tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/liberation-movement-30954/articlesliberation movement – The Conversation2022-07-06T13:30:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854942022-07-06T13:30:16Z2022-07-06T13:30:16ZNdabaningi Sithole: Zimbabwe’s forgotten intellectual and leader<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472725/original/file-20220706-21-uer96h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ndabaningi Sithole, July 1977. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Central Press/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ndabaningi-Sithole">Ndabaningi Sithole</a> was one of the founding fathers of the modern state of Zimbabwe in southern Africa. In August 1963, he became the first president of the <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803133457774">Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu)</a>, the militant liberation organisation that fought against white minority rule that he led for a decade before being deposed in a palace coup engineered by his rival <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Robert Mugabe</a>. Mugabe went on to become the post-independence leader of Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Sithole was the most prolific black writer in colonial <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Rhodesia">Rhodesia</a> from the 1950s until the country gained independence as Zimbabwe in 1980. In that period he published nine books (one serialised in African Parade magazine). He also left an incredible archive of the liberation struggle that was generated in real time. Surprisingly, most of Zimbabwe’s liberation figures did not leave behind a lot of their own writings. Sithole is unique in that regard. </p>
<p>His most important book, <a href="https://www.african-nationalism.com/">African Nationalism</a>, which has recently been republished, is part autobiography and part polemics that provides a history of the liberation movement in Zimbabwe at its nascent stages. It was first published in 1959 and then in 1968.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470768/original/file-20220624-16-3ltr5s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Book cover featuring a graphic of the map of Africa." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470768/original/file-20220624-16-3ltr5s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470768/original/file-20220624-16-3ltr5s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470768/original/file-20220624-16-3ltr5s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470768/original/file-20220624-16-3ltr5s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470768/original/file-20220624-16-3ltr5s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470768/original/file-20220624-16-3ltr5s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470768/original/file-20220624-16-3ltr5s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Third edition of African Nationalism.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ndabaningi Sithole Foundation</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A third edition of African Nationalism is timely. It was released by his family through the <a href="https://www.sithole.org">Ndabaningi Sithole Foundation</a> which was launched last year to “honour and perpetuate his legacy as an advocate for civil rights and pan African democracy” through republishing his books and hosting events.</p>
<p>It’s timely because there is a reconfiguration of the politics of Zimbabwe. Mugabe, who was a dominant force for almost four decades, has since died. There is currently a vigorous contestation for power and legitimacy going on in the country. Figures like Sithole who have been sidelined in Zimbabwe’s history offer us an opportunity to reconsider suppressed views and perspectives.</p>
<h2>The philosopher-politician</h2>
<p>More than six decades after the publication of African Nationalism, it remains a critical text to think about topical subjects such as self determination, political representation and decolonisation. Sithole’s foray into active politics was primarily through his writings and thus his bona fide credentials as a leading intellectual were embraced. His book’s wide critical acclaim and translation into half a dozen European languages earned him respect among his peers. </p>
<p>Sithole composed the book in the US where he was a student of theology. He explained his impetus in his introduction:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was confronted by what some of my American friends said about African nationalism, which at the time was just beginning to be felt throughout the length and breadth of the continent of Africa, and which was also beginning to make fairly sensational international headlines. The big question which everyone was asking: Is Africa ready for sovereign independence? The majority greatly doubted that Africa was ready. Some regarded the rise of African nationalism as a bad omen for the whitemen in Africa.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As historian <a href="https://www.hist.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2022-04/special_o_religion_nationalism_in_zimbabwe_2022-23.pdf">David Maxwell</a> writes, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/nationalism">nationalism</a> – supporting the interests of the nation-state – has been a powerful force in Zimbabwean history as a mobilising ideology. It continues to play a key part in the arena in which political ideas and participation are imagined. </p>
<p>Zimbabwean nationalism, a version of which historian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jan/18/terrance-ranger-obituary">Terence Ranger</a> called <a href="https://www.african.cam.ac.uk/system/files/documents/ranger.pdf">“patriotic history”</a> remains central to debates about who belongs, and who has the right to speak, to vote and to own land.</p>
<h2>The barrel of a pen</h2>
<p>Sithole’s tenure as leader of Zanu was mostly from prison, between 1964 and 1974. It was a treacherous time. Most of the black political leaders had been rounded up, detained, killed or forced into exile. Besides directing Zanu’s insurgent activities from his prison cell, Sithole also filled up time writing books: novels, poetry, and political tracts. He considered writing as a revolutionary tool. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472730/original/file-20220706-160-hzrycn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four men in suits sitting on couches around a coffee table in a lounge setting." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472730/original/file-20220706-160-hzrycn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472730/original/file-20220706-160-hzrycn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472730/original/file-20220706-160-hzrycn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472730/original/file-20220706-160-hzrycn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472730/original/file-20220706-160-hzrycn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472730/original/file-20220706-160-hzrycn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472730/original/file-20220706-160-hzrycn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">From left to right, Chief Jeremiah Chirau, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, Prime Minister Ian Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa in New York, 1978.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images</span></span>
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<p>His manuscripts, smuggled from prison with the help of guards and sympathisers, were mostly published abroad to avoid censorship. Two of these included <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/The_Polygamist.html?id=xlQRAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">The Polygamist</a> and <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Obed_Mutezo_the_Mudzimu_Christian_Nation.html?id=p3Z0AAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">Obed Mutezo</a> – the story of an “African Nationalist (Christian) Martyr”. Sithole was also a leading contributor to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/action/doBasicSearch?Query=zimbabwe+news&so=rel">Zimbabwe News</a>, a newsletter that was published by Zanu to convey its revolutionary messages. </p>
<p>As if he knew history was not going to be kind to him, Sithole spent considerable time writing his ideas, but also about people he met as a leader. He partly coordinated the liberation struggle through the barrel of the pen. Sithole writes himself into history. He is not just a chronicler of the liberation struggle, as it is happening in real time, but also acts as an archivist for the future.</p>
<h2>The teacher and preacher</h2>
<p>Sithole was a primary school teacher at home before studying theology in the US between 1955 and 1958. He had been mentored by the revered missionaries <a href="https://archives.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/repositories/2/resources/2265">Garfield and Grace Todd</a> at Dadaya Mission. This relationship was formative to his politics and civic interests. Despite later political disagreements, they maintained a cautious allyship and respect.</p>
<p>While in the US, Sithole published <em>AmaNdebele kaMzilikazi</em> in 1956, the first published novel in Ndebele in Zimbabwe. It was released by Longmans, Green & Co. in Cape Town before being republished in 1957 as <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Umvukela_wamaNdebele.html?id=GKZfPQAACAAJ&redir_esc=y"><em>Umvukela wamaNdebele</em></a> by the newly established Rhodesia Literature Bureau. The book is inspired by the events of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/second-matabele-war-breaks-out">Ndebele uprisings of 1896</a>.</p>
<p>Sithole was the product of an unusual progeny – a father from the Ndau clan and a mother from the Ndebele clan. As such, he was not easily contained by the Shona-Ndebele binary that has informed much of Zimbabwe’s modern politics. Growing up in rural Matebeleland, he was raised under Ndebele tradition and culture. It is not surprising that his first published book was inspired by Ndebele traditions. </p>
<h2>A complicated legacy</h2>
<p>To look at Sithole’s life and career in retrospect is to wade through so much hubris, of his own making and of others. His fall from grace was spectacular. He has been for the modern <a href="https://www.zanupf.org.zw">Zanu-PF</a> a persona non grata. But a figure like Sithole cannot be easily expunged from history, which he actively contributed to as a leading actor and as a writer.</p>
<p>At a time when a young generation of Africans are calling for decolonisation, Sithole’s ideas resonate even further. In the preface to the new edition of African Nationalism, former Kenyan prime minister, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Raila-Odinga">Raila Odinga</a> posits:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Reading African Nationalism evokes mixed feelings of sadness and joy. It is sad to imagine that a whole book had to be written to try and explain to fellow humans why Africans were agitating for and deserved self rule.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is always important to look back to the past, in order to navigate the present and the future. His ideas aside, Sithole is also a reminder of the fickleness of politics and history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185494/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite being almost erased from history, Sithole’s ideas are still relevant today.Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Junior Research Fellow, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1033772018-09-20T14:37:48Z2018-09-20T14:37:48ZWhat two books have to say about the political lifespan of South Africa’s ANC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236903/original/file-20180918-146148-1x9ibvh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Cornell Tukiri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>No political party can govern forever. In democracies with free and fair elections, no political party has been in power longer than <a href="https://www.quora.com/Which-party-has-the-record-of-the-longest-serving-democratic-government-continuosly-at-the-state-or-center-level-all-over-the-world">half a century</a>. So is the African National Congress (ANC), the party that governs South Africa, at least halfway through its first term in power? </p>
<p>It has already won more elections than the historic liberation movements <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Indian-National-Congress">in India </a> and <a href="http://www.ireland-information.com/reference/politica.html">Ireland</a> did after independence. That these countries were always multi-party democracies makes their histories relevant to South Africa. </p>
<p>Politics Professor Joleen Steyn Kotze’s new book, <a href="http://www.africansunmedia.co.za/Sun-e-Shop/Product-Details/tabid/78/ProductID/535/Default.aspx"><em>Delivering an Elusive Dream of Democracy: lessons from Nelson Mandela Bay</em></a> is timely. It makes a natural companion volume with Crispian Olver’s <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/product/crispian-olver-how-to-steal-a-city/jywy-5080-g730?PPC=Y&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIgZaS7pbE3QIVS7DtCh0EGQXfEAAYASAAEgLszPD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds"><em>How to Steal a City</em></a>. </p>
<p>Steyn Kotze provides analysis through an academic frame while Olver has written a civil servant’s empirical narrative. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236860/original/file-20180918-158225-1yludcj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236860/original/file-20180918-158225-1yludcj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=835&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236860/original/file-20180918-158225-1yludcj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=835&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236860/original/file-20180918-158225-1yludcj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=835&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236860/original/file-20180918-158225-1yludcj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1050&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236860/original/file-20180918-158225-1yludcj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1050&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236860/original/file-20180918-158225-1yludcj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1050&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>Steyn Kotze’s book details studies of how an ANC-run metropolitan municipality, Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality in the Eastern Cape, constantly deteriorated in the delivery of basic services, such as water and electricity, because of funds being squandered on tender corruption. </p>
<p>Olver’s book dissects how a criminal syndicate used a corrupt faction of ANC politicians to divert public funds to itself. </p>
<p>These are haunting facts on the fragility of political parties. They remind us that integrity and democracy are not destinations. They must be lifelong commitments that we ceaselessly strive for.</p>
<h2>Coalitions</h2>
<p>Nelson Mandela Bay has been run by a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/da-locks-down-mandela-bay-with-multi-party-coalition-20160817">coalition</a> since the 2016 local government elections. The first coalition government – led by the Democratic Alliance (DA) – <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/trollip-confident-that-fourth-motion-of-no-confidence-will-fail-16560854">recently</a> collapsed in acrimony. A new one has been formed led by an executive mayor from the United Democratic Movement, a party with <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/news/da-led-coalition-for-mandela-bay-a-step-closer-20160807">only 2% electoral support</a> in the area.</p>
<p>Coalitions across the world range from the stable to the fragile. In Bavaria, the coalition between the Christian Social Union and the Christian Democratic Union remains strong after an astonishing six decades. </p>
<p>By contrast, the DA coalition in Nelson Mandela Bay unwound <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-08-27-athol-trollip-ousted-as-nelson-mandela-mayor/">within two years</a>. And its fragile minority rule in <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/msimanga-to-reach-out-to-eff-after-motions-of-no-confidence-fails-20180830">Tshwane</a> and <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-03-16-da-draws-line-for-mashaba-over-eff-pandering/">Johannesburg</a> survive without a coalition, but only on tactical voting support from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). </p>
<p>The DA holds onto power in the two metropolitan councils solely by the grace of the EFF. </p>
<p>At their best, coalitions can ensure stability in a situation where no party won over half the votes. If two parties can compromise on their policies, each of their voters will get a significant part of what they support. </p>
<p>At worst, a cumbersome coalition can be hostage to the most extremist small member in it, with nasty ethnic or religious consequences. Or the smaller partner can crudely demand as a condition of coalition a share of the spoils: posts; tenders for its election donors; or real estate deals. </p>
<p>If coalitions are unstable, or if there are hung councils as there are Beaufort West, Oudtshoorn, and Lebanon, a city or country can suffer paralysis while potholes proliferate, rubbish piles up uncollected in the streets, or sewage works crumble. </p>
<p>But the demands of coalition politics isn’t the only factor pulling at the fabric of South Africa’s political parties. Factionalism looms large for both large parties. In the DA there are disagreements over affirmative action and Black Economic Empowerment policies. In the ANC patronage factions are making themselves felt in Kwa-Zulu Natal in particular. </p>
<p>The challenge for their national leaderships is how they manage the tensions. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>Both coalitions with and against the ANC, and factionalism within the ANC and the main opposition party the Democratic Alliance (DA), will clearly rank as important in the country’s 2019 general elections.</p>
<p>What are the prospects for the new ANC-led coalition in Nelson Mandela Bay? </p>
<p>Early signs are that the problems identified by Steyn Kotze and Olver haven’t gone away. The ANC could easily slide back into corruption, with the country seeing a continuation of what Steyn Kotze describes as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the degeneration of the ANC through the loss of its moral stature, the erosion of its integrity and the public disillusionment with its performance.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This suggests that the ANC may slip even further in next year’s elections. Other factors that point to electoral slide is the fact that the party continues to shoot itself in the electoral foot by choosing non-sensical policy positions. </p>
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<p>Take its shift from rainbow non-racialism to using a hierarchical concept of affirmative action and Black Economic Empowerment. To the sizable <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Coloured">Coloured </a>majority of voters in the northern areas of Nelson Mandela Bay, this lends credence to the complaint: under apartheid we were not white enough; under affirmative action we are not black enough. It wasn’t enough for the ANC to have put up a Coloured sports celebrity, Danny Jordaan, as their mayoral candidate. </p>
<p>This means that, as history has proven elsewhere, parties in democracies where there are free and fair elections don’t rule forever. Nelson Mandela Bay will offer a fascinating test of the two books’ analysis in the country’s elections next year. </p>
<p><em>Joleen Steyn Kotze: <a href="http://www.africansunmedia.co.za/Sun-e-Shop/Product-Details/tabid/78/ProductID/535/Default.aspx">Delivering an Elusive Dream of Democracy: Lessons from Nelson Mandela Bay</a>. Stellenbosch. African Sun Media. 2018. Crispian Olver. <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/product/crispian-olver-how-to-steal-a-city/jywy-5080-g730?PPC=Y&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIgZaS7pbE3QIVS7DtCh0EGQXfEAAYASAAEgLszPD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds">How to Steal a City. Jonathan Ball & Amazon. 2017</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103377/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this in his professional capacity.</span></em></p>Two authors unpack the fragility of South Africa’s political parties and why democracy is a lifelong commitment.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1011972018-08-12T06:59:43Z2018-08-12T06:59:43ZSouthern Africa’s liberation movements: can they abandon old bad habits?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231075/original/file-20180808-191038-1anoa8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Both South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Zimbabwean counterpart Emmerson Mnangagwa need to reform their parties.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Until recently, southern Africa’s political and economic outlook seemed to be moving in a promising direction. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/stability-in-southern-africa-hinges-on-how-leaders-gain-and-lose-power-89980">highlights</a> were provided by Zimbabwe and South Africa with the displacement of Robert Mugabe by Emmerson Mnangagwa in November 2017 and Jacob Zuma by Cyril Ramaphosa earlier this year. Both were to pronounce the inauguration of new eras for their countries, and to promise political and economic reform. </p>
<p>Prior to this, there were presidential changes in the three other countries ruled by the region’s liberation movements. Hage Geingob succeeded Hifekepunye Pohamba in <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Namibian-president-wins-5m-Africa-leadership-prize-20150302">Namibia</a> in March 2015; Filipe Nyusi succeeded Armando Guebeza in <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/05/05/mozambique-is-back-says-its-president.-donors-are-less-sure">Mozambique</a> in January 2017; and Joao Lourenco succeeded Eduardo Dos Santos as <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/angolas-president-makes-unexpected-moves-to-rein-in-dos-santos-11740653">Angola’s</a> state President after legislative elections last year. </p>
<p>All five new leaders were younger than their predecessors, three of them (Ramaphosa, Nyusi and Lourenco) by ten years or more. This diluted – but far from dissipated – the tendency towards gerontocracy. </p>
<p>And there was more. While Mugabe was ousted by virtue of a “<a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/news/watch-jubilation-as-mugabe-falls-12102771">military assisted transition</a>” the other four incumbent presidents were constrained to stand down because their terms in office were expiring. </p>
<p>Taken together, the changes in leadership, combined with initiatives of economic reform, seemed to bode well for the region as a whole. And to bring new hope to the 100 million people who live in their countries.</p>
<p>These events may yet result in outcomes that are progressive politically and economically. But, for all the commitment to renewal, doubts are beginning to accumulate that the region’s liberation movements are capable of turning away from the bad habits and practices of the past. </p>
<p>This has been brought home in dramatic fashion by the controversies surrounding the <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-zimbabwes-messy-election-get-messier-or-will-a-new-path-be-taken-101196">Zimbabwean election</a>.</p>
<h2>Signs of renewal</h2>
<p>The region’s national liberation movements became increasingly aware that after decades in power they were losing popularity. They were confronting a crisis of legitimacy. Signs that commitments to reform and renewal were meaningful were most apparent in Angola, Zimbabwe and South Africa. </p>
<p>In Angola, Lourenco was quick to move against the political and financial empire constructed by Dos Santos. He sacked <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42003016">Isabel Dos Santos</a>, daughter of the former president and widely known as the richest woman in Africa, as head of Sonangol, the state oil company. The large corporation is a fulcrum of the economy, responsible for about a third of GDP and 95% of exports. </p>
<p>Citing misappropriation of funds, he followed this up by dismissing <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/son-of-angolas-former-leader-dos-santos-accused-of-fraud-20180326">Jose Filemento</a>, Dos Santos’ son, as head of the nation’s $5 billion sovereign wealth fund. He also had brushed aside restrictions on his ability to appoint new chiefs of the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/angolan-army-chief-sacked-in-latest-anti-graft-move-20180423">military</a>, police and intelligence services by appointing his own security chiefs. </p>
<p>In Zimbabwe, the popular enthusiasm which greeted Mugabe’s ousting and Mnangagwa’s elevation was to be somewhat dimmed by the choice of his cabinet. The mix of military coup-makers, Mugabe left-overs and ZANU-PF re-treads rather than reaching out to the opposition to form a transitional coalition government did not go down well. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, Mnangagwa’s early initiatives offered promise of more rational economic policies. Above all, he indicated that he was bent on entering negotiations with the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imf-zimbabwe/imfs-lagarde-welcomes-mnangagwas-promise-to-revive-zimbabwe-economy-idUSKBN1FE2M6">international financial agencies</a> and other creditors to re-schedule payments due on Zimbabwe’s massive debt. </p>
<p>This was combined with a three-month <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/bring-back-the-cash-only-250-million-returned-to-zim-in-post-mugabe-amnesty-20180304">amnesty</a> to allow individuals and companies who were reckoned to have illegally exported some US$1.8 billion to bring it back into the country. Third, Mnangagwa announced a series of <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zim-white-farmer-mnangagwa-has-given-us-a-lot-of-encouragement-20180722">measures</a> to boost agriculture and mining. </p>
<p>All such measures were designed to encourage an inflow of foreign investment, that had slowed to a trickle because of the arbitrariness of Mugabe’s rule.</p>
<p>Opposition parties felt that Mnangagwa’s initiatives fell far short of what was required. Nonetheless, they were buoyed by his recognition that if Zimbabwe was to be restored to something approximating economic health, he would have to call an early election whose result would be accepted internationally as legitimate. </p>
<p>This, as it turns out, was too tall an order. </p>
<p>Round about the same time Ramaphosa was embarking upon his own programme of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosas-to-do-list-seven-economic-policy-areas-that-will-shift-the-dial-94352">reform</a> in South Africa. His triumph in the battle for the party leadership, achieved at the African National Congress’s (ANC) five yearly national congress in Johannesburg in December, had been narrowly won. </p>
<p>During his years in power, Zuma transformed the ANC, the state and state-owned companies into a massive <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-state-capture-is-a-regressive-step-for-any-society-56837">patronage machine</a> for looting the fiscus. This was to become known as “state capture”. Much of it was engineered by or in league with the immigrant Indian Gupta family. </p>
<p>Accordingly, Ramaphosa’s mission was to “re-capture” the state. War was declared on corruption, commitments made to cleaning up the state owned enterprises, to re-configuring state departments and restoring collaborative relations with business (which had been severely undermined under Zuma). </p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s efforts continue to be impressive. They have included appointing respected technocrats to key government positions as well as dismissing, prosecuting or sidelining a slew of Zuma acolytes. </p>
<p>He also cleared the way for an extensive judicial review of the state-capture project (which Zuma had done his best to obstruct). And he initiated extensive <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/sars-tom-moyane-suspended-with-immediate-effect-20180319">re-structuring</a> of failing state owned enterprises and state agencies, notably the South African Revenue Service. </p>
<h2>Doubts are mounting</h2>
<p>However, it has not been plain sailing.</p>
<p>The Zimbabwean election went into meltdown with accusations of a rigged election. The military is seen as being in firm alliance with Zanu-PF, ready to step in if its rule is <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-zimbabwes-messy-election-get-messier-or-will-a-new-path-be-taken-101196">threatened</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile in South Africa Ramaphosa has increasingly run up against the constraints imposed by the continuing political weight of the Zuma faction in an ANC which has remained deeply factionalised. He has struggled to forge party unity to prepare for the 2019 election. And he is most particularly challenged by the strength of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-deal-with-provincial-strongmen-is-haunting-south-africas-ruling-party-96666">Zuma faction in KwaZulu-Natal</a>. </p>
<p>A poor election result for the ANC in 2019 will severely undermine his political authority, and hobble his attempts to restructure the state and economy.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, cynicism is gaining ground. Many doubt Lourenco’s capacity to systematically deconstruct the powerful network which has supported and defended the Dos Santos family for decades. The view among some is that it will only re-engineer the political dominance of the ruling MPLA. </p>
<p>In both Namibia and Mozambique, critics suggest that changes in the presidency have led to little more than business as usual – and that in both countries the ruling party elites remain deeply enmeshed in corruption.</p>
<h2>Parties of liberation no more?</h2>
<p>The rule of liberation movements in southern Africa rule has been increasingly challenged by economic failure, rising popular discontent, the alienation of young people and yawning internal divisions. This has led to multiple suggestions that their time span is limited, and that their rule will give way as a result of internal division, electoral defeat or other unforeseen events. </p>
<p>They have responded with promises that they will embark on “renewal”. </p>
<p>But, so far the evidence is mixed. They may well retain their capacity to hang on to state power. But their capacity for significant and far-reaching reform remains severely constrained.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>Southern Africa’s liberation movements have been losing popularity and confronting a crisis of legitimacy.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/998592018-07-16T14:15:04Z2018-07-16T14:15:04ZCan Zimbabwe finally ditch a history of violence and media repression?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227563/original/file-20180713-27045-2alah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zanu-PF supporters at a peace rally in Harare.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe’s governing Zanu-PF is earnestly courting international legitimacy as the country approaches its first post-independence elections <a href="https://www.apnews.com/baee38cf5cd24282be5d7c332848a8b2">without Robert Mugabe</a>. </p>
<p>The party frequently uses clichés like “fresh start”, “new dispensation”, and “open for business” to signal its willingness to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/24/africa/zimbabwe-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-davos-intl/index.html">engage with the West</a>. The talk has been matched by some action.</p>
<p>The government has repudiated most of its <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/govt-amends-indigenisation-law/">indigenisation legislation</a>, and recently <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/62f28a38-5d0a-11e8-9334-2218e7146b04">applied to re-join</a> The Commonwealth. Additionally, <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimbabwe-invites-46-countries-to-observe-2018-polls/">46 countries and 15 regional bodies</a> have been invited to observe the elections. This includes many Western nations that had been excluded in recent years.</p>
<p>Their assessments will probably not be decided by technical factors. It seems unlikely that ongoing debates over <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/zec-under-fire-over-undelivered-voters-roll/">the voter’s roll</a> or the prominence of ex-military personnel in the <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/02/soldiers-make-15-zec-staff/">Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</a> will have much impact on the final judgements passed by the monitoring missions.</p>
<p>It’s more likely that the credibility of the elections will be shaped by issues such as political violence and media freedom. In both spheres, the legacy of colonialism and the liberation struggle weigh heavily. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-71015.html">breakaway party</a> from the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) in 1963, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) emerged in a very fragile position. It endured violence against its members and was denied access to a free media. In later years, the party perpetrated and perpetuated the same tactics under which it was conceived – both as a liberation movement and in government.</p>
<p>There are a number of examples of how Zanu-PF drew on colonial-era repressive tactics in its post-independence quest for political primacy. These include the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/01/31/gukurahundi-is-mugabe-s-baby">Gukurahundi violence</a> under the Mugabe led government in the 1980s against areas predominantly supporting Zapu, the government’s 2005 <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-operation-murambatsvina-overview-and-summary">Operation Murambatsvina</a> which targeted properties belonging mostly to urban opposition supporters, and the 2008 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">election run-off violence</a> after Mugabe lost the first round of voting.</p>
<p>As Zimbabweans head to the polls on July 30, this history looms large over the electorate and those responsible for overseeing its successful execution.</p>
<h2>History of political violence</h2>
<p>In July 1960, unprecedented protests in Zimbabwe’s two largest cities ushered in a new era of political violence in the British colony. A year later violence erupted within the liberation movement itself. In June 1961, the first significant attempt to form a breakaway nationalist movement in Zimbabwe was thwarted. Members of the <a href="https://zimhistassociation.wordpress.com/2018/03/27/the-first-split-in-zimbabwes-anti-colonial-struggle-continues-to-cast-shadows-over-contemporary-politics/">Zimbabwe National Party</a> (ZNP) were physically prevented from launching the party at their own press conference by <a href="http://www.sundaynews.co.zw/events-leading-to-banning-of-ndp/">National Democratic Party</a> (NDP) sympathisers.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The ill-fated efforts of the ZNP would have been prominent in the minds of Zanu founders when it was formed two years later. </p>
<p>Zapu, which replaced the NDP after it was banned, went to great lengths to beat Zanu into submission. The houses of Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole, the top leaders in Zanu, <a href="http://cba1415.web.unc.edu/files/2014/07/zapu.pdf">were stoned</a> after the new party was launched.</p>
<p>As other African nations became independent and Zimbabwe remained under minority rule, frustration mounted. This led to a determination to achieve majority rule by any means. A <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/arts/roots-political-violence-go-deep-zimbabwe">culture of political violence</a> became institutionalised.</p>
<h2>Media Repression</h2>
<p>Assaults on the media were particularly prominent under white minority rule following the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/40-years-on-from-udi-zimbabwe-is-still-paying-the-price-1-1101979">Censors </a> redacted broad swathes of news stories, littering papers with blank pages.</p>
<p>This overt censorship was but a new manifestation of a repressive media heritage. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/blcas/welensky.html">Political papers</a> of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/07/world/sir-roy-welensky-84-premier-of-african-federation-is-dead.html">Roy Welensky</a>, the second Prime Minister of the Federation to which Southern Rhodesia belonged from 1953 - 1963, reveal the invidious nature of attempts to control the press. His government covertly worked with journalists and editors to produce articles critical of the white opposition in newspapers that were nominally independent. He also consulted with the white publishers of newspapers geared toward a black audience about ways to promote his government.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol23n2/juz023002004.pdf"><em>Central African Examiner</em></a>, a news magazine that was theoretically independent and had links with <em>The Economist</em>, changed editors in the middle of the 1958 elections. The new editor, David Cole, was Welensky’s public relations adviser. </p>
<p>In 1961 the government considered blocking the sale of the colony’s newspaper titles catering to a predominantly black audience to the Thomson Newspaper Group. The concern was that it would be difficult to influence the editorial policy of papers with foreign ownership. Meanwhile, newspapers geared toward a predominantly white audience and owned by the South African based Argus Press were not seen as posing a threat.</p>
<p>The sale went ahead. But in August 1964 both the African Daily News (which had a pro-Zapu bias) and Zanu <a href="http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol6n2/juz006002015.pdf">were banned</a>. </p>
<p>Zanu learnt the importance of media control in its early years. Once in power it exerted its own influence. Forty years after Zanu and the <em>African Daily News</em> were proscribed, Zanu-PF replicated the tactics when it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2004/jan/22/pressandpublishing.Zimbabwenews">banned a newspaper, also known as the Daily News</a> amid a media clampdown.</p>
<h2>Eyes on Mnangagwa</h2>
<p>While President Emmerson Mnangagwa has backtracked from Mugabe’s more confrontational rhetoric, his political career is nearly as long as his predecessor’s. His political upbringing was profoundly shaped by the repressive measures the nationalists endured and took up in the 1960s to dismantle the unjust system that governed them.</p>
<p>Zanu-PF’s assaults on the media and penchant for violence are reflective of similar tactics that were used against the party during the colonial era. And they have been critical to its ability to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/06/10/violence-dominates-zim-political-history/">obtain and retain power</a> for 37 years. </p>
<p>Will Zimbabwe be able to turn the corner and move toward a more equitable election campaign in which the historic trajectory of media repression and political violence is fundamentally altered? If the answer is yes, Mnangagwa will have made a significant stride in truly ushering in a “<a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/the-first-100-days-of-the-new-dispensation/">new dispensation</a>”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99859/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brooks Marmon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The credibility of Zimbabwe’s elections will depend on issues like political violence and media freedom.Brooks Marmon, PhD Student, Centre of African Studies, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/919242018-02-15T12:37:42Z2018-02-15T12:37:42ZZuma era lessons: how democracies can be held hostage by party machinations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206537/original/file-20180215-131003-41tbrk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jacob Zuma announces his decision to step down.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/02/15/must-read-jacob-zuma-s-resignation-address">Jacob Zuma’s late night announcement</a> that he would step down as president of South Africa followed days of tense negotiations within the governing African National Congress (ANC). The Conversation Africa asked academics what lessons can be learnt, and how the ANC can redeem itself in the post-Zuma era.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Is this the biggest political crisis that South Africa has faced since democracy?</strong></p>
<p><em><strong>Vishnu Padayachee, the University of the Witwatersrand:</strong></em> Its equivalent to the recall of President Thabo Mbeki in 2008. For the people of South Africa to have been forced to suffer through this is hard to believe. The crises have lost the country much ground, locally and internationally. </p>
<p><em><strong>Jannie Rossouw, the University of the Witwatersrand:</strong></em> This will surely go down as one of the biggest political crises faced by South Africa in the post apartheid era. The situation became highly slippery as Zuma appeared to be defying calls by his party to resign. International experiences tells us that a stand off like that could easily develop into raging conflict.</p>
<p>Zuma’s expressions during the interview he had with the national broadcaster hours before he finally resigned did not help the situation. In addition to claiming that he did nothing wrong, he seemed to be making veiled threats.</p>
<p><em><strong>Mashupye Maserumule,Tshwane University of Technology:</strong></em> The steps to remove Zuma plunged the country into a political crisis. It exposed the dissonance between political processes of the African National Congress (ANC) as the governing party and those of the state, particularly around the party’s succession battle. </p>
<p>This has been a neglected lacuna, which started to show when Mbeki was recalled. At that time the big question was: what are the implications of the ANC’s concept of “recall” on South Africa’s constitutional democracy? This is because the recall wasn’t congruous with the provisions of the country’s constitution to remove a president. But it was never adequately debated and Zuma’s removal brought back these unresolved issues. </p>
<p><strong>Can the ANC salvage itself?</strong></p>
<p><em><strong>Vishnu Padayachee, the University of the Witwatersrand:</strong></em> For the ANC to salvage itself, a renewal is needed. It has to develop a new culture of inclusive and democratic politics at all levels. To do this, it will have to pay more attention to political education instead of regurgitating the political education of the camps. This is totally inappropriate for the 21st Century. </p>
<p>It must attack corruption with greater vigour and visible energy than it has done in the past. </p>
<p>But it must also attend to the critical tasks of re-igniting growth, creating employment, reducing the income and wealth inequality in addition to prioritising service delivery. For this, the Cyril Ramaphosa-led ANC needs a new progressive macroeconomic policy framework. This must be state led in the first phase to “crowd in” domestic and foreign investment through the opportunities created by rising growth and effective demand. </p>
<p><em><strong>Jannie Rossouw, the University of the Witwatersrand:</strong></em> To salvage itself, the ANC must eradicate corruption and replace corrupt and incompetent cabinet ministers. It must be clear after the replacement of Zuma that the ANC puts the people of South Africa first, rather than the interests of politicians.</p>
<p><em><strong>Mashupye Maserumule, Tshwane University of Technology:</strong></em> Firstly, a governing party in a constitutional democracy needs to have exemplary leadership. </p>
<p>There are several other lessons the ANC must learn for it to emerge from this fiasco. </p>
<p>The first is that its internal political processes have implications on the administration of the state. These should be synchronised with those prescribed in the country’s Constitution. </p>
<p>Secondly, it shouldn’t compromise in its fight against corruption, and should pursue ethical leadership on all levels in the organisation from its branches to its regions, provinces and its national leaders. </p>
<p>Thirdly, the ANC’s integrity commission must start to bite, without fear or favour. It should be well-resourced. In addition, the ANC should invest more in the political education of its cadres.</p>
<p>But lastly, it should also outgrow the nostalgic streak of being a liberation movement and embrace the reality that it is a governing party in a constitutional democracy.</p>
<p><strong>What does this mean for democracy in South Africa?</strong></p>
<p><em><strong>Vishnu Padayachee, the University of the Witwatersrand:</strong></em> South Africa’s hard won democracy has simply become a charade. If democracy is to be strengthened there are several things that have to change: how the President of the republic is elected; how members of parliament are elected and held accountable and how officers of parliament are elected. South Africa also has to find ways of creating new mechanisms for citizen to participate in the democracy between elections. </p>
<p>After 1994 South Africa simply re-positioned itself in the flawed structures of democracy that it inherited. The country should have taken time to re-think its position to ensure a more effective and functioning democracy where the people would come first.</p>
<p><em><strong>Jannie Rossouw, the University of the Witwatersrand:</strong></em> Democracy in South Africa will be stronger. Zuma’s resignation shows that it is possible to remove a corrupt president through constitutional measures.</p>
<p>The problem was that Zuma confused support he had as a result of being in power as personal popularity. This is a mistake many powerful people in politics, government and private business make. It is therefore not surprising that his support in the ANC Parliamentary Caucus slipped quickly once it became clear that his grip on power started slipping.</p>
<p>But the constitutional drama raises questions about the conduct of the ruling party to have kept Zuma in power so long after his corrupt conduct. For this, the ANC owes all South Africans an apology. </p>
<p><em><strong>Mashupye Maserumule, Tshwane University of Technology:</strong></em> The developments show that South Africa’s democracy is vulnerable to manipulation by party political processes. The processes of the leadership succession in the ANC ran roughshod over the supremacy of the Constitution of the country. </p>
<p>But in the end, Zuma was a disaster and the ANC’s decision to ask him to step down was the correct one. Even if Zuma was a good state president who had lost the presidency of his party, he would still have been coerced to resign, as it happened with Thabo Mbeki.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91924/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vishnu Padayachee was a non-executive director of the South African Reserve Bank from 1996-2007. He received numerous research grants from local and international foundations and Councils but none related to research on the subject of monetary policy and central banking.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jannie Rossouw is a NRF C3-rated researcher and receives funding from the NRF.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding previously from the National Research Foundation. He is affiliated to the South African Association of Public Administration and Management(SAAPAM). He is the Chief Editor of the Journal of Public Administration.</span></em></p>There are several steps South Africa’s governing party must take to strengthen democracy now that Jacob Zuma has resigned.Vishnu Padayachee, Distinguished Professor and Derek Schrier and Cecily Cameron Chair in Development Economics, School of Economics and Business Sciences, University of the WitwatersrandJannie Rossouw, Head of School of Economic & Business Sciences, University of the WitwatersrandMashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/781342017-05-29T14:01:28Z2017-05-29T14:01:28ZIt’s 30 years since Cuito Cuanavale. How the battle redefined southern Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171125/original/file-20170526-6380-10jzeca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rebel UNITA troops walk through a field twenty miles from the front line at Munhango, Angola April 29, 1986. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Wendy Schwegmann</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Thirty years ago in southern Angola, four military forces were mobilising for <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/battle-cuito-cuanavale-1988">the largest conventional battle</a> in Africa since the Second World War. It was a battle that would have huge consequences for Angola, Namibia and South Africa. Indeed it has been referred to as a <a href="https://monthlyreview.org/2013/04/01/cuito-cuanavale-angola/">turning point</a> in southern African history.</p>
<p>On the one side was the Angolan army backed by Cuban forces and Soviet advisers. On the other was the South African backed Angolan rebel movement fighting to overthrow the government. </p>
<p>The rebel Union for the Total Independence of Angola, better known by their Portuguese acronym Unita, had been one of the three liberation groups fighting Portuguese colonialism. But it is the pro-socialist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/11/newsid_2539000/2539679.stm">won power</a> in 1975 and formed the government. </p>
<p>With western support and arms supplies from South Africa and the <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/79546/next-stop-angola-reagan-doctrine-communism-intervention">Reagan administration</a>, Unita’s campaign to topple the government turned Angola into a Cold War battleground. The climax of this was the battle at Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola that lasted from March 1987 until the end of June 1988. </p>
<p>There are still fierce arguments about how important the battle was, who won and whether the South African army was really defeated. </p>
<p>That those who fought in the battle should have wildly different interpretations of its importance is not surprising. This is brought out strikingly in a new edition of Fred Bridgland’s book <a href="http://www.casematepublishing.co.uk/index.php/the-war-for-africa.html">The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent</a>. Originally published in 1990, it’s an account, primarily from the South African side, of the military campaign that reached its climax at Cuito Cuanavale.</p>
<h2>Contesting narratives</h2>
<p>The ANC and it’s leader Nelson Mandela, the Cubans and the Angolan government claim the South African army was decisively defeated. The veteran ANC military intelligence chief Ronnie Kasrils, <a href="https://monthlyreview.org/2013/04/01/cuito-cuanavale-angola/">described</a> it as </p>
<blockquote>
<p>a historic turning point in the struggle for the total liberation of the region from racist rule and aggression.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But many South African who fought in Angola swear that they were never defeated, as South African author and academic Leopold Scholtz noted in his <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/African-Defence-Forces-Border-1966-1989-x/dp/1909982768/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1496043564&sr=8-2&keywords=Leopold+Scholtz">book</a> on the battle. </p>
<p>Objective observers declared the end to have been a tactical military <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/battle-cuito-cuanavale-1988">stalemate</a> between the allied forces on either side. But it was a stalemate that led to major strategic realignments with huge consequences for the whole region, leading to the independence of Namibia, the withdrawal of South African and Cuban forces from Angola and the eventual <a href="http://www.historytoday.com/gary-baines/replaying-cuito-cuanavale">dismantling</a> of apartheid.</p>
<p>Nelson Mandela lauded the result of the battle during a visit to Cuba in 1991 to thank Fidel Castro for supporting liberation struggles in southern Africa. The future president of South Africa said in his <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2013/12/11/nelson_mandela_on_how_cuba_destroyed">keynote speech</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The decisive defeat of the racist army in Cuito Cuanavale was a victory for all Africa. This victory in Cuito Cuanavale is what made it possible for Angola to enjoy peace and establish its own sovereignty. The defeat of the racist army made it possible for the people of Namibia to achieve their independence. The decisive defeat of the aggressive apartheid forces destroyed the myth of the invincibility of the white oppressor.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Stalemate in Cuito Cuanavale</h2>
<p>At the time of the campaign and the key siege of Cuito Cuanavale, Bridgland was a journalist with unrivalled access to the rebels. Through the rebels, he also got access to South African Defence Force (SADF) in southern Angola. He says that the chief of the SADF, General Jannie Geldenhuys, gave him unfettered access to his officers and men on the frontline. </p>
<p>His account of the Cuito Cuanavale campaign is detailed and fascinating, but clearly written from one side. It was impossible for him to report from the Angolan government and Cuban side. The South Africans had been in Angola almost continuously since their unsuccessful bid in 1975 to put UNITA in power. </p>
<p>Their present objective was to weaken the socialist-oriented Angolan government, stop it from supporting the ANC and the Namibian Swapo movement. The aim was then to create a buffer to stop Swapo guerrillas entering South Africa-occupied Namibia.</p>
<p>The fighting lasted from initial skirmishes in March 1987, through the smashing of the Angolan army advance at the Lomba river in September-October 1987. Then followed the siege of Cuito Cuanavale by the South Africans and Unita from January to the end of March 1988. It ended with the Cuban bombing of the Calueque dam on 27 June 1988.</p>
<p>The battle for Cuito Cuanavale ended in stalemate with the SADF and Unita unable to overrun the Angolan positions and the Angolan-Cuban force unable to continue the offensive. The South Africans admitted to losing 79 dead, with two Mirage fighters and one Bosbok spotter plane shot down, plus three Olifant tanks and four Ratel armoured vehicles destroyed, as Bridgland describes in his very detailed book. </p>
<h2>Politics by other means</h2>
<p>The combination of being fought to a stalemate in the battle, and the heavy loss of life and material that couldn’t be replaced, was something South Africa couldn’t ignore. On top of that was the attack on the Calueque dam which demonstrated Angolan and Cuban air superiority. </p>
<p>Taken in the context of the domestic political violence, the growing economic crisis and international pressure, the results of the Cuito Cuanavale campaign were crucial in persuading the leaders of South Africa’s National Party to cut their losses. They did so following talks with the Soviet Union, Angola, Cuba, Britain and the United States. </p>
<p>This led directly to a ceasefire agreement on the total withdrawal of South African and Cuban forces from Angola. Also agreed was a timetable for UN-supervised elections in Namibia, leading to independence in March 1990. By this time, the ANC had been unbanned and Mandela released.</p>
<p>Cuito Cuanavale was not a military victory for any of the combatants. One must view it in the light of the maxim of the 19th century military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz that war is the <a href="https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch01.html">“continuation of politics by other means”</a>. There was never going to be a decisive military victory in southern Angola. </p>
<p>The battle of Cuito Cuanavale was a turning point, but one that needs to be taken in context.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78134/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Somerville does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For a military battle whose outcome is still hotly contested 30 years later, the impact was so remarkably clear – independence for Namibia, peace for Angola and the death knell for apartheid.Keith Somerville, Visiting Professor, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/760262017-04-19T15:16:15Z2017-04-19T15:16:15ZSouth Africa’s ANC can stay a liberation movement and govern well<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165115/original/image-20170412-25898-1979v02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s governing party, is <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/cloneofsouth-africa-anc-awaits-key-municipal-ele-160804084046975.html">weakening</a>. It has recently committed some <a href="https://theconversation.com/firing-of-south-africas-finance-minister-puts-the-public-purse-in-zumas-hands-75525">terrible mistakes</a> in government. </p>
<p>High on the list of errors is its decision to close ranks in defence of President Jacob Zuma during the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/09/15/Joel-Netshitenzhe-Nkandla-state-capture-evoke-indignation">Nkandla debacle</a> where public money was used on upgrades to his private homestead. Then there’s the deployment of incompetent “cadres” to critical positions in government as well as Zuma’s ill-timed <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2017-01-24-aubrey-matshiqi-zuma-move-will-show-who-insiders-are/">cabinet reshuffle</a>. </p>
<p>Critics argue that these problems stem from the ANC’s insistence on being a <a href="https://v1.sahistory.org.za/pages/pdf/raymond-suttner/ANC-attainment-power.pdf">liberation movement</a> which they say is incompatible with a constitutional democracy. </p>
<p>This has raised the question about the party’s very nature: Is it not time for the ANC to stop seeing itself as a liberation movement but rather a modern, professional political party?</p>
<p>But that argument is hard to sustain. There’s nothing particular about political parties that makes them compatible with constitutional democracy.</p>
<h2>Liberation movement vs political party</h2>
<p>Those opposed to the ANC’s holding place as a liberation movement argue that a movement – liberation or social – is the old way of doing politics. This, they claim, was suitable during the struggles against colonialism and apartheid. But that struggle is now over and the post-apartheid era presents a new set of challenges.</p>
<p>The idea of a liberation movement keeps archaic and obsolete traditions alive. These include the leadership collective, consensus choice of leadership, revolution, comradeship, cadre deployment and patriarchal leadership patterns.</p>
<p>The role and character of liberation movements in power is informed by the democracy theory (coming out of <a href="https://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/POLSC2312.1.4.pdf">liberalism ideology</a>) and the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/party_dominance.pdf">theory of party dominance</a>. These theories suggest that for democracy to be effective, there should be vibrant political party competition because it strengthens deliberative aspects of a liberal democracy. It also engenders internal dynamism and change of groups of elites in power. </p>
<p>The party dominance theory leads to the view that the ANC dominates South Africa’s politics because of its liberation movement legacy. This dominance is seen as inimical to democratic competition. </p>
<p>But when liberation movements become political parties they enhance their efficiency and effectiveness. They also deepen their internal democracy and their ability to connect with the wider public.</p>
<p>Internal democracy within the ANC is seen as <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-countrys-constitutional-court-can-consolidate-and-deepen-democracy-54184">particularly important</a> given its political dominance. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ANC military veterans guard the party’s headquarters ahead of a march by the opposition DA.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Political parties shed the tendency towards <a href="https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-7/basoc/ch-5.htm">democratic centralism</a>, and its opaque internal political systems which insist on toeing the party line and brooks no dissent. </p>
<p>Political parties are assumed to operate like professional associations. They value accountability and transparency embracing modern systems of management and leadership. This enables them to become dynamic platforms for advancing refined political ends. </p>
<p>The conduct of Zuma and his cohort of leaders has been blamed on the ANC’s choice to remain steeped in the traditions of a <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/iservice/the-marginalisation-of-parliament">liberation movement</a>. The form determines the content: it produces tendencies that cause all manner of problems. </p>
<p>The ANC has made some catastrophic mistakes. It sometimes displayed arrogance in power and has allowed corrupt leaders to go <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-at-an-inflection-point-will-it-resist-or-succumb-to-state-capture-66523">unpunished</a>. </p>
<p>There has also been a vacillation of policy stances on the economy, land and other crucial policy areas. Largely sound policies have been poorly implemented. </p>
<p>And there have been cases where the party and the state’s affairs have been <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/anc-urges-government-to-review-madonselas-party-state-separation-findings">conflated</a>.</p>
<p>Some have argued that these problems stem from the ANC remaining essentially a liberation movement. To move with the times, they argue, it needs to assume a new, modern professional political party posture. </p>
<h2>Lessons from elsewhere</h2>
<p>The challenge in the ANC is, however, not unique to South Africa.
Liberal democrats in Japan, Christian democrats in Italy, the <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21711925-new-law-has-allowed-government-freeze-its-assets-leaving-it-unable-pay-staff-taiwans">Kuomintang</a> in Taiwan and nationalist democrats in Kenya all experienced similar challenges. </p>
<p>Although they were not liberation movements, they share a number of features with the ANC. This includes arrogance of power, personalisation of power, elitism and the preponderance of sectional interests over the common good. So, it seems these are tendencies that need to be overcome.</p>
<p>It’s hard to sustain the argument that liberation movements are not right for democratic consolidation merely because they are movements or that political parties are by nature good for competitive politics. Political parties can dominate, distort, corrupt, abuse, and complicate democratic systems just as liberation movements deepen democracy by strengthening its social basis. </p>
<h2>What the ANC needs to do</h2>
<p>The ANC doesn’t need to transition into a political party, whatever that means in practice. But, it needs to develop a leadership that’s competent to use the state to change the economy fundamentally in order to serve the majority and bring about qualitatively positive changes to the people, especially the poor.</p>
<p>The party needs to put a stop to the self-inflicted damage to its image through endless scandals, public displays of arrogance, factionalism and internal conflict. </p>
<p>The ANC also needs to end its practice of deploying poor quality cadres to critical state structures, and start heeding the counsel of its friends and foes that it must place the country’s interests before sectional interests of whatever faction of its leadership is in power. </p>
<p>It can look to the <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Editorial/What-we-can-learn-from-Tanzania-s-Chama-Cha-Mapinduzi/689360-2787692-1173726z/index.html">Chama Cha Mapinduzi</a> movement that’s been in power in Tanzania since the 1960s for example.</p>
<p>The party has ensured an open contest for leadership positions. The elected leaders are then expected to root out corruption, crime, tribalism and so forth.</p>
<p>There’s a constant change of national leadership and a level of dynamism that enables the movement to adapt to changing society. It has produced leaders like <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/former-tanzanian-president-julius-nyerere-dies">Julius Nyerere</a> and <a href="http://zikoko.com/list/8-reasons-tanzanias-john-magufuli-africas-beloved-president/">John Magafuli </a>who commands respect across party lines. </p>
<p>If liberation movements were formed to achieve total decolonisation and freedom, then for as a long the process is incomplete, they will have a good reason to exist. Like orthodox political parties, they constantly have to adapt to change.</p>
<p>Ultimately, democracy is meaningless if it doesn’t improve the material circumstances for the people. To do this, political formations must be occupied by conscientious, competent, compassionate and interested political elite.</p>
<p>This is what the ANC has shown it lacks as it attempts to “deal” with every scandal and crisis it causes. The problem isn’t its commitment to being a liberation movement, but rather that it wants to be a callous one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76026/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siphamandla Zondi works for Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, which sometimes receives funding from research funding foundations like the Mellon Foundation and NRF. </span></em></p>Democracy in South Africa is meaningless if it doesn’t improve the lives of the people. To do this, the governing ANC must be led by conscientious, competent and interested leaders.Siphamandla Zondi, Professor and head of department of Political Sciences and acting head of the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/649892016-10-23T18:18:11Z2016-10-23T18:18:11ZInside apartheid’s prison – an experience that haunts for a lifetime<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136723/original/image-20160906-6127-8qd3ih.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A young Raymond Suttner with his bird, Jailbird (JB).</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gisèle Wulfsohn</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em><a href="https://raymondsuttner.com/about/">Raymond Suttner</a> was actively involved in the liberation struggle against apartheid, both in legal political activities and illegal underground work. He served two periods of imprisonment and after release in 1988 was under house arrest, totalling 11 years. At one point he was in the leadership of the banned <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/african-national-congress-anc">African National Congress</a>, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/south-african-communist-party-sacp">South African Communist Party</a> and the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/united-democratic-front-udf">United Democratic Front</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>In 1975 he was charged under the Internal Security Act after six weeks of detention during which he was tortured. This is an edited extract from his book Inside Apartheid’s Prison (2001). An updated edition with an afterword is set to be published early in 2017 by Jacana Media.</em></p>
<p>My experience of prison is still with me, years after I was finally released in 1988. It is something that makes me want to get out of claustrophobic, overheated rooms, to have access to fresh air and light, to avoid dark and dingy rooms and have a sense of space. It also resurfaces when I am forced to be with people with whom I have little in common.</p>
<p>What I found most oppressive was the absolute denial of everything I really wanted to do. This not only involved being confined to a physical space, but the imposition of sights and sounds that were unwanted and unwelcome.</p>
<p>There was no raised bed in the prison cell. I slept under blankets, on a mat placed on the cement floor. But the cell did have a basin and was clean. I was also permitted, under South African law, to have reading matter, and soon collected a lot of literature. </p>
<p>Obviously, the prison authorities had never encountered anything like this before, for they had no bookcases or were very reluctant to supply anything to house more than a Bible. I was supplied with very makeshift containers to accommodate my books.</p>
<p>I was the only political prisoner in the prison. Most of the other prisoners were awaiting trial. As remains the case today, many of these people waited months in jail before their cases were settled.</p>
<h2>Prison textures, materials and colours</h2>
<p>The prison was all grey and steel. These two words define the textures, the materials and colours I would have to deal with for a long time. In prison, there is little you want to touch or look at. The mat was rough, the blankets uninviting. There was nothing comforting or homely about what was to be my home. </p>
<p>There was no garden and there was little time to see the sky. I was allowed out into a small part of a yard for half an hour in the morning and half an hour in the afternoon. If I had a visit, it substituted for exercise. The rest of the time I stayed in my cell. And I could see nothing outside of it. </p>
<p>I was initially charged under the apartheid regime’s <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/1967-terrorism-act-no-83-1967">Terrorism Act</a> on August 3 1975. But this was merely a formality. The actual trial would start two months later, with the charges formulated under the Internal Security Act.</p>
<p>Just before being charged, I was given fresh clothes and taken for a haircut. I also decided to have my beard shaved off, since it might make me look more respectable in the eyes of a white South African judge. I also wanted to appear as dignified as possible, as I was a representative of the liberation movement.</p>
<p>Two things changed after I was charged and returned to the Durban Central prison. I now had access to lawyers and could see visitors for 30 minutes, twice a week. </p>
<p>Although aspects of my conditions were better than I had expected, I was impatient to have my trial settled and know my sentence so I could adapt to the life that lay ahead.</p>
<p>It was pleasant, as well as unsettling, to be visited by friends, and for them to send me food and fruit, which was allowed prior to sentencing. This made life easier, but I kept on thinking that I should not get used to such “luxuries”.</p>
<h2>Judas hole</h2>
<p>Although not yet a sentenced prisoner, I started to get a glimpse of what lay ahead of me. I saw the various ways in which prison rules try to rob prisoners of their individuality. There were constant invasions of privacy and attacks on the dignity of prisoners. One little thing that immediately struck me was the “Judas hole” on the door. </p>
<p>Any passerby could look into my cell whenever it took his fancy and sometimes other prisoners would do so, and shout obscenities at me. I felt, then, a peculiar sense of powerlessness. I could not see much of the outside from inside the cell, but anyone looking in could see as much as they liked and deprive me of any semblance of privacy. It was sometimes quite intimidating to have a person I could not see shouting threats at me from outside the cell.</p>
<p>From early on I noticed the prison noises, the occasional silences, broken by terrible noises, the banging of steel doors, jingling of keys, shouting and swearing of warders. No prison official speaks softly. Officers would shout at warders and warders always shouted at prisoners.</p>
<p>Sleep was difficult, since the young warders on patrol did not bother to be quiet. When they looked into my cell at night, they would switch on the light long enough to wake me and then go away. Sometimes a young warder would just stand around, apparently aimlessly, but lightly jingling his keys, enough to cause considerable irritation and make me realise how frayed my nerves were.</p>
<p>There were no direct contact visits, and you had to speak through a glass panel. Sometimes other prisoners had visitors at the same time as I did, although they generally tried to keep us separate. I preferred it this way, because it was hard to hear above the shouting of other prisoners and their visitors.</p>
<h2>Statement from the dock</h2>
<p>At this time, I was preoccupied with preparing my <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-court-raymond-suttner-lecturer-law-university-natal">statement from the dock</a>. There was not a lot I could say in my defence. Purely in terms of the law, the case against me was cut-and-dried. </p>
<p>In a letter to my grandmother, which was dated August 18, 1975, I wrote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Generally I do not feel very depressed here. It is a great waste to have to spend this time locked away and conviction for a minimum of 5 years will mean that – but I cannot pity myself in this context: there are others who have far longer sentences and also went to prison around my age. Though I do not want to go to gaol, this does not mean that I have any regrets for what I have done – I would do everything, but more again. That I have done insufficient is what I regret.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This passage is written in the tone of the revolutionaries I studied and tried to emulate. It is also a good example of my tendency to deny my own pain precisely because I knew others were experiencing worse. ANC leader <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography">Nelson Mandela</a> had been sentenced to life imprisonment. Therefore, I chose to say nothing about my own suffering.</p>
<h2>Taking a defiant stance</h2>
<p>At the time, I really did not understand what it meant to be put away for years – or know what depression really meant. I wrongly equated depression with unhappiness. I knew how to act, and how to take a defiant and unrepentant stance. But I did not foresee the real suffering that lay ahead, nor understand the toll that long imprisonment exacts. I am not sure that I fully understand it now, outside of recognising that many of my present habits are conditioned by my prison experiences.</p>
<p>But perhaps my behaviour was right at the time. Denying my pain was at least a strategy for coping, and perhaps an effective one. And I honestly did feel ashamed of complaining, especially when others had much heavier sentences. Complaining – as distinct from protesting – might have only wasted time, lowering my own morale and that of my comrades. </p>
<p>We live in different times now, and I am able to look back and be honest about how terrible it was.</p>
<p>The letters I wrote at the time, typical of my attitude of the time, now seem a little naive. But I was forced to draw on some basic beliefs to survive those difficult times. And my convictions were, in many ways, the key to my survival. </p>
<p>I took a defiant stance, made no apologies for what I had done and stood with the liberation movement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64989/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Raymond Suttner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Spending time in prison for one’s political beliefs can be incredibly challenging. Those convictions can help you to survive those times.Raymond Suttner, Emeritus Professor, University of South Africa and part-time professor, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.