tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/mujahideen-3811/articlesMujahideen – The Conversation2021-08-26T13:24:25Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1667672021-08-26T13:24:25Z2021-08-26T13:24:25ZAfghanistan: who’s who in the Taliban’s ‘inclusive’ new administration<p>As western powers frantically scramble to evacuate their citizens and the Afghan nationals who worked for them, the nature of the Taliban leadership’s intentions for how it intends to govern remains obscure. But if <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/8/24/what-the-taliban-may-be-getting-wrong-about-islamic-governance">various messages</a> fed in recent days to the international media are to be believed, the Islamic fundamentalist regime intends to completely revamp the structure of government when it formally embarks upon its administration from September 1. </p>
<p>Apart from designating the country as Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan – the same name as they used when they previously ruled the country from 1996 until 2001 – the Taliban also have some novel plans for the nature and character of their future government. </p>
<p>In a significant departure from the earlier republican model established by the US-backed administration between 2001-2021, it plans to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-council-may-rule-afghanistan-taliban-reach-out-soldiers-pilots-senior-2021-08-18/">get rid of the position of the elected president</a>. But, more importantly, it aims not to elevate or project a single individual to the position of supreme leader (as is the case in the neighbouring Islamic Republic of Iran). Instead, it intends to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-council-may-rule-afghanistan-taliban-reach-out-soldiers-pilots-senior-2021-08-18/">form an executive council</a> consisting of 12 prominent leaders. </p>
<p>With those objectives in mind, on August 23 the group held a <em><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/23/world/asia/taliban-meeting-religious-leaders-kabul.html">Loya Jirga</a></em>, or grand council, of nearly 800 prominent scholars. The council met to discuss the framework of a future government and the social, economic and political trajectory that Afghanistan should follow. </p>
<p>Following the discussion, it provisionally appointed several interim heads of ministries and agencies. These include the crucial interior ministry, the ministry of finance, ministry of defence and the intelligence service. </p>
<h2>Hardliners galore</h2>
<p>Mullah <a href="https://www.news18.com/news/world/afghanistan-taliban-ibrahim-sadr-afghan-interior-minister-al-qaeda-4124948.html">Ibrahim Sadr</a> the head of the interior ministry is a seasoned war veteran. In the 1980s he was part of the mujahideen forces fighting against the Soviet occupation. Later he joined the Taliban and fought against other opposition forces during the country’s civil war (1989-1996). An extreme hardliner in his religious views, Mullah Sadr used his days in the previous Taliban government to develop close contacts with jihadist or terrorist groups and <a href="https://www.firstpost.com/world/from-gul-agha-to-sadr-ibrahim-taliban-adds-slew-of-familiar-faces-to-its-cabinet-9914171.html">became quite close to al-Qaeda</a>. He went underground when the US-led operation unseated the Taliban government in 2001.</p>
<p>He would, however, resurface later in 2016 as the Taliban’s military chief. Since then Sadr has been instrumental in leading several strategic offensives against the coalition forces. It is his relentless war against the coalition forces which led <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/the-man-who-drove-the-us-out-of-afghanistan/">The Asia Times</a> to call him “the man who drove the US out of Afghanistan”. </p>
<p>There has been talk of the Taliban moving the country’s capital from Kabul to its religious heartland Kandahar in Afghanistan’s southern borders on the Arghandab River. But the outfit still attaches a great deal of importance to the current capital. This was confirmed by its appointment of Mullah Muhammad <a href="https://jamestown.org/brief/who-is-taliban-negotiator-mullah-sherin-akhund/">Shirin Akhund</a> as governor of Kabul. A former governor of the province of Kandahar and a member of the negotiating team in the Taliban’s office in Doha, Qatar, Akhund came to prominence as the chief of its erstwhile leader Mullah Omar’s security until his death in 2013.</p>
<p>Then there is Hamdullah Nomani who has been appointed as Kabul mayor. He was sanctioned in 2014 <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/materials/summaries/individual/hamdullah-nomani">by a resolution of the UN Security Council</a> and has already served in the same position as the capital’s mayor under the previous Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001. He gained a reputation as ruthless and tough when it came to maintaining law and order and his appointment to the same post in the new Taliban government is an indication of what the Taliban would like to see in Kabul in future.</p>
<p>The critical position of intelligence chief has gone to <a href="https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/taliban-appoints-obscure-figures-in-intelligence-security-positions-report20210825230823/">Najibullah</a>. A hardened veteran of several of the Taliban’s past military campaigns – true to the nature of his appointment – Najibullah (who goes by a single name) has skilfully avoided publicity and remains under the radar.</p>
<p>The Taliban’s choice of Mullah <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/materials/summaries/individual/gul-agha-ishakzai">Gul Agha Ishakzai</a> as the minister of finance in the new government should not come as a surprise. Until assuming this position he was head of the Taliban’s financial commission. <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudn/2017/416/annex/division/A/division/119/adopted/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true">Under UN sanction </a> and various other global bodies, Ishakzai is renowned for organising terror funding for suicide missions and was one of Mullah Omar’s closest confidants. </p>
<p>The decision to appoint a former Guantanamo Bay detainee as the country’s new defence minister will give a headache to many in the west. Mullah <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/taliban-ex-guantanamo-detainee-mullah-abdul-qayyum-zakir-defence-minister-1845400-2021-08-26">Abdul Qayyum Zakir</a> has extensive battlefield experience spanning more than a quarter of a century. On this critical appointment, the Taliban may be motivated by the fact that should there be an external aggression or an internal power struggle, Zakir’s experience will be invaluable. </p>
<p>While some of these top ministerial positions have been dished out, it is as yet unclear, <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/key-leaders-of-taliban-the-students-of-warfare/2338048">what future positions</a> some of the most senior Taliban are likely to occupy. These include the emir – or chief – the son of former leader Mullah Omar, Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada, and his deputies Abdul Ghani Baradar, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Muhammad Yaqoob.</p>
<p>They may not have been formally named as ministers in the administration, but it’s hard to imagine that these men, who are recognised as the Taliban’s key political, religious and military leaders, will not play significant roles in any future Taliban regime.</p>
<h2>Key opposition players</h2>
<p>Appointments to these key portfolios provide a pretty good indication on the nature and character of future Taliban governance. In composition and character it appears everything but “inclusive”. The early promises of a system of “stakeholder governnance” seem a very distant objective. </p>
<p>There are plenty of <a href="https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/the-taliban-must-deal-with-these-leaders-to-avoid-civil-war-2518877#pfrom=home-ndtv_topscroll">dissident non-Taliban leaders</a> that both aspire to – and will eventually demand – plum positions in the country’s future government.</p>
<p>Topping this list is Afghanistan’s former prime minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. At various times both an ally and enemy of the Taliban, Hekmatyar is a survivor in Afghanistan’s complex powerplays. Another to watch is former president <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/23/world/asia/hamid-karzai-home-kabul.html">Hamid Karzai</a>. A liberal and a nationalist he enjoys a strong powerbase among his moderate Pashtun supporters.</p>
<p>A key negotiator in the current transition to power, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-27138728">Abdullah Abdullah</a> is also a powerful voice on national unity who cannot be ignored, if the Taliban is serious about forming a government of national reconciliation.</p>
<p>Then there are some powerful ethnic contenders like like Uzbek warlord <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/17/afghan-warlord-abdul-rashid-dostum-power-sharing-war/">Abdul Rashid Dostum</a>, the Tajik strongmen and resistance leaders <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistans-panjshir-valley-the-last-stronghold-of-resistance-to-taliban-rule-166599">Ahmad Massoud</a> and <a href="https://jamestown.org/brief/the-warlords-return-to-afghanistan-atta-mohammad-noor/">Ata Mohammad Noor</a>, former vice president <a href="https://afghanembassy.com.pl/eng/rzad/first-voice-president-h-e-amrullah-saleh">Amrullah Saleh</a> and <a href="https://www.indiablooms.com/world-details/SA/29893/afghanistan-s-former-vice-president-mohammad-karim-khalili-warns-against-attacks-against-hazara-community.html">Mohammad Karim Khalili</a>, a leader of the persecuted Hazara minority.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistans-panjshir-valley-the-last-stronghold-of-resistance-to-taliban-rule-166599">Afghanistan's Panjshir Valley: the last stronghold of resistance to Taliban rule</a>
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<p>Khalili has already warned of armed insurrection if the people he represents aren’t protected from “targeted attacks”. And, more broadly, if the Taliban fails to accommodate the various minority leaders and the constituencies they represent it will most certainly lead to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/is-the-panjshir-valley-the-talibans-achilles-heel/">armed resistance</a>, perhaps even all-out war, emerging from the pockets of territory where their power bases remain solid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166767/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amalendu Misra does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Taliban has promised an ‘inclusive’ new government. But early signs aren’t promising.Amalendu Misra, Professor, Department: Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1666302021-08-26T12:14:11Z2021-08-26T12:14:11ZThe history of the Taliban is crucial in understanding their success now – and also what might happen next<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417618/original/file-20210824-23-1rlqfnm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2859%2C1934&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Taliban came to the fore during Afghanistan's civil war that followed the Soviet pullout of 1989. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/prob-taliban-fighter-atop-shell-littered-peak-nr-radical-news-photo/50437123?adppopup=true">Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The rapid takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban left many surprised. To Ali Olomi, a <a href="https://www.abington.psu.edu/person/dr-ali-olomi">historian of the Middle East and Islam</a> at Penn State University, a key to understanding what is happening now – and what might take place next – is looking at the past and how the Taliban came to prominence. Below is an edited version of a conversation he had with editor Gemma Ware <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-origins-of-the-taliban-podcast-166699">for our podcast, The Conversation Weekly</a>.</em></p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/612751f4cddf5c0012151f3b" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="190px"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>How far back do you trace the Taliban’s origins?</h2>
<p>While the Taliban <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvk12qf0">emerged as a force in the 1990s</a> <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/08/19/1028472005/afghanistan-conflict-timeline">Afghan civil war</a>, you have to go back to the <a href="https://adst.org/2016/04/the-saur-revolution-prelude-to-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan/">Saur Revolution of 1978</a> to truly understand the group, and what they’re trying to achieve.</p>
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<img alt="A group of fighters hold their guns aloft." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=964&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=964&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=964&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Afghan revolutionaries raise their guns during the Saur Revolution.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kabul-democratic-republic-of-afghanistan-workers-of-kabul-news-photo/522609532?adppopup=true">TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The Saur Revolution was a turning point in the history of Afghanistan. By the mid-1970s, Afghanistan had been <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2013/07/afghanistan-in-the-1950s-and-60s/100544/">modernizing for decades</a>. The two countries that were most eager to get involved in building up Afghan infrastructure were the United States and the Soviet Union – both of which hoped to have a foothold in Afghanistan to exert power over central and south Asia. As a result of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Chapter-1-3.pdf">influx of foreign aid</a>, the Afghan government became the primary employer of the country – and that led to endemic corruption, setting the stage for the revolution.</p>
<p>By that time, differing ideologies were fighting for ascendancy in the nation. On one end you had a group of mainly young activists, journalists, professors and military commanders influenced by Marxism. On the other end, you had Islamists beginning to emerge, who wanted to put in place a type of a Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamic state.</p>
<p>Daud Khan, the then-president of Afghanistan, originally allied himself with the young military commanders. But concerned over the threat of a revolutionary coup, he started to suppress certain groups. In April 1978, <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/afghan-president-is-overthrown-and-murdered">a coup deposed Khan</a>. This led to the establishment of the People’s Republic of Afghanistan, headed by a Marxist-Leninist government.</p>
<h2>How did a leftist government help ferment the Taliban?</h2>
<p>After an initial purge of the ruling Communist Party members, the new government turned toward suppressing Islamist and other opposition groups, which led to a nascent resistance movement.</p>
<p>The United States saw this as an opportunity and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/07/history-trump-cia-was-arming-afghan-rebels-before-soviets-invaded/">started to funnel money to Pakistan’s intelligence services</a>, which were allied with Islamists in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>At first, the United States funneled only limited funds and just gave symbolic gestures of support. But it ended up allying with an Islamist group that formed part of the growing resistance movement known as the mujahedeen, which was a loose coalition more than a unified group. Alongside the Islamist factions, there were groups led by leftists purged by the ruling government. The only thing they all had in common was opposition to the increasingly oppressive government. </p>
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<img alt="A group of mujahadeen fighters rest on a mountain." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Mujahedeen fighters in the mountains in the Kunar province in May 1980.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/AFGHANMUJAHEDEENREBELS/19d78f7105f2da11af9f0014c2589dfb/photo?Query=Afghan%20Soviet%20War&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=328&currentItemNo=326">AP Photo</a></span>
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<p>This opposition intensified in 1979, when then-Afghan leader <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/09/19/archives/exafghan-leader-is-reported-killed-a-pakistani-broadcast-says.html">Nur Mohammad Taraki was assassinated</a> by his second-in-command Hafizullah Amin, who took over and turned out to be a wildly repressive leader. Soviet <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/us/politics/afghanistan-trump-soviet-union.html">fears of the U.S. capitalizing on the growing instability</a> contributed to the Soviet Union invasion in 1979. This resulted in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/07/history-trump-cia-was-arming-afghan-rebels-before-soviets-invaded/">U.S. funneling further money to the mujahedeen</a>, who were now fighting a foreign enemy on their land. </p>
<h2>And the Taliban emerged from this resistance movement?</h2>
<p>The mujahedeen waged a guerrilla-style war against Soviet forces for several years, until exhausting the invaders militarily and politically. That and international pressure brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. </p>
<p>After the <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/afghanistan-russia-programs/2019-02-27/soviet-withdrawal-afghanistan-1989">Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989</a>, chaos reigned. Within three years, the new government collapsed and the old mujahedeen commanders turned into warlords – with different factions in different regions, increasingly turning on one another. </p>
<p>Amid this chaos, one former Islamist mujahedeen commander, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/de3dcdff7ba34d4b8c0f25993daee804">Mullah Mohammad Omar</a>, looked to Pakistan – where a generation of young Afghans had grown up in refugee camps, going to various madrassas where they were trained in a brand of strict Islamic ideology, known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/talibans-religious-ideology-deobandi-islam-has-roots-in-colonial-india-166323">Deobandi</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A grainy image of former Taliban leader Mullah Omar" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Taliban founder Mullah Omar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mullah-omar-chief-of-the-taliban-is-shown-in-this-headshot-news-photo/1168032?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>From these camps he drew support for what became the Taliban – <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/taliban-meaning-what-mean-english-name-how-started-afghanistan-explained-1156589">“taliban” means students</a>. The bulk of Taliban members are not from the mujahedeen; they are the next generation – and they actually ended up fighting the mujahedeen.</p>
<p>The Taliban continued to draw members from the refugee camps into the 1990s. Mullah Omar, from a stronghold in Kandahar, slowly took over more land in Afghanistan until the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/afghan_taliban.html">Taliban conquered Kabul in 1996</a> and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. But they never took full control of all of Afghanistan – the north remained in the hands of other groups.</p>
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<h2>What was behind the Taliban’s success in the 1990s?</h2>
<p>One of the keys to the Taliban success was they offered an alternative. They said, “Look, the mujahedeen fought heroically to liberate your country but have now turned it into a war zone. We offer security, we will end the drug trade, we will end the human trafficking trade. We will end the corruption.”</p>
<p>What people forget is that the Taliban were seen as welcome relief for some Afghan villagers. The Taliban’s initial message of security and stability was an alternative to the chaos. And it took a year before they <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-1d4b052ccef113adc8dc94f965ff23c7">started to institute repressive measures</a> such as restrictions on women and the banning of music.</p>
<p>The other thing that cemented their position in the 1990s was they <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf">recruited local people</a> – through force sometimes, or bribery. In every village they entered, the Taliban added to their ranks with local people. It was really a decentralized network. Mullah Omar was ostensibly their leader, but he <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf">relied on local commanders</a> who tapped into other factions aligned with their ideology – such as the <a href="https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/363">Haqqani network</a>, a family-based Islamist group that became crucial to the Taliban in the 2000s, when it become the de facto diplomatic arm of the Taliban by leveraging old tribal alliances in order to convince more people to join the cause.</p>
<h2>How crucial is this history to understand what is happening now?</h2>
<p>An understanding of what was going in the Saur Revolution, or how it led to the chaos of the 1990s and the emergence of the Taliban, is crucial to today.</p>
<p>Many were surprised by the <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/timeline-talibans-lightning-fast-takeover-afghanistan-1619740">quick takeover of Afghanistan</a> by the Taliban after President Biden announced a withdrawal of U.S. troops. But if you look at how the Taliban came to be a force in the 1990s, you realize they are doing the same thing now. They are saying to Afghans, “Look at the corruption, look at the violence, look at the drones that are falling from U.S. planes.” And again the Taliban are offering what they say is an alternative based on stability and security – just as they did in the 1990s. And again they are leveraging localism as a strategy.</p>
<p>When you understand the history of the Taliban, you can recognize
these patterns – and what might happen next. At the moment, the Taliban are telling the world they will allow women to have an education and rights. They said the exact same thing in the 1990s. But like in the 1990s, their promises always have qualifiers. The last time they were in power, those promises were replaced by brutal oppression.</p>
<p>History isn’t just a set of dates or facts. It’s a lens of analysis that can help us understand the present and what will happen next.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166630/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali A. Olomi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A historian explains how the Taliban emerged out of the decades of chaos that followed the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan in 1978.Ali A. Olomi, Assistant Professor of History, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1642062021-07-09T12:06:17Z2021-07-09T12:06:17ZAfghanistan: two decades of Nato help leaves a failed and fractured state on the brink of civil war<p>Afghanistan is falling apart. With US and Nato troops leaving the country earlier than planned, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-government-could-collapse-six-months-after-u-s-withdrawal-new-intelligence-assessment-says-11624466743">experts are warning</a> that the Taliban could take control of the country within six months. Currently the insurgents control the strategically important province of Helmand, and control or contest territory <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan">nearly every province</a> in the war-torn country. </p>
<p>As many as 188 of Afghanistan’s 407 districts are <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/07/taliban-afghanistan-us-withdrawal-conflict-ghani-peace-negotiations/">directly under Taliban rule</a>. With up to 85,000 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11451718">full-time fighters</a>), the insurgents have already forced thousands of troops belonging to the US-trained Afghan army <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-57720103">to surrender</a> or flee.</p>
<p>In response to the Taliban’s onslaught, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/world/asia/vulnerable-afghans-forming-militias.html">local militias are fighting back</a>. Most notable among them is a coalition of militias in northern Afghanistan called the Second Resistance, led by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/world/asia/afghanistan-massoud-cia.html">Ahmad Massoud</a> (the son of Northern Alliance commander <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ahmad-Shah-Masoud">Ahmad Shah Massoud</a>, who was assassinated in September 2001). </p>
<p>The Second Resistance has several thousand fighters and militia commanders who have fought against the Taliban, mostly of Tajik origin. Massoud insists that the Taliban will <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/afghan-militias-forced-to-fight-taliban-blame-americas-abandonment">not have the same success</a> in fighting his coalition due to far greater resolve of his soldiers compared to the Afghan military. But henceforth he will have to operate without the help of Nato troops. </p>
<p>But it’s not just seasoned veterans that are forming militias. Ethnic Shia Hazaras, thousands of whom were massacred between 1996 and 2001 by the Sunni Taliban, have tended to lack militias of their own. But after a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/13/anger-as-afghanistan-mourns-death-of-car-blast-victims">wave of attacks in May</a> that killed 85 people (mostly female students), Hazaras are also now <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/13/anger-as-afghanistan-mourns-death-of-car-blast-victims">rushing to mobilise</a>.</p>
<p>But while these tribal militias might be able to defend themselves, this was far from the objective of the US-led coalition. The goal was to <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm">help build a national Afghan army</a> that could become the sole legitimate fighting force. In spite of these intentions, this clearly never happened.</p>
<p>Much of the problem was that the US never fully grasped how to best support the Afghan military. The Americans relied on a model of trying to arm the Afghan army, training them and providing them with aerial support. But this model was not sustainable or practical for the Afghan military. </p>
<p>Afghanistan <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/afghan-militias-forced-to-fight-taliban-blame-americas-abandonment">does not have the revenues</a> to rely on sophisticated weaponry and technology. This remains a problem even though the US provides Afghanistan with almost <a href="https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/AFG">US$5 billion (£3.6 billion) in aid</a> per year – with US president, Joe Biden, asking for an <a href="https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/white-house-proposes-slight-boost-aid-afghan-forces">additional US$300 million</a> to support Afghan forces.</p>
<h2>2001: a failed mission?</h2>
<p>US efforts to engage in state building after it invaded in December 2001 was a more challenging objective than the Bush administration understood. For centuries, <a href="https://www.history.com/news/why-its-so-difficult-to-win-a-war-in-afghanistan">history has shown</a> that Afghanistan has been difficult to conquer – and impossible to govern. The country always struggled to create a unified national military to ward off invaders and maintain internal stability. Instead it has relied on local tribal militias <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781403981172_10">led by warlords</a> that could be immediately called to action to defend their territory. Efforts in the past (such as under <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Amanullah-Khan">Amanullah Khan</a> in 1923) to enforce conscription into the Afghan army <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/an-intimate-war-2/">resulted in revolt</a>.</p>
<p>As I discovered while researching a book on <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/failed-states-and-institutional-decay-9781441113429">failed states</a>, in addition to having little experience with a national military, other state institutions in Afghanistan were also almost nonexistent. This was not just because the country had faced decades of invasion and civil war, but also because it is is a nation in name only. </p>
<p>The various Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Turkmen, Baluch and Uzbek groups in Afghanistan <a href="http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_87/documentos/ABUBAKAR_SIDDIQUE.pdf">never accepted a central regime</a>. This complicated any effort after Afghanistan gained independence in August 1919 to create unified security institutions to fend off various violent non-state actors that threatened stability in the country.</p>
<p>The Taliban, which overthrew the Afghan government in 1996, was the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan">only group</a> able to exercise control over the country after the 1992-1996 civil war. But, in October 2001, after the 9/11 attacks and the Taliban’s refusal to turn in Osama bin Laden, US and British forces launched airstrikes against targets in Afghanistan. By early December, the Taliban had abandoned their stronghold in Kandahar and ceded their last territory in Zabul and a new president, Hamid Karzai, was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28257108">sworn in</a> within two weeks as interim leader.</p>
<h2>Taking control</h2>
<p>But the Taliban never accepted a western presence and launched an insurgency in 2002. Over two decades, the Taliban has become the most <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf">effective fighting group in the country</a>, building a professional and resilient organisation that has learned to rely on a sophisticated communication apparatus. Its structure has been flexible enough to withstand the death of its leadership, after <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-33703097">Mullah Omar died in 2013</a>.</p>
<p>During that time – and despite the presence of Nato troops in the country – thousands of civilians have continued to die in terror attacks and raids. In 2019 and 2020 alone, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/executive_summary_-_afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_annual_report_2020_english.pdf">has documented</a> more than 17,000 civilians killed or injured – the majority of which are blamed on the Taliban. Although the Taliban is currently in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/09/iran-and-russia-move-to-fill-diplomatic-vacuum-in-afghanistan">peace talks with the Afghan government</a> in Tehran, it has <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/311-taking-stock-talibans-perspectives-peace">little or no credibility</a> when it comes to compromise or adhering to agreements.</p>
<p>So, after spending US$2 trillion and involving over 130,000 Nato troops for over 20 years, the US and its western allies are almost <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-57746335">back to square one</a>. Meanwhile almost 50,000 Afghan civilians <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/afghanistan-47-600-civilians-killed-in-20-years-of-deadly-war/2219156">have died</a> – and most Afghan citizens <a href="https://www.adb.org/countries/afghanistan/poverty#:%7E:text=In%20Afghanistan%2C%2047.3%25%20of%20the,die%20before%20their%205th%20birthday">still live in poverty</a>. The one concrete achievement of the 20 years of occupation – reversing the Taliban’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/17/afghanistan-girls-struggle-education">ban on female education</a> – could be in jeopardy as well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164206/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Afghanistan is descending into anarchy as Nato troops withdraw, leaving the country desperately fighting off a Taliban insurgency.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1617692021-06-15T21:16:57Z2021-06-15T21:16:57ZProtecting education should be at the centre of peace negotiations in Afghanistan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403480/original/file-20210530-22-sngys6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C232%2C2568%2C1707&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Schoolgirls in Kabul, Afghanistan.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Lauryn Oates)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Taliban <a href="https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/voa-exclusive-taliban-attach-conditions-istanbul-conference-participation">appeared to be walking away from peace talks with the Afghan government — until, at the end of May, they suddenly</a> agreed to a proposed meeting in Istanbul. </p>
<p>But they stipulated major constraints, with a senior leader relaying, according to <em>Voice of America</em>, that the agenda shouldn’t include making decisions on critical issues, the conference must be short and the Taliban delegation should be “low level.” These conditions effectively render the meeting meaningless, and it’s likely that one of the critical issues the Taliban wish to avoid discussing is education. The Taliban have dismissed progress in education in Afghanistan as yet another manifestation of foreign occupation, <a href="https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/taliban_attitudes_towards_education.pdf">and has used this</a> as justification to attack schools, students and teachers. </p>
<p>It is clearly counter to Taliban interests to acknowledge the <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2021/0514/I-ll-go-again-Afghan-girls-undeterred-by-bombing-head-to-school#">intense demand</a> Afghan children and their families have for education, and their courageous efforts to realize that demand under the improved schooling conditions that have mercifully come about since 2001. </p>
<p>But now it’s not only the Taliban that have an interest in dismissing and downplaying these achievements. The United States government is absolving itself of Afghanistan <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">through a plan to withdraw by Sept. 11</a>, peddling a narrative that it isn’t responsible for the country’s future. It’s also turning its back on Afghanistan’s educational gains. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="In front of a black board, a female teacher stands beside a girl and helps her hold a book, while the girl is reading. " src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405753/original/file-20210610-16-ysk3ht.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405753/original/file-20210610-16-ysk3ht.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405753/original/file-20210610-16-ysk3ht.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405753/original/file-20210610-16-ysk3ht.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405753/original/file-20210610-16-ysk3ht.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405753/original/file-20210610-16-ysk3ht.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405753/original/file-20210610-16-ysk3ht.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A teacher helps a student read a textbook.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Lauryn Oates)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Justifying attacking schools</h2>
<p>The Taliban have not claimed responsibility for the <a href="https://opencanada.org/dont-look-away/">deplorable attack</a> recently carried out May 8 against the Sayed Al-Shuhada School in Dasht-e-Barchi, a neighbourhood in West Kabul where members of <a href="https://minorityrights.org/minorities/hazaras/">the Hazara ethnic minority</a> live. The attacks <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/08/world/asia/bombing-school-afghanistan.html">took the lives of at least 85 people, mostly schoolgirls</a>. But suspicion of Taliban involvement is justified given their history of violence against educational institutions and the view <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1311881/download">— shared with some other Sunni Islamist extremist groups —</a> of the Shia Hazaras as heretical.</p>
<p>Yet, despite the Taliban’s casual downplaying of <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/lauryn-oates/afghanistan-canada_b_4977113.html">the very significant social change</a> that has swept Afghanistan since the end of its rule, the last two decades have stood out in stark contrast to not only the time when the Taliban ruled the country, but also as an exceptional period in the overall history of the country’s efforts to establish and expand public education.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Boys sit on the ground in a school." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405756/original/file-20210610-15-1a4zuph.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405756/original/file-20210610-15-1a4zuph.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405756/original/file-20210610-15-1a4zuph.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405756/original/file-20210610-15-1a4zuph.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405756/original/file-20210610-15-1a4zuph.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405756/original/file-20210610-15-1a4zuph.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405756/original/file-20210610-15-1a4zuph.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Boys attend a primary school in Kabul that opened since the fall of the Taliban.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Lauryn Oates)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Expansion of Afghan education</h2>
<p>In 1950, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/44827771_Education_and_Afghan_Society_in_the_Twentieth_Century">six per cent of Afghan children — fewer than 100,000 — attended school, almost all of them boys</a>. By 1960, this figure had close to doubled and <a href="https://books.google.ca/books/about/Afghanistan_Its_People_Its_Society_Its_C.html?id=HOIcAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">girls accounted for just over 10 per cent of elementary students</a>. By 1978, more than a million students were in primary and secondary schools, but still only about 15 per cent were girls. </p>
<p>Even under the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/08/the-soviet-war-in-afghanistan-1979-1989/100786/">Soviet-backed regime</a> that introduced compulsory education aimed at paving the way for changing the socio-political structure of the country, 90 per cent of the population <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/1985/0326/opsych.html">remained illiterate</a>. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/44827771_Education_and_Afghan_Society_in_the_Twentieth_Century">By 1991</a>, 33 per cent of children attending elementary school were girls, but the student population had dropped to only 628,000 kids with 182,000 enrolled in secondary schools. </p>
<p>Then, the Mujahideen forces seized power, initiating the decimation of the modest progress made over the past century. In 1995, when the Taliban started closing down girls’ schools, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/history-education-afghanistan">there had been 103,256 girls in public schools in Kabul and 7,793 female teachers</a>. By May 1996, there were none at all. A small minority of girls managed to access clandestine schools, at great risk, but the public school system for girls effectively no longer existed.</p>
<h2>The right to human development</h2>
<p>Indeed, research in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380601125115">in 2007</a> and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290749901_Refusing_the_margins_Afghan_refugee_youth_in_Iran">2010</a> <a href="https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/chattydeterritorialized">showed that</a> a considerable portion of Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, had fled Taliban-controlled Afghanistan primarily so that their children could go to school. </p>
<p>These families had seen up close what a society stripped of educational opportunity looked like. They knew that education would be the most enduring capital they could give their children. And they are right: education is <a href="https://www.un.org/en/observances/education-day">essential for human development</a>.</p>
<p>Countries’ <a href="https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/Commentary_349_0.pdf">literacy rates predict</a> their GDPs, as well as health outcomes, including child and infant mortality rates. If the Taliban insist on denying access to a good quality education to all children, girls and boys, they effectively guarantee Afghans a future of poverty and chronic underdevelopment.</p>
<p>In 2009, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/sharmeen-obaid-chinoy-children-are-tools-to-achieve-god-s-will-the-taliban-commander-told-me-1764029.html">journalist Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy interviewed</a> Qari Abdullah, a Taliban commander in charge of recruiting children as suicide bombers. He told Obaid-Chinoy: “If you’re fighting, then God provides you with means [to win] … kids themselves are tools to achieve God’s will.”</p>
<p>Afghans <a href="https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2021/may/30/trudy-rubin-dont-give-up-on-us-afghan-girls-and-wo">don’t want this</a>, and they are asking the U.S. to hold the Taliban accountable, to help protect a meaningful future for children and families.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Female students inside a tent." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405757/original/file-20210610-10384-14lreox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405757/original/file-20210610-10384-14lreox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405757/original/file-20210610-10384-14lreox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405757/original/file-20210610-10384-14lreox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405757/original/file-20210610-10384-14lreox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405757/original/file-20210610-10384-14lreox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405757/original/file-20210610-10384-14lreox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After the end of Taliban rule, an insufficient number of school buildings to accommodate all the children seeking school has meant some schools have operated in tents.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Lauryn Oates)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Honest reckoning needed</h2>
<p>But <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/04/14/biden-afghanistan-speech-today-grave-error-withdraw-troops-column/7223047002">many have argued</a> that the U.S. troop withdrawal announcement has meant there is now no incentive for the Taliban to compromise. </p>
<p>Worse, U.S. President Joe Biden has expressed little concern for the very grave consequences this will have for Afghans, especially women and girls.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/women-in-afghanistan-worry-peace-accord-with-taliban-extremists-could-cost-them-hard-won-rights-154149">Women in Afghanistan worry peace accord with Taliban extremists could cost them hard-won rights</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>An honest reckoning with what’s at stake in paving the way for the Taliban to once again dismantle progress made in education would require facing the full tragedy of the cataclysm in store for millions of Afghan children who dream of going to a real school. </p>
<p>That truth is a hard one to face. As a consequence, we’re witnessing a strange convergence of views between Biden’s government and the Taliban — one where Afghan children are being asked to quietly absorb the blow of the end of their education.</p>
<p>The Biden administration should course correct and immediately recalibrate its strategy vis-à-vis the Taliban, if it wants to avoid leaving in place this dismal legacy. </p>
<h2>Zero responsibility?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/14/damned-either-way-biden-opts-out-of-afghanistan-as-us-tires-of-forever-wars">While on the campaign trail, Biden claimed</a> he would feel “zero responsibility” for the future of Afghan women and girls if they were negatively affected after a U.S. withdrawal. </p>
<p>But the truth is that after 20 years of military engagement in Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/ghost-wars-the-secret-history-the-cia-afghanistan-and-bin-laden-the-soviet-invasion-to">besides an earlier proxy war</a> and many promises made, the U.S. does hold responsibility for Afghans’ fate, including their human right to access education.</p>
<p>Safeguards to this right must be put in place now; waiting until the conclusion of talks will be too late. </p>
<p>Firm and detailed guarantees from those involved in the talks about the future of education in Afghanistan should be a condition of the negotiations, rather than a hoped-for outcome. And the U.S. should lead in brokering these guarantees. </p>
<p>Relying on the good will of the Taliban — the same people who have burned down schools, murdered teachers and used children as suicide bombers — is not a responsible strategy; it is, rather, enabling more suffering and more injustice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161769/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauryn Oates is affiliated with Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan (CW4WAfghan).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>I have been a board member of the Women Living Under Muslim Laws research division.</span></em></p>After 20 years in Afghanistan and many promises made, the U.S. does hold responsibility for Afghans’ fate, including their human right to access education.Lauryn Oates, Associate Faculty at Royal Roads University, Royal Roads UniversityHoma Hoodfar, Professor of Anthropology, Emerita, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/981432018-06-26T02:27:03Z2018-06-26T02:27:03ZFemale suicide bombers: how terrorist propaganda radicalises Indonesian women<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223493/original/file-20180617-85854-6rhi81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The image of Indonesia as home of moderate Muslims has come into question following terrorist attacks last month during which members of three pro-ISIS families tried to carry out separate but coordinated suicide bombings.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last month, Indonesia was shaken by a series of deadly terrorist attacks. Indonesian National police announced that the local extremist network of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PsKcy8KtmSI">Jama’ah Ansharud Daulah (JAD)</a>, <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/05/13/surabaya-church-bombings-might-be-linked-to-islamic-state-experts.html">affiliated with ISIS</a>, was responsible. </p>
<p>The world’s largest Muslim majority country has worked hard to block homegrown terrorist cells. Government and non-government organisations, including international institutions, have allocated budgets and collaborated to implement diverse <a href="http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/viewFile/103/86">de-radicalisation programmes</a>. However, the involvement of <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/05/24/613383263/family-suicide-attacks-indonesia-must-deradicalize-mothers-and-kids-too">children</a> as suicide bombers in this series of attacks has led <a href="http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-44154828">some</a> to believe these programmes have failed in cutting the chain of terrorism. </p>
<p>In our research, we investigate the conditions that lead to the radicalisation of women and children.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/to-fight-terrorism-indonesia-needs-to-move-beyond-security-measures-53231">To fight terrorism, Indonesia needs to move beyond security measures</a>
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<h2>Awakening of sleeper cells</h2>
<p>The image of Indonesia as home of moderate Muslims has come into question, especially due to the recent awakening of homegrown sleeper ISIS cells. Last year, the country’s military chief, General Gatot Nurmantyo, declared that such cells were <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-has-isis-sleeper-cells-in-almost-all-provinces-military-chief">operating in almost all parts of Indonesia</a>. </p>
<p>Before the formation of JAD in 2015, the leading group responsible for terrorist attacks was the <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-has-isis-sleeper-cells-in-almost-all-provinces-military-chief">Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network</a>, a South East Asian extremist group based in Indonesia. JI is <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/jemaah-islamiyah-aka-jemaah-islamiah">affiliated indirectly with al-Qaeda</a> and is responsible for the Bali bombings in 2002, which killed 202 people. </p>
<p>As a newcomer, JAD works with other radical movements, including extremists from Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), which was founded by a former leading figure in JI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Therefore, there is a link between JAD and JI. However, closer analysis demonstrates the groups differ in important aspects. </p>
<p>The caderisation and membership within JI are stricter than within JAD, which allows anyone who is interested to become part of its small cells. Another difference is their target, which reminds us of the difference between al-Qaeda and ISIS. </p>
<p>Al-Qaeda initially often referred to the West as its principal enemy, while in its earlier phase, ISIS demonstrated that its main enemy was <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0002716216672649">not the distant West</a>, but rather the nominal Muslim (“near” enemy), particularly Shiites and Sunni apostates. JAD’s main targets so far are also the “near” enemy, mainly Indonesian civilians, including <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/opinion/isis-terrorism-indonesia-women.html">non-Muslims, and police officers</a>, while JI has often targeted Westerners.</p>
<h2>Families radicalised</h2>
<p>The involvement of women in suicide bombings, which perpetrators usually call amaliyah (sacrifice or suicide attack), is not an entirely new phenomenon for Indonesia. In 2016, the country was shocked by the emergence of the first female would-be bomber, Dian Yulia Novi. In an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_OVvkjd1be0">interview</a>, Novi said she was inspired by the status of extremist ulama (clerics) and ISIS fighters on their Facebook accounts. Her marriage to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WMzRgv9XkVo">M. Nur Solihin</a>, a member of a homegrown militant cell inspired by ISIS, was to prepare her for a suicide bomb plot at the presidential palace in Jakarta, but the plot failed. </p>
<p>The latest series of blasts, in East Java, took a different trajectory, especially with the involvement of children. The perpetrators of the bombings of three churches in Surabaya were Dita Oepriarto, Puji Kuswati and their four children, the youngest of whom was nine years old. All six were killed, as well as 12 church goers. </p>
<p>On the same day, the Sidoarjo region witnessed a premature bomb explosion in a low-cost apartment belonging to a family of five. The parents and one of their three children were killed. </p>
<p>The day after, Tri Murtiono, Tri Ernawati and their three children, including an eight-year-old girl, blew themselves up at Surabaya police headquarters. All but one of the children were killed. </p>
<h2>Why women become terrorists</h2>
<p>Scholars point to diverse motives for women’s involvement in terrorist groups. The most important is ideology. According to ISIS followers, true Muslims must respond to the call of ISIS leader Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi to emigrate to Syria to build and nurture ISIS territory. The fighters need wives and mothers to produce the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-training-children-of-foreign-fighters-to-become-next-generation-of-terrorists-a7162911.html">next generation of terrorists</a>. </p>
<p>Another important motive is women’s disenchantment with their home country. ISIS’s prowess for propaganda, through diverse media, especially social media and video games, has convinced some Muslim women to travel to its territory for a better life under daulah Islamiyah (Islamic state). Notably, however, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bL8zvggGuwE">many are disappointed</a>, particularly after seeing and experiencing brutality and unfulfilled promises. </p>
<p>The significant <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-british-jihadis-return-uk-iraq-syria-report-islamic-state-fighters-europe-threat-debate-terror-a8017811.html">danger of disappointed returnees</a> has been widely acknowledged. However, many believe those who are radicalised and have pledged allegiance to the daulah but are unable to go because of the global travel ban to ISIS territory, can be even <a href="https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/pro-isis-di-indonesia-yang-belum-ke-suriah-lebih-berbahaya.html">more dangerous</a>. This has been a major concern of security agencies not only in Indonesia but also in many <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2018/01/18/what-happens-when-isis-goes-underground/">Western countries</a>. </p>
<p>The fact these radicalised women cannot join al Khansaa Brigade, an all-female militia group of ISIS formed in 2014 and operating in Iraq and Syria, does not mean they cannot conduct a deadly attack to support ISIS missions. </p>
<h2>Female martyrdom</h2>
<p>Elites of diverse terrorist groups often mention that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1025611?needAccess=true">using women should be a last option</a> in the case of “emergencies”, including lack of male fighters. Therefore, it would not be surprising if the current condition of ISIS, which has lost ground in many parts of Syria and Iraq, has led ISIS elites to call for <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-mujahidat-dilemma-female-combatants-and-the-islamic-state/">greater female involvement</a> in missions. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/defeated-in-syria-and-iraq-the-islamic-state-is-rebuilding-in-countries-like-indonesia-96724">Defeated in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State is rebuilding in countries like Indonesia</a>
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<p>In Indonesia, the imprisonment of terrorists affiliated with diverse terrorist groups, including ISIS, has also led local terrorist leaders to call for greater participation from women. They believe in the potential success of terrorist acts involving women because women are less likely to be suspected and detected as terrorists. </p>
<p>In line with this, female fighters and suicide bombers have a strong belief in the <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ronald-tiersky/isiss-deadliest-weapon-is_b_12087084.html">exceptional position of a shahid</a> (martyr). This includes beliefs that the purity status of martyrs allows them to be buried wearing clothes, without ritual washing, and that they would be granted the highest position close to the throne of god. In addition, they also believe their success in raising their children to be mujahidin (male fighters) and mujahidat (female fighters) can warrant them a portion of their children’s rewards. </p>
<p>In 2010, conducting research on women attached to terrorist networks in Indonesia, one of us met a woman who nicknamed herself Umm Mujahid (a mother of a male fighter). Asked why, she said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I want my nickname to be my prayer. I hope my little son will be a mujahid in the future, so he can bring me to God’s heaven.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This kind of ideology has become ingrained in the hearts and minds of radicalised women. Therefore, it is not surprising that bombings in Indonesia are beginning to involve women and children.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98143/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Indonesia has worked hard to block homegrown terrorist cells, but the involvement of children as suicide bombers in recent attacks has raised concerns that de-radicalisation programmes aren’t working.Eva Nisa, Lecturer in Religious Studies, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of WellingtonFaried F. Saenong, JD Stout Research Centre for New Zealand Studies (VUW), Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of WellingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/528652016-01-14T10:03:02Z2016-01-14T10:03:02ZParliament urgently needs to keep tabs on Britain’s arms exports<p>The aphorism that history repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce, seems cruelly relevant to the arms trade. Its history is littered with examples of arms transfers pursued on the basis of short-term interests, only for the same arms to be subsequently used in ways the supplier never intended. </p>
<p>Since at least World War I repeated arms trade scandals suggested that states were either unable or unwilling to learn lessons from the past. But in the late 1990s, the New Labour government adopted an ethical arms sales policy that appeared to offer a break with this past. It first established a new set of ethical criteria for arms sales, and then led on the development of what would eventually become the <a href="http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_en.htm">EU Common Position</a>, which sets out legally binding guidelines for arms exports. </p>
<p>The government also set up a new parliamentary Committee on Arms Exports Controls (CAEC) to bring greater transparency to UK arms sales and to monitor the implementation of ethical commitments. The current government has inherited this framework, and has also been a leading proponent of the <a href="http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/">Arms Trade Treaty</a>, which entered into force in December 2014. </p>
<p>Today’s government cites these measures in its regular claims to operate one of the <a href="http://rigorousrepetition.tumblr.com/">most rigorous</a> arms export control regimes in the world. Yet the UK routinely violates its commitments in spirit if not letter. </p>
<h2>What goes around …</h2>
<p>With human rights now declared “<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/human-rights-are-no-longer-a-top-priority-for-the-government-says-foreign-office-chief-a6677661.html">no longer a top priority</a>” under the Conservatives, the current era increasingly feels like a rerun of the 1980s when it comes to international responsibility. </p>
<p>Just as the current government is doing, the Thatcher government imposed austerity at home while aggressively pursuing arms sales abroad in the hope of generating jobs, improving Britain’s balance of payments and producing economies of scale for domestic weapons procurement. </p>
<p>The signature element of this policy was the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8501655.stm">Al-Yamamah contract with Saudi Arabia</a> – a deal that would become the mainstay of the British defence industry. At the same time, the Iran-Iraq war created both a massive market for arms supplies and a perceived imperative to provide arms to the secular Iraqi regime.</p>
<p>In addition, the Thatcher government exported several hundred tonnes of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-on-the-historical-role-of-uk-companies-in-supplying-dual-use-chemicals-to-syria">dual-use chemicals to Syria</a>, while the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 prompted Western powers (<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8215187/National-Archives-Britain-agreed-secret-deal-to-back-Mujahideen.html">including Britain</a>) to send massive arms supplies to the Afghan Mujahideen.</p>
<p>The outcome, of course, was various forms of “blowback”. The dual-use chemicals supplied to Syria were subsequently used to produce nerve agents including <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-on-the-historical-role-of-uk-companies-in-supplying-dual-use-chemicals-to-syria">sarin</a>. And while arming the Mujahideen arguably provided a short-term success, in the long-term weapons continue to circulate in the country and the wider region and are still used today by Taliban forces. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/defence-and-security-blog/2012/nov/09/arms-iraq-saddam-hussein">arms-to-Iraq scandal</a> and the ensuing Scott enquiry revealed that ministers had both secretly relaxed government policy on supplies to Iraq and provided weapons to neighbouring states in the knowledge they would be redirected to Saddam Hussein.</p>
<p>The UK-Saudi arms relationship, meanwhile, was almost immediately dogged by allegations of corruption. Britain quickly found itself in a supplicant relationship, the Saudis requiring ever more compromises in domestic and foreign policy to be appeased – a problem that <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/29/arab-states-critical-risk-defence-corruption-arms-dealing">continues to this day</a>.</p>
<h2>Back to the future</h2>
<p>While today’s cast list is slightly different, the new era of “ethical” arms sales feels much like the bad old days. The short-termism of foreign policy and the attractions of the Gulf arms market for austerity Britain have meant that the serial compromises over human rights have continued. </p>
<p>And once again, the Middle East is generating a crisis of European arms export and wider foreign and domestic policy. Most notably, it appears that British arms have been used by the Saudi-led coalition fighting Houthi rebels in Yemen in an <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-saudi-arabia-got-its-yemen-campaign-so-wrong-45664">increasingly indiscriminate war</a>. In September 2015, a <a href="http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/uk-made-missile-used-airstrike-ceramics-factory-yemen">British-manufactured cruise missile</a> of the type stocked by the UAE armed forces was used to destroy a civilian ceramics factory.</p>
<p>The flipside of UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia is the rise of IS and other Islamist groups. At first blush the use of British-supplied equipment in potential violations of international humanitarian law, such as the attack on an <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/27/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0SL0VK20151027">Médecins Sans Frontières hospital</a> in Yemen, and the November 2015 attacks in Paris (with <a href="https://theconversation.com/paris-attacks-terrorism-trafficking-and-the-enduring-curse-of-the-ak-47-50733">AK-47s</a> likely sourced from the former Yugoslavia or deactivated weapons stocks) have little in common. </p>
<p>One attack was carried out by a coalition of states, using high-technology military equipment transferred to them by major players in the international arms trade; the other was carried out by non-state actors, using small arms acquired through criminal networks. Yet they are part of the same feedback loop: Saudi citizens are amongst the chief sponsors of Islamist politico-military movements, such as IS, which the Saudi government has failed to curtail. </p>
<p>As the UK goes to war in Syria and considers how it might best support “friendlies” on the ground, it is doubly imperative that Parliament holds the government to account for its policies on arms transfers. The British state must ensure that it meets its own <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140325/wmstext/140325m0001.htm#14032566000018">domestic</a> and <a href="http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/">international</a> responsibilities, namely not to grant export licences if there is a clear risk they might be used for internal repression, used in the violation of international humanitarian law, or used aggressively either against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim. </p>
<p>Instead, eight months on from the general election, MPs have only just instructed clerks to <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mps-resume-scrutiny-of-arms-exports-to-saudi-arabia-a6805356.html">reconvene the CAEC</a>. But there has already been legal advice that the UK has <a href="http://www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/news-article/683-press-release-uk-government-breaking-the-law-supplying-arms-to-saudi-say-leading-lawyers">breached</a> its <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-in-breach-of-national-international-and-eu-law-say-lawyers-a6804961.html">domestic and international commitments</a> by continuing to supply weapons to Saudi Arabia, and the government faces a <a href="https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/countries/saudi-arabia/legal-2016/2016-01-08.ld-to-bis.pdf">legal challenge</a> to its policy. </p>
<p>In that light, the CAEC must indeed be reconstituted, and urgently launch an inquiry to shine a spotlight on what the British government is still doing. Otherwise, the UK’s arms trade history will keep repeating itself – and mostly as tragedy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anna Stavrianakis has received funding from the ESRC Impact Acceleration Account. She is a trustee of Trust for Research and Education on the Arms Trade and a donor to Campaign Against Arms Trade.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Neil Cooper is currently undertaking research on the arms trade funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada. He has previously received funding for research on the arms trade from the British Academy and the Trust for Research and Education on the Arms Trade. </span></em></p>British-made weapons are still finding their way into the wrong hands. Doesn’t parliament have a responsibility to stop that happening?Anna Stavrianakis, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of SussexNeil Cooper, Professor of International Relations and Security Studies , University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/376002015-02-13T12:45:10Z2015-02-13T12:45:10ZJohn Cantlie: a final message from a hostage to misfortune?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/71959/original/image-20150213-13178-17xp57n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">John Cantlie has been producing video content and aricles under duress.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Cantlie#mediaviewer/File:John_Cantlie.jpg">Futurenet1977 - Photograph taken by a friend Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On February 9, Islamic State propagandists uploaded the latest video to feature captured British journalist John Cantlie. In the film, <a href="http://leaksource.info/2015/02/09/inside-halab-islamic-state-hostage-john-cantlie-reports-from-aleppo/%20">From inside Halab (Aleppo)</a>, an expectedly unkempt and slightly dishevelled Cantlie presents a nevertheless mostly assured report from Syria’s largest city. </p>
<p>His scripted delivery is clear and pronounced as he tours Aleppo delivering observations on his surroundings and interviewing in the style of a veteran travel broadcaster.</p>
<p>In a remarkable commentary lasting nearly 12 minutes, the camera follows Cantlie around as he tells us that the seriously war damaged city is home to “vibrant markets” where “livestock leisurely graze on lush green grass”. We see the soldiers of the mujaheddin fishing, socialising and drinking tea. We see children in schools and in front of brightly coloured fruit stalls. </p>
<p>The message is clear: IS-controlled Aleppo is a city that, despite the Syrian and western bombs: “remains a place of serenity and surreal beauty” where the “standard of the caliphate flutters high”.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Cantlie’s final film?</span></figcaption>
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<p>But the message of jihad is underlined in the video’s final section when a French-speaking IS fighter refers to the recent attacks in France (clearly dating the documentary as after the Charlie Hebdo massacre of January 7). </p>
<p>Here Cantlie stands mute and nodding, holding the microphone in front of the young soldier who implores all of “brothers in the west” to defend their religion. They should start to carry out individual attacks, he says. Be as “wolves on the earth … kill them with knives, at the very least strike them in the face … So I call on you to come here or defend your religion wherever you are.”</p>
<p>And there, with one final call to attack, the broadcast ends. No coda, no piece to camera, no graphics, no end music. Just an abrupt halt to what Cantlie says at the start, is the “last film in this series”.</p>
<h2>Professional quality</h2>
<p>The two previous films: <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UA84ZubJ_Wk%20">From inside Ayn Al – Islam (Kobane)</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RN3ktXbLzlY%20">From inside Mosul</a> follow much the same bizarre pattern. From inside Mosul, (uploaded on January 4) begins with a seemingly relaxed Cantlie addressing the audience in an almost irreverent Alan Whicker prime-time fashion: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Hello – I’m, John Cantlie. And today we’re on top of the world in Mosul overlooking the second largest city in Iraq … It’s the absolute heartland of the Caliphate and home to 2m people from every walk of life.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The contrast between this approach and the<a href="http://www.jomec.co.uk/blog/wp-admin/%20%C2%A0https:/theconversation.com/terribly-effective-islamic-state-propaganda-draws-the-west-into-another-conflict-31801%20is"> extreme brutality</a> evident in the footage of the beheadings of David Haines and Alan Henning or the murder of <a href="http://www.adweek.com/tvnewser/fox-news-embeds-complete-isis-video-on-website/254623">Jordanian pilot,</a> Moaz al-Kasasbeh is glaringly apparent. </p>
<p>The Islamic State of Cantile’s video is one that cares about its image and about what the West thinks. Walking around a market, where we are told everything is normal and busy, Cantlie says: “This is not a city living in fear as the western media would have you believe”.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">From inside Mosul.</span></figcaption>
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<p>So it is explicitly clear that these images of civilisation, prosperity and hope are meant to challenge the Western media and the prevailing perception of IS as barbaric, medieval and ultimately backward-looking. </p>
<p>At one stage, in a Sharia court room, Cantlie states: “Like any other law court in the world, they’re playing TV in the background. This being the Islamic State, they’re playing Islamic State videos. I must say, they’re a lot more entertaining than watching the news at six.” </p>
<p>Cantlie’s reports seek to encourage comparison with Western life and to normalise life under the caliphate – for the observer and for those who might wish to join it.</p>
<h2>Chilling message</h2>
<p>The Inside… series is also reasonably well made and stylistically recognisable to viewers of current affairs programmes the world over. This is no surprise and the regressive, all-consuming rejection that IS has for the modern world clearly does not extend to the use of Twitter, Instagram, Tumblr and the other necessities of contemporary communication. </p>
<p>Writing about the fall of Mosul in June last year the Guardian’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/who-behind-isis-propaganda-operation-iraq">Patrick Kingsley</a>, reasoned: “in wars gone by, advancing armies smoothed their path with missiles. Isis did it with tweets and a movie.”</p>
<p>But of course the series is quite basic propaganda. As <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/07/isis-media-machine-propaganda-war%20">Steve Rose</a> points out in his excellent article on Islamic State’s hi-tech operations: “there is no evidence of in these films of abduction, rape, persecution, destruction of mosques, crucifixions, severed heads mounted on railings, whippings of women found not wearing the hijab and other Isis-inflicted atrocities. Women are barely visible at all, in fact.”</p>
<p>But why would there be? This is a different, more palatable IS. And what of Cantlie? He is a popular and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29261089">experienced war zone journalist</a> who has worked previously in Afghanistan, Libya and Somalia and written for a number of familiar titles including the Sunday Times, Esquire, GQ and Top Gear magazine. </p>
<p>In July 2012 he was kidnapped by jihadists in Syria before being rescued. He returned to the country again in the November of that year before he was abducted by Islamic State.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Lend me your ears.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nothing was heard from him until the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vcew3qmidRI">Lend me your ears</a> series of broadcasts which began in September 2014. In these, a clearly <a href="http://leaksource.info/2014/09/18/islamic-state-hostage-uk-journalist-john-cantlies-lend-me-your-ears-video-series-dabiq-articles">under-duress</a> and undernourished Cantlie wearily addressed the camera sitting behind a desk and against a pitch-black backdrop. </p>
<p>For six instalments, clad in an orange jumpsuit (to presumably mirror those detainees in Guantanamo Bay and the garb worn by IS’s other captives) he solemnly delivered his scripted material.</p>
<p>The Cantlie of Inside Mosul and Inside Halab uploads is markedly different. The clothes, the demeanour, the delivery – all much more professional and expressive. The occasional stutter and stumble notwithstanding, there is a confidence to him which, given his situation, is extraordinary. </p>
<p>There has been some <a href="http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/british-journalist-john-cantlie-appears-last-hostage-video%20">speculation</a> that his declaration to camera in Inside Halab that this was his “last film” somehow indicates that he has been murdered or that he soon will be. For the family and supporters of Cantlie it’s important to note that though he does say those words, he specifically emphasises with his hands, that it is “the last film in this series”. </p>
<p>Let’s hope that this means John Cantlie is alive and let’s hope he stays that way.</p>
<hr>
<p><em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/freejohncantlie">Click here</a> for the Free John Cantlie Facebook page.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37600/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
On February 9, Islamic State propagandists uploaded the latest video to feature captured British journalist John Cantlie. In the film, From inside Halab (Aleppo), an expectedly unkempt and slightly dishevelled…John Jewell, Director of Undergraduate Studies, School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/93512012-09-12T20:36:34Z2012-09-12T20:36:34ZState of origin? Libyan stability versus global jihad<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/15333/original/zh74tpjy-1347341878.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Libyan guards outside the Tripoli prison holding former Gaddafi era intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Sabri Elmhedwi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In October Libya will officially celebrate its first anniversary of independence, though in fact it has been more than a year since Tripoli was overrun. </p>
<p>In the same month the West will mark 11 years of involvement in Afghanistan, the first step in the global War on Terror. And unfortunately for Libya, its chances of marking future birthdays may very much be dependent on the prosecution of the latter.</p>
<p>In Libya the challenge is to build on the shaky constitutional foundation while keeping a lid on the possibility of an Islamic insurgency. This is going to become increasingly difficult given the fact that radical Islamist groups are gathering strength across the region in a broad campaign of resistance that includes parts of Mali, Algeria, Niger and Chad. Being sucked into the vortex of such Salafist conflicts will be all too easy for a state that is still struggling to find an anchor point.</p>
<p>If you join the dots, fragile transitional democracies such as Libya and Tunisia are squarely in the zone of a violent ideology that spreads across two continents. There is a dogmatic affinity and element of co-operation between North African groups and the original al-Qaeda organisation and its Middle Eastern and Asian franchises, as well as <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ash-Shabaab_(Somalia)">al-Shabaab</a> in Somalia and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram">Boko Haram</a> in northern Nigeria.</p>
<p>The key players for Libya are <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaeda_in_the_Islamic_Maghreb">Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</a> (AQIM), which is mainly focused on deposing the Algerian regime, and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansar_Dine">Ansar Dine</a>, which is now in control of half of Mali. The two groups have links with other regional Islamist and/or separatist movements, and in the case of AQIM, some of its members fought in the Libyan rebellion.</p>
<p>Like the proverbial tree roots finding a crack and splitting the rock, these ideologues find adherents in regional, ethnic, economic and sectarian discontent. By offering some sort of easy solution, they gather strength and erode the legitimacy of the government. In Libya, that means exploiting provincial rivalries between Benghazi and Tripoli, as well as mounting a campaign against Sufi Muslims.</p>
<p>In August, hardline Sunnis used heavy machinery to demolish a Sufi shrine right in the middle of Tripoli in broad daylight, without any apparent interference from authorities. This sort of action corresponds with Ansar Dine’s exploits in Mali, where Sufi sites in Timbuktu and elsewhere have been levelled. (In the worldview of al-Qaeda type groups, the Sufi practice of venerating saints, scholars and their tombs is idolatrous and heretical.) By exploiting such existing divisions, the radical Islamists destabilise the community and widen the “security gap”, causing a loss of legitimacy for the government and, potentially, an increasing spiral of violence, brigandry and population displacement.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/15335/original/ymrn9cq2-1347342859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/15335/original/ymrn9cq2-1347342859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/15335/original/ymrn9cq2-1347342859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/15335/original/ymrn9cq2-1347342859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/15335/original/ymrn9cq2-1347342859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/15335/original/ymrn9cq2-1347342859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/15335/original/ymrn9cq2-1347342859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Sufi shrine in Libya being destroyed by Sunni fighters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Str</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Overcoming a creeping Islamist influence is not only a challenge for any future Libyan government, but also for those other players who would like to see a stable and democratic state emerge from the wreckage of Gaddafi’s <em>[Jamahiriya](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Libya_under_Muammar_Gaddafi#Great_Socialist_People.27s_Libyan_Arab_Jamahiriya</em>.281977.E2.80.932011.29)_. That includes Western powers who want to showcase a working example of an Arab democracy and establish steady access to the country’s natural resources.</p>
<p>But do we have the mind-set to deal with a challenge that is not really made <em>in</em> Libya?</p>
<p>Part of our inability to grapple with such predicaments is the Western focus on the nation state and how it should operate - Ruritania exists within this set of borders, has the ability to enforce them and has total political, economic and security control within them. Therefore if Ruritania is our friend, no enemies should originate from it.</p>
<p>This sort of logic breaks apart when we consider North Africa, a place where vast swathes of inhospitable terrain are demarcated only by imaginary lines and inhabited by some groups with an ancient culture of itinerancy. Even when there is a strong national government, it may be concentrated in the capital and exert only weak, or even no control at all over the provinces. So how do we deal with the fact that an armed group can easily slip across a border that we have no right to cross, or even operate from the territory of a friend?</p>
<p>Given the experience of Afghanistan, we don’t seem to cope very well.</p>
<p>State-centric thinking also translates into a tendency to place territorial aspirations onto insurgent groups. The <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers'_Party">Kurdish PKK</a> wants this bit of territory, the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberation_Tigers_of_Tamil_Eelam">Tamil Tigers</a> want this bit and the IRA wants reunification with the Republic of Ireland. By thinking of this in terms of capturing or holding territory, which suits our own military tradition, we ignore the fact that Islamist insurgencies can be more about ideology than terrain. </p>
<p>Having a chunk of Yemen or Algeria is fine to use as a base, but if the organisation is really all about defeating the Great Satan or enforcing a particular interpretation of Islam, real estate is a flexible commodity.</p>
<p>Such global or regional ideologies also offer the possibility of co-operation amongst like minded-groups, further blurring the territorial assumptions. That an Indonesian can wander off to Yemen to work with Al-Qaeda or a Libyan can join an Islamist faction in the Syrian uprising challenges our Western imagining of nationalism and citizenship. The importance attached to sub-national identities across the Greater Middle East and Africa is also difficult for us to grasp.</p>
<p>The balancing act of helping or hindering any new Libyan leadership is a tricky one. Exerting too much obvious authority delegitimises the government, opening it up to accusations of being a Western puppet. Too little assistance and an insurgency can gain momentum; and history shows that putting such a genie back in the bottle is seldom possible.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/15339/original/25bp253t-1347343564.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/15339/original/25bp253t-1347343564.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/15339/original/25bp253t-1347343564.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/15339/original/25bp253t-1347343564.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/15339/original/25bp253t-1347343564.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/15339/original/25bp253t-1347343564.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/15339/original/25bp253t-1347343564.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A fighter stands guard over former dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s car. What kinds of future does Libya face a year on?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Mohamed Messara</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For the West, accepting that Islam will have a place at all in the politics of Libya and its neighbours will be a tough pill to swallow, but supporting the moderates is the best hope for short and medium-term stability. Collaboration between the transitional states is also important, because regional co-operation is the only way to deal with regional threats.</p>
<p>Finally we have to get better at appreciating the inter-connectedness of these threats. That so many of us are not able to point to Mali on a map or are surprised to find that Timbuktu is a real place is an indictment on our pretensions to fight terrorism. </p>
<p>And such ignorance really removes the right for us to wail and gnash our teeth over Islamist insurgencies appearing in countries we apparently care more about.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/9351/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mat Hardy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In October Libya will officially celebrate its first anniversary of independence, though in fact it has been more than a year since Tripoli was overrun. In the same month the West will mark 11 years of…Mat Hardy, Lecturer in Middle East Studies , Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.