tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/osce-10322/articlesOSCE – The Conversation2023-12-07T17:19:40Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194382023-12-07T17:19:40Z2023-12-07T17:19:40ZUkraine recap: western divisions an ominous sign for Kyiv as the aid funding tap begins to dry up<p>For the past week or so it has felt as if Ukraine’s fate is more likely to be decided in Washington and Brussels than on the battlefield as US president Joe Biden struggles to get his US$111 billion (£88 billion) package of aid through the senate and EU members quibble over a €50 billion euro (£43 billion) lifeline for Kyiv.</p>
<p>“History is going to judge harshly those who turn their back on freedom’s cause. We can’t let Putin win,” Biden said after a video meeting with G7 leaders. But with all 49 Republican senators voting against the aid package, it remains stalled. And the recent electoral triumph of far-right candidates in Slovakia and the Netherlands and the intransigence of Hungary means that European solidarity behind Ukraine appears to be beginning to crumble.</p>
<p>Meanwhile Russia continues to be a diplomatic wrecking ball. Last week foreign minister Sergei Lavrov attended the annual ministers’ meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is fast becoming an oxymoron. Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states refused to send their foreign ministers to the meeting over Lavrov’s presence, while the US’s Antony Blinken and UK’s David Cameron attended a pre-conference dinner but avoided any contact with Lavrov. </p>
<p>Meanwhile Lavrov blocked the appointment of Estonia as chair for the OSCE in 2024 (a non-Nato member – Malta – has been chosen instead). A three-year extension to the mandate of the OSCE’s secretary general and other top officials was planned. But rather than nodding this through, the meeting reached what Stefan Wolff – professor of international security at the University of Birmingham – has called a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russias-hard-line-at-european-security-meeting-ratchets-up-tensions-another-notch-218938">messy compromise</a>”. It allows the OSCE to carry on for only another nine months without a fresh agreement, which looks unlikely at this point.</p>
<p>Lavrov’s insistence that OSCE is becoming “an appendage of Nato and the EU” and finds itself “on the brink of the abyss” sounded an ominous note for the future of security and cooperation in Europe, Wolff says. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russias-hard-line-at-european-security-meeting-ratchets-up-tensions-another-notch-218938">Ukraine war: Russia's hard line at European security meeting ratchets up tensions another notch</a>
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<p>Over the past 22 months, Lavrov and his master, the Russian president Vladimir Putin, have proved themselves adept at manipulating the narrative over the invasion of Ukraine. Lavrov’s statement to the OSCE was peppered with references to Ukraine’s “Nazi regime” and Ukrainian “fascism” being given “a new lease on life through the Ukrainian elite with active encouragement from quite a few Nato and European Union member countries”.</p>
<p>Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager, associate professor of critical cultural & international studies at Colorado State University, has taken a <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-attempt-to-control-narrative-in-ukraine-employs-age-old-tactic-of-othering-the-enemy-206154">detailed look</a> at Moscow’s strategy of “othering” its enemies, especially since the invasion began in February last year. This is, she says, “a framing that fits well the Russian phrase that translates in English as ‘who is not with us, is against us,’ forms of which have been popularized through czarist and Soviet years and have returned with a vengeance under Putin”.</p>
<p>She traces the way Putin and his allies have effectively fused a “Nazi” Ukraine with the “decadent” west bent on corrupting the soul of Russia.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-attempt-to-control-narrative-in-ukraine-employs-age-old-tactic-of-othering-the-enemy-206154">Russian attempt to control narrative in Ukraine employs age-old tactic of 'othering' the enemy</a>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<h2>War crimes</h2>
<p>Russia is also taking a wrecking ball to much of Ukraine’s cultural heritage, writes Derek Matravers, professor of philosophy at the Open University. He cites a recent report published by the journal Antiquity, which lists damage to a number of historic sites. These include the Unesco-listed Vasyl Tarnovsky Museum of Ukrainian Antiquities and the burial mound at Boldyni Hory – one of the largest 11th-century Ukrainian necropolises.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ukraine with Russian-occupied territory in red and claimed Ukrainian counteroffensives in blue." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564309/original/file-20231207-21-ranice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The state of the war in Ukraine according to the Institute for the Study of War.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>Since the war began, Unesco has verified damage to 329 sites, while museum collections have been stolen and shipped back to Russia. This, Matravers <a href="https://theconversation.com/destruction-of-ukrainian-heritage-why-losing-historical-icons-can-leave-a-long-shadow-218558">points out</a>, amounts to a war crime under the Hague convention of 1954 – or to give it its proper title, the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/destruction-of-ukrainian-heritage-why-losing-historical-icons-can-leave-a-long-shadow-218558">Destruction of Ukrainian heritage: why losing historical icons can leave a long shadow</a>
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<p>In terms of war crimes in general, investigators are working hard to gather evidence of crimes committed by both sides in this bitter conflict. Olivera Simic of Griffith University and Anastasiia Chupis of Zaporizhzhia National University in Ukraine have been talking with activists who are engaged in fieldwork, <a href="https://theconversation.com/an-inside-look-at-the-dangerous-painstaking-work-of-collecting-evidence-of-suspected-war-crimes-in-ukraine-214725">documenting evidence</a> of attacks and other suspected crimes on Ukrainian educational facilities. </p>
<p>As of November, 365 educational establishments across Ukraine had been destroyed completely and another 3,800 institutions either partially destroyed or severely damaged from bombing and shelling, according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Education. As you’d expect, attacks on educational establishments and students are prohibited under international humanitarian law. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/an-inside-look-at-the-dangerous-painstaking-work-of-collecting-evidence-of-suspected-war-crimes-in-ukraine-214725">An inside look at the dangerous, painstaking work of collecting evidence of suspected war crimes in Ukraine</a>
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<h2>Who foots the bill?</h2>
<p>All of which begs the question of who will foot the bill for rebuilding once the fighting stops. And of course that will depends very much on the outcome. But there is a growing push to use Russian state assets, including central bank reserves, to pay. Jon Unruh from McGill University in Canada and Geoffrey Goodell from UCL have taken a look at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/seizing-russian-state-assets-to-rebuild-ukraine-will-it-prolong-the-war-or-end-it-218224">pros and cons of this approach</a>. </p>
<p>Russia’s frozen state assets reportedly amount to about €300 billion, which represents a fair bit of leverage when it comes to peace negotiations. This is in line with the idea that most of the measures taken to try to deter Russia from its war of aggression (sanctions, embargoes, asset freezes and international exclusion) are designed to be reversible. Agreeing to funnel such a sum into the rebuilding of Ukraine removes it as a lever.</p>
<p>You have to imagine it would be a popular move with western taxpayers who might otherwise have to stump up yet more money to help Ukraine get back in its feet.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/seizing-russian-state-assets-to-rebuild-ukraine-will-it-prolong-the-war-or-end-it-218224">Seizing Russian state assets to rebuild Ukraine: Will it prolong the war, or end it?</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219438/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of the best of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2189382023-12-05T12:39:07Z2023-12-05T12:39:07ZUkraine war: Russia’s hard line at European security meeting ratchets up tensions another notch<p>After many months of <a href="https://www.shrmonitor.org/exclusive-malta-under-consideration-to-become-osce-chair-in-2024/">diplomatic wrangling</a>, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was granted another lease of life at the annual ministerial council meeting last week in a <a href="https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/559671">messy compromise</a> between Russia and the west. But rather than ushering in a period of renewed efforts to mend Europe’s broken security order, existing faultlines have deepened and new ones have emerged.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.osce.org/whatistheosce">OSCE</a> traces its roots back to a period of serious attempts at detente between the US and the USSR during the 1970s. It’s now the world’s largest regional security organisation with 57 participating states encompassing three continents – North America, Europe and Asia. Yet its ability to fulfil its mandate of providing security has been severely compromised in recent years. </p>
<p>While the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the latest and most egregious violation of the OSCE’s fundamental principles, it was not the first. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the subsequent recognition of the independence of the Kremlin-supported breakaway states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August was followed, in 2014, by the annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of Donbas. </p>
<p>Russia has also deliberately undermined the OSCE’s existing missions in Ukraine. The “<a href="https://www.osce.org/observer-mission-at-russian-checkpoints-gukovo-and-donetsk-discontinued">Observer Mission </a>”, which was set up in July 2014 to monitor activity at key Russian-Ukrainian border checkpoints in eastern Ukraine was discontinued in September 2021. </p>
<p>Meanwhile the “<a href="https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-closed">Special Monitoring Mission</a>”, set up in March 2014 to observe and report in an impartial and objective manner on the security situation in Ukraine was closed in March 2022, weeks after Russia launched its all-out invasion. </p>
<p>The office of the <a href="https://www.osce.org/project-coordinator-in-ukraine-closed">project coordinator</a> in Ukraine, which was set up at Kyiv’s request in 1999 to help it meet a range of security challenges and assist and advise on reforms, was closed in June 2022. All of these initiatives ended after Russia vetoed their continuation.</p>
<p>Yet, none of this stopped the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, from <a href="https://mid.ru/en/press_service/video/view/1918477/">declaring</a> at the latest meeting that the OSCE was becoming “an appendage of Nato and the EU” and finds itself “on the brink of the abyss”.</p>
<p>At least on this latter point, there is little disagreement. The OSCE is experiencing the <a href="https://fpc.org.uk/is-a-russian-veto-on-leadership-about-to-provoke-the-downfall-of-the-osce/">deepest crisis</a> in its history. Because of Russia’s veto, the organisation has not had an approved budget since 2021. It has only survived on the basis of “<a href="https://www.shrmonitor.org/how-creative-diplomacy-has-averted-a-collapse-of-the-osce-until-now/">creative diplomacy</a>”, with individual member states finding money to fund its missions.</p>
<h2>Sense of instability</h2>
<p>The compromises <a href="https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/559671">achieved</a> at the ministerial council in Skopje last week do little to put the OSCE back onto a more sustainable footing. While <a href="https://www.shrmonitor.org/exclusive-osce-permanent-council-paves-the-way-for-malta-to-assume-the-osce-chair-in-2024/">appointing Malta</a> as chair of the organisation for 2024 averts complete dysfunctionality, the mandates of the organisation’s other top officials, including the secretary general, were extended by only nine months, rather than the customary three-year period. </p>
<p>This merely prolongs the existing agony by putting off a decision on who is to lead the organisation and its institutions. The pervasive sense of instability that now surrounds the OSCE fits neatly with the Kremlin’s narrative of the need for a fundamentally new and different European security order. </p>
<p>While Russia managed to block Estonia’s candidacy for the chair and secured a non-Nato member for the role with Malta, this is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/osce-limps-through-another-year-russia-relents-veto-2023-12-01/">hardly</a> a triumph of Russian diplomacy, given that the Kremlin had to drop its opposition to the renewal of the other leadership positions.</p>
<p>Nor is the compromise a win for the west. Crucially, the west was far from united in its approach. Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/11/28/baltic-countries-boycott-osce-meeting-over-russian-invitation">refused</a> to send their foreign ministers to the meeting in protest over Lavrov’s attendance. Their US and UK counterparts, Antony Blinken and David Cameron, attended the pre-meeting dinner but avoided any contact with Lavrov. </p>
<p>By contrast, the German foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, attended in person and launched a scathing condemnation of Russia and Lavrov in her <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/9/559131.pdf">statement</a>, underscoring that the Kremlin’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is also a war against the OSCE. </p>
<p>Several, including non-western, delegates emphasised the importance of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all participating states. But only nine of them aligned themselves with the <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/f/559590.pdf">EU statement</a>, which called on “Russia to immediately stop its war of aggression against Ukraine, and completely and unconditionally withdraw … from the entire territory of Ukraine”.</p>
<p>This does not mean that the remainder of the OSCE’s participating states support the Kremlin’s war of aggression. But it indicates the likely difficulties which Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-zelenskiys-10-point-peace-plan-2022-12-28/">peace formula</a> will face in the future. A wider pro-western line was adopted by more than 40 participating states that issued joint statements on <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/c/559713.pdf">human rights and fundamental freedoms</a> and on the <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/b/559707.pdf">90th anniversary of the Holodomor</a> genocide in Ukraine in 1932-1933.</p>
<h2>Deep divisions</h2>
<p>Yet this cannot gloss over the fundamental divide that persists in the OSCE between the collective west and Russia and its remaining allies. A <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nato-allies-joint-statement-to-the-osce-ministerial-council-2023">joint statement</a> by Nato members (and Sweden) squarely pointed the finger of blame for all that is wrong with the OSCE and European security at the Kremlin. </p>
<p>Russia and Belarus, in turn, received support from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in their <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/559662.pdf">attempt</a> to deflect that blame and portray themselves as champions of peace, security and human rights.</p>
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<p>Much was made at the ministerial council of the OSCE as an important platform for dialogue, especially in light of the many security challenges that the region faces. But, as Liechtenstein’s representative <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/1/559251.pdf">aptly put it</a>, for this to work, participating states need to recognise, and remind themselves of, the added value that the OSCE brings to each of them individually and the region as a whole. </p>
<p>There is little evidence that this message will be heard. And so the danger persists that an ongoing “dialogue of the deaf” will eventually push the OSCE into oblivion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218938/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK, a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe appears to be on its last legs.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1979372023-01-19T17:34:18Z2023-01-19T17:34:18ZUkraine war: Kremlin’s campaign of misinformation keeps Kyiv and its allies guessing<p>During a recent visit to St Petersburg, Russian president Vladimir Putin <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70368">reiterated his confidence in his country’s victory</a> over Ukraine. Visiting a defence contractor, he also took the opportunity to reassure workers that his so-called “special military operation” was in defence of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine against a “neo-Nazi regime” in Kyiv. In other words, Russia is acting in the tradition of the “great patriotic war” that saved Europe from Nazi Germany. </p>
<p>At a press conference in Moscow meanwhile, Putin’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, spoke <a href="https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1848395/">along similar lines</a>:</p>
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<p>Like Napoleon, who mobilised nearly all of Europe against the Russian empire, and Hitler, who occupied the majority of European countries and hurled them at the Soviet Union, the United States has created a coalition of nearly all European member states of Nato and the EU and is using Ukraine to wage a proxy war against Russia with the old aim of finally solving the ‘Russian question’, like Hitler, who sought a final solution to the ‘Jewish question’. </p>
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<p>This is now a well-established narrative – mostly for domestic consumption – seeking to convince Russians that the war is justified and winnable. But such statements also send signals to Ukraine and its allies about Russia’s determination to continue fighting and, by invoking parallels with the second world war, about an unshakeable belief that Russia will prevail. </p>
<p>This could easily be dismissed as propaganda if not for a number of other recent developments that underline that the Kremlin is willing and able to escalate, on the battlefields in Ukraine and beyond.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505440/original/file-20230119-18-4vcctd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing Moldova and the breakaway pro-Russia region of Transnistria." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505440/original/file-20230119-18-4vcctd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505440/original/file-20230119-18-4vcctd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=741&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505440/original/file-20230119-18-4vcctd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=741&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505440/original/file-20230119-18-4vcctd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=741&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505440/original/file-20230119-18-4vcctd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=931&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505440/original/file-20230119-18-4vcctd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=931&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505440/original/file-20230119-18-4vcctd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=931&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Russia is thought to have ambitions in Moldova and has troops stationed in the breakaway enclave of Transnistria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
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<p>Russia keeps a contingent of troops in Transnistria, a small breakaway region wedged between Ukraine and Moldova. At the end of December 2022, Russia was the only one among 57 participating states of the <a href="https://www.osce.org/">Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE)</a> to oppose the customary extension of the mandate of its <a href="https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova">Mission to Moldova</a>. Eventually, a <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/b/535614.pdf">compromise</a> was found, extending the mission until the end of June and enabling it to carry on with its mediation in the conflict.</p>
<p>Transnistria is a reminder of the fact that if Russia can establish full control over Donbas and southern Ukraine, Moldova would be a likely next target in what Putin calls his mission to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/moldova-protests-russia-over-comments-by-top-military-commander-2022-04-22/">protect</a>” ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-stage-two-of-russias-war-is-ringing-alarm-bells-in-nearby-moldova-heres-why-181813">Ukraine invasion: 'stage two' of Russia's war is ringing alarm bells in nearby Moldova – here's why</a>
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<p>Moldova’s president, Maia Sandu, is sufficiently worried about Russian destabilisation efforts – which have included fomenting <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-11-13/moldova-anti-govt-protesters-return-amid-energy-crisis">anti-government protests</a> and staging various <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/27/europe/transnistria-moldova-ukraine-russia-war-explainer-intl/index.html">false-flag</a> provocations in the Transnistria region – to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-says-requests-air-defence-systems-stems-russia-destabilising-efforts-2023-01-19/">ask</a> the country’s western partners for air surveillance and defence systems. </p>
<h2>Second front?</h2>
<p>Repeated signals from Moscow that a second front in the war against Ukraine might be reopened from Belarus could be considered fanciful in light of Russia’s humiliating retreat from the outskirts of Kyiv a few months into the invasion. Yet, Putin’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putins-belarus-visit-ends-with-talk-of-increased-defence-cooperation-and-nuclear-sabre-rattling-196888">end-of-year visit</a> to Minsk and recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-says-joint-air-force-drills-with-russia-are-defensive-only-2023-01-15/">joint airforce drills</a> create just enough ambiguity for Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-says-ukraine-must-be-ready-belarus-border-2023-01-11/">warn</a> that Russia may launch another ground invasion from Belarus.</p>
<p>Putin has also restructured his <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64235713">military leadership in Ukraine</a>, replacing the airforce general, Sergei Surovikin, with the long-serving chief of the Russian general staff, Valery Gerasimov. </p>
<p>Gerasimov oversaw the military operation that led to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/now-crimeas-in-the-bag-where-next-for-putin-and-russia-24521">illegal annexation</a> of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, and was the chief architect of Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This involved Russian forces attacking from occupied areas in Donbas and invading from the south via Crimea and the north via Belarus. </p>
<p>Putting Gerasimov in overall charge now, after almost a year of at best mixed success for Russia, is another not-so-subtle signal of Moscow raising the stakes.</p>
<h2>War of words</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev (who served a term from 2008 to 2012 after Putin’s first two stints) added further oil to the fire by yet again <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-ally-medvedev-warns-nuclear-war-if-russia-defeated-ukraine-2023-01-19/">raising the spectre of a nuclear escalation</a>. And Putin’s official spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-sooner-ukraine-accepts-our-demands-sooner-conflict-can-end-2023-01-19/">signalled Russia’s willingness to end the war</a> provided Kyiv accepts Moscow’s terms for a settlement (without specifying what these are). </p>
<p>Again, these comments could be dismissed as meaningless, But they are part of the bigger picture of how Russia is conducting this war by trying to raise tensions even further, in and out of Ukraine.</p>
<p>In his gloomy <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70315">new year address</a>, Putin again framed the war in Ukraine as a civilisational struggle between Russia and the west. Much of his signalling, therefore is directed at western leaders, currently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/berlin-sets-condition-us-exports-german-tanks-ukraine-source-2023-01-18/">gathered in Davos and debating</a>, among other things, what additional military equipment should be delivered to Ukraine. </p>
<p>Russia’s information war clearly has some effect on at least some western decision makers. Debates on how much to arm Ukraine continue. As a result, Kyiv still lacks sufficient artillery and air defences. And its requirements for another major offensive are far from fulfilled: more substantial western supplies, especially of tanks and other armoured vehicles, are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/berlin-will-allow-exports-german-tanks-ukraine-if-us-sends-its-tanks-source-2023-01-18/">only slowly being agreed</a> between the US and Germany.</p>
<p>Rather than allowing themselves to be unsettled by Russia’s use of distraction and misinformation, Ukraine’s allies should take them as threats to be countered. Doing so effectively will require them to supply Kyiv with more and better weapons systems and ammunition. </p>
<p>Without that, Ukraine will not be able to liberate Russian-ocuppied territories. This is the best-case scenario. The worst case is that Putin may be presented with a realistic option for a new offensive either while the ground in the next few months is still frozen or later in the spring.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197937/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK. He is also a past recipient of grants from the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>The Kremlin’s weapons of mass distraction are designed to keep Kyiv and allies guessing.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1962292022-12-13T10:37:19Z2022-12-13T10:37:19ZUkraine war: drones are transforming the conflict, bringing Russia on to the frontline<p>Nato secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg spoke recently of his fear that the war in Ukraine could spin out of control into a <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/12/06/russia-drone-strike-ukraine">full-blown confrontation</a> between Russia and the west. “If things go wrong, they can go horribly wrong,” he told Norwegian broadcaster NRK.</p>
<p>Stoltenberg’s remarks came on December 9, a few days after Ukraine is thought to have launched a series of <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/12/06/russia-drone-strike-ukraine">drone strikes at airbases</a> deep inside Russian territory. The following day, December 10, Russia reportedly used <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/10/iranian-made-drones-supplied-to-russia-after-february-invasion-says-ukraine">Iranian-supplied</a> drones in response, attacking the key southern port city of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-drone-attacks-target-power-network-ukraines-odesa-officials-2022-12-10/">Odesa</a> and leaving 1.5 million people without electricity. Since then, the air war has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fbd6dc6e-4a41-4bfa-977b-8c3ef4482dcc">further escalated</a>.</p>
<p>Russia and Ukraine have deployed a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-invasion-drones-war-types-list/32132833.html">wide range</a> of military and commercial drones since the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-ukraine-using-drones-against-russia">early days</a> of the war. But their increasingly frequent – and effective – deployment indicates a potential new stage of escalation with important consequences for Ukraine and its western backers.</p>
<p>Both sides have used drones in a variety of roles, including intelligence gathering and combat operations. They have also been used for the documentation of war crimes, and by journalists <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/06/europe/ukraine-russia-war-technology-intl-cmd/index.html">reporting</a> from otherwise inaccessible war zones.</p>
<p>While much of the emphasis has been on the use of aerial combat drones carrying out strikes against Russian forces from the air, Ukraine has also deployed drones successfully against Russian naval assets in occupied <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/01/could-ukraines-drone-attack-on-russian-ships-herald-a-new-type-of-warfare">Crimea</a>. In this particular attack, aerial drones were <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/29/drone-attack-repelled-in-sevastopol-moscow-installed-official">coordinated</a> with <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/ukraines-mysterious-marine-drones-threaten-russian-control-of-black-sea-coast-1945274">marine</a> drones, which work similarly to more traditional torpedoes. </p>
<p>Another relatively new feature in the war in Ukraine is the widespread and highly effective use of small commercial drones, many of them operated by civilian volunteers to gather intelligence. This has contributed to increasing the situational awareness of Ukrainian forces, identifying Russian positions and monitoring troop movements. </p>
<p>The now-abolished international special monitoring mission to Ukraine pioneered this use of drones in the country to <a href="https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/125813">check on</a> the ceasefire established by the first of the failed Minsk agreements of September 2014. But the sheer scale of their use after the beginning of the Russian invasion <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/drones-russia-ukraine-war">dwarfs</a> anything that happened before February 2022. </p>
<h2>Will drones help Ukraine win?</h2>
<p>Clearly, the Ukrainian use of drones shows the benefits of this technology. Drones have a longer range than many of the missiles Ukraine has in its current arsenal. They are cheaper, don’t require the same level of training that aircrews in manned aircraft would need, and don’t put Ukrainian troops at the risk of loss or capture.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1600186695315750912"}"></div></p>
<p>Drones thus provide a means to penetrate deep into Russian and Russian-occupied territory, extending Ukraine’s reach to several hundred miles behind the current frontlines. Even if the damage inflicted in the recent attacks inside Russia was only slight, it served as an important demonstration of Ukraine’s offensive capabilities. Their ability to evade air defences exposes yet more <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/092a9022-21ef-4e6c-8d57-895564c01883">Russian vulnerabilities</a> and serves as an important, morale-boosting tactical victory. </p>
<p>At the same time, it is also a psychological blow for Russia that demonstrates Ukrainians’ ability to hit the enemy at home and to answer drones with drones. And it demonstrates, too, that <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/ukraines-drones-becoming-increasingly-ineffective-090120379.html">earlier doubts</a> about the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone warfare was based on overestimating Russia’s air defence capabilities. </p>
<p>Yet, for now, drones have not decisively shifted the course of this war in Ukraine’s favour in a strategic sense. For that to happen, Ukraine will need more capable air defence systems against the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-62225830">kamikaze drones</a> Russia currently deploys to devastating effect against infrastructure and civilian targets.</p>
<p>And drone attacks alone are unlikely to inflict the losses and damage necessary for Russia to end its invasion. Ukraine will also need more long-range artillery and missile systems which can deliver more powerful strikes against Russian bases and installations, both in occupied territory and in Russia itself. </p>
<p>At the same time, supplies of drones from Russia’s most important military backer, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63921007">Iran</a>, need to be more effectively curtailed. </p>
<h2>Is escalation inevitable?</h2>
<p>US secretary of state Antony Blinken said Washington had “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63882955">neither enabled nor encouraged</a>” Ukrainian drone strikes against military bases in Russia (although the US defense department <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-drone-warfare-russia-732jsshpx">is reported to</a> have at least tacitly approved the attacks). </p>
<p>Throughout the war to date, Nato has been keen to avoid escalation beyond Ukraine, and this has included limiting the equipment and arms that have been supplied to Ukraine. Ukraine’s drone strikes against military facilities inside Russia do not necessarily signal the end of this strategy. Targeting the bases from which cruise missiles were launched at Ukraine is a legitimate defensive tactic to limit these strikes. </p>
<p>But it also shows a wider willingness on the part of Kyiv to attack Russia beyond occupied Ukrainian territories and at least tacit western approval of such an approach. Moscow will have to plan on that basis, allocating scarce military resources to the defence of key targets far from the front line. This will limit further Russian capacity to defend illegally annexed Ukrainian lands, let alone to escalate the intensity of its current efforts to capture more territory in Donbas. </p>
<p>Properly integrated into a wider Ukrainian and western military strategy, drones could in this way be an important contribution to forging a path towards Russia’s defeat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196229/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK. He is also a past recipient of grants from the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Hastings Dunn has previously received funding from the ESRC, the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the Open Democracy Foundation and has previously been both a NATO and a Fulbright Fellow.</span></em></p>The use of unmanned aircraft by both sides has massively increased, changing the nature of the air war.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamDavid Hastings Dunn, Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1770852022-02-14T15:53:49Z2022-02-14T15:53:49ZUkraine: the history behind Russia’s claim that Nato promised not to expand to the east<p>The main issue highlighted by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-a-country-wounded-by-eight-years-of-crisis-175296">crisis on the Ukraine borders</a> over the past few months has predominantly focused on the role of Nato and the friction over the eastward expansion of the alliance. This has been a constant message emerging from the Kremlin: that the Nato membership of many parts of the old Soviet Bloc, and the prospective membership of Ukraine to the alliance, poses a threat to Russian sovereignty. </p>
<p>But the decision to accept former members of the Warsaw Pact, the defensive alliance which included the USSR and several eastern European countries, is being subject to a revisionist history. This is perpetuating a myth that Nato promised not to expand eastwards after the Soviet Union dissolved. </p>
<p>In 2014, the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev marked the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall by noting in an interview that that Nato’s enlargement “<a href="https://www.rbth.com/international/2014/10/16/mikhail_gorbachev_i_am_against_all_walls_40673.html">was not discussed at all</a>” at the time:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Not a single Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. Western leaders didn’t bring it up, either. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>There was, he said, no promise not to enlarge the alliance, though in the same interview Gorbachev also stated that he thinks that enlargement was a “big mistake” and “a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made” in 1990.</p>
<p>Indeed, the only formal agreement signed between Nato countries and the USSR, before its breakup in December 1991, was the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201696/volume-1696-I-29226-English.pdf">Treaty of Final Settlement with Respect to Germany</a>. The promises made specifically relate to Germany, and the territory of the former GDR, which were on the deployment of non-German Nato forces into eastern Germany and the deployment of nuclear weapons – and these promises have been kept.</p>
<h2>Looking for security</h2>
<p>In seeking to develop a role in the international order after the end of the cold war, Nato realigned towards a crisis management and conflict prevention security function. The alliance agreed in July 1992 to offer to undertake peacekeeping duties on behalf of the United Nations and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The <a href="https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/nato_fsnacc.html">North Atlantic Cooperation Council</a> (NACC) had been established in 1991 with the USSR and former Warsaw Pact countries as members, to enable dialogue and enhance transparency between western and eastern Europe.</p>
<p>But many former Warsaw Pact countries wanted a greater level of assurance of their security after the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These countries duly signed the <a href="https://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412-2">Visegrad Declaration</a> in February 1991, with the objective of “full involvement in the European … system of security”. </p>
<p>The relative security of the eastern European states was challenged during the 1990s due to the attempted <a href="https://www.rbth.com/politics/2013/10/03/how_october_1993_led_to_president_putin_30489.html">October coup in Moscow in 1993</a>, the first <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/chechnya1.htm">Chechen war in 1994</a> and Russian assistance to the <a href="https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/rest-of-the-world-news/georgias-breakaway-republic-of-abkhazia-votes-for-president.html">breakaway Republic of Abkhazia</a> in the south Caucasus. The combination of these events increased the perception of vulnerability, particularly in the Baltic states, indicating that Moscow was prepared to act militarily to pursue its security objectives. </p>
<p>Alongside the increasing security concerns of former Warsaw Pact countries, there was significant debate in the early 1990s about the merits of enlargement. Rather than jump straight into enlarging Nato, the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm">Partnership For Peace (PfP)</a> was established in 1994 and included NACC members as well as former Soviet Asian countries, such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The result was a greater formalisation of the security arrangements, initially developed by the NACC, into a structure that allowed for PfP members to engage in Nato peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. </p>
<p>Russia was a participant in these new security arrangements, and was keen to clarify that Nato enlargement was not a security threat to Russia. The then president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, wrote in a September 1993 <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/4390818/Document-04-Retranslation-of-Yeltsin-letter-on.pdf">letter to the then US president, Bill Clinton</a>: “Any possible integration of east European countries into Nato will not automatically lead to the alliance somehow turning against Russia.” So it was being clearly signalled that Russia did not object to the direction Europe’s new security architecture was following.</p>
<p>The three Visegrad countries were duly invited to join Nato at the 1997 Madrid Summit, joining in 1999. Slovakia was <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/03/slovakia-life-after-velvet-divorce">forced to wait until 2004</a>. The move was widely supported by the people of the countries which joined. Hungarians voted <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/17/world/hungarians-approve-nato-membership.html">85.3% in favour of Nato membership</a> in a referendum, for example.</p>
<h2>Enemies no longer</h2>
<p>The bedrock of the Nato-Russia relationship, the <a href="https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/media/59451/1997_nato_russia_founding_act.pdf">Nato-Russia Founding Act</a>, was also signed at the 1997 Madrid Summit alongside the enlargement invitations. As the second formal agreement of the post-Cold War era between Russia and Nato, the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm">act confirms</a> that “Nato and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries”, and that Nato transformation is “a process that will continue”. It is, therefore, clear that Nato enlargement, was not considered a primary security concern for Russia.</p>
<p>The Baltic States openly pursued Nato membership, following the signing of the <a href="https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ch_9801_baltic_charter.html">Baltic Charter of Partnership</a> with the US in 1998. Rather than oppose Baltic membership, Russia actually <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/d-ru20060615_07/d-ru20060615_07en.pdf">helped it to happen</a> by resolving border disputes with Lithuania. </p>
<p>Russia also demonstrated its continued to desire to remain in a cooperative security relationship by developing the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm">Nato-Russia Council</a> in 2002. Despite Russia’s occupation of the Crimea and Donbass, both legally still part of Ukraine, the council has still met a number of times a year, most recently on <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm">January 12 2022</a>, alongside the informal lines of communications that continually remain open.</p>
<p>Nato enlargement has been a controversial subject – within as well as outside of the alliance – since the 1990s. But, when the present situation is placed within an appropriate context, it can be argued that Nato is not an aggressive, expansionist alliance. It also appears that Russia gave at least tacit approval to the enlargement, including the former Soviet Baltic states, and was signalling its desire to be a partner in the European security architecture.</p>
<p>Of course this has changed over the past decade. But the reason for that changed relationship is not Nato – it’s Vladimir Putin.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gavin E L Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia insists that there was an agreement not to expand Nato eastwards after the end of the USSR. History begs to differ.Gavin E L Hall, Teaching Fellow, Political Science and International Security, University of Strathclyde Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1443052020-09-08T12:32:13Z2020-09-08T12:32:13ZAs concerns mount over integrity of US elections, so does support for international poll monitors<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354391/original/file-20200824-16-1eyuclr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=84%2C56%2C4507%2C3225&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">International observers from Canada, India and Jamaica tour the Utah County election facilities on Nov. 6, 2018 in Provo, Utah.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/international-election-observers-from-canada-india-and-news-photo/1058239710?adppopup=true">George Frey/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With the U.S. presidential election approaching, Americans face a daunting set of challenges as they prepare to vote. </p>
<p>Many voters <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/2020-campaign-primary-calendar-coronavirus.html">fear the coronavirus</a> will force them to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/amp-stories/wisconsin-voters-primary-coronavirus/">risk their lives at the polls</a>. Yes, <a href="https://theconversation.com/search/result?sg=44b8fec6-545e-488d-bd08-fcd325a6025b&sp=1&sr=1&url=%2Fresearch-on-voting-by-mail-says-its-safe-from-fraud-and-disease-141847">voting by mail</a> <a href="https://berinsky.mit.edu/">represents a safe alternative</a>. But <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/13/donald-trump-usps-post-office-election-funding">President Donald Trump opposes additional funding</a> for the United States Postal Service, and the agency has warned 46 states that mail-in voters could be <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/usps-states-delayed-mail-in-ballots/2020/08/14/64bf3c3c-dcc7-11ea-8051-d5f887d73381_story.html">disenfranchised by delayed mail-in ballots</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/17/us/study-says-2000-election-missed-millions-of-votes.html">Past presidential elections</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/upshot/iowa-caucuses-errors-results.html">recent caucuses</a> provide even more cause for concern: Rickety voting systems risk changing election results.</p>
<p>When faced with potential problems at the polls, other countries invite international observers to help monitor elections. Just recently, <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-03/25/c_137922490.htm">Indonesia</a>, <a href="https://www.stabroeknews.com/2020/07/10/news/regional/trinidad/trinidad-pm-invites-international-observers-to-august-10-election/">Trinidad and Tobago</a> and <a href="https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro/457741">Montenegro</a> have welcomed observers. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.wku.edu/political-science/staff/timothy_rich">political science professor</a> who <a href="http://www.timothysrich.com/research">writes about electoral politics</a> and has observed elections in other countries, I’ve seen international observers promote faith and integrity in foreign elections. </p>
<p>Should an international organization monitor U.S. elections in November for fraud? The public seems to think so, even amid a pandemic.</p>
<h2>International observers in US elections</h2>
<p>Election observers typically monitor the entire election process – not just Election Day. They examine candidate registration, observe the opening of polling stations and help count ballots, for example. But they do not have the power to stop questionable activity, only to report it.</p>
<p>The U.S. often supports international election monitoring in other countries through the <a href="https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections">Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</a> and the <a href="http://www.oas.org/en/topics/elections.asp">Organization of American States</a>. Election observers with these groups <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/25/belarus-protests-erupted-because-these-4-things/">ensure electoral integrity</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/05/world/americas/evo-morales-election.html">observe voting procedures for potential fraud</a>. </p>
<p>International observers are no strangers to U.S. elections – they have <a href="https://theconversation.com/international-election-observers-evaluating-us-midterm-elections-will-face-limitations-105631">monitored at least seven of them since 2002</a>.</p>
<p>While the Republican and Democratic parties <a href="https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/poll-watcher-qualifications.aspx">routinely recruit volunteers to monitor polls</a>, election experts say it’s crucial that nonpartisan observers are present to ensure that observation does not devolve into <a href="https://theconversation.com/armed-poll-watchers-new-jerseys-cautionary-tale-ahead-of-the-2020-presidential-election-141328">voter intimidation</a>. </p>
<p>Since U.S. elections are run by the states, states decide whether or not to permit international election observers. Several of them – California, Missouri, New Mexico and Washington, D.C. – have laws <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/1/456169_0.pdf">that allow for international observers</a>. Additionally, Hawaii, North Dakota, South Dakota and Virginia have laws that allow election observers that could apply to international monitors. </p>
<p>But most other states do not welcome international observers. The practice is explicitly prohibited by statutes in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Texas. All other states have been silent about international observation missions. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354393/original/file-20200824-18-1r2f7xc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354393/original/file-20200824-18-1r2f7xc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354393/original/file-20200824-18-1r2f7xc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354393/original/file-20200824-18-1r2f7xc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354393/original/file-20200824-18-1r2f7xc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354393/original/file-20200824-18-1r2f7xc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354393/original/file-20200824-18-1r2f7xc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354393/original/file-20200824-18-1r2f7xc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">An international observer with Fair Elections International speaks to the media in Miami, Florida, on Nov. 2, 2004.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mathew-rosen-an-international-observer-with-global-exchange-news-photo/51647312?adppopup=true">Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>During the 2018 midterm elections, election officials in Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and West Virginia refused to meet with international observers before the elections, <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/US%20Midterm%202018%20LEOM_final%20report_13.02.2019_with%20MM.pdf">according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</a>. That organization’s report said that Indiana officials, for example, informed its observation mission that observers “were not welcome in the state at all.”</p>
<h2>Strong public support</h2>
<p>Polls show that <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/08/13/election-2020-voters-are-highly-engaged-but-nearly-half-expect-to-have-difficulties-voting/">Americans are highly engaged in the November election</a> – more so than in previous contests. But nearly half of them – Republicans and Democrats – expect to encounter problems at the polls. The coronavirus, malfunctioning voting machines and uncounted mail-in ballots represent just a few concerns.</p>
<p>While many states do not support election observers, evidence suggests the public largely does. With the <a href="http://www.timothysrich.com/ipol-research">International Public Opinion Lab</a> at Western Kentucky University, we conducted a web survey in July of 1,027 Americans across the country. We asked them if their state should allow an international, independent organization to observe the November elections to identify potential fraud.</p>
<p>Our survey found broad public support for international election observers. More than 70% agreed or strongly agreed to allow observers, with Democrats more supportive than Republicans – 77.2% and 65.3%, respectively. We found similarly high support between those preferring Joe Biden, 74.2%, and those preferring Donald Trump, 65.2%. </p>
<p>We also found that respondents concerned about contracting <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/covid-19">COVID-19</a> were more likely to support election observers, regardless of party affiliation. This is perhaps linked to concerns about their ballots being counted if voters cannot go to the polls on election day and instead vote by mail.</p>
<p><iframe id="3BtTc" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/3BtTc/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>However, the COVID-19 pandemic throws a wrench in the typical electoral observation mission. How will observers monitor large-scale mail-in voting? Will they monitor early voting or just polling stations on Election Day? Will states require international election observers to arrive early and quarantine?</p>
<h2>Establishing credibility</h2>
<p>COVID-19-related obstacles to voting – <a href="https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/07/08/election-experts-warn-of-november-disaster">reduced number of polling stations</a> and trouble recruiting <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/31/coronavirus-election-worker-shortage-389831">polling station workers</a>, as well as concerns about health risks from voting in person – will likely decrease trust in the 2020 election and potentially affect the results, <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/1/456169_0.pdf">according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</a>. That is why the group is calling for 500 international observers.</p>
<p>To encourage broad public confidence in the electoral process, state officials could invite international organizations to conduct observation missions, as many other countries do. This would help establish the credibility of election results and demonstrate a commitment to voter concerns.</p>
<p>In their invitation, state leaders could outline the safety measures they will take to <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html">minimize COVID-19 risks for voters</a>, poll workers and election observers. They could also request clear guidance from international observers on how to <a href="https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/voting-by-mail-absentee-voting">monitor mail-in ballots and early voting</a>.</p>
<p>The pandemic will challenge international observation missions, but ensuring fair elections in an essential component of American democracy. And international monitors have shown they can provide an effective means to reduce public concerns about fraud and voter suppression.</p>
<p><em>Maggie Sullivan and Mallory Treece Wagner contributed to this report and the original survey questions.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Rich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many US states forbid foreign observers to monitor their elections, but as the 2020 presidential election nears, a poll finds broad public support for international election observers.Timothy Rich, Associate Professor of Political Science, Western Kentucky UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1246052019-10-03T11:16:01Z2019-10-03T11:16:01ZUkraine: window opens for peace in the Donbas after Volodymyr Zelenskiy agrees to election plan<p>As the war in eastern Ukraine drags into its sixth year, all the attempts to end it have so far failed. But in a significant development on October 1, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, announced his <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-agrees-to-election-in-occupied-east-paving-way-for-peace-talks-with-russia/30193964.html">provisional agreement</a> to hold local elections in the currently occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, collectively known as Donbas.</p>
<p>The war in the Donbas began when mass protests in support of greater territorial autonomy escalated into a separatist crisis in the spring of 2014. Russia has been supporting the rebels in the Donbas since the inception of the war, which by now has claimed <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/death-toll-up-to-13-000-in-ukraine-conflict-says-un-rights-office/29791647.html">more than 13,000 lives</a>. In an attempt to end the conflict, Ukraine and Russia signed <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2016/09/13/what-are-the-minsk-agreements">two agreements in Minsk</a> in 2014 and 2015 aimed at establishing a ceasefire and lasting peace in eastern Ukraine. To date, the Minsk agreements have not been able to stop the fighting. </p>
<p>In 2016, the deadlock prompted former German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to propose a new approach, which became known as the “Steinmeier formula”. The <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ukraine-agrees-to-steinmeier-formula-green-lights-elections-in-occupied-donbas.html">essence of the formula</a> is simple. The local elections would be held in the occupied territories under Ukrainian legislation and the supervision of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) – but not before all armed groups leave the area and Ukraine regains control of the territory.</p>
<p>If the OSCE deems these elections free and fair, then the separatist controlled territories would be given a special status. The exact nature of what the special status would look like, should it come to that, has not yet been revealed by Zelenksiy’s administration. </p>
<p>The formula lays the groundwork for renewed talks of the so-called “Normandy Four”: Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France. But before then, <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/2791348-president-zelensky-we-agree-on-wording-of-steinmeier-formula.html">Zelenskiy said the wording</a> of the Steinmeier formula is still being agreed on with the OSCE.</p>
<h2>The Russian dimension</h2>
<p>Zelenskiy’s announcement that he was considering moving forward with the Steinmeier formula immediately attracted strong opposition from some groups in Ukraine. The most vocal of these have been the far-right and nationalist groups that <a href="https://liveuamap.com/en/2019/1-october-nationalists-are-protesting-steinmeier-formula">gathered</a> outside the presidential administration building in Kyiv. Their main grievance is a belief that the formula means <a href="http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/09/21/protest-against-steinmeiers-formula-grows-in-ukraine/">capitulation</a> to Russia, because Russia has been backing the Donbas separatists since the war started.</p>
<p>The Kremlin’s and international community’s reaction to the Steinmeier formula has largely been <a href="https://www.voanews.com/europe/steinmeier-deal-sparks-protests-ukraine-praise-moscow">positive</a>. Although critics lament the fact that the deal benefits Russia, the former US ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer <a href="https://www.voanews.com/europe/steinmeier-deal-sparks-protests-ukraine-praise-moscow">disagreed</a>. Pifer emphasised that more details about the agreement are needed, but that the unconditional demand that Russian and Russian proxy forces have to leave occupied Donbas is in Ukraine’s favour.</p>
<p>In Ukraine, Yulia Tymyshenko, a former prime minister and leader of the Batkivshchyna Party, also vehemently opposed the proposed plan. Writing on her Facebook page, Tymoshenko <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/2791462-batkivshchyna-sees-steinmeier-formula-as-threat-to-ukraines-national-security.html">called</a> the formula, “unacceptable” and “a direct threat to our country’s national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty”. </p>
<p>This puts Zelenskiy in an awkward position to say the least. One of the most notable pillars of his presidential campaign was a commitment to bring the war in the Donbas to a swift end. Yet, the president is also expected to end the conflict on Ukraine’s terms without any perception that he is giving in to Russia. The immediate protests by some of the far-right and anti-Kremlin groups, such as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/17/theres-one-far-right-movement-that-hates-the-kremlin-azov-ukraine-biletsky-nouvelle-droite-venner/">Azov</a>, who have been known to engage in acts of violence, are therefore a cause for concern. The most immediate of these concerns is the potential for protest violence should Zelenskiy move forward with the plan and allow for the elections to take place.</p>
<p>At the same time, all other approaches to end the growing number of casualties in the Donbas have failed. For the immediate sake of those living there, the conflict simply cannot keep dragging on and requires a new approach. Although the Steinmeier formula is controversial, it could potentially be a viable solution towards resolving the conflict.</p>
<h2>Zelensky’s new challenge</h2>
<p>Within months of taking office, Zelenskiy’s administration has taken on a number of ambitious reforms aimed at cleaning up corruption in Ukraine’s institutions. Recently, the president has also been caught up in the ongoing impeachment inquiry of US president Donald Trump – though he has tried to distance himself from the case.</p>
<p>It now seems that Zelenskiy’s efforts are being channelled into addressing the ongoing crisis in the Donbas. Some encouraging steps towards that end have already been taken. For example, Russia and Ukraine exchanged prisoners of war in September, in a move <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-russia-prisoners/russia-ukraine-swap-prisoners-in-first-sign-of-thawing-relations-idUSKCN1VS04X">praised</a> by the international community. </p>
<p>If the Steinmeier formula is successful, there will be a potential window of opportunity for a withdrawal of Russian troops from the Donbas. More information and discussion with the public about the proposed plan would be wise, however, as initial polls suggest <a href="https://www.unian.info/society/10706361-nearly-two-thirds-of-ukrainians-fail-to-assess-steinmeier-formula-poll.html">around 60%</a> of the population haven’t yet formed an opinion about the plan.</p>
<p>It’s quite possible that the proposed plan might not achieve the sought-after peace. The elections run the risk of consolidating the position of the current leaders of the occupied territories. </p>
<p>There is a lack of an alternative to the status quo and no guarantees that the occupied territories have any real chance of being reintegrated back into Ukraine. The proposed plan is no doubt a gamble, but offers some hope that an end to violence in the east could be on the horizon if all sides hold up their end of the agreement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liana Semchuk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What is the ‘Steinmeier formula’ for eastern Ukraine and why is it so controversial?Liana Semchuk, PhD Candidate in Politics, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/575352016-04-20T10:18:38Z2016-04-20T10:18:38ZWhat the people of Nagorno-Karabakh think about the future of their homeland<p>The disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakah has been caught in a tug-of-war between Armenia and Azerbaijan for decades. Internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, it’s home to an estimated 120,000 people, primarily ethnic Armenians, who want to separate from Azerbaijan. It’s been a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2014.915543">de facto</a> independent state since a fragile ceasefire was brokered in 1994, and low-level violence has flared up every spring ever since. </p>
<p>But while much remains unclear about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-war-in-nagorno-karabakh-could-spread-and-become-a-major-problem-for-europe-57241">alarming fighting</a> that began on April 2 this year, the scale of what’s happened is without precedent. </p>
<p>This year’s warfare has involved advanced weapons systems such as drones, helicopters, tanks, and artillery, including indiscriminate <a href="https://rbth.com/defence/2014/08/25/the_grad_system_a_hot_hail_of_cluster-fired_rockets_39283.html">Grad</a> rockets. <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/global-powers-scramble-contain-neglected-armenian-azerbaijani-conflict">Territory</a> appears to have changed hands for the first time since the ceasefire. While combat has subsided, a full-scale war, with the potential for a wider conflict involving Russia and Turkey, remains a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-war-in-nagorno-karabakh-could-spread-and-become-a-major-problem-for-europe-57241">serious risk</a>.</p>
<p>There have been plenty of efforts to stop it coming to this. The <a href="http://www.osce.org/mg">Minsk Group</a>, co-chaired by Russia, the US, and France, and charged with finding a peaceful solution, has put forward the “<a href="http://www.osce.org/mg/51152">basic principles</a>” of a framework agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh’s future, proposing international security guarantees in the form of peacekeepers, the return of territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control, an interim status for Karabakh (a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18270325">distinct sub-region</a> of the territory) pending determination of its final status, and a right of return for the displaced and refugees. </p>
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<p>Though peace talks have stalled in recent years, many <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/12/18/nagorny-karabakh-conflict-and-future-of-madrid-principleshttp://example.com/">observers</a> agree that these principles provide the outlines of a politically workable settlement. But the recent violence makes it clear just how far from a solution we are.</p>
<p>The international response to the violence has been to “<a href="http://tass.ru/en/world/867439">strongly condemn</a>” it and call for a return to the negotiating table. Much speculation has turned on the <a href="http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2016/04/03/whats-behind-the-flare-up-in-nagorno-karabakh/">regional politics</a> behind the renewed fighting and the dim prospects for peace – but what gets lost in these discussions are the voices of those whose lives would be most directly affected by any potential settlement. </p>
<p>This includes populations on either side of the line of control, including Azeris and Armenians displaced during the war, and perhaps most crucially, the population of Nagorno-Karabakh itself, where public opinion is one of the most serious obstacles in the way of a diplomatic breakthrough. </p>
<p>In the last few years, scholars have conducted representative <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15387216.2015.1012644#.VwOqPUeRZrY">public opinion surveys</a> that help us understand local attitudes on questions of war, peace, and reconciliation in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/will-war-erupt-in-nagorny-karabakh-here-are-the-5-things-you-need-to-know/?wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl_cage">Nagorno-Karabakh</a>. Here, we draw on <a href="http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk/project/F5945879-82E3-49AD-B7D3-C9255BD8FB73">Kristin Bakke’s ESRC-funded</a> survey from Karabakh in 2013 – to our knowledge the most recent scholarly survey of the region – and it paints a gloomy picture.</p>
<h2>Pessimism runs deep</h2>
<p>The people of Nagorno-Karabakh have mixed attitudes towards the mediators trying to resolve the situation. Of the 1,000 survey respondents, only 56% trusted the ability of Russia, the US, and France to come up with a good solution. They strongly believed that <a href="http://www.politybooks.com/book.asp?ref=9780745653426">Armenia</a> is genuinely interested in a peaceful settlement, but were less convinced that Azerbaijan wants one. And crucially, the vast majority believed that Nagorno-Karabakh, which is currently not directly represented at the talks, needs to be party to any decision on a permanent settlement.</p>
<p>Almost 63% of the respondents were justifiably worried about renewed warfare. When asked: “If there was a new war with Azerbaijan, who, in your view, would best be able to defend you and your close relatives?”, 46% pointed to the <a href="http://en.168.am/2016/04/08/5551.html">NK Defense Army</a>, the pillar of Karabakh’s state-building efforts, 30% to the Armenian armed forces, and 12% to Russia.</p>
<p>Western fears of an entrenched Russian presence in the South Caucasus need to be balanced against the real need for security guarantees. The largely symbolic presence of <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/78216">six OSCE monitors</a> is clearly inadequate; Russia, with its close links to both Armenia and increasingly Azerbaijan, is far from neutral, but it’ll be a vital broker in any peace settlement and in keeping the peace on the ground in the meantime.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most trenchant obstacle to any peace deal comes in people’s attitudes to territory. Our interviews with officials in Nagorno-Karabakh’s tight political, military, and civil society circles revealed serious misgivings about conceding territory, a sentiment echoed in the survey. </p>
<p>The population holds a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21622671.2013.842184">very expansive definition</a> of Nagorno-Karabkah’s territory, and many are unprepared to make territorial concessions of any kind.</p>
<p>This means that leaders in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh need to do more to prepare the public for the return of territories as the basis for a workable settlement, just as their counterparts in Azerbaijan need to prepare Azeris for painful concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh’s political status. Instead, leaders on both sides have exploited the conflict to consolidate their hold on power.</p>
<h2>Final Status</h2>
<p>When asked about their preferred status for Nagorno-Karabakh, more than half wanted unification with Armenia, and 38% wanted independence. Very few favoured an “interim” status with a referendum to decide the territory’s final status later, or thought the status should remain as is.</p>
<p>The vast majority of respondents (80%) agreed with this statement: “Because of the past, Nagorno-Karabakh can never be associated with Azerbaijan again.”</p>
<p>Set against the population’s reluctance to contemplate a return of occupied territories outside Nagorno-Karabakh, this suggests an unwillingness to accept that any gains on formalising status will likely come at a price – even though the majority acknowledge that the final borders will have to be decided by a peace agreement.</p>
<p>Almost 20 years after the war came to an end, the 2013 survey revealed that forgiving perpetrators of violence would still be difficult for a large majority (64%). Renewed violence, as we now have seen, compounds the difficulty of reconciliation.</p>
<p>The right of return to one’s former place of residence is an immensely complicated issue on both sides. Many families have experienced violence and displacement. Voices of moderation on either side pushing for greater contacts between communities are marginalised and often repressed.</p>
<p>Whatever the diplomatic obstacles to a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, to say nothing of the tangled geopolitical rivalries between the US and Russia (and increasingly Turkey and Russia), a lot more needs to be done to win over the people who have to live with whatever settlement is reached.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57535/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristin M. Bakke has received research funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). She is affiliated with the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lee J. M. Seymour's research has been funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).</span></em></p>After more than 20 years of tenuous ceasefire, Nagorno-Karabakh is once again the centre of a violent conflict. And its people haven’t exactly had their say.Kristin M Bakke, Senior Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations, UCLLee J. M. Seymour, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université de MontréalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/377732015-02-24T16:50:29Z2015-02-24T16:50:29ZHow the Ukraine crisis brought European security back from the dead<p>A <a href="https://theconversation.com/moscow-holds-aces-as-bombing-rattles-shaky-ukraine-ceasefire-37879">fragile peace agreement</a> is in place in Ukraine – but the task of determining whether or not it is holding is proving to be a fraught one indeed. </p>
<p>As Kiev and the pro-Russian rebels fight a war of words over who is slowing down the enforcement of the Minsk II agreement, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is doing its best to provide accurate picture of what’s really happening on the ground. </p>
<p>Once thought to have passed its use-by date, the OSCE has drawn new life from the conflict. It is once again seen as a vital agent of European peace and security – and as the only European security organisation that boasts both the Russia the US as participants, it’s been able to rise to the challenge for the very same reasons that many observers previously nearly wrote it off.</p>
<h2>Détente</h2>
<p>The OSCE was born as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 during of the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/detente">détente</a> era of the Cold War. It brought together NATO and Warsaw Pact countries along with non-aligned European states into one security governance group. </p>
<p>Nearly immediately written off by many sides as having sacrificed too much for too little, the CSCE was not based on any legal framework. Instead, it was a political agreement between participating states to ensure territorial integrity, human rights and common regional security challenges. </p>
<p>With the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev as the leader of the Soviet Union, there began a series of motions that would lead to the OSCE that we know today. The “Conference on” was dropped in favour of “Organisation for” in 1994. Yet, many of the institutions that would go on to define the OSCE had already been established. These institutions include the Permanent Council, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Conflict Prevention Centre, and Representative on the Freedom of the Media. </p>
<p>Since 1992, the OSCE has had field missions, offices and centres in place across Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, looking at everything from ethnic politics to communal policing. It was through these institutions that the organisation first got involved in Ukraine.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.osce.org/node/43976">In 1994</a>, an OSCE mission was dispatched to Ukraine to help address the situation in Crimea. Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union had dramatically increased ethnic tensions in the region, with a predominantly ethnic Russian population strongly linked to the Russian Federation suddenly encircled by the Ukrainian border. </p>
<p>The OSCE came in at the request of all participating states, including the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the US. With the organisation’s help, Ukraine and Crimea were able to agree some regional autonomy for Crimea within a united Ukraine, and it was duly enshrined in the country’s <a href="http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402303_text">1996 constitution</a>. </p>
<p>With some amendments, that arrangement held until pro-Russian militias <a href="https://theconversation.com/crimea-is-lost-now-ukraines-future-depends-on-a-delicate-power-game-in-the-east-24556">took hold of Crimea</a> in early 2014. </p>
<p>Since the conflict in Ukraine began in earnest, the OSCE has once again been on the ground at the request of its participant states. </p>
<h2>Suspicious minds</h2>
<p>Even before events in Ukraine spiralled into a full-blown conflict, the organisation had become criticised from the East as being overly concerned with political intervention “east of Vienna”. And towards the end of the 1990s, a group of countries led by Russia made a considerable effort to steer the OSCE away from political intervention and back to its Cold War focus of common security challenges such as arms control.</p>
<p>It’s true that all of its field missions, centres and offices have been and are beyond that line, though its guidelines and recommendations apply to all participating states (if not legally binding). But there is also an obvious political context for these misgivings, one that predates the current Ukraine crisis by years.</p>
<p>The so-called “Colour Revolutions” in <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4532539.stm">Georgia</a>, <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2005/apr/28/the-orange-revolution/">Ukraine</a> and <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/3785139">Kyrgyzstan</a> in the 2000s dramatically undercut support for the OSCE among Russia and its allies in Central Asia. Suddenly, the OSCE was seen as an agent not just of political intervention, but of Western-backed regime change across the post-Soviet world.</p>
<p>That suspicion has only grown in the ensuing years. The Kremlin’s behaviour during the Ukraine crisis shows just how wary Putin’s Kremlin is of regime change in Russia’s “<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/russia-moves-keep-near-abroad-soviet-states-in-check">near abroad</a>”, whether it emerges out of the domestic politics of states or the actions of external players.</p>
<h2>Getting worse</h2>
<p>Observing a conflict as messy as this one, replete as it is with <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/fsb-cuts-off-europe-russia-arms-smuggling-route-via-ukraine-340101.html">arms smuggling</a>, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/10/eastern-ukraine-conflict-summary-killings-misrecorded-and-misreported/">atrocities</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26532154">troops of ambiguous origin</a> and thousands of <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/03/ukraine-rising-civilian-death-toll">civilian casualties</a>, is extremely difficult for any organisation. The OSCE’s observers have faced serious problems accessing crucial arenas, such as the town of Debaltseve, which they have now labelled <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/osce-observers-call-debaltseve-humanitarian-disaster-381583.html">a humanitarian disaster</a>. </p>
<p>And while the Minsk II protocols are being implemented in fits and starts, there are still signs that the peace in Ukraine is unnervingly fragile.</p>
<p>Still, this is where the OSCE can come into its own. Uniquely among the international organisations that attend conflicts as it does, its <em>raison d'être</em> is to promote stability and peace while simultaneously representing all of its participating states, ideally offering the best hope of a neutral perspective on the conflicts it observes.</p>
<p>And despite Russia’s claims that the OSCE’s Ukraine mission is <a href="http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30056604">biased</a>, the organisation is still vital. Had we had gotten rid of the OSCE at the end of the Cold War rather than restructuring it, we would only have had to create it again. </p>
<p>But as worries about a full-blown East-West conflict refuse to go away, the OSCE mission’s job in Ukraine will only get harder.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37773/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof David Galbreath is a member of the OSCE Group of Experts which works with the OSCE Secretariat. He has received funding from the British Academy and Leverhulme Trust for work on the OSCE and has acted as a consultant on the organisation for the US and UK governments.</span></em></p>The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe is the only hope for neutral information about what’s going on in Eastern Ukraine.David J Galbreath, Professor of International Security, Editor of European Security, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/262792014-05-08T20:18:22Z2014-05-08T20:18:22ZUkraine separatists engaged in high-risk game as they press on with referendum plan<p>Vladimir Putin’s statements giving qualified <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27314816">support</a> for presidential elections in Ukraine on May 25, calling on separatists in eastern Ukraine to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/ukraine-crisis-putin-referendum-autonomy-postponed">postpone</a> their planned referendums and announcing a <a href="http://www.channel4.com/news/ukraine-mariupol-russia-soldiers-violence-hague-city-hall">pull-back</a> of troops from Ukraine’s border, has been greeted with scepticism in <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-vote-idINKBN0DN1J420140507">Kiev</a>, <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/ukraine/article18505621/">Brussels</a>, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/russia-fomenting-disorder-ukraine-election-william-hague">London</a> and <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/may/7/putin-troops-have-pulled-back-ukraine-border/">Washington</a>. </p>
<p>In Ukraine, separatist leaders <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/ukraine-separatists-referendum-putin-call-delay">rejected</a> the Russian president’s call for postponing the referendum. This is a high-risk game for them – not only if Putin’s call for a delay was genuine, but also in light of the most recent opinion <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/05/08/despite-concerns-about-governance-ukrainians-want-to-remain-one-country/">polls</a> from the Pew Research Centre that indicate overwhelming support for a unified, and better governed, Ukraine, including in the eastern regions.</p>
<p>Developments on the ground, at the same time, remain deeply worrying: Mariupol city hall was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27305245">retaken</a> by separatists, fighting <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27280814">intensified</a> in Sloviansk, and <a href="http://www.dw.de/odessa-next-flash-point-on-the-black-sea/a-17616055">tensions</a> in Odessa remained high. Unsurprisingly, the German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/06/ukraine-claims-30-pro-russia-separatists-killed">warned</a> that Ukraine was on the verge of all-out war. He urged a new round of talks in Geneva between Russia, Ukraine, the US and the EU, which Russia promptly <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27289897">rejected</a> unless separatists were included.</p>
<p>Taken together, these developments indicate a number of trends, none of which is particularly promising for a swift resolution of the current crisis, let alone a sustainable long-term solution of Ukraine’s underlying problems.</p>
<h2>Consolidating Russian gains</h2>
<p>First, as far as Russia is concerned, the Kremlin appears to be disinterested for the time being in any further escalation of the situation in eastern Ukraine, but rather intent on consolidating its gains there. Local separatists, enjoying considerable public support, are more than a match for Ukrainian security forces. Any further military operations would be costly for Kiev, including in terms of inevitable civilian casualties. Any further escalation of the situation, such as the holding of the referendums planned for May 11, with or without Russia’s official support, however, may force Kiev’s hand and create a situation that is completely out of control. </p>
<p>That said, Russian attempts to de-escalate the situation are not equivalent to making any real concessions, but will rather strengthen Moscow’s position. If the situation in eastern Ukraine stabilises, Russia can claim that it is doing its part in implementing the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/joint-geneva-statement-on-ukraine-from-april-17-the-full-text/2014/04/17/89bd0ac2-c654-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html">Geneva Accords</a>. This will further increase its relevance in any more concerted settlement efforts. If the situation does not stabilise, Russia can assert that this simply demonstrates that it does not really control events in eastern Ukraine. The decision by local separatists to go ahead with their referendum despite Putin’s call to postpone it, may thus well play into Russia’s hand. </p>
<p>Dubious as such claims by the Kremlin may nonetheless seem, they might not be complete fabrications either. Across eastern Ukraine, actors and agendas have proliferated. These are now driven by a range of local, national, and regional aspirations, some more opportunistic, some more strategic, but cumulatively more difficult to manage and control.</p>
<p>This trend of proliferation and the spread of the conflict now to strategically far more important cities <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/ukraine-conflict-creeps-crucial-city-odessa-n97391">such as Odessa,</a> also constrains the options for the Ukrainian government. A military solution is clearly beyond Kiev’s capability at the moment, but any political solution is far from easily obtained either. Talks with the separatists have not yielded any progress so far, OSCE mediation has been limited and the track record of recent agreements and their implementation does not look promising. </p>
<p>With no formal ceasefire in place, the best Kiev can do is avoid any steps – rhetorical or otherwise – that would further inflame the situation during <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/05/07/why-may-9-will-be-a-date-to-watch-in-ukraine/">May 9 Victory Day</a> celebrations (marking the end of World War II), the referendums in eastern Ukraine (if these go ahead) and the run-up to the presidential elections (again, if these go ahead). </p>
<h2>Focus on containment</h2>
<p>Containment, de-escalation and stabilisation need to be where all efforts in Kiev, Moscow, Washington and Brussels should be focused. This would certainly be more uselful than continuing the antagonistic rhetoric and posturing that has been going on for months and has contributed to the constantly deteriorating situation.</p>
<p>The danger of course is that stepping back from the brink may simply no longer be possible. Referendums and elections have a tendency to polarise and radicalise public opinion. Situations such as these – where the winner takes all – are hardly conducive to building the kind of political consensus that countries emerging from, or on the brink of, civil war need. </p>
<p>Putin’s seeming inability to have the referendums in eastern Ukraine postponed and his <a href="http://euobserver.com/foreign/124056">qualified endorsement</a> of the presidential elections may thus yet create a situation in which a Russian military intervention appears as the only “stabilising” option left. And this is a scenario that Moscow has significant experience with going back to the early 1990s when <a href="http://isiseurope.wordpress.com/2014/04/23/is-the-transnistrian-frozen-conflict-next-moldovas-fuzzy-position-between-russia-and-the-west/">Russia intervened militarily and/or diplomatically</a> in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, brokering ceasefires and terminating violence without settling any of what came to be called “frozen conflicts”. </p>
<p>The coming days and weeks will tell how serious all the players in and around Ukraine are about contributing to resolving this ever-more dangerous crisis and whether Kiev, Moscow, Brussels and Washington can rise above their own short-term and increasingly narrow interests and agendas and prevent the unnecessary bloodshed that further escalation would inevitably bring with it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/26279/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, and the EU's Jean Monnet Programme.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin’s statements giving qualified support for presidential elections in Ukraine on May 25, calling on separatists in eastern Ukraine to postpone their planned referendums and announcing a pull-back…Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of Public Administration, Donetsk State Management UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.