tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/lee-rigby-13713/articlesLee Rigby – The Conversation2015-07-06T18:29:44Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/443382015-07-06T18:29:44Z2015-07-06T18:29:44ZWhat we’ve learned about radicalisation since 7/7 bombings a decade ago<p>As the UK marks the tenth anniversary of the July 7 London bombings, there is a sense that what was a terrible new phenomenon in 2005 has become increasingly prevalent. </p>
<p>Back then, the country was shocked when 52 people died at the hands of four British nationals who had brought what they saw as a religious war on to the streets of London – and were willing to die in the process. In the ten years since, more have taken a similar path, causing anxiety about how long it will be before another attack happens and how these people are to be stopped.</p>
<p>The flight of men and women to join Islamic State might lead us to believe, depressingly, that we haven’t learned anything since 7/7 – when the four young men entered the London transport network carrying their backpacks of explosives. But the truth is very different. We’ve <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org">learnt, and are learning</a>, a tremendous amount about how and why people choose to get involved in terrorism.</p>
<p>We’ve picked up plenty of useful information about what leads people to join radical groups and how their path is made easier – or indeed harder. Now it’s a matter of applying that knowledge effectively.</p>
<h2>Not all about religion</h2>
<p>One of the most important lessons has been that, while it is important, radicalisation is <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/sacred-is-better-than-religion/">not all about religion</a>. Since 7/7 the media and the government have struggled to understand what role religion played in the London attacks and others around the world. Often the explanations are restricted to simplistic reductions of Islam. The perpetrators are either following a religion of war, or a perversion of a religion of peace.</p>
<p>These accounts fail to understand that religion, even Islam, is not practised in the same way by all Muslims and that there isn’t a commonly agreed “right” way of being a Muslim – despite proclamations to the contrary from Islamic State.</p>
<p>That said, we shouldn’t stop trying to understand the role ideology plays just because it is complicated. <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/subjective-uncertainty-reduction-through-self-categorization/">We know</a>, for example, that people and groups choose more extreme beliefs at times of uncertainty. <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/francis-ideology-radicalisation/">We also know</a> that while ideology plays a role in radicalisation, engagement with a terrorist group or action requires other enabling factors – such as access to weapons and acquiring the ability to use them.</p>
<p>The quality of public conversation about religion is often poor but the situation is improving. There has recently been a greater effort to increase <a href="http://www.religiousliteracy.org/">religious literacy</a> in general and to improve the <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/a-new-settlement/">place of education about beliefs</a> in schools, for example.</p>
<p>We won’t stop terrorism with these kind of efforts, but improving general understanding about religion and ensuring that people are able to talk about it will help young people challenge toxic and dangerous ideologies better than they can at present. </p>
<h2>What cults tell us</h2>
<p>As we’ve tried to come to terms with a new threat over the past decade, the work of <a href="http://inform.ac/">groups</a> specialising in minority religious and political movements has proved useful.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/van-eck-cult-members/">Research</a> has shown that while the vast majority of minority religions aren’t violent, there are still lots of similarities between the process of joining a terrorist group and joining high-cost groups that exist on the fringes of society – violent examples of which include <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/reader-2012-aftermath-2/">Aum Shinrikyo</a> and the <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/mayer-1996-mythes/">Solar Temple</a>.</p>
<p>Such groups provide a place for disenchanted people to call home. They do this through constant positive messaging – or “lovebombing” – to convince the person that they have found a purpose in life. Once in these groups, people often act in ways that they never previously would have considered, even cutting off all ties with family and friends.</p>
<p>But being a member of high-cost groups can also be <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/van-eck-cult-members/">very demanding</a> – and this can be one of the reasons people choose to leave. In extreme cases, people can be faced with violence if they try to leave and can be further deterred by the fact they lack job prospects and social networks on the outside.</p>
<p>The importance of providing personalised support to people who want to leave these groups has been echoed in policy, for example the UK’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance">Channel programme</a>. This is an important lesson, confirming that while we look to understand patterns in why people join – and leave – these kinds of groups, the actual reasons are unique to each person.</p>
<h2>Social networks are vital</h2>
<p>Attention has recently turned to the role of social networks in leading people into radicalisation. It seems that prior personal ties can ease uncertainty about taking part in action, for example. <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/busher-social-networks/">Research</a> on the far-right group the English Defence League shows that people attending their first protest found it easier if they already knew other people going as a result of previous participation in far-right activities or football hooliganism.</p>
<p>One particularly important finding has been that decisions to act, violently or otherwise, are taken collectively and there is evidence of block recruitment to activist movements. </p>
<p>We’ve seen this in recent cases of people joining IS, with groups of friends from <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-east-wales-28116575">Cardiff</a>, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/04/two-bethnal-green-schoolgirls-now-married-isis-men-syria">East London</a> and <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/2014/10/portsmouth-kobane">Portsmouth</a> leaving for Syria together. This is important because we’ve seen that these people don’t act out of ideological commitment alone, but often because of personal ties.</p>
<p>Even more importantly, we know from the study of social networks and cults that when people are in tight-knit groups there is a <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/busher-social-networks/">confirmation bias</a> in the way they view the world. Their perceptions are reinforced by like-minded individuals.</p>
<p>Conversely, people with stronger ties to wider society are less susceptible to joining high-cost groups or being convinced by their way of seeing the world. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28939555">The UK’s Prevent strategy</a> did originally try to encourage social cohesion through inter-communal activity, although that aspect of its mission has been <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/divorced-but-still-co-habiting/">poorly resourced</a>.</p>
<h2>Dealing with foreign fighters</h2>
<p>While the number of people leaving to fight abroad is a sensitive issue at the moment, it certainly isn’t a new phenomenon. We could do worse than to look at history for some clues about how to tackle this issue.</p>
<p>Around <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/foreign-fighters/">100,000</a> people have taken up such endeavours over the past 250 years. Most go home, even back to their old jobs, when they leave. There are still problems with counting how many have been involved with violence back at home <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/malet-foreign-fighters-home-grown-radicalization/">but research suggests</a> the figure is less than 10%.</p>
<p>A further concern has been that returnees could be used for recruitment and facilitating travel, but because of social media they no longer need to recruit in person. Indeed, we could even say that with their tall tales of derring-do on the battlefield, they are more effective when they stay abroad to fight.</p>
<p>One of the interesting lessons we’ve learned from historical analyses is <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/malet-foreign-fighters-home-grown-radicalization/">what happens</a> when citizenship is stripped from foreign fighters. Many people from various Middle Eastern states had their <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-10/lockyer-milad-where-will-banned-jihadists-go/5733370">citizenship revoked</a> when they left to fight the invading Soviets in Afghanistan. This not only prevented them from returning home, it bound them together as they looked for a way to use their new skills – and, with financial aid from Osama bin Laden, some of them formed the core of al-Qaeda. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/vague-promises-about-seizing-passports-wont-fight-off-the-islamic-state-31149">blanket policy of stopping foreign fighters from returning</a> is misguided, since many may head home because they no longer believe in the radical ideology of IS – if indeed they ever did. Still, as research on former cult members has shown, the reasons people give for disengaging with groups change over time. While they might initially claim they had realised they’d been brainwashed or duped, it often turns out they had simply fallen out with other members.</p>
<h2>Stop calling them lone wolves</h2>
<p>One step that could be taken to prevent people from joining these groups is to think more carefully how the media glamourises them. A good case in point is the moniker “lone wolf”, which implies a sense of cunning and intelligence that violent lone actor terrorists often sorely lack in reality.</p>
<p>Think of <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/lone-actor-terrorists-behavioural-analysis/">Mohammed Taheri-azar</a>, who first planned to hijack a fighter jet and drop a nuclear bomb on Washington DC; his plan B was a campus shooting spree, but he was ultimately unable to carry out either attack. In the end he ran over and injured nine people.</p>
<p>A crucial turning point for Islamist-inspired lone actor attacks was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/men-who-killed-lee-rigby-in-woolwich-are-murderers-not-soldiers-of-allah-21664">murder of Lee Rigby</a>. With the sheer impact of their actions, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale showed aspiring lone actors that even with little ability and minimal resources, it was still possible to vault into the <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/gill-lone-wolves/">social status and notoriety</a> that so many desperately crave.</p>
<p>But this desire for infamy is one of the reasons lone actors leak details of their attacks before carrying them out. <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/bombing-alone/">Research has shown</a> that leakage of plans is quite common. Understanding how and why these leaks occur is another example of significant outcomes of research since 7/7. Detection is still harder for police and other agencies than prevention, but detecting and stopping lone actors requires more attention than disrupting the communications of IS.</p>
<h2>Shifting tactics</h2>
<p>Since 7/7 we have learned a tremendous amount about radicalisation. But what about the future? During this time, research has adapted to focus on new technologies and shifting tactics, <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/mcginn-internet-incubator-radicalisation/">such as cyber-activists</a> and the proliferation of lone actor terrorists.</p>
<p>This research is <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/2015-radicalisation-briefings/">shared</a> with decision makers in government and is used to critique policies and strategies.</p>
<p>While the threat from terrorism will undoubtedly remain and continue to innovate, it is clear we understand it better than we did back in 2005.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44338/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Francis edits RadicalisationResearch.org. He receives funding from the RCUK Partnership for Conflict, Crime & Security Research.</span></em></p>It may feel like the battle is being lost but some vital information has been gathered in the decade since the London bombings.Matthew Francis, Senior Research Associate, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/351072014-12-05T15:55:27Z2014-12-05T15:55:27ZHow terrorists use Twitter to become ‘brand ambassadors’<p>On an overcast afternoon in London in May 2013, an off-duty soldier named Lee Rigby <a href="https://theconversation.com/woolwich-murder-the-view-from-south-east-london-14620">was murdered</a> near his barracks in Woolwich, southeast London. Rigby’s killers were two young British men of Nigerian descent, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. What people didn’t know at the time is that six months earlier Adebowale had talked on Facebook about his desire to slaughter a soldier.</p>
<p>The authors of the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/25/lee-rigby-murder-internet-firm-could-have-picked-up-killers-message-report-says">official report</a> into the killing chastised Facebook for not picking up on the threat, arguing there was a “significant possibility” that the attack could have been prevented if the technology company had alerted the authorities. Politicians turned on social networks for not doing enough to stop extremists, accusing Facebook and the like of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/25/lee-rigby-report-internet-firms-safe-haven-terrorists-pm">providing a safe haven for terrorists</a> and of not living up to their social responsibility.</p>
<p>It’s too easy to use social networks as scapegoats, especially when it distracts attention from the failings of the security services – who had previously had Adebolajo under surveillance. Extremists have always used whatever technology they could to get their message out, from printed propaganda to broadcasting over the airwaves. The smartphone is today’s printing press, and social media a ready-made distribution network. </p>
<p>So it’s hardly surprising that according to some estimates <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2006/04/11/DI2006041100626.html">90% of terrorist activity on the internet</a> takes place on social media sites. The real issue is about power: social media shifts the balance of power away from governments, police and the armed forces in favour of loosely organised groups of activists, dissidents and extremists too. </p>
<h2>Twitter guerrillas</h2>
<p>Social media inherently favours guerrilla warfare, where a small, nimble force can successfully take on a larger, more unwieldy one. To understand how to combat extremism on the internet, we need to understand why this is. </p>
<p>Social media is generally free, open to anyone who can get online, and messages can be more visible than ever before, with a global reach. Instead of relying on the press or other intermediaries, extremist groups reach people directly and tailor the message accordingly. The Islamic State (IS) skillfully targets messages designed to spread terror among Western audiences while recruiting followers with tweets aimed at the Muslim world.</p>
<p>Since social media operates as a network, it is much easier to spread hate from one person to another – each follower becomes a broadcaster – and the cost to reach 100, 1,000 or 10,000 people is essentially the same.</p>
<p>This distributed and decentralised model favours guerrilla tactics. Groups and individuals can operate independently, yet loosely connected. By contrast, messages from institutions tend to operate on a command and control structure, whose layers of bureaucracy make it hard to respond quickly. </p>
<h2>Brand ambassador or terrorist?</h2>
<p>It is much harder to shut down the propaganda channels of extremist groups when no one, and everyone, is in charge. Security comes through obscurity. Unofficial Twitter or Facebook accounts run by sympathisers are hard to track down as they can blend into the volume of stuff on social media. One study from earlier this year found <a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/isis-twitter-activity/">27,000 Twitter accounts that were positive about IS</a>, yet none were officially run by the group. Instead, these people become what in the business world are called “brand ambassadors”. In effect, extremists spreading hate are using the same tactics used by Hollywood studios to get fans buzzing about an upcoming film.</p>
<p>Twitter encourages us to live in the moment, to react rather than reflect. When news breaks, Twitter comes alive with a jumble of facts, speculation, rumour and emotion. The uncertainty that follows something like the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ottawa-shootings-canada-lost-its-innocence-a-long-time-ago-33387">Ottawa shooting</a> provides fertile ground for an atmosphere of fear. </p>
<p>The real-time nature of social media offers a tactical propaganda advantage to terror groups. They can try to seize the news agenda by sending immediate reports and photos from the scene of an attack, before the media or the authorities even have time to evaluate what has happened. </p>
<h2>The public domain</h2>
<p>The irony is how much of this activity happens in public, on networks that can be monitored by the security forces. As businesses have discovered, people are freely providing a wealth of information about their actions, intentions and beliefs on social media. Smart companies have learned to monitor in real time and respond rapidly to a consumer backlash on social media. There is a lesson here for the fight against terror. </p>
<p>Traditional, hierarchical institutions are slow moving beasts that are ill equipped to fight in a propaganda battleground that favours the guerrilla tactics of the nimble. </p>
<p>The same qualities of social media that can help people to come together and protest about income inequality or contribute to the overthrow of a dictator can also be harnessed for evil. At the core of the debate is the fact that social media is a contested space, where the power of institutions and elites can be challenged and neutralised by those on the edges – for good or evil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alfred Hermida does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>On an overcast afternoon in London in May 2013, an off-duty soldier named Lee Rigby was murdered near his barracks in Woolwich, southeast London. Rigby’s killers were two young British men of Nigerian…Alfred Hermida, Associate professor, Graduate School of Journalism, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/347742014-11-27T14:54:16Z2014-11-27T14:54:16ZLee Rigby report is another weapon in the propaganda war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/65702/original/image-20141127-10179-1g74u7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">How to win the war.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/birgerking/5993887422">birgerking</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lee Rigby’s sister stated in The Sun that Facebook had “blood on their hands” over her brother’s murder in May 2013, following the publication of a report by the Intelligence and Security Committee. The report states that one of Lee Rigby’s murderers discussed his plans to “kill a soldier” on social media five months before the murder, but the security services were unaware. Facebook was <a href="https://theconversation.com/blaming-facebook-for-lee-rigbys-murder-is-nonsense-34728">criticised</a> for not reporting this to the authorities. </p>
<p>Presenting Facebook as blameworthy focuses media attention away from the fact that many mistakes were made by intelligence agencies and police. Some judgements might be easier than others and Facebook is hardly equipped to evaluate.</p>
<h2>Listen to us</h2>
<p>But this is all really an attempt to justify even greater extension of government access to social media data. Back in June 2013 The Guardian <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa">reported</a> that in the UK, “Mastering the Internet” enables British intelligence agency GCHQ to access “phone calls, the content of email messages, entries on Facebook and the history of any internet user’s access to websites” with a warrant. There are also <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/legal-loopholes-gchq-spy-world">loopholes</a> which mean that, without an additional warrant, GCHQ may be able to access content of chat between two British people if it was routed via Facebook outside the UK. </p>
<p>Facebook said it already censors and closes pages that discuss terrorist acts to prevent their pages enabling terrorist planning. However, while British surveillance capabilities are already extensive it was bemoaned that UK security agencies had “considerable difficulty” accessing content from companies under US juristiction as they require an American warrant. The report <a href="https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20141125_ISC_Woolwich_Report%28website%29.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7co3O_RQnU_-JyJLAtEOQiC0lzZQ-iU0b3QzPxNlR0WHq5hfcQYOpwOcniCpa1aIQgrU9sr6VBnF-87KbfR-qdRGobmXMzHBhtw36cYUGYFcBY1CllAAYYyr17toKGKn5KB6iAeh4WqyF89HDf4b46xaO_t_AsJFs_XpE4bq9oQbGFaG5KsBi_DoWRo6_JnZoi4R-YDC5OKJghq3BJO6T65mNZi-UeqNkoGiHWiGr2FL_P7L7BGlqNGuPqcyb6oK2zvMJNO2&attredirects=0">confirms this</a>. The security services in Britain have a reciprocal relationship with the US that goes back to World War I and II. Both countries consider each other as top allies, especially when it comes to counter-terrorism activities and it therefore seems highly unlikely that such a warrant would not be forthcoming. </p>
<p>In defence, Britain tries to complement the US in ensuring its capabilities add value for this important ally. The changes proposed by Cameron would give Britain greater freedom and range of capabilities. In working on a <a href="http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/cgi-bin/indexer?product=9780719091056">forthcoming book</a>, I have found some evidence of a reciprocal relationship existing in propaganda and information operations. </p>
<p>In interview, for example, Joel Harding, former US Special forces, former director of the Information Operations Institute and current director of the National Security Enterprise Information Strategy Centre, confirmed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Both the US and the UK can take advantage of one another’s laws to skirt around restrictions, legal and otherwise. If the UK could not do something with a UK citizen, for instance, the US can assist. I’m especially thinking of extremists. That could be a repugnant situation, however, as we honestly think of you guys as family. At least I do, as do most veterans.</p>
<p>But as a former intelligence officer I’ve used that relationship a few times … especially when I was working in Special Operations. ‘Nuff said.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It’s important not to forget the two governments are fighting a broader propaganda war when considering the attacks on Facebook in which they wish to maintain an advantage. The Islamic State (IS) is also currently on a propaganda offensive and hoping its videos will provoke an Anglo-American response that they can manipulate to drive their recruitment. </p>
<h2>Dirty tricks</h2>
<p>In the online world, GCHQ is also moving toward a greater “offensive” role. With “<a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091">Squeaky Dolphin</a>” for example it is “crafting messaging campaigns to go viral” using Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, and Facebook. Throughout history security services have attempted to use reporters to spread propaganda and act as spies. This is now moving into social media.</p>
<p>In the US, Facebook, along with AOL, Google and other US companies have been <a href="https://www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com/#111614">campaigning</a> for an act to, among other things, prevent government access to their customers’ data “without proper legal process” and introduce more controls there. The British government’s attacks on Facebook and statements about their “moral duty” follow a week when the US Senate voted to end discussion of what has been called the USA Freedom Act.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/cgi-bin/indexer?product=9780719091056">My research</a> shows that many US government personnel saw their own laws governing the internet as too restrictive, particularly when it came to targeting within their own borders. Some pointed to what they saw as an advantage in what were seen as more UK permissive rules, believing these added “value” to their partnership. </p>
<p>David Cameron now seeks to expand the already extensive ability of Britain’s security services to monitor and intercept online content and it is unsurprising that the recent report is being used as a way to shift our focus and build legitimacy for this. Particularly as the US government is fighting the greater restriction of its own access to users’ online content.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Briant received funding for her doctoral work from the ESRC.</span></em></p>Lee Rigby’s sister stated in The Sun that Facebook had “blood on their hands” over her brother’s murder in May 2013, following the publication of a report by the Intelligence and Security Committee. The…Emma L Briant, Lecturer in Journalism Studies, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/346752014-11-27T06:20:18Z2014-11-27T06:20:18ZThe terror threat may be rising, but don’t expect Theresa May to say why<p>As she seeks to push through tough new terrorism legislation, Home Secretary Theresa May has reported an <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/nov/24/theresa-may-london-attacks-40-terror-plots-foiled">increased danger of terror attacks</a> in the UK.</p>
<p>But May’s claim that 40 terrorist plots have been uncovered in the past nine years seems to put her at odds with Metropolitan Police commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe, who cited an average of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30166946">one plot a year</a> being uncovered as well as “several” in the past year.</p>
<p>Still, whether the number of foiled threats is 15 or 40, the government believes the overall danger of an attack is increasing. It is singularly determined to get new legislation through, including controls on universities to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/nov/24/terror-bill-requires-universities-to-ban-extremist-speakers">stop them allowing extremist speakers on campus</a> – the definition of “extremist” being thoroughly unclear.</p>
<p>Part of the suspicion over the controversial new legislation, already dubbed the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-says-the-uk-is-not-a-surveillance-state-but-her-proposed-law-might-create-one-28473">snooper’s charter</a>”, is the lack of public trust in the police, not least because of examples such as <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-26466867">spying on the family of the murdered teenager Stephen Lawrence</a>.</p>
<p>These might possibly be resolved during the debate on the new bill if the necessary assurances are offered – but the much more important issue is still the extent of the threat, and the question whether it is increasing. This, in turn, means focusing on the main movement involved: Islamic State (IS).</p>
<h2>Stalemate</h2>
<p>The early indications are that air strikes against this rapidly expanding threat have curtailed its operations, but more by preventing further gains rather than pushing fighters back onto the defensive. </p>
<p>Recent talk of a “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/03/world/middleeast/iraqis-prepare-isis-offensive-with-us-help.html">spring offensive</a>” by the Iraqi Army to regain Anwar Province from Islamic State control have been ridiculed in both Iraq and the US. It will take at least a year to reform and retrain Iraq’s armed forces. The reality is that the international coalition fighting IS will be unable to do more than secure a stalemate for some time.</p>
<p>Accurate figures are difficult to obtain, but the consensus is that IS has <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-recruitment-reaches-unprecedented-scale-15000-foreign-jihadists-joining-militant-1716684">up to 15,000</a> paramilitary supporters from outside the region. Its total strength may be rather more than 30,000. </p>
<p>IS’s recent success in Syria has also seen other Islamist paramilitary groups such as al-Nusra Front start to collaborate. That said, this is hardly enough to put the movement back on track to create a substantial Caliphate – and still less to allow it to strike at some of its most hated enemies, such as the Saudi Royal Family or King Abdullah II of Jordan.</p>
<p>If IS is to successfully displace the al-Qaeda movement, it badly needs support from other major movements elsewhere in the world to accept its leadership. It’s certainly made progress on that score recently, especially with the powerful and extreme Egyptian Islamist group <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25882504">Ansar Beit al-Magdis</a> pledging its allegiance <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/world/middleeast/egyptian-militant-group-pledges-loyalty-to-isis.html?_r=1">in late November 2014</a>.</p>
<p>Even more indicative has been the pervasive spread of the IS flag among extreme groups in <a href="http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119535/isis-pakistan-islamic-state-distributing-flags-and-flyers">Pakistan</a>.</p>
<h2>Blowback</h2>
<p>All this may well help recruit supporters from countries such as the UK, but two other factors may be even bigger: the extensive and highly effective use of new social media to spread the IS message, and the fallout from the Western military offensive.</p>
<p>The West’s push is reported to have killed <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/22/world/meast/syria-airstrikes-toll/">more than 900 people</a>, mostly IS paramilitaries but with civilians as well, including children. IS propagandists are having a field day with this, happily demonising the West once again killing Muslims and assaulting Islam as they have done in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Mali and elsewhere.</p>
<p>It is a persuasive and pervasive message, with obvious appeal. Yet while Theresa May might well be right that the terror threat to the UK is increasing, there should be no disguising that this directly relates to fighting that distant war.</p>
<p>From IS’s perspective, the UK is attacking it, making the UK an entirely appropriate target for attack. But the question of what to do about that, and what legislation to pass to prevent it, is not any easier to answer just because the threat level has gone up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34675/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Rogers has received funding from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development. He lectures regularly at the Royal College of Defence Studies.</span></em></p>As she seeks to push through tough new terrorism legislation, Home Secretary Theresa May has reported an increased danger of terror attacks in the UK. But May’s claim that 40 terrorist plots have been…Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/347282014-11-26T16:06:04Z2014-11-26T16:06:04ZBlaming Facebook for Lee Rigby’s murder is nonsense<p>The <a href="http://isc.independent.gov.uk/">Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of Parliament</a> has now released its 191-page <a href="https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20141125_ISC_Woolwich_Report%28website%29.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7coc80ko2GUteM61zNoTjoxyCvqx2HwY4HZwadHCcO133klZDADASlsS7xhz6gbJ0EjxOk8MFHx6mfGkXE2cEzgnWQAmkkBnyACqGw6mFGI39sXe7jhMAOKVGTNoEUsamp7e90gy9GNigXtO02aDwzO8SvfTvIKQ0j5_jyE0dHrPd2usnysoebRbTEHCKyjVYeVHYYXJA4X_zp0GxbJECUn0CpT74r1p2bSs_Z0_Ndyb3wzkBRn-USVz_YVWyJiZIAP1DC6p&attredirects=0">report</a> into Lee Rigby’s murder. The report concludes that even though the ISC “discovered a number of errors,” the murder could not have been prevented by the intelligence and security services. </p>
<p>Instead, the blame seems to have been put decisively on <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-30199131">Facebook</a>, which one of Rigby’s killers apparently used to discuss “killing a soldier” several months prior to the murder. This despite the fact that the security services were apparently well aware of the killers and their motives, independent of their social media presence.</p>
<p>Michael Adebolajo, the controlling mind in the murderous attack on Fusilier Lee Rigby, was <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/25/timeline-intelligence-lee-rigby-murder">first arrested in 2006</a> at a protest against Danish cartoons he perceived to be insulting to the prophet Muhammad. By the autumn of 2008, he was on MI5’s radar as having potential connections with al-Qaeda and by 2011 was the object of close surveillance.</p>
<p>Between then and April 2013 – when the intensive surveillance of Adebolajo was cancelled since there was “no indication of a national security concern” – he had multiple encounters with police and security services. A month later, Rigby was brutally murdered.</p>
<h2>Counter-claims</h2>
<p>Adebolajo claims MI5 attempted to recruit him as an informant – claims the UK government refuses to comment on, citing national security – and accuses MI6 of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/25/uk-kenya-lee-rigby-killer">tacit complicity in alleged beatings and torture threats</a> he received when detained by Kenyan police in 2010. He had travelled to Kenya with the apparent intention of joining extremists in Somalia.</p>
<p>Adebolajo’s partner in the murder, Michael Adebowale, came to MI5’s attention in August 2011 as a result of his interest in online extremist material and the intelligence services were aware of the two’s close connections. They nevertheless eventually considered Adebowale a low-level threat unworthy of their continuing attention.</p>
<p>By detailing various communications problems between police and security services and between the various branches of the intelligence services themselves and the inferences drawn from knowledge of the activities of Lee Rigby’s attackers, the report does a decent job of illustrating that security and intelligence systems are imperfect. </p>
<p>We can never be 100% secure, because these systems and agencies can and do fail – they fail naturally through human and technical and communications errors and they can be made to fail by actors with malign and, in this case, murderous intent.</p>
<p>What seems odd about the report and the ensuing media frenzy, however, is how Facebook has been framed as the single entity that could have prevented the murder.</p>
<p>Paragraph 17 of the report notes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have found only one issue which could have been decisive. This was the exchange – not seen until after the attack – between Adebowale and an individual overseas (FOXTROT) in December 2012. In this exchange, Adebowale told FOXTROT that he intended to murder a soldier. Had MI5 had access to this exchange, their investigation into Adebowale would have become a top priority. It is difficult to speculate on the outcome but there is a significant possibility that MI5 would then have been able to prevent the attack.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Paragraphs QQ to VV of the recommendations and conclusions go into this claim in a little more detail, saying: “Adebowale expressed his desire to murder a soldier "in the most explicit and emotive manner.” It then criticises US big tech companies for their lack of cooperation with government on fighting terrorism.</p>
<p>Happy though I usually might be to criticise Facebook or big tech – if more for their own anti-privacy practices than their lack of co-operation in counter-terrorism – it’s a bit of a stretch to suggest a giant beam of enlightenment would have engulfed the security services if Facebook had only shouted loudly enough, “look at this!”. </p>
<p>They were already aware of extreme views expressed by Adebowale on the net – and even Adebolajo, considered the more dangerous of the pair, was providing no continuing indication of a national security concern.</p>
<h2>Brazen</h2>
<p>For David Cameron and Theresa May to turn the deranged murder of a young soldier by damaged extremists into a political device for rehashing discredited surveillance proposals is unconscionable. It’s also not supported by the report: two members of the ISC have <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/25/lee-rigby-murder-internet-firm-could-have-picked-up-killers-message-report-says">already criticised the notion</a> that their work supports the further <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2014-2015/0127/cbill_2014-20150127_en_3.htm#pt3-l1g17">expansion of surveillance powers</a> the government is now proposing.</p>
<p>Of course, with an election round the corner, we should hardly be surprised that party managers might be encouraging senior figures to ramp up their “tough on terrorism” rhetoric. The sad thing is to see how the media has uncritically swallowed the “blame Facebook” mantra hook, line and sinker.</p>
<p>Lee Rigby, who dedicated his life to defending the freedoms we enjoy in the UK, deserves better from our political leaders, from our media outlets and frankly, from all of us.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34728/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ray Corrigan is affiliated with the Open University. Ray has contributed to NGOs such as the Open Rights Group. He is a signatory of the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance <a href="https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text">https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text</a></span></em></p>The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of Parliament has now released its 191-page report into Lee Rigby’s murder. The report concludes that even though the ISC “discovered a number of errors…Ray Corrigan, Senior Lecturer in Technology, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/346822014-11-26T06:19:34Z2014-11-26T06:19:34ZIn the wake of Lee Rigby inquiry, remember radicalisation and terrorism are not the same<p>A <a href="https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20141125_ISC_Woolwich_Report%28website%29.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cpEagiSMND53lffzSHfMnxJFQGdDoP6QM6fXhW5rAGDFPkDYG3taWylolenPYOLzm9YuJgHHICHWResoo9lA_X1kS63BuKkeHOylGyD-Q_QUx9HfgSQHsMQRxSvaiGfASSb7ywiTa9FCqbZFwmrag9DvOKV5jLaXRmC5uJIdNK_GOCOK3weo8uxrj_NwUO56mhoALNdVEYQeME76xwpgjU2KvLbYw_XvGsxDrJQRE8vINUYxnzErVQdSuK3QMkiFRAwWP7Y&attredirects=0">parliamentary inquiry</a> has cleared MI5 of failing to prevent the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in May 2013. This despite the fact that his killers, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, were both subjects of previous investigations by the security services – investigations which showed that both men had been radicalised.</p>
<p>Inevitably this conclusion has reignited the debate about how one can go about spotting a terrorist, and preventing an attack. If these two men held radical beliefs, why weren’t they stopped before committing such a terrible crime?</p>
<p>But radicalisation and terrorism are often conflated. It is assumed that people who have been radicalised become terrorists, and vice versa that terrorists have radical beliefs.</p>
<p>This assumption is wrong, and indeed radicalisation is used to explain too much in many of these accounts.</p>
<h2>Signs of radicalisation</h2>
<p>The process of radicalisation tends to hinge on the beliefs of an individual. A person becomes radicalised when their beliefs have changed from being similar to the rest of society’s – which are assumed to be normal – to beliefs that are quite extreme and possibly violent.</p>
<p>But how do we know what someone is thinking if they don’t express their views out loud? When we ask about someone’s beliefs, are they telling us what they think we want to know, how they like to think of themselves, or, in the case of violent beliefs, what they think will keep them safe? </p>
<p>One way to approach the problem is to look at what they talk about more generally. That includes their beliefs but also about who they are, what they fear and what they think of other people. This can provide an insight into their non-negotiable beliefs and values – what they hold to be sacred.</p>
<p>This approach might help us get an outline of someone’s beliefs, and it might even tell us that these beliefs are very extreme, but it doesn’t necessarily tell us how or whether they are going to act violently. As the Director General of MI5 outlined in his evidence for the report, plenty of people express violent beliefs, the real difficulty lies in separating the doers from the talkers.</p>
<p>This is an important problem that is too often overlooked in the rhetoric about the threat posed by Islamic extremism. Plenty of people have extreme views but a liberal democracy doesn’t set out to police beliefs and values. It should challenge violent beliefs but that is a very different proposition from criminalising them.</p>
<h2>Terrorism, not radicalisation</h2>
<p>Radicalisation is a different problem to terrorism so we need to be clear that we only criminalise people who express their beliefs and values in a way that threatens or hurts others, who incite people to act violently, and who express their intent to act violently themselves.</p>
<p>Adebowale’s radical views, for example, became more specific threats in an online exchange with an unnamed person overseas that only came to light after Rigby’s death. Adebowale stated that he wanted to murder a soldier. This is crucial in this case. Had this information come to light earlier, MI5 would have made its investigation into Adebowale a top priority. What the security services can’t do is prioritise an investigation unless the person under surveillance shows signs of planning an attack. </p>
<p>Talking about planned terrorist acts is not that unusual, even amongst self-starter terrorists. <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/bombing-alone/">Research</a> certainly suggests that in a majority of cases, lone-actor terrorists make their intent clear, possibly to family and friends and even in public.</p>
<p>The fact that Adebowale’s communications about his plan were not shared with the security services will no doubt form part of the case to support the government’s attempts to increase powers for the security services. But we must be careful that this doesn’t extend to criminalising people for expressing unpalatable views. </p>
<p>As we debate whether monitoring rules should be tightened, we need to keep in mind the fact that spotting that someone has been radicalised is not the same as spotting a terrorist.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34682/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Francis edits RadicalisationResearch.org. He receives funding from the RCUK Global Uncertainties fund.</span></em></p>A parliamentary inquiry has cleared MI5 of failing to prevent the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in May 2013. This despite the fact that his killers, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, were both subjects…Matthew Francis, Senior Research Associate, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/346722014-11-25T17:32:46Z2014-11-25T17:32:46ZLee Rigby murder was a terrible crime, but MI5 can’t win them all<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/65487/original/image-20141125-4240-1999dd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">With limited resources, some threats will slip through the net.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/zongo/10784628845/in/photolist-fa2m3h-f9ouXJ-fa2hno-f986D6-fa2isj-f9M2xM-f995zM-fa2m6Y-fa2iSA-f99kWc-f9oHdN-fa2nW1-f99evr-f9qaoU-f9M89H-f9a3Kg-fa2fo5-f9M5AH-f9axfD-f9M2M2-f9aTZ4-f9M3WV-f9bdNk-f982o2-fa2jjd-hE6hFo-hE5xAM-eAYsba-3JaZjX-eDQH7r-f9a6aZ-f9osgN-f9qngS-fa2mEf-fa2inY-f98bT6-hr13qD-hE5Szj-hE5TZy-hE5RAL-hE6ZYc-hE6fWG-hE6YLH-hE6Wcz-hE5Urf-eB3eqq-eB3gqj-eAZ13z-eAZ34g-eAZ5q2">David Holt</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With its vigorous, fractious media and political environment, the UK is a nation of second guessers. Nowhere is that more evident than in the response to the vicious murder of Lee Rigby.</p>
<p>A parliamentary <a href="https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20141125_ISC_Woolwich_Report%28website%29.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cpEagiSMND53lffzSHfMnxJFQGdDoP6QM6fXhW5rAGDFPkDYG3taWylolenPYOLzm9YuJgHHICHWResoo9lA_X1kS63BuKkeHOylGyD-Q_QUx9HfgSQHsMQRxSvaiGfASSb7ywiTa9FCqbZFwmrag9DvOKV5jLaXRmC5uJIdNK_GOCOK3weo8uxrj_NwUO56mhoALNdVEYQeME76xwpgjU2KvLbYw_XvGsxDrJQRE8vINUYxnzErVQdSuK3QMkiFRAwWP7Y&attredirects=0">inquiry by the Intelligence and Security Committee</a> has concluded that MI5 could not have prevented Rigby’s killing – even though it had previously been investigating the two men who attacked him in a London street in May 2013, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale.</p>
<p>Optimistically, the report might offer a meaningful push in the direction of reality for the national conversation around counter-terrorism, particularly around the capabilities of the security agencies.</p>
<p>Past precedent, however, suggests this won’t happen. We have certainly seen this sort of discussion before. There seems to be an assumption in the media, and possibly among the wider public, that coming to the attention of the police or security services automatically equates to 24-hour-a-day surveillance in which suspects are under a constant spotlight.</p>
<p>This just isn’t the case in reality. Without unlimited resources, modern counter-terrorism in a democratic society demands triage.</p>
<h2>Priorities</h2>
<p>The same problem arose ahead of the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/july7">July 7 2005 bombings</a> in which four terrorists murdered 52 people in London. Again some of the perpetrators had come to the attention of the security services but again parliament found the attacks could not have been prevented. The bombers had been deemed a lower priority in relation to other investigations. And indeed, ahead of the report’s release, home secretary Theresa May said that 40 terrorist plots had been uncovered over the past nine years.</p>
<p>This is the crucial problem. Judgements constantly need to be made, and priorities set. Although there is room for criticism, realism must be a constant corrective to hindsight. And that’s particularly true in cases where the lack of information in the public domain makes informed criticism difficult.</p>
<p>As the Intelligence and Security Committee itself noted in 2009, <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1184234/MI5-7-7-ringleader-radar-12-times--MPs-report-fails-point-finger.html">several hundred thousand security agents would be required</a> to mount continual surveillance on the several thousand known terrorist suspects. MI5 currently has <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/careers/working-at-mi5/video-spotlight-working-for-mi5/video-spotlight-working-for-mi5---transcript.aspx">fewer than 4,000 employees</a>.<br>
In needing to prioritise, there must be an emphasis on stopping major plots that risk casualties in the dozens, hundreds, or even thousands. Such a focus means by definition that attacks by “lone actors” or small numbers of people, which because of their size are difficult to detect and prevent, will at times succeed.</p>
<h2>Get real</h2>
<p>The media and politicians could play a useful role by emphasising the low risk to the public from such attacks as these. Such realism could help reduce the fear, hysteria and overreaction the terrorists hope to achieve in the first place.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the idea that a free society can ensure absolute security from terrorism or crime in general is patently ridiculous. It is certainly not one that would have been entertained by the UK in the past, when generations endured far worse terrorist atrocities courtesy of the Irish Republican Army.</p>
<p>November 21 was the 40th anniversary of the still-unsolved Birmingham pub bombings, in which 21 people were killed by terrorists. Counter-terrorism agencies are doing everything possible to stop attacks, particularly on this scale, from occurring. But the public, media, and politicians must recognise that a risk, albeit small, remains and will always do so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34672/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steve Hewitt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With its vigorous, fractious media and political environment, the UK is a nation of second guessers. Nowhere is that more evident than in the response to the vicious murder of Lee Rigby. A parliamentary…Steve Hewitt, Senior Lecturer in American and Canadian Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.