tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/lesotho-24671/articlesLesotho – The Conversation2024-02-02T10:59:15Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219982024-02-02T10:59:15Z2024-02-02T10:59:15ZSouth Africa needs to manage migrants better. That requires cleaning up the Department of Home Affairs<p>Legal grievances against the South African Department of Home Affairs, including contempt of court cases, are depressingly common. Too frequently the minister has to apologise to a court, or to ask for more time, on behalf of the department. Most of the court cases involve the operations of the department regarding visas and permits for foreign visitors, immigrants and prospective refugees.</p>
<p>Just a few months ago home affairs minister Aaron Motsoaledi said, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-06-15-minister-motsoaledi-apologises-to-south-africa-for-the-mess-created-by-his-department/">in legal papers</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I would like to take this opportunity to extend my sincere apology to the Chief Justice, all judges of the high court and Constitutional Court, the President of South Africa, Minister of Finance, Lawyers for Human Rights and its legal representatives and the people of South Africa for the mess created by officials of the Department of Home Affairs.</p>
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<p>This particular mess was triggered by the minister’s failure to amend an unconstitutional law which allowed for the detention of irregular migrants for 120 days. </p>
<p>The rotten state of the department is widely known. Two reports released in the last three years, commissioned by the minister and the presidency and led by senior and seasoned individuals, set out the problems in detail. One, released <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/Review-Issuance_of_visas_permits.pdf">in 2022</a>, chronicled a backlog of visa, permit and status applications, evidence of fraudulent applications being first rejected, then accepted, and the system being used illegally. The other found multiple failures in the provision of visas to senior business managers and experts.</p>
<p>The issue of migration policy and its implementation has never been more pressing for South Africa. Immigration has grown relatively rapidly in the past 20 years. The proportion of migrants to local people more than doubled from a relatively low level of 2.1% in 2000 to a moderate level of 4.8% in 2020, according to a <a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/analysis-trends-patterns-migration-africa/">study</a> drawing on UN data.</p>
<p>The global average immigrant population is around 3.5% but countries like the US (nearly 16% in 2019), Australia and New Zealand are much higher. Côte d'Ivoire is the only country on the continent with a considerably higher percentage of immigrants than South Africa.</p>
<p>Migration policy is likely to be a key issue in South Africa’s forthcoming elections. A <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/2023-11-16-is-south-africa-heading-for-an-immigration-election/">leading journalist</a> has argued that 2024 will be an “immigration election”. Populist parties are expected to mobilise around people’s fears, while the government will continue to use immigration as an excuse for poor service delivery and joblessness.</p>
<p>The reality is that the impact of migrants on the circumstances of poor South Africans is marginal, and far less important than the very poor performance of the economy and many governmental institutions. </p>
<p>In a paper <a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/south-africa-migration-study-nsi-report/">just published</a> I examine the recent history of immigration policy in South Africa. I argue that the challenges would best be addressed by improvement in the operations of the Department of Home Affairs. This should be accompanied by some modernisation of migration law to encourage the use of regular migration channels and discourage irregularity. </p>
<h2>The problems</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/Review-Issuance_of_visas_permits.pdf">first</a> of the two investigations initiated by the minister was headed by Cassius Lubisi, former secretary of the cabinet. The <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/images/PDFs/Report-of-the-Work-Visa-Review-2023.pdf">second</a> was headed by anti-apartheid struggle stalwart Mavuso Msimang. </p>
<p>Their main findings were as follows.</p>
<p>Fraudulent documentation was used in 36,647 applications for visas, permits or status over a 16-year period. Of these, 880 were approved and 288 were pending. 4,160 of the fraudulent applications were first rejected, and then accepted after reconsideration.</p>
<p>Systems that had been replaced were still being used illegally from time to time. The outcomes of such activities were suspicious. In some cases applications were processed in zero days. The investigation found visa expiry dates issued beyond the legal limit.</p>
<p>The department’s databases for naturalisation and population registration didn’t correlate with each other.</p>
<p>The list identifying undesirable immigrants was “fatally flawed due to incomplete and missing crucial data”. </p>
<p>In some cases, files had been inserted illegally into the information system. This process would require “a highly skilled IT user with administrator rights to execute”. </p>
<p>There were multiple cases of “forum-shopping” by applicants. This is when an applicant applies for a range of unrelated permits in the hope that one of them will get through.</p>
<p>The department did not have systems that could identify multiple applications by the same person.</p>
<h2>Possible fixes</h2>
<p>The Department of Home Affairs <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202311/49690gon4061.pdf">recently issued</a> a draft white paper which it said was aimed at addressing the problems that had been identified.</p>
<p>It proposed severely curtailing the rights of prospective refugees, restricting paths to citizenship, and strengthening the Border Management Authority and supportive institutions. </p>
<p>But, based on my findings, it is clear that these changes won’t solve the problems. Experts <a href="https://www.guilford.com/books/The-Age-of-Migration/Haas-Castles-Miller/9781462542895">show</a> that tighter restrictions lead to greater illegality, not less migration.</p>
<p>The most disappointing element of the draft white paper is that it makes no reference to recommendations made in the two reports on the problems at the department. </p>
<p>Recommendations of the reports included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>major investment in and reorganisation of information systems </p></li>
<li><p>the integration of the various population databases </p></li>
<li><p>further forensic investigations to root out corruption </p></li>
<li><p>hiring and training staff with skills and integrity.</p></li>
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<p>The draft white paper also does not mention the need to modernise the colonial-style bilateral labour agreements which South Africa maintains with five regional neighbours – Mozambique, Lesotho, Eswatini, Malawi and Botswana. These countries, and Zimbabwe, are the greatest source of regular and irregular migration.</p>
<p>These agreements are no longer fit for purpose. Firstly, they impose tight restrictions on the rights of contracted migrants from other countries. Secondly, they are based on patterns of migrant labour developed during the colonial period to support farming and mining. Thirdly, they’re written up on the basis of an unequal relationship between countries of the southern African region.</p>
<p>Modern bilateral labour agreements have been developed. An example <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_837529.pdf">is the Canadian system</a>. It provides for long term arrangements with full labour and social rights for the duration of the multiyear contract, but no right to permanent residence for the workers or their families. </p>
<p>Modern Canadian-style migrant labour agreements would encourage more migrants to choose regular migration routes and fewer would try to evade or abuse the law.</p>
<p>The draft white paper gives the impression that the challenge of migration policy can be solved with tighter laws on refugees and citizenship. In fact the fundamental problem is the corruption and inefficiency in the permits and visa section of the department, which the white paper hardly mentions.</p>
<p>The unfortunate conclusion that can be drawn from a reading of the draft white paper is that it was designed primarily to give the ruling party a narrative for the upcoming election, rather than to reform the migration governance regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Hirsch is employed as a research fellow at the New South Institute under whose auspices he researched and wrote this article.</span></em></p>Problems identified include a backlog of visa, permit and status applications, fraudulent applications being first rejected, then accepted, and the system being used illegally.Alan Hirsch, Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2188332024-01-04T10:27:36Z2024-01-04T10:27:36ZAfricans discovered dinosaur fossils long before the term ‘palaeontology’ existed<p>Credit for discovering the first dinosaur bones usually goes to British gentlemen for their finds between the 17th and 19th centuries in England. <a href="http://www.oum.ox.ac.uk/learning/htmls/plot.htm">Robert Plot</a>, an English natural history scholar, was the first of these to <a href="https://www.amnh.org/explore/videos/dinosaurs-and-fossils/who-discovered-the-first-dinosaur-fossils?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=share-from-amnh-org">describe</a> a dinosaur bone, in his 1676 book The Natural History of Oxfordshire. Over the next two centuries dinosaur palaeontology would be dominated by numerous British natural scientists. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.lyellcollection.org/doi/10.1144/SP543-2022-236">our study</a> shows that the history of palaeontology can be traced back much further into the past. We present evidence that the first dinosaur bone may have been discovered in Africa as early as 500 years before Plot’s.</p>
<p>We’re a team of scientists who study fossils in South Africa. Peering through the published and unpublished archaeological, historical and palaeontological literature, we discovered that there has been interest in fossils in Africa for as long as there have been people on the continent. </p>
<p>This is not a surprise. Humankind originated in Africa: <em>Homo sapiens</em> has existed for at least <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature22336">300,000 years</a>. And the continent has a great diversity of rock outcrops, such as the Kem Kem beds in Morocco, the Fayum depression in Egypt, the Rift Valley in <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-maasai-legend-behind-ancient-hominin-footprints-in-tanzania-119373">east Africa</a> and the Karoo in southern Africa, containing fossils that have always been accessible to our ancestors. </p>
<p>So it wasn’t just likely that African people discovered fossils first. It was inevitable.</p>
<p>More often than not, the first dinosaur fossils supposedly discovered by scientists were actually brought to their attention by local guides. Examples are the discovery of the gigantic dinosaurs <a href="https://kids.britannica.com/students/article/Jobaria/390687"><em>Jobaria</em></a> by the Tuaregs in Niger and <a href="https://www.inaturalist.org/taxa/542624-Giraffatitan"><em>Giraffatitan</em></a> by the Mwera in Tanzania.</p>
<p>Our paper reviews what’s known about African indigenous knowledge of fossils. We list fossils that appear to have long been known at various African sites, and discuss how they might have been used and interpreted by African communities before the science of palaeontology came to be.</p>
<h2>Bolahla rock shelter in Lesotho</h2>
<p>One of the highlights of our paper is the archaeological site of Bolahla, a Later Stone Age rock shelter in Lesotho. Various dating techniques indicate that the site was occupied by the Khoesan and Basotho people from the 12th to 18th centuries (1100 to 1700 AD). The shelter itself is surrounded by hills made of consolidated sediments that were deposited under a harsh Sahara-like desert some 180 million to 200 million years ago, when the first dinosaurs roamed the Earth. </p>
<p>This part of Lesotho is particularly well known for delivering the species <em>Massospondylus carinatus</em>, a 4 to 6 metre, long-necked and small-headed dinosaur. Fossilised bones of <em>Massospondylus</em> are abundant in the area and were already so when the site was occupied by people in the Middle Ages. </p>
<p>In 1990, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3889171">archaeologists</a> working at Bolahla discovered that a finger bone of <em>Massospondylus</em>, a fossil phalanx, had been transported to the cave. There are no fossil skeletons sticking out the walls of the cave, so the only chance that this phalanx ended up there was that someone in the distant past picked it up and carried it to the cave. Perhaps this person did so out of simple curiosity, or to turn it into a pendant or toy, or to use it for traditional healing rituals. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dinosaur-tracksite-in-lesotho-how-a-wrong-turn-led-to-an-exciting-find-208963">Dinosaur tracksite in Lesotho: how a wrong turn led to an exciting find</a>
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<p>After heavy rains, it is not unusual that the people in the area discover the bones of extinct species that have been washed out of their mother-rock. They usually identify them as belonging to a dragon-like monster that devours people or even whole houses. In Lesotho, the Basotho call the monster “Kholumolumo”, while in South Africa’s bordering Eastern Cape province, the Xhosa refer to it as “<a href="https://chosindabazomhlaba.com/2022/03/29/ukufika-kwamacikilishe-angamagongqongqo/">Amagongqongqo</a>”.</p>
<p>The exact date when the phalanx was collected and transported is unfortunately lost to time. Given the current knowledge, it could have been at any time of occupation of the shelter from the 12th to 18th centuries. This leaves open the possibility that this dinosaur bone could have been collected up to 500 years prior to Robert Plot’s find.</p>
<h2>Early knowledge of extinct creatures</h2>
<p>Most people knew about fossils well before the scientific era, for as far back as collective societal memories can go. In Algeria, for example, people referred to some dinosaur footprints as belonging to the legendary “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10420940109380182">Roc bird</a>”. In North America, cave paintings depicting dinosaur footprints were painted by the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10420940109380182">Anasazi people</a> between AD 1000 and 1200. Indigenous Australians identified dinosaur footprints as belonging to a legendary “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10420940109380182">Emu-man</a>”. To the south, the notorious conquistador Hernan Cortes was given the fossil femur of a Mastodon by the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Fossil_Legends_of_the_First_Americans.html?id=CMsgQQkmFqQC&redir_esc=y">Aztecs</a> in 1519. In Asia, Hindu people refer to ammonites (coiled fossil-sea-shells) as “<a href="https://theconversation.com/shaligrams-the-sacred-fossils-that-have-been-worshipped-by-hindus-and-buddhists-for-over-2-000-years-are-becoming-rarer-because-of-climate-change-209311">Shaligrams</a>” and have been worshipping them for more than 2,000 years. </p>
<h2>Claiming credit</h2>
<p>The fact that people in Africa have long known about fossils is evident from folklore and the archaeological record, but we still have much to learn about it. For instance, unlike the people in Europe, the Americas and Asia, indigenous African palaeontologists seem to have seldom used fossils for traditional medicine. We are still unsure whether this is a genuinely unique cultural trait shared by most African cultures or if it is due to our admittedly still incomplete knowledge. </p>
<p>Also, some rather prominent fossil sites, such as the Moroccan Kem Kem beds and South African Unesco <a href="https://www.maropeng.co.za/content/page/introduction-to-your-visit-to-the-cradle-of-humankind-world-heritage-site">Cradle of Humankind</a> caves, have still not provided robust evidence for indigenous knowledge. This is unfortunate, as fossil-related traditions could help bridge the gap between local communities and palaeontologists, which in turn could contribute <a href="https://theconversation.com/graffiti-threatens-precious-evidence-of-ancient-life-on-south-africas-coast-157777">preserving</a> important heritage sites.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rock-stars-how-a-group-of-scientists-in-south-africa-rescued-a-rare-500kg-chunk-of-human-history-192508">Rock stars: how a group of scientists in South Africa rescued a rare 500kg chunk of human history</a>
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<p>By exploring indigenous palaeontology in Africa, our team is putting together pieces of a forgotten past that gives credit back to local communities. We hope it will inspire a new generation of local palaeoscientists to walk in the footsteps of these first African fossil hunters.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julien Benoit receives funding from the DSI-NRF African Origins Platform program and GENUS (DSI-NRF Centre of Excellence in Palaeosciences) </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cameron Penn-Clarke receives funding from GENUS (DSI-NRF Centre of Excellence in Palaeosciences).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Helm does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some time between 1100 and 1700 AD, a Massospondylus bone was discovered and carried to a rock shelter in Lesotho.Julien Benoit, Senior Researcher in Vertebrate Palaeontology, University of the WitwatersrandCameron Penn-Clarke, Senior Researcher, University of the WitwatersrandCharles Helm, Research Associate, African Centre for Coastal Palaeoscience, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134022023-09-27T13:56:24Z2023-09-27T13:56:24ZMeteorite discovery: unusual finds by South African farmer add to space rock heritage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549742/original/file-20230922-19-t7wiqi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A digital composite of a meteor shower speeding towards Earth.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Adastra</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Meteorites – fragments of rock that have fallen to Earth from space in spectacularly fiery meteors – have been the subject of public fascination, awe, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ancient-cultures-explained-comets-and-meteors-100982">myths</a> and even <a href="https://owlcation.com/social-sciences/The-Worship-of-Meteorites-in-Ancient-Cultures">religious worship</a> for thousands of years. </p>
<p>In recent decades they’ve become a cosmic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rosetta-Stone">Rosetta Stone</a> for scientists investigating the birth throes of our solar system and the organic life it hosts. Meteorites are therefore <a href="https://www.sahra.org.za/archaeology-palaeontology-and-meteorites/">rightly classified</a> by many countries as an integral part of communal natural heritage and are sought after by museums and private collectors.</p>
<p>South Africa, where I research meteorites, is one such country. In late 2021, my colleagues and I were alerted to an exceptional opportunity. Gideon Lombaard, a farmer in the Northern Cape province, reached out to us because he suspected that he had found two meteorite fragments. If proved true, these would be the first meteorite discoveries in South Africa in over 40 years. </p>
<p>After subjecting the fragments to a range of tests, we were able to show that the two fragments, despite being found only a kilometre apart, were unrelated – that is, they must have come from different meteor events.</p>
<p>In August, the <a href="https://meteoritical.org/">Meteoritical Society’s</a> nomenclature committee, which adjudicates all new meteorite submissions, formally accepted our proposal that the two fragments were different meteorites. They approved our suggested names – <a href="https://www.lpi.usra.edu/meteor/metbull.php?sea=&sfor=names&ants=&nwas=&falls=&valids=&stype=contains&lrec=50&map=ge&browse=&country=South+Africa&srt=name&categ=All&mblist=All&rect=&phot=&strewn=&snew=0&pnt=Normal%20table&code=79964">Brierskop</a> and <a href="https://www.lpi.usra.edu/meteor/metbull.php?sea=&sfor=names&ants=&nwas=&falls=&valids=&stype=contains&lrec=50&map=ge&browse=&country=South+Africa&srt=name&categ=All&mblist=All&rect=&phot=&strewn=&snew=0&pnt=Normal%20table&code=79963">Wolfkop</a> – after landmarks near their discovery sites. </p>
<p>Mr Lombaard’s double discovery raises South Africa’s tally of confirmed meteorites to 51 – the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. Namibia has 18 confirmed meteorites, <a href="https://theconversation.com/rare-meteorite-recovery-in-botswana-can-help-reveal-secrets-of-outer-space-99678">Botswana</a> 12, Zimbabwe four, and Lesotho and eSwatini one each. But, compared with the over 14,000 meteorites recovered from the Sahara desert, the number of recovered southern African meteorites is extremely small. A concerted national meteorite education awareness and search programme could thus reap great benefits. </p>
<h2>What is a meteorite?</h2>
<p>A meteorite is a piece of rocky space debris that survives collision with Earth. Meteorites are usually discovered by someone who notices an unusual rock while out walking (called a “find”). However, around 2% of meteorites are classified as “falls” because they are retrieved after witnessed meteor fireball events.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/secrets-revealed-of-dash-cam-meteorite-that-rocked-russia-19923">Secrets revealed of 'dash-cam' meteorite that rocked Russia</a>
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<p>The meteorite family comprises several different types of rocks. A very small proportion of the <a href="https://www.lpi.usra.edu/meteor/">approximately 72,000 meteorites recovered globally</a> to date are actually pieces blasted off the surfaces of the moon and Mars by giant impacts. The overwhelming majority appear to have originated in the asteroid belt that lies between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter. They are the shrapnel from past collisions between some of these asteroids that were ejected into orbits that have ended up crossing Earth’s path.</p>
<h2>Discovery and forensics</h2>
<p>Finding meteorites is not easy, which makes Mr Lombaard’s twin discoveries all the more significant. Because they originate in outer space, meteorites commonly contain iron in either metal or sulphide forms, both of which begin to deteriorate rapidly when they come into contact with free oxygen and water. </p>
<p>It is thus not surprising that nearly 80% of all meteorites have been found where arid climates aid their preservation, namely Antarctica and the Sahara desert. Meteorites typically become coated in a dark fusion crust during their fiery passage through the atmosphere. That makes the white Antarctic ice and the pale-coloured Sahara bedrock and sand perfect backdrops for searchers.</p>
<p>Mr Lombaard discovered the two meteorites during routine farming activities. The Brierskop meteorite is a 21.19g chondrite which he found on 18 September 2018. Chondrites are the oldest rocks in our solar system, dating back 4.567 billion years. It was only after he found the Wolfkop stone (also a chondrite, weighing 90.26g) 1km away from the Brierskop site on 27 August 2021 that he reached out to determine whether these were, as he suspected, meteorites. Contacting an expert is the best approach if you think you’ve found a meteorite.</p>
<p>The initial pictures he sent were very promising; our primary task was then to establish whether they represented two pieces from a single fall or had originated from separate falls.</p>
<p>Our analysis, which involved slicing a small piece from each stone and grinding it down to produce an ultra-thin wafer through which light from a microscope could pass, was able to show that the meteorites have distinct differences.</p>
<p>Brierskop contains less iron metal and less iron in its main silicate minerals than Wolfkop. The chondrules (particles in the rock) are much better preserved in Brierskop, indicating that they experienced less heating in the parent asteroid before the impact collision that liberated it. We then used the greater oxidation (rust) of the Wolfkop stone to suggest that its fall predated that of the Brierskop meteorite.</p>
<h2>South Africa’s meteorite heritage</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-heritage-resources-act">South African Heritage Act</a> No. 25 of 1999 classifies South African meteorites as national heritage items that cannot be damaged, removed, exported or traded without a permit issued by the South African Heritage Agency. The Meteoritical Society also requires that meteorites are properly stored and conserved at accredited institutions such as museums and universities for future research. Wolfkop and Brierskop are now stored at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, which is an accredited repository.</p>
<p>An average of between 10 and 50 meteorites are estimated to hit Earth’s surface every day. Technology will help drive new discoveries. In recent years an increasing number of countries have installed camera networks (such as NASA’s <a href="https://www.seti.org/cams">CAMS</a>) designed to record the trajectories of meteor fireballs that can then be triangulated to try to locate the fall site. The power of citizen science is also being harnessed in many places in the form of volunteer ground searches for fallen meteorites. </p>
<p>Prior to the two recent discoveries, the <a href="https://www.lpi.usra.edu/meteor/">Meteoritical Bulletin Database</a> listed 49 meteorites as having been satisfactorily proved to be from South African sites. Mr Lombaard’s double find takes the country’s meteorite inventory above 50. There’s no doubt that more are just waiting to be found.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Lawrence Gibson receives funding from the NRF. </span></em></p>Meteorites are usually discovered by someone who notices an unusual rock while out walking.Roger Lawrence Gibson, Professor of Structural Geology and Metamorphic Petrology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2089632023-08-03T14:39:56Z2023-08-03T14:39:56ZDinosaur tracksite in Lesotho: how a wrong turn led to an exciting find<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539023/original/file-20230724-14014-ctdnz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An artistic impression of the various dinosaur species that once roamed the Roma Valley.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Akhil Rampersadh</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>I am a poor navigator. This is not an easy thing for a field geologist to admit. We need to be able to find our planned area of interest in good time and make our way back to our potentially hidden and distant vehicles at the end of the day. It’s especially true that I am a poor navigator when I need to use nondescript bushes, the distant hill shape, and the odd fallen boulder as reference points. </p>
<p>So it was no surprise when I led my MSc student Loyce Mpangala and our PhD candidate field assistant Akhil Rampersadh astray in Lesotho’s Roma Valley. We were walking back to our car after looking at a <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-the-giant-dinosaur-that-roamed-southern-africa-200-million-years-ago-86004">dinosaur tracksite</a> that I’d visited before. The tracksite, which is marked on Google Maps as an attraction, was on the other side of a sparsely populated hill with numerous informal walkways, overlooking the National University of Lesotho.</p>
<p>Walking along the wrong (I didn’t know it then) footpath, I spotted a dinosaur footprint I hadn’t seen before. Once you’ve worked on dinosaur tracks for seven years and visited the same site a few times you get to know their shape and their personality. And this one was different. The first footprint I spotted superficially resembled others on the hill: three-toed, longer-than-wide with claw marks; but it was far away from the known site we had just visited. </p>
<p>After taking a few more steps, we spotted some more footprints. These had distinct shapes we had not yet seen in the Roma area: short, wide footprints with rounded, stubby toes. When we looked more closely, they were sometimes paired with star-shaped handprints. These footprints were made by herbivorous ornithischian dinosaurs and it is the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08912963.2023.2221306">first time</a> their distinct shape has been documented in the Roma Valley, which is rich in fossil footprints. It adds to scientists’ knowledge of the extensive trace fossil diversity of the local dinosaur community during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/Jurassic-Period">Early Jurassic</a> period about 200 million years ago. </p>
<p>I guess sometimes – and I cannot overemphasise how rarely – the wrong turn can lead you to the right place. </p>
<h2>New, old and very old</h2>
<p>The tracksite was new to our dino-tracking team from South Africa’s University of Cape Town. But it was not a new discovery. It is known as the Mokhosi site and was reported in 2003 by David Ambrose, a tracking enthusiast and mathematics professor at the National University of Lesotho. He noted that a number of large three-toed prints were preserved, with more likely to be beneath the recent sand covering. </p>
<p>Our extensive uncovering (a glamorous way for saying sweeping) of the 18 metre by 2 metre tracksite showed that more fossil evidence had indeed been captured in the rock. We documented 35 footprints; most were part of trackways, heading in all directions. </p>
<p>The footprints were all three-toed and fell into two main shape groupings – those that were longer-than-wide, with slender toes and sharp claw marks, and those that were wider-than-long, with robust, rounded toes. The latter were occasionally associated with smaller and shallow handprints, in front and slightly to the outer side of their corresponding footprints. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/footprints-take-science-a-step-closer-to-understanding-southern-africas-dinosaurs-185480">first group of tracks</a> (longer-than-wide) are a type commonly preserved in southern Africa and can be attributed to carnivorous theropod dinosaurs. The theropod tracks at Mokhosi reach a maximum length of about 40cm, meaning that these meat-eating travellers would have had a hip height of about 2 metres, towering over humans.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/footprints-take-science-a-step-closer-to-understanding-southern-africas-dinosaurs-185480">Footprints take science a step closer to understanding southern Africa's dinosaurs</a>
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<p>The second group of hand- and footprints preserve characteristics consistent with herbivorous ornithischian dinosaur trackmakers. Our excitement rose as we carefully dusted these tracks: globally, ornithischian footprints are rarer than theropods during the Early Jurassic. </p>
<p>This marks the first time these distinct quadrupedal ornithischian footprints have been found in the Roma Valley. It’s remarkable, given that a high number of tracksites (14) have been identified and studied in the area.</p>
<h2>Waiting to be found again</h2>
<p>When we walked back to our car after a long day, we took a moment to stare back at the wonderful site we’d stumbled across. We knew that the future rains and winds would once again hide the Mokhosi tracksite, leaving only small clues to the keen eye of what lies beneath the sand. </p>
<p>We wish the same excitement to the next passerby who unveils this little wonder. </p>
<p>To help you, I’d like to note that the nearby bush is “bushier than the surrounding ones”, that the hill gradient “changes ever so slightly above the track-bearing sandstone”, and that the nearby boulders are completely “nondescript”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208963/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The research component of this project was supported from the following research grants obtained by MA: DSI-NRF Centre of Excellence Genus (grant number 86073); NRF Thuthuka (grant number 138151); UCT Research Development Grants 2020 – 2021. AR is a recipient of postgraduate funding from the DST-NRF Centre of Excellence in Palaeoscience (Genus). LM is a recipient of postgraduate funding from the DST-NRF Centre of Excellence in Palaeoscience (Genus) and Palaeontological Scientific Trust (PAST), Johannesburg, South Africa; DSI-NRF Centre of Excellence in Palaeoscience.</span></em></p>Fossilised tracks of a group of plant-eating dinosaurs have been found in Lesotho’s Roma Valley for the first time.Miengah Abrahams, Lecturer, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1984552023-01-26T10:14:59Z2023-01-26T10:14:59ZHeat stress is rising in southern Africa – climate experts show where and when it’s worst<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506391/original/file-20230125-2999-tc5bml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Being too hot isn't just uncomfortable: it can be dangerous.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Angel DiBilio/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most of us have felt either too hot or too cold at some point in our lives. Depending on where we live, we may feel too cold quite often each winter, and too hot for a few days in summer. As we’re writing this in late January 2023 many southern Africans are probably feeling very hot and fatigued; a prolonged regional heatwave began around 9 January.</p>
<p>Being too hot isn’t just uncomfortable. Heat stress causes dehydration, headaches, nausea – and, when people are exposed to high temperatures for protracted periods, they risk <a href="https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/full/10.1289/ehp.123-A275">severe health outcomes and could even die</a>. For instance, at least five people working on farms in South Africa’s Northern Cape province <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/we-were-struggling-to-breathe-five-farm-workers-died-of-heat-stroke-in-sweltering-northern-cape-20230122">have died from heat stroke</a> in January. At least <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/south-asias-intense-heat-wave-sign-things-come-rcna30239">90 people died in India and Pakistan</a> in May 2022 during a devastating heatwave.</p>
<p>The situation is only going to get worse. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/about/frequently-asked-questions/keyfaq3/">warns</a> that “globally, the percentage of the population exposed to deadly heat stress is projected to increase from today’s 30% to 48%-76% by the end of the century, depending on future warming levels and location”.</p>
<p>We wanted to create a detailed picture of when and where heat stress occurs in southern Africa. By applying a global gridded dataset of a human thermal comfort index, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.8009">we found</a> that there has been a consistent change in thermal comfort – the human body’s experience of the outdoor thermal environment – from the 1970s to today. Simply put, southern Africans are experiencing heat stress more often than in 1979.</p>
<p>Given that global temperatures are <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/about/frequently-asked-questions/keyfaq3/">set to rise</a> in the coming years and decades, these findings are worrying. Warmer temperatures will mean that regions that were classified as having “favourable” thermal comfort will more regularly be classified as regions of “thermal stress”. Heatwaves have been projected to occur more frequently, and to be more intense.</p>
<h2>Measuring thermal comfort (or stress)</h2>
<p>Over the past two decades, scientists from across the world have developed the <a href="https://utci.lobelia.earth/what-is-utci">Universal Thermal Climate Index</a>. It has advanced our ability to model human thermal comfort levels, ranging from cold stress to heat stress. Earlier thermal comfort indices typically only modelled heat stress because they mainly measured the combined effects of humidity and temperature to calculate an equivalent temperature. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506300/original/file-20230125-16-cpv882.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506300/original/file-20230125-16-cpv882.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506300/original/file-20230125-16-cpv882.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506300/original/file-20230125-16-cpv882.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506300/original/file-20230125-16-cpv882.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506300/original/file-20230125-16-cpv882.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506300/original/file-20230125-16-cpv882.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Temperature extremes can put people’s health at risk. Authors supplied.</span>
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<p>This equivalent temperature would essentially measure how we feel in relation to the surrounding environment. For example, at 5pm on 23 January, Johannesburg’s outdoor air temperature was 29˚C; relative humidity was 30%; the sky was clear and there was a gentle breeze of 16km/h. </p>
<p>For someone outside, the equivalent temperature would have been slightly higher than the outdoor temperature (<a href="https://utci.lobelia.earth/images/what-is-utci/global-diff.png">possibly as high as 32˚C</a>), largely due to the effect of relative humidity and limited wind chill.</p>
<p>The Universal Thermal Climate Index considers a wider range of factors that influence thermal comfort than its predecessors. In addition to air temperature, relative humidity and wind speed, it also includes radiant heat, a measure of how hot we feel when standing in the sun rather than in the shade. </p>
<p>The index is built for humans navigating the real world: it includes a clothing model and an exertion model. </p>
<p>During the current southern African heatwave, for instance, the model assumes that nobody is dressed in a fuzzy jersey. In winter, it assumes nobody in countries like Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Eswatini, Lesotho and South Africa is wearing shorts and a T-shirt.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the inclusion of all these factors means that the Universal Thermal Climate Index is a more accurate and realistic indicator of the level of thermal comfort (or discomfort) perceived by the human body.</p>
<h2>Southern African application</h2>
<p>To apply the Universal Thermal Climate Index to southern Africa, we drew data from the <a href="https://cds.climate.copernicus.eu/cdsapp#!/dataset/derived-utci-historical?tab=overview">ERA5-HEAT</a> data collection, which provides an hourly dataset, of the equivalent temperature derived from the index, for 1940 to present; it is produced by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts.</p>
<p>We zoomed into the time period 1979-2021 and considered thermal comfort at annual, seasonal and monthly scales. Over these scales, we calculated the average climatology, and investigated changes and year-to-year variability patterns in day-time, night-time and daily average equivalent temperatures across southern Africa.</p>
<p>We found that heat stress occurs most widely during the summer months (December to March); cold stress occurs mainly during the winter months (June to August). Heat stress was, as one would expect, most common during the day and cold stress more common at night.</p>
<p>Drilling further into the data, we discovered that, from September to March, more than 85% of the subcontinent experiences day-time heat stress. Over parts of the Northern Cape in South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, day-time heat stress can reach very strong, and potentially dangerous, heat stress levels during these months. </p>
<p>From May to August, our results showed that more than 80% of southern Africa experiences night-time cold stress, and over much of South Africa night-time cold stress can reach moderate cold stress. In short, it’s unusual for people in the region to feel extremely cold and fairly common in certain months to feel extremely hot, especially outside.</p>
<h2>Going forward: why it’s bad news</h2>
<p>Everyone in southern Africa is at risk of heat stress. But children, the elderly, and those with underlying comorbidities are more vulnerable. </p>
<p>Those working outdoors, like farm and construction workers, are especially vulnerable because there’s little that can be done to adapt to and cope with heat stress while working outdoors during the day-time. <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2023-01-22-heat-stroke-deaths-department-suggests-working-early-late-hours/">Adjusting work hours</a> to avoid peak heat hours is one measure that could be applied.</p>
<p>There are also some coping mechanisms you could apply in your daily life. Limit your exposure to the sun by moving to shade or indoors to a well-ventilated or air-conditioned room. Keep hydrated (with water), avoid strenuous activities (like sports or excessive manual labour), wear lightweight protective clothing, a hat and sunblock, and, if you feel ill, seek medical attention.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198455/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Roffe works for the Agricultural Research Council. She receives funding from the National Research Foundation, South Africa. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Fitchett receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adriaan Van Der Walt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Simply put, southern Africans are experiencing heat stress more often than in 1979.Sarah Roffe, Researcher, Agricultural Research CouncilAdriaan Van Der Walt, Senior Lecturer of Physical Geography and GIS, University of the Free StateJennifer Fitchett, Professor of Physical Geography, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1932522022-11-02T14:54:13Z2022-11-02T14:54:13ZLesotho’s election brought change. Six things needed to promote peace and democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492728/original/file-20221101-16-tnki36.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Outgoing Lesotho prime minister Moeketsi Majoro, right, hands over the national flag as the symbol of passing power to his successor, Sam Ntsokoane Matekane, on 28 October 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Molise Molise/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lesotho’s <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3872/">2022 general election</a>, its tenth since its independence from Britain <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03005/06lv03006/07lv03012/08lv03015.htm">in 1966</a>, was unique in more ways than one. </p>
<p>It was the first election since the political transition <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2181_93.htm">of 1993</a> to be about key issues facing the nation, rather than personalities. This is largely due to the exit from active politics of <a href="https://theconversation.com/lesothos-new-leader-faces-enormous-hurdles-ensuring-peace-and-political-stability-139320">Motsoahae Thomas Thabane</a> of the All Basotho Convention and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pakalitha-Mosisili">Pakalitha Mosisili</a> of the Democratic Congress. They had dominated Lesotho’s politics for over two decades. </p>
<p>With the exception of <a href="https://prabook.com/web/monyane.moleleki/2086119">Monyane Moleleki</a> of the <a href="https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Alliance_of_Democrats_(Lesotho)">Alliance of Democrats</a>, the contenders were new to the political scene. This made the contest interesting and exciting as many citizens yearned for change.</p>
<p>A record 65 parties contested the election. </p>
<p>The winning party, <a href="https://twitter.com/RevolutionforP1?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor">Revolution for Prosperity</a>, led by businessman <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2022-10-12-who-is-lesothos-new-prime-minister-mogul-sam-matekane/">Samuel Ntsokoane Matekane</a>, was formed just six months ahead of the election. Its campaign message centred on governance and economic growth. This focus also influenced the party’s <a href="https://www.maserumetro.com/news/politics/coalition-agreement-signed-sealed/">coalition agreement</a> with the <a href="https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Alliance_of_Democrats_(Lesotho)">Alliance of Democrats</a> and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/MovementforEconomicChange/">Movement for Economic Change</a>. </p>
<p>The party’s overwhelming victory – <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/10/millionaire-wins-lesotho-vote-but-no-majority-officials">it won 56 of the 120 seats</a> – was as surprising as its emergence. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-elections-newcomers-score-impressive-win-but-politics-will-still-be-unstable-192466">Lesotho elections: newcomers score impressive win, but politics will still be unstable</a>
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<p>With the benefit of hindsight, there are three main factors that help explain the party’s victory.</p>
<p>These are the country’s <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/AD535-Basotho-are-preparing-for-general-elections.pdf">poor socio-economic conditions</a>, disenchantment with politics and the concerted efforts by the traditional leaders to withdraw support for the All Basotho Convention and the Democratic Congress. </p>
<p>The Matekane-led coalition government will need to make concerted efforts to address the socio-economic problems, restore faith in politics and deepen the country’s democracy and peace. Failure to deliver will dash citizens’ expectations. The <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/AD535-Basotho-are-preparing-for-general-elections.pdf#page=18">low public trust</a> in government institutions will decline further.</p>
<h2>Factors that swayed voters</h2>
<p>First, socio-economic conditions had deteriorated considerably, especially under the coalition governments led by All Basotho Convention and Democratic Congress since 2012. The COVID pandemic made conditions worse. </p>
<p>More than half of Lesotho’s 2.2 million people <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/lesotho/lesotho-more-half-population-lesotho-lives-below-poverty-line#:%7E:text=Background-,More%20than%20half%20the%20population%20of%20Lesotho%20lives%20below%20the,the%20severe%20HIV%2FAIDS%20pandemic">live in poverty</a>. Around 24.6% of the population is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=LS">unemployed</a>. Youth unemployment stands <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/812179/youth-unemployment-rate-in-lesotho/#:%7E:text=Youth%20unemployment%20rate%20in%20Lesotho%20in%202021&text=The%20youth%20unemployment%20rate%20in,significantly%20by%200.4%20percentage%20points">at 37.4%</a>. Lesotho is among <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/03/09/new-world-bank-report-assesses-sources-of-inequality-in-five-countries-in-southern-africa#:%7E:text=It%20finds%20that%20the%20Southern,the%20rest%20and%20Lesotho%20the">most unequal</a> societies in the world. Social discontent worked in favour of new parties.</p>
<p>Second, public faith in elections has been waning, as reflected by declining voter turnout since 1993. Voter turnout was 46.4% in 2017 and declined to <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1sdowO4GcCATh1ahqd0YoUldQAbeDvxCPxfXbsF95XKc/edit#gid=1965305309">37.7%</a> in 2022. </p>
<p>Public trust in the executive, parliament and judiciary and in political parties has declined over the years due to poor governance. <a href="https://www.thepost.co.ls/news/audit-exposes-massive-rot-in-ministries/">Corruption in the public sector</a> is a major reason for mistrust. </p>
<p>In contrast, public trust remains high for non-elective institutions such as the army, churches, <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/AD535-Basotho-are-preparing-for-general-elections.pdf#page=2">chiefs and the king</a>. </p>
<p>Citizens perceive politics as serving interests of the elites <a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-elections-turnout-was-down-to-38-new-leaders-will-have-to-deal-with-political-discontent-192749">at the expense of the broader national purpose</a>. Basotho were determined to see the Democratic Convention and All Basotho Convention <a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-elections-newcomers-score-impressive-win-but-politics-will-still-be-unstable-192466">out of state house</a>.</p>
<p>Third, the traditional leaders, who form the core of the upper house of parliament (the Senate), influenced voters’ choices against All Basotho Convention and Democratic Congress. The traditional leaders made it publicly known that they were unhappy with the failure of the national reform process.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-bungles-political-reforms-risking-fresh-bout-of-instability-after-2022-poll-191778">Lesotho bungles political reforms, risking fresh bout of instability after 2022 poll</a>
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<p>The reform was initiated at the behest of the Southern African Development Community in 2014 with a view to restoring security, peace and political stability in Lesotho. But the National Assembly and Senate could not agree on the proposals from the National Reforms Authority - a statutory body which was tasked with driving the reform agenda.</p>
<p>The chiefs blamed the coalition government for this failure. </p>
<h2>Deepening Lesotho’s democracy and peace</h2>
<p>Both state and non-state actors will have to make concerted efforts to entrench Lesotho’s democracy in order to anchor peace, and improve socio-economic conditions. There are six areas they can focus on:</p>
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<li><p>More resources and effort have to go into addressing <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lesotho/overview">underdevelopment</a>, poverty, hunger, unemployment and inequality.</p></li>
<li><p>More investment needs to be earmarked for democracy and peace education to reverse the trend of democracy fatigue. This manifests in voter apathy and dwindling public trust in governance institutions. </p></li>
<li><p>Public funding for political parties has to be revisited to stem the proliferation of parties. The current formula gives parties money for campaigns even before they test their electoral strength – an exercise in futility. </p></li>
<li><p>New regulations governing private funding and external technical assistance to parties should be introduced to safeguard Lesotho’s sovereignty and guard against state capture. </p></li>
<li><p>Concrete steps have to be taken to combat corruption in both public and private sectors. </p></li>
<li><p>The electoral <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/lesotho-election-court-idAFKBN2RH07O">commission’s case</a> in the Constitutional Court should be resolved by constitutional means to avoid a post-election political crisis. The case seeks to reallocate about four compensatory proportional representation seats to smaller parties.</p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-elections-turnout-was-down-to-38-new-leaders-will-have-to-deal-with-political-discontent-192749">Lesotho elections: turnout was down to 38% - new leaders will have to deal with political discontent</a>
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<p>The vote for the new party and its leader was largely a protest vote against the All Basotho Convention and Democratic Congress grand coalition government and their failure to improve the lives of the people – which have worsened <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lesotho/overview">because of COVID</a> – and the botched national reform process. </p>
<p>Basotho’s expectations are extremely high and the new coalition government has to deliver tangible changes fast, some of them within the first 100 days.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Khabele Matlosa serves on the board of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. He is also a member of the International Advisory Board of the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA). He is on the editorial board of the African Journal of Elections and observed Lesotho's 2022 under the aegis of the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations. </span></em></p>The new coalition government must act quickly to address the kingdom’s massive socio-economic problems, and restore faith in democracy.Khabele Matlosa, Visiting Professor, Centre for African Diplomacy and Leadership, University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1927492022-10-20T14:07:31Z2022-10-20T14:07:31ZLesotho elections: turnout was down to 38% - new leaders will have to deal with political discontent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490392/original/file-20221018-6100-n3odix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sam Matekane, Lesotho's new prime minister has the daunting job of restoring public trust in politics and government.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Molise Molise/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The southern African kingdom of Lesotho went to the polls on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/10/millionaire-wins-lesotho-vote-but-no-majority-officials">7 October 2022</a>. Or at least some of its voters did. Turnout was at an all-time <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1sdowO4GcCATh1ahqd0YoUldQAbeDvxCPxfXbsF95XKc/edit#gid=1965305309">low of 38%</a> of registered voters. Many are expressing discontent with politics in Lesotho by <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad309-election-fatigue-half-basotho-want-different-way-choose-leaders/">refusing to participate</a>. Those that did come out were in an anti-incumbent mood.</p>
<p>This turnout was almost 10 percentage points below the 47% who voted in the last elections in <a href="https://production-new-commonwealth-files.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/migrated/inline/Lesotho%20COG%202017%20-%20Report%20-%20final%20draft.pdf">2017</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2022-10-12-who-is-lesothos-new-prime-minister-mogul-sam-matekane/">Sam Ntsokoane Matekane</a>, a wealthy businessman who has never been engaged formally in politics before this year, emerged as the new prime minister. At 64, he’s much younger than the men who have hitherto dominated politics in Lesotho – <a href="https://pantheon.world/profile/person/Tom_Thabane/">Tom Thabane</a> was 81 when he was forced to resign in 2020 after being charged with the murder of his ex-wife; <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pakalitha-Mosisili">Pakalitha Mosisili</a> was 72 when he left office for the last time in 2017. Only <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/people-global-african-history/moeketsi-majoro-1961/">Moeketsi Majoro</a> (60), whom Matekane succeeds, is younger than him. </p>
<p>Matekane’s Revolution for Prosperity, a party formed only <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2022-10-11-revolution-for-prosperity-wins-lesotho-elections-but-observers-flag-irregularities/">in March</a>, won 56 seats out of 120 in parliament. He combined with two smaller parties, the Movement for Economic Change and the Alliance of Democrats, to form a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/10/11/matekane-announces-three-party-coalition-in-lesotho/">governing coalition</a>. </p>
<p>All the parties that had been in the last parliament lost some seats. The <a href="https://www.thepost.co.ls/comment/news-pst/why-abc-lost-the-elections-2/">All Basotho Convention</a>, the party occupying the prime minister’s office from 2017 to 2022, fell from 48 seats to eight.</p>
<p>The last parliament failed to pass a series of <a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-bungles-political-reforms-risking-fresh-bout-of-instability-after-2022-poll-191778">political and security reforms</a>. Those bills would have ended parliamentary representation for tiny parties and curbed the power of the prime minister. The prime minister’s power to appoint the judiciary, for one thing, means that Basotho perceive politics as a rigged game in favour of those with <a href="https://lestimes.com/thabane-maesaiah-walk-free/">power and connections</a>. Voters hope Matekane’s coalition will prioritise passing reforms.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-elections-newcomers-score-impressive-win-but-politics-will-still-be-unstable-192466">Lesotho elections: newcomers score impressive win, but politics will still be unstable</a>
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<p>Matekane’s victory is, perhaps, Lesotho’s last and best chance to actually enact the <a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-bungles-political-reforms-risking-fresh-bout-of-instability-after-2022-poll-191778">political reforms</a> that will allow the country to move forward from a decade of political malaise and non-governance. Voters are tired of the old politicians and their unwillingness and inability to solve the pressing problems of poverty, crumbling infrastructure and social service under-investment. </p>
<h2>Hope amid disillusion</h2>
<p>While Matekane’s party won a majority of the directly elected seats, it still polled under <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Lesotho_general_election">40% of the total vote</a>. This is because Lesotho, a country of about 2.1 million people, has <a href="https://www.iec.org.ls/political-parties/">65 registered political parties</a>. No party can command a majority. This has led in the recent past (2012-2022) to ever-shifting coalitions and repeated changes of government. Hence, general <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/pp57-declining-trust-basotho-perceptions-government-corruption-and-performance-drive/">disillusionment</a>.</p>
<p>The election turfed out many established politicians, with only the main opposition <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Democratic-Congress">Democratic Congress</a> reaching <a href="https://www.thepost.co.ls/comment/news-pst/why-the-dc-misfired/">double-digit numbers</a> of parliamentary seats.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-lesothos-in-such-a-mess-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-79678">Why Lesotho's in such a mess and what can be done about it</a>
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<p>The Revolution for Prosperity party poached a few established politicians to run, but largely relies on the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/250918/lesothos-sam-matekane-from-farmer-to-richest-man-to-prime-minister/">rags-to-riches story</a> of founder Matekane for its appeal. One of 14 children in his family, he was born in a rural village in the mountains near the town of Mantsonyane. </p>
<p>He left school before completing secondary education and built a business empire. Starting in road construction and mining transport, the company diversified into real estate, aviation and more. Matekane himself kept a low profile for many years, but in the past few years has increased his <a href="https://publiceyenews.com/matekane-wins-forbes-award/">public visibility through charitable giving</a> and as chair of a private sector group working to get more COVID-19 vaccinations to Lesotho. </p>
<p>Matekane will be challenged to work within a parliamentary system where he, as prime minister, will have plenty of power but not absolute control as he did in business. The art of compromise will be one he needs to master, and quickly. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lesotho-can-teach-eswatini-and-south-africa-about-key-political-reforms-184260">What Lesotho can teach Eswatini and South Africa about key political reforms</a>
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<p>He has come to office saying the right things about ending corruption, making government more transparent, and reforming a political system prone to gridlock and quick shifts of government. If he manages to finally pass the national reforms that stalled in the last parliament, the weary electorate in Lesotho will likely reward his party handsomely. </p>
<p>If, however, his party falls into infighting, the electorate could continue to lose hope in democracy as a <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad535-basotho-approach-election-with-grim-outlook-on-economy-and-democracy/">means of governance</a>.</p>
<h2>Headwinds</h2>
<p>The party’s inability to win an outright majority means another coalition. Its partner Alliance of Democrats is led by long-time politician <a href="https://prabook.com/web/monyane.moleleki/2086119">Monyane Moleleki</a>, who said in April that <a href="https://www.thepost.co.ls/news/i-made-matekane-rich-moleleki/">he had “made” Matekane</a> by steering his companies’ government contracts. </p>
<p>The other coalition party, the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/MovementforEconomicChange/">Movement for Economic Change</a>, is led by <a href="https://www.facebook.com/selibeselibe.mochoboroane/">Selibe Mochoboroane</a>, who currently faces <a href="https://www.newsdayonline.co.ls/mochoboroane-charged-for-treason-and-murder/">treason charges</a> related to the 2014 coup attempt.</p>
<p>Both leaders are seen as linked with the fractious coalition politics of the 2012-2022 period. Some Basotho are disappointed that Matekane had to include them in government.</p>
<p>The bigger question is whether the Revolution for Prosperity party can push through amendments to the constitution. They were mandated by the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/">Southern African Development Community</a> after repeated attempts to settle Lesotho’s political feuds dragged on for <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sadc-shouldnt-scrap-lesotho-from-its-agenda-just-yet">much of 2017-2022</a>. </p>
<p>The last parliament then <a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-due-to-hold-elections-despite-lack-of-progress-on-key-political-reforms-185542">failed to pass them</a>. They would have limited the power of parties and individual members of parliament. The new coalition promised to quickly pass them. Its popularity, somewhat ironically, will rest on curbing its own powers.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499">South Africa's efforts to stabilise Lesotho have failed. Less intervention may be more effective</a>
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<p>No matter what the government does, the Lesotho populace is hurting from the continued effects of the COVID pandemic. The border shutdown during the pandemic meant hardship for much of the population which is still largely dependent on <a href="https://migrants-refugees.va/country-profile/lesotho/">migrant labour</a> to South Africa. The textile factories in Maseru have retrenched around 20,000 workers, leaving only about <a href="https://lesothoexpress.com/more-bad-news-for-factory-workers/">30,000 employed</a> there now. There are few other secondary industries. Government is the major employer, and Matekane said he would bring <a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/Lestimes/status/1579868917069414400">“austerity”</a> to the national government.</p>
<h2>Daunting task</h2>
<p>Unable to change the country’s fundamental vulnerability to shifts in the global and regional economy, Matekane has few economic levers to pull. He will have to rely on his own personal persuasiveness. Even more difficult, he needs to get parliamentarians to limit their own personal power, and convince citizens he has changed the system. </p>
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Read more:
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<p>Many Basotho put their faith in the local champion from Mantsonyane who beat the odds to become the country’s richest man. His term as prime minister could bring about a more stable and better-governed Lesotho.</p>
<p><em>Headline changed.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Aerni-Flessner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Unable to change the country’s vulnerability to shifts in the global and regional economy, the new prime minister Matekane has few economic levers to pull.John Aerni-Flessner, Associate Professor of African History, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1924662022-10-14T16:55:14Z2022-10-14T16:55:14ZLesotho elections: newcomers score impressive win, but politics will still be unstable<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489755/original/file-20221014-20-60lf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lesotho Revolution for Prosperity party leader Sam Matekane (centre), Alliance of Democrats deputy leader Professor Ntoi Rapapa (L) and Movement for Economic Change leader Selibe Mochoboroane. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Molise Molise/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The 2022 national elections in Lesotho will go down in the country’s history as among the most eventful. A party formed only six months ahead of the legislative election, Revolution for Prosperity, emphatically ended the reign of the All Basotho Convention and the Democratic Congress, which have dominated politics in the kingdom of 2.1 million people since 2012. The rookies <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/10/millionaire-wins-lesotho-vote-but-no-majority-officials">won 56 out of 120</a> parliamentary seats – five seats short of an absolute majority. But the impressive win fell short of a majority that would have ended the era of unstable coalition politics in the country. Sam Matekane, the new party’s leader, has announced a three-member coalition government. The Conversation Africa’s politics editor, Thabo Leshilo, asked Lesotho constitutional law expert Hoolo ‘Nyane for his insights.</em></p>
<h2>What do the results tell us about Lesotho’s electoral politics?</h2>
<p>The election results confirm the trend that started in 2012 – that voters have the power to replace governments. This is a sign of the maturation of electoral politics in Lesotho. In the past, the idea that elections could replace incumbent governments seemed far-fetched. </p>
<p>The period between 1993 and 2012 was one of a one-party dominated political system. Elections were just five-year constitutional rituals to confirm the status quo. Since 2012, every election has removed the ruling party. The 2022 elections continued that trend.</p>
<p>The formation of the Revolution for Prosperity party, just six months before the 2022 elections, by the business mogul <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2022-10-12-who-is-lesothos-new-prime-minister-mogul-sam-matekane/">Sam Matekane</a>, gave voters an opportunity to replace the governing coalition of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/All-Basotho-Convention">All Basotho Convention</a> and the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/258295724248074/">Democratic Congress</a>. These two parties have taken turns to lead coalition governments since 2012. </p>
<h2>Another coalition. What is the history of coalition politics in Lesotho?</h2>
<p>The country formally started the tumultuous journey of coalition politics after the <a href="https://production-new-commonwealth-files.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/documents/Working%20Towards%20a%20Sustainable%20Democracy%20in%20Lesotho_0.pdf?VersionId=MfSrWj0t_CbJ8EFPyxOZbG11v1WT9QgA">2012 elections</a>. But the writing has been on the wall since 2002, when the country changed the electoral system, that coalitions are the future of electoral politics in Lesotho. The country changed the electoral system from a pure <a href="https://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/govern/elections.html">constituency-based electoral system</a> to a <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC17608">mixed member proportional representation system</a>. Under the new system parliament has 120 seats eighty of which are elected using constituency-based system while 40 are elected using proportional system. The forty proportional representation are compensatory in nature.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/les2007results.htm">2007 election</a> did not produce coalition governments. But parties formed pre-election alliances to contest elections. By that time, it was clear that single party dominance had ended. </p>
<p>The first coalition government was formed after the 2012 elections, led by the All Basotho Convention. The coalition collapsed <a href="https://lestimes.com/coalition-pact-collapses">in 2014</a>. An early election was held <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE14.2Letsie.pdf">in 2015</a>, which returned a coalition of seven parties led by the Democratic Congress. It was the biggest coalition in the country’s history. </p>
<p>The Democratic Congress-led coalition collapsed in 2017, and an early election was called. It resulted in an All Basotho Convention-led coalition government with its leader, Tom Thabane, as the prime minister. </p>
<p>The 2017 coalition collapsed in 2020 when Thabane <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/19/thomas-thabane-resigns-as-lesothos-prime-minister">resigned</a> as prime minister, after being accused of being involved in the murder of his ex-wife. In 2020, the grand coalition of All Basotho Convention and Democratic Congress was formed, with <a href="https://theconversation.com/lesothos-new-leader-faces-enormous-hurdles-ensuring-peace-and-political-stability-139320">Moeketsi Majoro</a> as the prime minister. The post-2022 elections coalition led by Matekane’s party is the fifth in a decade.</p>
<h2>What are the biggest challenges facing the new coalition?</h2>
<p>The new coalition announced on <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/lesothos-election-winner-announces-coalition-government-91337723">11 October 2022</a> comprises the Revolution for Prosperity Party, the <a href="https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Alliance_of_Democrats_(Lesotho)">Alliance of Democrats</a> and the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/MovementforEconomicChange/">Movement for Economic Change</a>. </p>
<p>I think the new coalition will be prone to the challenges that beset its predecessors. Their biggest challenge was that they could not endure. None were able to complete a five-year term. </p>
<p>The new coalition needs to be alert to this to survive and endure.</p>
<p>The causes of the collapse are many. Of these, three are distinct and interrelated: conflicts within parties and coalitions; corruption; and the weak legal framework for coalitions and the stability of parliament.</p>
<p>Political parties in Lesotho are generally not well-managed. As a result, they are always susceptible to conflicts that often pose an existential threat to coalition governments. </p>
<p>Corruption and patronage are <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/lso">rife</a> in Lesotho and within the coalition parties. Coalition partners find themselves entangled in conflicts over government tenders, deployment of senior civil servants and brazen use of public resources for either personal or political ends. Throughout his campaign and on the day of the announcement of his coalition the incoming Prime Minister, Sam Matekane committed to combating corruption. It remains to be seen when he will live that promise.</p>
<p>The weak legal framework to ensure stability of coalitions, governments and parliament: Most of the time, when conflicts boil up in government, floor-crossing (switching parties) and votes of no confidence in parliament are used to destabilise coalition governments.</p>
<p>Political reform that started <a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-due-to-hold-elections-despite-lack-of-progress-on-key-political-reforms-185542">after the 2012 elections</a>, aimed at bringing stability to Lesotho, included provisions to address these problems. But the reform process, which was supposed to have been finalised ahead of the 2022 elections, <a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-bungles-political-reforms-risking-fresh-bout-of-instability-after-2022-poll-191778">collapsed</a>. Hence the vulnerability remains.</p>
<h2>What will it take for the new coalition government to succeed?</h2>
<p>The new governing coalition enters office amid euphoria and excitement. The 2022 election was in a sense a “referendum” in which voters unequivocally rejected the two formerly dominant parties – the All Basotho Convention and the Democratic Congress. Those parties had presided over the <a href="https://lestimes.com/govt-has-no-desire-to-root-out-corruption-mochoboroane/">plundering of public resources</a>, thereby adding to <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lesotho/overview">economic hardship</a> in the country.</p>
<p>There are, therefore, great expectations on Matekane and his party because of their <a href="https://lestimes.com/matekane-promises-to-lure-more-mining-investors/">promises</a> to combat economic hardship, which is attributable primarily to poor management of public resources. Delivering on this promise is key to the success of the new coalition government. </p>
<p>In addition, the success of the coalition will turn on carrying out political reforms, some of which are intended to stabilise coalition governments. </p>
<p>Another important factor in the stability of coalitions is to have “one government”. In the past, coalition partners divided up government: each coalition partner was responsible for the ministries headed by his party. Each leader of a party in the governing coalition was a “mini prime minister”, accounting only for government ministries allocated to his party. Such balkanisation of government weakens accountability. It needs to be avoided.</p>
<h2>What does the government need to deliver?</h2>
<p>The new government has its work cut out. Highest on the national agenda is the outstanding <a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-bungles-political-reforms-risking-fresh-bout-of-instability-after-2022-poll-191778">reforms programme</a>. The political system in Lesotho needs to be reformed urgently. The advantage about this programme is that there is some semblance of consensus already. </p>
<p>In addition, the economy in Lesotho is <a href="https://country.eiu.com/lesotho">not in good shape</a>. The coalition government will have to deliver on efforts to turn around the economy quickly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hoolo 'Nyane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The new governing coalition enters office amid euphoria and excitement. There are great expectations it will end corruption and fix the ailing economy.Hoolo 'Nyane, Head of Department, Public and Environmental Law Department, University of LimpopoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1917782022-10-05T13:47:05Z2022-10-05T13:47:05ZLesotho bungles political reforms, risking fresh bout of instability after 2022 poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488261/original/file-20221005-11-ac6y6n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lesotho citizens queue to vote in a previous national elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/ Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Kingdom of Lesotho – a small landlocked country in southern Africa with a population of 2.1 million people – has failed to introduce key political reforms needed to bring stability to the country. This setback is the latest of many false starts since the reform process started in earnest <a href="https://production-new-commonwealth-files.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/documents/Working%20Towards%20a%20Sustainable%20Democracy%20in%20Lesotho_0.pdf?VersionId=MfSrWj0t_CbJ8EFPyxOZbG11v1WT9QgA">after the 2012 elections</a>. </p>
<p>It had been hoped that <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/07/21/lesothos-general-elections-scheduled-on-october-7//">the 2022 national poll</a> would be held under a new constitutional framework that would help end conflicts in key areas such as the formation of government, coalitions and the electoral system. Lesotho’s history has been punctuated by spasms of political instability <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE14.2Weisfelder.pdf">since independence in 1966</a>.</p>
<p>The reform drive was supposed to have been completed by the end of the five-year term of the latest parliament, on 13 July 2022. Parliament tried, without success, to enact the reforms bill before its dissolution. Even frantic and chaotic efforts to pass it at midnight before the parliament dissolved <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2LVg0UI1AVs">failed</a>. </p>
<p>A chaotic process then followed which involved parliament being recalled and passing the <a href="https://www.maserumetro.com/news/politics/rakuoane-presents-10th-amendment-act-to-basotho/">flagship</a> reforms bills. But this decision was <a href="https://nationalassembly.parliament.ls/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/29th-Monday.pdf">struck down</a> by both the High Court and Court of Appeal. </p>
<p>This, in effect meant the collapse of the reform programme. </p>
<p>The net effect is that elections will be held on the basis of the old constitutional framework. This is the same framework that is to blame for recurrent political instability in the country.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Majoro’s government is the fourth on whose watch the reform process collapsed, despite enormous resources being invested in the initiative. The causes for the collapse are common in all four attempts. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/book-review-zakes-mdas-subversive-take-on-lesothos-traditions-174063">Book review: Zakes Mda's subversive take on Lesotho's traditions</a>
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<p>In my view, two key reasons lie behind the failure of political reforms in Lesotho. The first is lack of interest by successive governments. The second is the poor design of the reform processes. </p>
<h2>Chaotic collapse</h2>
<p>The way in which the latest reform attempts collapsed provides a good example of why Lesotho has struggled to get itself on a new political path. It reflects the deep tensions in the country grounded in the fact that political elites are driven by self-aggrandisement.</p>
<p>After parliament’s term ended without passing the “omnibus bill”, the government came under immense pressure from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which has been trying to facilitate the reforms, as well as donors and civil society to recall the dissolved parliament to finish the reforms process. </p>
<p>The prime minister, Moeketsi Majoro, then declared a “state of emergency” to create grounds for King Letsie III to recall the parliament. But the premise for the recall – that failure to pass the constitutional amendment bill and the National Assembly Electoral (Amendment) Act constituted a state of emergency – was wrong. </p>
<p>The recalled parliament purportedly passed the bill into law following a chaotic process on the 29 August 2022. But the recall of parliament was challenged in the courts by <a href="https://www.thepost.co.ls/comment/news-pst/a-massive-blow-to-government/">a journalist and a lawyer</a>. In a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9tchockhuMA">landmark decision</a>, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal in separate judgements rightly ruled that the recall of parliament was unconstitutional as there was no state of emergency justifying such recall. </p>
<p>Consequently, all the business it transacted after its lawful dissolution on 13 July 2022, including passing the reforms law, was declared null and void.</p>
<h2>Lack of interest in fundamental reforms</h2>
<p>Despite their pretensions to support reforms, it is clear that governments in Lesotho are not interested in the fundamental reforms to the structure of government. None wants to let go of the unfettered powers that the prime minister enjoys under the current dispensation.</p>
<p>The current design enables manipulation of other branches and institutions of government by the executive. For instance, the prime minister can prorogue and dissolve parliament based on a whim. This is reflective of the weak checks and balances on the use of executive powers.</p>
<p>The prime minister also enjoys unfettered powers to appoint all the other vital institutions - the judiciary, security agencies, oversight institutions and the civil service.</p>
<p>Successive prime ministers have not hesitated to use these powers to torment political opponents, and enhance their political prospects. The result has been recurring instability.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-monarch-in-lesotho-should-be-given-some-powers-but-not-extreme-powers-165914">The monarch in Lesotho should be given some powers: but not extreme powers</a>
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<p>To curb unfettered executive powers, the <a href="https://sundayexpress.co.ls/nra-challenges-dissolution/">now-defunct National Reforms Authority</a>, proposed amendments that provided for checks and balances. But even before the failure to pass the amendments, the government had removed proposals to ensure minimal changes to the status quo.</p>
<h2>Poor design</h2>
<p>Political reform processes are generally informed by <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2871469/view">five principles of constitution-making</a>. These are proper agenda-setting (preparation), awareness and consultation, deliberation, adoption and implementation. </p>
<p>In Lesotho’s case, these phases were not clearly visible in the design of the reform process, hence it met incessant headwinds at every turn until it collapsed. </p>
<p>For instance, there was no proper agenda-setting. Consequently, the reform agenda was not clearly demarcated or agreed on. While there were five broad themes – <a href="https://lesotho.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Multi-stakeholder%20National%20Dialogue%20Plenary%20II%20Report%20A.pdf">judiciary, parliament, civil service, media, security and the constitution</a> – the extent to which the reform could go was unclear.</p>
<p>As result, competing political interests were often not moderated so that everyone could have a clear vision of what the new constitution should look like. The government view prevailed, as usual, causing discontent among other players.</p>
<p>Similarly, the role that would be played by citizens in the reforms process has been just as unclear. </p>
<p>Another fault line in the process was that the act that <a href="https://nra.org.ls/wp-content/uploads/filr/7272/Act%20No.%204%20of%202019.pdf">was passed</a> in 2019 to guide the reforms itself created more confusion.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-village-pope-has-passed-remembering-tsepo-tshola-lesothos-musical-giant-164650">The Village Pope has passed: remembering Tsepo Tshola, Lesotho's musical giant</a>
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<p>The new law saw the establishment of a multi-stakeholder constituent assembly called the <a href="https://nra.org.ls/">National Reform Authority</a>. But its relationship with parliament remained opaque. Most importantly, the parliament’s traditional legislative authority remained unaffected by it.</p>
<p>Another weakness of the process was the way in which it ran rough shod over the processes for changing the constitution in Lesotho: these are by an ordinary amendment by simple majority, two-thirds in both houses and a referendum. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>After the elections the new parliament must pass a new reforms law. Such a law must be based on the principles that have emerged following lessons in the many constitution-making exercises throughout the continent.</p>
<p>The most notable experiences are those in Kenya, South Africa, South Sudan and Zimbabwe. The law must carefully delineate the role of stakeholders such as government, other political players, civil society, experts, and, much more importantly, the public. </p>
<p>A careful design of the process and how various stakeholders participate in the process is the greatest lesson from many <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/aas/13/4/article-p429_3.xml">constitution-making experiences in Africa</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africans-want-consensual-democracy-why-is-that-reality-so-hard-to-accept-164010">Africans want consensual democracy – why is that reality so hard to accept?</a>
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<p>Inevitably, such a process is bound to reduce the classical powers of parliament. Parliament cannot regard a law passed through such a broad-based consultation, where agreements and compromises have been secured, as an ordinary piece of legislation with which it can do whatever it likes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191778/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hoolo 'Nyane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite their pretensions to support reforms, it is clear that successive governments are not interested in the reform.Hoolo 'Nyane, Head of Department, Public and Environmental Law Department, University of LimpopoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1901512022-09-09T07:35:28Z2022-09-09T07:35:28ZAfrica’s dinosaur discoveries: five essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483193/original/file-20220907-14-ap277n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Smile if you love dinosaurs as much as Spinosaurus Aegyptiacus loved being a carnivore.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">YuRi Photolife</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Few prehistoric creatures generate as much excitement and awe as dinosaurs. Whether it’s the “tyrant” T-Rex or a slim-necked Brachiosaurus, people are fascinated by these creatures that dominated landscapes all over the world - including across the African continent - hundreds of millions of years ago.</p>
<p>The dinosaurs are long gone (though we’re still surrounded by their direct descendants, birds). But researchers are still hard at work piecing together the fossil record to create a fuller picture of how dinosaurs lived, walked, ate and raised their young. Their discoveries offer a glimpse into ancient landscapes, helping modern scientists to better understand today’s climates and ecosystems.</p>
<p>The Conversation Africa has showcased a number of dinosaur finds on the continent. Here are five essential reads:</p>
<h2>A rich record</h2>
<p>Africa is widely acknowledged as the birthplace of humankind. But less attention is paid to its incredibly varied fossil record. Many of the planet’s most important life forms originated on the continent: bacteria-like organisms; many dinosaur species and, of course, primates – including humans. Even the rocks on the continent are among the oldest in the world. Some of them date back more than three billion years.</p>
<p>That’s what prompted Julien Benoit to create a syllabus for his palaeontology students that centred African fossil discoveries rather than focusing on finds from elsewhere in the world. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-rich-fossil-finds-should-get-the-air-time-they-deserve-91849">Africa's rich fossil finds should get the air time they deserve</a>
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<h2>Hidden in plain sight</h2>
<p>Many museums and universities keep extensive fossil collections. Their contents have been studied, labelled and catalogued. Sometimes, however, they hold secrets that can only be uncovered through a combination of scientific hunch and cutting-edge technology. That’s how Kimberley E.J. Chapelle discovered and described an entirely new species: <em>Ngwevu intloko</em> (“grey skull” in isiXhosa).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-fossil-hidden-in-plain-sight-in-south-africa-turns-out-to-be-a-new-dinosaur-121597">A fossil hidden in plain sight in South Africa turns out to be a new dinosaur</a>
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<h2>A giant African dinosaur</h2>
<p>Researchers are constantly rewriting the fossil record thanks to new discoveries. Dinosaurs’ fossilised footprints are a useful tool for this work, as evidenced by a – literally – gigantic find in Lesotho. </p>
<p>It was previously thought that ancient southern African landscapes were dominated by small and agile two-legged carnivorous dinosaurs called theropods. But Lara Sciscio and her colleagues’ study in Lesotho unexpectedly revealed that very large carnivorous dinosaurs with an estimated body length of between 8 and 9 metres (or 26 feet) – that’s a two-storey building or two adult rhinos nose to tail – lived in the region too.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-the-giant-dinosaur-that-roamed-southern-africa-200-million-years-ago-86004">Meet the giant dinosaur that roamed southern Africa 200 million years ago</a>
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<h2>Footprint finds</h2>
<p>Still on the subject of footprints, it turns out that fossilised dinosaur prints hold incredible detail about more than just the size and shape of the creature that made them. As Miengah Abrahams explains, they can reveal what organism made the tracks – different animals have different footprint shapes. They offer clues to the creature’s behaviour and may even contain evidence of what sort of environment dinosaurs roamed – did they sink into wet sand, or were they standing firmly on dry gravel?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/footprints-take-science-a-step-closer-to-understanding-southern-africas-dinosaurs-185480">Footprints take science a step closer to understanding southern Africa's dinosaurs</a>
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<h2>A toothy morsel</h2>
<p>Moving from feet to teeth: dinosaurs’ chompers hold important clues to their lives, diets and how they moved across landscapes. That’s why Femke Holwerda ventured to the Kem Kem beds, a geological formation in North Africa, to seek out fossil dinosaur teeth. Her discoveries allowed her to create a fuller picture of the long-necked, plant-eating (herbivorous) dinosaurs, called sauropods, from the Early Cretaceous period of North Africa.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-we-learned-from-dinosaur-teeth-in-north-africa-130894">What we learned from dinosaur teeth in North Africa</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190151/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The African continent is a rich repository for dinosaur fossils, including teeth and track marks.Natasha Joseph, Commissioning EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854802022-07-31T06:44:32Z2022-07-31T06:44:32ZFootprints take science a step closer to understanding southern Africa’s dinosaurs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476406/original/file-20220727-1332-rnl1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=308%2C232%2C1298%2C783&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A site in Tsiokane (Lesotho) where diverse tridactyl theropod tracks are preserved.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08912963.2020.1810681">Author supplied</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Dinosaurs have captured people’s imaginations more than any other ancient creatures. These reptiles – some large, some small; some carnivores and others herbivores – rose and dominated the world’s landscapes for more than 135 million years during a period known as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/Mesozoic-Era">Mesozoic</a>.</p>
<p>Today, dinosaur fossils can be found in many parts of the world, contained in rock successions. These are a series of strata or rock units in chronological order. South Africa and Lesotho’s main Karoo Basin, for example, contains plentiful dinosaur fossils in the rock succession that formed <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0012825219305586">between 220 million and 183 million years ago</a> during the Late Triassic-Early Jurassic period. These ancient remains include body fossils (bones) and trace fossils, which are <a href="https://theconversation.com/my-job-is-full-of-fossilised-poop-but-theres-nothing-icky-about-ichnology-182906">markings</a> in the ancient sediments in the form of footprints and burrows in the ground. </p>
<p>Body fossils can assist in recreating the ancient life forms, understanding what they looked like, their size, and even how they grew and evolved. The problem is that intact body fossils can be rare in some areas. Bone fragments alone cannot help scientists to piece together the puzzle of ancient life. The traces of animals offer another avenue of study.</p>
<p>In the main Karoo Basin, bone fossils of carnivorous dinosaurs called theropods are incredibly scarce. But their footprints, preserved in the rocks during the Late Triassic and Early Jurassic, are abundant. These fossil footprints are a treasure chest of information. They can reveal what organism made the tracks – different animals have different footprint shapes. They offer clues to the creature’s behaviour – hopping on two legs would leave a different footprint pattern than walking on four. They also provide evidence about the substrate conditions when the creature walked, such as whether it sank into wet sand or was standing firmly on dry gravel.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fevo.2022.925313/full">recent study</a>, our team looked at around 200 footprints attributed to theropods across a time span of about 35 million years. We wanted to understand how dinosaurs’ feet changed through time in southern Africa. The time interval we studied is critical in dinosaur history because it captures a mass extinction event and the ancient ecosystems’ subsequent recovery period.</p>
<p>Our findings reveal that over time, our local theropods became larger and had a greater diversity than what the body fossil record could suggest. </p>
<h2>Footprints: a closer inspection</h2>
<p>To begin our study, we first looked for diagnostic clues to tell theropod footprints apart from the tracks of other ancient animals. Theropod footprints typically preserve three, slender toe impressions where the footprint is longer than it is wide. The middle toe has a pronounced forward projection. These footprints also commonly preserve fierce claw mark impressions. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474643/original/file-20220718-71797-pw0u3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474643/original/file-20220718-71797-pw0u3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474643/original/file-20220718-71797-pw0u3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474643/original/file-20220718-71797-pw0u3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474643/original/file-20220718-71797-pw0u3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474643/original/file-20220718-71797-pw0u3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474643/original/file-20220718-71797-pw0u3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Natural casts of theropod tracks preserved on a cave ceiling, Tsikoane (Lesotho). Insets of dinosaur tracks from Tsikoane (top) and Roma (bottom).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Figure by author/Outlines of Meganosaurus (top) and Dracovenator (bottom) are adapted from Ornitholestes (2018) and Martz (2012), respectively.</span></span>
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<p>We know the shape of their feet and how they moved from reconstructions based on theropod body fossil material. Scientists have also learned about these aspects of dinosaurs by <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0031018204006728">making modern footprints</a> using their closest living relatives: birds.</p>
<p>Once we identified the theropod footprints in the field, we quantified their footprint shape by measuring a set of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/pala.12373">standard parameters</a> agreed on by the global dinosaur trace fossil scientist community. Based on these measurements across time and space, we were able to draw conclusions about theropod foot and body size evolution. This is possible because there is a direct link between foot length, and therefore footprint length, and body size (specifically hip heights and body lengths). </p>
<p>Our study recorded a 40% increase in the maximum and average footprint length in the studied time interval of 35 million years. Furthermore, we observed that larger bodied theropods were present, though rare, in the Late Triassic and that they became <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-the-giant-dinosaur-that-roamed-southern-africa-200-million-years-ago-86004">even larger</a> and more common in the Early Jurassic, during the recovery period following the mass extinction event. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-the-giant-dinosaur-that-roamed-southern-africa-200-million-years-ago-86004">Meet the giant dinosaur that roamed southern Africa 200 million years ago</a>
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<p>These observations echo trends recorded elsewhere in the world. We also observed that through time, theropod footprints became more prevalent. This may suggest that the carnivore population thrived during the recovery period. This change in abundance might, however, also have been influenced by changes in the ancient environment from meandering rivers with lushly vegetated floodplains to shallower ephemeral streams and lakes under dryland conditions. This newer setting is more conducive to preserving footprints because deposits in the soil are less likely to erode.</p>
<p>Based on our measurements, we identified three distinct types of footprint shapes that may be attributed to the three different theropods that roamed the landscape in the Early Jurassic. This means that southern Africa’s theropod footprint record reflects a greater theropod diversity than the scant carnivorous dinosaur body fossil record, which only preserves fragmentary material of two theropods, <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/39674608.pdf">Dracovenator</a> and <a href="https://core.ac.uk/display/39675047;%20https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/15970">Megapnosaurus</a>. </p>
<h2>More to explore</h2>
<p>Another key finding centred on changes to the form of theropods’ footprints. One is that the forward projection of the middle toes (how much further forward it is than the outer two toes) decreased over time. Another change is that small local theropods had shorter middle toe projections than their <a href="https://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.baztech-article-BUS6-0019-0023">contemporaneous North American equivalents</a>.</p>
<p>These observations require more investigation to better understand what these changes mean, especially because the middle toe projection has <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/pala.12449">been linked</a> to an animal’s running ability. </p>
<p>Our research illustrates the importance of the understudied fossil footprint record in studying ancient life and how it complements the more explored body fossil record. Make no bones about it: evolutionary changes among southern African dinosaurs can be tracked by examining their footprints.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The research for this study was supported by grants obtained by EB as principal investigator: DST-NRF Centre of Excellence in Palaeosciences (GENUS), NRF Competitive Programme, African Origins Platform. During the research period MA was supported by the DST-NRF Centre of Excellence in Palaeosciences (GENUS) and FK was supported by ERDF/Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation-State Research Agency. </span></em></p>Fossil footprints are a treasure chest of information.Miengah Abrahams, Lecturer, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1855422022-07-04T13:28:13Z2022-07-04T13:28:13ZLesotho due to hold elections despite lack of progress on key political reforms<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471817/original/file-20220630-17-3f141a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman votes in Lesotho's 2017 national election. New elections are due in October. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gianluigi Guercia/AFP via Gettty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lesotho is due to hold national elections in <a href="https://lestimes.com/polls-on-mid-october-iec/">mid-October</a>. The polls were expected to be held under a new constitutional regime resulting from a reform process that started in 2012. But, the process has not yielded much fruit. </p>
<p>There’s widespread consensus – locally and internationally – that the constitutional kingdom of about 2.2 million must reform its political system to overcome recurrent political instability. But successive governments have failed to bring about the necessary changes. </p>
<p>Now, with parliament legally required to dissolve by 14 July 2022 and elections held within three months, there is simply no time to undertake and complete the reforms. So, Basotho look set to vote without the much-needed political changes, at least the important ones. </p>
<p>The proposed reforms that have not been passed by parliament pertain to the excessive powers of the prime minister, unprofessional media, politicised security agencies and judiciary, parliament and the formation of government.</p>
<h2>The reasons for reforms</h2>
<p>The biggest deficiency of Lesotho’s political system is that the prime minister wields excessive powers.</p>
<p>These deficiencies became apparent with the advent of fragile coalition politics in 2012. In 2014 to 2015, the then prime minister, Thomas Thabane, capriciously replaced the chief justice, the president of the court of appeal as well as the leadership of the security agencies.</p>
<p>He also <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-06-19-parliament-suspended-amid-fears-of-a-coup-in-lesotho/">prorogued parliament</a> and changed most of the senior personnel of the civil service. Consequently, calls for reform grew louder while disagreements in the then tripartite coalition became pronounced. </p>
<p>The then deputy prime minister, Mothejoa Metsing’s party, <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/286041994.pdf">Lesotho Congress for Democracy</a>, withdrew its support for Thabane’s government. The government, which was formed through a hairbreadth majority in parliament – <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC183723">collapsed in 2015</a>.</p>
<p>A new government was elected, led by Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/cnews-us-lesotho-election-idCAKBN0MD1S220150317">in 2015</a>. It made the reforms its main agenda. But it didn’t have a clear process for executing the reform programme. Instead, it was consumed by the assassination of the then commander of the Lesotho Defence Force, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-29-killing-of-former-lesotho-army-chief-deepens-instability">Maaparankoe Mahao</a>, in June 2015 by rogue army operatives. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-cant-afford-incremental-changes-to-its-constitution-it-needs-a-complete-overhaul-140747">Lesotho can't afford incremental changes to its constitution: it needs a complete overhaul</a>
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<p>The country was thrown into instability, culminating in the Southern African Development Community establishing a <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2015/sadc0706.htm">commission of inquiry in July 2015</a> to investigate the death and related matters. A key recommendation of the commission was that the country undertake a comprehensive constitutional reform programme. </p>
<p>Mosisili’s government made reforms <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/sites/www.un.org.africarenewal/files/70_LS_en.pdf">one of its key objectives</a>. But the government failed to make any meaningful progress until it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/3/1/pakalitha-mosisili-loses-parliament-vote">collapsed in 2017</a>.</p>
<h2>Fresh attempts at reform</h2>
<p>A new government was elected in 2017, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/6/16/thomas-thabane-sworn-in-as-lesothos-prime-minister">led by Prime Minister Thabane</a> for the second time. There was renewed vigour to execute the reforms programme. The government proposed the National Reform Commission Bill of 2018 to parliament to establish an executive-based commission to <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/lesotho-commended-signing-reforms-agreement">implement the reforms</a>. </p>
<p>The bill never became law as it was greatly criticised by civil society and other stakeholders because government had <a href="http://www.lcn.org.ls/news/REFORM%20PROCESS.pdf">designed the process unilaterally</a>. A much more consultative approach was taken in 2018 when the first <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/5515/4384/2128/Multi-Stakeholders_National_Dialogue_Communique_pdf.pdf">muti-stakeholder dialogue</a> was organised. This resulted in the enactment of the <a href="https://www.ls.undp.org/content/lesotho/en/home/news-centre/articles/The-Lesotho-National-Reforms-Bill-to-safeguarding-and-insulate-Lesotho-Reforms-Process-passed.html">National Reforms Dialogue Act</a>.</p>
<p>The law established the National Leaders’ Forum and the National Dialogue Planning Committee to organise the second national dialogue on the <a href="http://www.lcn.org.ls/Resource/MSND%20Plenary%20II%20Report.pdf">content and process of the reforms</a>.
The second Multi-Stakeholder National Dialogue was held <a href="http://www.lcn.org.ls/Resource/MSND%20Plenary%20II%20Report.pdf">in November 2019</a>, after which the National Reforms Authority Act of 2019 was enacted.</p>
<p>The act established the <a href="https://nra.org.ls/">National Reforms Authority (NRA)</a>. The NRA was responsible for implementing the broad and often vague <a href="http://www.lcn.org.ls/Resource/MSND%20Plenary%20II%20Report.pdf">decisions of the Multi-Stakeholder National Dialogue</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lesotho-can-teach-eswatini-and-south-africa-about-key-political-reforms-184260">What Lesotho can teach Eswatini and South Africa about key political reforms</a>
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<p>The process suffered a setback in 2020 after Prime Minister Thabane resigned, following allegations that he was implicated in the murder of his ex-wife, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52707752">Lipolelo Thabane</a>. A new prime minister, Moeketsi Majoro, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/20/moeketsi-majoro-sworn-in-as-lesothos-new-prime-minister">was sworn in</a>. The reform programme continued under the stewardship of the National Reforms Authority.</p>
<p>However, the reforms authority exceeded its statutory lifespan without getting a single change to the constitution approved by parliament. Before its disbandment in <a href="https://sundayexpress.co.ls/nra-challenges-dissolution/">April 2022</a>, the reforms authority had completed proposed constitutional changes – the <a href="https://publiceyenews.com/parties-pledge-to-salvage-reforms-bills/">11th Amendment to the Constitution Bill 2022 </a>.</p>
<p>The so-called Omnibus Bill that is now before parliament is not perfect. But it promises to arrest some of the longstanding constitutional problems. These include the excessive powers of the prime minister, a judiciary that is controlled by the executive, politicised security agencies and a weak parliament.</p>
<h2>Implications of failure</h2>
<p>Despite the hype about passing the Omnibus Bill <a href="https://publiceyenews.com/parties-pledge-to-salvage-reforms-bills/">before the election</a>, it is almost certain that parliament will not have passed all the changes by its dissolution in mid-July. It is, therefore, expected that the country will hold election under the old political design.</p>
<p>The main hurdle is that the majority of critical provisions in the bill seek to amend the entrenched provisions of the constitution. These include changes on the judiciary, parliament and security. These provisions need a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament – Senate and the National Assembly. Some changes even require a referendum. </p>
<p>Given the improbability of especially the entrenched provisions being amended before parliament is dissolved, what then? </p>
<p>An option is to cherry-pick and pass the amendments that need a simple majority vote. But, that may not make any meaningful impact. Most of the problematic provisions of the constitution are entrenched. </p>
<p>The only viable option, albeit regrettable, is that parliament must avoid tampering with the Omnibus Bill, and wait for the new parliament after the elections to resuscitate the entire reform programme.</p>
<h2>Why reforms always fail in Lesotho</h2>
<p>This latest false start on reforms indicates that Lesotho is struggling to implement much-needed constitutional changes. The country has had five governments in 10 years. Every time a government collapses, the reform programme follows suit. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499">South Africa's efforts to stabilise Lesotho have failed. Less intervention may be more effective</a>
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<p>Another major cause of regular failure is the lack of clarity about the process of reforms. While there is some consensus about the broad areas for reform – parliament, the constitution, judiciary, civil service, security and media – there is a lack of clarity and consensus about the process of undertaking such thoroughgoing changes to the constitution.</p>
<p>The fact that the Omnibus Bill is now held up in parliament is emblematic of a lack of clear process. There was no plan about how different changes, including changes to the entrenched provisions of the constitution, would be undertaken.</p>
<h2>Where to from here?</h2>
<p>Now that the National Reforms Authority has been disbanded, and parliament has failed to pass the Omnibus Bill, it means the next election will be held under the old legal framework. Then after elections, yet another government will be expected to reinvigorate the reforms.</p>
<p>When the new programme starts after election, the country must pay particular attention to the process as previous attempts at reform were undermined by, among other factors, a poor process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185542/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hoolo 'Nyane was the consultant for the National Reforms Authority(NRA) during the drafting of the Omnibus Bill.</span></em></p>The country has had five governments in 10 years. Every time a government collapses, the reform programme follows suit.Hoolo 'Nyane, Head of Department, Public and Environmental Law Department, University of LimpopoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1842602022-06-09T13:55:02Z2022-06-09T13:55:02ZWhat Lesotho can teach Eswatini and South Africa about key political reforms<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466793/original/file-20220602-22-zj686t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Basotho men wearing the traditional blankets during the annual horse race held on the king's birthday. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two southern African countries, South Africa and Eswatini, are undergoing important reforms. South Africa is reviewing its <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-ripe-for-electoral-reform-why-its-time-might-have-come-157149">electoral system</a> while Eswatini is revisiting the powers of the monarch through a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-15-the-king-is-still-bent-on-determining-the-tone-and-character-of-national-dialogue-in-eswatini/">national dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa and Eswatini can look to Lesotho for lessons. It’s a fellow member of the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/member-states/">Southern African Development Community</a> and has grappled with these issues for decades. The three countries share geographic, historical and economic ties. </p>
<p>The kingdom of Lesotho returned to electoral politics in 1993, after a long haul of <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/lesoverview6.htm">dictatorship capped by a military junta</a>. Since then, it has experienced <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.1998.9627833?journalCode=rasr20">mutinies</a>, <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-08_Issue-3/benyera_e.pdf">coups</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589001.2020.1749246">electoral violence</a>. </p>
<p>The advent of tumultuous <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lesotho-after-may-2012-general-elections-making-the-coalition-work">coalition politics in 2012</a> laid bare the longstanding problems associated with the prime minister’s excessive powers. He compromised the security forces, the judiciary, civil service and even parliament, thereby <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00083968.2020.1834418">fuelling instability</a>.</p>
<p>The Southern African Development Community has intervened in Lesotho in <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE14.2Weisfelder.pdf">almost every electoral cycle</a>. Its interventions have ranged from diplomatic to <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC16147">military</a>. The country is now effectively under the trusteeship of the regional bloc as it sails through a turbulent reform programme. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, there are certain aspects that Lesotho has handled quite well. Its successes offer lessons for other states that are undergoing reforms in similar areas. </p>
<p>First, it has made its electoral system more inclusive. Second, it has curbed the powers of the monarch in a constitutional democracy. </p>
<h2>South Africa’s electoral system</h2>
<p>South Africa faces a critical period in its electoral history. The country is <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/bill/2300397">reviewing its electoral system</a> in the light of a debate that has raged since pre-constitution negotiations in the 1990s. The <a href="https://eisa.org/pdf/JAE2.1.pdf#page=76">contest</a> is between the proponents of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/proportional-representation">proportional representation</a>, and those favouring a <a href="https://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/govern/elections.html">constituency-based</a> electoral system.</p>
<p>Under proportional representation, candidates contest elections as party candidates – not as individuals. In parliament, the <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view/39377/30302">representatives occupy proportional seats allocated to parties</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/govern/elections.html">constituency-based electoral system</a> divides a country into relatively equal territorial units called constituencies. The system is often credited with <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/faure.pdf">increased accountability</a> to the voters by their representatives. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/constitutional-court-ruling-heralds-changes-to-south-africas-electoral-system-140668">Constitutional Court ruling heralds changes to South Africa's electoral system</a>
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<p>South Africa’s <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a> envisages an electoral system “that results, in general, in proportional representation”. The country has used this system for national and provincial elections since 1994.</p>
<p>But arguments over it have never been settled. Occasionally, the Constitutional Court is asked to intervene. </p>
<p>Its first major intervention was in 2002. The court had to decide whether floor-crossing – MPs switching parties – was in keeping with a proportional representation system. It found that floor-crossing at national, provincial and local government levels was <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/33media.pdf">consistent with the constitution</a>. </p>
<p>The second time was in 2020. Independent candidates had not been seen as having a place in an electoral system based on proportional representation of political parties. Then the court was asked to decide whether excluding independent candidates from contesting national and provincial elections <a href="https://theconversation.com/constitutional-court-ruling-heralds-changes-to-south-africas-electoral-system-140668">was constitutional</a>. </p>
<p>It decided that <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2020/11.html">excluding independents was unconstitutional</a>. This partly invalidated the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act73of1998.pdf">1998 Electoral Act</a>. The decision triggered a <a href="https://theconversation.com/constitutional-court-ruling-heralds-changes-to-south-africas-electoral-system-140668">search for an electoral system</a> that would allow independents to stand for election in an essentially proportional electoral system.</p>
<p>Lesotho grappled with the same questions following its <a href="http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/jch/article/download/4110/3694">controversial 1998 elections</a>. In 2001, it adopted a <a href="https://www.academia.edu/download/72989383/j.electstud.2003.12.00520211017-17059-u63y2z.pdf">“mixed member proportional”</a> system, the <a href="https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/annex/esy/esy_ls">first country in Africa</a> to do so. </p>
<p>It remains a species of proportional electoral system, but permits individuals to stand in constituencies, either as independents or sponsored by political parties. As a result, some MPs are elected as constituency representatives, others as proportional representatives of political parties. The system has performed relatively well. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://lesotholii.org/ls/legislation/act/2001/4/ls_amend_4th_2001_og.pdf">fourth amendment to the constitution of Lesotho</a> of 2001 can come in handy for the conversation <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Bills/2022/B1_2022_Electoral_Amendment_Bill/B1_2022_Electoral_Amendment_Bill.pdf">under way in the South African parliament</a> regarding electoral reform. </p>
<p>The lesson is that independent candidates can be allowed to stand for elections in a system that results, by and large, in proportional representation as required by section 46 of the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a>. </p>
<h2>Eswatini’s monarchy</h2>
<p>The most recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-uprisings-in-eswatini-the-unfinished-business-of-democratic-reform-171844">wave of discontent</a> in Eswatini reignited calls to reduce the powers of the only remaining absolute monarch in Africa. The king’s place in Eswatini’s democracy has been an issue since <a href="https://lib.ugent.be/catalog/ebk01:4100000009375057">independence from Britain in 1968</a>. At independence, the <a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ocw/law-ocw-cd19.regGroup.1/law-ocw-cd19#law-ocw-cd19-miscMatter-1">constitution</a> provided for a constitutional monarch along the lines of Lesotho’s. </p>
<p>The independence constitutions of both countries were cast in <a href="https://academic.oup.com/pa/article-abstract/36/2/218/1532256">classical Westminster moulds</a>. But, hardly five years into independence, in 1973, <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/king-sobhuza-ii-1899-1982">King Sobhuza II</a> of Swaziland (now Eswatini) suspended the constitution and claimed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2003.9627233?journalCode=rasr20">absolute powers</a>. This is still the position despite the new <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC53235">constitution of 2005</a>. The king has unlimited executive powers and political parties are prohibited. </p>
<p>Discontent over the king’s powers has been growing. There is now agreement in Eswatini that there must be <a href="https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjhmqL4j474AhULXsAKHbSUAHsQwqsBegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D1M9EAOyMJgA&usg=AOvVaw3rKTXbS1bmmWTJG_24fKfW">candid dialogue</a> about the king’s powers, and greater democratisation. The <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/statement-chairperson-sadc-organ-politics-defence-and-security-cooperation-his-excellency-matamela-cyril-ramaphosa-president-rep/">Southern African Development Community</a> is facilitating the dialogue. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-monarch-in-lesotho-should-be-given-some-powers-but-not-extreme-powers-165914">The monarch in Lesotho should be given some powers: but not extreme powers</a>
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<p>Lesotho has been grappling with the question of the king’s powers since pre-independence negotiations. Temptations to have an executive monarch have occasionally thrown the country into <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-monarch-in-lesotho-should-be-given-some-powers-but-not-extreme-powers-165914">turmoil</a>. But it is now generally accepted that executive powers must vest in the democratically elected prime minister. The monarchy is <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2225-71602020000100011">ceremonial</a>.</p>
<p>Politicians have run Lesotho into many constitutional problems, but at least voters can replace them periodically. The monarch is cherished but within a democratic system based on multi-partyism. The people of Eswatini do not have this under an absolute monarchy.</p>
<p>The usual tendency to look to Europe and elsewhere to solve problems in Africa is not always helpful. This may be an opportune moment to find <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26890401?casa_token=18Uxn8Ll5WIAAAAA:xmqDg7YoIPrBXRUs1JN-wscLp124zhjdaZdAW3oE1nnHXHO5mTbuwu7qsjNm0mV_L3QJpUF9VCpCL9ER9Ge8DkgWWqPEBH8GYF_HAQJIEVkKxYVejjs9">African solutions to African problems</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184260/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hoolo 'Nyane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lesotho has done a good job of curbing the powers of its monarch and making its electoral system inclusive.Hoolo 'Nyane, Head of Department, Public and Environmental Law Department, University of LimpopoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1796812022-05-30T14:15:11Z2022-05-30T14:15:11ZCannabis policy changes in Africa are welcome. But small producers are the losers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462493/original/file-20220511-26-a9sr7d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A farm worker picks medical cannabis flowers in Kasese, Uganda, in 2020.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Luke Dray/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cannabis is a drug crop with a <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/Assets/PubMaterials/978-1-4780-0394-6_601.pdf">long history</a> in Africa. Alongside coca and opium poppy, it has been subjected to <a href="https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-6-a&chapter=6&clang=_en">international control</a> for nearly a century. The International Opium Convention of 1925 institutionalised the international control system and extended the scope of control to cannabis.</p>
<p>In 1961 a new international <a href="https://www.incb.org/documents/Narcotic-Drugs/1961-Convention/convention_1961_en.pdf">convention</a> was adopted to replace the existing multilateral treaties for control of narcotic drugs. The prohibitionist framework it provided for control of cannabis was adopted by post-colonial African states. These official efforts succeeded in driving cannabis production underground and limiting its contribution to citizens’ livelihoods. But they <a href="https://www.unodc.org/res/wdr2021/field/WDR21_Booklet_3.pdf">failed</a> to eradicate the crop. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, many African states that persecuted citizens for cannabis related offences for years are now promoting legal cannabis production. Over the past five years 10 countries have passed laws to legalise production for medical and scientific purposes. These include <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/27/morocco-joins-growing-list-of-african-countries-to-legalize-cannabis/">Lesotho, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Uganda, Malawi, Zambia, Ghana, Eswatini, Rwanda and Morocco</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa has also legalised the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-top-court-legalises-the-private-use-of-marijuana-why-its-a-good-thing-103537">private growing</a> of cannabis plants by adults for their own personal consumption. </p>
<p>The cannabis policy liberalisation in Africa has been brought about by two main factors. One is the lobbying by local activists. Cannabis use is still criminalised in most African countries. But even in the most conservative ones there are emerging debates ultimately aimed at spurring cannabis policy reforms. </p>
<p>The other factor is the emergence of the global legal cannabis industry <a href="https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/industry-reports/cannabis-marijuana-market-100219">projected to grow to nearly US$200 billion by 2028</a>. For state authorities, policy changes are aimed at opening avenues for scarce foreign exchange revenue critically needed to boost stagnating economies.</p>
<p>But there are still policy and practical concerns requiring attention if the cannabis sector reforms are to have a positive impact on the economy and citizens’ livelihoods. These include the need to ensure participation of ordinary producers in the legal cannabis sector. This is because the emerging regulation frameworks seem to <a href="https://transformdrugs.org/blog/preventing-corporate-capture-of-emerging-cannabis-markets">favour</a> corporate businesses over smallholder farmers.</p>
<h2>Winds of change</h2>
<p>The liberalisation of the cannabis policy in Africa is primarily for production for medical and scientific purposes. Production, trade and consumption of cannabis outside of these purposes remain criminalised. The production by many smallholder farmers, who historically were custodians of the cannabis plant and knowledge, is not covered by the new regulations. It means their cannabis related livelihoods are still in contravention of the laws.</p>
<p>Among other conditions, producers must acquire a license from state authorities. There are various types of licenses and fees for cannabis manufacture, distribution and research. These can range from US$5,000 to US$50,000 in <a href="https://cannavigia.com/cannabis-country-report-zimbabwe-how-to-get-a-license">Zimbabwe</a>. In South Africa the <a href="https://gazettes.africa/gazettes/za-government-gazette-regulation-gazette-dated-2020-12-22-no-44026">gazetted fees</a> range from R9 200 (US$579.27) for an export permit to R25 200 (US$1,586.69) for the manufacture permit.</p>
<p>The highest licence fees have been reported in <a href="https://cannavigia.com/cannabis-country-report-lesotho-how-to-get-a-license-how-to-export-products-abroad">Lesotho</a> and <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202001280583.html">Uganda</a>. Here, they range from hundreds of thousands of dollars to a couple of million dollars.</p>
<p>The average farmer in these countries can’t afford these kinds of fees.</p>
<p>Additional requirements include tax clearance certificates, bank guarantees, compliance with cultivation guidelines and security guarantees. For authorities, these preconditions are designed to secure an end-product that could be easily “abused” if not properly regulated. They seem to be aimed also at ensuring that governments do not lose on tax revenues from the emerging industry. </p>
<p>However, the limited scope of legal production, the high license fees and business set-up costs and other conditions are likely to limit participation of many smallholder producers who lack resources to set up legal cannabis businesses.</p>
<h2>The emerging picture</h2>
<p>We are involved in a pan-African <a href="https://cannabisafricana.blogs.bristol.ac.uk/">research project</a> which aims to develop a deeper understanding of cannabis in Africa. We focus not only on its “traditional” uses, but on its contemporary growth as an economic cash crop, and source of livelihoods in a global context where drug policy is in flux. </p>
<p>Run jointly by the universities of Bristol and Cape Town, the project is gathering new empirical data in Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa. This will be used to examine the historical and contemporary place of cannabis in African rural and urban settings. </p>
<p>Our research also involves capturing the experiences of ordinary citizens, beyond the official narrative of medical and scientific production.</p>
<p>Our initial observations show that the risk of corporate capture of the legal cannabis industry, and exclusion of smallholder producers, is serious. Because the license fees are high, many smallholder producers cannot afford them. This leaves corporate businesses as the main holders of licences. </p>
<p>In Uganda, for instance, only one company is <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202001280583.html">currently licensed</a> by the government to produce medical cannabis. The strict regulations include a minimum capital of US$5 million and a bank guarantee. This is clearly a deterrent to most aspiring producers. </p>
<p>In Zimbabwe, the government <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-05/zimbabwe-licenses-57-cannabis-producers-as-it-eyes-export-market">licensed</a> dozens of new investors for cultivation and processing of medical cannabis in 2021. The beneficiaries are established agribusinesses and large-scale commercial farmers. </p>
<p>Similar concerns in Malawi and South Africa led small farmers to protest against the licensing process in November 2020 and April 2021. Jacob Nyirongo, the chief executive officer for the Farmers Union of Malawi, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_malawi-farmers-protest-cannabis-license-fees/6198855.html">argued</a>: </p>
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<p>The question is, if you buy a license at $10,000 what kind of market price for cannabis (must) a farmer (get) to make a profit? </p>
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<p>Other conditions attached to licenses are also obstacles for smallholder producers. For South Africa, applicants need to comply with <a href="http://webapps.daff.gov.za/AmisAdmin/upload/Final%20Draft%20from%20Communication%20-%2026-05-16.pdf">certification</a>, be registered, and provide police clearance, among other conditions. Police clearance, in particular, may affect those with past criminal records for the illegal production, possession or consumption of cannabis. </p>
<h2>Towards an inclusive cannabis future</h2>
<p>Early insights from our research show an emerging legal cannabis industry with a limited role for smallholder producers. This limits the industry’s ability to contribute to livelihoods of the poor and the majority more widely.</p>
<p>Further, the limiting of legal cannabis production to medical and scientific purposes excludes production activities of many existing smallholder producers. This perpetuates their criminalisation. It also creates a dual model where established businesses benefit from the reforms while small producers’ activities remain outlawed and suppressed.</p>
<p>Legalising cannabis production for medical purposes is all very well. But ensuring the participation of ordinary citizens and producers in the industry is the big challenge facing African states. The risk of corporate capture of the industry is a real possibility.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179681/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clemence Rusenga is a researcher on the Cannabis Africana: Drugs and Development in Africa project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Neil Carrier receives funding from the United Kingdom's Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gernot Klantschnig and Simon Howell do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ensuring the participation of ordinary citizens and producers in the industry is the big challenge facing African states.Clemence Rusenga, Research Associate, University of BristolGernot Klantschnig, Associate Professor in International Criminology, University of BristolNeil Carrier, Associate Professor in Social Anthropology, Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, University of BristolSimon Howell, Research Fellow, Global Risk Governance Programme, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1776352022-04-19T14:24:45Z2022-04-19T14:24:45ZAfrica’s relationship with India: a diplomat’s view<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456322/original/file-20220405-24-r2s4pn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Flags of India and African countries at the 2015 India Africa Friendship Summit in New Delhi.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Priyanka Parashar/Mint via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em><a href="https://www.theintlscholar.com/board-of-advisors/rajiv-bhatia">Rajiv Bhatia</a>, who represented India as the most senior diplomat to Kenya, South Africa and Lesotho for a combined seven years, has written an <a href="https://www.routledge.com/IndiaAfrica-Relations-Changing-Horizons/Bhatia/p/book/9780367489700#:%7E:text=This%20book%20explores%20the%20emergence,in%20all%20its%20critical%20dimensions.">account</a> of the relationship between his country and Africa. It comes at a time when India’s relationship with countries on the continent has been gaining momentum. This is shown by growing trade and investment, an increase in high level political engagement, and New Delhi articulating ten specific <a href="https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/30152/Prime+Ministers+address+at+Parliament+of+Uganda+during+his+State+Visit+to+Ugand">principles</a> that guide it’s engagement with Africa. Veda Vaidyanathan, who has researched Indian and Chinese contemporary engagement with various African countries, discusses what the new book adds to the understanding of this growing relationship.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the book about?</h2>
<p><em><a href="https://www.routledge.com/IndiaAfrica-Relations-Changing-Horizons/Bhatia/p/book/9780367489700#:%7E:text=This%20book%20explores%20the%20emergence,in%20all%20its%20critical%20dimensions">India Africa Relations: Changing Horizons</a></em> looks at the factors that have driven and shaped the relationship between India and Africa. The book explains how it has transformed with time, and recounts Bhatia’s own professional journey.</p>
<p>The author switches between perspectives and dimensions of the relationship - temporal and thematic, geographic and historic, anecdotal and critical.</p>
<p>He begins by providing an “optimistic-realistic evaluation” of the continent’s potential. A youthful demography, fast growing economies and proven resource wealth are grounds for optimism. He also flags issues like regional conflicts, poverty and high unemployment. He says the “world too has a responsibility to assist Africans secure their goals” and this should be based on a “respectful and empathetic attitude”.</p>
<p>Using an array of data sources, he presents a summary of key developments in the Africa-India relationship, first before and after 1947, and later from 2000 to 2019. </p>
<p>The narrative then shifts to Africa’s changing relationships with other countries and blocs. This is to drive home the point that “much of the world is far more interested in Africa today than it was 20 or even 10 years ago”. Their interests are “varied but largely common”, including security, access to natural resources, a growing market and “development of the continent’s human resources”.</p>
<h2>What fresh insights does the book offer?</h2>
<p>The author’s approach to Africa’s changing geopolitics is crucial on many counts. Scholars have largely studied the engagement of Indian actors in the region in isolation. They assume the levers that shape these relationships are largely internal. Their perspective overlooks a range of factors, particularly the impact of global events on African economies and how powers reengaging Africa are changing the status quo.</p>
<p>Bhatia’s primary aim appears to be underlining Africa’s importance to India’s foreign policy calculations. But the main questions that guide the book are these: how can New Delhi engage countries in Africa as other global actors, especially China, are stepping up their interactions in the region? And how can India-Africa relations be more comprehensive and productive?</p>
<h2>What struck you as the most interesting thing about the book?</h2>
<p>The author argues that relations “will be influenced by the larger global developments, especially the US-China relations that came under serious stress in the recent years”. Among other influences will be “the direction of the global economy once it begins to recover from the massive damage caused by COVID-19”.</p>
<p>For New Delhi, the most critical external partnership to examine closely would be China’s. Bhatia devotes an entire chapter to this, tracing the timeline and examining various aspects of this multifaceted relationship. They include summit diplomacy, trade, investments, projects under <a href="https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf">China’s Belt and Road Initiative</a>, and a growing diaspora. </p>
<p>He then presents a prudent assessment: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“instead of demonising China’s Africa policy and its implementation, the competing nations need to focus on analysing it objectively and devising a more attractive policy model for themselves.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He urges other powers to consider that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Africa needs and welcomes a multiplicity of options for partnerships. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Policymakers should consider each nation’s individual strengths and craft sustainable alternatives.</p>
<p>The book does not shy away from addressing difficult issues. Among them are the slow and inadequate implementation of previous agreements and commitments, lack of clarity in India’s Africa policy and attacks against African students in India.</p>
<h2>Who should read it and why?</h2>
<p>This book is a must-read for those interested in international affairs. But it will also be of interest to a broader audience. The insights are rooted in the reflections of an individual who has had a front row seat as the India-Africa relationship has evolved. Weaving personal impressions with the ideas of leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Kwame Nkrumah, Jawaharlal Nehru and Nelson Mandela, the author reminds the reader of the social, philosophical and cultural congruities that have guided the relationship.</p>
<p>The book places the responsibility of African growth on its leaders, people, and civil society. But he also recognises the role partners like India can play in achieving its goals. According to the author, this is crucial because the world stands to benefit from the continent’s prosperity as Africa is the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177635/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Veda Vaidyanathan is a Visiting Associate Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS), New Delhi. She was a recipient of the ICS - Harvard-Yenching Institute (ICS-HYI) Fellowship for China Studies and was also a Doctoral Fellow of the Indian Council of Social Science Research. </span></em></p>A new book places the responsibility of African growth on its leaders, people, and civil society, while also recognising the role partners like India can play in achieving its goals.Veda Vaidyanathan, Associate, Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1758562022-02-10T14:05:21Z2022-02-10T14:05:21ZSoapy plants can improve hand hygiene: southern Africa has plenty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443688/original/file-20220201-24-1dwcow1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Good hygiene practices such as disinfecting surfaces and regularly washing hands with soap and running water are important in preventing all infections.</p>
<p>The cost of commercial sanitisers and soap – and access to water – can be a problem for low-income communities. The United Nations has <a href="https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/2-5-schools-around-world-lacked-basic-handwashing-facilities-prior-covid-19-pandemic">reported</a> that about three billion people (40% of the world’s population) don’t have soap and water available in their homes. </p>
<p>In these settings, the use of soapy plant species to sanitise hands and disinfect surfaces might be an option. Modern soap has its origins in the sap of plants that contain chemicals called saponins. Chemically, the structures of saponins and of commercial soap are similar. </p>
<p>Saponins can destroy viruses and other microorganisms in the same way commercial soaps and detergents do. </p>
<p>Yet there is very little literature on the use of plants for hand hygiene. To address this, we conducted a literature review of research about saponin-rich plants from around the word with a specific focus on southern African flora. We set out to report on the occurrence and distribution, pharmacology and toxicity, mechanism of action, and overall availability of saponin-rich plants in southern Africa.</p>
<p>We compiled a <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2223-7747/10/5/842">checklist</a> of plants that are rich in saponins and easily accessible to communities in southern Africa. Some of them have been used traditionally for hygiene, and others appear to have useful properties that weren’t widely known. </p>
<p>We found research on 51 species in the region. South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Lesotho, Namibia and eSwatini were reported to contain a wealth of saponin-containing plants. Only 15 of these species had actually been reported as being used for soaps or shampoos in various communities. These include <a href="https://www.cocktailsafe.org/soap-bark-quillaja-saponaria-safety-in-cocktails.html">soap bark</a>, <a href="http://redlist.sanbi.org/species.php?species=4063-1">soap creeper</a>, <a href="http://pza.sanbi.org/pouzolzia-mixta">soap nettle</a>, <a href="https://pfaf.org/user/Plant.aspx?LatinName=Acacia+concinna">soap pod tree</a>, “<a href="http://pza.sanbi.org/dicerocaryum-senecioides">boot protectors</a>” and <a href="http://pza.sanbi.org/deinbollia-oblongifolia">dune soapberry</a>. Leaves, twigs, roots, stem barks, fruits, seeds, and flowers of these plants are rubbed or agitated in water, forming a lather, which is then used for washing, bathing, and hair shampooing. </p>
<p>We also looked for scientific data to support any antimicrobial claims about soapy plants. Numerous studies showed evidence that saponins possess potent antiviral, antibacterial, and antifungal activities. </p>
<h2>Saponins and harmful microorganisms</h2>
<p>Soap is able to detach dirt from a surface and disperse it into water, leaving the surface clean. It also has the extra property of being able to destroy microorganisms. Like commercial soap, saponins have been shown to be able to destroy microorganisms such as viruses, bacteria and some fungi. They can destroy the outer coat that protects viruses. This makes the viruses more susceptible to being denatured. Saponins in soapy plants use the same mechanism to kill bacteria and fungi. </p>
<p>Saponins are relatively non-selective in their disruption of cells. This makes them effective against a wide range of microorganisms that cause communicable diseases. </p>
<p>The extent to which microorganisms are susceptible to saponins depends on the types of saponins, and the types and structures of the targeted microorganisms. In enveloped viruses like the coronaviruses, the disease-causing proteins that are encoded by the viruses are protected by a lipid coat that makes it difficult to kill them. This is unlike the non-enveloped viruses like rotaviruses, which can be easily controlled by chemical substances because they don’t have the protective envelope.</p>
<p>But soap and saponins do work against coronaviruses. <a href="https://medicine.yale.edu/news-article/why-soap-works/">Soap</a> is made of molecules which easily bond with water at one end but avoid water at the other end. When you wash your hands with soap, the water-hating ends will try to move away from water. As they do so, they interact with the lipid coating of the coronaviruses, <a href="https://en.unesco.org/news/how-soap-kills-covid-19-hands">disrupting and destroying them</a>. Since saponins are soap, they will do the same to coronaviruses.</p>
<p>Saponins also work against bacteria and fungi. Some bacteria have an external membrane that protects their genetic material. <em>Escherichia</em> <em>coli</em>, a common disease-causing agent, is one of these bacteria. But soap can disrupt this layer, which is basically made up of lipid.</p>
<p>Soaps and saponins are also useful against fungi because keeping the skin clean will prevent the growth and spread of fungi. Soaps and saponins help with thorough cleaning. Soaps are safer than antifungal agents, which can be toxic to mammalian cells.</p>
<p>Our review suggests that the sap of soapy plants found in southern Africa could be useful as disinfectants or sanitisers. The use of plants to formulate crude antimicrobial products could increase access to hygiene and also lead to better conservation of the plants.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175856/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David R. Katerere is a trustee of PharmaConnect Africa, a nonprofit that advances access to medicines in Africa.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yvonne Kunatsa received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>Saponins from plants can destroy viruses and other microorganisms in the same way commercial soaps and detergents do.David R. Katerere, Research Platform Chair for Pharmaceutical and Biotech Advancement in Africa (PBA2), Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1740632022-01-09T08:31:04Z2022-01-09T08:31:04ZBook review: Zakes Mda’s subversive take on Lesotho’s traditions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439684/original/file-20220106-13-y7in1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Portrait of a Lesotho shepherd, Ntoaesele Mashongoane.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">JOHN WESSELS/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2019 at the Abantu Book Festival in Soweto, South African writer and artist Zakes Mda was celebrating the publication of his final novel, <em><a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/zulus-new-york/9781415210154">The Zulus of New York</a></em>, when he made a <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/entertainment/2019-12-09-mdas-new-novel-confession-caps-abantu-book-festival/">surprise announcement</a>. He had changed his mind and was writing another novel. He explained that “sometimes when you are a writer a story finds you and attacks you. It forces you to narrate it.” </p>
<p>The story is set in Lesotho, a landlocked and mountainous country neighbouring South Africa. It covers the growth of a kheleke – a wandering minstrel – and his career and the heights it is possible to reach, before tragedy engulfs and silences his accordion.</p>
<p>In <em><a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/wayfarers-hymns/9781415210826">Wayfarers’ Hymns</a></em>, the author draws on his early life in Lesotho, where he joined his father in exile, and where he later taught at the national university. This novel re-connects the author to the land and culture of <a href="https://www.wantedonline.co.za/art-design/2017-02-01-how-the-basotho-blanket-became-the-brand-identity-of-a-nation/">colourful blankets</a>, <a href="https://pan-african-music.com/en/introducing-lesothos-accordion-music/">Famo musicians</a> and feuding factions, or “musical gangsters” as academic Nokuthula Mazibuko-Msimang calls them in a recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/zakes-mda-on-his-latest-novel-set-in-lesothos-musical-gang-wars-170839">interview</a> with Mda.</p>
<h2>Subverting traditions</h2>
<p>The central character is a nameless boy-child kheleke – “the eloquent one” – who sings the praises of his sister Moliehi. Despite the abundance of compliments sung by her brother, she describes him as a lazy <em>leloabe</em> (vagabond) and <em>molelere</em> (wanderer), with the connotations of a wastrel. But as the kheleke narrates the novel, it is his viewpoint that wins over. He explains in the first line that “she was the one I sang my hymns to” and he makes her name and beauty famous.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/zakes-mda-on-his-latest-novel-set-in-lesothos-musical-gang-wars-170839">Zakes Mda on his latest novel, set in Lesotho's musical gang wars</a>
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<p>The tradition is explained thus:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A great hymn begins with the kheleke introducing himself to the world, repeating his name and his father’s, against his father’s if his father was a reprobate as men tend to be, and praising the virtues of his clan, his village and his chief.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And throughout Mda plays with this convention as the kheleke himself remains nameless, it is his “cult” (band) “of the arum-lily”, Mohalalitoe, that becomes famous. And although the kheleke sings about his father, it is a father who is missing, having died in a deep goldmine. He could not be buried among his kin in ancestral land and his spirit remains unappeased. In many ways it is the search for his father’s body that propels the action in the novel.</p>
<p>This apparently patriarchal form of music also praises the land, “even when the hymn is a lamentation. Even when the land is barren.” Before moving on to the sister: “A kheleke dwells on his sister and her unsurpassed qualities of womanhood.” Again the irony here is that the kheleke must sing about a “formidable woman in his life”, if he doesn’t have a sister, then his <em>rakhali</em> (paternal aunt) is the best he can do. </p>
<p>Most importantly, “No self-respecting kheleke sings the praises of his wife in public, lest he invites vultures to his homestead.” And yet the song the kheleke becomes famous for <em>U Ka Se Nqete</em> celebrates female polyamory, or at least the ability of women to take different sexual partners while their husbands are working in the gold mines of Johannesburg.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A bald man in a suit jacket stands in a garden smiling at the camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439686/original/file-20220106-23-109v0nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439686/original/file-20220106-23-109v0nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439686/original/file-20220106-23-109v0nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439686/original/file-20220106-23-109v0nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439686/original/file-20220106-23-109v0nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439686/original/file-20220106-23-109v0nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439686/original/file-20220106-23-109v0nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Zakes Mda.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">LEONARDO CENDAMO/Getty Images</span></span>
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<p>This song that celebrates cuckoldry becomes an unexpected hit. The duet that the kheleke creates with his girlfriend, the dancer Maleshoane, is what cements the success of the song. It’s upbeat and funny, and though the men claim to dislike it, they all sing along.</p>
<h2>Musical gangsters</h2>
<p>In the ensuing battle between rival bands, the kheleke’s Cult of the Arum Lily directly challenge The Cult of the Train, an antagonism that leads to his downfall. Unknown to him, the cults also operate illegal mining operations and, as his father’s age-mate Tau ea Khale explains, things have changed greatly since the days when “warriors were warriors and musicians were musicians”.</p>
<p>The gangs arose in 1999, escalating in 2007, when Tau ea Khale describes being in prison and hearing of “inmates sentenced to years because they killed others over music … Mosotho killing another Mosotho for a song … boys who used to look after cattle together.” It is this snapshot of Lesotho gang warfare that Mda expertly captures in this novel, though it also celebrates music, composition and creativity itself.</p>
<h2>Meditation on masculinity and femininity</h2>
<p>Mda develops a significant meditation on masculinity as <em>Wayfarers’ Hymns</em> continues the pattern of Siphiwo Mahala’s <em><a href="https://www.panmacmillan.co.za/authors/siphiwo-mahala/when-a-man-cries/9781770104075">When A Man Cries</a></em>, Thando Mgqolozana’s <em><a href="https://cassavarepublic.biz/product/a-man-who-is-not-a-man-2/">A Man Who is Not a Man</a></em>, and Masande Ntshanga’s <em><a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/reactive/9781415207192">The Reactive</a></em>, all of which consider <em>ulwaluko</em> (traditional circumcision ritual) and what it means to be a man in southern Africa (during the HIV/AIDS pandemic).</p>
<p>A continued refrain amongst the men of his band is that the kheleke is disloyal because he is not circumcised and must “graduate from an initiation school” to be a man. He responds: “All I wanted was to be a kheleke of note, playing beautiful music, appearing on television … Radio.” But he is pushed by an attack on his sister to write a song which directly challenges The Cult of the Train and therein lies his downfall.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/book-review-sindiwe-magonas-devastating-uplifting-story-of-south-african-women-166186">Book review: Sindiwe Magona's devastating, uplifting story of South African women</a>
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<p>Mda develops different notions of freedom – in performance, singing, music and mourning – by bringing back the much-loved character of Toloki from his celebrated 1995 novel <em><a href="https://www.oxford.co.za/book/9780195714982-ways-of-dying#.Ydb5sS8RpQI">Ways of Dying</a></em>. Toloki seeks more ways of mourning, away from the township and the HIV/AIDS bereavements of South Africa, with the deaths of the Famo musicians in Lesotho. Although he is a background figure in <em>Wayfarers’ Hymns</em>, Toloki provides ample comic respite from the posturing and machismo of the gang warfare. He also challenges us to rethink categories, bringing his performance of ‘grief’ to Lesotho and then juxtaposing it with his own genuine grief at losing the love of his life.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439664/original/file-20220106-15-cg5jd6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with the words 'Wayfarers' Hymns Zakes Mda' and an illustration, in greens and browns, of a man in a blanket standing on a rock looking out over hills, the moon full, an accordion and flowers filling up the page." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439664/original/file-20220106-15-cg5jd6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439664/original/file-20220106-15-cg5jd6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=940&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439664/original/file-20220106-15-cg5jd6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=940&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439664/original/file-20220106-15-cg5jd6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=940&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439664/original/file-20220106-15-cg5jd6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1182&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439664/original/file-20220106-15-cg5jd6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1182&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439664/original/file-20220106-15-cg5jd6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1182&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Umuzi</span></span>
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<p>Mda has always written strong female characters, but in <em>Wayfarers’ Hymns</em> he also classically undercuts notions of femininity by making Moliehi a woman who loves another woman, providing unexpected female khelekes and featuring female gangsters called MaRussia like Mme Mpuse. She offers her sage advice to the boy-child kheleke when he sings with her. She tells him, “One day you will be a sought-after kheleke. But never be led by your penis. That’s what has destroyed great men. Be led by the music.” The <em>Wayfarers’ Hymns</em> are songs worth listening to.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174063/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lizzy Attree works for Blake Friedmann Literary Agency, where Isobel Dixon represents Zakes Mda.</span></em></p>Set in the music wars of Lesotho, the new novel by the South African author tells of a wandering minstrel whose hit song leads to his downfall.Lizzy Attree, Adjunct Professor, Richmond American International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1708392021-11-15T14:06:13Z2021-11-15T14:06:13ZZakes Mda on his latest novel, set in Lesotho’s musical gang wars<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/430839/original/file-20211108-21-1gx3sb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A masked herdsman in Lesotho.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Edwin Remsberg/The Image Bank via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Zakes Mda is one of South Africa’s best-loved novelists – though he is also a celebrated playwright, children’s book author and an increasingly visible painter. His latest novel, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/wayfarers-hymns/9781415210826">Wayfarers’ Hymns</a>, is at once full of drama and mirth, set in Lesotho and playing out in the bloody world of famo musicians. At a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ze1piSqrasA">launch of the book</a> at the University of Pretoria, Dr Nokuthula Mazibuko-Msimang interviewed Mda about it. This is an edited transcription of that interview.</em></p>
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<p><strong>Nokuthula Mazibuko-Msimang</strong> I was intrigued that yes, you talk about the culture of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/sotho-south-sotho-or-basotho">Basotho</a> and the <a href="https://www.musicinafrica.net/magazine/musical-instruments-lesotho">instruments</a> of Basotho, but not in the way that you’ve done before, as a kind of healing salve to our colonial oppression and apartheid and so on. This is a different ballgame. Tell us a little bit about what inspired you. And about the process of writing this <a href="https://www.newframe.com/sharp-read-the-hymns-of-a-kheleke/">book about musical gangsters</a>, really.</p>
<p><strong>Zakes Mda</strong> This book is centred around <a href="https://www.musicinafrica.net/magazine/famo-music-lesotho">famo music</a>. Which is a genre of music in Lesotho. Very popular there, predominantly the instrument there is the accordion, it used to be the concertina before. So Basothos have taken the concertina and the accordion and turned them into Sesotho traditional instruments. And it’s a kind of music that’s full of poetry. And the poetry is known as hymns, <em>difela</em>, but these are secular hymns, they are not religious hymns. And so that is why the title is <em>Wayfarers’ Hymns</em>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/430988/original/file-20211109-19-ok7pso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with the title Wayfarers' Hymns and an illustration in blues and browns of a man in a blanket looking out over snow capped mountains beneath a full moon and an accordion , sheep and wild lilies also featured." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/430988/original/file-20211109-19-ok7pso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/430988/original/file-20211109-19-ok7pso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=941&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/430988/original/file-20211109-19-ok7pso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=941&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/430988/original/file-20211109-19-ok7pso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=941&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/430988/original/file-20211109-19-ok7pso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1182&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/430988/original/file-20211109-19-ok7pso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1182&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/430988/original/file-20211109-19-ok7pso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1182&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Penguin Random House</span></span>
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<p>Wayfarers are travellers. The title comes from the Sesotho name of the genre, it’s <em>difela tsa batsamai</em>, which means the hymns of those who traverse the land … Now, I grew up knowing this music because I grew up in Lesotho. But it’s only recently that I learned new things about it, which are <a href="https://chimurengachronic.co.za/accordion-cowboys/">recent developments</a>, gang wars, the wars, amongst the <a href="https://www.thereporter.co.ls/2021/08/15/famo-gang-violence-leads-to-internal-displacement/">gangs</a> that are led by musicians themselves. </p>
<p>So these musicians have evolved into gang leaders. And every weekend in <a href="https://www.lesotho-info.co.za/country/province/29/mafeteng">Mafeteng</a>, which is a district in Lesotho, there are their funerals of musicians who have died in these wars, of their followers, of the chorus boys and so on. Fighting for territory, fighting for followers, but also fighting for <a href="https://www.mineralscouncil.org.za/work/illegal-mining">illegal mining</a>. </p>
<p>The illegal mining that happens here in Gauteng, in Welkom and so on, is actually led by the musicians, the leaders of these gangs. So I was fascinated to hear of this because I’ve never read about it, even in the newspapers. Sometimes you will hear that four <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/04/30/the-plight-of-south-africa-s-zama-zama-illegal-miners//"><em>zama zamas</em></a>, by which they mean the illegal miners, were found dead on the roadside or something like that. And they never dig deeper, who were they, why were they there? And then right into the fact that the mining operations, the illegal mining operations are actually run by syndicates of Basotho musicians. They are fighting over these territories as well.</p>
<p>And indeed, when you listen to the music, I mean, it’s beautiful, it’s healing, with wonderful poetry, but it engenders a lot of death. You know, which is a contradiction in terms. I think that’s what fascinated me to write a novel set in this community of famo music, examining the culture that gave birth to it, the culture of the old <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200611080910.html">MaRussia gangs</a>, the Russian gangs of the 50s. And then up to the contemporary musicians, because you see, you trace the ancestry of the current famo musicians to those early MaRussia gangs.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/virtual-exhibition-breathes-life-into-lesothos-musical-tradition-and-clay-art-167315">Virtual exhibition breathes life into Lesotho's musical tradition and clay art</a>
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<p><strong>Nokuthula Mazibuko-Msimang:</strong> Scholars of African literature will know about the history of the MaRussia. And I grew up in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/soweto-johannesburg">Soweto</a>, in Pimville. So MaRussia were really big in Pimville. We all knew even as children, that, you know, when you see a Mosotho with a blanket … It might be an <a href="https://theconversation.com/worlds-deadliest-inventor-mikhail-kalashnikov-and-his-ak-47-126253">AK47</a> under the blanket.</p>
<p><strong>Zakes Mda:</strong> We know <em>difela</em>, the wayfarers hymns, as melodic, it’s so deceptively beautiful and calm, you know, but there is this kind of underbelly. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ze1piSqrasA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Pretoria launch of Wayfarers’ Hymns.</span></figcaption>
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<p><strong>Nokuthula Mazibuko-Msimang:</strong> And very elegantly done. The way you balance dramatic and sometimes very difficult issues, to do with race, to do with land, to do with economic freedom, but it’s tempered with humour. But specifically in this book, the issue of the toxic masculinities, the whole persona of the mine worker, you know, <em>o sebetsa dimaineng</em> don’t be a layabout, go and be a man and work in the mines, and the cost of that to the individuals and to the community. Talk to us about that, because in the past, you’ve spoken about strong women, but now you seem to be shining a light more on the many layers of masculinities.</p>
<p><strong>Zakes Mda:</strong> Yes. But even then, I still talk about strong women. But even there, it is not something that is preplanned, that this woman has to be strong, this man has to be toxic, and so on. The story takes me there. And the story is informed by the culture of the setting. The strong women don’t come from my imagination … “Oh, I wish there were strong women in the world, okay, let me create them in my fiction.” It is because in the environment that I’m writing about, they are there. In many instances, they’re the people who drive life in those environments. And therefore, they drive my story. The toxic environment of the men, in the setting of the wayfarers, this is one novel which is much more informed by the reality, than any other of my novels. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431780/original/file-20211113-15-slarr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a man in a denim shirt with a colourful scarf and a hat smiles and gestures with his hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431780/original/file-20211113-15-slarr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431780/original/file-20211113-15-slarr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431780/original/file-20211113-15-slarr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431780/original/file-20211113-15-slarr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431780/original/file-20211113-15-slarr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431780/original/file-20211113-15-slarr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431780/original/file-20211113-15-slarr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Zakes Mda.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joanne Olivier/Courtesy Penguin Random House</span></span>
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<p>The story itself is told a lot through the lyrics of their songs, and of their poetry, and those lyrics are full of that toxic masculinity that you are talking about. Because they are lyrics of war, and they challenge one another. And they do in Sesotho what is known as <em>ho kobisa</em> which means, you know, talking obliquely about each other in an insulting way, even without directly mentioning the names. But when you hear the song, you know that song is about me. And I’m going back to kill those people.</p>
<p><strong>Nokuthula Mazibuko-Msimang:</strong> I’ve got a question from one of the people watching: what is the one thing Prof Mda would like to see his books do in African communities? What kind of impact does he hope to achieve?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/this-award-winning-lesotho-film-also-has-social-justice-at-heart-154204">This award-winning Lesotho film also has social justice at heart</a>
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<p><strong>Zakes Mda:</strong> Well, like every writer in the world, you hope that your books will be read, that’s the main reason you write them. And first and foremost, you want them to entertain, because that’s what the intention is. That’s why it is a novel and not a pamphlet of ideas. It’s a novel because storytelling in itself is entertaining and therefore highly digestible and you transmit knowledge through a medium that gives you joy, just the joy of the stories itself … </p>
<p>But of course, there is no writer in the world who will be loved by everybody. There will be those who will love your work. There will be others who will say it’s so-so, it’s mediocre, but okay. And there are others who say, this is awful. That’s what we live with as artists in all the arts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170839/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nokuthula Mazibuko Msimang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lesotho’s famo music is known for the use of accordions - and gang violence. In Wayfarers’ Hymns, Zakes Mda explores this tradition.Nokuthula Mazibuko Msimang, Artist in Residency, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1704692021-11-11T14:44:44Z2021-11-11T14:44:44ZSouth Africa’s apartheid regime manipulated borders. Today, the effects linger<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428766/original/file-20211027-23-1mpzjqd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Elizabeth Dlamini at her curio stall in the Ezulwini Valley near Mbabane, eSwatini. The kingdom's economy is dependent on its larger neightbour, South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/John Hrusha</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The issue of land, especially its redistribution, remains <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/05/land-reform-south-africa-election/586900/">contentious</a> in South Africa 27 years after the formal end of apartheid. Land redistribution was promised at the end of apartheid. The failure of the African National Congress (ANC) government to do so is emblematic of its failure to fundamentally transform the country. </p>
<p>Yet, dispossession of land is a historically rooted problem. The <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/natives-land-act-1913">Land Act of 1913</a> forbade black ownership of land in roughly 93% of the country (amended in 1936 to 87%). In the 1960s and 1970s, the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> regime forcibly removed millions of black South Africans from their homes, dumping them in squalid conditions in the so-called <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/homelands">bantustans</a>. </p>
<p>The apartheid-created bantustans, or “homelands”, were 10 undeveloped territories the regime carved out for particular ethnic groups. These territories’ internal borders have disappeared from the map. But, for people living in them, the lack of opportunities that typified their lives during apartheid remains largely the same today.</p>
<p>In addition to the bantustans, two micro-states existed within the borders of South Africa: <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/lesotho">Lesotho</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/eswatini-formerly-swaziland">Swaziland</a> (today called eSwatini). The coexistence of these “legitimate” states – they were <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/growth-in-un-membership">recognised</a> by the United Nations – cheek by jowl with the bantustans challenged the meanings of state recognition and sovereignty.</p>
<p>Today, the governments and residents of both Lesotho and eSwatini still lay claim to some of South Africa’s land. What residents of former “homelands” and the two states have in common are limited government services and few job prospects. This has happened because residents of all these places have historically been denied the freedom to seek employment in South Africa’s best jobs. This was done through <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23271564">job reservation for whites</a>, passport requirements and pass laws that restricted the movement of black people. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2021.1982264?journalCode=cjss20">journal article</a> examined the history of border claims by Lesotho and Swaziland, as well as internal boundary changes the South African apartheid government made as it tried to implement the bantustan system. This showed how policymakers during apartheid attempted to manipulate these borders for strategic gain.</p>
<p>Borders are a socially constructed phenomenon. They are hardly immutable, as the <a href="https://merip.org/2012/03/the-sudan-split/">splitting of Sudan in 2011</a> showed. But, to the residents of what used to be South Africa’s “homelands”, as well as Lesotho and eSwatini, former borders still stand as a barrier. Passports are required for citizens of the two countries. Former homelands residents have built lives and own houses in these distant and under-serviced places. Residents remain trapped: both by decisions taken during apartheid and by the inflexibility of modern states and decision makers.</p>
<p>This research builds on the literature of the last decade that has finally started to tackle the continuing legacy of the bantustans on the lives of millions of South Africans. Additionally, we want to help refocus attention on Lesotho and eSwatini, which have been relatively ignored by scholars since the fall of apartheid. </p>
<p>By studying literature on these sites, scholars will be able to examine southern Africa as an interconnected regional economy, rather than a series of discrete national economies. This will highlight the historical roots of continued regional inequities.</p>
<h2>Strategic choices</h2>
<p>Our article examines the possibility of territorial transfer and border adjustments in the 1970s and 1980s. Then, South Africa was pushing for international recognition for the bantustans in order to generate a sense of legitimacy for the apartheid project.</p>
<p>It focused on getting its most vulnerable regional neighbours – Lesotho and Swaziland – to recognise the bantustans, whether formally via diplomatic recognition or in everyday relations on mundane matters like border control. </p>
<p>In trying to force its neighbours’ hands, South Africa proposed the possibility of making good on claims on South African land made by Lesotho and Swaziland dating back to the 19th century. Proposals to transfer land caused leaders on all sides to make difficult decisions that pitted national interests against global geopolitics. All too often, borderlands residents paid the price for disputes over sovereignty. This position of vulnerability continues today.</p>
<p>We examined a variety of records, including South African and United Kingdom archival sources, as well as contemporary reports on potential land transfers. </p>
<p>We focused on the ideas of land transfer and border adjustments because they are emotive issues for residents. They also signal state priorities. The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0305707042000215383">transfer</a> of Glen Grey and Herschel districts from the Ciskei to the Transkei “homelands” in 1975, for instance, shows that the apartheid regime made land concessions to further strategic goals.</p>
<p>South Africa approved the transfer to convince Transkei’s leader <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/kaiser-daliwonga-matanzima">Kaiser Matanzima</a> to declare “independence”. On the other hand, while demanding back the “conquered territory” (portions of South Africa’s Free State province taken by Afrikaner settlers in the 19th century), the leaders of Lesotho were unwilling to take on the Basotho bantustan of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Qwaqwa">Qwaqwa</a> (offered by South Africa) because it was not the whole conquered territory, and it would have meant recognising apartheid.</p>
<p>Lesotho’s leaders also calculated that international aid received from its status as a “front line state” – neighbouring states <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-3-historical-lesotho">harbouring South Africans fighting against apartheid</a> – was more valuable than a <a href="https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/4134/1/John_Bardill_-_Destabilization%2C_The_Lesotho_case.pdf">partial return</a> of the conquered territory.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/king-sobhuza-ii-1899-1982">Swaziland’s King Sobhuza II</a>, meanwhile, signed a deal in 1982 that would have enlarged the Swazi kingdom by incorporating <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/kangwane">KaNgwane</a>, the area that had been designated as a bantustan for Swazi-speaking South Africans. In exchange, Sobhuza and the Swazi state would take on as citizens every Swazi-speaking person in South Africa. And, in a secret pact, they would expel the then-banned liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), from its forward bases in the kingdom.</p>
<p>KaNgwane leaders rejected the deal. The KwaZulu administration, which would have lost its Ingwavuma District as well under the deal, sued in court to have it declared void. And so, the deal gradually fell apart and was never consummated.</p>
<p>These examples show that while international borders may seem fixed, they were negotiable for the right price in southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. It’s also clear that Lesotho would not, and Swaziland could not, take the apartheid state’s border deals. This shows the important role internal pressure and international aid played in influencing border changes. </p>
<h2>Continued disadvantages</h2>
<p>These cases also show how residents of the bantustans and small regional states paid the price for border and boundary disputes. Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana all faced an increased <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/south-african-defence-force-sadf-raid-maseru-effort-kill-suspected-members-african">military threat</a> from the apartheid regime.</p>
<p>Even after the fall of apartheid in 1994, borderlands occupants continue to face greater difficulty in crossing borders to access <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2021/03/border-wars">work</a>, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-02-14-swazi-parents-in-matric-panic/">school</a> and <a href="https://samponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Acrobat26.pdf">services</a>. </p>
<p>The challenge for the region is better integration to allow for a more just and humane border policy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170469/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>International borders were negotiable for the right price. What residents of former ‘homelands’ and of Lesotho and eSwatini have in common now are limited government services and few job prospects.John Aerni-Flessner, Associate Professor of African History, Michigan State UniversityChitja Twala, Associate Professor of History, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1668532021-09-16T14:33:43Z2021-09-16T14:33:43ZBreastfeeding trends show most developing countries may miss global nutrition targets<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419959/original/file-20210908-22-8w3xm0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Exclusive breastfeeding in the first six months makes more difference to a baby's health and survival than any other intervention.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Exclusive breastfeeding, the practice of giving only breast milk (no other food or water), is the ideal for an infant’s first six months. Breast milk <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/breastfeeding#tab=tab_1">contains all the essential nutrients</a> an infant needs at this stage.</p>
<p>Research has illuminated the longer-term health benefits of exclusive breastfeeding for the mother and child. These benefits include <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/breastfeeding#tab=tab_1">reducing the risk of overweight and obesity</a> in childhood and adolescence and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3929058/">certain noncommunicable diseases later in life</a> and enhancing human capital in adulthood. Additionally, breastfeeding <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2930884/">reduces the risk</a> of breast and ovarian cancers, type 2 diabetes and high blood pressure among mothers. </p>
<p>These are just a few of the benefits of exclusive breastfeeding. Overall, it makes <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/infant-and-young-child-feeding">more difference to a baby’s health and survival than any other intervention</a>. That’s the reason why the World Health Organisation (WHO) includes it as a <a href="https://globalhandwashing.org/resources/whounicef-global-action-plan-for-pneumonia-and-diarrhoea-gappd">proven protective intervention</a> in the Global Action Plan for Pneumonia and Diarrhoea.</p>
<p>The WHO initially set a global target of 50% prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding <a href="https://apps.who.int/nutrition/publications/globaltargets2025_policybrief_breastfeeding/en/index.html">by 2025</a>. Recently it was updated to at least <a href="https://www.who.int/nutrition/global-target-2025/discussion-paper-extension-targets-2030.pdf?ua=1">70% prevalence by 2030</a>. It means that every member country is expected to achieve an exclusive breastfeeding prevalence of at least 70% by the end of 2030. </p>
<p>Previous research has shown that the proportion of exclusively breastfed children <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30752-2/fulltext">remains low</a> in many lower and middle-income countries, however. </p>
<p>As part of the <a href="http://www.healthdata.org/gbd/2019">Global Burden of Disease study</a>, my colleagues and I recently <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-021-01108-6">published</a> our analysis of data covering two decades (2000-2018) from 94 low- and middle-income countries. We examined the trends and prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding and projected the performance of countries in relation to WHO targets. This type of analysis can help countries formulate the necessary policies and interventions to promote breastfeeding practices.</p>
<h2>Findings from our study</h2>
<p>Total prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding increased (27% to 39%) across all countries during the study period (2000-2018). But we found significant variations between countries and within regions. This suggests intra-regional inequalities that need attention from leaders.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/malnutrition-among-children-is-rife-in-nigeria-what-must-be-done-164496">Malnutrition among children is rife in Nigeria. What must be done</a>
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<p>Countries included in the study made substantial progress. For example, 57 of the 94 countries had an aggregate exclusive breastfeeding practice level of less than 30% in half of their basic administrative units (referred to in this study as provinces) in 2000. But by 2018, exclusive breastfeeding prevalence in some of these countries (8) rose closer to 50%, with at least 45% exclusive breastfeeding levels in most provinces. Similarly, 34 countries had at least one province recording more than a 45% increase in exclusive breastfeeding prevalence by the end of 2018.</p>
<p>Of the African countries, Chad and Somalia had the highest rates of annualised decline in exclusive breastfeeding practices during the study period. </p>
<h2>Progress towards the 70% target</h2>
<p>To estimate future prevalence, we assumed that current trends would continue. We first projected based on the initial target of 25% by 2025, followed by the updated target of at least 70% by 2030. In general, exclusive breastfeeding practices across the countries are expected to increase from 39% in 2018 to 43% by 2025. The practice level will increase to 45% by the end of the new targeted period of 2030. Although this is positive progress, it falls short of the 70% goal. </p>
<p>Our analysis projected six countries – Burundi, Cambodia, Lesotho, Peru, Rwanda and Sierra Leone – to meet 70% of exclusive breastfeeding prevalence by 2030. Eighty-eight of 94 countries are unlikely to meet the global nutrition target on exclusive breastfeeding by 2030. Only three countries (Burundi, Lesotho and Rwanda) are predicted to meet this target in all their sub-national level units (provinces and districts). </p>
<h2>Reasons for low rates of exclusive breastfeeding</h2>
<p>Several reasons may account for the poor performance of countries towards the goal. They include but are not limited to:</p>
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<li><p>manipulative <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0379572115602174">marketing or promotion</a> of breast-milk substitutes</p></li>
<li><p>lack of <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/3/5/e001032.abstract">workplace support</a> for optimal breastfeeding practices </p></li>
<li><p>lack of attendance at <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/public-health-nutrition/article/addressing-barriers-to-exclusive-breastfeeding-in-low-and-middleincome-countries-a-systematic-review-and-programmatic-implications/53EBA65F5D58D16E3E4D32E0FCFA938B">antenatal care</a></p></li>
<li><p>lack of skilled <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/public-health-nutrition/article/addressing-barriers-to-exclusive-breastfeeding-in-low-and-middleincome-countries-a-systematic-review-and-programmatic-implications/53EBA65F5D58D16E3E4D32E0FCFA938B">lactation support or breastfeeding counselling</a> in health facilities </p></li>
<li><p>societal or cultural <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/public-health-nutrition/article/addressing-barriers-to-exclusive-breastfeeding-in-low-and-middleincome-countries-a-systematic-review-and-programmatic-implications/53EBA65F5D58D16E3E4D32E0FCFA938B">beliefs</a> favouring mixed feeding.</p></li>
</ul>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-missing-in-south-africas-strategy-to-get-breastfeeding-levels-up-165548">What's missing in South Africa's strategy to get breastfeeding levels up</a>
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</em>
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<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Breastfeeding requires a lot of effort from mothers and support from wider networks, including their families, communities, workplaces, health systems and government leadership. </p>
<p>Advocacy at global, national and sub-national levels is critical and must be pursued by national and sub-national governments. For example, the global breastfeeding <a href="https://www.k4health.org/toolkits/breastfeeding-advocacy-toolkit">advocacy toolkit</a> outlines seven key policy actions to increase breastfeeding practices. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>increasing funding to support exclusive breastfeeding and continued breastfeeding up to 2 years</p></li>
<li><p>fully adopting and monitoring the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes</p></li>
<li><p>enacting workplace breastfeeding policies and paid family leave</p></li>
<li><p>implementing the baby-friendly hospitals’ ten steps to successful breastfeeding</p></li>
<li><p>improving access to skilled breastfeeding counselling in health facilities </p></li>
<li><p>strengthening links between health facilities and communities to support breastfeeding</p></li>
<li><p>strengthening monitoring systems to track progress. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These documented strategies can aid policy-makers in monitoring the success of breastfeeding policy and programme investments.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/community-initiative-keeps-kenyan-women-breastfeeding-exclusively-for-longer-165177">Community initiative keeps Kenyan women breastfeeding exclusively for longer</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>In conclusion, our study found that only six of the 94 low and middle income countries are on course to meet the WHO target of at least 70% exclusive breastfeeding prevalence by 2030. That means that 94% of the countries included in our study are unlikely to meet the target. This projected poor performance calls for deliberate efforts to promote exclusive breastfeeding for better child health and well-being. Robust policy interventions may still make it possible for some of these low and middle income states to achieve the target by 2030.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166853/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The original research of this paper was supported by Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation grant (OPP1132415) to the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation, University of Washington, USA. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
The author of the present paper, Dr Dickson Amugsi, who works with the African Population and Health Research Center has no conflict of interest to declare.
</span></em></p>Prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding has increased across all countries but few are likely to meet the 2030 goal of 70%.Dr Dickson Amugsi, Associate Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1659142021-08-24T14:16:00Z2021-08-24T14:16:00ZThe monarch in Lesotho should be given some powers: but not extreme powers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417444/original/file-20210823-23-pqrvtj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">King Letsie III of Lesotho. Frustration with politicians has led to a rise in popularity of the monarchy in recent times.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> CChris Jackson via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The kingdom of Lesotho has been marked by waves of <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/6196/Khabele%20Matlosa.pdf;sequence=1">political instability</a> since independence from Britain in 1966. This has manifested in several forms – such as coups, mutinies, electoral disputes, forced exile of political opponents and assassinations. The most recent wave of instability, which necessitated the current long-running facilitation by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), was from <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/appraising-the-efficacy-of-sadc-in-resolving-the-2014-lesotho-conflict/">2014 to 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Now the country is discussing wide-ranging <a href="https://www.gov.ls/reforms/">constitutional reforms</a> with the aim of achieving lasting peace and stability. The reforms are locally led by the <a href="https://www.ls.undp.org/content/lesotho/en/home/news-centre/articles/The-Lesotho-National-Reforms-Bill-to-safeguarding-and-insulate-Lesotho-Reforms-Process-passed.html">National Reforms Authority</a> – a statutory body comprising several stakeholders such as political parties, government, civil society and other formations.</p>
<p>The reform process dates back to 2012 but gained momentum in 2015 as a result of the strong recommendation of the <a href="https://www.gov.ls/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/phumaphi-report_201602081514.pdf">SADC Commission of Inquiry</a> into the assassination of the former army commander, Lieutenant General Maaparankoe Mahao. There are <a href="https://www.gov.ls/reforms-forum-achieves-goal/">seven themes</a> to the reform programme. They entail a review of the constitution, parliament, public service, justice, security, economic and media. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lesothos-new-leader-faces-enormous-hurdles-ensuring-peace-and-political-stability-139320">Lesotho's new leader faces enormous hurdles ensuring peace and political stability</a>
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<p>The reform process has once again raised the perennial question of the place of the monarch in the constitutional design. At present it’s mostly a ceremonial role. But recently there’s been a <a href="https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ad413-basotho_endorse_greater_role_for_traditional_leaders-afrobarometer_dispa_B4YDfRj.pdf">rise in popularity</a> of traditional leadership, and the monarch in particular, amid growing frustration with the elected leadership.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.ls/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/EXPERT-REPORT-OF-CONSTITUTUIONAL-REFORMSFINAL-23-OCT-19.pdf">citizens’ voices</a> on the reforms suggest that people want the monarch to have more power - including the control of the army. This is a change from earlier <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/lwati/article/view/57490">trends</a>. </p>
<p>The reforms are a wholesale enterprise to review all the institutions in Lesotho, including the institution of the monarch. But, the extent to which the reforms can overhaul the entire design is a matter of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00083968.2020.1834418?journalCode=rcas20">intense discourse</a>. </p>
<h2>Traditional leadership</h2>
<p>After independence from Britain <a href="https://books.google.co.ls/books?hl=en&lr=&id=B2TWVN92hYYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Independence+of+Lesotho&ots=iQftFOeTWM&sig=OkpQYBbasG3b6S--auSdyiOa4pY&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Independence%20of%20Lesotho&f=false">in 1966</a>, there was a steady decline in the power of traditional leadership in Lesotho. The powers of traditional leaders on key matters such as land allocation and dispensing of justice all dissipated. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/dejure/v53/11.pdf">1993 constitution</a> took away the little powers that the king had in terms of the 1966 constitution. He is now expected to act “on the advice” of the prime minister, cabinet or <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lesotho_2011.pdf?lang=en">Council of State</a>. The real political power has drifted, almost entirely, to the cabinet and the prime minister in particular. </p>
<p>But not everyone wants <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41231177.pdf?casa_token=G5L71YENm8sAAAAA:8JmPmKVKo1g7xlmn4XOluKUkVpzX78HN6d5561OdxIFeKsBI_JD8NPjkBx44vnWheCr97hFeDxu8tBQpnuthKu4p83JRG8XwB_l7nnv-Fbap96Y9n8E">the total abolition</a> of traditional leadership in Lesotho. The resilience of the monarch is arguably based on <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/112/448/353/124493">two pillars</a>. Firstly, the institution is still culturally embedded in the psyche of the society. Therefore, it still enjoys legitimacy. Secondly, the failure of democracy has led people to hope that other forms of government, like monarchism, can offer a better alternative. </p>
<h2>Failed democracy</h2>
<p>Lesotho’s constitutional democracy has not lived up to its lofty promises. Those who were chosen to represent the people have not performed any better <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC46008?casa_token=Jy412EVkS4MAAAAA:E-lGNAyej1APF-OZOTSpMZI2lu0FqeWAyYMCqcy7qVPw05cFNyHHXbGcLoTKql28_ddV3GMwW7X8Bg">than the pre-existing traditional institutions</a>. The country’s <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lesotho/overview">grinding poverty</a> and <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE14.2Weisfelder.pdf">political instability</a> continue.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499">South Africa's efforts to stabilise Lesotho have failed. Less intervention may be more effective</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Lesotho’s Auditor General always expresses <a href="http://www.auditgen.org.ls/images/OAG_Documents/AUDIT_CERTIFICATE_2016.pdf">disclaimer or adverse opinions</a> on government’s annual financial statements because of embezzlement and misappropriation, among other causes. Access to public office has been a <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/ldr-2018-0025/html">licence to loot state resources</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/lesotho-exiled-opposition-wants-sadc-intervention">torment political opponents</a>. </p>
<p>When citizens have an opportunity to rank politicians in surveys, they <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad413-citizens-endorse-traditional-leaders-see-greater-role-contemporary-lesotho">show dissatisfaction</a>. </p>
<p>The recent rise in the popularity of traditional leadership is not due to its achievements but to the failure of democratically elected leadership.</p>
<h2>Power balance</h2>
<p>In view of this resurgence in the popularity of the monarch, the powers of the monarch in the constitution may change somewhat. That is if the reforms are genuinely consultative. </p>
<p>There is not necessarily anything inherently wrong with giving power to the monarch in a system based on the constitutional monarchy. It may even enhance the constitution when power is balanced between the monarch and liberal politicians. That will build in checks and balances.</p>
<p>But restoring some powers to the monarch should be considered extremely carefully. A monarch with absolute powers is just as dangerous as self-serving politicians in a democracy. </p>
<p>Fortunately, the current constitutional reform process in Lesotho happens against the backdrop of <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/pro-democracy-protests-continue-rock-eswatini">pro-democracy demonstrations</a> in eSwatini – the southern African region’s only absolute monarchy. </p>
<p>In eSwatini the king wields all the power and there is no political participation of other political groups. The king has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02500167.2014.974639">monopolised the economy</a> too. </p>
<p>The frustration with politicians among Basotho should not evoke the decision to discard democracy completely. Democracy - the ability to choose public representatives and hold them to account - is still an <a href="https://books.google.co.ls/books?hl=en&lr=&id=VNez0rhiE44C&oi=fnd&pg=PA26&dq=democracy+and+elections&ots=vIflLnL7Yq&sig=OvWNmPV5GLDB484LG_fGpTLmjyg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=democracy%20and%20elections&f=false">essential principle of constitutionalism</a>. It should prevail over heredity. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pasha-86-why-its-wrong-to-be-pessimistic-about-democracy-in-africa-149927">Pasha 86: Why it's wrong to be pessimistic about democracy in Africa</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In a constitutional democracy, no single institution must wield untrammelled powers, even an elected one. The problem with Lesotho’s 1993 constitution is that it gives the prime minister near-absolute powers. The most brazen consequence has been the abuse of power to control the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2020.1749246">army</a>. For years, politicians have used the army to stoke <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/lesotho-exiled-opposition-wants-sadc-intervention">unrest and persecute opponents</a>.</p>
<h2>Time to talk about it</h2>
<p>The conversation about the place of the king in Lesotho’s constitution is timely. The monarch’s lack of power has not worked for constitutional development in the country.</p>
<p>The monarchy is embedded in society but has no significant role. This is counter-intuitive and costly. Taxpayers foot a hefty bill for an institution that has no significant role in checking on the excesses of elected politicians. </p>
<p>The monarch must be given some powers, but not extreme powers. That would equally harm efforts to consolidate democracy. Reformers must strike a balance between the principle of democracy and the doctrine of checks and balances.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165914/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hoolo 'Nyane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A monarch with absolute powers is just as dangerous as self-serving politicians in a democracy.Hoolo 'Nyane, Head of Department, Public and Environmental Law Department, University of LimpopoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1647022021-07-20T14:42:42Z2021-07-20T14:42:42ZThe spirit, life and art of Tsepo Tshola, pastor of South African pop<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411835/original/file-20210719-15-sru9ci.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tsepo Tshola during the memorial service of Hugh Masekela in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Frennie Shivambu/Gallo Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>I grieve to start this way. No sooner had I struggled to find some means to say my goodbyes to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-magnificent-mabi-thobejane-master-south-african-drummer-162231">Mabi Thobejane</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/steve-kekana-an-80s-south-african-pop-star-and-much-more-164141">Steve Kekana</a>, than South African music lost singer and composer <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-village-pope-has-passed-remembering-tsepo-tshola-lesothos-musical-giant-164650">Tsepo Tshola</a>. </p>
<p>These three masters of the nation’s musical soul were famous, but not celebrities. Because they never acted like that. Complex personalities and talents, they all possessed that son-of-the-soil joviality that made them ever accessible and “simple” in the reverent way South Africans use that adjective. </p>
<p>I remember, in 1978, during one of my many research tours in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Lesotho">Lesotho</a>, a mountainous kingdom encircled by South Africa, I was hanging with the brilliant guitarist and composer <a href="https://sisgwenjazz.wordpress.com/2018/07/10/frank-leepa-biography-brutal-history-personal-beefs-and-brilliant-music/">Frank Leepa</a>, drummers Moss Nkofo and the one and only Black Jesus (passing around the herb), and Tsepo, in a ramshackle old storefront across from Maseru Market.</p>
<p>They were Uhuru Band back then, and flushed with the success of their first hit song, simply entitled <em>Africa</em>. The song merely praises and celebrates the mother continent, yet so repressive was South Africa’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> regime that the band was banned from performing there. Their manager, Peter Schneider, pondered what to do. Shuffle the personnel a bit and change their name, I shrugged. And so eventually did they re-emerge as <a href="https://www.musicinafrica.net/magazine/ode-sankomota">Sankomota</a> – Lesotho’s most famous Afro-fusion pop ensemble. </p>
<p>Tsepo would go on to bridge Lesotho and South Africa in a time of political tumult. What drove his life and his music would be his fierce sense of belonging to both nations as one.</p>
<h2>The life</h2>
<p>He was born in 1953 in the Berea district of western Lesotho, in the “one-street” but scenic town of Teyateyaneng or TY. Tsepo, however, had other inspirations for his musical vocation than the late-night dances at TY’s famous Blue Mountain Inn. </p>
<p>His father Mokoteli was a pastor with the African Methodist Episcopal <a href="https://www.ame-church.com/our-church/our-history/">Church</a>, and both the Reverend Tshola and his wife MaLimpho were stalwarts of the double vocal quartet the Vertical 8. Tsepo always emphasised this church as his musical alma mater, with its liturgical roots in African-American hymnody (the singing or composition of hymns). </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411925/original/file-20210719-19-15tncr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="On a live music stage, a balding man in a tunic with cloth over his shoulder holds a walking stick. He is bathed in blue and silver stage light." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411925/original/file-20210719-19-15tncr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411925/original/file-20210719-19-15tncr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411925/original/file-20210719-19-15tncr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411925/original/file-20210719-19-15tncr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411925/original/file-20210719-19-15tncr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411925/original/file-20210719-19-15tncr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411925/original/file-20210719-19-15tncr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Tsepo Tshola performs at a jazz festival in South Africa, 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vathiswa Ruselo/Sowetan/Gallo Images</span></span>
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<p>By 1970 he had already joined Leepa, and they would form Uhuru in 1975. In the late 1970s, now as <a href="https://shifty.co.za/records/sankomota/">Sankomota</a>, they were the house band at Maseru’s Victoria Hotel, entertaining luminaries such as <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/miriam-makeba">Miriam Makeba</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/remembering-hugh-masekela-the-horn-player-with-a-shrewd-ear-for-music-of-the-day-86414">Hugh Masekela</a>, exiled from South Africa by their politics.</p>
<p>1983 was their breakout year, with South African producer Lloyd Ross of <a href="https://shifty.co.za/records/shifty-story/">Shifty Records</a> recording their first album, <a href="https://shifty.co.za/records/sankomota/"><em>Sankomota</em></a>, and the release of Leepa’s hit composition <a href="https://www.discogs.com/Hugh-Masekela-Pula-Ea-Na/release/2420893"><em>It’s Raining</em></a>. With Masekela, Tsepo toured southern Africa and ventured to London, where the rest of Sankomota joined him in 1985. </p>
<p>Returning from London as Nelson Mandela’s release from prison and the end of white minority rule approached, Tsepo then joined Masekela for his epochal homecoming <em>Sekunjalo</em> tour of South Africa in 1991. Masekela was stunned by the massive adulation with which he was greeted by audiences (including me) that he feared had forgotten him. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-village-pope-has-passed-remembering-tsepo-tshola-lesothos-musical-giant-164650">The Village Pope has passed: remembering Tsepo Tshola, Lesotho's musical giant</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Tsepo seized the opportunity to begin what would be his legendary solo career, one that would last until his heartrending departure on 15 July 2021. Collaborating and leading the vocals for countless top artists and ensembles, his gravelly “Louis Armstrong” baritone would drive gospel, traditional and pop songs in Sesotho and under the name The Village Pope.</p>
<h2>The spirit</h2>
<p>The intertwining of inner spirit, life and art in Tsepo Tshola’s odyssey cannot be overemphasised. Let me illustrate this through the songs. </p>
<p>Tsepo was astonishingly prolific, and he continued composing, recording and performing almost until his death. Of this monumental catalogue, however, a few are sure to be played as long as the turbulent, ebullient decades leading up to and following the turn of the 21st century are remembered. These include one of the earlier works, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4s4jbA3TUgQ"><em>Papa</em></a>, from Sankomota’s album <a href="https://www.discogs.com/Sankomota-The-Writing-On-The-Wall/release/4311445"><em>Writing on the Wall</em></a> (1989). </p>
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<p>Religious in tone, as ultimately with all of Tsepo’s music, the song includes a solo verse as much intoned in prayer as sung in his raspy voice:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You’re waiting for your name to be called (What do you say?) Your body is shaking with disbelief (Tell us more)…</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 1994, a newly democratic South Africa witnessed the release of Tsepo’s signature album, <a href="https://www.discogs.com/Tsepo-Tshola-The-Village-Pope/release/10838218"><em>The Village Pope</em></a>, the one that forever gave him his name as iconic pastor of South African pop. </p>
<p>Most of the tributes that have poured forth in print and on social media have included this jaunty, iconoclastic alias. Yet it is not at all an attempt at self-congratulation or promotion, nor a reference to his sometimes harshly paternalistic admonition of his musicians in rehearsal and recording. It is rather an honorific proclaiming his unwavering commitment to kith and kin; his home in Lesotho, his close friends and family, his bi-national identity. </p>
<h2>Upliftment</h2>
<p>Avoiding the trappings of fame and shallow, transactional relationships, Tsepo was a devoted husband who never got over the passing of his wife in 1984. He never remarried, but remained, as many a Mosotho patriarch will sigh, “everyone’s father”. He was back in Teyateyaneng for a family funeral when he fell ill with COVID-19 and passed away.</p>
<p>Other songs of special significance include <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoN1rudM-2s"><em>Holokile</em></a> (All Right) from 1994, based in hymnody and virtually a hymn in itself. Indeed, Tsepo’s style has often been labelled “traditional gospel” but this is definitely the wrong music store bin. </p>
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</figure>
<p>Tsepo’s style comes from a blending of the Afro-pop fusion of “black consciousness” groups such as <a href="http://www.music.org.za/artist.asp?id=170">Sakhile</a>, <a href="https://www.newframe.com/stimela-the-train-and-south-africas-musical-heritage/">Stimela</a>, and of course Frank Leepa’s Sankomota in the 1980s, and his own hymnodic upbringing. That is why his songs are more inspirational than celebratory, and more “step and sway” than danceable. They are ballads to uplift an African nation. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g3ykfbkFuv4"><em>Stop the War</em></a>, from 1995, is not a religious tune at all, but an upbeat, pop injunction to South Africans not to fight one another over the spoils of the victory over apartheid. During the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-have-south-africans-been-on-a-looting-rampage-research-offers-insights-164571">looting and insurrection</a> that was taking place on the very day of his death, <em>Stop the War</em> was the song heard on radio stations nationwide. </p>
<p>Finally, there is his rollicking, township-jiviest song (no gospel here), <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZyEtgQoxxzc"><em>Akubutle</em></a> (Don’t Ask), from 2003, the one that never fails to bring listeners to their feet at a restaurant, club or party. </p>
<p>BT, as Bra Tsepo was popularly known, we can’t blame you for leaving us, but how are we going to get through all this without you? Akubutle.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164702/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Coplan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Schooled in music through church, he was driven by a fierce sense of belonging to Lesotho where he was born, and neighbouring South Africa.David Coplan, Professor Emeritus, Social Anthropology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1646502021-07-16T15:01:20Z2021-07-16T15:01:20ZThe Village Pope has passed: remembering Tsepo Tshola, Lesotho’s musical giant<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411672/original/file-20210716-21-12rsg9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tsepo Tshola performs at A Night With Legends Live in Johannesburg in 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screengrab/Slice Events</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“It’s the love of what I’m doing that’s kept me in the business,” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kj4DMqgl2Wo">declared</a> singer and composer Tsepo Tshola, who <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-07-15-village-pope-tsepo-tshola-dies-of-covid-19-complications/">passed away</a> in Lesotho on July 15, aged 68. </p>
<p>Tshola had been in showbiz for over half a century: a career that stretched from Sesotho roots and popular music in the 1970s, through international tours and collaborations, to his most recent identity as an inspiring gospel singer, and the co-founder of independent music label Killer Joe.</p>
<p>What characterised his work was a passionate desire to tell it as he saw it, whether that was about the evils of racism in the early days of his career, or the dangers of addiction and, more recently, the need for self-reliance.</p>
<p>His righteous preaching earned him the soubriquet of The Village Pope, but was also a family legacy. </p>
<h2>The young artist</h2>
<p>Tshola was born on 15 August 1953 in Teyateyaneng in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Lesotho">Lesotho</a>, a small, mountainous and landlocked country surrounded by its larger neighbour, South Africa. His father was a preacher and church organiser and his mother a chorister. He first honed his rich baritone in a church choir.</p>
<p>As a teenager, he joined the pop band Lesotho Blue Diamonds. Later, he hooked up with Anti-Antiques, formed by guitarist “Captain” <a href="https://sisgwenjazz.wordpress.com/2018/07/10/frank-leepa-biography-brutal-history-personal-beefs-and-brilliant-music/">Frank Leepa</a>. The two first got talking in the streets, he <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bReTH8l3IKE">recalled</a>: “It was God’s doing. I was looking for a match – so one of us had a match and the other had a cigarette: ‘Sure, man, let’s share.’” </p>
<p>They also shared opinions about music, and although Anti-Antiques already had a vocalist – and was definitely not earning enough to support two – Leepa’s dream of forming a super-group, and Tshola’s striking voice, ensured his membership.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411663/original/file-20210716-27-1ssx7ya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man on a striped couch in a beige suit, smiling." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411663/original/file-20210716-27-1ssx7ya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411663/original/file-20210716-27-1ssx7ya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411663/original/file-20210716-27-1ssx7ya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411663/original/file-20210716-27-1ssx7ya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411663/original/file-20210716-27-1ssx7ya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411663/original/file-20210716-27-1ssx7ya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411663/original/file-20210716-27-1ssx7ya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Detail from the album cover for Nothing Can Beat the Truth (2010)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">CCP Records/EMI</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Tshola goes on:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I remember the first time I heard my voice on the radio. I was walking the streets and it was playing from a radio in a shop. I jumped for joy – and jumped straight into some water. I spent the time after that looking for cardboard to put into my shoes, because they had no soles.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In that insecure, erratic environment of the nascent Lesotho modern music scene, Anti-Antiques morphed into a second incarnation of Leepa’s band Uhuru. A small but relatively successful 1979 tour of South Africa crashed and burned when “we were banned for singing <em>Africa Shall Unite</em>”. South Africa’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> rulers did not tolerate the song’s Pan African liberation politics. Leepa’s fourth band, <a href="https://www.musicinafrica.net/magazine/ode-sankomota">Sankomota</a>, was founded in the mid-1970s.</p>
<h2>Sankomoto</h2>
<p>Tshola sang with that incarnation of Sankomota for some time in Lesotho, but by the mid-1980s he was working more widely too. He eventually accepted an invitation from jazz trumpeter <a href="https://theconversation.com/remembering-hugh-masekela-the-horn-player-with-a-shrewd-ear-for-music-of-the-day-86414">Hugh Masekela</a> to record the albums <em>Techno-Bush</em> and <em>Waiting for the Rain in Botswana</em>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Sankomota had recorded their widely acclaimed self-titled <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-11-23-00-sankomota-ode-explores-a-cultural-treasure/https://mg.co.za/article/2018-11-23-00-sankomota-ode-explores-a-cultural-treasure/">debut album</a> in Lesotho in 1983, with an international release the following year. The music combined <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sotho">Sesotho</a> musical roots with sharply contemporary musicianship and a stirring liberation message. </p>
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<p>When Tshola, by then in London, heard the cassette, he immediately rushed to persuade a London colleague, musician <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/julian-sebothane-bahula">Julian Bahula</a>, to help organise work for the band. After huge difficulties raising funds and arranging a route that didn’t pass through South Africa, where they were still banned, Sankomota made it to London. It became their base between 1985 and 1989.</p>
<p>Bahula organised a number of concerts and tours, many of them under the aegis of South Africa’s liberation movement, the African National Congress. “We were touring Europe and literally getting paid with bread and salami,” Tshola <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bReTH8l3IKE">recalled</a>. “There is no way you can keep quiet when you feel the pain. We were driven by pain.” And, despite the hardships: “That contribution still makes me happy today.”</p>
<p>Tshola’s voice sounds out sweet and clear on Sankomota’s second album <em>Dreams Do Come True</em> (1987) and their third, <em>The Writing’s On The Wall</em> (1989).</p>
<p>He also continued to tour with others including Masekela and, like the trumpeter, went through reckless times shadowed by drug addiction. And like Masekela, he took that experience forward <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2021/07/15/god-music-and-overcoming-drugs-how-tsepo-tshola-built-a-solid-50-year-career">positively</a>, later counselling other musicians battling addiction.</p>
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<h2>The Village Pope</h2>
<p>Tshola had been composing since the mid-1980s. As change came and South Africa transitioned to democracy, he found plentiful work there: appearing, for example, on the 1983 Africa Against Aids project and the ANC’s 1994 elections album <em>Sekunjalo</em>.</p>
<p>Tshola’s own album as leader, <em>The Village Pope</em>, was released in 1993; a second album, <em>Lesedi</em>, appeared in 2001 and a third, <em>New Dawn</em>, in 2003. He worked with the late Zimbabwean singer Oliver Mtukudzi, with South African vocalists Brenda Fassie and PJ Powers and, later, with dance music producer Cassper Nyovest, with vocal star Thandiswa Mazwai and, as his interest in returning to his gospel roots grew stronger, with gospel star Rebecca Malope.</p>
<p>By the 20-teens, much of his time was being occupied by his label Killer Joe, co-founded with musician Joe Nina and lawyer Stanley Letsela. That too was a response to earlier bitter experiences. “I never found managers,” he <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kj4DMqgl2Wo">said</a> in 2019, “they were just looters … Today, I manage myself.”</p>
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<p>Tshola also returned to his roots in other ways. He established a home in Johannesburg and another in Lesotho, where his adult sons, Kamogelo and Katlego, both singers, stayed. There, he collaborated with the Conservation Africa music project to archive Lesotho’s music legacy and mentor young musicians.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/remembering-hugh-masekela-the-horn-player-with-a-shrewd-ear-for-music-of-the-day-86414">Remembering Hugh Masekela: the horn player with a shrewd ear for music of the day</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>As news of Tshola’s death emerged, South Africa was staring bleakly at the results of nearly a week of unrest and disorder. Those mourning his death invoked his song <em>Stop the War</em>, as a message worth remembering.</p>
<p>But Tshola the social commentator had other words too. Asked by the South African Broadcasting Corporation on Freedom Day 2017 what freedom meant to him, he warned that living free was not a simple, self-evident thing: “Freedom needs discipline and focus. Unless you learn freedom, freedom will destroy you.” </p>
<p><em>Robala ka khotso</em> (rest in peace) to a truly golden voice and a very sharp thinker indeed.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Listen to a Tsepo Tshola playlist at the author’s blog over <a href="https://sisgwenjazz.wordpress.com/2021/07/16/rip-tshepo-tshola-1953-2021/">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164650/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gwen Ansell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For over 50 years Tshola was loved by audiences around the world for his rich baritone voice, which he used to inspire and to speak political truths.Gwen Ansell, Associate of the Gordon Institute for Business Science, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1640102021-07-11T09:47:01Z2021-07-11T09:47:01ZAfricans want consensual democracy – why is that reality so hard to accept?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410288/original/file-20210708-15-yitatg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">King Mswati III of eSwatini, Africa's last absolute monarch, is facing growing demands for democracy and rule of law. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has become common to argue that most Africans are not that committed to democracy. Commentators often suggest that Africans care more about development than democracy, and that voters – especially those in <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/trouble-democracy-africa/">rural areas</a> – don’t really <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/western-style-democracy-in-africa-is-just-a-way-of-pushing-the-neoliberal-agenda/">understand democracy</a>. They would thus happily trade away their political rights for a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/11/africa-strongmen-angola-dos-santos-zimbabwe-mugabe-uganda-sudan">“strong man”</a> who can get things done.</p>
<p>This narrative has proved to be durable despite being wrong. </p>
<p>In our new <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/african-studies-keyword-democracy/31A98158F9749E17ADFA5DEC518CD757">journal article</a> for the <a href="https://africanstudies.org/annual-meetings-asa/2019-call-for-panelists/keywords-in-african-studies-african-studies-review-sponsored-panels/">Keywords</a> series of the <em>African Studies Review</em>, we investigated three issues. First, is there support for democracy in Africa? Second, what kind of democracy do people want? Third, why are the desires of African citizens so often silenced?</p>
<p>Drawing on survey data collected by the <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> between 2016 and 2018, we show that strong majorities think that democracy is the best political system for their country. </p>
<p>Contrary to claims that “Western style” democracy is “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0ec9dc4e-8976-11e7-8bb1-5ba57d47eff7">unAfrican</a>”, we find widespread support for a form of consensual democracy, which combines a strong commitment to political accountability and civil liberties with a concern for unity and stability.</p>
<h2>Support for democracy remains strong</h2>
<p>Democracy in Africa has come under considerable pressure over the last decade. Satisfaction with the way that democracy is performing has fallen. This is in part due to a decline in public confidence in the <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/publications/wp84-quality-elections-satisfaction-democracy-and-political-trust-africa">quality of elections</a> – how free, fair and credible they are. </p>
<p>We argue that this has only had a modest impact on support for the principle of democratic government, in part because African citizens continue to view authoritarian rule as a worse option. Of the 35 countries surveyed, the proportion of citizens who suggested that non-democratic political systems might be preferable only exceeded 20% in eSwatini and Malawi.</p>
<p>This figure is now likely to have declined in both countries. Malawians faith in democracy was revived by a <a href="https://oxfamapps.org/fp2p/how-does-change-happen-lessons-from-malawi/">peaceful transfer of power in 2020</a>. And the people of eSwatini have been protesting against a failing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2021/7/1/will-eswatinis-king-respond-to-calls-for-democracy">authoritarian regime</a>.</p>
<p>Even in states in which the reintroduction of multiparty politics has been associated with political controversy and conflict, such as <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334391635_The_Root_Causes_of_the_Conflict_in_Ivory_Coast">Cote d’Ivoire</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tug-of-war-in-togo-over-term-limits-and-the-distribution-of-power-100731">Togo</a> and <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/11/how-museveni-mastered-violence-to-win-elections-in-uganda/">Uganda</a>, more than three quarters of citizens say that democracy is preferable.</p>
<h2>Consensual democracy</h2>
<p>It is, therefore, time to stop doubting that African citizens want democracy, and start asking what kind of democracy people want. We argue that there is widespread demand for a form of consensual democracy, in which a desire for elections and checks and balances on those in power goes hand in hand with a concern to maintain national unity.</p>
<p>Consensual democracy has four main features:</p>
<p><strong>Multiparty elections</strong></p>
<p>We show that the vast majority of Africans support selecting their government through multi-party elections. Three-quarters of those surveyed agreed that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Almost 65% also agreed that “many political parties are needed to make sure that (the people) have real choices in who governs them”. Most rejected the idea of one-party rule.</p>
<p><strong>Political accountability</strong></p>
<p>Our article also shows that most Africans want political accountability and the rule of law. Over three quarters of respondents agreed that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Only 34% agreed that the government getting things done was more important than being accountable to citizens.</p>
<p><strong>Civil liberties and political rights</strong></p>
<p>Respondents also wanted to be able to express their own opinions and engage in political activities. Over three quarters (76%) agreed that a citizen’s freedom to criticise the government was “important” or “essential” for a society to be called democratic.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Ugandans in Kenya demand freedom for opposition leader Bobi Wine in 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Daniel Irungu</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This extends to the right of association, with over 60% of individuals believing they “should be able to join any organisation, whether or not the government approves”. </p>
<p><strong>Consensual politics</strong></p>
<p>Strong support for rights, elections and accountability goes hand-in-hand with a concern to prevent “excessive” freedom and competition, lest they lead to disunity and instability. Many citizens worry about violence around elections; they want parties to put aside their differences and work for the common good.</p>
<p>Most respondents were therefore against the use of street protests to settle disputes, even though they often sympathised with protesters’ aims.</p>
<h2>The exceptions that prove the rule</h2>
<p>There are of course variations in how people feel about these issues, both across the continent and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/moral-economy-of-elections-in-africa/DDAE0D88636E296400383CFFFA2D13DF">within countries</a>. </p>
<p>Respondents in eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique were less committed to elections, but only in Lesotho did this drop below 50%. </p>
<p>Namibians and South Africans were more willing to trade accountability off against efficiency – perhaps because of majority support for the ruling party.</p>
<p>Yet, what is striking is the consistency of support for the four pillars of consensual democracy across the continent. What does this mean for African politics? Why is this reality not more accepted? </p>
<p>Our article outlines three key episodes in which support for democratic government has been silenced. We also identify vulnerabilities that authoritarian leaders could exploit. </p>
<p>Leaders who can persuade citizens that their country <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/118/473/603/5536927">faces a grave risk of violence and instability</a> may be able to legitimise backsliding on democracy – whether or not the risk actually exists. This is a cause for concern because supporters of democracy in Africa don’t always reject <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Working%20paper/AfropaperNo19.pdf">all authoritarian alternatives</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, as our <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/african-studies-keyword-democracy/31A98158F9749E17ADFA5DEC518CD757">study shows</a>, the overwhelming majority of Africans support consensual democracy.</p>
<h2>Lazy argument</h2>
<p>The argument that multi-party politics is incompatible with African ways of life stretches back to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/historical-journal/article/voting-nationhood-and-citizenship-in-latecolonial-africa/D6252CD6E0638A803F7086313BC703F1">racist colonial officials</a>. It was also used by nationalist leaders to justify creating one-party states after independence. But it is not true, and has become a lazy excuse for authoritarian regimes that are neither popular nor legitimate.</p>
<p>In a decade in which <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2015/10/23/book-review-africa-uprising-popular-protest-and-political-change-by-adam-branch-and-zachariah-mampilly/">activists have risked their lives</a> to advance democratic causes in Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, eSwatini, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, it is time to recognise that most Africans do not want authoritarian rule.</p>
<p>It is both misleading and patronising to suggest that democracy has somehow been imposed by the international community against the wishes of ordinary people. Instead, it has been demanded and fought for from below.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman is a member of the International Advisory Council of the Afrobarometer. This article is written in his individual capacity.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sishuwa Sishuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is more support for democracy among African people than is often recognised. Yet this can be undermined by election rigging and is lower in countries like Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamSishuwa Sishuwa, Postdoctoral Research Fellow; Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1625222021-06-16T14:17:37Z2021-06-16T14:17:37ZMalawi abolishes death penalty: what it means for southern Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405885/original/file-20210611-13-bsdunc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal decision ends years of confusion over the status of prisoners on death row.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal <a href="https://malawilii.org/mw/judgment/supreme-court-appeal/2021/3">abolished the death penalty</a> in April, the most notable decision against capital punishment since the South African Constitutional Court found the penalty unconstitutional <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1995/3.html">in 1995</a>. The Malawian decision is significant because Malawi’s constitution <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-and-subject-groups/death-penalty-research-unit/blog/2021/05/malawi-and-puzzle">specifically provides for the death penalty</a> (in Article 16), unlike the unqualified right to life in the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">South African constitution</a>.</p>
<p>The Malawian decision <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-47307275">ended years of confusion</a> over the status of the <a href="https://www.newswise.com/articles/malawi-abolishes-death-penalty-historic-ruling-felt-far-and-wide">remaining 37 prisoners</a> on death row. Nearly 15 years ago, the Malawi High Court abolished the <a href="https://www.globalhealthrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Kafantayeni-v.-Attorney-General.pdf">mandatory death penalty for murder</a>. It had found that an automatic death sentence did not sufficiently individualise sentencing and, therefore, was cruel and degrading punishment. </p>
<p>But, the ruling was not clearly retroactive. Many defendants were still appealing their mandatory death sentences or had them commuted to life imprisonment without ever having a sentencing hearing. This “grey area” led to the latest <a href="https://malawilii.org/mw/judgment/supreme-court-appeal/2021/3">court challenge</a> brought by <a href="https://reprieve.org/us/2021/05/06/malawi-just-abolished-the-death-penalty/">Charles Khoviwa</a>, a death row inmate and client of <a href="https://reprieve.org/us/">Reprieve</a>, a legal action non-profit organisation, and the <a href="http://legalaidbureau.org/">Malawi Legal Aid Bureau</a>, that resulted in the abolishment.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-death-penalty-is-losing-favour-in-sub-saharan-africa-43130">Why the death penalty is losing favour in sub-Saharan Africa</a>
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<h2>Malawi’s constitution</h2>
<p>Although the <em>Khoviwa</em> decision was particular to Malawi’s progressive constitution, the case has implications for other Southern African countries, most of which keep the death penalty on the books but do not use it in practice. </p>
<p>Malawi’s <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_2017?lang=en">constitution</a> came out of a public consultative process, initiated after a one-party dictatorship that ended <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43101816?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">in 1994</a>. As a result, this newer constitution has some progressive elements. They include that Malawi must consider international law obligations and may look to foreign case law in deciding constitutional disputes. </p>
<p>This is important because <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx">international human rights law</a> disfavours the death penalty, and has placed increasingly strict standards on its use. Ever fewer countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-death-penalty-is-losing-favour-in-sub-saharan-africa-43130">carry out executions in practice </a>, which in turn has strengthened the human rights case against the death penalty.</p>
<p>Because Malawi’s constitution is a living document that evolves, the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the global decline of capital punishment.</p>
<p>In the <em>Khoviwa</em> case, the court considered Article 16 of the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_2017?lang=en">Malawian constitution</a>. The court explained that the wording of this provision created two separate rights: the right to life and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life. This is clear in the text:</p>
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<p>Every person has the right to life and no person shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life.</p>
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<p>But, the wording of the second sentence of Article 16 was unusual compared to other <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/">Commonwealth</a> and African constitutions. This said, in the relevant part:</p>
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<p>the execution of the death sentence … shall not be regarded as arbitrary deprivation of his or her right to life.</p>
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<p>The second sentence only stated that the death penalty could not be an arbitrary deprivation of life; it did not state that the death penalty could not violate the right to life (the other right contained in Article 16) or the right to be free from cruel and degrading punishment at Article 19. This gave the court an opening to find the death penalty unconstitutional even though Article 16 specifically provided for the death penalty.</p>
<h2>Wider implications</h2>
<p>The wording of Malawi’s constitution is peculiar. The constitutions of its southern African neighbours; <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Botswana_2005.pdf?lang=en">Botswana</a>, <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/sz/sz010en.pdf">eSwatini</a>, and <a href="https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Zambia_2016.pdf?lang=en">Zambia </a> have a right to life provision that specifically provides for the death penalty. This, without setting out a separate right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life. As a result, the reasoning of the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal in the <em>Khoviwa</em> case is not precisely applicable.</p>
<p>Of course, the constitutions of <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/images/a108-96.pdf">South Africa</a>, <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mozambique_2007?lang=en">Mozambique</a>, and <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Namibia_2010.pdf">Namibia</a> have an unqualified right to life with no provision for the death penalty, which is why these countries are abolitionist. The <a href="https://www.aripo.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Constitution-of-Lesotho.pdf">Lesotho</a> and <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/tz/tz008en.pdf">Tanzania</a> constitutions also have unqualified right to life provisions with no exclusion for the death penalty. However, the senior courts in these countries have not yet found the death penalty to violate the right to life.</p>
<p><a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=398">Kenya</a> and <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf">Zimbabwe</a> have more complex constitutional “right to life” provisions. Zimbabwe’s 2013 constitution provides for the death penalty in an extremely narrow class of cases - adult men between the ages of 21 and 70 and only for the crime of aggravated murder.</p>
<p>In terms of Article 26 of Kenya’s constitution, </p>
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<p>[one] shall not be deprived of life intentionally, except to the extent authorised by this Constitution or other written law".</p>
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<p>But the constitution provides no authorisation except for abortion.</p>
<p>The Malawi court’s decision in <em>Khoviwa</em> could be especially useful in future human rights litigation in countries without clear constitutional support for the death penalty. This is so for two reasons.</p>
<p>First, the Malawian Supreme Court of Appeal validated the emerging global consensus that the death penalty violates the right to life, even where the constitution specifically authorises it. </p>
<p>Second, and even more importantly, the Malawian court used a more progressive interpretive method: if two interpretations of a constitutional provision are possible, the interpretation that expands human rights protections is preferred over an interpretation that restricts or limits human rights. </p>
<p>This is a roadmap for future challenges to the death penalty in other southern African countries.</p>
<p><em>A longer version of this article appeared as a <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-and-subject-groups/death-penalty-research-unit/blog/2021/05/malawi-and-puzzle">blog</a> for Oxford University</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162522/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Novak does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Malawi court’s decision provides a roadmap for future challenges to the death penalty in other southern African countries.Andrew Novak, Term Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology Law and Society, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.