tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/parliamentarians-29991/articlesParliamentarians – The Conversation2023-10-01T15:12:25Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2138032023-10-01T15:12:25Z2023-10-01T15:12:25ZPierre Poilievre is a career politician: Is that good or bad?<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/pierre-poilievre-is-a-career-politician-is-that-good-or-bad" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The Conservative Party is currently riding high in the polls <a href="https://abacusdata.ca/conservatives-lead-by-15-as-government-disapproval-jumps-4-points">with a 15-point lead over the Liberals.</a> <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/09/18/pierre-poilievre-trudeau-canada-00116084">Political commentators credit this polling success to the popular appeal of Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre.</a> </p>
<p>Poilievre’s political messaging on the housing crisis and inflation, in particular, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/poilievre-convention-speech-analysis-1.6961268">seems to be resonating with Canadians.</a></p>
<p>However, Poilievre’s career background is a double-edged sword. The same political background that makes Poilievre an effective parliamentarian may make him vulnerable to being characterized as out of touch by opposition parties and voters.</p>
<h2>Career politicians</h2>
<p>British academic Anthony King <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/193490">coined the term “career politician” in 1981, and it’s been part of the political lexicon ever since.</a> According to King, career politicians are parliamentarians who devote their professional life to politics, entering politics in their 30s and leaving at retirement age. </p>
<p>This definition has <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41293-017-0061-9">since expanded to include MPs who were previously political staffers.</a></p>
<p>Poilievre closely matches King’s definition of a career politician. He was first elected to his Carleton riding in 2004 at the age of 25, not in his 30s. Prior to his election as an MP, Poilievre had worked almost <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/news/ottawa%20&%20area/pierre-poilievre-the-minister-of-nepean-carleton">exclusively in the political sphere (apart from a brief stint in corporate collections at Telus).</a> </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/poilievre-campaign-freedom-anit-otoole-1.6577412">Poilievre interned in then-MP Jason Kenney’s office</a> and <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/news/ottawa%20&%20area/pierre-poilievre-the-minister-of-nepean-carleton">worked as a political assistant to Stockwell Day, former leader of the right-wing Canadian Alliance.</a> </p>
<p>Poilievre entered politics at an early age and stayed there. It’s safe to say he’s the textbook definition of a career politician.</p>
<h2>The benefits of career politicians</h2>
<p>Poilievre’s background has obvious advantages to his own career and the success of the Conservative Party. For one, his long career in politics, including as a political staffer, has given him a keen understanding of the legislative process. </p>
<p><a href="https://constitution-unit.com/2019/10/21/from-candidate-to-elected-member-will-new-mps-face-a-trial-by-fire-after-the-2019-canadian-federal-election/">According to my research</a> on the orientation of new MPs, former political staffers have an advantage when it comes to understanding the job of an elected member.</p>
<p>In order to help their MP bosses, political staffers need a strong understanding of the legislative process and the standing orders of the House of Commons. Poilievre likely translated the procedural knowledge he gained as a political staffer into his work as an MP.</p>
<p>New MPs need to quickly get up to speed on procedure to begin work in the House. Poilievre’s constituents, along with the Conservative Party faithful, no doubt appreciate his mastery of the standing orders and <a href="https://macleans.ca/longforms/why-is-pierre-poilievre-so-angry/">his ability to hold his own in debates.</a></p>
<h2>The problem with career politicians</h2>
<p>The most common criticism of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.10.006">career politicians</a> is that they are insulated from life outside of formal politics.</p>
<p>Poilievre has likely heard concerns and demands from Canadians inside and outside of his constituency as Conservative leader and MP for Ottawa’s Carleton riding. But listening to constituents’ problems is different from experiencing and understanding them. </p>
<p>Prof. Donald Savoie of the University of Moncton <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-perils-of-the-career-politician/article20924219/">has suggested that</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Career politicians … bring a narrow skill set to their governance. They excel at partisan politics …. But they lack the ability to test policy prescriptions against
experiences gained outside politics.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The business of the House of Commons is <a href="https://utorontopress.com/9781487550882/the-paradox-of-parliament/">often viewed as a political game that alienates both MPs and voters.</a> </p>
<p>An example of this gamesmanship is shown in a report from the Samara Centre for Democracy. A former Canadian MP recalled their party voted against an opposition amendment to correct a proofreading mistake on a piece of legislation. The MP said their party <a href="https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/637bf69c5352661ca8b6d15b/649ef54d8f6a1bba5e624df4_Flip%20the%20Script%20-%20By%20the%20Samara%20Centre%20for%20Democracy.pdf">did not want to give the opposition the “win,” even though the opposition amendment did not substantively alter the legislation</a>.</p>
<p>These partisan games are par for the course in Ottawa. However, they don’t do anything to help the constituents MPs are elected to represent.</p>
<h2>Out of touch</h2>
<p>In the past, <a href="https://macleans.ca/longforms/why-is-pierre-poilievre-so-angry/">Poilievre has been labelled a partisan attack dog,</a> <a href="https://www-hilltimes-com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/story/2020/01/13/will-conservatives-follow-skippy-over-the-cliff/266602/">primarily interested in dealing blows to the other parties.</a></p>
<p>His recent popularity <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/poilievre-convention-speech-analysis-1.6961268">appears to stem from talking about the issues Canadians care about.</a> If Poilievre becomes prime minister, he’ll have a hard time maintaining popularity if he focuses primarily on partisanship.</p>
<p>Poilievre isn’t the only career politician in Canada. He’s also not the only federal leader vulnerable to accusations of being “out of touch.” Prime Minister Justin Trudeau <a href="https://nationalpost.com/opinion/justin-trudeau-makes-history">grew up in politics as the son of Pierre Trudeau</a>, and he’s often been criticized for being <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-tofino-trip-truth-reconciliation-1.6201475">out of step with the average Canadian.</a></p>
<p>The fact that both Trudeau and Poilievre can be described as out of touch raises broader questions about representation in Canada.
Can a politician with a relatively narrow life experience represent the diverse needs of Canadians? </p>
<p>When it comes to Poilievre, this remains to be seen — if elected prime minister, he may use his experience as a career politician to advocate for issues important to Canadians, or he may choose to focus on partisan games in Ottawa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213803/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louise Cockram does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Can a politician with a relatively narrow life experience represent the diverse needs of Canadians?Louise Cockram, Instructor, Political Science, Carleton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1845592022-06-16T01:27:03Z2022-06-16T01:27:03ZThe teal independents want to hold government to account. That starts with high-quality information<p>The election of a record number of independents to the House of Representatives will undoubtedly increase pressure on parliament to change how it operates. Already the newly elected independent member for Goldstein, Zoe Daniel, has <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/independents-could-bring-end-to-oversight-captured-by-bureaucracy-20220527-p5ap13">called</a> for more resources for two key institutions, the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) and the Parliamentary Library.</p>
<p>The younger of the two, the PBO, was <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office/About_the_PBO">created</a> in 2012 to provide “independent and non-partisan analysis of the budget cycle, fiscal policy and the financial implications of proposals”. In practice, it focuses heavily on the last of those tasks – assessing the financial implications of new plans. And it won’t have escaped the independents’ attention that its findings are rarely out of step with the views of Treasury.</p>
<p>What this means, says Daniel, is that “backbenchers of all shades struggle to get the quality of information and objective advice they need to make decisions based on their merits and on the evidence”. She wants to see a broader, US-style body producing forecasts and other economic research independent of Treasury and the government.</p>
<p>This isn’t just a federal problem. Australia’s two other PBOs – in Victoria and New South Wales – also have a much narrower focus than their overseas counterparts.</p>
<p>Federally, two of three items on the PBO’s “<a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office/About_the_PBO">about</a>” page concern costings (the first explicitly; the second via a post-election compilation of election commitments) and the third relates to public education. In Victoria, <a href="https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/committees/paec/Inquiry_into_the_Parliamentary_Budget_Officer_/Report/PAEC_59-11_Inquiry_into_Parliamentary_Budget_Officer.pdf">according</a> to a parliamentary committee, “policy costings are a key legislative function of the office” despite being “not widespread” in other OECD countries.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/were-about-to-have-australias-most-diverse-parliament-yet-but-theres-still-a-long-way-to-go-183620">We're about to have Australia's most diverse parliament yet – but there's still a long way to go</a>
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<p>The NSW PBO is even more tightly focused: parliament’s website <a href="https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/pbo/Pages/Parliamentary-Budget-Office.aspx">describes</a> its work as providing “costings of election policies in the lead-up to NSW general elections”. Reflecting successive NSW governments’ belief that costings only matter before elections, it operates only one year in four. (The NSW system’s pluses and minuses are discussed in the PBO’s <a href="https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/pbo/Documents/PBOdocumentlibrary/Post-election%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf">2015 post-election report</a>.)</p>
<h2>Best practice?</h2>
<p>Many of the PBOs’ counterparts overseas have much broader mandates and more influence on public policy. The most important by far, as Daniel implies, is the US <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/">Congressional Budget Office</a>, whose reports and advice to Congress have had a major impact on budgetary policy in the United States. The CBO produces economic forecasts, research papers and fiscal analysis across all <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/topics">areas of government</a>.</p>
<p>The Netherlands has an even older institution, the Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Dating back to 1945, its <a href="https://www.jvi.org/special-events/2019/the-role-of-independent-fiscal-institutions-in-fiscal-frameworks-the-dutch-case.html">role</a> takes in budget projections and forecasting. Across the North Sea in Britain, the independent <a href="https://obr.uk/about-the-obr/what-we-do/#:%7E:text=The%20Office%20for%20Budget%20Responsibility,fiscal%20watchdogs%20around%20the%20world.">Office for Budget Responsibility</a> prepares the economic forecasts that accompany the government’s budget, evaluates the government’s performance against fiscal targets, analyses fiscal sustainability and risks, and – yes – provides costings of tax and welfare measures.</p>
<p>The most striking contrast is with the Canadian PBO, which had a habit of criticising government, especially when led by the independently minded economist <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/careers/careers-leadership/kevin-page-bean-counter-with-a-backbone/article595848/">Kevin Page</a>. That came at some peril – the government slashed its budget and <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/kevin-page-slams-liberal-governments-proposed-changes-to-pbo/article34686195/">changed</a> its reporting lines – but the body was always supported by parliament.</p>
<p>Australia’s federal PBO has a narrow focus primarily because the public service convinced parliament to keep it that way. Treasury resisted any notion that another body should have a role in economic forecasting, and so the legislation expressly prohibits the PBO from preparing economic projections or budget estimates.</p>
<p>The Business Council of Australia was an early advocate for a more powerful PBO. In its <a href="https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/bca/pages/3205/attachments/original/1531289994/bca_budget_submission_2011%E2%80%9312_final_14-2-2011.pdf?1531289994">2011–12 budget submission</a>, based on a research report I wrote that included a <a href="https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/ladocs/submissions/49104/Sub%2013%20Stephen%20Bartos.pdf">survey</a> of international practice, it argued unsuccessfully for a broader remit.</p>
<p>Since then, the PBO has largely been captured by the bureaucracy. Headed by a career public servant, it is part of the “official family”. Its research and statements don’t come even close to challenging official orthodoxies.</p>
<p>If parliament wants a more independent federal PBO it has power to act. The PBO reports to the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Public_Accounts_and_Audit">Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit</a>, which also approves its work plan. The JCPAA has traditionally been a staunch defender of the legislature’s right to question ministers and public servants. But it has retreated from that position as parliament has become more polarised. The arrival of a record number of independents could reverse the trend and strengthen parliament’s role.</p>
<h2>And the Parliamentary Library?</h2>
<p>Judged by its independence from government, the Parliamentary Library is a much better performer. <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/About_the_Parliamentary_Library">Established in 1901</a>, it has been part of the Commonwealth’s institutional furniture from the first parliament. Its long history of rigour and independence gives it a solid basis on which to keep offering MPs information that doesn’t necessarily follow the government line.</p>
<p>The library’s record is a good illustration of what is known as path dependence: the way an institution is established and works in its early days has a huge influence on how it continues to operate. Having set out on a path of impartiality and rigour, the library has maintained it. But that doesn’t mean it would knock back that extra funding Daniel has called for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184559/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Bartos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Parliamentary Library would certainly benefit from more funding, but the Parliamentary Budget Office urgently needs a wider brief and greater independenceStephen Bartos, Professor of Economics, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1644392021-07-19T15:10:27Z2021-07-19T15:10:27ZGhana’s style of democracy has recently shown cracks. Here’s how to fix it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411668/original/file-20210716-19-y3hge6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The full benefits of a majoritarian democracy are undermined by a winner takes all approach</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/worldbank/5094198109/">Jonathan Ernst/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The sight of soldiers in Ghana’s parliament on January 7, 2021 was a first for the country. What brought the institution to this point – now the subject of an inquiry – was a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbEDLAGcdSI">scuffle</a> between parliamentarians from the governing party and the opposition, over the election of a Speaker and two deputies. In the end, an opposition candidate was – for the first time – elected as Speaker. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://scholar.google.de/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=HksiiCIAAAAJ&citation_for_view=HksiiCIAAAAJ:Tyk-4Ss8FVUC">studied</a> several conflict and resolution situations in Ghana. And in my view, what happened in parliament was a perfect example of the shortcomings of the existing system of democracy in the country.</p>
<p>Ghana’s democracy takes the <a href="https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Ghana%20-%20Overview_EDarfour.pdf">western majoritarian form</a>, in which the majority side is “always right”. It gives governments a freer hand to enact the policies on which they campaigned. But critics say it distorts outcomes by favouring strong parties and under-representing weaker ones.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/05568640109485087">consensus-based democracies</a>, in contrast, voting is not necessarily used to determine an issue, settle controversies or reach an agreement. Elections still determine the formation of the government. But factions build consensus and reach agreements amenable to both sides. The minority accepts the agreement not because it takes that particular position but because of the need for maintaining and building relations. The Dutch system is a very clear example. </p>
<p>My view as a scholar of peace studies is that Ghana should focus on consensus building as the accepted system. This is because accommodation and pacification, coalitions and compromises fit the political make-up better. Leadership is more moderate in consensus democracy than it is in pendulum democracy, where power can swing from one side to another.</p>
<h2>Western-style democracy</h2>
<p>Democracy worldwide, especially Western-style democracy, has come under intense scrutiny. In the USA, Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa, democracies are struggling to deal with the growth of far right groups, democratic dictatorship, suppression and disregard for democratic institutions. There is also an increasing use of violence against minorities, opposition figures and the media. </p>
<p>Examples are the rise of Donald Trump and far right groups in the USA; the behaviour of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/7/15/could-hungary-break-the-eu">Viktor Orban of Hungary</a> and the rise of the far right in Europe; and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/11/top-brazil-newspaper-demands-removal-of-jair-bolsonaro">Jair Bolsonaro and his far-right views</a> in Brazil. We have also seen the rise of democratic dictators in parts of Africa (<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190505-senegal-mps-approve-reform-eliminate-post-prime-minister-macky-sall">Senegal</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20080411-cameroon-parliament-paul-biya-term-limit-extension">Cameroon</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/03/anniversary-shouldnt-be-40-years-president-obiang-equatorial-guinea">Equatorial Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/rwanda-vote-gives-president-paul-kagame-extended-powers">Rwanda</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-museveni-has-twisted-ugandas-constitution-to-cling-to-power-118933">Uganda</a>) who are changing term limits for the president. All these examples seem to depict Western majoritarian democracy in crisis. </p>
<p>Many democracies, whether conservative or liberal, show signs of growing intolerance and the reduced use of consensus in reaching agreements or settling disputes. People tend to use so-called democratic tenets to justify their actions even if logical reasoning dictates the use of a human face and consensus to deal with some situations. </p>
<h2>Consensus-based democracy</h2>
<p>Consensus-based democracy does not mean western-majoritarian style democracy is not good. It simply means building understanding, tolerance, acceptance and incorporation of minority views into policies and decisions. It means compromises and managing controversial issues until an agreement is reached.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/10/ghanas-opposition-rejects-election-results">2020 Ghanaian election</a>, for example, revealed a conspicuous lack of resolve to build consensus. Instead it stuck to formal and rigid democratic principles. The Electoral Commission’s failure to use consensus was reflected in its frosty relationship with key members of its <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/ndc-rejects-ec-and-ipac-election-reforms-proposes-new-ones/">Inter-Party Advisory Committee</a>. This committee, made up of all political parties, has guided the progress of elections for over 20 years. But the partnership was strained in the build-up to the 2020 election after the commission and the largest opposition party fell out. The fallout led to the hostile reception of election results, and from there to the scuffle in parliament. </p>
<p>A consensus based approach would have resulted in a far more peaceful acceptance of the election results and avoided the chaotic scenes in parliament.</p>
<h2>Reflecting on experiments</h2>
<p>African leaders have under the guise of democracy entrenched themselves in power and silenced opposition figures’ voices. After many years of democratic experiments, citizens are yet to see the dividends of democratic rule because they do not feel involved in sharing the national cake. The African Union and regional bodies need sober reflection on Africa’s democratic experiments. They must look forward to a type of democracy that is more inclusive, consensual and participatory to ensure peace on the continent. </p>
<p>Consensus democracy as the definitive system of governance is the way to go. Elections are good, especially when a large majority has to decide an issue, such as choosing a president and parliamentarians. But there is a need to use consensus to agree on some issues, including the rules of voting. Consensus-based democracy, unlike western majoritarian rule, allows for agreements based on healthy debates and genuine compromises.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164439/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kaderi Noagah Bukari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The disturbance in Ghana’s parliament during the election of a speaker has raised questions about its current democratic system.Kaderi Noagah Bukari, Research Fellow, Department of Peace Studies, University of Cape CoastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1467812020-10-05T15:07:32Z2020-10-05T15:07:32ZWhy members of parliament in Ghana can get away with ignoring voters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359975/original/file-20200925-14-sr0q2c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ghana has invested heavily in its parliamentary democracy</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Delali-Adogla Bessa/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Ghana turned to democracy in 1992 after many years of military rule, there were expectations that the people would choose their leaders. Ghanaians also expected to see a closer relationship between citizens and the state, making members of the legislature more sensitive to their needs. </p>
<p>Democracy has generally <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/154807">flourished</a> in Ghana. Freedom House’s <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb-compressed.pdf">rankings</a> have consistently marked Ghana as “free” since 2000.</p>
<p>But the country has yet to entrench some key aspects of democratic governance. One example is the disconnect between the people and their representatives in parliament. Public <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">opinion surveys</a> conducted by Afrobarometer show a wide gap between the two. For instance, between 2002 and 2013, an average of 85.8% of Ghanaians had no contact with their representatives in parliament.</p>
<p>Ghanaian voters indicate that their legislators spend little time in the constituency. Even when they do, they tend not to listen to the concerns of voters. This gap is a problem because modern democracy relies on representative institutions. The very foundations of democracy could be shaken if citizens do not feel adequately represented.</p>
<p>I set out to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2020.1814514">investigate</a> this disconnect. Other <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322245711_ASSESSING_THE_QUALITY_OF_PARLIAMENTARY_REPRESENTATION_IN_GHANA">studies</a> exist, but none has examined the role of patronage networks mediating legislators’ pathway to power in Ghana.</p>
<p>I found that a major contributing factor to the gap between legislators and their constituents in Ghana is the strong presence of patronage networks in primaries within the parties. The way the two main political parties, the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress, select parliamentary candidates for general elections makes it possible for patronage networks to hijack electoral processes.</p>
<h2>Internal party competition</h2>
<p>Parliamentarians in Ghana, as everywhere else, do not emerge out of the blue. Political parties have established procedures for selecting candidates. Internal party primaries have been the main avenue for selecting parliamentary aspirants since the early 2000s. </p>
<p>But the very nature of these internal competitions creates a cohort of legislators who can easily circumvent voters’ “punishment” if they don’t perform. </p>
<p>To become an MP in Ghana on the main parties’ tickets, aspirants must apply to designated constituency committees and be vetted by the regional and national party. Where more than one aspirant passes this stage, they are presented to the party’s delegates at a conference for a deciding vote. The small number of delegates who vote in these internal contests is a recipe for patronage. It’s easy for aspiring candidates to buy the support and loyalty of these delegates.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/politics/NPP-polls-Aspirant-shares-cars-on-election-day-at-Ajumako-Enyan-Essiam-784431">recent cases</a>, some aspirants have gone as far as buying cars to woo the delegates. Internal party primaries in Ghana are usually <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/authoritarian-origins-of-democratic-party-systems-in-africa/73C14DB2977550A337A424E8F7EEA67A">devoid of programmatic appeals</a>. A candidate who campaigns solely on programmes and doesn’t issue any material benefits will most likely lose. A candidate whose campaign relies solely on handing out material goods is likely to win even if his or her campaign contains zero programmes. </p>
<p>Therefore, the ability to award personal favours like pocket money, school fees, funeral donations, television sets and so on to party delegates becomes the exclusive focus of these party competitions. The road to parliament in Ghana gets smoother for the highest bidder than for the candidate with the most elaborate policies.</p>
<p>This places the power to determine the future of an MP in the hands of party delegates, not the electorate. After all, winning the primaries means a free ticket to parliament in many constituencies.</p>
<p>This is more so because more than <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123412000014">60% of the 275 seats</a> in parliament are safe for either the New Patriotic Party or the National Democratic Congress. The huge number of constituencies that are dominated by either of these two parties give MPs the incentive to concentrate more on local party delegates than the entire constituency voters. The voice of constituency voters, therefore, gets trumped by that of the party delegates.</p>
<h2>What is the way forward?</h2>
<p>To make constituency votes matter, the focus should be on reviewing internal party contests which determine who stands as an MP.</p>
<p>In emerging democracies, there are hardly any national laws regulating how parties select their candidates. In Ghana, the constitution says political parties must ensure that their internal processes conform to democratic standards. But there’s no legislation spelling out how they should choose their candidates.</p>
<p>Ghana could follow the examples of Germany, the United States, New Zealand and Finland in regulating internal party competitions. The focus should be on the inclusivity of mechanisms to select candidates within parties. For example, all party members or even the entire constituency of voters can participate in the selection of candidate MPs.</p>
<p>An open candidate selection process would provide less incentive to reward a few party delegates and neglect the constituency. With more participants, candidate MPs wouldn’t have enough money to buy everybody. This would force candidate MPs to campaign on the basis of policies that benefit the entire constituency. Also, to be reelected, MPs would have to build a good relationship with their constituencies, not with internal party oligarchies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146781/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Acheampong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An open candidate selection process would provide less incentive for the issuance of material benefits to only a few delegates while the constituency is neglected.Martin Acheampong, Doctoral Fellow, Bamberg Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of BambergLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1361632020-04-28T13:43:26Z2020-04-28T13:43:26ZHow e-voting could close Canada’s political gender gap<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330548/original/file-20200426-163110-17g7dd1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C28%2C1920%2C1247&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Allowing MPs to vote electronically would go a long way to promoting gender equity in Canadian politics.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Pixabay)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The year 2019 was eventful in the struggle to close the gender gap in Canadian politics. </p>
<p>A record <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/women-mps-house-of-commons-2019-election-1.5404800">98 women</a> (29 per cent of seats in Parliament) were elected into the House of Commons, and a law was finally passed that gives <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/parental-leave-commons-1.5175413">paid parental leave</a> to MPs. </p>
<p>Despite this progress, barriers continue to exist for equitable parliamentary practices. The requirement that House of Commons members are expected to vote <a href="https://www.ourcommons.ca/About/ProcedureAndPractice3rdEdition/ch_09_2-e.html">in person</a>, instead of via electronic voting, is a policy that discourages those recovering from childbirth or with care-giving responsibilities from <a href="https://ici.radio-canada.ca/info/2019/elections-federales/femmes-hommes-probabilites-vote-egalite-chateaux-forts/index-en.html">seeking political office</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Democratic Institutions Minister Karina Gould pauses to talk to reporters as she carries her three-month-old baby on Parliament Hill in May 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>MPs must find child care if their child is under 18 months old (the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/parental-leave-commons-1.5175413">minimum age</a> required to access the House of Commons daycare) and find a place to breastfeed (an act that can prompt <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/jun/21/karina-gould-canadian-minister-breastfeeding-baby-footage-viral">international headlines</a>). In extreme cases, lack of equitable policies has even led an MP in the United Kingdom to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/feb/12/tulip-siddiq-i-needed-a-caesarean-instead-i-was-at-parliament">delay child birth</a> to squeeze in a vote. </p>
<p>On the surface, paid parental leave for MPs addresses longstanding discrimination after years of docking <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/parental-leave-commons-1.5175413">$120 a day</a> from members who took leave longer than 21 days. It was a long time coming considering the first MP gave birth while in office <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/guergis-to-join-small-club-of-new-mothers-in-office-1.581142">in 1987</a>. </p>
<h2>What about voting?</h2>
<p>Yet the 2019 parental leave measures don’t address the logistics of MP voting while they’re on leave. That’s in keeping with other outdated House of Commons procedural measures that cause gender disparities among its members. </p>
<p>Those choosing to take leave under this policy are unable to take part in the parliamentary voting process and therefore perform the job they were elected to do. This could potentially negatively impact re-election campaigns and disincentivize MPs from taking leave at all, and therefore does little to address the systematic barriers to gender equity. </p>
<p>To boost inclusivity among its ranks, the House of Commons needs parliamentary reform of its voting procedures to allow electronic online voting, or e-voting, for its members.</p>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic has <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/coronavirus-creating-huge-stressful-experiment-working-home/607945/">prompted discussions</a> on how to keep the House of Commons operational while respecting public health measures. But emergency relief policies, created in a parliamentary system that was <a href="https://www.democraticaudit.com/2016/07/29/designing-a-new-parliament-with-women-in-mind/">built to fit the needs</a> of men, are falling short in providing protections for all Canadians. </p>
<p>One example of this policy failure is illustrated by the industries most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. <a href="http://behindthenumbers.ca/2020/03/20/covid-19-crisis-response-must-address-gender-faultlines/">Women outnumber men</a> in low-paying positions that are most at risk of COVID-19 exposure.</p>
<p>For example, personal support workers, responsible for disinfecting primary-care facilities, are experiencing <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/women-disproportionately-bearing-the-brunt-of-coronavirus-crisis-advocates-say-1.4907309">inadequate safety measures</a> — including a shortage of personal protection equipment — <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/6787770/coronavirus-canada-protective-equipment-cleaners-admin-workers/">despite efforts</a> by labour unions to increase health and safety measures for this industry. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A health-care worker waves as she finishes her shift for the day at the Eatonville Care Centre in Toronto on April 24, 2020. The care centre has been one of the hardest hit by COVID-19 pandemic in the country.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Nathan Denette</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>This issue, exacerbated by the pandemic, is an explicit example of how non-representative legislatures, coupled with a lack of empirical research on women, produce inadequate policies. E-voting acknowledges the need for flexibility and promotes more inclusive policy-making. </p>
<h2>We have the technology for e-voting</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/reports/online-voting-path-forward-federal-elections.html">Canada has the technology</a>. E-voting <a href="https://carleton.ca/canadaeurope/wp-content/uploads/AComparativeAssessmentofInternetVotingFINALFeb19-a-1.pdf">exists in municipal elections</a> in Canada, parties already use online voting to cast ballots for internal matters such as leadership contests and more than <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/october-2017/reforming-the-indian-act-to-allow-for-online-voting/">50 First Nations</a> in Canada use e-voting. </p>
<p>Designing MP voting practices that are integrated with existing online technologies has already been implemented within several parliamentary systems in varying degrees. </p>
<p>Recent coronavirus-related examples include the European Union adopting e-voting via <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2020/03/23/eu-parliament-moves-to-email-voting-during-covid-19/">email ballots</a> and the United Kingdom parliament approving e-voting <a href="https://irishtechnews.ie/blockchain-e-voting-is-real-where-how-when/">via Zoom</a>. Even the world’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-isle-of-man-52134400">oldest continuously sitting parliament</a> on the Isle of Man announced that it’s moving its voting online, using the <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/thehouse/article/coronavirus-how-are-parliaments-worldwide-working-during-the-pandemic">chat box</a> of its videoconferencing software to vote. </p>
<p>Canada’s House of Commons should look to international e-voting practices to adopt a system that promotes both accessibility and public health measures for its members. </p>
<p>Critics of e-voting cite cybersecurity concerns, especially in the age of <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/canadas-voting-system-isnt-immune-interference">foreign electoral interference</a>. Canadian academics Nicole Goodman and Aleksander Essex point out <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/march-2020/online-voting-entirely-possible-for-mps-during-times-of-crisis/">three reasons</a> why this critique does not apply to e-voting in Canada. </p>
<p>First, MP votes are public and easily verifiable. Second, educating MPs on e-voting best practices is feasible, no matter how archaic the institution. Third, registering e-votes via a secure remote device is well within the resources of the federal government.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Canada has the technology to allow MPs to vote electronically.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Pixabay)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Clearly, instituting remote online voting for Canada’s much smaller and institutionally younger parliamentary system is an easy win. Installing electronic online voting is necessary to bring Canada a step closer to closing the gender gap.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136163/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Regan M. Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To boost inclusivity among its ranks, the House of Commons needs parliamentary reform of its voting procedures to allow electronic online voting, or e-voting, for its members.Regan M. Johnston, PhD Political Science Student, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1175552019-05-23T14:43:12Z2019-05-23T14:43:12ZSouth Africa needs a functioning parliamentary budget office: now’s the time to fix it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275837/original/file-20190522-187185-1q4o0po.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African parliamentarians need impartial and expert advice about public finance issues</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/parliamentary-budget-office">Parliamentary Budget Office</a> (PBO) is in <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-10-10-budget-office-is-director-less-4-months-after-contract-extended-and-r265000-bursary-recipient-is-also-departing/">complete disarray</a>. In the 10 years since it was established by law, and the five years it has been in operation, the Office has failed to adhere to <a href="https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/OECD-Recommendation-on-Principles-for-Independent-Fiscal-Institutions.pdf">key principles</a> of institutional and political independence, technical credibility and transparency. For these and other reasons it has failed to give parliamentarians, and the public, a credible alternative analysis of South Africa’s public finances.</p>
<p>With the swearing-in of a new Parliament and president, there is a chance to change this for the better. The first six months will be crucial. They will determine whether the Office can be set on a path that will lead to a proud institutional legacy. If not, the institution will be a waste of public money that generates mediocre and politically compromised analysis - in which case it should be euthanased.</p>
<p>South Africa’s parliamentarians may look further afield for inspiration. For example, the history of the American Congressional Budget Office illustrates what’s possible. Its founding director, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/05/14/695947928/alice-rivlin-first-woman-to-serve-as-budget-director-dies-at-age-88">Alice Rivlin</a>, who died last week, was not just an accomplished bureaucrat. She was also an economist of calibre in her own right. And the legacy she left in the form of the US Congress’s budget office is one of a technically and politically credible institution that plays an important role in that country’s democracy.</p>
<p>Parliamentary budget <a href="http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/oecdnetworkofparliamentarybudgetofficialspbo.htm">offices</a> have been established in many countries. They can play a valuable role in any democratic system by providing impartial, expert advice to parliamentarians about public finance issues in a transparent manner. This strengthens oversight of government’s public finance decisions by parliamentarians and civil society.</p>
<p>South Africa’s is in urgent need of reform. The Constitution envisages a fundamental role for Parliament in holding the state to account and ensuring the voices of citizens and civil society are heard beyond elections. With the current state of the <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=11969">economy</a> and public <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-02/moody-s-sees-south-africa-debt-profile-in-line-with-baa3-rating">finances</a>, there are few areas more in need of credible, robust oversight. </p>
<p>The Parliamentary Budget Office could play a major role in ensuring that this happens. But to do so it must be a technically credible institution that is entirely independent of political influence. Unfortunately, the first opportunity to do this was squandered – resulting in 10 lost years.</p>
<h2>Dysfunctional</h2>
<p>The creation of South Africa’s own parliamentary budget office by the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/PBO/act-9-2009-money-bill-amendment-procedure.pdf">Money Bills Act</a> in 2009 was an important step. But the process of its establishment was flawed from the start. And those failures have recently been compounded and concealed. </p>
<p>One thing that is clear is that since its establishment the PBO has been in thrall to political influence – most notably from factions within the majority African National Congress (ANC). Such political influence also appears to have obstructed any clean-up of the office. </p>
<p>The problems around the appointment of a credible director illustrate this well.</p>
<p>In 2018 the ANC in Parliament <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26438/">rushed through</a>, with no public consultation and no serious consideration of his performance, a reappointment of its first director. A few months later, shortly after the completion of a forensic investigation into a range of alleged irregularities, he <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-09-03-da-welcomes-resignation-of-the-head-of-the-parliamentary-budget-office/">resigned</a>.</p>
<p>The director’s post has now been vacant for almost nine months with no attempt to fill it. Initially Parliament said a series of acting directors would be <a href="http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/181122NAPC_22_November.pdf">appointed </a> to give internal deputies a chance – a terrible argument. But even that has reportedly not been done, leaving the post vacant and Parliament arguably in violation of its own law.</p>
<p>The committees responsible argued that they wanted to let the new Parliament choose its own director, but that implies the post will be filled based on political considerations which it should not be. Furthermore, while the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-05-24-the-director-of-the-parliamentary-budget-offices-contract-is-extended-to-chagrin-of-da/">reappointment</a> of the previous director was brief, it allowed him to reappoint staff whose contracts would have ended. This deprived any new director of the opportunity to appoint staff untainted by the institution’s recent history.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Parliament spokesperson has <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-09-03-da-welcomes-resignation-of-the-head-of-the-parliamentary-budget-office/">sought to obscure</a> the existence of the forensic investigation. The final report is yet to be placed in the public domain and there is no indication that any action has been taken.</p>
<p>Another big challenge is the fact that under the previous director an informal advisory board was created that was composed of only ANC MPs. This was arguably illegal at the time. Recent <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-24-explainer-why-amendments-to-sas-money-bills-act-matter">amendments</a> to the Office’s founding legislation have ill-advisedly formalised this politically homogeneous structure in law and given it the power to appoint an acting director. </p>
<p>Concerns were <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/27139/">raised</a> about this during the public consultation process, but inexplicably ignored. The implications of that are now becoming apparent.</p>
<p>The former house chairperson who oversaw the original, invalid board, <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-03-29-anc-mp-cedric-frolick-in-a-corrupt-relationship-for-10-years-angelo-agrizzi/">Cedric Frolick</a>, was expected to be replaced by <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-05-04-nomvula-mokonyane-wants-to-cross-examine-agrizzi-at-state-capture-inquiry/">Nomvula Mokonyane</a>. Both have been implicated in corruption during the <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">State Capture Inquiry</a>. </p>
<p>While it has recently been reported that Mokonyane has withdrawn from Parliament of her own accord, it remains to be seen who will replace her. If anyone deeply implicated in corruption oversees the appointment of an acting director it could sound the death knell for the Office.</p>
<p>On the positive side, under law the multiparty committees of finance and appropriations retain responsibility for recommending a new director. Who the ANC appoints as chairpersons of these four committees will be important – for the Office and public finance oversight more generally. Another potential positive is that the new Speaker, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thandi-modise">Thandi Modise</a>, has a better reputation for non-partisanship than her predecessor. </p>
<p>While the Speaker has little direct responsibility for the budget office in law, within the political structures of Parliament they can either hamper, or enable, committee chairpersons in acting in accordance with their legislated duties to oversee a functional and nonpartisan Office. But at this point it is unknown whether Modise was complicit in past inaction and the active shielding of the Office and its director from accountability.</p>
<p>If the new Parliament is to do better, the appointment as director of a technically credible economist who is robustly independent and of the highest ethical repute will be crucial. Implementation of amendments to the Money Bills Act, which explicitly establish the Office as a juristic entity, will also be important. </p>
<p>Civil society and the public at large should pay close attention to both matters in order to ensure that the institution is not compromised a second time. The experience of other countries suggests that if the ANC under President Cyril Ramaphosa ensures the Office is established credibly, it could turn out to be one of his most valuable democratic legacies in decades to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117555/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Seán Mfundza Muller receives funding from a European Union-funded project, "Putting People back in Parliament", led by the Dullah Omar Institute (University of the Western Cape), in collaboration with the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Public Service Accountability Monitor (Rhodes) and Heinrich Boell Foundation (South Africa). He is affiliated with the Public and Environmental Economics Research Centre (University of Johannesburg), regularly making inputs to Parliament oversight of the national budget, advising civil society groups on public finance matters and consulting for private sector organisations on an ad hoc basis. He resigned from the South African Parliamentary Budget Office in 2016 and has made a number of subsequent submissions to Parliament on matters related to the PBO. The views expressed are his own.</span></em></p>With the current state of the South African economy and public finances, the Parliamentary Budget Office could play a major role in ensuring that this happens. But the office is in complete disarraySeán Mfundza Muller, Senior Lecturer in Economics and Research Associate at the Public and Environmental Economics Research Centre (PEERC), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/868482017-11-20T10:14:33Z2017-11-20T10:14:33ZShould Indonesia establish a legislative budget office?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193923/original/file-20171109-27120-xutxjr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5484%2C3700&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indonesia might benefit from having a Legislative Budget Office (LBO). </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Indonesia needs a new type of government office to manage the competing interests of its fast growing economy. Creating a legislative budget office would introduce more transparency in the budget process.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_338-1">legislative budget office</a> is an office of economists and budget experts that is attached to, but separate from, the government. Their job is to give <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01900692.2016.1242612">advice and analysis</a> to parliamentarians on key issues related to the budget.</p>
<p>According to the largest <a href="https://www.internationalbudget.org/opening-budgets/open-budget-initiative/open-budget-survey/country-info/?country=id">budget transparency database</a>, the International Budget Partnership, Indonesia does a fairly good job of creating transparent mechanisms in the budget process. However there is still room for improving; overall Indonesia’s ranking is 59 out of 100.</p>
<p>This ranking is somewhere in the middle for countries in the Asia Pacific region, with New Zealand (ranked 88) and Philippines (ranked 64) ranking higher and Malaysia (ranked 46) and Thailand (ranking 42) ranking lower. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s assessment by the International Budget Partnership clearly states that the country <a href="https://www.internationalbudget.org/opening-budgets/open-budget-initiative/open-budget-survey/country-info/?country=id">would benefit</a> from a legislative budget office.</p>
<p>There are also local considerations that are very important. Indonesia represents a large economy with enormous potential for economic growth, but this also means that it must <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/13005?show=full">have a strategy around its budget priorities</a> to reflect competing, and sometimes conflicting, goals. </p>
<p>In recent times, issues such as <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-26/architect-of-indonesia-post-crisis-economy-urges-more-tax-reform">tax reform</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-13/indonesia-subsidy-cuts-pit-inflation-risks-against-budget-goals">subsidy transfer payments</a> have come to the forefront in Jakarta. But while these are complex economic issues, they are also delicate political ones too.</p>
<p>This is why a objective analysis by a legislative budget office would be particularly helpful in separating the political considerations from the economic ones.</p>
<h2>What a legislative budget office does</h2>
<p>Having an independent office brings a degree of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/pa/article-abstract/70/2/361/2669626/The-Presidentialisation-Thesis-and-Parliamentary">impartiality and analytic rigour</a> into the budget process. The usual state machinery for budgeting in most countries includes Treasuries or Ministries of Finance working closely with the elected government, which tends to increase the risk of partisanship in budgeting. </p>
<p>A legislative budget office helps to counteract this by presenting an independent “<a href="http://revparl.ca/english/issue.asp?param=216&art=1545">second data point</a>.” So these offices increase the level of transparency and accountability in the budget process.</p>
<p>More than 60 countries already have an office like this one at the national-level, and many <a href="http://www.austaxpolicy.com/assessing-parliamentary-budget-offices-subnational-jurisdictions/">provincial and state governments</a> are looking into this idea as well. In the future, budget offices with power or influence that transcends national boundaries or governments, such as one for the <a href="http://www.austaxpolicy.com/european-fiscal-board-challenges-opportunities/">entire European Union</a>, may also become important. </p>
<p>Some of Indonesia’s neighbours, including Australia, have <a href="https://theconversation.com/business-briefing-how-does-australias-policy-costing-body-the-pbo-compare-60622">been pioneers in implementing legislative budget offices</a> to help fix their budget process. </p>
<h2>What would the legislative budget office in Jakarta need?</h2>
<p>Helping legislators improve their <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_698-1">budget oversight capabilities</a> is one thing, the actual implementation of such an office is quite another. As emerging research shows, in practice legislative budget offices tend to have <a href="http://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/intellect/ijcis/2016/00000010/F0020001/art00007">quite a difficult time</a> implementing their work.</p>
<p>Therefore, there are several key ingredients that an Indonesian legislative budget office would need in order to be effective from an early stage.</p>
<p>Jakarta’s legislative budget office would need to be granted “<a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_698-1">statutory independence</a>”, meaning that it should have a formally endorsed independence in some body of law (as in Australia’s <a href="https://www.finance.gov.au/publications/charter-of-budget-honesty/">Charter of Budget Honesty</a>). It would need a mandate to <a href="http://revparl.ca/english/issue.asp?param=216&art=1545">publish its findings openly</a>, so that the wider public can be informed of the costs of policy, and thus be better engaged in budgeting.</p>
<p>It also needs the authorisation from others in the budget process, including the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/01900692.2016.1242612?scroll=top&needAccess=true">conferral of legitimacy</a> from the government. Without this, much of the work of the legislative budget office that politicians may disagree with might be rejected, even if it is more accurate.</p>
<p>It may also require <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01900692.2017.1373673">Memoranda of Understanding</a> with government ministries to have access to the relevant budgetary information. </p>
<p>These sorts of offices can also benefit from cooperation and mentorship from other similar offices around the world, such as through the <a href="https://www.e-pbo.org/">Global Network of Parliamentary Budget Offices</a>.</p>
<p>The Indonesian legislative budget office will require three important internal resources: able leadership, capable staff, and sufficient funding.</p>
<p>Leadership is a key element in the success of legislative budget offices around the world, insofar as leaders can maintain a objective, professional, motivated, and politically astute approach. Sufficient funding and capable staff are necessary to engage in the actual exercise of rigorous budget analysis.</p>
<h2>Limitations of a legislative budget office</h2>
<p>Despite its appeal, the legislative budget office is not the be-all-end-all of budget reform, and there are inherent limitations to what it can accomplish.</p>
<p>One limitation is that it’s inherently difficult to <a href="http://www.austaxpolicy.com/measure-success-legislative-budget-offices/">measure the “success”</a> of an legislative budget office. Experts <a href="http://www.austaxpolicy.com/use-survey-instrument-legislative-budget-office-context/">continue to deliberate</a> on how to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/01900692.2016.1242612?scroll=top&needAccess=true">measure the value</a> that legislative budget offices create.</p>
<p>Even then the office can be constrained by politicians who won’t allow it to make <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01900692.2017.1373673">the relevant impact</a> in the budget process. Sometimes governments might actually <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2944875">try to stop legislative budget offices</a> from working.</p>
<p>There is also a need for <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2944558">strong accountability</a> for legislative budget offices themselves, because they can be vulnerable to internal corruption and self-sabotage. For <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-watches-the-watchmen-lessons-from-ugandas-budget-office-61093">example in Uganda</a> it was the head of the legislative budget office itself who was charged with 3 counts of embezzlement, false accounting, and theft, for which he is serving sentences at present.</p>
<p>In general, legislative budget offices end up fighting a hard battle to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01900692.2017.1317801">earn legitimacy</a> over time and to manoeuvre around political obstacles and demonstrate a track-record of serious, rigorous, nonpartisan analysis.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, a legislative budget office in Indonesia, so long as it works hard to develop a reputation of non-partisanship and strong analysis, can make significant contributions to the budget process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86848/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Usman W. Chohan tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Indonesia needs to follow the example of many other countries and have a legislative budget office. It would consist of economists that advice government on budgets.Usman W. Chohan, Economist, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/712732017-01-13T05:27:42Z2017-01-13T05:27:42ZLey goes, and Turnbull’s reforms pave way for fewer expenses scandals<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152616/original/image-20170113-11172-1g4kndg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sussan Ley maintains that her entitlement claims were within the rules.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Mick Tsikas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sussan Ley has <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-13/sussan-ley-tenders-resignation-parliament-expenses-scandal/8180602?pfmredir=sm">resigned as health minister</a> following <a href="https://theconversation.com/sussan-ley-and-the-gold-coast-apartment-murky-rules-mean-age-of-entitlement-isnt-over-for-mps-70993">allegations</a> she misused her travel entitlements and breached ministerial standards.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said Ley judged resignation to be the appropriate course of action in the interests of the government. But Ley <a href="https://twitter.com/sussanley/status/819758982130565121">has maintained</a> her claims were within the rules.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"819758982130565121"}"></div></p>
<p>In response to the scandal, Turnbull has announced major reforms to the parliamentary entitlements system. The changes are modelled on the UK’s system of vetting MPs’ expenses.</p>
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<h2>What are the proposed reforms?</h2>
<p>The main reform Turnbull announced is the introduction of an independent agency, modelled on the UK’s <a href="http://parliamentarystandards.org.uk/Pages/default.aspx">Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority</a>, for parliamentary entitlements. The <a href="http://www.finance.gov.au/publications/parliamentarians-reporting/">Department of Finance</a> administers Australia’s current system. </p>
<p>The independent authority will be staffed by a member experienced in auditing, a member experienced in remuneration matters, the president of the <a href="http://www.remtribunal.gov.au/">Remuneration Tribunal</a>, a former judge and a former MP. This is a very strong board. It will have significant independence from the government. </p>
<p>MPs and senators will be able to get advice and rulings from the independent agency if they are unsure about a claim. </p>
<p>This means the administration of MPs’ entitlements will now be out of the hands of MPs themselves, who may be interested in a generous interpretation of claimable expenses. MPs’ expenses will now be overseen in a more robust and independent way. </p>
<p>The second reform is to have monthly disclosure of parliamentary expenses, rather than every six months. More frequent reporting will certainly improve the system’s transparency.</p>
<p>The government has also committed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/choppergate-no-more-what-the-review-of-politicians-entitlements-will-mean-56196">implementing the recommendations</a> of the independent review of parliamentary entitlements that followed then-Speaker Bronwyn Bishop’s 2015 “Choppergate” scandal.</p>
<p>As such, entitlement claims will be limited to those made for the dominant purpose of conducting parliamentary business. This excludes political party administration and management, and activities for the dominant purpose of party fundraising, pursuing commercial interests or obtaining personal benefit. </p>
<p>The legal enforcement of the system will be increased. Where MPs misuse entitlements, legislation will oblige them to repay the money – plus a 25% penalty. </p>
<p>The terminology of “entitlements” will be changed to “work expenses”. This is because MPs are given resources to perform their duties in exchange for acting in the public interest.</p>
<h2>What happened in the UK?</h2>
<p>In 2009, the UK had its own <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-expenses/6226839/No-Expenses-Spared-the-inside-story-of-the-Telegraphs-MPs-expenses-investigation.html">MP expenses scandal</a>. UK MPs made inappropriate claims for a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/dec/10/mps-expenses-50-flipped-homes">second residence allowance</a>, alongside outrageous claims for moat cleaning, a ride-on lawn mower, jellied eels and a duck house. </p>
<p>The scandal led to the first resignation of a Speaker in the House of Commons for more than 300 years, and prompted the resignation of a dozen government ministers.</p>
<p>Following public outrage, <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/13/contents">legislation</a> was introduced to set up the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority. It was a strong reaction to a
situation that the then-British prime minister, Gordon Brown, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-expenses/6226839/No-Expenses-Spared-the-inside-story-of-the-Telegraphs-MPs-expenses-investigation.html">called</a> the “biggest parliamentary scandal for two centuries”.</p>
<p>The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority determines what MPs can claim, and administers and audits those claims. It is independent of government and has significant resources. </p>
<h2>Will the reforms fix the system?</h2>
<p>Turnbull’s reforms will significantly revamp the entitlements system. They introduce for the first time an independent agency to vet MP expenses. If the agency does its job well, it will ensure MPs do not abuse the system. </p>
<p>The reforms will also simplify the system, enhance transparency, tighten the rules, and introduce enforceable penalties. </p>
<p>When the system comes into effect, Australians will hopefully see fewer politicians flying around in helicopters and private jets while attending to their private affairs on public funds. The reforms are a great first step toward rebuilding public trust in our elected representatives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yee-Fui Ng does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Malcolm Turnbull has announced major changes to the parliamentary entitlements system, modelled on the UK’s system of vetting MPs’ expenses.Yee-Fui Ng, Lecturer, Graduate School of Business and Law, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/629562016-08-28T20:07:35Z2016-08-28T20:07:35ZWhy are professional development standards for new and returning federal MPs so inadequate?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133058/original/image-20160804-12227-b5xoyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">How well prepared are federal MPs to undertake the arduous tasks that will confront them daily?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Mick Tsikas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>MPs and senators, 226 in all, will soon commence proceedings in Australia’s newly elected 45th federal parliament. But how well prepared are they to undertake the arduous tasks that will confront them daily?</p>
<p>To address that question, a starting point might be to examine the formal education and training programs newly elected MPs are compelled to undertake to acquaint themselves with the intricacies of their role. For re-elected members, one might analyse the programs they are required to attend to further their knowledge, skills and abilities.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, this is not possible. Unlike all professions and many occupations, it is <a href="http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319241791">not mandatory for MPs</a> to take part in any education and training programs specific to their role.</p>
<p>I am not advocating an education bar for candidates; all Australians, regardless of education, wealth or supposed status, should be eligible to stand for election. The parliament would be more representative and perhaps more effective if <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-proposed-senate-voting-change-will-hurt-australian-democracy-55297">diversity among MPs</a> were greater.</p>
<p>Nor am I advocating that MPs should be obliged to undertake the level of education and training required by professions and most occupations before their members are able to practice. But MPs’ professional development, once elected to office, requires reform.</p>
<h2>What is an MP’s role?</h2>
<p>The 45th federal parliament will include many new MPs. Several others will be junior ministers, ministers or shadow ministers for the first time. Some will be taking on responsibility for a totally different portfolio or shadow portfolio.</p>
<p>This group of MPs, like those elected before them, have been entrusted, in their role as “legislator”, with the power to make laws applicable to all Australians. Their entrusted power includes the ability to pass laws that can deprive a person of their freedoms and subject them to life-changing economic and social policies.</p>
<p>But an MP’s role goes beyond legislative work. It includes other important functions, <a href="http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319241791">broadly classified as</a> “representative” and “scrutiniser”.</p>
<p>MPs are expected to perform all three roles simultaneously and under continuous media scrutiny. They must also deal with <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-challenged-democracy-wicked-problems-and-political-failures-39040">“wicked problems”</a> and are expected to resolve them. </p>
<p>Given these circumstances, is it unreasonable to expect that, once elected to office, this influential group of legislators, representatives and scrutinisers should be required to undertake education and training, including in-depth programs for new members, higher-order programs for those taking on senior positions for the first time, and continuous professional development programs for those who have occupied senior positions for some time? </p>
<p>The concerning reality is MPs are not compelled to attend an induction program, although virtually all do. But the induction programs for MPs and senators can present only a brief overview of what their multifaceted role entails. </p>
<p>Follow-up performance development opportunities, offered by both houses, are <a href="http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319241791">often poorly attended</a>. Some attract the interest of fewer than 20 MPs. </p>
<p>MPs are busy people, but they are not alone in being time-poor. Many people experience competing demands on their limited time in multifaceted jobs. A difference between many of them and MPs is that members of professions and many occupations would not be permitted to practise unless they had first attended a comprehensive induction program that covered, in some depth, all facets of their job.</p>
<p>It is highly unlikely that people in other professions and occupations would be promoted to a senior position unless they had first acquired many of the skills needed to be an effective leader. Acquiring those skills includes attending formal education and training programs specific to their role.</p>
<h2>An inadequate approach</h2>
<p>The argument <a href="http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319241791">put forward by many MPs</a> is they learn best on the job and through mentoring programs.</p>
<p>Learning on the job is a necessary element of performance development, but is not sufficient on its own. Nor are mentoring programs. The latter can only be as good as the mentors’ work ethic, the time they have available to devote to the mentoring and – most importantly – their ethical values. </p>
<p>Imagine the learning outcome if a mentor MP’s ethical values were based on the “whatever it takes” principle. This type of attitude by some MPs accounts, in large part, for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/now-for-the-big-question-who-do-you-trust-to-run-the-country-58723">ever-widening trust deficit</a> between those who are given the privilege of serving the people and those who granted them that privilege.</p>
<p>In debating whether MPs should be formally required to undertake education and training programs, it is worth remembering that once a person takes on the role of MP <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=fqovCwAAQBAJ">they are</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Neither ‘ordinary citizens’ nor experts but simply full-time politicians. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But becoming a full-time politician does not automatically endow a newly elected MP with the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to be a competent legislator, representative and scrutiniser. Nor does being promoted to a senior political position bestow on a MP the skill-set needed to perform a demanding leadership role effectively.</p>
<p>Learning primarily through “osmosis” is not an option in today’s rapidly changing, knowledge-based and globalised world. Should it be for MPs?</p>
<p>The laissez-faire approach to enhancing the knowledge, skills and abilities of our elected representatives does not appear to be adequate, especially when you take into account that MPs constitute the supreme decision-making body in Australia’s political system. </p>
<p>Is it unreasonable to expect that this small group of 226 MPs be required to attend continuous performance development programs designed specifically to enhance the knowledge, skills and abilities they need to make more informed decisions on our behalf?</p>
<p>Even if the answer is a resounding yes, only MPs have the power to introduce such a policy. But will they?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62956/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colleen Lewis has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council for research into parliaments and parliamentarians. She is a director of the Accountability Round Table.
Adjunct Professor Lewis is the lead editor of the recently published book (2016) Parliamentarians' Professional Development, edited by Colleen Lewis & Ken Coghill and published by Springer International Publishing, Switzerland.</span></em></p>Unlike most occupations, MPs are not obliged to take part in any education and training programs to prepare them for their role.Colleen Lewis, Adjunct Professor, National Centre for Australian Studies, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.