tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/palestinian-authority-14240/articlesPalestinian Authority – The Conversation2024-03-18T17:08:04Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259152024-03-18T17:08:04Z2024-03-18T17:08:04ZGaza conflict: Washington’s patience is wearing thin over the lack of leadership from both Israel and Palestine<p>The US senate majority leader Chuck Schumer – a Democrat and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/14/us/politics/schumer-netanyahu-israel-elections.html">highest-ranking Jewish official</a> in US history – has called for the removal of both Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, seeing both as representing the politics of the past. </p>
<p>In an incendiary intervention, Schumer – a longtime and stalwart supporter of Israel – <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2024-03-14/ty-article/.premium/senate-majority-leader-calls-for-new-elections-in-israel/0000018e-3d65-d67c-a18e-ff6d1f4a0000">told the Senate</a> that the continuing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza is testing US patience and that the lack of vision by both current Israeli and Palestinian leaders for the future beyond the war is also at variance with US policy.</p>
<p>Of the Israeli prime minister, he said: “Nobody expects Prime Minister Netanyahu to do the things that must be done to break the cycle of violence, to preserve his credibility on the world stage, to work to a two-state solution.” </p>
<p>Turning to Netanyahu’s counterpart in Ramallah, Schumer was equally forthright: “For there to be any hope of peace in the future, Abbas must step down and be replaced by a new generation of Palestinian leaders who will work towards attaining peace with a Jewish state.”</p>
<p>Reflecting on his fellow Democrat’s comments, US president Joe Biden said Schumer had made <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/15/schumer-netanyahu-speech-biden-reaction">“a good speech”</a>, adding that: “I think he expressed a serious concern shared not only by him, but by many Americans.”</p>
<p>Schumer’s speech came at the end of a week where Israeli and Palestinian politics showed how far away they are from the kind of change that Schumer rightly says is necessary.</p>
<p>Shifting factional politics has made Netanyahu’s position more secure. On March 12, Gideon Saar – a key powerbroker in the ruling coalition and an ally of Netanyahu’s biggest rival Benny Gantz – announced he was <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/a-statesmanlike-right-why-gideon-saar-has-decamped-gantzs-national-unity-party/">pulling out of his alliance with Gantz</a> and demanded that Netanyahu appoint him to the war cabinet. This has weakened Gantz while strengthening Netanyahu’s position. </p>
<p>The last opinion poll taken before Saar’s announcement showed Gantz with a <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-finds-44-of-israelis-prefer-trump-over-biden-as-next-us-president/">12-point lead over Netanyahu</a> and the opposition winning 74 seats out of the 120 Knesset seat if there were an election. But, with Saar’s change of allegiance, an election that could bring about the change that Schumer wants to see now appears further away.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Ramallah, the Palestinian president called on Muhammad Mustafa, a close associate, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-03-14/ty-article/.premium/pa-president-abbas-to-ask-mohammad-mustafa-to-form-new-palestinian-government/0000018e-3cac-d30d-a7de-7cbf89b70000">to be prime minister</a> after the resignation of Mohammad Shtayyeh in February. </p>
<p>Washington had expressed the hope that Abbas would reach outside his circle and appoint a fresh face, maybe choosing a candidate from the next generation that could project the hope of a revitalised Palestinian Authority (PA). While Mustafa is two decades younger than Abbas, at 69 he hardly qualifies as someone who can relate to a Palestinian population with a median age is <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2023-11-14/population-religion-and-poverty-the-demographics-of-israel-and-gaza#">21.9 years</a>.</p>
<p>Schumer’s frustration with the regional politics reflects a long-held view in Washington. Many US presidents have found Benjamin Netanyahu difficult to deal with, going back to Bill Clinton in the 1990s. Even Donald Trump had problems with Netanyahu, as the then US president’s <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/deal-of-the-century-what-is-it-and-why-now/">“deal of the century”</a> provided for a Palestinian state – small and weak though it would have been.</p>
<h2>Testing US support</h2>
<p>The Biden administration had thought that its solidarity with Israel after the October 7 atrocities would at least give it some influence over Israel’s response. </p>
<p>It has provided significant financial and human resources to Israel over the past five months. It has been resupplying much-needed military equipment while providing a diplomatic safety net through its veto at the UN security council. </p>
<p>This has been backed by the assiduous efforts of US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, to achieve a ceasefire and the return of the Israeli hostages. But Washington has watched in horror as its ally flattened Gaza and exacted a terrible civilian death toll.</p>
<p>Schumer is right when he says that Netanyahu’s alliance with Israel’s far-right is driving the country towards pariah status. The Gaza tragedy is accompanied by a <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-occupied-west-bank-since-october-7-movement-restrictions-and-collective-punishment/">vicious conflict in the occupied West Bank</a>, which has seen a rising number of Palestinian civilian deaths as a result of both IDF action and settler violence. All of this is aimed at undermining any moves towards reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians and a two-state solution.</p>
<p>Abbas succeeded Yasser Arafat as the president of the PA on Arafat’s death in 2004. He won the election in 2005 but has not held elections since. His administration lacks legitimacy and is widely seen as corrupt. </p>
<p>The combination of inefficiency and corruption of the PA and the continuing inhumanities of more than five decades of Israeli occupation alienates many Palestinians from any idea of peaceful coexistence with Israel and increases the attractiveness of extremist views. Schumer is right that there are extremists on both sides who want the destruction of the other,</p>
<p>But the US administration and leaders like Schumer are unable to change the politics of either Israel or Palestine, all they can do is call for new leaders. </p>
<p>Indeed, some might argue that all this noise about replacing leaders of other countries not only smacks of colonialism but could have the opposite effect. Netanyahu and Abbas – who are both beleaguered at home – might find it useful to have a foreign adversary as a foil to shore up domestic support. Both will pose as defenders of the nation. </p>
<p>With conflict resolution, the challenge is to bring together leaders who are often deeply flawed and who advance reprehensible policies. If they weren’t so flawed and unable to see the other side’s point there would not be a conflict. Schumer has shone a light on the extremist politics in both Israel and Palestine. The political developments in both countries this week make the vision of a peaceful future look more difficult. </p>
<p>And that’s why the US and the international community need to rise to the challenge. Less rhetoric and more practical peacebuilding would be a good start.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225915/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Strawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>But there is little sign that either side is listening.John Strawson, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2246902024-03-11T19:32:30Z2024-03-11T19:32:30ZUS attempt to ‘revitalize’ Palestinian Authority risks making the PA less legitimate, more unpopular<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580863/original/file-20240311-24-7bkwnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C23%2C5235%2C3461&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas meet on Nov. 30, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestinians/f6460a47ee174da48d6a3dabc0527453/photo?Query=Palestinian%20authority&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1602&currentItemNo=15">Saul Loeb/Pool via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gaza is still very much in the midst of war, yet discussion is turning to “<a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/01/29/israel-gaza-saudi-egypt-jordan-palestine-meeting">the day after</a>” the conflict – and who will govern the war-ravaged territory.</p>
<p>The Biden administration has said that a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/7/us-says-doesnt-support-israeli-occupation-of-gaza-after-war">full Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip</a> would be unacceptable. Instead, White House officials have discussed “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/05/palestinian-authority-security-forces-gaza/">revitalizing</a>” the Palestinian Authority, or PA, the governing apparatus of parts of the West Bank, to take over in Gaza. </p>
<p>Seemingly as an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinian-authority-government-explainer-aefe041e045f2c60918b42f42185f41e">initial step to enable this</a>, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/palestinians-abbas-israel-hamas-war-resignation-1c13eb3c2ded20cc14397e71b5b1dea5">PA cabinet resigned</a> on Feb. 26, 2024. This begins the process of overhauling the authority and setting up a “<a href="https://www.mei.edu/blog/monday-briefing-biden-administration-highlights-humanitarian-crisis-palestinians-gaza">technocratic government</a>” tasked with basic, short-term governance objectives, presumably in Gaza as well as the West Bank. </p>
<p>But analysts and researchers have questioned what role the PA could have, given that the body has <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-problem-of-legitimacy-for-the-palestinian-authority/">struggled with a legitimacy crisis</a> for well over a decade. And Israel has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-rebuffs-calls-for-palestinian-authority-to-rule-gaza-6e5509fe">refused to countenance any PA involvement</a> in post-conflict Gaza. </p>
<p>Moreover, PA officials are wary of entering Gaza “<a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/palestinian-authority-not-going-to-gaza-on-an-israeli-military-tank-pm-says">on the back of an Israeli tank</a>,” in the words of resigning Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://mei.edu/profile/dana-el-kurd">scholar of Palestinian politics</a>, I believe any possible solution to the war in Gaza involving the PA will face significant challenges over its legitimacy, public support and ability to govern. </p>
<p>But why do Palestinians have such a negative assessment of the PA, and is that justified? To answer that, it is important to understand the shift within the Palestinian national movement since the creation of the PA in 1994 and the international community’s role in those transformations.</p>
<h2>What is the Palestinian Authority?</h2>
<p>The PA was created as a result of the Oslo Accords. The accords, a framework for negotiated peace that took place in the early 1990s, represented the first time in which the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO, and the state of Israel formally accepted <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/97181.htm#:%7E:text=Along%20with%20the%20DOP%2C%20the,representative%20of%20the%20Palestinian%20people.">mutual recognition</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three men two in suits one wearing a traditional Palestinian headscarf stand. Two shake hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Oslo Accords were negotiated by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestiniansControllingGazaExplainer/533873b1296c4dbb8c2d3d583014a7c6/photo?Query=oslo%20accords%20arafat&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=6&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Ron Edmonds</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The accords were intended to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and achieve some sort of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-two-state-solution-israel-palestinian-conflict-2024-01-25/">two-state solution</a>.</p>
<p>In anticipation of a future Palestinian state, the PA was established as a governing body. Elections were held, and the dominant party within the PLO, Fatah, also came to dominate the PA.</p>
<p>The goal was that by 1999, the Palestinians would have a state in the West Bank and Gaza. Negotiations would continue as the PA built out the institutions of the state, under the optimistic assumption that both could be arrived at concurrently. </p>
<p>But this shift from seeking liberation to state-building signaled compromises on the <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/content/resolution-194">right of Palestinian refugees to return</a> to the land they were expelled from during the creation of Israel.</p>
<p>Despite this, <a href="https://pij.org/articles/677/palestinian-public-opinion-polls-on-the-peace-process">many Palestinians were</a> supportive of having some pathway forward in which they might achieve self-determination and sovereignty. </p>
<p>The state-building project reoriented a great deal of energy and resources to the institutions of the Palestinian Authority and attempts by Palestinian leadership to achieve a viable Palestinian state.</p>
<h2>The second intifada’s aftermath</h2>
<p>When a state was not achieved by 1999, the second intifada, or uprising, <a href="https://www.palquest.org/en/node/31123">broke out</a>.</p>
<p>The Palestinian Authority struggled to maintain order and stability during the period, crucially because the Israeli military raided urban centers and attacked PA infrastructure. Analysts refer to the intifada as a moment of “<a href="https://www.ichr.ps/cached_uploads/download/ichr-files/files/000000436.pdf">infilaat amni</a>,” or a collapse of order. It saw <a href="https://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20100927">massive disruption</a> to Palestinians and Israelis and many lives lost.</p>
<p>For the remnants of the PA and its American benefactors, the lesson learned from the second intifada was that such a collapse could never be allowed to happen again.</p>
<p>In the aftermath, the focus of the U.S. and the international community turned to restructuring the PA, expanding and “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/11/palestinian-authority-secuirty-forces-west-bank-faq/">professionalizing</a>” its security forces and ensuring that the PA would be a stalwart partner to Israel in maintaining security in the occupied territories.</p>
<p>But to an increasing number of Palestinians, this focus on security coordination and restructuring did not serve the needs of a people living under occupation. In fact, in the name of security, Palestinians saw themselves more and more repressed not just by the occupation forces but by <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2013/09/palestinian-authority-must-end-use-excessive-force-policing-protests-2013-0/">their own government</a>. </p>
<p>By the mid-2000s, after the intifada tapered off, it was clear the <a href="https://theconversation.com/30-years-after-arafat-rabin-handshake-clear-flaws-in-oslo-accords-doomed-peace-talks-to-failure-211362">peace process was going nowhere</a>; the Israeli government had become increasingly right wing, and Palestinian leadership seemed both less willing and less capable to represent its people’s interests.</p>
<p>In what amounted to a <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-palestinian-elections-sweeping-victory-uncertain-mandate/">referendum on the status quo</a>, <a href="https://www.palquest.org/en/node/31125">Hamas beat Fatah and won</a> in the 2006 parliamentary elections for the territories. But the results immediately led to instability and conflict between the two main Palestinian political factions: Fatah, which until then dominated the PA, and Hamas.</p>
<p>The international community also did not support the election results and empowered <a href="https://www.npr.org/2007/01/19/6923812/abbas-gets-money-support-and-distrust">Fatah to remain in power</a>.</p>
<p>This led to a split in governance between the West Bank and Gaza, with the PA losing control of Gaza entirely in the aftermath of infighting between the two parties. </p>
<p><iframe id="4sJq8" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/4sJq8/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In response, the international community – led by the U.S. – worked to bolster the PA once again.</p>
<p>The PA has not held elections since, with the president of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, remaining in office well past his term limit.</p>
<p>Over the years, the PA has continued to play a security coordination role in the West Bank but is perceived <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2089%20English%20Full%20Text%20September%202023.pdf">as a burden</a> by Palestinians and as having achieved little in improving their living conditions. </p>
<p>Rather, repression and fragmentation have only worsened within Palestinian society, even as the challenges imposed by the occupation have only amplified with a now 17-year-long <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-strip-the-humanitarian-impact-of-15-years-of-the-blockade-june-2022-ocha-factsheet/">blockade on Gaza</a> and continued <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/09/israeli-settlements-expand-by-record-amount-un-rights-chief-says.html">settlement building in the West Bank</a>. </p>
<p>Many Palestinian today see the PA as little more than a “<a href="https://www.972mag.com/palestinian-authority-nablus-occupation-subcontractor/">subcontractor of occupation</a> in the West Bank.</p>
<h2>Public opinion today</h2>
<p>It is, then, perhaps unsurprising that the Palestinian Authority has faced an ongoing legitimacy crisis. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2089%20English%20Full%20Text%20September%202023.pdf">September 2023 poll</a> by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 76% of Palestinians polled within both territories expressed dissatisfaction with the PA’s governance. </p>
<p>This lack of support for the PA does not necessarily signal support for Hamas either; in questions about possible parliamentary elections, Hamas garnered only 34% of the potential vote – second to Fatah.</p>
<p>These low approval trends are echoed in other polling. The <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/what-palestinians-really-think-hamas">Arab Barometer</a>, for example, conducted polling merely days before Oct. 7 and found only 27% of respondents in Gaza selected Hamas as their preferred party. Comparatively, only 30% favored Fatah. Although subsequent <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2090%20English%20press%20release%2013%20Dec%202023%20Final%20New.pdf">polling in December</a> shows a bump for Hamas, this is much more pronounced in the West Bank than in Gaza. And the majority of Palestinians still are unsupportive.</p>
<p>It is clear that most Palestinians are fed up with <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/94d888ce-9efc-4e65-b93c-bea952e83824">their political options</a>. Furthermore, the PA has long abandoned attempting to reflect Palestinian public opinion – in no small part because of the international community and the role it wants the PA to play.</p>
<p>Revitalizing the PA, as the U.S. appears intent on doing, looks to be a Herculean task, given how low the body is held in the eyes of many Palestinians. Moreover, any outside attempt to empower unaccountable leadership – and ignore Palestinian public demands and input – risks repeating history. After all, this was precisely how the PA lost its legitimacy to begin with.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dana El Kurd is affiliated with the Middle East Institute and the Arab Center Washington.</span></em></p>Israel has made it clear that Hamas should have no role in Gaza after the war. But seeking an alternative in the Palestinian Authority is fraught with problems.Dana El Kurd, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of RichmondLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247642024-02-29T12:55:31Z2024-02-29T12:55:31ZWhat is Netanyahu’s plan for a post-conflict Gaza and does it rule out a workable ceasefire? Expert Q&A<p><em>In recent days Joe Biden has been promising that a deal for a ceasefire is very close to agreement. But at the same time the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has revealed his vision for Gaza once the fighting stops, which appears to rule out Palestinian sovereignty on the strip. We spoke with John Strawson, a Middle East expert at the University of East London, who has been researching and publishing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for several decades.</em></p>
<p><strong>After weeks of wrangling, Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has published his vision for a post-conflict Gaza. How compatible is it with the idea of a two-state solution? To what extent is his tough line influenced by the more hawkish members of his government who take a hardline attitude to Palestinian sovereignty?</strong></p>
<p>Netanyahu’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/27/post-war-gaza-plan-netanyahu-israel-day-after-future-abbas/">plan for a post-war Gaza</a> is simply not practical and does not rise to the political challenges of the times. It is based on two principles: Israeli security control over Gaza and a civil administration run by non-Hamas officials. </p>
<p>But there has been Israeli security control over Gaza in one form since 1967 and it has not brought security for either Israel or Palestinians. There is no reason to think that the Israel Defense Forces can do better now, especially after this catastrophic war. At the same time, it is difficult to see where the non-Hamas Palestinian officials will come from. Hamas has had a tight grip of Gaza since 2007 and anyone with any experience of administration is likely to be a member of Hamas, a sympathiser or someone used to working with Hamas. </p>
<p>While there is opposition to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, there is little organised political opposition that could replace them. Like the US and Britain in Iraq after the 2003 invasion, when they <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/29/usa.iraq">banned officials from the Ba'athist party</a> from the administration, chaos will follow. The only realistic option is to extend the power of the Palestinian Authority – presently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/what-is-the-palestinian-authority-and-how-is-it-viewed-by-palestinians">based in Ramallah</a> – into Gaza. But Netanyahu and his <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-elections-benjamin-netanhayu-set-to-return-with-some-extreme-new-partners-193814">far-right allies</a> think it will advance pressure for a two-state solution – something they are opposed to. </p>
<p><strong>To what extent is this a starting point for Netanyahu? Has he left himself the political space to manoeuvre given pressure from the US and other international allies?</strong></p>
<p>The plan was provided mainly due to international pressure – especially by the Americans. It should be noted that the US secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, has been raising the issue of post-conflict Gaza with the Israelis since November and it still took months to produce this flimsy document. </p>
<p>This gives us an insight into how difficult it is in practice for the US administration to use its apparent power over the Israeli government. Netanyahu has much experience of dealing with American politicians and plays the system very well. He knows that Biden needs a calmer Middle East as a background to his re-election bid in November. As a result, the bargaining relationship is quite complex. </p>
<p>Netanyahu clearly thinks he has time on his side. The nearer it gets to the US election the more difficult it gets for Biden to please the progressive Democrats who want a ceasefire and the more traditional Democrats who have Israel’s back. What Netanyahu is doing is the minimum in the hope of hanging on hoping for a Trump win. </p>
<p><strong>Does Netanyahu’s vision reflect the feelings of the Jewish community in Israel? What about Arab voters? The prime minister appears deeply unpopular among most voter groups – is his intransigence more about maintaining his hold on power than on seeking a workable long term solution?</strong></p>
<p>While Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/">deeply unpopular</a> with all sections of the Israeli public, we have to be careful in reading the public mood on policies for a post-war dispensation. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/opinion/israel-hostage-negotiations-entebbe.html">Polling suggests</a> that support for a two-state solution is declining. Israelis have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-blaming-israel-for-october-7-hamas-attack-makes-peace-less-not-more-likely-223934">so traumatised by October 7</a> that there is little support for Palestinian empowerment. </p>
<p>To some extent this is the result of the way that the Israelis view their country’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005. It is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/a-decade-later-israelis-see-gaza-pullout-as-big-mistake/2015/08/14/21c06518-3480-11e5-b835-61ddaa99c73e_story.html">often presented</a> as an example of what happens when Israel ceases to occupy Palestinian land. In this account Israel leaves Gaza and Gaza becomes an armed encampment with the aim of destroying Israel – and indeed this <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67039975">remains Hamas’s policy</a>, despite the group releasing an <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/doctrine-hamas">amended charter in 2017</a>. </p>
<p>But the 2005 disengagement which included dismantling all Israeli settlements in the strip was not the result of negotiations, but a unilateral act. The then prime minister, Ariel Sharon, did not want to hand over power to the elected Palestinian Authority, thinking it would boost the PA’s for statehood. Instead, Israel just left – and that allowed Hamas, the major political force in Gaza, to claim that Israel has <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/45870/chapter-abstract/400820054?redirectedFrom=fulltext">“retreated under fire”</a>. Hamas then capitalised on the situation and went on to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/26/israel1">win the Palestinian legislative</a> elections in 2006. </p>
<p>The lesson of this is that Israel needs proper negotiations that can lead to a sustainable future – and that can only mean a Palestinian state alongside Israel. That is not merely right for the Palestinians but essential in any plan to defeat Hamas. It’s not only a military operation but a political one and Palestinians need to be offered a peaceful and just alternative.</p>
<p><strong>The US president, Joe Biden, has been talking up the idea of a ceasefire deal in recent days. But Netanyahu’s plan seems to make the deal brokered in Qatar an impossibility. Is Netanyahu serious about bringing an end to the conflict? Or is talk about a possible deal more about Israel’s need to be seen to be playing the game as well as optimism from a US president who needs to be able to show to his own voter base that he is getting results?</strong></p>
<p>Former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert argues that Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2024-02-22/ty-article-opinion/.premium/netanyahus-messianic-coalition-partners-want-an-all-out-regional-war/0000018d-d237-d06c-abbd-daf733870000">dragging Israel into a long term war</a> to save himself. Olmert draws some drastic conclusions from his analysis suggesting that Netanyahu and his far-right allies want a permanent war that would also see Palestinians driven out of the West Bank. That might seem too apocalyptic – but it does convey a sense of the mismatch between US aims and the Israeli political dynamic.</p>
<p>Talks are going on simultaneously in Qatar, in Paris and in Cairo. It is evident that the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/27/what-we-know-so-far-about-the-draft-israel-hamas-ceasefire-deal#:%7E:text=It%20envisions%20a%2040%2Dday,and%20fuel%20to%20start%20rebuilding.">formula for a 40-day ceasefire</a> has been agreed but there is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-palestinian-prisoners-will-be-a-key-condition-of-any-ceasefire-deal-heres-why-224700">wrangling over the details</a>. Much of this focuses on the grizzly trading over how many Palestinian prisoners will be exchanged for which Israeli hostages – both those still alive and those dead. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-palestinian-prisoners-will-be-a-key-condition-of-any-ceasefire-deal-heres-why-224700">Gaza war: Palestinian prisoners will be a key condition of any ceasefire deal – here's why</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>What is quite clear is that both Israel and Hamas have been dragging their feet as each thinks it is gaining the advantage by continuing the fighting. But with the arrival of the month of Ramadan (beginning March 10 – the date that Israel <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68334510">plans to begin</a> its ground assault on the city of Rafah) there is some likelihood of a Ramadan truce. </p>
<p>Netanyahu is under <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/19/pressure-building-netanyahu-hostages-hamas-israel">massive popular pressure</a> in Israel to move on the hostages even if that means painful concessions. Hamas is also under pressure by the masses of displaced Gazans who just want a semblance of a bearable existence for their families. So while Washington is exerting maximum pressure on Israel and its Arab allies, it is likely to be factors in Israel and Gaza that will lead to at least a temporary ceasefire. The challenge will then be to use the time to produce something permanent. </p>
<p><strong>Is it even feasible for the Israeli government to continue with its policy of refusing to deal with Hamas?</strong></p>
<p>In effect Israel has been dealing with Hamas indirectly all along. If the Israeli war aims were being successful it would not have to be negotiating with them over the hostage release issue. But I think that it’s now no longer possible for Israel to talk to Hamas politically. In 2009 I thought <a href="https://www.dissentmagazine.org/author/michael-walzer-john-strawson-ghada-karmi-donna-rob/">it was still possible</a> At the time it seemed possible that Hamas and Israel could agree a <em>Hudna</em>, an Islamic legal term for a long-term truce. But October 7 and subsequent Hamas statements and actions show that its real policy is the annihilation of Israel. So there is nothing to speak about. The real question is Israel speaking to the Palestinian Authority and having a viable plan for Gaza after the war rather than a renewed occupation. </p>
<p>The key to the next stage is to create a security mechanism that can replace the IDF and ensure the security of both Israel <em>and</em> the Palestinians. The international community – in particular the UN – has to stop being rhetorical and start being practical about peacemaking. What is needed is a security force that will give both Israelis and Palestinians confidence that the situation will change. Both sides must be able to feel secure – no more atrocities like October 7 and the Israeli response which has now killed 30,000 Palestinians, most of them civilians – and a high proportion of which have been women and children. </p>
<p>What is required is a multinational force that combines Arab League and Nato forces under perhaps Saudi command. Unless there is movement on this issue, there is little chance of a framework where any meaningful talks can take place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224764/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Strawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>John Strawson, a UK-based researcher of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, answers questions about the Israeli prime minister’s plan for Gaza.John Strawson, Emeritus professor of Law, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219652024-01-29T13:36:36Z2024-01-29T13:36:36ZIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a dilemma: Free the hostages or continue the war in Gaza?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571656/original/file-20240126-25-l606eo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">On Dec. 8, 2023, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends the funeral of a 25-year-old Israeli soldier who was killed in Gaza. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/prime-minister-benjamin-netanyhu-attends-the-funeral-for-news-photo/1842633511?adppopup=true"> Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>As Israel’s war with Hamas drags into its fourth month, some Israelis are becoming increasingly angry at Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government’s inability to free the remaining <a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/01/22/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire-hostages">136 hostages in the Gaza Strip</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Israeli protesters have called for <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/24/1226713168/in-israel-anger-at-netanyahu-is-getting-louder">Netanyahu’s resignation</a>, while dozens of <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/22/families-hostages-gaza-israel-parliament-00137069">family members of the hostages stormed</a> the Israeli parliament on Jan. 22, 2024, demanding a deal for the hostages’ release.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. spoke with <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=pgpEt8MAAAAJ&hl=en">Dov Waxman</a>, a scholar of Israeli politics and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to better understand the public pulse in Israel, and why some experts – including him – are saying that Netanyahu does not want to end the war.</em></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people, including several women, hold signs and shout in a nighttime shot, in front of tall, lit up buildings. One of the signs says 'Deal now.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Families of Israeli hostages protest in Tel Aviv, calling for the Israeli government to make a deal with Hamas and get the hostages released.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/families-of-israeli-hostages-carrying-photos-and-banners-news-photo/1950955826?adppopup=true">Mostafa Alkharouf/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How is Israeli public opinion on the war shifting?</h2>
<p>For the first three months or so of the war, Israelis, specifically Jewish Israelis, strongly supported the war and the government’s declared goal of defeating and dismantling Hamas. That consensus and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/over-half-of-israelis-say-theyre-let-down-by-war-cabinets-handling-of-hamas-conflict/">unity are rapidly fraying</a>.</p>
<p>Netanyahu says continuing the war is the best way to release the hostages, but more and more Israelis, including the families of the hostages, are arguing that with every passing day that the war continues, the lives of the hostages are in greater danger. </p>
<p>There’s also growing doubts about whether Israel <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-777771">can actually decisively defeat and destroy Hamas</a>. More than three months into the war, Hamas is still standing and firing rockets into Israel. While Israel has assassinated mid-level Hamas commanders, Hamas leaders are still alive and able to call the shots. </p>
<h2>You have said that Netanyahu does not want to end the war. Why would that be?</h2>
<p>Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/">widely unpopular</a> in Israel. Many Israelis, including some of Netanyahu’s supporters on the right, hold him accountable for the cascade of failures that resulted in Hamas’ massive incursion and horrific attack on Oct. 7, 2023. </p>
<p>To restore his domestic support, Netanyahu’s only hope is to continue the war and try to achieve the “total victory” over Hamas that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/netanyahu-insists-on-fight-until-total-victory-as-israel-marks-100-days-of-war">he has been promising</a>. If he fails to deliver on this, and on the release of the hostages, his Likud party is likely to lose the next election and he’ll be out of office. </p>
<h2>How does this political pressure influence Netanyahu’s response to the war?</h2>
<p>In order for Netanyahu to hold his coalition government together and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/why-is-israel-always-holding-elections-e671cfe22f9b045d2be3e65c5a60be61">avoid an election,</a> he has to <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-06/ty-article/.premium/limits-to-surrender-if-pm-placates-haredim-hell-enrage-broad-public/0000018b-0127-d037-a9af-51ff9dc00000">appease the far-right</a> and ultra-Orthodox parties in his government. For the ultra-Orthodox parties, that means ensuring that their constituents receive the generous government subsidies and welfare benefits that they depend on, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2023/11/01/israel-hamas-haredi-idf/#">not requiring them</a> to serve in the Israel military – unlike other Israeli Jews – and maintaining the religious status quo in Israel. For the far-right parties, it means supporting <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-01-24/ty-article/.premium/israeli-army-weighs-plan-to-arm-west-bank-settlements-with-anti-tank-missiles/0000018d-3b7e-d32b-adcf-ff7e83330000">Israeli settlers in the West Bank</a> and expanding settlements there, and also preventing anything that will strengthen the Palestinian Authority, which the far-right wants to get rid of.</p>
<p>To keep his far-right allies in the government, Netanyahu has to block any post-war plan that gives the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-news-01-20-2024-ba66b165f3e5d1904d30b591199cface#">Palestinian Authority control over Gaza</a>. Merely discussing the question of post-war Gaza is treacherous for Netanyahu because the far-right is calling for Israel to <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-01-24/ty-article/netanyahus-likud-ministers-far-right-mks-to-attend-gaza-resettlment-confab/0000018d-3b1e-d35c-a39f-bb5e38070000">reestablish Jewish settlements</a> there. The Biden administration opposes any long-term Israeli presence in Gaza and wants a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/revamped-palestinian-authority-should-govern-gaza-west-bank-says-senior-us-2023-12-14/">“revamped and revitalized”</a> Palestinian Authority to eventually return to oversee the territory. </p>
<p>Netanyahu’s way to evade these conflicting pressures is to avoid any discussion of the post-war governance of Gaza as much as possible. </p>
<p>Netanyahu has only said that Israel must have <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/damascus-airstrike-said-to-kill-iranian-revolutionary-guards/7448161.html#">security control over Gaza</a>, but what that actually entails is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/evasive-on-postwar-gaza-netanyahu-risks-saddling-israel-with-full-responsibility/">totally unclear</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier wearing a red beret carries a coffin covered in a blue and white cloth. People stand behind him crying." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mourners in Tel Aviv cry on Jan. 23, 2024, during the funeral ceremony for an Israeli soldier killed in Gaza.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mourners-cry-during-the-funeral-ceremony-of-major-ilay-levi-news-photo/1948671112?adppopup=true">Eyal Warshavsky/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What are most Israelis increasingly focused on, regarding the war?</h2>
<p>Most Israeli Jews are focused on the fate of the hostages and on Israeli military casualties – these are the stories that dominate Israeli media coverage. The families of the hostages have made sure that their plight is not forgotten. And since some of the hostages who were released back in November are recounting their harrowing experiences in captivity, this is also keeping public attention focused on the hostages still in Gaza. </p>
<p>The deaths of Israeli soldiers in Gaza also receive a lot of attention – on Jan. 23, the Israeli military had its deadliest day since the war began when <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/23/1226305928/israel-military-deadliest-gaza-hamas-war">24 soldiers were killed</a>. Most Israeli Jews have served in the military, and most have family members or friends currently serving. So they are very connected to the military, and military deaths resonate very powerfully in Israeli society.</p>
<p>What most Israelis are not focusing on is the suffering of <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/unicef-state-palestine-humanitarian-situation-report-no-15-escalation-11-17-january-2024%20in%20Gaza">Palestinian civilians in Gaza</a>. Many are not even aware of what is happening to Palestinians in Gaza, because it receives little coverage in the Israeli media. </p>
<h2>Families of the hostages are speaking out against the Israeli government and its inability to free the hostages. What kind of pressure is this creating?</h2>
<p>It has a big effect. There is great empathy for what these families are going through. There is also a strong ethos that the state has a moral obligation to rescue its citizens, including its soldiers. </p>
<p>Many people feel that the state fundamentally failed its citizens on Oct. 7 because it failed to prevent or stop the massacre and abductions that took place. So it is now especially incumbent on the government to bring the hostages home. Even if Israel defeats Hamas but doesn’t free the hostages, it will leave an open wound in Israeli society and damage, if not rupture, the relationship between the Israeli state and its citizens. </p>
<h2>Why is it unlikely that the military can free the hostages?</h2>
<p>The hostages are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/21/world/middleeast/gaza-hamas-israel-tunnels-hostages.html">kept underground in tunnels</a> that are hundreds of miles long. It’s likely they are frequently moved around, so it is next to impossible to even locate them. And even if they are located, actually reaching them before they are killed by their captors would be very, very difficult. </p>
<p>The only feasible option to free the hostages is to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-netanyahu-rejects-hamas-conditions-hostage-deal-which-include-outright-2024-01-21/">strike another deal</a> with Hamas. But it will be very hard for Netanyahu to accept the terms that Hamas is demanding, particularly ending the war. Netanyahu and his defense minister argue that the more military pressure Hamas is under, the more likely it is to accept a deal on terms that are acceptable to Israel. But the other members of the war cabinet, and growing numbers of Israelis, now believe Israel should make a deal to release the hostages whatever the price, even if that means ending the war without defeating Hamas.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dov Waxman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of Israeli politics explains why Israelis are increasingly turning against Netanyahu and his promise that Israel can quickly defeat Hamas and bring Israeli hostages home.Dov Waxman, Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Foundation Professor of Israel Studies, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2158522023-10-23T18:35:09Z2023-10-23T18:35:09ZThe Israel-Hamas war deepens the struggle between US and Iran for influence in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554866/original/file-20231019-22-45pt1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iranians stage a rally outside the former U.S. embassy in Tehran in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pro-regime-iranians-stage-a-rally-outside-the-former-us-news-photo/1244484898?adppopup=true">Contributor#072019/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Israel readies for a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-b084e9c453cc99f7bec6f66d7b5913d9">ground invasion of Gaza</a>, and Palestinian and Israeli civilian deaths continue to mount, a broader struggle for influence continues in the Middle East between the United States and Iran. </p>
<p>The U.S. has long played an important leadership role in the Middle East. American influence has hinged on <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-power-and-influence-middle-east-part-one">maintaining close ties</a> to diverse allies, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>And since the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/">1979 Iranian Revolution</a>, Iran’s leaders have sought to boost their regional influence and secure their domestic position in power by <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf">undermining America’s relationships</a> in the Middle East. </p>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/battle_lines/">built its own regional network</a>, composed largely of Shia Muslim entities, including Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.</p>
<p>Iran also has long <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">supported Hamas</a>, a Sunni Islamist movement and U.S.-designated terrorist group that controls Gaza. <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/iran-israel-and-war-in-the-middle-east/">Like Iran</a>, Hamas is committed to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">destruction of Israel</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/john-ciorciari">scholar of international politics</a>, I am interested in how this rivalry between the U.S. and Iran has evolved and how this war may affect it. </p>
<p>The long-standing Israel-Palestinian dispute is central to Iran’s regional strategy, which aims to drive a wedge between Israel and its neighbors and complicate U.S. relations throughout the Arab world. So far, the Israel-Hamas war appears to be having precisely those effects.</p>
<h2>Iran’s role in the Gaza war</h2>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/iran-israel-hamas-attacks.html">denied direct involvement</a> in Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, atrocities in Israel, in which Hamas fighters <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">killed about 1,400 people</a> and kidnapped more than 200. </p>
<p>U.S. officials and others have said that it <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-denies-it-had-role-in-hamas-attack-on-israel-claims-accusation-is-political/">is too soon to determine</a> Iran’s exact role in the violence. </p>
<p>Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/10/18/israel-hamas-war-how-iran-could-spread-gaza-conflict-through-middle-east/76d4e006-6dcf-11ee-b01a-f593caa04363_story.html">applauded the attacks</a>. </p>
<p>He has called Israel’s ensuing assault on Gaza “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-israeli-officials-should-face-trial-their-crimes-2023-10-17/">a genocide</a>,” as <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">Palestinian casualties</a> generate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/gaza-hospital-al-ahli-al-arabi-blast-explosion-protests-demonstrations-middle-east">large protests</a> against the Israeli offensive throughout the Middle East.</p>
<p>Israeli strikes on Gaza since Oct. 7 have <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">killed more than 3,780 people</a>, according to the United Nations. </p>
<p>Iran has also threatened “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/17/iran-warns-of-preemptive-action-against-israel-amid-gaza-war">preemptive</a>” action against Israel if it continues its offensive. </p>
<p>Israel and Hezbollah are now <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/19/world/middleeast/hezbollah-lebanon-israel-explained.html">exchanging daily artillery and rocket fire</a>. Israel has drawn a buffer zone near its border with Lebanon and has begun <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiEn_Ga_4SCAxVwlokEHVVMCQ4QvOMEKAB6BAgREAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reuters.com%2Fworld%2Fisrael-evacuate-residents-town-near-lebanon-border-after-flare-up-2023-10-20%2F&usg=AOvVaw1k3eGVpjw_jNIskM4HpFmI&opi=89978449">evacuating its citizens</a> there. </p>
<p>Israel also has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67093081">bombed key airports</a> in Syria, its longtime adversary, which also has strong ties to Hezbollah. </p>
<p>These actions bring Israel, one of America’s closest allies, perilously closer to a wider war with a coalition backed by Iran. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men stand on a city street with a police car nearby and burn a drawn Israeli flag. Behind them is a large billboard of a man with a white beard and black hat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian demonstrators burn an Israeli flag in Tehran on Oct. 17, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/tehran-iran-in-the-aftermath-of-the-bombing-of-gazas-al-news-photo/1734088645?adppopup=true">Hossein Beris/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Iran’s push for regional clout</h2>
<p>Over the past several decades, Iran has looked to grow its regional influence while exploiting the differences between the U.S. and Israel.</p>
<p>In Lebanon, Iran <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/">helped build Hezbollah</a> in the early 1980s, backing deadly <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/1696242955-iranian-official-admitting-tie-to-beirut-1983-attack-breaks-decades-of-denial">1983 attacks</a> on the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. </p>
<p>In Iraq, Tehran has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-iraq">built influence</a> by affiliating itself with friendly Shiite groups following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein, who was one of Iran’s top rivals. </p>
<p>In Syria, Iran and Hezbollah have helped the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/factbox-iranian-influence-and-presence-in-syria/">Assad regime gain an upper hand</a> in the country’s ongoing civil war by giving the government weapons, intelligence and troops.</p>
<p>And in Yemen, Iran has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">backed Shiite rebel groups</a> that are fighting the government, which is in turn supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<h2>Iran’s support for Palestinian militants</h2>
<p>In the Palestinian territories, meanwhile, Iran has supported militant groups since the 1980s. By the early 1990s, Iranian forces and Hezbollah were <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-iran-fuels-hamas-terrorism">training Hamas fighters</a> in Lebanon. </p>
<p>Iran boosted aid to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjI4vOj_4SCAxWSl4kEHZ58DCkQFnoECCUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Firanprimer.usip.org%2Fresource%2Firan-and-palestinians&usg=AOvVaw2tFw0DL41km7oV3K1act-j&opi=89978449">Hamas during the Second Intifada</a>, a violent Palestinian uprising from 2000 to 2005, and again after a 2006 election victory brought Hamas to power in Gaza. Iran <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/GazaCrisis_ENG-151-157.pdf">also gave weapons and money</a> to Hamas during its 2008-09 and 2014 armed conflicts with Israel. </p>
<p>Recurrent fighting in Gaza has helped keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict salient in Middle Eastern politics. This fighting and tension has advanced Iran’s aims of undermining U.S. and Israeli ties with Iran’s Arab rivals, such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The United States therefore scored a major diplomatic victory by brokering the 2020 <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a>, in which Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates agreed to have diplomatic relations with Israel. </p>
<p>Not to be outdone, Iran announced it made a deal to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal">restore diplomatic relations</a> with Saudi Arabia in March 2023, seven years after they broke ties. </p>
<p>After this announcement, U.S. officials tried to make a deal to formalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia – an agreement that the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say-2023-10-13/">Gaza war has put on ice</a>. Some analysts have <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-is-the-only-one-likely-to-benefit-from-hamas-attack-on-israel/">speculated that Iran</a> may have encouraged Hamas to attack Israel precisely for this reason. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Joe Biden sits next to Benjamin Netanyahu, behind a row of Israel and US flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Joe Biden meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv on Oct. 18, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-listens-to-israels-prime-minister-news-photo/1730656163?adppopup=true">Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The diplomatic challenge ahead</h2>
<p>The Israel-Hamas war poses serious diplomatic challenges for the U.S. </p>
<p>Israel’s bombing, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/19/israel-security-officials-signal-readiness-for-ground-offensive-into-gaza">threatened ground invasion</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/18/israel-says-it-wont-block-humanitarian-aid-entering-gaza-from-egypt">restrictions of aid to Gaza</a> have energized its enemies and created additional tensions with its partners. </p>
<p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called the Israeli assault a “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/turkeys-erdogan-calls-israeli-siege-and-bombing-of-gaza-a-massacre">massacre</a>.” Qatar has <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231007-qatar-holds-israel-responsible-for-escalation-in-gaza/">blamed Israel</a> for the violence, while Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has said Israel’s campaign amounts to “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypts-sissi-says-israeli-gaza-campaign-has-gone-beyond-right-to-self-defense/">collective punishment</a>” of the people of Gaza. </p>
<h2>Preventing a wider war</h2>
<p>Fraying diplomatic ties among some partners became even more apparent after Hamas accused Israel of the Oct. 17 explosion outside a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/world/middleeast/gaza-hospital-israel-hamas-explained.html">Gaza hospital</a>. Although Israel and the U.S. have maintained that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-hospital-blast-what-we-know-about-explosion-2023-10-18/">Palestinians caused the explosion,</a>, possibly in error, anti-Israel demonstrations quickly swept across the Middle East. </p>
<p>Shortly before President Joe Biden arrived in Israel for a regional visit on Oct. 18, Jordan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-cancels-summit-with-biden-egyptian-leader-amman-2023-10-17/">canceled his planned summit</a> with el-Sisi, Jordanian King Abdullah II, and Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas. </p>
<p>The Biden administration has tried to balance strong support for Israel with a message of restraint.</p>
<p>During his visit to Israel, Biden defended Israel’s right to respond to protect its borders and people and tried to deter Iran and others from expanding the war. At the same time, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/joe-biden-urges-israel-not-be-consumed-by-rage-pledges-support-netanyahu-gaza-hamas">pressed Israel</a> to follow the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwir-5vN_4SCAxUUvokEHTspDo0QFnoECCAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheconversation.com%2Fhow-the-laws-of-war-apply-to-the-conflict-between-israel-and-hamas-215493&usg=AOvVaw2gJZ_OA0_IsqEijkwTksSG&opi=89978449">laws of war</a>, and he secured an Israeli agreement to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/20/1207370235/israel-rafah-border-crossing-gaza-humanitarian-aid">allow some aid</a> into Gaza through Egypt. The Egypt-Gaza border crossing opened to allowed some <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-captives-border-aid-f5976ed58ba508f14d45b72b428125ac">bottled war and medical supplies in to Gaza</a> on Oct. 21. </p>
<p>Despite tension and anger across the region, the Biden administration’s effort to deter Iran and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67128900">prevent a wider war</a> aligns with the priorities of most Arab governments, which <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/06/the-arabs-forlorn-envy-of-iranians.html">fear Tehran</a> and its allies are deeply wary about domestic and regional stability. </p>
<p>Perceptions that Tehran is causing escalation and regional instability could push other nations back toward Washington. Pressing for Israeli restraint may be the key both to mitigating the humanitarian crisis and to preventing Iran from emerging a winner from the war in Gaza.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Ciorciari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran’s long-term strategy includes eradicating Israel and driving a wedge between Israel and its regional neighbors. So far, the war seems to be accomplishing that goal.John Ciorciari, Professor of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2161612023-10-23T04:49:09Z2023-10-23T04:49:09ZEven if Israel can completely eliminate Hamas, does it have a long-term plan for Gaza?<p>Not counting periodic cross-border skirmishes, Israel has fought three major wars against Hamas since withdrawing its forces from Gaza in 2005 – in 2008, 2014 and 2021. Each involved limited ground incursions, with Israeli soldiers in Gaza for about a fortnight.</p>
<p>In the past couple weeks, Israel has put together a huge force to mount <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/gaza-israel-ground-offensive/">another ground invasion</a> in retaliation for the Hamas cross-border attacks that killed around 1,400 Israelis on October 7. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/10/19/as-israels-invasion-of-gaza-nears-the-obstacles-get-more-daunting">called up</a> their entire armoured corps – more than 1,000 tanks. Around 360,000 reservists will also join the force’s full-time personnel of about 170,000. </p>
<p>The operation is shaping up to be Israel’s biggest since its <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538330">invasion of Lebanon in 1982</a>, which was aimed at driving the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from its base there. The Israelis succeeded in that objective. But an unforeseen consequence of that war was the development of the Shia militant organisation <a href="https://theconversation.com/hezbollah-alone-will-decide-whether-lebanon-already-on-the-brink-of-collapse-gets-dragged-into-israel-hamas-war-212078">Hezbollah</a>. With Iran’s support and tutelage, Hezbollah has become a far stronger enemy for Israel than the PLO had ever been.</p>
<p>It’s a truism that wars have unintended consequences. And in the current conflict with Hamas, it’s not clear what the end game might be for Israel.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hezbollah-alone-will-decide-whether-lebanon-already-on-the-brink-of-collapse-gets-dragged-into-israel-hamas-war-212078">Hezbollah alone will decide whether Lebanon − already on the brink of collapse − gets dragged into Israel-Hamas war</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Why a ground invasion is so risky</h2>
<p>The difficulties of a Gaza ground assault are clear enough. Fighting street to street in a confined, highly urbanised environment will be hideously difficult for Israel’s forces. Hamas also has the advantage of an extensive tunnel network estimated at up to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/15/middleeast/hamas-tunnels-gaza-intl/index.html">500 kilometres</a> in length, enabling its militants to attack and then disappear.</p>
<p>Israel can counter these challenges to some extent with the use of robots and drones. But night vision technology will be <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/10/17/hamas-tunnels-under-gaza-will-be-a-key-battlefield-for-israel">ineffective</a> in the total darkness of tunnels, as these devices require faint ambient light to work. </p>
<p>Israel has also warned the roughly 1.1 million civilians in the northern half of Gaza to move to the southern half. Altogether, the United Nations says some 1.4 million people in Gaza have been <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-16#:%7E:text=About%201.4%20million%20internally%20displaced,2.5%20times%20their%20designated%20capacity.">displaced</a> so far in the conflict, with nearly 580,000 sheltering in UN shelters. </p>
<p>It’s unclear how many people are still in the north. Israel has warned that those who remain could be classed as sympathisers with “a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-tells-gazans-move-south-or-risk-being-seen-terrorist-partner-2023-10-22/">terrorist organisation</a>”. </p>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-956" class="tc-infographic" height="400px" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/956/fd0c2038c556d9563e44b32f6a6905a07c78e824/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Inevitably, there will be appalling civilian casualties. Not all will necessarily be the IDF’s fault, but the default position of the region and those in the global community opposed to Israel’s action will be to blame Israel.</p>
<p>Another challenge is the estimated 200 hostages taken by Hamas during its raid into Israel. Hamas says it has spread them around Gaza. Almost certainly, some will be in the northern war zone. Hamas claims 22 have already been <a href="https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-hamas-war-gaza-conflict/card/hamas-says-israeli-air-strikes-killed-9-hostages-4oCzhJHit8WsF9vBrfmL">killed</a> by Israeli bombs. Some relatives of the hostages are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/17/hes-unfit-israel-fiercely-divided-over-netanyahus-hostage-response">criticising</a> the Netanyahu government for not giving sufficient priority to freeing their loved ones.</p>
<h2>When the fighting stops: no good options</h2>
<p>What Israel intends to do if and when it has secured the northern half of Gaza is not clear. The coastal strip is already facing a “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142652">catastrophic</a>” humanitarian situation, according to the UN. And in terms of administering the territory, there are few good options.</p>
<p><strong>1) A military reoccupation of Gaza, as Israel did from 1967 to 2005.</strong> </p>
<p>This would constitute a huge military burden and expose IDF personnel to violence and kidnapping. US President Joe Biden has <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4257650-biden-says-occupation-of-gaza-by-israel-is-big-mistake/#:%7E:text=President%20Biden%20said%20in%20a,that%20has%20left%20thousands%20dead.">warned</a> reoccupation would be a big mistake.</p>
<p><strong>2) Eliminate Hamas’ senior leadership, declare victory, then leave.</strong> </p>
<p>Such a victory would almost certainly be short-term. Other low-level members of Hamas would take pride in coming forward to reconstitute the group. Or another group, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, might fill the vacuum. Israel would not be able to control who or what that entity might be.</p>
<p><strong>3) Call on the secular Fatah party that now controls the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to take control in Gaza.</strong> </p>
<p>That is scarcely viable. Fatah lost a civil war to Hamas in 2007 and there’s no indication the Palestinian Authority’s return would be acceptable to Palestinians there. Moreover, the authority’s leader, Mahmoud Abbas, was elected to a four-year term in 2005 – and is still in charge. As such, he lacks <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/07/world/middleeast/palestinians-west-bank-frustration.html">legitimacy</a>, even in the West Bank.</p>
<p><strong>4) Administration of Gaza by non-aligned local leaders.</strong> </p>
<p>This is a pipe dream. Even if such figures could be found, Gazans would almost certainly see them as collaborators with the Israelis, given their role would be to keep the strip’s hardliners under control. </p>
<p><strong>5) Administration of Gaza by a non-Palestinian Arab force.</strong></p>
<p>Again, this is not feasible. The leaders of potential Arab contributors to such a force, such as Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, would not want to be seen as policing Palestinians on behalf of Israel.</p>
<p><strong>6) Administration of Gaza by a non-Arab or United Nations force.</strong> </p>
<p>Given the enormous risks, it’s very hard to see any non-Arab countries embracing this idea. A UN peacekeeping force would require not only Israeli approval, but a UN Security Council resolution at a time when Russia and China rarely agree with the three Western permanent members. </p>
<p>Israel also <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-demands-major-changes-in-un-peacekeeping-in-lebanon/">contends</a> Hezbollah has impeded the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon from carrying out its mandate, preventing it from stopping militant attacks. After the Hamas attacks, Israel would be unlikely to entrust its security to peacekeepers with little incentive to put their lives on the line for its sake.</p>
<h2>‘Mowing the grass’</h2>
<p>For too long, Israel has believed the Gaza imbroglio could be contained. However, the population has grown so large, this is no longer the case.</p>
<p>With a growth rate of just over 2% per year, its population is expected to be <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/12/548332">three million</a> by 2030.</p>
<p>Gaza is also incredibly young, with a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7b618433-ba5f-4e92-a3e0-d5d41d6d17f8">median age</a> of 19.6, compared with the global average of 30.5. Almost half the adult population is unemployed, and Palestinians in Gaza are four times more likely to be living in poverty than those in the West Bank. This is a recipe for social upheaval and radicalisation.</p>
<p>As two Israeli journalists, Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, noted in a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2013.830972">perceptive analysis</a> of Israel’s 2014 Gaza war, the Israeli military describes its assaults on Gaza as “mowing the grass” – acting to punish Hamas severely for its aggressive behaviour and degrading its military capabilities. </p>
<p>The aim was to achieve realistic and, therefore, limited political and military goals. It was part of a long-term strategy of attrition, which would have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along the border.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1715097244326572348"}"></div></p>
<p>Eliminating Hamas altogether, the authors said, was not an “attainable military objective”.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Even if Hamas rule can be terminated, the alternatives are Israeli rule, the rule of more radical groups, or chaos.</p>
<p>Against an implacable, well-entrenched, non-state enemy like the Hamas, Israel simply needs to ‘mow the grass’ once in a while to degrade the enemy’s capabilities. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>From a humanitarian perspective, this phrase is objectionable. The question, now, is whether Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu will attempt a different strategy this time. We’ll find out in the coming weeks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216161/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Parmeter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Here are six possible options for what a post-war Gaza might look like – and why none will seemingly work.Ian Parmeter, Research Scholar, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2156792023-10-17T01:38:03Z2023-10-17T01:38:03ZDecades of underfunding, blockade have weakened Gaza’s health system − the siege has pushed it into abject crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554124/original/file-20231016-15-4u7mpn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C98%2C4121%2C2644&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A health service on its knees.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/personnel-carry-a-man-to-a-hospital-in-khan-yunis-injured-news-photo/1726774222?adppopup=true">Abed Zagout/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For the wounded, injured and sick in Gaza, there is seemingly no escape. On Oct. 17, 2023, news broke that at least 500 patients, staff and people seeking shelter from Israeli bombs had been <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-biden-rafah-e062825a375d9eb62e95509cab95b80c">killed in an explosion at a hospital</a>, according to health authorities in the Hamas-run enclave.</p>
<p>It amounts to a devastating loss of life during a campaign of bombing that has not spared the frail or sick. Just days earlier, the World Health Organization said <a href="https://twitter.com/WHO/status/1713277138437038573">in a stark assessment</a> that an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/16/it-will-be-worse-than-hamas-order-to-evacuate-strikes-fear-into-north-israel">order to evacuate</a> from hospital beds and head south amounts to a “death sentence.”</p>
<p>By that time, four hospitals <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/food-water-and-medicine-run-low-in-gaza-amid-deadly-israeli-airstrikes-delayed-aid#:%7E:text=Four%20hospitals%20in%20northern%20Gaza,patients%20and%20newborns%20on%20ventilators.">had already ceased functioning</a> in Gaza’s north because of damage from Israeli bombs. </p>
<p>Beyond the sheer immediate devastation of the current conflict – in which <a href="https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-hamas-war-gaza-palestinians">thousands of Israelis and Palestinians</a> <a href="https://ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-9">have been killed</a> – there will be significant and undoubtedly long-lasting implications for the Gaza Strip’s health system.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://ccie.ucf.edu/person/yara-asi/">Palestinian expert in global health</a> who has worked with medical professionals from Gaza, I know that even before this latest escalation of violence, health services in Gaza were in a poor shape. Insufficiently and poorly resourced for decades, doctors and hospitals also had to contend with the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g6644">devastating effects of a 16-year blockade</a> imposed by Israel, in part with <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0402/Israel-Gaza-tensions-Why-Egypt-helps-maintain-the-blockade">coordination with Egypt</a>.</p>
<h2>A system completely overwhelmed</h2>
<p>The immediate concern in Gaza is for those seeking assistance due to the bombing campaign that Israel ordered after an attack on its people by Hamas fighters. An <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/15/israel-gaza-urban-warfare-bloodbath/">expected ground offensive</a> will only further risk more civilian casualties. </p>
<p>Hospitals in Gaza are <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/10/16/overwhelmed-gaza-hospitals-try-to-treat-thousands-under-bombings_6178146_4.html">completely overwhelmed</a>. They are seeing around 1,000 new patients per day, in a health system with only <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/12/war-crime-gaza-medics-say-israel-targeting-ambulances-health-facilities">2,500 hospital beds</a> for a population of over 2 million people. It has forced hospitals to tend to patients <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/14-10-2023-evacuation-orders-by-israel-to-hospitals-in-northern-gaza-are-a-death-sentence-for-the-sick-and-injured">in corridors and nearby streets</a>. People maimed in the bombing are being treated for horrific injuries without basics such as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-781b3c63af4ae6e51c313a68f314e66d">gauze dressings, antiseptic, IV bags and painkillers</a>. Those experiencing traumatic injuries are unable to receive sufficient care, increasing rates of infection and amputation.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Paramedics roll over a man on a a gurney." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554125/original/file-20231016-25-6vsoc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554125/original/file-20231016-25-6vsoc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554125/original/file-20231016-25-6vsoc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554125/original/file-20231016-25-6vsoc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554125/original/file-20231016-25-6vsoc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554125/original/file-20231016-25-6vsoc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554125/original/file-20231016-25-6vsoc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A citizen receives first aid at a hospital in Khan Yunis, Gaza, on Oct. 16, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/citizen-receives-first-aid-at-a-hospital-in-khan-yunis-news-photo/1726774220?adppopup=true">Abed Zagout/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And things may soon get worse. According to the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Gaza’s hospitals have been forced to work <a href="https://ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-9#:%7E:text=KEY%20POINTS,Ministry%20of%20Health%20in%20Gaza.">without electricity</a>, using fuel to run generators to ensure life-saving equipment remains functioning. The U.N. estimates this fuel will run out any day due to a complete siege placed on Gaza by Israel. </p>
<p>Such conditions have led to concerns that alongside the massive number of bombing victims, Gaza health services will soon have to <a href="https://abc7chicago.com/news-israel-war-palestine-hamas/13921958/">contend with the outbreak of disease</a>. Patients with immediate health needs, like dialysis or chemotherapy, are among those being ordered to leave and head for greater safety in Gaza’s south, although evacuation routes <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinians-fleeing-fighting-south-find-no-escape-danger-2023-10-15/">have also been bombed</a>.</p>
<h2>A century of underfunding</h2>
<p>The current devastation to Gaza’s health system is obvious. But Gaza’s health care system was already under stress before the latest bombardment. In fact, policies that stretch back decades have left it unable to meet even the basic health needs of Gaza’s residents, let alone respond to the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe.</p>
<p><iframe id="Ky3de" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Ky3de/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/history/">just over a century</a>, the health system in Gaza has been administered by six authorities: the <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ottoman-rule-1517-1917">Ottomans until the end of World War I</a>, the <a href="https://time.com/3445003/mandatory-palestine/">British during the mandate period</a> from 1917 to 1947, <a href="https://embassies.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/1949-1967%20Armistice%20Lines.aspx">Egypt from 1949 to 1967</a>, Israel under <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/6/4/the-naksa-how-israel-occupied-the-whole-of-palestine-in-1967">occupation starting in 1967</a>, and then a Ministry of Health led first by the Palestinian Authority from 1995-2006 and since then by Hamas.</p>
<p>What each have had in common is that, from my perspective as a global health expert, they invested little in Palestinian health. For periods of the 20th century, the health priorities of successive governing bodies appeared focused more on reducing the spread of <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1847484/">communicable disease</a> to protect foreigners interacting with the native Palestinian population. </p>
<p>There was seemingly far less attention paid to building health infrastructure, adequately training health personnel, promoting preventive care and other long-term initiatives that make up a sustainable health system.</p>
<p>Under Israeli occupation from 1967, several Palestinian hospitals were <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-201580/">turned into detention centers or military offices</a>, while others were closed, and new ones were prohibited from opening. Palestinian physicians working in the occupied territories earned one-third the salary of their Israeli counterparts.</p>
<p>As a result of this neglect, health indicators throughout what are now called the occupied territories – the West Bank and Gaza Strip – have been poor. </p>
<p>Maternal and infant mortality – typical indicators of health system functioning – tends to be high. For example, <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-201580/">in the mid-1980s</a>, infant mortality was over 30 per 1,000 live births for Palestinians, compared with just under 10 per 1,000 among the Jewish population of Israel. And infant mortality has <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/infant-mortality-gaza-no-longer-decline-%E2%80%9Calarming-trend%E2%80%9D-according-new">remained stubbornly high in Gaza</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, a lack of a reliable drinkable water infrastructure and overall unsanitary conditions resulted in the spread of parasitic and other infectious diseases, like rotavirus, cholera and salmonella – which <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/2018-10-16/ty-article-magazine/.premium/polluted-water-a-leading-cause-of-gazan-child-mortality-says-rand-corp-study/0000017f-e847-dc7e-adff-f8ef68c50000">remain leading causes of death</a> in Gaza’s children.</p>
<h2>Dying before they can leave</h2>
<p>Most residents of Gaza <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/the-west-bank-and-gaza-a-population-profile/">fled there in 1948</a> after being displaced from their homes in what became the state of Israel. They were classified as refugees, many receiving limited services from the <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/about_unrwa.pdf">United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</a> that was established in 1949.</p>
<p>Since then, chronic underfunding of public hospitals has meant that Palestinians in Gaza have remained reliant on outside money and nongovernmental organizations for essential health services. This started a trend of <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/dependency-and-humanitarian-relief-critical-analysis">humanitarian dependence</a> that continues to this day, with many of Gaza’s health facilities funded by the United Nations, humanitarian agencies like <a href="https://www.msf.org/hospitals-are-overwhelmed-catastrophic-situation-gaza">Doctors Without Borders</a> and religious organizations.</p>
<p>During the passage of the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo">Oslo Accords</a> in the mid-1990s, the Palestinian Authority was established to administer services in the occupied territories. The accords called for health responsibilities to be transferred to the newly formed Palestinian Ministry of Health as preparation for a sovereign Palestinian state, which the accords called for within a five-year period.</p>
<p>The Palestinian Authority received a <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/international-aid-to-the-palestinians-between-politicization-and-development/">significant influx of humanitarian aid</a> as it took on civil responsibilities, including health. As a result, health indicators for Palestinians, including <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=PS">life expectancy</a> and <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.IMM.MEAS?locations=PS">immunization rates</a>, started to improve in the late 1990s. </p>
<p>But as it became increasingly clear that the overarching goal of the Oslo Accords for Palestinians – statehood – <a href="https://theconversation.com/30-years-after-arafat-rabin-handshake-clear-flaws-in-oslo-accords-doomed-peace-talks-to-failure-211362">would not materialize</a>, disillusion with the Palestinian Authority led to victory for Hamas in 2006 elections held in Gaza. Since then, Hamas has been considered the de facto governing body in Gaza, while the Palestinian Authority operates in the West Bank.</p>
<p>The rise of Hamas, which <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/hamas.html">the U.S., Israel and others</a> designate as a terrorist group, saw Gaza become isolated from the international community. It also coincided with Israel imposing a full land, sea and air blockade of Gaza. </p>
<p>There is no doubt that the blockade has rapidly accelerated the <a href="https://www.map.org.uk/downloads/map-al-mezan-access-to-health-online.pdf">deterioration of the health system</a> in Gaza and <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/09/18/palestinian-healthcare-critically-impacted-by-weak-economy-and-barriers">directly impacted the mortality</a> rate.</p>
<p>Gazans who need advanced care, whether for cancer or other chronic illnesses, traumatic injuries and other life-threatening ailments, often can only <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/2215363/">access needed services</a> in Israeli hospitals and require a permit to cross the border from Gaza. Some die before the <a href="https://www.unicef.org/mena/documents/gaza-strip-humanitarian-impact-15-years-blockade-june-2022">permit process is complete</a>.</p>
<h2>Gaza health services after the siege</h2>
<p>This vulnerable health system is now facing unprecedented challenges, staffed by health professionals who have <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/prcs-statement-al-quds-hospital-evacuation-order-enar">committed to stay with their patients</a> even under hospital evacuation orders and at risk of death.</p>
<p>It is uncertain what the health system of Gaza will look like in the future. </p>
<p>In years past, <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/rebuilding-gaza-yet-again/">international aid would help repair</a> and rebuild some, but not all, of the infrastructure damaged in airstrikes, especially schools and hospitals. </p>
<p>But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has promised a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/08/world/middleeast/hamas-israel-netanyahu-gaza.html">long and difficult war</a>.” And with the level of destruction seen in just a few days, it remains unclear just what will be left in the aftermath.</p>
<p>Already <a href="https://insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2.-12-15-October-2023-Attacks-on-Health-Care-in-Israel-and-the-oPt.pdf">at least 28 doctors and other health workers</a> have been killed in Gaza, with ambulances and a number of hospitals rendered useless by the bombs.</p>
<p>Replacing this human capital and vital infrastructure could take years, if not generations – and that is without the limits of a punishing blockade and continued bombardment.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated on Oct. 17, 2023 to add news of an explosion at a Gazan hospital.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215679/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yara M. Asi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hospitals have been destroyed, and doctors and health care staff killed. Gaza’s health services may take years to recover, warns a Palestinian health specialist.Yara M. Asi, Assistant Professor of Global Health Management and Informatics, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2154932023-10-15T14:19:03Z2023-10-15T14:19:03ZHow the ‘laws of war’ apply to the conflict between Israel and Hamas<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553788/original/file-20231014-23-50yq19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C106%2C5439%2C3530&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Warring parties are duty-bound to minimize civilian casualties.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-citizens-inspect-damage-to-their-homes-caused-news-photo/1735465776?adppopup=true">Ahmad Hasaballah/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The killing of Israeli civilians by Hamas and retaliatory airstrikes on the densely populated Gaza Strip by Israel raises <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2023/oct/12/what-are-the-rules-of-war-and-how-do-they-apply-to-the-israel-gaza-conflict">numerous issues under international law</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Indeed, President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/10/10/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-terrorist-attacks-in-israel-2/">made express reference to the “laws of war</a>” in comments he made at the White house on Oct. 10, 2023, noting that while democracies like the U.S. and Israel uphold such standards, “terrorists” such as Hamas “purposefully target civilians.” Speaking the same day, the European Union’s top diplomat Josep Borrell condemned Hamas’ attack but also suggested that Israel was <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eus-borrell-israel-has-right-to-self-defence-but-some-actions-counter-international-law/">not acting in accordance with international law</a> by cutting water, electricity and food to civilians in Gaza.</em></p>
<p><em>But international law and the very nature of the conflict itself – along with the status of the two sides involved – is a complex area. The Conversation turned to <a href="https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/goldman/bio">Robert Goldman</a>, an expert on the laws of war at American University Washington College of Law, for guidance on some of the issues.</em></p>
<h2>What are the ‘laws of war’?</h2>
<p>The laws of war, also known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL), consist of the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm">four 1949 Geneva Conventions</a>, their two Additional Protocols of 1977, the <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/hague-conventions">Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907</a>, as well as certain weapons conventions.</p>
<p>Simply put, these instruments seek to spare civilians and others who are no longer active combatants from the effects of hostilities by placing restrictions and prohibitions on the conduct of warfare.</p>
<p>It is important to understand that modern IHL is not concerned with the reasons for, or the legality of, going to war. Rather, that is governed by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text">United Nations Charter</a> and a member state’s own practice.</p>
<p>It is also important to note that violations of the laws of war are <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/03/22/russia-putin-war-crimes-icc-ukraine">notoriously hard to prosecute</a> and can be frustrated by lack of cooperation by the parties involved. </p>
<h2>What is the nature of the conflict between Israel and Hamas?</h2>
<p>The answer to this question is by no means clear.</p>
<p>Many humanitarian law experts would argue that Hamas and Israel are engaged in what is known as a “<a href="https://www.undrr.org/understanding-disaster-risk/terminology/hips/so0002">non-international armed conflict</a>.” In other words, it would be classified the same way as a civil war that pits the armed forces of a state against an armed non-state actor, rather than an international conflict between two or more sovereign states.</p>
<p>If that were the case, the conflict would not be governed by the entirety of the laws of war, but instead by the more limited <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/us/AP-Guantanamo-Geneva-Conventions.html?scp=5&sq=torture&st=cse">Common Article 3</a> of the Geneva Conventions along with numerous <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law">customary law rules</a>, which derive from general practices accepted as law. Common Article 3, which applies to civilians and those no longer fighting, prohibits practices such as torture, summary execution and denial of a fair trial. But Prisoner of War status only applies to conflicts between states so would not apply.</p>
<p>But some international observers, including the United Nations, view Israel as, <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/">in effect, occupying Gaza</a> – a view predicated on the fact that Israel <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/gaza-strip-controls-s-know-rcna119405">controls Gaza’s borders</a> and airspace and it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/why-is-gaza-out-of-fuel-and-what">supplies most of its electricity</a>.</p>
<p>If that is the case, then the recent outbreak of hostilities between Hamas and Israel would trigger the entirety of laws of war.</p>
<p>That said, I do not believe that Israel is an occupying power
in Gaza under a strict reading of the law. This is because Israel ceased governing and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-gaza-disengagement-insight/shadow-of-israels-pullout-from-gaza-hangs-heavy-10-years-on-idUSKCN0QF1QQ20150810">pulled its forces out of Gaza in 2005</a>. Since 2007, Hamas, after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/15/israel4">expelling the Palestinian Authority</a>, has in effect governed Gaza.</p>
<h2>Is the bombing of Gaza illegal under international law?</h2>
<p>Today the rules governing the conduct of hostilities in both international and non-international armed conflicts are essentially the same.</p>
<p>The foremost requirement in all conflicts is that combatants must always distinguish between civilians and combatants, and that attacks can only be directed at combatants and other military targets.</p>
<p>Protecting civilian populations caught in warfare essentially depends upon three factors: </p>
<ol>
<li>Civilians must abstain from fighting;</li>
<li>The party in control of the civilian population must not place them at heightened risk of harm by using them as human shields; and</li>
<li>The attacking force must take precautions to avoid or minimize excessive civilian casualties when attacking lawful targets.</li>
</ol>
<p>Not only are civilians in Gaza not lawful targets, they are also protected under IHL by the <a href="https://lieber.westpoint.edu/proportionality-international-humanitarian-law-principle-rule/">rule of proportionality</a>. This rule prohibits an attack against a military target which foreseeably could cause civilian casualties that are excessive, or disproportionate in relation to the advantage anticipated from the target’s destruction.</p>
<p>In the case of Gaza, this rule requires that before launching an attack, the Israeli military analyze and determine the likely effect on civilians. If it appears that such an attack will cause disproportionate civilian casualties, then it must be suspended or canceled.</p>
<p>Given Gaza’s urban density, it will be extremely difficult for the Israelis to avoid substantial civilian casualties even when using precision weapons. </p>
<p>And this task will be nearly impossible if Hamas, as it has <a href="https://stratcomcoe.org/cuploads/pfiles/hamas_human_shields.pdf">consistently done in the past</a>, uses civilians and now hostages to shield military targets.</p>
<p>While Israel bears primary responsibility to avoid excessive civilian deaths in its bombardment of Gaza, Hamas’ ability to claim the bombardment constitutes a war crime would be weakened if it deliberately places its own people in harm’s way. </p>
<p>And while Israel is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-c8b4fc20e4fd2ef381d5edb7e9e8308c">complying with its duty to give an advanced warning</a> of an attack in north Gaza, the problem remains: Where do 1 million people go to seek safety when borders are closed and military targets are being hit throughout Gaza?</p>
<h2>Is Israel’s siege of Gaza illegal?</h2>
<p>Unlike <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/06/sieges-law-and-protecting-civilians-0/i-introduction">in the past</a>, total siege warfare now is unlawful regardless of whether the warring parties are involved in international or non-international hostilities.</p>
<p>Blocking the entry of all food, water, medicines and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/12/no-power-water-or-fuel-to-gaza-until-hostages-freed-says-israeli-minister">cutting off electricity</a> – as appears to be happening in Gaza – will disproportionately affect civilians, foreseeably leading to their starvation. This is a banned method of warfare under customary and conventional IHL.</p>
<p>No matter how horrific the actions of Hamas, IHL does not permit an aggrieved party to respond in kind. Violation of the law by one party cannot, in principle, justify or sanction actions by the other that violate established prohibitions in international humanitarian law.</p>
<h2>What are the status and obligations of Hamas under IHL?</h2>
<p>IHL rules apply equally to all the warring parties irrespective of the nature of the conflict. This means that Israeli and Hamas combatants have the same rights and duties.</p>
<p>If, however, the conflict is non-international, then Hamas will be regarded as an armed non-state actor and its combatants ineligible for Prisoner of War status upon capture. Accordingly, Israel can try them for all their hostile acts whether or not Hamas complies with the laws of war.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Masked men in black hold aloft rifles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553789/original/file-20231014-29-84rl03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553789/original/file-20231014-29-84rl03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553789/original/file-20231014-29-84rl03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553789/original/file-20231014-29-84rl03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553789/original/file-20231014-29-84rl03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553789/original/file-20231014-29-84rl03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553789/original/file-20231014-29-84rl03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Masked militants from the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, a military wing of Hamas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PalestiniansHamasanniversary/919f51e5b9314839a8fbe54bc4e75fcd/photo?Query=hamas%20fighters&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=4&currentItemNo=3&vs=true">AP Photo/Adel Hana</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But even if the conflict is an international one, then Hamas’s fighters would still be debarred from Prisoner of War status. They are not the armed forces of Palestine – which is <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-that-recognize-palestine">recognized as a state by 138 nations</a> and has the Palestine Authority as its government.</p>
<p>Rather, Hamas combatants are an irregular armed group. To be eligible for Prisoner of War status under <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949/article-4">Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention</a>, members of an irregular armed group must adhere to very strict standards, both collectively and individually. These includes distinguishing themselves from civilians and complying with the laws of war. Manifestly Hamas has not and does not meet these standards. As such, Israel could lawfully deny them Prisoner of War status upon capture.</p>
<p>Israel, the U.S. and others label <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/hamas.html">Hamas fighters as terrorists</a>. Hamas’ recent acts – indiscriminately firing thousands of rockets into Israel, targeting, killing and taking civilians as hostages – are acts of terrorism in warfare and qualify as war crimes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215493/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Goldman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of the laws of war explores the complex issues raised by Israeli bombing of Gaza in retaliation for the slaughter of its citizens.Robert Goldman, Professor of Law, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2153932023-10-13T20:37:42Z2023-10-13T20:37:42ZReflections on hope during unprecedented violence in the Israel-Hamas war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553731/original/file-20231013-23-tqinee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People in Tel Aviv on Oct. 12, 2023, light candles in memory of civilians and soldiers killed, as well as hostages taken, by Hamas.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-light-candles-in-memory-of-the-civilians-and-news-photo/1720743594?adppopup=true">Amir Levy/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Yom Kippur in 1973, I was 6 years old and living in Petah Tikvah, a city in central Israel. Playing a nail-biting game of marbles, I initially ignored my mom calling me from our front porch. But sensing something was wrong, I gave up my potential winnings and ran home. </p>
<p>I arrived to see my dad emerge from our front door wearing an Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, olive-green uniform. He hugged and kissed me goodbye. He then disappeared for nearly two weeks. </p>
<p>Every night, as instructed by the IDF, I switched off my bedroom lights to avoid enemy aircraft detection. Every day, I heard adults discuss the government and military’s failure to anticipate and intercept the <a href="https://time.com/6322802/yom-kippur-war-israel-history/">surprise Egyptian-Syrian attack</a> that <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/10/12/hamass-attack-was-the-bloodiest-in-israels-history#:%7E:text=The%202%2C656%20Israelis%20who%20died,week%20were%20active%20military%20personnel.&text=Most%20of%20the%20victims%20were,(15%20miles)%20inside%20Israel">killed 2,656 Israeli </a>soldiers. </p>
<p>Fifty years later, on another Jewish holy day, <a href="https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/shemini-atzeretsimchat-torah-101/">Simchat Torah</a>, I hopped out of bed in my home in central Pennsylvania at 6 a.m. – an hour before my twin 6-year-olds usually awaken on Saturdays. I’m a documentary filmmaker, and I had planned to use the uninterrupted time to start scoring my post-Holocaust documentary, “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/10/hero-of-entebbe-deserves-own-film">Cojot</a>.” </p>
<p>A barrage of messages from family and friends stopped me in my tracks. <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/timeline-surprise-rocket-attack-hamas-israel/story?id=103816006">Hamas had launched a surprise attack on Israel</a>. Before my brain could process the news, my stomach told me that this was unprecedented.</p>
<p>Around-the-clock calls, texts and media reports from Israel have reinforced my feeling that <a href="https://apnews.com/article/hamas-iran-israel-war-b18d649d426390b6ab618b33ef2f051a">we’ve never seen anything like this before</a>. At the same time, certain aspects of the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-news-hamas-war-10-13-23/index.html">Israel-Hamas war</a> are familiar. They remind me of previous conflicts, acts of terrorism and retribution in Israel and the surrounding region. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553728/original/file-20231013-21-yb68ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People are seen walking around small gravestones in a row, in front of fresh, long plots of dirt in a black and white photo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553728/original/file-20231013-21-yb68ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553728/original/file-20231013-21-yb68ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553728/original/file-20231013-21-yb68ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553728/original/file-20231013-21-yb68ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553728/original/file-20231013-21-yb68ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553728/original/file-20231013-21-yb68ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553728/original/file-20231013-21-yb68ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mourners gather at the fresh graves of Israeli soldiers killed during the Yom Kippur War in Israel in 1973.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mourners-gather-at-the-fresh-graves-of-israeli-soldiers-news-photo/3241021?adppopup=true">Hulton Archive/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Plenty of similarities</h2>
<p>Palestinians and Jews have been maligning, menacing and murdering each other since the 19th century. </p>
<p>The era of extreme violence began in the 1920s, when clashes between Palestinians and Jews <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/timeline-long-history-israeli-palestinian-conflict/story?id=103875134">slayed hundreds of people in each group</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, Palestinian terrorism has claimed the lives of <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-casualties-arab-israeli-conflict">more than 10,000 Jews</a>, mostly civilians. From 2008 through 2022, IDF attacks have killed <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties">more than 6,100 Palestinian civilians</a>.</p>
<p>On Oct. 7, 2023, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hostages-gaza-war-822b214252a77f3c3556bb71d9ce7c89#">Hamas murdered an estimted 1,300 Israelis and abducted about 150 people</a>, including civilians ranging in age from infants to the elderly, as well as Israeli soldiers and Americans.</p>
<p>Terrorists have taken hostages on Israeli soil before.</p>
<p>In 1974, a <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/democratic-front-for-the-liberation-of-palestine-dflp">terrorist group</a> called the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, or DFLP, entered <a href="https://www-jstor-org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/stable/3011682#">Israel through Lebanon</a> and took 105 Israeli children and 10 adults hostage in the northern Israeli town of Ma'alot. </p>
<p>The IDF <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/10/how-israel-adapts-after-failure/675588/">botched its attempt to rescue the Ma’alot hostages</a>. Its rushed operation spurred the terrorists to kill 22 children and three adults, as well as injure 68 other hostages. </p>
<p>For many Israelis, Saturday’s attack was also reminiscent of 2006, when Hamas kidnapped a 19-year-old Israeli soldier named <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/10/11/hamas-terrorists-israel-hostages-gilad-shalit-key-words/">Gilad Shalit</a>. </p>
<p>Hamas <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/opinion/gilad-shalits-release.html?searchResultPosition=8">exchanged Shalit five years later for more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners</a> held in Israel. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553730/original/file-20231013-24-ool99b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Gilad Shalit and Benjamin Netanyahu walk with two other men in suits on an airplane tarmac." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553730/original/file-20231013-24-ool99b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553730/original/file-20231013-24-ool99b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553730/original/file-20231013-24-ool99b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553730/original/file-20231013-24-ool99b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553730/original/file-20231013-24-ool99b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=641&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553730/original/file-20231013-24-ool99b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=641&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553730/original/file-20231013-24-ool99b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=641&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, second from right, walks with Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials in 2011 after being held captive by Hamas for five years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-photo-provided-by-the-israeli-defence-force-news-photo/129572162?adppopup=true">IDF via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Not the first military misstep</h2>
<p>Hamas’ surprise attack in October was not the only disaster the IDF did not foresee. The Israeli military also failed to foil <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20231006-50-years-on-explaining-the-yom-kippur-war.cfm">Egypt and Syria’s Oct. 6, 1973, attack</a> on Israel.</p>
<p>Another similarity between then and now involves Israeli and Palestinian civilians being fired on from outside either Israel or Gaza.</p>
<p>Thirty years ago, <a href="https://jewishjournal.com/commentary/327554/what-my-personal-story-from-the-1991-iraqi-scud-assault-teaches-about-covid-19/">Iraqi President Saddam Hussein shot 38 Scud missiles at Israel in the 1991 Gulf War</a>, during which a U.S.-led coalition pushed Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. </p>
<p>Although many of the Iraqi missiles splashed into the Mediterranean Sea, grazed open fields or caused little damage, <a href="https://jewishjournal.com/commentary/327554/what-my-personal-story-from-the-1991-iraqi-scud-assault-teaches-about-covid-19/">they generated panic throughout the country</a>. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242876402_Why_were_Scud_casualties_so_low">The missiles directly killed two Israelis</a>. But the missiles also resulted in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/gulfwar/CHAP8.htm">the deaths of 12 other people</a>, some of whom succumbed to heart attacks. </p>
<p>Residing in a nation surrounded by enemies means living in fear.</p>
<h2>Just as many differences</h2>
<p>For Israelis, the most striking differences between now and then are the Oct. 7 terrorist attack’s unimaginable <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/israels-ground-zero-beeri-kibbutz-bloodiest-scenes-hamas/story?id=103936668">brutality and destruction</a>. Few pictured Hamas wreaking ISIS-style havoc on 20 towns, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israels-netanyahu-says-hamas-militants-beheaded-soldiers-raped-women-in-their-attack-on-israel">raping women</a> and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahus-office-releases-horrifying-images-of-infants-murdered-by-hamas/">murdering children</a>. </p>
<p>Hamas murdered many more Israelis in one day than Palestinians killed during the entirety of the <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18080066/israel-palestine-intifadas-first-second">Second Intifada,</a> a major West Bank and Gaza uprising that lasted from 2000 through 2005. </p>
<p>Another difference is the unconditional, full-fledged U.S. government support for Israel during this current conflict. </p>
<p>Since the 1980s, the U.S. has maintained a <a href="https://www.retroreport.org/video/israel-survived-an-early-challenge-with-war-planes-smuggled-by-u-s-vets">strategic alliance</a> with Israel. But the U.S. has tended to offer support with certain conditions attached. For instance, Israel must spend at least 75% of the nearly $4 billion the U.S. gives it each year on <a href="https://www.commentary.org/articles/elliott-abrams/do-not-cut-off-aid-to-israel/">American weapons and products</a>. </p>
<p>Some observers say President Joe Biden has swiftly shown Israel the kind of unconditional love that Israelis want. </p>
<p>“The loss of innocent life is heartbreaking,” <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/10/10/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-terrorist-attacks-in-israel-2/#:%7E:text=They%20use%20Palestinian%20civilians%20as,respond%20%E2%80%94%20to%20these%20vicious%20attacks.">Biden said Oct. 10</a>. “Like every nation in the world, Israel has the right to respond – indeed has a duty to respond – to these vicious attacks.”</p>
<p>Israelis are so moved that they’ve put up <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/JoeBiden/comments/175lq0x/a_new_billboard_has_been_erected_in_israel_by/">billboards to thank Biden</a>.</p>
<p>America’s unconditional love may crack as Israel pursues an unprecedented goal: to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-gantz-agree-form-emergency-israel-government-statement-2023-10-11/">rid the world of Hamas</a>. </p>
<p>No Israeli prime minister has ever set such a goal, much less officially led such an effort. During the <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-06-02/ty-article/.premium/lebanon-war-40-years-on-the-conflict-that-changed-israel/00000181-256c-dba3-ab87-adfd5f5e0000">1982 Lebanon War</a>, Israel’s then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin sought to keep the northern border free of Palestinian terrorists. But he never aimed to eradicate the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Palestine-Liberation-Organization/Intifada-and-Oslo-peace-process">Palestinian Liberation Organization</a> from the face of the earth. </p>
<p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pwny3vOQShI">2023 kill-them-all objective</a> when it comes to Hamas has become the war’s flashpoint. <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2023-10-13/ty-article-opinion/.premium/no-to-collective-punishment-against-gaza/0000018b-254d-dd34-afdf-f5cfb9f00000">Many people in Israel worry about this mission claiming the lives of countless civilian Gazans</a>. This has already begun, with Israeli airstrikes killing <a href="https://apnews.com/article/gaza-israel-palestinians-war-hamas-militants-civilians-casualites-8469bbcb566446d78f368bf2a1b49d88">more than 1,400 Gaza civilians. </a></p>
<p>These many Palestinian civilian deaths, too, may be unprecedented.</p>
<h2>There’s hope</h2>
<p>What do these differences and similarities point to? A new day, I hope. This horrendous war offers a tremendous opportunity to finally resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. </p>
<p>I spoke recently with a relative in Israel who’s been adamantly opposed to the creation of a Palestinian country. Despite his anger over the Hamas attack, he said that if the IDF can remove this “ISIS-like organization” from the equation, he will favor the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/11/arab-ministers-urge-israel-to-resume-talks-on-two-state-solution">two-state solution</a>. </p>
<p>Several other right-wing Israelis and Americans I know have also hinted at such a resolution. </p>
<p>To me, this feels like a turning point.</p>
<p>While Hamas has long prepared for war, it’s possible the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/11/israel-gaza-war-abbas-pa/">Palestinian Authority</a>, which governs the West Bank and has been working with Israel for years, could prepare to eventually oversee Gaza. </p>
<p><em>This article was updated on Oct. 16, 2023, to clarify the number of Palestinian civilian deaths because of the IDF from 2008 through 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Boaz Dvir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Israel’s war with Hamas is unlike anything Israelis have seen before in some important ways, writes an Israeli filmmaker. But in other ways, it is reminiscent of the distant and not so long ago past.Boaz Dvir, Associate Professor of Journalism, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2155142023-10-12T22:22:53Z2023-10-12T22:22:53ZGaza depends on UN and other global aid groups for food, medicine and basic services – Israel-Hamas war means nothing is getting in<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553573/original/file-20231012-19-v34aud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Palestinian children play outside an UNRWA school following Israeli airstrikes on Oct. 12, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinians-take-shelter-at-the-united-nations-relief-and-news-photo/1719617860?adppopup=true">Ashraf Amra/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>International aid groups <a href="https://www.msf.org/hospitals-are-overwhelmed-catastrophic-situation-gaza">are warning</a> that they cannot deliver food and other basic services to people in the Gaza Strip and that a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/oct/12/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-biden-hamas-attack-holocaust-gaza-displaced-palestine">“dire” humanitarian crisis</a> is set to worsen. </p>
<p>International aid groups provide food and other means of support to <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/gaza-strip">about 63% of people in Gaza</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-11/ty-article/.premium/gaza-power-plant-stops-operating-due-to-lack-of-fuel-palestinian-energy-authority-says/0000018b-1efe-d2fc-a59f-dfff86f70000">Israel</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-refuses-request-bring-food-medical-supplies-into-gaza-palestinian-plo-2023-10-10/">stopped allowing deliveries of food, fuel and other supplies</a> to Gaza’s 2.3 million residents on Oct. 10, 2023, and is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-airstrikes-cabinet-beb1fa2b9e4ede6cf4568dd6c86ff11a">reportedly preparing for a ground invasion</a>. </p>
<p>On Oct. 12, 2023, Israel <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/13/israel-hamas-war-latest-gaza-residents-told-move-ground-assault">warned 1.1 million Gaza residents</a> in the northern section of the enclave to leave for the southern region, in advance of a potential ground invasion.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=kXfdkJwAAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of peace and conflict economics</a> and a former World Bank consultant, including during the <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/2014-gaza-conflict">2014 war</a> between Hamas and Israel.</p>
<p>International aid groups <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-hamas-war-74d8d8dc8dd26e84a189f72b65ec9428">now face the same problem</a> in Gaza that local businesses and residents have encountered for about 16 years: a blockade that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/gaza-strip-israel-egypt.html">prevents civilians and items</a>, like medicine from easily moving into or out of the enclosed area, roughly 25 miles long. That 16-year blockade did not apply to the food and fuel that groups brought in to Gaza. </p>
<p>Now, it does.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553552/original/file-20231012-15-m8bwdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three men walk past a dilapidated looking building and cars that have been partially destroyed and fallen into a crater in the ground." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553552/original/file-20231012-15-m8bwdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553552/original/file-20231012-15-m8bwdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553552/original/file-20231012-15-m8bwdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553552/original/file-20231012-15-m8bwdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553552/original/file-20231012-15-m8bwdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553552/original/file-20231012-15-m8bwdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553552/original/file-20231012-15-m8bwdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinian men walk past damaged cars and a crater in front of an UNRWA school in Gaza City on Oct. 9, 2023, following Israeli airstrikes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-men-carrying-bread-walk-past-damaged-cars-and-a-news-photo/1714770121?adppopup=true">Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Gaza’s blockade and economy</h2>
<p>Gaza is <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/gaza-strip-map-density-israel-hamas-conflict/index.html">about the size of Philadelphia</a> and requires trade with different businesses and countries in order to maintain and grow its economy.</p>
<p>But Gaza is heavily dependent on foreign aid.</p>
<p>This is partially the result of Israel setting up permanent <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/10/10/the-gaza-strip-blockade-explained-in-one-map_6162224_4.html">air, land and sea blockades</a> around Gaza in 2007, one year after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/12/what-is-hamas-the-militant-group-that-rules-gaza">Hamas rose to political power</a>. Egypt, which borders Gaza on its southern end, also <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/10/11/rafah-border-crossing-a-barrage-of-israeli-fire-endangers-gaza-s-only-gateway-to-egypt_6165190_4.html">oversees one checkpoint</a> that specifically limits people coming and going. </p>
<p>While Israel has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-strip-devastated-by-conflict-economic-blockade-2023-10-12/#:%7E:text=In%20August%2C%20Egypt%20allowed%2019%2C608,but%2088%25%20below%202000%20levels.">granted permits to about 17,000 Gaza</a> residents to enter and work in Israel, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/why-is-gaza-out-of-fuel-and-what#:%7E:text=The%20blockade%20has%20also%20meant,run%20generators%20is%20effectively%20impossible.">food, fuel and medical supplies</a> that people in Gaza use all first pass through Israel. </p>
<p>Israel controls two physical checkpoints along Gaza, which monitor both the entry and exit of people and trucks. Israel limits the kind and quantity of materials that pass into Gaza. And the blockades generally prohibit Gazans who do not have work permits or special clearance – for medical purposes, for example – from entering Israel.</p>
<p>Israel’s restrictions through the blockade intensified since Hamas’ <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-rockets-airstrikes-tel-aviv-11fb98655c256d54ecb5329284fc37d2">surprise attack</a> on 20 Israeli towns and several military bases on Oct. 7, with Israel then announcing a broad blockade of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-hamas-war-74d8d8dc8dd26e84a189f72b65ec9428">imports into Gaza</a>. This stopped all food, fuel and medical supplies from entering the region.</p>
<h2>Gaza’s isolation</h2>
<p>The Palestinian enclaves of West Bank and Gaza – which are generally lumped together in economic analyses – both have small economies that run a <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-investment-climate-statements/west-bank-and-gaza">massive deficit</a> of US$6.6 billion in losses each year, as the value of the imports they receive greatly outweighs the value of the items they produce and sell elsewhere.</p>
<p>More than <a href="https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_PSE.pdf">53% of Gaza residents</a> were considered below the poverty line in 2020, and about 77% of Gazan households <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-unrest-sends-message-about-economic-misery-under-israeli-blockade-2023-10-04/">receive some form of aid from the United Nations</a> and other groups, mostly in the form of cash or food. </p>
<p>Gaza’s weak economy is caused by a number of complex factors, but the largest is the <a href="https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2023/327/article-A001-en.xml">blockade and the economic and trade isolation</a> it creates.</p>
<p>For the average Gazan, the blockade has several practical effects, including people’s ability to get food. About 64% of people in Gaza are considered <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/6/15/the-seven-border-crossings-of-gaza">food insecure</a>, meaning they do not have reliable access to sufficient amounts of food. </p>
<p>Food as a percentage of Gaza’s total imports has <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.VAL.FOOD.ZS.UN?locations=PS">skyrocketed by 50%</a> since 2005, when Israel first imposed a temporary blockade. And the amount of food the West Bank and Gaza actually produce <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.PRD.FOOD.XD?locations=PS">has tumbled by 30%</a> since then.</p>
<p>It is hard for Gaza to produce food within its own borders. One factor is that <a href="https://theconversation.com/gazas-food-system-has-been-stretched-to-breaking-point-by-israel-188556">Israeli airstrikes hit</a> Gaza’s only power generation plant and main sewage treatment plant in 2008 and again in 2018. These <a href="https://theconversation.com/gazas-food-system-has-been-stretched-to-breaking-point-by-israel-188556">attacks resulted in the spread of sewage waste</a> on land and in the water, destroying farmlands and food crops and threatening fish stocks in the ocean as well. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553553/original/file-20231012-17-vsjxfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A classroom is seen with desks turned upside down and glass on the floor." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553553/original/file-20231012-17-vsjxfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553553/original/file-20231012-17-vsjxfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553553/original/file-20231012-17-vsjxfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553553/original/file-20231012-17-vsjxfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553553/original/file-20231012-17-vsjxfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553553/original/file-20231012-17-vsjxfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553553/original/file-20231012-17-vsjxfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An UNRWA classroom in Gaza City was damaged in an Israeli airstrike on Oct. 8, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/october-2023-palestinian-territories-gaza-city-a-general-news-photo/1712424066?adppopup=true">Mohammed Talatene/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The UN’s big role in Gaza</h2>
<p>Gaza’s weak economy and isolation because of the blockade mean that it relies heavily on international aid organizations to provide basic services to residents. The biggest of these aid groups in Gaza is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East – also known as UNRWA. </p>
<p>Today, UNRWA is the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/242-unrwas-reckoning-preserving-un-agency-serving-palestinian-refugees">second-largest employer</a> in Gaza, following Hamas. It provides the bulk of the education, food aid and health care services for people in Gaza, in addition to 3 million other people registered as Palestinian refugees who <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees">live in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank</a> and other places. </p>
<p>Over time, UNRWA has evolved into a kind of parallel government, alongside Hamas, which Israel, the United States and other countries designate as <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">a terrorist organization</a>. </p>
<p>UNRWA funds and runs a network of <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/what-we-do/education">284 schools</a> in Gaza alone, employing over 9,000 local people as staff and educating over 294,000 children each year. </p>
<p>UNRWA runs 22 hospitals in Gaza that employ almost 1,000 health staff and has 3.3 million patient visits per year. </p>
<p>Its schools are converted into <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rb2JBK91dWI">humanitarian shelters</a> in times of crisis, such as the current war. People can go there to get clean water, food, mattresses and blankets, showers and more. </p>
<p>The number of people in Gaza who are <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-5">displaced from their homes</a> has quickly risen over the last few days, totaling over 330,000 on Oct. 12, 2023. Over two-thirds of these people are staying in UNRWA schools.</p>
<h2>A complicated US relationship</h2>
<p>The U.S. has historically been the <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/news-releases/united-states-contributes-us-1537-million-unrwa-support-palestine-refugees#:%7E:text=In%202022%2C%20the%20United%20States,contribution%20of%20US%24%203.4%20million.">single-largest funder</a> of UNRWA, a U.N. agency that relies on <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/how-we-are-funded">governments to support</a> its work. The U.S. gave more than <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-palestinian-people/">$500 million to Palestinians</a> from April 2021 through March 2022, including more than $417 million that went to UNRWA. </p>
<p>U.S. support to UNRWA has fluctuated throughout different presidential administrations. </p>
<p>Total <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS22967/59">U.S. aid to the West Bank and Gaza</a> peaked at $1 billion in 2009 – after Israel sealed off the territory. It reached $1 billion in annual contributions again in 2013, when former Secretary of State John Kerry helped <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/world/middleeast/kerry-extends-stay-in-mideast-to-push-for-talks.html">restart peace talks</a> between Israel and Hamas.</p>
<p>In 2018, the <a href="https://nypost.com/2018/08/31/trump-cuts-funding-for-un-palestinian-refugee-agency/">Trump Administration cut</a> almost all of the money the U.S. typically gives to UNRWA, amounting to roughly 30% of the organization’s total budget. </p>
<p>Defenders of the policy change cited UNRWA-published textbooks that <a href="https://nypost.com/2023/10/10/biden-admin-funneled-730-million-to-un-group-despite-its-personnel-calling-for-violence-against-jews/">allegedly glorified jihad</a>. UNRWA, for its part, maintained that, as an outside organization, it can only use the <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/demsytifying_unrwa_approach_to_curriculum2020.pdf">educational materials the country</a> it is working in wants.</p>
<p>The Biden administration <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-56665199">then restored funding</a> to UNRWA and other organizations helping Palestinians in 2021. </p>
<p>Some Republican politicians have said that UNRWA has “<a href="https://nypost.com/2021/06/05/unrwa-which-biden-is-funding-again-is-cozying-up-to-hamas-again/">cozied up</a>” to Hamas. And an internal UNRWA ethics committee has <a href="https://unwatch.org/unrwa-ethics-scandal-fact-sheet/#:%7E:text=The%20allegations%20against%20them%20include,toxic%20and%20dysfunctional%20work%20environment.">accused top staff at the agency</a> of “sexual misconduct, nepotism, retaliation … and other abuses of authority” that created a toxic work environment. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, since the war between Israel and Hamas <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/9/what-does-israels-declaration-of-war-mean-for-palestinians-in-gaza">began on Oct. 8,</a> more than <a href="https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-news-hamas-war-10-12-23#h_7f195f98ace51da9a68fe237963389c7">1,500 Gazans</a> have been killed and more than 5,300 injured, while Hamas attacks have killed more than 1,300 people in Israel and injured about 3,200 others. </p>
<p>International aid groups and European Union officials <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/11/gaza-attacks-hamas-israel-war-us-holds-talks-on-safe-passage-civilians">have called for a humanitarian corridor</a> to be set up in Gaza – meaning a protected path specifically for civilians, aid workers and necessary basic items to pass through safely back and forth from Gaza to Israel and Egypt. So far, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/egypt-discussing-plans-provide-aid-gaza-under-limited-ceasefire-security-sources-2023-10-11/">there are no clear plans</a> for such a protected pathway.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215514/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Topher L. McDougal has worked as a consultant for the World Bank on multiple occasions, one of which involved emergency housing assistance strategies in the Gaza Strip following the 2014 Gaza War. </span></em></p>Many people in Gaza are reliant on the United Nations and other international aid groups to meet their basic needs, like food and medical care. A scholar of peace and conflict economics explains why.Topher L. McDougal, Professor of Economic Development & Peacebuilding, University of San DiegoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2091152023-07-06T16:38:28Z2023-07-06T16:38:28ZIsrael’s assault in Jenin will only further erode the Palestinian Authority’s legitimacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536070/original/file-20230706-21-ythtq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=29%2C67%2C4962%2C3255&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Palestinian Authority officials were chased from funerals like this one in Jenin on July 5, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mourners-carry-the-bodies-of-palestinian-men-some-draped-in-news-photo/1504653260?adppopup=true">Nasser Ishtayeh/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Israeli soldiers withdrew from the Jenin refugee camp in the occupied West Bank after <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/02/world/middleeast/israel-west-bank-jenin.html">two days of fighting</a>, Israel’s generals and politicians were quick to hail the major military operation there a success. </p>
<p>Herzl Halevi, chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-07-05/ty-article/netanyahu-israel-will-complete-mission-in-jenin-operation-is-not-a-one-off/00000189-219a-df82-a78f-65bad9ab0000">declared</a>, “We hit the terrorists hard, we arrested many and destroyed many of their weapons and ammunition.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu <a href="https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-748850">praised the military</a> for destroying “many terrorist infrastructures.”</p>
<p>But however successful in the short term, no military operation can resolve what I see as the underlying problem that caused Jenin’s refugee camp to become what Netanyahu has described as a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/04/jenin-refugee-camp-west-bank-israel-military-operation">“safe haven” for Palestinian militants</a>.</p>
<p>That problem is a <a href="http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1031232686&Country=Palestine&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Political+stability">legitimacy crisis</a> facing the Palestinian Authority – the self-governing body that has limited rule over parts of the occupied West Bank, including Jenin, that are not directly ruled by Israel.</p>
<p>As a scholar who specializes on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and has written a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Israeli-Palestinian-Conflict-Everyone-Needs-Know%C2%AE/dp/0190625333">book about it</a>, I believe that this latest military operation will, in fact, only worsen that legitimacy crisis. Indeed, when three senior Palestinian Authority officials <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinians-defiant-amid-damage-after-israel-ends-jenin-raid-2023-07-05/">attended a mass funeral in Jenin on July 5, 2023</a>, for some of the Palestinians killed in the fighting – at least 12 Palestinians were killed, most confirmed as militants – they were accused by mourners of weakness and quickly forced to leave by an angry crowd chanting, “Get out! Get out!”</p>
<h2>Failure to provide security</h2>
<p>The Israeli military’s incursion into Jenin’s densely populated refugee camp is just the most recent operation it has conducted in the northern West Bank city over the past two years. To be sure, the assault of June 3-4 was on a much greater scale than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/19/world/middleeast/israel-west-bank-raid.html">previous raids into Jenin</a>. It was the largest that Israel has conducted in the West Bank since <a href="https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/982">Operation Defensive Shield in 2002</a> during the Palestinian uprising of 2000-05, known as the second intifada. It was also the first time that Israel has used air strikes since then. </p>
<p><iframe id="In6as" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/In6as/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>But the reason for this incursion was fundamentally the same as the reason why Israel has staged previous raids into Jenin – as well as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/22/world/middleeast/west-bank-nablus-palestinians-killed.html">into Nablus</a>, another city in the northern West Bank – in recent years. That is, these cities have effectively become <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/2022-04-13/ty-article-magazine/.premium/once-a-developing-city-jenin-has-turned-into-a-terror-hotbed/00000180-5bcb-db1e-a1d4-dfebdd5a0000">sanctuaries for armed Palestinian militants</a> from which they regularly carry out <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/20/world/middleeast/israelis-attacked-west-bank.html">shooting attacks against both Israeli soldiers and civilians</a>. </p>
<p>Under the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo">Oslo Accords</a> signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in the early 1990s, the Palestinian Authority is responsible for policing these cities and preventing militants from operating within them. </p>
<p>Yet the growing number of shooting attacks against Israelis that have been conducted by militants based in these areas suggests that it has failed in this task. Israeli officials have said that more than 50 shooting attacks have been carried out by Jenin-area militants <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/why-is-israel-attacking-jenin-west-bank-operation-explained-2023-07-04/">since the beginning of 2023</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/373640">Israeli officials</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/RitchieTorres/status/1676225841011802112">American politicians</a> have blamed the Palestinian Authority and its octogenarian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, for this failure. This criticism, however, overlooks why the Palestinian Authority has lost control over parts of the northern West Bank.</p>
<h2>Unpopular and increasingly autocratic</h2>
<p>The Palestinian Authority has become deeply unpopular with the Palestinian public. In a poll conducted last month by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/940">63% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza</a> thought the Palestinian Authority is a burden on them, while 50% thought its collapse or dissolution would be in the best interests of the Palestinian public. Abbas himself has even less support – 80% of Palestinians in that survey expressed dissatisfaction with him and wanted him to resign. </p>
<p>The Palestinian Authority’s unpopularity is due to numerous factors. Palestinians have accused it of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/12/10/1063171482/palestinian-dissidents-rally-against-corruption-in-the-palestinian-authority">corruption</a>, <a href="https://www.972mag.com/palestinian-authority-protests-vaccines-oslo/">incompetence</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/07/world/middleeast/Palestinian-Authority-protesters.html">brutally repressing dissent</a>. Human rights groups have
accused the Palestinian Authority of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/palestine-state-of/report-palestine-state-of/">arbitrarily arresting people</a> and even torturing detainees. </p>
<p>The Palestinian Authority has undoubtedly become increasingly autocratic and authoritarian. There has not been a presidential election since 2005, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/29/world/middleeast/palestinian-vote-delayed.html">the last legislative elections were held in 2006</a>. The continued schism between Abbas’s Fatah party and Hamas – a bitter rival that governs the Palestinian enclave of Gaza – has prevented its parliament, the Palestinian Legislative Council, from functioning. As a result, Abbas <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/25/palestinian-lawyers-protest-against-abbas-governing-by-decree">rules by decree</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men and one woman sit around a large conference table." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535926/original/file-20230705-2979-6g78ua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535926/original/file-20230705-2979-6g78ua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535926/original/file-20230705-2979-6g78ua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535926/original/file-20230705-2979-6g78ua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535926/original/file-20230705-2979-6g78ua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535926/original/file-20230705-2979-6g78ua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535926/original/file-20230705-2979-6g78ua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas chairs an emergency meeting of the Palestinian leadership on July 3, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-president-mahmoud-abbas-chairs-an-emergency-news-photo/1490158780?adppopup=true">Palestinian President Office/Handout via Xinhua</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The PA’s <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/04/23/halting-palestine-s-democratic-decline-pub-84383">democratic decline</a> is a product of a deeper, more fundamental problem: It has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/07/07/palestinians-authority-protests/">lost its legitimacy among an increasing number of Palestinians</a>.</p>
<p>The reason for this, I believe, is that the Palestinian Authority has lost its raison d'etre. It was created in 1994 with the intention that it would be the embryo of a future Palestinian state. According to the Oslo Accords, it was meant to exist only temporarily – for no more than five years – during which time a peace agreement between Israel and the PLO would be negotiated, resulting in Palestinian statehood. </p>
<h2>Fading hopes of statehood</h2>
<p>Nearly three decades later, the Palestinian Authority still exists, but Palestinian statehood looks like a distant prospect at best.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the land on which Palestinians expected this state would be built has been steadily eaten away by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/29/world/middleeast/israel-west-bank-settlements-expansion.html">relentless Israeli settlement building</a>. Indeed, most Palestinians have <a href="https://pcpsr.org/en/node/912">given up their hope for a Palestinian state</a>.</p>
<p>The peace process appears to be dead – the Biden administration hasn’t even tried to resuscitate it – and Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, which began 56 years ago, seems permanent. </p>
<p>In such a bleak situation, the Palestinian Authority has become merely a municipal government – operating in the 40% of the West Bank that Israel prefers to avoid ruling over directly.</p>
<p>In addition to providing public services such as education and health care to Palestinians, its main function is to assist the Israeli army and security services to prevent Palestinian violence against Israelis. Yet, it is unable to prevent Israeli violence against Palestinians, which happens on a regular, and sometimes daily, basis, especially by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/12/world/middleeast/settler-violence-west-bank.html">extremist Jewish settlers</a>.</p>
<p>It is little wonder, therefore, that many Palestinians regard the Palestinian Authority as a collaborator with Israel, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/7/14/pa-security-forces-are-not-serving-the-palestinian-people">a facilitator of Israel’s occupation, rather than a means to end it</a>. </p>
<p>The Palestinian Authority’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/06/palestinian-authority-israel-west-bank-security-cooperation-suspended-mahmoud-abbas/">security cooperation with Israel is most unpopular</a>, which is why its officials and particularly the members of its security forces have become reluctant to perform this mission.</p>
<p>As a result, the Palestinian Authority has gradually lost control over places like Jenin and Nablus, leaving a power vacuum that has been filled by militant groups. </p>
<p>Some of these groups, specifically Hamas and Islamic Jihad, have ties with Iran, which <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-raisi-meets-with-top-hamas-and-islamic-jihad-officials-urges-israels-defeat/">encourages them to attack Israelis</a> in order to destabilize the West Bank. </p>
<p>Others are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/04/world/middleeast/west-bank-lions-den.html">newly formed, unaffiliated groups</a> composed of armed young men and teenagers, whose violence is driven by despair, desperation and a desire for revenge.</p>
<p>These are the militants in Jenin whom the IDF has tried to capture or kill during its most recent military operation there. </p>
<p>No doubt, as Israeli authorities have said, the raid has succeeded in arresting some and killing others. </p>
<p>But this success comes at a steep price – first and foremost, to Palestinian civilians, but also to the Palestinian Authority. Unable to prevent this Israeli incursion or protect Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority’s impotence is apparent for all to see. This will, I believe, only worsen its standing in the eyes of the Palestinian public and exacerbate its legitimacy crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209115/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dov Waxman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The West Bank governing body has seen its popularity erode amid accusations of corruption and incompetence.Dov Waxman, Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Foundation Professor of Israel Studies, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2034642023-04-13T12:27:28Z2023-04-13T12:27:28ZMost Palestinians in East Jerusalem are sitting out Israeli protests – but they are still concerned about a potential judicial reform<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520607/original/file-20230412-20-9p08z0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Palestinian girl plays with a ball outside of the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in the old city of Jerusalem. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/672383194/photo/topshot-palestinian-israel-religion-islam.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=t9WkHH1lF85JtWrqYIm99b5o1In5Ibg729a0jjWTo50=">Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israeli protesters have been demonstrating against the Netanyahu government’s controversial efforts to radically overhaul the judicial system for nearly three months. And while the <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-enters-a-dangerous-period-public-protests-swell-over-netanyahus-plan-to-limit-the-power-of-the-israeli-supreme-court-199917">protests regularly bring out more than 100,000 people</a> to the streets across Israel, few Arab faces have appeared among the demonstrators. </p>
<p>The protests cause some minor annoyances, like traffic delays, to Palestinians living in East Jerusalem. </p>
<p>But the greater threat to these East Jerusalem Palestinians are the proposed changes to Israel’s judiciary system. The changes, referred to as “reforms,” would limit the Supreme Court’s powers to rule against the legislative and executive branches, effectively giving the Knesset the power to override Supreme Court decisions <a href="https://www.ajc.org/news/what-to-know-about-israels-judicial-reforms">with a simple majority</a>.</p>
<p>I believe that such changes would be dangerous to East Jerusalem Palestinians, especially when right-wing governments – like the current one led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – are in power and <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/qanda-with-raja-shehadeh">oppose giving Palestinians</a> more rights. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/polisci/people/graduate-students/dlief.html">political science scholar</a> with a regional focus on the Middle East, I have spent a significant time with East Jerusalem Palestinians asking what they think about judicial reform plans and the protests against it. </p>
<p>Our discussions show that East Jerusalem Palestinians feel an an overarching sense of indifference and resignation to whatever will happen. </p>
<p>“That is the Israelis’ fight, not mine,” or “What does it matter what happens? Nothing will help with anything anyway,” were the most common reactions that East Jerusalem Palestinians had to the protests when I spoke with them in March 2023. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520606/original/file-20230412-16-v1mxoa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Several white buildings are seen in the distance, beyond a concrete wall and green, grassy areas." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520606/original/file-20230412-16-v1mxoa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520606/original/file-20230412-16-v1mxoa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520606/original/file-20230412-16-v1mxoa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520606/original/file-20230412-16-v1mxoa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520606/original/file-20230412-16-v1mxoa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520606/original/file-20230412-16-v1mxoa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520606/original/file-20230412-16-v1mxoa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A view of East Jerusalem is seen in February 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1198900127/photo/daily-life-in-jerusalem.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=jVnH8hAANB4-ILX0beUul1qISJ7nmYHk4htyrkLGo1w=">Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A brief background</h2>
<p>While Israel claims that East Jerusalem is simply a part of its capital city, the United Nations and <a href="https://en.idi.org.il/articles/38540">Palestinians say it is occupied territory</a> by the Israeli government. Further, East Jerusalem covers approximately 27 square miles and is home to about about <a href="https://en.idi.org.il/articles/38540">362,000 Arab residents</a> who are considered permanent residents of Israel. </p>
<p>These Palestinians have no passports and cannot vote in Israeli elections. </p>
<p>Just 18,982 Palestinians in East Jerusalem have <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-05-29/ty-article/why-so-few-palestinians-from-jerusalem-have-israeli-citizenship/00000181-0c46-d090-abe1-ed7fefc20000">obtained Israeli citizenship</a> since 1967. This followed the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-1967-six-day-war">1967 Six-Day War</a>, when Israel defeated Egypt, Syria and Jordan over a territorial dispute and occupied parts of Jerusalem that were under Jordanian control. </p>
<p>This small number of Palestinians in East Jerusalem who have received Israeli citizenship stems from two main factors. First, many Palestinians feel resistant toward taking Israeli citizenship because of cultural divisions and a desire for their own nationhood. Second, the Israeli government makes it difficult for these Palestinians <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2019-01-15/ty-article/.premium/east-jerusalem-palestinians-face-uphill-battle-in-bid-for-israeli-citizenship/0000017f-e55e-d62c-a1ff-fd7fe78d0000">to get Israeli citizenship</a>. </p>
<p>Today, East Jerusalem Palestinians truly <a href="https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/the-legal-status-of-east-jerusalem.pdf">live between two worlds</a>. They are <a href="https://pij.org/articles/1662/palestinians-in-west-jerusalem-economic-dependency-amid-violent-contestation">politically and economically connected</a> to West Jerusalem, home to Israeli Jews and the Israeli government. Most East Jerusalem Palestinians are able to cross in and out of West Jerusalem easily, though <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/israel-begins-construction-of-new-wall-separating-jews-and-arabs-in-east-jerusalem/a-18790400">walls exist</a> around sections of East Jerusalem, dividing Arab neighborhoods from Jewish ones.</p>
<p>Palestinians in East Jerusalem also pay Jerusalem city taxes and <a href="https://justvision.org/glossary/east-jerusalem">receive general city services</a>, like water. </p>
<p>About 79% of the Palestinian families in East Jerusalem <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-jerusalem-poverty-lifestyle-5a461a09f2e14043beffa6643f5bf699">live in poverty</a>. </p>
<p>Culturally, East Jerusalem Palestinians are more connected to the West Bank, a <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18080034/west-bank-israel-palestinians">landlocked Arab area of Israel</a> that is governed by a separate government, the Palestinian Authority. Many East Jerusalem Palestinians have extended families and friends living in the West Bank.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520608/original/file-20230412-28-3qt6l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women with head covers and long dresses line up and face towards people in military green, with Hebrew writing on their back. One holds a metal detector." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520608/original/file-20230412-28-3qt6l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520608/original/file-20230412-28-3qt6l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520608/original/file-20230412-28-3qt6l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520608/original/file-20230412-28-3qt6l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520608/original/file-20230412-28-3qt6l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520608/original/file-20230412-28-3qt6l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520608/original/file-20230412-28-3qt6l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinian women are checked at an Israeli checkpoint between the West Bank and Jerusalem.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/959718222/photo/topshot-palestinian-israel-religion-ramadan.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=-VXkdDY7TAvLkkUCFEJ_sDe6nSJgxfa7mveKhGo22fs=">Musa Al Shaer/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Speaking with East Jerusalem Palestinians</h2>
<p>With this guiding question – what do East Jerusalem Palestinians think about the proposed judicial reforms and the protests against them – I conducted a survey and series of interviews with 24 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem over the course of three days in March 2023. Another Palestinian I spoke with lived in the nearby city of Ramallah, but worked in East Jerusalem.</p>
<p>I spoke with 10 women and 15 men, and the average age of the respondents was about 26. Thirteen of these people had full-time jobs, while seven were employed part time. The rest were either students or temporarily unemployed. </p>
<p>A slight majority of the respondents – approximately 52% – said that they were following <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-rejects-claim-mossad-backed-judiciary-overhaul-protests-2023-04-09/">news about the judicial reforms</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/8/thousands-join-israeli-judicial-protests-amid-soaring-tensions">ongoing protests.</a> </p>
<p>Respondents demonstrated empathy toward the protesters’ goals of suspending the judicial reform plans and, in some cases, pushing Netanyahu out of power, with one respondent openly claiming that “If I were an Israeli, I would protest too!”</p>
<p>But just two respondents said that they would want to participate in the protests themselves. “I know how the Israeli police behave,” one person explained, saying that they were afraid of being arrested or that legal action would be taken against them.</p>
<p>More significantly, they said that they did not want to protest to help preserve a legal system that has not helped them. </p>
<p>The respondents were also very concerned about the potential for increased violence against them if they joined the protests. Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, for example, grabbed headlines in early November 2022 for encouraging Israeli police to <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2022-11-25/far-right-ben-gvir-israel-national-security-minister">open fire on Palestinian stone throwers</a>.</p>
<h2>A disconnect</h2>
<p>As Israelis demonstrate in the name of saving their democracy, these Palestinians’ overarching sentiment is that they have no leader or partner to help them achieve their own civic rights or national aims. </p>
<p>“Who represents Jerusalem for us? Who speaks for Jerusalem? What brings us together?” were rhetorical questions posed during my discussions and interviews with East Jerusalem Palestinians. These people feel they are cut off from the Palestinian Authority – but that the Israeli government is also “out to get them,” as one respondent said. </p>
<p>Fundamentally, these East Jerusalem Palestinians want their most basic needs met. In particular, they say that the city neglects their neighborhoods – for example, resulting in a buildup of trash. And that their schools are severely underfunded, relative to the Jewish ones in West Jerusalem. </p>
<p>Palestinian civil society leaders have argued that this sense of isolation and lack of direction has produced a generation of young people in East Jerusalem <a href="https://public-policy.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/public-policy/files/thesismichal_weissbrod.pdf">willing to sacrifice everything</a> and possibly push back violently against the Israeli government and citizens. </p>
<p>It’s clear that East Jerusalem Palestinians indeed are listening and watching the major events underway in Israel. They want a voice in politics. But until they feel like an equal partner with democratic rights equal to Jewish Israelis, they will sit on the sidelines – and sometimes, even respond angrily with violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203464/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Derek Lief does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent in-depth interviews with Palestinians living in East Jerusalem show that while they are following the Israeli protests, they feel an overall sense of resignation about their futures.Derek Lief, PhD Student/Researcher, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1819692022-05-03T14:29:24Z2022-05-03T14:29:24ZIsrael: supreme court’s double standard on liability is unfair to Palestinians<p>One of the most basic and intuitive features that are expected of any legal system is to treat similar cases in a similar way. Sadly, when it comes to the law of negligence, Israel is not consistent in its treatment of Palestinians and other (often Jewish) citizens. </p>
<p>In the recent case of Plonim v The Palestinian Authority that was <a href="https://www.haaretz.co.il/embeds/pdf_upload/2022/20220410-172612.pdf">handed down</a> by the Supreme Court of Israel – its highest court – this liability gap was further widened. The court ordered the Palestinian Authority to compensate Israeli victims of terrorist activities, due to the fact that the Palestinian Authority provides support payments for individuals that Israel convicts of security offences. </p>
<p>This ruling, which comes at a time of growing tensions <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/29/israeli-police-and-palestinians-clash-at-al-aqsa-mosque-in-jerusalem">and clashes</a> between Israel and Palestine, is a step further in creating a liability regime of total liability of Palestine towards Israel. Israel, meanwhile, enjoys a near blanket immunity from liability towards Palestinians.</p>
<h2>A wider context</h2>
<p>In the past 40 years, Israel has <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4000631">increasingly expanded</a> its immunity from liability through legislation and court rulings, grounding a principle that it is not liable for any death, injuries or property damage it inflicts while engaging in combatant and counter-terrorist activities. This immunity regime exists in <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-war-on-compensation-troubling-signs-for-civilian-casualties-in-the-gaza-strip/">other jurisdictions</a> as well, such as Australia, Canada, the US and England and Wales. But what is unique and troubling is that alongside the ever expansive immunity Israel grants itself, its courts are constantly increasing the scope of the Palestinian Authority’s liability.</p>
<p>For example, in 2017, the <a href="https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts/13/440/021/o15&fileName=13021440.O15&type=2">supreme court ordered</a> the Palestinian Authority to pay damages to the estate of Amos Mentin, a telecommunications employee who was shot and killed by a 15-year-old Palestinian. The Palestinian Authority didn’t order the boy to commit this act of terrorism, nor did it supply the boy with the gun, or plan. </p>
<p>Why was it held liable? Because it operated a training camp in which the boy may have received some military training and – although no clear proof was provided – anti-Israel content was delivered as part of the training. The Palestinian Authority refused to supply evidence of the content of the delivered lectures, and consequently the court inferred that the talks were in fact encouraging terrorist activities. </p>
<p>To date, Israel has not been held liable for any terrorist activities that its civilian population engages in against Palestinians – even though 17-year-olds can undertake <a href="https://www.the-rampage.org/3612/features/gadna-an-authentic-idf-experience/">a week-long military training</a> aimed at readying young people for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Conscription to the military is mandatory for a duration of at least two years to the majority of 18-year-olds.</p>
<h2>The 2022 development</h2>
<p>In the Plonim ruling, the supreme court went a step further. One could accept the Mentin ruling as a failure of the burden of proof, which led to the conclusion that the Palestinian Authority encouraged terrorist activities. This conclusion is strenuous and technical, yet plausible. The Plonim conclusions are challenging and do not seem to share a similar plausibility.</p>
<p>Here, the estates of several individuals, who were killed in different terrorist activities, appealed a Jerusalem District Court decision to dismiss their claims for compensation. The claim had been against the Palestinian Authority for liability for Hamas’s terrorist activities that resulted in the deaths of the appellants’ relatives. The supreme court accepted the appeals and overturned the district court’s ruling. </p>
<p>The crux of the supreme court majority’s decision lies in the fact that the Palestinian Authority provides support payments to convicted terrorists and their families. The court views these payments as proof that the Palestinian Authority ratifies, condones and incentivises such terrorist activities. Under Israel’s <a href="https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law00/73015.htm">law of negligence</a>, it is possible to order an award of compensation against a person who didn’t cause an injury, but merely ratified the actions that caused it in retrospect.</p>
<h2>Expansion of liability</h2>
<p>The court’s conclusions in this case are a significant expansion of liability. The Palestinian Authority was not held liable for actively participating in the terrorist activities that resulted in the deaths of the appellants’ relatives. Nor was it held liable for providing the means, training, tools or funding for such activities to take place. Rather, it was held liable for providing payments that are deemed to communicate the message that these terrorist activities are legitimate. That’s it. </p>
<p>The court does not find the payments to be a way for the Palestinian Authority to claim “ownership” over the acts, as if they were done on its behalf. Instead, the payments are the equivalent of a statement of support of them.</p>
<p>The ruling also raises questions. If, for example, the Palestinian Authority were to post a message of support for the family of a convicted terrorist, would that also makes it possible for Israel to order it to compensate the victims of the terrorist attack, as the post ratifies the actions? That seems to be possible according to the Plonim case.</p>
<p>More importantly, if support payments made after the terrorist activities have taken place are sufficient to establish approval, then when security forces are standing idly by without stopping terrorist activities, that too should be considered as ratification. Yet when Israeli settlers <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iqVutFavYUI&ab_channel=TRTWorld">engaged in terrorist activities</a> against Palestinian civilians under such circumstances, the courts didn’t hold Israel liable to pay for the damage caused.</p>
<p>It seems that there are two laws of negligence: one that applies to Israel and Israelis, and another that applies to Palestine and Palestinians. Whether a person who was injured during terrorist activities will be able to obtain compensation for their injuries becomes <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/60803/discrimination-fight-terror/">a question of national identity</a> instead of being a question of law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Haim Abraham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent decisions by Israel’s highest court establish a clear divide in the way it treats Israeli and Palestinian civilians.Haim Abraham, Lecturer in Law Faculty of Laws, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1615652021-08-06T12:39:46Z2021-08-06T12:39:46ZMaking peace between Israelis and Palestinians – is now the time for a different approach?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414621/original/file-20210804-27-9ya6s1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6709%2C4446&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Palestinian and Israeli members of the Women Wage Peace movement march in Jerusalem in October 2017 to demand a peace deal.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/israeli-and-palestinian-activists-of-the-women-wage-peace-news-photo/859027322?adppopup=true">Menahem Kahana/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The violence in May 2021 between Israelis and Palestinians was the latest deadly eruption of a decadeslong conflict that has proved immune to attempts at forging a comprehensive peace. We asked two Middle East experts to assess what can be done now to promote peace. Scholars Raslan Ibrahim, assistant professor of political science and international relations at the State University of New York at Geneseo, and David Mednicoff, chair of the Department of Judaic and Near Eastern Studies at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, both imagine there’s a way forward, though their scenarios are very different.</em> </p>
<h2>A peace plan based on human rights – Raslan Ibrahim</h2>
<p>Following the <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14527.doc.htm">cease-fire</a> between Israel and Hamas after the Gaza conflict, the international community has become <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/ga12327.doc.htm">more interested in promoting the peace process</a> between Israel and Palestine. </p>
<p>So far, however, the traditional approach to conflict resolution has <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315409375-11/human-rights-israeli%E2%80%93palestinian-peace-agreements-raslan-ibrahim-edy-kaufman">failed to achieve peace in Israel/Palestine</a>. But <a href="https://www.geneseo.edu/political_science/raslan_ibrahim">as a scholar of human rights and the politics of the Middle East</a>, I believe it’s possible that a different approach, one that uses a human rights perspective on conflict resolution, could produce what the old approach could not. </p>
<p>Human rights are virtually absent in the peace agreements that have been made over the years between Israelis and Palestinians, despite the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/29/approaching-peace-centering-rights-in-israel-palestine-conflict-resolution-pub-84397">role of human rights abuses</a> in the causes and consequences of this conflict. <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/oslo-accords">The Oslo Accords</a>, signed in 1993, and subsequent peace processes demonstrate an almost complete divorce between the concepts of peace and human rights. </p>
<p>Multiple factors account for the exclusion of human rights in the Oslo Accords. </p>
<p>First, the relative power of Israel and <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315409375-11/human-rights-israeli%E2%80%93palestinian-peace-agreements-raslan-ibrahim-edy-kaufman">its interest in security and stability</a> – not human rights and justice for Palestinians – influenced the peace agreements.</p>
<p>Second, the Palestinian Authority, which serves as the Palestinian government in the occupied territories, tends to focus more on the Palestinian state and the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/10/02/focus-on-palestinian-rights-not-palestinian-state/">right of national self-determination</a> and less on other basic human rights, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx">including civil and political rights</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx">economic, social and cultural rights</a>. Strikingly, the Oslo peace process led ultimately to the establishment of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/10/23/two-authorities-one-way-zero-dissent/arbitrary-arrest-and-torture-under">Palestinian authorities in the West Bank and Gaza that abuse the human rights</a> of their own people. </p>
<p>Third, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is generally defined as a territorial conflict. That leaves human rights as a domestic issue that would not be addressed in negotiations.</p>
<p>Last, the mediators apparently adopted the traditional conflict resolution approach that <a href="https://ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2019/a-human-rights-approach-to-conflict-resolution/">regards human rights as irrelevant or even in contradiction</a> with conflict resolution practices. Clearly, this perspective has failed to end the conflict. </p>
<p>In contrast, what are the main elements of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679419000352">human rights approach</a>? </p>
<p>The human rights approach asserts that the principles and practices enshrined in the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights">Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants</a> – including equality and nondiscrimination; participation, inclusion and accountability; and the importance of the rule of law – should guide all stages of the peace process. Human rights principles also offer clear, objective criteria for monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement by the Israelis and Palestinians. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679419000352">This approach</a> calls for inclusivity and participation in the peace process, of not only the elites but also others, such as victims of the conflict, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/">women’s organizations</a> and nongovernmental organizations.</p>
<p>The human rights approach aims to achieve a particular type of peace that would include negative peace – the absence of war and violence. It also aims for <a href="https://www.economicsandpeace.org/research/#positive-peace">positive peace</a> through addressing the root causes of the conflict and building institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful relations between Israelis and Palestinians. </p>
<p>Last, this approach seeks <a href="https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice">accountability and redress for victims of the conflict</a> though a variety of mechanisms including truth commissions, reconciliation, criminal prosecutions and reparations. Past human rights abuses and injustice need to be addressed to achieve a legitimate and sustainable peace. Otherwise, the unaddressed grievances can be manipulated for future conflicts. </p>
<p>The human rights approach to conflict resolution is not a panacea. But it has distinctive advantages that help the negotiation process and can provide sustainable peace, security and human dignity for both Palestinians and Israelis.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414626/original/file-20210804-19-vjmjbo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shaking the hand of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, with President Bill Clinton between them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414626/original/file-20210804-19-vjmjbo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414626/original/file-20210804-19-vjmjbo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414626/original/file-20210804-19-vjmjbo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414626/original/file-20210804-19-vjmjbo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414626/original/file-20210804-19-vjmjbo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=515&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414626/original/file-20210804-19-vjmjbo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=515&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414626/original/file-20210804-19-vjmjbo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=515&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, U.S. President Bill Clinton and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat at the Oslo Accords signing ceremony in September 1993.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20061123154643/http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/pubpaps/1993portv2.html">Vince Musi / The White House</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A ‘grand bargain’ – David Mednicoff</h2>
<p>The recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/israel-gaza-what-we-know.html">flare-up in the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict</a> shows both that the issue is not going away and that prospects for real progress remain bleak. </p>
<p>Thoughtful commentators argue that long-standing <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/19/breaking-israel-palestine-status-quo-pub-84167">hopes for separate independent states for Palestine and Israel have been dashed</a> by the increasing Jewish Israeli settler presence in the West Bank and the lack of will or capacity of leaders on both sides to work toward a two-state agreement.</p>
<p>Many experts argue that the only way forward is to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/05/old-israeli-palestinian-conflict-is-dead-long-live-emerging-israeli-palestinian-conflict-pub-84457">assume that the two-state solution is dead</a> and pair that with pressure to improve the economic and political status of Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.</p>
<p>But can Palestinian rights actually improve in the face of Israeli state power and the world’s inaction?</p>
<p>U.S. President Joe <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-big-story-is-still-joe-bidens-mighty-ambitions">Biden’s unexpected tendency to go big in domestic policy</a> suggests the merit of at least considering a different and more ambitious approach to the Palestinian-Israeli dispute: a grand bargain. </p>
<p>This idea seeks to broaden the political scope of diplomacy to address the Palestinian issue in tandem with <a href="https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2021-03/The%20Biden%20Administration%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20-%20Policy%20Recommendations%20for%20a%20Sustainable%20Way%20Forward.pdf">long-term goals shared by many Middle Eastern and global states</a>. Those include regional stability, economic growth, conflict reduction, particularly in Yemen, and resolution of the Syrian refugee crisis. </p>
<p>In exchange for diplomatic relations with many states in the region, Israel would broker major material improvements, and ideally an acceptable territorial home, to Palestinians. </p>
<p>More specifically, a grand bargain would mean that Arab countries establish relations with Israel, and Israel would provide real political autonomy and facilitate investment and economic improvements for Palestinians. The broader region, hopefully including Iran, could focus on building trade, long-term growth and improved human security.</p>
<p>Current regional politics open the door to such an approach. To start with, Israel’s new government after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s election defeat <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/bennett-looking-to-strengthen-israel-as-a-middle-east-player-analysis-675264">could benefit</a> from an acceleration of stable economic and political ties with other countries in the region, which is <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-emergence-of-gcc-israel-relations-in-a-changing-middle-east/">likely only if Palestinians’ conditions are addressed</a>. Major Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, would be better off if they could openly pursue relations with Israel. Such a shift is possible because of the opening of official relations in 2020 between Israel and several other Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the power most known for being a major thorn in the side to both Israel and Saudi Arabia and other powerful Arab states, Iran, might <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2021/07/iran-saudi-arabia-on-the-edge-of-rapprochement/">just be open</a> to toning down its more aggressive militarism in the Middle East if trade and other economic benefits of diplomatic normalization were on the table.</p>
<p>A grand bargain approach is risky and labor-intensive, because working with a range of parties requires attention to more issues and diverse perspectives. </p>
<p>Yet the shift among Arab governments in accepting Israel in the region, <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-is-already-carving-out-a-different-middle-east-policy-from-trump-and-even-obama-156206">Biden’s openness to large-scale policy</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/conservative-hard-liner-elected-as-irans-next-president-what-that-means-for-the-west-and-the-nuclear-deal-162835">Iran’s relative global vulnerability</a> and the <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14521.doc.htm">swell of global opinion against Israeli treatment of Palestinians</a> could constitute enough favorable conditions to make this idea an innovative alternative to the dismal status quo.</p>
<p><a href="https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/about-the-grand-bargain">A grand bargain approach</a> could be initiated by the combined efforts of the U.S., Europe, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council states and would also likely require the engagement of Russia, Turkey and even China. </p>
<p>Admittedly, it would be a major uphill battle getting this range of countries to build support for major change from prominent Israelis, Palestinians and others. Yet a genuinely multilateral coalition could have the diplomatic connections and credibility to bring parties to work on a grand bargain.</p>
<p>Could the promise of greater overall stability and large-scale global economic aid allow key players to think broadly and cohesively toward a grand regional bargain? </p>
<p>Middle Eastern governments are hampered in significant ways by the fragile security, economic challenges and high military costs associated with the Palestinian and other regional conflicts. Apart from the direct <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2021/05/12/the-human-cost-of-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-over-the-past-decade-infographic/">loss of Israeli and Palestinian lives due to violence</a>, the broader region is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56397601">highly militarized</a> and has lost <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/views/news/middle-east/2018/07/27/The-cost-of-Middle-East-wars-11-trillion-and-rising">trillions of dollars as a result of conflict</a>. A benefit of the recent rapprochement between several Arab states and Israel is that more economic and political elites than ever before are working together and may have reason to prioritize regional prosperity over conflict. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.umass.edu/jne/member/david-mednicoff">As a scholar of Middle Eastern politics</a>, I assume that the odds for a grand bargain in the Middle East are low. Yet Palestinians have sought to internationalize their plight precisely because they are stuck between a dead Oslo process and a vision for a one-state solution directly at odds with many Israelis’ idea of a Jewish state.</p>
<p>To be sure, significant initiative from a wide range of parties would be needed to get this idea off of the ground. Still, a grand bargain strategy, however challenging, offers hope of improving the long-term human security prospects of Palestinians, Israelis and others by favorably resolving their current dilemma, which might be paraphrased starkly as go big or no home.</p>
<p>[<em>Understand key political developments, each week.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s politics newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nothing seems to have brought a lasting peace to Palestinians and Israelis. Two Middle East scholars suggest approaches different from what has been tried before.David Mednicoff, Chair, Department of Judaic and Near Eastern Studies, and Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies and Public Policy, UMass AmherstRaslan Ibrahim, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations, State University of New York, College at GeneseoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1642092021-07-19T12:11:22Z2021-07-19T12:11:22ZEvangelical support for Israel is neither permanent nor inevitable<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411528/original/file-20210715-32900-1hrwmn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C3%2C1007%2C679&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Trump's evangelical supporters cheered the 2018 move of of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MideastUSEmbassyToJerusalem/b6ce96595ae2499cbbc86872bc51ffdf">Ariel Schalit/AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israel’s former ambassador to the U.S., Ron Dermer, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/dermer-suggests-israel-should-prioritize-support-of-evangelicals-over-us-jews/">made waves</a> in May 2021 when he publicly suggested that Israel should prioritize its relationship with American evangelicals over American Jews. </p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/AmbDermer">Dermer described</a> evangelicals as the “backbone of Israel’s support in the United States.” By contrast, he described American Jews as “disproportionately among [Israel’s] critics.” </p>
<p>Dermer’s comments seemed shocking to many because he stated them in public to a reporter. But as <a href="https://walkerrobins.com/">a historian of the evangelical-Israeli relationship</a>, I didn’t find them surprising. The Israeli right’s preference for working with conservative American evangelicals over more politically variable American Jews has been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/19/world/middleeast/netanyahu-evangelicals-embassy.html">evident for years</a>. And this preference has in many ways paid off. </p>
<h2>Christian Zionism in the Trump era</h2>
<p>American Christian Zionists are evangelicals who believe that Christians have a duty to support the Jewish state because the Jews remain God’s chosen people.</p>
<p>During the Trump years, Christian Zionists were crucial allies for former Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. They helped Netanyahu lobby Trump for the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/19/world/middleeast/netanyahu-evangelicals-embassy.html">relocation of</a> the U.S. embassy <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/12/18/the-biggest-fans-of-president-trumps-israel-policy-evangelical-christians/">to Jerusalem</a>, as well as the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/05/08/the-withdrawal-from-the-iran-deal-signals-a-new-power-player-in-washington-christian-zionists/">withdrawal of the U.S.</a> from the “Iran Deal” – the international nuclear arms control agreement with Iran.</p>
<p>These evangelicals also backed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-endorses-israeli-control-of-the-disputed-golan-heights/2019/03/21/7cfc0554-4bfb-11e9-93d0-64dbcf38ba41_story.html">Trump’s recognition</a> of Israel’s 1981 annexation of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-recognition-of-the-golan-heights-as-israeli-territory-matters-114132">the Golan Heights</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-cuts-more-than-200-million-in-aid-to-the-palestinians/2018/08/24/5bd7d58e-a7db-11e8-97ce-cc9042272f07_story.html">cuts of more than US$200 million to American funding for the Palestinian Authority</a> in 2018. </p>
<p>Coming after this string of policy victories for the Israeli-evangelical alliance, Dermer’s comments made sense.</p>
<p>However, the alliance’s future may be in doubt. <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/evangelical-youth-losing-love-for-israel-by-35-percent-study-shows-671178">Recent polling shows dramatic declines</a> in support for Israel among <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/05/26/as-israel-increasingly-relies-on-us-evangelicals-for-support-younger-ones-are-walking-away-what-polls-show/">young American evangelicals</a>. Scholars <a href="https://uncp.academia.edu/MottiInbari">Motti Inbari</a> and <a href="https://www.uncp.edu/profile/dr-kirill-bumin">Kirill Bumin</a> found that between 2018 and 2021, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/support-for-israel-among-young-us-evangelicals-drops-sharply-survey/">rates of support fell</a> from 69% to 33.6% among evangelicals ages 18-29.</p>
<p>While these polls speak most immediately to the current context, they also underline a larger historical point: Evangelical support for Israel is neither permanent nor inevitable.</p>
<h2>Southern Baptists and Israel</h2>
<p>The Southern Baptist Convention – long the denominational avatar of white American evangelicalism – offers an example of how these beliefs have shifted over time, which I examine in my book “<a href="http://www.uapress.ua.edu/product/Between-Dixie-and-Zion,7406.aspx">Between Dixie and Zion: Southern Baptists and Palestine before Israel</a>.” </p>
<p>Southern Baptists are broadly supportive of Israel, and have been for much of the past half-century. Baptist leaders like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/20/archives/evangelists-meet-in-the-holy-land-1000-from-32-countries-confer-on.html">W.A. Criswell</a> and <a href="https://www.baptistpress.com/resource-library/news/ed-mcateer-pioneer-for-faith-in-public-policy-dies-at-78/">Ed McAteer</a> helped organize Christian Zionism in the U.S. The Southern Baptist Convention itself has passed a number of <a href="https://www.sbc.net/resource-library/resolutions/?fwp_resolution_search=israel">pro-Israel resolutions</a> in recent decades.</p>
<p>More recently, Southern Baptist support for Israel was highlighted when the Trump administration <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/05/15/mitt-romney-may-not-like-it-but-robert-jeffress-was-a-natural-choice-to-deliver-the-invocation-at-the-new-u-s-embassy-in-jerusalem/">invited Robert Jeffress</a>, pastor of the First Baptist Church in Dallas, to lead a prayer at the opening of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem in 2018.</p>
<p>However, Southern Baptists were not always so unified in support for Israel, or the Zionist movement that led to its creation. This was evident only days after the establishment of Israel in 1948, when messengers to the convention’s annual meeting <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1948/05/20/archives/baptists-criticize-truman-on-israel-refuse-commendation-consider.html?searchResultPosition=1">repeatedly and overwhelmingly voted down resolutions</a> calling for the convention to send a congratulatory telegram to U.S. President – and fellow Southern Baptist – Harry Truman for being the first foreign leader to recognize the Jewish state. </p>
<h2>Zionism was ‘God’s plan’ – unless it wasn’t</h2>
<p>This seems shocking today, after years of seemingly unanimous evangelical support for Israel. However, as I document in <a href="http://www.uapress.ua.edu/product/Between-Dixie-and-Zion,7406.aspx">my book</a>, Southern Baptists had diverse views on Zionism and “the Palestine question” in the decades leading up to Israel’s birth. While some did argue that support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was a Christian duty, others defended the Arab majority’s rights in the Holy Land. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="U.S. President Harry S. Truman holds a copy of the Torah, presented to him by Chaim Weizman, right, in Washington on May 25, 1948." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Southern Baptist Convention refused to congratulate President Harry Truman for being the first world leader to officially recognize the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, even though he was one of their own. At right is Chaim Weizman.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TrumanandWeizman/ae37ce7d442f4f5388d28efdb8b9938d">ASSOCIATED PRESS</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During this era, the Southern Baptist Convention published books, pamphlets and other materials reflecting both sides. In 1936, its press <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/9963436">published a work by missionary Jacob Gartenhaus</a>, a convert from Judaism to evangelical Christianity, arguing that to be against Zionism was “to oppose God’s plan.” The following year, however, the press published <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/7962317">a mission study manual by J. McKee Adams</a> contending that “by every canon of justice and fair-play, the Arab is the man of first importance.” </p>
<p>Adams was one among a coterie of professors at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary who spoke out against what they sometimes derided as “Christian Zionism” – then an unusual term.</p>
<p>Even evangelicals who believed the Bible anticipated the return of Jews to Palestine disagreed on whether the Zionist movement was part of God’s plan. </p>
<p>The influential Baptist leader J. Frank Norris of Fort Worth, Texas, who broke away from the mainstream Southern Baptist Convention in the 1920s, argued in the 1930s and 1940s that Christians had a duty to God and civilization <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/432608001">to support the Zionists</a>. </p>
<p>But there was no widespread sense that being a Baptist – or an evangelical Protestant – entailed support for Zionism. John R. Rice, a prominent disciple of Norris’, rejected his mentor’s arguments outright. “The Zionist movement is not a fulfillment of the prophecies about Israel being restored,” Rice <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31748240">wrote in 1945</a>. “Preachers who think so are mistaken.” </p>
<p>Regarding the political question of whether Arabs or Jews should control Palestine, most evangelicals were unconcerned. The Southern Baptists focused on other priorities in the Holy Land, such as the growth of their missions in Jerusalem and Nazareth. Even those Baptists who supported the establishment of a Jewish state did not organize politically around the issue.</p>
<h2>The future of Christian Zionism</h2>
<p>In the decades after the establishment of Israel, however, <a href="https://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15966.html">motivated evangelical and Jewish activists – as well as the Israeli government – </a> worked to stitch together the interfaith relationships, build the institutions and spread the ideas underpinning today’s Christian Zionist movement. These efforts have been remarkably effective in making support for Israel <a href="https://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15966.html">a defining element</a> of many evangelicals’ religious and political identities.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://religionnews.com/2021/05/26/survey-young-evangelicals-largely-backed-biden-and-have-shifting-views-on-israel/">as the latest polling of young evangelicals shows</a>, there is no guarantee this will be permanent. This diverse and globally connected generation of evangelicals has <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-gen-x-and-millennial-evangelicals-are-losing-faith-in-the-conservative-culture-wars-162407">its own ideas and priorities</a>. It is more interested in social justice, less invested in the culture wars and increasingly weary of conservative politics.</p>
<p>Young evangelicals remain to be convinced of Christian Zionism. And they very well may not be.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Walker Robins does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The political alliance between American evangelicals and Israel’s right wing may have peaked during the Trump administration.Walker Robins, Lecturer in History, Merrimack CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/974872018-06-06T15:17:50Z2018-06-06T15:17:50ZPalestinians are not powerless – they can take the initiative<p>Donald Trump’s recent policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been unambiguous, to put it mildly. His administration is increasingly aligned with <a href="https://theconversation.com/profile-avigdor-lieberman-israels-hardline-defence-minister-96474">one of the most right-wing governments</a> in Israel’s history. Most radically of all, it reversed a longstanding US policy by <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-trumps-recognition-of-jerusalem-as-the-capital-of-israel-means-for-the-middle-east-88722">recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel</a>, and relocating the US embassy there from Tel Aviv. But, while the US policy has been the subject of furious debate, there’s been relatively little discussion about how the Palestinian leaders can respond.</p>
<p>It’s very important not to see the Palestinians and their leaders as passive actors or helpless victims. This is an evolving situation, and the Palestinian people are far from powerless. In fact, the current US-Israeli alliance presents Palestinian leaders with new opportunities to formulate counter-policies and preserve the Palestinian issue’s status as a just cause.</p>
<p>There’s plenty to do on the home front, and high up the list is achieving national unity among the different Palestinian political factions – Fatah and Hamas – and also the wider Palestinian communities in the homeland and the Shatat (diaspora). </p>
<p>Shatat communities have been marginalised in Palestinian political life ever since the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7385301.stm">Oslo Accords</a> were signed in the early 1990s. While the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) returned to the occupied territories, the vast majority of the Palestinian refugee and displaced communities in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan were left waiting for an end to the displacement that began in 1948. They are still waiting today.</p>
<p>The PLO’s existing institutions need to be reformed and reinvigorated, and Palestinian communities within the homeland and the Shatat given a true voice in them. More than that, if Palestinian leaders want to put Israel under pressure, they need to think seriously about engaging in national campaigns of nonviolent popular resistance and civil disobedience.</p>
<h2>Changing course</h2>
<p>One of the Israeli military and political leadership’s biggest fears is the emergence of an unarmed and nonviolent movement in the occupied Palestinian territories, one that could attract international support and the attention of the world’s media. The possibility of Palestinian refugees marching towards their confiscated land and demanding their national rights has <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/gaza-s-refugees-have-always-haunted-israel-now-they-re-on-the-march-1.5958265">haunted Israel for 70 years</a>, and the last thing the Netanyahu government wants to see is an organised peaceful mass resistance movement that the wider world might feel comfortable supporting.</p>
<p>Along these lines, there’s another radical option the Palestinian leaders should consider: to shift its focus from the failing two-state solution to the pursuit of full and equal rights for all its citizens.</p>
<p>Palestinians in Israel face severe everyday discrimination, and Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank including East Jerusalem are living under oppressive military occupation. Both are subject to complex and unjust legal structures that accord full rights to Israelis and settlers while denying protection and national rights to indigenous Palestinian communities.</p>
<p>Seeking equal rights and justice in all of Palestine is not only a democratic question, but a challenge to exclusive ideologies that have maintained separation and conflict. Among Palestinian intellectual and political representatives, the discourse of citizenship and equality is <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/04/israel-palestinians-mahmoud-abbas-demography-two-state.html">regaining currency</a> as a primary means of conflict transformation – largely because of the failure of the two-state solution.</p>
<h2>The high ground</h2>
<p>Another option is to keep pursuing international recognition of Palestinian statehood. This may not make much impact on Palestinians’ everyday lives, but it will certainly help enhance Palestine’s international status and foreground the Palestinian issue in international law. And that in turn will put Israel under increasing pressure to accept Palestinian national independence.</p>
<p>The most recent breakthroughs on this front came at the UN, which in 2012 effectively <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-statehood/palestinians-win-de-facto-u-n-recognition-of-sovereign-state-idUSBRE8AR0EG20121201">recognised Palestine’s statehood</a> and granted it membership as a “non-member observer state”. That move has granted the Palestinians access to international justice mechanisms; today, the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/palestine">International Criminal Court</a> is investigating potential war crimes committed by Israel since June 2014 in Palestinian territories, particularly in Gaza.</p>
<p>The Palestinian political leadership can also do more to leverage the PLO’s recognition of Israel. Whereas the PLO has recognised Israel’s right to live in peace and security since the 1993 Oslo Accords, Israel has never reciprocated and recognised Palestinian statehood. Instead, in the words of <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt18dzscm">Sara Roy</a>, the Oslo process saw the Israeli military occupation of Palestinian territories became “formalised” and “institutionalised”. Yet despite <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/middle-east/173784-180502-palestinian-leader-to-i24news-oslo-agreement-to-be-voted-obsolete">repeated statements</a> bemoaning the Oslo framework’s failure, the Palestinian Authority has yet to capitalise on this obvious political inequality. Instead, it is still firmly committed thanks to the political, economic and security interests of its ruling elites.</p>
<p>To change the calculus, the Palestinian Authority leadership needs to put the issue of equal state recognition back on the agenda and consider the merit of its dogged commitment to the Oslo Accords. Options like this might not reverse the damage created by Trump’s alignment with the right-wing Israeli leadership, but they will prove that the Palestinians are serious and capable of developing policies that can lead to genuine change and win over international public opinion.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>More articles about <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/palestine-1178?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement">Palestine</a>, written by experts:</em></p>
<ul>
<li><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/stop-telling-palestinians-to-be-resilient-the-rest-of-the-world-has-failed-them-96587?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement">Stop telling Palestinians to be ‘resilient’ – the rest of the world has failed them</a></em></li>
<li><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/five-myths-about-palestines-youth-activists-debunked-96736?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement">Five myths about Palestine’s youth activists – debunked</a></em></li>
<li><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-now-has-a-toxic-biosphere-of-war-that-no-one-can-escape-95397?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement">Gaza now has a toxic ‘biosphere of war’ that no one can escape</a></em></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97487/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yaser Alashqar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Palestinian nonviolent protests and mass movement of resistance is one of Israel’s biggest fears.Yaser Alashqar, Adjunct Assistant Professor and Lecturer in conflict studies and Middle East politics, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/902822018-01-23T14:52:02Z2018-01-23T14:52:02ZTrump cuts aid to Palestinian refugees – and throws their future into doubt<p>The Trump administration has announced that it will <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/cuts-unrwa-funding-180116193513823.html">drastically cut its donations</a> to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (<a href="https://www.unrwa.org">UNRWA</a>). Instead of the US$125m expected, UNRWA will now receive only US$60m from the US to fund its services for Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.</p>
<p>The move is the latest stage in the ongoing fallout from the US’ December 2017 decision to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-42246564">recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital</a>, to which the Palestinian Authority responded by saying that it would <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/erekat-no-peace-talks-until-us-revokes-jerusalem-recognition/">no longer participate</a> in US-led peace talks. President Trump then <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/948322496591384576">tweeted</a> that he would cut US payments to “the Palestinians” due to their lack of respect. </p>
<p>The significance of this funding cut cannot be overstated. UNRWA currently provides not only emergency relief but also education and healthcare to more than 5m Palestinian refugees. As UNRWA Commissioner-General, Pierre Krähenbühl, <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/statement-unrwa-commissioner-general-pierre-kr%C3%A4henb%C3%BChl-1">stated</a>, their living conditions are now severely threatened. The impact is likely to be particularly serious in Gaza, where <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/gaza-strip">more than 70%</a> of the population receive services from UNRWA. </p>
<p>The cut’s repercussions will be political as well as humanitarian. UNRWA provides aid to <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees">exiled communities of stateless Palestinians</a> who originally lost their homes in the 1948 war (known in Arabic as the <a href="https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/PalestineRemix/al-nakba.html#/17">Nakba</a> or catastrophe). In other words, it serves some of the poorest and most vulnerable people in the Middle East – people whose <a href="http://prrn.mcgill.ca/research/papers/brynen_980403.htm">position</a> remains one of the most intractable <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11104284">issues</a> in the struggle with Israel.</p>
<p>Standing at the intersection of aid and politics, UNRWA is seen as a key force for maintaining stability in the region. Indeed, UNRWA spokesperson Chris Gunness has said that the cut <a href="https://www.albawaba.com/news/original-unrwa-trump-cuts-funding-refugees-1075840">threatens the stability</a> of the entire Middle East.</p>
<p>In particular, UNRWA currently provides <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/what-we-do/education">schooling</a> to half a million Palestinian children. They are now at risk of becoming acutely vulnerable at a time when numerous extremists are seeking recruits in the region. This will be to the benefit of the US’s enemies, and particular, it will create a vacuum for more hostile regional actors to provide refugees with services – most notably <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/12/donald-trump-cut-funding-palestinian-refugees-middle-east-security">Hamas in Gaza</a>. </p>
<p>Since UNRWA works across the Middle East, the impact will not be limited to the Palestinian territories. The agency’s services are vital in Jordan, Lebanon, and most of all Syria, which is now in its seventh year of civil war. Since 2011, UNRWA has provided essential aid to Palestinians fleeing Syria as <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/03/palestinian-syrians-refugees-160321055107834.html">two-time refugees</a>. It has also helped relieve the burden on the Jordanian and Lebanese governments, which host the <a href="http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/culture/the-palestinian-precedent-and-the-syrian-refugee-crisis_44193">largest populations of Syrian refugees</a> in addition to long-term Palestinian refugee populations.</p>
<h2>Tearing it up</h2>
<p>Unsurprisingly, Palestinian leaders have been swift to condemn the move. The Palestine Liberation Organisation described it as a <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Trump-cuts-UNRWA-funding-amid-Abbas-assault-536917">political decision</a> designed to <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/plo-cut-to-unrwa-proves-u-s-complicit-in-israeli-occupation-1.5742399">undermine Palestinian rights</a>. The Trump administration’s <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/abbas-palestinians-are-canaanites-were-in-jerusalem-before-jews-1.5743576">already shaky relationship</a> with the Palestinian Authority seems doomed to decline further.</p>
<p>To make matters worse, the US’s announcement comes at a critical time in Palestinian politics. After over a decade of bitter division, rival factions Fatah and Hamas signed a <a href="https://theconversation.com/palestinian-leaders-must-make-their-unity-deal-work-for-their-own-sake-and-their-peoples-85033">reconciliation deal</a> in October 2017, which set out proposals to establish a united Palestinian government in the West Bank and Gaza. But recent <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-fatah-hamas-are-at-an-impasse-1.5630299">reports</a> suggest that the deal may be <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171222-hamas-reconciliation-agreement-with-fatah-collapsing/">stalling</a> – and further instability will not help.</p>
<p>The cut to UNRWA’s funding also signifies serious fissures in US foreign policy. While some right-wing politicians in the US have long criticised UNRWA for allegedly being pro-Palestinian, successive administrations have continued to fund it. Krähenbühl noted this in his recent <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/statement-unrwa-commissioner-general-pierre-kr%C3%A4henb%C3%BChl-1">statement</a>, pointing out that the US <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2018/01/withholding-aid-palestinian-refugees-180119175843394.html?ref=hvper.com">donated US$350m</a> last year. In reversing this decades-long position, the Trump administration has signalled it is willing to disregard some of the central pillars of US foreign policy.</p>
<h2>The view from abroad</h2>
<p>International reactions to the move have largely been unfavourable. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres expressed concern and pointed out in a statement that <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sgsm18856.doc.htm">UNRWA is a UN organisation</a>, not a Palestinian institution as Trump implied. <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/arab-league-us-cutting-unrwa-funds-to-erase-palestinian-refugees/">The Arab League</a> and <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/global-ngos-criticise-drastic-cuts-unrwa-funding-180117061559788.html">numerous NGOs</a> have also been critical. Following the US decision, the Belgian government has pledged <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/belgium-pledges-23m-unrwa-aid-cut-180118081044623.html">an emergency donation of US$23m</a> and the Norwegian government has <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/norway-provides-nok-125-million-un-agency-palestine-refugees">announced</a> one of 125 million krone – but these will not fill the gap completely.</p>
<p>Only the Israeli government has <a href="http://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/israel/2018/january/as-us-slashes-65m-to-anti-israel-unrwa-netanyahu-says-us-to-move-embassy-to-jerusalem-much-sooner">welcomed</a> the news, following on from <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/11/israeli-pm-calls-un-dismantle-palestinian-aid-agency/?WT.mc_id=tmg_share_fb">Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s call last year</a> to abolish UNRWA completely. Yet with the Trump administration vocal in its disregard for world opinion, its isolation on this issue may prove immaterial. </p>
<p>Before the US announced the funding cut, UNRWA was already suffering from a <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/statement-unrwa-commissioner-general-pierre-kr%C3%A4henb%C3%BChl-0">prolonged budget deficit</a>. Now it faces another crisis, UNRWA has responded with an <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/donate">emergency appeal</a>, and is considering alternative sources of funding. But it doesn’t have much time – and the window for mitigating the cut’s potentially disastrous impact is worryingly tight.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article has been updated to include the Norwegian government’s announcement.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne Irfan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With a single cut in donations to a UN agency, Donald Trump has abandoned another norm of US foreign policy. The consequences could be disastrous.Anne Irfan, Teaching Fellow in Middle Eastern History, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/850332017-10-19T13:16:02Z2017-10-19T13:16:02ZPalestinian leaders must make their unity deal work – for their own sake and their people’s<p>A <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/hamas-fatah-finally-reconciliation-deal-171013111631942.html">new reconciliation deal</a> between Palestine’s two main political parties, Hamas and Fatah, is the first successful attempt to bring the two sides together in years. If implemented, it could see them finally form a single authority to oversee all the Palestinian territories. But anyone who follows the politics of Palestine closely will know not to take the much-ballyhooed accord for granted until it’s actually put into practice.</p>
<p>The sheer number of factors at play makes true unity among Palestine’s leaders extremely difficult to achieve. Foremost among these is the Israeli occupation and its ever-deepening expansion and belligerence. In practice, Israel controls the entirety of historic Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. While it may not control Gaza on the inside, it has total control over its airspace, sea and almost all its borders.</p>
<p>Yet this is not to say that Palestinian leaders themselves are blameless. For 11 years, Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank have been separately ruled. The two are committed to contradictory political programmes; they have spent too much time locked in damaging squabbles, more than once apparently closing in on a deal and then failing to seal it. </p>
<p>Small wonder then that the current Egyptian-sponsored plan for reconciliation and consolidation of authority has been welcomed by Palestinians in both areas of control. So far, only Israel has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/17/israel-will-not-negotiate-with-palestinian-unity-government-if-hamas-is-involved">objected</a>. Its hawkish prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, responded with the usual demands for Hamas to recognise Israel as an exclusively Jewish state – the implication being the acceptance of its prerogative to enforce the status quo. </p>
<h2>Locked in</h2>
<p>Of the two Palestinian factions, Hamas in particular is in a squeeze. As its popularity ebbs away – its worst fear realised – it seems to be waking up to the need to change tack.</p>
<p>Far from the party of resistance it claims to be, its leaders have spent years <a href="https://www.algemeiner.com/2014/07/28/gazas-millionaires-and-billionaires-how-hamass-leaders-got-rich-quick/">accumulating wealth for themselves</a> while their people suffer. But now, its decision to give up some of its authority by striking a deal with Fatah signals that it’s willing to retreat to its default resistance movement mode. Isolated without much leverage in a destabilised Middle East, it is apparently ready to relinquish the grinding business of sole authority.</p>
<p>To keep control of Gaza, it needs the financial support of useful Arab allies, but it has very few. Only Egypt has any particular interest in working with it; despite the group’s affinity with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which the Cairo government considers a terrorist organisation, it has a vital role to play in securing Egypt’s troubled borders and the violent Sinai region. The Egyptian president, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is keen to turn Egypt into a regional deal-broker, so despite their mutual distrust, the two parties had an interest in making this new deal happen.</p>
<p>Gaza’s challenges are enormous. Its very survival has been in doubt for the 11 years since its siege began, and indeed long before that; alarm bells have been rung by most of the United Nations’ aid agencies. It has endured three cruel Israeli wars and several incursions, which killed and destroyed thousands of lives and damaged its weak infrastructure. It still endures severe shortages of electricity, water, medical and basic food supplies.</p>
<p>One of the cruellest aspects of the siege is its impact on Gaza’s mostly young population, who are trapped without hope of realising their enormous potential for education and innovation. In this, all the powers concerned – Israel and its paymaster ally the US, Egypt, Palestinian leaders on both sides – are complicit.</p>
<p>And so the newly mooted Palestinian reconciliation is clearly a major step. It’s especially reassuring to see Hamas leader Yahiya al-Sinwar, who was imprisoned in Israel for more than 22 years, confirm his movement’s commitment to reconciliation.</p>
<p>But it would be naïve to think that Gaza’s woes are nearly over. It is still under siege. Egypt has yet to fully open its borders with Gaza and cement its formal relationship with the Hamas leadership. And Hamas realises that Gaza is – however tenuously – still in its hands. If it can only play by the diplomatic rules required to satisfy Egypt and its allies, it might not lose that much after all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85033/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Atef Alshaer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After many failed attempts, Hamas and Fatah might just have struck a crucial accord. But can they follow through?Atef Alshaer, Lecturer in Arabic Studies, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/819192017-08-15T12:14:27Z2017-08-15T12:14:27ZA major uprising in Jerusalem and beyond is just a few missteps away<p>The last thing the Middle East needs is a major conflagration in Israel-Palestine – but a summer crisis in Jerusalem made it clear that in the right circumstances, it really could happen.</p>
<p>The crisis began in the early hours of July 14. Three young Arab Israelis broke into the Haram al-Sharif, which Jews call the Temple Mount, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/14/shooting-attack-jerusalem-temple-mount-friday-prayers">killed two Israeli-Druze police officers</a>; they were pursued inside the holy place and shot dead nearby. In a highly unusual and controversial move, the Israeli government responded by shutting down the holy compound to Muslim worshippers gathering for Friday prayers. The shrine was reopened to Muslims the following Sunday, but with new metal detectors and additional “smart cameras” installed. </p>
<p>The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, vowed that the status quo at the site <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=netanyahu+status+quo+temple+mount&rlz=1C5CHFA_enUS685US685&oq=netanyahu+status+quo+temple+mount&aqs=chrome..69i57.3934j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">would be preserved</a>, but his reassurances weren’t enough. </p>
<p>Many Palestinians saw Israel’s unilateral decision to set up metal detectors as part of an <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/plo-warns-against-danger-of-temple-mount-judaization/">attempt</a> to “Judaise” the site, and soon a popular uprising was underway. Muslim worshippers gathered outside the site’s entrances to defend what they called “al-Aqsa under threat”. In keeping with the orders of the city’s Islamic leaders, the <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/amid-temple-mount-tumult-the-who-what-and-why-of-its-waqf-rulers/">Muslim Waqf</a> and the <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/7/15/grand-mufti-of-jerusalem-freed-from-israeli-custody">Grand Mufti of Jerusalem</a>, they refused to enter the compound through the metal detectors, and organised collective prayers in defiance of what they saw as an Israeli encroachment on Islam’s third holiest site.</p>
<p>When Israel finally removed the security apparatus from the holy site and everything supposedly returned to normal, the Waqf and the Mufti <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/islamic-waqf-prayers-al-aqsa-170727071457738.html">lifted their boycott</a>, encouraging Muslims to worship at al-Aqsa again. Thousands of Palestinians <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/there-no-sweeter-feeling-palestinians-hail-victory-al-aqsa-747348862">hailed the announcement</a> as “a victory from God” over the “Israeli occupier”.</p>
<p>This might sound like a disaster averted. But while the crisis might have been temporarily resolved, it proved that the risk of serious violence and instability is still very much there.</p>
<p>Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount has been <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/03/magazine/israel-s-y2k-problem.html">called</a> “the single most explosive piece of real estate on the planet”. It sits in the heart of a holy city that’s claimed as a capital city by both sides in one of the world’s most intractable conflicts. </p>
<p>Tensions at the site have ignited hostilities before most notoriously in 2000 at the outset of the Second Intifada, also known as the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3677206.stm">al-Aqsa Intifada</a>. In October 2015, the idea that al-Aqsa was falling into Zionist hands was one of the given justifications for a wave of <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-idUSKBN17P0G9">stabbings, shootings and vehicular attacks</a> on Israeli police and civilians. </p>
<p>Given this history, there’s nothing truly unprecedented about the most recent crisis. But the sheer impact of the protests it sparked took everyone by surprise, including political leaders on all sides.</p>
<h2>Caught in the middle</h2>
<p>As far as the Israeli authorities are concerned, the situation has now returned to normal, but the state’s behaviour during the crisis should worry everyone concerned.</p>
<p>Netanyahu’s government framed the July 14 attacks as a security issue, and put the sacred compound under strict surveillance. Despite the risks of escalation attached to more or less anything Palestinian leaders perceive as a change to the status quo, Israel still installed its metal detectors and cameras unilaterally, surely reinforcing Palestinian anxieties about a supposed Zionist takeover of the holy site.</p>
<p>Netanyahu knows all too well how dangerous sudden change can be, and only a minority of national-religious politicians in his ruling coalition really want to see unrestrained Jewish control over the sacred site. But he’s in a bind: only with the support of these powerful national-religious figures can he hold his government together, and it’s those same allies’ growing activism that usually triggers dangerous clashes at the sacred site. </p>
<p>Sure enough, Netanyahu’s decision to withdraw Israel’s security measures at the holy site enraged his hard-right coalition partners, not least his minister of education, <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.574692">Naftali Bennett</a>, who’s expected to challenge him at the next election.</p>
<p>As for Palestinian leaders, the events of July showed how much the dynamics on their side have changed in recent years.</p>
<p>The president of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, initially <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Israel-to-reopen-Temple-Mount-following-attack-treads-carefully-amid-heightened-tensions-499798">condemned the assailants’ actions</a>. But once Israel installed its metal detectors, he had to change tack, offering <a href="http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2017/07/27/27-jul-17-world-view-israel-braces-for-new-day-of-rage-at-al-aqsa-mosque-in-jerusalem-on-friday/">words of support</a> to the Muslim worshippers refusing to enter the compound: “We support you and are proud of you … This is the appropriate reaction to anybody hurting our holy sites.”</p>
<p>Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri took a similar tone, <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.801344">calling</a> the attack in Jerusalem “a natural reaction to Israeli terror and the desecration of al-Aqsa Mosque” by the Jewish settlers. As Zuhri, that reaction would have also proved that all Palestinians are “united” in resistance. </p>
<p>Yet for all their grandiose rhetoric, Fatah and Hamas probably had little if any influence over what was happening in the Old City and East Jerusalem. Since at least the Second Intifada, Palestinians living in these areas have steadily become isolated from leaders in Ramallah and Gaza. Given the success of their recent protests, they may well start gearing up for a <a href="http://www.jerusalemonline.com/news/middle-east/israeli-palestinian-relations/hamas-leader-calls-muslims-to-defend-al-aqsa-29838">protracted struggle</a> to “defend” al-Aqsa, and they can do it without direction from either Fatah or Hamas.</p>
<h2>Beyond borders</h2>
<p>If they do, the ramifications could be seismic. Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount is more than a touchstone of the Palestinian struggle for national self-determination; it’s a concern for millions of faithful Muslims in the Middle East and beyond, and anything that happens there is almost guaranteed to have repercussions well beyond Israel and Palestine.</p>
<p>Sure enough, when the recent crisis took hold, local and international news outlets reported that several Arab leaders were variously <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/151077-170722-jordan-and-egypt-seek-to-persuade-israel-to-remove-temple-mount-metal-detectors">working to defuse it</a> and to <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.802834">mute</a> reports on it in their own countries. They did so out of fear that the Palestinian uprising could spread to other Muslim countries and spark something like an another “Arab Spring”. </p>
<p>A new intifada centred on such a powerful symbol of Muslim identity would be more than a local struggle; it could start a wave of Islamic solidarity and protest across the Middle East, and force repressive, unjust Arab regimes into violent confrontation with their own citizens.</p>
<p>For now, Israel and the Palestinian Authorities are at a diplomatic impasse, and the international community still isn’t seriously engaged with the conflict’s central symbolic problems. As the <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Palestinians-want-US-to-back-two-states-and-ask-Israel-to-halt-settlement-building-502353">Israeli settlement project</a> continues, Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount is still a dangerous flashpoint – and a wave of unrest and violence across both Palestine and Israel proper is still on the cards.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81919/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlo Aldrovandi receives funding from Trinity College Dublin - Irish Research Council </span></em></p>What caused the latest crisis at the world’s most explosive piece of real estate, and could it happen again?Carlo Aldrovandi, Assistant Professor in International Peace Studies, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/497942015-11-04T16:46:35Z2015-11-04T16:46:35ZWhat is the legacy of Yitzhak Rabin?<p>On November 4 1995, Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister of Israel, was murdered by Yigal Amir, an extremist religious Jew opposed to his peace deals with the Palestinians. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo">Oslo process</a>, which culminated with the awkward handshake between Rabin and Yasser Arafat on the White House lawn in September 1993, established limited self-rule for Palestinians and entailed an Israeli redeployment from the West Bank, territory that Amir believed to be the biblical birthright of the Jewish people. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/T8CFL6gHgxI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>It’s common to contend that Rabin’s murder also killed the peace process. But given Rabin’s willingness to change course depending on the circumstances, there is no way to know whether he would have continued with the concessions agreed in the Oslo accords. </p>
<p>So, 20 years on, how to assess Rabin’s legacy? </p>
<h2>The 1990s – a relatively secure decade</h2>
<p>Rabin knew that by the 1990s, Israel was more secure than it had ever been since its establishment in 1948. </p>
<p>By the time he became prime minister (for the second time) in 1992, Israel had a peace treaty with Egypt and a close alliance with the United States. It was the strongest military power in the region, with the most advanced weapons systems and a powerful domestic arms industry, while its most vociferous enemies – Iraq and the Palestine Liberation Organization – had either been defeated (Iraq in the First Gulf War) or were at the nadir of their influence and appeal (the PLO at the end of the First Intifada). It was also in the early 1990s that the country established diplomatic relations with key states in the world, including Russia, China and India. Israel could, Rabin felt, afford a peace process with the Palestinians. </p>
<p>That realism also led Rabin to the belief that a Palestinian state was inevitable as a result of Oslo, as he told his close aide Eitan Haber (who in turn told me during an interview). </p>
<p>Rabin <a href="http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/16/4/687.abstract">didn’t like or trust</a> Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, and it’s not clear whether he had a sense of what such a state would look like. But he knew ruling over another people was no longer viable. And he was <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Israels-National-Security-Woodrow-Wilson/dp/0801862175">already thinking</a> about Iran as the primary strategic threat to the country. </p>
<p>At the same time, however, Rabin was capable of using brute force when he deemed it necessary. </p>
<h2>A ‘risk’ for peace?</h2>
<p>Rabin’s “break their bones” <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=hHQe4qn-EmUC&pg=PA259&lpg=PA259&dq=Rabin+break+their+bones+Yaari+intifada&source=bl&ots=DYWWXxPDDe&sig=ZuuOCDui6ZacxF-1QNcJIsWNcks&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDgQ6AEwBGoVChMIgdKc4tP0yAIVDGs-Ch0WAgmC#v=onepage&q=Rabin%20break%20their%20bones%20Yaari%20intifada&f=false">instructions</a> regarding Palestinian protesters and rioters in the First Intifada helped legitimize a harsh Israeli response to civilian rallies against the occupation. </p>
<p>He used deportation and border closures as he thought necessary. In other words, he did not hesitate to use force and coercion. But he was, at the same time, willing to innovate for the sake of Israeli security, and to adopt nonmilitary means as well. </p>
<p>It’s become a cliché to talk of “risks for peace,” and Rabin used similar language in defending Oslo. </p>
<p>But Rabin didn’t see things as gambles. As a military man, he saw issues as having best solutions, which might still fail. But it was important to try. </p>
<p>Almost all of Israel’s leaders have dismissed this part of his legacy – his willingness to take risks.<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/19/the-weakening-of-the-israeli-left/"> Even those on the left and in the center</a> worry that the Israeli public doesn’t want to hear about an end to the occupation while Palestinian terrorism continues. Unlike Rabin, they have been unwilling to confront public opinion on the matter.</p>
<h2>A golden era for Jewish-Arab relations in Israel</h2>
<p>There is another important issue of Yitzhak Rabin’s time in office that has been eclipsed in the past 20 years. </p>
<p>Rabin’s second tenure as prime minister is known as the “golden era” of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel. Rabin paid more attention to Arab citizens of Israel, about 20% of the population, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2015-10-14/arab-israelis-step-out">than any other Jewish Israeli leader had before or has since</a>.</p>
<p>In addition to <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Soldier-Peace-Life-Yitzhak-Rabin/dp/0060186844">directing more resources</a> to the community, he responded to their concerns by dropping the traditional paternalistic attitude the Zionist parties had long held regarding the Arab minority.</p>
<p>Perhaps more importantly, for the first and only time, Arab political parties played an indirect role in policymaking. </p>
<p>In 1993, as a result of the Oslo accords, Rabin lost his majority in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. Two Arab parties propped him up from outside his own coalition, voting with the government on no-confidence measures brought by the opposition.</p>
<p>Rabin’s views on Israel’s Arab minority reflected his analysis of Israeli-Palestinian relations more broadly – namely, that coercion was simply untenable as a solution to Israel’s relations with Palestinians inside and outside of Israel.</p>
<p>Since 1995, Arab citizens have either disengaged from the political process or <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-israels-minorities-bring-about-a-change-in-government-38764">voted for Arab parties in increasing numbers</a>, at the expense of Rabin’s party, Labor. The percentage of Arab citizens’ votes for the top three Arab parties, for example, has climbed from 68.7% in 1999 to 80% in 2015.</p>
<p>Wars between Israel and Hamas have cast Palestinian citizens of Israel as potential fifth columns, while Arab participation in the political process has been delegitimized by some Jewish leaders. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, running for reelection in 2015, <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-apologizes-to-arabs-for-voter-turnout-remark/">warned</a> his supporters that Arabs were coming out to vote “in droves” and thus endangering his party’s rule, and that of the right wing more generally. (Netanyahu later apologized for the remark, though many Arab leaders remained skeptical and unsatisfied.)</p>
<p>At the same time, a new generation of Arab leaders has adopted a more confrontational approach, most notable in their rhetoric. In addition to calls for the Arab community to be recognized as a national minority that would give the equal status to the Jewish community, some Arab politicians have also cast Jewish Israelis as among the evildoers of the world. Knesset member Haneen Zoabi, for example, has <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Zoabi-says-IDF-worse-than-ISIS-379241">compared</a> the Israeli military to the Islamic State. Not surprisingly, this caused the Zionist parties to view the Arab parties with suspicion and hostility. </p>
<p>It’s difficult, then, to speak clearly about Rabin’s legacy because of changed domestic and regional conditions, only some of which are related to the Oslo process that Rabin promoted. </p>
<p>But I would argue that he should be remembered for trying – for understanding that Israel needed to change, to focus on achieving domestic harmony and an accepted place in the Middle East. </p>
<p>The right in Israel, by contrast, views <a href="http://www.momentmag.com/qa-explaining-israels-wave-of-violence/">the recent wave of violence</a> as simply the latest outburst of anti-Jewish activity and threat that stretches back to the Roman age. </p>
<p>Rabin also proposed serious ideas for how to scale down the occupation, even in the face of domestic opposition. The left in Israel forgets this, and tends to react to public opinion rather than try to shape it with bold policies.</p>
<p>Rabin’s was a gritty peace, requiring constant effort to fend off challenges. It was not the “clean” version many expect today – that the occupation will be easy to end, that Palestinian hostility will cease once Israel withdraws from the West Bank, that Israel’s security concerns are exaggerated. That he pushed forward in the face of these challenges makes Rabin a peacemaker in the true sense of the word.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49794/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brent E Sasley receives funding from UT Arlington.</span></em></p>Twenty years ago, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin – the man who ushered in the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians – was assassinated. Today’s Israel is a very different place.Brent E Sasley, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Texas at ArlingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/358422015-01-04T21:15:47Z2015-01-04T21:15:47ZAround the world in 2015: the big stories predicted<p>The New Year always provides an opportunity for both introspection and speculation. So it seems a good time to consider what the big stories are likely to be this year. </p>
<p>Some of the five major stories I have listed below are obvious, hangovers from 2014. Others are not. But, as my list makes clear, there is always room for optimism amid the messiness, despair and incoherence – and a realization that progress is often uneven and frustrating. </p>
<p>In each case, I’ve tried to include a possible surprise or two that could shift the current situation out of its malaise. </p>
<p>What do you think? Do these match your top five? It’ll be interesting to compare at the end of the year.</p>
<h2>The greater commitment of ground troops in Iraq and Syria.</h2>
<p>President Obama keeps promising not to do so, as part of a zero tolerance policy for American casualties. His joint chiefs keep telling him, however, that he has to commit more forces if he wants a victory, one he would like before he departs from office. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the number of official “personnel” in “Syraq” keeps inching up, from 300 to 3,000. And this figure doesn’t include many of those subcontractors, specialists and advisers who aren’t dressed in battle fatigues, about which we have no accurate numbers. </p>
<p>The likelihood is that the war will drag on, putting greater pressure on Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, and resulting in greater domestic strife in those countries.</p>
<p>Possible surprises? More militant attacks in Europe result in some European governments committing grounds troops and the war intensifies. Even bigger surprise? Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party does unexpectedly badly in Israel’s March election. A new coalition of Labor and centrist parties assume power – and changes the map of peace negotiations as it halts development in the West Bank. Gaza-based <a href="http://www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968">Hamas</a> then refuses to negotiate and the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/439781/Palestinian-Authority-PA">Palestinian Authority</a>’s Mahmoud Abbas enhances his position once again as the “representative of the Palestinian people.” A grand coalition is formed that isolates and weakens ISIS.</p>
<h2>The situation with Russia will become more acute before there is any relief.</h2>
<p>Putin is under no domestic pressure to relieve the pressure on the average Russian – yet. Indeed, he seems to revel in defying Europe and the Americans, even as his economy slips into a deeper recession. </p>
<p>Any pressure on Putin to negotiate with America and Europe on Ukraine is more likely to originate from gentle suggestions from his wealthy friends rather than any limited street protests. Then again, we’ve seen powerful leaders across Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa succumb to unanticipated pressure before. So let’s hope that Putin can find a way to “declare victory” before the Russian people suffer too much. </p>
<p>A possible surprise? The nationalist <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27173857">Right Sector</a> makes further electoral progress in Ukraine, becomes increasingly militant, and the conflict expands beyond the current war zones in Luhansk and Donetsk. An even worse surprise? The Arctic becomes the new focal point of friction between the US and Russia as both seek to consolidate their rights in the region. Russia, by the way, is much better prepared to do so than the US at the moment. So look for greater expenditures on this issue in the Pentagon’s next budget.</p>
<h2>Immigrants and asylum seekers will keep coming – to Europe and beyond.</h2>
<p>And they will do so in record numbers as they flee the conflicts in Libya, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. They will also likely die in record numbers. Last year it is <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30653742">estimated</a> that nearly 3,500 refugees died trying to attempt the crossing to Europe, while another 200,000 were rescued. These mortality rates are less unusual than is commonly assumed, stretching back over a decade. </p>
<p>But now the spotlight is increasingly on the behavior of the EU. It has gloated that it is a global “force for good” for a decade, even winning the Noble Prize to reinforce that claim. Yet, <a href="http://frontex.europa.eu/">Frontex</a> - the EU’s extended border patrol force - cut back the number of vessels designed to patrol the Mediterranean under Operation <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30039044">Triton</a> in late 2014 when it replaced the former operation run by the Italian government. Patrolling in this case really means rescuing distressed immigrants in sinking boats. This cutback has resulted in untold numbers of refugees drowning in the last three months, although we mostly get to hear about those who are rescued. </p>
<p>Frontex has received offers from <a href="http://frontex.europa.eu/news/more-technical-support-needed-for-operation-triton-IKo5CG">15 EU member states</a> to provide technical equipment and border guards. The EU will have to bolster its patrols if its international reputation is not to be permanently tarnished. But what it really needs is more ships, and a streak of humanity. </p>
<p>A possible surprise move? President Obama offers US humanitarian assistance in patrolling the Mediterranean.</p>
<h2>On the brighter side, the US enhances its ties with Latin America.</h2>
<p>Vice-President Joe Biden’s impromptu <a href="http://laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=2367640&CategoryId=10717">meeting </a>with Venezuelan president Nicholas Maduro (at the inauguration of Brazil’s president) has followed on the heels of the US’s rapprochement with Cuba. Together they appear part of a well-orchestrated diplomatic offensive by the US to wrestle back influence from China. </p>
<p>Focused on the Middle East and Africa, the US has sorely neglected what it regards as its own backyard for the last decade. China has filled this vacuum with aid and <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/12/29/commentary/world-commentary/china-steps-in-as-the-banker-to-call-in-a-pinch/#.VKmrmCvF-8Q">loans</a> to the continent’s major oil producers, notably Brazil and Venezuela. As a result, the US’s influence has declined. In an effort to shore up a major hemispheric trade agreement that excludes the Chinese, President Obama is busy restoring those ties. It is a job made easier for him by the decline in oil prices, a rapid change that has made these countries again reliant on external aid and American trade. </p>
<p>A surprise: President Obama convenes a meeting of Latin American leaders in Washington and announces a breakthrough in a trade agreement, one that the Republican leadership reluctantly has to support.</p>
<h2>On the really brighter side, 2015 becomes a banner year because the West reaches a deal on nuclear weapons with Iran and on proliferation with North Korea.</h2>
<p>Okay, I admit these are unlikely. In fact, a real stretch. But as someone who lived through the fall of the Berlin Wall, and more modestly the recent reforms in Myanmar, I have learned never to discount the possibility of positive developments on the upside. While the morass in which we find ourselves seems never-ending, the fact is that things are getting better – at least when you look at the statistics. </p>
<p>2014 did not turn out to be the quagmire of 1914. We didn’t start any major interstate wars, and the number of people lifted from extreme poverty in Africa and Asia kept <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/multidimensional-poverty-index-mpi">improving</a>. So while it never hurts to be pragmatic, there may be hope for humanity yet.</p>
<h2>And finally…</h2>
<p>The biggest story of the year may never make the front pages of the foreign news section – the resurgence of the US dollar. </p>
<p>It spent 2014 steadily strengthening against the Euro and strongly rebounding against all of Asia’s currencies. A strong dollar was generally regarded as part of the tripod of US power during the Cold War, the others being America’s nuclear capacity and the global influence of its corporations. Parity with the Euro is still widely considered unrealistic. But so was a <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/12/23/u-s-economy-grew-at-a-rate-of-5-percent-in-third-quarter-the-fastest-in-more-than-a-decade/">5%</a> US growth rate, as recently as a year ago. </p>
<p>A strong dollar has its advantages and disadvantages for Americans: cheaper imports and less competitive exports. But any global crisis is only likely to strengthen it further as the currency of last resort. A strong dollar once again giving the US significant leverage over global affairs, even if reporting on that story remains confined to the financial news.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35842/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The New Year always provides an opportunity for both introspection and speculation. So it seems a good time to consider what the big stories are likely to be this year. Some of the five major stories I…Simon Reich, Professor in The Division of Global Affairs and The Department of Political Science, Rutgers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.