tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/maritime-law-3136/articlesMaritime law – The Conversation2023-06-06T12:32:03Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070992023-06-06T12:32:03Z2023-06-06T12:32:03ZUS, Chinese warships’ near miss in Taiwan Strait hints at ongoing troubled diplomatic waters, despite chatter about talks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530210/original/file-20230605-15-7sme40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=36%2C219%2C4846%2C2730&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The USS Chung-Hoon observes a Chinese navy ship cross into its path.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ChinaUS/c5c2eb573dff49a688c81c9fe4adc103/photo?Query=Taiwan%20Strait&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=524&currentItemNo=0">Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Andre T. Richard/U.S. Navy via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>An encounter in which a Chinese naval ship <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-china-taiwan-strait-489a45bb6df134fa09443d285b3f8669">cut across the path of a U.S. destroyer</a> in the Taiwan Strait on June 3, 2023, has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/04/asia/china-defense-minister-shangri-la-speech-intl-hnk/index.html">both Beijing</a> <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-30/us-accuses-china-of-aggressive-encounter-over-south-china-sea#xj4y7vzkg">and Washington</a> pointing fingers at each other.</em></p>
<p><em>It was the second near miss in the space of just a few weeks; in late May a Chinese plane <a href="http://aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/31/provocative-dangerous-china-blames-us-for-air-confrontation">crossed in front of an American surveillance aircraft</a> above the South China Sea.</em></p>
<p><em>Meredith Oyen, <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/meredith-oyen/">an expert on China-U.S. relations</a> at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, helps explain the context of the recent encounters and how they fit within growing tensions between the two countries.</em></p>
<h2>What do we know about the Taiwan Strait incident?</h2>
<p>It came as the U.S. and Canada were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-canadian-navies-stage-rare-joint-mission-through-taiwan-strait-2023-06-03/">conducting a joint transit</a> of the Taiwan Strait – a body of water that separates the island of Taiwan from mainland China. Washington does these transits fairly regularly, but not usually with another country.</p>
<p>As the American destroyer USS Chung-Hoon and Canadian frigate HMCS Montreal traveled up the channel, a Chinese warship passed and <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-military-releases-video-of-near-collision-between-chinese-u-s-warships-in-taiwan-strait">veered across the U.S. vessel’s path at a pretty close range</a>, according to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. As a result, the USS Chung-Hoon had to reduce its speed to avoid a collision. </p>
<p>The U.S. has <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3223054/us-military-slams-chinese-warships-unsafe-and-unprofessional-manoeuvres-taiwan-strait">characterized the incident as an “unsafe” maneuver</a> on behalf of the Chinese and protested that it took place in international waters.</p>
<p>The perspective from Beijing is that the U.S. and Canada were “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-canadian-navies-stage-rare-joint-mission-through-taiwan-strait-2023-06-03/">deliberately provoking risk</a>” by sailing a warship through Chinese waters.</p>
<h2>Who is right? Did it take place in international or Chinese waters?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> stipulates that a country’s “territorial waters” extend 12 nautical miles off its coast – anything above or on the sea in that zone is considered part of the country’s territory. After that, there is a further 12-mile “contiguous zone,” over which a coastal state has rights to prevent infringement of the country’s “customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary” laws, according to the UN treaty.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An aerial shot shows blue waters and two green land masses." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The Taiwan Strait.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-taiwan-strait-is-a-strategic-maritime-shipping-route-news-photo/1091868100?adppopup=true">Gallo Images/Orbital Horizon/Copernicus Sentinel Data</a></span>
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<p>Complicating matters, Beijing – a signatory to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, unlike the U.S. – claims the island of Taiwan as part of China. Under the U.N. convention’s stipulations, this would also mean Beijing can claim the 12 miles of territorial waters off Taiwan’s coast, as well as a 12-mile contiguous zone.</p>
<p>But even at its narrowest point, the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jillgoldenziel/2022/06/28/china-claims-to-own-the-taiwan-strait-thats-illegal/?sh=6cc6f59d9ba2">Taiwan Strait is around 86 miles wide</a>. So even accepting Beijing’s territorial claim, there would, under U.N. law, be a channel that falls outside its territory. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, Beijing <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2022/07/narrowing-the-differences-between-china-and-the-us-over-the-taiwan-strait/">claims sovereignty of the entirety of the waters</a> between Taiwan and China under its exclusive economic zone. </p>
<p>Despite not signing the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the U.S. abides by the 12-mile standard and views a large chunk of the strait as international waters.</p>
<h2>How common are these ‘near misses’?</h2>
<p>The United States has regularly sailed vessels through the Taiwan Strait for decades. At times of tension – notably <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises">during the Korean War and Taiwan Straits crises of 1954-55, 1958 and 1962</a> – the U.S. has deployed destroyers in the channel as a deliberate show of military strength and support for Taiwan.</p>
<p>This continued after the U.S. normalized relations with China in 1978 until today, with few incidents that caused the level of tit-for-tat recriminations such as in the latest case. But there have been “near misses” in the sky, noticeably the <a href="http://aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/31/provocative-dangerous-china-blames-us-for-air-confrontation">recent airplane-to-airplane encounter</a> that preceded this incident.</p>
<p>What we have increasingly seen, though, is Chinese officials protest these Taiwan Strait transits by the U.S. And the number of protests by China has increased in recent years, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-again-indicates-that-us-will-defend-taiwan-militarily-does-this-constitute-a-change-in-policy-190946">tension over Taiwan has increased</a>.</p>
<h2>How does this incident fit growing maritime tension in the region?</h2>
<p>The past few years have seen a deterioration in U.S.-China relations. There have been <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/11/why-u.s.-and-chinese-militaries-aren-t-talking-much-anymore-pub-85123">no direct, high-level military talks between the two countries since 2019</a>. Meanwhile, relations have further soured on other topics, such as the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/16/u.s.-china-trade-war-has-become-cold-war-pub-85352">ongoing trade war</a>, the issue of Taiwan and <a href="https://theintercept.com/2020/03/18/coronavirus-china-world-power/">allegations relating to the spread</a> of COVID-19.</p>
<p>At times of better relations between Beijing and Washington, military transits such as the one in the Taiwan Strait might have gone largely unremarked upon. But amid such tensions, any incident is elevated to the level of uniquely bad provocation.</p>
<p>The broader context is that the U.S. regularly holds military drills and <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3370607/dod-releases-fiscal-year-2022-freedom-of-navigation-report/#:%7E:text=Upholding%20freedom%20of%20navigation%20as,operate%20wherever%20international%20law%20allows.">“freedom of navigation” operations</a> in the South China Sea. These activities are used by the U.S. Department of Defense to demonstrate that the U.S. has a right to sail in waters it views as international, even if they are claimed by nation states.</p>
<p>The concern is that with tensions as they are – and with no official direct line of dialogue – a near miss during such a drill, or, worse still, an actual collision, could escalate beyond control, leading to military conflict.</p>
<h2>Any significance over why this happened now?</h2>
<p>The near miss came at a curious time – while top diplomats and defense chiefs from both the U.S. and China were attending <a href="https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2023/">the Shangri-La Dialogue</a> in Singapore.</p>
<p>At that security summit, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/02/austin-china-military-handshake-00099875">shook the hand</a> of his Chinese counterpart, Li Shangfu. But they didn’t hold a side meeting – as some observers had hoped.</p>
<p>Austin also <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/02/asia/austin-shangri-law-dialogue-speech-taiwan-intl-hnk/index.html">underscored the importance of the Taiwan Strait</a> to Washington: “The whole world has a stake in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The security of commercial shipping lanes and global supply chains depends on it. And so does freedom of navigation worldwide. Make no mistake: conflict in the Taiwan Strait would be devastating.”</p>
<p>Washington <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/05/10/deconfliction-us-china-talk-about-talking/">has suggested</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/3/us-says-talks-with-china-key-to-a-prevent-crisis-or-conflict">that it wants to resume official talks</a> with Beijing. Incidents such as that in the Taiwan Strait underscore the potential need for such discussions, if only to avoid encounters escalating into something more serious.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207099/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What was behind the latest encounter between US and Chinese military vessels in contested waters?Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1986512023-04-19T12:44:42Z2023-04-19T12:44:42ZThe US is about to blow up a fake warship in the South China Sea – but naval rivalry with Beijing is very real and growing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521714/original/file-20230418-28-hiqec4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C146%2C3377%2C2411&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Marine amphibious assault vehicle takes part in a 2019 joint U.S.-Philippines exercise.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/marine-amphibious-assault-vehicle-maneouvers-before-the-uss-news-photo/1136245278?adppopup=true">Ted Aljibe/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As part of a joint military exercise with the Philippines, the U.S. Navy is slated to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-philippines-military-exercises-60af099f1526c6fce180d217e97788ad">sink a mock warship</a> on April 26, 2023, in the South China Sea. </p>
<p>The live-fire drill is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65236459">not a response to increased tensions</a> with China over Taiwan, both the U.S. and the Philippines have stressed. But, either way, Beijing isn’t happy – responding by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-following-chinas-taiwan-drills-with-great-interest-2023-04-10/">holding its own staged military event</a> involving actual warships and fighter jets deployed around Taiwan, a self-governed island that Beijing claims as its own.</p>
<p>The tit-for-tat war games underscore a reality that U.S. presidents have increasingly had to contend with as the 21st century has drawn on. More than a century after President Theodore Roosevelt <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/april/theodore-roosevelts-great-power-navy">made the United States the preeminent maritime power</a> in the Pacific, that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/16/asia/china-navy-fleet-size-history-victory-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">position is under threat</a>. China is seeking to displace it. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://bakercenter.utk.edu/find-an-expert/krista-wiegand/">scholar of East Asian security and maritime disputes</a>, I believe that the growing rivalry between the U.S. and China over dominance of the Pacific has the potential to define <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf">geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region</a> for the next half-century.</p>
<p>Already, ongoing maritime disputes pit China against several Asian countries. For example, China regularly <a href="https://www.cfr.org/chinas-maritime-disputes/#!/chinas-maritime-disputes?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide">challenges the maritime rights</a> of Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea. </p>
<p>But the disputed waters are also of huge strategic importance to the U.S. It is where China is flexing its growing military might in the face of U.S. allies and partners, notably Taiwan, which the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-event-chinese-invasion-2022-09-18/#:%7E:text=Asked%20last%20October%20if%20the,a%20commitment%20to%20do%20that.%22">U.S. has committed to defend</a>. If a war between China and the U.S. is going to happen, I believe the South China Sea is likely to be a major theater, with Chinese aggression toward Taiwan the spark.</p>
<h2>The scramble over the South China Sea</h2>
<p>For centuries, the dozens of islands, shoals, reefs, banks and rocks in the South China Sea were regarded as little more than hazards to navigation. </p>
<p>But with the discovery of large reserves of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0360-5442(85)90057-X">oil and gas in the 1970s</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-south-china-sea-is-really-a-fishery-dispute/">billions of dollars’ worth of fisheries</a>, the previously largely ignored sea has gained significant attention from the countries whose shorelines meet it.</p>
<p>It led to a revival of elapsed conflicting claims of “ownership” over the sea.</p>
<p>China currently claims legal rights to the vast majority of the South China Sea, extending well beyond the boundaries established by the 1982 U.N. <a href="https://www.noaa.gov/law-of-sea-convention#:%7E:text=The%201982%20Law%20of%20the,both%20natural%20and%20cultural%20resources.">Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> (UNCLOS).</p>
<p>This claim by China, designated on maps by a <a href="https://time.com/4412191/nine-dash-line-9-south-china-sea/">nine-dash line</a>, overlaps with the legally recognized maritime and territorial rights of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia.</p>
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<img alt="An infographic shows a map of the South China Sea and surrounding countries with their claims to the waters represented by dotted lines." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-infographic-titled-south-china-sea-a-hotbed-of-news-photo/1246032083?adppopup=true">Omar Zaghloul/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Over the past decade, China has consistently engaged in low-level coercive activities called “<a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA594-1.html">gray zone tactics</a>,” such as small-scale deployment of the Chinese Coast Guard in disputed waters and the manning of fishing vessels with civilians trained by the Chinese military. The purpose is to harass others and assert Chinese maritime rights outside legal Chinese waters, as recognized under UNCLOS. </p>
<p>Since 2013, China has also built up several reefs and shoals into artificial islands, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/21/china-has-fully-militarized-three-islands-in-south-china-sea-us-admiral-says">building military bases</a> with runways, radar technology and missile-launching capabilities. </p>
<p>In 2016, an UNCLOS Annex VII arbitration panel ruled that China’s nine-dash line <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/tribunal-issues-landmark-ruling-south-china-sea-arbitration">claims were illegal</a> and rejected China’s rights to maritime features in the legal waters of the Philippines.</p>
<p>But despite the legally binding nature of the ruling, China has continued to militarize its artificially built-up islands and harass neighboring countries’ military and fishing vessels. It has also <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/china/article/2023/03/23/us-military-rejects-china-s-claim-that-warship-entered-south-china-sea-illegally_6020398_162.html">denied passage to U.S. Navy ships</a> legally sailing through waters in the South China Sea. </p>
<p>Successive U.S. administrations have aired concern over developments in the sea. In 2020, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/index.html">issued a U.S. position</a> on the South China Sea, rejecting China’s maritime claims and its “bullying” tactics as “unlawful.” His successor, Antony Blinken, <a href="https://www.state.gov/fifth-anniversary-of-the-arbitral-tribunal-ruling-on-the-south-china-sea/">in 2021 declared</a>: “Nowhere is the rules-based maritime order under greater threat than in the South China Sea.” </p>
<p>But why does the South China Sea matter so much to the U.S.? The answer lies in economics and power politics. </p>
<h2>A source of trade, natural resources</h2>
<p>About one-third of the world’s shipping transits the South China Sea. In all, more than <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/">US$3.4 trillion worth of products</a> – everything from rubber ducks to cars – is transported through its waters every year. </p>
<p>The sea connects the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean, allowing trade from East Asian countries to flow to and from billions of people in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. It is also where <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/">14% of all U.S. maritime trade</a> passes through. It is a crucial route for outgoing U.S. goods as well as getting products to the U.S. Without it, the transport of products we use every day would slow down, and these products would cost more.</p>
<p>And then there are oil and gas. Around <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36952">30% of all global crude oil</a> transits through the South China Sea. Furthermore, there is an estimated <a href="https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/South_China_Sea">$11 billion worth of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of proven deposits of natural gas</a> in the sea, as well as undiscovered oil and gas.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, more than <a href="https://ocean.csis.org/spotlights/illuminating-the-south-china-seas-dark-fishing-fleets/">half of all fishing vessels in the world</a> operate in the South China Sea. </p>
<p>For economic reasons alone, the U.S. and the rest of the world need open trade routes and sea lanes in the South China Sea. Preventing one country – especially a hostile China – from controlling these trade routes and resources is a crucial policy concern for Washington.</p>
<h2>Power politics at sea</h2>
<p>Although economics plays a part, China’s actions in the South China Sea are part of a much broader aggressive campaign. Beijing views territorial and maritime control in the region <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-are-china-s-leaders-saying-about-south-china-sea">through the lens of its national security</a>. It seeks to project its power in the region and defend the Chinese mainland.</p>
<p>Ultimately, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf">as acknowledged by the U.S. government</a>, China is looking to overturn the status quo, replacing the U.S. as the superpower. </p>
<p>This battle for power is already taking shape in the South China Sea, with <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/east-asia/us-china-confrontation-south-china-sea-b2307238.html">regular confrontations</a> between U.S. naval vessels and China’s maritime militia and navy. </p>
<p>The artificial islands in the South China Sea provide China with military capabilities far beyond the mainland alone. These outposts can be used to help counter and fight the U.S. and its allies, for example, in a war over Taiwan. </p>
<p>While the U.S. is not itself a claimant in the South China Sea disputes, the waters there remain a significant priority for <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/14/the-united-states-is-deeply-invested-in-the-south-china-sea/">the national security interests of Washington</a>, too.</p>
<p>It is why the U.S. and its allies conduct freedom of navigation missions through the South China Sea and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/south-korea-us-announce-largest-military-exercises-in-5-years/">engage in naval exercises</a> such as the one <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-philippines-military-exercises-60af099f1526c6fce180d217e97788ad">taking place in April 2023</a> with the Philippines.</p>
<p>With China playing by a different set of rules than the U.S. and its allies in the region, the risk of clashes at sea is very real. It could even lead to conflict between the two most powerful countries in the world today. </p>
<p>The next time a warship is blown up in the South China Sea, I fear that it may not be just a drill.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198651/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Krista Wiegand received funding as a Senior Fulbright Scholar to conduct research on the South China Sea. </span></em></p>The South China Sea is of strategic and economic importance to Beijing and the US, setting up a potential power struggle that could spark conflict.Krista Wiegand, Professor of Political Science, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2016062023-03-21T10:13:12Z2023-03-21T10:13:12ZUkraine: how uncrewed boats are changing the way wars are fought at sea<p>When Ukraine successfully deployed <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C_tvZufo4hE&t=574s">self-driving “drone” boats</a> for a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/30/russias-black-sea-flagship-damaged-in-crimea-drone-attack-video-suggests">major attack on the Russian navy at Sevastopol</a> in Crimea in September 2022 it was a defining moment that changed the future of naval warfare. Uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) have been used before, but this was the first instance of multiple, armed USVs, used simultaneously in combination with aerial drones for a successful, offensive naval operation on a military target. </p>
<p>Several Russian ships were damaged in the attack, and the USVs were reportedly able to penetrate the harbour defences and cause damage to ships in protected anchorages. This will cause a rethink of the role of uncrewed vessels for offensive naval ops, and of harbour defences to protect against such attacks.</p>
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<p>USVs offer a number of advantages over regular manned vessels which make them attractive to navies – and many countries have been developing or experimenting with them in recent years. The US has invested heavily with <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45757.pdf">a strategic plan</a> to acquire medium, large and extra-large “unmanned vehicles” to operate both on the surface and underwater. By 2052, more than half of the US naval fleet could potentially be uncrewed. </p>
<p>Other navies are reluctant to be left behind and are actively developing their uncrewed and autonomous capabilities. These include <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/navdex-2023/2023/02/china-reveals-new-heavily-armed-extra-large-uncrewed-submarine/">China</a>, <a href="https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/operations/united-kingdom/unmanned-warrior">UK</a>, <a href="https://ipdefenseforum.com/2019/01/indo-pacific-countries-turn-to-unmanned-vessels-to-patrol-regions-waters/">South Korea, Japan, Singapore</a>, <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2022/12/first-anduril-prototype-ghost-shark-drone-sub-delivered-to-aussies-3-months-early/">Australia</a>, and others. </p>
<p>By <a href="https://nmiotc.nato.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/24-2022.pdf">removing human crews from naval vessels</a> a number of efficiencies can be achieved. The design of the ship can be streamlined, disregarding human needs such as sleeping, eating and safety (sleeping berths, galleys, life-rafts and life-jackets can all be removed). So they can be smaller, cheaper to run, faster and able to remain at sea for longer periods of time, in harsher conditions, without any risk of injury or human error. </p>
<p>If armed, they are able to strike targets at the push of a button. And if armed with artificial intelligence (AI) enabled weapons, they are able to identify, acquire and engage targets without any human oversight – and at much greater speeds. Vice-admiral Roy Kitchener, the commander of US naval surface forces, <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45757.pdf">commented in December 2022 that</a> USVs would be a “catalyst for innovation” in the US Pacific fleet, adding that: “The implementation of unmanned systems will increase decision speed and lethality to enhance our warfighting advantage.”</p>
<h2>Ethical and legal questions</h2>
<p>But the use of these uncrewed warships raises a number of important legal and ethical questions. Under the <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS</a>) – often referred to as the “<a href="https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/uncls/uncls.html">Constitution of the Oceans</a>” – a “warship” is legally defined as being “under the command of an officer” and “<em>manned by a crew</em> which is under regular armed forces discipline” (emphasis added). </p>
<p>As the <a href="https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/8_1_8_2_1956.pdf">“Articles to the Law of the Sea with Commentaries”</a> from 1956 explains, “the definition of the term ‘warship’ has been based on articles 3 and 4 of The Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 relating to the conversion of merchant ships into warships”. The purpose of Article 29 was not to ensure the <em>presence</em> of human crews on warships. That was assumed. It was actually directed at ensuring crews of naval vessels were <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/40830/pdf/">subject to state oversight and military discipline</a> in response to the practice of privateering which had been employed by some states.</p>
<p>At present there is no settled legal position on the status of uncrewed vessels as “warships”. So how different states use them will be instrumental in forming a more solid position in international law.</p>
<p>Arguably, an expansive, evolutionary approach to interpreting the convention in light of modern advancements, and the purpose of Article 29, could allow an uncrewed vessel to be regarded as a “warship” to ensure a state’s accountability for its actions. This is precisely the view taken by the UK Ministry of Defence <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/40830/pdf/">in a submission</a> to the House of Lords in November 2021. On the question of whether UNCLOS is “fit for purpose” in the 21st century, it said that Article 29 confirms that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>State responsibility for the actions of warships and requires that the state have an accountable system of discipline to control the actions of those who operate them. Uncrewed vessels should be incorporated into this regime to regulate their proper use. This would be best achieved by an acceptance that Article 29 applies to state operated military uncrewed vessels.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The House of Lords, in its report on <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/9005/documents/159002/default/">UNCLOS: the law of the sea in the 21st century</a>, noted the “absence of international regulation” on the question of “whether maritime autonomous vehicles can be classified as warships or not” and the need to “work with like-minded partners to regulate these technologies”. Effectively leaving the question open until further international practice, opinion and consensus builds up.</p>
<p>The rapidly evolving technology means that the pace of naval conflict will continue to increase. Swarms of networked drones, equipped with AI will <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=CW-nDwAAQBAJ">give significant speed and lethal</a> advantages to those forces that use them. This will make human “in-the-loop” decision-making increasingly redundant – and even disadvantageous in future conflicts. </p>
<p>But there are significant <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cybersecpods.2018.8560690">cyber-security concerns and questions</a> about the reliability and timeliness of human oversight of autonomous systems operating hundreds of nautical miles – possibly underwater – away from human oversight or control. Further, the UK’s commitment to the ethical and legal use of autonomous systems does in no way guarantee that rivals, enemies, or even allies, will show the same restraint – especially in times of war.</p>
<p>The international debate over lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) and calls for a convention to ban them <a href="https://www.amacad.org/publication/ethics-morality-robotic-warfare-assessing-debate-over-autonomous-weapons">are relevant</a> in this context. An issue of this importance needs to be subject to a public debate and parliament, as a representative of the people, needs to determine their legality and use.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201606/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam James Fenton receives funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101029232. </span></em></p>A recent attack by Ukrainian ‘robot ships’ in Crimea shows how effective these unmanned surface vessels can be. Now maritime law needs to keep up with technological developments.Adam James Fenton, Associate Professor (Research), Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1966942022-12-21T13:41:01Z2022-12-21T13:41:01ZWhen fishing boats go dark at sea, they’re often committing crimes – we mapped where it happens<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502060/original/file-20221220-22-3bbpfo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C7%2C5152%2C3430&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Workers flood a Vietnamese-flagged boat caught operating illegally off West Kalimantan, Indonesia on May 4, 2019 in order to sink it.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IndonesiaIllegalFishing/495acf8677984e80b8f47d00e0ee4d35/photo">AP Photos/William Pasaribu</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In January 2019, the Korean-flagged fishing vessel Oyang 77 sailed south toward international waters off Argentina. The vessel had a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/audio/2019/oct/14/ship-of-horrors-life-and-death-on-the-lawless-high-seas-podcast">known history of nefarious activities</a>, including underreporting its catch and illegally dumping low-value fish to make room in its hold for more lucrative catch. </p>
<p>At 2 a.m. on Jan. 10, the Oyang 77 turned off its location transponder at the edge of Argentina’s <a href="https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/eez.html">exclusive economic zone</a> – a political boundary that divides Argentina’s national waters from international waters, or the high seas. At 9 p.m. on Jan. 11, the Oyang 77 turned its transponder back on and reappeared on the high seas. For the 19 hours when the ship was dark, no information was available about where it had gone or what it did.</p>
<p>In a study published in Nov. 2022, I worked with colleagues at <a href="https://globalfishingwatch.org/">Global Fishing Watch</a>, a nonprofit that works to advance ocean governance by increasing transparency of human activity at sea, to show that these periods of missing transponder data actually <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abq2109">contain useful information</a> on where ships go and what they do. And authorities like the <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/IIIS/Pages/IUU-FISHING.aspx">International Maritime Organization</a> can use this missing data to help combat illegal activities at sea, such as overfishing and exploiting workers on fishing boats. </p>
<p>Illegal fishing causes economic losses <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0004570">estimated at $US10 billion to $25 billion annually</a>. It also has been linked to human rights violations, such as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-07118-9">forced labor</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2020.589000">human trafficking</a>. Better information about how often boats go dark at sea can help governments figure out where and when these activities may be taking place.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Countries can combat illegal, unreported and unauthorized fishing by checking paperwork, verifying catches and sharing information across borders.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Going dark at sea</h2>
<p>The high seas are the modern world’s Wild West – a vast expanse of water far from oversight and authority, where outlaws engage in illegal activities like <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/538736/the-outlaw-ocean-by-ian-urbina/">unauthorized fishing and human trafficking</a>. Surveillance there is aided by location transponders, called the <a href="https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/automatic-identification-system-overview">Automatic Identification System</a>, or AIS, which works like the <a href="https://apps.apple.com/us/app/find-my-iphone/id376101648">Find My iPhone app</a>.</p>
<p>Just as thieves can turn off phone location tracking, ships can disable their AIS transponders, effectively hiding their activities from oversight. Often it’s unclear whether going dark in this way is legal. AIS requirements are based on many factors, including vessel size, what country the vessel is flagged to, its location in the ocean and what species its crew is trying to catch.</p>
<p>A ship that disables its AIS transponder <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/world/middleeast/china-oil-iran-sanctions.html">disappears from the view</a> of whomever may be watching, including authorities, scientists and other vessels. For our study, we reviewed data from two private companies that combine AIS data with other signals to track assets at sea. <a href="https://spire.com/spirepedia/automatic-identification-system/#:%7E:text=Automatic%20Identification%20System%20(AIS)%20is,domain%20awareness%20through%20vessel%20tracking.">Spire</a> is a constellation of nanosatellites that pick up AIS signals to increase visibility of vessels in remote areas of the world. <a href="https://www.orbcomm.com/en/solutions/maritime">Orbcomm</a> tracks ships, trucks and other heavy equipment using internet-enabled devices. Then, we used machine learning models to understand what drove vessels to disable their AIS devices.</p>
<p>Examining where and how often such episodes occurred between 2017 and 2019, we found that ships disabled their transponders for around 1.6 million hours each year. This represented roughly 6% of global fishing vessel activity, which as a result is not reflected in global tallies of what types of fish are being caught where. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="World map showing zones where large shares of boats disable their transponders" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This map shows the fraction of fishing vessel activity hidden by AIS disabling events from 2017 to 2019. Heavy AIS disabling occurred adjacent to Argentina, West African nations and in the northwest Pacific – three regions where illegal fishing is common. In contrast, the disabling hot spot near Alaska occurs on intensively managed fishing grounds and likely represents vessels going dark to avoid competition with other boats.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Global Fishing Watch</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Vessels frequently went dark on the high-seas edge of exclusive economic zone boundaries, which can obscure illegal fishing in unauthorized locations. That’s what the Oyang 77 was doing in January 2019. </p>
<h2>Laundering illegal catch</h2>
<p>The AIS data we reviewed showed that the Oyang 77 disabled its AIS transponder a total of nine times during January and February 2019. Each time, it went dark at the edge of Argentinean national waters and reappeared several days later back on the high seas. </p>
<p>During the ninth disabling event, the vessel was spotted <a href="https://fiskerforum.com/korean-trawler-detained-by-argentina/">fishing without permission in Argentina’s waters</a>, where the Argentinean coast guard intercepted it and escorted it to the port of Comodoro Rivadavia. The vessel’s owners were later fined for illegally fishing in Argentina’s national waters, and their <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.31230/osf.io/juh98">fishing gear was confiscated</a>.</p>
<p>AIS disabling is also strongly correlated with transshipment events – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/09/26/world/asia/china-fishing-south-america.html">exchanging catch, personnel and supplies</a> between fishing vessels and refrigerated cargo vessels, or “reefers,” at sea. Reefers also have AIS transponders, and researchers can use their data to <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2018.00240">identify loitering events</a>, when reefers are in one place long enough to receive cargo from a fishing vessel.</p>
<p>It’s not unusual to see fishing vessels disable their AIS transponders near loitering reefers, which suggests that they want to hide these transfers from oversight. While transferring people or cargo can be legal, when it is poorly monitored it can become a means of laundering illegal catch. It has been <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_in_the_Fishing_Industry.pdf">linked to forced labor and human trafficking</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1135458346310389760"}"></div></p>
<h2>Valid reasons to turn off transponders</h2>
<p>Making it illegal for vessels to disable AIS transponders might seem like an obvious solution to this problem. But just as people may have legitimate reasons for not wanting the government to monitor their phones, fishing vessels may have legitimate reasons not to want their movements monitored. </p>
<p>Many vessels disable their transponders in high-quality fishing grounds to hide their activities from competitors. Although the ocean is huge, certain species and fishing methods are highly concentrated. For example, <a href="https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/bycatch/fishing-gear-bottom-trawls">bottom trawlers</a> fish by dragging nets along the seafloor and can operate only over continental shelves where the bottom is shallow enough for their gear to reach. </p>
<p>Modern-day pirates also use AIS data to intercept and attack vessels. In response, ships frequently disable their transponders in historically dangerous waters of the <a href="https://maritime-executive.com/article/indian-ocean-high-risk-designation-to-be-withdrawn-at-end-of-2022">Indian Ocean</a> and the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-11/gulf-of-guinea-piracy.php">Gulf of Guinea</a>. Making AIS disabling illegal would leave fishing vessels more vulnerable to piracy. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An electronic screen shows triangles, representing nearby ships, within concentric circles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An AIS-equipped system on board a ship presents the bearing and distance of nearby vessels in a radarlike display format.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_identification_system#/media/File:Ais_dcu_bridge.jpg">Clipper/Wikipedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Instead, in my view, researchers and maritime authorities can use these AIS disabling events to make inferences about which vessels are behaving illegally.</p>
<p>Our study reveals that AIS disabling near exclusive economic zones and loitering reefers is a risk factor for unauthorized fishing and transshipments. At sea, real-time data on where vessels disable their AIS transponders or <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/03/world/americas/ships-gps-international-law.html">change their apparent position using fake GPS coordinates</a> could be used to focus patrols on illegal activities near political boundaries or in transshipment hot spots. Port authorities could also use this information onshore to target the most suspect vessels for inspection. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden signed a national security memorandum in 2022 pledging U.S. support for <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/27/fact-sheet-president-biden-signs-national-security-memorandum-to-combat-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-and-associated-labor-abuses/">combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing</a> and associated labor abuses. Our study points toward a strategy for using phases when ships go dark to fight illegal activities at sea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196694/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heather Welch received funding from Catena and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Office of Law Enforcement for this work.</span></em></p>Understanding when, where and why fishing vessels sometimes turn off their transponders is a key step toward curbing illegal fishing and other crimes on the high seas.Heather Welch, Researcher in Ecosystem Dynamics, University of California, Santa CruzLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1883812022-08-18T14:14:58Z2022-08-18T14:14:58ZGhana has developed a maritime policy. Here is what it means<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478740/original/file-20220811-19-caf7sd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ghana's maritime space is key to its economy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ghana has an abundance of marine resources. They include fisheries, hydrocarbon reserves, inland waterways and ports that are located along important international shipping lanes. These present the country with a wide range of opportunities for ensuring food security, bridging income inequalities, attracting foreign direct investment, increasing domestic productivity, and enhancing trading conditions. </p>
<p>This underscores the imperative to harness and safeguard them wisely.</p>
<p>About <a href="https://en.unesco.org/courier/2021-1/ghanas-coastline-swallowed-sea">7.5 million people</a> in Ghana live in coastal areas and double that number live about 50km away from the coast. Like many other coastal African countries, Ghana significantly relies on its blue economy for income, employment and food. The oil and gas sector has <a href="https://www.piacghana.org/portal/12/13/546/ghana-earns-unimpressive-$65b-from-oil-in-10-years#:%7E:text=He%20added%20that%3A%20%E2%80%9CThe%20Ghana,total%20%246.55%20billion%20revenue%20earned">generated over $4 billion</a>.) in revenue since commercial operations began in 2010. And about <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277775952_Fishery_and_aquaculture_industry_in_Ghana">10% of Ghana’s workforce</a> is employed in the fishing sector, which also accounts for 4.5% of the country’s GDP.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="https://arbiterz.com/ghana-port-tipped-to-become-largest-in-west-and-central-africa/">70%</a> of Ghana’s trade is carried by sea through its ports in Tema and Takoradi. The <a href="https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/6-major-ports-in-ghana/">Port of Tema</a> is the largest container port in West Africa and Ghana. </p>
<p>But Ghana’s coastal areas also faces significant challenges in the form of what are referred to as “blue crimes”. These include ocean dumping, piracy, stowing away, drug and human trafficking, smuggling of arms, blue cyber threats and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Piracy has taken the centre-stage in Ghana and other Gulf of Guinea countries. But the other crimes also have a significant impact on the trade, government revenue and the potential developments that can accrue from the blue economy.</p>
<p>Certainly, Ghana cannot afford the consequences of ignoring its maritime domain. That’s why it’s developed a comprehensive <a href="https://www.gna.org.gh/1.21217943">National Integrated Maritime Strategy </a>.</p>
<p>In a recently <a href="https://www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/milscience/sigla/Pages/Research-Briefs-2022.aspx">published paper</a> we analyse the strategy. One thing is certainly clear: it is destined for failure without adequate political will from the highest echelons of government and without the necessary resources (financial, human resource, equipment and technology) to support strategies and actions plans.</p>
<h2>A policy is born</h2>
<p>The vision of the strategy is to ensure that by 2040, Ghana’s maritime space will be safe and secure with a thriving blue economy that benefits every Ghanaian. It presents an integrated approach towards achieving this vision.</p>
<p>The document outlines six strategic objectives that focus on safety, security, marine environmental protection, blue economy development, capacity building and cooperation. It also provides a framework for implementation and sustainability. This includes calls for the allocation of resources funded from the national budget.</p>
<p>The origins of the strategy can be traced to the work of the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiSzcO63cj5AhVOdcAKHRPSCOsQFnoECAUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2F2009-2017.state.gov%2Fdocuments%2Forganization%2F254115.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1yTz1c9_5UUs5R1i2RZ8bw">Security Governance Initiative</a>. This is an international security initiative signed in 2016 between the US and five partner African countries. They are Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Tunisia. Its objective is to facilitate the development of expertise on national security issues to assist with key reforms in some sectors. </p>
<p>There was an initial focus on maritime security threats and transnational blue crimes spanning maritime, border and cyber. However, this changed after the settlement of Ghana’s<a href="https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/23_published_texts/C23_Judgment_20170923.pdf"> maritime border dispute</a> with Cote d'Ivoire by the <a href="https://wcl.american.libguides.com/c.php?g=563260&p=3877828#:%7E:text=The%20International%20Tribunal%20for%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea%20is,and%20application%20of%20the%20Convention.">International Tribunal of the law of the Sea</a> in 2017. The settlement allowed Ghana to retain ownership of its lucrative offshore oil fields.</p>
<p>With Ghana’s maritime space now exceeding its landscape, there was a need to replace the existing policy with a more expansive framework. Thus the National Integrated Maritime Strategy was born.</p>
<h2>Two drivers</h2>
<p>The initial drivers of the strategy were both maritime security and blue economy development. Yet at the implementation workshop, some stakeholders were of the view that it seemed to be a maritime security strategy that attempted to integrate other sectors of the blue economy. </p>
<p>When the initial draft was being reviewed by stakeholders, this resulted in heated debates by breakout teams about prioritisation of activities. At the heart of this is the extent to which development-related stakeholders were initially involved. Stakeholder representation is crucial, particularly when there is unavailability or little use of national maritime data.</p>
<p>In Ghana, some stakeholders also argue that the driver for the maritime strategy must be economic in nature and not security focused. This is because safety and security play a cross-sectional role in the marine space. They further argue that economic issues including oil and gas activities, fishing, tourism, port expansion, coastal erosion and flooding due to climate change directly affect livelihoods. Therefore, the stakeholders assert that development should have been the focus and driver of the strategy from the onset. Security strategies could then be developed from threat assessments linked to the economic issues.</p>
<h2>Important new tool</h2>
<p>Ghana is a relatively young maritime nation. Traditionally, the ocean has been used for fishing but there is now increased multiple use of the marine space. Hence the integrated strategy is crucial to the development, safety and security of the blue economy. </p>
<p>In the regional context, it is an essential linchpin for the <a href="https://www.stableseas.org/post/gauging-maritime-security-in-west-and-central-africa">Yaounde Code of Conduct Architecture</a>. This was signed in 2013 by 25 countries in the West and Central African region with the aim of assisting the regions in addressing an array of maritime crimes affecting the region. </p>
<p>The progress of Ghana with this policy will be a learning platform for other African countries. For example, South Africa is in the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287050931_Maritime_security_challenges_for_South_Africa_in_the_Indian_ocean_region_IOR_The_southern_and_east_coast_of_Africa">process of addressing</a> its own maritime security interests. Of particular importance is how the process Ghana followed serves as a catalyst to advance and direct the South African endeavour.</p>
<p>As both the process, as well as the eventual strategy each holds its own intrinsic values for success, it is the consultative process Ghana followed and situating the integrated strategy at high political office that serve as good guidance for South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188381/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francois Vreÿ receives funding from Stellenbosch University and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>George Kobina vanDyck does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ghana’s maritime economy faces significant challenges in becoming viable.George Kobina vanDyck, Dean of Maritime Studies, Regional Maritime UniversityFrancois Vreÿ, Research Coordinator, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1868242022-07-25T03:08:36Z2022-07-25T03:08:36Z‘Narco-drones’ are the newest form of drug trafficking. Our laws aren’t yet ready to combat them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474771/original/file-20220719-22-v9kneu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5184%2C3453&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chris Jackson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This month, Spanish police authorities <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62040790">seized autonomous underwater vehicles</a>, each capable of transporting around 200 kilograms of drugs. It’s <a href="https://www.metropolinotizie.it/la-droga-la-consegna-il-barchino-con-il-pilota-automatico/">not the first time</a> police authorities have caught an uncrewed vessel carrying illicit substances. </p>
<p>These remote-controlled “narco-drones”, “<a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/colombian-navy-catches-narco-submarine-carrying-4-tons-of-cocaine/">narco-subs</a>” or “underwater drones” herald a new era in international drug trafficking. Drugs and other illicit goods can now be transported across the oceans, controlled by a remote operator located anywhere in the world. </p>
<p>Drugs are clandestinely shipped to Australia with traffickers attempting <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-11/drug-smugglers-stash-contraband-ships-hull-australian-ports/101053844?utm_campaign=abc_news_web&utm_content=link&utm_medium=content_shared&utm_source=abc_news_web">a variety of methods</a>. It’s only a matter of time before Australian Border Force is confronted with these “maritime autonomous vehicles” being used to smuggle contraband into the country. These are ships or underwater vehicles that are remotely controlled or autonomous and don’t have humans on board. </p>
<p>Both international and Australian laws need to catch up.</p>
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<h2>International law isn’t entirely ready for narco-drones</h2>
<p>There isn’t one universal definition of a “ship” or “vessel”. This makes it difficult to know when rights and duties attach to that ship.</p>
<p>China, for example, has a <a href="https://dronedj.com/2021/07/13/its-not-safe-for-subs-in-the-water-china-develops-military-shark-drone/">shark-shaped drone</a> used to gather intelligence. While a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-14/chinese-spy-ship-returns-to-australian-waters/100289192">naval surveillance ship</a> may be entitled to the freedom of navigation, it shouldn’t be presumed that such a small, uncrewed “vehicle” also enjoys this right. </p>
<p>Law enforcement officials are already using uncrewed sea vessels for policing purposes. Australia <a href="https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/unmanned/australia-and-sri-lanka-strengthen-ties-over-aerial-drone-surveillance#:%7E:text=At%20a%20virtual%20ceremony%2C%20Commander,crime%20fighting%20in%20Sri%20Lanka.">gifted drones to Sri Lanka</a> last year to support efforts against migrant smuggling operations.</p>
<p>Private companies are designing <a href="https://www.saildrone.com/news/autonomous-vehicles-combat-iuu-fishing#:%7E:text=A%20fleet%20of%20six%20saildrones,large%2Darea%20search%20and%20rescue.">uncrewed surface vehicles</a> for use patrolling against illegal fishing.</p>
<p>The new technology will likely become a critical component for countries wanting better information about who’s doing what and where. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A 'narcosub' found off the coast of Spain" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474773/original/file-20220719-22-d4v6tn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474773/original/file-20220719-22-d4v6tn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474773/original/file-20220719-22-d4v6tn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474773/original/file-20220719-22-d4v6tn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474773/original/file-20220719-22-d4v6tn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474773/original/file-20220719-22-d4v6tn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474773/original/file-20220719-22-d4v6tn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A ‘narco-drone’ found off the coast of Spain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Marta Vázquez Rodríguez/Europa Press via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Law enforcement</h2>
<p>International law requires states to cooperate and share information to prevent different transnational crimes at sea. For example, Article 108 of the <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm">UN Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> requires all states to cooperate in the suppression of drug trafficking on the high seas. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/illicit-trafficking.html?ref=menuside">1988 Drugs Convention</a> goes further, allowing parties to the treaty to stop and board each other’s vessels when they’re reasonably suspected of trafficking in illicit drugs.</p>
<p>However, if there’s no-one onboard a remote-controlled submarine, the existing rules and procedures for law enforcement cannot work as they have before. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Autonomous-shipping.aspx">International Maritime Organization</a> is undertaking a study of who is a “master” and “seafarer” in the context of uncrewed surface ships used to transport cargo around the world. While the organisation has an important focus on maritime safety, there are many legal questions relating to crimes at sea that also need to be answered.</p>
<h2>Who’s held criminally responsible?</h2>
<p>Determining who might be held criminally responsible when an uncrewed vessel is seized isn’t immediately apparent.</p>
<p>Australian legislation criminalises drug-trafficking when a “<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2022C00156/Html/Volume_2#_Toc101884932">person transports the substance</a>” but doesn’t refer to a situation where the person isn’t present at the time of transport. A person isn’t necessarily in “possession” of illicit drugs if they’re remotely controlling a narco-drone.</p>
<p>The alternative may be to prosecute an alleged offender on the grounds they’ve aided and abetted in the crime. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/drug-delivery-drones-shouldnt-surprise-us-smugglers-have-used-everything-else-36637">Drug delivery drones shouldn't surprise us – smugglers have used everything else</a>
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<p>This also raises the question of whether, and how, the designer of an autonomous vehicle may be criminally responsible. For example, what if the person designing the autonomous vehicle didn’t know it was to be used for criminal purposes?</p>
<p>We may need to rethink how we understand criminal recklessness or intention as requirements of a drug-trafficking offence when remote-controlled trafficking occurs.</p>
<p>Designers and manufacturers of maritime autonomous vehicles may need to consider how to safeguard their products against improper use. </p>
<h2>Who has jurisdiction?</h2>
<p>Determining which country has legal jurisdiction when a criminal enterprise uses autonomous narco-subs may be a complex issue.</p>
<p>For example, what if the alleged offender is a Russian national located in Belarus who’s operating the autonomous vehicle to transport drugs from Myanmar to Australia?</p>
<p>Australia doesn’t usually criminalise conduct by foreigners that occurs in the sovereign territory of other countries (the offence of <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2022C00156">killing an Australian overseas</a> being one exception).</p>
<p>In light of uncrewed vessels, states may need to consider new bases of jurisdiction to justify the exercise of authority over an alleged offender.</p>
<p>Even if law enforcement officials manage to arrest the perpetrator and assert jurisdiction, prosecution will likely depend upon a range of other challenges such as criminal intelligence sharing and extradition processes.</p>
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<p>Prior to the recent seizure in Spain of the “narco-drones”, Houthi rebels in the waters around Yemen were using <a href="https://eeradicalization.com/remote-controlled-terror-houthi-suicide-boats/">small remote-controlled vehicles laden with explosives</a> to attack Saudi ships.</p>
<p>This terrorist act potentially falls within the terms of the <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx">2005 Convention</a> for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. States party to this treaty are to criminalise these sorts of actions and prosecute or extradite those responsible.</p>
<p>But as with drug-trafficking laws, questions arise as to how terrorism laws will apply to the use of these autonomous vessels.</p>
<h2>Destroying narco-drones</h2>
<p>Broader consideration of Australian policing powers is further needed to determine if our laws are fit for purpose in assessing this new security threat.</p>
<p>It’s not entirely clear, for example, that the “seafarer” definition in the <a href="http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/na2012123/">Navigation Act</a> could currently cover maritime autonomous vehicle operators. This is because it states: “seafarer means any person who is employed or engaged or works in any capacity (including that of master) <em>on board a vessel</em> on the business of the vessel…”</p>
<p>The simplest response to this new criminal enterprise might be <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/estu/36/3/article-p389_1.xml">destroying any narco-drones captured at sea</a>. International law doesn’t prohibit such a response, although environmental considerations would likely arise.</p>
<p>In Australia, the <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdb/au/legis/cth/num_act/mpa2013191/">Maritime Powers Act</a> permits the disposal of vessels at sea only in certain circumstances. But the simple interception and destruction of a narco-drone – with no intention to seize and investigate, or to collect evidence – is likely to require updates to the law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186824/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natalie Klein receives funding from an Australian Research Council Discovery Project addressing international maritime security law and maritime autonomous vehicles, which is also held by Professor Douglas Guilfoyle at UNSW Canberra and A/Professor Saiful Karim at QUT. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rob McLaughlin receives funding from an Australian Research Council Discovery Project addressing international maritime security law and maritime autonomous vehicles, which is also held by Professor Douglas Guilfoyle at UNSW Canberra and A/Professor Saiful Karim at QUT. </span></em></p>International and Australian laws need to be updated to cope with the newest drug-trafficking technique threatening maritime security: remote-controlled narco-drones.Natalie Klein, Professor, UNSW SydneyRob McLaughlin, Professor, Centre for Military and Security Law, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1667422021-12-16T02:09:58Z2021-12-16T02:09:58ZDoes the US have the right to sail warships through the South China Sea? And can China stop them?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437676/original/file-20211215-15-1mqng9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=180%2C45%2C4539%2C3293&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The USS Ronald Reagan and USS Nimitz sailing in the South China Sea in July 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Samantha Jetzer/US Navy/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Images of what appeared to be US warships <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/nov/08/satellite-images-china-mock-ups-us-warships">emerged</a> from China last month, but they were not anywhere near an ocean. In fact, they were thousands of kilometres away, in a desert in western China.</p>
<p>Military experts said the mock-ups of US warships were part of a new target range developed by the People’s Liberation Army. The images demonstrate how seriously China is taking the repeated appearances of foreign warships in waters it claims to control – and why this is a worry for the stability of the region. </p>
<p>In late November, a US destroyer <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/23/us-warship-sails-through-taiwan-strait-first-since-biden-xi-meet">sailed</a> through the Taiwan Strait, prompting a warning from China to “stop stirring up trouble, crossing the line and playing with fire”. This followed sailings of naval ships through the strait in recent months by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-canadian-warships-sailed-through-taiwan-strait-last-week-2021-10-17/">Canada</a>, <a href="https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4314084">France</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/sep/28/uk-sends-warship-through-taiwan-straight-for-first-time-in-more-than-a-decade">the UK</a>.</p>
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<p>The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3155365/more-warships-are-raising-risk-misfire-south-china-sea">made nine visits</a> to the South China Sea this year, most recently in October when it <a href="https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2021/10/27/uss-carl-vinson-operates-in-south-china-sea-with-japan-maritime-self-defense-force/">conducted training exercises</a> with a Japanese helicopter destroyer. </p>
<p>China has been incensed by this uptick in naval activity. Beijing claims the vast majority of the South China Sea as its own and regards self-governing Taiwan as a renegade province. </p>
<p>In a clear demonstration of its own naval capabilities, four People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels <a href="https://www.alaskapublic.org/2021/09/14/coast-guard-encountered-chinese-warships-in-the-aleutians/">conducted military and surveillance operations</a> just 75km (45 miles) off the coast of Alaska in the US exclusive economic zone in late August. </p>
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<p>Both nations’ naval operations are fuelling an atmosphere of deep distrust and suspicion. Chinese commentators blame the US for turning the Taiwan Strait into a flashpoint, and characterise US transits in the South China Sea as provocative violations of China’s sovereignty. </p>
<p>And although the passage of the PLAN vessels near Alaska was in compliance with international law, the US is concerned about China’s aims to aggressively expand its naval operations to become the dominant power in the Pacific.</p>
<p>With tensions running high in the Pacific, where does international law come in? What does the law say about sailing vessels in disputed waters, and have China or the US and its allies violated these rules?</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-is-the-south-china-sea-such-a-hotly-contested-region-143435">Explainer: why is the South China Sea such a hotly contested region?</a>
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<h2>The rule of law in the oceans</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> (UNCLOS) establishes the rule of law in the oceans, as well as the rights of both coastal and maritime states.</p>
<p>For example, coastal states have the right to control and manage the resources in their exclusive economic zones (EEZ), which extend 200 nautical miles (370km) from their shores. </p>
<p>At the same time, these zones remain international waters through which ships may travel consistent with international law.</p>
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<p>UNCLOS also specifies which waters fall under a state’s direct sovereign control, otherwise known as its “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_waters#Territorial_sea">territorial seas</a>”. This extends at most 12 nautical miles (22km) from a nation’s coast. </p>
<p>Some of the world’s most important waterways, such as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18366503.2014.956856">Straits of Malacca</a> between Indonesia and Malaysia and the Taiwan Strait, fall into this category. </p>
<p>Foreign ships have a right of innocent passage through these territorial waters, as long as they navigate “<a href="https://www.maritime-executive.com/features/Maritime-Security-Private-The-Concept-of-Innocent-Passage">continuously and expeditiously</a>”, not unnecessarily stopping or anchoring. They must travel on the surface of the water and not threaten the “peace, good order, or security of the coastal state”.</p>
<p>Coastal states may stop foreign ships from passing through their territorial waters if they deem it “non-innocent”, but the passage itself cannot be considered a threat.</p>
<h2>Ambiguity being exploited by China</h2>
<p>UNCLOS is scattered with undefined and ambiguous terms in an attempt to strike a balance between the competing interests of coastal and maritime states. </p>
<p>This ambiguity raises the risk of clashing interpretations of the law, as well as the potential for nations to exploit it for their own purposes. China, for example, has complained US surveillance in its EEZ is not for “peaceful purposes” – an undefined term under UNCLOS.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-the-legal-implications-of-the-south-china-sea-ruling-62421">Explainer: what are the legal implications of the South China Sea ruling?</a>
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<p>UNCLOS also does not grant sovereignty over the sea in the absolute terms that China claims. Under the convention, the sea is shared by states and no nation can claim absolute dominion over it. </p>
<p>In recent years, China has passed domestic laws that claim to supersede international law. For example, Beijing <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/deliberate-ambiguity-china-s-new-territorial-waters-declaration">requires vessels</a> to seek permission before undertaking innocent passage through the South China Sea, which it considers its “territorial waters”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Chinese vessels in the South China Sea." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese vessels moored at Whitsun Reef in the South China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Task Force-West Philippine Sea/AP</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>China also claims <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-china-bending-rules-south-china-sea">historical control</a> over the South China Sea, which is also not clearly defined under UNCLOS. Historical control over waters has been recognised under international law, but this requires a state to have had continuous authority over a sea, with the acquiescence of other nations. </p>
<p>China’s claim to historical control over the South China Sea has been <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/whatever-happened-south-china-sea-ruling">dismissed</a> by an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china">international tribunal</a> and vigorously protested by its neighbours, as well as other nations without claims to the waters. </p>
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<h2>US belief in freedom of navigation</h2>
<p>The US maintains its passages through the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea are within its rights under UNCLOS, even though it is not a signatory. (It believes the convention contains pre-existing customary rights, such as the freedom of navigation, which all nations have always enjoyed.) </p>
<p>To maintain these rights, Washington has maintained a <a href="https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/archive/fonops/">Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) program</a> since the late 1970s. The purpose of these operations is to ensure all nations retain their unrestricted sea transit rights as spelled out under UNCLOS.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-does-not-want-war-at-least-not-yet-its-playing-the-long-game-160093">China does not want war, at least not yet. It's playing the long game</a>
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<p>As such, FONOPS send an overt message – the US has the right to sail its warships through the South China Sea because UNCLOS permits it. There must be no ambiguity under the convention when it comes to this.</p>
<p>China claims FONOPS are a mask for unwarranted aggression and regional interference. Beijing’s opposition is not surprising – the program contests the legality of both China’s sea claims and its attempts to restrict navigational freedom through these waters. </p>
<p>China has no legal grounds for dismissing these international rules. However, the longer it does, the more likely the tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait are going to intensify.</p>
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<p><em>Correction: An earlier version of this article misstated that the right of innocent passage is applicable to international waters, whereas it is relevant only to territorial seas.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166742/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claudio Bozzi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China and the US have differing interpretations of the law of the sea – and this is fuelling deep distrust and suspicion.Claudio Bozzi, Lecturer in Law, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1689522021-09-29T15:04:14Z2021-09-29T15:04:14ZHow illegal fishing off Cameroon’s coast worsens maritime security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423823/original/file-20210929-18783-1mw0gog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man removes water from a fishing boat in Idenau, Cameroon. Illegal activity by foreign fishing companies has depleted fishing stocks. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ann Johansson/Corbis via Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Cameroon there is growing awareness that there’s a direct relationship between illegal and unregulated activity in the fisheries sector, and maritime security in the waters off the country’s coast.</p>
<p>Like most countries along Africa’s Atlantic coast, addressing illegal fishing and fisheries crimes is challenging for Cameroon. Earlier this year the European Commission <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_621">called out</a> the country for failing to control vessels engaged in illegal fishing under the country’s flag. It also pointed to weak governance, including poor knowledge of the scale of illegal fishing.</p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2021.1982241?journalCode=uafs20#.YUxa6m1ZGHg.twitter">research paper</a> I looked at how Cameroon’s fisheries sector allows for unscrupulous actors to use fishing activities and fishing assets to engage in criminal activities.</p>
<p>I also sought to assess the implications for Cameroon’s maritime security. I analysed existing research and media reports, talked to military officers and other state agents, representatives of fishing community organisations and civil society actors.</p>
<p>My study shows both artisanal and industrial fishing vessels being intercepted and used for smuggling fuel, arms, other contraband and illegal migrants. </p>
<p>This affects national security greatly. The Cameroon navy is increasingly wary that fishing vessels are being used to smuggle weapons into Cameroon from neighbouring countries, particularly Nigeria. In addition, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/cameroon-equatorial-idINLC51095420090112">confrontations</a> between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea’s Navy officers over fishing rights in the Campo border settlement – and continuous tension between Cameroon and Nigerian authorities over illicit fishing activities in Bakassi peninsula – are important national security concerns. </p>
<p>Efforts to combat fishing and fisheries crime must recognise the relationship between the sector and maritime security. And there must be efforts to ensure cooperation with locals as well as non-state actors. These include fisheries-based community groups and civil society organisations.</p>
<h2>Cameroon’s dependency on fishing</h2>
<p>Millions of Cameroonians depend on fisheries for their livelihoods. </p>
<p>In a report, the Ministry of Finance says that the fisheries sector <a href="https://www.cabri-sbo.org/uploads/bia/cameroon_2017_approval_external_enacted_budget_ministry_of_finance_eccas_french_1_2.pdf">contributed</a> 3% of Cameroon’s US$39 billion gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019. It is projected to stay the same in coming years. Marine capture fishing <a href="http://www.minfi.gov.cm/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021_FINANCE_LAW_REPORT_ON_THE_NATION_S_ECONOMIC_SOCIAL_AND_FINANCIAL_SITUATION_AND_OUTLOOK.pdf">operations account</a> for 83% of fish production in the country. Nearly 80% is from <a href="http://www.minfi.gov.cm/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021_FINANCE_LAW_REPORT_ON_THE_NATION_S_ECONOMIC_SOCIAL_AND_FINANCIAL_SITUATION_AND_OUTLOOK.pdf">marine small-scale fisheries</a>. This supports the livelihoods of millions of Cameroonians especially women who mostly depend on fish trade for their livelihood. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cameroon-cant-afford-to-continue-ignoring-crime-in-fisheries-sector-124519">Cameroon can't afford to continue ignoring crime in fisheries sector</a>
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<p>Fishing equally constitutes an important part of the socio-cultural system in coastal communities building social cohesion. </p>
<p>But the fishery sector faces numerous challenges. One is illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and fisheries crimes. </p>
<p>In my paper I map the extent of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing and fisheries crimes off the country’s coast. I noted that these activities are a threat to Cameroon’s blue economy development, marine safety, ocean health and human resilience, and by extension national security. </p>
<h2>My research</h2>
<p>I found that in both industrial and artisanal sectors, illegal and unregulated fishing issues include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>violation of fishing zones,</p></li>
<li><p>use of prohibited chemicals,</p></li>
<li><p>fishing in breeding grounds,</p></li>
<li><p>non-declaration of catch data,</p></li>
<li><p>landing of catch in foreign ports and poor regulations and ineffective enforcement of existing laws.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Alongside these are criminal practices that are directly related to fishing such as corruption and document fraud. Some actors use the fisheries sector and its assets for crime. This includes drug and arms trafficking, illegal immigration and human rights abuses. </p>
<p>I also found that both industrial and artisanal fishing is dominated by foreign vessels and crew. An estimated 70 industrial fishing vessels that operate in Cameroonian maritime area come from mainly China and Nigeria. Some operate in partnership with Cameroonian entrepreneurs though details of such alliances are murky. </p>
<p>Meanwhile over 80% of artisanal fishers come from Nigeria, Ghana, Benin and Togo. Fisheries officers are concerned that this foreign dominance exacerbates illegal fishing and fisheries crime practices. This is because they explore their transnational social and economic networks to enhance illicit activities. For instance, small-scale fishing entrepreneurs bring in workers from their countries of origin, sometimes illegally. They are sometimes subjected to poor working and living conditions and have no labour protection. </p>
<p>Illegal fishing and fisheries crime leads to depleting fish stocks. Illegal catches by foreign industrial vessels alone <a href="http://www.seaaroundus.org/doc/publications/wp/2015/Belhabib-et-al-Cameroon.pdf">rose</a> from 2,300 tons in the 1980s to 95,000 tons in the 2000s. These estimates mask the true scale of the problem especially as the number of industrial vessels fishing illegally has <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0308597X19303264">increased</a> in recent years. </p>
<p>The same is true for the economic cost of illegal fishing and fisheries crime. A recent <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7043925/">study</a> estimated that illegal fishing leads to a tax revenue loss of between US$9000 to US$14000 per year. According to a <a href="https://www.businessincameroon.com/fish/1006-7192-cameroon-a-new-fishing-boat-boarded-and-search-on-wouri-river-for-illegal-fishing">government estimate</a>, the overall cost of illegal fishing alone is about US$33 million a year. </p>
<p>Depleting fisheries means small scale fishers struggle to access enough fish. The lack of fish and dwindling fishing activities means small-scale fisherfolks have to seek alternative livelihoods. A lack of opportunities in fishing communities also breeds discontent. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>To address illegal and unregulated fishing, endemic governance challenges, that have plagued the sector for decades, must be resolved. There must also be recognition of the link between illegal fishing and fisheries crime. </p>
<p>I identify a number of steps that need to be taken.</p>
<p>There needs to be effective regulation of who fishes, where and when in Cameroon’s maritime area. </p>
<p>Regulation of how fish is processed either for local consumption or export is equally important.</p>
<p>Ensuring transparency along the Cameroon fisheries value chain – from vessel registration to market – is also essential. To achieve this the Ministry of Fisheries and Animal Industries must ensure transparency in matriculating licensing fishing vessels and in monitoring control and surveillance of fishing operations. </p>
<p>All industrial fishing partnership agreements must be transparent. To this end a national open registry system must be set up. And the government must do more to involve Cameroonians in the sector. It took a step in the right direction by promoting and <a href="https://www.ifad.org/en/web/latest/-/news/cameroon-receives-us-1-million-grant-from-united-nations-agency-to-promote-aquaculture-entrepreneurship">facilitating</a> the greater involvement of local people in fishing activities. </p>
<p>The transnational nature of fisheries crime practices requires inter-agency cooperation both within Cameroon and other countries. Understanding the social networks and economic partnerships of the various agencies will help focus resources to tackle actors and their illegal proceeds.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168952/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maurice Beseng received funding from Coventry University Research Studentship Awards to conduct this research.</span></em></p>Efforts to combat illegal fishing and fisheries crime must recognise the relationship between the sector and maritime security.Maurice Beseng, Research associate, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1676792021-09-10T14:08:54Z2021-09-10T14:08:54ZTurning back migrant boats: what does the international law of the sea say?<p>The Home Office has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-58504016">unveiled plans</a> to use “turnback” tactics in the English Channel, with the border force compelling small boats carrying migrants to return to French waters. </p>
<p>The move is the latest in a series of strict immigration policies by Home Secretary Priti Patel, following the introduction of a <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/nationality-and-borders-bill/">controversial</a> nationality and borders bill in July that seeks to criminalise arrival in the UK without permission. </p>
<p>The practice of turnback or pushback of migrant boats is not new. Australia, Greece and Italy have all <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/oct/30/australias-asylum-boat-turnbacks-are-illegal-and-risk-lives-un-told">been criticised</a> for similar policies, with the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants calling it a <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27200&LangID=E">“cruel and deadly”</a> practice that states must end immediately. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/sep/09/priti-patel-to-send-boats-carrying-migrants-to-uk-back-across-channel">More than 13,500</a> people have crossed the English Channel so far in 2021. The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan highlights why people risk their lives making dangerous journeys in small, unsafe boats. </p>
<p>As the Strait of Dover is the <a href="https://www.marineinsight.com/marine-navigation/the-strait-of-dover-the-busiest-shipping-route-in-the-world/">busiest shipping route</a> in the world, pushbacks could be extremely dangerous. <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/migrant-crisis-priti-patel-planning-to-send-uk-bound-migrant-boats-back-to-france-12402671">Reports suggest</a> that the UK’s turnback policy is only applicable to “sturdier, bigger migrant boats” and in “very limited circumstances”. The government says it has legal advice that allows it to do so under maritime law.</p>
<h2>Is it legal?</h2>
<p>It is a fundamental and longstanding obligation of international and maritime law to render assistance to persons in distress at sea. Article 98 of the <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm">UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982</a> (LOSC) mandates that every state require its ships “to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost”.</p>
<p>The convention also places a duty on states to operate an effective search and rescue service and to cooperate with neighbouring states. The <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201184/volume-1184-I-18961-English.pdf">International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea</a> and the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201405/volume-1405-i-23489-english.pdf">International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue</a> also recognise this obligation to assist.</p>
<p>Gérald Darmanin, the French interior minister, has <a href="https://twitter.com/GDarmanin/status/1435901947681427458?s=20">stated</a> that France would not accept any practice that breaches the law of the sea. Indeed, implementing a blanket “turn back boats” policy would be to break international law. </p>
<p>The UK government claims it can lawfully utilise this practice in a limited and specific way – certain boats in particular circumstances – but is yet to confirm how Patel has become <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/sep/09/priti-patel-to-send-boats-carrying-migrants-to-uk-back-across-channel">“the first home secretary to establish a legal basis”</a> for this.</p>
<p>Foreign vessels have a right of innocent passage in a state’s territorial sea (up to 12 miles from shore) under article 17 LOSC. If passage is not innocent, such as when domestic immigration laws are breached, states can take necessary steps to prevent passage. For seaworthy vessels, this is generally unproblematic. It may be that the UK government expects to rely on some iteration of this principle. </p>
<p>But if a vessel determines and justifies that it is in distress, it can enter the state’s territorial sea, according to an exception in article 18 LOSC. The duty to render assistance is also still applicable, even where the state believes that migration offences have been committed by those in peril.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/09/09/france-won-t-be-blackmailed-over-uk-s-migrant-boat-pushback-plan">France says</a> that a turnback policy would negatively impact its cooperation with the UK. There are no international waters in the Dover Strait, the narrowest part of the Channel, which is divided between the UK and France’s territorial waters. France simply may not permit the UK into their territorial waters if returning migrants by force, triggering a stand-off. </p>
<h2>Human rights</h2>
<p>Beyond the law of the sea, when officials start to exercise effective control over another vessel at sea, by rescuing or physically towing boats back, human rights obligations come into play. </p>
<p><a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-109231%22%5D%7D">Hirsi Jamaa v Italy</a>, a case considered by the European Court of Human Rights, involved Italian authorities’ interception of migrants at sea, forcibly returning them to Libya. The court concluded that the applicants were under the “continuous and exclusive <em>de jure</em> and <em>de facto</em> control of the Italian authorities” during the transfer, meaning Italy had an obligation to protect their human rights. </p>
<p>Human rights at sea expert Sofia Galani also <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/estu/35/2/article-p325_6.xml?language=en">affirms</a> that people in the territorial waters of a state are within its jurisdiction for the purposes of human rights, which the state must respect and protect.</p>
<p>Such rights would include giving people access to a procedure that determines their refugee status, and ensuring that there is no collective expulsion of people. In the Hirsi case, the court held that Italian authorities violated the European Convention on Human Rights by not examining each applicant’s individual situation. </p>
<p>When officials turn back boats, they risk breaching the rights and obligations enshrined in international human rights law. The exercising of these rights is not affected by any potential migration offences that may have been committed. There could also be breaches of <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/3b66c2aa10">refugee law</a> depending on the circumstances, such as the principle of <em>non-refoulement</em>, which prevents states from forcing asylum seekers and refugees back to a place where they may face persecution.</p>
<p>There is no obligation in international law to seek asylum in the first safe country, and there are <a href="https://www.freemovement.org.uk/why-do-the-migrants-in-calais-want-to-come-to-the-uk/">many reasons</a> why individuals choose not to do so.</p>
<p>Political sociologist Lucy Mayblin states that there is <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2021/07/nationality-and">virtually no way</a> for refugees to safely and legally travel to the UK, due to carriers being fined if they transport individuals without visas, and tight controls at the UK border in France. People are left feeling that they have no choice but to make risky journeys. </p>
<p>In taking a hardline approach to immigration through border security and policing, the UK must ensure it adheres to the clear obligations within human rights and refugee law, as well as the law of the sea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167679/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hayley Roberts does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest border protection move from the UK government could breach international law.Hayley Roberts, Senior Lecturer in Public International Law, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1633872021-06-25T12:28:52Z2021-06-25T12:28:52ZHMS Defender: what this episode tells us about British naval power in the ‘Global Britain’ era<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408211/original/file-20210624-23-ku6v96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C3953%2C2532&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">HMS Defender: 21st-century British sea power.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kevin Shipp via Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The naval incident in the sea off the Crimean peninsula on June 23 highlights the resurgence of British sea power. Accounts of what actually happened differ. Russia’s defence ministry <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-forces-fire-warning-shots-british-destroyer-black-sea-interfax-cites-2021-06-23/">claimed that</a> warning shots were fired at the British destroyer HMS Defender within their territorial waters off Sevastopol. The UK Ministry of Defence denied that this happened and added that: “The Royal Navy ship is conducting innocent passage through Ukrainian territorial waters in accordance with international law.”</p>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> (UNCLOS) guarantees the right of “innocent passage through the territorial sea”, which coastal states shall not hamper. The practice of innocent passage is standard among world’s navies, allied or not. Russian warships transit through the English Channel en route to the Mediterranean. </p>
<p>It is also normal practice for the coastal state to escort any warships while they are transiting through their territorial waters in a show of sovereignty. For example, in January 2017 a Royal Navy frigate <a href="https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2017/january/25/170125-st-albans-escorts-russian-warships">escorted</a> the Russian Admiral Kuznetsov carrier task group through the channel.</p>
<p>What is different with Crimea is that neither the <a href="https://undocs.org/A/RES/68/262">UN General Assembly</a> nor <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-reaffirms-uks-solidarity-with-ukraine-on-seventh-anniversary-of-illegal-annexation-of-crimea">the UK</a> have recognised the legality of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/crimea-9186">2014 annexation of Crimea</a> by Russia and thus the legal status of the waters around the peninsula is highly contested.</p>
<p>Relations between the UK and Russia have been increasingly antagonistic for almost two decades. The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy">Integrated Review 2021</a>, which describes the UK government’s vision for the nation’s role in the world over the next decade, states that “Russia will remain the most acute direct threat to the UK”. This accounts for diplomatic, intelligence and (conventional and hybrid) military threats.</p>
<p>Accordingly, the UK is routinely involved in confidence-building activities in the Black Sea region with Nato allies in support of Ukraine in the context of its protracted conflict with Russia. This includes the signing (incidentally on board HMS Defender on June 21) of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-signs-agreement-to-support-enhancement-of-ukrainian-naval-capabilities">an agreement</a> to support the enhancement of Ukrainian naval capabilities. This includes “the development and joint production of eight fast missile warships and the creation of a new naval base”.</p>
<p>In this context, the transit of a British destroyer (presented as one of “<a href="https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/the-equipment/ships/destroyers/daring-class">the most advanced warship ever built</a>)” in the waters close to the strategically and historically important Russian naval base of Sevastopol was always going to engender a Russian response of some sort. </p>
<p>So given the recurring tensions between the two countries, this claimed incident is at first sight somewhat mundane and predictable. But the relative gravity of Russia’s claims and the high-level reactions to the event in the UK – by the defence secretary, the prime minister’s spokesperson, the foreign minister, then even Boris Johnson himself – might well suggest otherwise. </p>
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<p>The incident further highlights the crucial role that the Royal Navy is going to play in the “Global Britain” era.</p>
<h2>Prestige and ‘Global Britain’</h2>
<p>The Royal Navy is an instrument for both the projection of military power and prestige. As a symbol of the nation, the Royal Navy is central to Britain’s prestige. It is represented and often perceived as a cornerstone of British power in the world. As such, the navy contributes to the standing of the UK in the global pecking order of states.</p>
<p>This means that the UK government is likely to increasingly use the navy as an instrument of Britain’s global power in the years to come, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-to-the-house-on-the-integrated-review-19-november-2020">as hinted</a> by Boris Johnson in autumn 2020 and confirmed in his foreword to the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy">Integrated Review 2021</a> in April 2021.</p>
<p>The recent incident off Crimea epitomises this approach: a “Global Britain”, whose international standing in the modern era is based on the proactive defence of progressive forces within the global liberal world order, taking on a resurgent Russia that aggressively asserts its exclusive rights in its strategic backyard.</p>
<p>But the UK also engages with allies and faces competitors on a global scale. This includes the Indo-Pacific region, towards which the carrier strike group led by Britain’s new flagship, HMS Queen Elizabeth, is <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/carrier-strike-group-sets-sail-on-seven-month-maiden-deployment--2">currently heading</a>. This no doubt aims to send a strong message to China – not unlike the one sent to Russia by HMS Defender.</p>
<h2>Theatres of operations</h2>
<p>I recently <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/36473/pdf/">gave evidence</a> to the defence committee of the House of Commons as part of an inquiry into the <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/work/1209/the-navy-purpose-and-procurement/publications/">navy’s purpose and procurement</a>. As I wrote: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Decision-makers have a choice to make about the hierarchy of theatres of operations for the navy. It might not be possible to operate at the same level of intensity and in a sustainable way in both Europe and Asia. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Given resource constraints, the government will have to prioritise theatres of operations so that the ambitions stated in the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy">Integrated Review 2021</a> around the concept of a “Global Britain” that proactively defends progressive values around the world can be sustained over several decades.</p>
<p>For the Royal Navy and relevant decision-makers, it means that naval missions and the strategic importance given to Europe, the Middle East and Asia should be proportionate to Britain’s core national interest. The incident off Crimea suggests that the Royal Navy might logically prioritise the Euro-Atlantic theatre.</p>
<p>But in practice, this is not how sea power works. The Royal Navy is a global instrument whose power and prestige derives from the unbound nature of the maritime domain. And the pursuit of Britain’s interests requires that it should operate across the global grid, so it needs to strike the correct balance.</p>
<p>At any rate, beyond the ongoing diplomatic row between Britain and Russia that this claimed incident has created, it appears that the navy is back as Britain’s key defence, security and foreign policy instrument in the post-Brexit and post-pandemic era.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163387/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basil Germond does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Royal Navy is central to the government’s vision of ‘Global Britain’.Basil Germond, Senior Lecturer and Director of Research Training, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1633892021-06-24T16:53:59Z2021-06-24T16:53:59ZHMS Defender incident: what the law of the sea says<p>There are conflicting accounts from the UK and Russia about an incident off Cape Fiolent on the Crimean peninsula on June 23 when Russia’s defence ministry said its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/23/russian-ship-fired-warning-shots-at-royal-navy-destroyer-hms-defender-moscow-says">aircraft had fired</a> warning shots at the British destroyer HMS Defender to expel it from Russia’s claimed territorial sea.</p>
<p>The geopolitics that might lie behind the episode are for others to debate, but having credible legal arguments is always important. The UK’s Ministry of Defence said <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQPress/status/1407670812262518785">on Twitter</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Royal Navy ship is conducting innocent passage through Ukrainian territorial waters in accordance with international law.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>“Innocent passage” for foreign ships is the main qualification on a coastal state’s otherwise untrammelled sovereignty over its territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. Several provisions are devoted to it in Part II of the 1982 <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> (UNCLOS), to which both the UK and Russia (as well as Ukraine) are party.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/2kG2R1GY0UI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Under Article 17 of UNCLOS, innocent passage is the right to proceed through another country’s territorial waters without interference. Article 18 defines “passage” as navigation through the territorial sea of a coastal state without calling into one of its ports – as HMS Defender was doing – or to or from the internal waters of a state. It must be “continuous and expeditious”, without stopping and anchoring, except in so far as is incidental to ordinary navigation, or because of <em>force majeure</em> or distress, or in order to render assistance to another vessel in distress. </p>
<p>Nothing suggests that HMS Defender’s passage was anything but continuous and expeditious. As for what is “innocent”, UNCLOS Article 19 equates this with not being prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal state, and contains an exhaustive list of prejudicial acts, including use or threat of force, weapons exercises, defence- or security-related information-gathering, propaganda, smuggling of goods or people, launching, landing or taking on board aircraft or military devices, fishing, wilfully polluting and a few others.</p>
<h2>UK within its rights</h2>
<p>All of this points to the UK being within its rights to send its ship through the territorial waters off the Crimean peninsula. Notably, there is no requirement that innocent passage must be done for a particular purpose, nor does it need justification in terms of the directness of the route from port of origin to destination (although a glance at the map shows that passing close to Crimea is indeed the shortest way from Odessa to any Georgian port).</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408206/original/file-20210624-19-1ns8vzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Wikimedia map of Black Sea showing main ports." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408206/original/file-20210624-19-1ns8vzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408206/original/file-20210624-19-1ns8vzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408206/original/file-20210624-19-1ns8vzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408206/original/file-20210624-19-1ns8vzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408206/original/file-20210624-19-1ns8vzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408206/original/file-20210624-19-1ns8vzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408206/original/file-20210624-19-1ns8vzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Black Sea: the waters off Crimea are part of the route from Odessa to any Georgian ports.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So far there has been no accusation from Russia that HMS Defender was engaged in any of the acts that by UNCLOS Article 19 render passage non-innocent, which would have triggered Article 25 permitting the coastal state to take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent. It seems to have been its mere presence that Russia found objectionable, possibly because HMS Defender was too close for comfort to the sensitive naval port of Sevastopol. </p>
<p>The UK maintains that the ship was in a recognised sea lane. This appears to be an indirect reference to UNCLOS Article 22, which permits the coastal state to “require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through its territorial sea to use such sea lanes … as it may designate or prescribe for the regulation of the passage of ships”. </p>
<p>Sea lanes off southwestern Crimea were already included in the 2013 edition of the <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Pages/ShipsRouteing.aspx">Ships’ Routeing</a> publication of the <a href="https://www.imo.org/">International Maritime Organization</a> (the UN specialised agency for shipping), the last that predates the 2014 Russian takeover of Crimea. The current (2019) edition is behind a paywall, but it would not have been in Russia’s interest to alter the lanes since then, as that would invite the question of whether it has lawfully acquired territorial title to Crimea, answered resoundingly in the negative by <a href="https://undocs.org/A/RES/68/262">UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262</a>.</p>
<h2>A different rule for warships?</h2>
<p>One possible counterargument would be to say that warships do not in fact have the right of innocent passage, only merchant ships. But this is a minority view and unconvincing, as it would make nonsense of much of the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. Many of the acts identified as prejudicial under Article 19 can in practice only be done by warships, yet there is no point including them in this list if warships do not benefit from the right in the first place. </p>
<p>Moreover Russia – which, in the eyes of international law is considered as a “continuator” state to the former Soviet Union – is on record as taking what one might call the orthodox view. The 1989 USA-USSR <a href="https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1989-USA-USSR-Joint-Statement-with-Attached-Uniform-Interpretation-of-Rues-of-International-Law-Governing-Innocent-Passage.pdf">Joint Statement</a> on the Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage confirms that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>All ships, including warships …, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea in accordance with international law, for which neither prior notification nor authorization is required.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The 1989 statement, on which all states can rely, goes on to say that a coastal state “which questions whether the particular passage of a ship through its territorial sea is innocent shall inform the ship of the reason why it questions the innocence of the passage, and provide the ship an opportunity to clarify its intentions or correct its conduct”. No exchange of this type has been publicly released. So it is not clear why Russia reacted as it did against the passage of HMS Defender, and the UK’s legal position, at least on the facts as known, appears strong.</p>
<p>But if the aim of the passage was to underline the UK view that the Crimea belongs to Ukraine and not Russia, given the reference in the Ministry of Defence statement to HMS Defender being in Ukrainian territorial waters, this is misconceived, as it cannot possibly advance Ukraine’s claim. It might even be counterproductive, by giving an opening to an argument that the passage, if undertaken predominantly for propaganda purposes, becomes non-innocent under Article 19. </p>
<h2>The China question</h2>
<p>For the whole point of innocent passage is that, as a right, permission does not have to be sought for it, which makes it irrelevant to which state the territory in question belongs. The same, incidentally, goes for the South China Sea, where – even now – the Royal Navy is <a href="https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/eyes-china-british-aircraft-carrier-group-heads-south-sea-military-drill">sending a carrier group</a>. Innocent passage within 12 nautical miles of any feature clear of the water at high tide is a right irrespective of which of the claimants has the better case for territorial title. </p>
<p>The only difference is that one of them, China, is the leading proponent of the view confining innocent passage to merchant ships. So – bearing in mind the qualification about propaganda – making a demonstration of passing through without seeking any claimant’s permission does actually serve a purpose there. </p>
<p>This thus calls into question the wisdom of an operation which has predictably annoyed Russia – assuming that was not in fact its sole aim. But it does nothing to bolster Ukraine’s claim, however worthy a goal it might be to act in support of the UN’s rejection of any change in status of Crimea in 2014. </p>
<p>So in future the UK would be well advised to avoid relying on Ukrainian “permission” as a justification. This would only undermine the innocent passage rule, as one imagines the US and perhaps others are forcefully pointing out to the UK behind the scenes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163389/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Serdy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nothing suggests that HMS Defender’s passage was anything but continuous and expeditious. But the UK should avoid relying on Ukrainian “permission” as a justification.Andrew Serdy, Professor of the Public International Law of the Sea, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1493412021-04-19T12:27:36Z2021-04-19T12:27:36ZCompetition heats up in the melting Arctic, and the US isn’t prepared to counter Russia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395568/original/file-20210417-15-1qcv628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=235%2C770%2C3695%2C2051&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russia has been beefing up its Arctic icebreaker fleet to take advantage of the changing climate.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-50-let-pobedy-50th-anniversary-of-victory-nuclear-news-photo/1135830248">Lev Fedoseyev\TASS via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For decades, the frozen Arctic was little more than a footnote in global economic competition, but that’s changing as its ice melts with the warming climate.</p>
<p>Russia is now attempting to claim <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus_rev1.htm">more of the Arctic seabed</a> for its territory. It has been rebuilding Cold War-era Arctic military bases and recently announced plans to test its Poseidon nuclear-powered, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russia-sends-doomsday-nuclear-powered-torpedo-for-test-in-the-arctic-wf5ttr260">nuclear-armed torpedo</a> in the Arctic. In Greenland, the recent election ushered in a new pro-independence government that opposes foreign <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/07/world/europe/left-wing-greenland-election-mine.html">rare earth metal mining</a> as its ice sheet recedes – including projects counted on by China and the U.S. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-is-worried-about-its-critical-minerals-supply-chains-essential-for-electric-vehicles-wind-power-and-the-nations-defense-157465">to power technology</a>. </p>
<p>The Arctic region has been warming <a href="https://theconversation.com/100-degrees-in-siberia-5-ways-the-extreme-arctic-heat-wave-follows-a-disturbing-pattern-141442">at least twice as fast</a> as the planet as a whole. With the sea ice now thinner and disappearing sooner in the spring, several countries have had their eyes on the Arctic, both for access to <a href="https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/archive/2009/arctic/index.html">valuable natural resources</a>, including the fossil fuels whose use is now <a href="https://science2017.globalchange.gov/">driving global warming</a>, and as a shorter route for commercial ships. A tanker carrying liquefied natural gas from northern Russia to China tested that shorter route this past winter, <a href="https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/russian-lng-carrier-completes-winter-trips-on-the-northern-sea-route">traversing the normally frozen Northern Sea Route</a> in February for the first time with the help of an icebreaker. The route cut the shipping time by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-novatek-cnpc-lng/russias-novatek-ships-first-lng-cargo-to-china-via-arctic-idUSKBN1K90YN">nearly half</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395412/original/file-20210416-17-15qz7tp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A round map with a view centered on the North Pole showing shipping routes" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395412/original/file-20210416-17-15qz7tp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395412/original/file-20210416-17-15qz7tp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395412/original/file-20210416-17-15qz7tp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395412/original/file-20210416-17-15qz7tp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395412/original/file-20210416-17-15qz7tp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=716&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395412/original/file-20210416-17-15qz7tp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=716&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395412/original/file-20210416-17-15qz7tp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=716&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Arctic shipping routes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Sea_Route#/media/File:Map_of_the_Arctic_region_showing_the_Northeast_Passage,_the_Northern_Sea_Route_and_Northwest_Passage,_and_bathymetry.png">Susie Harder/Arctic Council</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russia has been building up its icebreaker fleet for years for these and other purposes. The U.S., meanwhile, is playing catch-up. While Russia has access to <a href="https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Prevention-Policy-CG-5P/Marine-Transportation-Systems-CG-5PW/Office-of-Waterways-and-Ocean-Policy/Office-of-Waterways-and-Ocean-Policy-Mobility-and-Ice-Operations/">more than 40</a> of these ships today, the U.S. Coast Guard has two, one of them well past its intended service life. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/rockford-weitz">expert in maritime trade and Arctic geopolitics</a>, I have been following the increasing activity and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/15/world/europe/us-russia-sanctions.html">geopolitical tensions</a> in the Arctic. They underscore the need for fresh thinking on U.S. Arctic policy to address emerging competition in the region. </p>
<h2>The problem with America’s icebreaker fleet</h2>
<p>America’s aging icebreaker fleet has been a persistent topic of frustration in Washington. </p>
<p>Congress put off investing in new icebreakers for decades in the face of more pressing demands. Now, the lack of polar-class icebreakers undermines America’s ability to <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/video/582402/coast-guard-cutter-polar-star-breaks-ice-supporting-operation-deep-freeze-2018">operate in the</a> Arctic region, including responding to disasters as shipping and mineral exploration increase. </p>
<p>It might sound counterintuitive, but diminishing sea ice can make the region more dangerous – breakaway ice floes pose <a href="https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/icebergs-disrupt-north-atlantic-shipping">risks both to ships and to oil platforms</a>, and the opening waters are expected to attract both more shipping and more mineral exploration. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that about 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas and 13% of undiscovered oil <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/324/5931/1175">may be in the Arctic</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People walk on the ice beside the giant icebreaker" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395565/original/file-20210417-17-1ixnw7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395565/original/file-20210417-17-1ixnw7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395565/original/file-20210417-17-1ixnw7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395565/original/file-20210417-17-1ixnw7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395565/original/file-20210417-17-1ixnw7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395565/original/file-20210417-17-1ixnw7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395565/original/file-20210417-17-1ixnw7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Polar Star icebreaker is 45 years old and in need of replacement.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/1078451/polar-star-antarctic-trip-2006">Mariana O'Leary/U.S. Coast Guard</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The U.S. Coast Guard has just two icebreakers to manage this changing environment. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Cutters/cgcPolarStar/">Polar Star</a>, a heavy icebreaker that can break through ice up to 21 feet thick, was commissioned in 1976. It is usually posted to Antarctica in the winter, but it was <a href="https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/12/02/coast-guard-icebreaker-polar-star-heading-to-arctic-as-covid-19-limits-antarctic-operations/">sent to the Arctic</a> this year to provide a U.S. presence. The crew on the aging ship has had to <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/08/16/meet-polar-star-coast-guards-vital-neglected-icebreaker-its-falling-apart.html">fight fires</a> and deal with power outages and equipment breaks – all while in some of the most inhospitable and remote locations on Earth. The second icebreaker, the smaller <a href="https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Cutters/cgcHealy/">Healy</a>, commissioned in 2000, suffered a fire on board in August 2020 and <a href="https://news.usni.org/2020/08/25/coast-guard-icebreaker-healy-suffers-fire-on-arctic-mission-all-arctic-operations-cancelled">canceled all Arctic operations</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two Coast Guard crew members, a man and a woman, work amid pipes on the ship." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395564/original/file-20210417-23-1krdxnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395564/original/file-20210417-23-1krdxnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395564/original/file-20210417-23-1krdxnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395564/original/file-20210417-23-1krdxnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395564/original/file-20210417-23-1krdxnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395564/original/file-20210417-23-1krdxnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395564/original/file-20210417-23-1krdxnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Engineers aboard the Polar Star fix a saltwater pump while in the Bering Sea on Jan. 28, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6505575/coast-guard-cutter-polar-star-arctic-west-winter-2021">Cynthia Oldham/U.S. Coast Guard</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Congress has <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34391/196">authorized construction of three more heavy icebreakers</a> at a total cost of around US$2.6 billion and has funded two of them so far, but they take years to produce. A shipyard in Mississippi expects to deliver the first by 2024.</p>
<h2>An icebreaker solution</h2>
<p>One way to add to the icebreaker fleet would be to have allies jointly procure and operate icebreakers, while each still builds up its own fleet. </p>
<p>For example, the Biden administration could collaborate with NATO allies to create a partnership modeled on NATO’s <a href="https://www.nspa.nato.int/about/namp/sac%5D">Strategic Airlift Capability</a> of C-17 airplanes. The airlift program, started in 2008, operates three large transport planes that its 12 member nations can use to quickly transport troops and equipment.</p>
<p>A similar program for icebreakers could operate a fleet under NATO – perhaps starting with icebreakers contributed by NATO countries, such as Canada, or partner countries, such as Finland. Like the Strategic Airlift Capability, each member country would purchase a percentage of the shared fleet’s operating hours based on their overall contributions to the program. </p>
<p>U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced a step toward more of this kind of collaboration on June 9, 2021, with plans to establish a new <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2651852/the-department-of-defense-announces-establishment-of-arctic-regional-center/">Center for Arctic Security Studies</a>, the sixth <a href="https://www.dsca.mil/dod-regional-centers-rc">Department of Defense Regional Center</a>. The centers focus on research, communications, and collaboration with partners.</p>
<h2>Using the Law of the Sea</h2>
<p>Another strategy that could boost U.S. influence in the Arctic, buffer looming conflicts, and help clarify seabed claims would be for the Senate to ratify the <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Russian President Vladimir Putin stands a man who is pointing outside the lit-up LNG plant." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395569/original/file-20210417-21-r9fhtq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395569/original/file-20210417-21-r9fhtq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395569/original/file-20210417-21-r9fhtq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395569/original/file-20210417-21-r9fhtq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395569/original/file-20210417-21-r9fhtq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395569/original/file-20210417-21-r9fhtq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395569/original/file-20210417-21-r9fhtq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russia recently opened a large liquefied natural gas plant on the Kara Sea, above the Arctic Circle.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-listens-to-novatek-ceo-news-photo/888363240">Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>The Law of the Sea took effect in 1994 and established rules for how the oceans and ocean resources are used and shared. That includes determining how countries can claim parts of the seabed. The U.S. initially objected over a section that limited deep seabed mining, but <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110shrg45282/html/CHRG-110shrg45282.htm">that section was amended</a> to alleviate some of those concerns. Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/lawofthesea/chapter-eleven/">all urged the Senate to ratify it</a>, but that <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-resolution/284/text">still has not happened</a>. </p>
<p>Ratification would give the U.S. a stronger international legal position in contested waters. It also would enable the U.S. to claim more than 386,000 square miles – an area twice the size of California – <a href="https://www.cfr.org/report/arctic-imperatives">of Arctic seabed along its extended continental shelf</a> and fend off any other country’s overlapping claims to that area. </p>
<p>Without ratification, the U.S. will be forced to rely on <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/lawofthesea/chapter-one/">customary international law to pursue any maritime claims</a>, which weakens its <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/lawofthesea/chapter-eleven/">international legal position in contested waters</a>, including the <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/lawofthesea/chapter-eight/">Arctic</a> and the <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/lawofthesea/chapter-ten/">South China Sea</a>.</p>
<h2>Relying on international cooperation</h2>
<p>The Arctic has generally been a region of international cooperation. <a href="https://arctic-council.org/en">The Arctic Council</a>, an international body, has kept eight countries with sovereignty over land in the region focused on the Arctic’s fragile ecosystem, the well-being of its Indigenous peoples, and emergency prevention and response. </p>
<p>Over the past few years, however, <a href="https://arctic-council.org/en/about/observers/">“near-Arctic” countries</a>, including China, Japan, South Korea, Britain and many European Union members, have become more engaged, and Russia has become more active.</p>
<p>With the rising tensions and expanding interest in the region, the era of cooperative engagement has started to recede with the melting sea ice. </p>
<p><em>This article was updated with the Defense Department announcing plans on June 9, 2021, to establish a new center to promote collaboration in the Arctic.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149341/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rockford Weitz receives funding from the Smith Richardson Foundation to study emerging maritime security challenges, including those in the Arctic Ocean region. In addition to his position at Tufts University, he serves as a Board Director and President at the Institute for Global Maritime Studies Inc., a Massachusetts-based research and education non-profit, and as an advisor and investor in OceanShield Pte. Ltd., a maritime cyber-security startup.</span></em></p>Russia is attempting to claim more of the Arctic seabed, an area rich in oil, gas and minerals. It’s also expanding shipping and reopening Arctic bases. Here are two things the U.S. can do about it.Rockford Weitz, Professor of Practice & Director, Fletcher Maritime Studies Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1459772020-09-21T12:15:57Z2020-09-21T12:15:57ZUS-China fight over fishing is really about world domination<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358865/original/file-20200918-18-1oeb43k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C4%2C3000%2C1989&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China has clashed with neighbors over its fishing in the contested South China Sea, pictured here. Controversially, Chinese fishermen also venture as far as Argentina and Ecuador.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fishing-boats-set-sail-for-fishing-after-the-four-and-a-news-photo/1272762923?adppopup=true">Yao Feng/VCG via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China’s aggressive, sometimes illegal fishing practices are the latest source of conflict with the United States.</p>
<p>China has the <a href="https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-expanding-fishing-fleet-is-depleting-worlds-oceans">world’s largest fishing fleet</a>. Beijing claims to send around 2,600 vessels out to fish across the globe, but some <a href="https://www.odi.org/publications/16958-china-s-distant-water-fishing-fleet-scale-impact-and-governance">maritime experts say</a> this distant-water fishing fleet may number nearly 17,000. The United States has fewer than 300 distant-water ships. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lawofsea.html#:%7E:text=The%20law%20of%20the%20sea%20is%20a%20body%20of%20customs,peaceful%20relations%20on%20the%20sea.&text=The%20United%20Nations%20(UN)%20held,resulted%20in%20a%201958%20Convention.">1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a>, nations control marine resources within a 200-mile “exclusive economic zone”; beyond that are international waters. While the U.S. never signed the treaty, it has declared a 200-mile offshore exclusive economic zone.</p>
<p>Bolstered by generous subsidies and at times protected by armed coast guard cutters, Chinese fishermen have been illegally fishing near the Korean Peninsula and in the South China Sea, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-is-the-south-china-sea-such-a-hotly-contested-region-143435">hotly contested area claimed by six countries</a>. By exploiting these waters <a href="https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-expanding-fishing-fleet-is-depleting-worlds-oceans">China has come to dominate the international squid market</a>. Nearly half of this catch is exported to other Asian nations, Europe and the United States.</p>
<p>Chinese ships have even <a href="https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2013/11/curbing-chinas-massive-destructive-distant-water-fishing-fleet/#:%7E:text=China%20created%20its%20distant%20water,mirrored%20China's%20overall%20economic%20surge.">pushed as far as Africa</a> and <a href="https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/china-fishing-boats-ecuador">South America</a>, where fishermen have been known to remove their identifying flags to avoid detection. In 2017 Ecuador caught 20 Chinese fishermen in the environmentally protected Galapagos Marine Reserve and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-environment-galapagos/ecuador-jails-chinese-fishermen-found-with-6000-sharks-idUSKCN1B81TS">sentenced them to four years in prison</a> for capturing thousands of sharks, the primary ingredient in a Chinese delicacy, shark fin soup.</p>
<p>In August, <a href="https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/1289896501234110464">U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo criticized</a> China for “<a href="https://www.state.gov/on-chinas-predatory-fishing-practices-in-the-galapagos/">predatory fishing practices</a>” that violate “the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal states.” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358864/original/file-20200918-16-y0sgm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Police escort a man off a bus" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358864/original/file-20200918-16-y0sgm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358864/original/file-20200918-16-y0sgm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358864/original/file-20200918-16-y0sgm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358864/original/file-20200918-16-y0sgm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358864/original/file-20200918-16-y0sgm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358864/original/file-20200918-16-y0sgm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358864/original/file-20200918-16-y0sgm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A crew member of the Chinese-flagged ship confiscated by the Ecuadorean navy arrives for a court hearing in the Galápagos Islands on Aug. 25, 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/crew-members-of-the-chinese-flagged-ship-confiscated-by-the-news-photo/863641990?adppopup=true">Juan Cevallos/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>China’s Foreign Ministry said Pompeo was just trying “<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1804582.shtml">stir up trouble for other countries</a>.”</p>
<p>But Pompeo’s rebuke is about more than fish. Governments often use the fishing industry to advance their diplomatic agenda, as my work as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=rDxMAlQAAAAJ">historian of fishing and American foreign relations</a> shows. The United States used fishing, directly and indirectly, to build its international empire from its founding through the 20th century. Now China’s <a href="https://chinaus-icas.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/American-Perspectives-on-the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative.pdf">doing it, too</a>. </p>
<h2>Fishing its way from independence to imperialism</h2>
<p>Before the 1800s, when international law began to define maritime rights, restrictions on fishing depended wholly on what a given nation could enforce. </p>
<p>That’s why, at the Paris negotiation to end the Revolutionary War in 1783, future president <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/6wh90-3.asp">John Adams insisted that Great Britain recognize the right of Americans to fish</a> the North Atlantic. Its rich waters were full of cod and mackerel, but that’s not all: The <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/paris.asp">fishing rights Adams won in 1783</a> extended the young country’s presence well into the sea.</p>
<p>Because American fishing rights were recognized alongside American statehood, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/jearlyrepublic.36.3.493">my research shows</a>, generations of U.S. diplomats associated the two. In 1797, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering called American fisheries “the fairest fruits of independence.” </p>
<p>Even so, for decades after independence, the U.S. and Great Britain quarreled over international fishing, leading to many new and renegotiated treaties. At each turn, the Americans uniformly defended their right to fish the North Atlantic, even threatening war to do so. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Black and white drawing of a ship at sea" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357940/original/file-20200914-20-uo7e3e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=60%2C3%2C731%2C564&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357940/original/file-20200914-20-uo7e3e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357940/original/file-20200914-20-uo7e3e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357940/original/file-20200914-20-uo7e3e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357940/original/file-20200914-20-uo7e3e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357940/original/file-20200914-20-uo7e3e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357940/original/file-20200914-20-uo7e3e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Atlantic fisheries were closely tied to American independence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">George Brown Goode, The Fisheries and Fishery Industry of the United States</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By the 1860s, international fishing had become a key component of <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/153038/how-america-reinvented-empire-review-daniel-immerwahr">America’s newly expansionist foreign policy</a>. Between 1850 and 1898, the U.S. annexed numerous overseas territories, among them Alaska, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines. Today this empire gives both American fishing vessels and the U.S. military a global reach.</p>
<p>Secretary of State William Henry Seward, who purchased Alaska and its rich North Pacific waters under Andrew Johnson in 1867, also tried unsuccessfully to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/16/american-imperialists-have-always-dreamed-of-greenland/">buy Greenland and Iceland</a>, hoping to further extend American fishing claims across the North Atlantic. During archival research I learned that Seward’s like-minded successor, Hamilton Fish, toyed with the idea of purchasing the Canary Islands, near northwest Africa, as a naval depot and a base for American fishermen.</p>
<h2>Cold War fish</h2>
<p>For a time around the turn of the 20th century, fishing took a back seat to <a href="https://www.visitthecapitol.gov/exhibitions/artifact/naval-appropriations-act-fiscal-year-1891-battleship-act-1890-june-30-1890">military might</a> in the U.S.’s international power plays. </p>
<p>After World War II, though, Washington again turned to marine resources to serve its foreign policy agenda. This time the government used what I call “fish diplomacy” to help build a more America-friendly world order.</p>
<p><a href="https://networks.h-net.org/system/files/contributed-files/env-roundtable-5-2.pdf">American diplomats of the 1940s used the notion of “maximum sustainable yield”</a> – that is, the idea that there is a level of fishing that maximizes the number of fish caught without damaging the long-term health of fisheries – to expand American maritime influence. </p>
<p>The idea was more political tool than <a href="https://academic.oup.com/icesjms/article/70/2/245/797356">scientific discovery</a>, as historian <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=5EhQDX4AAAAJ&hl=en">Carmel Finley has thoroughly explored</a>. But the U.S. used this faux sustainability argument to pass laws and agreements that limited foreign incursions into American waters while giving American fishermen freer reign over the world’s oceans. </p>
<p>Citing <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d324">maximum sustainable yield</a>, the <a href="https://iea.uoregon.edu/treaty-text/1945-presidentialproclamationcoastalfisherieshighseasentxt#:%7E:text=In%20view%20of%20the%20pressing,the%20future%20may%20be%20developed">Truman administration declared conservation zones</a> to protect certain fisheries in 1945. This move essentially <a href="https://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/article/fish-unlimited-how-maximum-sustained-yield-failed-fishermen/">barred Japanese salmon fishermen from Alaska’s Bristol Bay</a>. Just a few years later the State Department cited maximum sustainable yield to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1227781">argue against restricting U.S. tuna fishing in Latin American waters</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358869/original/file-20200918-14-17kj8wk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black and white image of a fishing boat" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358869/original/file-20200918-14-17kj8wk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358869/original/file-20200918-14-17kj8wk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358869/original/file-20200918-14-17kj8wk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358869/original/file-20200918-14-17kj8wk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358869/original/file-20200918-14-17kj8wk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=586&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358869/original/file-20200918-14-17kj8wk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=586&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358869/original/file-20200918-14-17kj8wk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=586&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A fishing boat moored in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1947.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/puerto-rican-fishing-boat-moored-in-san-juan-after-its-news-photo/3360891?adppopup=true">Rotkin/Three Lions/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As the Cold War developed in the 1950s, fish diplomacy helped the U.S. shore up allies to <a href="https://contingentmagazine.org/2019/05/01/overfishing-is-a-choice/">counter the Soviet Union</a>. </p>
<p>Washington gave generous subsidies to expand the fishing fleets of various countries – most notably Japan, whose war-ravaged economy was revived in part by the U.S. boat-building subsidies that resurrected its own <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bestor/files/bestor_2014_eaa.pdf">once vital empire-building fishing industry</a>. The U.S. also lowered tariffs for strategically located fishing nations like Iceland, making their main export, cod, cheaper for Americans to buy.</p>
<p>[<em>The Conversation’s science, health and technology editors pick their favorite stories.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-favorite">Weekly on Wednesdays</a>.]</p>
<p>Of course, the U.S. also fought communism with mutual defense alliances, arms sales to friendly nations and direct military interventions. But fishery politics was part of its Cold War plan. </p>
<p>This history helps explain why the U.S. now sees China’s enormous fishing fleet and international trawling as threat. In sending its fishermen far and wide, Beijing has, wittingly or not, followed America’s lead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145977/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blake Earle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese fishermen are illegally trawling South American waters, inflaming tensions with the US. But for centuries Washington used aggressive fishing to expand its overseas presence, too.Blake Earle, Assistant Professor of History, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1445332020-08-18T11:19:23Z2020-08-18T11:19:23ZSouth China Sea: after all its posturing, the US is struggling to build a coalition against China<p>As tensions continue to mount in the waters surrounding the contested islands of the South China Sea, a US navy aircraft <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/navy-carrier-conducts-exercises-south-china-sea-200815035414443.html">carrier conducted exercises</a> in the region on August 17. This came after the Trump administration hardened the US’s longstanding neutral position on China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. </p>
<p>In May 1995, following China’s occupation of Mischief Reef in the South China Sea – which is also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan – the US announced that <a href="http://www.scspi.org/en/dtfx/1590569799">it would take</a> “no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the various islands, reefs, atolls and cays in the South China Sea”. </p>
<p>But the US has <a href="https://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2014.RSIS.us.policy.scs.pdf">not remained neutral</a> on how the multiple disputes in the region should be managed or resolved – something we’ve written about in a <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030348069">recent book</a>. </p>
<p>In July 2020, US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, took things one step further when he <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/">stated</a> that most of China’s claims to offshore resources in the South China Sea were unlawful. Four years after a ruling by the <a href="https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/">South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal</a>, which found China’s claims had no basis in international law, the US has now endorsed that ruling.</p>
<p>Pompeo’s statement was followed a few days later by a <a href="https://www.iiss.org/events/2020/07/special-presentation-us-secretary-of-defense">speech</a> from the US secretary of defense, Mark Esper, in which he accused China of “brazen disregard of international commitments”. He said China had bullied nations around the Pacific, and that its aggressive tactics in the South China Sea obstructed other countries’ rights to fishing and natural resources.</p>
<h2>Two shoals and a reef</h2>
<p>Pompeo’s announcement deviated from 25 years of US neutrality over three key issues. First, the US now argues that Mischief Reef and the Second Thomas Shoal, located 130 nautical miles and 105 nautical miles west of the Philippine Palawan Island respectively, are not Chinese but Philippine territories. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Island reef in South China Sea developed by China." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353164/original/file-20200817-16-1cwbicw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353164/original/file-20200817-16-1cwbicw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353164/original/file-20200817-16-1cwbicw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353164/original/file-20200817-16-1cwbicw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353164/original/file-20200817-16-1cwbicw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353164/original/file-20200817-16-1cwbicw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353164/original/file-20200817-16-1cwbicw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 2018 photo of Mischief Reef after it was reclaimed and redeveloped by China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/7538452@N03/40836669690">Tony Peters/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Second, the announcement amounted to a declaration that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to James Shoal. Although the Chinese government claims James Shoal as its southernmost territory, it is an entirely submerged feature, 50 nautical miles from Malaysia and 1,000 nautical miles from China’s coast. Under <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf">international law</a>, underwater features cannot be claimed by any state. So the US declared that James Shoal “is not and never was PRC territory”. </p>
<p>And third, Pompeo asserted that China had not put forward a “lawful, coherent maritime claim” and a legal basis for the <a href="https://time.com/4412191/nine-dash-line-9-south-china-sea/">“nine-dash line”</a> in the South China Sea which it uses for the basis of its territorial claims. Under <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide">international law</a>, sovereignty extends 12 nautical miles into the seas surrounding a land feature that can sustain human habitation. This means the US also does not accept China’s claims to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone in the region, far beyond 12 nautical miles surrounding any of the islands, atolls, reefs or rocks.</p>
<p>Still, except for the two shoals and Mischief reef, when it comes to the ownership of the Spratly Islands, which are claimed by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan, the US has stuck to its longstanding position of neutrality and not taken a position.</p>
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<h2>Why now?</h2>
<p>As the Trump administration’s mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic worsens and Trump’s re-election chances <a href="https://ig.ft.com/us-election-2020/">appear to be diminishing</a>, his administration’s backlash against China has accelerated. Some <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/25/world/asia/us-china-trump-xi.html">reports suggest</a> hawkish senior officials in the Trump administration, concerned about potential defeat in the November presidential election, are <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a4529344-6808-4f33-902e-4fc47218df56">trying to introduce</a> irreversible changes in China-US relations. </p>
<p>The strengthening of the US position on the South China Sea signals an effort to build a coalition of allies and partners to counter and – in Esper’s words “openly compete” with – China. In more substantial terms, the US may be considering deeper defence support to regional states such as the Philippines and Malaysia, which has effectively managed James Shoal, to confront Chinese encroachment there.</p>
<p>To date, only Australia has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/29/australia-to-step-up-south-china-sea-defence-cooperation-with-us-but-wont-commit-to-patrols">agreed</a> to pursue “increased and regularised maritime cooperation” with the US in the South China Sea. Despite American pressure on Canberra to participate in operations guaranteeing <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide">international freedom of navigation</a> surrounding disputed features such as reefs or islands, Canberra has so far resisted a specific commitment to conduct operations within 12 nautical miles of the features. While Australia rejects China’s illegal maritime claims, it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jul/28/australia-to-pursue-national-interest-when-us-asks-for-south-china-sea-action">doesn’t want to inflame further tensions</a> over the sensitive sovereignty issue of disputed islands and their surrounding waters.</p>
<h2>South-east Asian reticence</h2>
<p>In contrast to Australia, south-east Asian states such as <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8537751f-2ffd-4d78-b6bb-2b3beb5230c3">the Philippines</a> are <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2020/08/us-fails-to-build-regional-coalition-against-china/">more reticent</a> about working with the US to rein in China’s expansionism. </p>
<p>The inherent contradictions between the Trump administration’s America First strategy and the current calls for a coalition against China remain a sticking point. Trump has never attended <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Trump-skips-ASEAN-Summit-again-ceding-influence-to-China">an East Asia Summit</a>, and his administration’s denigration of regional alliances has reduced American capacity to create a coalition of like-minded partners to support its position in the South China Sea.</p>
<p>Rhetorical posturing against China will not inspire regional allies to rally to America’s side while it trumpets its America First policy. A better US strategy would be to rebuild relations with democratic allies, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and even Indonesia. But the Trump administration’s attempts to permanently harden US policy towards China, without prior consultation with the rest of the world, will make it harder to build much needed collective resilience against China’s activities in the South China Sea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144533/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anisa Heritage is affiliated with the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. The opinions expressed are the author's own and are solely drawn from open-source published research and data.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pak K Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US used to remain neutral on China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. Why it changed tack.Pak K Lee, Senior Lecturer in Chinese Politics and International Relations, University of KentAnisa Heritage, Research Fellow, School of Politics and International Relations, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1354282020-04-02T04:51:18Z2020-04-02T04:51:18ZExplainer: what are Australia’s obligations to cruise ships off its coast under international law?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/324807/original/file-20200402-23100-355131.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joel Carrett/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The spectre of large ships with people desperate to come ashore is not a new sight in Australia. </p>
<p>In 2001, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-politics-explainer-the-mv-tampa-and-the-transformation-of-asylum-seeker-policy-74078">MV Tampa</a> infamously sought to enter Australian waters off Christmas Island to discharge more than 400 asylum seekers who had been rescued by the Norwegian vessel. </p>
<p>It is estimated that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/apr/01/coronavirus-calls-to-repatriate-15000-crew-members-from-cruise-ships-off-australias-coast">15,000 crew members are now stranded on 18 cruise ships</a> floating around Australia, with mounting concerns that coronavirus will take hold and spread. </p>
<p>The circumstances for each ship may vary, but the fundamental rules of international law remain the same.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/324808/original/file-20200402-23086-1457hxd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/324808/original/file-20200402-23086-1457hxd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/324808/original/file-20200402-23086-1457hxd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/324808/original/file-20200402-23086-1457hxd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/324808/original/file-20200402-23086-1457hxd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/324808/original/file-20200402-23086-1457hxd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/324808/original/file-20200402-23086-1457hxd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Passengers from the cruise ship MS Artania en route to their charter flight from Perth back to Germany last week.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Richard Wainwright/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Duty to render assistance</h2>
<p>For those at sea, there is a duty for masters of vessels to render assistance to those in distress. States must fulfill this obligation, too. </p>
<p>Australia could be seen as fulfilling this responsibility <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/coronavirus-covid19-mission-to-end-cruise-drama/news-story/2bda699c5e646d08d317faf24d7e072f">with its plan to send doctors to the cruise ships</a> to evaluate sick crew members. An at-sea boarding is challenging, though, and requires the consent and cooperation of those on board.</p>
<p>When the vessel itself is in distress, the international law of the sea allows for it to enter a port of refuge. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/yes-australians-on-board-the-diamond-princess-need-to-go-into-quarantine-again-its-time-to-reset-the-clock-131906">Yes, Australians on board the Diamond Princess need to go into quarantine again. It's time to reset the clock</a>
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<p>Though countries exercise sovereignty over their ports and are entitled to control which vessels enter, an exception exists <a href="https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/the-law-of-the-sea-prevents-us-dispatching-these-hulking-hotels-off-our-coast-20200402-p54gfx.html">under customary international law</a> to allow ships in distress to dock. </p>
<p>This is what happened in 2001 when the master of the Tampa <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/from-the-archives-2001-the-tampa-sends-distress-signals-to-australia-20190820-p52iti.html">issued a distress call</a> to warrant his entry to Christmas Island.</p>
<p>But what counts as distress? Essentially, it is when there is a clear threat to the safety of those aboard the ship. </p>
<p>Traditionally, this related to situations when a vessel had a broken mast, damaged sails or malfunctioning engines or other mechanical failures requiring repair. A vessel could enter into port and seek the repairs needed before continuing on its journey.</p>
<p>The Tampa’s distress, however, was caused by the fact it was carrying an excess number of people who required more food, water and medical attention than the vessel was equipped to provide. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1245551687965671427"}"></div></p>
<h2>International law protections for crews</h2>
<p>What about a cruise liner with a crew of 1,000 who live in close quarters and are exposed to the coronavirus? A situation of distress could well arise on these ships, as well.</p>
<p>International law has minimum requirements for the crew operating a ship. At the moment, it would seem the crew on a cruise liner would be divided between those who are essential for the running of a vessel and those whose jobs are to look after the passengers. </p>
<p>A situation of distress would be more easily established when the crew responsible for the actual running of the vessel are unwell and unable to perform tasks essential for the safety of the ship.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-has-seriously-tested-our-border-security-have-we-learned-from-our-mistakes-134794">Coronavirus has seriously tested our border security. Have we learned from our mistakes?</a>
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<p>The crew members also have core rights that are set out in the <a href="https://www.amsa.gov.au/vessels-operators/seafarer-safety/about-maritime-labour-convention-2006">Maritime Labour Convention</a>, which came into force in 2013. It sets the working and living standards for crews working on ships internationally.</p>
<p>Under this convention, seafarers who are in need of immediate medical care are to be given access to medical facilities on shore. Australia is bound by this obligation for vessels located in its territorial waters, regardless of whether those ships are foreign-registered. </p>
<p>Australia has implemented the convention under its own <a href="https://www.amsa.gov.au/about/regulations-and-standards/navigation-act-2012">Navigation Act</a> and, most particularly, the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2019C00019">Marine Order 11</a>. </p>
<p>That order requires the owners of vessels </p>
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<p>put in place measures for the health protection, medical care and essential dental care for seafarers on board. </p>
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<p>This obligation extends to ensuring that </p>
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<p>seafarers have health protection and medical care as comparable as possible to that available to workers on shore, including prompt access to: (i) necessary medicines, medical equipment and facilities for diagnosis and treatment; and (ii) medical information and expertise.</p>
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<p>This order applies to Australian vessels. The question is whether the same rules apply to a foreign-registered vessel. </p>
<p>The Ruby Princess, for example, <a href="https://www.princess.com/news/backgrounders_and_fact_sheets/factsheet/Ruby-Princess-Fact-Sheet.html">is registered to the Bahamas</a>. The Bahamas is bound by the <a href="https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:91:0::::P91_SECTION:MLCA_AMEND_A4">Maritime Labour Convention</a>, which sets out similar requirements to those in Australia’s Marine Order.</p>
<p>However, the vessel owners do not have full responsibility for the well-being of crews on board. The Maritime Labour Convention makes clear that Australia is duty-bound to offer medical care to crew on ships in its territorial waters. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/memories-overboard-what-the-law-says-about-claiming-compensation-for-a-holiday-gone-wrong-132012">Memories overboard! What the law says about claiming compensation for a holiday gone wrong</a>
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<p>The convention does not indicate who has primary responsibility to provide medical assistance in cases like these, but the shipowner does have financial liability <a href="https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:91:0::::P91_SECTION:MLCA_AMEND_A4">under the treaty</a> to defray the expenses of such treatment. What matters is the crew receives the necessary medical care.</p>
<p>For Australia, there is still a balance of rights to be achieved. Under international law, a state might refuse access to its ports for a ship that poses a serious and unacceptable safety, environmental, health or security threat to it. A pandemic would no doubt count in this regard. </p>
<p>Port states have the right to protect their local populations in different ways, consistent with <a href="https://www.who.int/csr/ihr/WHA58-en.pdf">international health regulations</a> put forth by the World Health Organisation and with the <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Guide_to_Maritime_Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-2%20ISPS%20Code.aspx">International Ship and Port Facility Code</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, the safety of persons on board must be assured, as well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/135428/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natalie Klein does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia has a duty to provide urgent medical care to the crews under a maritime convention, but it must weigh the threat to Australians if it allows the ships to dock, too.Natalie Klein, Professor, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1245192019-10-06T09:04:42Z2019-10-06T09:04:42ZCameroon can’t afford to continue ignoring crime in fisheries sector<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/295440/original/file-20191003-52837-6xlxj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Chinese trawler offloads its catch at a fishing port in Cameroon</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maurice Beseng</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cameroon’s maritime fisheries, both artisanal and industrial, are <a href="https://www.oceandocs.org/bitstream/handle/1834/5228/overview%20management%20and%20exploitation%20of%20fishery%20resources%20of%20Cameroon.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">largely dominated</a> by foreign fishers. </p>
<p>Industrial fishing is carried out entirely by foreign trawlers predominantly, from China and Nigeria, in partnership with Cameroon fish entrepreneurs. They are licensed to commercially exploit fish stocks beyond 3 nautical miles of the coastline. Their main catch includes croakers, oysters and a variety shrimp species. </p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="https://www.oceandocs.org/bitstream/handle/1834/5228/overview%20management%20and%20exploitation%20of%20fishery%20resources%20of%20Cameroon.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">about 80%</a> of the documented 34 355 artisanal fishers are immigrants from Nigeria, Ghana, Benin and Togo. They operate from around 300 artisanal fishing ports along Cameroon’s 402-kilometre coastline and are allowed to fish within 3 nautical miles of the coast. These artisanal fishers mainly target fish found in shallow depths, such as bonga shad, sardinella, prawns and shrimp. </p>
<p>While most of the industrial caught fish <a href="http://www.fao.org/in-action/globefish/fishery-information/resource-detail/en/c/338418/">are destined</a> for Europe and Asia, the artisanal catch is <a href="http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/CMR/en">mainly</a> sold in local markets. It’s a vital source of animal protein, especially for communities that live along the coastline.</p>
<p>Cameroon’s fisheries sector is of huge social and economic importance to the country. Fisheries makes up <a href="http://acpfish2-eu.org/index.php?page=cameroon-fr">1.8%</a> of the country’s <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/cameroon">estimated</a> US$35 billion GDP. The sector employs <a href="http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/CMR/en">more than</a> 200 000 people and, since 2015, fishers catch an average of 205 000 tons of fish each year. The industrial sector accounts for about 9 000 tons of this.</p>
<p>Despite its importance, the maritime fisheries sector is plagued with <a href="https://www.oceandocs.org/bitstream/handle/1834/5228/overview%20management%20and%20exploitation%20of%20fishery%20resources%20of%20Cameroon.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">largely hidden, or ignored,</a> fisheries crimes. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X19303264">My research</a> over the past three years tries to lift the lid on the types of crimes that are happening, the actors involved, their networks and how they operate. I looked at both the industrial and artisanal sectors. </p>
<p>My study documented numerous crimes involving people associated with the fisheries sector. But most go undetected. To tackle criminality in the fisheries sector, all concerned stakeholders – from fishers to policymakers – need to be able to identify and report on the different fisheries crimes they see. </p>
<h2>Endemic problems</h2>
<p>I found that there’s an endemic problem of corruption, fraud and the illegal exploitation of and trade in endangered marine species. I also found a link between the fisheries sector and wider transnational crimes such as the smuggling of contraband, weapons and immigrants.</p>
<p>Because of the hidden nature of these offences it’s difficult to quantify the impact they’ve had on Cameroon. There are some insights. For instance, <a href="https://www.businessincameroon.com/fish/1006-7192-cameroon-a-new-fishing-boat-boarded-and-search-on-wouri-river-for-illegal-fishing">based on</a> government statistics, illegal fishing in Cameroonian waters costs the country about CAF 20 billion (about US$33 million) every year.</p>
<p>If not tackled quickly, these crimes will continue to compromise government efforts to raise income from taxes generated from the sector. Moreover, it will affect the livelihood of millions of people that depend on the sector through job losses, and access to essential food and nutritional security.</p>
<p>I conducted research over a period of three years. I observed fishing operations at industrial and artisanal fishing ports and carried out informal group discussions and semi-structured interviews with state officials, coastal community groups and other civil society organisations. I also analysed existing research and media reports. </p>
<p>I found that in both the industrial and artisanal sectors, fisheries crimes were perpetrated by a variety of stakeholders. These include senior government officials, fisheries officers, elites with stakes in industrial fishing companies, fishers and fish entrepreneurs. </p>
<p>While some fisheries crimes are carried out at sea, most occur on land; in government offices, fish landing sites, beach huts and coastal backwaters, sometimes by those who are meant to protect fish resources. It involved nationals and foreigners, some from as far as China. </p>
<h2>Corruption</h2>
<p>Corruption was identified as a major problem. It manifested as bribery and abuse of office. It was systemic and permeated all aspects of the value chain from acquiring fishing permits, catching fish at sea, processing the catch and marketing the produce to consumers. This <a href="https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/cameroon/">typifies</a> the corruption landscape in the country as highlighted in other areas, such as the judiciary and police administration.</p>
<p>Corruption has enabled other crimes to flourish. This includes document and identity fraud and the abuse of workers. Some workers (particularly immigrants and children) were illegally recruited into the fisheries sector. Most workers were made to work in squalid conditions.</p>
<p>Corruption also allowed for the illegal exploitation of and trade in endangered and critically endangered marine species, such as dolphins and turtles. Of particular concern was the illegal trade in giant croaker fish bladder. This is a <a href="https://qz.com/468358/how-chinas-fish-bladder-investment-craze-is-wiping-out-species-on-the-other-side-of-the-planet/">highly valued delicacy</a> in China and, despite the huge volumes I saw traded, there’s little awareness about it. </p>
<p>I also found that the fisheries sector was used to commit transnational crimes, specifically to smuggle weapons, fuel, ivory, rice, fake bank notes and timber products. Most of this happened between Cameroon and Nigeria, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Boats were also used to traffic illegal immigrants between Nigeria and Cameroon, and from Cameroon to Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.</p>
<h2>Combating fisheries crime</h2>
<p>There’s <a href="http://www.conac.cm/en/index_en.php">currently</a> a national effort to root out corruption which has mainly focused on the judiciary and police. This needs to pay more attention to the fisheries sector. The best option would be to have a subcommittee dedicated to rooting out corruption in fisheries. </p>
<p>Because of the transnational nature of fisheries crime, regional and international cooperation is vital. A <a href="https://bluejustice.org/copenhagen-declaration/">key first step</a> is for the state to ratify the Copenhagen Declaration – an international framework to specifically support inter-agency cooperation of all relevant stakeholders against fisheries crimes at national, regional and international levels.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124519/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maurice Beseng received funding from Coventry University Research Studentship Awards to conduct this research.</span></em></p>Despite its importance, Cameroon’s maritime fisheries sector is plagued with largely hidden, or ignored, fisheries crimes.Maurice Beseng, Visiting Research Fellow in Maritime Security, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1208162019-07-23T11:26:08Z2019-07-23T11:26:08ZIran: what the law of the sea says about detaining foreign ships in transit<p>With the British ship the Stena Impero now detained in an Iranian port, under investigation for its alleged transgression against navigation regulations in the Strait of Hormuz, there are several legally curious aspects to this affair. </p>
<p>So far, the Iranian authorities have given only scant detail of what the unlawful actions of the UK-flagged ship were that caused them to detain it. The information seems contradictory. Some reports say the ship <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-iran-tanker-accident/iran-says-it-seized-tanker-after-collision-uk-calls-move-a-hostile-act-idUKKCN1UF03B">collided with a fishing vessel</a>, others that the change of course ordered by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard vessel was for <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-49061675">security reasons</a>. </p>
<p>Both explanations are wanting as pretexts for interfering with merchant shipping in straits used for international navigation during peacetime.</p>
<h2>Keeping transit flowing</h2>
<p>The legal regime for such straits, in <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part3.htm">Part III of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> (UNCLOS), is designed precisely in order to keep open such vital chokepoints for seaborne trade. </p>
<p>Under Article 44, states bordering straits may not hamper transit thought them, nor suspend passage for any reason. Article 39 obliges ships exercising the right of transit to proceed without delay through the strait, refraining from any threat or use of force against states bordering the strait.</p>
<p>In addition, Article 41 requires ships in transit to respect applicable sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. Such a scheme does exist in the Strait of Hormuz, adopted by the International Maritime Organization, which directs westbound traffic within the strait through Iranian territorial waters. It’s not clear where in relation to the outer limit of Iran’s territorial sea the Stena Impero was when the Iranian action took place, but Iran is not alleging the ship had no right to be where it was. </p>
<p>Ships in transit must also comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for safety at sea, including the 1972 <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201050/volume-1050-I-15824-English.pdf">International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea</a>, and for preventing pollution. </p>
<p>Iran signed UNCLOS, but unlike the UK, never went on to ratify it. This raises questions as to whether Iran is even bound by anything in the treaty. If the matter were ever to go before an international court or tribunal – though that is unlikely as it would depend on Iranian consent to being sued – it would be in the UK’s interests to argue that the Part III regime, negotiated nearly 40 years ago, has also come to represent the customary international law on passage through such straits, applicable to all states. This argument would stand a reasonable chance of succeeding.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/19/british-tanker-iran-capture-fears-stena-impero-uk-ship-latest">claim</a> by the owners of the Stena Impero that the ship was in international waters needs to be approached with scepticism. In the narrowest parts of the strait no such waters exist: all of it is within the territorial sea of either Iran or the other coastal state, Oman. Still, there is nothing in Part III that allows a coastal state to intervene and order a vessel into port – the purpose of the legal regime is to keep traffic moving, and to deal afterwards with the legal consequences of any navigational incidents.</p>
<h2>An act of retaliation</h2>
<p>Iran threatened to retaliate against the UK for the detention in Gibraltar in early July of the Grace I, a tanker with a cargo of Iranian oil allegedly bound for a Syrian port contrary to EU sanctions. It’s conceivable that Iran regards its act against the Stena Impero as authorised by the legal <a href="http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf">doctrine of countermeasures</a> – but this is a rather long bow to draw. </p>
<p>Unlike domestic legal systems that normally frown on those who take the law into their own hands, in international law there is no police force, and to fill that gap the doctrine of countermeasures permits a limited degree of direct enforcement of obligations owed by one state to another, under a number of conditions. The most straightforward of these is proportionality: detention of one ship in response to that of another. But any defence based on countermeasures is always risky: the state advancing it is effectively admitting that its actions would otherwise be unlawful, and it depends on the accusation of prior breach by the other state being legally correct. </p>
<p>Yet it’s less than obvious that the UK’s detention of the Grace I did infringe Iran’s rights. It may not even be an Iranian ship: it was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/21/panama-deregisters-tanker-that-strayed-into-iranian-waters">removed by Panama</a> from its shipping register in late May, alongside several others, on suspicion of breaching sanctions. Unless Iran has since taken the Grace I onto its own register – of which there is no evidence to date – its only clear link with the Grace I is property in the cargo of petroleum, limiting Iran’s ability to argue its retaliation in taking the Stena Impero was a countermeasure. And it certainly isn’t, as Iran has claimed, an act of piracy. </p>
<p>Piracy by the definition in <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm">Article 101 of UNCLOS</a> can be committed only beyond the territorial sea, and the Strait of Gibraltar, like the Strait of Hormuz, is narrow enough to be completely overlapped by the territorial seas of the states on either side of it. It can also only be committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or aircraft. So the only way piracy can be committed by a warship or state-operated helicopter is if the crew has mutinied and is engaged in plunder for profit – clearly not the case with either of the detained ships. “State piracy”, the UK’s equally <a href="https://news.sky.com/video/irans-action-in-gulf-is-state-piracy-says-british-foreign-secretary-11768446">overheated countercharge</a>, doesn’t exist either. </p>
<p>All of the above is predicated on the law applicable in peacetime. The picture would be very different if an armed conflict were to break out between Iran and the UK, and would justify many of the acts that appear legally dubious on the analysis above. That may still happen if the escalating tension gets out hand, but we are not there yet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120816/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Serdy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An international maritime lawyer explains whether Iran broke the law of the sea by detaining the Stena Impero.Andrew Serdy, Professor of the Public International Law of the Sea, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/947972018-04-12T10:54:03Z2018-04-12T10:54:03ZThe urgency of curbing pollution from ships, explained<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214328/original/file-20180411-584-cm110e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A cargo ship passes the Golden Gate Bridge outside San Francisco.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Ocean-Emissions/45a647327e58463481ac1d356999aff3/54/0">AP Photo/Jeff Chiu</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx">International Maritime Organization</a>, a United Nations agency that regulates global shipping, is <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-04100-9">writing new rules</a> to curb greenhouse gas emissions from ships by 2050 as it implements other regulations that will mandate <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/environment/pollutionprevention/airpollution/pages/sulphur-oxides-(sox)-%E2%80%93-regulation-14.aspx">cleaner-burning fuels at sea by 2020</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=74F-n3sAAAAJ&hl=en">As researchers</a> who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=nFDXRBkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">study the shipping industry</a>, we have determined that the benefits of greener shipping outweigh the costs. Yet <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24590915?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">global environmental rule-making, implementation and enforcement</a> take a long time, creating delays that can endanger public health and the environment. </p>
<h2>Heavy fuel oil</h2>
<p>The more than <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/264024/number-of-merchant-ships-worldwide-by-type/">52,000 ships</a> crisscrossing ocean trade routes will burn more than <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Documents/Third%20Greenhouse%20Gas%20Study/GHG3%20Executive%20Summary%20and%20Report.pdf">2 billion barrels of heavy fuel oil</a>
this year. Heavy fuel oil, a crude oil byproduct, contains sulfur concentrations up to 1,800 times higher than the diesel fuel burned on <a href="https://www.epa.gov/diesel-fuel-standards/diesel-fuel-standards-and-rulemakings">U.S. highways</a>. </p>
<p>Ships <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Documents/Third%20Greenhouse%20Gas%20Study/GHG3%20Executive%20Summary%20and%20Report.pdf">contribute between 2 and 3 percent</a> of the world’s total greenhouse gas emissions, studies show. Unless the world takes action to control noxious air pollutants and reduce greenhouse gases, harmful pollution will grow in tandem with <a href="http://www.futurenautics.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/GlobalMarineTrends2030Report.pdf">global trade</a> in the coming decades.</p>
<p>Atmospheric processes transform ship exhaust into toxic particles, which drift far from shipping routes. Originating along shipping routes, these pollutants endanger human health and acidify lakes and streams hundreds of miles inland.</p>
<h2>Public health hazard</h2>
<p>As part of an international team of scholars, we researched how sulfur-related pollution from ships affects human health. Our team found that ship pollution causes about <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-02774-9">400,000 premature deaths</a> from lung cancer and cardiovascular disease, and 14 million cases of childhood asthma each year.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214204/original/file-20180411-592-z2pl9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214204/original/file-20180411-592-z2pl9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214204/original/file-20180411-592-z2pl9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214204/original/file-20180411-592-z2pl9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214204/original/file-20180411-592-z2pl9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214204/original/file-20180411-592-z2pl9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214204/original/file-20180411-592-z2pl9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214204/original/file-20180411-592-z2pl9d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Projected premature mortality from lung cancer and cardiovascular disease due to sulfur pollution from ships in 2020 unless emissions are cut.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://doi.org//10.1038/s41467-017-02774-9">Study by James Winebrake, James Corbett and other researchers</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Maritime regulation requires cooperation among many, if not most, of the world’s nations, using their shared authority to verify compliance upon arrival in their ports. But at sea, most shipping companies operate relatively independently of the country where they are headquartered.</p>
<p>The International Maritime Organization sets international shipping policies through consensus agreements that specify compliance requirements and leave enforcement up to national authorities. In 2008, governments and industries agreed to adopt cleaner fuels in 2020. Since then, we estimate that ship air pollution exposure contributed to more than 1.5 million premature deaths and aggravated asthma conditions for over 100 million children.</p>
<p>Given the climate benefits of low-carbon shipping, we believe that the world can’t wait three decades to set and enforce shipping greenhouse gas targets.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94797/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James J. Winebrake co-led research partly funded by non-governmental organizations including the ClimateWorks Foundation. He has also received funding from other environmental and industry organizations, regulatory agencies, the U.S. government and the International Maritime Organization.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>James J Corbett co-led research directly related to this article that was partly funded by non-governmental organizations, including the ClimateWorks Foundation. He has also received funding from other environmental and industry organizations, regulatory agencies, the U.S. government and the International Maritime Organization.</span></em></p>The maritime pollution that drifts to dry land, causes an estimated 400,000 premature deaths and 14 million cases of childhood asthma each year.James J. Winebrake, Professor of Public Policy and Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, Rochester Institute of TechnologyJames J Corbett, Professor, University of DelawareLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/930922018-03-19T12:59:51Z2018-03-19T12:59:51ZSnow crab saga: a story that demonstrates the complexities of climate change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210125/original/file-20180313-30994-3ckmlp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/snow-crab-opilio-on-seabed-611947913?src=9n7kLrGJxMkX9KWIiQfotw-1-25">Kondratuk Aleksei/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There’s much more to <a href="http://www.fao.org/fishery/species/2644/en">snow crab</a> than their tasty legs and claws. Especially so in the last few years as these large, cold water Arctic crabs have started <a href="http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/CM%20Doccuments/CM-2014/Theme%20Session%20F%20contributions/F0414.pdf">showing up in the Barents Sea</a>, where they’ve never been before. The snow crab’s story is a harbinger of climate change complexities on the horizon, and much more.</p>
<p>Until recently, they could only be found in Alaskan, Pacific Russian and Atlantic Canadian waters. But globalisation and growing human access to Arctic waters due to climate change have expanded the crab’s reach: increased marine traffic has seen the species successfully hitch a ride to the Barents from elsewhere in the Arctic. The new territory has proved quite amenable, and they are thriving. Crabs still at home in their native habitats, however, have been weathering climate change <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/snow-crab-stock-assessment-1.4001411">less successfully</a> due to climate changes and warming waters. </p>
<p>Climate change is also making it easier to fish the crabs, with <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2017GL074304/pdf">more of the Barents ice-free for longer</a>. And that means humans are benefiting too, because humans adore eating this particular variety of crab. Alaskan crab fishing is so dangerous, risky, but potentially profitable that it has had its own TV series since 2005: <a href="https://www.discovery.com/tv-shows/deadliest-catch/">The Deadliest Catch</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210812/original/file-20180316-104639-s365z8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210812/original/file-20180316-104639-s365z8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210812/original/file-20180316-104639-s365z8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210812/original/file-20180316-104639-s365z8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210812/original/file-20180316-104639-s365z8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210812/original/file-20180316-104639-s365z8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210812/original/file-20180316-104639-s365z8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Served up for supper.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/snow-crab-legs-178126874?src=9n7kLrGJxMkX9KWIiQfotw-1-3">alisafarov/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Economics and ecosystems</h2>
<p>Given humanity’s voracious appetite for this particular variety of crab, when they started appearing in Russian waters in the Barents Sea in the late 1990s, the Russians and Norwegians agreed to study them to see whether they could make money for them too. They also wanted to know what effects they were having as newcomers to the area’s seabed. The countries now do <a href="http://www.imr.no/tokt/okosystemtokt_i_barentshavet/survey_reports/nb-no">joint ecosystem surveys</a> each autumn, and have a pretty good idea now that populations are growing very fast – fast enough that <a href="http://barentsobserver.com/en/opinion/2014/03/snow-crab-valuable-new-fishery-resource-barents-sea-20-03">some predict</a> that their value in the fishing industry in Norway could overtake cod in terms of value within a decade or two.</p>
<p>The crabs eat pretty much everything, but the net effect on the marine ecosystem’s productivity is still unclear. This is for two reasons. First, baseline science on Arctic seabed conditions still has a lot of unknowns. We can’t be sure what the changes are, because <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00300-005-0013-5">we don’t really know</a> what has always been there. Second, the way the crabs dig into the seabed <a href="https://forskning.no/meninger/kronikk/2015/05/snokrabben-skurk-eller-nyttig-mellommann">can release food</a> for other species. </p>
<p>The ecosystem is definitely changing, but we don’t really know if that’s going to be good or bad for the planet. It’s at times like these that we like to invoke the <a href="http://www.precautionaryprinciple.eu/">precautionary principle</a>, which suggests that we should avoid taking risks when consequences are highly uncertain but may include permanent losses or other unacceptable damages to present or future generations. In this case, that means stopping the spread of the crab until we know more. That way we can avoid making irreversible choices. </p>
<p>But humans also like to make money, and the global price of snow crab <a href="https://www.undercurrentnews.com/2018/02/06/snow-crab-prices-not-melting-any-time-soon/">keeps rising</a>. As the crab has expanded west, it has crawled out of Russian waters and into <a href="http://www.fao.org/tempref/FI/DOCUMENT/ec-sfs/2002/Stokke-Barents-FAO-Bergen.pdf">international waters</a> – more than 200 nautical miles from any shore – meaning any nation’s vessels could fish for them. Some EU and Norwegian vessels started doing that around 2012. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209616/original/file-20180308-30983-u38ype.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209616/original/file-20180308-30983-u38ype.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209616/original/file-20180308-30983-u38ype.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209616/original/file-20180308-30983-u38ype.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209616/original/file-20180308-30983-u38ype.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209616/original/file-20180308-30983-u38ype.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209616/original/file-20180308-30983-u38ype.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The snow crabs’ expansion.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brooks Kaiser</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301479718300070">This fishing has an added bonus</a>: it has reduced the population of crabs that remain on the seabed that could continue moving west and changing the existing ecosystems. And so market forces are currently helping implement the precautionary principle, which is unusual to say the least.</p>
<h2>Whose crabs are they, anyway?</h2>
<p>The crab’s advance into international waters meant anyone might fish crab and make money. But in 2015, Norway and Russia found common ground and changed the rules in their favour. </p>
<p>They used a loophole in international law to categorise the crab as seabed resource, basically equivalent to a mineral or oil, instead of a fishing resource. Reclassifying the crab means that the Russians and Norwegians can kick out vessels from other countries and keep the profits from the crab. This is because continental shelves define mineral resource boundaries, while distances to shore define fisheries boundaries. The Barents’ continental shelves extend beyond the 200 nautical mile fishing boundaries, and so this identity change benefits the Norwegians and the Russians.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/SPOLITICO-17061514340.pdf">arrest</a> of a foreign crab fishing vessel in these Barents international waters spawned a lawsuit in Norway that has made it to the highest state court, which recently <a href="https://www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/decisions-in-english-translation/hr-2017-2257-a-snow-crab.pdf">held up Norway’s actions</a>. The case has potential to proceed to European courts. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210829/original/file-20180316-104673-nmnr05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210829/original/file-20180316-104673-nmnr05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210829/original/file-20180316-104673-nmnr05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210829/original/file-20180316-104673-nmnr05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210829/original/file-20180316-104673-nmnr05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210829/original/file-20180316-104673-nmnr05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210829/original/file-20180316-104673-nmnr05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Koreans love their snow crab.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://pxhere.com/en/photo/1225730">PX Here</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Broader truths</h2>
<p>But that’s not even the biggest controversy. The Norwegian continental shelf also extends to <a href="http://www.npolar.no/en/the-arctic/svalbard/">Svalbard</a>. Due to an <a href="http://library.arcticportal.org/1909/1/The_Svalbard_Treaty_9ssFy.pdf">international treaty from 1920</a>, anyone who wants to engage in commercial or scientific opportunities on Svalbard may do so. </p>
<p>This has led to a complementary <a href="https://www.neafc.org/">set of international treaties</a> which help govern fishing in the area around the archipelago. When international vessels were kicked out of the international waters, some moved to the Svalbard zone, <a href="http://ldac.chil.me/attachment/f6eb347b-06e7-4f41-ba15-9a3fa22f0c64">gaining international permits to fish snow crab there</a>. But Norway <a href="http://www.fiskerforum.dk/en/news/b/crab-catcher-arrested-in-svalbard-zone">arrested one of these boats</a>, too. EU states <a href="http://www.dpa-international.com/topic/eu-norway-row-crab-fishing-rights-arctic-waters-heats-180224-99-221213">continue to issue licenses</a>, against Norway’s insistence that they cease. The question at the bottom line is – do the continental shelf rules trump the 1920 Svalbard rules, or vice-versa? </p>
<p>This time, it is not just about profit from crabs. The stakes are high. The dispute is set to resolve broader questions about the seabed under the Svalbard zone. As valuable as the crabs may be, oil, gas and other seabed resources may be <a href="https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2017/04/norway-doubles-arctic-oil-estimates">many times more valuable</a>. Norway and the EU are at an impasse: legal arguments will have to decide whether Norway has the right to other seabed mineral and oil resources in the zone, or whether the resources fall under the open commercial access rules for Svalbard. </p>
<p>The consequences should also be expected to extend far beyond the Barents. Because climate change is making it more and more common for species to move <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/aqc.2764/full">in and out of legal jurisdictions</a>. This will require new ways of negotiating shared resources amongst interested local and global parties. And these decisions will then impact the ecological changes brought by the species, as well as who profits.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brooks Kaiser receives funding from the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Danish Ministry of Science and Higher Education, the Carlsberg Foundation, and the Belmont Forum (Nordforsk). She is affiliated with the Polar Research and Policy Initiative. Colleagues Melina Kourantidou, University of Southern Denmark, and Linda Fernandez, Virginia Commonwealth University, also contributed substantially to the research behind this article. </span></em></p>The tale of the snow crab bears witness to the how the complexities of climate change and fights over fishing rights play out.Brooks Kaiser, Professor, Management and Economics of Resources and the Environment, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/762542017-05-11T14:57:28Z2017-05-11T14:57:28ZExpertise and innovation: what UK must do to develop its Blue Economy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168935/original/file-20170511-32620-16tf06r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/windmill-on-sea-sun-rays-609571739?src=Jmlvy2cpdYRYCAXiGlBKgg-1-2">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UK prides itself on being an island nation in a world that is almost three-quarters oceans and seas. Packed full of potentially valuable resources, the ocean has long played a vital role in transport and fishing. But commercial exploitation has been slowed by the very real technical and non-technological challenges and the high costs that accompany them.</p>
<p>What has come to be known as the “<a href="https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/circular-economy/schools-of-thought/blue-economy">Blue Economy</a>” is set to power an expanding global ambition to create jobs and economic growth by bringing together expertise and technology across a range of traditional and emerging industries, ranging from energy, shipping and fisheries to biotechnology and seabed mining. Individual sectors of the Blue Economy are increasingly interdependent, relying on common skills and shared infrastructure.</p>
<p>Offshore oil and gas operations at sea, for example, introduced technologies for heavy industrial activities, ranging from engineering to <a href="http://www.edinburgh-robotics.org/">robotics</a>, and these are now employed in other emerging sectors such as offshore wind.</p>
<p>The eight key Blue Economy sectors identified by the OECD (<a href="http://www.oecd.org/about/">Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</a>) as of particular interest are broken down into two categories. There are existing sectors: offshore oil and gas, shipping, fisheries and tourism. Then there are emerging/Blue Growth sectors: aquaculture, marine energy (wind, wave, tide and thermal), biotechnologies and seabed mining. Common to the future of all of these sectors are marine science, international maritime law, marine governance and marine planning. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.oecd.org/environment/the-ocean-economy-in-2030-9789264251724-en.htm">The Ocean Economy in 2030</a>, a major report issued by the OECD in 2016, estimates <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/specific/economy/national-accounts/gva/relationship-gva-and-gdp/gross-value-added-and-gross-domestic-product.html">the gross value added</a> (GVA) of the Blue Economy at more than US$3 trillion by 2030, (at 2010 prices) and at 2.5% of total global GVA.</p>
<p>Currently offshore oil and gas leads in value at about 34% of the whole, but this will fall to an estimated 21% by 2030. Tourism is second at 26% and is expected to retain this share to become the leading marine industry by value by 2030.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168932/original/file-20170511-32596-w4g7yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168932/original/file-20170511-32596-w4g7yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168932/original/file-20170511-32596-w4g7yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=821&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168932/original/file-20170511-32596-w4g7yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=821&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168932/original/file-20170511-32596-w4g7yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=821&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168932/original/file-20170511-32596-w4g7yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1032&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168932/original/file-20170511-32596-w4g7yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1032&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168932/original/file-20170511-32596-w4g7yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1032&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tourism is set to overtake oil and gas as the leading global marine industry within 15 years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/whale-watching-provincetown-massachusetts-387688051">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of the emerging industries, offshore wind demonstrates most growth, from less than 1% today to more than 8% by 2030. In employment, and therefore in social terms, fisheries are by far the largest global marine employer at over 11m people, although at a smaller proportion of value at around 6% including processing. This is followed by tourism at about 7m employees. All other sectors employ fewer than 2m people each.</p>
<p>Scottish universities in particular, such as my own, <a href="https://www.hw.ac.uk/">Heriot-Watt</a>, and UK industry generally, have a wealth of background, knowledge and experience in many of these established and emerging sectors of the Blue Economy and a strong tradition of working together to develop them. The challenges include increasing the sector’s knowledge and data on the current state of ocean resources and marine ecosystems and managing the risks involved in developing and exploiting them.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/industrial-strategy">The UK Industrial Strategy</a> and new integrated collaborations with an eye to the international marketplace have “Blue” written all over them. So delivery will need greater ambition and co-ordination of research in marine and maritime science with other scientific, social science and engineering sectors. Significant breakthroughs in key technologies and innovative business sectors embracing data science and robotics will play large in this new world. </p>
<p>Of course the Blue Economy can only be sustainable if it has a strong interconnectivity with the <a href="http://whygreeneconomy.org/introduction-to-the-green-economy/">Green Economy</a>, the creation of a sustainable economy on land. That is, an economy that restores, protects and maintains diverse, productive and resilient ecosystems – and one that is based on <a href="http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/clean-technology.html">clean technologies</a>, renewable energy and active recycling and repurposing of materials.</p>
<p>As oceans cover more of this planet than land, it follows that they should merit the keenest attention when it comes to opportunity and sustainability. Blue is the new Green.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76254/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Andrew Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By 2030, the Blue Economy will be worth $3 trillion. And the UK is well placed to capture a slice of this lucrative market, if it meets the challenges involved with innovation and ambition.Richard Andrew Williams, Principal and Vice Chancellor, Heriot-Watt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/702162017-01-04T13:28:11Z2017-01-04T13:28:11ZOrganised crime in the fisheries sector starts to get the attention it deserves<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150745/original/image-20161219-24299-1kup3of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Coastal states like Indonesia and South Africa are beginning to take the necessary steps to manage the proliferation of fisheries crime. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PescaDOLUS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Governments across the world struggle to cope with organised crime in the fisheries sector. This is partly because legislative frameworks to tackle the problem are inadequate, and appropriate law enforcement tools are underutilised. It is also because the nature and negative effects of fisheries crime are poorly understood.</p>
<p>Traditionally, fisheries crime has been met with far less commitment and urgency than “traditional” crimes like drug trafficking. Yet fisheries crime hurts states as well as coastal communities – both socially and economically.</p>
<p>Coastal communities – particularly in developing nations – suffer the most from unchecked organised fisheries crime. Many rely heavily on a healthy marine environment <a href="http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/01/31/000461832_20140131135525/Rendered/PDF/831770WP0P11260ES003000Fish0to02030.pdf">for their livelihoods and nutrition</a>.</p>
<p>Fisheries crime also often involves <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2016/88.html">tax evasion and fraud</a>, which leads to large-scale revenue losses. This has a domino effect as budgets shrink and governments cut back on education, health care and housing. </p>
<p>Conservative estimates put the losses from <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0004570">illegal fishing globally</a> as high as US$23.5 billion per year. The African Union’s 2015 <a href="http://pages.au.int/maritime/documents/2050-aim-strategy-0">Integrated Maritime Strategy</a> recognises the devastating impact of illegal fishing on the continent and supports measures to actively stop it.</p>
<p>Governments’ response to fisheries crime is slowly changing. Coastal states in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia are taking up the challenge and are beginning to throw their political weight behind tackling the problem.</p>
<p>This was highlighted at the recent second international <a href="http://fishcrime.com/fishcrime-2016/">symposium</a> on fisheries crime in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. It reflected how seriously governments view the socioeconomic costs of failing to act.</p>
<h2>Holes in the system</h2>
<p>If managed well, the fisheries industry is a lucrative business. But it is also a sector at high risk from low non-compliance detection and law enforcement.</p>
<p>At sea, surveillance remains a massive problem. The sheer scope of marine seas and the limited resources of developing states to patrol their national waters is the biggest challenge. </p>
<p>There are also loopholes in the laws regulating marine fisheries. Many commercially exploitable fish stocks – such as the Southern Bluefin Tuna in the Southeast Atlantic – are already over-fished. This renders fish an increasingly valuable commodity. </p>
<p>These vulnerabilities make the sector <a href="http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_in_the_Fishing_Industry.pdf">highly attractive</a> to organised criminal operators. </p>
<p>An additional challenge to managing the problem is that illegal activity in the sector extends beyond offences tied to fishing. It encompasses a range of other associated serious crimes throughout the value chain. These include document fraud, corruption, money-laundering, human trafficking and economic crimes like tax evasion. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150755/original/image-20161219-24284-1cfaynt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150755/original/image-20161219-24284-1cfaynt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150755/original/image-20161219-24284-1cfaynt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=288&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150755/original/image-20161219-24284-1cfaynt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=288&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150755/original/image-20161219-24284-1cfaynt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=288&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150755/original/image-20161219-24284-1cfaynt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150755/original/image-20161219-24284-1cfaynt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150755/original/image-20161219-24284-1cfaynt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Detecting fisheries crime as well as identifying those responsible for criminal offences and successfully prosecuting them is extremely difficult.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">United Nations</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On top of this there are a large number of key actors in commercial fisheries. These include vessel insurers, ship registry owners, captains at sea, fish processors and fish traders. They are spread across a variety of jurisdictions worldwide. The result is that organised criminal activities are complex and almost always transnational.</p>
<p>So, detecting fisheries crime as well as identifying those responsible for the criminal offences and successfully prosecuting them is extremely difficult. It requires inter-state co-operation, including cross-border police collaboration.</p>
<p>An example of a recent successful international joint investigative operation, co-ordinated by INTERPOL, was <a href="https://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2015/N2015-160">the Thunder case</a>. A court in Sao Tome and Principe found the captain and two engineers of a vessel, The Thunder, guilty of engaging in fisheries crime.</p>
<p>But cases such as this remain the exception rather than the rule.</p>
<h2>Tackling the problem</h2>
<p>The first step at domestic and international level is the correct diagnosis of the problem – namely, transnational organised crime in the fisheries sector as opposed to a fisheries management problem.</p>
<p>The next is to develop an appropriate and effective criminal law enforcement response. South Africa and Indonesia are making strides toward this goal.</p>
<p>Vital is in this regard is capacity-building for frontline law enforcement officers from all relevant agencies, including fisheries, ports, customs and labour as well as the police, and inter-agency co-operation. Appropriate research and analysis of fisheries crime must guide such training. </p>
<p>To facilitate detection and subsequent investigation and prosecution, law enforcers need to be able to draw on all applicable laws as entry points. But this in turn requires laws that criminalise serious offences throughout the sector in all jurisdictions and that prescribe adequate penalties. </p>
<p>Above all, national and international political awareness is key to securing governmental and ministerial buy-in. </p>
<p>The strong political commitment to fighting transnational organised fisheries crime demonstrated by Indonesia and South Africa is encouraging. Organised criminal networks are becoming increasingly innovative and brazen in their actions. The time for action and maximising the ocean’s potential is now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70216/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Witbooi is part of PescaDOLUS, an international interdisciplinary network focusing on research into fisheries crime, and the FishFORCE Fisheries Crime Law Enforcement Academy project at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. </span></em></p>Indonesia and South Africa are making strides against transnational organised fisheries crime.Emma Witbooi, Postdoctoral Fellow, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/679892016-11-07T20:14:12Z2016-11-07T20:14:12ZCooperation is key to securing maritime security in the Indian Ocean<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144357/original/image-20161103-25359-3ax99k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Maritime security is a problem in the Indian Ocean. Different countries use a variety of means to protect their regions. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Royal Navy Media Archive/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Maritime security is a major challenge for the poorer coastal and island countries of the Indian Ocean Region. In particular those that have large zones of maritime jurisdiction. The Indian Ocean is the world’s <a href="http://theworldsoceans.com/indian.html">third largest ocean</a>. It has an area of around 73.5 million square kilometres. Unlike the Pacific and the Atlantic, it is enclosed on three sides by landmasses.</p>
<p>The Indian Ocean region comprises all the littoral and island states of that ocean. Some of these nations also share borders with the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. There are forty‑eight independent countries in the region including hinterland and landlocked states of East Africa and South Asia. There are 18 in Africa, 11 in the Middle East, seven in South Asia, six in Southeast Asia, five island states, and Australia.</p>
<p>The island states of Madagascar, Mauritius, Maldives and Seychelles, for example, have maritime zones of around 1 million square kilometres or more. Some west Indian Ocean states, notably Somalia and Yemen, also have large maritime zones that are fish rich. They are open to illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. But also other forms of maritime crime, including piracy, drug and arms smuggling.</p>
<p>Managing maritime security is a challenging endeavour. It requires cooperation between regional countries, and between those with a stake in regional security. Maritime security is no longer the sole prerogative of navies with more non-military agencies now involved.</p>
<p>Maritime security is a priority for the Indian Ocean Rim Association, currently the main <a href="http://www.iora.net/charter.aspx">regional organisation</a> for economic and security cooperation. It recently <a href="http://www.iora.net/media/151273/communiqu__final.pdf">committed</a> its members to working on increasing cooperation among navies and other maritime security forces in the region. The plan is to do this collaboratively with the <a href="http://ions.gov.in/">Indian Ocean Naval Symposium</a>, a voluntary initiative to address shared maritime security challenges and threats. The threats include illegal trafficking in drugs, arms and people, piracy, terrorism, illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, and the risks of natural disasters.</p>
<p>But there are many challenges with developing effective management in the Indian Ocean region. The diversity of interests among regional countries is a problem. There is no agreement on what encompasses maritime security. African countries in the region are more concerned about local issues of governance, poverty, disease and internal security than the broader strategic issues that concern the wider region. </p>
<p>The African Union has developed the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime <a href="http://www.au.int/en/documents/30928/2050-aim-strategy">strategy</a>. It makes a clear link between maritime security and human security. It does this by drawing attention to threats in the maritime domain. </p>
<p>This strategy provides a framework for cooperation but much more still needs to be done. Obstacles to effective cooperation include, lack of capacity and political will, as well as maritime boundary and <a href="http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1192/">sovereignty disputes</a>.</p>
<h2>Much more cooperation needed</h2>
<p>There is clearly a need for enhanced civil maritime security cooperation. This must include coastguards and equivalent national agencies of regional members. In April 2016, a consensus was <a href="http://www.iora.net/media/164376/160414_padang_consensus_as_of_11_35_pm.pdf">recognised</a>, looking at the importance of cooperation between navies, coastguards and other agencies. The aim was to develop cooperation to tackle traditional and non-traditional threats in the region.</p>
<p>Many countries in the region have separate navies and coast guards. Exceptions include Madagascar, Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania, Myanmar, South Africa, Thailand and Timor-Leste that only have navies. Mauritius, Seychelles and Maldives only have coast guards. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144356/original/image-20161103-25362-1ghsxjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144356/original/image-20161103-25362-1ghsxjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144356/original/image-20161103-25362-1ghsxjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144356/original/image-20161103-25362-1ghsxjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144356/original/image-20161103-25362-1ghsxjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144356/original/image-20161103-25362-1ghsxjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144356/original/image-20161103-25362-1ghsxjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144356/original/image-20161103-25362-1ghsxjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Somalia is a region where there is massive illegal, unregulated and underreported fishing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/albanyassociates/8569063626/in/photolist-e4dG5j-e4sPTU-e4sQWd-ykgLAE-xqFWic-y5ZbYN-y5Rbxd-yo9js8-xqqoff-y5W2J3-yocEYc-y5Qc1w-y5WZy7-ymDDoQ-ykgEKb-y5VQjP-ymDJvJ-yohpKX-ykciws-xqw7dd-y5WFQS-y5ZgHh-y65wEc-y5X4WM-ykgjG5-y5R6Hd-ymCfcb-y5W5mh-yk8pAj-y5WZBK-y5W1e8-xqEqeB-xqyJXa-y62iUt-xqGGj8-yk8Gnf-y5XW6J-ykgAZA-ynxHox-e484SB-5EsUiL-ztNk6-e4dG2J-5EsUp3-4dRcrZ-5NEXyL-eYVzmV-Hu13D-eZ7YrU-eYVBnx">Albany Associates/Flickr</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Indonesia has recently established a coast guard despite some reluctance by other agencies to concede responsibilities to the new force. Kenya has rejected its earlier plan for a coast guard. Instead the country chose to boost inter-agency <a href="http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Kenya-shelves-coast-guard-plan-for-inter-agency-security/1248928-3177808-mmuvd/index.html">coordination</a>. The South African Navy performs the coast guard function and shows characteristics of a coast guard rather <a href="http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/articles15/coast%20guard.html">than a navy</a>.</p>
<p>France and its Indian Ocean territories, like Reunion and Mayotte, are an interesting case. France uses its navy in coast guard roles along with some other European countries, including Portugal and Spain. A similar principle has been followed by former French and Portuguese colonies in the region, like Madagascar and Timor-Leste. Even former British colonies Kenya and Tanzania display a strong institutional impulse based on the colonial legacy to maintain distinctly <a href="http://africacenter.org/2009/12/navies-versus-coast-guards-defining-the-roles-of-african-maritime-security-forces">military structures</a>.</p>
<h2>Regional architecture</h2>
<p>Another hurdle is the lack of effective regional architecture for the task. The Indian Ocean Rim Association has broad oversight, but most initial effort is through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. However, there is some scepticism about the symposium’s ability to make a broader contribution to maritime security. There is too much focus much on naval cooperation risks, diverting attention from real requirements. </p>
<p>These include maritime governance, capacity-building, developing national legislation, development, and <a href="http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/42412/dr-christian-bueger.pdf">poverty alleviation</a>. A regional forum of civil agencies involved in maritime security might help overcome this challenge.</p>
<p>The involvement of extra-regional countries in regional arrangements is also a challenge. The major powers of the United States, China and Japan have legitimate interests in regional maritime security. But there are sensitivities as to how involved they should be.</p>
<p>Given these challenges, sub-regional cooperation may be more achievable. For example, cooperation through organisations like the Indian Ocean Commission in the Southwest Indian Ocean, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the African Union. This may be the most effective way of taking regional maritime security management forward.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67989/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Bateman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Managing maritime security is a challenging endeavour. Forms of maritime crime include piracy, drug and arms smuggling.Sam Bateman, Professorial Fellow, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/597662016-05-20T14:59:44Z2016-05-20T14:59:44ZEgyptAir MS804: search and rescue at sea is never easy<p>The disappearance of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-36333664">EgyptAir flight MS804</a>, presumed lost over the eastern Mediterranean on a flight between Paris and Cairo with all 66 on board, is the latest passenger aircraft to go missing. The loss of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-26503141">Malaysia Airlines flight MH370</a> along with its 239 passengers over the Indian Ocean in March 2014 still looms large – the aircraft is yet to be found. While the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean greatly differ in size, both disasters highlight the difficulty of search and rescue operations at sea.</p>
<p>Maritime search and rescue is difficult for many reasons, but operations at sea are inevitably complicated in comparison to those on land – not least due to the need for international cooperation, and the effects of the shifting waters under which that which is lost must be found.</p>
<p>An aircraft that crashes on land may end up in inaccessible areas such as tropical forests or mountain peaks, but it will remain at the same location until it is located. And this location, wherever it is, is most likely to be within a single sovereign state’s national territory, jurisdiction and responsibility. </p>
<p>At sea, however, the additional dimension of depth makes the rescue teams’ efforts extremely hard. This not only comes from the physical difficulty of working under the pressure and depth of the water column above any wreck, along with the darkness or disturbed seabed sediment that make visual location and identification almost impossible. But the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/sep/05/black-box-plane-crash-malaysia-airlines-mh370-mh17-video-animation">flight data recorder transmitter</a> is limited to a range of about 5km: the depth of seawater into which any wreckage falls may mean a strong signal becomes weak and distant, even to those searching directly overhead. Finding MH370’s transmitter in the 73.5 million km<sup>2</sup> of the Indian Ocean is an incredible task; at 2.5 million km<sup>2</sup> the Mediterranean may be smaller, but it is certainly not small.</p>
<p>Further complicating the issue is that, as time passes by, sea currents and weather conditions such as the sea state will cause wreckage to drift. In practice, this means the search and rescue area must continue to expand, rather than shrink, for every hour the search goes on. Teams form an increasingly bigger circle outwards from the estimated point of last contact – in this case, where Greek air traffic control lost contact with the EgyptAir jet. The search areas’ radius increases with calculations based on the weather conditions and time. As an indication, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36273194">debris from flight MH370</a> has been recovered in Mauritius and South Africa, more than 2,500 miles from the estimated crash site.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123392/original/image-20160520-4475-jxenl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123392/original/image-20160520-4475-jxenl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123392/original/image-20160520-4475-jxenl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123392/original/image-20160520-4475-jxenl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123392/original/image-20160520-4475-jxenl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123392/original/image-20160520-4475-jxenl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1055&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123392/original/image-20160520-4475-jxenl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1055&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123392/original/image-20160520-4475-jxenl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1055&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Aircraft can travel quicker, but ships are required for really heavy lifting.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sarah E Ard/US Navy</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Search and rescue teams working at sea are also subject to the “tyranny of distance”: ships are slow in comparison to aircraft or road vehicles, and take a long time to reach the crash site. Even then, they are limited in how long they can sustain their search until they must return to port to take on more fuel or supplies, and then again return to the area of operations. At all times, ships are at the mercy of the weather conditions – even strong winds can significantly affect performance.</p>
<p>This is why the first and quickest search and rescue response is usually assigned to patrol aircraft or helicopters that can quickly reach an area. Due to their altitude they also have a greater capability to see or locate through radar wreckage or survivors. Of course aircraft too have even more limited flight time, and are little help in the rescue, rather than just the search, aspect of operations.</p>
<h2>International search and rescue</h2>
<p>The need for an international mechanism to provide search and rescue at sea led the International Maritime Organisation to develop the <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Maritime-Search-and-Rescue-(SAR).aspx">International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue</a>. It was adopted by its signatories in 1979 and came into force in 1985. This convention is supplemented by the <a href="https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/nsarc/IMO%20Maritime%20SAR%20Regions.pdf">13 search and rescue regions</a>, maritime zones that detail which specific states have authority and responsibility to carry out search and rescue operations.</p>
<p>Based on the <a href="http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf">UN Convention on the Law of the Sea</a>, all merchant vessels in an area have a duty to “proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance”, and this is why the responsible state is required to coordinate civilian shipping in the area. </p>
<p>Although nations’ responsibilities are defined, not all have the capacity to cover huge ocean territories, and this is why international cooperation is essential. This means not only that foreign states contribute their assistance where needed, but that coastal states accept that foreign shipping or aircraft may enter its territorial waters.</p>
<p>This should give a sense of how different and difficult it is to conduct search and rescue at sea. Hopefully, and bearing in mind the huge volume of transoceanic flights and flows of shipping over the vast expanse of ocean worldwide, improving technology and better collaboration between states will continue to help minimise loss of life at sea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59766/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ioannis Chapsos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why it is so difficult to find planes in water, even ones of vastly different sizes.Ioannis Chapsos, Research Fellow in Maritime Security, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/559392016-03-14T05:50:51Z2016-03-14T05:50:51ZFactCheck Q&A: can foreign seafarers be paid $2 an hour to work in Australian waters, under laws passed by Labor?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/114832/original/image-20160311-11264-twnp47.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Employment Minister Michaelia Cash and the opposition's Penny Wong appearing on Q&A with host Tony Jones.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Q&A</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Conversation is fact-checking claims made on Q&A, broadcast Mondays on the ABC at 9:35pm. Thank you to everyone who sent us quotes for checking via <a href="http://www.twitter.com/conversationEDU">Twitter</a> using hashtags #FactCheck and #QandA, on <a href="http://www.facebook.com/conversationEDU">Facebook</a> or by <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">email</a>.</strong></p>
<hr>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/VHii8ydj7IE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Excerpt from Q&A, March 7, 2016.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<blockquote>
<p>MATTHEW LAWRENCE (audience member): I’m an unemployed Australian merchant seafarer. Why would any government in their right mind replace tax paying Australian seafarers with exploited foreign seafarers working on 457 visas, working for as low as $2 an hour?</p>
<p>… MICHAELIA CASH: Thank you very much for the question. Just to be sort of sure here, everything that you are referring to is currently happening under the legislation that the Labor Party brought in, in 2012…<strong>– Federal Minister for Employment and Women, Michaelia Cash, responding to audience member Matthew Lawrence <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s4405538.htm">on Q&A</a>, March 7, 2016.</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>For Australian miners, manufacturers or other firms, it can be cheaper to send cargo by sea – from one Australian port to another – than sending it by road or rail.</p>
<p>On Q&A, an unemployed merchant seafarer said Australian seafarers could replaced by foreign seafarers working on 457 visas, working for as little as $2 an hour. </p>
<p>The question came after <a href="http://www.mua.org.au/noise_outside_garners_q_a_attention">the Maritime Union of Australia</a> (MUA) had spent weeks trying to get a question put to the panel on seafaring jobs. According to the MUA, audience member <a href="http://www.mua.org.au/mua_member_matt_lawrence_on_abc_qanda">Matthew Lawrence</a> is a union member.</p>
<p>This has been a controversial issue for months, after the government granted aluminium producer Alcoa a <a href="http://www.alcoa.com/australia/en/news/releases/2016_01_13_moves_to_end_illegal_industrial_action.asp">temporary licence</a> in 2015 to use a ship crewed by foreign workers <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-13/alcoa-under-fire-for-hiring-foreign-ship-crew-to-move-cargo/6937030">to transport alumina</a> between Western Australia and Victoria. The firm wanted to use the foreign-manned vessel for the domestic route after selling its own ship, the ageing MV Portland.</p>
<p>The union protested the granting of the temporary licence, saying <a href="https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/muanational/pages/3455/attachments/original/1447048738/MV_Portland_Crew_Statement.pdf?1447048738">Australian workers may have been able to do the job</a>. Alcoa <a href="http://www.alcoa.com/australia/en/news/releases/2016_01_13_moves_to_end_illegal_industrial_action.asp">said</a> it sought a quote for the job from a company with Australian-flagged ships, but received no reply.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2012A00055/Html/Text#_Toc327452028'">Federal Court ruled in 2015</a> that while there were problems with the way the government notified interested parties about Alcoa’s application, the licence remained valid.</p>
<p>The issue was debated at length on Q&A and you can read the comments in context in the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s4405538.htm">transcript here</a>.</p>
<p>This FactCheck aims to answer two key questions about what’s allowed under Australian law: </p>
<ul>
<li>Can foreign seafarers on as little as $2 an hour work on domestic shipping routes in Australian waters?</li>
<li>And was Employment Minister Michaelia Cash right that this is allowed under legislation passed by Labor in 2012?</li>
</ul>
<h2>Can foreign seafarers on $2 an hour work on domestic shipping routes in Australian waters?</h2>
<p>It is true foreign crew on roughly US$2 an hour can work on domestic shipping routes in Australian waters – though only under certain conditions. </p>
<p>But it is wrong to say this can happen using 457 visas. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2012A00055/Html/Text#_Toc327452028">Coastal Trading (Revitalising Australian Shipping) Act 2012</a>, passed by the Gillard government (and <a href="http://www.mua.org.au/shipping_reform_passing_parliament_will_save_australia_s_shipping_industry">supported by the Maritime Union of Australia</a>), allows for the granting of temporary licences, subject to certain conditions.</p>
<p>These temporary licences allow companies to use foreign ships and foreign crews working under a <a href="https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Visa-1/Spec">special purpose visa</a> to transport goods between Australian ports.</p>
<p>These foreign workers can be paid under “existing international arrangements” for the first two domestic voyages in Australian coastal waters.</p>
<p>What’s that mean in wage terms? Brandt Wagner, head of the Transport and Maritime Unit at the International Labour Organisation, an agency of the United Nations in Geneva, told The Conversation by email that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The <a href="http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---sector/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_250409.pdf">current minimum monthly basic pay or wage figure for able seafarers</a>, which became effective on January 1, 2016, is currently US$614. The International Labour Organisation does not refer to an hourly figure but only the monthly figure.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The International Transport Workers’ Federation says a typical able seafarer may work around <a href="http://www.itfseafarers.org/files/seealsodocs/33560/itfuniformtcccba20122014.pdf">around 263 hours a month</a> (40 hours a week plus 103 hours of overtime). </p>
<p>That gets you an average hourly rate of around US$2.33 (roughly A$3.11 in Australian dollars). A little over, but not far off the figure cited by Matthew Lawrence on Q&A. This rate is well below the Australian award wage.</p>
<p>Dean Summers, an inspector with the <a href="http://www.itfglobal.org/en/transport-sectors/seafarers/">International Transport Workers’ Federation</a> (ITF), said the ITF was aware of a foreign-flagged vessel working in Australian waters that paid close to $US2 an hour for foreign seafarers working on the vessel.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The already paltry wage is not a requirement and there are many ships trading on our coast that are not paying the US$2.10 figure as it is not regulated… The reality is that there are zero minimum wages for international seafarers. The international shipping lobbyists quote an International Labor Organisation minimum rate of US$1000 per month but that is a voluntary figure and completely unenforceable in any jurisdiction.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>You can read his full response <a href="https://theconversation.com/full-response-from-the-international-transport-workers-federation-and-maritime-union-of-australia-56270">here</a>. </p>
<p>Under the law, however, a temporary licence holder is allowed to use foreign crews paid under existing international arrangements for only the first two domestic voyages per temporary licence granted. </p>
<p>A spokesman for Employment Minister Michaelia Cash told The Conversation by email that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The true situation on foreign worker wages is that when a foreign vessel operates domestically (which can only happen under a temporary licence), the crew are paid under whatever existing international arrangements apply on that vessel for the first two domestic voyages only. From the third domestic voyage onwards, crew on foreign vessels must be paid no less than the Australian Award. The Australian Award (set by the Fair Work Commission) expressly includes pay rates for workers on foreign vessels … Any suggestion that temporary licences are being used to engage a foreign crew on $2 an hour as a permanent replacement for Australian crew is wrong and nothing more than a scare campaign of misinformation being run by the MUA and Labor.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>You can read the spokesman’s full response <a href="http://theconversation.com/full-response-from-a-spokesman-for-michaelia-cash-and-penny-wong-56131">here</a>, as well as a comment from a spokeswoman for Opposition Senate Leader Penny Wong, who was part of the same Q&A discussion.</p>
<p>So yes, foreign seafarers working for roughly US$2 an hour can work on ships moving cargo between Australian ports, as long as it’s on a foreign vessel operating under a temporary licence. But this can only happen on the first two domestic voyages.</p>
<h2>Was the minister right that this is allowed under legislation passed by Labor in 2012?</h2>
<p>The short answer is yes, Senator Cash is right. </p>
<p>As established above, the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2012A00055/Html/Text#_Toc327452028">Coastal Trading (Revitalising Australian Shipping) Act 2012</a> passed by the Gillard government expressly allows for companies to apply for a temporary licence to use a foreign ship with a foreign crew moving material from one part of coastal Australia to another.</p>
<p>Among the objects of the Act is promotion of a viable shipping industry that contributes to the broader Australian economy and facilitation of the long term growth of the Australian shipping industry.</p>
<p>The work must first be advertised locally to give local ships an opportunity to respond to the work.</p>
<p>So why is this even up for debate? It’s because in the MV Portland case, the Maritime Union of Australia <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2015/187.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=%22Ms%20JD%20Williams%22">argued in court</a> that problems with the way Alcoa’s application for a temporary licence was advertised may have put local operators at a disadvantage.</p>
<p>The Federal Court <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2015/187.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=%22Ms%20JD%20Williams%22">decided</a> while the government didn’t publish the notice in compliance with the law, the temporary licence was still valid.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Foreign seafarers working for roughly US$2 an hour <em>can</em> work on ships moving cargo between Australian ports, as long as it’s on a foreign vessel operating under a temporary licence. But this can only happen on the first two domestic voyages. </p>
<p>It is wrong to say this can happen using 457 visas. </p>
<p>The minister was right to say those foreign seafarer and temporary licence rules are covered by the legislation passed by the Labor government in 2012. <strong>– Joanna Howe</strong></p>
<hr>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This is a sound analysis. The author correctly notes that the current law, passed under the last Labor government in 2012, does allow for firms to apply for and be granted temporary licences that allow the use of foreign-manned vessels to transport goods from one Australian port to another. This is subject to conditions, including that the work be advertised locally first and that the licence holder use foreign workers for no more than the first two domestic voyages undertaken under the licence. </p>
<p>Given the International Labour Organisation puts the minimum wage for able seafarers at US$614 a month, and given that a standard month of work would be around 260 hours, it is fair to say this works out at an average wage of between US$2 and US$3 an hour. <strong>– Tess Hardy</strong></p>
<hr>
<p><em>UPDATE: This story was updated at 11.04am AEST on March 15 to include quotes from a spokesman from the International Transport Workers Federation, and a link to his full response <a href="https://theconversation.com/full-response-from-the-international-transport-workers-federation-and-maritime-union-of-australia-56270">here</a>.</em></p>
<p><div class="callout"> Have you ever seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at checkit@theconversation.edu.au. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55939/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tess Hardy has previously received ARC Linkage funds and separate funding from the Fair Work Ombudsman.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joanna Howe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>On Q&A, an unemployed merchant seafarer said Australian seafarers could replaced by foreign seafarers working on 457 visas, working for as little as $2 an hour. We check the facts.Joanna Howe, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/504422015-11-11T16:17:03Z2015-11-11T16:17:03ZUnder the sea: Russia, China and American control of the waterways<p>In the summer of 2007, in a bizarre incident shown live on Russian television, scientists accompanied by a couple of senior politicians descended 4,300 meters to the floor of the Arctic Ocean in two Mir mini submarines. Divers then planted a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/03/world/europe/03arctic.html">Russian flag </a>on the seabed, and Russia officially notified the United Nations that it was claiming the ridge as part of its sovereign territory. </p>
<p>In effect, the Chinese did the same kind of thing when they decided to start <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html">building islands</a> in the South China Sea by dredging sand from the bottom of the ocean. </p>
<p>In both cases, the countries were creating new sovereign territory. </p>
<p>One implication of their declaration was that anyone traveling within the 12-mile limit defined by <a href="http://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_maritime.html">international law</a> was traversing through their sovereign waters, and could only do so subject to their approval. </p>
<p>Indeed, the Chinese take their claim so seriously that last week it even threatened that it “<a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/949261.shtml">is not frightened to fight a war with the US in the region</a>” to protect its sovereignty. </p>
<p>So the question is: why do American policymakers care about seemingly insignificant tracts of land so far away from America’s shores? </p>
<h2>International law and American concerns</h2>
<p>International law is pretty <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Convention_on_the_Law_of_the_Sea">clear.</a> You can’t declare any territory submerged under the sea outside the conventional 12-mile limit as your own, although you may have some privileges in the waters that lie immediately beyond it. You certainly can’t build up some land to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/27/world/asia/challenging-chinese-claims-us-sends-warship-near-artificial-island-chain.html">above the waterline</a>, thus creating an island, and call it part of your own territory. And in neither case can you legitimately control access by other vessels. Indeed, no international commission has upheld the Russian or Chinese claims. But that hasn’t stopped either the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/27/china-lambasts-illegal-u-s-operation-in-south-china-sea-subi-mischief-lassen/?utm_source=Sailthru&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&amp;utm_term=*Situation%20Report&wp_login_redirect=0">Chinese</a> or the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/03/world/europe/03arctic.html">Russians</a> from trying.</p>
<p>Americans, however, are pretty emphatic when it comes to denying such claims have any legitimacy.</p>
<p>In the Russian case, American policymakers were understandably caught off guard and bemused by this strange symbolic act. </p>
<p>But, at the same time, American policymakers have a right to be worried. Climate change could vastly increase sea traffic through the Arctic Ocean. And the future implications of Russian control of these sea-lanes have lots of potential downsides, given recent friction over Ukraine and Syria.</p>
<p>In the Chinese case, Americans were caught off guard and bemused when they shouldn’t have been. </p>
<p>The Chinese have been making claims for a long time about their sovereignty over huge portions of both the East and South China Sea. But in this case, Americans are worried about what China’s control of these waterways might do now to these commercial shipping lanes. Every year an estimated <a href="http://amti.csis.org/atlas/">50%</a> of the world’s total of commercial trade plus oil passes through the area.</p>
<h2>Global trade and American national security</h2>
<p>The question of why we do care isn’t as obvious as it may seem. </p>
<p>America’s policymakers <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf">declare</a> that the maintenance of global trade and commerce is in its national security interests. So America needs to keep these shipping lanes open to what they call “freedom of navigation.” </p>
<p>What that means is that they can send an Aegis class destroyer (so this was a powerful ship, not the equivalent of a coast guards vessel) and sail it past the Subi Reef (think of an island so small it would drive you mad if it was deserted and you had to live on it alone). It’s the equivalent of a drive-by – <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/02/in-south-china-sea-a-tougher-u-s-stance/">just to send a message.</a> </p>
<p>Then you put the US secretary of defense on an aircraft carrier, the USS Roosevelt, and do it again – just to ensure that both the Chinese and America’s important regional allies understood the <a href="http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2015/11/05/pentagon-chief-takes-jab-china-aircraft-carrier-stop/75204754/">message:</a>. “This isn’t your territory – and our mighty navy is not about to allow you to push us out.”</p>
<p>You might understandably assume that the Chinese, with their huge volume of exports, would also want to maintain open seas. And that the Russians would want to ship oil and gas to keep their economy afloat by water. So there is nothing to worry about. </p>
<p>But that’s where more modest concerns about global trade are replaced by those about deeper, hardcore national security interests. For Americans there is a difference between “our” open seas and “their” open seas.</p>
<h2>Freedom of navigation and American doctrine</h2>
<p>A central element of American national security doctrine is the notion of “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_navigation">Freedom of Navigation</a>” or FON. </p>
<p>In effect, we (Americans) assert our right to sail where we want, when we need to. Behind that, however, is the deeply embedded concept of “<a href="http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/posen/commandofthecommons.pdf">control of the commons.</a>.”</p>
<p>Military historian Alfred Thayer Mahan popularized this idea over 130 years ago. He stressed the importance of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Influence_of_Sea_Power_upon_History">America’s navy</a> in ensuring the free flow of international trade. The seas were his <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Iw7r9n_Ck8AC&pg=PA74&lpg=PA74&dq=mahan+control+of+the+commons&source=bl&ots=MzFfZ20IdB&sig=krc_ygMXztM92UAHEWRZZ2EZKzE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDkQ6AEwA2oVChMIl8Ht3teDyQIVyzg-Ch0ljglC#v=onepage&q=mahan%20control%20of%20the%20commons&f=false">“commons.”</a> </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101523/original/image-20151111-21201-40ii1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101523/original/image-20151111-21201-40ii1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101523/original/image-20151111-21201-40ii1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101523/original/image-20151111-21201-40ii1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101523/original/image-20151111-21201-40ii1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101523/original/image-20151111-21201-40ii1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101523/original/image-20151111-21201-40ii1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Alfred Thayer Mahan 1840 - 1914.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mahan <a href="https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/85c80b3a-5665-42cd-9b1e-72c40d6d3153/NWC-1005-NAVAL-CLASSICAL-THINKERS-AND-OPERATIONAL-.aspx">argued</a> that the British Empire was able to retain its commercial and military advantage by ensuring its ships could go anywhere. And that it could deny anyone else from doing so, if needed, in times of war. The overriding lesson is that wars are not won on the land. They are won on the sea by denying your adversary access to resources.</p>
<p>Today, Mahan’s work remains a core element of America’s military doctrine. It is taught to America’s naval officers at their major training <a href="https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/e7dabb3b-333d-4af1-8eb3-b98d311c470d/Command-of-the-Sea--An-Old-Concept-Surfaces-in-a-N">academy</a> where he himself once worked and where his work is still regarded as having biblical significance. But it no longer is just applied to commercial trade. It now is applied to the access of its military in all kinds of commons – in <a href="http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-07/contested-commons">the air, on the sea, in space and even in cyberspace.</a> </p>
<p>So American policymakers become frustrated when they believe Chinese hackers spy on the US or they build islands because it demonstrates that the US can’t “control” that commons. </p>
<p>The answering message is clear. As Ash Carter, the US Secretary of Defense, said in a speech about Russia last week “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11982109/Ashton-Carter-vows-to-defend-US-interests-and-allies-against-Russian-aggression.html">At sea, in the air, in space and in cyberspace, Russian actors have engaged in challenging activities</a>.” Carter went on to make it clear that the US wouldn’t tolerate Russian efforts to control those domains. Responding to Chinese threats, he also clearly implied in the same speech that China’s continued activities could indeed lead to conflict. </p>
<h2>The importance of chokepoints</h2>
<p>But the sea remains the priority when it comes to controlling the commons. </p>
<p>And Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea offers the prospect that a key trading route located in a narrow strip of water between land masses either side, what they call a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Choke_point">chokepoint</a> could be closed by the Chinese, in the future, if not today. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101524/original/image-20151111-21206-x9hdck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101524/original/image-20151111-21206-x9hdck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101524/original/image-20151111-21206-x9hdck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101524/original/image-20151111-21206-x9hdck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101524/original/image-20151111-21206-x9hdck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101524/original/image-20151111-21206-x9hdck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101524/original/image-20151111-21206-x9hdck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101524/original/image-20151111-21206-x9hdck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Strait_of_malacca.jpg">US Department of Defense</a></span>
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<p>The <a href="http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-tensions/p29790">Malacca Strait</a> on the Western end of the South China Sea is one chokepoint – the immediate object of the US’ concern <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/r-for-southeast-asia-growing-us-china-maritime-row-means-a-balancing-act-2015-11">last week</a>. The <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/bp0112_emmerson_stevens.pdf">Strait of Hormuz </a>in the Persian Gulf, where much of the world’s oil passes through, is another. And, at least according to the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=v_ZR5mYo0FcC&pg=PA58&lpg=PA58&dq=Arctic+chokepoints&source=bl&ots=nmWEAveW1m&sig=FYaivVx9zRkX3OmH3LXSdGUj4ng&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAmoVChMIl6TxqN-DyQIVRTM-Ch2QJAdx#v=onepage&q=Arctic%20chokepoints&f=false">US Congressional Research Service</a>, the Arctic Ocean, where the Russian planted their flag, could become another. </p>
<p>So this leaves the Americans with an abiding dilemma. </p>
<p>They are saddled with a grand military doctrine built on the principle of keeping the globe’s key access points freely accessible to the US. The barely audible counterpart is that it should maintain a capacity to deny that access to any potential adversary in case of war. The doctrine, however, in practice can itself engender conflict – as we saw with the Chinese. </p>
<p>America may have a much bigger military capacity and even newer technologies that allow it to fight conventional wars. But defending the open seaways is expensive and often counterproductive. The Chinese, for example, are the world’s <a href="http://2014.newclimateeconomy.report/china/">largest importer of fossil fuels</a> and China is far more dependent on foreign oil than the newly fossil fuel independent United States. </p>
<p>So critics ask why the US is defending the Persian Gulf when the Chinese are the prime beneficiaries? </p>
<p>The answer, it appears, has far more to do with military strategy than with global commerce.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50442/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
In the summer of 2007, in a bizarre incident shown live on Russian television, scientists accompanied by a couple of senior politicians descended 4,300 meters to the floor of the Arctic Ocean in two Mir…Simon Reich, Professor in The Division of Global Affairs and The Department of Political Science, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.