tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/rwandan-patriotic-front-24066/articlesRwandan Patriotic Front – The Conversation2023-06-21T14:58:31Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2048342023-06-21T14:58:31Z2023-06-21T14:58:31ZRwanda: Paul Kagame is a dictator who clings to power but it’s not just for his own gain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524433/original/file-20230504-25-9wocho.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Kagame at a commemoration of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in April 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mariam Kone/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz0zdet/rwanda">recently said</a> he was looking forward to his retirement after 23 years in power. Speaking to the press in April 2023, he claimed he “may join journalism in my old age” – a somewhat surprising choice, given the poor <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/rwanda">state of the freedom of the press</a> in Rwanda.</p>
<p>But the chances that Kagame will actually step down seem rather small. After a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-rwanda-politics-idUKKBN0U209D20151219">controversial referendum</a> in 2015, Rwandans voted to extend presidential term limits, allowing Kagame to rule potentially until 2034. More recently, Kagame was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230404-paul-kagame-re-elected-as-head-of-rpf">re-elected to head the ruling party</a> – the Rwandan Patriotic Front – for another five years. And last year he suggested that he might <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2OBIiz0PJgQ">run for president again</a> in Rwanda’s 2024 elections. He said:</p>
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<p>I would consider running for another 20 years. I have no problem with that. Elections are about people choosing.</p>
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<p>While the 65-year-old leader seems to be open to the idea of retirement, he continues to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz0zdet/rwanda">feel duty-bound</a> to serve his country, saying:</p>
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<p>We have been having this discussion within our (ruling) party since 2010 but circumstances, challenges and the history of Rwanda tend to dictate certain things.</p>
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<p>My <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">research</a> suggests Kagame is not only acting out of self-interest. For the past decade, I have studied dictators – broadly defined as leaders who <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26798255?casa_token=H1VtUP6OXN4AAAAA%3ACN4ZMpqRQLjTVWADVkXNAy7DkihYbR37keo8XMMpN6KUdqpLTa1nJyH40iUKhIp-ZKKCl_xcF_PWJnL83ej-Sf_QMuCsg95AIYSyk3X67O8ptoy1N_AH">cannot be removed through elections</a>, or where political opposition doesn’t operate on a level playing field. I have tried to <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/289/289">nuance the assumption</a> that all dictators are <a href="https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/the-rationality-of-dictators-towards-a-more-effective-implementat">power hungry</a>. Some dictators are. But often their motives to rule their countries are more complex.</p>
<p>In my view, this is the case with Kagame. While staying in power is necessary to attaining his vision for Rwanda, it isn’t a goal in itself. Kagame’s end goal seems to be a safe and prosperous Rwanda, but not one that’s meant to benefit all Rwandans equally. </p>
<p>Although it’s prohibited by law to differentiate among Hutu and Tutsi, ethnic differences <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">still matter in Rwanda</a> – <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/rhetorical-legacies-of-leadership-projections-of-benevolent-leadership-in-pre-and-postgenocide-rwanda/916F556DD2CFAB34AEF40A509E4D9229">favouring</a> <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/11/from-ethnic-amnesia-to-ethnocracy-80-of-rwanda-top-officials-are-tutsi/">Tutsi refugees</a> who were driven out of their country in pre-1994 episodes of genocidal violence. Former refugees like Kagame.</p>
<p>Kagame is indeed a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">dictator</a> who <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">restricts</a> serious political opposition, independent media and civil society. But he doesn’t rule only for the sake of being in power. I argue that he’s motivated by more than innate self-interest, which is likely to make him more <a href="https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/the-rationality-of-dictators-towards-a-more-effective-implementat">persevering</a> in the pursuit of his goals.</p>
<h2>Kagame’s Rwanda</h2>
<p>The circumstances, challenges and history of Rwanda are intertwined with Kagame’s own life story. Following a genocidal killing spree that began in 1959 and targeted his ethnic community, the Tutsi, Kagame and his family <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/56058176?queryString=waugh%20kagame&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false">were forced to flee to Uganda</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">Life as a refugee</a> was difficult. Kagame was confronted with discrimination and became politically conscious as he grew older. This culminated in his role as the leader of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rwandan-Patriotic-Front">Rwandan Patriotic Front</a>, which fought in Rwanda’s civil war in 1990, and eventually to end the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">1994 genocide</a>. </p>
<p>Throughout his ascent to Rwanda’s highest office in 2000, Kagame has been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">pragmatic and ruthless</a>. </p>
<p>The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/rwanda-progress-or-powder-keg/">invasion of Rwanda from Uganda</a> in 1990 sparked a civil war. Kagame was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Stephen-Kinzer-Thousand-Rwandas-5-2-2008/dp/B00HTKBBR0">realistic</a> about what his forces were able to do and was <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">more open to the eventual peace talks</a> than many others in his ranks were. </p>
<p>Yet, when mediation failed and the 1994 genocide needed to be ended, Kagame didn’t shy away from <a href="https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/gsi.12.2.03">perpetrating mass atrocities</a> to <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">attain this end</a>. After he got into power, his <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/4876.htm">ruthless tactics</a> targeted anyone he believed to be an enemy at home and abroad <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/586476/summary?casa_token=fIZfzS2BSB0AAAAA:e79DaDyhEhWY5BqB4gCoA-JyMoDKnyGaFnrdv2tyHkX-ugS8M9lCzRfu5M7CRfhKic3IeK3iU6k">in the Democratic Republic of Congo</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-kagame-could-be-president-of-rwanda-until-2035-whats-behind-his-staying-power-204051">Paul Kagame could be president of Rwanda until 2035 - what's behind his staying power</a>
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<p>Kagame is also idealistic. He has consistently worked towards the same goal, against all odds, for most of his adult life. He sees the end as justifying the means – whether this entails sacrificing innocent lives to save others during the genocide, or sacrificing freedom for prosperity in post-genocide Rwanda. But for Kagame, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">idealism</a> goes hand in hand with pragmatism: </p>
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<p>If you are driven by the ideal, but you are able to recognise and work with reality, then managing this reality will help you to embrace it and get there. So, the marathon is the long journey we take towards development, it is reality. But we are driven by an ideal, and this ideal allows us to sprint forward; it motivates us; it helps us to achieve our goals and manage reality.</p>
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<p>Kagame has <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/828735733?queryString=rwanda%20crisafulli%20redmond&stickyFacetsChecked=false&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false&format=Book&subformat=Book%3A%3Abook_printbook&subformat=Book%3A%3Abook_digital&changedFacet=format">received</a> credit for the manner in which Rwanda prospered after the genocide into a clean, modern country with a growing economy. </p>
<p>These achievements are <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview">impressive</a> in many respects. But as various <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">studies</a> have <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">shown</a>, this growth hasn’t benefited all Rwandans equally. </p>
<p>This is because the president’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23018900">allegiance</a> <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/11/from-ethnic-amnesia-to-ethnocracy-80-of-rwanda-top-officials-are-tutsi/">lies with</a> his fellow Tutsi.</p>
<h2>Kagame’s mission</h2>
<p>In my view, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter/149350840">Kagame’s goal</a> is to create a home for the Tutsi population that was chased out of Rwanda before the 1994 genocide. </p>
<p>The president launched a project of social engineering where, on the surface, ethnicity <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/714811956?lang=nl&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false&queryString=remaking%20rwanda&stickyFacetsChecked=false">no longer matters</a> and the economy is thriving due to extensive modernisation. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">ethnicity continues to matter</a>. An example of this is that, for nearly 10 years, the Tutsi have come to be recognised as the only genocide survivors in the country. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">2014</a>, Kagame officially renamed the genocide “the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">How Rwanda's annual genocide commemoration fans the flame of ethnicity</a>
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<p>The name change suggests that only the Tutsi are victimised. Consequently, the Hutu are perceived as either <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">culpable bystanders or perpetrators</a>. It obscures the fact that moderate Hutus were targeted as well in 1994. </p>
<p>In addition, some scholars have <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Chronicles-African-Region-French/dp/9057187574">questioned the extent of Rwanda’s economic progress</a>. An Ansoms, a professor in development studies, states that the country’s apparent modernisation hides “<a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">the true extent of poverty and inequality in the countryside</a>”. </p>
<p>For as long as Kagame believes he hasn’t <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter/149350840">fulfilled his goal</a> of creating a prosperous and stable Rwanda that can be home to former Tutsi refugees like himself, he will continue to seek power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204834/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maartje Weerdesteijn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The circumstances, challenges and history of Rwanda are intertwined with Paul Kagame’s own life story.Maartje Weerdesteijn, Assistant Professor, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2074232023-06-12T14:51:41Z2023-06-12T14:51:41ZRwanda genocide accused Félicien Kabuga is ruled unfit to stand trial: this will further erode trust in international justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531219/original/file-20230610-107201-wj7ibu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals recently <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-65826274">concluded</a> a two-year court hearing on Félicien Kabuga. Kabuga is accused of crimes against humanity during the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. The court ruled that he was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/07/africa/felicien-kabuga-trial-incapable-intl/index.html">not mentally fit for trial</a>.</em> </p>
<p><em>The court proposed that the tribunal judges find an “alternative procedure that resembles a trial as closely as possible, but without the possibility of a conviction”. What this “alternative procedure” will look like is still not fully known. Rwanda’s ambassador to the Netherlands, Olivier Nduhungirehe, <a href="https://twitter.com/onduhungirehe/status/1666435782435905538">has suggested</a> a court case would still occur, but without Kabuga. Questions will be raised about how this falls within international legal procedures. Jonathan Beloff, who has <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/people/jonathan-r-beloff-phd">researched post-genocide Rwanda</a>, explores the implications of the tribunal’s decision for genocide victims.</em></p>
<h2>Who is Félicien Kabuga?</h2>
<p>Kabuga, who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-rwanda-kabuga-idUSKBN22W1L9">claims to be 90</a>, was a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/rwanda/News/The-humble-social-man-who-grew-to-be-rich-and-influential-/1433218-1459342-91ulchz/index.html">successful businessman</a> before and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. </p>
<p>He gained considerable wealth from tea production during the presidency of Juvénal Habyarimana between 1973 and 1994. </p>
<p>In 1997, Kabuga was accused by the <a href="https://www.irmct.org/en/cases/mict-13-38">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a> of seven criminal charges. These included providing funds to <a href="https://www.ktpress.rw/2022/11/ex-militia-says-felicien-kabuga-supplied-ak47-rifles-to-commit-genocide/">import weapons</a> used to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">kill an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus</a> over 100 days in 1994.</p>
<p>He was also accused of <a href="https://www.irmct.org/en/cases/mict-13-38">funding</a> a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354894105_The_Role_of_Radio-Television_Libre_Des_Mille_Collines_in_The_Rwandan_Genocide_An_Analysis_From_The_Theoretical_Perspectives_of_Intergroup_Threat_and_Aggression">radio station</a> that broadcasted anti-Tutsi messages. </p>
<p>Kabuga fled Rwanda during the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm#:%7E:text=The%20Rwandan%20Patriotic%20Front%20ended,April%20and%20ended%20in%20July.">operation</a> to end the genocide.</p>
<p>He was named among <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">93 suspected leaders</a> of the genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. However, he remained in hiding in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/5/24/the-risky-business-of-tracking-rwandan-fugitive-felicien-kabuga">Kenya</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/lindamelvern/status/1666390119203450880">Switzerland</a> and later France. </p>
<p>In May 2020, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-rwanda-kabuga/rwandan-genocide-fugitive-kabuga-due-before-french-court-idUSKBN22V1FY">French authorities arrested him at his Paris home</a>. Kabuga has, however, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/rwandan-felicien-kabuga-calls-genocide-charges-lies/a-53590828">denied</a> the charges against him. </p>
<h2>What happened after his arrest in France?</h2>
<p>The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals at The Hague gained custody of Kabuga shortly after his arrest. His alleged crimes fell under its jurisdiction. The Hague-based court took over from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, whose mandate ended <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>Prosecution in Rwanda was never a realistic option – Kabuga was wanted by an international court, which holds legal precedence over Rwanda’s judicial demands.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwandans-will-want-felicien-kabuga-tried-at-home-why-this-wont-happen-139010">Rwandans will want Félicien Kabuga tried at home. Why this won't happen</a>
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<p>Additionally, international human rights groups, such as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/25/law-and-reality/progress-judicial-reform-rwanda">Human Rights Watch</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr47/013/2007/en/">Amnesty International</a>, have questioned the credibility of Rwanda’s judicial system, often claiming unfair practices and political interference. This has affected the Rwandan government in extradition applications for other genocide perpetrators. Nevertheless, Rwanda’s National Public Prosecution Authority committed to assisting the international tribunal in Kabuga’s prosecution.</p>
<p>The central focus of Kabuga’s case at the tribunal was his ability to participate in the hearings meaningfully. By the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/rwanda-genocide-kabuga-trial-dementia-f49f92513ef7f6ecbdefb993e4a86e23">time of his arrest</a>, he had suffered physical deterioration from old age and <a href="https://www.alz.org/alzheimers-dementia/what-is-dementia">dementia</a>. Dementia covers a range of conditions that include a loss of memory, problem-solving and language skills.</p>
<p>Kabuga’s lawyers argued that he was unfit for trial because of these medical conditions. Since his arrest, he has been held by The Hague-based court. </p>
<p>Rwandan genocide survivor organisations, such as Ibuka, have <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/113158-kabuga-trial-for-rwandans-the-old-man-is-still-hiding.html">previously protested</a> against any hindrance to what they perceive as necessary justice. But Kabuga’s lawyers’ arguments on their client’s mental well-being convinced the judges. </p>
<h2>What are the implications of this judgement for Rwandans?</h2>
<p>The recent court decision on Kabuga’s inability to fruitfully participate in any trial reinforces what <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/8129/news/crime/un-court-decision-on-kabuga-trial-disappointing---activists">some Rwandans expected as a failure of the international system and justice</a>. </p>
<p>Shortly after his arrest, some Rwandans <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/6/2/who-should-try-rwandan-genocide-suspect-felicien-kabuga">expressed scepticism</a> about Kabuga’s trial that would be in Europe rather than Kigali. They say those suspected of participating in <a href="https://survivors-fund.org.uk/news/cnlg-and-ibuka-call-out-uk-judiciary/">Rwanda’s genocide must be prosecuted in the country</a> where the crime occurred. As the Ibuka executive secretary <a href="https://survivors-fund.org.uk/news/cnlg-and-ibuka-call-out-uk-judiciary/">once put it</a>:</p>
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<p>Rwanda has all it requires to deliver standard justice. </p>
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<p>Some Rwandans have also <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26893864?seq=1">questioned</a> the effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20200528-debate-who-is-f%C3%A9licien-kabuga-rwandan-genocide-kingpin-arrested-in-france">claiming</a> it sought to make up for the international community’s inaction during the genocide rather than provide justice for the victims.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rusesabagina-vs-rwanda-how-kagame-wields-soft-power-to-get-his-way-with-the-west-202963">Rusesabagina vs Rwanda: how Kagame wields soft power to get his way with the west</a>
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<p>This tribunal cost nearly <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">US$1 billion</a>, and convicted 61 out of 93 Rwandan perpetrators from 1995 to 2012. In contrast, Rwanda’s domestic judicial and reconciliation system, <a href="https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/publications/how-rwanda-judged-its-genocide-new/">gacaca</a>, prosecuted an estimated one million people for various crimes and offences during the genocide at a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dpr.12281#:%7E:text=Clark%20notes%20that%20the%20Gacaca,%2C%20%26%20Gasanabo%2C%202016">much lower cost</a> between 2002 and 2012. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994/Aftermath#ref1111323">Gacaca courts</a> were presided over by local leaders. They gave the accused opportunities to admit guilt and reconcile with victims. </p>
<p>This latest international court ruling on Kabuga will <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/rwanda-challenges-icc-role-as-court-marks-fifteen-years/1703692.html">reinforce the belief</a> that the international community has abandoned Rwandans who seek meaningful justice. The decision, particularly in light of the fact that <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/6482/news/kwibuka/29-years-after-genocide-over-1000-suspects-still-at-large">genocide suspects are still at large in other countries</a>, is likely to erode Rwandan trust in international courts’ capabilities to properly prosecute suspects and deliver justice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Beloff receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>Kabuga’s release raises questions about the international community’s commitment to delivering justice for genocide victims.Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1922532022-11-07T13:50:13Z2022-11-07T13:50:13ZHotel Rwanda: a film that proved to be a double-edged sword for Kigali<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491348/original/file-20221024-25-fvcj8m.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Rusesabagina at the Supreme Court in Kigali, Rwanda, in February 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Paul Rusesabagina is perhaps one of the world’s best <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/world/africa/rwanda-paul-rusesabagina.html">known</a> Rwandans. His actions during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi were made famous in the 2004 Hollywood film <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0395169/">Hotel Rwanda</a>. </p>
<p>The film was inspired by what happened inside Hotel des Mille Collines in the capital, Kigali. Here, 1,268 Rwandans, both Tutsis and Hutus, were saved from genocidal forces waiting beyond its walls.</p>
<p>The film depicts Rusesabagina – who <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/rusesabagina-i-am-not-rwandan-try-me-as-a-belgian-2486428">left Rwanda</a> in 1996 – as a hero who saved these lives. Following the film’s release, Rusesabagina received several humanitarian awards, including the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/presidential-medal-of-freedom-9-11-05/6/">US Presidential Medal of Freedom</a> in 2005 from former president George W Bush. He eventually became a US resident and Belgian citizen.</p>
<p>On 27 August 2020, however, Rwandan officials arrested Rusesabagina. Human Rights Watch accused the Rwandan government of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/10/rwanda-rusesabagina-was-forcibly-disappeared">intentionally misleading</a> him into a flight to Kigali. </p>
<p>The government accused Rusesabagina of supporting anti-Rwanda groups. He was charged with terrorism, arson, kidnapping and murder over two <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-security-idUSKCN1S61AG">attacks</a> in 2018 that killed nine Rwandans. On 20 September 2021, Rusesabagina was convicted of these charges. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison.</p>
<p>Since his conviction, Rwanda has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/rwanda-rejects-calls-to-release-rusesabagina-3911342">rebuffed</a> growing international pressure for Rusesabagina’s release. </p>
<p>In August 2022, during a visit to Kigali, US secretary of state Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/aug/11/blinken-kagame-hotel-rwanda-paul-rusesabagina">urged the government</a> to release Rusesabagina. In Hollywood, actors and actresses have highlighted the issue through a “Free Rusesabagina” clothing campaign.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-and-rwanda-how-the-relationship-has-evolved-since-the-1994-genocide-188115">The US and Rwanda: how the relationship has evolved since the 1994 genocide</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In my most recent <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1999&context=jss">research paper</a>, I focused on the Rusesabagina case. Based on interviews with Rwandans, I conclude that Hollywood’s interpretation of historical events significantly differs from those who lived in the hotel during the genocide. </p>
<p>Hotel Rwanda is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/17/hotel-rwanda-hollywood-ending">double-edged sword</a> for the country. </p>
<p>On one hand, it introduced the horrific <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">1994 genocide</a> to a world that knew little of what had happened in the small African nation. Over 100 days between 6 April and 19 July, Rwanda witnessed the deaths of up to one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the film’s historical inaccuracies <a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-08-17/now-jailed-for-terrorism-one-time-hotel-rwanda-hero-has-become-point-of-u-s-contention-with-rwanda">built up</a> Rusesabagina’s profile. Based on what I found during the course of the interviews I did, I argue that he used his fame to promote his version of Rwandan history and his <a href="https://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/African-hero-now-living-in-S-A-will-run-for-6791393.php">desire for political power</a>. My research findings echo those of others, including <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hotel-Rwanda-Tutsi-genocide-Hollywood-ebook/dp/B008FXI9EI">Rwandan academics</a>, who have explored the <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Inside-Hotel-Rwanda-Surprising-Matters-ebook/dp/B00APDFXF4">mismatch</a> in narratives. </p>
<p>Many in the global north, whose primary knowledge of Rwanda consists of the film, were swayed to Rusesabagina’s rather than Rwandans’ expression of their history, goals and desires. This narrative was driven to a large extent by human rights groups, which have been highly critical of the country’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/rwanda">human rights record</a>. </p>
<h2>Differing narratives</h2>
<p>Between 2008 and 2018, more than 100 Hotel des Mille Collines survivors discussed with me their historical experiences and belief that Rusesabagina was not the reason they were still alive. I conducted most of these interviews at the hotel and the Kigali Genocide Memorial, which houses the remains of more than 250,000 genocide victims. My research also used existing networks within the Rwandan government and civil society organisations. </p>
<p>Survivors who were at the hotel <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1999&context=jss">said</a> Rusesabagina ran the hotel as a personal profit-making venture. </p>
<p>If one could not pay him, one would face expulsion from the hotel’s grounds, which meant certain death. One survivor said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you could pay, you would stay in a room. If you couldn’t pay for a room, you could pay to stay in a hallway. If you couldn’t pay that, you could pay to stay by the pool. If you couldn’t pay that, he (Rusesabagina) would demand you to leave. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>One hotel worker told me this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>He (Rusesabagina) didn’t care about any of us (workers). I begged him to let them (my family) stay as I was working there (at the hotel) for a long time. He didn’t care and demanded I pay him money or he would throw them out to be killed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Several other <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/survivors-rusesabagina-was-no-hero-hotel-rwanda-film--1934890">survivor stories</a> suggest a different narrative from the one in the film. In Hotel Rwanda, Rusesabagina is depicted as collecting money only to pay off genocide perpetrators. </p>
<h2>Rusesabagina during the genocide</h2>
<p>Prior to the genocide, Rusesabagina worked at the neighbouring Hotel des Diplomates. He took over the management of Hotel des Mille Collines after discovering that its European manager, Bik Cornelis, had been evacuated. One former hotel worker told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…a few days into the killings, Rusesabagina walked in one day and saw that the old manager (Cornelis) was taken with the other Europeans. He called (the hotel owners) and told them to … only work with him. They had no idea what was going on and probably hadn’t talked to Cornelis yet, so they agreed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While the film credits Rusesabagina with creating an oasis during the conflict, he’s not the reason the hotel – one of the few areas offering refuge at the time – survived attacks from those behind the genocide. </p>
<p>Not depicted in the film are the seven to 10 United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) soldiers who were constantly positioned in front of the facility. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Shake-Hands-Devil-Failure-Humanity/dp/0786715103">book</a>, Roméo Dallaire, a former commander of this UN mission, says he stationed troops at the hotel’s only entrance as a symbolic indication that it was under the UN’s protection. Dallaire has <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/archive/ca/entry/romeo-dallaire-senator-slams-hotel-rwanda-film-as-revisionist_n_1174607">spoken out</a> against Hotel Rwanda as historical revisionism.</p>
<p>Further, the Interahamwe, the primary Hutu death squads responsible for the
genocidal killings, had been directed to stay outside the walls of the hotel. They allowed people to run into it, but would threaten or kill those who tried to leave. </p>
<p>One former Interahamwe who had been stationed about 20 metres from the hotel’s entrance told me that he received instructions from his regional commander to “just stay put by the hotel and to allow the Tutsis and others to have access”. The hotel was also used for prisoner exchanges “and it would be the final spot for us to cleanse (murder the Tutsis) once we beat the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front)”.</p>
<p>The Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by Paul Kagame, took control of the country in July, ending the genocide. The horrors of the 100-day period led to Rwanda’s focus on forming a new single ethnic identity: “Rwandan”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Beloff receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>Rwanda has rebuffed international pressure to release Paul Rusesabagina, a man made famous by Hollywood.Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1862442022-08-02T14:05:56Z2022-08-02T14:05:56ZHow Rwanda’s annual genocide commemoration fans the flame of ethnicity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473875/original/file-20220713-9357-jjdkei.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A billboard highlights Rwanda's 100-day commemoration of the 1994 genocide.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thierry Falise/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Each year, Rwandans at home and in the diaspora remember those <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">killed in the 1994 genocide</a>. This is not a single-day event. Kwibuka (“to remember” in the local Kinyarwanda language) consists of 100 days of official commemoration. It’s characterised by explicit acknowledgement and public discussions of ethnic identity.</p>
<p>But there’s a puzzling contradiction of state policy at play during Kwibuka. </p>
<p>In 2003, Rwanda adopted a policy of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/world/a-decade-after-massacres-rwanda-outlaws-ethnicity.html">ethnic non-recognition</a>. There are no Hutus or Tutsis; only Rwandans. The aim is to achieve national homogeneity in a country that was torn apart by ethnic genocide. </p>
<p>The policy is strictly enforced, but relaxes during the 100 days of Kwibuka. </p>
<p>This has led to seemingly opposed practices: legally erasing identity groups because of their link to conflict, contrasted against three months of saturated reminders in the form of public speeches, memorial programming, burials and commemorative signage.</p>
<p>In 2014, 20 years on, the genocide was officially renamed from the Rwandan genocide to “the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi”. This decision was recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12000.doc.htm">2018</a>. </p>
<p>The change marked a distinct shift from an inclusive naming. It also centred Tutsi people as the sole targets of genocidal violence. This, despite Rwanda and the international community historically acknowledging that moderate Hutus were victimised, too. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-rwanda-genocide-commemorations-are-infused-with-political-and-diplomatic-agendas-160283">In Rwanda, genocide commemorations are infused with political and diplomatic agendas</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/constructing-identity-through-commemoration-kwibuka-and-the-rise-of-survivor-nationalism-in-postconflict-rwanda/CFE362C810D66B522D751AC1938DCF59">My research</a> pinpointed four anomalies that were not present during the rest of the year but emerged during Kwibuka:</p>
<ul>
<li>a perceived increase in violence towards survivors</li>
<li>an increase in accusations and convictions of genocide ideology and denial</li>
<li>widespread youth involvement in identity rhetoric</li>
<li>a reported increase in prisoner confessions. </li>
</ul>
<p>These anomalies highlight how Kwibuka exacerbates social tensions. My research was done five years ago, but the <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rib-warns-against-genocide-ideology-ahead-kwibuka27">anomalies</a> I observed <a href="https://www.ktpress.rw/2022/04/kwibuka-28-killed-and-dumped-in-river-rubyiro-remembered-for-the-first-time/">persist</a>.</p>
<h2>Studying state-led commemoration</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/CFE362C810D66B522D751AC1938DCF59/S0022278X19000259a.pdf/constructing-identity-through-commemoration-kwibuka-and-the-rise-of-survivor-nationalism-in-post-conflict-rwanda.pdf">my research</a>, I examined the rhetoric coming from the Rwandan state on the 1994 genocide. I also observed nine commemoration events to see how attendees reacted to and spoke about Kwibuka.</p>
<p>I additionally conducted interviews to help me understand the differences between the commemoration period and the rest of the year. </p>
<p>I was curious to follow what effect this sudden shift from ethnic non-recognition to recognition might have on people. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the country’s leading political party, has “<a href="https://advox.globalvoices.org/2020/08/07/the-chilling-tale-of-mass-surveillance-and-spying-in-rwanda/">positioned itself</a> as the only guarantor of peace, security and development”, as Rwandan lawyer Louis Gitinywa writes. </p>
<p>My research shows this message is reinforced through commemoration programming. This commonly emphasises that only the ruling party and current political leadership stand between ordinary Rwandans and a reemergence of genocidal violence. </p>
<p>The ethnic non-recognition policy is linked to Rwandan laws against “genocide ideology” and <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ac5c4302.pdf">“sectarianism”</a>. The government claims that such laws keep Rwandans safe. However, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr47/005/2010/en/">critics</a> point out their chilling effect on legitimate political opposition and dissent. I was at times told that simply asking questions about genocide commemoration and ethnicity could be seen as being at odds with the law.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/commonwealth-leaders-gather-in-rwanda-as-uk-refugee-plan-focuses-attention-on-human-rights-185328">Commonwealth leaders gather in Rwanda as UK refugee plan focuses attention on human rights</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Anomalies</h2>
<p>I discovered four anomalies that are only present during the commemoration period. </p>
<p>First, there is heightened sensitivity across the country. Survivors told me they were worried about violence against them and their property. This is not baseless. National radio and television stations report threats against survivors throughout Kwibuka. These include their livestock being tortured, property destroyed and bones mailed to memorial sites.</p>
<p>The second anomaly is the emergence of “survivor youth” and their engagement with ethnic rhetoric. Among my interviewees, “survivor” was synonymous with “Tutsi”. </p>
<p>This self-claimed identity held even among young people who have spent most of their lives in a country with an ethnic non-recognition policy. Notably, my youth interviewees identified themselves by ethnicity unprompted, and when asked if they knew any non-Tutsi who would refer to themselves as “survivors”, they all said no or were unsure.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnlg.gov.rw/index.php?id=2">National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide</a> shared data with me on accusations and convictions related to genocide denial and ideology during Kwibuka. It showed that many of these cases involved people born well after 1994. This happened despite the state’s insistence that the next generation is free of the old biases or violent inclinations that drove the genocide.</p>
<p>The third anomaly is the increase in accusations and convictions of genocide ideology, denial and sectarianism. My interview data was consistent with <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/call-unity-kwibuka27-activities-draw-closer">statistics</a> from the Rwanda Investigation Board showing that such accusations and convictions are concentrated during Kwibuka. It’s not clear why, but heightened sensitivity and the fear rhetoric promoted by the Rwandan Patriotic Front during the 100 days may be among the reasons.</p>
<p>Finally, Kwibuka always marks an increase in confessions from imprisoned génocidaires. This relates directly to an <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/genocide-over-18000-victims-exhumed-kigali-mass-graves">increase</a> in bodies of genocide victims being discovered. Confessions are made each year, even though authorities say incentives for prisoners who share information ended some time ago.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/ateliers/2019-v14-n2-ateliers05462/1071136ar/">argued</a> that this continual discovery of bodies merits further attention. Exhumation and reburial can lead to <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/publications/promoting-reconciliation-through-exhuming-and-identifying-victims-1994-rwandan-0/">closure</a> for families and communities, and is an important part of commemoration. However, a claim that prisoners confess because they are “moved by the spirit of Kwibuka” is at odds with documented <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/10/we-will-force-you-confess/torture-and-unlawful-military-detention-rwanda">coercion and human rights violations</a> in Rwandan prisons.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwandans-discuss-how-best-to-commemorate-genocide-94452">Rwandans discuss how best to commemorate genocide</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Memory without exclusion</h2>
<p>My research in no way aims to promote covering up history. But there is a difference between teaching history and stoking historical social divisions. The exclusionary “us versus them” form of nationalism that emerges during Kwibuka may threaten Rwanda’s precarious peace. </p>
<p>One solution may lie in the fact that the commemoration period is highly mutable. It adapts and changes every year. This means it’s possible to have more inclusive events that favour a <a href="https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/agaciro-vernacular-memory-and-the-politics-of-memory-in-postgenocide-rwanda(2e914106-f314-4a45-a6f2-7927a68d2be6).html">balance</a> between official narratives and ordinary people’s memories.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186244/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gretchen Baldwin received funding for this research from the Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity (AC4) in 2017. She is currently a Researcher with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. </span></em></p>In 2003, Rwanda adopted a policy of ethnic non-recognition. However, for 100 days in a year, it centres ethnicity in the country’s psyche.Gretchen Baldwin, Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1617172021-05-29T07:35:24Z2021-05-29T07:35:24ZRwanda genocide: Macron forgiveness plea resets historic ties<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403352/original/file-20210528-24-8ypnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French president Emmanuel Macron lays a wreath on a mass grave at the Kigali Genocide Memorial on 27 May 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> EPA-EFE/Eugene Uwimana</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>French president Emmanuel Macron has just paid his <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210526-macron-seeks-reset-with-rwanda-on-africa-visit-after-years-of-tensions">first state visit to Rwanda</a>. While many world leaders have visited the central African nation of 13 million, including past French presidents, such as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/26/world/europe/26france.html">President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2010</a>, this trip was going to be different. </p>
<p>Sure enough president Macron would come the closest to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/27/kagami-the-winner-as-macron-gives-genocide-speech-in-rwanda">apologising</a> for France’s involvement during the <a href="https://news.trust.org/item/20140402113037-u315s/">1994 genocide</a> against the Tutsis.</p>
<p>At the Kigali Genocide Memorial, Macron <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/time-bow-genocide-victims-listen-survivors-macron">asked</a> for forgiveness for France’s involvement in the genocide. He also expressed his desire to combat genocide ideology and denial in order to foster stronger relations with Rwanda. </p>
<p>The long-term impact of this trip will be based on building on this commitment. France’s tangible foreign policy mechanism will be committing itself to helping Rwanda through foreign aid development funding and COVID-19 vaccines. However, for France to gain the trust of Rwandans, the country has to commit itself to combatting genocide ideology and denial. A great start would be the arrest and extradition of Rwandans who participated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Prior to the genocide, France was Rwanda’s closest European ally. It was never the colonising power. Rwanda was colonised by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Rwanda/Rwanda-under-German-and-Belgian-control">Germany</a> (1884-1919) and later transferred to Belgium. It was during the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html">Belgian colonial period</a> (1919-1962) that socio-economic divisions of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa become immovable ethnic divisions. To <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Rwanda_Before_the_Genocide/IawzAAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=jj+carney&pg=PP2&printsec=frontcover">justify Belgium’s colonial atrocities</a>, the colonial government elevated some Tutsi elites into positions of power to illustrate local rule. </p>
<p>In a 1973 coup, Juvénal Habyarimana <a href="https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dossiers/rwanda/r1271.asp#P1538_159983">took</a> the presidency. <a href="https://watermark.silverchair.com/mqi059.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAr4wggK6BgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggKrMIICpwIBADCCAqAGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMVb1nio-L8HxBN5IVAgEQgIICcfmSwQPwxnjhFmGazhzmvbvWVJHCsdHtBhSaRUxEPbWaooM_6zm3YbVvLQFQ5w3K1fzj_VpgJ7lhBJ2Mo51JzbrBo6aIhVV-rSMLVTF_NYAqnf1e9dca2g72gCnzsZh7RGsNOiWi4KncyQR_kuf6If0DxMzmynXoGSa_zYVhRoxs6OFwFXrKqDUWTHKbdSoJHHpAUjmuyHR60HMxJP5xgvEKSRIW52kwQOiZaq5lXKMh3mj4JSEhrJoOFaU8OhNRWGS1izkN5ThorQPj_qM_tb4Dz4C6UXBQFlAs317hufIaCo_UljeXiHPQ99v_xck4S9AySSSKnb0k9tAplFT8NYJm_IPH9PvneNGOdZ8F8kEkdA-lWo0F5j07na5AjvCBAZxHDY_IyLprT59_gzEFXrn9NVz1673Vz39A6r2m0HLnRHsjxlR7T9BUSVuqLqCXq8rv79g3FE_ZpWk3i0CiC3bK02cD13G5VwxlLOwoVAT9zO3xHSJ_rA-p595gNXCDMOqE_Odib_wUxM-yTMydmHkuaTYzKboAyxxpca6YVxJZHWUPMf6G9q87zso6ntLOegnyFUbZuI69wLjQxPGtDTxeyTbar3SQD_5i91d1QT6Ash3Q3lpcEMFfWSMz5s7eRuMShH9ETbNudZG_JbvlXzDc_xxBkzX_pACcGXdqGsPj3icp_HfSeSCG0aNLMuwejx8cDxj2sJMPSZrFA5w5BufpCGcMNOkArPpW6qhcoT_R0NcyYDxwrSiPfVp9FT40g3eLm4-xmvZa4lK8zBBL1_cvMhEkkkxaCYX64m35dhcYOqYEqbyW5bO2tWkEWsvynTE">He</a> developed a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/05/paris-trial-elysee-rwanda-genocide">close personal relationship</a> with French president François Mitterrand (1981-1995). </p>
<p>France under Mitterrand provided the Habyarimana regime with considerable financial and military support. Mitterrand’s backing helped create a sense of legitimacy for his Rwandan counterpart. This in turn aided the policies of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4187200.pdf?casa_token=2_AoP5kA5cYAAAAA:T5NDvKsEM6UwsdYT-nhG_J5J3_i7WmE7RvDrvEtKtrxPCaY1LFhFrAY-3kD_GRPkjq3oR4P7rXcQNJdP-QqzvoE1zjPTIbQuI_fIwmeFPUP9pg8l4A">ethnic divisionism</a>, hatred and pogroms that would eventually result in the 1994 genocide.</p>
<p>Since then, Rwandan-French relations have been poor at best. Many within the Rwandan government, led by the Rwanda Patriotic Front, <a href="https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1696&context=gsp">denounced</a> France’s closeness to Habyarimana as unacceptable. Rwanda also demanded an acknowledgement of French involvement in the 1994 genocide. Unfortunately, this did not happen under the next French president <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/15/opinion/15iht-edkinzer.1.15328850.html">Jacques Chirac</a>. </p>
<p>Subsequently, president <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/25/sarkozy-rwanda-genocide-kagame">Sarkozy</a> attempted to foster greater relations with Rwanda. He came close to admitting France’s role during the genocide, but blamed “political errors” for the country’s actions. Relations deteriorated again under president <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/187831">François Hollande</a> who minimised France’s involvement prior to and during the genocide. </p>
<p>Now, however, Macron has gone beyond Sarkozy’s tentative steps. </p>
<h2>How relations went south</h2>
<p>As Cold War declined in the early 1990s, France <a href="https://apnews.com/article/edfa5353874d34c97d3062d300bca767">began to apply pressure</a> on its African allies – such as Habyarimana – to democratise. In Rwanda, however, the transition from dictatorship to open political competition did not go well. Rather than peaceful mobilisation, the opening of political space helped Hutu ideological extremists loyal to Habyarimana to propagate the ideology of genocide against the Tutsis. </p>
<p>At the same time, Rwandan exiles — mostly Tutsis – formed the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/161382?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Rwandan Patriotic Front</a> signalling the start of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1462352042000225958?casa_token=XXZMNZVErBsAAAAA:EHqfGZrSRrG1vr1c8CDkKHS1k_Mx8BN5bSuyYwg0OJB7RwtuZ4DBw8Djnr4iFG7AZrDLzMZ1RXw">Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994)</a> between government and well-organised rebels.</p>
<p>France backed Habyarimana’s regime by fighting back the first invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (1990-1991). After this campaign, the French government provided its military assistance to rebuild Rwanda’s military against the party. They also secretly supported a government-backed militia, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994/Genocide#ref1111308">Interahamwe</a> (Those who fight together).</p>
<p>The genocide began hours after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/12/rwanda-hutu-president-plane-inquiry">assassination</a> of Habyarimana. The presidential plane he was in was shot down by unknown assailants. </p>
<p>France remained steadfastly behind the new genocide government. While not providing military equipment or troops, it pressured for the removal of the United Nation’s peacekeeping <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unamirS.htm">force</a> in Rwanda. It also moved the Rwandan government’s <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-arrest-of-madame-agathe">inner circle</a> of power out of Rwanda in the early days of the genocide.</p>
<p>Later France was to send military troops under the UN-sanctioned <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/05/14/assessment_of_opration_turquoise_113440.html">Opération Turquoise</a>. The French government publicly stated their substantial contribution of nearly 2,500 soldiers would help stop the genocidal killings. However, it became a safe zone for genocide perpetrators to continue the massacres as well as to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Zaire.htm">flee</a> into neighbouring Zaire.</p>
<h2>Goodwill gestures</h2>
<p>The political fallout from the 1994 genocide will remain at the heart of relations between Rwanda and France for some time to come. But the signs are promising. A great first step was made in 2019 with the creation of the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/europe/report-frances-role-rwandas-genocide-fails-lay-rest-dark-past">Duclert Commission</a> to investigate France’s role in the genocide. </p>
<p>The commission report expressed reasonable doubt as to whether the French government was fully aware of how its relationship with the Habyarimana regime and training of Interahamwe forces would lead to the genocide. It nevertheless acknowledged France’s involvement in the events leading to the mass killings. </p>
<p>The Rwandan government <a href="https://www.gov.rw/blog-detail/statement-on-the-release-of-the-duclert-commission-report">accepted</a> the report’s findings and commented on how important this was to help restore trust between the two nations.</p>
<p>Macron and current Rwandan president Paul Kagame recently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/27/world/africa/france-rwanda.html">met</a> in France. Macron publicly showed his desire for a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20210527-replay-france-s-macron-meets-rwanda-s-kagame-to-turn-page-on-post-genocide-tensions">friendship</a> with his Rwandan counterpart. </p>
<p>During Macron’s Rwanda state visit some significant <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rwanda-france-sign-two-bilateral-agreement">agreements</a> were made between the two countries – for <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rwanda-france-sign-two-bilateral-agreement">example</a> a bilateral cooperation agreement between the two nations’ foreign ministers, financial support for development and for combating Covid-19.</p>
<p>But the highlight for Rwandans was Macron’s visit to the Kigali Genocide Memorial. While this might not appear to be a tangible benefit in foreign policy, it holds significant influence in Rwandan perceptions of France amid hesitation, scepticism and open hatred for France. </p>
<p>For many Rwandans, France represents a period in their country’s history that was filled with ethnic hatreds, instability and Habyarimana’s dictatorship. Many still hold France responsible for aiding the destructive ideology of the genocide. </p>
<p>It will take time for Rwandans, especially those who suffered or witnessed the genocide, to trust France again. Macron will be aware of these challenges and how French-Rwandan relations will require time, gestures of goodwill and actions addressing the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Beloff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It will take time for Rwandans, especially those who suffered or witnessed the genocide, to trust France again.Jonathan Beloff, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1145122019-04-01T12:52:25Z2019-04-01T12:52:25ZDebate continues about the media’s role in driving Rwanda’s genocide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266532/original/file-20190329-70986-1nyct8d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Inside the Genocide Memorial Church in Karongi-Kibuye - Western Rwanda. 11,000 people were killed here during the 1994 genocide.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Choral_Group_Rehearses_inside_Genocide_Memorial_Church_-_Karongi-Kibuye_-_Western_Rwanda_-_01.jpg">Adam Jones/WikiMedia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Twenty-five years ago, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14093238">Rwandan</a> government launched a meticulously planned <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486">genocide</a> against its Tutsi minority. It killed approximately 800 000 people in 100 days. </p>
<p>We can’t reflect on the history of the 1994 genocide without considering the critical role the media played in both inciting and prolonging the violence. </p>
<p>In the summer of 1993 the government, ruled by the pro-Hutu National Revolutionary Movement for Development, engaged in a peace process with the mostly-Tutsi rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front. They negotiated an end to the civil war and the repatriation of Tutsi exiles. At the same time, however, the Movement was also preparing for genocide. </p>
<p>The youth wing of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development established the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno4-7-03.htm">Interahamwe</a>. This paramilitary group would eventually lead attacks on Tutsi civilians. Hardliners from the party also launched <a href="http://www.genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Radio_T%C3%A9l%C3%A9vision_Libre_des_Mille_Collines">Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines</a> (RTLM - French for “Thousand Hills Free Radio and Television”). It was a radio station that disseminated hate propaganda and prepared its listeners for the coming violence. The broadcaster provided a popular platform for ideas already circulating in <a href="http://genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Category:KANGURA"><em>Kangura</em></a>, an extremist magazine founded in 1990. </p>
<p>In its early broadcasts, the station used Radio Rwanda’s transmission equipment. The new broadcaster developed lively, informal and accessible programming that targeted ordinary citizens. Unlike Radio Rwanda, it played popular music from neighbouring Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). This was particularly appealing to younger listeners. </p>
<p>In the weeks prior to the April 1994 genocide the station ramped up its anti-Tutsi, pro-Hutu propaganda. Broadcasters used increasingly dehumanising language to speak about the Tutsi minority. This mobilised ordinary Hutu citizens against the Tutsi. Historian Alison Des Forges <a href="https://www.idrc.ca/en/book/media-and-rwanda-genocide">wrote</a> that, once the genocide was underway, government leaders used the station to promote violence. It also gave specific directions for carrying out the killings.</p>
<p>A quarter of a century on, media scholars, historians and journalists are still debating the precise role of RTLM in the genocide. Did radio broadcasts directly incite violence? Or did they simply amplify the fear and genocidal ideology that was already circulating throughout the Hutu population? </p>
<h2>Media effects</h2>
<p>Most early scholarship about the genocide views RTLM as a lethal influence. In 2001, researcher, war correspondent and diplomat Samantha Power <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/">suggested</a> that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>killers often carried a machete in one hand and a transistor radio in the other.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The refusal of international actors like the US and the UN Security Council to use radio jamming technology to stop RTLM’s broadcasts is another flash-point for discussion. It reflects the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-inquiry-actions-of-united-nations-during-1994-genocide-rwanda-s19991257">general failure</a> of the international community to intervene and stop the genocide. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/ISEC_a_00100">More recent studies</a> question the primacy of radio broadcasts in directly motivating the killers’ actions. These scholars see radio as an extension of years of state propaganda which was disseminated through schools, churches, and other government institutions. </p>
<p>In a detailed empirical study published in 2007, social scientist <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100622570">Scott Straus</a> found that only 15% of perpetrators cited radio broadcasts as a key influence in their decision to kill Tutsi. Face-to-face intimidation and communication between peers appeared to have a stronger influence. Radio broadcasts were a secondary factor. </p>
<h2>Enduring debate</h2>
<p>The enduring debate about the role of media was central to a <a href="http://unictr.irmct.org/en/cases/ictr-99-52">case</a> before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The tribunal was tasked with prosecuting high level perpetrators and the masterminds of the genocide. The defendants in what was known as the Media Case included RTLM co-founder Ferdinand Nahimana, its executive Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and <em>Kangura</em> founder and editor, Hassan Ngeze. </p>
<p>In 2003, all three were <a href="http://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/three-media-leaders-convicted-genocide">convicted</a> of genocide, incitement to commit genocide, and persecution using radio broadcasts and newspaper articles as a crime against humanity. The conviction for committing genocide was overturned on appeal, but much of the original ruling was retained. </p>
<p>The Media Case was precedent-setting. It held media executives accountable for inciting genocide, regardless of other factors that may have influenced the perpetrators. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/prosecutor-v-nahimana-barayagwiza-and-ngeze-case-no-ictr-9952a/FBD07F6AB3AD4108BCED83978DF1A9B0">Legal scholars suggest</a> that the judgement will have a significant impact on future cases of incitement to genocide. </p>
<h2>International response</h2>
<p>We may never definitively settle the “media effects” debate – that is, did radio and other media directly incite violence, or were they a secondary driver?</p>
<p>But the establishment of RTLM in 1993 was undoubtedly a clear warning sign to the world. In a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d1da8752.pdf">2000 report</a>, the Organisation of African Unity suggested that silencing RTLM during the genocide would have had limited impact. The international community should have moved to address the hate propaganda before the killing started. It should have recognised the broadcasts as an essential part of the preparation for the genocide. </p>
<p>One mechanism for countering RTLM’s hate propaganda could have come from the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda, which was deployed by the Security Council in 1993 to oversee the peace process. However, due to typical delays, the Mission’s radio broadcast equipment was never shipped to Rwanda. The absence of an effective communication tool left the UN without the means to produce counter broadcasts. It could also not provide airtime for the voices of moderate Hutu leaders. </p>
<h2>Lessons remain</h2>
<p>Although many years have passed, the Rwandan genocide still has much to teach us about the centrality of media in cases of state violence. An analysis of media opens up important discussions about genocide prevention, the regulation of hate speech, and the appropriate forms of international intervention.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114512/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda Grzyb receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). </span></em></p>Although many years have passed, the Rwandan genocide still has much to teach us about the centrality of media in cases of state violence.Amanda Grzyb, Associate Professor and Faculty Scholar of Media and Information Studies, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1049952018-10-29T14:19:54Z2018-10-29T14:19:54ZA look back in history provides fresh insights into Rwanda today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/242684/original/file-20181029-76396-1io2j2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Except during the relatively brief period of colonial rule, Rwanda was, and is, a violent society.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Olivier Matthys</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At first sight, three fundamental ruptures occurred in modern Rwandan history: colonisation, starting at the end of the 19th century; the revolution of 1959-1961 followed by independence in 1962; and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">1994 genocide</a> followed by the seizure of power by the Rwandan Patriotic Front.</p>
<p>Of course, these are breaks with the past. But I <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2018.1462985">argue</a> that there are also striking continuities spanning the entire period, from the mid-19th century to the 2010s. These include the concentration of power, intra-regime conflict, the salience of ethnicity, and the nature of the state. </p>
<p>Another characteristic – the pervasiveness of the military institution and of military ethics – disappeared during colonial days and the first two republics. But it resurfaced from 1994 onwards, resuming continuity after a century-long interval.</p>
<p>This longue durée view is very illuminating. It offers a better understanding of crucial characteristics of governance in Rwanda today, at home and in the region. </p>
<h2>Concentration of power</h2>
<p>A first continuity throughout the four periods (precolonial, colonial, post-revolution and post-genocide) is the concentration of power. The precolonial kingdom became increasingly centralised, particularly from the latter part of the 18th century. </p>
<p>In a structure like a pyramid, regional authorities were dependents of the mwami (king). Below them were hill chiefs who tightly controlled the population. </p>
<p>Authoritarian centralisation continued in colonial days in two ways. On the one hand, indirect rule reinforced and stabilised the power of the court and the chiefs. On the other, the Belgian administration was authoritarian and, like the indigenous one, ignored principles like the separation of powers and the rule of law. </p>
<p>The elective principle and checks and balances were introduced less than two years before independence. It’s therefore not surprising that, in Rwanda as elsewhere in Africa, the new political elites continued colonial modes of governance. In this respect, there is not much of a break between colonial rule, the de facto single-party first republic, the de jure single-party second republic and de facto single-party regime in post-genocide Rwanda. </p>
<h2>Internal strife</h2>
<p>Intra-regime conflict is a second continuity. Internal strife within the royal court and among ruling elites was common in precolonial days. Most successions to the throne were contested and led to bitter and often violent infighting, and even to civil war. Regime infighting resumed after independence. The gradual narrowing of the ruling party’s power base through the elimination of important constituencies eventually led to the downfall of the first republic. </p>
<p>A similar phenomenon occurred under the second republic. A number of regime leaders were arrested in 1980. Fearing a similar fate, others fled the country. </p>
<p>The Rwandan Patriotic Front has also fallen prey to intense struggle. This pitted factions against each other from the first days of the invasion. This evolution became more pronounced after 2000 and took a radical turn in 2010 when four leading figures who fled published a <a href="http://rwandatekaiteka.over-blog.com/article-declaration-on-rwanda-by-gerald-gahima-general-kayumba-nyamwasa-colonel-patrick-karegeya-dr-theogene-rudasingwa-56727400.html">long diatribe</a> against the regime. </p>
<h2>Ethnicity</h2>
<p>A third major continuity is the importance of ethnicity, although it has had different political implications depending on the period. </p>
<p>Political ethnicity emerged clearly in the 19th century. The distinction between ethnic groups that earlier referred to political positions and economic and military occupations became institutionalised. </p>
<p>From the 1870s, the awareness of ethnic distinction spread all over the country and led to several revolts. The 1897 insurrection showed that the population was conscious of a great divide between the <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/2909.htm">two ethnic groups</a>. </p>
<p>Colonial rule further institutionalised and rigidified ethnicity. Belgium first entrenched Tutsi rule. However, in the 1950s it switched sides when democratisation and independence came to the fore. </p>
<p>Although there were underlying social, political and economic grievances, the revolution of 1959-1961 took place under an almost exclusively ethnic banner. On assuming power, the Rwandan Patriotic Front set out to pursue a policy of de-ethnicisation. But the denial of ethnicity is an essential element of the hegemonic strategies of the party-dominated elite. The claim that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/world/a-decade-after-massacres-rwanda-outlaws-ethnicity.html">“there are no Hutu or Tutsi, we are all Rwandans now”</a> allows them to hide a Tutsi ethnocracy. </p>
<p>The regime’s narrative merely reflects the public transcript. But the hidden transcript – that of oppressed Hutu and Tutsi – is <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/5148.htm">very different</a>. </p>
<h2>The state</h2>
<p>A fourth strong continuity lies in the nature of the state which, unlike in much of Africa, is strong and well internalised by citizens. </p>
<p>Rwanda is not a colonial creation, and an ancient state tradition plays an undeniable role in the maintenance of an efficient pyramid-like structure. The Rwandan Leviathan is highly centralised and hierarchical – it reaches every inch of the territory and every citizen. </p>
<p>Echoing the situation in earlier days, a mere two years after the extreme human and material destruction of 1994, the state had been rebuilt, and Rwanda was again administered from top to bottom. Before – as after the genocide – the regimes displayed a strong belief in managing, monitoring, controlling, and mobilising the population. Both showed a strong belief in using the state in projects of economic and social engineering implemented under the stewardship of forward-looking and enlightened leaders.</p>
<p>A final determining continuity is the pervasiveness of the military institution and of warrior ethics and values. What is particularly striking is the re-emergence of this in 1994, after it had virtually disappeared during colonial days and the two Hutu republics. After that century-long gap, it reappeared almost seamlessly. Beyond the army as an institution, military values are disseminated throughout the entire society by the widespread use of means like <a href="https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/PurdekovaMaking">ingando and itorero (re-)education practices</a>. </p>
<h2>History as a reference point</h2>
<p>Clearly the continuities outweigh the ruptures. Except during the relatively brief period of colonial rule, Rwanda was, and is, a violent society. Throughout the entire period, central political power has been almost absolute. In today’s Rwanda, constant references to history, whether factually true or not, are used as a tool of legitimation. The idealised glorification of the precolonial era supports the political objectives and strategies of the current rulers. </p>
<p>Rwanda’s history matters in a concrete way. Hence efforts by the Rwandan Patriotic Front to impose and tightly police its narrative. The problem is that the public and the hidden transcripts often don’t tally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104995/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filip Reyntjens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Throughout the entire period, central political power has been almost absolute.Filip Reyntjens, Emeritus Professor of Law and Politics Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/973302018-05-28T13:24:22Z2018-05-28T13:24:22ZWhen the poor sponsor the rich: Rwanda and Arsenal FC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220617/original/file-20180528-80658-35bz8h.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Arsenal FC's new sponsor is Rwanda.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://twitter.com/search?q=Visit%20Rwanda&src=typd">Twitter/@Arsenal</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda keeps surprising. Recently the Rwandan Development Board signed a <a href="https://www.arsenal.com/news/club-welcomes-visit-rwanda-new-partner">sleeve sponsoring deal</a> with London Premier League club, Arsenal. Over a three-year period, the 200 sq centimetre ad “Visit Rwanda” will cost the country USD$39 million. </p>
<p>President Paul Kagame is known to be a <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/05/23/rwanda-becomes-arsenal-s-first-sleeve-sponsor-in-3-year-partnership//">committed Arsenal fan</a>. Recently, he even tweeted that the club needed a new coach after Arsenal’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/43846363">once invincible</a> league and cup winning manager Arsene Wenger’s poor record over the past number of seasons. One may suppose that it is a coincidence that the deal was struck just after Wenger’s retirement at the end of the 2017/18 season.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"992151058892902403"}"></div></p>
<p>Rwanda is the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD">19th poorest country</a> in the world with a per capita income of around USD$700. Arsenal is one of the <a href="http://www.cityam.com/257361/arsenal-chelsea-tottenham-and-west-ham-make-london-home">richest football clubs</a> in the world. It’s not surprising therefore that the nearly USD$40 million has upset quite a few people. </p>
<p>Dutch lawmakers, including some from the governing coalition, immediately <a href="http://ktpress.rw/2018/05/dutch-mps-annoyed-by-rwanda-arsenal-fc-deal/">reacted angrily</a> to the news that such a poor country receiving a great deal of aid from The Netherlands would sponsor one of the world’s richest soccer clubs. Similar reactions could be heard in the UK, Rwanda’s second largest bilateral donor. An MP <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world/africa">described</a> the deal as “an own goal for foreign aid”. </p>
<p>In addition, those concerned with democracy and human rights think the deal is sending the wrong message about a country that has a strong <a href="https://theconversation.com/presidential-term-limits-slippery-slope-back-to-authoritarianism-in-africa-96796">authoritarian streak</a> running through it. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-rwandas-development-model-wouldnt-work-elsewhere-in-africa-89699">Why Rwanda's development model wouldn't work elsewhere in Africa</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The question is: Is Kagame entering into a deal with his favourite club to promote tourism or has he done it to enhance his image and shield him from criticism? He appears to have made the <a href="http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/BUdget_Management_and_Reporting_Unit/Budget_Framework_Papers/2017-2020_Budget_Framework_Paper.pdf">decision</a> off his own bat: the contract appears not to have been discussed in the cabinet and the money does not figure in the budget approved by parliament.</p>
<h2>Rwanda’s rationale</h2>
<p>For the Rwandan government, the deal is part of a broader strategy to develop <a href="https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/countries-2018/rwanda2018.pdf">tourism</a>, which in 2017 accounted for about 12.7% of GDP and USD$400 million of revenue. The country sees upmarket leisure and convention tourism as an important growth sector. It has a lot going for it: lush green landscapes, the mountain gorillas of the Virunga volcanos, the Akagera wildlife park, the tropical Nyungwe forest, idyllic Lake Kivu, and even genocide memorials – all compressed into a space of just 26,000 sq kms.</p>
<p>This strategy is integrated and makes sense on paper. The state has invested heavily in its national airline<a href="https://www.rwandair.com/"> RwandAir</a> and built the Kigali Convention Centre and high-end hotels. And the development of the new Bugesera International Airport, designed to become a major regional hub, is underway. </p>
<p>But there are doubts about the profitability of these ventures. For instance, RwandAir has yet <a href="https://www.afritraveller.com/single-post/2017/08/28/Aggressive-Marketing-RwandAir-Reduces-Losses-to-1million">to break even</a> 14 years after it was launched. The government <a href="http://www.therwandan.com/rwandair-bankrupting-rwanda/">keeps it afloat</a> with an annual grant of USD$50 million just for operations.</p>
<p>Investments in a constantly expanding fleet to cater for an ever growing network of continental and intercontinental destinations require considerable borrowing at a high cost. The fiscal <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1458768/rwandas-risky-bet-prosperous-economic-future">risk</a> involved in the government’s strategy is high, and economists wonder how sustainable these outlays will be in the medium term.</p>
<p>Calculations like these are for the Rwandan government to consider. But has Arsenal considered the signal it’s giving in light of Kagame’s human rights and democracy records?</p>
<h2>Risks for Arsenal</h2>
<p>Canadian investigative journalist Judi Rever recently <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-monday-full-episode-1.4602119/canadian-journalist-challenges-rwandan-genocide-narrative-in-new-book-1.4602122">recorded in a book</a>, “In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front”, that the Rwandan regime has massacred tens if not hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, particularly in the 1990s. </p>
<p>And last year <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/rwanda">Human Rights Watch</a> issued worrying reports about human rights abuses. These included the rounding up and arbitrary detention of poor people in “transit centres” across the country, widespread repression in land cases, extrajudicial killings and unlawful detention and torture in military facilities. </p>
<p>In October 2017 the United Nations subcommittee on Prevention of Torture <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-africa-41513811">suspended</a> its visit to Rwanda because of “a series of obstructions imposed by the authorities”. It was only the third time in 10 years the subcommittee has done this. </p>
<p>On top of this there has been widespread analysis and commentary on the state of democracy in Rwanda. The country is a <em>de facto</em> one-party state with no meaningful political opposition, no press freedom and no independent civil society. </p>
<p>Kagame’s grip on power is absolute and in August last year he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/05/paul-kagame-secures-third-term-in-rwanda-presidential-election">reelected</a> with over 98% of the vote. A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/rwanda-vote-gives-president-paul-kagame-extended-powers">referendum</a> on a constitutional amendment in 2015 gave him the right to stay office until 2034.</p>
<p>Realising that battles are fought in the media as much, if not more than on the ground, Kagame’s party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has developed a formidable information and communication <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm">strategy</a> stretching back to the civil war it launched in October 1990.</p>
<p>Kagame once <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=qMi8CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA225&lpg=PA225&dq=Kagame+:+We+used+communication+and+information+warfare+better+than+anyone.+We+have+found+a+new+way+of+doing+things.&source=bl&ots=c02IPqnffm&sig=jxE09JPPgsHbjPXcOOR1tSB6-Lo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi_wZiOkKjbAhVpBMAKHXPaADkQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=Kagame%20%3A%20We%20used%20communication%20and%20information%20warfare%20better%20than%20anyone.%20We%20have%20found%20a%20new%20way%20of%20doing%20things.&f=false">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We used communication and information warfare better than anyone. We have found a new way of doing things. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This has involved paying those who can help promote the right image, including <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=dX4LAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA188&lpg=PA188&dq=Rwanda+W2+Group+at+the+cost+of+US$50,000+per+month&source=bl&ots=K_Itl3UI_t&sig=JYFJVP5vXlWUknNJaV3o1kYnd-0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj84q2kkKjbAhXJLMAKHVE5APkQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=Rwanda%20W2%20Group%20at%20the%20cost%20of%20US%2450%2C000%20per%20month&f=false">public relations firms</a>. </p>
<h2>Political ethics and sport</h2>
<p>True, political ethics and sports don’t match well. Until recently FC Barcelona agreed to a Qatar sponsorship that saw the country featured on the team’s jerseys. Qatar has a very chequered political record. Due to host the 2022 World Cup, it’s <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/qatar/report-qatar/">known</a> for its notorious human rights abuse, especially when it comes to the rights of migrant workers and women. </p>
<p>Another example is Atlético Madrid which was controversially <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/may/04/football-sponsored-shirts-shame-atletico-madrid-azerbaijan">sponsored by Azerbaijan</a>, where the Euro 2020 football tournament will take place. This east European country has been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/azerbaijan/">flagged by Amnesty International</a> for its “crackdown on the right to freedom of expression, particularly following revelations of large-scale political corruption”.</p>
<p>Not that it should make any difference, but these two countries are very rich, while Rwanda is very poor.</p>
<p>And I nearly forgot: Many Arsenal fans were <a href="https://news.arseblog.com/2018/05/arsenal-reveal-sleeve-sponsor-for-2018-19-season/">opposed to the deal</a>, not because of Rwanda’s human rights and democracy records, but because they didn’t like the design of the sleeve print.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97330/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filip Reyntjens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Political ethics and sports don’t match well. The recent deal between Rwanda and Arsenal is potentially a case in point.Filip Reyntjens, Professor of Law and Politics, Institute of Development Policy and Management (IOB), University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/896992018-01-08T09:18:17Z2018-01-08T09:18:17ZWhy Rwanda’s development model wouldn’t work elsewhere in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200946/original/file-20180105-26142-cm4fig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Kagame has exercised firm personal control over Rwanda's politics since becoming president in 2000.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Phillip Guelland</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda is often touted as an example of what African states could achieve if only they were better governed. Out of the ashes of a horrific genocide, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rwandas-paul-kagame-saviour-or-dictator-bjdhp22nv">President Paul Kagame</a> has resuscitated the economy, curtailed corruption and maintained political stability.</p>
<p>This is a record that many other leaders can only dream of, and has led to Rwanda being cited as an economic success story that the rest of the continent would <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/1208900/rwanda-rising-new-model-economic-development">do well to follow</a>.</p>
<p>In countries like <a href="https://www.tuko.co.ke/253319-kenya-a-dictator-paul-kagame-uhuru-leader-jubilee-vice-chair.html#253319">Kenya</a> and <a href="https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2017/12/04/mnangagwa-zimbabwes-kagame/">Zimbabwe</a> some have argued that their leaders should operate more like Kagame. In other words, that job creation and poverty alleviation are more important than free and fair elections.</p>
<p>In response, critics have sought to puncture Kagame’s image by pointing to <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/rwanda-paul-kagame-americas-darling-tyrant-103963">human rights violations</a> committed under his leadership. This is an important concern. But the notion that the Rwandan model should be exported also suffers from a more fundamental flaw: it would not work almost anywhere else because the necessary conditions – political dominance and tight centralised control of patronage networks – do not apply.</p>
<h2>The Rwandan model</h2>
<p>Many of the achievements of Kagame and his governing <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm">Rwandan Patriotic Front</a> party are impressive. He took over a deeply divided nation in desperate need of economic and political reconstruction in 1994. Since then, Kagame has established firm personal control over Rwandan politics, generating the political stability needed for economic renewal.</p>
<p>Instead of sitting back and waiting for foreign investors and the “market” to inspire growth, the new administration intervened directly in a process of state directed development. Most notably, his government kick started economic activity in areas that had previously been stagnating by investing heavily in key sectors. It has done so through party-owned holding companies such as <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/business/21718000-crystal-ventures-has-investments-everything-furniture-finance-rwandan-patriotic">Tri-Star Investments</a>.</p>
<p>Combined with the careful management of agriculture, these policies generated <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview">economic growth of around 8%</a> between 2001 and 2013. Partly as a result, the percentage of people living below the poverty line fell from 57% in 2005 to <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/04/5-things-to-know-about-rwanda-s-economy/">45% in 2010</a>. Other indicators of human development, such as <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/RWA.pdf">life expectancy</a> and <a href="https://en.unesco.org/countries/rwanda">literacy</a>, have also improved.</p>
<h2>An example for Africa?</h2>
<p>Despite the impressive headline figures, a number of criticisms have been levelled at the Rwandan model.</p>
<p>Most obviously, it sacrifices basic human rights – such as <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/08/04/rwanda-kagame-efficient-repression/">freedom of expression and freedom of association</a> – to sustain the ruling party’s political hegemony. The Rwandan system therefore involves compromising democracy for the sake of development. That decision may be an easy one to make for those who enjoy political power, but is often rejected by the opposition.</p>
<p>Less obviously, the use of party-owned enterprises to kick start business activity places the ruling party at the heart of the economy. It also means that when the economy does well, the already dominant Rwandan Patriotic Front is strengthened. This empowers Kagame to determine who is allowed to <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/ruling-partys-business-arm-dominates-rwandan-economy-20170730">accumulate economic power</a>, which in turn undermines the ability of opposition leaders and critics to raise funds.</p>
<p>These arguments have been around for some time. But they have done little to dampen the allure of the Rwandan model for some <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-07-00-like-it-or-not-rwanda-is-africas-future">commentators</a> and <a href="http://en.igihe.com/news/kenya-s-kenyatta-congratulates-kagame.html">leaders</a>. </p>
<p>Given this, the strongest argument against exporting the Rwandan model is not that it is undemocratic and gives the ruling party tremendous economic power. It’s that it won’t actually work.</p>
<h2>Can’t work everywhere</h2>
<p>One of the most rigorous efforts to understand the political conditions that made the Rwandan model possible has emerged from the <a href="http://www.institutions-africa.org/">African Power and Politics</a> research project led by David Booth, Tim Kelsall and others. They argue that Kagame’s government is an example of <a href="http://www.institutions-africa.org/page/developmental-patrimonialism.html">“developmental patrimonialism”</a>. In this system, the potentially damaging aspects of patrimonial politics are held in check by a leader who enjoys tight control over patronage networks. These include jobs for the boys, waste and inefficiency.</p>
<p>This authority needs to be established both internally and externally. External political control is required because the threat of electoral defeat by a strong opposition party may force the government to prioritise short-term survival over long-term investments. Internal control is required because the absence of checks and balances on the ruling party is likely to exacerbate corruption.</p>
<p>When these conditions hold, elements of patrimonialism may be economically productive by generating resources that are channelled back into the system. In the Rwandan case, the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s economic and political dominance has not undermined development because the funds generated through party-owned enterprises have often been <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270777957_Developmental_Patrimonialism_The_Case_of_Rwanda">reinvested in the economy</a>.</p>
<h2>Unintended consequences</h2>
<p>The problem is that these conditions don’t hold in most African states. With a few exceptions such as Chad and Angola, the ruling party cannot aspire to the level of dominance witnessed in Rwanda because the opposition is too strong for this degree of political control to be sustained. In <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/06/13/why-do-opposition-coalitions-succeed-or-fail/">Kenya and Zimbabwe</a>, for example, the opposition has consistently won a large share of the legislative and presidential vote. </p>
<p>In addition, even some states that feature more dominant ruling parties have consistently failed to impose economic discipline on their governments. Instead, entrenched clientelism and internal factionalism have typically undermined anti-corruption efforts. This is true for both <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/08/14/angola-elections-ruling-family-dos-santos-worth-billions-what-happens-when-dad-steps-down/">Angola</a> and <a href="https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_of_corruption_and_anti_corruption_in_chad">Chad</a>, hurting efforts to reduce poverty and boost economic growth.</p>
<p>Shorn of the internal and external political control required to make it work, the application of the Rwandan model elsewhere would generate very different results.</p>
<p>Extending the control of the ruling party over the economy is more likely to increase graft and waste than to spur economic activity. And efforts to neutralise opposition parties are likely to be strongly resisted, leading to political instability and economic uncertainty.</p>
<p>What this means is that if other countries on the continent try to implement the Rwandan model, the chances are that they will experience all of its costs while realising few of its benefits.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89699/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Rwandan model can’t be replicated easily given that it depends heavily on political dominance and tight, centralised control of patronage networks.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/549752016-02-23T04:12:16Z2016-02-23T04:12:16ZSexual violence: a weapon of war in eastern Congo for more than 20 years<p><a href="http://www.panzihospital.org/about/dr-denis_mukwege">Denis Mukwege</a> has been treating female victims of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1996. The subject of a new documentary by Thierry Michel, <a href="http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-03-21-film-the-man-who-mends-women-salutes-doctor-treating-rape-victims-in-dr-congo">The Man Who Mends Women</a>, Mukwege has dedicated his life to caring for victims of rape and other forms of sexual abuse in Africa. It is an epidemic that continues despite the supposed end of the Second Congo War in 2003.</p>
<p>Sexual violence is often a hidden dimension of war. The film illustrates how survivors work to rebuild their lives, organise to resist aggressors and denounce their crimes. They do so even when trapped in seemingly endless conflicts.</p>
<p>Through the testimony and actions of these brave women, impressive progress has been made to mobilise support and build collective awareness of this tragic oppression. Yet 20 years after Mukwege began his work, the fact remains: no one is yet able to protect women in conflict zones and to end the use of rape as a weapon of war.</p>
<h2>The coming of the second war</h2>
<p>Knowing the region’s history is critical to understanding the gravity of the situation. In 1994, widespread attacks on civilian populations in the border provinces of eastern Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) led to an influx of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees, defeated soldiers and militia members fleeing the Rwandan civil war. Two years later, the Rwandan Patriotic Army - the armed wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front operating under the orders of Rwanda’s current President <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-paul-kagame-sur-orbite-jusquen-2034-53001">Paul Kagame</a> - destroyed the camps, forcing the refugees to flee deeper into the country.</p>
<p>In conjunction with Congolese opposition groups, the Rwandan army pushed all the way to the Congolese capital, Kinshasa. In 1997 it brought down the regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko. Rwandan forces then occupied eastern Congo despite the hostility of the local population. By August 1998 when its senior officers were squeezed out of command positions in Kinshasa, Rwanda unleashed the Second Congo War.</p>
<p>By early 1999 the front line stabilised and the DRC was effectively partitioned. The strategists from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi had essentially achieved their goal. Now began a war within the war. Senior commanders of the occupying forces worked to enhance their own power, while their armies took on the administration and economic exploitation of conquered provinces - each in their own way and according to their own priorities.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/181/33459.html">December 2001 statement</a>, the United Nations Security Council noted that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the plundering of the natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues unabated.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It condemned activities</p>
<blockquote>
<p>which are perpetuating the conflict in the country, impeding the economic developing of the DRC and exacerbating the suffering of its people.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Submission of populations</h2>
<p>The nature of the conflict then shifted because there was another war that had to be won - forcing occupied populations into submission for the long term. The war of conquest now overlaid a civil war - or rather, civil wars. In working to build national alliances and reduce local resistance, the occupying armies exploited and aggravated existing divisions between populations.</p>
<p>In the province of Kivu, the armies’ task was made easier by the multiplicity of community and tribal affiliations, ethnic groups and cultural areas (Bashi, Bahavu, Bavira, Bafuliru, Bahunde, Banyindu, Batembo, Banyanga…), tensions between shepherds and farmers, rivalries between professional organisations and various associations.</p>
<p><figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111541/original/image-20160215-22593-19t8sdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111541/original/image-20160215-22593-19t8sdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111541/original/image-20160215-22593-19t8sdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111541/original/image-20160215-22593-19t8sdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111541/original/image-20160215-22593-19t8sdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111541/original/image-20160215-22593-19t8sdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111541/original/image-20160215-22593-19t8sdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A soldier of the UN force in Beni, in the north-eastern Congo, in March 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/13313977255/in/photolist-mhvBzZ-pRDYch-nmbViL-mhxvtA-mhvBce-nmbVqu-pKCYeE-pWS1H6-bsf4VC-pcdSh3-9A1XfW-7SstUb-nTiJUN-nTjt22-i4nJEg-Tiq8M-TeMM2-dj57Fg-mhsW96-ocz9dP-9JZ2ad-aRs3VB-LmLwa-85dAUz-CL89Cp-DckGrn-DhiEyd-7g6wA7-mhvBWa-5HA5Fq-Cn7jm7-dbReY5-7ZxrkX-6R29Q6-36mmPk-9nJKrX-e6isEb-mhs7R2-9A1Y5E-DhiFUQ-Lfsud-aRsoFZ-dx4Mos-aRsoFg-aRs3Wc-aRs3WP-aRs3Vg-aRsoGr-aRsoEz-aRs3UD">UN/Sylvain Liechti/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure></p>
<p>The situation lasted until October 2013 when the main rebel movement supported by the Rwandan authorities, M23, was defeated by the intervention of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/05/congo-rebels-surrender-hopes-peace">UN troops</a>. The surrender allowed Congolese armed forces to retake the DRC’s eastern provinces. Beyond the urban centres and main roads, however, various armed forces and militia continue to exploit local resources and populations.</p>
<h2>Women still suffer</h2>
<p>Now 20 years long, the conflict is fuelled by armed groups that are being continuously renewed. Local populations are subject to violence and abuse not only at the hands of foreign armies, but also numerous guerrilla movements fighting for control of land, resources and people.</p>
<p>Among those implicated by women’s testimony are men carrying arms or wearing uniforms, including many Congolese military and police officers. So are “all the men” who, in the climate of impunity and violence, abuse their authority over local populations, and particularly women. It is no longer a question of a war, but the perpetuation of a state of lawlessness.</p>
<p>Many countries rebuilding after an armed conflict see rates of sexual violence remain high or even increase. The continuing instability in eastern Congo has led to the region being dubbed the “<a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23086003">rape capital of the world</a>”, even if reliable statistics in this domain remain difficult to establish.</p>
<p>The attitude of the Congolese authorities is also questionable, revealed by their <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/dr-congo-bans-documentary-surgeon-denis-mukwege-who-treated-40000-women-raped-conflict-1518315">banning</a> The Man Who Mends Women for two months after its initial release in September 2015.</p>
<p>In this context, it’s astonishing that the DRC - the site of the first great African war, which caused the highest number of casualties since World War II - has never set up special tribunal. An independent authority is needed to fully assess this tragedy and establish the responsibilities of all the warring parties.</p>
<p>Tribunals in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda at least made strong symbolic denunciations of sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Leighton Walter Kille.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/54975/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Guichaoua has received funding in the context of the research work of his laboratory.</span></em></p>Even with the end of the war in central Africa, continuing instability in the region has triggered an epidemic of rape.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/539882016-02-05T04:26:00Z2016-02-05T04:26:00ZRwanda’s Achilles’ heel: there is no back-up plan to Kagame<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110338/original/image-20160204-3012-2yckrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwanda has no succession plan to President Paul Kagame.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Tiksa Negeri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwandan President Paul Kagame New Year’s Eve <a href="http://paulkagame.com/index.php/speeches/national-events/1626-president-kagame-s-new-year-s-message">announcement</a> that he will run for a third term as president
came as no surprise to most observers of the tiny central African country.</p>
<p>It was widely expected after a national referendum approved constitutional changes that allow Kagame to run his <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jan/27/rwanda-freedom-of-speech">authoritarian</a>, <a href="http://theworldoutline.com/2013/09/kagame-country-rwanda-effectively-one-party-state/">single-party</a> state until <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-paul-kagame-is-in-line-to-stay-in-office-until-2034-53257">2034</a>.</p>
<p>The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front’s <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Rwandan-Patriotic-Front">(RPF)</a> public relations machinery claims that it is only Kagame himself who has the leadership acumen to oversee Rwanda’s continued <a href="http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1416124/rwandans-clarity-democratisation-process">peace and prosperity</a>. This is the dominant narrative of success that the RPF has painted for foreign audiences.</p>
<p>The reality is that there is no viable alternative to Kagame, within or outside his RPF. Political rivals have died, are jailed and have <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/opinion/why-are-rwandans-disappearing.html">disappeared</a> or have fled the country.</p>
<h2>Dubious poll and economic statistics</h2>
<p>It is alarming that the purported overwhelming popular support for the RFP has been accepted with such alacrity. </p>
<p>The story fed to the world is that December’s constitutional referendum was approved by more than 98% of voters and before that, when Rwandan lawmakers consulted 3.7 million voters, they could find <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/only-10-rwandans-oppose-kagame-third-term-report-093404258.html">only ten people opposed</a> the idea of a third term for Kagame. That’s an astonishing 99.9997%, which is just slightly higher than the average electoral percentage the RPF has received since <a href="http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/180/">taking office in 1994</a>. </p>
<p>These numbers should raise eyebrows. As researchers, we know that when we poll a group of 100 free-thinking individuals in the real world on whether or not the sky is blue, we don’t get that kind of consensus. </p>
<p>The numbers from Kigali are literally off the charts – so much so that they discredit themselves. We might as well be told that 110% of Rwandans approve of extending Kagame’s mandate.</p>
<p>This does not even begin to address the fact that democracy since the 1994 genocide is not a system of majority rule, but rather is a complex system that protects the political interests of the RPF and its loyalists.</p>
<p>Political opponents, journalists and ordinary citizens alike dare not voice dissent in Rwanda, as Anjan Sundaram’s recent book <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/jan/11/bad-news-last-journalists-in-dictatorship-anjan-sundaram-review-rwanda-paul-kagame">Bad News</a> carefully and persuasively documents. </p>
<p>Kigali tells us not to worry because this movement is popular with the “majority”. They say the West should mind its own business, leaving Rwandans to deal with Rwanda. </p>
<p>Kagame devotees are quick to point out the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-kagames-bid-to-serve-a-third-term-makes-sense-for-rwanda-53354">economic successes</a>, using reports produced by the Rwandan government itself to back up their claims. In recent years, the World Bank has indeed found Rwanda to be among the easiest countries in Africa in which to <a href="http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/rwanda">do business</a>. </p>
<p>But in 2006, when the same World Bank found data that did not support the narrative of economic growth in Rwanda, that data was destroyed and the foreign researchers were <a href="http://www.bertingelaere.net/uploads/2/2/5/2/22520142/life_after_genocide_knowledge_rwanda_ingelaere_asr_final_april_2010.pdf">expelled</a>. Since then everything from the World Bank on Rwanda has been positive. Suppressing dissent knows no bounds.</p>
<h2>An absence of checks and balances</h2>
<p>In Rwanda today there are no checks and balances. There is <a href="http://en.rsf.org/rwanda.html">no independent media</a> in the country. Since he took power there has never been a Rwandan court decision that did not end the way that Kagame <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/rwanda0708/8.htm">wanted it to</a>. Every vote in parliament has produced the result Kagame desired. There has never been a popular vote in which people did not concede to Kagame’s will.</p>
<p>Foreign support of this decimation of democracy would also have us remove any remaining incentive for Kagame to show restraint in the coming years. His supporters argue that the country and region would most likely spiral into chaos if he were to step down. </p>
<p>But what if Kagame were to suddenly perish? Kigali has no <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-changes-made-to-rwandas-constitution-are-peculiar-heres-why-53771">back-up plan</a>. He has personally made sure of that. Irresponsible backers of this oppressive regime seem to think Kagame is immortal. </p>
<p>Even using the Rwandan government’s own impressive stats, Kagame is close to the limit of life expectancy for a man born during his era (1957). Life expectancy for Rwandan men is <a href="http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/rwanda-life-expectancy">63.8 years</a>. Add the risk factors of military service, poor sleep habits and the weight of a stressful job and he is living on <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/magazine/paul-kagame-rwanda.html?_r=0">borrowed time</a>.</p>
<p>Kagame’s supporters argue that the country and region would most likely spiral into chaos if he were to step down. No-one who cares about Rwanda would wish for his sudden demise. That would have a catastrophic effect. But you cannot call his government sustainable if it has not prepared a succession plan for the one event that awaits us all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Thomson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The reality of Rwanda is that there is no viable alternative to President Paul Kagame, within or outside his ruling RPF. Political rivals have died, are jailed, or have fled the country.Susan Thomson, Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies, Colgate UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/532572016-01-18T12:17:10Z2016-01-18T12:17:10ZRwanda: Paul Kagame is in line to stay in office until 2034<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108407/original/image-20160118-31807-8ycd7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwandan president Paul Kagame has long benefited from the support of the US.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/dfid/7557085872/in/photolist-cvN3m1-nmah6Q-nCr1qs-oTXGA1-7WCsj6-eqgjzu-pyVGCk-pyVDKB-pyZejH-pyVHJt-pNAmoJ-pQFP9K-pycgxK-pNAhYC-pNAhcC-pycim4-pNAiqE-pQL1ds-pQs5rT-77V5RD-71xtbE-bw7nL7-pycjZK-pyYd5S-pRbyda-pRqhPa-oUyP1f-pRuuX7-pPjJa5-oUBSwr-pRbxye-pz2cZs-pPjJ7j-pPjEWm-pRqfkc-pyYeqY-oUBRDV-pRuy8q-oUBQLH-pPjF2m-pyYhPG-pyZcNr-pRqdcV-pz28ZU-pyYezf-oUyM1y-pRbwk2-pRusML-pyVHzF-pyVFPg">DFID/Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 31 December 2015, in his greetings to the nation, Rwandan president Paul Kagame announced that he would run a third term.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You asked me to continue to lead this country after 2017. Given its importance to you, I can only accept.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A well-ordered strategy</h2>
<p>Kagame’s announcement, intended as much for international observers as for the people of Rwanda, was anything but spontaneous. Instead, it was the final step of a meticulously prepared political process that started in October 2014 when three satellite parties of Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) called for a revision of the constitution. At the time it limited the president to two seven-year terms.</p>
<p>Then, in February 2015 several prominent Rwandans published articles in support of Kagame in <em>The New Times</em>, the pro-government newspaper. They hailed the president’s achievements and expressed their desire for him to stay in office – Rwanda still needed him.</p>
<p>In mid-March, the mayor of Kigali, the country’s capital, indicated that according to regional officials, citizens were demanding a reform of the Constitution.</p>
<p>In late May, the Parliament announced that 2 million people had signed a petition asking that Kagame be given the possibility of running for a third seven-year term.</p>
<p>By June 15, the petition had 3.6 million signatures (out of 6 million voters), and the RPF came out in favour of the constitutional reform.</p>
<p>On July 14, Parliament voted unanimously the principle of a constitutional revision and formed a committee to propose a national referendum. A month later their report was presented to Parliament. It testified that the majority of the population wanted a constitutional amendment, and that only a dozen Rwandans would have voted against the project.</p>
<p>Taking their justification from the large number of petitions, on October 28 the Parliament approved the new law to be submitted to a referendum. It stipulates that the current president could run again in 2017 for another term. Then, in 2024 — year zero of the new Constitution — the seven-year term would be replaced by a five-year one, renewable once. This ingenious arrangement gives Paul Kagame the possibility of running for two new mandates in 2024. He thus could potentially stay in office until 2034.</p>
<p>Finally, on December 18, the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-phil-clark/rwanda-kagame-third-term-_b_8703166.html">following question</a> was put to the country’s 6.4 million voters:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Do you agree with the constitution of the Republic of Rwanda which was amended this year of 2015?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Of the responses, 98.9% were “yes”. Only the small Democratic Green Party, which has no members in Parliament, dared to protest, filing a petition in the Supreme Court against any reform of the Constitution. It was dismissed.</p>
<p>Throughout this operation, Kagame kept the country in suspense, not revealing his intentions, saying that he hadn’t decided.</p>
<h2>A well-controlled spontaneity</h2>
<p>This orderly and sophisticated campaign achieved its goal without a hitch. It culminated with the production of a “spontaneous” mass petition, a method portrayed by the authorities as a democratic consultation. All that then remained was to give legal form to the popular will with the triumphant referendum on December 18.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108022/original/image-20160113-10414-1c532v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108022/original/image-20160113-10414-1c532v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108022/original/image-20160113-10414-1c532v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108022/original/image-20160113-10414-1c532v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108022/original/image-20160113-10414-1c532v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=627&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108022/original/image-20160113-10414-1c532v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=627&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108022/original/image-20160113-10414-1c532v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=627&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kagame is increasingly being criticized abroad.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/3952224716/in/photolist-qTNowf-nzVHwF-nzW7Ss-nxT6nd-nxT6Sb-nireXh-nzVGX4-nzFL2A-nzFMjL-nirdUW-nircKv-nBGMLV-nir3oM-9S1wAb-dPgEwP-dPmuDh-jtaz2T-jtavPa-jtdSiS-dPahhB-qCzV9m-72fbHs-pY91Mu-7dzVVT">UN Photos/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The widespread use of popular petitions has been singled out for criticism by international observers, even those who have regularly celebrated the “new Rwanda”. They point out that government control of local populations is sufficiently tight and that those who expressed opposition to a third term - and thus against the president - could be putting themselves in danger. Phil Clark, a lecturer at the University of London, <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-phil-clark/rwanda-Kagame-third-term-_b_8703166.html">highlighted the “coercion”</a> being exercised over the population:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Rural Rwandans report that local authorities went house to house cajoling voters to sign the petition, which many did multiple times.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indeed, <a href="http://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/4876.htm">research in Rwanda</a> describes how communities are tightly controlled by a web of local authorities. The result is a widespread surveillance system that allows for public displays of obedience only.</p>
<p>Kagame was appointed vice president in 1994 and chairman in 2000, then elected president in 2003 and 2010. Each time he has reportedly obtained more than 90% of the vote, and worked carefully to crush any open opposition by the elite or the public, using methods whose brutality has been regularly denounced by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/fr/world-report/2015/country-chapters/268129">human rights organizations</a>.</p>
<h2>In Washington, the end of the illusions?</h2>
<p>The US, Rwanda’s primary ally, has long denounced presidents for life. In July 2009 during a trip to Ghana, US President Barack Obama criticized African leaders who</p>
<blockquote>
<p>change their constitution to stay in power.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In July 2015 he <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/28/remarks-president-obama-people-africa">repeated his comments</a> while in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, saying that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>no one should be president for life.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>On September 4 the US State Department reacted negatively to the Rwandan Parliament’s decision to amend the Constitution and, on November 17, said that Kagame should <a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/11/249625.htm">honour his earlier promise to retire in 2017</a>.</p>
<p>None of these declarations had any apparent effect. In Kagame’s December 31 speech, he responded by contrasting <a href="http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2016-01-01/195757/">Rwanda’s public petitions with American legalism</a>: Exemplary behaviour will be for later. In the short term, the people have spoken.</p>
<p>On January 2 the State Department expressed the US’s “deep disappointment”, and the next day, Samantha Power, its ambassador to the United Nations, issued the following tweet: </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"683667528225275908"}"></div></p>
<p>In Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Burkina Faso, leaders wanting to repeal constitutional limits to their staying in office were met with strong resistance. The president of Burkina Faso was ousted last fall; the president of Burundi was overruled, plunging the country into a violent crisis.</p>
<p>In Rwanda, nothing of the sort. The authoritarian exercise of power is firmly established, especially in its ability to monitor and control local populations. Under such circumstances, with a campaign that was carefully controlled and put in place, it’s no surprise that the end result was a “popular victory”.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Leighton Walter Kille.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53257/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claudine Vidal ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda, has carefully orchestrated a constitutional reform that allows him to remain in power for the next 18 years.Claudine Vidal, Directrice de recherches émérite au CNRS, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.