tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/nepad-20716/articlesNEPAD – The Conversation2022-08-11T14:53:46Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1877052022-08-11T14:53:46Z2022-08-11T14:53:46ZNot yet uhuru: the African Union has had a few successes but remains weak<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477122/original/file-20220802-19-k8vu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Delegates at the African Union Summit held in Malabo, Capital of Equatorial Guinea, on 27 May 2022 to address worsening humanitarian crises in Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) was born in the South African port city of Durban <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/september-2002/african-union-launched">in 2002</a>. Under its first chair,<a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki-mr-0">Thabo Mbeki</a>, African leaders seemed determined to abandon the grandiose plans of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU had been established <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau">in 1963</a> to promote African unity and liberation. Other aims included: to protect the territorial integrity of its member states, promote non-alignment, and advance the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">peaceful settlement of disputes</a>.</p>
<p>The African Union, for its part, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">was established</a> to achieve an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa which would be led by its own citizens and play a dynamic role in global politics. Unlike the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">OAU Charter</a>, the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000</a> allowed for interference in the internal affairs of its members to stem instability, halt egregious human rights abuses and sanction military coups d’état.</p>
<p>Military regimes in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/2/25/togo-suspended-from-au">Togo</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mauritania-coup-idUSL855802420080809">Mauritania</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/20/african-union-suspends-madagascar">Madagascar</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20100219-african-union-suspends-niger-thousands-celebrate-coup">Niger</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-africa-idUSBRE9640EP20130705">Egypt</a>, <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/sudan-suspended-african-union#:%7E:text=On%20the%206th%20of%20June,exit%20from%20its%20current%20crisis.">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-suspends-guinea-after-military-coup/a-59144311">Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/4/17/guinea-bissau-suspended-from-african-union">Guinea-Bissau</a>, <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/african-union-suspends-mali-participation-all-activities">Mali</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/african-union-suspends-burkina-faso-after-military-coup-2022-01-31/">Burkina Faso</a> were thus suspended from the AU. The continental body launched praiseworthy military stabilisation missions into <a href="https://issafrica.org/chapter-4-the-african-union-mission-in-burundi">Burundi</a> (2003), <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201231-un-african-union-peacekeeping-mission-in-sudan-s-darfur-ends">Darfur</a> (2007) and <a href="https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/amisom/">Somalia</a> (2007). However despite this progress, autocrats continued to rig electoral outcomes. </p>
<p>As the AU <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">turned 20 in July 2022</a>, it had achieved a few successes. But it remains a weak organisation embarking on sporadic bouts of illusory reforms. This is due to financial and capacity constraints. And too much decision-making power resides with its omnipotent heads of state which has denied the organisation the ability to take decisions, and act more effectively on behalf of its members.</p>
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<h2>Institutional sclerosis</h2>
<p>The Addis Ababa-based <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">AU Commission</a> – its implementing arm – is led by an <a href="https://au.int/en/assembly">Assembly of Heads of State</a>, with an Executive Council of foreign ministers and a Permanent Representatives Committee of ambassadors. The ambassadors work with specialised development, governance, parliamentary and judicial organs. The AU Commission has, however, struggled to establish its independence to take initiatives on behalf of its 55 member states in fulfilment of its mandate. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20Audit%20of%20the%20AU.pdf">2007 audit report</a> led by the Nigerian scholar-technocrat <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/pan-africanism/tribute-my-mentor-professor-adebayo-adedeji">Adebayo Adedeji</a> revealed how the AU Commission headed by <a href="https://www.africaunionfoundation.org/professor-alpha-oumar-konare/">Malian Alpha Konaré</a> (2003-2008) misunderstood its mandates and authority levels, and failed to coordinate overlapping tasks. Some of these problems still persist.</p>
<p>Under the French-influenced Gabonese <a href="http://jeanping.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CV-Jean-Ping-VGB.pdf">Jean Ping</a> (2008-2012), the commission’s annual budget had reached <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2011/01/27/short-of-cash-and-teeth">$260 million by 2011</a>. Only 40% of this sum was actually paid by members. The European Union, China and the United States mostly funded the rest. This posed the risk that AU institutional priorities could be set by its donors.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://au.int/en/assembly">AU Assembly</a> of heads of state has often failed to adhere to the principle of subsidiarity: taking decisions at the lowest practical level, as the European Union – the world’s only genuinely supranational regional organisation – does. </p>
<p>The AU also conducts most of its business through unanimity, making it difficult to reach quick decisions.</p>
<p>While the AU Commission has some impressive staff, it also has much “dead wood” inherited from the OAU era. </p>
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<p>The AU’s 2003 plan to set up an <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1">African Standby Force</a> by 2010 was <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/african-union-says-progressing-to-military-force-by-end-2015/">postponed until 2015</a>. In December 2020, the organisation simply declared the force to be fully operational, despite the fantasy involved in such a statement. The deadline for “Silencing the Guns” (ending armed conflicts) <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2021.1995222#:%7E:text=The%20Africa%20Union's%20Agenda%202063,all%20illegal%20weapons%20in%20Africa.">by 2020</a>“ was casually pushed back a decade.</p>
<h2>Illusory reforms</h2>
<p>As chair of the AU Commission (2012-2016), former South African foreign minister <a href="https://www.africaunionfoundation.org/dr-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma </a> complained that over 97% of the continental body’s programmes were <a href="https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2012/Dec/27467/budget_challenge_for_dlamini_zuma_at_au.aspx">funded by external donors</a>. In 2013, $155 million of the $278 million annual budget (56%) was still <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/6158/african-union-its-never-too-late-to-avoid-war-dlamini-zuma/">provided by foreign partners</a>. But Dlamini-Zuma failed to reduce this dependence during her four-year tenure. AU leaders refused to back efforts to find alternative sources of funding, such as customs duties and <a href="https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/885/Assembly%20AU%2018%20%28XIX%29%20_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">taxes on flights and hotel stays</a>. </p>
<p>Among the more quixotic ideas of the Dlamini-Zuma-driven 50-year development vision, <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">"Agenda 2063”</a> includes increasing intra-African trade from 12% to 50% by 2045, ending armed conflicts by 2020 ](https://au.int/en/flagships/silencing-guns-2020) and eradicating poverty in two decades.</p>
<p>Under the Francophile Chadian chair, <a href="https://au.int/en/biography-he-moussa-faki-mahamat">Moussa Faki Mahamat</a>, since 2017, the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34915-file-report-20institutional20reform20of20the20au-2.pdf">report</a> chaired by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Paul-Kagame">Rwandan president Paul Kagame</a> on reforming the AU seemed rushed and lacked substance, and its laundry list of recommendations on institutional reforms were on a level of vacuity as to be of no real utility. </p>
<p>These were physicians proposing half-baked cures to ills that had not been properly diagnosed. All the 2017 report’s “key findings” had been more coherently outlined in <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20Audit%20of%20the%20AU.pdf">Adedeji’s report</a> a decade earlier, the recommendations of which still have not been implemented. </p>
<p>Another disappointment has been the 2018 <a href="https://au.int/en/cfta">African Continental Free Trade Area</a> which seeks to facilitate trade, build infrastructure, establish a common market and ensure the free movement of people. But outside West and Eastern Africa, the free movement of people <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/africa-intracontinental-free-movement">remains a pipe dream</a>.</p>
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<p>Most African governments are security-obsessed and hostile to intra-African migration. There is also a lack of convergence of African economies. Many compete to export raw materials rather than exchange diverse goods.</p>
<p>Road, rail, and port infrastructure remains poor. Rules of origin – which define where goods are made – are often restrictive, and non-tariff barriers are widespread. If integration has not worked at the national and sub-regional levels, transferring all these problems to the continental level will certainly not integrate Africa. </p>
<h2>Need for realism</h2>
<p>The 15-member <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">AU Peace and Security Council</a> has contributed substantively to peacemaking efforts across Africa, and coordinated closely with the United Nations.</p>
<p>But other AU organs have performed less well. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nepad.org/publication/nepad-brief">New Partnership for Africa’s Development</a> clearly lacks the resources and capacity as a development agency to uplift the continent. The <a href="https://au.int/en/aprm#:%7E:text=APRM%20is%20a%20voluntary%20arrangement,economic%20growth%20and%20sustainable%20development">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>, which identifies governance challenges in 41 countries, is toothless.</p>
<p>The Pan-African Parliament remains a <a href="https://theconversation.com/toothless-pan-african-parliament-could-have-meaningful-powers-heres-how-87449">“talking shop”</a>. The <a href="https://au.int/en/about/ecosocc">Economic, Social and Cultural Council</a> has failed to provide genuine civil society participation in the AU’s institutions. The idea of the African Diaspora in the Americas, the Caribbean and Europe as a <a href="http://www.west-africa-brief.org/content/en/six-regions-african-union">sixth African sub-region</a>, along with the five continental ones, is largely devoid of substance.</p>
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<p>The AU must thus adopt more realistic and less illusory mandates. Its approach should be based on an accurate assessment of financial and logistical realities. </p>
<p>More positively, AU members had contributed <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220630/african-union-peace-fund-board-trustees-convene-meeting-review-progress">$295 million</a> to their <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/peace-fund-lies-dormant-as-member-states-discuss-its-use">revised Peace Fund</a> by June 2022, complementing a <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-union-20-much-accomplished-more-challenges-ahead/">$650 million 2022 budget </a>. African leaders must now strengthen the institutions they have created.</p>
<p>They must also establish one effective economic body in each sub-region that can promote socio-economic development and provide jobs for the continent’s youthful population.</p>
<p>The AU’s first two decades have largely represented a magical, mystical world of unfulfilled expectations. This is not yet uhuru (freedom).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adekeye Adebajo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The AU’s first two decades have largely represented a magical, mystical world of unfulfilled expectations.Adekeye Adebajo, Professor and Senior research fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1798622022-04-08T08:15:18Z2022-04-08T08:15:18ZObasanjo: from a Nigerian village to the pinnacle of power on the continent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455482/original/file-20220331-25-v46ioh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/olusegun-obasanjo-former-president-of-nigeria-at-the-book-news-photo/1160298341?adppopup=true">Darren Stewart/Gallo Images via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s former president and a pan Africanist extraordinaire, <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/03/05/obasanjo-clocks-85-amid-loads-of-goodwill-messages/">turned 85 on 5 March 2022</a>. </p>
<p>Obasanjo was Nigeria’s military head of state <a href="https://www.theafricaceoforum.com/en/portraits/olusegun-obasanjo/">between 1976 and 1979</a> and two-time democratically elected president, <a href="https://www.clubmadrid.org/miembro/olusegun-obasanjo/">from 1999 to 2007</a>. </p>
<p>“OBJ”, as he is widely called, is probably the most globally known and celebrated Nigerian leader. One probable reason is his political credentials as military and civilian head of state. He also led Africa’s biggest country longer than any other person. </p>
<p>His initiatives and policies as Nigerian leader are another reason. In 1976, he introduced <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Operation-Feed-the-Nation">Operation Feed the Nation</a>, a social revolution aimed at changing the fortunes of the people through farming. To increase production and exports, his administration also created the <a href="https://nnpcgroup.com/NNPC-Business/Business-Information/Pages/Industry-History.aspx">Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation</a> in 1977. This initially recorded some successes but is currently unable to make refined fuel available for local consumption and export. </p>
<p>Obasanjo <a href="https://republic.com.ng/august-september-2021/political-legacy-obasanjo/">returned Nigeria to democratic rule in 1979</a>, the country’s first successful transition from military to civilian rule. After 19 years of social and political upheavals, including bloody coups, a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f9cSA1gLizE">civil war</a>, economic crisis and a corruption pandemic occasioned by an oil boom, Obasanjo handed over power to civilian successors. He also set up a constitutional conference culminating in <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/nig_const_79.pdf">the 1979 Constitution</a>. Thus, he helped create a path towards a multiparty democracy. </p>
<h2>Obasanjo’s second coming</h2>
<p>The years between 1979 and 1999 witnessed political instability, corruption in public office, economic collapse and decay of social infrastructure. Becoming president in 1999, Obasanjo introduced an anti-corruption regime with three agencies: the <a href="https://www.efcc.gov.ng/">Economic and Financial Crimes Commission</a>, <a href="https://icpc.gov.ng/">Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission</a> and the <a href="https://www.bpp.gov.ng/background/">Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligent Unit</a>. The unit is also known as the Due Process Commission. </p>
<p>The agencies’ dragnets <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/aaechp/978-3-030-50509-7_21.html">caught</a> some big fish, projecting the administration as the first of its kind in Nigerian politics. </p>
<h2>Pan-Africanism as personal philosophy</h2>
<p>Obasanjo’s <a href="https://www.nepad.org/news/olusegun-obasanjo-my-africa-utopia">vision for Africa</a>, which manifested in his public policies as a leader, brought back memories of the radical pan-Africanism of the 1960s. For example, British Petroleum was <a href="https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/3479#:%7E:text=In%20July%201979%2C%20Nigeria's%20federal,been%20controlled%20by%20foreign%20investors.">nationalised in 1979</a> as a sanction against Britain for supporting apartheid in southern Africa. His administration <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05152.6?seq=1">granted asylum to leaders and financed the anti-apartheid movement in southern Africa</a>. It also supported liberation movements in Angola and other African countries. </p>
<p>In 1988, Obasanjo established the <a href="https://www.africaleadership.org/">African Leadership Forum</a>. This brought thought leaders to Nigeria from across Africa and the world to discuss issues relating to black people and the African continent. He also travelled widely to attend high-profile meetings and meet world leaders about charting new paths for the continent. These meetings became the thinking hub for African regeneration. Some of the outcomes included some continental bodies and initiatives.</p>
<p>Obasanjo joined others to form the <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/nepad">New Partnership for Africa’s Development</a> in 2001. The partnership introduced the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2013/african-peer-review-mechanism-comes-age">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>, an initiative intended to commit leaders to good governance. For the years that it was effective, accountability and transparency in leadership became the watchwords for most African governments and governance <a href="https://gsdrc.org/document-library/the-african-peer-review-mechanism-development-lessons-from-africas-remarkable-governance-assessment-system/">picked up positively</a>.</p>
<p>He was also there when the <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">African Union</a> succeeded the Organisation of Africa Unity in 2002. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/9191/1/Folarin%206.pdf">an assessment</a> of Obasanjo’s policy score-sheet, I found that his administration’s West Africa policy between 2001 and 2006 tried to stem the tide towards war in Togo, Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea. Rebuffed by the latter two, he had to influence the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union to attend to the situation.</p>
<p>Having <a href="https://guardian.ng/features/obasanjos-story-of-debt-relief-and-burden/">secured</a> US$20 billion in debt relief for Nigeria and cleaned up the Nigerian debt profile, he <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200005180015.html">rallied other African leaders</a> to do the same thing. However, his successors in Nigeria have raised the country’s debt profile <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/government-debt-to-gdp">to dangerous levels</a>.</p>
<p>Obasanjo was <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/former-president-obasanjo-appointed-high-representative-horn-africa">appointed </a> as the African Union’s High Representative for the Horn of Africa in 2021. His task is to work towards achieving lasting peace and stability in the region. His experience in peacemaking, his personality and his leadership qualities make him the right person for the job. </p>
<h2>Controversies galore</h2>
<p>Obasanjo is, however, not free from controversies. </p>
<p>His administration’s Operation Feed the Nation is <a href="http://ng.dailyadvent.com/politics/2019/05/13/obasanjo-how-operation-feed-the-nation-project-became-obasanjos-well-known-ota-farms/">dismissed sometimes</a> as having been used to advance his own personal cause. </p>
<p>He has also been described in some quarters, by either political opponents or some Yoruba ethnic leaders, as someone who often put other ethnic groups ahead of his own. He has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/oct/20/chrismcgreal">accused</a> of being too soft on Northern ethnic militants and highhanded on Southern counterparts. </p>
<p>He was also alleged to have nursed an ambition to remain in power <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/obasanjos-costly-failed-third-term-bid">after his constitutional two terms</a>. </p>
<h2>Humble beginnings</h2>
<p>Obasanjo’s legacies are better appreciated when viewed against his humble background. He was born into a poor family in Ibogun-Olaogun, a farming settlement in Owu-Egba, near Abeokuta, south-west Nigeria. <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/irinw52799.html">In 1958</a> he joined the Nigerian Army, where he specialised in engineering. He had military training in the Congo, Britain and India. </p>
<p>He fought on the Nigerian side of the civil war between 1967 and 1970. From 1975 to 1976, he was second-in-command to military ruler Murtala Muhammad. Many regard him as the man who put an end to the civil war. </p>
<p>He became a farmer and published 24 books on various issues, including military and political leadership, the civil war and his vision for Africa. </p>
<p>Obasanjo remained the nemesis of several successive rulers, checking their excesses. He will be remembered for his roles in the rebirth of the African Union and peacemaking. </p>
<p>Some see Obasanjo as a great Nigerian; others as an African hero like Nelson Mandela, or an influential thinker. Some believe he is just a self-serving tyrant who tries to bring the world to his feet. </p>
<p>No matter how others see him, Obasanjo may just pass for another local but influential village farmer who was fortunate to lead his country and Africa in many diverse ways.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179862/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sheriff Folarin receives funding from William P. Hobby Center for Public Service, Texas State University. </span></em></p>Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria, will be remembered for his roles in the rebirth of African Union and peacemaking.Sheriff Folarin, Professor of International Relations and Visiting Scholar, Texas State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1247182019-11-05T14:23:11Z2019-11-05T14:23:11ZMalawi’s dream of a waterway to the Indian Ocean may yet come true<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299688/original/file-20191031-187898-1ytiywh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A small boat carries passengers across the Zambezi river. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Malawi’s landlocked status places a huge <a href="https://www.africanwaterfacility.org/fileadmin/uploads/awf/Projects/AWF-Project-appraisal-report-MULTIN-SHIREZAMBEZI.pdf">burden on its economy</a>. This makes imports and exports expensive. Because of time-consuming and poor-quality rail and road transport, the country’s transport costs are <a href="http://repository.uneca.org/pdfpreview/bitstream/handle/10855/23017/b11560861.pdf?sequence=1">among the highest in Africa</a>. </p>
<p>The search for a solution has dominated Malawi’s foreign policy since independence in 1964. Malawi relies on four main trade corridors: the ports of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania; Beira and Nacala in Mozambique and Durban in South Africa. </p>
<p>An alternative route is a waterway to the Indian Ocean through Mozambique. It was first proposed in 1891. The now <a href="http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/livros/des2015/IESE-Desafios2015_16_ConSob.pdf">controversial idea</a> was revived in 2005 by Malawi’s third president, Bingu wa Mutharika (2004-2012) as a signature foreign policy project. It was known as the Shire-Zambezi Waterway. </p>
<p>Believing it would be an important legacy of his presidency, he <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/malawi-zambia-seek-trade-waterway-mozambique">consistently</a> claimed that using the route from Nsanje in Malawi to Chinde in Mozambique would drastically reduce Malawi’s transport costs and boost economic growth.</p>
<p>Malawi’s <a href="http://www.nsomalawi.mw/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=110">main exports</a> are tobacco, tea, sugar. It imports oils, consumer goods and fertilisers.</p>
<p>But Malawi has so far failed to get access to the Indian Ocean. Our <a href="https://www.sum.uio.no/english/research/publications/2019/happy-kayuni-dan-banik-joseph-chunga-the-perils-of-megaphone-diplomacy-malawian-mozambican-relations-following-the-shire-zambezi-waterway-project.html">research</a> suggests this is because of two important factors: Malawi’s diplomatic strategy and the absence of Mozambique’s buy-in. </p>
<p>We found that for the project to happen, Malawi must change its diplomatic approach and the two countries must ensure that their national interests in the project are closely aligned.</p>
<p>Yet there may be renewed hope for the project. This is because there are recent signs that the two countries do in fact have interests in common and can collaborate on a project. </p>
<h2>The Shire-Zambezi waterway</h2>
<p>Malawi’s diplomatic relations with Mozambique have not been harmonious since independence. Historically, Malawi was aligned to apartheid South Africa, which provided support to the Renamo rebel movement during Mozambique’s 16-year <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/mozambique-civil-war/">civil war</a>. </p>
<p>Mozambique’s leaders therefore showed little interest in Mutharika’s vision of a waterway running through its territory. The other factor was Mozambique would likely lose out on the toll or freight charges for foreign vehicles that use its transport network. Instead, in 2009 they announced plans to <a href="http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/Dibben,Pauline_tranport.pdf">rehabilitate the port of Beira</a>, rather than Chinde’s, and improve the country’s road network.</p>
<p>Still, Mutharika pursued the waterway project. First, beginning in 2005, he sought <a href="http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0610/S01566/cablegate-the-shire-zambezi-waterway-gods-highway-or-bingus.htm">support from other African leaders</a> at meetings of the African Union, Southern African Development Community (SADC) and New Partnership For Africa’s Development (NEPAD). </p>
<p>Second, he bolstered the credibility of the project by formally and informally <a href="https://www.timalawi.nl/LaatsteNieuws/NsanjeInlandPort.htm">including</a> Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As a former Secretary General of the Preferential Trade Area of East and Central Africa (PTA), he believed that a regional integration component would win his project favour. </p>
<p>Third, Mutharika insisted that the project be <a href="http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0610/S01566/cablegate-the-shire-zambezi-waterway-gods-highway-or-bingus.htm">completed quickly</a>, even in the absence of Mozambican approval. He may have reasoned that if he demonstrated his commitment, Mozambique would be forced to comply for the sake of neighbourly relations.</p>
<h2>Megaphone diplomacy</h2>
<p>Mutharika’s strategy demonstrated the shortcomings of <a href="https://www.saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/16-Dlamini.pdf">“megaphone diplomacy”</a> in international relations. Megaphone diplomacy is generally understood as the use of mass media to advance contentious diplomatic aims. This is the opposite of “quiet diplomacy” through traditional diplomatic channels. </p>
<p>Without consulting the Mozambican government and after almost a year in power, Mutharika organised a highly publicised groundbreaking ceremony in Nsanje port in southern Malawi in October 2005. Subsequently, his administration engaged a private Portuguese company to begin phase one of the construction of the port. </p>
<p>This phase was quickly completed and Mutharika’s government went ahead to publicise the official opening of the waterway. Billboards went up across the country emblazoned with the words </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The dream becomes reality: Nsanje Port opens October 2010”. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The presidents of Zambia and Zimbabwe were invited to the public ceremony to celebrate the planned arrival of a barge carrying 60 tonnes of imported fertiliser. Mozambican authorities, however, <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/daily-news-south-africa/20101026/282531539771813">impounded the barge and detained </a> four Malawians for navigating the river without authorisation. </p>
<p>Mozambique objected to the project on grounds that no economic feasibility study or environmental impact assessment had been carried out. It also claimed that Malawi had not even requested official clearance of the barge. </p>
<p>The final blow for Malawi’s diplomatic debacle was the publication of the feasibility report commissioned by the SADC. The 2013 report <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/PRINT-VERSION/SHIRE-ZAMBEZI-2016-02-19">concluded</a> that the project is </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“technically feasible but not financially viable.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Although the waterway is Malawi’s shortest route to the sea, the report <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/shire-zambezi-waterway-not-viable-insists-transport-ministry-of-mozambique/">concluded</a> that only 273,200 tonnes per year could be transported through the waterway. Annual dredging and removal of aquatic plants would cost 80 million US dollars per year, the report further said. </p>
<h2>Mozambican response</h2>
<p>The report provided a legitimate reason for Mozambique’s withdrawal from the project, but failed diplomacy undoubtedly led to the collapse of the waterway project. Mozambique was operating from a position of power as it controls access to the sea. And it was unlikely to benefit much from the Shire-Zambezi Waterway. If Malawi changes its diplomatic approach, the project may ultimately see the light of day. </p>
<p>Indeed, Malawi’s tactics appeared to reinforce Mozambique’s opposition to the project, which it felt undermined its national interests. </p>
<p>In recent months, Malawi’s current president Peter Mutharika (Bingu Mutharika’s brother) has been drumming up support for the project again. Mozambique continues to ignore such signals. </p>
<p>But the two countries recently <a href="https://southerntimesafrica.com/site/news/world-bank-funding-malawi-mozambique-interconnection">signed an agreement</a> that will allow the Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi to purchase 200 megawatts of power from Mozambique starting in 2022. This is a clear case of a successful partnership with both countries sharing a common national interest on power generation and supply. </p>
<p>Despite the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/flagship-projects">talk of globalisation, regional integration and partnerships</a>, national interest continues to rule in international diplomacy. For the Shire-Zambezi project to go ahead, Malawi and Mozambique must have a frank discussion about how they could both benefit from it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Happy Kayuni receives funding from the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Banik receives funding from the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Chunga receives funding from the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). </span></em></p>Malawi must change its diplomatic approach and align its national interests with Mozambique’sHappy Kayuni, Professor, University of MalawiDan Banik, Professor of political science, Director of the Oslo SDG Initiative, Host of "In Pursuit of Development" podcast, University of OsloJoseph Chunga, Lecturer & Research fellow, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1047002018-10-15T09:59:47Z2018-10-15T09:59:47ZTies between African countries and China are complex. Understanding this matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240247/original/file-20181011-154549-1lowuqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ghana's President Nana Akufo-Addo and China's President Xi Jinping at the 2018 summit in Beijing.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Andy Wong (Pool)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The complex relationship between Africa and China has become even more complicated this year. Initially, 2018 was set to reaffirm the bond through the latest Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit held in Beijing in <a href="http://africachinareporting.co.za/2018/09/highlights-from-focac-2018/">September</a>. The summit delivered its usual pageant of African leaders, side deals, and the announcement of a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-africa/chinas-xi-offers-another-60-billion-to-africa-but-says-no-to-vanity-projects-idUSKCN1LJ0C4">USD$60 billion</a> financing package. The year also saw the recurrence of misgivings about the relationship.</p>
<p>The most explicit theme of this conversation was debt. Donald Trump’s US administration added fuel to smouldering anxiety, and China found itself having to defend its lending to Africa – at home and globally. At the same time, African governments are battling rumours that they are about to hand over state assets to <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/09/13/zambia-denies-offering-power-utility-as-collateral-for-china-loan">the Chinese</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-africas-debt-to-china-is-complicated">debt debate</a> is flawed – not least for underestimating Western contributions to African debt. Nevertheless, it is revealing. In particular, the debate reflects an anxiety that has haunted relations between China and the continent since the beginning of this century: the massive power gap between China and individual African countries. </p>
<h2>Power imbalances</h2>
<p>The constant rhetoric of win-win cooperation between China and Africa has never adequately answered the simple structural question at the heart of the relationship. That is: how is an economy the size of Benin’s or Togo’s, for example, supposed to meaningfully engage with the Chinese behemoth? It’s a bit like trying to speed up your bicycle by grabbing on to a passing jumbo jet. It can take you to the next level, or it can simply rip off your arms.</p>
<p>The fundamental economic and power imbalance between China and African countries has led to the relationship being criticised as <a href="https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/05/08/behind-the-goodwill-aid-china-s-neo-colonialism-in-africa/">neocolonial</a>. The truth, however, is that African governments exercise more agency than they are given credit for. This includes frequently playing China and traditional Western development partners off against one another. </p>
<p>The word “agency” is key here: to what extent is Africa able to freely make its own decisions and drive the best deals with China?</p>
<p>Our new <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/research/in-the-drivers-seat-african-agency-and-chinese-power/">research</a> focused on this issue. We looked at two emerging areas shaping African agency in relation to China. These are reforms to the African Union (AU) and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer">Belt and Road Initiative</a> (BRI). The initiative involves a massive infrastructure rollout aimed at linking China to Europe and beyond. The aim is to set up a zone of shared development that encompasses <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer">Central and Western Asia and Africa</a>.</p>
<h2>The AU and the Belt and Road initiative</h2>
<p>The AU has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-african-unions-planned-overhaul-may-affect-its-ties-with-china-73160">proposed</a> a set of reforms to streamline African negotiations at events like the FOCAC under the auspices of the continental body. This could be seen as a step towards the frequently repeated goal of Africa negotiating collectively with China. But, in fact, we show that it faces significant resistance from within the continent. This comes both from powerful states worried about losing control of their bilateral relationships with China, and from smaller states worried about being excluded.</p>
<p>China’s BRI reveals other aspects of African agency. It’s structured by numerous bilateral agreements, but is also subject to regional as well as local pressures. The way the initiative’s projects have been pulled into national debates involving opposition politics shows that the range of actors constituting African agency is potentially much wider than national governments.</p>
<p>We argue that before African agency can be maximised, this aspect of relations between China and particular African governments needs to be taken into account. Thinking about the issue has so far fixated on the role of national governments, to the exclusion of other actors. The biggest include regional economic communities such as <a href="http://www.nepad.org/">Nepad</a> and the AU. The smaller ones comprise opposition parties, civil society, local businesses and communities. All contribute to and constitute African agency. </p>
<p>What is this agency, how does it work and how can it be strengthened? </p>
<h2>Understanding African agency</h2>
<p>We identified three key areas where African agency can be located.</p>
<p>Firstly, African agency is expressed in the frameworks and documents that govern bodies like the forum. For example, in the early days arrangements paid relatively little attention to the issue of industrialisation. That changed after the formal adoption in 2015 of the AU’s <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a> – its blueprint for Africa’s sustainable development. <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/focac-2015-consolidating-china-africa-relations/">The forum held that year</a> saw an uptick in how many times the issue was mentioned. </p>
<p>By 2016, African industrialisation had become a key initiative of <a href="http://www.g20chn.org/English/Documents/">China’s presidency</a> of the G20. Beijing directed an unprecedented level of G20 attention to the continent. </p>
<p>By <a href="https://www.focac.org/eng/">2018</a>, the Beijing summit ended with fewer declarations of intent relating to industrialisation. Instead, it had become integrated into the continental and bilateral planning processes. In particular, it features regularly in discussions on development financing. Likewise the word “training” was mentioned over 40 times and in virtually every section of the <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1593683.shtml">Beijing Action Plan</a>.</p>
<p>This suggests there is a shift from declarations of intent to more specific engagement towards industrialisation. This doesn’t necessarily guarantee the success of Africa’s industrialisation. But it shows that China responds to African agenda-setting.</p>
<p>Secondly, African agency is diffused across various levels and among various actors. Any analysis of African agency has to consider the complex interactions between continental bodies like the AU, regional economic blocs, national governments, civil society, business, and local communities. Each plays a role in shaping African decision making in relation to China. Partnerships that cut across the state-business-civil society divide are as important as state led initiatives in articulating policy initiatives in relation to China.</p>
<p>Thirdly, it’s important to think of the changing terms of agency as African governments face growing debt burdens via such initiatives as the BRI. For instance, rumours that the Zambian government offered its national electricity supplier as <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1391111/zambia-china-debt-crisis-tests-china-in-africa-relationship/">collateral</a> in exchange for a new tranche of Chinese loans have reportedly caused political division at home. </p>
<p>Critics have focused on debt as diminishing African agency. What they’ve ignored are the significant financial and reputational risks to China. </p>
<h2>Maximising African agency</h2>
<p>As Africa becomes more involved in global initiatives, and as it moves towards greater continental integration via AU reforms and the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/continents-free-trade-deal-a-game-changer-for-africa-15795779">Continental Free Trade Agreement</a>, the need increases to think harder and more creatively about what African agency means. It isn’t enough to simply reiterate the call for Africa to negotiate collectively with China – not least because this disregards the complex interactions between African governments. </p>
<p>Rather, it’s time for more comprehensive thinking about how African agency manifests across actors and geographic scales. Only once we have a firmer handle on this can we move towards maximising it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104700/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yu-Shan is affiliated with the Africa-China Reporting Project (ACRP), Department of Journalism, University of Witwatersrand</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Alden is affiliated as a senior research associate with the South African Institute of International Relations </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cobus van Staden does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Not enough credit is given to the agency African governments have in their dealings with China.Yu-Shan Wu, Foreign policy researcher and doctoral candidate, University of the WitwatersrandChris Alden, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political ScienceCobus van Staden, Senior Researcher: China Africa, South African Institute of International AffairsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/941962018-04-16T13:56:19Z2018-04-16T13:56:19ZWeaning African leaders off addiction to power is an ongoing struggle<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215044/original/file-20180416-540-1cwprob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President of Uganda Yoweri Museveni refuses to relinquish power.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Some African countries have recorded democratic victories in the past 12 months. Ethiopia has a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopias-new-leader-could-be-a-game-changer-94424">new leader</a> whose ascent holds great promise for change, despite the country’s <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/ethiopia-100-election">problematic 2015 election</a>. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/30/liberia-george-weah-salary-change-constitution-racism">Liberia</a> and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/sierra-leones-new-leader-bio-starts-work-as-president-20180405">Sierra Leone</a> have new leaders.</p>
<p>But elsewhere on the continent, leaders continue to disregard their countries’ own constitutions and laws governing presidential tenure. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Joseph Kabila has been in power <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/07/joseph-kabila-will-not-stand-in-next-drc-elections-aide-says">since 2001</a>. He refuses to go even though he was meant to step down in December 2016. In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni has clung to power since <a href="http://www.africareview.com/news/UG-lawmakers-pave-the-way-for-Museveni-stay-in-power/979180-4093204-ug1sqi/index.html">1986</a>. Denis Sassou Nguesso has ruled Congo for <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14121193">almost 30 years</a>. </p>
<p>Their refusal to step down at the appointed time flies in the face of several governance blueprints adopted as African countries shifted away from liberation politics to the new post independence <a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-in-africa-the-ebbs-and-flows-over-six-decades-42011">struggle for democracy</a> in the early 2000s.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/organisation-african-unity-formed-and-africa-day-declared">Organisation of African Unity</a> was transformed into the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a> in 2001 with this shift in mind. The continent adopted progressive governance tools like the <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/aprm">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>. This was spearheaded by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki as a tool for African countries to review one another’s performance. </p>
<p>Numerous African countries adopted and agreed to uphold the terms of the African Union Charter on Democracy, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7790-treaty-0034_-_african_charter_on_democracy_elections_and_governance_e.pdf">Elections and Governance</a>. It came into force in 2012 and was designed to guard against undemocratic governance.</p>
<p>These plans promised a great deal. They were designed to usher in good governance, democracy and security. It was hoped Africa’s image as a continent of ignorance, poverty, disease, misrule and corruption could be erased.</p>
<p>The rhetoric pointed in the right direction. But not all African leaders were willing to be swept by this wave of democratic reforms. Some are quite simply addicted to power, as shown by their reluctance – if not outright resistance – to leave at the end of their legal terms.</p>
<p>Leaders continuing to overstay their welcome undermines Africa’s attempts at overhauling its leadership and negates the noble intentions of the AU’s founders.</p>
<h2>Term limits</h2>
<p>Term limits regulate leadership succession. They are meant to counteract leaders’ temptation to overstay their welcome. This helps to consolidate and legitimise democratically elected leadership. </p>
<p>Of course, they’re not enough. Regular transfer of power as seen in countries like Mauritius, Ghana, Botswana and Zambia, among others, cannot guarantee political and socio-economic stability. Other ingredients such as accountable, legitimate leadership are critical. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1118&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1118&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1118&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Botswana president Ian Khama recently stepped down.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Felipe Trueba</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But regular transfers of power give citizens hope that new policies, programmes and approaches will be adopted by the new leadership. In turn, this could overturn numerous political, social, economic impacts of uninterrupted strangleholds on power in Africa. </p>
<p>The benefits of frequent power transfers are evident in African countries that have them, such as <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/electoral-commission-confirms-senegal-ruling-coalition-landslide-20170805-2">Senegal</a>; <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-botswana-politics/botswanas-khama-steps-down-as-president-after-a-decade-at-helm-idUSKBN1H70DO">Botswana</a> and <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/mauritius-gets-new-pm-opposition-demands-new-election/">Mauritius</a>. Incumbents are kept on their toes because there’s a real chance they can be removed from power if they fail to govern properly. </p>
<p>Term limits have recently become controversial and divisive. Some leaders have used dubious constitutional amendments to extend their stay in power. Usually, governing parties and their leaders almost exclusively pass such amendments with minimal or no opposition participation. That’s what happened in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Congo Republic. </p>
<p>Similarly, despite constitutional provisions and regular elections, countries such as Angola, Togo, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea are virtually de facto one party or one leader repressive states wherein resignation, retirement and term limits are meaningless.</p>
<p>Leaders have different reasons for refusing to leave office. In some countries, the answer lies in a lack of succession planning to transfer power. In others, leaders blatantly refuse to resign because of their despotic and kleptocratic tendencies. They abuse their states’ minerals, oil and money with their <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/african-leaders-take-the-blame-for-the-continents-resource-curse">families and friends</a>. Stepping aside would cost them these “benefits”.</p>
<p>For instance, the eventual departure of Angola’s Eduardo Dos Santos from office after decades in power has <a href="https://theconversation.com/stability-in-southern-africa-hinges-on-how-leaders-gain-and-lose-power-89980">left his family exposed</a>. His children stand accused of amassing billions during their father’s many terms. </p>
<p>Without strong constitutional safeguards and a democratic culture to counter the negative consequences of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-04-13-anc-must-renew-itself-and-root-out-sins-of-incumbency">“sins of incumbency”</a> – as corruption associated with state power is often described by South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress – can be menacing. It breeds <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Big-Men-Little-People-Leaders/dp/081477542X">“Big Men, Little People”</a>, to borrow a phrase from the title of a book by journalist Alec Russel.</p>
<h2>Weaning leaders off power addiction</h2>
<p>Perceptive leaders know when to leave office, whether through resignation or <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/03/31/botswana-president-ian-khama-steps-down-after-end-of-tenure//">retirement</a>. Botswana’s past and current presidents have established this practice despite the country’s continued <a href="http://www.thepatriot.co.bw/analysis-opinions/item/3585-single-party-dominance-not-good-for-democracy.html">one-party domination</a>.</p>
<p>With the emergence of a strong democratic culture, South Africa has experienced the opposite of such presidential power mongering. Two presidents were recalled by their political party the ANC, albeit for different reasons. Thabo Mbeki readily <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-21-mbeki-resigns-before-the-nation">accepted his fate</a> when he was told to pack up and go, although he was not accused of any specific wrong doing. Jacob Zuma remained defiant and only stepped aside when faced with the very real prospect of a vote of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-02-13-anc-want-motion-of-no-confidence-against-zuma">no-confidence</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/nana-akufo-addo-sworn-ghana-president-170107124239549.html">Ghana</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37086365">Zambia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/namibia-grown-up-after-a-generation-into-independence-but-not-yet-mature-74571">Namibia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/buharis-victory-in-nigerian-election-has-global-significance-39416">Nigeria</a>, <a href="https://www.constitutionnet.org/news/presidential-elections-malawi-towards-majoritarian-501-electoral-system">Malawi</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/magufuli-has-been-president-for-two-years-how-hes-changing-tanzania-86777">Tanzania</a> are other African states where regular transfer of power has occurred.</p>
<p>African voters are not blameless. They habitually relax their vigilance on leaders and fail to hold them to account after elections. This, coupled with winner-take-all election systems, renders some African countries vulnerable to autocratic, despotic and non-accountable leaders who would rather die in office than leave.</p>
<p>What, then, is the solution? It may be time for ordinary voters across the continent to begin to collaborate through non-governmental organisations and other cross-border institutional mechanisms to share experiences and begin to enforce durable continental democracy. Africa needs democracy from below.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kealeboga J Maphunye receives funding from National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, NIHSS, South Africa. </span></em></p>Not all African leaders are willing to be swept by the democratic reforms of the early 2000s.Kealeboga J Maphunye, Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA), University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/715692017-01-19T13:54:54Z2017-01-19T13:54:54ZTrump vs Africa: how the continent can counter destructive policies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153430/original/image-20170119-26539-zgzzsb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Donald Trump has promised to make America great again.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Jonathan Ernst</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every four years the CIA’s <a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-who-we-are">National Intelligence Council (NIC)</a> provides the incoming president and his administration with an assessment of the most powerful global forces likely to affect foreign and domestic affairs. Known as the CIA’s Global trends, the report is also available to the public and normally has a time horizon of five years and beyond.</p>
<p>Donald Trump would probably be prompted to dismiss the 235-page <a href="http://www.dni.gov">2017 edition</a> with a tweet after getting just half-way down the first summary page. The next five years, the report says, will</p>
<blockquote>
<p>close an era of American dominance following the Cold War.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Trump would undoubtedly see this as a personal affront to his promise that he will <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-donald-trump-trademarked-the-slogan-make-america-great-again-49070">“Make America Great Again”</a>.</p>
<p>Ironically, Trump’s own behaviour during his presidential campaign and transition only lends credence to one of the report’s general forecasts that the next five years</p>
<blockquote>
<p>will see rising tensions within and between countries.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So far Trump has stirred tensions with a range of countries. He has made controversial statements that have offended, among others, Europeans, Asians and, of course, Mexicans. </p>
<p>The report provides a useful starting point to reflect on what’s in store for Africa over the next five years. And how the continent should think about responding to challenges it identifies in the context of a Trump presidency. </p>
<p>A case in point are the report’s findings set against Trump’s stance on climate change. The <a href="http://www.dni.gov">Global Trends 2017</a> puts greater emphasis on the urgent need to mitigate and adapt to global warming and other man-induced climate change than earlier editions. But Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-threat-on-climate-change-pledges-will-hit-africa-hard-70488">climate denial rhetoric and the prominent deniers</a> he is including in his cabinet, contradict all available evidence-based judgements.</p>
<p>This might suggest that the continent and Trump are on a collision course given that Africa will suffer more than most regions from the threat of climate change. This needn’t be the case. There are some low-cost ways African Union members, individually and together, could undertake to slow down, and even derail, Trump and his climate deniers. And shrewd diplomats would do well to use the report as a useful reference for prodding US negotiators. They might also use it for gauging levels of public and Congressional support for Trump’s controversial policies.</p>
<h2>Clues to Trump’s views on Africa</h2>
<p>There have been few indications of Trump’s interest in sub-Saharan Africa. But a few clues of how his administration views the continent have been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/world/africa/africa-donald-trump.html">reported by the New York Times</a>. </p>
<p>The report was based on a leaked four-page list of questions about Africa his transition team sent to the State Department and Pentagon. The questions indicate a general scepticism about the value of foreign aid or even US security interests in sub-Saharan Africa, suggesting Africans have squandered American money and effort.</p>
<p>Questions included:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>With so much corruption in Africa, how much of our funding is stolen?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>and in relation to the <a href="https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html">African Growth and Opportunity Act</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Why do we support that massive benefit to corrupt regimes?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>and regarding US business interests</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Are we losing out to the Chinese?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Based on these questions, it’s possible that Trump will opt for an American retreat from the bipartisan development, humanitarian, and security assistance goals of previous administrations. Even so, policies he pursues on global issues such as trade and climate change will have a dramatic impact on the continent.</p>
<h2>Trends facing Africa</h2>
<p>The Global Trends report conclusion is that prospects for progress on the continent clearly outweigh the dangers. It says that in the next five years African countries will focus on internal issues as they struggle to consolidate the gains of the past 15 years and try to resist the geopolitical and economic headwinds that threaten them.</p>
<p>It also identifies the key challenges, among them the familiar issues of rapid population growth and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-africa-can-build-inclusive-safe-and-sustainable-cities-48445">rural-urban migration</a>, severe if uneven environmental and health risks, radicalisation, and failures of governing institutions. </p>
<p>The report’s emphasis on climate change is particularly telling. It cites credible scientific evidence of global warming and forecasts dire consequences for countries across the world, <a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=378">including in Africa</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153432/original/image-20170119-26539-2uj35r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153432/original/image-20170119-26539-2uj35r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153432/original/image-20170119-26539-2uj35r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153432/original/image-20170119-26539-2uj35r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153432/original/image-20170119-26539-2uj35r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153432/original/image-20170119-26539-2uj35r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153432/original/image-20170119-26539-2uj35r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An emaciated cow walks in Gelcha village, one of the drought stricken areas of in Ethiopia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Tiksa Negeri.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The report endorses the findings and process approved by 194 countries participating in the UN <a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/docs/factsheets/FS_what_ipcc.pdf">Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)</a>. </p>
<p>The Obama Administration was a global leader in the IPCC and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-paris-climate-deal-can-teach-us-about-solving-the-worlds-most-complex-problems-52162">agreements reached in Paris</a> in 2015 on reducing greenhouse gases emissions in a voluntary process now endorsed by virtually all UN members. </p>
<p>Obama was also committed to a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/03/fact-sheet-us-china-cooperation-climate-change">bilateral agreement with China</a>, obligating the world’s two largest emitters to major reductions. And he <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/obama-to-pledge-3-billion-for-international-green-fund2/">made a pledge</a> vital to Africa of US$3 bn toward an initial IPCC $10 billion fund to assist the most vulnerable and under-resourced countries adapt to global warming. This fund is scheduled to <a href="http://cancun.unfccc.int/">grow to $100 billion annually by 2020</a>.</p>
<p>Trump, however, has repeatedly threatened to renege on all these US commitments once in office.</p>
<h2>What Africa needs to do</h2>
<p>Here are some low-cost ways African Union members, individually and together, could undertake to slow and even derail Trump and his climate deniers:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Seize every opportunity in bilateral talks and multilateral forums to reference the findings presented in Global Trends 2017. Although prepared during the Obama administration, it is the work of non-partisan civil servants.</p></li>
<li><p>Devise and implement public diplomacy campaigns in partnership with civil society groups, environmental activists, and the African Diaspora. Recalling lessons from the highly effective <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-rise-african-american-politicians-must-lead-on-africas-affairs-68439">anti-apartheid movement</a> of the 1970s and 1980s could be helpful.</p></li>
<li><p>Develop a better understanding of and links to America’s booming alternative energy sector. Costs of solar, wind, and other clean energy sources have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/aug/11/solar-and-wind-cheaper-than-new-nuclear-by-the-time-hinkley-is-built">fallen dramatically</a> to the point that economics, rather than politics or ethics now drive most major reductions of America’s dangerous emissions. There may be positive business opportunities for African companies and countries to exploit for economic grow, development and dealing with the effects of global warming.</p></li>
<li><p>Actively support Americans (and anyone else) who support a carbon tax, with generous allowances for low polluting African countries swap credits with rich emitters, with cash generated assisting climate adaptation.</p></li>
<li><p>With Obama gone, China alone appears poised for global leadership on climate change. South Africa could help by using its membership in the BRICS and close ties to China and Brazil to press India, and especially Russia to meet their obligations. Perhaps it might even get the group to increase its contributions to the special fund for seriously affected African countries.</p></li>
<li><p>Reassure potential American donors and partners, including Trump and his allies, that funds allocated for helping Africans adjust to climate change will be accounted for through a voluntary transparent process of planning and reporting. Such accountability is a key vision of the <a href="http://www.nepad.org/">New Partnership for Africa’s Development</a> and its <a href="http://aprm-au.org/">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>, currently under renewal.</p></li>
<li><p>Finally: tap into African expertise. Arguments should make full use of the continent’s small but growing community of climate scientists and their many links to America’s scientific community and environmental activists. Holding Trump to facts, not opinion, has failed so far. But evidence suggests public sentiment and economic incentives increasingly favour better climate management.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Africa’s appeals to America for fairness can be as effective as they once were for freedom.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71569/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Global Trends report provides a useful starting point to reflect on what’s in store for Africa over the next five years. And how the continent should think about responding to its challenges.John J Stremlau, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/655782016-09-27T16:06:56Z2016-09-27T16:06:56ZHow Kenyan and Tanzanian medicine producers deserve a shot in the arm<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138058/original/image-20160916-6319-bg2ok2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite major improvement in access to HIV/Aids and TB treatment most people living in Africa still lack access to reliable and appropriate medicines. They continue to struggle with the worst health status in the world. Why is this happening? What can be done?</p>
<p>Unexpectedly, part of the explanation can be found in the state of Africa’s own pharmaceutical industry. Far too little is heard about the industry in debates about access to medicines. And it’s often said that <a href="http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137546470">Africa has no pharmaceutical industry</a>. But this simply isn’t true. </p>
<p>We set out to discover what was happening to local pharmaceutical production in Kenya and Tanzania. We also wanted to explore the extent to which more local production of medicines could improve access for those countries’ populations. </p>
<p>It’s a timely question. Both countries have an established pharmaceutical industry with scope for expansion into a huge and expanding regional market that is largely served by imports. </p>
<p>The two year research project surveyed those who buy medicines for facilities and shops, public and private, and included interviews with local manufacturers. We found that in both countries, but especially in Tanzania, the industries are vital to meeting their populations’ health needs, but <a href="http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137546470">struggled against external competition</a>.</p>
<p>But, more optimistically, our findings also showed that this situation can be turned around.</p>
<p>The domestic market for medicines is large. In 2013, we estimated that local firms in Tanzania were supplying 15% of a US$333 million market for pharmaceuticals (down from a third in 2009). Kenya-based firms were supplying a third of a US$577 million market. Access to reliable essential medicines is poor in both countries. It depends heavily on out-of-pocket payment by low income populations.</p>
<h2>Long history of production</h2>
<p>Medicines have been made in African countries since the 1930s, and after independence many governments supported the development of pharmaceutical manufacturing. There were two particular bursts of investment: in the 1970s – as part of early efforts to promote industrialisation – and from the 1990s onwards as industrialisation efforts revived.</p>
<p>In addition to this firms in Africa, most of which are owned by African capital, have a record of <a href="http://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-8603-10-12">promoting inclusive access</a> to medicines. Research in Tanzania, for example, showed that the local producers distributed essential medicines effectively in both rural and urban areas. Imports, on the other hand, were much less likely to move beyond the towns in which they arrived. </p>
<p>Several local firms had a good reputation: their products were widely regarded as reliable and indeed were preferred to Indian products of uncertain origin in the private market. In Kenya too, up-country facilities rely heavily on low cost locally produced medicines. </p>
<p>Tanzania’s firms mainly produce basic essential medicines in the form of tablets and capsules along with syrups for children. Kenya’s industry is by far the largest in East Africa. It also produces more complex items such as creams, intravenous drips and injectables. </p>
<h2>Importers have the upper hand</h2>
<p>External competition is skewed against local producers by a context of increasingly free trade in medicines, together with tax and import regimes that favoured importers, and aid funding that bypassed and undermined local producers. </p>
<p>In 2009, for example, the East African Community agreed to a zero tariff rate on imports of finished medicines with the rationale of meeting essential health needs. But local producers frequently have to pay duties on their imports of inputs for production.</p>
<p>In addition, the large aid funders bypass local African producers almost entirely, buying in bulk from overseas. This means that when Tanzania and Kenya switched to the new, and much more expensive, combination anti-malaria therapies, local firms that had been supplying most of the anti-malarials until then lost the business. One Tanzanian firm lost a third of its turnover. Rural populations used to reliable access to cheap locally produced anti-malarials, through facilities and private shops, became reliant on sometimes erratic imports of medicines. </p>
<p>Our research makes clear that the current pattern of globalisation of access to medicines simply isn’t working and isn’t sustainable. Rather than strengthening the domestic economic and political links – between population needs for medicines, government health policy and industrial development – it weakens them. </p>
<h2>Situation can be turned around</h2>
<p>With the right government policies, supported by a rethink by donors, the demand for medicines can be directed more towards local firms. This in turn can help them improve their products and become more competitive, generating much needed industrial employment and productivity. </p>
<p>Industrialisation in pharmaceuticals also brings with it the growth of technological, industrial, intellectual, organisational and research-related capabilities. Without these, quality medicines can’t be produced and health systems can’t be improved. Firms whose business focus is the domestic and regional market have an incentive to distribute and market their medicines effectively. Access improves and everyone gains.</p>
<p>There is real optimism that this turnaround can happen. African policy makers are already increasingly aware of the importance of this agenda. The Tanzanian government has made pharmaceuticals a priority industry in its <a href="http://www.mof.go.tz/mofdocs/msemaji/Five%202016_17_2020_21.pdf">new five-year development plan</a>. </p>
<p>Pan-African bodies are focusing on the issue too. The African Union Commission has developed a <a href="http://sa.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Pharmaceutical%20manufacturing%20plan%20for%20Africa-English.pdf">pharmaceutical manufacturing plan</a> for Africa. NEPAD has been working on bringing together cross-country regulation of medicines. Meanwhile, international bodies such as the WHO and European and Japanese donors are supporting manufacturing improvement in pharmaceuticals. This East African research is <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/ikd/sites/www.open.ac.uk.ikd/files/files/projects/Submission%20to%20UN%20Secretary-General%E2%80%99s%20High-Level%20Panel%20on%20Access%20to%20Medicines.pdf">widely cited internationally</a>. </p>
<p>A number of other African countries are showing what can be done. Ghana, Ethiopia and South Africa have all successfully supported the growth and technological improvement of medicines manufacturing in their countries. </p>
<p>But health and industrial policymakers have to work together – something of a revolution in itself – if these efforts are to succeed. The route to improved, more inclusive access to medicines needs to be based on an active African industrial policy that supports manufacturing. This should be coupled with a health policy geared towards the purchase and use of local medicines.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maureen Mackintosh has received funding, as an Open University, UK, academic, from the Department of International Development , UK, and the Economic and Social Research Council, UK, for research underpinning this article. The content of the article is the sole responsibility of the authors and does not represent the views of the DFID or ESRC. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof Samuel Wangwe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Firms with a focus on the domestic and regional market have an incentive to distribute their medicines effectively. Local production can create a win-win situation for health and employment.Prof Samuel Wangwe, Executive Director, Policy Research for Development Maureen Mackintosh, Professor of Economics, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/590892016-05-10T11:40:15Z2016-05-10T11:40:15ZTime for Africa to transition from extractive to learning economies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121718/original/image-20160509-20605-1d7afo2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There is very little evidence that commodity producing countries diversify their economies by adding value to their raw materials</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siegfried Modola</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The current slump in world commodity prices is forcing Africa to rethink its traditional dependence on raw material exports. This is why the time for African nations to lay the foundations for transitioning from extractive to learning economies is now.</p>
<p>The jolts are real. The International Monetary Fund has <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2016/CAR050316A.htm">projected</a> that the continent will grow by 3% in 2016. This is well below the 6% average growth over the past decade and the lowest rate in the past 15 years.</p>
<p>Some argue that Africa has already <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/africa-economy-idUSL5N1103RD20150825">squandered</a> the commodity boom and wasted the opportunity to increase its manufactured exports. Others point to the fact that <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/oct/25/africa-diversify-resource-curse-thinktank">extractive industries</a> crowd out manufacturing, making diversification more difficult.</p>
<p>International policy discourse on the issue is still dominated by the need to bring more transparency to extractive industries. The assumption here is that this will help control the operations of multinational corporations, which in turn will improve the use of revenue from exports. Noble as they are, the suggestions are still framed in the context of commodities and will add little to economic diversification.</p>
<h2>Why learning economies make better sense</h2>
<p>Extraction is not just an economic activity in Africa. It is a pervasive worldview that defines behaviour from business interactions to relations between the state and its citizens. This phenomenon is vividly captured in Tom Burgis’s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/books/review/the-looting-machine-by-tom-burgis.html?_r=0">book</a>, “The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa’s Wealth”.</p>
<p>Lamentation is not enough. Neither is the magical thinking that the downturn in the commodity boom and consumer-driven growth will automatically lead to diversification. This can only be achieved through practical efforts to focus on creating learning economies driven by <a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2098/innovation.html">technological innovation</a>.</p>
<p>The good news is that African policymakers are aware of what needs to be done. For example, in 2014 the African Union (AU) adopted a ten-year Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy to help reposition the continent as a collection of technology-driven economies. This strategy contributes to Africa’s 50-year <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/en//vision">Agenda 2063</a>.</p>
<p>The challenge is how to do it. One example can be found in the decision by the AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development Agency to collaborate in building executive capacity among African ministers through the Technology, Innovation and Entrepreneurship <a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25761/gift_from_the_schooner_foundation_will_support_executive_education_leaders_from_african_nations.html?">Programme</a>. This is funded by the <a href="https://www.ihrfg.org/funder-directory/schooner-foundation">Schooner Foundation</a>.</p>
<h2>Diversification isn’t a simple process</h2>
<p>Rhetorical statements about value-addition are not enough. For example, in 2015 Africa exported nearly US$2.5 billion worth of coffee. Germany’s re-export of coffee, on the other hand, was about $3.9 billion.</p>
<p>There is little evidence to support the view that commodity exporting countries diversify their economies by adding value to their raw materials. So, adding value to coffee in Africa is hardly the best response. To the contrary, nations add value to imported raw materials when they already possess the minimum technological competence. In effect, they do so because they are learning rather than extractive economies.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121723/original/image-20160509-20616-1tf463y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121723/original/image-20160509-20616-1tf463y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121723/original/image-20160509-20616-1tf463y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121723/original/image-20160509-20616-1tf463y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121723/original/image-20160509-20616-1tf463y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121723/original/image-20160509-20616-1tf463y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121723/original/image-20160509-20616-1tf463y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nigeria’s former President Olusegun Obasanjo sees agriculture as more than the ‘new oil’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Tiksa Negeri</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So how do nations shift from extractive to learning economies? First, they do not do so by simply shifting to another sector and hoping that diversification will occur automatically. An example of this is the description of Nigeria’s emphasis on agriculture as the country’s “new oil.” As noted by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/05/14/in-nigeria-agriculture-is-the-new-oil/#4a998e0e4517">agriculture</a> can be more than the “new oil”:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>One day the oil will run out – but sub-Saharan Africa will always have its fertile land, its rivers, its youthful workforce and its huge domestic market. Investing now can turn that potential into prosperity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Agriculture is an important entry point for economic diversification not because of abundant land, but because it offers a foundation for building learning economies through <a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25699/new_harvest.html">technological innovation</a>. Agriculture can serve as an effective source of technological lessons for the wider economy.</p>
<p>Shifting from extractive to learning economies therefore requires refocusing attention on continuous improvement, adaptation and diversification. The key starting point for Africa is not to retreat into the false safety of “African solutions for African problems.” It is to learn from other economies – not just copy them – and adapt the lesson to local needs.</p>
<h2>The benefit of being latecomers</h2>
<p>African nations have the benefit of being latecomers. The world is full of inspirational <a href="http://newafricanmagazine.com/diamonds-are-not-forever-knowledge-is-power/">examples</a> they can learn from. In fact, many of the countries that have recently transitioned to being learning economies started off with a lot less resources (finance and research facilities) than the majority of African countries have today.</p>
<p>Take the case of Taiwan. In the early 1960s, the country’s main export was mushrooms, of which it was a world leader. The prospects of industrial learning were quite limited when dealing with a high-volume, low-value and perishable export commodity. It transitioned to becoming a semiconductor powerhouse by redefining itself as a learning economy.</p>
<p>Taiwan’s premier <a href="http://www.inderscienceonline.com/doi/abs/10.1504/IJTG.2008.020332?journalCode=ijtg&">research centre</a>, the Industrial Technology Research Institute that spawned many of its leading semiconductor firms, was created by consolidating four dilapidated research centres left behind by Japanese occupiers. The institute was not created to add value to mushrooms but was part of the country’s policy reinvention as a learning economy.</p>
<p>The case of Taiwan illustrates the fact that economic diversification results from the initial use of existing technologies that can be readily combined to generate increasingly diverse products. Some technological capabilities generate more combinations that others. Semiconductor and chemical industries are examples of such a platform of generic technologies.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121720/original/image-20160509-20584-11n2dhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121720/original/image-20160509-20584-11n2dhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121720/original/image-20160509-20584-11n2dhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121720/original/image-20160509-20584-11n2dhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121720/original/image-20160509-20584-11n2dhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121720/original/image-20160509-20584-11n2dhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121720/original/image-20160509-20584-11n2dhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Industrial growth proceeds like a game of Scrabble. Some letters have higher values, but they do not combine readily to form words.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Srdjan Zivulovic</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As my colleague Professor Ricardo Hausmann <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2FeugaLv5Bo">explains</a>, industrial growth proceeds like a game of Scrabble. Nations start off with minimum technological capabilities that they recombine to create more technologies in the same way letters are used to create new words in a Scrabble game. Not all letters are created equal. Some have higher values, but they do not combine readily to form words.</p>
<p>Raw materials, for example, are like the letters J, Q, X and Z, which appear to have high value but are hard to use in creating words. Players often have to substitute them with more versatile letters. This is like using revenue from raw materials to acquire technological capabilities that have higher recombinant value. As in Scrabble, industrial development involves considerable learning, not just about letters but also about vocabulary and strategies for thinking about creating new words.</p>
<p>Africa’s economic downturn is not itself a fatal development. Countries need not recoil into despair and leave their future to the fate of commodity price fluctuations. It is an opportunity to start building new futures that focus on enhancing human capabilities as the foundation of durable economic development.</p>
<p>Unlike its predecessors, Africa has access to a much <a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/26476/how_can_africa_master_the_digital_revolution.html">wider range of technologies</a> that can serve as platforms for industrial learning. They cover diverse fields such as digital technologies, genetics, synthetic biology and new materials. Harnessing them requires building among the youth a <a href="http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/3227/new_culture_of_innovation.html">culture of innovation </a>that is driven by learning and not extraction. </p>
<p><em>This article was originally published by <a href="http://www.technologyandpolicy.org/about/#.VzAvZPl97IU">Technology and Policy, Innovation at Work</a> and is based on the author’s draft book, “How Economies Succeed: Technology, Innovation and Entrepreneurship”.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59089/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Calestous Juma receives funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation</span></em></p>The downturn in the commodity boom will not automatically lead to diversification of Africa’s economies. This can only be achieved through a focus on creating learning economies driven by innovation.Calestous Juma, Professor of the Practice of International Development, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/583112016-04-24T05:33:07Z2016-04-24T05:33:07ZMbeki’s dream of Africa’s renaissance belied South Africa’s schizophrenia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119878/original/image-20160422-17411-l4og37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African President Thabo Mbeki.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>A new book, <a href="http://www.exclus1ves.co.za/books/Thabo-Mbeki-AuthorAdekeye-Adebajo/000000000100000000001000000000000000000000000009781431423309/">“A Jacana Pocket Biography: Thabo Mbeki”</a>, by Adekeye Adebajo, reflects on the legacy of the man some have called Africa’s “Philosopher king”. This is an edited extract.</em></p>
<p>Mbeki’s foreign policy was in part driven by his vision of an <a href="http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/colleges/docs/1998/tm1998/tm980813.pdf">African Renaissance</a>. He encouraged South Africans to embrace an African identity and sought to promote the continent’s political, economic and social renewal. He also sought to reintegrate Africa into the global economy. </p>
<p>Mbeki urged Africans to adapt democracy to fit their own specific conditions without compromising its principles of representation and accountability. He further challenged them to discover a sense of their own self-confidence. This, after centuries of slavery and colonialism which had systematically denigrated their cultures and subjugated their institutions to alien rule.</p>
<p>The African Renaissance did not naively assume, as some critics asserted, that this renewal was already under way. It merely sought to set out an inspiring vision and lay down the policy actions that could create the conditions for Africa’s rebirth.</p>
<p>Mbeki’s African Renaissance had as its central goal the right of African people to determine their own future. It called for cancellation of Africa’s foreign debt. It also called for an improvement in Africa’s terms of trade, the expansion of development assistance and better access to foreign markets for African goods.</p>
<p>He also pragmatically urged African governments to embrace the positive aspects of globalisation by attracting capital and investment with which to develop their economies.</p>
<p>Political scientists Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko have insightfully commented: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>South Africa’s idea of an African Renaissance is abstruse, puzzling, even perhaps mysterious, more promise than policy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With Mbeki as chief architect, the drafting of the <a href="http://www.dfa.gov.za/au.nepad/nepad.pdf">New Partnership</a> for Africa’s Development in 2001 and the birth of the <a href="http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell">African Union</a> in 2002 were clearly attempts to add policy flesh to the skeletal bones of his renaissance vision. </p>
<p>There was certainly some truth to the criticism that the renaissance was devoid of substantive policy content. Seventeen African Renaissance festivals were held each May between 1999 and 2015 in different South African cities. Mbeki delivered keynote addresses at some.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119860/original/image-20160422-17385-89cz1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119860/original/image-20160422-17385-89cz1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=983&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119860/original/image-20160422-17385-89cz1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=983&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119860/original/image-20160422-17385-89cz1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=983&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119860/original/image-20160422-17385-89cz1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1235&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119860/original/image-20160422-17385-89cz1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1235&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119860/original/image-20160422-17385-89cz1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1235&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption"></span>
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<p>But they mostly involved South African government, business, civil society leaders and musicians. Thus, they tended to be parochially focused on South Africa rather than the broader continent and its diaspora.</p>
<p>It remains a mystery why Mbeki did not use his ministers and other senior officials more effectively to promote the African Renaissance. And to seek to build grassroots support for the concept within South Africa and across the continent and its diaspora.</p>
<p>A rare example was the elegant speech delivered by Mbeki’s arts and culture minister, Pallo Jordan, “Thoughts on an African Renaissance”, at the Aardklop festival in Potchefstroom in 2005. </p>
<p>Despite talk of an African Renaissance, South Africa’s cultural schizophrenia was evident in the fact that its new rulers continued to refer only to its black population as “African”, leaving one wondering whether “coloureds”, Asians and whites were not also African. </p>
<p>Furthermore, many black South Africans still talked about the rest of Africa as if they were not part of it. The fact that so many symbols of apartheid still littered South Africa’s political landscape under Mbeki’s rule astounded many African visitors.</p>
<p>Most astonishingly, outside South Africa’s parliament – the deliberative body of Africa’s greatest hope – stood a statue of Louis Botha, a white military conqueror and prime minister, on horseback. Nothing could better symbolise South Africa’s cultural limbo, caught between a shameful past of arrogant European racism, and a future at which it was struggling to arrive as the midwife of Africa’s renaissance.</p>
<p><em><a href="http://www.exclus1ves.co.za/books/Thabo-Mbeki-AuthorAdekeye-Adebajo/000000000100000000001000000000000000000000000009781431423309/">“A Jacana Pocket Biography: Thabo Mbeki”</a> is published by Jacana Media.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58311/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adekeye Adebajo is Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town.</span></em></p>A central goal of Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance was the right of African people to determine their own future. But the country he governed struggled to embrace his pan-African vision.Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director: Centre for Conflict Resolution and Visiting Professor, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/559572016-04-12T14:03:52Z2016-04-12T14:03:52ZHow Africa can close its continent-wide science funding gap<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118347/original/image-20160412-15858-trhqf2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Investment in science and innovation is needed to help build Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kate Holt/Africa Practice/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The idea that Africa’s development depends critically on science, technology and innovation is embodied in the African Union’s <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/en/vision">Agenda 2063</a>. This document emphasises economies that are led by innovation and driven by knowledge. But the continent has some serious work to do if it’s to create such economies.</p>
<p>It starts at a disadvantage: Africa is home to 15% of the world’s population and 5% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) but <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">accounts</a> for just 1.3% of the globe’s investment in research and development (R&D). It also holds <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">only 0.1%</a> of the world’s patents, which leads us to question how effectively the existing research and development investment is being used.</p>
<p>The good news is that there are grounds for optimism. And those grounds will only grow if African governments – as well as the continent’s private sector – ramp up their scientific investment in the coming years.</p>
<h2>Coherent strategies</h2>
<p>There are increasing signs of coherence in developing scientific strategies across the continent. The first comprehensive attempt involved the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) coming together in 2003 to initiate a series of consultations. These resulted in Africa’s Science and Technology Consolidated <a href="http://www.nepad.org/humancapitaldevelopment/knowledge/doc/2395/africa%E2%80%99s-science-technology-consolidated-plan-action">Plan of Action</a> (2005–2014). </p>
<p>The plan was criticised on a number of grounds, especially for not being adequately linked with other pan-African initiatives, but it recorded <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">some real successes</a>. Between 2007 and 2013 total investment in African R&D grew by about 54%, albeit from a low starting point. At the same time the continent’s output of scientific publications rose by 60%, compared with growth in Europe over the same period of just 14%. </p>
<p>Its successor, the <a href="http://au.int/en/newsevents/27635/african-union-heads-state-and-government-adopt-science-technology-and-innovation">Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa</a>, was launched by the African Union in 2014. It is a ten-year strategic plan and has been widely bought into by national governments.</p>
<p>Another cause for optimism is a whole set of new initiatives to support the development of a research culture in Africa. For instance, the World Bank has partnered with national governments to create <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/04/15/world-bank-centers-excellence-science-technology-education-africa">centres of excellence</a> across the continent in many disciplines. The bank is also involved in an initiative to train <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/paset">10,000 new PhDs</a> in applied science, engineering and technology. </p>
<p>In 2015 the African Academy of Sciences and NEPAD, together with a group of international partners, launched the <a href="http://aasciences.ac.ke/programmes/easa/alliance-for-accelerating-excellence-in-science-in-africa-aesa/">Alliance for Accelerating Excellence in Science in Africa</a>. This is a new platform to develop and fund major initiatives in science across the continent. The alliance’s establishment has been welcomed by the African Union’s heads of state.</p>
<p>These new developments are exciting. But it is also important to be realistic about what more is required. African science needs billions – not millions – of dollars in investment. If the continent wants to achieve even the <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">world average</a> for the number of researchers per head of population, it will need to rapidly train one million new PhDs.</p>
<p>There will need to be investment in infrastructure and career development, both at universities and other research organisations. To achieve this the continent will need to invest another US$2 billion in R&D each year. </p>
<h2>Where will the money come from?</h2>
<p>For the most part, it will be up to countries themselves to invest this money, rather than international partners – though such partners’ contributions will remain essential for targeted and catalytic effects.</p>
<p>Some countries are beginning to take up the baton. Between 2009 and 2013 Ethiopia increased its investment in R&D by <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">more than 150%</a>. In 2013 Kenya incorporated a commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on R&D in a new <a href="https://ipkenya.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/kenya-enacts-new-law-on-science-technology-and-innovation/">Science, Technology and Innovation Act</a>. The heads of state of <a href="http://www.govmu.org/English/News/Pages/Scientific-agenda-of-Mauritius-and-Africa-crucial-in-advancing-socioeconomic-growth,-says-President-of-the-Republic.aspx">Mauritius</a>, <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2016/03/09/senegal-hosts-first-edition-of-next-einstein-forum/">Rwanda and Senegal</a> have all made strong commitments to a future that’s led by science.</p>
<p>Governments are not, of course, the only potential source of funding. </p>
<p>In the most successful science-led economies globally a substantial proportion – sometimes the majority – of funding comes from the private sector. In South Africa and Namibia <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">up to 30%</a> of investment in R&D comes from business. Elsewhere in Africa there is practically no such investment. </p>
<p>The other important source of funding globally but untapped in Africa is philanthropy. At the beginning of 2016 there were <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2016/03/01/the-african-billionaires-2016/#48bacdae2a5a">24 African billionaires</a>, with assets totalling more than $100 billion. This raises the question of whether there will ever be an African equivalent of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which focuses on funding scientific research and innovation.</p>
<h2>The money is there</h2>
<p>Whatever the potential spread of funding, there is no doubt that the prime driver has to be African governments investing in their own future.</p>
<p>In 2007 African leaders committed to invest 1% of GDP in R&D. Starting from a low base, actual investment had <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">reached 0.45%</a> in 2013. Africa’s estimated GDP is <a href="http://www.lemauricien.com/article/india-africa-summit-2015">$2.4 trillion</a>. Simply achieving the 1% already committed to would release an additional $12 billion a year for science. By 2050, on current estimates, this would rise to $300 billion dollars a year compared with today’s approximately $20 billion. </p>
<p>The money is there. The challenge is to make sure that it is invested in science innovation and technology for Africa’s development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55957/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Marsh receives funding from The Wellcome Trust and Medical Research Council UK in the form of research grants. He is affiliated with The African Academy of Sciences and the University of Oxford</span></em></p>Successful economies are led by innovation and driven by knowledge. For Africa to advance, it needs to make more substantial investments in its research and development sector.Kevin Marsh, Professor of Tropical Medicine, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/479032015-09-25T04:31:43Z2015-09-25T04:31:43ZSustainable development goals are in reach if African universities work together<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95707/original/image-20150922-16706-aq4wzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The "Africa we want" envisioned by the AU can be built - but not without universities' help and hard work.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>By 2030, if the United Nations has its way, poverty will be history. Nobody will wake up or go to bed hungry. Cities and communities will be sustainable. Quality education will be a reality for all.</p>
<p>The Millennium Development Goals have been and gone. Now, with the <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/">Sustainable Development Goals</a> (SDGs) being unveiled the focus shifts to this new list of global priorities.</p>
<p>The United Nations’ member states <a href="http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/sustainable/looking-ahead-at-the-post-2015-summit.html">say</a> these targets can only be met through a “revitalised, global partnership for sustainable development, including for multi-stakeholder partnerships.” They have also called for “increased capacity-building and better data and statistics to measure sustainable development.”</p>
<p>Higher education can play a key role in pursuing the SDGs. Universities produce knowledge for the public good. Their best research addresses societal needs and their graduates are able to contribute to society. </p>
<p>The sector has also proved that it values collaboration of the type required to turn the SDGs from pipe dream to reality. But there is still room for improvement and growth. </p>
<h2>A call to action</h2>
<p>The Association of African Universities, a <a href="http://www.aau.org/">continental body</a> working in higher education, wants institutions on the continent to rise to this challenge. They are likely to do so: already, the African Network for Internationalisation of Education is set to discuss higher education’s <a href="http://www.info.anienetwork.org/index.php/2015/04/30/about-us/">potential role</a> in bringing the SDGs to life at its annual conference in October 2015.</p>
<p>There are many opportunities for universities to collaborate on teaching, research and information exchange and dissemination. This should be done through well supported, coordinated academic networks that incorporate public and private partners throughout the continent - and beyond.</p>
<p>The Royal Society has showed that <a href="https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/projects/knowledge-networks-nations/report/">collaboration is crucial</a> for researchers and institutions. It is an important indicator of competitiveness, enhances the quality of research and improves its efficiency and effectiveness.</p>
<p>It has also been <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2011-09-09-africa-collaborate-to-integrate/">argued</a> that researchers based in Africa have traditionally had relatively limited contact with their colleagues elsewhere on the continent. This is probably partly because of colonialism: universities tended to maintain contact with their former colonial ties after independence but were slow to build relationships with their peers in Africa.</p>
<p>There has been some progress in this regard, as illustrated most recently by the formation in March 2015 of the <a href="http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20150310185922166">African Research Universities Alliance</a> in Senegal. This is a network of 15 leading higher education institutions from eight African countries. Its goal is to train research managers as well as promoting cooperation between universities when it comes to research. </p>
<p>My own institution, Stellenbosch University, is one of several South African universities involved in such collaborations. It has signed on to more than 150 bilateral institutional arrangements in 45 countries. In Africa, it has 350 active projects with 760 partners - institutions and individuals - in 43 countries. </p>
<p>One of these collaborations is the Partnership for Africa’s Next Generation of Academics. This is a <a href="http://sun025.sun.ac.za/portal/page/portal/Arts/Pangea">network</a> between the universities of Botswana, Dar es Salaam, Ghana, Makerere, Malawi, Nairobi and Stellenbosch. It is trying to build and sustain world-class doctoral programmes and scholarly communities by creating partnerships in the arts and social sciences on the African continent.</p>
<p>Another example with particular relevance to sustainable development is the Periperi (Partners Enhancing Resilience for People Exposed to Risk) Universities network. It has partners in Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. The network aims to be an <a href="http://www.riskreductionafrica.org/">Africa-led approach</a> to the increasingly important area of disaster risk management.</p>
<p>Periperi-U has conducted important research, educated graduates able to work in this area and offered short-course training in local languages to government officials and civil society.</p>
<h2>Some things change, some need more attention</h2>
<p>We and others in higher education have spent some time watching the SDGs take shape. Will our work and focus have to change entirely, or will it be a more simple matter of redirecting existing projects and networks for the challenges of the next 15 years?</p>
<p>The answer is: a bit of both.</p>
<p>Curriculum reform will have to be among the changes of focus the SDGs bring to Africa’s universities. We will need to consider how sustainability gets incorporated into what and how we teach and research and engage with communities. This process is underway at Stellenbosch, with 254 projects already identified that relate to the UN’s lofty goals.</p>
<p>But working together on African development issues is nothing new. There are a number of consortiums pursuing important work around <a href="https://www.aims.ac.za/en/about/about-aims">science and maths</a> training, <a href="http://www.treccafrica.com/pages/about-us.html">climate change</a>, <a href="http://www.nepad.org/">water</a> and bio-energy. </p>
<p>Universities have long concluded bilateral and multilateral agreements. More recently, we have seen the rise of multiple-partner networks. These are often organised around a jointly administered educational programme. </p>
<p>Now it’s time for African universities to step on the gas. Increased collaboration around the SDGs will not only raise the share of <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-time-to-redraw-the-worlds-very-unequal-knowledge-map-44206">African scientific output</a>, but help create “The Africa We Want” outlined by the AU in its <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/en/vision">Agenda 2063</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47903/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wim de Villiers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Higher education can play a key role in pursuing the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. Collaboration will be crucial.Wim de Villiers, Rector and Vice-Chancellor, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.