</a> of tax evasion, corruption, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/contraband-parallel-imports-tunisia-abidi-abdelhakim/">smuggling and parallel trading</a> – <a href="https://www.ensafrica.com/news/Parallel-imports?Id=972&STitle=IP%20ENSight">where</a> products are imported without the permission of the manufacturer. </p>
<p>Whether the government has the will or authority to pursue such solutions remains to be seen. It doesn’t help that it is weak and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/180-endiguer-la-derive-autoritaire-en-tunisie">riddled with</a> in-fighting between coalition partners. </p>
<p>Tunisia’s international partners meanwhile need to recognise that it’s not enough to just improve the country’s voting system. Guaranteeing social and economic rights – creating decent jobs, tackling corruption – are the democratic substance without which elections remain empty promises. </p>
<p>Tunisia, like the other countries in the region, is unstable because it has failed to address the very issues that fuelled the revolution of 2011. People want more than formal political freedom and freely elected governments; they want leaders who deliver on the substance that goes with the promise of democracy – not just ballot boxes but tangible fairness. </p>
<p>In short, the roots of the current protests are not merely economic but also political; borne of repeated political failure. Ignoring citizens’ concerns and embracing the quick and easy path of repression will only further destabilise this country – be it through revolution, radicalisation or the return of dictatorship. This is the main lesson of the Arab Uprisings. Tunisia’s true friends would be wary of letting such mistakes happen again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90245/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pamela Abbott received funding from the European 7th Framework Programme for the Arab Transformations project.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti received funding from the European 7th Framework Programme for the Arab Transformations project.</span></em></p>Seven years after Ben Ali was deposed, Tunisians feel little happier with their lot.Pamela Abbott, Director of the Centre for Global Development and Professor in the School of Education, University of AberdeenAndrea Teti, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.