tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/myanmar-1674/articlesMyanmar – The Conversation2024-03-27T00:47:11Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2245152024-03-27T00:47:11Z2024-03-27T00:47:11ZGangs, kidnappings, murders: why thousands of Rohingya are desperately trying to escape refugee camps by boats<p>Late last week, a boat crammed with Rohingya refugees fleeing a squalid camp in Bangladesh capsized off the coast of Indonesia. Around 75 people were rescued, including nine children, but <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-25/three-rohingya-found-at-sea-indonesia-aceh/103626938">more than 70 are missing and presumed dead</a>. </p>
<p>This tragedy isn’t an isolated incident. The number of Rohingya people trying to escape refugee camps by boat has skyrocketed in recent months. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar">UN High Commissioner for Refugees</a>, 1,783 Rohingya refugees boarded boats from Bangladesh from January to October 1, 2023. Since then, around 3,100 people have embarked on these treacherous journeys – an increase of nearly 74%.</p>
<p>Since January 2023, around 490 Rohingya have been reported dead or <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar">missing</a>, including 280 since October 1. </p>
<p>Their attempts to reach countries like Malaysia and most recently Indonesia are <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/rohingya-refugees-facing-hostile-reception-aceh">being met with refusals and pushbacks</a>, leaving many Rohingya stranded at sea and vulnerable to exploitation, trafficking and even death.</p>
<p>Why are so many Rohingya trying to flee in recent months? And how should the international community respond to this increasingly desperate humanitarian crisis? </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/379050392_As_long_as_we_are_stateless_we_will_have_tension_Idioms_of_distress_amongst_Rohingya_Refugees_in_Cox's_Bazar_Bangladesh">new article</a> recently submitted for peer review, we (two Australian academics and six anonymous Rohingya activists) describe the “push factors” that have been identified in community-based research in the camps, which are forcing many people to board boats to try to reach safety. </p>
<h2>Living with constant tension</h2>
<p>The nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees now living in Bangladesh are survivors of a massive Myanmar military operation in 2017 aimed at driving them from their homes in western Rakhine state. </p>
<p>Estimates of the number of people killed during the operation range from around <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(19)30037-3/fulltext">7,800</a> to <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3242696">24,000</a>. The United Nations has called it a “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-example-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar">textbook example of ethnic cleansing</a>” and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133597">genocide</a>.</p>
<p>Even before they were forced across the border, the Rohingya people had been subjected to decades of discrimination, denial of citizenship, exclusion from schools and work, restrictions on freedom of movement and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/myanmar-apartheid-against-rohingya">violence</a> from authorities. </p>
<p>Now, trapped in limbo in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh, they are experiencing many of the same things.</p>
<p>In 2019, we conducted on-the-ground interviews with 27 Rohingya community experts living in Cox’s Bazaar, including teachers, mothers, religious leaders, spiritual healers, youths and activists. We wanted to know how Rohingya people understand and describe the psychological impacts of genocide and displacement. </p>
<p>This understanding is important because most mental health services are based on Western terminology like “depression”, “anxiety” or “stress”. But these may not properly fit the Rohingya experience. Instead, we found the English word “tension” (in Rohingya, <em>sinta</em>) was used by many refugees, which conveys feelings of worry, concern and anxiety and captures the experience of being stateless.</p>
<p>As two anonymous adolescent Rohingya women described it to us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is no opportunity to do anything, all we do is stay inside.</p>
<p>Tension is loss. We’ve lost land, children, husband, that’s why we feel tension. </p>
<p>Tension is neck pain. Tension is throat, shoulders and head pain. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>After conducting our interviews, we then developed a pictorial model of “tension”, as Rohingya is an oral language. The model (below) showed how being “opportunity-less” – from lack of work, education or freedom of movement – sits at the centre of tension. </p>
<p>Our interview subjects told us lack of opportunity leads to thinking too much, pain in the body and conflict in the family, between families and with the Bangladeshi community. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=666&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=666&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=666&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why the situation has become even more dire</h2>
<p>The six Rohingya activists who helped us to conduct this research have since described to us how these sources of tension have worsened since 2019.</p>
<p>Like so many in their communities, they have personally experienced arbitrary arrest, fabricated legal cases and <a href="https://www.fortifyrights.org/bgd-inv-2023-08-10/">imprisonment</a> by the Bangladeshi authorities.</p>
<p>After dark, the “night government” (armed groups) roam the camps, kidnapping and demanding ransoms from families, threatening people in their <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2417091/world">homes</a>, trafficking <a href="https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Armed-Rohingya-gangs-kill,-abduct-and-sow-fear-in-Cox's-Bazar-57510.html">drugs</a> and killing anyone who tries to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/16/armed-group-behind-rohingya-leaders-murder-bangladesh-police">speak up</a>. Women and girls are targeted for <a href="https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/closer-look/news/why-are-rohingya-women-and-girls-so-unsafe-refugee-camps-2911316">assault and trafficking</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1453331896407138307"}"></div></p>
<p>The camps are also fenced off, like open-air prisons. This means the refugees are trapped when fires break out, which happens frequently. In January, a huge fire <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-12/rohingya-refugees-fire-coxs-bazar-january/103415134">spread quickly</a> in the congested encampments, destroying some 800 shelters and leaving 7,000 people homeless. </p>
<p>And with civil war raging inside Myanmar across the border, some Rohingya in Bangladesh have even been killed by <a href="https://www.thedailystar.net/news/cross-border/news/2-killed-ghumdhum-mortar-shell-myanmar-explodes-bangladesh-3536756">stray mortar shells</a>.</p>
<p>Bangladesh, one of the most <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344470001_COVID-19_pandemic_dengue_epidemic_and_climate_change_vulnerability_in_Bangladesh_Scenario_assessment_for_strategic_management_and_policy_implications">densely populated and poorest</a> countries in the world, cannot address these push factors in the camps without support. International aid for the Rohingya, meanwhile, continues to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/13/un-makes-appeal-calling-for-more-than-850-mn-for-rohingya-refugees">rapidly decline</a>. </p>
<h2>What Australia and regional partners should do</h2>
<p>What can – and should – the international community do to find a durable solution to this problem?</p>
<p>As a well-resourced regional partner, Australia can play a much bigger humanitarian role not focused solely on punishing people smugglers or the refugees themselves through <a href="https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/asylum-boats-statistics/">boat turnbacks</a>.</p>
<p>When people are faced with such dire conditions, they will move, no matter the cost. As recent refugee boat arrivals in <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-19/beagle-bay-residents-on-asylum-seeker-arrivals-in-wa/103483398">Australia</a> and Indonesia demonstrate, boat turnbacks and arrests fail to address the root causes of forced migration. They do not “stop the boats”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/amid-a-worsening-refugee-crisis-public-support-is-high-in-both-australia-and-nz-to-accept-more-rohingya-199504">Amid a worsening refugee crisis, public support is high in both Australia and NZ to accept more Rohingya</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Here are our recommendations for what Australia, New Zealand and their regional partners should do instead to help the Rohingya people:</p>
<p>1. Exert diplomatic pressure on the Myanmar junta to recognise Rohingya citizenship and facilitate a peaceful resolution to the ongoing conflict in Rakhine state so the refugees can return home.</p>
<p>2. Address the shortfall in <a href="https://humanitarianadvisorygroup.org/the-silent-decay-of-international-aid-to-rohingya-refugees/">funding</a> to humanitarian organisations working in Bangladesh to address the immediate needs of Rohingya refugees, including food, shelter, health care, proper education and psychosocial support. Invest in the resilience of refugees.</p>
<p>3. Increase pressure on Bangladesh to improve conditions in the refugee camps and provide livelihood opportunities for Rohingya refugees. This includes advocating for policies that allow refugees to work legally and contribute to the local <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/aug/23/five-years-rohingya-refugees-2017-bangladesh-myanmar-military-crackdown">economy</a>.</p>
<p>4. Prioritise resettlement opportunities for Rohingya refugees in third countries, especially those who have been displaced since the 1990s. Resettlement offers a durable solution for those in need of international protection, providing them with the opportunity to rebuild their lives in safety and with dignity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224515/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The number of Rohingya trying to escape Bangladesh by boat has risen 74% since October. Increasing lawlessness in the camps is one of the major push factors.Ruth Wells, Senior research fellow, Psychiatry and Mental Health, UNSW SydneyMax William Loomes, Senior Researcher, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212972024-02-01T17:04:20Z2024-02-01T17:04:20Z3 years on from coup, economic sanctions look unlikely to push Myanmar back to democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572880/original/file-20240201-21-z6rg6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=39%2C377%2C4427%2C2551&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sanctions have failed to prevent Myanmar's military from obtaining hardware.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/military-hardware-is-displayed-during-a-parade-to-celebrate-news-photo/1249572841?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html">Myanmar’s military seized back control</a> of the country in February 2021 after a decade-long democratic interlude, the international community reached for a familiar tool: economic sanctions.</p>
<p>The coup led several countries, <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/burma">including the United States</a> and <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/11/myanmar-burma-council-adds-4-persons-and-2-entities-to-eu-sanctions-list-in-eighth-round-of-sanctions/#:%7E:text=The%20Council%20has%20imposed%20restrictive,February%20and%2020%20July%202023.">European Union member states</a>, to impose or reinstate trade embargoes and other financial proscriptions against Myanmar’s military.</p>
<p>On Feb. 1, 2024 – coinciding with the third anniversary of the military coup – the U.S. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-marks-anniversary-of-myanmar-coup-with-new-sanctions/7465629.html">announced a fresh round of sanctions</a>. It comes as the Myanmar government continues to be embroiled in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">grinding civil war</a> with <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/burma-myanmar/could-myanmar-come-apart">ethnic minority insurgent groups</a>. But to date, sanctions have not encouraged the ruling generals back toward a democratic path or tipped the war in favor of pro-democratic resistance groups.</p>
<p>Moreover, as experts on <a href="https://cnwillis.com/">East and Southeast Asia</a> and <a href="https://poliscikeith.com/">economic sanctions</a>, we know that the history of Myanmar – and our own research – suggests that economics sanctions are unlikely to have that impact any time soon.</p>
<h2>Current sanctions against Myanmar</h2>
<p>The current sanctions against Myanmar share much in common with those imposed prior to 2010, when the country began a <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/battle-democracy-myanmar_en?s=110">process to restore democratic government</a>. The actions taken since 2021 by the U.S., EU and others – which include targeted and sector-specific sanctions – are aimed at undermining the military junta’s ability to <a href="https://www.state.gov/sanctions-against-the-myanma-oil-and-gas-enterprise-and-concerted-pressure-with-partners/">violently repress the country’s pro-democracy movement</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="6JbEj" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/6JbEj/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>At the same time, those imposing sanctions appear to be more cognizant than in previous periods of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.764581">potential negative impacts on the Burmese people</a>.</p>
<p>The sanctions imposed after the 2021 coup are more targeted and designed to affect the military government and its enterprises. In earlier periods, the <a href="https://poliscikeith.com/">financial measures were broader</a> and affected the entire Myanmar economy.</p>
<p>This is by design. The legal basis for post-2021 U.S. economic sanctions on Myanmar, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/02/12/2021-03139/blocking-property-with-respect-to-the-situation-in-burma">Executive Order 14014</a>, serves as the foundation for a multitude of targeted measures, which include restrictions on individuals and businesses connected to supplying Myanmar’s air force with jet fuel. </p>
<p>Signed on Feb. 11, 2023, the new U.S. sanctions regime reflects changes in how the <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Treasury-2021-sanctions-review.pdf">Biden Administration intends</a> to use financial penalties to target Myanmar’s generals, not its people. </p>
<p>The U.S. has also made it a priority to work collaboratively with international partners on imposing complementary rather than competing sanctions.</p>
<p>Evidence of this coordination emerged <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-promotes-accountability-for-human-rights-violations-and-abuses/">on Dec. 10, 2021</a>, coinciding with <a href="https://www.un.org/en/observances/human-rights-day">Human Rights Day</a>, with the U.S. rolling out a package of measures in conjunction with the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union. For example, the EU’s “<a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures_en">restrictive measures</a>” – the bloc’s parlance for economic sanctions – include many of the same sanctions imposed by the U.S., such as restrictions on the export of military and dual-use equipment, asset freezes, visa and travel restrictions, and restrictions on the export of telecommunications equipment.</p>
<p>The U.S. has also imposed targeted sanctions via the <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/1631">Specially Designated Nationals list</a>, a blacklist of people with whom U.S. citizens and firms are banned from doing business. Listed entities in Myanmar include military leaders, business people and their families. The idea is to focus the economic pain on individuals and entities involved in the coup and subsequent repression of democracy campaigners, rather than on the country as a whole.</p>
<h2>Past sanctions against Myanmar</h2>
<p>Certainly, history suggests that the U.S. needed to update its sanctions policy. Myanmar observers have long debated the effectiveness of the old Myanmar sanctions regime, with <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/busting-myth-myanmar-sanctions-success-story/">many concluding</a> that it had little impact on the junta’s decision to return to democracy. Rather, Myanmar’s democratic elections <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.764581">were part of the military’s road map</a> and not the result of sanctions pressure.</p>
<p>One reason for this skepticism over earlier sanctions was that they targeted imports from key sectors of Myanmar’s economy, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/9797/chapter-abstract/157012800?redirectedFrom=fulltext">such as garments and textiles</a>, that were not connected to the junta. These economic sanctions harmed private enterprises in Myanmar.</p>
<p>The latest sanctions <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0078?_gl=1*1mmoid*_gcl_au*MTYyMjQ3ODI3OC4xNzA1MDgyMDky">target military-owned or -linked enterprises</a>, such as Myanma Economic Holdings Public Company, Myanmar Economic Corporation Limited, Myanma Gems Enterprise, Myanma Timber Enterprise and the Myanmar Pearl Enterprise. </p>
<p>The post-2021 sanctions, though, are still plagued by some of the same problems of their predecessors. </p>
<p>They lack the weight of the United Nations, which has not called for sanctions against Myanmar. This stands in contrast to sanctions against other countries flouting international norms, like <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-north-korea-sanctions/">North Korea</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/international-sanctions-iran">Iran</a>. </p>
<p>The U.N. Security Council is <a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-myanmars-junta-have-been-tried-before-can-they-work-this-time-158054">unlikely to sanction Myanmar</a> as permanent members <a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-myanmar-military-killing-rights-suu-kyi-029f8503bf1eb6ec0e97e8521775184a">China and Russia refuse to condemn</a>, let alone sanction, Myanmar’s military rulers.</p>
<p>As a result, the international community has been split in its response to Myanmar’s democratic backsliding and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/myanmar">human rights violations</a>. While Western countries have decided to isolate Myanmar through targeted trade and financial sanctions, countries in East and Southeast Asia have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02185370600832497">maintained diplomatic and trade ties</a> with the military government. </p>
<p>And there is an incentive for countries in Southeast Asia to not take part in any sanction regime. As we show in our forthcoming book, “<a href="https://poliscikeith.com/">Trading with Pariahs</a>,” Myanmar’s trade ties tend to be strongest within its region. </p>
<p>During the first sanctions regime from 1988 to 2015, Southeast Asian economic ties with Myanmar became stronger as the country’s trade with sanctions-imposing Western states declined. </p>
<p>For countries in East and Southeast Asia, maintaining ties with Myanmar provided not only economic opportunities but also a strategy for monitoring and perhaps ameliorating Myanmar’s internal situation. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, <a href="https://asean.org/asean-10-meeting-the-challenges-by-termsak-chalermpalanupap/">admitted Myanmar</a> in 1997 despite the refusal of the junta to allow democratic elections and address human rights abuses. The approach favored by Myanmar’s neighbors was to try and bring Myanmar’s generals in from the cold rather than ostracizing them internationally.</p>
<p>And despite Singapore’s recent declaration that it <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/06/22/whats-next-for-sanctions-on-myanmar/">will stop arms transfers to Myanmar</a>, ASEAN member countries and those in East Asia continue to refrain from sanctioning Myanmar, preferring engagement to isolation.</p>
<h2>Can sanctions work?</h2>
<p>While U.S. sanctions have the potential to hurt the military, there are reasons to believe that they won’t be able to bring the government to its knees. It is likely that the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221087080">uneven termination of the United States’ earlier sanctions</a> provided insufficient time for American firms to fully engage and invest in Myanmar’s market, limiting the potential for future leverage now.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men in uniform take part in a military parade." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C276%2C5241%2C3228&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Myanmar’s military are bogged down in civil war, but not yielding to sanctions pressure.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MyanmarUSSanctions/8798420feac44ad88a7359ff1e70a23f/photo?Query=myanmar%20sanctions&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=346&currentItemNo=1">AP Photo/Aung Shine Oo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Those countries that do have significant leverage are unlikely to sanction Myanmar. And this undermines efforts by the U.S. or the West to isolate the country. </p>
<p>The challenge for the West can be seen in its sanctions on jet fuel trade. Amnesty International’s “<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/myanmar-new-shipments-of-aviation-fuel-revealed-despite-the-militarys-war-crimes/">Deadly Cargo” report in 2023</a> highlighted how Myanmar’s military can still secure reliable shipments of jet fuel despite the U.S. sanctions on the product.</p>
<p>The reason is more than 95% of Myanmar’s refined petroleum oils – needed for jet fuel – come from regional trading partners. Since 2021, China, Thailand, Singapore and Russia have <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/11/myanmar-amnesty-aviation-fuel/">provided much of the Myanmar’s military’s jet fuel</a>, enabling it to continue bombing campaigns throughout the country.</p>
<p>Even though the U.S. Treasury <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1701?_gl=1*nc1bho*_gcl_au*MTYyMjQ3ODI3OC4xNzA1MDgyMDky">has expanded its sanctions on jet fuel</a> to include both military and commercial, the impact of these sector-wide sanctions remains unclear. </p>
<p>While the nature of the current U.S. sanctions is starkly different from prior efforts to pressure Myanmar’s generals, the effectiveness and potential for success appear quite similar. Given the dearth of economic ties between Myanmar and countries outside its region, the potential for change in Myanmar seems unlikely without significant efforts by those countries with an ability to weaponize their extensive economic interdependence: China, Japan and ASEAN member states. </p>
<p>ASEAN is not blind to the erosion of human rights, and it has signaled its awareness of the regime’s atrocities and support for civilians by <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/06/myanmar-wont-be-allowed-to-lead-asean-in-2026-in-blow-to-generals.html">denying Myanmar its turn as ASEAN’s chair in 2026</a>. </p>
<p>However, the regional bloc is unlikely to impose economic sanctions on Myanmar in the foreseeable future, casting further doubt on the ability of Western sanctions to improve human rights and democracy meaningfully.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Economic proscriptions by the US and EU are hampered by lack of support among Myanmar’s major trading partners in the region.Charmaine N. Willis, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Skidmore CollegeKeith A. Preble, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215862024-01-29T19:05:33Z2024-01-29T19:05:33ZMyanmar’s misery: 3 years after the military coup, is there any end in sight for a ravaged country?<p>Three years since a military coup ousted Myanmar’s democratically elected government on February 1, 2021, a brutal civil war has left the country devastated. </p>
<p>In December, a United Nations report on <a href="https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-issued-december-2023">Myanmar’s humanitarian needs</a> said the country “stands at the precipice [of] a deepening humanitarian crisis”, with a third of the population (around 18 million people) estimated to be in dire need.</p>
<p>Aung San Suu Kyi, whose elected government was toppled by the coup, is currently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/02/aung-san-suu-kyis-partial-pardon-still-means-27-year-sentence">serving</a> a 27-year sentence on trumped-up charges that include breaching COVID public safety regulations, illegally importing walkie talkies, inappropriately hiring a helicopter, violating the official secrets act and electoral fraud. She has appealed the convictions.</p>
<p>Despite this bleak picture, there is some optimism in the opposition camp that the civil war may be shifting in their favour, thanks to recent battlefield successes against the military. The junta’s forces look <a href="https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/army-or-prison-forced-recruitment-in-myanmars-towns-and-cities/">stretched</a> and vulnerable.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, there will be no quick victory. The junta still controls the levers of government, the main cities and most larger towns.</p>
<p>Democratic governments from around the world might shorten the conflict by supplying the opposition forces and more progressive ethnic armed groups with aid and military support. But little has been forthcoming so far.</p>
<p>Sadly, regardless of whether opposition forces make further military gains in 2024, the heavy consequences of this bloody conflict for Myanmar’s 55 million people will continue to be felt for years to come.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-junta-reducing-aung-san-suu-kyis-sentence-is-an-empty-gesture-from-a-failing-state-210809">Myanmar junta reducing Aung San Suu Kyi's sentence is an empty gesture from a failing state</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What is life like under the military junta?</h2>
<p>Economic conditions have deteriorated sharply since the coup. Myanmar struggled during the first year of the COVID pandemic, but unlike other countries, it has yet to see a recovery. The economy is <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/overview">estimated</a> to be 30% smaller than it would have been without COVID and the coup, while real gross domestic product per capita is about 13% below 2019 levels.</p>
<p>Many other parts of society have been transformed for the worse by three years of jolting political violence. Educational institutions, health care providers, civil society organisations, news and other media outlets, and technology companies have all faced incredible challenges. Many limp along, a pale facsimile of the vibrant and outward-looking teams that did such impressive work before the coup.</p>
<p>Many foreign investors, understandably, have headed for the exits. Myanmar is now a disaster for anybody wanting to adhere to robust environmental, social and governance requirements. Some foreign companies remain, such as Japan’s <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/02/myanmar-junta-cant-hide-behind-a-sham-election/">Suzuki</a>, South Korean bedding manufacturer <a href="http://www.panpacific.co.kr/en/ppc/myanmar.php">Pan-Pacific</a>, as well as various banking and energy conglomerates from Singapore and Thailand. </p>
<p>These keep people employed and families fed. But many companies <a href="https://burmacampaign.org.uk/take-action/dirty-list/">do business with the junta</a> and their taxes help fund the military. There is also no enthusiasm for fresh investment. </p>
<p>In day-to-day life, Myanmar’s people are poorer and more vulnerable than before, with less access to education and health services and fewer chances to improve their economic circumstances. Many young people have abandoned their studies and careers to fight against the military, or are plotting their routes to escape. Thailand and other neighbours continue to reluctantly absorb large migrant flows.</p>
<p>For those who choose to fight, life is perilous. Enemies of the regime are hunted mercilessly by police and security forces tasked with protecting the top generals.</p>
<h2>What gains have been made by the opposition forces?</h2>
<p>While the military and opposition have been in a stalemate for most of the last three years, there have been rapid developments on the battlefield in recent months, with the junta experiencing catastrophic losses.</p>
<p>In October, opposition forces known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance conducted <a href="https://www.ispmyanmar.com/op-17/">Operation 1027</a>, capturing two border towns in northern Shan state and overrunning hundreds of military posts and bases.</p>
<iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/16608832/embed" title="Interactive or visual content" class="flourish-embed-iframe" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" style="width:100%;height:700px;" sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-scripts allow-downloads allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox allow-top-navigation-by-user-activation" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<div style="width:100%!;margin-top:4px!important;text-align:right!important;"><a class="flourish-credit" href="https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/16608832/?utm_source=embed&utm_campaign=visualisation/16608832" target="_top"><img alt="Made with Flourish" src="https://public.flourish.studio/resources/made_with_flourish.svg"></a></div>
<p>The offensive was accompanied by attacks on military forces in eastern Myanmar by ethnic Karenni and Karen resistance forces. And in the central Sagaing region, the People’s Defence Force, the armed wing of the exiled opposition National Unity Government, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-rebels-capture-provincial-town-anti-junta-offensive-widens-2023-11-07/">captured</a> a key town.</p>
<p>Then, in mid-November, the powerful Arakan Army, part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, broke a year-long ceasefire with the military in western Rakhine state. They seized border guard posts and attacked regime forces in four major townships, resulting in tens of thousands of <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/clashes-12012023151051.html">displaced villagers</a>. </p>
<p>In January, the group claimed control of the key western town of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/16/arakan-army-fighters-claim-control-of-key-city-in-northwestern-myanmar">Paletwa</a> near the border of India and Bangladesh.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1744240339064406194"}"></div></p>
<p>Myanmar’s military has an overwhelming advantage in the air. It has used its jet fighters and helicopter gunships to indiscriminately bomb <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/myanmar-28-civilians-killed-in-military-air-strike-new-investigation-and-witness-testimony/">civilians</a> and insurgents alike. But as the war in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-drone-war-ukraine-transforming-conflict">Ukraine</a> has also shown, inexpensive drone technology is starting to win battles for the opposition forces, as well.</p>
<p>The insurgent Chin National Army, whose main area of operations is next to Rakhine state, has been using <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/20/myanmar-rebels-junta-above-drones">drones</a> to attack military forces buried in the Chin Hills. This has helped them seize at least <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/chin-fighting-11302023071854.html">two towns</a> in the border regions.</p>
<p>The opposition forces in Myanmar claim to have deployed about <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2024/01/end-for-myanmar-militarys-monkey-grip-on-independence/">25,000</a> unmanned aerial vehicles, or “drop-bombs”, on the battlefield since the start of Operation 1027.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/beijing-may-have-brokered-a-fragile-truce-in-northern-myanmar-but-it-cant-mask-chinas-inability-to-influence-warring-parties-221301">Beijing may have brokered a fragile truce in northern Myanmar – but it can't mask China's inability to influence warring parties</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>A China-brokered <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/12/myanmar-junta-and-armed-rebels-agree-ceasefire">ceasefire</a> announced in mid-January between the military and the Three Brotherhood Alliance in Shan state only highlighted the success of Operation 1027 and the difficulties facing the military. </p>
<p>However, it is unlikely to last and will probably be used by both sides to consolidate their forces in the border regions.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://theconversation.com/beijing-may-have-brokered-a-fragile-truce-in-northern-myanmar-but-it-cant-mask-chinas-inability-to-influence-warring-parties-221301">China</a> remains the key international player in the civil war, it is also losing some of its authority. The rise of new military forces unconnected to China, such as the democratic People’s Defence Forces, have further fractured an already complex battlefield that is becoming increasingly difficult to influence.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1749553298921926693"}"></div></p>
<h2>What will 2024 bring?</h2>
<p>The big question this year is whether the region’s most influential body, ASEAN, will move to support Myanmar’s democratic forces more fully.</p>
<p>Thus far, ASEAN has taken a cautious approach. But it may find that keeping the coup makers in charge serves to delay the rebuilding of a shattered society and could further destabilise the region. The crisis in Myanmar also raises challenging questions about ASEAN’s coherence at a time when many members are seeking to balance their strategic relations with both China and the US. </p>
<p>With elections looming in Indonesia, a new government in Thailand, and increasing dissatisfaction with Myanmar’s status quo in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, there is a chance the victories for the anti-coup forces on the battlefield could lead to more proactive Southeast Asian diplomacy. </p>
<p>Rapid improvements in the use of drones and other battlefield technologies may also shift the strategic judgements of Western governments, who might see a low-cost path to success for the opposition. But as with the the conflict in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67830918">Ukraine</a>, US funding for Myanmar has been <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/burma-act-debate-pushed-into-early-2024/7356280.html">delayed</a> due to gridlock in Washington.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1725242332818358541"}"></div></p>
<p>The generals are also vulnerable to ongoing <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/12/21/myanmar-military-under-pressure-as-legal-jeopardy-builds/">legal pressure</a>. There is a case before the International Court of Justice accusing the Myanmar military of genocide in its treatment of the Rohingya, which received international support in November. </p>
<p>The junta leaders may eventually seek some kind of political compromise, particularly if there are <a href="https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/worst-leader-militarys-winter-of-discontent/">fractures</a> within the military. It’s not clear, however, if the democratic leaders and ethnic armed forces will again tolerate the political involvement of those who, three years ago, launched such a misguided and devastating coup.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Farrelly has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council for Myanmar-focussed work. He is on the board of the Australia-ASEAN Council, which is an Australian government body, and also a Director of NAATI, Australia's government-owned accreditation authority for translators and interpreters. These are his personal views.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The military has suffered huge defeats on the battlefield, which might lead junta leaders to be more open to a political compromise.Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South AustraliaNicholas Farrelly, Pro Vice-Chancellor, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213012024-01-19T13:40:58Z2024-01-19T13:40:58ZBeijing may have brokered a fragile truce in northern Myanmar – but it can’t mask China’s inability to influence warring parties<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570235/original/file-20240118-17-o51ffm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C6%2C4514%2C3002&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the rebel Ta'ang National Liberation Army standing guard in Shan state, Myanmar.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-photo-taken-on-december-13-2023-shows-members-of-news-photo/1851374184?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmar-ceasefire-breaks-down-01172024054526.html">shaky agreement to end fighting</a> in northern Myanmar has served to highlight concerns in Beijing over the ongoing unrest – and the limits of <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/chinas-influence-increases-amid-myanmars-instability">China’s power to influence</a> the <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">ongoing civil war</a>.</p>
<p>On Jan. 12, 2024, China announced that it had <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3248278/china-brokers-myanmar-ceasefire-urges-junta-and-rebel-militia-exercise-maximum-restraint">brokered a cease-fire</a> between the Myanmar military and a trio of ethnic armies, known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance.</p>
<p>There is, however, one caveat: The agreement only applies to the northern Shan state. The state has seen <a href="https://isdp.se/publication/return-to-war-militarized-conflicts-northern-shan-state">conflict since Myanmar’s independence in 1948</a>, and especially after <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/chinas-relations-burma">the once-Beijing-backed</a> Burma Communist Party established its headquarters there in 1968 and engaged the country’s army in a prolonged war.</p>
<p>It is also a region where opposition to Myanmar’s military government has had the most success in the current civil war. Since launching a fresh push against the Myanmar military on Oct. 27, 2023, the alliance has captured one town in Shan state <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/conflicts-in-numbers/33-towns-in-80-days-mapping-the-gains-of-myanmars-anti-junta-offensives.html">every three days</a>, according to media reports.</p>
<p>And despite the China-brokered agreement, <a href="https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20240115_33/">sporadic fighting has continued</a> in Shan state. Meanwhile, the truce has done nothing to end the civil war outside the state.</p>
<p>But that might not be the point: The agreement brokered by Beijing is, I believe, more about trying to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/09/myanmar-china-border-offensive-cyberscams-three-brotherhood-alliance/">safeguard the interests of China</a> than about ushering in elusive peace to Myanmar. Beijing has increasingly been concerned over the threat of Myanmar’s turmoil spilling over into China.</p>
<p>Indeed, a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b5f830f7-8aec-4862-832c-c68f81fac49f">statement by the Chinese foreign ministry</a> announcing the truce noted that both sides in the conflict had “committed to not harming the safety of Chinese border residents and personnel involved in projects in Myanmar.”</p>
<p>There are clear reasons why China would like to see peace in Myanmar. The destabilized northern region has become <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/19/china/myanmar-conflict-china-scam-centers-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html">a haven for Chinese criminal gangs</a> that traffic humans and drugs, and run online scams from across the border. Meanwhile, the war has <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-border-trade-falls-100-million-in-april-december-amid-clashes.html">blocked trade routes</a> and seen Chinese citizens in border towns increasingly put at risk.</p>
<p><iframe id="RWA6y" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/RWA6y/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Military under siege</h2>
<p>Regardless of China’s desire to see the truce hold, there appears little chance of that happening. Myanmar’s army has faced major losses since fighting began in 2021, sparked by a coup in which the country’s generals <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html">overthrew the democratically elected government</a>. Since then, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">fierce resistance movement</a> has emerged across Myanmar – one the generals have failed to subdue.</p>
<p>The recent truce has done little to end the violence, opposition successes or the threat to China. A day after the cease-fire was announced, one member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the Arakan Army, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67982635">captured Paletwa</a>, a border town with India in the west of Myanmar. Meanwhile, the Kachin Independence Army <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmar-junta-loses-battalion-hq-fighter-jet-hundreds-of-troops-in-two-days.html">shot down a China-made fighter jet</a> – the third one in just a few weeks – and the Myanmar army lost control of one of its division headquarters in the cease-fire area.</p>
<p>In southeast regions of Myanmar bordering Thailand, the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/interview/operation-1111-close-to-securing-all-of-kayah-state-for-myanmar-resistance.html">Karenni Nationalities Defense Forces</a> and allied fighters launched “Operation 1111,” expanding their territorial and administrative control in the region. And in the central plains, the People’s Defense Forces, an umbrella resistance group, continues to engage in guerrilla warfare against the military. </p>
<h2>Dwindling Chinese influence</h2>
<p>In the context of the sprawling civil war, China has found itself in uncharted territory. </p>
<p>In the past, China has been able to exert its influence over Myanmar’s politics. But the civil war has seen the emergence of new resistance groups, such as the People’s Defense Forces, most of whose members are younger than the soldiers in established armies. And they have no intention of entering any agreement with the Myanmar military – despite the entreaties of Beijing.</p>
<p>Moreover, these new groups have made strategic and logistic links beyond Myanmar’s borders, giving them access to smuggled arms and supplies.</p>
<p>As such, China’s influence over Myanmar is constrained. This is even more so given the ethno-nationalism underpinning much of the fighting in Myanmar. Chinese efforts to end the fighting do little to provide solutions to tie the disparate ethnic groups in Myanmar together. In fact, the one thing binding the ethnic groups that form the Three Brotherhood Alliance is the common goal of defeating the Myanmar army.</p>
<p>In addition, the safety of Chinese citizens in regions across the Myanmar border cannot be guaranteed by the cease-fire agreement with the military. The army’s inability to tackle criminal gangs in Shan state prior to civil war suggests that even without warfare, the region will continue to pose a threat to China.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China’s relationship with, and influence over, groups in northern Myanmar has changed as a result of the civil war.</p>
<p>Take the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/tag/myanmar-national-democratic-alliance-army-mndaa/">Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army</a> (MNDAA), a resistance group in the Kokang region that borders China’s Yunnan province and shares linguistic and cultural ties with China. Since being formed in 1989, its support has switched back and forth from the Myanmar government to the resistance groups – as has China’s.</p>
<p>But the MNDAA cannot be viewed as a vassal state of China. </p>
<p>In 2019, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/16/what-is-myanmars-three-brotherhood-alliance-thats-resisting-the-military">MNDAA joined the Three Brotherhood Alliance</a> with the Arakan Army and Ta'ang National Liberation Army, groups with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds.</p>
<p>China’s diplomacy and influence over the Three Brotherhood Alliance is limited: A truce threatens the unity that the group has developed in opposition to the military.</p>
<p>And there is little incentive among the Three Brotherhood Alliance to stop fighting at a time when it appears to be on the front foot, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65743887">morale among Myanmar’s soldiers is low</a>. </p>
<p>Entering the truce is in itself risky for the alliance, as it may threaten the group’s standing with other armed groups – many of whom China never dealt with until 2021.</p>
<h2>Losing faith in the military</h2>
<p>As such, Beijing’s power to influence Myanmar’s ethnic resistance groups is limited. But there is another reason why the truce Beijing brokered may not hold: Beijing’s desire to give any support to the military government has its limits, too.</p>
<p>China is losing patience with the Myanmar military, which has failed to crack down on criminal gangs that have targeted Chinese citizens. As many as <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/hundreds-thousands-trafficked-work-online-scammers-se-asia-says-un-report">120,000 people</a>, many of them Chinese citizens, have been trafficked into Myanmar by these organizations to help <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/1/18/24041696/cyberscams-myanmar-china-pig-butchering">operate online scams</a>.</p>
<p>China’s default position on Myanmar has traditionally been to support whoever is in power. And Beijing had a good relationship with the democratic government under Aung San Suu Kyi prior to the 2021 coup.</p>
<p>The corruption and non-governability of Myanmar’s border towns since then threaten the safety of Chinese citizens and undermines any faith China has in the military’s ability to deliver stability.</p>
<p>If Myanmar’s military cannot stabilize northern Myanmar, China is in a difficult situation. The status quo – with the Myanmar military in power, but unable to subdue resistance movements – will continue to present a threat to China.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221301/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tharaphi Than does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beijing is losing patience with Myanmar’s military, as well as its influence with resistance groups.Tharaphi Than, Associate Professor of World Cultures and Languages, Northern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211532024-01-19T09:44:01Z2024-01-19T09:44:01ZWhat is genocide? Six western countries want a broader application of the law – experts unpack why it matters<p>In November 2023, six western states filed a <a href="https://icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/178/178-20231115-wri-01-00-en.pdf">joint application</a> before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) arguing for an ample and expansive understanding of genocide. This intervention, as it is legally termed, was made by Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK in relation to the genocide case The Gambia filed against Myanmar in 2019. The still on-going case revolves around the <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-charged-with-genocide-of-rohingya-muslims-5-essential-reads-128742">violent expulsion of Rohingya</a> people from Myanmar into Bangladesh.</p>
<p>Our research focus is on international law and transitional justice. Our view is that the intervention is interesting and significant, both because of how it interprets past genocide cases, and in terms of what this could mean for the ICJ’s future determinations regarding states’ commission of genocide. </p>
<h2>Consolidating genocide law</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-what-the-term-genocide-means-under-international-law-podcast-218844">Genocide</a> concerns the destruction of a people. It is called <a href="https://legal.un.org/avl///pdf/ls/Schabas_outline.pdf">“the crime of crimes”</a> because of its collective significance; it diminishes our humanity. The Genocide Convention, which grew out of the horrors of the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/the-holocaust">Holocaust</a>, was introduced in 1948 and has since been <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml">joined by 153 states</a>. Its <a href="https://theconversation.com/both-israel-and-palestinian-supporters-accuse-the-other-side-of-genocide-heres-what-the-term-actually-means-217150">definition of genocide</a> requires the demonstration of an intent to destroy a group in whole or in part. The Genocide Convention addresses states, which can either carry out or refrain from genocidal policies. It was <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2024-01-12/icj-israel-south-africa-genocide-case-gaza-civilians">designed to prevent genocide</a> and should be forward-looking. </p>
<p>The ICJ, which hears claims between states, has only decided two genocide cases to date, and has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/11/icj-case-against-israel-could-finally-empower-the-genocide-convention">never held a state responsible</a> for genocide. This has contributed to discussions of the Genocide Convention as a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/genocide-70-years-on-three-reasons-why-the-un-convention-is-still-failing-108706">failure</a>”. </p>
<p>While the ICJ’s record is sparse, there are many genocide findings produced by international criminal courts in cases against individuals. For example, the <a href="https://ijrcenter.org/international-criminal-law/ictr/case-summaries/akayesu/">Akayesu case</a> before the International Tribunal for Rwanda found a Rwandan major guilty of genocide in relation to sexual violence. And the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia found several individuals guilty of genocide in relation to the 1995 massacre of 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica. </p>
<p>This law is developed not under the Genocide Convention but rather through international criminal law. International criminal courts have produced far-reaching and inclusive definitions of the kinds of violent crime that can constitute genocide. This is the jurisprudence that the joint intervention consolidates to argue for a more expansive construction of genocide than the ICJ has so far employed.</p>
<p>The joint intervention makes three key interpretive points. First, genocide concerns “destruction”, which need not be death. Indeed, the Genocide Convention itself recognises that killing is not a necessary aspect of genocide and that other forms of violence may also be genocidal. </p>
<p>Second, the joint intervention examines how sexual and gender-based crime can contribute to a finding of genocide. It connects these crimes both to the intent standard in the crime of genocide, as well as to the group destruction standard.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/genocide-70-years-on-three-reasons-why-the-un-convention-is-still-failing-108706">Genocide: 70 years on, three reasons why the UN Convention is still failing</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Finally, the joint intervention argues that the threshold for how genocide is constituted should be lowered when considering crimes against children. These crimes affect an individual for the rest of their life, defining entire generations. It also matters that children are more vulnerable than adults, and therefore easier to harm or to kill. The joint intervention reasons: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Given the significance of children to the survival of all groups, evidence of harm to children may contribute to an inference that the perpetrators intended to destroy a substantial part of the protected group.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In legal terms, the joint intervention is progressive because it draws from existing case law to show patterns in how genocide can be established. These legal conversations are part of how jurisprudence develops and can be integral to judicial decision making. In political terms, the joint intervention is enterprising because it may lock the six states into a more ample understanding of genocide. This is because one of the characteristics that distinguish law from politics is its relative stability of meaning.</p>
<p>Therefore the joint intervention suggests ways the ICJ can apply genocide jurisprudence to better realise the Genocide Convention’s forward-looking mandate. </p>
<h2>Significance beyond The Gambia v Myanmar</h2>
<p>The Genocide Convention makes all states that are parties to it responsible for the prevention of genocide anywhere in the world. Before The Gambia’s 2019 case against Myanmar, however, this “erga omnes” jurisdictional mandate had never been realised. The Gambia’s case against Myanmar <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-gambias-plea-for-the-rohingya-matters-for-international-justice-129365">is the first time</a> that the Genocide Convention has been raised not by states in conflict with each other, but rather between two unrelated states. The alleged genocide does not target The Gambia or its citizens. </p>
<p>The collective responsibility signalled by erga omnes jurisdiction is why the six states were allowed to intervene in The Gambia v Myanmar. This is also why South Africa, in its recent case against Israel alleging genocide in Gaza, characterised its actions as <a href="https://icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240111-ora-01-00-bi.pdf">“seeking interim measures against itself as well as against Israel</a>”. </p>
<p>So far, the six states who submitted the joint intervention in The Gambia case <a href="https://theconversation.com/canada-is-being-hypocritical-by-failing-to-support-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-220531">have not expressed</a> support for South Africa in its case against Israel. Regardless of what they do or don’t say regarding South Africa’s case, however, their November 2023 intervention in The Gambia v Myanmar speaks for them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221153/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Genocide is called ‘the crime of crimes’ because of its collective significance.Kerstin Bree Carlson, Associate Professor International Law, Roskilde UniversityLine Engbo Gissel, Associate Professor, Global Political Sociology, Roskilde UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214112024-01-19T00:37:04Z2024-01-19T00:37:04ZIsrael now ranks among the world’s leading jailers of journalists. We don’t know why they’re behind bars<p>Israel has emerged as one of the world’s leading jailers of journalists, according to a <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2024/01/2023-prison-census-jailed-journalist-numbers-near-record-high-israel-imprisonments-spike/">newly released census</a> compiled by the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists.</p>
<p>Each year, the committee releases a snapshot of the number of journalists behind bars as of December 1 2023 was the second highest on record with 320 in detention around the world. </p>
<p>In a small way, that is encouraging news. The figure is down from a high of 363 the previous year.</p>
<p>But a troublingly large number remain locked up, undermining press freedom and often, human rights.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/more-than-one-journalist-per-day-is-dying-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict-this-has-to-stop-217272">More than one journalist per day is dying in the Israel-Gaza conflict. This has to stop</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>China takes out unenviable top spot</h2>
<p>At the top of the list sits China with 44 in detention, followed by Myanmar (43), Belarus (28), Russia (22), and Vietnam (19). Israel and Iran share sixth place with 17 each. </p>
<p>While the dip in numbers is positive, the statistics expose a few troubling trends. </p>
<p>As well as a straight count, the Committee to Protect Journalists examines the charges the journalists are facing. The advocacy group found that globally, almost two-thirds are behind bars on what they broadly describe as “anti-state charges” – things such as espionage, terrorism, false news and so on. </p>
<p>In other words, governments have come to regard journalism as some sort of existential threat that has to be dealt with using national security legislation. </p>
<p>In some cases, that may be justified. It is impossible to independently assess the legitimacy of each case, but it does point to the way governments increasingly regard information and the media as a part of the battlefield. That places journalists in the dangerous position of sometimes being unwitting combatants in often brutally violent struggles.</p>
<p>China’s top spot is hardly surprising. It has been there – or close to it – for some years. Censorship makes it extremely difficult to make an accurate assessment of the numbers behind bars, but since the crackdown on pro-democracy activists in 2021, journalists from Hong Kong have, for the first time, found themselves locked up. And almost half of China’s total are Uyghurs from Xinjiang, where Beijing has been accused of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf">human rights abuses</a> in its ongoing repression of the region’s mostly Muslim ethnic minorities.</p>
<p>The rest of the top four are also familiar, but the two biggest movements are unexpected. </p>
<p>Iran had been the <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2022/12/number-of-jailed-journalists-spikes-to-new-global-record/#:%7E:text=The%20Committee%20to%20Protect%20Journalists,in%20a%20deteriorating%20media%20landscape.">2022 gold medallist</a> with 62 journalists imprisoned. In the latest census, it dropped to sixth place with just 17. And Israel, which previously had only one behind bars, has climbed to share that place. </p>
<p>That is positive news for Iranian journalists, but awkward for Israel, which repeatedly argues it is the only democracy in the Middle East and the only one that <a href="https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-709045#google_vignette">respects media freedom</a>. It also routinely points to Iran for its long-running assault on critics of the regime. </p>
<p>The journalists Israel had detained were all from the occupied West Bank, all Palestinian, and all arrested after Hamas’s horrific attacks from Gaza on October 7. But we know very little about why they were detained. The journalists’ relatives told the committee that most are under what Israel describes as “administrative detention”. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-israeli-government-has-haaretz-newspaper-in-its-sights-as-it-tightens-screws-on-media-freedom-218730">Gaza war: Israeli government has Haaretz newspaper in its sights as it tightens screws on media freedom</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>17 arrests in Israel in less than 2 months</h2>
<p>The benign term “administrative detention” in fact means the journalists have been incarcerated <a href="https://www.btselem.org/topic/administrative_detention">indefinitely, without trial or charge</a>. </p>
<p>It is possible that they were somehow planning attacks or involved with extremism (Israel uses administrative detention to stop people they accuse of planning to commit a future offence) but the evidence used to justify the detention is not disclosed. We don’t even know why they were arrested. </p>
<p>Israel’s place near the top of the Committee to Protect Journalists’ list exposes a difficult paradox. Media freedom is an intrinsic part of a free democracy. A vibrant, awkward and sometimes snarly media is a proven way to keep public debate alive and the political system healthy. </p>
<p>It is often uncomfortable, but you can’t have a strong democratic system without journalists freely and vigorously fulfilling their watchdog role. In fact, a good way to tell if a democracy is sliding is the extent of a government’s crackdown on the media.</p>
<p>This is not to suggest equivalence between Israel and Iran. Israel remains a democracy, and Israeli media is often savagely <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/public-trust-in-government-scrapes-bottom-amid-criticism-for-inadequate-war-response/">critical</a> of its government in ways that would be unthinkable in Tehran. </p>
<p>But if Israel wants to restore confidence in its commitment to democratic norms, at the very least it will need to be transparent about the reasons for arresting 17 journalists in less than two months, and the evidence against them. And if there is no evidence they pose a genuine threat to Israeli security, they must be released immediately. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/at-a-time-when-journalism-needs-to-be-at-its-strongest-an-open-letter-on-the-israel-hamas-war-has-left-the-profession-diminished-218596">At a time when journalism needs to be at its strongest, an open letter on the Israel/Hamas war has left the profession diminished</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221411/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Greste is Professor of Journalism at Macquarie University, and the Executive Director of the Alliance for Journalists' Freedom. He was also a signatory of an open letter calling for balanced coverage in the Gaza/Israel conflict and in 2006, covered Gaza for the BBC. </span></em></p>New statistics show a spike in the amount of journalists jailed in the country. To protect its democracy, Israel needs to be transparent about why members of the media are arrested.Peter Greste, Professor of Journalism and Communications, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211142024-01-16T00:55:36Z2024-01-16T00:55:36ZNew Zealand can learn from South Africa, The Gambia and others when it comes to international accountability<p>In 2023 the world witnessed a sustained attack on the very foundations of the international legal order. </p>
<p>Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9847/">continued its illegal invasion in Ukraine</a>. Israel’s response to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/07/israel-strikes-back-after-massive-palestinian-attack">October terrorist attack by Hamas</a> exceeded its legitimate right to self-defence. And <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-venezuela-is-threatening-to-annex-guyanas-oil-rich-province-of-essequibo-219352">Venezuela threatened force against Guyana</a> over an oil-rich area of disputed territory. </p>
<p>But is it all bad news for the international legal order? </p>
<p>There are six ongoing international court cases initiated by states or organisations seeking to clarify the law and hold other states to account on behalf of the international community. </p>
<p>These cases offer smaller countries, such as New Zealand, an opportunity to have a significant role in strengthening the international legal order and ensuring a pathway towards peace.</p>
<h2>A departure from the legal norm?</h2>
<p>Normally, <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/cases">cases are brought</a> to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when a state’s direct interests are impacted by the actions of another state.</p>
<p>However, six recent court cases reflect a significant departure from this tradition and mark an important development for international justice. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-made-its-genocide-case-against-israel-in-court-heres-what-both-sides-said-and-what-happens-next-221017">South Africa has made its genocide case against Israel in court. Here's what both sides said and what happens next</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These cases argue the international community has a collective interest in certain issues. The focus of the cases range from Israel’s actions in Gaza (brought by South Africa) through to the responsibility of states to ensure the protection of the climate system (brought by the United Nations General Assembly).</p>
<h2>Holding states accountable for genocide</h2>
<p>Three of the six cases seek to hold states accountable for genocide using Article IX of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%2520on%2520the%2520Prevention%2520and%2520Punishment%2520of%2520the%2520Crime%2520of%2520Genocide.pdf">1948 Genocide Convention</a>. Put simply, Article IX says disputes between countries can be referred to the ICJ. </p>
<p>In late December, South Africa <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231229-pre-01-00-en.pdf">asked the court</a> to introduce <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-taking-israel-to-court-for-genocide-in-palestine-what-does-it-mean-for-the-war-in-gaza-220660">provisional measures</a> – a form of international injunction – against Israel for genocidal acts in Gaza. </p>
<p>These proceedings build on the precedent set by a 2019 case brought by <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/178/178-20220722-jud-01-00-en.pdf">The Gambia against Myanmar</a> for its treatment of the Rohingya people. </p>
<p>In 2022, the ICJ concluded it had jurisdiction to hear The Gambia’s case on the basis that all parties to the Genocide Convention have an interest in ensuring the prevention, suppression and punishment of genocide. </p>
<p>According to the ICJ, The Gambia did not need to demonstrate any special interest or injury to bring the proceedings and, in effect, was entitled to hold Myanmar to account for its treatment of the Rohingya people on behalf of the international community as a whole. </p>
<p>South Africa has <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf">made the same argument</a> against Israel. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1745260487267307788"}"></div></p>
<p>In the third case, Ukraine was successful in obtaining <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/182/182-20220316-ord-01-00-en.pdf">provisional measures</a> calling on Russia to suspend military operations in Ukraine (a call which has been reiterated in several <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency11th.shtml?_gl=1*1i8bd0e*_ga*MTc2NzMyNjk4MC4xNjkxOTc0NjUx*_ga_S5EKZKSB78*MTcwNDY3Mjk1MC4xLjAuMTcwNDY3Mjk1NC41Ni4wLjA.*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*MTcwNDY3Mjk1MC4zLjAuMTcwNDY3Mjk1MC4wLjAuMA..">United Nations General Assembly resolutions</a>). </p>
<p>While Ukraine is directly impacted by Russia’s actions, 32 states, including <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/182/182-20220728-WRI-01-00-EN.pdf">New Zealand</a>, have also intervened. These countries have argued there is an international interest in the resolution of the conflict. </p>
<p>In November 2023, following the example of intervention in Ukraine v. Russia, seven countries – Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (jointly) and the Maldives – <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/178/intervention">filed declarations of intervention</a> in The Gambia v. Myanmar, in support of The Gambia and the international community. </p>
<p>States can apply for permission to intervene in proceedings where they have an interest of a legal nature that may be affected by the decision in the case (in the case of the ICJ, under <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/statute">Article 62 of the ICJ Statute</a>). That said, intervening in judicial proceedings in support of the legal order or international community more generally was relatively rare until 2023. </p>
<h2>Climate change obligations under international law</h2>
<p>But it is not just acts of genocide that have attracted wider international legal involvement. </p>
<p>In 2023, three proceedings seeking advisory opinions on the legal obligations of states in respect of climate change under international law have been introduced before the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/187/187-20230412-app-01-00-en.pdf">ICJ</a>, the <a href="https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/list-of-cases/request-for-an-advisory-opinion-submitted-by-the-commission-of-small-island-states-on-climate-change-and-international-law-request-for-advisory-opinion-submitted-to-the-tribunal/">International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea</a> and the <a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/soc_1_2023_en.pdf">Inter-American Court of Human Rights</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-charged-with-genocide-of-rohingya-muslims-5-essential-reads-128742">Myanmar charged with genocide of Rohingya Muslims: 5 essential reads</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These cases can be similarly characterised as having been brought on behalf of the international community for the international community. <a href="https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/31/written_statements/1/C31-WS-1-3-New_Zealand.pdf">New Zealand</a> has intervened in the Law of the Sea case.</p>
<p>Collectively, these six cases comprise actions taken on behalf of the international community with the overarching purpose of strengthening the international legal order. </p>
<p>They demonstrate faith in and support for that legal order in the face of internal and external challenges, and constitute an important counter-narrative to the prevailing view that the international legal order is <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/project-2100-is-the-international-legal-order-fit-for-purpose/">no longer robust</a>. </p>
<p>Instituting proceedings does not guarantee a positive outcome. But it’s worth noting that less than three years after the ICJ issued an <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/169">advisory opinion</a> condemning the United Kingdom’s continued occupation of the Chagos Archipelago, the UK is quietly negotiating with Mauritius for the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/03/uk-agrees-to-negotiate-with-mauritius-over-handover-of-chagos-islands">return of the islands</a>.</p>
<h2>New Zealand’s support for the global legal order in 2024</h2>
<p>The international legal order underpins New Zealand’s security and prosperity. New Zealand has a strong and internationally recognised track record of positive intervention in judicial proceedings in support of that order. </p>
<p>In 2012 <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/148/17256.pdf">New Zealand intervened</a> in the case brought by <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/148">Australia against Japan</a> for whaling in the Antarctic. Following our contributions to cases before the ICJ and ITLOS in 2023, we are well placed to continue that intervention in future judicial proceedings. </p>
<p>Calls have already been made for New Zealand to intervene in <a href="https://www.thepost.co.nz/nz-news/350142118/government-urged-join-genocide-case-against-israel">South Africa v. Israel</a>. Contributing to this case and to The Gambia v. Myanmar proceeding provides an important opportunity for New Zealand to make a proactive and substantive contribution to strengthening the international legal order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221114/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karen Scott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Six cases are testing international accountability mechanisms and showing how small countries like New Zealand can impact global justice.Karen Scott, Professor in Law, University of CanterburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2205232024-01-13T14:00:34Z2024-01-13T14:00:34ZWhat enforcement power does the International Court of Justice have in South Africa’s genocide case against Israel?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569112/original/file-20240112-23-eadg1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Judges take their seats prior to the hearing of Israel's defense at the International Court of Justice on Jan. 12, 2024. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/judges-take-their-seats-prior-to-the-hearing-of-israels-news-photo/1919200308?adppopup=true">Dursun Aydemir/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa <a href="https://apnews.com/article/world-court-israel-genocide-gaza-south-africa-774ab3c3d57fd7bcc627602eaf47fd98">says that Israel is committing genocide</a> against Palestinians in Gaza and has asked the International Court of Justice to intervene and stop Israeli military action in Gaza.</em> </p>
<p><em>Israel issued its initial defense to South Africa’s charges on Jan. 12, 2024, at the International Court of Justice – the United Nations’ highest human rights court – based in The Hague, Netherlands. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67944903">Israel argues that</a> its military is trying to minimize civilian harm and that South Africa is trying to both weaponize the term genocide and interfere with Israel’s right of self-defense against Hamas.</em></p>
<p><em>But can the International Court of Justice enforce any decision it makes in the case? “The question of the International Court of Justice’s actual powers of enforcement is a key issue on many people’s minds,” said <a href="https://search.asu.edu/profile/858959">Victor Peskin</a>, a scholar of international relations and human rights.</em> </p>
<p><em>We spoke with Peskin to better understand the potential impacts of South Africa’s <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192">genocide complaint against Israel</a> and the scope of the court’s power.</em> </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571666/original/file-20240126-9772-jccs82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men wearing dark jackets - one wearing a tie and the other wearing an old fashioned white wig - sit together at a table with the words Israel in a placard at the front of the table." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571666/original/file-20240126-9772-jccs82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571666/original/file-20240126-9772-jccs82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571666/original/file-20240126-9772-jccs82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571666/original/file-20240126-9772-jccs82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571666/original/file-20240126-9772-jccs82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571666/original/file-20240126-9772-jccs82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571666/original/file-20240126-9772-jccs82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israeli lawyers Gilad Noam, left, and Malcolm Shaw sit inside the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Nethalnds, on Jan. 26, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/gilad-noam-israelian-deputy-attorney-general-for-news-photo/1962733903?adppopup=true">Michael Porro/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What is the significance of South Africa bringing these charges?</h2>
<p>South Africa is a former apartheid state that underwent a largely peaceful transition to democracy in the mid-1990s. Symbolically, the fact that South Africa is bringing the case may have particular resonance. </p>
<p>However, South Africa has itself been accused of thwarting the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">1948 U.N. Genocide Convention</a>. This happened <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1791FQ/">after it hosted and failed to arrest</a> Sudan’s then-President Omar al-Bashir in 2015. Al-Bashir was <a href="https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/cases/omar-albashir#:%7E:text=Africa-,Sudanese%20President%20Omar%20al%2DBashir%20has%20been%20wanted%20by%20the,wanted%20by%20an%20international%20court.">charged by the International Criminal Court</a> with committing war crimes and genocide in the Darfur region of western Sudan in the 2000s. </p>
<p>South Africa’s case against Israel is the fourth genocide-related case at the International Court of Justice. The others pertained to the conflicts in Bosnia, Myanmar and Ukraine.</p>
<h2>What precedent did the Gambia-Myanmar case set for the court?</h2>
<p>There is some precedence for countries to bring a case regarding a conflict it is not directly involved in to the International Court of Justice. In 2019, Gambia filed a complaint at the <a href="https://iimm.un.org/icj-the-gambia-v-myanmar/#:%7E:text=On%2011%20November%202019%2C%20The,in%20Rakhine%20State%20as%20required">court against Myanmar</a>, regarding its alleged genocide of the Rohingya people, an ethnic minority living in Myanmar. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Genocide Convention</a> obligates all ratifying states to comply with the treaty. So, countries without a direct connection to an alleged case of genocide can legally bring a genocide complaint forward. </p>
<h2>What are provisional measures and why are they important?</h2>
<p>The International Court of Justice judges are still reviewing and adjudicating the merits of Gambia’s genocide complaint. There isn’t a final decision on that yet. The court did, within a relatively short period of time after it held a hearing in the case, issue written orders called provisional measures, <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-APP-01-00-EN.pdf">directing Myanmar</a> to prevent genocide and to preserve evidence related to the case. </p>
<p>If the judges were convinced that the Israeli military’s attacks on Gaza were excessive, they could quickly call for a halt in Israel’s attacks and a cessation of hostilities.</p>
<p>In theory, this could put public pressure on Israel to curtail or halt its military campaign. But even if the International Court of Justice calls for this, it would not necessarily indicate that the court will eventually rule that genocide has occurred. </p>
<h2>The International Court of Justice lacks enforcement power. So, is this case more than political theater?</h2>
<p>The International Court of Justice does not prosecute individuals, but rather focuses on resolving legal disputes between countries. The Hague-based International Criminal Court, which has the legal authority to investigate and prosecute individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, has opened up a <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-khan-kc-ramallah-situation-state-palestine-and-israel">separate investigation</a> into Israeli forces’ and Hamas militants’ alleged violations of international humanitarian law. </p>
<p>It’s always an open question – will an International Court of Justice ruling even be enforced and have any tangible effect? </p>
<p>While the International Court of Justice moved at a glacial pace in reaching a final decision in the Bosnia-Serbia case, it has shown that it can move more quickly when addressing mass violence. The judges did issue provisional measures calling for the prevention of violence in the Myanmar and Russia cases. </p>
<p>However, there is <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80703/qa-icj-order-on-provisional-measures-ukraine-russia/">little indication</a> that the International Court of Justice’s provisional measures eased <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar">Myanmar’s crackdown on the Rohingya</a>. Similarly, the ICJ’s provisional measures calling on Russia to halt its invasion of Ukraine has <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/182">had no apparent effect</a>.</p>
<p>This International Court of Justice could call for the Israeli military to end or curtail its conduct in Gaza, or to ease the flow of much-needed humanitarian aid for Palestinians, for example. This could put considerable international pressure on Israel. It could also push Israel’s strongest allies, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, to put more pressure on Israel. </p>
<h2>What does the ICJ’s track record on genocide tell us about this current case?</h2>
<p>In the first <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/91/judgments">case of this kind</a>, in 1993, <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/91#:%7E:text=On%2020%20March%201993%2C%20the,the%20United%20Nations%20on%209">Bosnia instituted proceedings</a> against Serbia, which was then part of the former republic of Yugoslavia, for alleged genocide. </p>
<p>The International Court of Justice’s eventual <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf">ruling in 2007</a> in the Serbia case was controversial. The court ruled that genocide was committed in the Bosnian war but that the government of Serbia was not directly responsible for it. Instead, the court ruled that the Serbian government failed to prevent genocide in Srebrenica. </p>
<p>Srebenica was the eastern, Muslim enclave in Bosnia that <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Srebrenica-massacre">Bosnian-Serb military forces overran</a> in 1995, murdering around <a href="https://www.hmd.org.uk/learn-about-the-holocaust-and-genocides/bosnia/srebrenica/">8,000 Muslim boys and men</a>. </p>
<p>The court also found the Serbian government violated the Genocide Convention by failing to arrest former Bosnian Serb Gen. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ratko-Mladic">Ratko Mladic,</a> then wanted for genocide by the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal in the former Yugoslavia. </p>
<p>That judgment by the International Court of Justice was a big blow and disappointment to many Bosnian Muslims and global human rights activists. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571671/original/file-20240126-25-3c6g4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large crowd of people wave Palestinian flags outside of a tall European building on a grey day." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571671/original/file-20240126-25-3c6g4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571671/original/file-20240126-25-3c6g4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571671/original/file-20240126-25-3c6g4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571671/original/file-20240126-25-3c6g4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571671/original/file-20240126-25-3c6g4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571671/original/file-20240126-25-3c6g4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571671/original/file-20240126-25-3c6g4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pro-Palestinian protesters gather outside the International Court of Justice on Jan. 26, 2024, the day the justices issued a preliminary order regarding Israel’s war in Gaza.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-holding-palestinian-flags-gather-outside-the-news-photo/1955396359?adppopup=true">Nikos Oikonomou/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How long could it take the ICJ to determine whether Israel committed genocide?</h2>
<p>It could take a number of years. The Bosnia-Serbia case took 14 years. It is unclear if the South Africa-Israel case would have to wait for a final judgment to first be rendered in the Gambia-Myanmar and Ukraine-Russia cases, which have not concluded.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220523/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Victor Peskin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While the International Court of Justice lacks enforcement powers, it can issue orders that could heighten international pressure on Israel to curtail some of its offensive in Gaza.Victor Peskin, Associate professor of politics and global studies, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178072023-12-28T20:38:22Z2023-12-28T20:38:22ZWill the world see more wars or unrest in 2024? Here are 5 hotspots to watch<p>Sadly, 2023 has been a violent one on the global stage. War broke out between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, leading to the deaths of thousands of Palestinians and hundreds of Israelis, including many children on both sides. And the bitter war between Russia and Ukraine continued with no end in sight. </p>
<p>As a result of the focus on these two conflicts, other countries have dropped off the radar for many people. Some of these nations have been dealing with simmering unrest, however, which could erupt in 2024 and seize the global spotlight. </p>
<p>So, where should we be watching in the coming year? Here are five places where I believe civil conflicts or unrest could worsen and potentially lead to violence.</p>
<h2>Myanmar</h2>
<p>Myanmar descended into chaos in 2021 when a military coup overthrew the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi and sparked widespread civil protests that eventually morphed into an armed resistance. </p>
<p>The country, home to <a href="https://www.embassyofmyanmar.be/ABOUT/ethnicgroups.htm">135 ethnic groups</a>, has rarely known peace. For years before the coup, there was a ongoing, low-grade civil conflict between the military and several minority ethnic groups who have long sought control over natural resources in their regions and independence from the state.</p>
<p>This exploded after the coup as ethnic militia groups joined forces with pro-democracy fighters from the Bamar majority protesting the junta.</p>
<p>Their resistance <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/the-myanmar-military-is-facing-death-by-a-thousand-cuts/">escalated in late 2023</a> with a coordinated northern offensive dealing the military its most significant losses in many years. </p>
<p>Insurgents won control of towns and villages on the northeastern border with China, including control over key trade routes. This led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/22/myanmar-fighting-at-its-worst-since-2021-coup-says-united-nations">renewed fighting</a> in western Rakhine state, as well as in other areas.</p>
<p>The tenacity of the resistance of these minority groups, paired with the refusal of the military to compromise, suggests the country’s civil war may worsen considerably in 2024 and regain international attention. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1728638209502880035"}"></div></p>
<h2>Mali</h2>
<p>In Mali, a nation in the turbulent Sahel region of Africa, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/nord-du-mali-une-confrontation-dont-personne-ne-sortira-vainqueur">tensions escalated throughout 2023</a> and now threaten to erupt into full-scale civil war. </p>
<p>Mali has long battled insurgent activity. In 2012, Mali’s government <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-calls-for-elections.html">fell in a coup</a> and Tuareg rebels, backed by Islamist militants, seized power in the north. </p>
<p>A United Nations peacekeeping mission was established in 2013 to bring stability to Mali. Then, in 2015, key rebel groups <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20150620-rebels-mali-tuareg-peace-deal-algiers-accord">signed a peace agreement</a> with the Mali government. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mali-crisis-un-peacekeepers-are-leaving-after-10-years-whats-needed-for-a-smooth-transition-210210">Mali crisis: UN peacekeepers are leaving after 10 years – what's needed for a smooth transition</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>After two more coups in 2020 and 2021, military officers consolidated their power and said they would restore the state’s full territorial control over all of Mali. The regime insisted the UN peacekeeping mission <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/july-2023/un-mali-we-respect-government%E2%80%99s-decision-mission-withdrawal">withdraw</a> from the country, which it did in June 2023. Subsequently, violence broke out between the military and rebel forces over future use of the UN bases. </p>
<p>In November, the military, reportedly backed by Russia’s Wagner Group, took control of the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/mali-tuareg-rebels-kidal-azawad-d1184c497265601de5d18d306fc398e3">strategic northern town of Kidal</a> which had been held by Tuareg forces since 2012. This undermines the fragile peace that has held since 2015. </p>
<p>It is unlikely the military will regain complete control over all rebel-held areas in the north. At the same time, insurgents are emboldened. With the 2015 peace agreement now all but dead, we can expect increased volatility in 2024. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1729138391545966975"}"></div></p>
<h2>Lebanon</h2>
<p>In 2019, widespread civil protest broke out in Lebanon against leaders who were perceived not to be addressing the day-to-day needs of the population. </p>
<p>The situation <a href="https://theconversation.com/lebanons-crisis-has-gone-from-bad-to-worse-but-is-anyone-listening-169645">continued to deteriorate</a>, with a reshuffled government, escalating economic crisis and a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-port-blast-beirut-blocked-investigation-d4606d6f28e3eb56510eac923611a03c">massive port explosion</a> that exposed corrupt practices. </p>
<p>The International Monetary Fund <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/09/14/pr23315-lebanon-imf-staff-concludes-visit-to-lebanon">criticised Lebanon in September</a> for a lack of economic reform. The Lebanese government has also failed to reach agreement on appointing a president, a post that has been vacant for <a href="https://www.state.gov/one-year-anniversary-of-lebanons-presidential-vacancy/">more than a year</a>. </p>
<p>This risks undermining the fragile power-sharing arrangement in Lebanon in which the key political posts of prime minister, speaker and president are allocated to a Sunni-Muslim, Shia-Muslim and Christian Maronite, respectively. </p>
<p>Most recently, the war between Israel and Hamas has threatened to spill over to Lebanon, home to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67307858">Hezbollah</a> militant group, which claims to have an army of 100,000 fighters. Importantly, this jeopardises tourism as a key hope for Lebanon’s economic recovery. </p>
<p>These factors may precipitate a more serious economic and political collapse in 2024. </p>
<h2>Pakistan</h2>
<p>Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the military has played an <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-a-historical-trail-of-pakistans-powerful-military-enterprise-205749">interventionist role in politics</a>. Though Pakistani leaders are popularly elected, military officials have at times removed them from power. </p>
<p>In 2022, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan fell out of favour with Pakistan’s militant leaders. He was subsequently <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/09/asia/imran-khan-voted-out-pakistan-prime-minister-intl-hnk/index.html">ousted from power</a> in a parliament vote and later arrested on charges that his supporters claim are politically motivated. </p>
<p>Violent demonstrations <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/09/world/asia/imran-khan-arrest-pakistan.html">broke out</a> nationwide after his arrest – a display of anger against the military that was once unthinkable. </p>
<p>Pakistan also faces spillover from instability in neighbouring Afghanistan and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/09/1141712">increased terror attacks</a>. These security challenges have been compounded by a struggling economy and ongoing costs from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/aug/05/a-year-on-the-devastating-long-term-effects-of-pakistans-floods-are-revealed">devastating 2022 floods</a>.</p>
<p>Pakistan is expected to hold <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/2/pakistan-to-hold-delayed-elections-on-february-8-electoral-commission-says">parliamentary elections</a> in February 2024, after which the current military caretaker government is expected to transfer power back to civilian rule. Many are watching the military closely. If this transfer of power does not take place, or there are delays, civil unrest may result.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1728529031262306609"}"></div></p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-imran-khans-populism-has-divided-pakistan-and-put-it-on-a-knifes-edge-205392">How Imran Khan's populism has divided Pakistan and put it on a knife's edge</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Sri Lanka</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/how-did-sri-lanka-run-out-of-money-5-graphs-that-explain-its-economic-crisis-187352">Sri Lanka faced a debilitating economic crisis in 2022</a> that led to critical fuel, food and medical shortages. Civil protests caused then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country. He was quickly replaced by current President Ranil Wickremesingh. </p>
<p>Stability returned in 2023 as Sri Lanka began implementing economic reforms as part of a bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund. However, widespread dissatisfaction with political elites and the underlying drivers of the country’s economic hardship have not been addressed. </p>
<p>Elections are also due in Sri Lanka by late 2024. While Wickremesingh, the incumbent, is likely to run for a second term, he has <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/unpopular-sri-lankan-president-consolidates-power-after-victory">low trust</a> with the public. He is viewed as too close to corrupt political elites. </p>
<p>This dissatisfaction could lead to renewed protests – particularly if the economy stumbles again – in a repeat of the situation that led to Rajapaksa’s ousting in 2022.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217807/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Genauer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From Myanmar to Pakistan, these countries have long-simmering conflicts or increasingly dissatisfied publics that could worsen in the new year.Jessica Genauer, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177532023-11-16T14:27:50Z2023-11-16T14:27:50ZMyanmar’s military junta appears to be in terminal decline<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559661/original/file-20231115-27-jfftqy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C6000%2C3970&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Myanmar military cracks down on peaceful protesters in Taunggy, Shan state.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/taunggyi-myanmar-11-march-2021-military-1944980590">R. Bociaga/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Myint Swe, the acting president of Mynamar’s military government, has warned that the country “will be split into various parts” after his armed forces suffered <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-67305690">huge territorial losses</a> to resistance fighters recently. His response was to call on Mynamar’s people to support his military forces, a call that is likely, based on previous experience, to fall mainly on deaf ears.</p>
<p>Far from sharing the military government’s fears of shrinking territorial control, it’s likely that most among Myanmar’s 55 million people will celebrate the army’s territorial losses. Junta misreads like this are not new – after they seized power in February 2021, the coup leaders indicated surprise when the coup met with <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-myanmar-is-rising-up-in-collective-fury-after-a-military-coup-the-conversation-weekly-podcast-154991">widespread outrage</a> and sustained public protest and resistance.</p>
<p>To quell opposition, military bosses have adopted a strategy of arbitrary arrest and extreme violence. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners estimates 19,675 people are <a href="https://coup.aappb.org/">currently jailed</a> – a figure which increases almost daily. Peaceful protests are met with army snipers and shoot-to-kill orders.</p>
<p>Myanmar’s military routinely responds to armed resistance by collectively punishing nearby civilian populations. This has included devastating airstrikes on civilian targets and scorched-earth “<a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/culture/books/the-quality-of-mercy-in-myanmar.html">clearance operation</a>” campaigns that have killed thousands of people and displaced more than 700,000 more. Rather than cowing the populace, junta violence continues to spur nationwide resistance.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559671/original/file-20231115-22-m3te4e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Myanmar showing states." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559671/original/file-20231115-22-m3te4e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559671/original/file-20231115-22-m3te4e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1316&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559671/original/file-20231115-22-m3te4e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1316&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559671/original/file-20231115-22-m3te4e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1316&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559671/original/file-20231115-22-m3te4e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1653&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559671/original/file-20231115-22-m3te4e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1653&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559671/original/file-20231115-22-m3te4e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1653&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Myanmar is a patchwork of different states and ethnic groups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hintha/Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since September 2021, the <a href="https://www.nugmyanmar.org/en/">National Unity Government (NUG)</a>, a shadow government in exile, has authorised a “<a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=563426214705678">defensive war</a>” against the state military, pushing for the creation of militias targeting the junta and its economic base. NUG militias have increasingly coordinated with Myanmar’s dozens of ethnic armed groups, many of which have already been fighting the Tatmadaw (the junta’s military) for decades. </p>
<p>Now, every time government troops leave their barracks they face potential attack, causing them to increasingly lean on air power, but further limiting their ability to maintain effective control on the ground. Economic and territorial losses have <a href="https://myanmar.iiss.org/">steadily accumulated</a>.</p>
<p>This is important because the Tatmadaw’s legitimacy depends on its ability to hold the country together. The controversial 2008 <a href="https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf">military-drafted constitution</a> refers to “non-disintegration” of Myanmar a dozen times, including as a duty of the defence forces. This was a key justification for the 1962 military coup that ushered in five decades of military rule.</p>
<p>During the immediate post-independence period (1948-1962), Myanmar’s civilian government struggled to maintain territorial control, at times controlling little more than major urban centres. The situation is similar now, except that today it is the Tatmadaw that is unable to maintain control beyond urban centres and military barracks. This will hit junta morale badly and inspire further resistance.</p>
<p>The junta’s <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/nine-towns-occupied-by-myanmar-military-for-decades-lost-to-resistance-in-days.html">recent reversal in Shan State</a>, its most significant territorial loss, came at the hands of three ethnic-based armed groups, the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army. These three groups now coordinate their activities as the <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/myanmar-operation-1027-11102023122533.html">Brotherhood Alliance</a>. </p>
<p>They <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmar-military-chiefs-gather-for-emergency-meeting.html">inflicted heavy losses</a> on junta forces in early November, overrunning dozens of military posts and killing the commander of the 99th Light Infantry Division, a unit known internationally for its genocidal campaign against the Rohingya community. The Brotherhood Alliance also captured the main overland route from Mandalay to China, a key economic corridor.</p>
<h2>China’s role</h2>
<p>Brotherhood Alliance members are themselves territorially ambitious, but rely on China for arms so it is unlikely an operation in China’s hinterland could have occurred without China’s acquiescence. Allowing this operation to go ahead is a strong statement by a Chinese government frustrated with the junta’s inaction on <a href="https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2618314/china-tells-myanmar-to-root-out-scam-gangs">online scam centres</a> in Shan State where thousands of trafficked Chinese and other foreigners have been forced to work in slave-like conditions. </p>
<p>China’s strategic ambiguity is unsurprising. China was far from enthusiastic about the 2021 coup. China’s ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/ambassador-tries-calm-anti-china-feeling-myanmar-following-coup.html">told journalists</a> at the time a coup was, “absolutely not what China wants to see”. While traditionally a key international ally of the junta, China’s leadership had a very close relationship with Myanmar’s ousted de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and maintains close ties with many of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups. </p>
<p>Now, strategic reversals, nationwide territorial losses and economic decline mean momentum has strongly shifted away from Myanmar’s junta. China’s leadership may have read the situation better than most, recognising the junta may now be in a death spiral. </p>
<p>Others have been less shrewd. Russia has displaced China as the junta’s <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/05/un-expert-exposes-1-billion-death-trade-myanmar-military">biggest arms supplier</a> accounting for US$406 million (£326.5 million) of Myanmar’s arms imports since the coup and crucially providing aviation fuel in exchange for funds, access to Bay of Bengal port facilities, and regional relevance. </p>
<p>Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing recently welcomed <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-myanmar-navy-andaman-sea-1d0f0c692a4583a0c449e6c8cc3b620b">Russia’s navy</a> for joint manoeuvres, describing Vladimir Putin in glowing terms as a “leader of the world who is creating stability on the international arena”. For Putin, this may soon be embarrassingly unwelcome praise. By linking itself so closely with a declining junta, Russia guarantees its Myanmar influence and regional relevance will not outlast military rule.</p>
<h2>Post-junta planning</h2>
<p>The NUG idealises a post-junta Myanmar unified under its leadership with Aung San Suu Kyi returned to power. But for many ethnic armed groups – who will feel they, rather than the NUG, inflicted the strongest blows on the junta and now control significant territory – that is not likely their preferred outcome. They will seek guarantees about key demands around federalism and minority rights that were not satisfactorily addressed when Aung San was last in power.</p>
<p>The junta appears on a clear path to defeat, but this will not be immediate. Meanwhile, the state’s military forces commonly respond to reversals with shocking violence, so bringing junta rule to a speedy end must be prioritised. Myanmar’s population and neighbouring states will also not want the country, post-junta, to descend into the same sort of fractured instability as in the immediate post-independence period.</p>
<p>Myanmar’s neighbours, Asean, and western powers who have talked tough on human rights in Myanmar, including the US, UK and EU, must now take steps to ensure the post-junta future plays out peacefully with all resistance groups included in decisions about Myanmar’s future. </p>
<p>The transitional period after the removal of the military will require a commitment from international actors to ensure the stability of the country, perhaps like the <a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=f332bc0c967c19a5JmltdHM9MTcwMDAwNjQwMCZpZ3VpZD0yYWIyNjBjYS04YWVmLTZhYTctMmMyYi03M2NkOGIzZDZiYmEmaW5zaWQ9NTI2Nw&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=3&fclid=2ab260ca-8aef-6aa7-2c2b-73cd8b3d6bba&psq=Cambodian+Untac+process&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly9oaXIuaGFydmFyZC5lZHUvY2FtYm9kaWFzLXRyYWdlZHktYW5kLXRyaXVtcGgtdGhlLXVucy1ncmVhdGVzdC1leHBlcmltZW50LTMwLXllYXJzLW9uLw&ntb=1">Cambodian Untac process</a> in the 1990s. Rather than being again caught on the hop by events in Myanmar, Asean and the UN should begin preparations to manage the transition to a post-junta Myanmar that now appears increasingly likely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217753/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronan Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nearly three years after seizing power, the military junta in Myanmar has lost control of most of the country.Ronan Lee, Vice-Chancellor Independent Research Fellow, Institute for Media and Creative Industries, Loughborough University London, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2160592023-10-27T12:18:51Z2023-10-27T12:18:51ZHow to deal with visual misinformation circulating in the Israel-Hamas war and other conflicts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555906/original/file-20231025-32532-ydudo7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C8053%2C4990&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Social media is often used during times of conflict to spread fake news.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/social-media-icon-logo-displayed-on-a-smartphone-with-news-photo/1726773180?adppopup=true">Jonathan Raa/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the three weeks since war began between Israel and Hamas, social media has been taken over with images and stories of attacks, many of which proved false. </p>
<p>For example, within hours of Hamas’ surprise attack on Oct. 7, 2023, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/10/1204755129/video-game-clips-and-old-videos-are-flooding-social-media-about-israel-and-gaza">screen grabs from a popular video game</a> were shared by thousands of social media users as if depicting real scenes of violence against Israeli troops in Gaza. Five days later, a real explosion at a hospital in Gaza <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/19/1207173798/fake-accounts-old-videos-and-rumors-fuel-chaos-around-gaza-hospital-explosion">spurred further sharing</a> of such spurious images to buttress various claims and counterclaims about responsibility for the casualties.</p>
<p>It’s not just this war. Over the past decade, international commissions and tribunals working to mediate conflicts in Syria, Myanmar, Ukraine and elsewhere <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80404/the-intl-criminal-courts-ukraine-investigation-a-test-case-for-user-generated-evidence/">have struggled</a> to verify the large amount of digital evidence. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=7bfZyk8AAAAJ&hl=en">human rights scholar</a>, I have, of late, been studying the ethics of viewing photos and videos of war and atrocities in situations where falsification of imagery is widespread. A principal lesson of this research is that users of social media have significant power to influence the content they receive and thus bear some responsibility when they consume and share false information.</p>
<h2>Defining misinformation and disinformation</h2>
<p>Scholars and policymakers distinguish misinformation from disinformation <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/ukraine-disinfo-desinfo.aspx?lang=eng#a1">based on the intentions behind their creation and circulation</a>. Misinformation consists of false information that is not created or circulated with the intent to deceive. Disinformation consists of false information, including visual information, that is intended to deceive and do harm.</p>
<p>At the start of any war, misinformation proliferates. Rumors that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had fled Kyiv spread quickly after Russian forces invaded that country, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraines-zelenskyy-squashes-rumors-hes-fled-kyiv-video-we-are-here-1682830">only to be rebutted</a> by videos posted from the streets of the capital. The difficulty of sifting reports on the ground, along with the reality that Zelenskyy was personally at risk, made many people accept and share those rumors.</p>
<p>Increasingly, however, false information about conflicts comes from actors – whether governments, military officials, separatist groups or private citizens – <a href="https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2021/03/30/fog-of-war-and-information/">intentionally using texts and images to deceive</a>. In Myanmar, for example, military propaganda officers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/31/myanmar-army-fakes-photos-and-history-in-sinister-rewrite-of-rohingya-crisis">published photographs</a> supposedly depicting Rohingya people arriving in the country under British colonial rule in the mid-20th century. In actuality, these photographs, shared to support the military’s claim that the Rohingya had no right to live in Myanmar, depicted refugees from the 1994 Rwandan genocide. </p>
<h2>Conditions for ethical responsibility</h2>
<p>As social media becomes saturated with falsified images of mass violence in the Israel-Hamas war, the Ukraine war and other regions of the globe, individuals should ask what ethical responsibility they bear for their consumption of misinformation and disinformation. </p>
<p>Some might deny that users of digital media bear any such responsibility, since they are merely the passive recipients of content created by others.
Philosopher <a href="https://philosophy.princeton.edu/people/gideon-rosen">Gideon Rosen</a> <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3840937">claims</a> that when people are passive toward some occurrence, they generally don’t bear ethical responsibility for it. Anyone scrolling the internet will passively encounter hundreds of images and related texts, and it is tempting to assume they bear no responsibility for the images of war and mass violence that they see but only for how they respond to them. </p>
<p>However, users of digital media are not merely passive recipients of falsified images and stories. Instead, they have power to influence the kinds of images that show up on their screens. This means, in turn, that users bear some ethical responsibility for their consumption of visual misinformation and disinformation.</p>
<h2>Algorithms and influence</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555909/original/file-20231025-37260-qkxp15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman sits facing two computer screens while scrolling through news stories." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555909/original/file-20231025-37260-qkxp15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555909/original/file-20231025-37260-qkxp15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555909/original/file-20231025-37260-qkxp15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555909/original/file-20231025-37260-qkxp15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555909/original/file-20231025-37260-qkxp15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555909/original/file-20231025-37260-qkxp15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555909/original/file-20231025-37260-qkxp15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Digital media relies on algorithms to deliver content.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/war-room-leader-for-brazil-elections-lexi-sturdy-works-in-news-photo/1052439022?adppopup=true">Noah Berger/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Digital media platforms deliver content to users on the basis of complex decision-making procedures known as algorithms. <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/shoshana-zuboff/the-age-of-surveillance-capitalism/9781610395694/?lens=publicaffairs">Through both online and offline behaviors</a>, users help determine what these algorithms deliver. </p>
<p>It is helpful to distinguish between influence and control. Having control over content would mean either encountering only images and stories that one consciously chooses or having the power to screen out any and all unwanted images. It is typical of digital communications, as philosopher <a href="https://www.some.ox.ac.uk/eminent/onora-oneill/">Onora O'Neill</a> has <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108981583">pointed out</a>, that users lack the ability to control content in these ways.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, users can significantly influence the material they encounter in digital spaces. The algorithms by which social media platforms and other digital networks deliver content to users are not fully transparent, but neither are they wholly mysterious. In most cases, they are <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ct/article-abstract/26/3/309/4061231?redirectedFrom=fulltext">propelled</a> by users’ past engagement with a platform’s content – a fact reflected in the very name of the “For You” page on TikTok. </p>
<p>Liking, tagging, commenting on or merely continuing to watch images of war and atrocities tends to lead to additional encounters with such content. The potential risks of this algorithmic process became apparent in the mid-2010s, when YouTube’s algorithm was found to be leading users into progressively <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/18/business/youtube-terrorism.html">more extreme videos related to jihadist violence</a>. </p>
<p>Although major social media platforms have community guidelines prohibiting incitement to violence and sharing of graphic content, those prohibitions are difficult to enforce. In the context of some ongoing wars, they have even been relaxed – with Facebook <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-facebook-instagram-temporarily-allow-calls-violence-against-russians-2022-03-10/">temporarily allowing</a> posts calling for violence against Russian troops and paramilitary groups occupying parts of Ukraine, for example. Taken together, these processes and policies have opened the door to substantial misinformation and disinformation about armed conflict.</p>
<p>Hiding, reporting or simply disengaging with violent content, by contrast, tends to lead to fewer such messages coming in. It may also reduce the odds that such content will reach others. If one knows that a Facebook friend or TikTok content creator has shared false information before, it is possible to block that friend or unfollow that creator. </p>
<p>Because users have these means of influencing the images they receive, it is reasonable to assign them some responsibility for algorithmically generated misinformation and disinformation. </p>
<h2>Verifying images</h2>
<p>Altering patterns of engagement with digital content can decrease users’ exposure to misinformation in wartime. But how can users verify the images they do receive before directing others to them?</p>
<p>One simple protocol, promoted by educators and public health groups, is <a href="https://guides.lib.uchicago.edu/c.php?g=1241077&p=9082322">known by the acronym SIFT</a>: stop, investigate, find, trace. The four stages of this protocol ask users to stop, investigate the source of a message, find better coverage, and trace quotes and claims back to their original contexts. </p>
<p>Images, like quotes, can often be traced to their original contexts. Google makes available its reverse image search tool, which <a href="https://newslit.org/tips-tools/doctored-images/">allows users</a> to select an image – or parts of it – and find where else it appears online. I found this tool helpful during the first months of the COVID pandemic, when Holocaust photographs were circulated online in <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/kansas-newspaper-cartoon-face-mask-holocaust-the-anderson-county-review-2020-7">posts comparing</a> mask mandates to deportation trains. Of course, as journalists and forensic researchers are quick to <a href="https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/bbc-expert-debunking-israel-hamas-war-visuals-volume-misinformation-twitter-was-beyond">point out</a>, such tools can only be applied to a small portion of the images we encounter in our daily lives. </p>
<p>No technique or protocol will give users absolute control of the images they see in wartime or provide complete assurance against sharing false information. But by understanding users’ power to influence content, it may be possible to mitigate these risks and promote a more truthful future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216059/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Morrow receives funding from a Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Grant number EMW-2022-GR-00093). In March 2023, he co-curated an exhibit at Dayton's International Peace Museum titled The Disinformation Age.</span></em></p>A human rights scholar explains how social media users can take charge of what content comes into their feed and reduce the risk of receiving misinformation.Paul Morrow, Human Rights Fellow, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2108092023-08-08T02:48:33Z2023-08-08T02:48:33ZMyanmar junta reducing Aung San Suu Kyi’s sentence is an empty gesture from a failing state<p>In a general amnesty announced on military television last week, Myanmar’s military junta <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/01/aung-san-suu-kyi-receives-partial-pardon-myanmar">removed six years</a> from the jail term of Aung San Suu Kyi, the 78-year-old leader of the government removed by a coup in February 2021. This came a week after the junta <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66323190">moved her into house arrest</a> following a year in solitary confinement.</p>
<p>But it still leaves Aung San Suu Kyi facing a 27-year jail term on <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/myanmars-kangaroo-courts-hand-aung-san-suu-kyi-another-six-year-term-while-sean-turnell-pleads-not-guilty/">bogus charges</a>.</p>
<p>The junta also lopped four years off former president Win Myint’s sentence, and reportedly released more than 7,000 other prisoners.</p>
<p>But we shouldn’t be persuaded that the junta has changed its stripes. It regularly uses <a href="https://theconversation.com/relief-as-australian-sean-turnell-to-be-released-from-prison-in-myanmar-but-more-needs-to-be-done-194814">mass amnesties</a> in attempts to cultivate goodwill, either at home or abroad. But any major figures released in these amnesties shouldn’t have been locked up in the first place.</p>
<p>The day before the amnesty, the junta <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-08-01/myanmar-junta-rulers-officially-postpone-election/102672784">extended</a> its state of emergency for a fourth time, further delaying elections, due to relentless opposition to its February 2021 coup.</p>
<p>The coup sparked ongoing and widespread violence, and shredded the military’s last claims to social esteem. This has left Myanmar impoverished, largely friendless, and without any clear plan for a positive future.</p>
<h2>Determined resistance</h2>
<p>The army’s top decision-makers, currently bunkered in the capital, Naypyidaw, struggle to maintain control of enough territory to seriously contemplate even a heavily stage-managed nationwide poll.</p>
<p>Under these volatile conditions, people have been voting with their feet by fleeing abroad or taking up arms in a revolutionary mobilisation.</p>
<p>The junta’s leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, reportedly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/1/myanmar-military-extends-emergency-postpones-election">told</a> the National Defence and Security Council that elections couldn’t be conducted due to continued fighting in several regions.</p>
<p>The reality for the generals in their fortified compounds is that any poll could further embarrass them – they cannot even reliably rig the national vote.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-myanmar-suffers-the-military-junta-is-desperate-isolated-and-running-out-of-options-187697">As Myanmar suffers, the military junta is desperate, isolated and running out of options</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Many areas are off-limits to government forces, perhaps as much as half the country – which is Southeast Asia’s second-largest by land area. While aerial bombardments by regime aircraft might set back the resistance, the strategy is hardly a way to win hearts or minds. Inch by inch, the diminution of central government control raises questions about the country’s future. </p>
<p>There’s increasing concern across the Southeast Asian region. An intractable civil conflict presents significant challenges for neighbours Thailand, China, India and Bangladesh.</p>
<p>Diplomatic efforts to maintain Myanmar’s territorial integrity jostle with the discomfort felt almost everywhere about doing business with a blood-splattered regime.</p>
<p>The regime tries to play the politics of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to its advantage. But even there, sometimes in the company of other autocrats, Myanmar now faces the ignominy of an “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/asean-foreign-ministers-hold-talks-on-myanmar-crisis/7177251.html">empty seat</a>” at the political level. And almost nobody wants to shake hands with regime representatives.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1619792583546343425"}"></div></p>
<h2>An unnecessary crisis</h2>
<p>It’s a precipitous erosion of what was, until the coup, a relatively positive story for most Myanmar people.</p>
<p>Before the coup, the most problematic issue was the military’s abuses of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2020.1813251">Rohingya</a>, a Muslim ethnic minority living in westernmost Myanmar.</p>
<p>Other issues – such as longstanding ethnic grievances and yawning economic inequality – were, at the very least, subject to open debate in the media and sometimes in the country’s 16 regional and national legislatures.</p>
<p>That political and social infrastructure, and the emerging civil society it helped sustain, has now crumbled. It’s been replaced by violence, mistrust, terror and martial chauvinism.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">Military violence in Myanmar is worsening amid fierce resistance and international ambivalence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Myanmar’s young talent now banned from universities, bravely disobedient in the faces of tanks and bullets, face dismal options: the mountains, the jungle, the border. Some lie low. Others still seek to fan the revolutionary spark. Many are now in jail, others dead.</p>
<p>The military, of course, blames its opponents for the devastation its coup unleashed. That sad fact hides a tremendous political and cultural miscalculation. </p>
<p>It’s unclear whether Myanmar can recover from the army’s self-inflicted wounds. Some speculate the whole system will collapse, making it impossible for powerbrokers to keep up the increasingly flimsy charade of state power. It has all the ingredients of a failed state.</p>
<h2>No way out</h2>
<p>The decision to abandon the proposed elections, followed by last week’s amnesty, is hardly a surprise. But it does reveal the fragility of the military system and the paranoia of the men in charge.</p>
<p>It’s also further evidence that nobody can trust the junta. Not only has it broken the faith of the Myanmar people, it constantly tests the patience of foreign governments, even those that offer some sympathy for its self-sabotage.</p>
<p>With Aung San Suu Kyi and other senior members of the democratically elected government still locked up, the reality facing the generals is they will never beat her at any election. They are still betting that eventually the world – and, most importantly, their near neighbours – will lose interest and allow some type of partial rehabilitation. Maintaining <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/2/china-russia-india-enabling-myanmars-military-report">links with China and Russia</a> is a key strategy.</p>
<p>Still, there’s no obvious path to fuller inclusion in ASEAN while the generals unleash such violence against their own people.</p>
<p>The extension of the state of emergency and postponement of hypothetical elections will further invigorate resistance forces hoping to steadily weaken the army’s grip on power.</p>
<p>A pointless reduction in the jail sentences for Myanmar’s democratically elected leaders is unlikely to quell the fires of opposition now burning across the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Farrelly has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council for Myanmar-focussed work. He is on the board of the Australia-ASEAN Council, which is an Australian government body. These are his personal views.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A pointless reduction in the jail sentences for Myanmar’s democratically elected leaders is unlikely to quell the fires of opposition now burning across the country.Nicholas Farrelly, Professor and Head of Social Sciences, University of TasmaniaAdam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2092912023-08-03T12:22:36Z2023-08-03T12:22:36ZMyanmar crisis highlights limits of Indonesia’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ as it sets sights on becoming a ‘great regional power’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540124/original/file-20230731-16223-lebhyc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=532%2C1391%2C5750%2C3261&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Myanmar's seat was left empty at a recent meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/this-picture-shows-an-empty-seat-reserved-for-a-myanmar-news-photo/1521950355?adppopup=true">Achmad Ibrahim/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With regional power comes regional responsibilities – as Indonesia is finding out.</p>
<p>The world’s fourth most populous nation aspires to be a “<a href="https://setkab.go.id/keketuaan-asean-dan-visi-politik-luar-negeri-indonesia/">great regional power” by 2030</a>, playing a stabilizing role in Southeast Asia.</p>
<p>It is getting an early taste of what that entails. As the <a href="https://theconversation.com/chairing-asean-what-does-it-mean-for-indonesia-in-2023-190208">current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations</a>, Indonesia has been called upon by international bodies, including the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/06/un-expert-urges-coordinated-action-indonesia-and-other-nations-address">United Nations</a>, to show leadership in resolving one of the region’s bloodiest conflict: <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">Myanmar’s civil war</a>. And progress has been slow.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=JhojdBgAAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of international relations</a> and Indonesian foreign policy, I see the nation’s handling of the Myanmar crisis as an early test of how Indonesia could fare as the region’s great power.</p>
<h2>The limits of ‘quiet diplomacy’</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60144957">civil war</a> between the military and the anti-military groups in Myanmar has <a href="https://www.prio.org/news/3062">claimed thousands of lives</a>. It followed a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/19/myanmar-coup-2021-explained-in-30-seconds">2021 coup</a> that returned the country to military rule, with the junta embarking on a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/28/myanmar-year-brutality-coups-wake">brutal crackdown of the opposition</a>. Since then, the ruling generals have <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">encountered fierce resistance</a> from armed groups.</p>
<p>In April 2021, a few months into the conflict, ASEAN leaders meeting in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta <a href="https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf">agreed to a “five-point consensus”</a> on Myanmar, calling for an immediate cease-fire, constructive dialogue between all parties, a special envoy to help mediate the conflict, humanitarian assistance from ASEAN and a delegation visit to Myanmar to facilitate the peace process.</p>
<p>More than two years on, the first point of the <a href="https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf">five-point consensus</a> has still not been implemented, and chances of a cease-fire look remote under the current level of fighting. In May, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-quietly-engaging-key-stakeholders-myanmar-crisis-foreign-minister-2023-05-05/">responding to criticism over perceived inaction</a> over the crisis, said Indonesia was relying on “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230505-indonesia-says-using-quiet-diplomacy-to-help-solve-myanmar-crisis">quiet diplomacy</a>.” Such a policy forms part of Indonesia’s attempts to balance the <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/08/asean-and-the-principle-of-non-interference/">nonintervention principal</a> of ASEAN – by which meddling in the domestic affairs of neighboring states is unacceptable – with the need to address the internal crisis in Myanmar. But efforts to influence the behavior of another state through discreet negotiations or actions have clearly not yet succeeded.</p>
<p><iframe id="RI5Dq" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/RI5Dq/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>It doesn’t bode well for Indonesia’s desire to be a stabilizing factor in the region. </p>
<p>In theory, Indonesia should be well placed to assume regional leadership. It is a member of the G20 gathering of richest nations and is poised to have the <a href="https://setkab.go.id/en/indonesia-will-be-worlds-4th-largest-economy-by-2045-president-jokowi-says/">world’s fourth largest economy within two decades</a>. Its military is <a href="https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-southeast-asia.php">ranked the most powerful</a> in the region. Added to this economic and military might is a willingness to assume the role of regional leader.</p>
<p>Yet Indonesia’s calls for a cease-fire in Myanmar have fallen on deaf ears, in part because the warring parties know Indonesia is unwilling to punish Myanmar for failing to end the fighting. Any such punitive action would be deemed unacceptable under the ASEAN nonintervention principle. </p>
<h2>No end to war</h2>
<p>The pressure that Indonesia may have been able to assert on Myamar’s warring parties has been blunted for a number of reasons.</p>
<p>Theoretically, the high cost of war <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400824465/committing-to-peace">should encourage combatants</a> to the negotiating table – the idea being that when coffers dry up and civilian suffering mounts, peace becomes a more attractive option. Yet the worsening violence on the ground suggests that both sides are absorbing the costs.</p>
<p>Myanmar’s ruling junta is aided here by revenue generated from the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/05/un-expert-exposes-1-billion-death-trade-myanmar-military">Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise</a>, which allows the military to finance the purchasing of arms. And <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-slap-new-sanctions-myanmar-state-owned-banks-sources-2023-06-21/">despite sanctions</a> imposed by the United States and several Western nations, the generals are able to replenish weapon stocks through deals with countries <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/18/world/un-myanmar-report-military-junta-deadly-arms-sales-russia-china-intl-hnk/index.html">including Russia, China</a> <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/arms-07032023152856.html">and India</a>. </p>
<p>Part of the problem is that implementation of the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-burma-act-does-and-doesnt-mean-us-policy-myanmar">current targeted</a> round of Western sanctions partly relies on support from other countries. And the story of sanctioned arms dealers such as business tycoon <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-17/myanmar-tycoons-arms-dealer-sanctioned-by-us-finds-shelter-in-singapore">Tay Za</a>, who has been accused by the U.S. of supplying arms and equipment to the junta but still manages to operate his business from Singapore, provides an example of how traders are able to circumvent international sanctions.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, through the BURMA Act – incorporated into the <a href="https://armedservices.house.gov/ndaa">National Defense Authorization Act</a> and <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3252968/biden-signs-national-defense-authorization-act-into-law">signed by President Joe Biden</a> in December 2022 – the U.S. pledged to provide nonlethal assistance, such as medical supplies, radar equipment and armored military vehicles, to pro-democratic forces in Burma. </p>
<p>Although this is welcomed by supporters of Myanmar democracy, it nonetheless makes it harder to force a weakened opposition to the negotiating table – especially if it believes it is winning the war.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="M16 assault rifles lean against a wall that appears to be blood-stained." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540409/original/file-20230801-25-v5y65s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540409/original/file-20230801-25-v5y65s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540409/original/file-20230801-25-v5y65s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540409/original/file-20230801-25-v5y65s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540409/original/file-20230801-25-v5y65s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540409/original/file-20230801-25-v5y65s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540409/original/file-20230801-25-v5y65s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Myanmar’s civil war: well armed and bloody.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/rifles-lean-against-the-wall-of-a-karenni-nationalities-news-photo/1549096325?adppopup=true">Daphne Wesdorp/Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And finally, although the junta is finding it difficult to force an emboldened pro-democracy opposition into submission, it is still the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-s-military-numbers">strongest party in the conflict</a>. Knowing that might make it more reluctant to negotiate. As it is, any mediator faces the problem of trying to force a military junta <a href="https://humanrightsclinic.law.harvard.edu/beyond-the-coup-in-myanmar-in-accordance-with-the-law-how-the-military-perverts-rule-of-law-to-oppress-civilians/">used to being in power and accustomed to impunity over its actions</a> to the table. </p>
<h2>So what is Indonesia’s role?</h2>
<p>So where does that leave Indonesia’s attempt to play regional peacemaker?</p>
<p>Patience is <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/time-is-running-out-for-indonesia-to-turn-the-tide-on-myanmar/">understandably running thin</a> for <a href="https://jakartaglobe.id/news/quiet-diplomacy-raises-expectations-on-asean-chair-indonesia">international observers</a> who watch the military junta committing atrocities on the opposition daily. Some have <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/After-success-with-G-20-Indonesia-now-must-rally-ASEAN-to-act">called on Indonesia to suspend</a> Myanmar’s ASEAN membership. </p>
<p>Although Indonesia and the rest of ASEAN member states decided <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/26/asean-summit-begins-without-myanmar-after-top-generals-exclusion">not to invite</a> the representative of the junta to attend this year’s summit, I believe they are unlikely to suspend its ASEAN membership out of concern for destabilizing the region further.</p>
<p>As an aspiring <a href="https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0222.xml">regional power</a>, Indonesia has the ability to harness not only its economic and military weight but its moral voice by continuing to appeal to warring parties to better protect the lives of Myanmar civilians.</p>
<p>Getting the combatants to agree to end the violence might be an unattainable goal during its tenure as the chair of ASEAN. But if Indonesia is to become a stabilizing leader in the region, it will need to continue efforts long after it relinquishes that role in December 2023.</p>
<h2>Getting the big guns involved</h2>
<p>In the final few months of ASEAN leadership, Indonesia can lay the foundation for a resolution of the Myanmar crisis. That includes holding the junta accountable or at least cutting its capacity to violently attack the anti-junta forces. </p>
<p>Such a goal would require coordinated action among the U.S. and China, as well as other ASEAN members, to exert pressure on Myanmar’s generals. </p>
<p>And here Indonesia can play a role by making sure the Myanmar crisis is not being overlooked by the U.S. and the West in general, or by China, which has <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/02/limits-beijings-support-myanmars-military">continued close ties</a> with Myanmar’s generals. As the emerging regional power, Indonesia’s “quiet diplomacy” can extend to bringing up the issue of Myanmar in high-level meetings in Beijing and Washington, as well as in regional bodies.</p>
<p>In such bilateral discussions, Indonesia can help steer the direction of sanctions. Although the junta has survived multiple Western sanctions, the threat of a well-coordinated round of tougher, targeted sanctions could gradually deprive the junta of resources. Indonesia, can further assist by encouraging regional governments to crack down on sanction-breaking junta supporters supplying military equipment to the generals from places such as Singapore. Similarly, coordination with Washington over the type of lethal assistance it provides the opposition could support humanitarian efforts while not inflaming the situation further.</p>
<p>Perhaps before becoming the “great regional power” it aspires to be, Indonesia is best placed to lean into its position as a conduit to the current geopolitical power brokers in Washington and Beijing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209291/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angguntari Ceria Sari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As current chair of the regional body ASEAN, Indonesia is tasked with resolving a conflict that has killed thousands. Progress has been slow.Angguntari Ceria Sari, Lecturer in International Relations, Universitas Katolik ParahyanganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2081662023-07-18T12:30:07Z2023-07-18T12:30:07ZRegistering refugees using personal information has become the norm – but cybersecurity breaches pose risks to people giving sensitive biometric data<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537876/original/file-20230717-228004-jmszuz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=260%2C116%2C5452%2C3871&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A refugee from the Democratic Republic of Congo registers his fingerprints on a biometric machine in Uganda in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1241304591/photo/uganda-drcongo-conflict-refugees.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=GIveI_8HesUbGVDN5Hf6zrzolPVHEsfdeTOn98hP4qM=">Badru Katumba/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/worldwide-refugees-reach-all-time-high/">number of refugees worldwide</a> reached record high levels in 2022. More than 108.4 million people have been forced to flee their homes because of violence or persecution. Meanwhile, <a href="https://hir.harvard.edu/new-technologies-that-monitor-displaced-persons/">governments and aid agencies are increasingly using</a> a <a href="https://www.digital-adoption.com/what-is-digital-technology/">controversial method</a> of effectively identifying and tracking many refugees. </p>
<p>This method, known as biometrics, involves collecting someone’s physical or behavioral characteristics, ranging from fingerprints to voice. Organizations that collect the personal physical data can store it to instantly recognize someone after scanning their fingerprints or irises, for example. </p>
<p>The United Nations refugee agency, often known as UNHCR, is among the groups that have grown their <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/blogs/unhcrs-biometric-tools-in-2023/#:%7E:text=UNHCR%2C%20the%20UN%20Refugee%20Agency,in%20countries%20across%20the%20world">biometrics programs</a> over the past several years to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/02/big-brother-turns-its-eye-on-refugees/">help identify refugees</a> and deliver lifesaving aid and other services. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ITS9Jk4AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">cybersecurity scholar</a>, I think it is important to understand that while identifying people using biometrics might be convenient for organizations collecting the data, the practice comes with inherent privacy risks that can threaten vulnerable people’s safety. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537873/original/file-20230717-200504-rtj5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A cellphone showing a woman's face is held up near the same woman's face." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537873/original/file-20230717-200504-rtj5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537873/original/file-20230717-200504-rtj5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537873/original/file-20230717-200504-rtj5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537873/original/file-20230717-200504-rtj5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537873/original/file-20230717-200504-rtj5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537873/original/file-20230717-200504-rtj5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537873/original/file-20230717-200504-rtj5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An election official in Afghanistan scans a voter’s face with a biometric device at a polling center in 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1052593356/photo/an-afghan-independent-election-commission-official-scans-a-voters-face-with-a-biometric.jpg?s=612x612&w=0&k=20&c=52TDw37mZutBK1lSY-OBeiT1MXwqLT_5Jwre4gM15wI=">Hoshang Hashimi/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How it works</h2>
<p>The biometrics data-gathering process begins with <a href="https://iow.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2013/04/07-Rijpma-Background4-Refugees-and-Biometrics.pdf">enrollment, which involves</a> representatives from a government or organization collecting someone’s personal physical information when they perform intake into a registration system.</p>
<p>Many people also routinely use biometrics for personal reasons, like recording their own fingerprints so they can unlock and use their phone.</p>
<p>Organizations can use this kind of personal biometric information to authenticate a person’s identity – meaning, confirming that a person is who they say they are. Or, they can use it to simply identify someone and determine who they are. </p>
<p>Authentication works by comparing a person’s previously captured images or recordings – their biometrics – with their recently collected biometrics information.</p>
<p>Identification, on the other hand, compares a person’s recently collected biometrics against all other people’s templates stored in a biometrics database. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbp.gov/travel/biometrics">U.S. law enforcement</a> and international <a href="https://www.cntraveler.com/story/how-airports-are-using-biometrics-so-you-can-spend-less-time-waiting-in-lines">travel-related companies</a> alike tend to use biometrics in their work. <a href="https://le.fbi.gov/science-and-lab/biometrics-and-fingerprints/biometrics/next-generation-identification-ngi">That ranges from identifying</a> re-offending criminals across multiple jurisdictions, for example, or quickly identifying people as they <a href="https://www.tsa.gov/biometrics-technology#:%7E:text=During%20the%20tests%2C%20TSA%20will,between%20TSA%20officers%20and%20passengers.">pass through an airport</a> or cross an international border. </p>
<h2>Cybersecurity challenges</h2>
<p>For groups of people like refugees who might not be carrying passports or other forms of identification, biometrics provides a convenient and reliable way to verify their identities while reducing the risk of fraud.</p>
<p>Aid workers can also use <a href="https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/monthly-issues/security-technology/archive/2021/december/reaching-the-remote-with-fingerprint-biometrics/">biometrics systems in remote areas</a> with limited cell service or internet, which is common in refugee processing centers in poor countries. </p>
<p>More than <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2019-06-21/biometric-data-is-being-collected-from-refugees-asylum-seekers/11209274">80% of the refugees</a> registered with UNHCR have a biometric record. In most cases, this is considered a standard practice that is necessary for refugees to receive aid. </p>
<p>In Jordan, for instance, <a href="https://help.unhcr.org/jordan/wp-content/uploads/sites/46/2022/04/Biometrics-EN_Final_April2022.pdf">UNHCR uses</a> uses iris scans to identify refugees and distribute monthly allowances. </p>
<h2>Human rights concerns</h2>
<p>But refugees and advocacy groups alike have voiced <a href="https://odi.org/en/publications/digital-identity-biometrics-and-inclusion-in-humanitarian-responses-to-refugee-crises/">human rights concerns</a>, arguing that collecting refugees’ biometric data can put an already vulnerable group at risk. That can happen if a militant group or government that pushed people to become refugees gets hold of their personal information and is able to potentially identify them if they are in hiding. </p>
<p>Unlike passwords and PIN numbers, fingerprints and facial recognition are unique and cannot be changed if there is a security breach. </p>
<p>Ukrainians in need of aid following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2023/07/11/you-dont-need-demand-sensitive-biometric-data-give-aid-ukraine-response-shows">have pushed back on UNHCR</a> and other U.N. agencies using biometrics. As a result, it has become more common there for people to be registered in other ways, such as by using their Ukrainian national tax identity numbers or their passports. </p>
<p>Another concern observers have made is that if a biometric database is breached, <a href="https://www.ibm.com/topics/cyber-attack">cybercriminals can take</a> people’s data and try to impersonate them and steal their identities. </p>
<p>Security breaches can be <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/threat-actor/">particularly dangerous</a> for refugees.</p>
<p>Researchers at the University of North Carolina exposed flaws of compromised biometric systems in 2016 <a href="https://www.wired.com/2016/08/hackers-trick-facial-recognition-logins-photos-facebook-thanks-zuck/">when they designed</a> an experiment to spoof facial recognition systems. The researchers downloaded social media photos of volunteers and and used the images to construct three-dimensional replicas of faces. The 3D-developed faces successfully tricked four of the five facial recognition systems. </p>
<h2>Things have gone wrong</h2>
<p>Refugees and other people in vulnerable positions have experienced devastating consequences after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jun/15/un-put-rohingya-at-risk-by-sharing-data-without-consent-says-rights-group">having their biometric data breached</a>. </p>
<p>For instance, the Taliban in Afghanistan seized the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-taliban-may-have-access-to-the-biometric-data-of-civilians-who-helped-the-u-s-military-166475">U.S. military’s biometric collection and identification</a> devices in August 2021 after the U.S. withdrew its final troops from Afghanistan. The U.S. collected and used this <a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/08/17/afghanistan-taliban-military-biometrics/">data to track terrorists</a> and other potential insurgents. </p>
<p>Human rights activists expressed <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/us-built-biometric-system-sparks-concerns-afghans-rcna1829">concern that the Taliban could use the biometric</a> data to identify – and target – Afghans who helped the U.S. coalition forces by serving as translators and in other positions after the U.S. withdrawal. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/51768/troopers_deploy_hiide_system_at_border_crossing_point">biometric devices</a>, contained Afghans’ biometric data, including iris scans and fingerprints. </p>
<p>While the Taliban have said that they will not retaliate against Afghans who had worked with the U.S. and other Western coalition forces, the U.N. has tied <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/08/30/1033941/afghanistan-biometric-databases-us-military-40-data-points/">reports of civilians and Afghan soldiers being executed</a> to compromised U.S. biometrics databases. </p>
<p>Similarly, in 2021 news reports revealed that the U.N. shared its <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2021/6/21/rohingya-data-protection-and-UN-betrayal">biometric data of more than 800,000 Rohingya refugees</a> living in Bangladesh with the government there. The Bangladeshi government then shared the information with the Myanmar government – the same government that Rohingya refugees feared would hurt or kill them. </p>
<p>The U.S.-based advocacy group Human Rights Watch reported that the U.N. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/15/un-shared-rohingya-data-without-informed-consent">had informed Rohingya refugees</a> that they needed to give their biometrics information in order to receive lifesaving aid and other services from the U.N. Some people interviewed in refugee camps said that they went into hiding after they learned that their information had been shared. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537878/original/file-20230717-248129-moawde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman wears a face mask and stands next to a computer next to a small child. A man in a green uniform and a mask holds her finger down near the computer." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537878/original/file-20230717-248129-moawde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537878/original/file-20230717-248129-moawde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537878/original/file-20230717-248129-moawde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537878/original/file-20230717-248129-moawde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537878/original/file-20230717-248129-moawde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537878/original/file-20230717-248129-moawde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537878/original/file-20230717-248129-moawde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A migrant and her daughter have their biometric information entered at a Texas immigrant detention center in 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1232022951/photo/topshot-us-texas-border-immigration-detention.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=0S_KzPxMiQEr4qn3baY5OH_LMolPLhMwb9H3j6wpXUY=">Dario Lopez-Mills/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A need for reform</h2>
<p>I believe that there is a need to consider whether and how refugees are giving consent for the recording <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jun/15/un-put-rohingya-at-risk-by-sharing-data-without-consent-says-rights-group">of their personal information</a> – and whether refugees are fully informed of the inherent risks associated with biometric system use. </p>
<p>At a minimum, I think that UNHCR and other groups collecting biometric data information should set up stronger <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/zero-trust-security/">security models</a> and undertake routine <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-02/22_1201_safecom_guide_to_cybersecurity_risk_assessment_508-r1.pdf">cyber risk assessments</a> to understand evolving threats. </p>
<p>Without the necessary money and technological ability to respond to cyberthreats, U.N. agencies and others will remain vulnerable to cyberattacks, which can undermine people’s rights and ability to find safe refuge.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208166/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph K. Nwankpa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Capturing biometric data helps UN agencies and other groups avoid the risk of fraud and increase efficiency. But the practice is complicated and has created security risks for vulnerable groups.Joseph K. Nwankpa, Associate Professor of Information Systems & Analytics, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2047222023-06-14T12:34:23Z2023-06-14T12:34:23ZRefugees are living longer in exile than ever before, with complex consequences for them and their host communities<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531008/original/file-20230608-14786-dlan6s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rohingya girls share a laugh in Kutupalong, the world's largest refugee camp in Bangladesh.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1024026662/photo/rohingya-refugees-mark-one-year-since-the-crisis.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=5nx1vrDQTLqscJJfQ2i3H68piCF9lDmYeRwvTea1atg=">Paula Bronstein/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The number of people forced from their homes, primarily because of conflict or climate change, is on the rise, <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/insights/explainers/100-million-forcibly-displaced.html">topping 100 million people</a> in 2022 – <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-global-trends-2012-displacement-new-21st-century-challenge">more than double the number</a> of displaced people in 2012. </p>
<p>About a third of those <a href="https://help.unhcr.org/faq/how-can-we-help-you/asylum-and-refugee-status/">100 million people are refugees</a>. Refugees live in a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45054745">legal limbo</a> that can increasingly <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/media/protracted-refugee-situations">stretch for decades</a>. And the number of people remaining refugees for five years or longer <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/8999f6e3-bc56-42ac-9dd9-32a747243d08/content">more than doubled over the past decade</a>, topping 16 million in 2022. These are people who do not have a clear path to residency in any country but are unable to return to their homes because they are unsafe.</p>
<p>Typically, because of domestic political pressure and other issues, the countries hosting refugees do not want to offer them permanent residency.</p>
<p>I have spent years interviewing Rohingya people – members of an ethnic minority who have lived in Myanmar for centuries but <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/29/the-battle-over-the-word-rohingya/">without actual citizenship</a> – in refugee camps in Bangladesh. These talks show the real-life effects of people remaining refugees for years. </p>
<p>“We escaped our home and belonging to save our lives from bullets. Now, we are hanging in uncertainties – no right to attain higher education, no permission to work, no claim over property. Yet no path to return,” Jafar, a 27-year-old Rohingya refugee, told me during my fieldwork in the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/countries/bangladesh">Kutupalong refugee camp</a> in Bangladesh in July 2022.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=cw1ds5IAAAAJ&hl=en">Bangladeshi scholar who researches refugees’ everyday lives</a>. I have closely followed the trajectory of Kutupalong, which grew to become the <a href="https://theconversation.com/i-visited-the-rohingya-refugee-camps-and-here-is-what-bangladesh-is-doing-right-90513">largest refugee camp in the world</a> in 2017.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102568">research shows that</a> host countries’ interests in protecting the rights and services of their own citizens keeps refugees from being fully integrated into society or obtaining citizenship.</p>
<p>In the absence of legal protection outside their home countries, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/24694452.2021.2023001?journalCode=raag21">refugees’ livelihoods</a> and <a href="https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10315/8011/Milner-Responding-Brief.pdf;sequence=1">well-being</a> often remain in jeopardy, an effect that can span generations.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531009/original/file-20230608-21-ut6dg5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People walk in single file against a dark blue sky." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531009/original/file-20230608-21-ut6dg5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531009/original/file-20230608-21-ut6dg5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531009/original/file-20230608-21-ut6dg5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531009/original/file-20230608-21-ut6dg5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531009/original/file-20230608-21-ut6dg5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531009/original/file-20230608-21-ut6dg5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531009/original/file-20230608-21-ut6dg5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thousands of Rohingya refugees walk along a rice field after crossing into Bangladesh in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/859402922/photo/rohingya-refugees-flood-into-bangladesh.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=uIiWCvtJY1PXB1Z6VgmxRO53eC9U1TCKz2Psd7gp5wI=">Paula Bronstein/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why people are remaining refugees for longer</h2>
<p>People can <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/refugees">get refugee status</a> when a government or international organization such as the U.N. finds that they have a legitimate fear of persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group in their home country.</p>
<p>Refugees are <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/refugees-asylum-seekers-and-migrants/">legally protected under international law from deportation</a> but often do not have safe places to live or the opportunity to legally work in their host countries. Most refugees live outside of formal camps, in <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/dev4peace/how-refugees-decision-live-or-outside-camp-affects-their-quality-life">informal settlements in cities</a>.</p>
<p>Only <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/">204,500 of the world’s 32 million refugees</a> were able to return home or get resettled permanently in 2022. </p>
<p>Generally, people are remaining refugees for longer periods for three reasons.</p>
<p>First, conflicts in places <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia">ranging from Ethiopia</a> to Syria are lasting longer than conflicts have historically, dragging on for more than a decade in some cases. </p>
<p>Second, there generally aren’t cohesive international, regional or national strategies to handle large numbers of refugees. Low- or middle-income <a href="https://us.boell.org/en/2022/08/17/immigration-politics-refugees-turkey-and-2023-elections">countries like Turkey that do not guarantee</a> a path to citizenship host <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/media/40152">more than two-thirds of the world’s refugees</a>.</p>
<p>And third, some wealthier countries are developing restrictive policies that make it harder for refugees to cross their borders. They are also taking actions that make it harder for refugees to ever cross their borders – including <a href="https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/border-wall-system">building more border walls</a>, <a href="https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/operation-sovereign-borders-offshore-detention-statistics/">detaining refugees</a> in offshore islands and <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520287976/boats-borders-and-bases">intercepting refugee</a> boats.</p>
<p>One general exception to this trend is the protection granted by European Union countries to <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukraine-refugees-eu/">4 million Ukrainian refugees</a> fleeing the war, including giving them the legal right to work, for several years. </p>
<h2>Increasing years in exile</h2>
<p>The Rohingya situation demonstrates the civic and physical dangers of long-term legal refugee limbo.</p>
<p>In 2017, Mynamar’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-ethnic-cleansing.html">military launched widespread violent attacks</a> against the Rohingya people that the United Nations <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/08/un-expert-calls-action-against-myanmar-military-anniversary-atrocities">considers genocide</a>. </p>
<p>Hundreds of thousands of <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/rohingya-refugee-crisis/#:%7E:text=Emergencies,-ROHINGYA%20REFUGEE%20CRISIS&text=More%20than%20742%2C000%20Rohingya%20were,Myanmar's%20Rakhine%20State%20in%202017.&text=of%20Rohingya%20refugees%20and%20asylum,children%3B%2025%20percent%20are%20women">Rohingya people fled</a> across the border to Bangladesh. Now, about <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/bgd">930,292 Rohingya refugees</a> live in a sprawling refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar in the southern part of Bangladesh. </p>
<p>Negotiations over repatriating Rohingya people to Myanmar <a href="https://www.state.gov/marking-two-years-since-the-military-coup-in-burma/">stalled in 2021</a> following a military coup in Myanmar.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-history-of-the-persecution-of-myanmars-rohingya-84040">the Rohingya situation</a> in Bangladesh is not unique.</p>
<p><a href="https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/29455">Syrian refugees in Turkey</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-refugees-protests-trfn/missing-from-indias-citizenship-law-100000-sri-lankan-refugees-idUSKBN1YS0VA">Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India</a>, <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/us/countries/afghanistan">Afghan refugees in Pakistan</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdr013">Somali refugees in Kenya</a> are among the large groups of refugees who fled conflict and have lived for decades in another place without the protections of citizenship.</p>
<h2>When refugees are stuck</h2>
<p>During my fieldwork in Cox’s Bazar in August 2022, I met with a 65-year-old refugee named Kolim who lost both his legs in a shooting by the Myanmar army. He said that the local nonprofit organization that had supported him with a disability allowance for five years just ended its project, because the organization could not secure funding for the next year.</p>
<p>This follows an <a href="https://devinit.org/resources/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2022/volumes-of-humanitarian-and-wider-crisis-financing/">overall trend</a> of major international humanitarian organizations and smaller nonprofits alike tending to give the most money following an emergency response or crisis.</p>
<p>Similarly, international funding for long-term conflicts and continuing humanitarian crises that last years <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/global-humanitarian-need-worse-than-un-estimates-report-suggests-103606">tend to see drops</a> in funding and help over time.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, only about <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/education">half of refugee children are in school</a>.</p>
<p>Refugees – who are <a href="https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2022/7/27/new-study-refugees-restricted-from-working-in-at-least-32-countries-limiting-their-ability-to-support-themselves-and-contribute-to-host-country">typically unable to legally work</a> in their host countries – also tend to undertake informal kinds of employment, working as day laborers in construction, for example, or as street vendors.</p>
<p>Refugees in dire situations also often engage in work without permission and risk <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2018.1465046">being arrested</a> by the police. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2021.2023001">Some of my research</a> shows that competition to find work also generates tension between the host and the refugee communities.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530311/original/file-20230606-17-shmj8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Shanty houses are seen against a blue sky." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530311/original/file-20230606-17-shmj8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530311/original/file-20230606-17-shmj8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530311/original/file-20230606-17-shmj8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530311/original/file-20230606-17-shmj8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530311/original/file-20230606-17-shmj8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530311/original/file-20230606-17-shmj8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530311/original/file-20230606-17-shmj8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Daily life for Myanmar refugees plays out in Cox’s Bazaar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sharif Wahab</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Initiatives that help</h2>
<p>There have been some recent efforts at the international level to address the challenges facing refugees and host countries alike.</p>
<p>In 2018, countries in the U.N. agreed to an informal plan to jointly share the responsibility to host <a href="https://globalcompactrefugees.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/New%20York%20Declaration%20for%20Refugees%20and%20Migrants.pdf">refugees and migrants</a>.</p>
<p>These countries committed to a framework for <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework">shared responsibilities</a> in their response to refugee crises.</p>
<p>But nonprofit groups that work with refugees have said it is unclear whether the plan has <a href="https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/6324/ircdrcnrcjointreportv4final.pdf">resulted in any change</a>, noting that few countries have implemented the strategy into their domestic planning.</p>
<p>Without any systematic solutions to deal with migration and refugees, refugees continue to forge ahead without a clear direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sharif A Wahab does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As conflicts last longer, the number of refugees and other displaced people is on the rise.Sharif A Wahab, PhD Candidate, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2029202023-04-27T15:07:05Z2023-04-27T15:07:05ZHuman activities in Asia have reduced elephant habitat by nearly two-thirds since 1700, dividing what remains into ever-smaller patches<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522859/original/file-20230425-26-oskryk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C0%2C2492%2C1511&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Habitat loss has driven Asian elephants, like these foraging at a garbage dump in Sri Lanka, into human areas.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-photograph-taken-on-may-11-wild-elephants-rummage-news-photo/958346764">Lakruwan Wanniarachchi/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite their iconic status and long association with humans, Asian elephants are one of the most endangered large mammals. Believed to number between 45,000 and 50,000 individuals worldwide, they are at risk throughout Asia due to human activities such as deforestation, mining, dam building and road construction, which have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/ecs2.1624">damaged numerous ecosystems</a>. </p>
<p>My colleagues and I wanted to know when human actions started to fragment wildlife habitats and populations to the degree seen today. We quantified these impacts by considering them through the needs of this species. </p>
<p>In a <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-30650-8">newly published study</a>, we examined the centuries-long history of Asian landscapes that once were suitable elephant habitat and often were managed by local communities prior to the colonial era. In our view, understanding this history and restoring some of these relationships may be the key to living with elephants and other large wild animals in the future. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522847/original/file-20230425-14-twwigb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Several elephants walk along a path parallel to a road with cars on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522847/original/file-20230425-14-twwigb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522847/original/file-20230425-14-twwigb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522847/original/file-20230425-14-twwigb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522847/original/file-20230425-14-twwigb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522847/original/file-20230425-14-twwigb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522847/original/file-20230425-14-twwigb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522847/original/file-20230425-14-twwigb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Although elephants can cross roads and other infrastructure, elephant habitats across Asia are increasingly hemmed in, with firm boundaries between human and wildlife spaces. These elephants are in Sri Lanka.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shermin de Silva</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How have humans affected wildlife?</h2>
<p>It isn’t easy to measure human impacts on wildlife across a region as large and diverse as Asia and more than a century ago. Historical data for many species is sparse. Museums, for instance, only contain specimens collected from certain locations. </p>
<p>Many animals also have very specific ecological requirements, and there often isn’t sufficient data on these features at a fine scale going far into the past. For instance, a species might prefer particular microclimates or vegetation types that occur only at particular elevations.</p>
<p>For nearly two decades <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=wPzBt-EAAAAJ&hl=en">I’ve been studying Asian elephants</a>. As a species, these animals are breathtakingly adaptable: They can live in seasonally dry forests, grasslands or the densest of rain forests. If we could match the habitat requirements of elephants to data sets showing how these habitats changed over time, we knew that we could understand how land-use changes have affected elephants and other wildlife in these environments.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/5GmzakE1yRc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Fewer than 50,000 Asian elephants remain in the wild across 13 countries. Habitat loss is one of the main reasons for their decline.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Defining elephant ecosystems</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/7140/45818198">home-range sizes</a> of Asian elephants can vary anywhere from a few hundred square miles to a few thousand. But since we couldn’t know exactly where elephants would have been centuries ago, we had to model the possibilities based on where they occur today. </p>
<p>By identifying the environmental features that correspond to locations where wild elephants live now, we can distinguish places where they could potentially have lived in the past. In principle, this should represent “good” habitat.</p>
<p>Today many scientists are using this kind of model to identify particular species’ climatic requirements and predict how areas suitable for those species might shift under future climate change scenarios. We applied the same logic retrospectively, using land-use and land-cover types instead of climate change projections. </p>
<p>We drew this information from the <a href="https://luh.umd.edu/">Land-Use Harmonization (LUH2)</a> data set, released by a research group at the University of Maryland. The group mapped historical land-use categories by type, starting in the year 850 – long before the advent of nations as we know them today, with fewer large population centers – and extending up to 2015.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522857/original/file-20230425-18-9z1dzq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing active, possible and potential elephant range across Asia." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522857/original/file-20230425-18-9z1dzq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522857/original/file-20230425-18-9z1dzq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522857/original/file-20230425-18-9z1dzq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522857/original/file-20230425-18-9z1dzq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522857/original/file-20230425-18-9z1dzq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522857/original/file-20230425-18-9z1dzq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522857/original/file-20230425-18-9z1dzq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Asian elephants live in countries with large human populations, and their range has been shrunk and fragmented. Their future depends on human attitudes toward elephants and their conservation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.trunksnleaves.org/status-threats.html">Hedges et al., 2008, via Trunks & Leaves</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>My co-authors and I first compiled records of where Asian elephants have been observed in the recent past. We limited our study to the 13 countries that today still contain wild elephants: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam. </p>
<p>We excluded areas where elephant populations are prone to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/20/asia/human-elephant-conflict-india-krithi-karanth-c2e-spc-intl-hnk/index.html">clashing with people</a>, such as intensively farmed landscapes and plantations, in order to avoid classifying these zones as “good” elephant habitat. We included areas with lighter human influence, such as selectively logged forests, because they actually contain great food for elephants.</p>
<p>Next, we used a machine-learning algorithm to determine what types of land use and land cover existed at our remaining locations. This allowed us to map out where elephants could potentially live as of the year 2000. By applying our model to earlier and later years, we were able to generate maps of areas that contained suitable habitat for elephants and to see how those areas had changed over the centuries.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522862/original/file-20230425-24-dz2yar.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A line of elephants drinking at a reservoir." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522862/original/file-20230425-24-dz2yar.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522862/original/file-20230425-24-dz2yar.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522862/original/file-20230425-24-dz2yar.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522862/original/file-20230425-24-dz2yar.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522862/original/file-20230425-24-dz2yar.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522862/original/file-20230425-24-dz2yar.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522862/original/file-20230425-24-dz2yar.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some human-made features, like this reservoir in Sri Lanka, can also be resources for wildlife.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shermin de Silva</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Dramatic declines</h2>
<p>Land-use patterns <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1466-8238.2010.00540.x">changed significantly on every continent</a> starting with the Industrial Revolution in the 1700s and extending through the colonial era into the mid-20th century. Asia was no exception. </p>
<p>For most areas, we found that suitable elephant habitat took a steep dive around this time. We estimated that from 1700 through 2015 the total amount of suitable habitat decreased by 64%. More than 1.2 million square miles (3 million square kilometers) of land were converted for plantations, industry and urban development. With respect to potential elephant habitat, most of the change occurred in India and China, each of which saw conversion in more than 80% of these landscapes.</p>
<p>In other areas of Southeast Asia – such as a large hot spot of elephant habitat in central Thailand, which was never colonized – habitat loss happened more recently, in the mid-20th century. This timing corresponds to logging concurrent with the so-called <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/green-revolution">Green Revolution</a>, which introduced industrial agriculture to many parts of the world. </p>
<h2>Could the past be the key to the future?</h2>
<p>Looking back at land-use change over centuries makes it clear just how drastically human actions have reduced habitat for Asian elephants. The losses that we measured greatly exceed estimates of “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2016.08.049">catastrophic” human impacts on so-called wilderness</a> or forests within recent decades.</p>
<p>Our analysis shows that if you were an elephant in the 1700s, you might have been able to range across 40% of the available habitat in Asia with no problem, because it was one large, contiguous area that contained many ecosystems where you could live. This enabled gene flow among many elephant populations. But by 2015, human activities had so drastically fragmented the total suitable area for elephants that the largest patch of good habitat represented less than 7% of it.</p>
<p>Sri Lanka and peninsular Malaysia have a disproportionately high share of Asia’s wild elephant population, relative to available elephant habitat area. Thailand and Myanmar have smaller populations relative to area. Interestingly, the latter are countries known for their large captive or semi-captive elephant populations.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1649084703272517636"}"></div></p>
<p>Less than half of the areas that contain wild elephants today have adequate habitat for them. Elephants’ resulting use of increasingly human-dominated landscapes leads to <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/research-topics/25165/human-elephant-conflict-and-coexistence-in-asia">confrontations that are harmful</a> for both elephants and people. </p>
<p>However, this long view of history reminds us that protected areas alone are not the answer, since they simply <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-22989-1">cannot be large enough</a> to support elephant populations. Indeed, human societies have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2023483118">shaped these very landscapes for millennia</a>. </p>
<p>Today there is a pressing challenge to balance human subsistence and livelihood requirements with the needs of wildlife. Restoring <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/gch2.202200051">traditional forms of land management</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-021-00815-2">local stewardship</a> of these landscapes can be an essential part of protecting and recovering ecosystems that serve both people and wildlife in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202920/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shermin de Silva receives funding from the US Fish & Wildlife Asian Elephant Conservation Funds. She is president and founder of Trunks & Leaves Inc. a non-profit organization that works to facilitate evidence-based conservation of Asian elephants and their habitats. de Silva also directs the Udawalawe Elephant Research Project in Sri Lanka, which she initiated in 2005, and is a member of the Asian Elephant Specialist Group of the IUCN Species Survival Commission. </span></em></p>A new study looks back into history to assess human impacts on the range of Asian elephants and finds sharp decline starting several centuries ago.Shermin de Silva, Assistant Professor of Ecology, Behavior and Evolution, University of California, San DiegoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2036462023-04-15T12:42:22Z2023-04-15T12:42:22ZMilitary violence in Myanmar is worsening amid fierce resistance and international ambivalence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521085/original/file-20230414-28-pqalii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C40%2C2982%2C1953&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A village elder stands outside a school destroyed by aircraft fire in Shan State.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/village-elder-is-standing-in-front-of-the-village-school-news-photo/1246147334?adppopup=true">Mai Thomas/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the early days of a brutal 2021 military crackdown on anti-coup protesters in Myanmar, members of the nascent resistance movement began asking “<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/myanmar-protester-dead-bodies-united-nations-b1809046.html">how many dead bodies</a>” it would take for the world community to act.</p>
<p>More than two years on from a coup that installed military rule in the Southeast Asian country, pro-democracy protesters say they have <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/the-world-myanmar/global-community-slammed-for-failure-to-act-over-myanmar-junta-atrocities.html">yet to receive an adequate answer</a>.</p>
<p>On April 11, 2023, the country’s armed forces dropped <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/12/myanmar-airstrike-on-civilians-sparks-global-outcry-as-witnesses-describe-attack">multiple bombs</a> on a gathering in Pazigyi, a village in Sagaing Region, killing <a href="https://apnews.com/article/airstrikes-military-myanmar-village-918fd636bb81153928ab7481e06423e5">around 100 people</a>, it has been estimated, including many children.</p>
<p>Such attacks are not uncommon, if not usually so deadly. The day before the Sagaing massacre, the Myanmar air force <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/eleven-chin-civilians-killed-in-myanmar-regime-airstrikes.html">dropped bombs in Falam</a>, Chin State, killing 11 people. In fact, since civil war broke out, 3,240 civilians and pro-democracy activists <a href="https://aappb.org/?p=24712">have been killed</a>, according to the human rights group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. In response, a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/01/1153150529/resistance-to-military-rule-in-myanmar-remains-steady-2-years-after-army-seized-">fierce resistance movement</a> has emerged, with an <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/understanding-peoples-defense-forces-myanmar">estimated 65,000 fighters</a> using ambushes and other guerrilla tactics against military targets.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.niu.edu/clas/world-languages/about/directory/than.shtml">scholar on Myanmar’s history</a>, I would argue that the escalating violence can be attributed to two main factors, one internal and one external: a miscalculation by the military over the resistance of Myanmar’s people, and ambivalence from the international community.</p>
<h2>From coup to civil war</h2>
<p>Myanmar has witnessed <a href="https://aappb.org/?cat=109">killings by the military almost daily</a> since generals <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/19/myanmar-coup-2021-explained-in-30-seconds">seized control of the country in 2021</a>. The coup ended the short period of democratic rule under <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1991/kyi/facts/">Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi</a>’s party, the National League for Democracy.</p>
<p>But there are, I believe, reasons to suggest that the Myanmar military grossly miscalculated the timing of the coup, and underestimated the sentiment of a people unwilling to give up the freedom and prosperity they experienced under democracy.</p>
<p><iframe id="gYbI0" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/gYbI0/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In this, the military may have been misled by the experience of their counterparts in neighboring Thailand. In 2014, generals in Thailand <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thailand-coup-a-brief-history-of-past-military-coups-0">launched a coup</a> ending months of political instability and promising a process back to democratic rule. That coup was met by sporadic protests, but no unified armed resistance emerged in response.</p>
<p>The Myanmar military similarly promised “free and fair elections” <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62373975">further down the line</a> after its coup.</p>
<p>Unlike in Thailand, people in Myanmar – especially younger generations that came of age in the democratic decade after 2010 – fiercely resisted the army’s takeover and were skeptical of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/1/myanmar-coup-military-repeats-election-promise-people-strike">claims that it would restore democracy</a>.</p>
<p>After peaceful protests following the coup were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56636345">met with live ammunition</a>, pro-democracy activists turned to armed resistance.</p>
<p>In the years since, many young people have <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/01/1153150529/resistance-to-military-rule-in-myanmar-remains-steady-2-years-after-army-seized-">undergone military training</a> – often by armed ethnic groups that already existed along the country’s borders – and fought back under the umbrella resistance group, <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/understanding-peoples-defense-forces-myanmar">People’s Defense Forces</a>.</p>
<p>Protracted counter-coup activities have humiliated the Myanmar army. The commander in chief, Min Aung Hlaing, recently conceded that two years after the coup, the military was still <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-28/myanmar-junta-chief-vows-crush-resistance-forces-rare-speech/102152844">not in control of swaths of the country</a>. He vowed to intensify a crackdown against people <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-28/myanmar-junta-chief-vows-crush-resistance-forces-rare-speech/102152844">he branded “terrorists</a>.”</p>
<p>The growing instability, Min Aung Hlaing said, meant that promised elections – after which the military was to hand over power to a civilian government – cannot be scheduled.</p>
<h2>Uniting around a common enemy</h2>
<p>Myanmar’s military leaders have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/race-and-ethnicity-myanmar-army-min-aung-hlaing-aung-san-suu-kyi-cc6402c492edbc1fbaefef5e6e9dbf21">vowed to annihilate</a> resistance groups. Yet there are reasons to believe that the resistance is only getting stronger. </p>
<p>Despite slow initial progress to show a common front, the Bamar majority and minority ethic groups such as Karen, Chin, Kachin, Rakhine and Karenni appear to be <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/05/asia/myanmar-protests-ethnic-minorities-intl-hnk/index.html">unifying against military rule</a>. And resistance fighters have <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/01/1153150529/resistance-to-military-rule-in-myanmar-remains-steady-2-years-after-army-seized-">widespread support</a> throughout the country.</p>
<p>A lot will now depend on whether Myanmar soldiers lose the will to fight. Already there are signs of strain. The military is reportedly facing an acute shortage of new recruits, resulting in <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/women-recruits-being-trained-for-combat-roles-by-myanmar-junta.html">women being trained to fight in combat</a>. People in the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-struggling-to-recruit-new-officers.html">Bamar heartlands</a>, including Sagaing where the April 11 massacre occurred, are refusing to let their sons join the Myanmar army.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A line of men with camouflage helmets and guns. One looks at the camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Military officers march during Armed Forces Day in Myanmar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PicturesoftheWeekAsiaPhotoGallery/cde66b8eac814040b3e7e1f39ed927d7/photo?Query=Myanmar&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=38717&currentItemNo=1">AP Photo/Aung Shine Oo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In such circumstances, the Myanmar army is increasingly relying on guns and bombs rather than troop numbers.</p>
<p>But the longer the resistance lasts, the more humiliating it will be for a junta that has upped its annual spending on the military to an estimated <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-increases-military-budget-to-us2-7-billion.html">US$2.7 billion</a> – more than 25% of the national budget – largely to suppress its own population.</p>
<h2>Leaving the oil and gas taps running</h2>
<p>These internal dynamics have taken place largely in the absence of intense scrutiny from the international community, <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/has-the-international-community-abandoned-myanmar-99854">pro-democracy activists say</a>.</p>
<p>The Ukraine war has seemingly pushed Myanmar down the list of international concerns. It has also exacerbated cracks among the global powers that would, otherwise, likely be on the same page over the worsening situation – prolonged violence and instability in Myanmar is not in any country’s strategic interests, not least China’s or the United States’.</p>
<p>Both the U.S. and the United Nations have made statements <a href="https://www.state.gov/marking-two-years-since-the-military-coup-in-burma/">in support of democracy</a> in Myanmar, and <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sgsm21759.doc.htm">condemned killings</a>. </p>
<p>But concrete action – which to date has been largely limited to <a href="https://earthrights.org/media_release/new-report-shines-light-on-flaws-in-international-use-of-sanctions-in-response-to-myanmar-coup/">sanctions on individuals and entities</a> – falls well short of what <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/support-myanmars-junta-only-prolongs-countrys-conflict">human rights groups</a> <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/myanmars-junta-benefits-weak-international-response">have demanded</a>. There has, for example, been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/01/myanmar-coup-second-anniversary/">no comprehensive global arms embargo</a> despite the use of weapons against civilians. Neither has Myanmar been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/01/asean-act-stop-myanmar-military-abuses">shut off from foreign currency revenues</a>. And the country is still able to purchase the jet fuel being used by bombers, despite calls for a <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/myanmar-atrocity-commentary-04122023130016.html">global ban on such sales</a> to accompany the recent sanctions imposed by some governments, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1364">including the U.S</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, sanctions have yet to bite Myanmar’s energy sector. Activist group Justice for Myanmar has identified <a href="https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/the-international-oilfield-services-companies-supporting-the-myanmar-juntas-oil-and-gas-industry">22 oil and gas companies</a> from countries including the U.S. that have continued to provide revenue to Myanmar’s generals during the civil war. Indeed, U.S. oil companies including Chevron <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/22/us/politics/chevron-myanmar-sanctions.html">lobbied hard against broad sanctions</a> against the Myanmar military.</p>
<p>The failure to shut off oil revenue allows Myanmar’s generals – for whom oil and gas is a <a href="https://www.mizzima.com/article/eu-imposes-sanctions-myanma-oil-and-gas-enterprise-moge">major revenue source</a> – to fund the military.</p>
<p>To many within the resistance movement, the reluctance of the international community to exert more pressure on the country’s military looks like global collusion. It also has the potential to prolong the violence by funding the military’s campaign.</p>
<h2>Beware the tiger’s tail</h2>
<p>A well-known Myanmar phrase <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/from-the-archive/letting-go-of-the-tigers-tail.html">warns against the dangers</a> of “catching hold of a tiger’s tail” – once you do so there is no turning back; let go and you will be killed.</p>
<p>It aptly sums up the position now for Myanmar’s military rulers and the resistance fighters being drawn deeper into conflict with each atrocity. They are fighting for the past, present and the future and can’t let go now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203646/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tharaphi Than does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since seizing power in a 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military has killed more than 3,000 civilians and pro-democracy activists. But the army has struggled to contain an armed resistance movement.Tharaphi Than, Associate Professor of World Cultures and Languages, Northern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1993902023-02-16T13:27:55Z2023-02-16T13:27:55ZWhy does Turkey want other countries to start spelling its name ‘Türkiye’?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510183/original/file-20230214-23-rltrz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C341%2C2461%2C1652&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Turks have called their country Türkiye since 1923.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/campaign-billboard-showing-the-portrait-of-turkish-news-photo/667766060?phrase=Türkiye billboard&adppopup=true">Chris McGrath/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Is Turkey’s recent spelling change about being more authentically Turkish? Or is there more to the story? </p>
<p>In June 2022, the United Nations <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/02/turkey-turkiye-erdogan-united-nations-un/">agreed to change</a> the spelling of the country known in the English-speaking world as Turkey to Türkiye, heeding a request by the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In January 2023, the U.S. State Department also agreed to adopt the requested change <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jan/05/us-turkey-spelling-turkiye-country">in its written communications</a>.</p>
<p>A number of news outlets <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/06/03/1102841197/turkey-changes-its-official-name-to-turkiye">have reported</a> that Turkey has changed its name, but that’s not really true – Turks have called their country Türkiye <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Lausanne-1923">since 1923</a>, when Turkey became the successor state to the Ottoman Empire. The change is less like Rhodesia becoming Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/zimbabawean-independence-day">in 1980</a> and more akin to what would happen if the country known in English as Germany asked that the world refer to it as Deutschland, which is the way the Germans say it. </p>
<p>But Erdogan’s request – and the U.N.’s decision to follow suit – does raise the question of why countries seek to change their names.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/98kqyvQuy2I?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<h2>From Burma to Myanmar</h2>
<p>As Julie Tetel Andresen and I explain in our book “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Languages+In+The+World%3A+How+History%2C+Culture%2C+and+Politics+Shape+Language+-p-9781118531280">Languages in the World: How History, Culture, and Politics Shape Language</a>,” the answer almost always has to do with politics and power. It might be inspired by domestic politics, as is likely the case with Türkiye, or it could represent a shift in regional or global power dynamics. </p>
<p>The case of Burma, which officially <a href="https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-burma-different-names-explained-8af64e33cf89c565b074eec9cbe22b72">renamed itself Myanmar in 1989</a>, illustrates both of these dynamics. </p>
<p>From 1824 to 1948, Burma was ruled by Britain, which set up colonies in the interior of the country to control the production of timber, oil and <a href="https://theconversation.com/earth-day-colonialisms-role-in-the-overexploitation-of-natural-resources-113995">minerals</a>. Later settlements along the fertile Irrawaddy Delta coastline controlled the even more profitable production of rice. </p>
<p>British administrators, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F00207152211023793">as they did throughout their colonies</a>, played favorites with different ethnic groups on the ground, benefiting those who were willing to learn English and convert to Christianity. In British colonial Burma, <a href="https://rpl.hds.harvard.edu/faq/karen">it was the Karens</a> – a large ethnic minority group whose members speak a number of related languages, including Pa’O and Karenni – who played this role. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Vintage photograph of eight men in uniform." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510189/original/file-20230214-1870-h13uwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510189/original/file-20230214-1870-h13uwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510189/original/file-20230214-1870-h13uwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510189/original/file-20230214-1870-h13uwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510189/original/file-20230214-1870-h13uwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510189/original/file-20230214-1870-h13uwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510189/original/file-20230214-1870-h13uwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">British soldiers pose in Rangoon, Burma, in 1913. Today, Rangoon goes by Yangon, and Burma is called Myanmar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-pioneers-of-the-1st-royal-munster-fusiliers-rangoon-news-photo/520681821?phrase=burma%20british&adppopup=true">Hulton Archive/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the 100 years of British rule, the Karens cultivated a sense of national identity that became so strong that they called for the formation of an independent state, seemingly with the support of the British. The divide between the Karens and the Burmans – the majority ethnic group – grew so stark that when the Japanese occupied British Burma in 1942 during World War II, <a href="https://www.mnkaren.org/history-culture/karen-history/">the Karens sided with the British</a>, while the Burmans sided with the Japanese. Things only worsened when the British abruptly pulled out of Burma in 1948, leaving a power vacuum that the Burmans quickly filled. </p>
<p>In 1989, Burma’s military dictatorship set up a language commission to replace or modify the spellings given to Burmese cities by the British. They changed the capital city from Rangoon to Yangon. In a surprise to the world, Burma became Myanmar. </p>
<p>In the Burmese language, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/register">differences in register</a>, or specific styles of the language used for specific purposes, are common. In colloquial, spoken Burmese, the country is known as Bama, from which the British derived Burma. In the formal, written literary style, the country is known as Myanma. </p>
<p>The shift from Burma to Myanmar represented, on the one hand, a postcolonial power move intended to signal distance from British Burma and its colonial legacy. At the same time, the name change waded into domestic ethnopolitics. Bama is preferred among non-elites, including many ethnolinguistic minority groups that don’t have access to the formal register. However, Burman elites have tended to use Myanma. </p>
<p>The move showed that Burman elites in positions of power and authority, who are more likely to use the formal literary style, were calling the shots.</p>
<h2>Excising exonyms</h2>
<p>Not all name changes are quite as complicated. </p>
<p>For hundreds of years, the country currently known in English as Thailand <a href="https://www.historytoday.com/archive/months-past/siam-becomes-thailand">was referred to as</a> Siam, a word likely of Chinese origin that Portuguese colonists started using in the 16th century. </p>
<p>Linguists call words like Siam <a href="https://www.dictionary.com/browse/exonym">exonyms</a> – names applied by outsiders with no particular connection to the named group. When Thailand declared itself a constitutional monarchy in 1939, <a href="https://www.historytoday.com/archive/months-past/siam-becomes-thailand">it simply requested that the exonym be corrected</a>, and that the world refer to its country using a variant of the local term Thailand. </p>
<p>Exonym corrections have been commonplace in postcolonial Africa. The change from Zaire, a Portuguese variant of a Bantu word, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-05-31-mn-64217-story.html">to the Democratic Republic of the Congo</a> and the change from Rhodesia – named for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32131829">Cecil Rhodes</a>, a British colonizer – to Zimbabwe are just two examples.</p>
<p>It’s unclear what motivated Erdogan’s request – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61671913">the government claims</a> Türkiye avoids confusion with the bird among English speakers. Oddly enough, <a href="https://theconversation.com/talking-turkey-how-the-thanksgiving-bird-got-its-name-and-then-lent-it-to-film-flops-171925">Turkey the country does have a connection to the bird</a>. In the 16th century, English speakers noticed similarities between turkeys, which the Aztecs had domesticated, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guineafowl">guinea fowl</a>, a bird imported from Africa to Europe via Turkey.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/03/middleeast/turkey-name-change-mime-intl/index.html">But some observers speculate</a> that putting forth a word of Turkish origin fits seamlessly within Erdogan’s brand of nationalism and may divert attention from a <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/11/09/everything-is-overheating-why-is-turkeys-economy-in-such-a-mess">weak economy</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-05-06/istanbul-falls-victim-to-turkish-political-cold-war-with-erdogan">political turmoil</a>. </p>
<p>How the language politics will play in the wake of the devastating earthquake that has thus far <a href="https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/turkey-syria-earthquake-updates-2-13-23-intl/index.html">killed more than 35,000 Turks</a> is anyone’s guess.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199390/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phillip M. Carter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey vs. Türkiye? When a country changes its name or requests changes to the spelling of its name, there are almost always political motives.Phillip M. Carter, Professor of Linguistics and English, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1982542023-01-31T12:55:29Z2023-01-31T12:55:29ZMyanmar: two years after the military seized power the country is mired in a bloody civil war – but there are grounds for optimism<p>Two years on from the latest <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-coup-how-myanmars-military-used-the-pandemic-to-justify-and-enable-its-power-grab-155350">military coup</a> that deposed Myanmar’s democratically elected government, what began as a wave of national protest against the army’s power grab has descended into outright civil war. </p>
<p>Myanmar’s military have gone beyond repression or terrorising ethnic minority groups – it is making war on society as a whole. There is little prospect of the violence ending, let alone the prosecution of the perpetrators for a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/myanmar-urgent-global-action-needed-stop-militarys-nationwide-assault-human-rights#:%7E:text=Since%20the%20coup%20on%201,the%20opposition%20across%20the%20country.">litany of crimes</a> against their people. </p>
<p>Meanwhile the junta continues to steal what wealth there is in Myanmar. This UN-designated “least developed country” is <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/search?q=myanmar+rich+natural+resources%C2%A4tTab=1&x=0&y=0">vastly endowed</a> with natural resources which are being misappropriated. There is a major humanitarian and growing environmental crisis. Yet outside of the country, the situation’s complexities are barely grasped. </p>
<p>Myanmar’s 2020 election delivered a <a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyi-wins-big-in-myanmars-elections-but-will-it-bring-peace-or-restore-her-reputation-abroad-149619">crushing defeat</a> to the Union Solidarity and Development Party – the proxy political party of the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) – and a huge mandate to Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy and allied parties. </p>
<p>Yet on the morning of February 1 2021, army general Min Aung Hlaing blocked access to parliament, arrested Aung San Suu Kyi and many senior colleagues. He declared a “state of emergency” and <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-coup-how-myanmars-military-used-the-pandemic-to-justify-and-enable-its-power-grab-155350">installed himself</a> as head of a ruling state administration council.</p>
<p>Millions took to the streets. A civil disobedience movement formed, led mainly by young people who saw their bright futures being stolen. The military reaction was <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/myanmar/">swift and brutal</a>: demonstrators shot by snipers, bombed indiscriminately, arrested, tortured and executed.</p>
<p>Two years on, Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as most of her top party colleagues, remain in custody – she was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/30/asia/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-court-verdict-intl-hnk/index.html">recently sentenced</a> to 33 years jail for “corruption”. But several democratically elected leaders managed to escape to form a “<a href="https://www.nugmyanmar.org/en/">national unity government</a>” in exile. This government now represents Myanmar at the United Nations and has representatives in a range of countries.</p>
<h2>Fightback</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, across Myanmar ordinary people have taken up arms. Many have received basic training from one or another of the <a href="https://www.mizzima.com/article/assessing-eaos-2022-uncertainty-groups-fight-junta-sit-fence-or-side-junta">ethnic armed organisations</a> which formed over decades of regional conflicts, and have returned to fight as the <a href="https://mod.nugmyanmar.org/en/peoples-defence-force/">People’s Defence Force</a>. </p>
<p>The whole of Myanmar is now a conflict zone. The Tatmadaw <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-military-bombs-village-killing-seven-sources-2023-01-19/">routinely attacks or bombs villages</a> resisting or suspected of harbouring People’s Defence Force members. Thousands have died and many more have been injured.</p>
<p>Thanks to significant <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-s-sanctions-hit-junta-still-netting-vast-oil-gas-profits/6697189.html">revenues from oil and gas</a>, the Tatmadaw has the military advantage, particularly in <a href="https://www.militaryfactory.com/modern-airpower/aircraft-myanmar-burma-air-force.php">air power</a>, yet it is struggling in the face of unified opposition. It lacks numerical superiority compared to the democrats, and many soldiers and police have defected – <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-61243316">over 8,000 so far</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile it is finding it hard to recruit or even conscript new troops, risking becoming in the long term an “<a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/myanmars-military-its-last-legs">army without soldiers</a>”. It is also struggling to pay wages and is resorting to printing money, which is fuelling inflation that feeds into public discontent.</p>
<p>But two years of fighting has left Myanmar’s resistance outgunned, with dwindling supplies, particularly ammunition, and little defence against air attacks. Conflict fatigue is affecting some.</p>
<h2>Environmental disaster</h2>
<p>It is a major humanitarian crisis. Over half the country is in poverty after the previous decade of rapid improvements under a civilian quasi-democracy. The UN has <a href="https://myanmar.un.org/en/216732-myanmar-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-january-2023">identified 4.5 million people</a> needing emergency support, with millions displaced, the economy and international trade disrupted, and basic foodstuffs and essential drugs scarce.</p>
<p>But the conflict is delivering plenty of business opportunities for the Tatmadaw and its political cronies. Numerous large-scale projects previously blocked for environmental reasons <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/1/myanmar-climate">have been reactivated</a>: new dams and mines are of particular concern. </p>
<p>Logging appears to be <a href="https://www.forest-trends.org/publications/myanmars-timber-trade-one-year-since-the-coup/">on the increase</a> and a new wave of “crony” land grabbing by the army and its business partners has been taking over farmland for agricultural commodity production, often adding to deforestation. </p>
<p>Unregulated mining, taking advantage of Myanmar’s significant share of gold, gems, jade and rare earth elements, is poisoning Myanmar’s waterways. Oxford University-led research in 2017 into water quality <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360720721_Dissolved_trace_element_concentrations_and_fluxes_in_the_Irrawaddy_Salween_Sittaung_and_Kaladan_Rivers">found arsenic and lead concentrations</a> above safe levels. And today, mining projects <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/natural-resource-governance/myanmars-poisoned-mountains/">are proliferating,</a>, undoubtedly increasing pollution.</p>
<p>Meanwhile in many cities, <a href="https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/all-i-want-is-a-shower-all-day-blackouts-make-life-miserable-in-myanmar/">electricity outages</a> is forcing people to burn coal and wood for fuel, affecting air quality.</p>
<h2>Grounds for optimism</h2>
<p>Aside from the solidarity in the resistance movement and the increasingly fragile position of the military, there are grounds for optimism in the robust response of many foreign governments. The UN security council <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolution-2669-2022-on-the-situation-in-myanmar-too-little-too-late/#:%7E:text=On%20December%2021%2C%202022%2C%20the,%2C%20and%20the%20Russian%20Federation">issued a resolution in December 2022</a> calling for an immediate cessation to all forms of violence (Russia, China and India abstained).</p>
<p>The US has <a href="https://www.state.gov/burma-sanctions/">imposed escalating sanctions</a> targeting generals, arms suppliers and cronies. In December 2022, the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-senate-passes-defense-authorization-bill-including-myanmar-language/6879009.html">National Defense Authorization Act</a> provided support for democratic groups in Myanmar, including training and non-lethal assistance. </p>
<p>The EU passed its <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/08/myanmar-burma-eu-imposes-further-restrictive-measures-on-19-individuals-and-one-entity/">fifth package of sanctions</a> against the junta in November 2022, targeting arms exports. This international pressure has increased to the extent where it appears even China is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/11/beijing-delivers-subtle-snub-to-myanmars-military-regime">becoming embarrassed</a> by its association with the junta.</p>
<p>The civil war will undoubtedly continue for some time, and when it eventually ends the scars will take even longer to heal. What would make the pain bearable for many would be a just peace in which the menace of the Tatmadaw, after more than 60 years of violence, is removed, and the wealth of the generals, their cronies and the military companies used to alleviate poverty. </p>
<p>In the absence of direct military assistance, foreign governments and organisations should consider supporting the national unity government to help alleviate the suffering of Myanmar’s people. Key to this will be the coordination of health, education and financial services – now widely absent – as well as the groundwork to help civil society to restore democracy when the time comes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198254/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Oliver Springate-Baginski has received funding from a range of research and advocacy groups in relation to work in Myanmar/Burma including Pyoe Pin Program (Rangoon/Uk Govt), ALARM (Rangoon), Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation (Rangoon), TransNational Institute (Amsterdam); International Union for Conservation of Nature, (Gland), Forest Trends (Washington), World Bank Group (Washington), CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems (Vientiane), London School of Economic and Political Science (London).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Win Myo Thu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Myanmar’s opposition parties and ethnic separatists have formed a united front against the military junta.Oliver Springate-Baginski, Associate Professor of Environment & Development, University of East AngliaWin Myo Thu, Visiting Fellow, Christ Church College, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1982972023-01-29T19:09:34Z2023-01-29T19:09:34ZWhy has the West given billions in military aid to Ukraine, but virtually ignored Myanmar?<p>Two years after <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-military-reverts-to-its-old-strong-arm-behaviour-and-the-country-takes-a-major-step-backwards-154368">Myanmar’s coup on February 1 2021</a>, the country’s large and growing resistance forces receive almost no attention outside the country. </p>
<p>The democratic opposition, fronted by the National Unity Government (NUG), but comprising many different groups, armies, militias and individuals, has also struggled to gain awareness, even for its substantial battlefield successes.</p>
<p>And perhaps most notably, the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-civilian-acting-president-demands-international-arms-assistance.html">opposition’s pleas for weapons</a> from the West to fight against an increasingly brutal crackdown by the military junta have gone unheeded.</p>
<p>The difference with the West’s response to Ukraine’s war against Russia could not be more stark. While the two conflicts are not completely analogous, it is nonetheless striking how much Ukraine has galvanised the international community, while Myanmar has almost completely been ignored.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1618247798612426752"}"></div></p>
<h2>No charismatic, wartime figure</h2>
<p>Part of this has to do with the visibility of a central, iconic leader. With <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/30/myanmar-court-jails-aung-san-suu-kyi-for-extra-seven-years-in-final-closed-trial">ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi</a> and other public figures locked up, Myanmar’s resistance forces have no recognisable public face. </p>
<p>The NUG has an acting president, Duwa Lashi La, who makes occasional <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aw59uKsHL30">YouTube</a> and social media appearances. While he enjoys a strong reputation among ethnic Kachin in the country’s north, he is barely recognised on the global, or even national, stage.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Aw59uKsHL30?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">NUG President Duwa Lashi La announcing a people’s defensive war against the military junta in September 2021.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By contrast, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s transformation into a wartime commander has resulted in a huge global profile. He has given carefully scripted speeches to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bPfFYvAFlU8">foreign parliaments</a> and rousing addresses to both the Ukrainian people and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64321281">key international meetings</a>. </p>
<p>His constant efforts to refocus attention on the next phase of fighting in Ukraine have inspired his own people, and have made the Ukrainian flag a potent symbol of defiance in the face of tyranny.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/HYKqInuA98o?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Volodymyr Zelensky addressing the Australian parliament.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A lack of a simple narrative</h2>
<p>Ukraine has mastered the digital battlefield, too. Its leaders have simplified the narrative and calibrated it in a powerful way to emphasise a “good” versus “evil” struggle in which Western democracies are compelled to offer both symbolic and material support.</p>
<p>The complexities in Myanmar – ethnic, linguistic, geographic, ideological, historical and more – make such a narrative much harder to muster and sustain. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60820215">genocide of the Rohingya</a> in 2017, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyis-extraordinary-fall-from-grace-104250">took place under the Suu Kyi-led government</a>, also muddied the waters of the previously simplistic tale of a Nobel Peace laureate facing off against a brutal Myanmar military.</p>
<p>Suu Kyi’s government did not have oversight or control over the military that carried out the bloody purge, but this hardly seemed to matter. Suu Kyi’s decision to offer a <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/03/26/the-folly-of-aung-san-suu-kyis-bad-apple-defence/">stubborn defence</a> of the military’s actions at the International Court of Justice in 2019 dramatically shifted international opinion. </p>
<p>Now, with Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya still such a raw issue, it’s unclear whether Suu Kyi – or her democratically elected government – deserves the sympathy and support from the West they once received.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyis-extraordinary-fall-from-grace-104250">Aung San Suu Kyi's extraordinary fall from grace</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>A fringe actor on the global stage</h2>
<p>Geography matters, too. In a global strategic sense, Myanmar has almost always been an afterthought in the West. </p>
<p>In contrast, for a century or more, Ukraine has been a constant site for strategic competition, especially in the duels between Western powers and the government in Moscow. The attacks on Ukraine over the past decade by a nuclear-armed Russia are therefore seen by Western powers as a first-order geopolitical threat.</p>
<p>As such, the US alone <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-will-give-military-tanks-to-ukraine-signaling-western-powers-long-term-commitment-to-thwarting-russia-198555">committed</a> about US$50 billion in total assistance to Ukraine in 2022, about half of which was military aid.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-will-give-military-tanks-to-ukraine-signaling-western-powers-long-term-commitment-to-thwarting-russia-198555">US will give military tanks to Ukraine, signaling Western powers' long-term commitment to thwarting Russia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>With Myanmar a far less important site of conflict, most of the international community (including the regional body of Southeast Asian states, ASEAN) have been reluctant to provide military support for the resistance fighters. </p>
<p>Historically, <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/07/18/myanmar-fighters-improvised-weapons/">weapons smuggled into Myanmar</a> to support anti-government armies have used neighbouring countries, most notably Thailand and India, as the gateways. Today, however, the leaders in Bangkok and New Delhi are reluctant to get too entangled in Myanmar’s mess. They also have their own insurgencies to keep an eye on.</p>
<p>When weapons and materiel do flow into Myanmar today, they are moved quietly, with as much deniability as can be marshalled. With no Western government publicly <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/why-doesnt-the-west-sell-weapons-to-myanmars-anti-junta-rebels/">supplying the resistance with weapons</a>, the fighters are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/8/myanmar-fighters-say-injuries-make-willpower-stronger">resorting</a> to crowdfunding to buy weapons and using explosives pieced together with salvaged metal.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1590160997653807104"}"></div></p>
<p>Meanwhile, the military junta has built up a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/china-russia-arming-myanmar-junta-un-expert-says/a-60868089">huge arsenal of weapons</a> purchased from Russia and China, or made domestically using <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64250674">supplies from companies in countries like the US, Japan and France</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Military trucks loaded with missiles" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Military trucks loaded with missiles during a ceremony marking Myanmar’s 75th Independence Day anniversary in January.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aung Shine Oo/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Geopolitics may also matter when it comes to the international courts, as well. </p>
<p>There are two parallel genocide cases relating to Myanmar and Ukraine winding their way through the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The Ukraine case, still less than 12 months old, has received formal interventions by <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/182/intervention">almost all Western states, 33 in total</a>. </p>
<p>By contrast, the Myanmar case relating to the Rohingya was launched in 2019 and not a <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/178">single country</a> has formally intervened, despite several countries indicating they may do so.</p>
<h2>An opportunity to support democracy</h2>
<p>Another reason for the tentative international response to the Myanmar conflict is the expectation, particularly in ASEAN, that Myanmar’s coup-makers will, in the end, hold enough ground and continue to control the levers of power. </p>
<p>But we should ask if this assessment is correct. In early 2023, after two years of protest and violence, the junta looks especially vulnerable. </p>
<p>For example, influential voices within ASEAN, notably from <a href="https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/malaysian/asean-slams-myanmar-for-executions-07262022135128.html">Malaysia</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/indonesian-fm-says-myanmar-military-to-blame-for-countrys-crisis/">Indonesia</a>, have begun strongly rebuking the Myanmar military. </p>
<p>They seemingly no longer want the entire region’s reputation tarred by the junta’s brutal mismanagement of Myanmar. They are also aware that anti-regime forces are taking and holding significant ground.</p>
<p>Under these conditions, the international community needs to move more quickly to consider a future for Myanmar after this war ends. That means dramatically limiting the military’s ability to gain international legitimacy, ramping up efforts to starve the generals of weapons and financial resources, and supporting war crimes prosecutions in international courts.</p>
<p>At the same time, Myanmar’s revolutionary forces need support – both on the battlefield and in civilian efforts to rebuild a traumatised society.</p>
<p>The invasion of Ukraine has clearly demonstrated, for the first time in many years, that Western military force can be successfully used to support a democracy under siege. If only a small fraction of the support to Ukraine was provided to Myanmar’s resistance fighters, they could be given the chance to one day build a thriving democratic state in the heart of Asia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Farrelly has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council for Myanmar-focussed work. He is on the board of the Australia-ASEAN Council, which is an Australian government body. These are his personal views.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Myanmar’s two-year resistance to the brutal military regime barely registers in the West. But Ukraine shows that Western military force can be successfully used to support a democracy under siege.Nicholas Farrelly, Professor and Head of Social Sciences, University of TasmaniaAdam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1967202023-01-04T20:44:20Z2023-01-04T20:44:20ZBy helping Rohingya women, Canada can do the right thing and demonstrate global leadership<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503105/original/file-20230104-22-6g4jf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=82%2C14%2C4896%2C3426&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women display a poster during a rally against the persecution of Rohingya Muslims outside the Myanmar embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UN Security Council recently adopted its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/22/un-security-council-resolution-demands-end-to-myanmar-violence">first resolution on Myanmar</a> in more than seven decades. The resolution demanded an end to the violence and called on Myamnar’s military junta to release all political prisoners. In 2021, the military seized power in the country in a violent coup that saw thousands killed and jailed. </p>
<p>In 2022, Canada announced its long awaited Indo-Pacific strategy. The strategy focuses on <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-launches-new-indo-pacific-strategy-focus-disruptive-china-2022-11-27/">deepening economic ties with Pacific countries and boosting Canada’s military and cyber security in the region</a>.</p>
<p>The strategy also states that Canada will “<a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng">speak up for universal human rights</a>” and defend “human rights in the region, including women’s rights.”</p>
<p>Since 2017, Canada has been providing humanitarian aid to the Rohingya. The <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/myanmar-phase2.aspx?lang=eng">Canadian government</a> has pledged $288 million in humanitarian aid.</p>
<p>A strategy that truly stands up for women’s rights would advance Canada’s global leadership through offering greater support to the Rohingya, who are described as the “<a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/es/content/recognizing-the-rohingya-and-their-horrifying-pers/">world’s most persecuted minority</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman stands in a queue carrying a baby." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rohingya refugees board a ship as they are ferried to Bhasan Char, or floating island, in the Bay of Bengal, from Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Saleh Noman)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Who are the Rohingya?</h2>
<p>The Rohingya are an ethnic minority group in Myanmar. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/12/5/humans-are-for-the-grave-karen-face-myanmar-military-violence">Along with other minority groups</a>, they have been the regular target of state violence by the <a href="http://worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/myanmar">Myanmar military</a>, also known as the Tatmadaw.</p>
<p>In August 2017, the Tatmadaw launched a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/24/myanmar-no-justice-no-freedom-rohingya-5-years">brutal campaign in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine state</a>. Many international organizations, including the UN, reported evidence of widespread <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2021.1931136">sexual violence</a> as well as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-rakhine-events/https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-rakhine-events/">massacres and the destruction of villages</a>.</p>
<p>Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya people fled to neighbouring Bangladesh where they <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/aug/23/five-years-rohingya-refugees-2017-bangladesh-myanmar-military-crackdown">live in poor conditions</a>. </p>
<p>The government of Myanmar has systematically denied the population the right to education in their own language and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis">discriminated against them based on their religion</a>. Myanmar’s leaders have repeatedly branded the Rohingya as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/10/enemies-of-the-state/">illegal immigrants</a>, denying them fundamental rights to education and to seek employment. </p>
<h2>Sexual violence during the 2017 Rohingya genocide</h2>
<p>Several UN member states, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/21/canada-accuses-myanmar-of-genocide-against-rohingya">including Canada</a>, have condemned Myanmar’s actions, labelling them genocide. <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/sexualviolence">A 2018 UN report</a> documented how sexual violence was “<a href="https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/sexual-violence-and-genocide-the-international-court-of-justices-ruling-on-rohingya/">strategically deployed</a>” against Rohingya women and girls.</p>
<p>Reports from health-care providers indicate that in 2017, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-022-13038-7">conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)</a> was perpetrated by the Myanmar military. Along with mass rapes, the military would beat and shoot the victims who were predominantly women. Sometimes, they would also murder family members in front of the victims. </p>
<p>Evidence published by the UN and other human rights organizations indicate that the Myanmar militia’s use of <a href="https://restlessbeings.org/articles/genocidal-rape-analysis-of-tools-and-tactics-to-dehumanize-a-community">rape was a tool of genocide</a> to result in the complete and partial destruction of the Rohingya community. Survivor testimonies published by the UN, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other organizations reveal that sexual violence and rape were meticulously planned. </p>
<p>The military raided Rohingya villages and <a href="https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/weaponisation-of-female-body-the-genocidal-rape-of-the-rohingya-people">forcefully entered households</a> where women were gathering. Survivors recounted how soldiers would take turns raping the women. </p>
<p>CRSV is causing a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s13031-020-00329-2">public health crisis</a> for Rohingya women in refugee camps. While urgent health care was dispatched by human rights organizations, much of it focused on treating infectious diseases and physical trauma. </p>
<p>CRSV can be particularly stigmatizing for the victims, especially in conservative patriarchal societies. Survivors may feel reluctant to report the crime because of the shame that could bring them and their families. </p>
<p>Lack of access to health care is also a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/30/rohingya-refugees-facing-medical-crisis-bhasan-char">major deterrent</a>. Many refugee women often live in conservative environments where the use of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanwpc.2021.100246">contraceptives</a> is frowned upon. Furthermore, pregnant refugee women are <a href="https://www.unicef.org/rosa/stories/ante-and-post-natal-care-ensure-health-rohingya-mothers-and-children">encouraged to stay at home by their families and not seek medical assistance due to superstition and fear</a>. </p>
<h2>What can Canada do for Rohingya women?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/myanmar.aspx?lang=eng">Canadian government’s response</a> to the Rohingya crisis focuses on alleviating the humanitarian crisis and encouraging positive political developments in Myanmar. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A photo of a woman with blond hair wearing a beige coat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=649&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=649&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=649&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly announced Canada’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy in November 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This kind of a top-down approach focuses on assisting fragile states with political tools and financial resources to build political stability and prevent violence. But the risk with this approach is that persecuted communities remain at the bottom of the power hierarchy, where they continue to remain vulnerable. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://brownpoliticalreview.org/2018/10/bottom-approach-foreign-aid/">bottom-up approach,</a> the focus is on ensuring healing for survivors and empowering them to access resources that aid in their social and psychological rehabilitation. </p>
<p>By applying a bottom-up approach, Canada should engage with local women’s and human rights organizations working with survivors who can also weigh in on post-conflict recovery.</p>
<p>There must be greater understanding of how race, ethnicity and gender relations contribute to women’s vulnerability during genocide and conflict. By addressing the crimes of sexual violence, Canada can work to bring survivors’ lived experience to the centre of humanitarian responses and help to prevent future abuses.</p>
<h2>Localize humanitarian responses</h2>
<p>Canadian policymakers and stakeholders need to understand and engage with historical identities, gender relations and survivors’ everyday lived experiences. </p>
<p>Localizing humanitarian engagements by partnering with grassroots organizations and community-led initiatives can help create healing and inclusive spaces for survivors of sexual violence.</p>
<p>This is a way Canada can ensure that survivors are protected and have access to the resources they need. </p>
<p>Canada needs to follow through on its commitment to combat <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/un-onu/statements-declarations/2020-07-17-VTC_conflict-conflits_visio.aspx?lang=eng">conflict-related sexual violence</a> and lead the international community in seeking justice for the Rohingya people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deeplina Banerjee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada’s new Indo-Pacific strategy must include providing assistance to Rohingya women who have suffered sexual violence.Deeplina Banerjee, PhD Candidate, Gender, Sexuality and Women Studies, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1954192022-11-29T07:06:38Z2022-11-29T07:06:38ZHow Australian economist Sean Turnell came to be in and freed from a Myanmar jail<p>Macquarie University economist Sean Turnell is free and living in Sydney after 650 days of imprisonment in Myanmar, for what appears to be the “crime” of doing an economist’s job, which is trying to make people’s lives better – in this case the lives of the people of Myanmar. </p>
<p>A former Reserve Bank of Australia official, Turnell worked as an economic adviser to the government of Aung San Suu Kyi and continued to advise her after she was overthrown in a coup in February 2021.</p>
<p>He was imprisoned on trumped-up charges over the handling of confidential information – even though the papers he had in his possession were the papers he needed for his role as an economic adviser.</p>
<p>As a family friend and fellow economist, I was part of the campaign to get him released. Here are some personal reflections on Sean and that campaign. </p>
<h2>Who is Sean Turnell?</h2>
<p>Even before he set foot in Myanmar, Turnell’s story was a remarkable one. </p>
<p>He grew up in a working class family in the south western Sydney suburb of Macquarie Fields in the federal electorate of Werriwa, then represented by Labor’s Gough Whitlam. Sean’s dad, Peter Turnell, scored an invite to Whitlam’s house 50 years ago this week to celebrate Whitlam’s election as prime minister.</p>
<p>Whitlam ensured that Werriwa was sewered (it hadn’t been) and, by making university free, gave Sean the opportunity to go to Macquarie University.</p>
<p>As an academic at Macquarie University, Sean’s interest in Myanmar stemmed from his interest in social justice in general, from his own upbringing, and also getting to know Burmese students as an undergraduate at Macquarie.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-sham-sentence-after-a-secret-trial-for-australian-sean-turnell-191667">A sham sentence after a secret trial for Australian Sean Turnell</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Myanmar’s economy, after years of military rule (with the population of Canberra in the army despite no external threat) was underperforming. But Sean thought it had the potential of a Thailand or Vietnam with the right economic policies. </p>
<p>Sean established “<a href="https://prospectburma.org/news/burma-watch/">Burma Watch</a>”, a much-followed publication of economic data and analysis on the Myanmar economy, and then wrote an influential book on Myanmar’s financial system, <a href="https://uhpress.hawaii.edu/title/fiery-dragons-banks-moneylenders-and-microfinance-in-burma/">Fiery Dragons</a> that made him an internationally-recognised expert on the subject.</p>
<p>His reputation gained the interest and confidence of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy. Sean became a trusted adviser of “The Lady” when she was under house arrest and during the short time democracy was restored. He remains loyal to her to this day.</p>
<h2>A global network of support</h2>
<p>Macquarie University was also where Sean met the love of his life, his wife Ha Vu (also a development economist), who with other Macquarie University staff campaigned tirelessly for his release.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497861/original/file-20221129-20-8ebhi2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497861/original/file-20221129-20-8ebhi2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497861/original/file-20221129-20-8ebhi2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497861/original/file-20221129-20-8ebhi2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497861/original/file-20221129-20-8ebhi2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497861/original/file-20221129-20-8ebhi2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1218&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497861/original/file-20221129-20-8ebhi2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1218&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497861/original/file-20221129-20-8ebhi2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1218&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sean Turnell with Tim Harcourt.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I have spoken to Sean several times since his release, and he has just started to realise how big the campaign to free him was. </p>
<p>He would like to thank the supporters in Australia and internationally who worked tirelessly for his release, among them Macquarie University economists David Throsby and Wylie Bradford, Peter McCawley at the Australian National University and Leanne Ussher of Bard College in New York, and American microfinance economist Curtis Slover, who delivered him food while in prison.</p>
<p>He had help from unexpected quarters. Bruce Wolpe, a former US Congressional aide, offered to enlist former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, who had successfully negotiated for the release of US journalist Danny Fenster. </p>
<p>In Australia, Sean’s campaign was assisted by two former ambassadors to Myanmar, Christopher Lamb and Nicholas Coppel. Both provided strategic advice and specific knowledge to the campaign and Lamb’s <a href="https://aummi.edu.au/">Australian Myanmar Institute</a> provided resources and networks.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/relief-as-australian-sean-turnell-to-be-released-from-prison-in-myanmar-but-more-needs-to-be-done-194814">Relief as Australian Sean Turnell to be released from prison in Myanmar, but more needs to be done</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The union movement helped, as did the <a href="https://esavic.org.au/latest-news-item/46097/the-release-of-professor-sean-turnell/">Economic Society of Australia</a>, the hard-working officers of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and publications including <a href="https://theconversation.com/fate-of-detained-australian-economist-sean-turnell-may-be-tied-to-aung-sung-suu-kyi-166516">The Conversation</a>.</p>
<p>The energetic Labor MP for Lismore, Janelle Saffin, used her expertise and links. While having to deal with the Lismore floods at home, she found time to make waves in Myanmar. </p>
<p>The political campaign picked up after the election in May. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong became tireless in their advocacy, raising Sean’s case in international and regional meetings and pulling out all stops for Sean’s release. </p>
<h2>Reflection, then a book</h2>
<p>What next for Sean and Ha? It is unlikely Sean can ever return to Myanmar, although he says “he will always love the people of Myanmar”. </p>
<p>It might pay for Sean to be an armchair economist, at least for a while. He will be putting his literary skills to good use, writing a book about his ordeal and telling the story from inside and outside the prison’s walls.</p>
<p>And there is time for fun for Ha and Sean too. He is likely to want to see the musical Hamilton as, even before it began, he was fascinated with the life of the first Treasury Secretary of the United States, even visiting his archives in Washington DC in his holidays.</p>
<p>The people of Myanmar and Australia’s Burmese community are extraordinarily grateful. Thi Thi Power, a friend of Sean’s, said in tears when hearing of his release: “The Burmese people owe Sean one thousand times over”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195419/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Harcourt is a friend of Sean Turnell.</span></em></p>Sean Turnell was jailed for the ‘crime’ of doing an economist’s job, which is trying to make people’s lives better. Here’s how he was freed – and what comes next.Tim Harcourt, Industry Professor and Chief Economist, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1897802022-11-18T03:58:45Z2022-11-18T03:58:45ZChina’s influence in Myanmar could tip the scales towards war in the South China Sea<p>The fate of Myanmar has major implications for a free and open Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p>An undemocratic Myanmar serves no one’s interests except China, which is consolidating its economic and strategic influence in its smaller neighbour in pursuit of its <a href="https://cimsec.org/chinese-maritime-strategy-indian-ocean/">two-ocean strategy</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-if-growing-us-china-rivalry-leads-to-the-worst-war-ever-what-should-australia-do-185294">Friday essay: if growing US-China rivalry leads to 'the worst war ever', what should Australia do?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Since the coup China has been – by far – the main source of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/myanmar-economy-idUSL4N2U721T">foreign investment</a> in Myanmar. </p>
<p>This includes <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/junta-approves-25bn-power-plant-project-backed-by-chinese-companies">US$2.5 billion</a> in a gas-fired power plant to be built west of Myanmar’s capital, Yangon, that will be 81% owned and operated by Chinese companies.</p>
<p>Among the dozens of infrastructure projects China is funding are high-speed rail links and dams. But its most strategically important investment is the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/china-myanmar-economic-corridor-and-chinas-determination-see-it-through">China-Myanmar Economic Corridor</a>, encompassing oil and gas pipelines, roads and rail links costing many tens of billions of dollars. </p>
<p>The corridor’s “jewel in the crown” is a deep-sea port to be built at Kyaukphyu, on Myanmar’s west coast, at an estimated <a href="https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/kyaukphyu-deep-sea-port-poses-challenges-maday-islanders-and-local-fisheries">cost of US$7 billion</a>.</p>
<p>This will finally give China its long-desired “back door” to the Indian Ocean.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: Vivekananda International Foundation</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>Natural gas from Myanmar can help China reduce its dependence on imports from suppliers such as Australia. Access <a href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/myanmar-chinas-west-coast-dream">to the Indian Ocean</a> will enable China to import gas and oil from the Middle East, Africa and Venezuela without ships having to pass through the contested waters of the South China Sea to Chinese ports. </p>
<p>About <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/">80% of China’s oil imports</a> now move through the South China Sea via the Malacca Strait, which is just 65 kilometres wide at its narrowest point between the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia’s Sumatra. </p>
<hr>
<iframe title="Shipping choke points between the Middle East and Asia " aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-0FGem" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/0FGem/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="border: none;" width="100%" height="486"></iframe>
<hr>
<p>Overcoming this strategic vulnerability arguably makes the Kyaukphyu port and pipelines the most important element of China’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-financing-infrastructure-projects-around-the-world-many-could-harm-nature-and-indigenous-communities-168060">Belt and Road initiative</a> to reshape global trade routes and assert its influence over other nations.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-south-china-sea-threatens-90-of-australias-fuel-imports-study-188148">Conflict in the South China Sea threatens 90% of Australia's fuel imports: study</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Deepening relationship</h2>
<p>Most of China’s infrastructure investment was planned before Myanmar’s coup. But whereas other governments and foreign investors have sought to distance themselves from the junta since it overthrew Myanmar’s elected government in February 2021, China has deepened its relationship.</p>
<p>China is the Myanmar regime’s most important international supporter. In April Foreign Minister Wang Yi said <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wang-yi-aung-san-suu-kyi-china-myanmar-diplomacy-d68de69436c1462f647f6475b6315c92">China would support Myanmar</a> “no matter how the situation changes”. In May it used its veto power on the United Nations Security Council to thwart <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/russia-china-block-un-statement-034542265.html">a statement expressing concern</a> about violence and the growing humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. </p>
<p>Work continues on projects associated with the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. New ventures (such as the aforementioned power station) have been approved.
More projects are on the cards. In June, for example, China’s embassy in Myanmar announced the completion of <a href="https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2022/06/08/feasibility-study-completed-for-myanmar039s-wan-pong-port-improvement-project">a feasibility study</a> to upgrade the Wan Pong port on the Lancang-Mekong River in Myanmar’s east.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-myanmar-suffers-the-military-junta-is-desperate-isolated-and-running-out-of-options-187697">As Myanmar suffers, the military junta is desperate, isolated and running out of options</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Debt trap warnings</h2>
<p>In 2020, before the coup, Myanmar’s auditor general Maw Than <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/costly-borrowing-06102020151951.html">warned of growing indebtedness</a> to China, with Chinese lenders charging higher interest payments than those from the International Monetary Fund or World Bank. </p>
<p>At that time <a href="https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Forty-per-cent-of-Myanmar%E2%80%99s-government-debt-held-by-China-46071.html">about 40%</a> of Myanmar’s foreign debt of US$10 billion was owed to China. It is likely to be greater now. It will only increase the longer a military dictatorship, with few other supporters or sources of foreign money, remains in power, <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/06/23/how-the-coup-is-destroying-myanmars-economy/">dragging down Myanmar’s economy</a>.</p>
<p>Efforts to restore democracy in Myanmar should therefore be seen as crucial to the long-term strategic interests of the region’s democracies, and to global peace and prosperity, given the increasing belligerence of China under Xi Jinping. </p>
<p>Xi, now president for life, this month told the People’s Liberation Army to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/09/xi-jinping-tells-chinas-army-to-focus-on-preparation-for-war">prepare for war</a>. A compliant and indebted Myanmar with a deep-sea port controlled by Chinese interests tips the scales towards that happening. </p>
<p>A democratic and independent Myanmar is a counter-strategy to this potential. </p>
<h2>Calls for sanctions</h2>
<p>Myanmar’s democracy movement wants the international community to impose <a href="https://specialadvisorycouncil.org/cut-the-cash/">tough sanctions</a> on the junta. But few have responded.</p>
<p>The United States and United Kingdom have gone furthest, banning business dealings with Myanmar military officials and state-owned or private companies controlled by the military. </p>
<p>The European Union and Canada have imposed sanctions against a more limited range of individuals and economic entities.</p>
<p>South Korea has suspended financing new infrastructure projects. Japan has suspended aid and postponed the launch of Myanmar’s first satellite. New Zealand has suspended political and military contact. </p>
<p>Australia has suspended military cooperation (with some <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/sanctions-regimes/myanmar-sanctions-regime">pre-existing restrictions</a> on dealing with military leaders imposed following the human rights atrocities committed against the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561">Rohingya</a> in 2017. </p>
<p>But that’s about it. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-myanmars-junta-have-been-tried-before-can-they-work-this-time-158054">Sanctions against Myanmar's junta have been tried before. Can they work this time?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Myanmar’s closest neighbours in the ten-member Association of South-East Asian Nations are still committed to a policy of dialogue and “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/will-asean-finally-change-its-approach-toward-myanmar/">non-interference</a>” – though <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/malaysian-fm-says-asean-envoy-welcomes-idea-of-engaging-myanmars-nug/">Malaysia</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/indonesian-fm-says-myanmar-military-to-blame-for-countrys-crisis/">Indonesia</a> are increasingly arguing for a tougher approach as the atrocities mount. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://myanmar.iiss.org/">Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</a> says the only country now more violent than Myanmar is Ukraine. </p>
<p>Given its unique geo-strategic position, self-interest alone should be enough for the international community to take greater action.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189780/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Htwe Htwe Thein receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery grant. </span></em></p>An undemocratic Myanmar serves no one’s interests except China.Htwe Htwe Thein, Associate professor, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1948142022-11-17T08:21:37Z2022-11-17T08:21:37ZRelief as Australian Sean Turnell to be released from prison in Myanmar, but more needs to be done<p>In one of the few positive developments to come out of Myanmar in recent times, the military junta announced on Thursday it would be releasing almost 6,000 prisoners in an <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/australian-economist-former-uk-ambassador-among-thousands-freed-in-myanmar-amnesty">amnesty</a> to mark Myanmar’s National Day. </p>
<p>Included in the announcement were four foreign nationals being held in Myanmar’s jails: Australian academic Sean Turnell; former UK Ambassador to Myanmar and Myanmar resident Vicky Bowman; Japanese documentary filmmaker Toru Kubota; and US citizen Kyaw Htay Oo.</p>
<p>Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong reacted cautiously to the announcement, clearly waiting for further confirmation before celebrating the news.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1593099862991843330"}"></div></p>
<p>Turnell had been in jail for more than 21 months, and in September <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-09-29/australian-sean-turnell-court-verdict-myanmar/101478440">had been sentenced</a> to three years in jail for violating the country’s official secrets act. He was a close adviser to former Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whom the military deposed in a February 2021 coup.</p>
<p>At the time of <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-desperate-junta-trying-failing-shore-its-legitimacy">Turnell’s sentencing</a>, Suu Kyi had been sentenced to a total of 23 years in jail. It appeared likely that, with the 77-year old Suu Kyi removed from any role in the military’s next election charade, Turnell would be released soon afterwards. Suu Kyi has since been sentenced to a further <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/12/aung-san-suu-kyi-faces-total-of-26-years-in-prison-after-latest-corruption-sentencing">three years’ detention</a>.</p>
<p>However, the most likely prod towards the amnesty that included the foreign nationals was the politics surrounding the ASEAN-led round of summits over the previous weeks.</p>
<p>The ASEAN leaders statement was suitably bland, due to the need for consensus among all member states. But it did call for “<a href="https://asean.org/asean-leaders-review-and-decision-on-the-implementation-of-the-five-point-consensus/">concrete, practical and measurable indicators with a specific timeline</a>” to achieve the five-point peace plan it has developed to tackle the country’s political crisis. </p>
<p>However, the important messaging came from ASEAN powerhouse Indonesia, outside of the formal channels.</p>
<p>The week before the summit, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi stated in no uncertain terms that the military junta was solely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-junta-responsible-crisis-says-indonesia-foreign-minister-2022-11-03/">responsible</a> for the failing peace process.</p>
<p>On the sidelines of the summit, Indonesian President Joko Widodo then proposed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/11/southeast-asia-leaders-struggle-with-myanmar-crisis-at-summit">broadening</a> the ban on political representatives at ASEAN events, arguing “we must not allow the situation in Myanmar to define ASEAN”.</p>
<p>The Indonesian proposal drew support from Malaysia and Singapore, but pushback from the more authoritarian member countries Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.</p>
<p>This division in the organisation means statements and actions are necessarily limited in their scope.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1593095686043893760"}"></div></p>
<p>Nevertheless, the unusually strong statements from Indonesia, in addition to the persistence of the empty Myanmar chair at these events, will be causing concern within the junta.</p>
<p>Myanmar’s military – and other militaries in the region such as Thailand’s – can normally count on ASEAN eventually falling into line whenever they supplant elected governments with military regimes.</p>
<p>The fact that this time, 21 months after the coup, powerful ASEAN members seem to be digging in their heels in vehement hostility towards the military may have led the junta to reassess its situation.</p>
<p>As with previous military juntas in Myanmar, the current regime’s playbook is chequered with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/17/myanmar-junta-pardons-releases-more-than-23000-prisoners">amnesties</a> that are deployed strategically to ease diplomatic and domestic pressure, and it appears that is what has happened here.</p>
<p>While we should be extremely thankful that some political prisoners are being released from Myanmar’s jails, we should also recognise they should never have been there in the first place.</p>
<p>As a friend and colleague of Sean Turnell and Vicky Bowman, I will be relieved to see them return to safety.</p>
<p>However, there will remain <a href="https://twitter.com/aapp_burma/status/1592838654573293569?s=20&t=qdfwWloCJ4q0GUm-gTS08A">thousands</a> of other political prisoners in Myanmar’s jails even after this amnesty, not including those who have already been <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-killings-beatings-and-disappearances-escalate-whats-the-end-game-in-myanmar-156752">tortured to death</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-killings-beatings-and-disappearances-escalate-whats-the-end-game-in-myanmar-156752">As killings, beatings and disappearances escalate, what's the end game in Myanmar?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The international community’s focus understandably remains on Ukraine, but we need stronger action from our political leaders on Myanmar.</p>
<p>An inexpensive and relatively risk-free diplomatic manoeuvre would be to formally intervene to support the Gambia in the Rohingya <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/10/05/myanmars-genocide-overshadowed-by-ukraine/">genocide case</a> against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice. </p>
<p>While 23 mostly-Western countries have intervened to support Ukraine’s <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/182">genocide case against Russia</a>, not a single country has intervened <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/22/genocide-case-against-myanmar-over-rohingya-atrocities-cleared-to-proceed">to support the case</a> against Myanmar. Low hanging fruit indeed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194814/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While we should be extremely thankful that some political prisoners are being released from Myanmar’s jails, we should also recognise they should never have been there in the first place.Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1916672022-09-30T05:12:20Z2022-09-30T05:12:20ZA sham sentence after a secret trial for Australian Sean Turnell<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487460/original/file-20220930-16-4vbc24.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C3%2C1799%2C921&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/ruling-for-australian-nld-economics-advisor-expected-next-month.html">The Irawaddy</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australian Sean Turnell, economic adviser to Myanmar’s democratically elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi, has been in prison since the military coup of February 2021, awaiting trial for the supposed crime of stealing state secrets. </p>
<p>This week a puppet court sentenced him <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-court-sentences-suu-kyi-australian-economist-3-years-jail-source-2022-09-29/">to three years</a> in prison, alongside Suu Kyi, who has already been sentenced to 20 years’ jail in other sham court cases.</p>
<p>Both pled not guilty to the charge of holding confidential secret government documents. Turnell has said all he had were economic papers needed for his work as a technical economic adviser to Myanmar’s government. </p>
<p>The trial was held behind closed doors. Australian consular officials attempted to attend but were denied access. Foreign affairs minister Penny Minister <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/sentencing-professor-sean-turnell">has issued a statement</a> rejecting the legitimacy of the trial and calling for Turnell’s release.</p>
<p>The Myanmar regime has agreed to take into account the 20 months Turnell has already spent in prison. So he is due for release in January 2024.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-myanmar-suffers-the-military-junta-is-desperate-isolated-and-running-out-of-options-187697">As Myanmar suffers, the military junta is desperate, isolated and running out of options</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It is possible, however, that he could be released and deported early. There is a precedent for this. In November 2011 US journalist Danny Fenster was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/12/myanmar-junta-jails-us-journalist-danny-fenster-for-11-years">sentenced to 11 years</a> with hard labour but <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/15/us-journalist-danny-fenster-released-from-prison-in-myanmar">released just a day later</a>. Bill Richardson, a former New Mexico governor and US ambassador to the UN, was appointed as a special envoy and negotiated his release.</p>
<h2>How Turnell ended up in Myanmar</h2>
<p>I’ve known Turnell as a family friend and colleague for many years.</p>
<p>A working-class kid from Macquarie Fields in south-west Sydney, he attended Macquarie University, where he earned a bachelor’s degree in economics, then a PhD and ended up as an associate professor.</p>
<p>Turnell went on to become an expert on the links between banking systems and economic performance in developing countries, particularly in South-East Asia. </p>
<p>He wrote some important academic articles on Myanmar discussing how, after decades of isolation under military rule, economic reforms could rebuild the nation’s agriculture and tourism sector. </p>
<p>His work gained the attention of Aung San Suu Kyi. They first met in the early 1990s, before Suu Kyi was sentenced to house arrest. After her release in 2010 the junta (temporarily) allowed democratic reforms and she invited him to become her economic adviser. </p>
<p>Turnell’s economic competence was widely admired. He became a sort of John Maynard Keynes of Myanmar. I witnessed this in 2017 when he gave the keynote address to an <a href="https://aummi.edu.au/conference-2017/">Australian Myanmar Institute</a> conference in Yangon. It was a full house with an enthusiastic audience.</p>
<p>On February 1 2021 the miltary staged its coup. Turnell was arrested, along with other prominent advisers to Suu Kyi, a few days later. </p>
<h2>Is it time for sanctions?</h2>
<p>It has been suggested that Australia should appoint a special envoy help get Turnell released, just as the US did for Danny Fenster. Former prime minister Kevin Rudd might be suitable given his good relationships in Asia.</p>
<p>In the meantime it is pleasing to see that foreign minister Penny Wong has been more vigorous than her predecessor Marise Payne in advocating for Turnell, and Myanmar generally. </p>
<p>Last month Wong <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/statement-asean-australia-ministerial-meeting">raised the issue</a> of Myanmar at a meeting of ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Myanmar is one of ASEAN’s ten members, and its neighbours have been divided over the forum’s longstanding policy of “constructive engagement” versus taking a harder line. </p>
<p>But will the Australian government back up its rhetorical support for Myanmar’s democracy movement with the type of sanctions the movement wants from the international community?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-myanmars-junta-have-been-tried-before-can-they-work-this-time-158054">Sanctions against Myanmar's junta have been tried before. Can they work this time?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Observers <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/will-australia-use-its-amended-sanctions-act-against-myanmar">have suggested</a> Turnell’s fate may have influenced the former government’s lack of enthusiasm for sanctions. </p>
<p>That still appears the case, with Wong adopting a similar stance to Payne in saying only that sanctions against members of Myanmar’s military regime “<a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/australia-mulls-sanctions-against-myanmars-military-leaders-after-appalling-executions/bhwe88g6l">are under active consideration</a>”.</p>
<p>But there’s a paradox at play here. If Turnell’s predicament really is behind the government’s reluctance to impose sanctions, that gives Myanmar’s junta an incentive to keep Turnell locked up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191667/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Turnell is a family friend</span></em></p>Having already spent 20 months in a prison, Aung San Syy Kyi’s Australian economic advisor is due for release in January 2024.Tim Harcourt, Industry Professor and Chief Economist, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.