tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/limits-to-empathy-36399/articlesLimits to empathy – The Conversation2019-06-07T11:44:22Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1183592019-06-07T11:44:22Z2019-06-07T11:44:22ZAutism is linked to lower levels of empathy – but that may not be a bad thing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278490/original/file-20190607-52748-18ewpnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/rear-view-hugging-female-friends-sitting-310570025?src=EPfsOLCizeih6OdTIN9DFA-1-38&studio=1">Shutterstock/Dragon Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>We use empathy to understand other people’s feelings – to be able to predict and influence their behaviour. But the ability to empathise varies from person to person. While many people are easily able to understand others, some people – such as the majority of those with autism – experience difficulties in social situations.</p>
<p>Empathy has therefore been the focus of much psychological research, particularly in autism. Yet there is still some debate about whether or not people on the autistic spectrum experience empathetic difficulties. This lack of clarity has, until now, been largely due to problems associated with the tests used to measure empathy and the small number of participants in research. </p>
<p>Studying empathy in autism is further complicated by the fact that many autistic people also have <a href="http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150818-what-is-it-like-to-have-never-felt-an-emotion">alexithymia</a>, a condition known as “emotional blindness”.</p>
<p>People with alexithymia have difficulty understanding their own emotions, so they struggle to understand how others are feeling too. It is important to consider alexithymia when investigating empathy and autism – this is something that has not been enought of a focus in previous research.</p>
<p>In an effort to counter these previous limitations, a <a href="https://rdcu.be/bFMcY">brand new study</a> used large-scale surveys of more than 600 adults from the general population. <a href="https://www.punitqshah.com/">Punit Shah</a> and his team measured the links between autism, alexithymia, and scores on a <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21184334">reliable empathy test</a>. The study also used statistical methods that had not previously been used in autism research.</p>
<p>The study found that having more autistic traits is associated with lower empathy – even after factoring alexithymia into the analysis. In fact, the study provides some of the best evidence so far that autism is definitely linked to lower empathy. </p>
<p>We hope these findings will help to resolve debate among researchers and clinicians, and ultimately help to improve understanding and acceptance of people with autistic tendencies and diagnosed autism.</p>
<h2>A different view</h2>
<p>But we also need to consider whether autism being linked with lower empathy may not necessarily be a bad thing. Empathy is useful in social situations, but it has also been found to be <a href="https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/04/190422090847.htm">mentally tiring</a>. </p>
<p>It is also thought that “selective” empathy, such as understanding some people’s feelings while ignoring the feelings of others, leads to immoral behaviour and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Si1YSUAEH4w">exclusion of some groups from society</a>. For example, it is common for people to engage in behaviours that prioritise the feelings of friends and family, but neglect the perspectives of strangers.</p>
<p>Empathy is widely seen as a positive attribute, but it has a <a href="https://www.vox.com/conversations/2017/1/19/14266230/empathy-morality-ethics-psychology-compassion-paul-bloom">dark side</a> that is poorly understood. So lower empathy in autism might have benefits that we do not yet fully appreciate.</p>
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<p>There are other psychological abilities <a href="https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/aut.2018.0035">related to autism</a> that can also be useful in society. For example, autism has been linked to higher levels of <a href="https://molecularautism.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13229-016-0104-x">logical thinking and rational decision making</a>. </p>
<p>Autistic people have also been shown to make fairer social decisions. Earlier this month <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/aur.2130">it was reported</a> that they are more likely to share money equally with unfamiliar people instead of taking more money for themselves. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/people-with-autism-make-more-logical-decisions-66946">People with autism make more logical decisions</a>
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<p>It may be that it a lower level of empathy is actually allowing autistic people to make these fairer decisions, without undue influence of how others may respond emotionally. </p>
<p>Outside of social contexts, other psychological abilities of autistic people have been identified. For instance, it has been well established that they have <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10803-013-1957-x">superior visual search abilities</a>. That is, autistic people are better able to scan a visual environment and find a specific object or feature.</p>
<p>It has also been suggested that autistic people may have <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10803-015-2518-2">untapped creative talent</a>. It is likely there are many more abilities associated with autism that are not yet fully appreciated. </p>
<p>What is clear is that autism is linked to a different way of thinking. This sometimes makes interactions awkward between people with and without autistic tendencies. </p>
<p>But autistic ways of thinking are enormously valuable. They allow people to view problems from new perspectives and challenge irrational thinking, which fuels progress in society. Lower empathy and other psychological factors related to autism may in fact have unrealised potential to improve all of our lives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118359/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emily Taylor receives funding from a Whorrod Doctoral Scholarship. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucy Anne Livingston receives funding from the Medical Research Council and is an employee of the National Autistic Society.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Punit Shah has received funding from the Medical Research Council</span></em></p>Attributes of autism can have a hugely positive role in society.Emily Taylor, PhD Candidate, University of BathLucy Anne Livingston, Researcher, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College LondonPunit Shah, Assistant Professor (Lecturer) in Psychology, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/919872018-02-22T01:47:06Z2018-02-22T01:47:06ZHow we decide who and what we care about – and whether robots stand a chance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207199/original/file-20180221-161923-1n9bpla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The 2014 film Ex Machina explored a dystopian vision of what could happen in a world where humans empathise with robots.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.lionsgatepublicity.com/home-entertainment/exmachina/">Lionsgate Home Entertainment</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When psychologists talk about a “moral circle” they are referring to how far we extend our moral consideration towards others. That is, whether we care about the well-being of others, and act accordingly.</p>
<p>For most of us, the continuum of our moral circle is pretty straightforward: we include our loved ones, and we aren’t all that concerned about rocks or the villains of society. But the middle ground between the obvious ins and the obvious outs are not quite as clear-cut.</p>
<p>In a <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0963721417730888?journalCode=cdpa">paper published in this month’s issue of Current Directions of Psychological Science</a>, myself and a team of researchers from The University of Queensland, The University of Melbourne, and The University of Bath synthesised this emerging field of psychological research. We found that our moral circles are a surprisingly multifaceted and impressionable element of our moral cognition. </p>
<p>And historical trends suggest they are expanding, meaning the future of our moral circles may be vastly different from today. Could they one day include robots?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-do-we-weigh-the-moral-value-of-human-lives-against-animal-ones-60698">How do we weigh the moral value of human lives against animal ones?</a>
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<h2>Why moral circles are important</h2>
<p>The moral circle is an intuitive concept. We are concerned about the welfare of those inside our moral circle and feel a sense of moral obligation for their treatment. Those on the outside can be subject to indifference at best, and horrific treatment at worst – think the Holocaust, or the cruellest elements of factory farming. </p>
<p>Therefore, our assessment of who is in and who is out is incredibly consequential, and we are confronted with the reality of these decisions every day. Do you feel an obligation to help a homeless person you pass? Are you concerned about the plight of refugees? Or the survival of the great apes? </p>
<p>These issues are frequently presented to us as <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-do-we-weigh-the-moral-value-of-human-lives-against-animal-ones-60698">direct tradeoffs</a>. For example, if you support political policies that champion economic advancement you might be less concerned about the protection of ecosystems that would interfere with such policies. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26751743">Our research suggests</a> that how we respond to these ethical challenges is in large part determined by the makeup of our moral circle.</p>
<h2>What determines our moral circle</h2>
<p>Whether you include someone or something within your moral circle is more complicated than you may think. When pressed, you may be able to identify whether an entity is worthy of moral consideration, but can you explain why?</p>
<h3>Individual differences</h3>
<p>As a bedrock, our moral circle judgements are <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26751743">associated with some relatively stable differences at the individual level</a>. For example, including more entities within our moral circle correlates strongly with increased empathy, the ability to take another’s perspective, and the <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022022107308992?journalCode=jcca">endorsement of egalitarian values</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, we tend to possess a larger moral circle if our <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19379034">moral instincts</a> centre around the reduction of harm, rather than a priority for our in-group. People who <a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/record/2012-16073-001">identify with all humanity</a> are likely to show greater concern for out-group members. While those who possess a sense of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272494404000696">oneness with nature</a> feel a strong moral obligation toward non-human animals and the environment. </p>
<h3>Motivation</h3>
<p>Beyond individual differences, your moment to moment motivations have the power to manipulate your moral circle. For example, if you love animals, but you also love eating meat, in the moment you are about to tuck into a steak you are likely to <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21980158">deny the moral standing of animals</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, we are more likely to cast an entity out of our moral circle if its <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1993.tb00909.x/full">needs conflict with our own</a>, such as when weighing up our desire for economically valuable land with habitat protection. Likewise, if resources are scarce – <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0956797612450892?journalCode=pssa">say, during a recession</a> – we are more likely to hold biased attitudes towards out-group members and view them as exploitable. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/future-robots-wont-resemble-humans-were-too-inefficient-86420">Future robots won't resemble humans – we're too inefficient</a>
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<h3>Perceptions of others</h3>
<p>Our perceptions of others are also crucial to their inclusion within the moral circle. First and foremost is the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17272713">possession of a mind</a>. Can they feel pain, pleasure or fear? If we perceive the answer is yes then we are far more likely to grant them moral inclusion. </p>
<p>Equally, if <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21884545">groups are dehumanised</a> and perceived to lack fundamental human traits, or <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ejsp.755/full">objectified</a> and denied personhood, we are far less likely to include them within our moral circle. Consider how stigmatised groups are often portrayed by political leaders, or on social media, and the power this might have in determining their moral inclusion. </p>
<h3>Cognitive forces</h3>
<p>Finally, our moral circles can be shaped by subtle cognitive forces beyond our conscious awareness. The simple cognitive switch of adopting an <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103108001613">inclusion versus an exclusion</a> mindset can have a substantial impact. Looking for evidence that something is worthy of moral inclusion produces a smaller moral circle than when looking for evidence that it is unworthy. </p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1948550611425106">how an entity is framed</a> can be of tremendous consequence. Framing animals as subtly human-like has been shown to reduce speciesism and expand our moral circles.</p>
<h2>An impending ethical challenge</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/books/review/the-better-angels-of-our-nature-by-steven-pinker-book-review.html">History shows</a> that humanity trends toward moral expansion. Time and again, generations consider the moral standing of entities beyond the scope of their ancestors. </p>
<p>In the coming years we will face yet another novel ethical challenge due to the inevitable rise of artificial intelligence. Should robots be granted moral inclusion? </p>
<p>Indeed, some are already <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-013-0133-8">beginning to ask these questions</a>. Robots have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/an-ai-professor-explains-three-concerns-about-granting-citizenship-to-robot-sophia-86479">awarded citizenship status</a>, and their perceived <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/13/tech/spot-robot-dog-google/index.html">mistreatment can elicit an emotional response</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-blade-runner-2049-prepares-us-to-welcome-robots-for-real-85050">How Blade Runner 2049 prepares us to welcome robots for real</a>
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<p>The estimation of robots as worthy of moral consideration could depend on whether they meet many of the criteria outlined above. Do we perceive them to feel pain, pleasure or fear? Are they are framed as human-like or entirely artificial? Are we looking for evidence that they should be included in our moral circle, or evidence that they shouldn’t be? And do their needs conflict with our own?</p>
<p>While this issue is guaranteed to be divisive, one cannot deny that it presents a fascinating ethical challenge for our species.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91987/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charlie Crimston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When we include someone (or something) in our moral circle we feel a sense of moral obligation for their treatment. But the factors determining who is in or out are more complicated than you may think.Charlie Crimston, Postdoctoral Researcher in Morality and Social Psychology, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/726372017-03-02T01:39:37Z2017-03-02T01:39:37ZDoes empathy have limits?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158985/original/image-20170301-5504-1l7vjh2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Why do we lack empathy in certain situations?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/holacomovai/8690837710/in/photolist-eeYPgu-6bssfy-WfXSo-4rycrv-psTCc-a52yDz-goSZN-k9VH1-5z3Bpm-4KfZH-7P6YtV-92KAH5-6kXXhq-8WVpL-8e8ru-Wg3dC-Xgjr6-Wcjg6-9rEXt-kGKW-CpW6a-hww1gu-KfHnw-7N9rTf-rhBB-Jemgn-HYNGHo-dW2Ghr-4FDPeP-qttUeF-KjBEu-3hgHgV-7NWxTq-McdGa-qaS8n8-frT2r-9D1tQf-b8Q62-7jevcK-4CYFqX-4hS6QN-fAyuhM-8ruKk-86CUDN-8yWCjZ-kGhhdc-kufpY7-A5oQt7-dR5jgq-anUXRe">PROFrancisco Schmidt</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Is it possible to run out of empathy?</p>
<p>That’s the question many are <a href="http://news.psu.edu/story/430603/2016/10/17/impact/ask-ethicist-how-important-empathy-us-presidential-election">asking</a> in the wake of the U.S. presidential election. Thousands have marched on streets and airports to encourage others to expand their empathy for women, minorities and refugees. Others have argued that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/opinion/sunday/a-confession-of-liberal-intolerance.html">liberals lack empathy</a> for the plight of rural Americans.</p>
<p>Against this backdrop, some scholars have recently come out against empathy, saying that it is <a href="http://bostonreview.net/forum/paul-bloom-against-empathy">overhyped</a>, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/opinion/brooks-the-limits-of-empathy.html">unimportant</a> and, worse, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-perils-of-empathy-1480689513">dangerous</a>. They make this recommendation because empathy appears to be limited and biased in ethically problematic ways.</p>
<p>As psychologists who study empathy, we disagree. </p>
<p>Based on advances in the science of empathy, we suggest that limits on empathy are more apparent than real. While empathy appears limited, these limits reflect our own goals, values and choices; they do not reflect limits to empathy itself. </p>
<h2>The ‘dark side’ of empathy</h2>
<p>Over the past several years, a <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2016.11.004">number</a> <a href="http://journal.sjdm.org/7303a/jdm7303a.htm?version=meter+at+null&module=meter-Links&pgtype=article&contentId=&mediaId=&referrer=&priority=true&action=click&contentCollection=meter-links-click">of scholars</a>, including <a href="https://hbr.org/2016/01/the-limits-of-empathy">psychologists</a> and <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00069.x">philosophers</a>, have made arguments that empathy is morally problematic. </p>
<p>For example, in a recently published and thought-provoking book, <a href="https://www.harpercollins.com/9780062339355/against-empathy">“Against Empathy,”</a> psychologist <a href="http://psychology.yale.edu/people/paul-bloom">Paul Bloom</a> highlights how empathy, so often touted for its positive outcomes, may have biases and limitations that make it a <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364661316301930">poor guide</a> for everyday life. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158983/original/image-20170301-5540-gkyx5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158983/original/image-20170301-5540-gkyx5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158983/original/image-20170301-5540-gkyx5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158983/original/image-20170301-5540-gkyx5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158983/original/image-20170301-5540-gkyx5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158983/original/image-20170301-5540-gkyx5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158983/original/image-20170301-5540-gkyx5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">What explains our feelings of empathy toward some and not others?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/15216811@N06/13495437084/in/photolist-myxDgJ-78A5w6-g2rBrE-fMwuhH-9rTuCZ-6XWW5t-fMwQDc-fMPgHj-dsE6bM-fMwsVc-egHtpz-fMwNMt-961qoC-fMwsWt-fMPa4Y-fMwEDH-fMwMHt-fMwxnr-fMwF7z-fMPgFC-fMwNLK-FwDTui-fMPa19-fMPfw7-fMP4sw-72FwpS-fMPnJs-fMwz3r-fMwQsn-fMPqYN-fMwwqV-fMP9pU-fMwvSx-fMwNRp-fMwRuF-fMwtZH-fMwP8Z-fMwHVK-fMPraj-fMwKrv-fMPpuy-fMP4CU-fMwt4V-fMwrBB-fMwrvD-fMPrtA-fMwuMX-fMwq4K-fMPfu3-fMP2i5">N i c o l a</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Bloom claims that empathy is a limited-capacity resource, like a fixed pie or fossil fuel that quickly runs out. He suggests that, </p>
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<p>“We are not psychologically constituted to feel toward a stranger as we feel toward someone we love. We are <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=op67CwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=against+empathy&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjB09XQtLHSAhUOfiYKHSVMA-0Q6AEIHDAA">not capable of feeling</a> a million times worse about the suffering of a million than about the suffering of one.” </p>
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<p>Such views are echoed by other scholars as well. For example, psychologist <a href="http://psychology.uoregon.edu/profile/pslovic/">Paul Slovic</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/opinion/the-arithmetic-of-compassion.html?_r=0">suggests</a> that “we are psychologically wired to help only one person at a time.” </p>
<p>Similarly, philosopher <a href="https://www.gc.cuny.edu/Page-Elements/Academics-Research-Centers-Initiatives/Doctoral-Programs/Philosophy/Faculty-Bios/Jesse-Prinz">Jesse Prinz</a> has argued that empathy is prejudiced and leads to “<a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00069.x/full">moral myopia</a>,” making us act more favorably toward people we have empathy for, even if this is unfair.</p>
<p>For the same reason, psychologist <a href="http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/directory/waytz_adam.aspx">Adam Waytz</a> suggests that empathy can “<a href="https://hbr.org/2016/01/the-limits-of-empathy">erode ethics</a>.” Slovic, in fact, suggests that “our capacity to feel sympathy for <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0100115">people in need appears limited</a>, and this form of compassion fatigue can lead to apathy and inaction.”</p>
<h2>Are there limits?</h2>
<p>The empathy that the scholars above are arguing against is emotional: It’s known scientifically as <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2014.04.008">“experience sharing,”</a> which is defined as feeling the same emotions that other people are feeling. </p>
<p>This emotional empathy is thought to be limited for two main reasons: First, empathy appears to be less sensitive <a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/100/1/1/">to large numbers of victims</a>, as in genocides and natural disasters. Second, empathy appears to be less sensitive to the suffering of people from <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002210311400095X">different racial or ideological groups</a> than our own. </p>
<p>In other words, in their view, empathy seems to put the spotlight on single victims who look or think like us.</p>
<h2>Empathy is a choice</h2>
<p>We agree that empathy can often be weaker in response to mass suffering and to people who are dissimilar from us. But the science of empathy actually suggests a different reason for why such deficits emerge.</p>
<p>As a growing body of evidence shows, it’s not that we are unable to feel empathy for mass suffering or people from other groups, but rather that sometimes we “choose” not to. In other words, you <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/opinion/sunday/empathy-is-actually-a-choice.html">choose the expanse</a> of your empathy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158987/original/image-20170301-5525-1fvxz2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158987/original/image-20170301-5525-1fvxz2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158987/original/image-20170301-5525-1fvxz2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158987/original/image-20170301-5525-1fvxz2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158987/original/image-20170301-5525-1fvxz2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158987/original/image-20170301-5525-1fvxz2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158987/original/image-20170301-5525-1fvxz2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Empathy is a choice.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/cuppini/2519976746/in/photolist-4QFxhW-it8cXt-wF5cW-344QUT-9UykwK-7Pzozk-8VmV66-ongdet-zGq77-6MkuSp-6xWo2D-4qRaXP-wgZAf-s8mtHv-5jFUy1-oEA2-agNv1-ESdP1-SctYST-5emMsM-JrAJGp-feEcgD-5rprcy-4c1Jk5-eCA45-pVFaBZ-wyPhY-bqQMhR-6yTu7N-NppZT-4cour1-dqYPfz-r5KV3k-dVfWEJ-7MLUJP-ndGEos-nubLkS-aTtz2n-rHgQj-ddtWBm-5EU22y-nvZZE-idqiU-8VEwjj-7LKmL6-ypHTz-3ixpWv-6Jw1J-auHaMM-aoU5RY">Riccardo Cuppini</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is evidence that we choose where to set the limits of empathy. For example, whereas people usually feel less empathy for multiple victims (versus a single victim), this <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0021643">tendency reverses</a> when you convince people that empathy won’t require costly donations of money or time. Similarly, people show less empathy for mass suffering when they think their helping won’t make any difference or impact, but this pattern goes away when they think they can <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.06.001">make a difference</a>. </p>
<p>This tendency also varies depending on an individual’s <a href="http://www.sjdm.org/journal/13/13321a/jdm13321a.pdf">moral beliefs</a>. For instance, people who live in “collectivist cultures,” such as <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039708">Bedouin individuals</a>, do not feel less empathy for mass suffering. This is perhaps because people in such cultures value the suffering of the collective.</p>
<p>This can also be changed temporarily, which makes it seem even more like a choice. For <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039708">example</a>, people who are primed to think about individualistic values show less empathic behaviors for mass suffering, but people who are primed to think about collectivistic values do not. </p>
<p>We argue that if indeed there was a limit on empathy for mass suffering, it should not vary based upon costs, efficacy or values. Instead, it looks like the effect shifts based on what people want to feel. We suggest that the same point applies to the tendency to feel less empathy for people different from us: Whether we extend <a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/113/1/80.short">empathy to people who are dissimilar from us</a> depends on what we want to feel. </p>
<p>In other words, the scope of empathy is flexible. Even people thought to lack empathy, such as psychopaths, appear <a href="http://socialneuro.psych.utoronto.ca/understanding%20everyday%20psychopathy.pdf">able to empathize</a> if they want to do so.</p>
<h2>Why seeing limits to empathy is problematic</h2>
<p>Empathy critics usually do not talk about choice in a logically consistent manner; sometimes they say individuals choose and direct empathy willfully, yet other times say we have no control over the limits of empathy. </p>
<p>These are different claims with different ethical implications. </p>
<p>The problem is that arguments against empathy treat it as a biased emotion. In doing so, these arguments mistake the consequences of our own choices to avoid empathy as something inherently wrong with empathy itself.</p>
<p>We suggest that empathy only appears limited; seeming insensitivity to mass suffering and dissimilar others is not built into empathy, but reflect the choices we make. These limits result from general trade-offs that people make as they balance some goals against others. </p>
<p>We suggest caution in using terms like “limits” and “capacity” when talking about empathy. This rhetoric can create a self-fulfilling prophecy: When people believe that empathy is a depleting resource, they exert <a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/107/3/475/">less empathic effort</a> and engage in more <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1948550615604453">dehumanization</a>. </p>
<p>So, framing empathy as a fixed pie misses the mark – scientifically and practically. </p>
<h2>What are the alternatives?</h2>
<p>Even if we accepted that empathy has fixed limits – which we dispute, given the scientific evidence – what other psychological processes could we rely upon to be effective decision-makers?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158988/original/image-20170301-5507-1cbq9zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158988/original/image-20170301-5507-1cbq9zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158988/original/image-20170301-5507-1cbq9zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158988/original/image-20170301-5507-1cbq9zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158988/original/image-20170301-5507-1cbq9zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158988/original/image-20170301-5507-1cbq9zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158988/original/image-20170301-5507-1cbq9zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Is compassion less biased?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/paullew/2768127350/in/photolist-5dBnPC-aS9KUr-4mevp4-4B4k5x-oZD338-d38KW3-4uA29J-5i7owC-7CRs2W-qFw8Mx-pQPmzj-6aGsgM-52P7Xi-cQ63h3-qzhFJc-Sk48oy-ehuRgu-qsvjz8-pgTPm8-5ETRzQ-bwS2SS-aMMhuB-6YWCNH-dVmcMr-g7eYFX-5WeEK1-g7f2sZ-9QTDTg-us8kV-g7eZ1V-9Ef4oW-krV9cX-7fb5g2-7zvjv-3ckcQP-as2zRv-ctNAuq-dpDe9R-6w8jqw-cXWQ6w-diY4HX-7WQaxo-isqh8-9pj4xo-8Dhin5-7sWBqQ-8QTSsR-Mf2it-KLXDa-a3sUvX">Fr Lawrence Lew, O.P.</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/emo/16/8/1107/">Some scholars suggest</a> that <a href="https://academic.oup.com/scan/article-abstract/9/6/873/1669505/Differential-pattern-of-functional-brain">compassion is not as costly</a> or biased as empathy, and so should be considered more trustworthy. However, compassion can also be insensitive to <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592459">mass suffering</a> and people from <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327957pspr0901_1">other groups</a>, just like empathy.</p>
<p>Another candidate is reasoning, which is considered to be free from emotional biases. Perhaps, cold deliberation over costs and benefits, appealing to long-term consequences, may be effective. Yet this view overlooks how <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1754073912445820">emotions can be rational</a> and reasoning can be motivated to support desired conclusions. </p>
<p>We see this in politics, and people use utilitarian principles differently depending on their political beliefs, suggesting <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0079742108004106">principles can be biased</a> too. For example, a study found that conservative participants were <a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/2009-20839-006">more willing to accept consequential trade-offs</a> of civilian lives lost during wartime when they were Iraqi instead of American. Reasoning may not be as objective and unbiased as empathy critics claim.</p>
<h2>Whose standard of morality are we using?</h2>
<p>Even if reasoning was objective and didn’t play favorites, is this what we want from morality? Research suggests that for <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2184440">many cultures</a>, it can be immoral if you don’t focus on the immediate few who share your beliefs or blood.</p>
<p>For example, <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=zUiFCwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA61&dq=waytz+empathy&ots=j5RmKSQO1a&sig=n2vYf0_xLQmJbfManTtw_YpsJUA">some research</a> finds that whereas liberals extend empathy and moral rights to strangers, conservatives are more likely to reserve empathy for their families and friends. Some people think that morality should not play favorites; but others think that morality should be applied more strongly to family and friends.</p>
<p>So even if empathy did have fixed limits, it doesn’t follow that this makes it morally problematic. Many view impartiality as the ideal, but many don’t. So, empathy takes on a specific set of goals given a choice of a standard. </p>
<p>By focusing on apparent flaws in empathy and not digging deeper into how they emerge, arguments against empathy end up denouncing the wrong thing. Human reasoning is sometimes flawed and it sometimes leads us off course; this is especially the case when we have skin in the game. </p>
<p>In our view, it is these flaws in human reasoning that are the real culprits here, not empathy, which is a mere output of these more complex computations. Our real focus should be on how people balance competing costs and benefits when deciding whether to feel empathy. </p>
<p>Such an analysis makes being against empathy seem superficial. Arguments against empathy rely on an <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1754073912445820">outdated dualism</a> between biased emotion and objective reason. But the science of empathy suggests that what may matter more is our own values and choices. Empathy may be limited sometimes, but only if you want it to be that way.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72637/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>C. Daryl Cameron receives funding from the National Science Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Inzlicht receives funding from an Insight Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada, from an Insight Development Grant also from SSHRC, and from a Discovery Grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>William A. Cunningham receives funding from the National Science Foundation, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council.</span></em></p>Research shows empathy itself does not have any limits. If it appears limited, it is because of people’s goals, values and choices.C. Daryl Cameron, Assistant Professor of Psychology and Research Associate in the Rock Ethics Institute, Penn StateMichael Inzlicht, Professor of Psychology, Management, University of TorontoWilliam A. Cunningham, Professor of Psychology, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.