tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/muslim-brotherhood-3131/articlesMuslim Brotherhood – The Conversation2023-11-07T17:29:05Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2167732023-11-07T17:29:05Z2023-11-07T17:29:05ZEgypt’s strongman president faces election amid economic slump and popular anger over inaction on Gaza<p>The bitter conflict between Israel and Hamas could not have come at a worse time for Egypt. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the former military strongman who <a href="https://theconversation.com/full-circle-in-egypt-as-failed-revolution-lets-the-military-strengthen-its-grip-22501">seized power in 2013</a> amid the turbulent fallout of the Arab Spring, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egyptian-president-sisi-confirms-candidacy-december-presidential-election-2023-10-02/">faces a general election in December</a>. </p>
<p>Beset by economic woes and with a political and humanitarian catastrophe unfolding on his country’s border, it will be an election fraught with risks.</p>
<p>Sisi effectively took power in July 2013, after decades of military dictatorship under Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak’s 30-year reign, which ended in April 2011 during the Arab Spring, was followed by a brief and turbulent interregnum in which a Muslim Brotherhood-backed government led by academic Mohamed Morsi struggled to maintain order. </p>
<p>In July 2013, Sisi removed Morsi from power and <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypts-counter-revolution-won-out-in-a-year-of-epochal-change-35799">won 96% of the vote</a> the following year in an election which drew <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/middleeast/international-observers-find-fault-with-egypt-vote.html">widespread international criticism</a>. He has not really faced significant political opposition since, but this can’t hide his deep unpopularity with many Egyptians.</p>
<p>At present, Sisi presides over what most experts would say is a contender for the region’s worst performing economy. Annual inflation hit a historic high of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-inflation-quickens-record-380-september-2023-10-10/#">38% in September</a> and the <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/EGY/egypt/youth-unemployment-rate#">youth unemployment rate is currently running at 17%</a>. </p>
<p>Compounding this economic crisis have been several rounds of currency devaluation and an incoming mandated International Monetary Fund bailout. A harsh <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/31/egypt-imf-bailout-highlights-risks-austerity-corruption">IMF-imposed austerity programme</a> will push struggling Egyptians to a level of destitution not seen since the Egyptian bread riots of 1977.</p>
<p>It’s against this unstable background that Sisi will have to fight for reelection. You could be excused for assuming it would be a mere box-ticking exercise, as Sisi has ruled Egypt with an iron fist since ousting the Muslim Brotherhood in July 2013’s brutal coup. </p>
<p>No election has been free and fair since then and Egypt’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/07/journalists-go-on-trial-in-egypt-for-offending-mps">independent media has been all but crushed</a> in the interceding years. Opposition parties have either been suppressed or co-opted, while civil society – previously a lively political sphere – now looks back at Mubarak’s dictatorship with a degree of nostalgia.</p>
<p>Initially – and for the first time since Sisi took power – it looked as if he would face a credible opposition. Former MP <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/67601/egypts-ahmed-tantawi-the-last-major-opposition-leader-standing-up-to-sisi/">Ahmed Tantawi</a>, a candidate for the Civil Democratic Movement, made a name for himself as an MP by openly criticising Sisi in parliament and not taking part in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-launches-national-dialogue-amid-ongoing-security-crackdown-2023-05-03/">National Dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>This was a Sisi-sponsored initiative which was launched in May 2023. It was presented by the government as an inclusive forum for addressing Egypt’s economic and political challenges – but has been dismissed by critics as merely a vehicle for Sisi’s own agenda.</p>
<p>Tantawi’s campaign gained momentum with support from prominent left-wingers, secularists and even some Muslim Brotherhood leaders in exile, attracted by Tantawi’s stance on releasing political prisoners. There are currently an estimated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-brotherhood-prisons-specialrepo-idUSKCN0R30Y420150903">40,000 political prisoners in Egypt’s jails</a>, many of them Muslim Brotherhood members. </p>
<p>But Tantawi <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egyptian-opposition-candidate-ends-campaign-presidential-poll-2023-10-13/">withdrew his candidacy on October 13</a>, saying that pro-government “thugs” were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egyptian-opposition-candidate-ends-campaign-presidential-poll-2023-10-13/">preventing people from registering their support</a> for his candidacy. </p>
<p>If his abortive campaign wasn’t a direct threat to Sisi, Tantawi’s popularity represents a structural shift in Egyptian politics. Sisi has dealt so badly with Egypt’s economic problems in recent years it has left him vulnerable. </p>
<p>And his habit of <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220523-sisi-suggests-egyptians-eat-tree-leaves-as-prices-soar/">incautious statements</a> hasn’t helped – at one point when questioned about the soaring price of okra, an Egyptian staple, he suggested they emulate the followers of the prophet Muhammad and “eat leaves”.</p>
<h2>War on the doorstep</h2>
<p>With the war in Gaza on Sisi’s doorstep, the regime faces a difficult balancing act. Israel is bent on securing its border no matter the consequences for Egypt. Yet the fallout for Sisi at home could antagonise domestic vulnerabilities. The image of thousands of Gazans dying while Egypt’s Rafah border stays closed could be very harmful for the regime.</p>
<p>Sisi needs to be cautious, given his <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-israels-war-hamas-spells-trouble-egypts-sisi#:%7E:text=Indeed%2C%20ever%20since%20Sisi%20came,a%20decade%20of%20Sisi's%20tenure.">close relationship with the Israeli government</a>. Egypt has been <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/egypt-cauldron-gaza">party to the 16-year-long Israeli blockade</a> of Gaza, enforcing tight controls on the border crossing at Rafah. </p>
<p>But with an election looming he now needs to appease an Egyptian public who are far more sympathetic to the Gazan’s plight than the Israelis. He has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/21/exploiting-our-anger-egyptians-denounce-staged-pro-palestine-protests">attracted widespread criticism</a> from opponents who say his administration has been organising staged protests to piggyback on public sympathy for Palestinians as the death toll from Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip rises.</p>
<p>But the real risk to his administration lies at home with the ever-present threat of Egypt’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/30/egypt-sisi-muslim-brotherhood-history-repression-nationalism-democracy-opposition/">well-established Islamist movements</a>. It was a Muslim Brotherhood-sponsored popular uprising at Tahrir Square that toppled Mubarak and handed government to Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011. </p>
<p>That history now acts as a serious warning for Egypt’s military to never be complacent about the potential threat of Islamist movements. Sisi’s regime has done its utmost to destroy the Brotherhood. </p>
<p>In the ten years since his security forces <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">massacred more than 900 people</a> while violently breaking up mass anti-government sit-ins in Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares in August 2013, tens of thousands have been subject to arbitrary detention without trial or have been sentenced in military courts to lengthy prison terms for dissent. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most shameful exhibition of corrupt use of power was his regime’s treatment of Morsi. The former president died after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/17/mohamed-morsi-dead-ousted-president-egypt-collapses-after-court-session">collapsing inside the defendants “cage” in a Cairo courtroom</a> following six years in solitary confinement. </p>
<p>It is one thing for an incumbent to deal with the failings of a collapsing economy. It is quite another to accommodate an aggrieved public watching a human rights massacre right on its border. If the Sisi regime continues to let this happen on its watch, the opposition will have more ammunition than they have had for years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216773/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Gillian Kennedy received previously funding from the Leverhulme Foundation.</span></em></p>Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has held Egypt in an iron grip for a decade, but his regime’s close relations with Israel might prove a problem with voters.Gillian Kennedy, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1965432022-12-16T13:13:27Z2022-12-16T13:13:27ZMuslim Brotherhood at the crossroads: Where now for Egypt’s once-powerful group following leader’s death in exile, repression at home?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501383/original/file-20221215-22-5t8yv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C53%2C3994%2C2604&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the Muslim Brotherhood protest at a rally in 2013.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/members-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-and-supporters-of-ousted-news-photo/173509620?phrase=Muslim%20Brotherhood%20flag%20Egypt&adppopup=true">Carsten Koall/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ibrahim Munir, the leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-ibrahim-munir-muslim-brotherhood-acting-leader-dies">died on Nov. 4, 2022</a>, in exile in London. While the news generated few headlines around the world, Munir’s death marks a critical moment in the evolution of a group founded nearly 100 years ago, as a social and religious movement.</p>
<p>Over the years, the Brotherhood grew into the most significant social movement and political opposition in Egypt. Its Islamist ideology – which calls for public policies in line with its interpretation of Islam – <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-muslim-brotherhood-and-jamaat-i-islami/">became widely influential</a> around the world.</p>
<p>But since a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">2013 military coup</a> that removed the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed Morsi from power, the group has been all but destroyed, with most of its leaders either imprisoned, killed or in exile.</p>
<p>For now, the group has <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20221107-muslim-brotherhood-assigns-temporary-acting-guide/">a new temporary leader</a> in Muhyeddine al-Zayet, a 70-year-old senior figure in the movement.</p>
<p>But the stark reality is that the Brotherhood is at a turning point: The movement either will have to reinvent itself or face the prospect of gradually fading into irrelevance.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.wesleyan.edu/academics/faculty/imatesan/profile.html">scholar of social movements</a> who has <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-violence-pendulum-9780197510087?cc=us&lang=en&">studied the evolution of the Brotherhood</a> and interviewed both members and defectors, I believe its fate hangs on three issues: how it responds to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s repression of opposition groups including the Brotherhood; which leaders guide the movement during its crisis; and how the group rebuilds in exile. </p>
<h2>Has the Brotherhood run its course?</h2>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood was <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/egypts-muslim-brotherhood">established in 1928</a> by Hassan al-Banna, a primary school teacher with a vision that piety and Islamic values can help transform the individual, reform society and ultimately bring about an Islamic state.</p>
<p>Appealing to Egyptians disillusioned with the country’s existing religious institutions, critical of its political system and angered by the Western interference in the Muslim world, the Brotherhood <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/africa/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-explainer/index.html">grew into a grassroots movement</a> with an intricate network of schools, newspapers and social services.</p>
<p>By the end of the 20th century, the Brotherhood dominated civil society in Egypt and became a prominent source of political opposition. It also established branches and affiliates throughout the Muslim world. </p>
<p>Following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start">2011 Arab Spring</a>, which saw popular uprisings in a number of countries across the Middle East, the Brotherhood came to power in Egypt’s first free and fair elections. Its affiliated political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, won the largest parliamentary block, and its candidate, Mohammed Morsi, was elected president. By June 2013, however, disillusionment with the lack of political progress and the poor economic performance of the country led to widespread popular mobilization against the Brotherhood. A month later the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">military ousted Morsi</a> from power. </p>
<h2>Emergence of two Brotherhoods</h2>
<p>When Brotherhood supporters took to the streets and demanded that the democratically elected president be reinstalled, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/08/egypt-clashes-morsi-muslim-brotherhood-military">police and army forces opened fire on demonstrators</a>. On Aug. 14, 2013, security forces brutally put down the sit-in in Rab’a Square in eastern Cairo, killing over 800 people, in what Human Rights Watch said <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">likely amounted to crimes against humanity</a>.</p>
<p>For some Brotherhood members, the brutality of the security forces sparked a <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/13510347.2016.1273903?journalCode=fdem20">desire for revenge and justified a violent response</a>.</p>
<p>For the most senior Brotherhood leaders, however, violence was neither politically pragmatic nor ideologically justified. In the absence of a clear vision for how to respond to the political crisis, many young members became <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/13510347.2019.1630610">disillusioned with the organization</a>. </p>
<p>By 2014, the Brotherhood was not just losing members. Two additional fault lines emerged: the question of leadership and the question of exile. Mass arrests caused a leadership vacuum that led to a <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/13510347.2019.1630610">new cadres of midranking members</a> taking over activities inside Egypt. </p>
<p>These new leaders adopted a more revolutionary tone and started operating independently of the older leadership. The parallel claims to authority and divergent visions over how to respond to the political repression <a href="https://research.sharqforum.org/2018/09/07/iran-and-the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-heading-towards-development-or-simply-repair/">led to a split</a> between the so-called “historical leaders” and the new leadership.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Photo of an elderly man in a black blazer and blue shift." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Ibrahim Munir in 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-general-of-the-international-organization-of-the-news-photo/173448728?phrase=Ibrahim%20Munir%20Muslim%20Brotherhood&adppopup=true">Ozan Kose/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By 2016 there were in effect two Muslim Brotherhoods: the original group, under the leadership of Ibrahim Munir as the deputy guide operating out of the U.K., and the <a href="https://research.sharqforum.org/2018/09/07/iran-and-the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-heading-towards-development-or-simply-repair/">so-called “General Office,” under the new leadership</a>. The General Office attracted many young revolutionaries, including women, but the group had significantly fewer resources, which led it eventually to dissipate.</p>
<p>I learned from interviews with Brotherhood members that with Munir operating as leader in exile, a deeply contested internal debate emerged over whether to restructure the movement and shift the strategic decision-making to the leaders abroad. Outside of Egypt, the organization established regional consultative councils in most host states with a significant Brotherhood presence, most notably in Turkey.</p>
<p>While this allowed for some semblance of organizational rebuilding, some leaders still insisted that all major decisions about the direction, tactics and strategies of the Brotherhood be made inside Egypt. </p>
<h2>Can the Brotherhood rise again?</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that the Muslim Brotherhood has been nearly destroyed by government repression. In 1954 a militant faction of the Brotherhood allegedly attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser, prompting <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-violence-pendulum-9780197510087?cc=us&lang=en&">a severe crackdown on the group</a>. The torture and abuse that Brotherhood members faced in prison inspired a new militant vision for activism and led a small group of Brotherhood members to start plotting attacks on government officials. The government discovered these cells before any plans came to fruition, leading to a <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691167886/making-the-arab-world">second major wave of repression in 1965</a>.</p>
<p>But the circumstances in which the Brotherhood finds itself today are different from these past periods of repression. It is more deeply divided than before. And importantly, the current repression comes after the movement came to power and had a chance to rule but ultimately failed.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_Egypt_Report_Public-Opinion_Arab-Barometer_2019.pdf">Arab Barometer</a>, a nonpartisan research network, shows that since 2013 Egyptians have been consistently skeptical of political Islam as expressed by the Brotherhood, even as the population remains largely religious. For for many of Egypt’s young people the Brotherhood cannot offer any solutions to the economic hardships facing the country, or the growing human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Faced with these internal divisions and challenging political circumstances, the road ahead will not be easy for the Brotherhood. As some of its former members have admitted, there is a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/rethinking-political-islam-9780190649197?cc=us&lang=en&">tension between being a social movement and being a political party</a>.</p>
<p>The Brotherhood knows that many Egyptians agree with the group’s religious values at the same time that they are deeply critical of its political ambitions.</p>
<p>If the Brotherhood seeks to become a force of change again and attract a new generation of Islamist activists, I believe it needs to develop a new vision and theory of political agency that inspires both the youth in exile, who speak the language of inclusion, diversity and revolution, and Egypt’s young people, who hunger for freedom and economic opportunities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ioana Emy Matesan has previously received funding from the National Science Foundation. </span></em></p>The Muslim Brotherhood once held the reins of power in Egypt. Now it faces internal splits, government repression and dwindling support.Ioana Emy Matesan, Associate Professor of Government, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1328352020-03-17T12:11:10Z2020-03-17T12:11:10ZMubarak’s lasting legacy on Egypt’s Coptic Christians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319975/original/file-20200311-168563-10vxnk5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=59%2C17%2C1934%2C1473&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A 2005 presidential election poster of then-President Hosni Mubarak that said: '70 million Egyptian Muslims and Christians say yes to Mubarak.'</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Egypt-EGYPT-/93bdc91923e1da11af9f0014c2589dfb/136/0">AP Photo/Hasan Jamali</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The rule of Egypt’s former leader <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/hosni-mubarak-dies-at-91-his-autocratic-rule-of-egypt-ended-with-a-citizens-revolt/2020/02/25/d70e076a-57bf-11ea-ab68-101ecfec2532_story.html">Hosni Mubarak</a>, who died in February at age 91, will be remembered by many for its repressive tactics and the unprecedented Arab Spring protests that led to the strongman’s ouster in 2011. </p>
<p>But Mubarak’s legacy is more complicated than that. Egypt’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-coptic-christians-76273">Coptic Orthodox Christian Church</a> had a friendly relationship with Mubarak. At the height of the Arab Spring in February 2011, Pope Shenouda III, the Coptic Church’s head at the time, ordered Christians to stay <a href="https://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2011/march/egyptaftermubarak.html">home</a> rather than to join those protesting the regime. </p>
<p>In my book <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/alien-citizens/BF353EC932B7A72B61239484061FD4E8">“Alien Citizens</a>,” I show how those in political authority use minorities for their own interests. Mubarak used his relationship with the Copts to bolster support for his rule while failing to put in place lasting legal safeguards for Christians.</p>
<p>This strategy did not change after Mubarak’s ouster from office. </p>
<h2>The Copts in Egypt</h2>
<p>Egypt’s Copts, the largest Christian community in the Middle East and one of the oldest Christian communities in the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=OpIgDQAAQBAJ">world</a>, constitute about 10% of the country’s total population of 95 million. </p>
<p>Since 1952, when Egypt became a republic following a military <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=kjDmdakFpVQC">coup</a>, the church’s relationship with the state has not always been smooth. Christians in Egypt have faced discrimination in multiple forms.</p>
<p>Until <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/features/egypts-law-building-churches-dashes-christian-hopes-equality">recently</a>, Christians required permission from Egypt’s president to build a church. A ruling on whether one can be constructed took into account the number of Christians living in a neighborhood and the proximity of the proposed church from nearby mosques. </p>
<p>The relationship between Coptic popes and presidents influenced policy on Egypt’s Christians. The rules on church construction were largely a result of the souring relations between Pope Shenouda III and Anwar Sadat, who ruled Egypt between 1970 and 1981 – just before <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410500059664">Mubarak</a>. </p>
<p>The pope <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/09/07/egyptian-copts-support-ousted-patriarch/f8f951b7-bd0e-4ea0-a874-6e16a39abf16/">spoke against </a> Sadat’s more tolerant stance toward the <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691149400/the-muslim-brotherhood">Muslim Brotherhood</a>, Egypt’s Islamic revivalist movement that was repressed under Sadat’s predecessor, Jamal Abdel Nasser. </p>
<p>In 1981, Sadat <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03064228308533618">accused Pope Shenouda III</a> of “fomenting sectarian trouble between Copts and Muslims.” He also rescinded a previous presidential decree that recognized Pope Shenouda III as the leader of the Coptic Orthodox Church and put him under house <a href="http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,953135,00.html">arrest</a>. </p>
<p>Mubarak <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/11/26/mubarak-orders-release-of-31-jailed-by-sadat/a5d17755-56ed-4e1a-b83b-287ecc619d65/">released Pope Shenouda III</a> and gave him more access to the corridors of power. But, in return, the pope had to <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=mt-9CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA187&lpg=PA187#v=onepage&q&f=false">pledge his support</a> to Mubarak’s regime. </p>
<h2>A complicated relationship</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319976/original/file-20200311-116240-gsnt8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319976/original/file-20200311-116240-gsnt8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319976/original/file-20200311-116240-gsnt8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319976/original/file-20200311-116240-gsnt8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319976/original/file-20200311-116240-gsnt8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319976/original/file-20200311-116240-gsnt8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319976/original/file-20200311-116240-gsnt8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Egypt’s Coptic Pope Shenouda III, center, casts his vote for Parliament elections in Cairo, Egypt in November 2010.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mideast-Egypt-Elections/afc5bd975a584d11ab414c02faa54817/11/0">AP Photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Under Mubarak, the Coptic Orthodox Church gained a privileged position and became the main interlocutor for state’s relations with <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=9muVAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA84#v=onepage&q&f=false">Christians</a>.</p>
<p>However, the condition of Christians did not necessarily improve under the Mubarak-Shenouda III pact. Political representation of the Copts remained very low. In the 1995 parliamentary elections, for example, Mubarak’s National Democratic Party did not have a single Christian <a href="https://mepc.org/node/4823">candidate</a>. Even when political representation later improved, the number of Coptic representatives in Parliament never exceeded 3% under <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/17/the-roots-of-egypts-muslim-christian-tensions/">Mubarak</a>. Youssef Boutros-Ghali, a Coptic Christian, was among the few to serve in a high-level Cabinet <a href="http://www.mof.gov.eg/English/About%20MOF/Pages/History.aspx">position</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, periodic violence against <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/egypt-bck-1001.htm">Christians</a> continued. For example, in January 2000, a skirmish between Copts and Muslims led to the death of 20 Copts in Kosheh, a small village 273 miles south of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jan/17/4">Cairo</a>.</p>
<p>Mubarak exploited such violence to crack down on his Islamist rivals in the name of fighting against <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=LlQgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA63#v=onepage&q&f=false">terrorism</a>. </p>
<p>The attacks on Copts reinforced the idea that religious violence was a threat. As anthropologist <a href="https://www.gc.cuny.edu/Faculty/Core-Bios/Talal-Asad">Talal Asad</a> wrote, the Mubarak regime maintained that the regime “was the only force capable of ensuring religious peace precisely because it suppressed Islamic <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23350066?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">extremism</a>.”</p>
<p>Pope Shenouda III <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-middle-east-studies/article/vicissitudes-in-the-entente-between-the-coptic-orthodox-church-and-the-state-in-egypt-19522007/C3D5A63D8B6223705397743B804E12B1">supported</a> Mubarak all through his rule, including Mubarak’s reelection bid in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=9LinfigcDnwC&pg=PA90#v=onepage&q&f=false">2005</a>, which elicited strong popular <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4709011.stm">dissent</a>. </p>
<p>During the Egyptian revolution in January 2011, in urging Copts to stay at home during the revolts, the Coptic Church leaders <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703439504576116222399438428">warned</a> that Mubarak’s removal from power might cause uncertainty for Christians under a new regime. </p>
<h2>After the revolution</h2>
<p>This coziness to Mubarak put Egypt’s Christians more at risk after the president was ousted from <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=mt-9CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA192#v=onepage&q&f=false">power</a>.</p>
<p>Immediately after Mubarak’s fall, the violence against Copts <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=qx0mDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA4#v=onepage&q&f=false">increased</a>. In 2011, tens of churches were attacked and communal clashes <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/coptic-christians-torn-over-egypts-future/2011/09/14/gIQA3pzJdK_story.html">surged</a>. In October 2011, a Christian protest against the demolition of a church for not having a license ended with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15235212">the killing of 24 Copts</a> by the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137530868_11#citeas">military</a>. </p>
<p>With Morsi in power, the Muslim Brotherhood pushed for a constitution that would consider <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-politics/egypts-contentious-islamist-constitution-becomes-law-idUSBRE8BL03X20121226">Islamic law as the main source of legislation</a>. Many Christians felt marginalized by the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypts-christians-worried-by-islamists-rise/2013/01/07/9db90546-58f3-11e2-88d0-c4cf65c3ad15_story.html">move</a>.</p>
<h2>Increasing violence</h2>
<p>When the military ejected Morsi from power by force in 2013, the Coptic Church <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/egypt-coptic-pope-backs-sisi-presidential-bid-201432481312796748.html">supported the move and the subsequent presidency of Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi</a>. </p>
<p>Fearing a <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/78706/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-postMorsi-political-map.aspx">return to power of the Muslim Brotherhood</a>, Sissi and the subsequent leader of the Coptic Church, Pope Tawadros II, developed an alliance. In return for the Copts’ support, Sissi would extend more protections to Christians. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319972/original/file-20200311-116255-iq8khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319972/original/file-20200311-116255-iq8khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319972/original/file-20200311-116255-iq8khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319972/original/file-20200311-116255-iq8khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319972/original/file-20200311-116255-iq8khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319972/original/file-20200311-116255-iq8khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319972/original/file-20200311-116255-iq8khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi is accompanied by Coptic Pope Tawadros II, on Jan. 6, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Egypt/bd03dae1ecc046b8ac0a2d12ef1a942f/30/0">AP Photo)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sissi became the first Egyptian president to attend a Christmas Eve Mass in January 2015. He gave the messages of equality to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/07/egypt-president-sisi-coptic-christmas-mass-cairo">Copts</a>. In 2015, the number of Copts in the Parliament increased to 36 out of 596 <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/09/middleeast/egypt-coptic-christians/index.html">members</a>.</p>
<p>But violence against Copts continued in the years after <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/anti-christian-violence-surges-in-egypt-prompting-an-exodus-11556290800">2013</a>. Explosions at two Coptic churches, on Palm Sunday in 2017, left more than 40 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/world/middleeast/explosion-egypt-coptic-christian-church.html">dead</a>.</p>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood leadership condemned the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-denies-attacks-churches-flna6C10934212">attacks against Copts</a>, but the Sissi regime portrayed the attackers as affiliates of the Islamist <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20161213-egypt-accuses-muslim-brotherhood-over-coptic-church-attack-suspect-mustafa">group</a>. After the coup in 2013, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/egypt-adjourns-second-mass-brotherhood-trial-201432592426453446.html">thousands of people affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood</a> were <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/world/middleeast/egypt.html">killed</a> or <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-security/egypt-detains-prominent-opposition-leader-over-alleged-anti-government-plot-idUSKCN1TQ161?il=0">imprisoned</a>. </p>
<p>Although the Coptic Orthodox Church continued its amicable relationship with Sissi, many Christians, particularly youth, gradually distanced themselves from the government in response to increasing violence and <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/02/many-coptic-youths-stances-oppose-sisi-and-church-election.html">authoritarianism</a>. </p>
<p>In the end, it might be only the leaders of the Coptic Orthodox Church who benefited from a relationship with Mubarak. Ordinary Christians needed the rule of law for protection which Mubarak and his successors did not provide.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132835/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The research related to this piece has been partially funded by the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Opinions are the author's and do not represent the views of the University of Nebraska at Omaha</span></em></p>Mubarak used his relationship with the Copts to receive support for his rule, but he did not build institutions that could guarantee Christians constitutional rights.Ramazan Kılınç, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska OmahaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1325652020-02-28T12:22:18Z2020-02-28T12:22:18ZMubarak: a man who built on his talent for self-promotion while stifling opposition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317765/original/file-20200228-24668-5mn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hosni Mubarak, the late former President of Egypt.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Amel Pain</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 21-gun salute fired in eastern Cairo during <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/364225/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Sisi-attends-military-funeral-ceremony-for-.aspx">the burial</a> of the late president <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/hosni-mubarak-president-egypt-born">Hosni Mubarak</a> was an elegant end to the life of a man preoccupied with building his image and personality cult.</p>
<p>In my book, <a href="https://library.soas.ac.uk/Record/10043339">The Arab Split</a>, I emphasised how Mubarak was keen to build his reputation as a gentleman president, beloved by his people and respected by leaders the world over.</p>
<p>His desire to be smart, well-presented and always liked was an impediment, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z0mfCAcCKx4">according to</a> his Egyptian-British wife Suzanne. This desire for perfection led the modern <a href="https://www.israeltoday.co.il/read/israel-mourns-death-of-a-modern-pharaoh/">pharaoh</a> to become head of the military aviation academy when he was still in his 30s. A few years later he became the commander of the air force. </p>
<p>The role Mubarak played in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Yom-Kippur-War">the 1973 war with Israel</a> led president <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1978/al-sadat/facts/">Anwar el Sadat </a>to choose him as his vice-president. Mubarak was inches away from Sadat when the president was shot dead by army officers during a parade in 1981. At the time many analysts thought he would lead the country for an <a href="https://search.proquest.com/openview/a90e590240d1c3734e1dc131b43d74b5/1?cbl=31168&pq-origsite=gscholar">interim period</a> before a stronger leader could take over.</p>
<p>Instead, Mubarak became the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/egypt-president-hosni-mubarak-dies-91-200225105344417.html">longest-serving president of Egypt</a>, staying almost 30 years in power. He survived by building on his talents for self-promotion while controlling or stifling political opposition. Even his strongest critics have noted that it took some skill to die a “normal, natural death” while all the other presidents; <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2019/7/3/egypts-history-of-erasing-presidents-from-naguib-to-morsi">Mohamed Naguib</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2014/sep/29/egypt-president-nasser-dies-archive-1970">Gamal Abdel Nasser</a>, <a href="https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/the-assassination-of-anwar-sadat-1981/">Sadat</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-after-death-of-mohamed-morsi-119134">Mohamed Morsi</a> died in controversial circumstances. </p>
<p>My research on Mubarak’s personality in 2015 found that his long stay in power was founded upon building a personality cult. Professor of politics at the University of East Anglia <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2004.00149.x">John Street</a> has argued that politicians and celebrities share a common identity. To succeed in the new globalised celebrity culture, politicians – much like celebrities – have to rely on self-promotion, advertising, targeting and branding. </p>
<p>According to Street, modern politics has become more a matter of marketing than of science – challenging the concepts of traditional marketing and classical political leadership. Mubarak managed to do that very well. </p>
<h2>Image-making</h2>
<p>Mubarak hired a top journalist, Makram Mohamed Ahmed, to write his speeches. He was very keen to have extensive coverage in the media for all his activities. He also sponsored annual extravagant musicals to commemorate the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/yom-kippur-war">6 October 1973 war</a>, pouring praise on the many singers who performed for him and who sang songs in his name. </p>
<p>Propaganda was one of his main tools in building his image, and the widespread brainwashing of the masses reverberates back to French psychologist Gustave le Bon’s notion of the <a href="https://exploringyourmind.com/gustave-le-bon-psychology-of-the-masses/">psychology of the masses</a>.</p>
<p>When he came into office Mubarak promised to <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ihcpCSjpzzIC&oi=fnd&pg=PP11&dq=Sullivan+egypt&ots=86cbnXDcR8&sig=g5V3sc4h-k3YyDcNwa48sBjQDw0&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=mubarak&f=false">defend democracy</a> in Egypt. Nevertheless, the political system he adopted in practice was authoritarian and very restrictive. Universal rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly were trampled upon. </p>
<p>An authoritarian system is the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hamdy_Hassan/publication/228628363_State_versus_society_in_Egypt_Consolidating_democracy_or_upgrading_autocracy/links/00b7d52626d844c1f2000000/State-versus-society-in-Egypt-Consolidating-democracy-or-upgrading-autocracy.pdf">basis</a> of a strong personality cult. </p>
<p>His international image was particularly important to Mubarak. </p>
<p>He became a leading voice in the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, promoting aggressively the idea of a <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Mubarak-Determine-Palestines-borders">two-state solution</a>. In 1989, Mubarak’s image was given a major boost when he raised the Egyptian flag on Taba, the resort that Israel kept under its authority even after Camp David. When Israel withdrew from Sinai it insisted that Taba, which borders the Israeli port of Eilat, was not part of Egypt and keeping it under the Israeli authority did not contradict the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2015/03/on-this-day-36-years-ago-the-signing-of-the-egyptisrael-peace-treaty/388781/">Camp David Egypt-Israeli peace treaty</a>. <a href="https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_xx/1-118.pdf">The arbitration</a> ruling on September 1988 proved that Israel was wrong.</p>
<p>Another moment of international limelight for Mubarak was Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Egyptians fought alongside the Americans to facilitate the Kuwait “liberation” and subsequent invasion of Iraq. On the back of this, Mubarak managed to return the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/12/world/arab-league-headquarters-to-return-to-cairo.html">Arab League headquarters</a> to Cairo after 10 years of boycott following the Camp David peace agreement with Israel in 1978. </p>
<p>Back at home, Mubarak did less well. His relationship with the opposition grew steadily worse, reaching its all-time low in 2010 when he decided to exclude all opposition from the parliament. The emergency laws were in effect for the almost three decades of his rule. Last but not least, Mubarak was grooming his son <a href="https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/egypts-mubarak-grooming-son-presidency">Gamal to succeed him as a president</a>. These efforts were silently opposed by the army but they had the chance to have their say during the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/01/egypt-revolution-160124191716737.html">January 2011 uprising</a>, when they refused to support Mubarak over the demonstrators. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Officers escort the flag-draped coffin former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Khaled Elfiqi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When it came to the Muslim Brotherhood, Mubarak <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DjbpC5nqNlk">allowed</a> the organisation a level of freedom for activism. He allowed it to grow and control student unions and most of the professional organisations – such as those for doctors, engineers and teachers – and to build its wealth. But his regime made sure it was always under control. </p>
<h2>The military</h2>
<p>The fact that Mubarak’s military funeral with full honours was attended by the Egyptian president and former <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/201373112752442652.html">Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el Sisi</a> will keep future Egyptian generations in utter confusion for years to come. Was this the president who drove millions of Egyptians onto the streets for 18 days in January and February 2011, begging him to stand down, face justice and even face execution?</p>
<p>What were the feelings of thousands of Egyptian families who lost a loved one, or have a family member living with an injury or who were tortured during that “revolution”? Many have not yet heard an answer about who killed or injured their loved ones. </p>
<p>The highly formal full military funeral held one solid truth; those military men in Egypt, no matter what they do, are held in awe. The military is still in charge as it has been for the last 70 years. The image of the funeral was the image of the military and both the dead body of Mubarak in his coffin and the live body of Abdel Fattah el Sisi who was following the coffin grew from the same root: the “military institution” which has been ruling Egypt for decades. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-after-death-of-mohamed-morsi-119134">Where next for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood after death of Mohamed Morsi</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed Taha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mubarak held power for three decades, on the foundation of a personality cult.Mohamed Taha, PhD Candidate, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1208002019-08-20T11:22:00Z2019-08-20T11:22:00ZHow two Islamic groups fell from power to persecution: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s Gulenists<p>Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first-ever democratically elected president, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/mohamed-morsi-and-end-egyptian-democracy/591982/">died unexpectedly during a trial</a> in June 2019. He was a member of the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Hc7iAAAAQBAJ&q=Tarek+Masoud#v=onepage&q=%22Chapter%2031%22&f=false">Muslim Brotherhood</a>, an almost century-old Islamist group that rose to power after the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. </p>
<p>Its political tenure was short. Morsi was deposed by a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-revolution">coup in 2013</a>, on the one-year anniversary of his election. Egypt’s new military regime declared the Muslim Brotherhood, whose political coalition received 38% of the votes in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/middleeast/voting-in-historic-egyptian-elections-enters-second-day.html">2011 parliamentary elections</a>, a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/16/legislating-authoritarianism-egypt-s-new-era-of-repression-pub-68285">terrorist organization</a>. Its members have been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1202532019ENGLISH.pdf">arrested, jailed</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/we-do-unreasonable-things-here/torture-and-national-security-al-sisis-egypt">tortured</a>. Morsi was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/opinion/morsi-death-egypt.html">sentenced to death</a>, though the sentence was overturned on appeal.</p>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood’s fall recalls the sudden decline of another once-powerful Islamic group: Turkey’s Gulen movement.</p>
<p>In July, Turkish president Tayyip Erdogan marked the third anniversary of a failed coup accusing Fethullah Gulen – a former <a href="http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Islam-And-Democracy-In-Turkey.php">ally</a> and leader of an influential Islamic movement – of <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/failed-coup-attempt/turkey-commemorate-3rd-anniversary-coup-attempt">masterminding the attempted overthrow</a> of his government.</p>
<p>Gulen, a Turkish scholar and cleric who has lived in the United States for 20 years, has consistently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/fethullah-gulen-turkey-coup-attempt.html">denied involvement</a> in the coup. He founded an Islamic community in the 1970s. By 2013, his movement had millions of supporters worldwide, as well as media institutions and schools in over <a href="http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1969290,00.html">100 countries</a>, including <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/gulen-movements-charter-schools-may-be-caught-up-in-turkey-u-s-standoff-1468967536">some 150 charter schools</a> in the United States. </p>
<p>The New York Times once presented the movement as promoting “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/world/asia/04islam.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=D2E054B31541981F4179434CC8A6F7C4&gwt=pay">a gentler vision of Islam</a>.” In 2014, the BBC called Gulen “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25885817">Turkey’s second most powerful man</a>,” after then Prime Minister Erdogan. </p>
<p>Now, Erdogan has declared the Gulenists to be terrorists. Those who are affiliated with the movement have been systematically <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2018-01-29/remarkable-scale-turkeys-global-purge">purged and jailed</a>. </p>
<p>How did the Muslim Brothers and the Gulenists fall so far, so fast? </p>
<h2>The authoritarian state</h2>
<p>My <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">research on Islam and authoritarianism</a> indicates that both groups were victims of the same dangerous combination: an authoritarian state, Utopian ideas about Islam and unreliable friends.</p>
<p>Both in Egypt and Turkey, Islamic movements have struggled to survive in authoritarian regimes that exert strong control over religious practice.</p>
<p>Egypt’s autocratic presidents keep <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-middle-east-studies/article/conflict-and-cooperation-between-the-state-and-religious-institutions-in-contemporary-egypt/88682BFE96041526E0E4FFB0EC3B892E">mosques and Al-Azhar</a>, a leading educational institute of Sunni Islam, under their thumb. </p>
<p>In Turkey, a government agency called the <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/gulen-movement/secret-diyanet-report-gauges-threat-posed-turkeys-islamists">Diyanet</a> oversees religious affairs and defines for the Turkish people what “correct Islam” is. Under the strongman regime Erdogan has built since 2013, which combines <a href="https://theconversation.com/nationalism-and-piety-dominate-turkeys-election-98609">religious conservatism, nationalism and authoritarianism</a>, the Dinayet has been a crucial instrument of social control.</p>
<p>Given these political conditions, both the Muslim Brothers and the Gulenists have since their founding had a well-founded fear of persecution. Their leaders, several of whom I <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/01/29/egypts-transition-two-years-later-a-turkish-perspective/">interviewed</a> in 2013 during my book research, assumed that these groups could not survive unless they became powerful enough to control state institutions entirely. </p>
<p>That fear has proven to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. </p>
<p>Their efforts to capture the state institutions were initially so successful that they created a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=gR9KTPUCUkk">backlash</a>. Political elites in Turkey and Egypt turned against these powerful groups, designating them enemies of the state.</p>
<h2>Utopian Islam</h2>
<p>The comparison I’m developing here will be unacceptable for most Gulenists. </p>
<p>Gulen’s followers see themselves as nonpolitical, a <a href="https://fgulen.com/en/press/interview-by-foreign-policy/26368-meet-fethullah-gulen-the-worlds-top-public-intellectual">civil society organization</a> – sharply different from the Muslim Brothers, an Islamist political organization with an explicitly <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/muslim_bros_participation.pdf">political agenda</a>.</p>
<p>And it is true that the Gulenists never established a political party. But their initial alliance with Erdogan – and, later, their <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_government%E2%80%93G%C3%BClen_movement_conflict">conflict</a> with him – demonstrates that Gulenists are a deeply political force in Turkey.</p>
<p>Like the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/20/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-faces-a-dilemma-religion-or-politics/?utm_term=.ad667bd681e2">Muslim Brothers</a>, the <a href="https://kitalararasi.com/2018/11/26/hepimiz-islamciyiz-ozgur-koca/">Gulenists</a> have a certain Utopian vision of their religion. Both groups see Islam – albeit different versions of it – as the solution to all society’s ills. </p>
<p>Religion is, for these organizations, a blueprint that should guide Muslims in every detail of their life, from restroom manners to governance. The judiciary, military and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/09/turkish-police-fethullah-gulen-network">police</a>, too, should be “Islamic.”</p>
<p>In their quest to control everyday life in Turkey and Egypt, the <a href="http://rusencakir.com/Tanidigim-Fethullah-Gulen/7057">Gulenists</a> and the <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/egypt-at-a-crossroads-after-morsi-grants-himself-sweeping-powers-a-869291.html">Muslim Brothers</a> made enemies. They alienated secular citizens, who rejected the “Islamization” of their country. They also angered <a href="http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Islam-And-Democracy-In-Turkey.php">other Islamic groups</a>, who felt themselves being <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/11/01/egypt-s-pragmatic-salafis-politics-of-hizb-al-nour-pub-64902">edged out of power</a>.</p>
<h2>Wrong partners</h2>
<p>Even one-time allies have turned against these groups. </p>
<p>This is a sign of the third feature that, I found, contributed to the downfall of the Gulenists and the Muslim Brotherhood: Neither is very good at choosing their friends.</p>
<p>Within a month of winning the Egyptian presidency, Morsi promoted to defense minister and head of the armed forces <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/02/egypts-failed-revolution">General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi</a>, a young general. Morsi thought al-Sisi had strong enough Islamist leanings that he would be friendlier to the Muslim Brotherhood than other high-ranking officials in the Egyptian military. </p>
<p>A year later, al-Sisi staged the coup that overthrew Morsi. Once in power, he designated the Muslim Brothers a terrorist organization.</p>
<p>The Muslim Brothers have made this mistake before. In the 1950s, they believed <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/11081.html">Gamal Abdel Nasser</a> – the military mastermind of Egypt’s 1952 revolution – was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. But after using the group to seize power, President Nasser persecuted his former partners.</p>
<p>The Gulenists have made similarly disastrous partnerships. </p>
<p>Between 2006 and 2011, they <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/gulen-movement/how-has-gulen-movement-ended-where-it">allied with Erdogan</a>, helping him eliminate Turkey’s secular political establishment. But once Erdogan consolidated his <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/politics/turkeys-one-man-rule-will-end-end-man-ahmet-kuru">personal power</a>, he turned against all his former allies – the Gulenists included. </p>
<p>Concerned about Erdogan’s persecution of their movement, some Gulenists came to see General Hulusi Akar, then the head of Turkey’s armed forces, as the man to check the Turkish president’s dictatorial tendencies. Arguably, they expected some sort of <a href="https://twitter.com/farukmercan/status/755646527129935876?lang=en">military intervention against Erdogan</a>. </p>
<p>Whether Akar actually played a role in the 2016 coup attempt is still a mystery in Turkey. He insists he had <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/army-failed-to-spot-all-gulenists-chief-of-general-staff-129234">nothing to do</a> with the effort to overthrow Erdogan. </p>
<p>In 2018, Erdogan <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4e273880-8823-11e8-bf9e-8771d5404543">promoted Akar to defense minister</a>. With Akar’s support, more than <a href="https://twitter.com/t24comtr/status/1124236467499425793?s=20">16,000 military officers have been fired</a> for allegedly being Gulenists.</p>
<h2>Lessons to be learned</h2>
<p>Just a few years ago, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Gulenists were powerful enough to imagine that their Utopian goal of remaking society in their image was within reach.</p>
<p>Today their leaders are exiled, dead and jailed. Their <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/04/egypt-approved-law-seizing-assets-funds-muslim-brotherhood.html">properties</a> have been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fed595d0-631e-11e7-8814-0ac7eb84e5f1">seized</a>, their <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/gulen-movement/intellectual-crisis-gulen-movement">reputations tarnished</a>.</p>
<p>The downfall of these two Islamic organizations is a cautionary tale for other religious groups with political ambitions in the Muslim world. </p>
<p>Trying to run a country based on a single Utopian vision of what an ideal Islamic society looks like is risky business. Add authoritarianism to the mix, and the chances of failure grow. Choose the wrong allies, and the result can be deadly. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru is the author of Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment: A Global and Historical Comparison (Cambridge University Press, 2019).</span></em></p>A few years ago, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s Gulenists were running the show. Now both religious movements face political repression. How did they fall so far, so fast?Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1191342019-07-01T11:02:12Z2019-07-01T11:02:12ZWhere next for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood after death of Mohamed Morsi<p>The death of Egypt’s former president, Mohamed Morsi, in a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/17/mohamed-morsi-dead-ousted-president-egypt-collapses-after-court-session">Cairo court on June 17</a>, on the same day he was elected six years previously, closed a chapter in Egyptian history. Morsi was the first president of Egypt to be elected in popular, representative and multiparty elections. But his burial in a graveyard alongside previous leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood group is a symbolic indication that a different approach within the 90-year-old organisation has not yet happened. His family <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/18/mohammed-morsi-swiftly-buried-denied-public-funeral-hometown/">wasn’t allowed to bury</a> his body as he wished in his birthplace in the Delta village of Edwa.</p>
<p>Morsi led the Freedom and Justice Party, the Muslim Brotherhood’s first official political arm, and stood at the climax of its social, political and ideological struggle. His time as president only lasted one year and ended with the group plunged into its worse ever internal and external crisis. Six years on, the group still seems unable to find its way forward in a rapidly changing national, regional and international landscape.</p>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood was <a href="https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-109268859/al-ikhwan-al-muslimeen-the-muslim-brotherhood">founded as a social movement by Hassan Al Banna</a> in the eastern Egyptian city of Ismailia in 1928, as a reaction to the fall of the Ottoman empire. The Brotherhood’s understanding is that Islam should encompass all aspects of life: political, social and personal. The early Brotherhood thought they could spread this concept by engaging in elections and by integrating into established social and political structures. </p>
<p>The group flourished under the Egyptian monarchy and managed to spread rapidly in Egypt and across the world until it faced its first crackdown under President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954. It started to rebuild its structure again from the 1970s onward under presidents Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. </p>
<p>After the revolution that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html">overthrew Mubarak in 2011</a>, the Brotherhood was initially undecided about whether the time was right for the group to put up a candidate for the presidential elections that followed. Its guidance office voted twice to reject running for the presidency but the group’s strong man, Khairat El Shater, managed to overturn this decision and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-nominates-presidential-candidate/2012/03/31/gIQAnIZpnS_story.html?utm_term=.4ba6afc7775d">won the group’s approval</a> to run for president. However, he was among a group of candidates <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/04/2012414185229419379.html">discredited by the electoral commission</a> and Morsi replaced him. </p>
<p>Members who defected from the Brotherhood in 2013, who I’ve interviewed for my PhD research into the group’s political communications, maintain it should not have participated in the presidential elections. That remains the perspective of many of its current members.</p>
<h2>Factionalism</h2>
<p>During Morsi’s presidency there was no difference between the Brotherhood’s structure and that of its party political arm. All media, social and even religious activities of the members were combined.</p>
<p>During the Mubarak era, the Brotherhood had been a <a href="https://search.proquest.com/openview/7e542a35eba1798efa0aaa351b531d05/1?cbl=32013&pq-origsite=gscholar">key player</a> in the lives of Egyptians. It built hospitals and schools, established charities, helped the poor and dominated unions of both workers and students. None of this appeared to be helpful for running the country when the Freedom and Justice Party had full power. It was accused by critics of “Ikhawanisation” <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=B3orDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=morsi+and+the+ikhwanisation&ots=ZjQLf04W0Z&sig=NqujUSJYYVQ40eSWFUPpkcoD-U4#v=onepage&q=morsi%20and%20the%20ikhwanisation&f=false">of the country</a> – that they wanted Brotherhood members to occupy all the sensitive posts in the country. The liberals, leftists, Christians and other forces within Egyptian society were concerned about what effect the dominance of religion would have under the Brotherhood’s rule. </p>
<p>After the army <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-revolution">ousted Morsi from power in July 2013</a>, the group split into many factions. In the clampdown by the military that followed, it was designated as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-explosion-brotherhood/egypt-designates-muslim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUSBRE9BO08H20131225">a terrorist organisation in Egypt</a> later that year and the Freedom and Justice Party <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28722935">was banned</a>, accused of being linked to violence in the Sinai peninsula, which it denied.</p>
<p>Since then, its leaders – who are now mainly outside Egypt – have struggled to convince many of remaining young members to accept that the peaceful approach established by Al Banna 90 years ago remains the right one to reach the group’s goals. Al Banna planned for the group to build and develop the individual Muslim, then the Muslim family, then Muslim society, then the Muslim state, then unity between Muslim countries, finally reaching “mastery of the world”. </p>
<p>After 2013, the Broterhood’s youth members kept asking the group’s leaders that if they had been removed from power so easily once they had been given the opportunity to rule Egypt, what was the point of keeping to that path. Many young members believed that they would have to find other ways to make the “Islamic project” succeed.</p>
<p>Mass trials of members of the Brotherhood <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/08/egypt-sentences-75-to-death-in-rabaa-massacre-mass-trial">found them guilty</a> of a string of violent offences in late 2018, handing down death sentences to many. Many youth left the group after 2013, protesting about the dominance of the same leaders who they held responsible for the group’s crisis. </p>
<h2>Intransigence</h2>
<p>In my research, I’m finding that the Brotherhood is only prepared to tactically modify a few of its political strategies, no matter how big the change around them is. While its leaders in exile are using slightly more national language to address the whole Egyptian nation, it continues to use the same main themes of communication it was using before Morsi came to power. </p>
<p>Before they were banned in Egypt in 2013, the group’s affiliated media houses, the <a href="https://fj-p.com/">Freedom and Justice newspaper</a> and Misr 25 TV channel, used to attack their opponents with accusations of violence, claiming that they didn’t represent Islam, were financed by foreign sources and didn’t act in Egypt’s national interests. They asserted that they alone represented Islam as a political force in Egypt, that they had refined understanding of its teachings and that following them was a duty for every Muslim. The Brotherhood’s media in exile are still using the same ideological framework.</p>
<p>Morsi’s death provoked an outpouring of mourning in Egypt and in countries where the Brotherhood still has a presence, such <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-egypt-mursi-brotherhood/thousands-of-brotherhood-supporters-in-turkey-mourn-egypts-mursi-idUKKCN1TJ1CV">as Turkey</a>, Qatar and the UK. While much of Egypt looks ready to move on – particularly with many Egyptians focused on the African Cup of Nations which Egypt is hosting – it appears many of the Brotherhood’s supporters had still hoped that Morsi might have one day returned as president. But unless the group makes big changes to its political strategies and internal policies, it’s unlikely they will be playing a role in Egyptian politics any time soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119134/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed Taha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Muslim Brotherhood has been slow to adapt to its new reality.Mohamed Taha, PhD Candidate, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1190422019-06-21T13:53:11Z2019-06-21T13:53:11ZEgypt’s powerful football fans and politics: a toxic mix that could combust during Afcon<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280530/original/file-20190620-149835-ewbkzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Egyptian policemen pose in front of the Cairo International Stadium in Egypt, where Afcon takes place.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Khaled Elfiqi/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the 32nd <a href="https://www.cafonline.com/total-africa-cup-of-nations/">Africa Cup of Nations</a> (Afcon) opens in Cairo, Egypt, the focus will be on the games between the continent’s top football teams to see who is going to raise the cup on Friday 19 July at the end of the three-week tournament. But behind the scenes the North African state’s security agencies will be keeping a close eye on a certain group of fans, known as “ultras”.</p>
<p>Ultras are fanatical football fans who organise themselves into support groups, often attached to clubs but also often reflecting a particular class or brand of politics. The ultras movement <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110713024313/http://inbedwithmaradona.com/journal/2010/11/2/we-dont-fight-we-paint-flags-instead.html">began</a> in Italy in the 1950s. Today they are also prominent in countries like Germany, France, Poland, Serbia Scotland, Russia, Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. </p>
<p>They can often be seen strutting their stuff at major matches, providing sounds, visuals and noise through songs, chants, fireworks, instruments, flags and banners. Some ultras have political connotations – left or right wing, fascist, communist or revolutionary. A number of ultra groups are <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/fascism-and-football-death-and-hatred-in-the-soccer-stadium">racist and violent</a> and some are linked to <a href="https://thesefootballtimes.co/2015/05/30/the-importance-of-ultras-in-europe-and-south-america/">criminal gangs</a>. But most are simply passionate supporters.</p>
<p>There’s tension around the security issue because of the role previously played by ultra groups in Egypt. The situation has been so tense that the government has gone as far as banning groups of fans linked to some of the country’s top teams. But the ban goes against the Confederation of African Football’s wishes to have stadia filled to the brim. </p>
<p>Egypt has lifted some of the restrictions it imposed on fans. But some remain in place, including a ban on ultras attending matches. The hope is that this will keep a lid on any outbreak of violence.</p>
<h2>Revolution</h2>
<p>The close link between football and politics often manifests in ultras groups. In Egypt, the powerful ultras played a <a href="https://thesefootballtimes.co/2014/05/10/the-chaotic-world-of-al-ahly/">crucial role</a> in the revolution of 2011.</p>
<p>Two ultra groups – <a href="https://thesefootballtimes.co/2014/05/10/the-chaotic-world-of-al-ahly/">Al Ahlawy</a>, that supports Al Ahly, Egypt’s iconic club and its major rivals, Zamalek’s White Knight ultras – marched together in their thousands on Cairo’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12332601">Tahrir Square</a> in 2011. They became a leading voice on the front line against Hosni Mubarak’s regime, helping unseat the despot after 30 years of autocratic rule.</p>
<p>The influential revolutionary group’s role in the events of 2011 has been written about extensively by senior football writer, Matt Gault. As he’s observed, it was a time when only two groups in Egypt were allowed to air their views: the Muslim Brotherhood and the ultras.</p>
<p>Al Ahly is huge in Egypt. It was named <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/sport/egypts-al-ahli-named-african-club-of-century-491787">African Club of the Century</a> by the continent’s football umbrella body in 2000 for its astonishing record: eight times African Champions League winners, 38 Egypt league winners and 35 times Egypt cup winners. The illustrious club’s highly organised ultras movement, <a href="https://thesefootballtimes.co/2014/05/10/the-chaotic-world-of-al-ahly/">Al Ahlawy</a>, was formed in 2007.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://thesefootballtimes.co/author/mattgault92/">Gault</a> wrote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Ahlawy provided fuel for the revolution which ultimately overthrew Mubarak. They manned barricades, participated in songs of protest and produced banners denouncing the regime of Mubarak.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The author observes that as a result of this, the Ahlawy today has an exalted position in the hearts and minds of Egyptians:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>They were seen to be the protectors of the revolution, the voice of the poor and disenfranchised.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Arab Spring</h2>
<p>One of the questions around Egypt’s bid to host this Afcon, after Cameroon was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-stripped-of-afcon-2019-hosting-duties/a-46531556">stripped of the rights</a>, was the issue of security. It is a pertinent question considering that the Egyptian state has been, since the Arab Spring, engaged in a battle with the ultras.</p>
<p>Their strained relationship got even worse after <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-allows-football-fans-not-ultras-back-stadiums">clashes</a> following a match in Port Said city led to the death of 74 Al-Ahly club fans in February 2012. Fans accused police and paid hooligans of orchestrating the violence, with it being perceived as revenge for the 2011 uprising.</p>
<p>The state banned fans from attending matches after that. The ban was partially lifted last year but only 5,000 spectators will be allowed into games initially, and ultras will remain banned. </p>
<p>These clampdowns by Egypt reflect similar activities in Tunisia and in Morocco that are designed to limit activities of the ultras. While the state has generally used security systems to silence the youth, they had been largely unsuccessful in doing so within the football stadium. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1073977/egypt-named-as-hosts-of-2019-africa-cup-of-nations">award to Egypt</a> of hosting rights to the Afcon was a mild surprise. Clearly, the Confederation of African Football (CAF) had few options. Cameroon clearly <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20181130-cameroon-stripped-hosting-2019-africa-cup-nations">wasn’t ready</a>. The only two countries that stepped up to the plate as alternative sites were Egypt and South Africa. South Africa had been a more recent host and its broken diplomatic relationship with influential Morocco was clearly a negative. </p>
<p>Thus, Egypt, despite the underlying security issues, offered the better opportunity – at least in the Confederation’s eyes. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, to win the bid to host the Afcon, the Egypt had to assure CAF that the state would relax the rule limiting spectators at Egyptian stadia. CAF needs spectators at games. Egypt complied. But, as the Afcon approached there were reports of <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/amnesty-criticises-arrest-of-football-fans-before-afcon2019-opener-26808933">ongoing arrests</a> of members of the ultras – most recently 30 were arrested in connection with “terror offences”. </p>
<p>The Egyptian state clearly believes the arrests will prevent ultras from being at the games. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the state hopes that fan-instigated stadium riots will not occur during the Afcon. While the ongoing clampdowns may make the state feel that this problem has been nipped in the bud, there are uncertainties. Hopefully, for the Confederation and Egypt, the Afcon will be all about football and not about ultras or social problems that inspire the protests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119042/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chuka Onwumechili does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The nervous Egyptian state hopes that fan-instigated stadium riots will not occur during the Afcon, following a clampdown on some fans.Chuka Onwumechili, Professor of Communications, Howard UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1160492019-05-09T10:38:20Z2019-05-09T10:38:20ZUS ‘foreign terrorist’ designation is more punishment than threat detector<p>The Trump administration in April designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran, a branch of Iran’s military and intelligence services, as a <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/hp644.aspx">terrorist group</a>. Any groups designated this way are cut off from potential U.S. funding, communications with Americans, travel to the U.S. and other American “material support.” </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-organization-73576">Muslim Brotherhood</a>, an Egyptian political party founded on Islamic ideals, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-trump.html?searchResultPosition=1">may be next</a>.</p>
<p>The IRGC is the first government agency to receive such a designation, which calls attention to the political purposes that often prompts additions and removals from the list. Since its creation in 1997, the State Department’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm">Foreign Terrorist Organizations</a> list has been used to punish enemies, appease allies and advance discrete U.S. foreign policy interests. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://genius.com/Us-department-of-state-us-foreign-terrorist-watchlist-annotated">annotated version</a> of this list exposes the quirks, inconsistencies and strategic logic behind the “terrorist” designation, revealing why it’s hardly a master directory of the militant groups most likely to target Americans. </p>
<p><strong><em>This document was edited using <a href="https://genius.com/a/news-genius">Genius</a>. To see an annotation, click or tap the gray-highlighted part of the transcript. <a href="https://genius.com/Us-department-of-state-us-foreign-terrorist-watchlist-annotated">Go here</a> to view the annotations – or add your own – on the Genius website. Common spellings of group names are in parentheses.</em></strong></p>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-387" class="tc-infographic" height="400px" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/387/38a9b06eebac6cd3b3bd47efa9e146afc25522fc/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116049/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Fleury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A terrorism expert exposes the quirks, inconsistencies and foreign policy strategy behind the State Department’s terrorist watchlist.Eric Fleury, Visiting Assistant Professor, College of the Holy CrossLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1020902018-08-27T10:46:13Z2018-08-27T10:46:13ZQatar’s $15 billion snub of Trump over Turkey puts another key US relationship in Middle East at risk<p>The U.S. and Qatar have been key allies for decades, with close military and economic ties. Qatar is home to the United States’ biggest base in the region, and in turn the U.S. has pledged to protect the small, oil rich country that juts out into the Persian Gulf. </p>
<p>But the relationship is being tested like never before by the latest example of Qatar snubbing the interests of Uncle Sam – or, put more generously, its maverick foreign policy.</p>
<p>The U.S. recently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/world/europe/us-sanctions-turkey-pastor.html">placed severe sanctions</a> on Turkey’s economy for refusing to release an American pastor detained for almost two years, sparking a <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-currency-collapse-shows-just-how-vulnerable-its-economy-is-to-a-crisis-101556">currency crisis</a>. Qatar was the first, and so far only, nation to offer Turkey tangible aid in the form of a US$15 billion investment and other types of financial assistance. </p>
<p>Although the Gulf country has long pursued policies out of step with the U.S., such as maintaining good relations with Iran and aiding <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-leadership-exprimeminister/former-qatari-pm-drove-bold-maverick-foreign-policy-idUSBRE95P12Y20130626?mod=related&channelName=worldNews">various groups that the U.S. considers terrorists</a>, its very visible support for Turkey in the dispute poses a direct challenge to the Americans. And while the U.S. has in the past practiced patience with its sometimes wayward ally, President Donald Trump is often willing to toss out the rulebook and has previously <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/06/qatar-panic-buying-as-shoppers-stockpile-food-due-to-saudi-blockade">lambasted</a> Qatar on Twitter. </p>
<p>As a longtime observer of the region’s complicated economic and political developments, I believe that Qatar’s interjection in the U.S.-Turkey crisis raises two important questions: Why is Qatar willing to risk its close relationship with the U.S.? And why has the U.S. let it get away with this behavior for so long? </p>
<h2>Punching above its weight</h2>
<p>A country of just <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/qatar/population">320,000 citizens</a> – as well as 2.32 million expatriate residents – Qatar has a habit of using its massive oil and natural gas reserves to exert influence in the Middle East and beyond. Such a <a href="https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/53181">hyperactive foreign policy</a> is very unusual for a small state like Qatar. </p>
<p>Qatar made its offer to Turkey during a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/qatari-emir-vows-15bn-investment-turkey-erdogan-meeting-180815152545652.html">recent visit</a> by Qatari leader Sheikh Tamim Al Thani to Ankara. The announcement helped stem the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-currency-collapse-shows-just-how-vulnetrable-its-economy-is-to-a-crisis-101556">rout</a> in the lira, which <a href="https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=TRY&To=USD">lost a third of its value</a> in a month. It was followed by a so-called <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/qatar-turkey-central-banks-ink-currency-swap-deal-180820072749514.html">currency swap agreement</a> that will allow Turkey to bypass the U.S. dollar in bilateral trade and financial transactions with Qatar.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1002081/iran-trump-us-turkey-lira-dollar-world-war-3">Iran</a> and several Arab countries including <a href="https://gulfnews.com/news/mena/turkey/kuwait-denies-injecting-1-6b-to-back-lira-1.2266062">Kuwait</a> have expressed opposition to the U.S. sanctions, none so far has offered tangible financial support similar to Qatar’s.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the U.S. is trying to put economic pressure on Turkey in hopes it spurs the release of the American pastor, who has been detained for nearly two years on allegations he supported the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/18/middleeast/turkey-failed-coup-explainer/index.html">failed July 2016 coup</a>. Qatar’s aid clearly counteracts that pressure. </p>
<p>So far, the U.S. hasn’t publicly reacted to Qatar’s actions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. sanctions prompted a currency crisis in Turkey.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey/3f5cdaf4ae8e4e128190cf3219fc2b17/44/0">AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Allies aiding adversaries</h2>
<p>This gesture of support for Turkey is not the first time that Qatar has taken a stand that conflicts with U.S. foreign policy objectives. </p>
<p>On several occasions in the past two decades, the U.S. has expressed concern about Qatar’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-leadership-exprimeminister/former-qatari-pm-drove-bold-maverick-foreign-policy-idUSBRE95P12Y20130626">support for various Islamist and extremist groups</a>, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as its relations with Iran. In May U.S. officials issued a warning after a <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/stop-funding-pro-iranian-militias-us-warns-qatar-1.729810">newspaper reported</a> evidence of clandestine contacts between Qatar and Iran’s revolutionary guards and other groups it supports.</p>
<p>This behavior may seem puzzling because ever since its creation as an independent state in 1971, Qatar <a href="https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5437.htm">has relied on the United States</a> for its external security. </p>
<p>At the same time, Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. military personnel at <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/1/30/qatar-plans-massive-expansion-of-us-military-base">Al Udeid Air Base</a>, home of the U.S. Air Force Central Command, which is used to conduct operations in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. </p>
<p>The United States also maintains strong economic relations with Qatar as its <a href="https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5437.htm">largest foreign investor</a> – particularly in oil and natural gas production. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">All smiles as Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Muslim-Summit/2dda6e158fb344e296f909393723b097/7/0">Presidential Press Service/Pool via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Qatar’s possible rationale</h2>
<p>So why would Qatar risk jeopardizing the relationship by aiding Turkey so publicly?</p>
<p>One possible explanation is that Turkey itself has become an important strategic and economic partner. </p>
<p>The two signed a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/171227051912500.html">military cooperation agreement</a> in 2014, which allowed Turkey to maintain a small base in Qatar. When fellow <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/us-relations-gulf-cooperation-council/">Gulf Cooperation Council states</a> Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates broke diplomatic relations with Qatar in 2017 and imposed a trade embargo, Turkey increased the number of its troops at the base to deter military action. </p>
<p>This was important to Qatar because the U.S. seemed to be showing <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/06/06/trump-sides-with-saudis-other-arab-nations-against-qatar.html">more support</a> for Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the standoff, a perception reinforced by highly critical <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/06/qatar-panic-buying-as-shoppers-stockpile-food-due-to-saudi-blockade">tweets from Trump</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"872062159789985792"}"></div></p>
<p>Qatar’s recent expansion of trade with Turkey also helped it survive the embargo as Turkish consumer goods flowed in, leading to a surge in <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180117-qatar-turkey-trade-grows-by-30-per-cent-since-gulf-crisis">trade</a> between the two countries.</p>
<p>Bilateral investment between Qatar and Turkey has also increased in recent years. Qatar <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/8/16/turkeys-erdogan-thanks-qatar-emir-for-15bn-investment-pledge">has nearly $20 billion in investments</a> in Turkey, and a large number of Turkish construction firms are active in Qatar. </p>
<p>Another possible explanation is that Qatar’s leaders simply believe that the U.S. needs Qatar more than Qatar needs the Americans. The rationale is that the American military bases there are vital to its ability to project power in the region. Meanwhile, Qatar’s significant reserves of oil and gas make it a valuable economic partner.</p>
<p>As a result, Qatar may believe the U.S. will continue to show a high level of patience, even in the face of support for Turkey. </p>
<h2>US patience running thin?</h2>
<p>It is true that the United States has tended to be patient with Qatar’s maverick foreign policy, including over Iran.</p>
<p>But Qatar’s government would be wise to have a realistic understanding of the erratic and unpredictable nature of American foreign policy under the Trump administration. Just as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan <a href="https://www.albawaba.com/news/erdogan-accuses-us-stabbing-turkey-back-sending-lira-tailspin-1173240">was shocked</a> by Trump’s sudden impositions of harsh sanctions this month, Qatar might also face a similar American reaction for going too far in its support for Turkey, or getting too close to Iran. </p>
<p>In addition, Qatar must keep in mind that Turkey could never replace the U.S. as a partner both in terms of military protection or the advanced American oil and gas technology it receives. </p>
<p>In other words, if Trump is willing to risk the United States’ relationship with Turkey so easily, Qatar should not assume that it is immune from his wrath – or could find as useful an ally. Perhaps a better strategy for Qatar is to maintain a balance between its two important allies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102090/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Qatar’s decision to aid Turkey in the face of American sanctions against the country may finally be a snub too far for its close relationship with the US.Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/920702018-02-28T15:30:21Z2018-02-28T15:30:21ZScramble for gas in eastern Mediterranean is stoking old tensions in the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207889/original/file-20180226-120129-1mwwwzg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Turkish ships on patrol. </span> </figcaption></figure><p>The Turkish navy <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20180224/turkey-navy-forces-back-italian-drillship-cyprus">blocking a drilling ship</a> from exploring for gas off Cyprus ought to make international headlines, but it has gone almost unnoticed at a time of such conflict in the region. The ship has been marooned while diplomats from several European countries try to broker a solution between Turkey and Cyprus. </p>
<p>The blockade relates to claims and counter claims over the rights to explore the waters off this troubled island. It is just one of a number of conflicts between Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, Israel and Lebanon that have arisen since huge reserves of gas <a href="https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/timeline-game-changing-gas-discoveries-eastern-mediterranean/">began to be</a> discovered in the eastern Mediterranean in 2009. What started as a promising opportunity for cooperation is instead fuelling existing tensions. </p>
<p>Peaceful and cooperative gas exploration should have been attractive to these countries. Conventional wisdom suggested natural gas would be in high demand because it is cheaper than renewable energy but with lower carbon emissions than oil and coal. </p>
<p>Yet despite these countries rushing to explore their waters, historic animosities have prevented them from reaching a multilateral agreement with each other demarcating the boundaries or exclusive economic zones in their respective waters. Instead, they have signed various bilateral agreements, clarifying positions between some countries but not with others. </p>
<p>Global enthusiasm for gas has since <a href="https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-golden-age-of-gas-is-over-1510257145">waned somewhat</a>. Renewable energy sources like wind and solar have become drastically cheaper, while coal has had enough political clout to stay in business. Consequently, a gas glut made prices weaker than the industry had hoped. Arguably, this should still incentivise these Mediterranean countries to cooperate to share the costs of exploration and export infrastructure. It is not playing out that way, however. </p>
<h2>The Cyprus problem</h2>
<p>The Republic of Cyprus has reached demarcation agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel. Yet drilling has been complicated by relations with the Turkish Cypriot community’s administration, which is recognised only by Turkey. After talks to reunify the island <a href="https://theconversation.com/cypriot-hopes-for-unification-are-on-life-support-but-not-doomed-90121">collapsed</a> last July, mutual distrust is on a high.</p>
<p>The Turkish Cypriots are concerned about being cut out of the gas bonanza, but their main interest is reunification. They believe that if the two sides on the island were jointly exploring and taking the gas to market, the majority of the Greek Cypriot community would agree to a reunification deal they have opposed in the past. This, they argue, would redress the historic mistake of the EU granting the south exclusive membership in 2004 without insisting on a solution to the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/20/newsid_3866000/3866521.stm">1974 division conflict</a>. </p>
<p>The Turkish Cypriots have been using their claims over the territorial waters to try and force cooperation. The Turkish Cypriot deputy prime minister, Kudret Özersay, <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/cyprus-turkey/turkish-cold-blooded-stance-stops-cyprus-gas-clash">said recently</a> that exploration would no longer be permitted by the north without either a north-south agreement over gas or a <a href="http://www.atimes.com/article/showdown-drilling-vessel-off-cyprus-spur-talks">full settlement</a> of the wider island issue. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Google Maps</span></span>
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<p>Turkey <a href="http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-43_-gkrynin-dogu-akdenizdeki-hidrokarbon-faaliyetleri-hk.en.mfa">followed up</a> with a statement saying it would not tolerate unilateral exploration by Nicosia, whose authority it doesn’t recognise. Besides wanting to shore up the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey sees the eastern Mediterranean as a “<a href="https://sigmaturkey.com/2018/02/23/cyprus-natural-resources-vital-part-blue-homeland/">blue homeland</a>” for its own growth ambitions – and related <a href="http://ceftus.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/CEFTUS_Turkey-Energy-Security-and-Foreign-Policy_White-Paper.pdf">concerns about</a> domestic energy security. Worse, Turkey watches the tighter cooperation between Nicosia and more powerful neighbours like Israel, Egypt and Greece in matters as sensitive as energy with growing unease. </p>
<p>Relations between Turkey and Greece, the region’s oldest maritime rivalry, have also started being affected by gas politics – together with a row over <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-security-greece/greek-court-suspends-asylum-granted-to-turkish-soldier-idUKKBN1EX0TF">Greece granting asylum</a> to officers suspected of aiding the attempted coup in Turkey in 2015. In a separate incident to the blocking of the drilling ship, a Turkish vessel <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/turkish-patrol-boat-accused-of-ramming-greek-ship-jmxj0lwl6">rammed</a> a Greek ship in the Aegean earlier this month. Greek foreign minister Nikos Kotzias <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/226143/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-is-neither-iraq-nor-syria-fm-tells-turkey">vowed to defend</a> its maritime borders, linking the matter to Turkish activities in Cypriot waters. </p>
<p>These tensions threaten an additional problem for Turkey. The EU is <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/projects-by-country/multi-country/7.3.1-0025-elcy-s-m-15">looking at</a> constructing a gas pipeline from the region to mainland Europe via Crete. Turkey already has the pipeline infrastructure to export the region’s gas to Europe easily and cheaply, but this new pipeline would bypass the country and turn Cyprus into a competing energy transfer hub – potentially including gas from Israel and Egypt. </p>
<p>This prospect has made no difference to the fate of the blockaded drill ship, however. The marooned vessel, which is owned by Italy’s Eni, <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20180224/turkey-navy-forces-back-italian-drillship-cyprus">looks set</a> to sail elsewhere – albeit other exploration work by France’s Total and US giant MobilExxon remain on the schedule. </p>
<h2>Other wrangles</h2>
<p>Old conflicts are also complicating gas exploration elsewhere in the region, notably the one between <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-israel-natgas/lebanon-to-begin-offshore-energy-search-in-block-disputed-by-israel-idUSKBN1FT218">Lebanon and Israel</a>. Like with Turkey/Cyprus, negotiations are made more difficult by these countries not recognising one another diplomatically. Lately, Israel <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-natgas-lebanon-israel/israel-lebanon-clash-over-offshore-energy-raising-tensions-idUSKBN1FK1J0">has been</a> making threats following Lebanon’s decision to launch an exploration tender in disputed waters. </p>
<p>Egypt is meanwhile sitting on the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-16/egypt-says-eni-s-giant-zohr-gas-field-starts-first-production">largest gas discovery</a> in the region. The Zohr field has an estimated 30 trillion cubic metres of gas, and Egypt is keen to use it to fuel a domestic development boom to stabilise the military regime. But President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi
is having to contain <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/2/21/sisi-scores-own-goal-praising-israel-gas-deal">domestic opposition</a> to Egypt’s <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/21/curb-your-enthusiasm-gas-israel-egypt-cyprus-turkey-mediterranean-lebanon-leviathan/">expanding energy cooperation</a> with Israel, which has invited attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure in the past. </p>
<p>Tensions are also simmering with Turkey over <a href="https://www.thenationalherald.com/190551/egypt-cyprus-energy-alliance-rattling-turkey-tension-grows/">Egypt’s cooperation</a> with Cyprus. The mutual resentment between Turkey and Egypt has never really thawed since the ousting of the Turkey-friendly Muslim Brotherhood government in 2013. Most recently, Turkey declared the demarcation agreement between Egypt and Cyprus null and void for allegedly violating Turkish territorial waters. </p>
<p>Some countries that discover oil and gas turn into hydrocarbon-rich economies. For others it becomes a resource curse, leading to endless corruption, civil wars and domestic tensions. For the countries in the eastern Mediterranean, the promise of offshore wealth has made the region’s fragile geopolitics yet more complex. If they are going to turn their vast gas potential into economic and fiscal benefits, regional actors are going to have to find new solutions to old problems before tensions rise any further.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clemens Hoffmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The prospect of gas wealth has been escalating old rivalries and disputes between Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt and Greece.Clemens Hoffmann, Lecturer in International Politics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/857842017-10-20T01:13:44Z2017-10-20T01:13:44ZWhy is Saudi Arabia suddenly so paranoid?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190836/original/file-20171018-32348-utma03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saudi Arabia's King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud on Oct. 5, 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Pavel Golovkin</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the past, Saudi Arabia depended upon its enormous oil wealth and the United States for its security. It used the former to buy friends and pay off enemies and potential enemies. It used the latter to guarantee its survival. With a few exceptions, Saudi Arabia did not involve itself directly in the affairs of its neighbors.</p>
<p>Over the course of the past decade, however, that has changed. Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15bahrain.html">Bahrain</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/">Yemen</a>. It helped finance the 2013 coup d’état launched by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/20/saudi-arabia-coup-egypt">Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt</a>. It has supported insurgents in <a href="https://www.libyaobserver.ly/opinions/uae-saudi-arabia-aiding-libya-eastern-forces-blacklisting-qatar-alleged-support-other">Libya</a> and <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/saudi-arabias-dark-role-i_b_3402447.html">Syria</a> and put together <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/14/middleeast/islamic-coalition-isis-saudi-arabia/index.html">an international coalition purportedly to fight terrorism</a>. And it led the Gulf Cooperation Council’s campaign against its tiny neighbor, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/06/the-persian-gulf-crisis-over-qatar-explained/?utm_term=.a7b15b994b14">Qatar</a>. </p>
<p>Why the sudden change?</p>
<p>Based on recent developments, it is evident that Saudi Arabian officials assume that they can no longer depend on their traditional security safeguards of oil and U.S. might. They seem to imagine that the only guarantee for their security is their own muscular response.</p>
<p>As a historian of the modern Middle East who has researched and taught about <a href="http://www.history.ucla.edu/faculty/james-gelvin">the region for over 30 years</a>, I believe there are three causes for the shift in Saudi Arabia’s security stance: the Arab uprisings of 2010 and 2011, the policies of the Obama administration and the collapse of oil prices.</p>
<h2>A perceived threat</h2>
<p>Saudi Arabia looked at the Arab uprisings as <a href="http://www.pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/POMEPS_BriefBooklet5_SaudiArabia_web.pdf">a potential calamity</a>. The Saudis support the status quo in the region and Saudi-Western leadership there. The uprisings endangered not only Saudi Arabia’s authoritarian allies such as Egypt and Bahrain, but the regional order and the foundations of Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy as well. The uprisings also threatened to expand the realm of democratic and human rights in the region – something which the Saudi regime fears.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the Saudis feared the uprisings would open the way for the expansion of Iranian influence throughout the region. That led to the Saudi intervention into Yemen, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-summit-iran/saudi-arabia-accuses-iran-of-meddling-ahead-of-summit-idUSBRE8BN07P20121224">where they believe the Iranians have meddled</a>. In reality, local grievances, not Iranian meddling, precipitated <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/yemen-6632">Yemen’s current civil war</a>. Saudi Arabia made the same accusation with regard to Bahrain, although a royal commission appointed by the king of Bahrain <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/23/no-iranian-role-found-in-bahrain-unrest/">failed to find any evidence of Iranian subversion there</a>.</p>
<p>Just as serious for the Saudis, the uprisings threatened to empower Muslim brotherhoods and Muslim-Brotherhood-style movements throughout the region. The Saudi royal family believes this movement provides a model for <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/114468/why-saudi-arabia-helping-crush-muslim-brotherhood">reconciling religion and politics</a> that competes with its own vision of the proper relationship between the two. While the brotherhoods have linked religion and politics, the Saudi royal family has sought to distance one from the other to prevent the emergence of potentially destabilizing Islamist movement. This has been the royal family’s survival strategy since 1932.</p>
<p>At the behest of Abdulaziz ibn Al Saud, the founder of the current Saudi state, Saudi religious scholars have emphasized the doctrine that <a href="https://www.al-islam.org/new-analysis-wahhabi-doctrines-muhammad-husayn-ibrahimi/absolute-obedience-ruler">Muslims should passively obey their leaders</a> so long as those leaders are also Muslim. That is still their position.</p>
<p>The Saudis were outraged by what they claimed was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/amid-the-arab-spring-a-us-saudi-split/2011/05/13/AFMy8Q4G_story.html?utm_term=.be211a547542">American support for the Arab uprisings</a>. While the American government was, in fact, ambivalent about the uprisings because friendly autocrats have furthered American interests in the region since World War II, the Saudis were outraged that the United States did not give its unconditional support to the authoritarian governments it had long supported.</p>
<h2>Saudi Arabia versus Obama</h2>
<p>This brings us to the second reason for Saudi paranoia and assertion in the region: the Middle East policy of the Obama administration.</p>
<p>Obama sought to reverse <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">the fixation of his predecessor, George W. Bush, on the Middle East</a>. He believed that the United States should focus its attention on East Asia, where the global future will be determined, not on a region as conflict-prone and economically stagnant as the Middle East.</p>
<p>And so Obama was looking to reduce America’s commitments in the region and resolve or at least smooth over conflicts so that the United States could turn its attention elsewhere. This is one of the reasons why he signed the Iran nuclear deal and tried to restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Most of all, he sought to have American allies take more responsibility for their own defense.</p>
<p>Obama’s grand strategy, however, made America’s traditional allies in the region fear abandonment. The Saudis found his comment that they would have to learn to “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/#5">share the neighborhood</a>” with Iran particularly horrifying.</p>
<h2>Saudi Arabia’s oil dependency</h2>
<p>The final reason for Saudi paranoia has to do with the collapse of oil prices. From June 2014 to April 2016, <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/why-are-oil-prices-so-low/">oil prices dropped 70 percent</a> for a variety of reasons, including a glut in the market, alternative sources for fuel and conservation.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/03/oil-prices-break-out-second-half.html">Most economists think the price of oil will rebound</a>, although not to peak levels. But this hasn’t prevented oil-producing states from following the advice of the International Monetary Fund to take steps to diversify their economies.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia has been particularly receptive to IMF entreaties. In spring 2016, then-Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman unveiled a plan titled “<a href="http://vision2030.gov.sa/en">Vision 2030</a>.” “Vision 2030” is hardly innovative. It includes a list of the same tired free-market recommendations that have been applied internationally since the 1970s.</p>
<p>The plan calls for privatizing government assets, including education and 5 percent of the national oil company, Saudi Aramco; reducing and targeting subsidies on oil, electricity and water; introducing an income tax; and creating 450,000 new private sector jobs, among other proposals.</p>
<p>The odds that Saudi Arabia is capable of transforming its economy to become globally <a href="https://chronicle.fanack.com/saudi-arabia/economy/saudi-arabia-vision-2030/">competitive in 13 years are not high</a>. This would mean, among other things, discarding the most effective tool the Saudi government has to gain that population’s consent – buying it. When the Arab uprisings threatened to spread to Saudi Arabia, for example, the Saudi government distributed <a href="http://persiangulffund.com/saudi-arabia-distributes-130-billion/">US$130 billion worth of grants to its population to maintain their loyalty</a>. It would also mean ensuring a free flow of information in a country in which transparency on all levels of governance and commerce is rare. In 2017, Saudi Arabia <a href="https://rsf.org/en/ranking">ranked 168th out of 180 countries surveyed in terms of press freedom</a>. Finally, it would mean changing attitudes toward work in a country in which women make up only 22 percent of the workforce – compared to close to 40 percent globally – and foreigners literally do all the heavy lifting.</p>
<p>Muhammad bin Salman has already had to back away from some of the proposals outlined in “Vision 2030.” It is unlikely this vision will be <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/khairuldeen-al-makhzoomi/the-failure-of-saudi-intervention-in-yemen_b_8469744.html">any more successful than Saudi Arabia’s failed Yemen war</a>, for which the crown prince is also responsible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85784/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James L. Gelvin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When it comes to foreign policy, Saudi Arabia has recently become far more aggressive. A historian of the modern Middle East sees three possible causes for the shift.James L. Gelvin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/789062017-06-07T01:33:08Z2017-06-07T01:33:08ZWhy have other Gulf states cut ties with Qatar?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172568/original/file-20170606-3677-1533bvt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The skyline of Doha, Qatar.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AWest_Bay_Skyline%2C_Doha%2C_State_of_Qatar.jpg">Gregory Hawken Kramer</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gulf Arab countries summon images of oil-fueled wealth, luxurious malls and strong Muslim identity. Nasty regional rivalry, diplomatic ruptures and panicked citizens <a href="https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/story/Qatar_residents_stockpile_food_as_Saudi_plans_to_close_land_border-ZAWYA20170605103702/">stockpiling groceries</a> don’t usually figure.</p>
<p>So why have Gulf states Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen, as well as non-Gulf Egypt, dramatically ruptured relations with tiny Qatar? What will this international crisis mean for the Middle East and the broader world?</p>
<h2>What is the dispute about?</h2>
<p>The Arab Gulf spans diverse countries. On one end of the scale is <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview">fractured, war-torn Yemen</a>. Then come the tourist destination and politically unassertive Oman, the small oil kingdoms of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, and regional powerhouse Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>As the largest country in the Arab Gulf, Saudi Arabia has long championed common regional policies under its leadership. However, in the past few decades, the rapid growth of massive oil wealth in smaller countries like Qatar and the UAE has allowed them excess capital to establish their own global influence.</p>
<p>The UAE has largely aligned its foreign policy with its larger neighbor. But Qatar has used its wealth to adopt policies different from, and sometimes rivaling, Saudi Arabia’s. Qatari positions have been propelled through the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/">Al-Jazeera</a> media network, based in Qatar’s capital, Doha, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/al-jazeera-block-article-slamming-saudi-arabian-human-rights-record-a6779596.html">partially funded</a> by Qatar’s ruling family, and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/al-jazeera-the-most-feared-news-network/">popular throughout the Middle East.</a></p>
<p>The Saudis have not appreciated Qatar’s foreign policy assertions, particularly its warmer relations with their archrival Iran. In Syria’s civil war, Qatar and Saudi Arabia both oppose ruler Bashar al Assad, but have supported competing Sunni militias. Qatar also had <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/qatar/inside-doha-at-the-heart-of-a-gcc-dispute">good relations with the freely elected Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt</a> and other anti-establishment Islamist organizations, again in contrast to Saudi positions.</p>
<p>The 2013 removal by the military of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood government under President Mohamed Morsi spearheaded a broader move among Arab governments to crack down on Sunni Islamist organizations that could threaten their authority. Some of these organizations <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/giorgio-cafiero/the-uae-and-qatar-wage-a-_b_8801602.html">had received Qatari support</a>. </p>
<p>In 2014, to pressure Qatar to fall in line with Saudi-led policies, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE suspended diplomatic ties with their neighbor. In response Qatar pulled back somewhat from open support for militant Sunni political groups and cooperation with Iran. It continued nonetheless to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/will-gcc-survive-qatar-saudi-rivalry-201431864034267256.html">assert a right to its own foreign policy.</a> </p>
<h2>What prompted the current crisis?</h2>
<p>Relations improved modestly since 2014. But Saudi and other commentators still complained that Qatar was <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/qatar-cannot-be-allowed-to-sabotage-the-region">“sabotaging the region</a>.”</p>
<p>And then came President Donald Trump’s May 21 visit to Riyadh, bolstering U.S. ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and promoting a common front against Iran and <a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1103136/saudi-arabia">Islamist “extremism,”</a> a vague term which for the Saudis can include political opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On his recent trip to Saudi Arabia, President Donald Trump, right, met with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-Middle-East/5912b74b0fe3474d845b0ccb60dd1200/2/0">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Soon after, on May 24, Qatari news sites were blocked by Saudi Arabia and the UAE after alleged remarks by Qatar’s ruler <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/25/saudi-arabia-and-uae-block-qatari-media-over-incendiary-statements-iran-israel">that openly acknowledged Iran’s regional political role and Qatari ties to Israel.</a> Arab Gulf leaders would not normally take such positions publicly. Qatari sources insisted that the remarks were inaccurate, and that <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-05-23/qatar-says-its-official-state-news-agency-was-hacked">Doha’s media had been hacked</a>.</p>
<p>But Saudi Arabian and Emirati sources played up the alleged comments. They portrayed them as a renewed sign that Qatari policies remain deviant, despite the 2014 efforts to make Doha fall in line. The Trump administration’s <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/20/us-saudi-arabia-seal-weapons-deal-worth-nearly-110-billion-as-trump-begins-visit.html">announcement of a large military sale to Saudi Arabia</a> suggests new assurance in Riyadh that Washington will back confrontation against Iran. This likely bolstered Saudi confidence that it could move to rein in Qatar.</p>
<h2>What is Qatar’s perspective?</h2>
<p>Qatar’s ambitious growth has included opening its society to global <a href="http://qatarphilharmonicorchestra.org/">cultural</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/in-qatars-education-city-us-colleges-are-building-an-academic-oasis/2015/12/06/6b538702-8e01-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html?utm_term=.0b78554f2a2a">educational</a> and business influences, as the country completes its plans to host <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/jun/05/2022-world-cup-qatar-under-threat-saudi-arabia-blockade-fifa-football">soccer’s 2022 World Cup</a>. As part of this ambition, Qatar has asserted its intention to <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/INTA89_2_10_Khatib.pdf">work with a range of global partners</a>. </p>
<p>This foreign policy has included <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-English.pdf">mediating between Islamist groups and Arab governments</a>, as well as <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/iran-qatar-rapprochement-middle-east.html">between Iran and other countries</a>. Although <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/22/qatar-needs-to-do-its-part/">some have critiqued</a> such an approach as two-faced, Qatari officials could argue that it is a rational strategy to resolve conflict in places where repressing Islamic political opposition <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/10/14/islamism-the-arab-spring-and-the-failure-of-americas-do-nothing-policy-in-the-middle-east/">has not worked</a>. </p>
<p>Whatever actually happened to trigger the crisis, <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4535914/Qatars-state-news-agency-hacked-unknown-entity.html">Qatar’s concerns about hacking</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/2017/06/06/Qatar-s-ambition.html">recent Saudi and other critiques of the country</a>, and <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/leakers-share-new-email-dump-targeting-top-arab-diplomat-and-us-foreign-policy-elites_us_5934450be4b0c242ca252468">leaked emails from other Gulf governments</a> make Qataris feel victimized by what <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/01/whats-going-on-with-qatar/?utm_term=.4baf6d58fffe">could be a well-orchestrated campaign against them</a>. </p>
<h2>Why does this matter?</h2>
<p>Stability in the Arab Gulf region is <a href="https://gccstat.org/en/">critical to world trade</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_busiest_airports_by_international_passenger_traffic">global transportation</a> and regional military security. Dubai, for example, has been the world’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/middle-east/united-arab-emirates/dubai/articles/The-incredible-rise-of-Dubai-as-the-worlds-air-travel-hub/">busiest airport by international passenger traffic for several years</a>, with Qatar’s Hamad Airport not far behind. And, with 11,000 U.S. troops on site, Qatar hosts the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/middleeast/qatar-us-largest-base-in-mideast/index.html">Middle East’s major American military base</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/54/Al_Udeid_Air_Base.jpg">U.S. Government</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The bottom line is that the dramatic escalation of tensions in the Arab Gulf threatens regional stability, and makes it much harder to resolve graver conflicts in Syria, Libya, Islamic State-controlled Iraq and Yemen. Indeed, Qatar’s isolation from other Arab states could lead it closer to Turkey or even Iran. </p>
<p>More generally, the move against Qatar is part of a broad regional shift since the Arab uprisings of 2011. Many Arab governments now feel justified in <a href="https://www.ifex.org/middle_east_north_africa/2017/06/04/repression-crush-dissent/">acting strong to quash dissent</a>. They are now more likely to condone <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170526-world-leaders-find-freedom-repress-era-trump">using force internally to maintain stability</a> and in <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/20/if-trump-doubles-down-on-the-saudi-war-in-yemen-millions-could-starve/">external conflicts like Yemen</a>. The Trump administration appears <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/world/middleeast/-egypt-sisi-trump-white-house.html?_r=0">comfortable with this</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"872077638042628096"}"></div></p>
<p>Indeed, the President has inserted himself directly into the growing conflict in several tweets, pointing a finger at Qatar as a funder of “radical ideology.” The U.S. may end up mediating the dispute out of its own interest in regional stability and its military base. At the same time, Trump has revealed his support for the Saudi position, and the trend to curb dissenting Arab voices around regional policy.</p>
<p>This trend goes against Qatar’s past autonomy and policies, leaving it little wiggle room. Qatar may have no choice but to conform its policies to Saudi ones, and to limit Al-Jazeera’s independence. Whether or not the crisis resolves soon, Riyadh’s new move against Doha has underscored its clear <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/qatar-may-have-pay-heavy-price-restore-links-its-gulf-neighbors-620948">determination to limit Qatari policy influence as much as possible</a>.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This article was updated to include President Trump’s statements – via Twitter – on Qatar.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78906/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff received a Fulbright US-government fellowship to be a visiting professor in Qatar in 2006-7, a fellowship at Harvard University funded in part through the Dubai School of Government in the UAE, and a research grant from 2013-16 from the Qatar National Research Fund. He currently receives no external funding from any government or government-funded entity.</span></em></p>Qatar has used its wealth to adopt policies sometimes rivaling Saudi Arabia’s. Think, for example, of the popular Al-Jazeera. Now the Saudis seem determined to limit Qatari influence as much as possible.David Mednicoff, Director, Middle Eastern Studies, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/735762017-03-10T04:18:57Z2017-03-10T04:18:57ZIs the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160012/original/image-20170308-24211-1grb91k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A member of the Muslim Brotherhood during Egypt's Freedom and Justice Party convention.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lilianwagdy/6353083693/in/photolist-aFpdrK-fFZ6er-fGgQnQ-fzbW6u-dLak6r-avjwbb-dVjnd3-dVe5kn-4A5iFg-sg9NF7-fGgLhQ-3nbnzX-fFZ8Ue-fFZ9Bn-fFZ5pc-cgfKXh-9moxrU-ck3o9U-aK7mXD-otEhw1-fFZar4-a8PBfM-ck3oD3-dB3CSM-ck3hL1-dAjmMx-a8SkE9-bBCL9k-fGg2fQ-ck3p3h-dApNYA-fw8UVe-dAdHS2-dVjGLf-bygpJs-fGgfmy-fFYF5V-fGg1q9-fFYMvM-fFYvhZ-dAjnmx-fGgi87-a8PtXH-fFYz3t-gPupGq-fFYCgF-fFYKqD-fFYAc2-fFYsPx-fFYuvV">Lilian Wagdy</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-terrorism-trump.html?_r=0">Trump administration</a> as well as <a href="https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2953">Republican lawmakers</a> are seeking to introduce legislation that would designate the Muslim Brotherhood a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). </p>
<p>Many are <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/02/muslim-brotherhood-trump-terror-list-170201090317237.html">questioning</a> this move. The fact is that the Muslim Brotherhood has not been directly involved in any <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/01/30/should-the-muslim-brotherhood-be-designated-a-terrorist-organization/">violent terror attacks</a> in recent decades. </p>
<p>I have been studying Islam and politics over many years, and have learned that this is a highly complex phenomenon. Given its informal character and the diffuse nature of its organization, labeling the Muslim Brotherhood a foreign terrorist organization is not as simple as it seems.</p>
<p>To understand the Muslim Brotherhood, we need to first know how it is structured, and what it represents ideologically.</p>
<h2>The different groups</h2>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood exists both in the form of local organizations (in Egypt, Jordan and so on) and in the form of an international organization. The international Muslim Brotherhood has, however, little <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/21/the-irrelevance-of-the-international-muslim-brotherhood/">influence</a> over any of the <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9780230100695">local organizations</a>. </p>
<p>The point is that the term “Muslim Brotherhood” represents a broader ideological trend. There are numerous organizations and groups across the Muslim world that to a varying degree associate themselves with this current. </p>
<p>Some of them use the name of the Muslim Brotherhood, while others operate under different labels. One example is the <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3115-one-against-all-the-national-islamic-front-nif.pdf">National Islamic Front</a> (NIF), that was established in the 1960 as the Sudanese Islamic Charter Front.</p>
<p>There are also a number of informal groups, <a href="http://noref.no/Regions/Africa/Publications/The-Intellectualist-movement-in-Ethiopia-the-Muslim-Brotherhood-and-the-issue-of-moderation-Report">such as the Ethiopian Intellectualist Movement</a>, that rather selectively find inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood’s thinkers without appropriating the entirety of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology. </p>
<p>None of these groups could be characterized as <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/21/the-irrelevance-of-the-international-muslim-brotherhood/">branches</a> of one unified Muslim Brotherhood. There does not exist any worldwide hierarchical structure. Nor are there any formal links between any of these organizations. </p>
<p>Most of them have produced independent thinkers and developed ideological profiles that <a href="http://www.sunypress.edu/p-3300-the-management-of-islamic-activ.aspx">focus more on local issues</a>. All this makes it difficult to speak about a coherent Muslim Brotherhood ideology.</p>
<h2>The origins and spread of the Brotherhood</h2>
<p>The original Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 by <a href="http://www.biography.com/people/hassan-al-banna-9198013">Hassan al-Banna</a>, an Egyptian schoolteacher. Its initial activities were concentrated in the town of Ismailiyah, in northeastern Egypt. However, due to al-Banna’s charismatic personality and skills as a community organizer, the group grew rapidly into a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-society-of-the-muslim-brothers-9780195084375?cc=us&lang=en&">mass organization</a> throughout Egypt. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brotherhood members and Salafists praying in Tahrir Square, Cairo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/alisdare/6377938093/in/photolist-quQp7-3nbnzX-biwQEz-EADW3-aHAAMT-amUj2u-bdNEei-oEzf8n-dH3gGK-ruZ24h">Alisdare Hickson</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is important to note that the Muslim Brotherhood was not a political movement in the beginning. Instead, it was devoted to education and social work. It was also focused on enhancing religious piety among Muslims and countering Western influences during the colonial period by <a href="http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/22131418-00101003">building an Islamic identity</a>. </p>
<p>Joining the opposition to the British colonizers, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership reluctantly decided to participate in Egypt’s parliamentary elections in the 1940s. Its anti-colonial attitudes also led the organization to support the coup in 1952 which eventually brought <a href="http://www.oupcanada.com/catalog/9780195069358.html">Gamal Abdel Nasser</a> to power as president.</p>
<p>However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s strong popular support soon led to an open conflict with Nasser, who responded by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30069528?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">suppressing</a> it. In addition to filling up Egyptian prisons, Nasser’s policy produced thousands of refugees who became instrumental in spreading the movement’s ideas across the Muslim world.</p>
<h2>Ideological diversity</h2>
<p>While the Muslim Brotherhood’s initial political engagement was within a democratic framework, a more militant and anti-democratic substream gradually emerged within the movement. </p>
<p>The key figure here was <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/sayyid-qutb-and-the-origins-of-radical-islam-9780199333479?cc=us&lang=en&">Sayyid Qutb</a>, an Egyptian writer and thinker, who wrote the seminal book <a href="https://www.kalamullah.com/Books/Milestones%20Special%20Edition.pdf">“Milestones</a>.” He claimed that contemporary secular politics was reminiscent of the pre-Islamic “Jahiliyyah” (age of ignorance), and moreover, that “Hakmiyyah” (God’s sovereignty) could be restored only through armed struggle. </p>
<p>His teaching later inspired groups such as al-Qaida, and caused serious frictions within the Egyptian Brotherhood.</p>
<p>The main leadership made significant efforts to renounce the use of violence and to portray the Muslim Brotherhood <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Muslim-Brotherhood-Hasan-al-Hudaybi-and-ideology/Zollner/p/book/9780415664172%22%22">as a moderate reformist movement</a>. This was evident in the Muslim Brotherhood’s struggle to participate in Egypt’s electoral politics. The authoritarian Egyptian regimes, however, blocked it from gaining much influence. Not until Mohamed Morsi became president of Egypt in 2012 did the Muslim Brotherhood ascend to power. That victory proved, however, to be <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/523085/summary">short-lived</a>. </p>
<p>Globally too the Muslim Brotherhood has been similarly ideologically diverse. For example, some local Muslim Brotherhood-associated organizations, such as those in <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9780312238438">Kuwait</a> and <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9948.html">Morocco</a>, were initially influenced by Sayyid Qubt’s thinking. Later, however, they gradually abandoned such ideas. Others developed relatively pragmatic political programs. </p>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood in <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329086?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Jordan</a>, for example, did not challenge the local political authorities and developed rather cordial relationship with the Jordanian monarchy.</p>
<h2>Islam and democracy</h2>
<p>Ideologically, the Muslim Brotherhood as a current has commonly been categorized under the heading of “Islamism.” This ideology emphasizes <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Islam-and-Politics-2nd-Edition/Mandjjjkiaville/p/book/9780415782579">control over the state</a> as crucial for Islamization of state and society. There are <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Muslim-Brotherhood-Hasan-al-Hudaybi-and-ideology/Zollner/p/book/9780415664172">different opinions</a>, however, about what this means.</p>
<p>Various groups and individuals associated with the Muslim Brotherhood have over the last decades been engaged in elaborate discussions about their views on democracy and secularism. </p>
<p>However, there is still some ambiguity around certain issues. One part of this relates to the way the vast majority of Muslim Brotherhood organizations <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9948.html">embrace Shari’a</a>, or the Islamic law, as foundational for political and constitutional frameworks. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Muslim Brotherhood women.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/7408004@N06/2354671081/in/photolist-4A5iFg-5ewgqF-fFZ7bK-aFpdrK-fFZ6er-fGgQnQ-fzbW6u-sg9NF7-fGgLhQ-3nbnzX-fFZ8Ue-fFZ9Bn-fFZ5pc-cgfKXh-9moxrU-ck3o9U-aK7mXD-otEhw1-fFZar4-fw8UVe-dAdHS2-a8PBfM-ck3oD3-dVjGLf-ck3hL1-dAjmMx-a8SkE9-bBCL9k-fGg2fQ-ck3p3h-dApNYA-dB3CSM-dAHNFN-fGgfmy-fFYF5V-bygpJs-fGg1q9-cvmexQ-fFYMvM-fFYvhZ-dVjxaQ-dAjnmx-fGgi87-a8PtXH-fFYz3t-gPupGq-otE2tr-fFYCgF-fFYKqD-fFYAc2">Gaynor Barton</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This relates to tensions between the belief in Shari’a as a divinely ordained authority and the acceptance of the popular will. Some tensions, for example, relate to the question whether Islamists would accept the outcome of a democratic election that does not necessarily correspond with their interpretation of Shari'a. Others are related to whether the Islamists would recognize the freedom of citizens to make individual choices in a state governed according to the Shari'a. Also, would they accommodate the rights of women and religious minorities? </p>
<h2>The current situation</h2>
<p>So what does this mean in assessing the current situation of the Muslim Brotherhood? </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12813859">Arab Spring</a>, a 2011 democratic uprising that quickly spread in the Arab world, was viewed by many Muslim Brotherhood-associated groups as a moment to put their ideological programs into political action.</p>
<p>However, regional instability across the Middle East, political violence (in Libya and Syria) and the return of an authoritative regime in Egypt shattered such hopes. The political takeover by <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/01/world/africa/abdel-fattah-el-sisi-fast-facts/">Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi</a> as the new president of Egypt in 2014 and the subsequent <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28722935">banning</a> of the Muslim Brotherhood seriously weakened the organization.</p>
<p>In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s increasingly <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-middle-east-studies/article/div-classtitlefrom-islamic-renaissance-to-neo-fascism-in-turkeydiv/3B9E527945D99DD5E575890A48134189">authoritarian rule</a> further blocked debates around Islam and politics. Developments in North Africa have added to the setbacks. The post-Islamist Tunisian Ennadha Party, for example, has been losing in national elections. </p>
<p>All this has exacerbated tensions over the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/islamism-after-the-arab-spring_english_web_final.pdf">future of the Muslim Brotherhood</a>. These developments have created a space for the emergence of more militant groups such as the Islamic State, although one should be careful not to draw explicit causal links. </p>
<p>Indeed, designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization could have the effect of limiting the opportunities for those Muslims who are attracted by the Muslim Brotherhood’s moderate agenda to engage in politics. </p>
<p>It could even accelerate recruitment to terrorist outfits – a possibility that the Trump administration might seek to take into account.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Terje Ostebo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Muslim Brotherhood exists in the form of many local organizations and well as an international organization. Research shows there isn’t a coherent Muslim Brotherhood ideology.Terje Ostebo, Director of the Center for Global Islamic Studies and associate professor in the Department of Religion and the Center for African Studies, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/546442016-03-01T19:05:58Z2016-03-01T19:05:58ZHow the political crises of the modern Muslim world created the climate for Islamic State<p><em>How do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">Our series on the jihadist group’s origins</a> tries to address this question by looking at the interplay of historical and social forces that led to its advent.</em></p>
<p><em>In the penultimate article of the series, Harith Bin Ramli traces the Muslim world’s growing disaffection with its rulers through the 20th century and how it created the climate for both the genesis of Islamic State and its continuing success in recruiting followers.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Islamic State (IS) declared its re-establishment of the caliphate on <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/29/isis-iraq-caliphate-delcaration-war">June 29, 2014</a>, almost exactly 100 years after the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/archduke-franz-ferdinand-assassinated">was assassinated</a>. Ferdinand’s death set off a series of events that would lead to the first world war and the fall of three great multinational world empires: the Austro-Hungarian (1867-1918), the Russian (1721-1917) and the Ottoman (1299-1922). </p>
<p>That IS’s leadership chose to declare its caliphate so close to the anniversary of Ferdinand’s assassination may not entirely <a href="http://www.jonathanhtodd.com/2014/06/27/6-degrees-geopolitcal-separation-franz-ferdinand-isis/">be a coincidence</a>. In a sense, the two events are connected. </p>
<p>Ferdinand’s assassination and the events it brought about (culminating in the <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/treaty-of-versailles">1919 Treaty of Versailles</a>) symbolised the <a href="http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/2/463.full">final triumph of a new idea</a> of <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/">sovereignty</a>. This modern conception was based on the popular will of a nation, rather than on noble lineage. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1038&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1038&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1038&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated on June 28, 1914.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Archduke_Franz_Ferdinand_of_Austria_-_b%26w.jpg">Carl Pietzner [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In declaring the resurrection of a medieval political institution almost exactly 100 years later, IS was announcing its explicit rejection of the modern international system based on that very idea of sovereignty. </p>
<h2>Early secularisation</h2>
<p>Other than the Ottoman Sultanate’s <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-11-19/myth-caliphate">very late and disputed claim</a> to the title, no attempt has been made to re-establish a caliphate since the fall of the Abbasid dynasty at the hands of the Mongols in 1258. In other words, Sunni Islam has carried on for hundreds of years since the 13th century without the need for a central political figurehead. </p>
<p>If we go further back in history, it seems that <a href="http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100141493">Sunni political theory</a> had already anticipated this problem. </p>
<p>The Abbasid caliphs began to lose power from the mid-ninth century, effectively becoming puppets of various warlords by the tenth. And the caliphate underwent a serious process of decentralisation at the same time. </p>
<p><a href="http://ilsp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/hurvitz.pdf">Key contemporary texts on statecraft</a>, such as Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi’s (952-1058) Ordinances of Government (<em>al-Ahkam al-sultaniyya</em>), described the caliph as the necessary symbolic figurehead providing constitutional legitimacy for the real rulers – emirs or sultans – whose power was based on military might. </p>
<p>As in the case of the <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/buyids">Shi'i Buyid dynasty (934-1048)</a>, these rulers didn’t even have to be Sunni. And they were often expected to provide legislation based on practical and functional, rather than religious, considerations. </p>
<p>The Muslim world, then, had arguably already experienced secularisation of sorts before the modern age. Or, at the very least, it had for quite some time existed within a political system that balanced power between religious and worldly interests. </p>
<p>And when the caliphate came to an end in the 13th century, both the institutions of kingship and the religious courts (run by the scholar-jurists) were able to carry on functioning without difficulty.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AWilayah_Abbasiyyah_semasa_khalifah_Harun_al-Rashid.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It was the 19th-century Muslim revivalist and anti-colonial movement known as <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1819?_hi=3&_pos=1">Pan-Islamism</a> that was responsible for reviving the Ottoman claim to the caliphate. The idea was revived again briefly in early 20th-century British India as the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Khilafat-movement">anti-colonial Khilafat movement</a>. </p>
<p>But anti-colonial efforts after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, even those primarily based on religious beliefs, have rarely called for a return of the caliphate. </p>
<p>If anything, successors of Pan-Islamism, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, have generally worked within the framework of nation states. Putting aside doubts about their actual ability to commit to democracy and secularism, such movements have generally envisioned an Islamic state along more modern lines, with room for political participation and elections.</p>
<h2>Modern utopias and old dynasties</h2>
<p>So why evoke the caliphate in the first place? The simple answer is that it has never been completely dismissed as an option. </p>
<p>In Sunni law and political theology, once <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e989?_hi=0&_pos=3182">consensus</a> over an issue has been reached, it is hard for later generations to go against it. This was why Egyptian scholar <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/apr/09/religion-islam-secularism-egypt">Ali Abd al-Raziq</a> was removed from his post at <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Azhar_University">Al-Azhar University</a> and attacked for introducing a deviant interpretation after he wrote an argument for a secular interpretation of the caliphate in 1925.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thinkers such as Abul Ala Mawdudi tried to place a revived caliphate within some type of democratic framework.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAbul_ala_maududi.jpg">DiLeeF via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-inevitable-caliphate/">many</a> <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13267/new-texts-out-now_madawi-al-rasheed-carool-kersten">recent</a> <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/recalling-the-caliphate/">studies</a> show, the idea of the caliphate and its revival has had a certain utopian appeal for a wide spectrum of modern Muslim thinkers. And not just those with authoritarian or militant inclinations. </p>
<p>Some leading Muslim revivalists such as <a href="http://muhammad-asad.com/Principles-State-Government-Islam.pdf">Muhammad Asad (1900-1992)</a> and <a href="http://www.meforum.org/151/islams-democratic-essence">Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979)</a>, for example, have tried to place a revived caliphate within some type of <a href="https://www.academia.edu/421254/Democracy_in_Islam_The_Views_of_Several_Modern_Muslim_Scholars">democratic framework</a>.</p>
<p>But, in practice, the dominant tendency here too has really been to seek the liberation or revival of Muslim societies within the nation-state framework. </p>
<p>If anything, national aspirations and the desire to modernise society existed before the formation of the new political order after the first world war. The majority of the populations of Muslim lands welcomed the fall of the three empires, or at least didn’t feel very strongly about the survival of traditional ruling dynasties. </p>
<p>And, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, most dynasties that stayed in power did so by reinventing their states along modern, mainly secular, models. </p>
<p>But this did not always succeed. The waves of <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/7/newsid_3074000/3074069.stm">revolutions</a> and <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/1/newsid_3911000/3911587.stm">military coups</a> that swept the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world throughout the 1950s and 1960s amply illustrate that popular sentiment identified traditional dynasties with the continuing influence of colonial powers. </p>
<p>In Egypt, under the Muhammad Ali dynasty (1805-1952), for example, the control of the then-French Canal epitomised the interdependent relationship between the dynasty and Western power. This was why <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200852517252821627.html">Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970)</a> made great efforts to regain it in the name of Egyptian sovereignty when he became the country’s second president in 1956.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Inauguration of the Suez Canal at Port Said, Egypt, in 1869.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ASuezkanal1869.jpg">Public domain via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Dissolving political legitimacy</h2>
<p>Either way, the success of the new Muslim nation states could be said to be predicated on two major expectations. The first was improvement of citizens’ lives – not only in terms of material progress, but also the benefits of freedom and the ability to represent the popular will through participatory politics. </p>
<p>The second was the ability of Muslim nations to unite against outside interference and commit to the liberation of Palestine. On both counts, the latter half of the 20th century witnessed abysmal failures and an increasing sense of frustration with Muslim leaders. </p>
<p>In many places, populism eventually gave way to authoritarianism. And the loss of further lands to Israel in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War">1967 Six-Day War</a> revealed the inherent weakness and lack of unity among the new Muslim nations.</p>
<p>Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel after the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/6/newsid_2514000/2514317.stm">1973 Yom Kippur War</a> was widely seen as an act of betrayal, for breaking ranks in what should have been a united front. His decision to do so despite lacking popular support in Egypt only revealed the extent to which the country had evolved into a dictatorship. </p>
<p>Sadat’s consequent <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/6/newsid_2515000/2515841.stm">assassination</a> at the hands of a small radical splinter group of religious militants acted as a warning to other Muslim leaders. Now they couldn’t simply ignore or lock away religious critics, even if the majority of the population still subscribed to the secular nation-state model. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel was widely seen as an act of betrayal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APresident_Anwar_Sadat_of_Egypt_arrives_in_the_United_States.JPEG">US Department of Defence Visual information via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This idea was reinforced by Iran’s <a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution-of-1978-1979">1979 Islamic Revolution</a>, as well as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Mosque_seizure">failed religious revolution</a> in the holy city of Mecca the same year. </p>
<p>Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Muslim leaders around the world increasingly made compromises with religious reactionary forces, allowing them to expand influence in the public sphere. In many cases, these leaders increasingly adopted religious rhetoric themselves.</p>
<p>Showing support for fellow Muslims in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1987) or the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Intifada">First Palestinian Intifada</a> provided an opportunity to manage the threat of religious radicalism. National leaders probably also saw this as an effective way to deflect attention from the authoritarian nature of many Muslim states. </p>
<p>And, as demonstrated by <a href="https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/09/12/did-saddam-hussein-become-a-religious-believer/">Saddam Hussain’s turn to religious propaganda</a> after the 1990-91 Gulf War, it could be used as a last resort when other ways of demonstrating legitimacy had failed.</p>
<h2>The longer view</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Persian-Gulf-War">The Gulf War</a> also brought non-Muslim troops to Arabian soil, inspiring <a href="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-july-dec96-fatwa_1996/">Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad</a> against the Western nations that participated in it. And it eventually led to the US invasion of Iraq. That set off a chain of events that created in the country the chaotic conditions that enabled the rise of Islamic State. </p>
<p>If the IS leadership is really an <a href="http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/">alliance between ex-Ba'athist generals and an offshoot of al-Qaeda</a>, as has often been depicted, then we don’t have to go far beyond the events of this war to explain how the group formed. But the rise of Islamic State and its declaration of the caliphate can also be read as part of a wider story that has unfolded since the formation of modern nation states in the Muslim world. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/86c958c2-ff78-11e3-8a35-00144feab7de.html#axzz367SAUfPl">some commentators</a> have pointed out, it’s not so much the Sykes-Picot agreement and the drawing of artificial national borders by colonial powers that brought about IS. </p>
<p>The modern nation-state model – as much as it’s based on <a href="https://nationalismstudies.wordpress.com/2012/10/24/benedict-anderson/">a kind of fiction</a> – is still strong in most parts of the Muslim world. And, I believe, it’s still the preferred option for most Muslims today. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People of Arak toppled the Shah’s statue in Bāgh Mwlli (central square of Arak) during 1979 revolution.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AIranian_Revolution_in_Arak.jpg">Dooste Amin [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the long century that has passed since the first world war has been increasingly marked by frustration. It’s littered with the broken promises of Muslim rulers to bring about a transition to more representative forms of government. And it has been marked by a sense that Western powers continue to control and manipulate events in the region, in a way that doesn’t always represent the best interests of Muslim societies.</p>
<p>An extreme <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-arab-spring-five-years-on-a-season-that-began-in-hope-but-ended-in-desolation-a6803161.html">high point of frustration</a> was reached in the events of the so-called <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12813859">Arab Spring</a>. The wave of popular demonstrations against the autocratic regimes of the Arab world were seen as the first winds of change that would bring democracy to the region. </p>
<p>But, with the possible exception of Tunisia, all of these countries underwent either destabilisation (Libya, Syria), the return of military rule (Egypt), or the further clamping down on civil rights (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other Gulf monarchies). </p>
<p>I would hesitate to describe IS’s declaration of a caliphate as a serious challenge to the modern nation-state model. But the small, albeit substantial, stream of followers it manages to recruit daily shows it would be wrong to take for granted that the terms of the international order can simply be dictated from above forever. </p>
<p>When brute force increasingly has the final say over how people live their lives, it becomes harder for them to differentiate between the lesser of two evils.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the eighth article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/54644/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harith Bin Ramli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rise of Islamic State and its declaration of the caliphate can be read as part of a wider story that has unfolded since the formation of modern nation states in the Muslim world.Harith Bin Ramli, Research Fellow, Cambridge Muslim College & Teaching Fellow, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/410922015-07-07T04:15:02Z2015-07-07T04:15:02ZIgnorance and hostility fuel ‘imagined solidarity’ with Islamists<p>As the sociopolitical structures of Islamic societies are radically different from those of Western democracies, so too are the nature and dynamics of Islamic movements. Both in Australia and in the Western world, the <a href="http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/essentialism">Essentialist</a> and <a href="http://www.arabstereotypes.org/why-stereotypes/what-orientalism">Orientalist</a> approaches have dominated attempts to describe and understand Islamic movements. This has led to the view that if you know one of the Islamic movements you know all of them – they are all reactionary, irrational, anti-democracy and anti-secularism.</p>
<p>However, in reality, as Husnul Amin <a href="http://www.academia.edu/4084377/Making_Sense_of_Islamic_Social_Movements_A_Critical_Review_of_Major_Theoretical_Approaches">observes</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Islamic social forces in Muslim societies, engaged in multiple social and political activities, have also undergone substantial transformations in terms of strategies, modes of activism and global connectivity.</p>
<p>Such an ‘astonishing variety of currents and counter-currents’, as aptly remarked by <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Said">Edward Said</a>, can no longer be captured with reductionist and essentialist approaches.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Western accounts have often overemphasised the religious characteristics of Islamic movements and ignored their sociopolitical dimensions. As such, Islamic movements have been presented as unique, senseless collective actions outside the realm of history, “an expression of primordial loyalties” in <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=Qp1mRmV_ljcC&pg=PA5&dq=Orientalism+represents+a+discursive+apparatus&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAGoVChMI4aX-u8eVxgIViLC8Ch0djABf#v=onepage&q=Orientalism%20represents%20a%20discursive%20apparatus&f=false">the words of Asef Bayat</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The construction of ‘unique’ Muslims is not new; it has been the hallmark of the so-called Orientalist outlook which Edward Said and others have so remarkably and critically taken up. For Said and other critics, Orientalism represented a discursive apparatus that produced knowledge as an instrument of power, as a means to maintain domination.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Bayat proposed the theory of <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=q-dCBAAAQBAJ&pg=PT112&lpg=PT112&dq=%22Imagined+solidarity%22&source=bl&ots=sqT1TF0fdg&sig=AmZt7apLfEOP0gaRUUT232IDwjg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=y1WHVcuxD4TpmQWNrYPgAQ&ved=0CB8Q6AEwATgK#v=onepage&q=%22Imagined%20solidarity%22&f=false">“Imagined Solidarity”</a> to understand Islamic movements. This has applications in Australia, where a long history of hostility to Muslims, intensifying since the turn of the century, has generated a sense of Islamic solidarity that extends even beyond the domestic community.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">A victim of anti-Islamic abuse in Australia discusses the potential impacts on young Muslims.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bayat notes that Western approaches have over-emphasised the role of Islamic ideologues in shaping Islamic movements. These attempts have studied Islamic movements through the language and discourses of ideologues such as <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Abul-Ala-Mawdudi">Abu Ala Mawdudi</a>, <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Hasan-al-Banna">Hasan al-Banna</a>, <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Sayyid-Qutb">Sayyid Qutb</a>, Ayatollah <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Ruhollah-Khomeini">Ruhallah Khomeini</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Musa_al-Sadr">Musa Sadre</a>, <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Rachid-al-Ghannouchi">Rachid Qanoushi</a> and <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Ali-Shariati">Ali Shariati</a>. </p>
<p>While Islam has been used as a catalyst to generate popular support, the concerns and issues of Islamic movements are much broader and more complex than concern about Islam and the discourse of the above ideologues.</p>
<h2>Diversity defies Western categorisations</h2>
<p>The Islamic world represents many multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multilingual, multi-political and multicultural societies. Unlike Western societies, they lack liberal democratic political systems. They are often subject to tight political control with limited access to means of communication.</p>
<p>Besides presenting Islamic movements as homogeneous and coherent bodies, Western media and scholars tend to present Islam in a fixed and coherent form. There is ignorance of the historical reality of Islam as a religion and as an ideology. During its 1400 years of history, there has never been one dominant and widely acceptable interpretation of Islam at any given time.</p>
<p>Western scholars have used numerous terms to describe Islamic movements since their “discovery” of the phenomenon in the 1970s. But most of the so-called “Islamic movements” have been political parties or political associations and institutions, without a broader basis within society or any success in creating the sense of common and collective purpose necessary for shaping a social movement.</p>
<p>The numerous terms used are not only testimony to confusion among Western scholars but also to the complexity and diversity of Islamic movements.</p>
<p>Initially, the term “Islamic fundamentalism” became popular in Western media and scholarly circles. It soon lost its attraction among academics as they discovered not all these movements are scripturist and that besides religious considerations they may also have a radical political agenda.</p>
<p>Attempts were made to rescue the term and it was soon replaced by “radical traditionalism”. But this term did not become popular as further “discoveries” proved that many of these movements are quite critical of past traditions and offer modern interpretations of Islam and the Koran.</p>
<p>Thus, the trend of adopting new terms such as “political Islam”, “Islamic activism” and “Islamic revivalism” continued. It did not take long for these, too, to lose their appeal as such terms referenced the political nature of these diverse movements at the expense of their religious elements. </p>
<p>To resolve the “dilemma”, Nikki Keddie <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/179307?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">proposed</a> “new religious politics” to cover both religious and political aspects of the phenomenon. And, you guessed it, this term was also replaced – by “Islamism”.</p>
<p>However, László Csicsmann <a href="http://www.academia.edu/8507797/Authoritarian_Upgrading_The_Role_of_Islamist_Movements_in_the_Arab_Spring_A_Case_Study_on_the_Competitive_Islamist_Parties_in_Egypt">notes</a> another development:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Recent literature on Middle Eastern political developments shows a certain kind of transformation within Islamist movements, called … ‘Post-Islamism’ by the French scholar, Olivier Roy.</p>
<p>… Most of the Islamist organisations have turned toward a different alternative: deradicalisation and moderation. Islamists realised that armed struggle against the ‘infidel’ autocrats failed to achieve the desired political system based on Islamic legislation. Many Islamists dropped the idea of establishing an Islamic state from their agenda and focused more on society rather than politics (deradicalisation).</p>
<p><a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/41479718?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Omar Ashour</a> defines the process of moderation on two levels: 1. On an ideological level, Islamist movements accept the principle of democracy; and 2. On a behavioural level, they participate in electoral politics if they can.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To this end, I suggest that Bayat’s application of the theory of “Imagined solidarities” is the most powerful attempt to analyse Islamic movements so far. Bayat insists that Islamic movements are very dynamic – like other social movements, they are in constant flow and motion as a result of both internal and external factors.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Asef Bayat discusses the dynamics of social movements.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By describing a social movement as an evolving process, we are emphasising its historical dimension. One cannot discern much about Iranian Islamism, for instance, if one does not recognise its historical dynamics. </p>
<h2>Islamists in Egypt vs Iran</h2>
<p>Most scholarly writings on post-revolutionary Iran have overestimated the strength of Islamism before the revolution. Compared with Egypt, Iran did not have a strong Islamist movement. Bayat <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=VaG-zBov6BsC&pg=PA32&dq=an+Islamic+movement+was+in+the+making&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAGoVChMI38_RndCVxgIVyqq8Ch0UnQDc#v=onepage&q=an%20Islamic%20movement%20was%20in%20the%20making&f=false">writes</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… an Islamic movement was in the making when it was interrupted by an Islamic revolution.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As the result of the writings of people such as Said Qutb, Ali Shariati and others, a generation of Iranian youth was shaping the early stages of an Islamic movement. But no Islamic political parties were in a position to create a serious challenge to the regime. </p>
<p>Bayat <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=VaG-zBov6BsC&pg=PA49&dq=absence+of+a+strong+Islamist+social+movement&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAGoVChMIt9Plg9GVxgIVCFC8Ch3IZgAw#v=onepage&q=absence%20of%20a%20strong%20Islamist%20social%20movement&f=false">argues</a> that the absence of a strong Islamist social movement generated a favourable environment for an Islamic revolution in Iran. In Egypt, by contrast, the success of a strong Islamic movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, in creating pressure for reforms during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s avoided an Islamic revolution similar to the one in Iran.</p>
<p>In Iran, the Islamic parties such as the Fedahion of Islam and the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/iran/mujahadeen-e-khalq-mek/p9158">Mujahadeen-e-Khalq</a>, despite a long history of existence, had little success in becoming popular movements. They remained largely intellectual groups without a strong social base of support that could force the system to reform itself.</p>
<p>This contrasts with the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Muslim-Brotherhood">Muslim Brotherhood</a>, which since its founding in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna has successfully spread and deeply influenced Islamic societies and movements around the world. Aside from creating an atmosphere of intellectual discourse and engagement with Islam, the movement has inspired militant Islamic movements such as <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Hamas">Hamas</a>, Islamic Jihad and Gamaat Islamiyah. </p>
<p>At the height of its success, the Muslim Brotherhood had more than half-a-million active members in Egypt alone, representing wide segments of the society from professors at universities to factory workers and farmers.</p>
<h2>‘Imagined solidarity’ in Australia</h2>
<p>Bayat argues that, in forming a social movement, a wide range of constituencies, activists and actors with many differences among them may become united in the desire to achieve a particular goal. </p>
<p>Such goals, and the ways these may be achieved, are not often well known and defined. Yet there are some common elements and a general desire, which can induce different players to underestimate their differences and form alliances. Recognition of this common purpose or “ambiguous desire” is an essential aspect of understanding Islamic movements.</p>
<p>Applying Bayat’s theory in Australia, I can say that a long history of hatred, discrimination and rejection of Muslims in Australia at all levels of society has generated a sense of imagined solidarity among Muslims. </p>
<p>On an informal level, the engagement of the people with Muslims has too often involved physical <a href="https://theconversation.com/community-backlash-leaves-nation-exposed-in-fight-against-terrorism-38773">attacks and harassment</a> on the streets, parks, public transport and beaches. On a formal level, the Australian state has had hardly any meaningful and intellectual engagement with Islam and Muslims, except at the level of investigating terror and terrorism.</p>
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<p><em>You can read other articles in the Roots of Radicalisation series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/roots-of-radicalisation">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wahid Razi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>People sometimes overlook their profound differences if social forces unite them in a common, often ill-defined desire. Hostility to Muslims is creating an imagined solidarity that Islamists can exploit.Wahid Razi, Lecturer, Department of Social Inquiry, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/419482015-05-18T13:46:22Z2015-05-18T13:46:22ZMorsi death penalty completes military takeover of Egypt<p>In shocking but not exactly surprising news, Mohammed Morsi, the first democratically elected president of Egypt has been sentenced to death for his role in a 2011 prison break, which occurred during the protests that ultimately led to the toppling of Hosni Mubarak.</p>
<p>While it is rare for Amnesty International, the US and Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to agree on anything, all quickly expressed outrage at Morsi’s sentence. The US expressed “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/expresses-deep-concern-morsi-death-sentence-150517064527019.html">deep concern</a>”, Erdogan <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/expresses-deep-concern-morsi-death-sentence-150517064527019.html">decried the use of the death penalty</a> and Amnesty called the trial a “<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/press-releases/2015/05/egypt-court-recommends-death-sentences-for-morsi-more-than-100-others/">charade</a>”. </p>
<p>On the night of January 28 2011, two days after their arrest, 34 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Mohammed Morsi, <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptMarketNews/idAFLDE70T06S20110130">fled the Wadi Natrum prison</a>, along with several thousand other prisoners. While some accounts suggest that the guards at the prison fled their posts in the face of chaos on the streets, the official Sisi regime line is that Hamas and Hezbollah were involved in facilitating the prison break. </p>
<p>Morsi was not the only person to be sentenced to death for these crimes – 104 others were also sentenced for the same crime (a large number of them in absentia, as allowed under the newly reformed Penal Code). In the courtroom, Morsi and his fellow defendants were defiant as charges were read out, chanting “down with military rule”. </p>
<p>The verdict comes less than a month after <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/21/egypts-ex-president-mohamed-morsi-jailed-protest-deaths-muslim-brotherhood">Morsi was sentenced to 20 years in prison</a> after being found guilty of inciting violence and the illegal detention and torture of protesters while occupying the office of the president. </p>
<p>Senior Brotherhood officials are rejecting the legitimacy of the judicial process, a sentiment <a href="http://www.afp.com/en/news/us-deeply-concerned-morsi-death-sentence-egypt">echoed by senior figures in the US State Department</a>, who suggest that this decision is “inconsistent with Egypt’s international obligations and the rule of law”. </p>
<h2>Crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood</h2>
<p>This appears to be the latest step in the almost two-year long crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which began with the coup d’etat against the Morsi government in July 2013. </p>
<p>The sentence now has to be confirmed by the Egyptian grand mufti, whose decision will likely be instrumental in determining whether chaos is to envelop Egypt once again. Coming from Egypt’s highest religious figure, the mufti’s pronouncement is not legally binding but nevertheless necessary to carry out a death sentence, as the final verdict cannot be issued until that is known. The mufti’s decision will also be indicative of the real state of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics, as the religious figure has sided with the Islamist organisation in the past. </p>
<p>In August 2014, Egypt’s highest legal official in fact <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/07/uk-egypt-courts-badie-idUKKBN0G70Y620140807">refused to approve the death sentence of Mohamed Badie</a> (the Brotherhood’s general guide) and of another 13 Brotherhood members – which is seen in some quarters as setting a precedent for what might happen next. </p>
<p>Whatever the mufti’s final decision, chaos is likely to break out in the country once again, from either “betrayed” Brotherhood supporters or angered governmental officials, depending on which side the religious authority chooses to support. Only hours after the verdict, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/three-egyptian-judges-shot-dead-in-sinai-hours-after-mohamed-morsi-sentenced-to-death-10255067.html">three Egyptian judges were killed in Sinai</a>, a reflection of the levels of discontent and growing unrest within Egypt.</p>
<p>Regardless of the final verdict, the increasing number of death sentences is indicative of the deteriorating state of what little democracy was established after the 2011 uprisings. The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/01/egypt-parliamentary-elections-to-be-postponed-by-new-legal-setback">endless postponement of the parliamentary elections</a> is a clear sign of al-Sisi’s unwillingness to be held accountable by anyone outside of his circle of supporters. </p>
<p>Sisi’s administration is characterised by a steady decrease of democratic practices and civil liberties, as the president attempts to reinforce its authority by propagating levels of brutality and repression that are unmatched in the country’s history. </p>
<p>Another element that is indicative of the current state of affairs in Egypt is the decision to <a href="http://www.democracynow.org/2014/12/1/a_dark_moment_in_egypts_history">drop all criminal charges against previous dictator Hosni Mubarak and his sons</a>, which further underlines the continuation of the military’s deep state despite the events of 2011. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, daily human rights abuses are quickly leading the country to breaking point once again. The <a href="http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/egypt">steady deterioration of human rights and democratic practices</a> in Egypt can be directly traced to al-Sisi’s <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/news/president-amends-law-include-life-sentence-receiving-funds-arms">amendments to the Penal Code</a>, which allow civilians to be tried in absentia in military courts without the right of even consulting with a lawyer. </p>
<p>Morsi’s sentence will not only be another blow to Egypt’s already fragile democracy, but is also further diminishing al-Sisi’s volatile international credibility.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/full-circle-in-egypt-as-failed-revolution-lets-the-military-strengthen-its-grip-22501">As we argued previously</a>, Morsi’s trial can be seen as the culmination of the military’s quest to regain its ruling power and to reinstate the status quo that was interrupted by the 2011 uprisings. Similarly, such events are also a continuation of the previous Egyptian governments’ decades long practice of branding Islamists as scapegoats. </p>
<p>Morsi’s sentence can still be appealed – as a second court date has been set for June 2 – meanwhile Egypt awaits the grand mufti’s decision. But until then, the country remains on the verge of explosive popular discontent and chaos, which al-Sisi’s unprecedented security measures are failing to contain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41948/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucia Ardovini receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two years after the ousting of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, military rule is now firmly entrenched.Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLucia Ardovini, ESRC PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/408132015-04-28T00:40:31Z2015-04-28T00:40:31ZIslamic State theoreticians have honed plans for battle and a state<p>What is Islamic State’s (IS) political program? What is its ideology? Who are its theoreticians? The answers to these questions can be found in its propaganda.</p>
<p>IS has transformed from an ultra-minority party into one of the major political actors in the Middle East within a few months. It is tempting to explain this rapid evolution by the existence of a combination of favourable circumstances. Chief among these is the prolonged weakness of the Syrian and Iraqi governments, an obvious enabling factor for IS.</p>
<p>However, another major cause is less well known but equally decisive: the internal development of the organisation, which has been able to learn from the past failures of other jihadist movements and refine and sharpen its strategy.</p>
<h2>Learning from many years of jihadist setbacks</h2>
<p>The jihadists of IS are no small players. They follow a battle plan developed over many years by seasoned and experienced theoreticians. The British-American journalist <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Bergen">Peter Bergen</a>, who met the most famous of these, the Syrian <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mustafa_Setmariam_Nasar">Abu Musab al-Suri</a>, in the 1990s, was highly impressed by him.</p>
<p>“He was tough and very smart,” the reporter recalls in an article published in the French daily Le Monde in April 2013. Bergen saw in al-Suri a real intellectual, well versed in history, who was very serious about his objectives. He was even more impressed by him than by Osama bin Laden.</p>
<p>Abu Musab al-Suri knows what he is talking about when it comes to armed struggle. His experience dates back to the Muslim Brotherhood <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/aug/01/hama-syria-massacre-1982-archive">uprising in Hama</a>, Syria, and its bloody suppression in February 1982 by the troops of Hafez al-Assad, the father of President Bashar al-Assad.</p>
<p>Musab al-Suri, who was among these rebels, has spent the ensuing years writing a series of articles on the uprising’s strategic aspects. These articles focus on the major errors committed by the insurgents. These include a list of 17 “bitter lessons” for future jihadists.</p>
<p>Al-Suri says that the Muslim Brotherhood’s main mistake was not to develop its strategy sufficiently before launching the uprising. A second mistake was to share too little information about its ideology and goals. A third mistake was to rely too heavily on outside support and not sufficiently develop its own resources.</p>
<p>Mistake number four was to place too heavy a reliance on mass recruitment instead of identifying and winning over elite fighters. Mistake number five was to have launched a war of attrition against the Syrian regime rather than a combination of terrorist acts and guerrilla warfare. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">This online video featuring a doctor is part of Islamic State’s strategy of projecting the creation of a new order.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>IS project has solid foundations</h2>
<p>The lessons drawn by Musab al-Suri have provided the basis for creating a politico-military project as solid as it is comprehensive. Today, IS follows many of al-Suri’s advices. It has refrained from depending on foreign aid and has developed its own financial resources through kidnapping and the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/08/iraq-syria-oil-smuggling-islamic-state-turkey.html">sale of crude oil</a>. </p>
<p>Its doctrine and objectives are also clearly explained to its fighters. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, momentarily <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/06/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-isis">came out of hiding</a> on July 4, 2014, to present his views at the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul. His propaganda agencies broadcast news flashes on the internet.</p>
<p>After publishing several issues of IS Report, a periodical of only a few pages, IS began issuing in July of last year the online magazine Dabiq. This is a substantially more ambitious publication named after a small town in northern Syria where, according to Muslim tradition, a major battle will take place before the end of time. The IS also uses social networks intensively.</p>
<p>IS propaganda stresses the “oppression” and “humiliation” of which Muslims are victim throughout the world, but particularly in Western countries. It promises a final and liberating revenge for these humiliations. The first issue of Dabiq declared:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of humiliation and being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their long slumber in the darkness of neglect – the time has come for them to rise.</p>
<p>Soon, by Allah’s permission, a day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a master, having honour, being revered, with his head raised high and his dignity preserved … Whoever was heedless must now be alert. Whoever was sleeping must now awaken. Whoever was shocked and amazed must comprehend. The Muslims today have a loud, thundering statement, and possess heavy boots.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The ongoing war in Syria and Iraq is especially meaningful, as it is described as a throwback to heroic periods in the history of Islam. The setbacks suffered by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi are deemed to remind Muslims of those of the Prophet Muhammad, who was forced to leave Mecca and then defeated at the Battle of Uhud. The violence perpetrated by the IS jihadists is considered legitimate and is supposed to correspond with that of Abu Bakr, the successor of the Prophet and the first Caliph.</p>
<p>In addition to the “bitter lessons” learnt during the uprising at Hama, the jihadist theoreticians have another major source of inspiration, according to <a href="http://www.mei.edu/profile/michael-ryan">Michael W.S. Ryan</a> of the Middle East Institute in Washington and one of the best experts on jihadist movements. They are well read in the history of modern Far Eastern and Western insurgency strategists, from Mao Zedong, Che Guevara and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Vo Nguyen Giap, Emiliano Zapata and Ho Chi Minh. In his seminal work The Call to Global Islamic Resistance, Abu Musab al-Suri writes that he has carefully read American journalist Robert Taber’s book on Fidel Castro’s guerrilla warfare strategy during the Cuban Revolution.</p>
<p>Dabiq magazine reflects these influences. Its first issue outlines a strategy to seize power through three steps reminiscent of the methods used by Maoist China. This strategy is also echoed by another influential jihadist theoretician, Abu Bakr Naji, who has presented his views in his book <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Management_of_Savagery">The Management of Savagery</a>. </p>
<p>He argues that “Allah’s fighters” must continually attack the vital economic sectors of some key political regimes to incite these to concentrate all their forces in these areas. It will be then possible for the fighters to increase their presence in the periphery of these countries, forcing the enemy to multiply law enforcement actions to regain control of the lost ground. </p>
<h2>‘Savagery’ has a particular purpose</h2>
<p>This is when the second stage should begin, that of “savagery”, in which the violence will reach such a level that people will turn away from the government and be ready to join any force capable of restoring peace. Large parts of Iraq and Syria are now enduring this second stage, according to these theoreticians. </p>
<p>The third and last stage is the restoration of law (Sharia) and order through the establishment of a caliphate. Afghanistan is supposedly an example of a place where this final stage had taken place, with the coming to power of the Taliban after a long and bloody reign of local warlords.</p>
<p>This strategy, which is not unique to jihadism, implies that an explosion of violence will happen during the second phase of the insurgency. Jihadist theoreticians do not consider this bloodshed an act of wanton cruelty but a necessary means to achieve victory. Abu Bakr Naji chillingly writes in The Management of Savagery that jihadist fighters should “drag the masses into the battle”, which means that they must:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“make [that] battle very violent, such that death is a heartbeat away, so that the two groups will realise that entering this battle will frequently lead to death. That will be a powerful motive for the individual to choose to fight in the ranks of the people of truth in order to die well, which is better than dying for falsehood and losing both this world and the next.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Focus is now on rebuilding lost base as caliphate</h2>
<p>Jihadist movements share many common ideas, such as the rejection of democracy, nationalism and Western culture, but they are at loggerheads on strategy. Abu Musab al-Suri had some harsh words to say about Osama bin Laden and his taste for high-profile attacks on government institutions, security forces and symbolic buildings. He severely criticised the September 11 attacks, which, he believes, incurred the wrath of the United States against the Taliban in Afghanistan. This consequently denied the “holy war” its most precious territory and wasted the time of the jihadist movement.</p>
<p>Fourteen years on, IS’s ambition is to rebuild this territory – though now in Syria and Iraq – in the shortest possible period by <a href="https://theconversation.com/isis-does-not-have-enough-public-support-to-extend-its-caliphate-in-iraq-28940">establishing a “caliphate”</a>. This will become the central base for the spread of the international jihad.</p>
<p>In this perspective, the putative caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has recently changed the IS’s focus from “savagery” to the onset of a new order. One of his current priorities is to establish, in places where the military situation is sufficiently stabilised, a number of public services: law and order, of course, but also trade networks, food supplies, education and health care.</p>
<p>This was the background to his July 2014 speech, which he sought to spread far and wide:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Oh Muslims, hasten to your new state. We make a special call to the scholars and callers, especially the judges, as well as people with military, administrative and service expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all different specialisations and fields.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Islamic State knows what it wants, and it is striving to put the new “caliphate” on a permanent footing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40813/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Rousseau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Islamic State is a project built on solid foundations by jihadist theorists with decades of experience. The savagery of terrorism precedes the next stage of a caliphate that delivers longed-for order.Richard Rousseau, Associate Professor of Political Science, American University of Ras Al KhaimahLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/357992014-12-30T10:41:13Z2014-12-30T10:41:13ZEgypt’s counter-revolution won out in a year of epochal change<p>It was a year of huge transition for Egypt. Gone was the Muslim Brotherhood, in both word and deed, while the military regime of Abdel Fatah al-Sisi strengthened its control across the state. </p>
<p>Despite facing numerous challenges – political, economic, secessionist and security related – al-Sisi’s regime has ostensibly emerged from 2014 in a much stronger domestic position, promising to deliver increased security and stability to the Egyptian population. </p>
<p>What that really means is not that Egypt is safer, but that the political space and opposition movements across Egypt are now as heavily restricted as ever.</p>
<h2>Distant memory</h2>
<p>This was the year that the military counter-revolution was completed. Al-Sisi’s election as president with <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/03/abdel-fatah-al-sisi-presidential-election-vote-egypt">96% of the vote</a>, albeit on a low turnout, made the overthrowing of Hosni Mubarak seem like a distant memory. </p>
<p>A clampdown on members of the Muslim Brotherhood (and all others opposed to al-Sisi’s rule) was followed by the arrest and prosecution of many Brotherhood members and supporters. </p>
<p>Then came <a href="https://theconversation.com/setting-mubarak-free-will-galvanise-egyptians-against-hated-sisi-34890">Mubarak’s acquittal</a> for the manslaughter of 900 protesters during 2011, which further cemented the image of a failed revolution.</p>
<p>Despite al-Sisi’s clampdown, for many Egyptians he remains a popular leader, offering protection and stability where previously there had been only insecurity and chaos. And while security problems across Egypt remain serious – highlighted by a general reluctance among women to leave the house on their own – al-Sisi’s regime is still broadly seen as a solution to the country’s big problems, not a problem in itself.</p>
<h2>The price of security</h2>
<p>But that doesn’t mean all is well. Since gaining power after the July 2013 coup d’etat, al-Sisi has sought to consolidate his rule by whatever means necessary – and the means he has chosen are starting to deepen domestic and international unease.</p>
<p>The government has dialled up its authoritarianism and passed various new laws that restrict Egyptians’ human rights. The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/18/egypt-constitution-yes-vote-mohamed-morsi">new constitution</a>, devoted to a “war against terrorism”, defines terrorism as an “act” that might obstruct the work of public officials, embassies or institutions and therefore includes anyone who joins peaceful protests or takes part in a strike. Prison sentences of up to ten years can be given to anyone who is part of a group that “<a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/05/egypt-painting-terrorism-very-broad-brush">harms national unity or social peace</a>”. </p>
<p>As a consequence, an estimated 41,163 Egyptians were <a href="http://www.ihrc.org.uk/publications/briefings/11123-the-never-ending-story-of-egypt-al-sisi-and-the-military-legacy">arrested</a> in the period between July 3, 2013 and May 15, 2014, including 36,478 detained during political events and a further 3,048 arrested as members of the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p>These numbers are unmatched in Egyptian history, and they show just how restricted and security-minded Egypt’s politics have become. </p>
<p>Together with the re-issuing of Mubarak’s much criticised State of Emergency Law and of the <a href="http://www.ishr.ch/news/egypt-end-systematic-misuse-assembly-laws-against-peaceful-protestors-and-release-women-human">Assembly Law</a>, which gives the security forces the right to forcibly disperse any public meeting of more than ten people, this is another clear sign of a regime trying to retain power by utterly dominating the political sphere.</p>
<h2>Return of the tourists?</h2>
<p>Much of the Egyptian economy is driven by tourism, which stagnated in the three years following Mubarak’s overthrow. Tourists were increasingly cautious about visiting Egypt, the land of revolution and instability, which led to a drop in revenue gained from tourism from £250m to £10.5m <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/egypt-tourism-revenue-falls-95-percent">in three years</a>. </p>
<p>Yet in the third quarter of 2014, tourism <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9f87f378-72ff-11e4-a257-00144feabdc0.html%23axzz3Mj3Dmx5c">rose 70%</a> from the same period in 2013 and in September alone, the increase from 2013 was 193%. This suggests that international perceptions about stability in Egypt have shifted, despite conditions on the ground.</p>
<h2>Declining power</h2>
<p>The year also saw a transition in Egypt’s regional relations. Given its unique transnational and geopolitical position Egypt could have acted as a balance in the deteriorating situation in both Gaza and Libya – but the country’s borders are instead growing increasingly insecure. </p>
<p>Al–Sisi’s direct involvement as a mediator between Israel and Gaza across 2014 showed how much he wants to restore Egypt’s old role as a regional leader, but his alliance with Jerusalem provoked both regional and domestic criticism. </p>
<p>In negotiating with Netanyahu and stopping wounded civilians and humanitarian aid from crossing the Rafah border for most of Israel’s Gaza offensive, al–Sisi was seen to be effectively siding with Israel and the US and against other regional powers. This <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/13465-egypt-refuses-to-let-gazas-wounded-travel-turkish-plane-uses-tel-aviv-airport">badly damaged his country’s popularity</a> in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the state’s struggle to effectively secure its borders has left Egypt open to the violence engulfing its blighted neighbourhood and has caused problems of its own. </p>
<p>The violent Rafah crossing was closed after <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/egypt-clear-residents-from-gaza-border-2014102941345405677.html">deadly attacks on security forces in the Sinai</a>. A 13km-long buffer zone created along the border there threatened to cause <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/rafah-egypt-army-destruction-houses-residents-compensation.html#">mass displacement</a>. Meanwhile, rumours of a <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/08/Egypt-libya-border-chaos-military-intervention.html">possible intervention in Libya</a> to stop Islamic insurgencies there only draw attention to the worry that the Libyan chaos might spill over. </p>
<h2>The next year and beyond</h2>
<p>Despite al-Sisi’s largely successful consolidation of raw power, the overall outlook at the end of 2014 is far from positive or stable. While the military government managed to cement its rule via the election, the continuation of Mubarak’s “deep state” shows that popular attempts to gain dignity and secure fair representation for all Egyptians have failed.</p>
<p>The increasing brutality and authoritarianism displayed by the Egyptian government are symptoms of undying domestic discontent, and coupled with growing insecurity at the country’s borders, this all speaks to Egypt’s declining regional influence. </p>
<p>While it is hard to foresee what 2015 might have in store, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/setting-mubarak-free-will-galvanise-egyptians-against-hated-sisi-34890">brewing renewal of the revolutionary movement</a> is an undeniable sign that not all Egyptians have lost hope, and will not accept yet another military dictatorship. </p>
<p>But as long as al-Sisi’s stunningly effective attempts to lock out any formal opposition from politics pay off, they will have little hope of success. For now, it seems, Egypt is doomed to repeat its history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35799/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucia Ardovini receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It was a year of huge transition for Egypt. Gone was the Muslim Brotherhood, in both word and deed, while the military regime of Abdel Fatah al-Sisi strengthened its control across the state. Despite facing…Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLucia Ardovini, ESRC PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/334232014-10-28T10:19:57Z2014-10-28T10:19:57ZViolent crackdown on students engulfs Egyptian universities<p>Egypt’s new academic year started in early October amid unprecedented repressive measures by the state against students. On October 11, the morning of the first day of university, police <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/14/egypt-release-arrested-university-students">carried out a massive wave of arrests</a> – mostly students taken from their homes as they were preparing for their first day of classes. More arrests followed the next morning. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201410230276.html">number of students arrested</a>, allegedly belonging to a student movement called “<a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/10/19/sac-promise-student-uprising-due-increased-campus-security/">Students Against the Coup</a>”, is now <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/10/26/students-stage-protests-violations/">more than 200</a> according to the civil society group, Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression. No charges have been pressed against the students, who are now being kept in custody pending trial. </p>
<p>The student movement has long had a political role in Egypt and played a <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=uFPoWgTLq0EC&pg=PA39&lpg=PA39&dq=egypt+student+movement+1930&source=bl&ots=UasZfXvUf0&sig=hmo2Bv0JapZALYQVL7lCohjXX3s&hl=en&sa=X&ei=kBlOVMjKEKHC7AaW7IDICw&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=egypt%20student%20movement%201930&f=false">vital part in the national struggle</a> against the British and against the corrupt monarchy during the 1930s and 1940s. Since independence in 1952 the student movement has continued to play a leading role in the struggle against repression and social injustice during successive regimes. </p>
<h2>Beefed-up security</h2>
<p>Now a new wave of government repression is in full swing.
A private company, Falcon Security, which specialises in anti-protest and riot measures, <a href="http://www.albawaba.com/news/egypt-raises-security-presence-top-universities-614609">has started operating</a> on nine campuses nationwide. The company adopted tight and sometimes violent tactics from day one, with students waiting in long queues to be personally searched before being admitted to their schools through poorly constructed magnetic tin corridors. Instances of verbal violence and harassment were widely reported during the first few days of school.</p>
<p>Hostels at a number of universities refused to receive students, under the pretext that renovation work was still in progress, but no specific dates were announced for their opening. The start of the school year (scheduled according to university law to start the third Saturday of September) had <a href="http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20140917130415310">already been postponed</a> under the pretext that maintenance work in the dorms had not finished. But it was not difficult to see that the reason was mainly for the authorities to finish implementing a tighter security system both in the dorms and on campuses. </p>
<h2>Power-grab over university management</h2>
<p>In the midst of all this, Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who – in the <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/110800/Egypt/Politics-/Preparations-for-Egypts-parliamentary-elections-to.aspx">absence of a legislative council</a> – has assumed the power of tabling legislation (with his cabinet) issued an <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/10/13/cairo-university-professors-protest-amendments-university-laws/">amendment on October 13</a> of the controversial Law for the Regulation of Universities. </p>
<p>Those amendments cancel one of the very few positive changes that had taken place after January 2011, when the academic community <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/10/03/faculty-deans-elections-prove-mb-unpopular-at-public-universities/">managed to reinstate elections</a> for university high officials. This had replaced a system of direct appointment, meaning that officials were both subject to selection according to security measures and responsible to answer to ministers rather than to the large academic community that had elected them. Egypt has now returned to this state control of academia. </p>
<p>Like anywhere else in Egypt, universities are shot through with political strife. Students belonging to the now-banned Muslim Brotherhood have cause for complaint against the Sisi regime, which they accuse of deposing “their” democratically elected president and initiating a wave of indiscriminate persecution against the Brotherhood. </p>
<p>But Muslim Brotherhood students are not alone. Various other political and social forces on the ground are asking for a more egalitarian public sphere where they can voice their opinions, criticise the regime and protest peacefully. This has been categorically denied to them by the current regime under the pretext of curbing the “terrorism” of the Muslim Brotherhood.</p>
<h2>Violence on campus</h2>
<p>According to another recent amendment of university regulations, university rectors now have the power to call in police forces, armed with tear gas, birdshot and live ammunition, as well as heavy trucks, to raid university campuses when student “riots” break out. During the first week of school, police forces raided at least three university campuses nationwide. </p>
<p>In the face of these restrictions, it was only natural that students would raise their voices and student protests (mainly calling for the release of their detained colleagues) erupted at Alexandria University where the rector called in armed police forces on campus to confront protesting students. Police stormed the campus under a thick cloud of tear gas, while <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201410220692.html">a law student sustained bullet injuries</a> in the neck and head and later died in hospital.</p>
<p>The authorities are blaming the violence on students. Yet photos and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DyiwAx-efjg">video clips</a> as well as student testimonies collected by individual faculty members that I’ve seen testify that in an unprecedented move, the police actually stormed into lecture halls – and were at times firing birdshot at students. </p>
<p>On October 23, the Egyptian minister of higher education appeared in a televised press conference indirectly blaming the dead student by saying that as a law student he had no business being at the faculty of engineering where he was shot. In an obvious attempt to clear the police of any responsibility, even though investigation is still underway, the minister also alluded to the possibility that the student might have been shot by his fellow students in an attempt to frame the police.</p>
<h2>Wider clampdown</h2>
<p>As an academic in Egypt, it is not difficult to see the clamping down on universities as part of a more general policy that the new regime is trying to establish: an iron fist over civil liberties and a stifling of dissent on all levels, no matter whether it is Islamist or otherwise. </p>
<p>State-controlled media is launching a fierce campaign against activists, establishing a narrative that the January 25, 2011 revolution was a conspiracy concocted by enemies of the state that was corrected by the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/04/egypt-coup-military-morsi-democracy">military’s soft coup</a> of July 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood in particular – and Islamist politics in general – are projected as the enemy, seeking to dismantle the state. Any rejection of that narrative of events is seen as suspicious if not downright subversive. </p>
<p>In that context, it is not surprising to see that the student movement erupt with little fear of the possibly violent consequences. The clashes and repression that have already taken place have inflicted considerable damage on student life and on the educational process in Egypt. But in a broader sense they reflect the subtle negotiations that continue between an emerging authoritarian regime and a strong and determined student movement. This academic year looks like it will be a decisive one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Randa Aboubakr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Egypt’s new academic year started in early October amid unprecedented repressive measures by the state against students. On October 11, the morning of the first day of university, police carried out a…Randa Aboubakr, Professor of English and Comparative Literature, Cairo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/293552014-07-18T05:30:28Z2014-07-18T05:30:28ZAfter eight years under siege, Hamas is fighting to stave off a slow death<p>After days of oscillation over an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has escalated into a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28359582">full-on Israeli ground offensive in Gaza</a>. According to authorities in Gaza, 258 Palestinians have been killed since the start of the latest hostilities – which now show no sign of slowing.</p>
<p>By the time Israel’s forces rolled in, reports of Mahmoud Abbas’s meeting <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/july17/israel-seeks-ceasefire-restore-abbas-authority-hamas">with General al-Sisi in Cairo</a> had already exposed just how low Hamas’s relations with its most important former ally have sunk, with Egypt reportedly seeking a deal that would place Gaza back under Abbas’s control.</p>
<p>Predictably, Hamas’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/16/egypt-no-negotiations-gaza-ceasefire-israel-hamas">rejection of Egypt’s ceasefire plan</a> has been subject to widespread misunderstanding and distortion – and superficial western commentary has failed to take into account the critically important political context that has shaped the Hamas response.</p>
<p>Historically, Egypt’s intelligence services were the main channel through which Hamas and Israel mediated their disputes. These services had intensive contact and dialogue with both their Israeli and Hamas counterparts during the conflicts in 2008/2009 and 2012, and these mediations led to the successful brokering of ceasefires on both occasions – hence the frequent current references to the 2012 ceasefire.</p>
<p>But that channel has now closed. This time around, while Israel was reportedly consulted on the main points of the Egyptian ceasefire initiative, Hamas’s leaders <a href="http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=713161">say they were not part of the negotiations</a> that constituted the Egyptian initiative. In fact, they claim to have heard about about it through media reports, rather than from any diplomatic source. </p>
<p>This is a major shift from the way Egypt has dealt with Hamas during previous conflicts with Israel – and it is largely a consequence of the Arab Spring uprisings.</p>
<h2>Allies no more</h2>
<p>As a close ally of the the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, one of the most influential religious organisations in the Muslim world, Hamas has made strategic choices that have been very damaging to its regional ties, and especially to its relationship with Egypt. Hamas has aligned itself with softly-leaning Islamist governments in <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/alarabiya-studies/2013/10/14/Turkey-s-relationship-with-the-Muslim-Brotherhood.html">Turkey</a> and <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0418/Behind-Qatar-s-bet-on-the-Muslim-Brotherhood">Qatar</a>; in the process, it has shifted its allegiances away from former close supporters like <a href="http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=9335">Iran and Syria</a>.</p>
<p>This is why in 2012, when the Israeli-Hamas fighting broke out, Morsi’s Brotherhood-ruled Egypt was able to play a pivotal role in mediating a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-conflict.html?pagewanted=all">ceasefire agreement</a>. Morsi in fact threatened that Egypt would not remain neutral in the fight, and <a href="http://www.presstv.com/detail/2012/09/26/263717/morsi-bashes-israel-over-iran-war-threats/">condemned Israel’s Gaza policy at the UN</a>.</p>
<p>But since the ouster of Morsi just over a year ago, the new administration in Cairo has pursued a scorched earth policy of elimination against the Muslim Brotherhood, <a href="http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-anniversary-morsi-ousting-2014-07-02">arresting thousands of brotherhood members</a> as well as Morsi himself. </p>
<p>Hamas now stands accused of assisting the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, supporting the deposed Morsi government, and helping foment uprisings against the new Egyptian rulers. </p>
<p>In particular, it is accused of assisting in attacks against Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai – but no evidence has been publicly produced to confirm the accusations that Hamas committed or assisted in terrorist activities on Egyptian soil.</p>
<p>Still, ever since Morsi’s removal, the military-led regime has waged a war against Hamas, largely through economic means. In particular, it has <a href="http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/07/21/314793/gazans-suffer-as-egypt-continues-to-destroy-tunnels/">destroyed more than 90% of the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt</a>, which used to serve as the principal lifeline for Gaza in terms of goods and services, food, petroleum, and arms. <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/business/2012/02/smugglers-fed-up-with-hamas-taxe.html">Taxing these imports</a> was crucial for subsidising the running of Gaza, providing millions of dollars in vital income.</p>
<h2>Double siege</h2>
<p>The destruction of the Rafah tunnels is especially important given that, over the past eight years, Israel has consistently besieged Gaza from land, air and sea, keeping it isolated and cut off. David Cameron <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/27/david-cameron-israel-gaza-comments">drew fire for suggesting</a> in 2010 that Gaza’s current situation is analogous to that of a gigantic “prison camp”, but he is hardly alone in that assessment.</p>
<p>What has changed in the last year and a half is that Gaza is now besieged by both Israel and Egypt. The Egyptian siege has been particularly painful; fully cutting off Gaza from the outside world, it has left Hamas bleeding to death.</p>
<p>The current violence therefore reflects a measure of desperation on the part of the Hamas leadership. Hamas’s military and governance capacity has been hugely damaged, and before the current violence broke out, it had tried to reconcile with President Mahmoud Abbas’s Fatah – an acknowledgement of its extremely fragile position.</p>
<p>Hamas had hoped that reconciling with the more secular nationalist movement in the West Bank would provide salaries for its tens of thousands of workers, and allow it to hold on against the two-pronged Israeli-Egyptian seige. This hope was never realised, and with thousands of unpaid workers on its hands, Hamas’ existential crisis continues – while the standard of everyday life for the residents of Gaza has steadily deteriorated. </p>
<p>This was the context for the event that sparked the current crisis: the <a href="https://theconversation.com/murder-of-three-teenagers-sends-israel-into-security-overdrive-28679">kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers</a> followed by the murder a Palestinian youth.</p>
<h2>The spark</h2>
<p>Israel has provided no concrete evidence implicating Hamas in the murders, and the crime is not typical of Hamas’s methods; they would have been much more likely to use the teenagers to bargain for the release of Palestinian prisoners. But Israel has nonetheless started a major crackdown in response to the murder, arresting not only hundreds of pro-Palestinian activists but also <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/18/palestinians-freed-2001-gilad-shalit-custody">more than 50 former prisoners</a> who had been released for the return of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.</p>
<p>Ironically, neither Israel nor Hamas wants an all-out confrontation. Yet their calculated and limited escalation has spiralled out of control – as has the number of <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/why-doesnt-israel-publish-figures-and-details-of-gaza-casualties/">Palestinian casualties</a>.</p>
<p>When Israel started bombing Gaza, the silence of the international community was deafening. As has happened so many times before, Israel’s allies give a yellow light, if not a green one, framing its actions as an assertions of Israel’s right “to defend its citizens, towns, and cities”. </p>
<p>For their part, Israeli experts and strategists have long framed their periodic engagements in Gaza as “<a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/1120/Israelis-ponder-alternatives-to-mowing-the-lawn-in-Gaza-video">mowing the lawn</a>,” which is meant to degrade Hamas’s military capability and try to break its will, as well as to destroy its capacity to govern, by keeping in in a state of constant attrition and scarcity.</p>
<p>But after a few days of aerial bombing, mounting casualties triggered the moral conscience of the world – particularly due to the rising number of <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/israel-warns-gaza-strip-residents-evacuate-article-1.1868604">children</a> killed. </p>
<p>In contrast to his predecessors, Egypt’s leader General al-Sisi made no major statements in support of the Palestinian side. The foreign ministry placed blame on <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ap-interview-egypt-gaza-cease-fire-bid-alive-24594832">both sides</a>, and called on them to cease hostilities. </p>
<p>The dilemma facing Israel is that it does not have the capacity to break the will of Hamas, and it knows that its ground invasion will be extremely politically costly.</p>
<h2>Core concerns</h2>
<p>The Egyptian ceasefire initiative did not address Hamas’s core concerns; ending the eight-year siege and opening the Rafah crossing to allow supplies and revenue back into Gaza. Even though the recent ceasefire said this could be discussed afterwards – that was what the 2012 ceasefire promised and did not deliver. It is unlikely Hamas would once again accept the 2012 terms, because they can no longer depend on the Egyptian lifeline which has been withdrawn.</p>
<p>Hamas is not waging all-out war against Israel; in fact, its political leaders have made it clear they would like to translate this round of violence into concrete political gains. It has a limited set of demands; it principally wants to stop the bleeding and the war of starvation waged against it by Egypt and Israel, and find a way out of its existential crisis. </p>
<p>Despite the foolishness and absurdity of its rocket attacks, Hamas is not a messianic movement that wants to die fighting; it is a movement battling for survival. The current Hamas strategy, then, is a limited military one of seeking leverage to bargain for relief from the ongoing siege of Gaza. </p>
<h2>Bargaining</h2>
<p>Both camps have been trying to maximise their bargaining position. <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Abbas-to-meet-Egypts-Sisi-over-Gaza-crisis-20140717">Abbas is in Egypt</a>, as are some Hamas allies, particularly Islamic Jihad; there are no reports of any Hamas leaders from Gaza or exile (for instance, in Qatar) coming to Egypt.</p>
<p>Hamas and Egypt are currently testing each other’s nerve. Hamas wants to engage the Egyptian government and press the point that they have nothing to do with the Islamist insurgency there, in an effort to get the border crossings open and re-engage with the new al-Sissi administration.</p>
<p>But regardless of whether this round of conflict is resolved sooner rather than later, or whether Egypt softens its stance on Hamas, the fundamental challenge facing both Palestinians and Israelis remains the same: to reach a political settlement for a viable Palestinian state where both Palestinians and Israelis can live in peace and security. </p>
<p>As things stand with now, with Israel’s ongoing and thickening settlements on the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem and its strangulation and now ground invasion of of Gaza, Palestinians feel a sense of hopelessness and despair. </p>
<p>As things stand, there seems to be no light at the end of this tunnel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/29355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fawaz Gerges does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After days of oscillation over an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has escalated into a full-on Israeli ground offensive in Gaza. According to authorities in Gaza, 258…Fawaz Gerges, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/283492014-06-23T22:29:22Z2014-06-23T22:29:22ZVerdict in Al Jazeera trial shows regime’s contempt for press freedom in Egypt<p>Three Al Jazeera English journalists have been convicted in the Cairo Criminal Court of spreading false news, threatening national security and aiding the Muslim Brotherhood – previously Egypt’s first democratically elected government now deemed a terrorist organisation. </p>
<p>The trial judge, Mohamed Nagy, handed Australian journalist, Peter Greste, and his Egyptian-Canadian colleague, Mohamad Fadel Fahmy, seven-year sentences in a maximum security prison. Egyptian Al Jazeera journalist Baher Mohamad was given an additional three years for being in possession of a spent bullet casing he picked up. </p>
<p>The “Al Jazeera Three” were tried with 20 other defendants – some of whom were students thought to be members of the Brotherhood – and other foreign correspondents, including the Dutch journalist Rena Netjes and British journalists Sue Turton and Dominic Kane, who were all tried in absentia and received ten-year sentences. </p>
<p>The international community has expressed its shock and outrage. Australia’s foreign minister, Julie Bishop, <a href="https://theconversation.com/appalled-abbott-government-will-try-to-intervene-for-journalist-peter-greste-28359">remarked on the appalling severity of the verdict</a> while in the UK, both foreign minister, William Hague, and the prime minister, David Cameron, said they were “appalled” by the verdict. The EU has said it is “extremely concerned” and the US secretary of state, John Kerry, called the verdict “chilling and draconian”. Several Western countries have summoned Egyptian ambassadors. Amnesty International’s director, Steve Crawshaw, called the sentence “Outrageous … [an] absolute affront to justice.”</p>
<h2>No credible evidence</h2>
<p>The prosecution lacked any credible evidence in the case, producing an array of elements as evidentiary support ranging from the dubious to the surreal, including the playing of inaudible recordings in court, showing clips from networks other than Al Jazeera, and even a pop video by Gotye, an Australian singer. </p>
<p>These judgments are part of the new Egyptian government’s strategy to <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypt-qatar-and-the-battle-over-al-jazeera-thats-landed-three-journalists-in-jail-28363">marginalise the influence of Qatar</a> at the behest of the new Egyptian regime’s Saudi allies. Qatar, where Al Jazeera is headquartered, supports the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p>But the sentences also serve as a stark reminder of the intimidation experienced by journalists on the ground – whether foreign or Egyptian – and the dismal environment in which political dissent and opposition navigate <a href="https://theconversation.com/egyptian-regimes-charges-against-me-are-baseless-and-politically-motivated-22334">at great personal risk</a>. The judiciary has in recent months sentenced more than 1,000 Brotherhood supporters to death, including, just last week, Muslim Brotherhood’s general guide, Mohamad Badie, and at least 182 of the organisation’s supporters. </p>
<h2>No due process</h2>
<p>The verdicts will still go through an appeals process, but given they came the day after Kerry’s personal meeting with Egypt’s recently elected president, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, the Egyptian regime seems to have been callously heedless of guaranteeing due process in the trial. </p>
<p>Sisi has led a crackdown on any political dissent since Mohamad Morsi’s ousting by the military in July 2013. Islamists and Brotherhood supporters, prominent human rights advocates and protestors have all come under attack with an estimated 41,000 arrested since the military takeover. The al Jazeera verdicts surely highlight the reality of the current state of media freedom in Egypt and the grim continuation of the regime’s crackdown. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf">Article 70 of Egypt’s new constitution</a> guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of the press. However, prior to being elected Egypt’s president, Sisi made a statement to the editors of the nation’s primary newspapers that freedom of the press should be balanced with national security. Al Jazeera, in particular, has come under attack by the Egyptian regime for its supposed sympathies with the Muslim Brotherhood. This trial is a clear message that opposition voices, including journalists, may also fall victim to the state’s arbitrary security measures. Despite scant evidence, the judiciary appears all too willing to issue politically useful but legally nonsensical verdicts at the expense of any semblance of human rights or the rule of law.</p>
<p>These verdicts send a chilling message to all journalists, and particularly to Egyptian journalists trying to do their job, who cannot rely on the attention of the international media or the support of foreign governments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28349/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti is affiliated with the European Centre for International Affairs. He receives funding from the Carnegie Trust for Universities of Scotland.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Hynek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Three Al Jazeera English journalists have been convicted in the Cairo Criminal Court of spreading false news, threatening national security and aiding the Muslim Brotherhood – previously Egypt’s first…Sarah Hynek, Postgraduate researcher, University of AberdeenAndrea Teti, Director, Centre for Global Security and Governance, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/247422014-03-25T14:28:10Z2014-03-25T14:28:10ZMass death sentences for Muslim Brotherhood complete the counter-revolution in Egypt<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/44580/original/qntv8xhx-1395676151.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Court of public opinion.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/35079081@N07/12309259985/in/photolist-jKJb9r-jKHHoa-jKJYfH">Sebastian Horndasch</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26712124">529 death sentences</a> handed down to supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood represent the largest number issued collectively in living memory in the country. That these sentences were delivered after a two-day trial, without benefit of defence testimony, has sparked international outrage - yet many in Egypt have greeted the move positively.</p>
<p>It signals the completion of a counter revolution, the wheels of which have been turning since mass protests, supported by the army, <a href="https://theconversation.com/morsis-authority-ebbed-away-but-egypt-is-dangerously-divided-15774">ousted the legitimate but unpopular Islamist president Mohammed Morsi</a> last July. </p>
<p>Morsi had been in power for only 12 months but the unpopularity of his political decisions built a massive groundswell of opposition which spilled onto the streets, giving the military its opportunity to force events.</p>
<h2>Army takes control</h2>
<p>The past nine months have seen the military, headed by Field Marshall Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, <a href="https://theconversation.com/full-circle-in-egypt-as-failed-revolution-lets-the-military-strengthen-its-grip-22501">consolidate its power</a>. Now it appears al-Sisi will run for the presidency. </p>
<p>The announcement of the death penalties came just one day after police entered al-Azhar University in Cairo to disperse anti-government protesters. Students, academics and opposition journalists <a href="https://theconversation.com/opinions-are-dangerous-as-egypt-cracks-down-on-dissent-24039">have been a sustained target</a> for the counter-revolution since July 4. </p>
<p>The speed at which the trial proceeded – it was adjourned after one session on Saturday and the death sentences were announced on Monday – highlights the way military power is <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/04/egypt-s-draft-constitution-rewards-military-and-judiciary/gvc8">now operating hand-in-glove with a compliant judiciary</a> within the Egyptian state. This is a stark demonstration of the “deep state”, that’s roots can be traced back to the time of Nasser. </p>
<p>The new Egyptian constitution approved in January 2014 is a prime example of this privileged – yet not unprecedented – relationship between military and judiciary. It grants considerable autonomy to the state institutions, particularly those concerned with security, which have aligned together against the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/03/24/2014-egyptian-constitutionwithout-accountability-checks-balances/">new constitution</a> also outlaws the participation in politics of religious parties, something that existed at the time of Nasser.</p>
<h2>Brotherhood going underground</h2>
<p>At a stroke, the Muslim Brotherhood is once again an illegal organisation. Some 16,000 members have been arrested or killed. The Brotherhood, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-failed-in-egypt-because-it-was-inept-incompetent-and-out-of-touch-23738">which experienced political authority for the first time in 2012</a>, is now forced to once again seek answers to many of the questions it has previously engaged with over the legitimate use of violence. </p>
<p>While the Brotherhood’s spokesman in London declares that this sentence is just a further proof of Egypt’s descent into yet another dictatorship, there is the palpable danger of the Brotherhood resorting to violent means and re-organising itself in a quasi-militia movement to protect its members, as a consequence of repression and daily discrimination.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the recent resignations of the cabinet and prime minister seemingly pave the way to al-Sisi’s run to presidency, which would mark Egypt’s <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egyptian-cabinet-resigns-in-surprise-move/2014/02/24/0968ac0e-9d51-11e3-9ba6-800d1192d08b_story.html">return to a military autocracy</a>. It is as yet unclear how the mass of Egypt’s populace will react to this. Will it result in yet another eruption of protest or will it instead be tacitly accepted in favour of some long-sought stability?</p>
<p>Either way, it will add to the list of grievances that fuel the rage of the Egyptian people, which is arguably not lost but just suppressed. Egypt’s quest for dignity is not dead but has rather been drowned in violence, meaning that even if the population seems today to be coming to terms with the way the freedoms they thought they had won in 2011 have been clawed back by the Deep State, discontent is likely to keep bubbling away under the surface until it eventually explodes again. Once again, such development would not be unprecedented but a demonstration of Egypt’s cyclic history.</p>
<p>What must be remembered is that what is happening in Egypt is not new but can be traced back to several previous periods in recent history. This cycle of Islamist engagement within politics followed by violent repression also <a href="http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00091523/00646">occurred under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak</a>. </p>
<p>What is clear is that the Muslim Brotherhood faces the most severe challenge to its long-term stability since the time of Nasser. In the aftermath of being a democratically elected party, the Brotherhood faces serious external and internal pressures that it must overcome in order to continue as a prominent actor within Egyptian politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/24742/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucia Ardovini receives funding from ESRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 529 death sentences handed down to supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood represent the largest number issued collectively in living memory in the country. That these sentences were delivered after a…Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLucia Ardovini, ESRC PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/240392014-03-07T06:05:39Z2014-03-07T06:05:39ZOpinions are dangerous as Egypt cracks down on dissent<p>As I write this, 20 journalists – including several al-Jazeera reporters – are <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26445506">on trial in Cairo</a> on charges of spreading disinformation and abetting terrorists. Their alleged crime includes operating without proper accreditation and conspiring with the Muslim Brotherhood, now a proscribed organisation, to tarnish Egypt’s international reputation. Some of them have been locked up for more than six weeks.</p>
<p>This episode highlights a dangerous state of affairs in Egypt, which is going through an unprecedented period of suppression of fundamental civil rights and a severe stifling of freedom of expression and press. </p>
<p>Following the military coup of July 3, the new regime has shown little tolerance for dissent or peaceful protest. The massive crackdown against the supporters of former president Mohamed Morsi expanded to include many voices that oppose military rule. </p>
<p>Taking advantage of the absence of an elected legislative body, the coup regime has used with full impunity draconian laws and repressive measures against journalists, academics and peaceful protesters. The coup leader assured his officers in what <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/egypt-army-chief-seeks-immunity-military-20131121881635251.html">became known as Sisi-leaks</a> that no one would be held accountable for any brutality against protesters. So far <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/22/world/meast/egypt-morsy/">an estimated 3,000 have been killed</a>, 22,000 detained and thousands more injured.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the man who might reasonably be described as the architect of all this, Field Marshal Abdel Fatah al-Sisi <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/egypt-army-chief-abdel-fatah-al-sisi-indicates-run-presidency">prepares to stand for office as president</a>, bound – as he says – by the “will” of the people.</p>
<p>To be a journalist in Egypt is to have one of the most dangerous jobs in the country. In 2013 <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2013/12/syria-iraq-egypt-most-deadly-nations-for-journalis.php">Egypt was listed as one of the three deadliest countries</a> in the world for journalists, tailing Syria and Iraq. On the third anniversary of the revolution, more than 1,000 protesters were arrested and 103 shot dead; 36 cases of violations against journalists and photographers were documented, the largest number of such violations since January 2011, according to <a href="http://afteegypt.org/">the Association of Freedom of Thought and Expression</a>. </p>
<p>Reporters Without Borders confirmed in its <a href="http://rsf.org/index2014/en-middle-east.php">2013 annual report</a> that an “anti-Brotherhood witch hunt is under way that targets not only Egyptian journalists but also their Turkish, Palestinian or Syrian colleagues”. This led them to rank Egypt 159th out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom Index. The military-backed regime’s crackdown on media is systematic and extends to liberal and foreign media exposing the truth after closing down of Islamists’ TV channels and killing scores of journalists over the past eight months. </p>
<p>In Egypt today only one narrative is allowed and that is the regime’s. Anyone who dares to challenge the official account risks being arrested and accused of “spreading fabricated news”. The <a href="http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/01/29/268481172/detention-of-al-jazeera-journalists-strains-free-speech-in-egypt">journalists’ trial</a> is yet further proof of the serious deterioration of the current state of freedom of press in Egypt.</p>
<h2>Opinion is not a crime</h2>
<p>But journalists are not the regime’s only target. In Sisi’s Egypt, expression of any opinion that is not in line with the regime’s policies is treated as a crime. Three members of Strong Egypt Party were <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/02/25/misr-al-qawia-members-sentenced-campaigning-constitution/">sentenced to three years in prison</a> for distributing flyers and posters advocating a no vote on the draft constitution, which passed with 98% approval. This case is remarkable because the charges bluntly state “the crime” of distributing flyers without exerting the effort of sugarcoating the accusations.</p>
<p>Another equally appalling case is that of Dr Mervat Galil, chair of the radiology department in the Mit Ghamr public hospital. Last month, she was sentenced to <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/9943-2-year-prison-sentence-for-doctor-wearing-rabaa-al-adawiya-pin">two years in prison for wearing a Rabaa Pin</a> during working hours. The indictment included inciting riots in the hospital and belonging to a banned organisation, charges that she along with her husband and colleagues vehemently deny. These two cases demonstrate that the coup regime is determined to follow a zero tolerance policy toward any form of dissent. Any kind of opposition, however peaceful, will be fiercely silenced.</p>
<p>In an attempt to increase control over universities and suppress student activism, The Court for Urgent Matters <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/95111.aspx">approved the return of police to campuses</a>, overturning a 2010 ruling that banned their presence. Students and professors alike objected to these measures aiming at suppressing any political views on campus. The campus police is regarded as a symbol of state tyranny and a remnant of the Mubarak era, which students had strongly fought against for years until they won their court case in 2010. </p>
<p>The return of police officers to campuses now demonstrates the extent of the regime’s concern over its inability to control daily peaceful protests by thousands of university students demanding freedom and democracy. During the first six months after the coup, more than 2,000 students and 150 faculty members <a href="http://wikithawra.wordpress.com/2014/01/21/sisidetaineessocialgroups/">have been detained</a>. The military-backed government has twice <a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-govt-postpones-second-academic-term-one-more-week">postponed the beginning of the second term</a> for all universities with predictions circulating that it may be cancelled altogether.</p>
<p>But suppression of freedom of expression does not end here; it also extends to the virtual world. So websites, blogs and social media that played a real part in the January 2011 revolt have come under severe scrutiny from the regime. Last month, Mohamed Salah al-Din, a university professor at Cairo University <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Al7oriallgd3an/photos/a.110216819090186.15443.110174469094421/481700851941779/?type=1&theater">was arrested at his home</a> for expressing views that were sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p>Earlier, blogger Ahmed Nour was sentenced to three months in jail and a fine of 10,000 EGP (US$1500) for posting a satirical video “insulting the police” and making fun of the lack of security in the country. These are not isolated cases. The ministry of interior announced that anyone who “incites violence” though social media, that is expresses dissent, is <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/93065/Egypt/Politics-/Police-to-arrest-social-media-users-inciting-viole.aspx">subject to arrest</a>.</p>
<p>The struggle against the military coup in Egypt is in essence a struggle for the restoration of democracy, basic civil liberties, and the rule of law. It is a struggle between those who believe in freedom is a basic value in society, and where human dignity is respected and those who fear freedom. It’s a battle against a renewed authoritarian regime believing it could resurrect a repressive past and silence dissenters through intimidation, oppression and terror.</p>
<p>Democratic nations must take a strong and unequivocal stand against the behind the scenes military rule, the return of the police state and the gross human rights violations in Egypt.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>In January, Emad Shahin was told he faces a charge of “Grand Espionage” in a case which includes former president Mohamed Morsi and senior leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. He has <a href="https://theconversation.com/egyptian-regimes-charges-against-me-are-baseless-and-politically-motivated-22334">dismissed these claims</a> as “baseless and politically motivated”.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/24039/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emad Shahin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As I write this, 20 journalists – including several al-Jazeera reporters – are on trial in Cairo on charges of spreading disinformation and abetting terrorists. Their alleged crime includes operating without…Emad Shahin, Professor, American University in CairoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/172922013-08-22T13:32:27Z2013-08-22T13:32:27ZEgypt needs a proper roadmap to get through this crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/29757/original/jmpq4xkt-1377177985.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Thousands are dead and tens of thousands injured after three months of devastation in Egypt</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mohamed Azazy</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23792546">release from prison today</a> of Hosni Mubarak, the former strongman whose downfall in 2011 was hailed as the start of the Arab Spring in Egypt, could be the moment at which the counter-revolution has prevailed.</p>
<p><a href="https://docs.google.com/a/theconversation.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0At6CC4x_yBnMdGZ4LWR4WllKUWNNM3VqSG43ZGY1LWc#gid=0">Thousands of lives lost</a>, tens of thousands injured, huge numbers of people detained and the prospect of continuing violence - especially if the Muslim Brotherhood, which was emerging as a legitimate player after years of being denied legal recognition, is driven back underground and forced to resort to non-legitimate political activity.</p>
<h2>Nightmare scenario</h2>
<p>The world can see what an important moment this is. All sides have sent envoys to encourage a peaceful and democratic solution. Today is the turn of the EU’s foreign ministers <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/21/uk-egypt-protests-eu-idUKBRE97K00B20130821">meeting in Brussels</a> to puzzle out a way of putting pressure on the warring parties to find a peaceful way through the crisis.</p>
<p>The alternatives are too awful to contemplate: Money, arms and training flowing to Islamic radicals to engage in violent confrontations. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23780839">Splits within the army</a> as senior officers divide along the lines of those who support a military take-over and those for whom distaste at shedding the blood of innocent civilians (and there are many) will force them into the opposing camp. And, most frighteningly of all, Israel being <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5506ae1c-08b0-11e3-ad07-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2cc9pYjAK">drawn into the conflict</a> by bloodshed spilling across from the Sinai, sparking a bloody regional conflict with unknown and terrifying consequences.</p>
<p>It’s hard to see what can be done to avoid those outcomes, but something must be done and very soon.</p>
<h2>Alternative roadmap</h2>
<p>Here are a few suggestions: first, those people - both in the army and from the political establishment - whose actions led to the spilling of Egyptian bloody must be put on trial and brought to justice. They cannot continue to be involved in Egyptian politics.</p>
<p>The army must then identify one of its senior offices to lead negotiations. The negotiating team must also include a representative from the Islamists, the liberals, and possibly the secretary-general of the <a href="http://www.arableagueonline.org/">Arab League</a> and the <a href="http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/">Organisation of the Islamic Conference</a> or <a href="http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963_0.pdf">Organisation of African Unity</a> as observers. </p>
<p>Negotiations should aim to reach a consensus appointment for an interim prime minister and a technocrat cabinet. Once this is done the military must pledge to completely withdraw from Egyptian political life. The military-backed interim government must immediately resign and take responsibility for the atrocities that have been committed against civilians - and for agreeing to come to power backed by the military’s tanks. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/29681/original/9gp962bf-1377092539.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/29681/original/9gp962bf-1377092539.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/29681/original/9gp962bf-1377092539.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=797&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29681/original/9gp962bf-1377092539.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=797&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29681/original/9gp962bf-1377092539.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=797&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29681/original/9gp962bf-1377092539.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29681/original/9gp962bf-1377092539.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29681/original/9gp962bf-1377092539.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mohammed Morsi: should be released.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Local and international human rights organisations must be given the authority to conduct a thorough and objective investigation, gathering an accurate tally of all the dead and injured and the circumstances in which they suffered. The dead must be given honourable burials to relieve the pain of the afflicted families and diffuse the desire for revenge. </p>
<p>An independent fact-finding commission should be established and allowed to have access to all parties as well as to hold impartial and thorough investigations of those who instigated, planned, committed or advocated violence.</p>
<p>All those who took part in the massacres must face open and fair trials, while all the detainees arrested for political reasons since June 30 must be released.</p>
<h2>Restore democratic legitimacy</h2>
<p>In order to act within the bounds of the constitution, the process must restore some legitimacy to Mohammed Morsi, who was deposed as president rather than voted out. He should immediately appoint the consensus prime minister nominated by the negotiating committee and immediately submit his resignation as a gesture to end further division and bloodshed.</p>
<p>The main purpose of new prime minister and cabinet would be to call for parliamentary elections within 60-90 days and presidential elections within 60-90 days after that. Meanwhile, the new government should concentrate on promoting reconciliation between all political parties, as well as instituting transitional justice.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/29682/original/w93tsx5n-1377092628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/29682/original/w93tsx5n-1377092628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/29682/original/w93tsx5n-1377092628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29682/original/w93tsx5n-1377092628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29682/original/w93tsx5n-1377092628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29682/original/w93tsx5n-1377092628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29682/original/w93tsx5n-1377092628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29682/original/w93tsx5n-1377092628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hosni Mubarak: should not be released.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During this transitional period, the cabinet must appoint a committee to review all the controversial articles in the new constitution which should then presented to the new parliament once elected. In the meantime, all political parties must pledge to refrain from street demonstrations while the right of the people to hold peaceful protests must be protected.</p>
<h2>Time for healing</h2>
<p>For the past 32 months, the people of Egypt, especially its youth, have paid dearly in order to gain their freedom, build a genuine democracy, restore their dignity and assert their will. The bloodshed, arrests, terror and suborning of Egypt’s media over the past six weeks has broken their heart.</p>
<p>Now the prospect of the release of Mubarak is seen as a sign that the army is rolling back the changes that the people of Egypt risked all. Let the army go back to what they are supposed to do - let them focus on restoring security and protecting the country’s borders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/17292/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emad Shahin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The release from prison today of Hosni Mubarak, the former strongman whose downfall in 2011 was hailed as the start of the Arab Spring in Egypt, could be the moment at which the counter-revolution has…Emad Shahin, Professor, American University in CairoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/170852013-08-15T09:58:30Z2013-08-15T09:58:30ZEgyptians pay for democracy in blood<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/29269/original/nhgrr3r5-1376494078.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Morsi supporters after the savage crackdown.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The violent deaths of hundreds and the injury of thousands of peaceful pro-democracy protesters in a few short hours yesterday is tragic. What is the more tragic is that it could have been avoided.</p>
<p>In past weeks, foreign mediators and domestic sides have presented sound initiatives to resolve the ongoing crisis in Egypt peacefully. None was headed by the leaders of the military coup that repeatedly rejected these initiatives in “<a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/08/07/Egyptian-govt-rejects-McCain-s-clumsy-statements-on-Mursi-s-ouster.html">substance and in form</a>” and insisted on superimposing their own road-map that toppled a freely elected civilian president, suspended the constitution and dissolved an elected parliament. </p>
<p>In their place, the military junta has installed an interim figurehead president, appointed an unelected cabinet, issued a <a href="http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinionla/la-oe-landau-egypt-constitution-20130808,0,2851442.story">constitutional declaration</a> that merged legislative and executive powers and cracked down on the Islamist opposition. All these steps were taken under the guise of a staged popular support and mandate to rid the country of 12 months of Muslim Brotherhood rule.</p>
<p>The pro-coup media and the military-backed government spared no effort to demonise their opponents, dubbing them terrorists and projecting the conflict as one between the people and the Muslim Brothers. They focused people’s attention on whether the government was going to disperse the pro-Morsi supporters and restore normality to the nation’s life, thus bypassing the real issue. The essence of the ongoing conflict is a true struggle between military rule and a democratic future for Egypt.</p>
<p>The overall performance of the Muslim Brothers over the past year shows they have not been the best democrats or statesmen. They lacked the experience and inclusiveness required for a proper management of Egypt’s rough transition. They were also blocked by certain strongholds of <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324260204578587872719316196.html">Mubarak’s deep state</a>. </p>
<h2>A failure of democracy</h2>
<p>Yet the Muslim Brothers were certainly not worse than some segments of the military-backed “liberal” opposition who are no more inclusive or experienced. This is the nature of authoritarian regimes that usually deprive their opponents of any power sharing opportunities. In democracies, you punish failure at the ballot box, not by a military coup and depriving the majority of their right to rule.</p>
<p>Egyptians are clearly divided over serious political issues: identity, ideological orientations, distribution of power, models of development and foreign policy. These should be resolved through dialogue and compromise. The coup’s leaders have sided with a certain party, thus deepening the division and polarisation.</p>
<p>The current military-backed regime is pushing Egypt toward an unnecessary violent path that could trigger a prolonged civil war. The coup and its advocates, admittedly millions of Egyptians who have been fomented over the past year by a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23635879">biased anti-MB media</a>, a politicised judiciary, uncooperative police, and obstructive opposition, is entrenching itself in the state institutions, restoring a police state and rolling back the democratic gains Egyptians scored following the January 25 Revolution. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/29271/original/f87vbxtr-1376495391.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/29271/original/f87vbxtr-1376495391.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/29271/original/f87vbxtr-1376495391.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29271/original/f87vbxtr-1376495391.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29271/original/f87vbxtr-1376495391.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29271/original/f87vbxtr-1376495391.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29271/original/f87vbxtr-1376495391.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/29271/original/f87vbxtr-1376495391.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Gunned down: Sky News cameraman, Mick Deane.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sky News</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>So far, the coup leaders have undertaken repressive and extra-legal measures against liberties and human rights, including the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23189180">detention of hundreds of opponents</a>, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/2013740531685326.html">closing down satellite channels</a>, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/egypts-public-prosecutor-orders-the-assets-of-14-muslim-brotherhood-leaders-to-be-frozen-8708108.html">freezing bank accounts</a>, <a href="http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-egypt-travel-ban-morsi-brotherhood-coup-20130703,0,5475739.story">imposing travel bans</a>, and staging politically motivated trials; resurrecting some of Mubarak regime’s regular practices. In the latest bloody confrontations, they have deliberately targeted journallists to prevent journalists covering the atrocities that have taken place during the ongoing massacres. Sky News cameraman <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23700044">Mick Deane</a> was killed by what appears to have ben a sniper’s bullet. Other journalists killed include <a href="Habiba%20Abdel%20al-Aziz">Habiba Ahmed Abd Elaziz</a> from Gulf News, and <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/14/journalists-killed-egypt_n_3758016.html">Ahmad Abdel Gawad</a> from Akhbar newspaper.</p>
<p>Great revolutions are often associated with violence and blood. Egypt’s initial struggle against Mubarak’s authoritarian regime was peaceful - and all Egyptians took pride in their success in removing a dictator by peaceful means. </p>
<h2>Violence begets violence</h2>
<p>But the latest violence by the coup leaders marks a threatening turn. Violence begets violence. The leaders of peaceful pro-democracy protests will not be able to control their supporters if the violence against them continues. They will have few arguments to use to prevent them from demanding that Egypt goes all the way towards an Islamic Revolution.</p>
<p>Fortunately, there is still a window for a legitimate exit to this crisis. The best way forward is to defend the democratic process against the coup. The military junta has failed so far to consolidate its coup, despite controlling the state institutions: the media, the police and their goons, the judiciary and huge material resources. Their excessive violence and killing of peaceful protesters is not helping. They need to exit the scene and withdraw from the political process. </p>
<p>The solution to the crisis needs to emerge from a constitutional legality and not from the reality of an illegitimate coup. The 2012 Constitution, which received the support of almost two-thirds of a majority of Egyptian voters, can provide a framework for a legitimate and peaceful resolution. </p>
<p>Whether we like it or not, Mohammed Morsi is still legally the president of Egypt, and he is the key to any legitimate transfer of power. The 2012 Constitution allows the president to delegate his powers to a prime minister that can call for immediate parliamentary elections, followed by presidential elections.</p>
<p>Egyptians have paid in blood for democracy. It is not too late to restore constitutionality and avoid further bloodshed. The alternatives are bleak: a looming civil war that must be avoided or a military rule and a police state that could take decades to uproot.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/17085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emad Shahin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The violent deaths of hundreds and the injury of thousands of peaceful pro-democracy protesters in a few short hours yesterday is tragic. What is the more tragic is that it could have been avoided. In…Emad Shahin, Professor, American University in CairoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.