tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/service-delivery-protests-40527/articlesService delivery protests – The Conversation2022-07-26T14:49:02Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1876342022-07-26T14:49:02Z2022-07-26T14:49:02ZSouth Africa has been warned that it faces an ‘Arab Spring’: so what are the chances?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476062/original/file-20220726-13-kdqkq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protest in Johannesburg against the lack of service delivery or basic necessities such as access to water and electricity.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Marco Longari / AFP via Getty images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Former South African President <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> recently launched a sharp critique of the governing African National Congress (ANC) for failure to address what it has <a href="https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/88080_umrabulo-policy-document-18th-may-2022.pdf">labelled</a> the triple challenge of poverty, unemployment and inequality. </p>
<p>Mbeki, who led the party <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/former-leaders-2/">from 1997 to 2007</a>, said the government seemed to have no plan to address these problems, warning that rising poverty and hardship, poor governance, and mounting lawlessness could see South Africa erupt into its own version of the “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring">Arab Spring</a>”.</p>
<p>The “Arab Spring” uprisings which swept across North Africa and parts of the Middle East more than a decade ago, led to the overthrow of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Many of the protesters were young and educated and had become disillusioned by the corruption and patronage that benefited only political and economic elites. </p>
<p>A common feature of these uprisings was that the existing constitutional orders had become so delegitimised that they simply collapsed under the weight of social discord. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-deadly-july-2021-riots-may-recur-if-theres-no-change-186397">South Africa's deadly July 2021 riots may recur if there's no change</a>
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<p>Mbeki’s prophesy is sobering, especially coming a year after <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-deadly-july-2021-riots-may-recur-if-theres-no-change-186397">devastating riots</a> in parts of the country in July 2021. With the plotters of what President Cyril Ramaphosa described as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-deadly-july-2021-riots-may-recur-if-theres-no-change-186397">failed insurrection</a> still at large, many South Africans nervously await a repeat. </p>
<p>Political parties, trade unions, business, civil society groups all realise that South Africa is a pressure cooker. But the youth have shown little interest in organised politics. Their <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1614389/south-africa-election-young-voters-stay-away-from-polls/">low participation rates</a> in elections are a sign of that. There is a sense that something needs to change quickly, and radically. If not, the youth could explode in impatience and anger, a tsunami that even political parties will find difficult to contain.</p>
<h2>Ramaphosa’s plan to avert chaos</h2>
<p>President Ramaphosa used a public platform to respond to Mbeki’s criticism, almost a week later. Addressing the closing session of the ANC KwaZulu-Natal electoral conference <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9EthSjP-Amk">he pointed</a> out that the government did have a reform agenda to address these problems. He cited the unwieldy <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030">National Development Plan</a>, government’s formal blueprint for achieving its long term goals, and the ANC’s own <a href="https://voteanc.org.za/assets/manifesto-summaries/A5_Manifesto_English.pdf">2019 election manifesto</a> as “the plan”. </p>
<p>Some of the priorities identified have since been translated into the government’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202010/south-african-economic-reconstruction-and-recovery-plan.pdf">Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan</a>, which aims to change the asset and resource base of the economy by making the ownership structure more inclusive. </p>
<p>Tellingly, the president referred to these measures as “reforms”, language that invokes the idea of incremental change. But such initiatives sound distant and removed from what is needed.</p>
<p>What people want to see is visible change in their daily lives, and more imagination on the part of their government in relieving their hardships. The R350 (about US$20.72) monthly grant to unemployed people <a href="https://www.gov.za/services/social-benefits/social-relief-distress">during the COVID pandemic</a> was a tangible response to the crisis that families facing starvation needed. Similar scaled-up measures to deal with the multiple crises are needed, and there is no time to waste. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-social-unrest-in-south-africa-and-what-might-be-done-about-it-166130">What lies behind social unrest in South Africa, and what might be done about it</a>
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<p>Something needs to be done urgently to address a host of big challenges, ranging from the <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/609268/warning-signs-as-wealthy-south-africans-take-strain-from-the-higher-cost-of-living/">high cost of living</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-driving-the-surge-in-south-africas-fuel-price-185302">soaring fuel prices</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/local-government-in-south-africa-is-broken-but-giving-the-job-to-residents-carries-risks-155970">inadequate provision of basic municipal services</a>.</p>
<p>Bored youth, with limited opportunities for work and gaining skills, get sucked into drugs or alcohol abuse, petty crime or worse. </p>
<h2>Possible trajectories</h2>
<p>Given the picture I have painted, is an Arab Spring likely? </p>
<p>It is impossible to make an accurate prediction, but two trajectories are plausible. </p>
<p>One is a repeat of last July’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-deadly-july-2021-riots-may-recur-if-theres-no-change-186397">devastating unrest</a>. The failure of the state to respond decisively to the July unrest could encourage politically inspired anarchists to resort to violence again if they don’t get their way. They have tested the waters and seen what’s possible. And given that people remain frustrated about their lives, the country could see another outbreak of violence.</p>
<p>Another trajectory is the one in which lawlessness increases even further. Transnational organised crime networks and local gangs are <a href="https://theconversation.com/mass-shootings-in-south-africa-are-often-over-group-turf-how-to-stop-the-cycle-of-reprisals-187182">becoming increasingly brazen</a>. The police are <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/police-are-overstretched-and-understaffed-north-west/">overstretched</a> and gripped by their own internal problems. This breakdown in respect for the law by criminals has the effect of eroding the legitimacy and authority of the state. </p>
<p>Extortion, protection rackets, kidnappings, drive-by shootings, if they are allowed to encroach unchecked, will result in criminal networks being even more of a destabilising factor than political actors. A convergence of these elements – a South Africa where disgruntled elements engage in ongoing destabilisation, and collude with, or even unwittingly create the space for criminal networks to run amok – does not augur well for a prosperous nation.</p>
<h2>Mitigating factors</h2>
<p>Uprisings like those that occurred in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, were the result of combustible local conditions, triggered by a small spark. People were railing against political systems they saw as authoritarian and intolerant of dissent. </p>
<p>South Africa is still a very different political space. The country is a noisy democracy with a free and open media, lots of dissenting voices, and insulting the government of the day doesn’t carry any overt sanction.</p>
<p>It could be a blessing in disguise that the country is perpetually in election mode. The local government elections and national general elections occur every five years. Because they overlap each other, the country has an election every three years. </p>
<p>In between these events, political parties hold their own leadership contests, which serve as bellwethers for who is likely to occupy national office or local government seat. This ongoing extra- and intra-political competition serves as a pressure valve to absorb the energy that might otherwise bubble over.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-political-risk-profile-has-gone-up-a-few-notches-but-its-not-yet-a-failed-state-170653">South Africa's political risk profile has gone up a few notches: but it's not yet a failed state</a>
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<p>Political assassinations, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-political-killings-have-taken-hold-again-in-south-africas-kwazulu-natal-143908">especially at the local level</a>, are a pernicious by-product of this endless electoral churn. But the prospects of attaining office through outwitting, or ganging up with rivals, are still sufficiently attractive to the political classes. </p>
<p>This is not to deny that destabilisation is not widespread, something referred to by Ramaphosa when he addressed the nation on broadcast media on <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-actions-address-electricity-crisis%2C-union-buildings%2C-tshwane">Monday 25 July</a>. Sabotage of electrical infrastructure, illegal connections by community members, theft of cables by organised criminals might not necessarily be centrally orchestrated. Nevertheless, they delegitimise the authority of the central state. </p>
<p>Already, many young people engage in protest action. So-called <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2017.1329106">service delivery protests</a> are part of the South African experience: for the moment they remain largely localised and driven by single issues. Just five years ago, student protests through the <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1753-59132021000400006">#FeesMustFall movement</a> saw activism on a national scale. The national mood changed; politics changed. Some of those young activists are now in parliament, in local government, and other spaces. </p>
<p>But they account for a small minority. There is a vast, restless sea of young people with unmet dreams and aspirations. They wake up to lives of poverty, joblessness, boredom. They see little change, and perceive the state to be indifferent to their plight. </p>
<p>Yet these same young people are energetic, connected via social media, and bursting to claim their space. Some are fortunate to come by opportunities, but for those from poor families, there is not much to persuade them that their lives are about to get better. Therein lies the challenge to political parties and the state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187634/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sandy Africa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The country is still a very different political space. It’s a noisy democracy with a free media, lots of dissenting voices, and insulting the government doesn’t carry any overt sanction.Sandy Africa, Associate Professor, Political Sciences, and Deputy Dean Teaching and Learning (Humanities), University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1706532021-12-14T14:33:07Z2021-12-14T14:33:07ZSouth Africa’s political risk profile has gone up a few notches: but it’s not yet a failed state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434759/original/file-20211130-26-rfceqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Looters rampage through a shopping centre in the city of Durban during lawlessness triggered by the arrest of former president Jacob Zuma</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In July, South Africa suffered the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57818215">worst violence since the 1990s</a>. Highways were blocked and businesses, warehouses and other property looted and set alight. More than 300 people died. </p>
<p>In mid-October, people were again shocked when a group of men, said to be Somali nationals, openly <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/eastern-cape/we-are-not-at-war-bheki-cele-slams-rifle-brandishing-men-in-wake-of-gqeberha-violence-fdca7ffc-8226-44df-9c66-e7739f6d650e">brandished high calibre weapons</a> during a fight between Somali shop owners and local taxi drivers in public view in Gqeberha, Eastern Cape. </p>
<p>Not long after 56 people, said to be disgruntled military veterans, <a href="https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-15-anc-military-veterans-arrested-after-allegedly-holding-ministers-hostage/__;!!LRJdiIM!SZcV1USZ800B4zCKx2F2qTCIilUCjyTzLg5_g9ef6W6N-1ITPBUYNfjixYqFjCRns6_J%24">were arrested</a> after allegedly holding two government ministers and a deputy minister hostage in Pretoria. They allegedly <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-liberation-war-veterans-are-angry-heres-why-170596">demanded compensation</a> for their role in the liberation struggle against minority white rule. </p>
<p>These violent incidents led to a question being asked: has South Africa become a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/weekend-argus/news/south-africa-not-a-failed-state-yet-3d74e6b1-48e8-4e42-9236-b4578c24aa4d">failed state</a>? The issue has <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-09-22-is-south-africa-a-failing-or-failed-state-lets-stop-with-the-useless-labels/">come up</a> and warnings sounded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/9/10/south-africa-heading-towards-becoming-a-failed-state-report">before this year’s events</a>.</p>
<p>I teach political risk analysis – in essence the study of potential harms to a country’s stability and future. The work entails providing new, comprehensive current-day political risk analyses of South Africa each year. This has to be based on a variety of variables, ranging from ‘legitimacy of government’ to ‘safety and security’ to ‘socio-economic conditions’ and many more.</p>
<p>The concept of a <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-background-papers/Definition-of-a-Failed-State.pdf">failed state</a> is contested. But, in general, it applies to states where the administrative, political, and economic systems have become so weak that key governmental functions become inoperable or even disintegrate.</p>
<p>This, in turn, affects the ability of a government to support or improve the conditions of life for most of the citizenry.</p>
<p>Looking at South Africa, it can be argued that some things in the country are still the same since 1994 in terms of the <a href="http://dspace.nwu.ac.za/handle/10394/19408">broad macro-political</a> risk profile of the country. Yet, serious political risks – such as war, revolution, a coup d’état, hostile neighbours, military involvement in politics – remain relatively low.</p>
<p>Even violent racial or ethnic conflict do not seem to be of major concern as they have never threatened the post-1994 democratic project in any substantial manner.</p>
<h2>Risk factors</h2>
<p>Political risk relating to several variables in the socio-economic domain are increasingly of considerable concern. For example, government shortcomings in providing or facilitating enough <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-safrica-homes-feat-idUSKCN22615J">housing, water, electricity</a> and <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02113rdQuarter2021.pdf">jobs</a> to millions of people is a huge source of frustration. </p>
<p>As much as South Africa has changed for the better in certain areas in the sense that it has, for example, become a <a href="https://www.globalintegrity.org/2020/09/25/towards-more-racially-just-societies-learnings-from-south-africa/">more racially just society</a> several new red flags have begun to appear in the past two decades. </p>
<p>The country witnessed increasingly high levels of violence and or dissatisfaction associated with <a href="http://www.labour.gov.za/strikes-in-2018-reaches-a-high-in-the-past-five-year-%E2%80%93-department-of-employment-and-labour">labour unrest</a>. <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/everything-you-need-to-know-south-africa-protests/?gclid=CjwKCAjwwsmLBhACEiwANq-tXInfvpw8OKpiQ4i81GT1zMNij6Kf4LIYM7wLrrOZeks3EFZ7n1TH9BoCR_YQAvD_BwE">Violent protests</a> have become a common phenomenon. In fact, risk in the form of violent service delivery protests and other <a href="https://td-sa.net/index.php/td/article/view/643/1111*">unrest has increased</a> markedly. </p>
<p>Other forms of socio-economic frustrations also increased as well as <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/2174661/put-out-the-fires-and-act-ramaphosa/">xenophobia</a>.</p>
<p>Importantly, the <a href="https://www.saferspaces.org.za/understand/entry/what-is-the-situation-in-south-africa">cost of violence</a> to the economy is among the highest in the world. The 2021 <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/">Global Peace Index</a> recently placed the national cost of violence in South Africa is a staggering 19% of the country’s GDP. This is the 16th highest rate in the world. </p>
<p>Overall the country ranked <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/">128th out of 161 countries</a> in the most recent Global Peace Index, which is an index measuring the peacefulness of countries on the basis of 23 quantitative and qualitative indicators. </p>
<p>A number of other factors also pose high degrees of political risk. These pertain to a need for <a href="https://www.intransformation.org.za/2021/05/22/visionary-leadership-needed-in-south-africa-to-reduce-inequality/">solid and visionary political leadership</a> at all levels of government to deal with a range of governance problems, high levels of <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/cw-annual-report-average-11-whistle-blower-reports-a-day-in-2020/?gclid=CjwKCAjwwsmLBhACEiwANq-tXHwJAPx2o88fqIKVQvgjXK5mKBUkJguMDFqd-Cg1JXzQqmyK_gUeUBoCB3YQAvD_BwE">corruption</a>, <a>inefficient government administration</a>, especially at <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2020-02-11-local-government-crisis-rooted-in-incompetence-and-corruption/">municipal level</a>. Added to this is the need to tackle the never-ending institutional challenges facing Eskom, the power utility, resulting in <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/energy/477278/eskoms-problems-are-far-worse-than-we-thought-analysts/">erratic electricity supply</a> to the detriment of the economy.</p>
<p>Underlying the protests and related frustrations are <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview#1">several years of low economic growth</a> and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-03-02-00-sa-counts-cost-of-poor-governance/">poor governance</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02113rdQuarter2021.pdf">Unemployment is extremely high</a>, amid low levels of education and skills. <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14415">Youth unemployment</a>, especially, remains one of South Africa’s most pressing challenges. </p>
<p>Another problem area is <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-22-law-enforcement-agencies-incompetent-and-compromised-da/">incapacitated law enforcement institutions</a>. Recently, <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/33357/">parliamentarians expressed concern</a> that the country’s law enforcement agencies did not have the capacity to handle situations like civil unrest, if it was more widespread than the recent unrest in July 2021. In fact, the Human Rights Commission recently heard that the South African Police Service was not “<a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-22-outmanned-outgunned-outrun-police-commissioner-sitole-admits-saps-failings-as-sahrc-hearings-continue/">equal to the task</a>” when riots and looting broke out in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in July.</p>
<p>For the Police Commissioner to admit before a commission of inquiry that a country’s police force was <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-22-outmanned-outgunned-outrun-police-commissioner-sitole-admits-saps-failings-as-sahrc-hearings-continue/">outmanned, outgunned and outrun</a> when called upon to protect citizens, their property and public property against the looters, is most concerning.</p>
<p>In view of the above, the broad macro-political risk profile of the country has changed fundamentally and worsened substantially <a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/">from 2006 to 2021</a>. In this context, the country’s political risk profile must be considered a matter of serious concern.</p>
<p>So, is the country now a failed state or about to become one?</p>
<h2>Where South Africa stands</h2>
<p>The annual <a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/">Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Index</a> can be taken as an authoritative indicator of international state fragility and political risk. The index maps states across the globe and ranks them in terms of 12 categories – from sustainable (shades of blue) to stable (shades of green) to warning (shades of yellow) to alert (<a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/">shades of red</a>). </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of the world with colours indicating fragility" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435275/original/file-20211202-21-vy4vq5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Fragility in the World 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/">Fragile States Index</a></span>
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<p>South Africa’s standing in the index is cause for concern. It has moved from <a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/">stable in 2006 to warning in 2021</a>. This clearly indicates a much higher level of political risk in the country. Interestingly, the opposite happened to Botswana, which moved from the warning to the stable category. </p>
<p>In my view South Africa is probably still in the medium-risk category of political risk.</p>
<p>Countries like Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Chad, Sudan and South Sudan, which are either in a state of armed conflict or recovering from armed conflict, are indicated as far more ‘fragile’ on the Fragile State Index, and find themselves in the alert category. These countries are all showing high levels of institutional and social <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations">fragility</a>, based on publicly available indicators that measure the quality of policy and institutions and manifestations of fragility. South Africa, on the other hand, is also miles away from experiences in these countries. </p>
<p>This implies that state failure is of much more relevance to these countries than South Africa.</p>
<p>Still, the evidence shows that political risk in the country has increased markedly in certain areas over the past two decades. It’s clear that South Africa has been moving from ‘medium risk’ into ‘high-medium risk’ or even ‘high risk’ in recent years.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, to call South Africa a failed state would be an exaggeration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170653/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>The evidence shows that political risk in South Africa has increased markedly in certain areas over the past two decades.Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1661302021-08-18T15:00:39Z2021-08-18T15:00:39ZWhat lies behind social unrest in South Africa, and what might be done about it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416500/original/file-20210817-23-1nmv9ak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Residents clean up the streets and local businesses after looting incidents in Alexandra, Johannesburg. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has among the highest recorded levels of social protest of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2012.697426">any country in the world</a>. The reasons behind this are more complex than often assumed.</p>
<p>The scale and severity of the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/investigations/anatomy-of-a-violent-july-data-mapping-shows-unrest-was-part-of-tactical-plan-to-shut-down-sa-20210806">looting and sabotage</a> in KwaZulu-Natal and parts of Gauteng in July, following the jailing of former president Jacob Zuma, has brought social protest and civil unrest into the popular discourse.</p>
<p>But much of the commentary on the July riot – which cost over 300 lives and billions of rands in damage to the economy – has neglected the long history of violent protest in the country. The truth is that, while <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-07-30-south-africas-july-riots-and-the-long-shadow-of-jacob-zuma-fall-over-party-and-state/">disgruntlement by Zuma’s supporters</a> was the trigger, the roots of social unrest go much deeper. </p>
<p>What is more, the available data shows that the number of protests in South Africa has been steadily <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/research-data/view/7862">rising over the past 20 years</a>. For instance, there has been an almost nine-fold increase in the average number of service delivery protests each year <a href="https://www.municipaliq.co.za/index.php?site_page=article.php&id=52">comparing 2004-08 with 2015-19</a>. </p>
<p>There is also evidence that social protests are <a href="https://journals.assaf.org.za/sacq/article/view/3031">increasingly violent and disruptive</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/violence-in-south-africa-an-uprising-of-elites-not-of-the-people-164968">Violence in South Africa: an uprising of elites, not of the people</a>
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<p>It is important to understand what lies behind this trend of growing social unrest, which makes the country precarious, and what might be done to tackle the underlying causes.</p>
<p>If the government wants to avoid a repeat of the social and economic catastrophe of the July 2021 riots – even if on a smaller and more localised scale – it should look back to learn some important lessons about why protest happens and how to address this. </p>
<h2>Seeds of discontent</h2>
<p>There are a number of key factors in understanding the reasons behind social protest in South Africa:</p>
<p>First, it is important to recognise that the people and places with the highest levels of social and economic deprivation are not those most likely to protest. For example, protests over “service delivery” – the provision of basic services such as electricity, water and sanitation – are heavily concentrated in the metropolitan areas, such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, eThekwini, Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay and Mangaung. Yet rural municipalities actually have <a href="https://catalog.ihsn.org/index.php/citations/52590">much lower levels of service coverage</a>. </p>
<p>Access to basic services has also improved across the country over the <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report%2003-01-22/Report%2003-01-222016.pdf">past two decades</a>. But delivery protests have increased exponentially over the same period. There are evidently deeper and more complex reasons behind how and when ineffective delivery of municipal services ends up in social conflict.</p>
<p>Second, it is often a sense of unfairness (inequality), not just levels of provision, that lead to grievances and resentment which <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022002717723136">spark social protest</a>. For instance, long-standing differences in amenities between neighbouring communities send a clear signal that the government is not willing or not able to meet their needs in an equitable manner. </p>
<p>A case in point is informal settlements which have often been <a href="http://repository.hsrc.ac.za/handle/20.500.11910/11292">hotspots for protest action</a>. Rural migrants arrive in the city with expectations of a better life, only to end up living in squalor. Until the government can implement a realistic and scalable plan for upgrading informal settlements, this is likely to continue.</p>
<p>Third, government departments tend to get fixated with meeting numerical targets at the expense of service quality and what matters most for communities. <a href="https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Rules-of-the-Game-Report_final-draft-1.pdf">Recent research</a> suggests that municipal officials get locked into a culture of “playing it safe” and “compliance” in delivering services and related public investments rather than innovation and genuine transformation. </p>
<p>An infamous example is the delivery of <a href="https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/handle/10919/37125">toilets in an open field</a> where municipalities get the credit and contractors get paid for erecting them, whether or not there are any houses or people living in the vicinity.</p>
<p>Government needs to stop paying “lip service” to the principles of community consultation and local participation, and take this work seriously. The extra time and effort are justified by aligning municipal plans and investments closer to people’s actual priorities. Local buy-in can also help ensure that investments in public infrastructure are protected and maintained.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/understanding-violent-protest-in-south-africa-and-the-difficult-choice-facing-leaders-148751">Understanding violent protest in South Africa and the difficult choice facing leaders</a>
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<p>Finally, feelings of frustration and anger have been heightened by years of waiting for promises to be fulfilled. International <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/223459">studies</a> suggest that communities are more likely to protest when they can clearly attribute blame, and where visible institutions are perceived to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022002717723136">possess the means for redress</a>. </p>
<p>Municipal services have a clear line of sight, where communities can easily measure and attest to progress in their experience of daily life. <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-revolting-against-inept-local-government-why-it-matters-155483">Mismanagement and corruption</a> have led to the collapse of many municipalities over recent years. This is especially so in smaller cities and towns, with images of <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/mangaung-where-the-stench-of-sewage-smells-as-bad-as-its-finances-20200825">sewage running down the street</a> and no water in the pipes. In this way, grievances over service delivery are a common trigger for social protest. But the grievances often reflect a much broader basket of discontent. </p>
<p>Over the last 18 months, the hardship and suffering facing poorer urban communities, in particular, has been compounded by their disproportionate loss of jobs and livelihoods <a href="https://cramsurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/12.-Turok-I.-_-Visagie-J.-2021-Drive-apart_-Contrasting-impacts-of-COVID-19-on-people-and-places.pdf">during the pandemic</a>. The reality of hunger and food insecurity is a moral issue but also critical for social stability.</p>
<p>The recent extension of the R350 (US$23) <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/sa-moves-to-lockdown-level-3-ramaphosa-reinstates-r350-covid-grant-20210725">special COVID-19 monthly grant</a> should help to alleviate some of the immediate pressures on poorer households. But, the country also needs a clearer plan of how to tackle the problem of food insecurity. </p>
<h2>No quick fix</h2>
<p>At the heart of the matter, South Africa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/pandemic-underscores-gross-inequalities-in-south-africa-and-the-need-to-fix-them-135070">deep-seated social inequalities</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-their-rush-to-become-global-cities-risk-creating-spatial-apartheid-77200">segregated living conditions</a> provide fertile ground for popular discontent. There is no easy fix for these.</p>
<p>Metropolitan populations continue to expand. This places added pressure on poorer communities forced to cope with rapid densification, strained services, informality and sparse economic opportunities. Fractured communities and weak, under-resourced governing institutions further complicate the task of upgrading and transforming these neighbourhoods.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-1994-miracle-whats-left-159495">South Africa's 1994 'miracle': what's left?</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, affluent households can buy their way into places that are safer, better planned and have higher quality facilities. They can opt out of public services by paying for private schooling, healthcare and security. This accentuates the socio-economic divides even further.</p>
<p>There is a real danger that the <a href="https://www.econ3x3.org/article/part-1-fiscal-dimensions-south-africas-crisis">current fiscal crisis</a> will further corrode public services. This will encourage more and more middle-class families to buy into private provision. Unless the government gets to grips with this issue, the widening chasm between middle and working-class communities will amplify perceptions of unfairness and exacerbate social instability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Visagie receives funding from the South African National Research Foundation through the SARChI in City-Region Economies at the University of the Free State.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ivan Turok receives funding from the South African National Research Foundation through the SARChI in City-Region Economies at the University of the Free State.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sharlene Swartz receives funding from the South African Department of Science and Innovation, the Mastercard Foundation and the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>Much of the commentary on the July riots, which cost over 300 lives and billions of rands in damage to the economy, has neglected the long history of violent protests in the country.Justin Visagie, Senior Research Specialist, Human Sciences Research CouncilIvan Turok, Distinguished Research Fellow, Human Sciences Research CouncilSharlene Swartz, Head of Inclusive Economic Development, Human Sciences Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1610042021-05-18T14:49:06Z2021-05-18T14:49:06ZFixing local government in South Africa needs political solutions, not technical ones<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401286/original/file-20210518-17-1e14nj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters gather in the middle of the road during a demonstration in Johannesburg.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Thabo Jaiyesimi/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) has long been good at <a href="https://www.ancpl.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Eye-of-the-needle.pdf">diagnosing its problems</a>, but not much good at fixing them. Its own documents have been accurately describing its problems for two decades – factionalism and corruption, which are often mentioned by its detractors, have been discussed in its reports and strategy documents <a href="https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/anc/1997/strategy-tactics.htm">since the 1990s</a>. But knowing what the problems are does not seem to help it to solve them.</p>
<p>The newest example of this ability to identify problems is a comment by deputy finance minister <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/person-details/192">David Masondo</a>. He told an ANC MP who asked him why local government was not working and was getting worse that the key was <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/politics-at-local-government-level-needs-to-change-says-david-masondo/">“sorting out” politics in local government</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We can change rules and regulations but as long as we don’t tackle the issue of political leadership at a local government level we will continue to have many of these problems.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Local government needed “developmental political leadership” which would be better able to work with business and national government to promote economic development. This leadership would also appoint competent officials.</p>
<p>South Africa has three “spheres” or levels of government – national, provincial and local. While all three are often accused of corruption and incompetence, local government is commonly identified as the worst. Councils are frequently accused of being unable or unwilling to provide residents with adequate services (seemingly because many councillors are only interested in self-enrichment <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2020-02-11-local-government-crisis-rooted-in-incompetence-and-corruption/">rather than public service</a>). </p>
<p>Studies have shown that Masondo’s diagnosis that the problem is political <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24858282?seq=1">is accurate</a>. His comment also sheds light on government in South Africa. From the early 1990s, the country’s elites have shown a strong taste for technical solutions to political problems. They assume that if a law is changed or a policy is adopted which says that government should work better, it will.</p>
<p>The latest fad is that changing the electoral system will mean <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/guestcolumn/opinion-changing-our-electoral-system-is-now-more-urgent-than-ever-20200912">more accountable government</a>, despite the fact that the system to which most of the faddists want to change – in which there would be both proportional representation and the election of representatives in voting districts – <a href="https://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/localgov/local.html">already operates</a> in the same local government which everyone agrees <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-paying-a-heavy-price-for-dysfunctional-local-government-102295">is not working</a>.</p>
<p>Local government has seen its fair share of legal solutions and other technical fixes – the favourite right now is the <a href="https://www.cogta.gov.za/ddm/index.php/about-us/">district development model</a>, often mentioned as a solution by President Cyril Ramaphosa.</p>
<p>Officially, this allows municipalities to draw on help from national and provincial government – some in government no doubt hope that what it really means is that they will tell local government what to do. But even if they do help rather than instruct, this assumes that the cure for local government’s ills is technical, that municipalities need help on how to perform management tasks. In reality, the problem is political.</p>
<h2>Good diagnosis, bad remedy</h2>
<p>South African local government is deeply unpopular – it has been the <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-soar-amid-unmet-expectations-in-south-africa-42013">target of protest</a> in the <a href="https://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Bond%20Townships.pdf">townships</a> (black residential areas) and shack settlements for years. While it is fashionable to say that the problem is poor <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/south-africa-what-does-service-delivery-really-mean">“service delivery”</a>, which means that local government is not good at technical tasks, the real reason is that people believe, accurately, that mayors or councillors do not hear them and so have <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-soar-amid-unmet-expectations-in-south-africa-42013">no idea what they need</a>.</p>
<p>So, Masondo does know what the problem is. His solution is less clear. What are “developmental” political leaders? Since he also <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/politics/rush-of-candidates-to-anc-political-school-20210515">heads the ANC’s political school</a>, he may believe that they are produced by careful selection and training. This would not be the first time the ANC believed it needed a “better” sort of candidate. Former president Thabo Mbeki <a href="https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/82857_tmf_newsletter_-_july_2020.pdf">still argues</a>, as he did when he was president, that the ANC reserved its best people for national and provincial government and sent only the third best to local government. ANC elections head Fikile Mbalula wanted to ensure that only people with <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1495010/mbalula-only-people-with-impeccable-credentials-should-be-elected/">“impeccable credentials”</a> were chosen.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A bespetacled man with a clean shave smiles" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401255/original/file-20210518-17-2pcjnk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401255/original/file-20210518-17-2pcjnk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=749&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401255/original/file-20210518-17-2pcjnk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=749&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401255/original/file-20210518-17-2pcjnk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=749&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401255/original/file-20210518-17-2pcjnk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=941&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401255/original/file-20210518-17-2pcjnk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=941&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401255/original/file-20210518-17-2pcjnk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=941&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Deputy finance minister David Masondo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
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<p>But who is “developmental” or who has the right character are matters of opinion. Who would decide who the “right” people are and why is their judgement better than anyone else’s? Nor do qualifications necessarily make anyone a better representative – what is needed is not a degree but a willingness to listen to people and to serve them.</p>
<p>This approach also misunderstands why local councillors often don’t care what their voters think. The reason is not that people have not taken the right courses. It is that, in an economy from whose benefits many are excluded, politics is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-corruption-in-south-africa-is-deeply-rooted-in-the-countrys-past-and-why-that-matters-144973">route into the middle class</a>.</p>
<p>Since some parties are reelected in suburbs (mainly white and wealthier) and townships whatever their councillors do, keeping your seat – and so staying in the middle class – depends on impressing not voters but the power holders who decide who the candidates are. None of this will be changed by introducing character tests or requiring qualifications.</p>
<p>Even if training or selecting a new set of leaders is not what Masondo has in mind, he does insist that it is the type of person who becomes a councillor which matters. But local government lacks popular support because of deep-seated realities which will remain no matter what type of candidates are selected.</p>
<h2>Fixing the problem</h2>
<p>The problem is not that the wrong people are being chosen. It is that the wrong people are doing the choosing – not only of candidates but of what they do if elected. While the ANC talks of ensuring that “communities” choose candidates, the process is dominated by elites who decide who should be chosen and what they should do if they win.</p>
<p>For example, the law provides for <a href="https://www.cogta.gov.za/index.php/2020/03/20/municipal-ward-committees-need-know/">ward committees</a> which are meant to enable “community members” to tell the councillor what they want. But the committees usually comprise politically connected people because members are not chosen in direct elections. Either they are elected at meetings which only activists attend or are simply selected. </p>
<p>This further strengthens pressure for councillors to take their cue from elites rather than voters.</p>
<p>If the politics is really to change, local voters must gain far more control over councillors. In the suburbs, where people can hold councillors to account, they usually choose not to. In townships and shack settlements, people often can’t do this because the elites have much more power than them.</p>
<p>Not much can be done about this in the suburbs (people can’t be forced to hold councillors to account if they don’t want to), but much could be done elsewhere to change a power balance which always dooms most voters to putting up with councillors who don’t serve them. If that began to happen, the deep-seated realities would ensure that many councillors would still see office as a ticket into the middle class. But keeping hold of the ticket would depend on impressing voters, not party elites.</p>
<p>This point goes beyond local government. South Africa’s politics <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-corruption-in-south-africa-isnt-simply-about-zuma-and-the-guptas-113056">divides</a> the political world into “good people” who are the solution and “bad people” who are the problem. Local government is not the only area in which this hides the real problem: a power balance which ensures that most citizens have little control over the governments they elect.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161004/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The problem in municipalities is not that the wrong people are being chosen. It is that the wrong people are doing the choosing – not only of candidates but of what they do if elected.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1576952021-03-30T13:23:48Z2021-03-30T13:23:48ZSouth Africa needs to address the lingering legacy of its police using excessive force<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391883/original/file-20210326-19-18fdex1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African Police Service march to disperse students blocking traffic in Johannesburg, in March. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michele Spatari / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has a painful history of police using excessive force against protesters. In one of the worst incidents under the apartheid government 69 protesters were shot in cold blood by police outside a police station <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960">in Sharpeville in 1960</a>.</p>
<p>One of the legacies of that terrible day is that no one was held to account. No one was ever held criminally responsible or civilly liable for the deaths. Instead of identifying, naming and holding responsible those who shot protesters, the apartheid state brought <a href="https://idep.library.ucla.edu/sharpeville-massacre">charges of public violence </a> against 70 residents of Sharpeville who were part of the protests.</p>
<p>The protests were against the <a href="https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/dompas">identity documents</a> the apartheid regime forced black people to carry, <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/project-event-details/2">restricting their movements</a>.</p>
<p>A quarter of a century later South Africans need to be reminded of the past they seek to leave behind. When he signed into law the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/images/a108-96.pdf">Constitution of the Republic of South Africa</a>, 1996, President Nelson Mandela chose to do it at Sharpeville. To him the constitution was brought into being <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/history/MEDIA/PRESIDEN.PDF">by an</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>unshakeable determination that respect for human life, liberty and well-being must be enshrined as rights beyond the power of any force to diminish.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But the hard truth is that excessive use of force, impunity and efforts to circumvent transparency remain features of policing in South Africa.</p>
<h2>Systemic</h2>
<p>Earlier this month a young man, Mthokozisi Ntumba, was <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-03-12-mthokozisi-ntumba-know-the-man-who-was-killed-in-the-wits-protest-crossfire/">shot dead by a policeman in Johannesburg</a>. At the time the police were confronting a student protest. Ntumba was passing by. </p>
<p>Following the shooting the minister of police, Bheki Cele, characterised the police action as an <a href="https://www.702.co.za/articles/410978/it-s-a-sad-situation-cele-says-after-mthokozisi-ntumba-s-killing">unexplainable exception</a>. In a radio interview he said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I can’t explain it, it is something without an inch and has no grain of explanation in it. Somebody, for me, just went crazy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But his statement negates the extent and underlying systemic nature of police brutality. Here are just a few examples from across South Africa, over the last decade.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>In February 2011, Bongani Mathebula, 21 years old, was <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/opinion/2021-03-12-shirley-de-villiers-deadly-violence-is-hardwired-into-saps-dna/">shot and killed</a> in crossfire, as police fired on protesters in Ermelo, a town in the Mpumalanga province. </p></li>
<li><p>On 13 April 2011, Andries Tatane, a 33-year-old father of two, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2011-04-18-police-under-fire-after-ficksburg/">was shot and killed</a> with a rubber bullet during a service delivery protest in Ficksburg, a small town in the Free State province. </p></li>
<li><p>At Marikana, a platinum mining town in the North West province, on 16 August 2012, <a href="https://justice.gov.za/comm-mrk/docs/20150710-gg38978_gen699_3_MarikanaReport.pdf">police shot and killed 34</a> striking mineworkers. </p></li>
<li><p>In 2015, Lucas Lebyane, a 15-year-old boy, was <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2015-02-27-police-kill-boy-in-mpumalanga-protest/">shot dead</a> during a service delivery protest, demanding that the Bushbuckridge local municipality, a rural area in Mpumalanga province, provide them with water.</p></li>
<li><p>In July 2020, Leo Williams, a 9-year-old boy, <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2020/08/17/leo-williams-the-laingville-boy-shot-in-service-deliery-protest-dies">was shot</a> during a service delivery protest in Laingville, St Helena Bay, a coastal town in the Western Cape province, and died later in hospital. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These are but a few examples based on anecdotal media reporting. But incidents of police excess are much more prevalent. This is known from annual reports of the <a href="http://www.ipid.gov.za/">Independent Police Investigative Directorate</a>, the oversight body charged with ensuring police respect the rule of law and uphold human rights. </p>
<p>In the last two reporting cycles, the number of cases of deaths resulting from police action submitted to the oversight body (393 in 2018/2019 and 392 in 2019/2020) averaged <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/IPID_Annual_Report_2019-2020.pdf">more than one case a day</a>.</p>
<h2>A lack of accountability</h2>
<p>The shootings listed above had two things in common: excessive use of police force, and a lack of accountability. </p>
<p>In some instances, as in Tatane’s case, those accused <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2013-03-28-court-acquits-all-seven-police-accused-of-killing-tatane/">were acquitted</a>. </p>
<p>In other cases, such as in Marikana, there were no prosecutions. In the case of Leo Williams, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2021/03/18/laingville-community-frustrated-with-ipid-probe-into-leo-williams-death">recently confirmed that investigations were continuing</a>. </p>
<p>Under the constitution, the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/chp11.html">job of the South African Police <em>Service</em> is to</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic (section 205(3)). </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But without transparency, it’s impossible to hold them to this.</p>
<p>South Africans deserve a fuller picture of the extent of police brutality and the level of accountability, especially when people die at at the hands of police. The statistics that the Independent Police Investigative Directorate provide are informative. But the focus is on its own efficiency in investigating alleged police misconduct, rather than specific cases. The information is nameless and provides no link to specific cases. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>This year provides an opportunity to face the challenge head on. </p>
<p>Some work has already been done. But it hasn’t been shared with the public.</p>
<p>Three years ago a panel of national and international experts put together a report that provided recommendations on addressing the underlying problems relating to public order policing, including policy, methods and training. The panel was convened on the back of a recommendation made by the <a href="https://justice.gov.za/comm-mrk/index.html">Farlam Commission of Enquiry</a> on Marikana.</p>
<p>The panel handed its <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/marikana-experts-report-points-the-way-to-better-policing">report</a> to the minister of police in 2018. It has now finally been <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/marikana-massacre-136-recommendations-by-expert-panel-for-reforms-in-saps-20210329">made public</a> by the police minister.</p>
<p>The senseless death of Mthokozisi Ntumba should make the report a pivot for an urgently needed national dialogue on issues around policing. The proposed amendment to the South African Police Service <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/docs/120523police.pdf">Act 68 of 1995</a>, introduced <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/newsroom/msspeechdetail.php?nid=28546#:%7E:text=The%20South%20African%20Police%20Service%20Amendment%20Bill%2C%202020%2C%20provides%20a,children%20and%20persons%20with%20disabilities">in 2020</a>, provides an excellent opportunity for such a dialogue. </p>
<p>Topics should include the <a href="https://theconversation.com/marikana-shining-the-light-on-police-militarisation-and-brutality-in-south-africa-44162">demilitarisation</a> of the police, changing the culture in the police, and building better relations with communities. The criteria and process for recruitment, ethics, equipment and leadership should also be open to debate. </p>
<p>While the immediate impetus is the use of force in response to protest, other aspects of policing should be part of the discussion. These include the high level of deaths in police custody, with 237 such cases being reported to the Independent Police Investigative Directorate in the 2019/2020 cycle.</p>
<p>The aim of this process should be to ensure that the country’s police better appreciate that they are custodians of democracy. They are there to protect the most basic right, the right to life. When they fall short due to excessive use of force, the right to know should be fully respected. Full transparency would be a milestone on the road to greater trust between the police and the people of South Africa. Full transparency will also bring about greater accountability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frans Viljoen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africans deserve a fuller picture of the extent of police brutality, and the level of accountability, especially when people die at the hands of police.Frans Viljoen, Director and Professor of International Human Rights Law, Centre for Human Rights, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1554832021-02-23T14:53:20Z2021-02-23T14:53:20ZSouth Africans are revolting against inept local government. Why it matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385266/original/file-20210219-23-1982qok.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Failures by municipalities to do their work are forcing many residents to take matters into their own hands.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A sea change is under way at local government level in South Africa, one which all political parties had better watch out for. Citizens’ groups are taking control of municipal functions, some with the support of courts, and are delivering services where this sphere is collapsing.</p>
<p>The trend is being driven by voters who are sick of corrupt politicians – as every poll <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/global-corruption-barometer-africa-2019/">makes clear</a>. For example, a poll <a href="https://citizensurveys.net/">run in late 2019</a> showed growing mistrust in political parties and politicians. There was a deep-seated belief that the country was headed in the wrong direction. <a href="https://citizensurveys.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Abridged-South-African-Citizens-Survey-2018-Q4-Core-Report.pdf">Over 80%</a> of respondents thought corruption was increasing.</p>
<p>The sad state of the local sphere has been lamented by many, not least the late Auditor-General Kimi Makwetu. He <a href="https://www.agsa.co.za/Portals/0/Reports/MFMA/201819/GR/Section%201%20-%20Executive%20summary.pdf">noted</a> in 2018 that “on average almost 60% of the revenue shown in the books will never find its way into the bank account”, raising the alarm that such rampant corruption and incompetence would inevitably result in a growing revolt against rates and taxes.</p>
<p>The consequence has been precisely that – talk of withholding rates and taxes, and going further to simply do what has to be done – but which government seems incapable of doing. The “<em><a href="https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/gatvol">gatvol</a></em>” (fed-up) tipping point seems to be upon us.</p>
<h2>Growing discontent</h2>
<p>It is against this background that the country will have local government <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2021-02-11-2021-local-government-elections-will-go-ahead-as-planned-cyril-ramaphosa/">elections</a>, currently scheduled for August this year. </p>
<p>Soon the media will be replete with pundits talking about the low turnout that <a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/The+South+African+non-voter+-+An+analysis.pdf/acc19fbd-bd6d-9190-f026-8d311078b670?version=1.0&t=1608150183902">generally affects local elections</a>. Some will touch on the way all parties are commonly “punished” at local rather than national elections, others will talk to the winners, losers and likely coalition partners. All this will be pretty predictable. Some of it may even be correct. But something more subterranean and interesting is happening.</p>
<p>There has been growing discontent with many local authorities. In some this has gone as far as concerned citizens successfully calling for the municipality to be dissolved and <a href="https://theconversation.com/landmark-court-ruling-highlights-crisis-in-south-africas-cities-and-towns-130140">put into administration</a>, as happened in Makhanda in the Eastern Cape province in 2020.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, citizen groups have found other ways of simply taking matters into their own hands. Instead of just moaning, people are taking action. </p>
<p>Events in <a href="https://www.kgetlengrivier.gov.za/">Kgetlengrivier Local Municipality</a>, in the platinum-rich North West province, have shown just how serious the situation has become.</p>
<p>In December 2020, in what was described as an <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/north-west-residents-take-matters-into-their-own-hands-and-get-courts-blessing/">“astonishing judgment”</a>, a judge in the North West High Court ordered the imprisonment of the municipal manager of Kgetlengrivier for 90 days. The sentence was suspended on condition that sewage spilling into the Elands and Koster rivers be cleared up. </p>
<p>Remarkably, the judge also gave the residents’ association the right to take control of the area’s sewage works, and to be paid by local and provincial governments for its efforts.</p>
<p>The local residents duly took over the job of clearing sewage, successfully.</p>
<p>The legality of this will be tested on appeal, and may well be overturned by a more risk averse higher court. But the seeds have been sown, and national government seems to agree – national ministers were respondents in the case, and did not appeal. And the governing African National Congress (ANC) had better be careful – most of the places where these events are occurring are in ANC-held municipalities.</p>
<p>Take events in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-51479450">Harrismith</a> in the Free State, were residents also took over fixing the sewerage; or <a href="https://southcoastherald.co.za/250426/umdonis-tyred-citizens-threaten-withhold-rates/">Umdoni Municipality</a> in <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ward15umdoni/">Scottburgh</a>, in KwaZulu-Natal, where residents are threatening to stop paying rates. In Graaff-Reinet, in the Eastern Cape, residents have objected to increases in municipal rates, frustrated by the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-02-17-raw-sewage-flows-into-sundays-river/">broken down sewerage</a> system and other municipal services.</p>
<p>This could be construed as anarchy. And it may well be. But anarchy is often criticised and used as a pejorative – a “descent” into anarchy – rather than analysed or understood as one possible “ascent” from a corrupt and coercive politics. It means something along the lines of a belief in abolishing all government, and organising residents on a voluntary, non-coercive, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-anarchism-all-about-50373">cooperative basis</a>. </p>
<p>And this is happening, across the country, from withholding rates and taxes to taking over key service delivery functions.</p>
<p>South Africans may be leading themselves from the trough of corruption to something much more interesting, contested and dangerous to a young democracy. When an entire sphere of the state is <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-02-22-we-are-living-in-a-pigsty-lament-standerton-residents/?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=We+are+living+in+a+pigsty%2C+lament+Standerton+residents+%7C+J%26J+vaccine+is+not+yet+official%2C+say+experts%C2%A0&utm_term=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sowetanlive.co.za%2Fnews%2Fsouth-africa%2F2021-02-22-we-are-living-in-a-pigsty-lament-standerton-residents%2F">close to dysfunctional</a> and can have its power, functions and revenue turned over to citizen groups because of incompetence or malfeasance, something is very seriously wrong. Yet political parties still want voters to trust them, come election time.</p>
<h2>Loss of trust</h2>
<p>Trust in all spheres of government is close to rock bottom, as is trust in political parties. In the last <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-za">Ipsos poll</a>, no party was trusted by <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-za/political-party-landscape-south-africa-amidst-covid-19">a third of its own supporters</a>. The opinion voters have of politicians could not be lower, matched by pessimism: less than half of respondents felt the country was heading in the right direction.</p>
<p>The final straw may well have been watching with revulsion as the most politically connected stole money meant for life-saving <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/1-774-service-providers-under-investigation-for-ppe-corruption-spree-siu-report-reveals-f7d93b31-4079-48af-a586-d6a6e470378b">COVID-19 protective equipment</a>. </p>
<p>Talk of withholding rates and taxes has now become commonplace. Community groups have been seeking legal advice on <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/Graaff-Reinet-Residents-Ratepayers-Association-102908934831171/posts/?ref=page_internal">withholding rates</a> and are sharing legal opinions about the issue. Why pay, if your money is merely going to be “eaten”? This is now backed up the North West High Court ruling. Who needs government?</p>
<p>If pollsters want to understand where South Africa is going, it seems that measuring political parties and their campaigns is perhaps necessary – much as a visit to the dentist is necessary – but it may miss the point.</p>
<p>They should be polling those who no longer care about the local sphere, and who see themselves as constituting a more legitimate and, frankly, competent part of the governance infrastructure. And while taps run dry, power cuts continue due to corruption or incompetence, and no politician has yet been jailed, who is to say they are wrong?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Everatt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There has been growing discontent with many local authorities and calls by concerned citizens for the municipalities to be dissolved.David Everatt, Professor of Urban Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1507522020-11-26T19:02:43Z2020-11-26T19:02:43ZDelivery rider deaths highlight need to make streets safer for everyone<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371401/original/file-20201125-23-ee8k8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=473%2C540%2C3014%2C2041&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mahathir Mohd Yasin/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Five food-delivery cyclists <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-11-24/uber-eats-vows-to-improve-safety-cyclist-killed-in-inner-sydney/12913840">have died</a> on Australian roads in the past three months, four in Sydney. Most commentary has focused on the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/food-delivery-riders-are-the-21st-century-s-chimney-sweeps-20201125-p56htn.html">harsh employment conditions</a> that force people to take risks they shouldn’t have to. These problems should of course be fixed, but cycling in general is too dangerous in our cities. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/three-charts-on-the-rise-in-cycling-injuries-and-deaths-in-australia-116660">Three Charts on the rise in cycling injuries and deaths in Australia</a>
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</p>
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<p>We need to look not just at labour laws but at the laws that shape our streets: things like road rules, planning requirements and engineering standards. Food delivery is a compelling example because it shows cycling is the most efficient way to get around the city. </p>
<p>Despite the efforts of supposedly business-minded people like shock jock Alan Jones and New South Wales’ former roads minister, Duncan Gay (who infamously ripped up infrastructure including a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/aug/25/sydney-australia-bike-lane-skeptic-cycling-duncan-gay-cycleways">cycleway along College Road</a> in central Sydney and a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-04-11/government-tears-up-rainbow-crossing/4621896?nw=0">rainbow crossing</a> on Oxford Street in Surry Hills), businesses have worked out bikes are the best way to move around the city. </p>
<p>Bikes are fastest for distances <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.3141/2247-12?casa_token=6vELy3I6legAAAAA:vMzALMcRv95IJtv7HzstBi1F7BhRF_gbZoaFwCZNU9MQmigqh3MsgonjZKJQWLYMvgXLAlT2aZI">up to 5km</a>, even for beginners. For more experienced cyclists and during peak hour, bikes are faster for trips of 10km and often even more. </p>
<p>Cycling has wider benefits too. Swapping cars for bikes can reduce the tens of billions of dollars lost in traffic <a href="https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/cities/smart-cities/plan/index.aspx">congestion</a>, the many gigatonnes of <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter8.pdf">greenhouse gas emissions</a> and the health impacts of sedentary lifestyles. Even after accidents are taken into account, the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01441647.2015.1057877">health benefits</a> of cycling far outweigh the costs. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cycle-walk-drive-or-train-weighing-up-the-healthiest-and-safest-ways-to-get-around-the-city-100238">Cycle, walk, drive or train? Weighing up the healthiest (and safest) ways to get around the city</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<p>Cycling can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-cyclists-expanding-bike-lane-network-can-lead-to-more-inclusive-cities-144343">help to improve equity</a> and social inclusion, since the burdens of car-centric development are suffered most by people who are already vulnerable. They include the largely migrant food-delivery workforce. </p>
<p>Food-delivery cyclists are not the only people dying in car crashes. Worldwide, traffic accidents cause more than <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/road-traffic-injuries">1.35 million deaths</a> every year and are the leading killer of children. </p>
<h2>Blaming the victims</h2>
<p>Instead of focusing on the dangers created by cars and trucks, however, NSW Transport and Roads Minister Andrew Constance this week <a href="https://www.2gb.com/minister-insists-premiers-critics-clutching-at-straws-over-accusations-of-health-rules-breach/">blamed the victim</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If people are riding around, particularly at night, they have an obligation to make sure they are wearing high-visibility jackets. They’ve obviously got to have the requisite lighting in terms of the bike. They themselves should obviously be putting protective and high-vis clothes on.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Before this week, news stories about food-delivery cyclists were mostly negative. Just last month, police announced a <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/nsw-act/news/sydney-police-crack-down-on-delivery-drivers-who-ride-bikes-on-footpaths/news-story/5c05fc45d6bdca54c607b31e48fae537">crackdown on delivery cyclists</a> riding on footpaths. </p>
<p>Fears about cyclists injuring pedestrians receive a lot of attention, yet car driving <a href="https://theconversation.com/road-safety-switch-to-cycling-to-keep-others-safe-131964">kills three times more people</a> per kilometre than cycling. The danger created by trucks is more than ten times greater per kilometre (and vastly greater overall). </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cars-bicycles-and-the-fatal-myth-of-equal-reciprocity-81034">Cars, bicycles and the fatal myth of equal reciprocity</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Rules give priority to cars</h2>
<p>Of course, we have all seen cyclists doing risky things. But the issue is less about individual behaviour and more about the regulatory environment. In Sydney and many other places, a plethora of state and federal rules and regulations give priority to cars in our cities. </p>
<p>Planning rules entrench the dominance of cars by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-elephant-in-the-planning-scheme-how-cities-still-work-around-the-dominance-of-parking-space-87098">mandating the provision of car parking</a> (despite its significant <a href="https://vtpi.org/park-hou.pdf">impact on housing affordability</a>). Engineering standards support high-speed travel. </p>
<p>Road rules and policing practices also enforce the dominance of cars on streets. An example is penalising pedestrians who step onto or cross the road within 20 metres of a zebra crossing. In contrast, sanctions for dangerous driving are weak and <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/furious-cyclists-demand-police-focus-on-dangerous-drivers-not-helmets-20180426-p4zbte.html">poorly enforced</a>, and cycling is <a href="https://www.amygillett.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/AGF-Submission-to-NSW-Staysafe-Committee-Inquiry-into-Driver-Education-Training-and-Road-Safety-200217.pdf">left out of driver education</a>.</p>
<h2>Infrastructure is a problem too</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/cycling-and-walking-can-help-drive-australias-recovery-but-not-with-less-than-2-of-transport-budgets-142176">Lopsided budget allocations</a> and infrastructure make the situation worse. Even projects supposedly aimed at pedestrians and cyclists often benefit cars far more. An example is overpasses that increase walking and cycling distances, while giving cars a smooth, lights-free ride. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cycling-and-walking-can-help-drive-australias-recovery-but-not-with-less-than-2-of-transport-budgets-142176">Cycling and walking can help drive Australia's recovery – but not with less than 2% of transport budgets</a>
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</p>
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<p>The challenge is particularly acute in older areas, where streets were not designed for high car use. Calls for bike lanes, widened footpaths and other infrastructure for pedestrians and cyclists are often refused on the grounds of lack of space. But why do cars get what little space there is? </p>
<p>The site of Sunday’s death is a clear example. The intersection where the cyclist was killed by an excavator-carrying truck is not a highway but a relatively narrow street with houses and a school. Should large trucks really be driving on streets like this? </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/physical-distancing-is-here-for-a-while-over-100-experts-call-for-more-safe-walking-and-cycling-space-137374">Physical distancing is here for a while – over 100 experts call for more safe walking and cycling space</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Law reform is overdue</h2>
<p>Internationally, there is a growing recognition that legal reform is needed to improve safety, and in turn to achieve both individual and national benefits. The <a href="https://bicycledutch.wordpress.com/2012/01/02/sustainable-safety/">Dutch approach</a> has long been celebrated, both for the high quality of cycling infrastructure and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/cars-overwhelmingly-cause-bike-collisions-and-the-law-should-reflect-that-78922">high level of liability for car drivers</a>. The Swedish <a href="https://visionzeronetwork.org/">Vision Zero</a> has also been influential, with cities around the world introducing laws and policies to eliminate deaths in traffic. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cars-overwhelmingly-cause-bike-collisions-and-the-law-should-reflect-that-78922">Cars overwhelmingly cause bike collisions, and the law should reflect that</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Even in the US, where car culture is deeply entrenched, many cities are adopting <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ad9018bf93fd4ad7295ba8f/t/5f1f030c0cf14f38fa318020/1595867918978/CityHealth_Complete+Streets+Report.pdf">complete streets</a> legislation. These laws require streets to be planned, designed, operated and maintained to enable safe, convenient and comfortable access for users of all ages and abilities, regardless of their transport mode. </p>
<p>In Australia, councils like the <a href="https://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/cycling">City of Sydney</a> are taking very positive actions to support cycling, but this alone is not enough. To save the lives of delivery riders – and everyone else – we need legal reforms at the state and federal levels.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150752/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amelia Thorpe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Delivery riders are paying the ultimate price for the fact that our cities, their infrastructure and the rules governing them make cycling much more dangerous than it should be.Amelia Thorpe, Associate Professor in Law, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1419382020-07-13T14:39:31Z2020-07-13T14:39:31ZThe ANC insists it’s still a political vanguard: this is what ails democracy in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346377/original/file-20200708-19-x1jtcx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The post-apartheid system of participatory democracy is generally considered to have failed. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A common claim of the governing African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa is its commitment to participatory democracy: the involvement of citizens in decisions about issues that affect their lives. It is a principle and a system, primarily at the local government level, that has been institutionalised alongside representative democratic government.</p>
<p>The country has a prominent history of popular participation in the struggle for democracy. Under the largely ANC-aligned national liberation movement, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/107/429/589/79989?redirectedFrom=PDF">mass participation and popular control</a> characterised the struggle discourse. South Africans have shown, as opponents of apartheid and as free citizens, their desire to engage government.</p>
<p>Yet the post-apartheid system of participatory democracy is generally considered to have failed. This is evident in the <a href="http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/12155">weaknesses of institutionalised mechanisms</a> and the growth of informal channels such as <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/247170/pdf">protests</a>. Citizens still lack influence in governance processes.</p>
<p>With this in mind, I set out to examine the roots of this policy failure. My findings are published in a book, <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030257439">The African National Congress and Participatory Democracy</a>. </p>
<p>It examines the ANC’s understanding of participatory democracy – first as a liberation movement, then as a government since 1994. It seeks to show how the failure of participatory democracy can be linked to the ideas that underpin it.</p>
<h2>A precedent for participation</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-national-congress-anc">Founded in 1912</a> by a small group of educated, middle class Africans, the ANC grew into a mass movement in the 1940s. It later became an exiled underground organisation from 1960, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">after its banning by the apartheid regime</a>. In exile, its roots in African nationalism merged with Marxist-Leninist ideology. </p>
<p>It draws on these intellectual traditions, but has always been a <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/sites/default/files/ANC%20Today%20%289%20Nov%29.pdf">“broad church”</a>. There has never been a singular, uniform understanding of participation within the ANC. Instead, during the struggle, multiple traditions and approaches to popular participation emerged.</p>
<p>In the 1980s, as the struggle heightened, one of these ideas took form in the “people’s power” movement. Rooted in local, informal structures of self-governance, it represented for some participants a form of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm167">prefigurative</a>, participatory democracy, built from the bottom up.</p>
<p>From 1990, with the onset of talks to end apartheid, and after the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994">first democratic elections in 1994</a>, some of this inspiration was woven into public policy. This was often through participation of civic and labour movements in formulating policy. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/governmentgazetteid16085.pdf">1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme</a> emphasised people-driven development. This ethos informed the <a href="http://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta_2016/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/whitepaper_on_Local-Gov_1998.pdf">1998 White Paper on Local Government</a> and legislation that established municipal ward committees as key forums for citizen participation.</p>
<p>But new ideas and influences also emerged – from development theory, governance discourse and international best practice. They can be seen in various consultative mechanisms, such as ward committees and <a href="https://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/localgov/webidp.html">municipal development planning</a>. </p>
<p>Some discomfort has arisen between an impetus for managing the public sector efficiently and allowing citizens to participate. But South Africa’s public policy on participation does allow for some popular influence. </p>
<p>Separately, though, the ANC as a movement has a distinct discourse about participation. </p>
<h2>The political vanguard idea</h2>
<p>Emerging from its dominant intellectual heritage, the ANC’s very identity as a mass movement is rooted in the notion that it exists as a political vanguard. Associated with the ideas of Vladimir Lenin, the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781405198073.wbierp1514">vanguard party</a> is a vehicle led by an enlightened, revolutionary leadership through which the people can be led to freedom.</p>
<p>The adoption since 1994 of a largely market-oriented economic strategy makes this discourse meaningless at a policy level. Yet the narrative continues. </p>
<p>ANC documents, statements and commentary still refer to the governing party as “a vanguard movement”. For example, its discussion document on organisational renewal, presented at its most recent policy conference in 2017, stated: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The ANC has to operate as a vanguard movement with political, ideological and organisational capacity to direct the state and give leadership to the motive forces in all spheres of influence and pillars of our transformation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Why is this a problem for participatory democracy? </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346361/original/file-20200708-3991-w0otyw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346361/original/file-20200708-3991-w0otyw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=846&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346361/original/file-20200708-3991-w0otyw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=846&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346361/original/file-20200708-3991-w0otyw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=846&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346361/original/file-20200708-3991-w0otyw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1063&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346361/original/file-20200708-3991-w0otyw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1063&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346361/original/file-20200708-3991-w0otyw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1063&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Vanguardism holds that a dedicated movement – or party – is needed to give ideological, moral and intellectual leadership through a process of “conscientisation”. A vanguard views itself as a true representative, able to interpret the popular will. The people must not only see the vanguard’s objectives as in their best interests. They must also see leadership by that vanguard as essential for those interests to be secured. It implies a fundamental connection between the people’s collective needs and the leadership of their vanguard organisation. </p>
<p>An active role for the people is a critical component of vanguardism. But the movement must guide participation. It’s not the form of participation that’s usually associated with democracy. But the ANC understands it as being the same as participatory democracy.</p>
<h2>Vanguardism versus participatory democracy</h2>
<p>The challenge for South Africa’s democracy is that the very existence of vanguardism prevents citizens from being empowered. It keeps the party dominant. It also contains what the political theorist Joseph V. Femia, in his book <a href="https://www.questia.com/library/4548330/marxism-and-democracy">Marxism and Democracy, p.136)</a>, said was an important tension in Marxism generally, between a desire for </p>
<blockquote>
<p>political control from above and popular initiative from below.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This can be framed as a tension between vanguardism and participatory democracy.</p>
<p>Twenty six years since the end of apartheid, South Africa has reached a critical point in its democracy. Popular <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-must-offer-more-than-promises-to-win-over-south-africans-109788">disillusionment with the ANC</a>, <a href="https://witspress.co.za/catalogue/dominance-and-decline/">failures in government performance </a> and the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-01-31-these-provinces-had-the-most-service-delivery-protests-in-2019/">rise of popular protest</a> are evident. But certain ideas continue to influence the way democracy is practised. </p>
<p>The ANC has been found wanting as a leader of society. <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">Rampant corruption and abuse of office</a> have marred its claim to the rightful leadership of South Africa’s people. It was inevitable that citizens would lose faith in formal political processes. </p>
<p>The difficult path from liberation movement to governing party is well-trodden in Africa. Liberation struggles across the continent were conducted in the context of state repression. Political organisations were not free to operate openly. </p>
<p>But the requirements of underground operations and of unity in struggle are different to those of democracy. Organisational traditions focused not on empowering citizens but on maintaining movement hegemony do not allow democratic influence and agency to flourish.</p>
<p><em><a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030257439">The African National Congress and Participatory Democracy: From Peoples Power to Public Policy</a> is published by <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp">Palgrave Macmillan</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141938/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heidi Brooks received funding from the Leverhulme Trust for the doctoral research on which this article is based. </span></em></p>The challenge for the deepening of South Africa’s democracy is that the very existence of vanguardism prevents the realisation of empowered citizens.Heidi Brooks, Senior Researcher and Associate, Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic ReflectionLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1345932020-04-06T14:18:37Z2020-04-06T14:18:37ZBook review: lessons from a township that resisted apartheid<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323612/original/file-20200327-146678-103wrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Oukasie residents protest over poor service delivery in 2010.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jaco Marais/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Can people on the wrong end of power change the world by working together? Or are the moments when the powerless take control of their own lives doomed to be snuffed out?</p>
<p>The question is raised by Kally Forrest’s <a href="https://jacana.co.za/our-books/bonds-of-justice-the-struggle-for-oukasie-hidden-voices-series/">book</a> Bonds of Justice: The Struggle for Oukasie. It is another in the <a href="https://jacana.co.za/our-books/?filter=Hidden%20Voices%20Series">Hidden Voices</a> series which aims to recover and preserve writings on society which would otherwise fall through publishers’ nets. The book is short and highly readable, and so is accessible to a non-academic audience. It has been some years in the making – it uses information gathered in 2011 and 2012. But the story it tells raises topical issues.</p>
<p>Forrest details the fight, in the last years of apartheid, of the people of Oukasie, a township near Brits in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/north-west">North West</a> Province, against an attempt to force them to move to Lethlabile, 25 km from Brits, primarily because their presence offended white residents. While it was common under apartheid for black people to be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/18/world/south-africa-orders-the-removal-of-10000-blacks-to-new-site.html">removed</a> to areas where they would be out of sight to whites, it was uncommon for those who faced this threat to resist it successfully. Oukasie did manage to defeat the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files/ChOct89.1024.8196.000.028.Oct1989.5.pdf">attempted removal</a>. </p>
<p>It organised to do this despite a sustained campaign by the apartheid authorities. This included the murder of anti-removal leaders and members of their family, but its chief strategy was to divide residents. So, resistance could only succeed if the resisters were <a href="https://learnandteachmagazine.wordpress.com/2014/11/12/oukasie-yes-letlhabile-no/">organised and united</a>. While thousands were induced to move, enough stayed to force the authorities to abandon the removal and agree that Oukasie be developed.</p>
<p>Unusual circumstances made Oukasie an ideal site for strong grassroots organisation in which people remain united because they share in decisions.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hidden Voices/Fanele</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The resistance</h2>
<p>Brits was the site of strong worker organisation, largely the work of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Catholic-Action">Young Christian Workers</a> (YCW), founded by Roman Catholic priests as a vehicle for European workers to change exploitative conditions through organised efforts. YCW, which in Brits was open to non-Christians, stressed democratic grassroots organisation based on careful strategy summed up in its motto – “See, judge, act” – which encouraged members to reflect on what they saw before deciding what to do about it.</p>
<p>Young Christian Workers was political, since it challenged the effect of economic power on its members. But it was wary of the political movements which, it believed, wanted workers to act in ways which advanced the movements’ interests but not their own. It was able to maintain this stance because, in contrast to much of the rest of the country, the political organisations were not active in Oukasie.</p>
<p>Its attitude was identical to that of a section of the trade union movement which happened to be strongly represented in Brits. Its vehicle was the union which became the <a href="https://www.numsa.org.za/history/">National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa)</a>. Young Christian Workers’s members gravitated to it and it developed a strong presence in Oukasie. The resistance to removal relied on the same stress on grassroots participation and careful strategy which Young Christian Workers and Numsa adopted in the workplace.</p>
<p>The Oukasie resistance became, therefore, a test for an approach which relied on the efforts of grassroots people rather than high profile political leaders to change the world.</p>
<p>In one sense, this route to change worked. Oukasie was reprieved, and this was followed by a <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-08-31-wr-29871-story.html">period of development</a>. The Brits transitional local government which was elected in the mid-1990s was led by Levy Mamobolo, a unionist and anti-removal leader who, until his untimely death, led the area effectively and honestly. The first few years seemed to show that democratic local organisation could also produce political leadership which serves the people rather than itself.</p>
<p>But, as Forrest shows, the Oukasie story does <a href="https://ewn.co.za/Topic/Mothotlung-service-delivery-protests">not end happily</a>. Leaders committed to public service were forced out of the local government; public services declined and corruption increased.</p>
<p>Forrest therefore frames her book not as a story of the triumph of a particular way of fighting for change but as evidence of what is possible if people organise themselves in the way Oukasie did. The author of an important <a href="https://witspress.co.za/catalogue/metal-that-will-not-bend/">book</a> on Numsa, she is an advocate of the approach followed by Young Christian Workers, Numsa and the Oukasie resisters. She contrasts this with the selfish elitism which gained control of Brits. </p>
<p>But she leaves unanswered the key question: is the grassroots organisation which saved Oukasie a realistic route to change, or is it doomed to give way to the top-down leadership to which Brits <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-05-03-mayor-suspended-in-difficult-but-necessary-decision-by-anc/">succumbed</a>?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2010 Oukasie rose again, in furious protests over poor service delivery. More than 100 were arrested.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Foto24/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What does the ultimate defeat mean?</h2>
<p>Given the importance of this question, it is a pity that Forrest does not analyse the defeat of grassroots democracy in Oukasie. We are left wondering how and why control passed from the “good guys” to the “bad guys”.</p>
<p>One reason may well have been that the governing African National Congress’s (ANC’s) politics turned out to be more powerful than those who supported the Oukasie resistance hoped. Forrest records that key figures in the resistance to removal joined the ANC and served in its committees once it was unbanned. This suggests that Oukasie’s ability to maintain an independent path was purely a result of happenstance (the lack of a political presence in the area).</p>
<p>Despite these limitations, the book makes an important contribution. Forrest’s sympathy for the Oukasie campaign does not prevent her from highlighting weaknesses. She acknowledges that the campaign failed to prevent thousands leaving Oukasie, and she documents the defeat of the politics she champions as Oukasie moved from resistance to local governance. This makes the book a highly credible account of the events it describes.</p>
<p>The book should, therefore, be read by anyone concerned with democracy’s future in South Africa, but in other contexts too. It should also trigger a debate on whether the political approach it describes is feasible.</p>
<p><em><a href="https://jacana.co.za/our-books/bonds-of-justice-the-struggle-for-oukasie-hidden-voices-series/">Bonds of Justice</a>: The Struggle for Oukasie is <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/search?cat=b&terms=Bonds+of+Justice%3A+The+Struggle+for+Oukasie">available</a> <a href="https://www.exclusivebooks.co.za/search?expedite=&keyword=Bonds%20of%20Justice:%20The%20Struggle%20for%20Oukasie">online</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134593/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A readable and important new book on the struggle for justice in South Africa’s Oukasie township does not go far enough to question the feasibility of grassroots resistance.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1221332019-09-01T09:22:14Z2019-09-01T09:22:14ZBlack South Africans explain who they voted for in last poll, and why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289629/original/file-20190827-184229-uu1t3j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africans who receive welfare grants vote for the governing African National Congress more than any other party. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In May this year South Africans went to the polls to vote in the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/south-africans-vote-today-sixth-national-elections-apartheid">sixth national and provincial elections</a> of the democratic era. The election was a test of strength for the governing African National Congress (ANC), whose electoral support has declined <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/the-anc-in-terminal-decline/">over the last decade</a>. </p>
<p>The election affirmed the pattern of ANC decline, with its <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/IECOnline/Reports/National-and-Provincial-reports">worst electoral performance to date</a>. The <a href="https://effonline.org/about-us/">Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)</a>, founded in July 2013 by expelled former ANC Youth League President, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/julius-sello-malema">Julius Malema</a>, and which describes itself as a far-left political party, saw growth in its support. Meanwhile the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), a broadly liberal party, saw a <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/App/dashboard.html">decline in support.</a> </p>
<p>But who voted for these parties and why? </p>
<p>To answer this question, the Centre for Social Change at the University of Johannesburg surveyed over 5,000 voters in an exit poll on the day of the election. Twenty three sites across eight of South Africa’s nine provinces were surveyed, with most sites concentrated in Gauteng, the economic hub of the country. The survey focused primarily on <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/the-economics-of-south-african-townships-special-focus-on-diepsloot">townships</a> and informal settlements, whose residents are mostly poor and black; 91% of respondents were black African, and 22% lived in informal dwellings or shacks. </p>
<p>Similar surveys were also conducted on the day of the 2014 national and provincial <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/115/460/419/2195267">elections</a> and the <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/newandevents/Documents/LGE%202016%20Report%20CR%2011%2001_Final%20Cover%20Included.pdf">2016 local government election</a>. </p>
<p>The survey asked a range of demographic questions – such as age, gender, race, ethnicity and employment status – as well as questions about participation in protests, and who respondents voted for and why. </p>
<p>The survey sample was not nationally representative. But, the areas chosen provide a crucial insight into the historic heartlands of support for the governing ANC.</p>
<h2>Who votes for what party?</h2>
<p>The survey asked about all political parties but we concentrated our analysis on the three largest political parties: the ANC, the DA and the EFF. </p>
<p>As the ANC continues to experience declining electoral support, our survey provides some understanding of the patterns that lie beneath deepening electoral competition in South Africa. Age, gender, ethnicity, receipt of government benefits, and participation in protest were all found to significantly correlate with voters’ choices of different parties. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/contact/Documents/Final%202019%20election%20report.pdf">Our analysis</a> shows that the ANC and the DA secured their greatest support among older voters, while the EFF secured the greatest support among younger voters, as one might expect. </p>
<p>In line with our previous surveys, we found that women were more likely than men to vote for the ANC. Nearly two-thirds of women (64%) voted for the ANC, compared to only 55% of men. </p>
<p>Nearly half of all DA voters surveyed had full time jobs compared to about a third of ANC and EFF voters. </p>
<p>The data also revealed interesting ethnic differences. IsiXhosa speakers were most likely to vote for the ANC while Sepedi speakers were most likely to vote for the EFF. </p>
<p>In previous surveys, we found that the ANC, then under the leadership of President Jacob Zuma, drew particularly strong support from isiZulu speakers. But in this round of the survey, we observed that while support for the ANC was still strong among isiZulu speakers, they were also the most likely to vote for opposition parties beyond the EFF and DA. </p>
<p>The findings also reveal that those who had reported taking part in some form of protest action over the last five years were more likely to vote for opposition parties. </p>
<h2>Why do people vote?</h2>
<p>The survey included a series of six questions that asked respondents to rate the reasons that they came to vote by “a lot”, ‘“a bit” or “not at all”. The two most influential reasons were “because it is my responsibility to vote” and “to improve the economy”, with 90% and 87% of respondents, respectively, saying that these factors influenced them “a lot”. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly, different reasons influenced voters who supported different parties. Nearly two thirds of ANC voters, compared to only half of DA voters, said that the prospect of government benefits influenced their decision to vote.</p>
<p>In contrast, about three quarters of EFF voters agreed that “land redistribution” influenced their decision to vote, compared to less than half of DA voters. </p>
<h2>Explaining voter choices</h2>
<p>The survey also asked people to explain why they voted for a particular party. Personal identification, including reasons based on a sense of trust, loyalty or a personal affinity with a party, was most common among ANC voters.</p>
<p>DA and EFF voters most frequently expressed a desire for “change” as influencing who they voted for. Although it must be noted that a high proportion of ANC voters also expressed the idea of “change” as motivating their decision to vote for the ANC.</p>
<p>A fifth (20%) of EFF voters explained their vote choice in terms of their satisfaction with the party’s policies. This could be related to the <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-effs-2019-election-manifesto-iv">EFF’s manifesto</a> pledges on the issue of land redistribution. We found that land redistribution was a strong motivator for bringing EFF supporters out to vote. Meanwhile, 17% of DA voters explained their vote choice as being related to the desire to increase electoral competition and to put pressure on the governing party.</p>
<p>Our survey was also able to give insight into whether government benefits, in the form of social grants or government housing, may have played a role in influencing party choice. Our findings show that social grant recipients were statistically more likely to vote for the ANC. Receipt of a government house, however, did not have a statistically significant relationship to voting for the party.</p>
<h2>South African electoral politics</h2>
<p>The fault lines identified in the survey may deepen, to the extent that political parties emphasise them in campaign messaging. </p>
<p>At the same time, the salience of factors such as social grants and land redistribution highlight that party policies and performance in government matter as well. As electoral competition continues to escalate in South Africa, it will be useful to monitor the relative significance of, and interaction between identities, policy preferences, and government performance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122133/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carin Runciman receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the University of Johannesburg Research Committee.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marcel Paret does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The survey findings show that people who had taken part in protests over the last five years were more likely to vote for opposition parties.Carin Runciman, Associate professor, University of JohannesburgMarcel Paret, Assistant professor, University of UtahLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1183522019-06-10T13:27:47Z2019-06-10T13:27:47ZMore countries need to give peaceful protest the chance it deserves<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278286/original/file-20190606-98010-9lc4lh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Sudanese protester waves the Sudanese and Algerian flags. Peaceful protestors in both countries eventually toppled their long term presidents.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Amel Pain</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The right of peaceful protest is enshrined in the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/">Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a>, adopted by the United Nations in December 1948. Today, this right is recognised in the constitutions of 182 countries. However, we are still far away from universal acceptance of this right in practice. </p>
<p>There is, of course, nothing inherently good or bad about the causes pursued through peaceful protest. It has been used, for example, to foster acceptance for many fundamental human rights. It’s also been used to call for the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/brussels-anti-immigration-far-right-protest-riot-police-eu-un-global-migration-a8685876.html">rejection of foreigners</a>, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/anti-trans-protest-london-pride-parade-lgbt-gay-2018-march-lesbian-gay-rights-a8436506.html">LGBTQ)</a> people. It has also been used for and against <a href="https://elombah.com/anti-abortion-pro-life-protest-rocks-nairobi-kenya/">abortion</a>. And in some cases assemblies deteriorate into riots. </p>
<p>But when a society permits people to air their grievances in the streets in a peaceful way, it allows public engagement with the matter, and creates a powerful tool for tensions to be resolved in an inclusive and peaceful manner. This is an integral part of a democratic and pluralistic society.</p>
<p>Yet, in spite of noble promises in their constitutions, a significant number of countries worldwide have a very restrictive approach to demonstrations. </p>
<p>At the Centre for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria we did a comprehensive survey of the <a href="https://www.policinglaw.info/">use of force laws</a> of every country in the world. Many countries allow the use of force by the police to disperse assemblies, without regard to the principles of necessity and proportionality, as is required under international law. Or they ominously provide that the police may use <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/useofforceandfirearms.aspx">“all means necessary”</a>. </p>
<p>Such an approach very easily results in an escalation of force on all sides - or in the long term suppression of the population, which can only be sustained with more repression.</p>
<p>The national laws of a country are the first line of defence of the population’s freedoms. The international human rights system can help to set universal standards. But it can provide only limited protection if this is not done in the country itself. Moreover, uncertainty about the applicable laws leads to dangerous “surprises”. The <a href="http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/hrc/A_HRC.26.36.pdf">reform of national laws</a> to reflect internationally accepted and clear “rules of engagement” during peaceful protest is a matter of greatest importance.</p>
<p>International law reflects the experience of many years and societies. It requires accommodation of those who want to take their protests to the streets but also provides that the legitimate interest of the State in maintaining law and order and protecting the rights of the rest of society should be recognised. For example, such assemblies have to be peaceful, hate crimes must be prohibited, and advance notification of large gatherings may be required to allow the State time to prepare. </p>
<h2>Use of force laws</h2>
<p>But, there are still some unanswered questions concerning the international standards. It is in this context that those of us who serve on the United Nations Human Rights Committee are in the process of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GC37.aspx">drafting a document</a> aimed at helping to bring more clarity on the standards applicable to peaceful assemblies.</p>
<p>For example, may demonstrations be held on privately owned property? If the marketplace where people used to assemble has been replaced by shopping malls, can people no longer demonstrate there? Can assemblies occur online, or do they require physical presence? What are the standards for the <a href="https://www.geneva-academy.ch/news/detail/131-leading-academics-will-address-the-use-of-less-lethal-weapons-for-law-enforcement-purpose">use of less lethal weapons</a> for law enforcement?</p>
<p>In the wake of the killing of 34 striking miners by police in <a href="https://theconversation.com/marikana-shining-the-light-on-police-militarisation-and-brutality-in-south-africa-44162">Marikana</a>, South Africa, in August 2012, a local company has started marketing <a href="https://www.desert-wolf.com/dw/products/unmanned-aerial-systems/skunk-riot-control-copter.html">drones</a> which can be used to dispense weapons such as teargas and rubber bullets. </p>
<p>The selling point is that this will prevent situations where the police may feel compelled to use lethal force to defend themselves. However, the remote use of force raises the risk of treating people like animals, and adding insult to injury. Should this be allowed?</p>
<p>There are also questions where the African context may matter. The approach in Europe and elsewhere has largely been that organisers of demonstrations cannot be <a href="https://www.osce.org/odihr/73405?download=true">held responsible for riot damage</a>. </p>
<p>Do the same considerations apply in Africa, where vendors who bear the brunt may not not have insurance and are without recourse? The South African Constitutional Court has <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2012/13.html">held</a> that organisers can, under certain circumstances, be held responsible.</p>
<h2>Need for reform</h2>
<p>While it is necessary to find answers to these questions on the international level, the real protection of people’s rights lies in their countries’ legal systems. The test for the new UN guidelines will be whether they help to ensure greater compliance with international standards, and the realisation of the promises of nations’ constitutions.</p>
<p>It is in the interest not only of the people concerned, but of democracy itself, in Africa and elsewhere, that internationally accepted ground rules are set for peaceful assembly as a tool of change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118352/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christof Heyns is a member of the UN Human Rights Committee.</span></em></p>In spite of noble promises in their constitutions, many countries have a very restrictive approach to demonstrations.Christof Heyns, Professor of human rights law, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1165432019-05-06T14:04:57Z2019-05-06T14:04:57ZLocal radio is plugging gaps in South Africa’s mainstream media coverage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272748/original/file-20190506-103045-nwynul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Local communities have taken advantage of campaign trail visits by leaders such as President Cyril Ramaphosa.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Epa/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Beyond the choreographed photo opportunities and big rallies, there is a local dimension to South Africa’s election campaign that is going largely unnoticed by the national media. As a result, important insights into political dynamics are being missed.</p>
<p>Media coverage is dominated by the speeches and activities of the national party leaders, analysts’ commentary and opinion polls. If communities appear, it is when violent protests erupt as did in <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-04-08-support-and-sympathy-for-alex-residents-as-protests-continue/">Alexandra</a>, near Johannesburg. They also appear in carefully scripted events designed to show that leaders are in tune with the electorate: Mmusi Maimane of the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) poses <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/05/02/maimane-on-campaign-trail-in-stanger">outside a shack</a>, the governing African National Congress’s Ace Magashule peers into somebody’s fridge. <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/Redi_Tlhabi/redi-tlhabi-ancs-poverty-porn-parade-a-reflection-of-its-detachment-from-the-people-20190113">A poverty porn parade,</a> one commentator has called it.</p>
<p>And yet after the big party roadshow has moved on, the election campaign continues at community level. Inevitably, as local politicians weigh in to rally support for their parties, they have to address local issues.</p>
<p>Research has shown that the mainstream media have a blind spot when it comes to community perspectives. Leading academic <a href="https://www.biznews.com/briefs/2012/10/14/miners-voices-absent-from-initial-marikana-coverage-analysis-by-jane-duncan">Jane Duncan’s well known research</a> into coverage of the 2012 <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/marikana-massacre-16-august-2012">Marikana massacre</a> in which police shot 34 striking miners dead, showed how the media ignored the voices of the striking miners. This led to a serious distortion of initial reporting. <a href="https://theconversation.com/voices-of-the-poor-are-missing-from-south-africas-media-53068">Other research </a>has focused on the wider absence of poor people’s voices from media coverage.</p>
<p>A new initiative hosted by the <a href="http://wits.journalism.co.za/wits-radio-academy/">Wits Radio Academy</a> seeks to draw on community radio reporting to help fill the gap. The <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/">LocalVoices</a> initiative supports community radio reporters by publishing their stories on its website and associated social media to give them a wider platform. This means these reports can be read by a wider audience and are available for reuse by participating radio stations.</p>
<p>The project was launched in collaboration with the <a href="https://www.childrensradiofoundation.org/">Children’s Radio Foundation</a>, <a href="https://africacheck.org/">Africa Check</a>, the Media Development and Diversity <a href="https://www.mdda.org.za/">Agency</a> and the <a href="https://www.osf.org.za/">Open Society Foundation</a>.</p>
<h2>Community radio in South Africa</h2>
<p>South Africa’s community radio sector is large, with well over 200 stations and a weekly listenership of around <a href="https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://brcsa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BRC-RAM-Release-Presentation_February-2019-FINAL.pdf&hl=en">8.3m people </a> -– 25% of the regular adult audience. Despite their significant reach, a lack of resources and skills have fuelled chronic instability in many.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the LocalVoices project has shown that the stations have thrown themselves into the political discussion with gusto. Many host political debates between parties and the communities whose votes they seek.</p>
<p>Local events have also given smaller political parties the opportunity to be heard. There are a record 48 parties on the ballot and many of the smaller parties haven’t commanded much national attention. </p>
<p>Sometimes, the topics have been surprising. For instance, Durban’s Vibe FM hosted an election debate on <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/04/09/local-arts-finance-becomes-election-issue/">local arts funding</a>.</p>
<p>But community engagement with the political process goes beyond debates, using the opportunity to press for local issues to be addressed. Clearly, disaffection runs very deep, and a wide range of issues regarding the poor provision of basic services - from roads to schools. For example, issues around water have been prominent.</p>
<p>Water shortages were central to a party debate hosted on <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/04/12/water-shortages-take-centre-stage-at-the-sekhukhune-elections-debate-2/">Sekhukhune Community Radio</a> in Limpopo, and <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/04/24/indwedwe-municipality-accused-of-sabotaging-water-supply/">Ndwedwe</a>, outside Durban.</p>
<p>Even though it’s clearly a major concern in many communities, the issue of water hasn’t been highlighted by political parties.</p>
<h2>Tactics</h2>
<p>Of significance also are the tactics being used by communities to gain politicians’ attention.</p>
<p><a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/03/22/ekuvukeni-community-in-ladysmith-abandon-meeting-with-mec-kaunda/">Nqubeko FM in Ladysmith has reported</a> how the community of Ekuvukeni demanded that President Cyril Ramaphosa should intervene over a series of local demands, including broken sewage pipes and water supply. They made the demand after refusing to listen to the provincial minister for community safety. </p>
<p>When Ramaphosa later visited a small coal mining town, Dannhauser, 75 km away, a delegation from Ekuvukeni hopped onto a bus to <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/04/18/residents-crash-school-opening-to-question-ramaphosa/">put their concerns to him</a>. They failed to address him on that day, but Ramaphosa did later <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/04/23/ramaphosa-visits-ladysmith/">visit Ekuvukeni</a>, and promised to attend to their problems.</p>
<p>Similarly, a community called Marikana, outside Potchefstroom in the North West Province, refused to let the mayor hold an election debate, insisting he come and listen to them at a community meeting instead. <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/04/10/marikana-communitys-election-tactic-to-get-housing/">According to Aganang FM</a>, he came and promised to address their housing needs. He even promised to start taking action before the election.</p>
<h2>Doing democracy differently</h2>
<p>The strong <a href="https://www.municipaliq.co.za/">upsurge</a> in community protests in the first months of the year has been widely noted by the national media. But local radio reports have shed light on the fact that it’s been incorrect to assume that protests are always violent.</p>
<p>Instead, it becomes clear that communities are using a wide range of tactics to draw attention to their issues. The opportunity is clear: usually aloof politicians are on the ground, appealing for votes, and this presents a chance to hold them to account. Time and again, one sees communities threatening to withhold their votes.</p>
<p>In other words, communities are using the election to “do democracy” in a different form, beyond exercising the vote.</p>
<p>The LocalVoices project shows up the weaknesses of mainstream media coverage, which focuses too strongly on the big names, the major drama and the grand narrative. Individually, the radio stories have mainly local significance. But, read together, new nuance and important patterns and dynamics emerge.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Franz Krüger is Director of the Wits Radio Academy, which initiated the project discussed. The Wits Radio Academy received funding from the Open Society Foundation for the project. </span></em></p>Community radio stations have thrown themselves into the political discussion with gusto.Franz Krüger, Adjunct Professor of Journalism and Director of the Wits Radio Academy, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1154822019-04-23T08:33:26Z2019-04-23T08:33:26ZElectoral systems need urgent reform. South Africa is no exception<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269521/original/file-20190416-147499-xa2jpl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africans go to the polls on 8 May, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The long running political soap opera unfolding in Westminster over a decision taken two years ago in a referendum to leave the European Union has been the top running news story for <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-is-not-just-theresa-mays-disaster-britains-whole-political-class-has-failed-a-nation-114463">months on end</a>. The UK finds itself at an impasse, with members of parliament unable to decide how to proceed. </p>
<p>The crisis has raised fundamental questions about the country’s democracy. The biggest is whether the two-party system is now dead on its feet.</p>
<p>This question is pertinent in the UK, as well for other countries, including South Africa where voters will go to the polls on <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/About-Us/IEC-Events/2019-National-and-Provincial-Elections/">8 May</a>. </p>
<p>South Africans may enjoy seeing the imperial lion becoming increasingly decrepit. Yet it has few reasons for feeling smug. Like the UK, questions continue to be asked about whether South Africa’s particular <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Election-types/">proportional representation</a> system is fit for purpose. </p>
<p>Under the system – designed to ensure inclusivity in the run up to the first democratic elections in 1994 – voters vote for party lists <a href="https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/the-south-african-electoral-system">selected by the parties </a>. As a result, members of parliament are wholly accountable to their parties, minimally accountable to the voters. <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/in-their-own-words/2018/2018-10/sas-electoral-system-is-weak-on-accountability.html">Lack of accountability</a> results in the arrogance of power for which the African National Congress has become increasingly notorious. </p>
<p>South Africa should be alive to the reality that the failure of electoral systems to produce parliaments that adequately represent opinions on the ground can have disturbing consequences. One is the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt20krxdr.6?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">rise in right-wing populism</a> being seen in a number of countries across the world.</p>
<h2>Collapse of UK’s two parties</h2>
<p>British MPs have deserted both the Labour and Conservative parties to form the centrist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/apr/14/stephen-dorrell-defection-change-uk-tory-poll-five-year-low">Change UK party</a>. This has increased the number of small parties which now congregate on the opposition benches, reinforcing the widespread view that the traditional support bases of the two major parties is splintering.</p>
<p>If, as is widely thought, an early election is called, there is no guarantee that it will not result in yet another hung parliament, in which no single party will secure a majority. Minority or coalition government may have arrived as a recurrent feature in a political system wherein politicians are more accustomed to adversarial politics.</p>
<p>The current crisis in British politics is in significant part the result of the failure of the first-past-the-post electoral system to reflect changes in British society. The electoral system systematically over-represents winning parties and under-represents minority parties. </p>
<p>Historically, the argument in favour of a first-past-the-post electoral system was that it produced governments with workable majorities in parliament, even though governing parties are regularly elected by considerably less than a majority of the voting electorate. </p>
<p>Today, the system in Britain is no longer guaranteed to result in governing parties having a working majority of MPs. Conservative leader David Cameron had to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/12/david-cameron-nick-clegg-coalition">forge a coalition</a> with the Liberal Democrats in order to form a majority government after the election of 2010. </p>
<h2>The quandry of coalitions</h2>
<p>South Africa’s national list proportional representation system was designed (wisely) to maximise representivity. </p>
<p>During the process of negotiation which preceded the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">transition to democracy</a>, it was considered necessary to ensure that minority opinions should find voice in parliament, rather than being excluded. This, regardless whether they expressed interests of race, ethnicity, religion, region or ideology.</p>
<p>The country has avoided the complications of a national coalition government so far because the African National Congress (ANC) has consistently been elected with a majority of MPs. The results since 1994 have shown the party never getting <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/elections/results/2014-national-and-provincial-elections--national-results/">less than 60% of the vote</a>. </p>
<p>It’s probable that the ANC will secure another <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-11-07-undecided-voters-will-be-key-as-survey-shows-party-loyalties-are-waning/">majority in parliament</a> in the forthcoming election poll. </p>
<p>Yet if it does, it’s likely to have been elected by a <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/About-Us/News/Voters--Roll-Certified-for-National-and-Provincial-Elections-2019/">smaller proportion</a> of eligible voters than it was in <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/elections/results/2014-national-and-provincial-elections--national-results/">2014</a>. Then it was elected by <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief61_Aug14.pdf">just 35%</a> of the potential electorate. Large numbers of potential voters fail to register in the country.</p>
<p>Furthermore, each election brings predictions – which one day will be realised – that the ANC will fail to win an election at national level and will be forced to <a href="http://www.nb.co.za/Books/20247">govern in coalition</a> with a smaller party. Even in this year’s election, it is more than a little possible that the ANC might have to form coalitions if it wants to hang onto power in certain provinces. The most likely is the country’s economic hub, Gauteng. The ANC has already had to form coalitions for three big metropoles after local government elections in 2016 – Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and Johannesburg.</p>
<p>Many would welcome the ANC being forced into coalition. This is because the monopoly of power the party’s enjoyed since 1994 has resulted in a lack of accountability.</p>
<p>This lack of accountability is hard-baked into the way the country’s electoral system is set up. </p>
<h2>The disproportionate power of parties</h2>
<p>Not surprisingly, there are constant calls for the electoral system to be <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/mosiuoa-lekota-south-africa-private-members-bill/">reformed</a>. The most widely touted solution, favoured even from within some quarters of the ANC, is for members of parliament to be elected from <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-electoral-reform-but-presidents-powers-need-watching-88820">multi-member constituencies</a>. This was recommended in 2002 by a commission set up to <a href="http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/Van-Zyl-Slabbert-Commission-on-Electoral-Reform-Report-2003.pdf">review the country’s electoral system</a>. But the commission’s recommendations were <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2017/08/10/van-zyl-slabbert-sa-parliament">turned down by the ANC</a>.</p>
<p>Notionally, the proposed change would have required MPs to look downwards to their constituents as well as upwards to their party bosses.</p>
<h2>Legitimacy</h2>
<p>South Africa is, once again, experiencing, a massively high level of <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/look-service-delivery-protests-snowball-as-politicians-shift-blame-21026190">social protest</a>. This shows that popular support for the country’s political system is steadily eroding. </p>
<p>Change in the electoral systems is needed. A failure to deal with the inadequacies of electoral systems – in South Africa as well as more broadly – will only perpetuate and exaggerate social crises.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115482/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall has received funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>The current crisis in British politics is significant for countries like South Africa where a change in electoral systems is needed.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1155952019-04-17T08:55:34Z2019-04-17T08:55:34ZHow portrayal of protest in South Africa denigrates poor people<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269611/original/file-20190416-147508-31nmli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man challenges police during a protest in Eldorado Park, Johannesburg.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Poor people in South Africa often feel that the only way they can be heard is to <a href="https://theconversation.com/voices-of-the-poor-are-missing-from-south-africas-media-53068">protest</a>. The past few days have shown that not even this gets them a hearing.</p>
<p>Protests in the townships and shack settlements where most poor people live in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Cape Town are <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/look-service-delivery-protests-snowball-as-politicians-shift-blame-21026190">in the news</a>. These are the three metropolitan areas controlled by the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA).</p>
<p>The party insists that the protests have been <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/maimane-accuses-anc-of-orchestrating-violent-protests-in-da-led-areas-20190414">organised</a> by the governing African National Congress (ANC). The DA has <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-04-07-solly-msimanga-asks-police-to-probe-anc-involvement-in-alex-protests/">has laid a charge</a> against the ANC with the police, claiming that it has proof of the party’s involvement.</p>
<p>Much of the media have supported, denouncing the ANC for disrupting the calm of these cities in a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2019-04-12-anthony-butler-ancs-desperate-election-campaign-behind-the-alex-shutdown/">cynical attempt to embarrass</a> the main opposition party during the current national election campaign.</p>
<p>The effect is, not for the first time, to denigrate poor people by offering a distorted picture of their lives and to keep alive spurious claims about protest which hail back to the era when the apartheid system governed the country.</p>
<p>The consensus between parts of the media and the DA presents protest in South Africa as something abnormal, which must be organised by sinister forces if it is to happen at all.</p>
<p>Protests are still presented as unusual events - the media insists that there has been a “wave of protest” triggered by the election campaign. But protest is commonplace in townships and shack settlements, where most poor people live. </p>
<p>Every now and then - <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/anc-behind-recent-violent-protests-says-maimane">as now </a>- the media announces that <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-01-16-more-protests-in-2018-than-in-any-of--previous-13-years--and-it-could-get-worse/">protest has increased</a>.
In reality, South Africa has experienced constant high levels of protest since 1973, when workers in the port city of Durban <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1973-durban-strikes">struck for higher wages</a>, with only a brief pause between 1994 and 1997. This was prompted, no doubt, by hopes that democracy had ended the need to protest. So, what the media really mean when they announce a “wave” of protest is not that there are more protests, but that they have noticed them more.</p>
<p>At the same time as attention was fixated on protests in DA controlled areas, Klerksdorp and Potchefstroom in North West province and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-04-16-five-arrested-for-steynrus-unrest/">Steynsrus</a> in the Free State were also gripped by protest. None of the commentaries mention these events, which happened in ANC municipalities and so couldn’t have been caused by a desire to embarrass the opposition.</p>
<h2>Organisation</h2>
<p>Horror at the fact that the protest was organised harks back to the apartheid period. The authorities claimed then that black people were content with their lot. When protest erupted, it had to be because it was organised by agitators who manipulated people into believing that there was something wrong with legalised racism.</p>
<p>All protest is organised. So are cake sales and shopping expeditions – any activity in which human beings cooperate needs organising. But that doesn’t mean, as those who mention organisation claim, that people are forced to protest by the organisers.</p>
<p>Unless there is evidence that organisers forced unwilling people to protest, harping on the fact that a protest is organised is like noting that people won’t go to an event unless someone invites them. There’s no evidence that anyone has been forced to take part in the current protests. </p>
<p>Anyone who knows life in townships and shack settlements will know that you don’t need agitators to persuade people to protest – protest organisers simply channel existing anger. Complaining about this denies the justifiable anger that poor people feel at being ignored by both public and private power holders.</p>
<p>If these protests were organised by the ANC, this also says less than we are told. First, the DA and the country’s third biggest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters, sometime organise protests directed at the ANC. It’s not clear why these are acceptable but not those which the ANC might organise against them.</p>
<p>Second and more important, in the areas where poor people live, many protests are organised by the ANC – including many which are <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/watch-irate-mkmva-members-storm-anc-kzn-offices-with-list-of-demands-20190107">directed at the ANC</a>.</p>
<p>The ANC has, for many years, dominated the townships. This continues even in those areas governed by the DA. In Johannesburg and Tshwane, the DA governs with only about a third of the vote because the ANC still wins all the wards in these areas. Since this is typical of much of the country, protests often reflect tensions within the ANC - one part is protesting at another. One reason the ANC lost Tshwane in 2016 is that its branches <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/news/tshwane-anc-members-protest-over-didiza-nomination-20160620">organised protests</a> directed at the mayoral candidate chosen by the party leadership.</p>
<h2>Denigrating poor people</h2>
<p>Politicians and journalists who find it interesting that the ANC organised a protest are again showing that they have no idea how township protest works. Nor does this, in the absence of other evidence, show that people have been manipulated or forced to protest.</p>
<p>Poor township conditions do not justify another way of denigrating the poor favoured by media and politicians – explaining protests away as <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-05-14-service-delivery-protests-increasing-and-most-are-violent/">“service delivery protests”</a>.</p>
<p>The term “service delivery” is deeply undemocratic. It implies that the role of citizens in a democracy is to wait while those in government who know better “deliver” to them. The democratic view is that everyone is entitled to an equal say in the decisions which affect them – including a say in how government serves them. The “service delivery” explanation reduces citizens to people who benefit or suffer from decisions over which they have no control.</p>
<p>More important, the “service delivery” cliché doesn’t describe why people protest. The issues vary but, in each case, people are saying that their <a href="https://theconversation.com/voices-of-the-poor-are-missing-from-south-africas-media-53068">views and needs are ignored </a>– that they have no voice. They don’t want government to “deliver” to them, they want it to listen to them. Journalists often say people are engaged in a “service delivery protest” because they cannot be bothered to ask them why they are protesting.</p>
<h2>Insiders and outsiders</h2>
<p>None of this means that the ANC is the victim of injustice. South African electoral politics are rough and the ANC is guilty of as many assaults on the truth as its opponents.</p>
<p>What it does show is that the default position of the mainstream is to denigrate poor people. They are courted at election time and noticed when their protests spill out of townships, affecting the lives of the insider minority who monopolise public life. </p>
<p>For the rest, the insiders who dominate debate claim regularly that everything they do favours poor people – but never ask the poor what they favour. And, when poor people are persuaded by local organisers or ambitious politicians that they have an opportunity to be heard by taking to the streets, they are reduced by the insiders to passive consumers of “delivered” services or pawns in the hands of agitators.</p>
<p>All of which explains why poor people have been on the streets for more than 40 years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To claim that protests are being organised suggests sinister motives. But all protest is organised. So are cake sales and shopping expeditions.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1097882019-01-14T08:29:41Z2019-01-14T08:29:41ZThe ANC must offer more than promises to win over South Africans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253548/original/file-20190113-43525-11vp8gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa's party, the ANC, faces a tough set of elections in May. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Launching the governing African National Congress’s (ANC) 2019 general election manifesto in South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa lauded the successes of the last 25 years of democracy. He claimed that the governing party had <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/12/must-read-the-anc-s-2019-elections-manifesto">“given substance to the promise of a better life for all”</a>. He declared 2019 <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-sets-out-a-bold-vision-for-south-africa-but-can-he-pull-it-off-109784">“the year of united action to grow South Africa”</a>, with a focus on economic growth and job creation:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Today, we are issuing a call to all the people of South Africa, to join us as we strive to accelerate change in our country, as we strive to build an inclusive economy that creates jobs and as we work towards a <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/12/must-read-the-anc-s-2019-elections-manifesto">better future for our children</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He also emphasised that the ANC’s aim was to create a developmental state which would put the people first, and that corruption and factional politics would not be tolerated. </p>
<p>He outlined the ANC’s political agenda. This included mobilising for a decisive victory in the 2019 general elections; intensifying the renewal of ANC branches; fighting corruption in government, in the ANC and across society; and organising against social ills such as gender-based violence, substance abuse and racism.</p>
<p>But the same golden promises have been made before. They may not have the same shine any more given that South Africa is at a precarious point in its 25th year of democracy. The country faces massive socio-economic and socio-political challenges. Unemployment remains <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate">stubbornly high</a>, particularly among young people. Economic growth is <a href="https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/south-africa">tepid</a> and protests over the government’s poor delivery of basic services are <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/10/17/south-african-riots-over-poor-services-poverty-hit-record-in-2018">on the rise</a>.</p>
<p>A survey by <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/about">Afrobarometer</a> –- a non-partisan African research network – shows that South Africans generally believe their current economic conditions are bad. Not surprisingly, most believe that the government is dealing with economic policy badly. More than 60% think the government’s performance isn’t satisfactory on this front. </p>
<p>More worrying is that South Africans are increasingly becoming disillusioned with democracy because of the <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno71_south_africa_perceptions_of_democracy.pdf">government’s anorexic delivery</a> on the promise of a better life for all. While the ANC continues to make this promise, its delivery remains elusive. </p>
<p>The next few months will be crucial. The ANC will need to take decisive action if it’s going to win over sceptical voters.</p>
<h2>Echoes of past manifestos</h2>
<p>A cursory glance at previous ANC election manifestos shows that very similar promises and plans have been made ahead of previous elections.</p>
<p>In 1999, at the launch of its manifesto, the party urged South Africans to vote for it in return for speedy change and the delivery of services, to ensure a <a href="https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/4126439">better life for all</a>. </p>
<p>The 2004 manifesto, under the banner of <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Finweek/Openers/ANCs-broken-promises-20090124">“a people’s contract to create work and fight poverty”</a>, stressed growing the economy, creating sustainable livelihoods, accessing basic services, facilitating comprehensive social security as well as fighting crime and corruption. </p>
<p>Similar sentiments were expressed in the ANC’s 2009 general election manifesto. The overarching theme of this manifesto was “working together we can do more”. The party <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/party/text-of-the-ancs-2009-election-manifesto">claimed that</a> a </p>
<blockquote>
<p>…. vote for the ANC is a vote for a better life. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Focus areas were the creation of decent work and sustainable livelihoods, education, health, rural development, food security and land reform as well as the fight against corruption and crime. </p>
<p>By 2014 the promise of a “better life for all” remained an elusive dream. Corruption, allegations of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture">state capture</a>, and predatory political factionalism undermined trust in the ANC’s abilities to deliver on its 2014 promises. As in 2009, economic growth and job creation, rural development and land reform, addressing apartheid legacies, fighting crime and corruption, and delivering quality health and education were key priorities. </p>
<p>Will the electorate buy those golden promises? It’s not clear that they will, given the decline in electoral support as well trust in the ruling party. </p>
<p>A time series by Afrobarometer shows both these trends very clearly.</p>
<h2>Decline in electoral support and trust</h2>
<p>The party’s electoral support has shrunk. In 1999 the ANC held an overwhelming majority of 66%. By the 2014 general elections, this fell to 61%. </p>
<p>The change of voter support in certain provinces is very marked. Electoral support for the ANC declined between 1999 and 2014 in <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/National-and-provincial-elections-results/">some</a> provinces. Most notable was the <a href="http://www.africansunmedia.co.za/Sun-e-Shop/Product-Details/tabid/78/ProductID/535/Default.aspx">decline of electoral support in the Eastern Cape</a>, its traditional stronghold. </p>
<p>In the Free State, the ANC held 81% of electoral support in 1999 but, by 2014, the party only secured 70% of the vote. Similar trends were evident in the North West, Mpumalanga, Limpopo and Gauteng provinces.</p>
<p>Trust in the ANC remains precarious. In 2002 a quarter of South Africans who took part in the Afrobarometer survey didn’t trust the governing party at all. By 2018, this sentiment increased to 36%. </p>
<p>Trust in the president also fell. In 1999 37% of South Africans indicated a measure of trust in the president. By 2018 only 30% said they trusted the president a little. </p>
<h2>Crucial times ahead</h2>
<p>There are similar themes of addressing economic growth for job creation, of increasing education and skills development, addressing unemployment, inequality and poverty, and working to create a better life for all in the ANC’s latest manifesto. </p>
<p>But the party will need to take decisive action on corruption as well as facilitate the necessary conditions for economic growth and job creation to restore some semblance of trust in its governing ability. </p>
<p>The next few months will be crucial. There are a few caveats that may undermine its electoral performance in 2019. These include addressing factionalism and corruption and ensuring accountability for those involved in state capture. The ANC also has to get public institutions functioning in a way that delivers basic services to the people. </p>
<p>If it fails to do any of this, the ANC may well suffer losses akin to the 2016 local government elections at a national level and reduce its electoral dominance of South Africa’s political landscape. Indeed, the key lesson from 2016 was that people are no longer buying promises with their vote.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109788/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joleen Steyn Kotze receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>The African National Congress faces two big challenges: fewer South Africans trust it, while its electoral support has been waning.Joleen Steyn Kotze, Senior Research Specialist in Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery at the Human Science Research Council and a Research Fellow Centre for African Studies, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1063172018-11-06T13:29:59Z2018-11-06T13:29:59ZCan the centre hold, or will South Africa get its own Bolsonaro?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243925/original/file-20181105-83626-z6lpip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa faces the daunting task of fighting corruption and winning votes for his party.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Present indications are that South African voters are not gearing up to “do a Brazil” in the face of a mounting economic crisis and high levels of corruption within the ruling party. Polls <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r7_dispatchno248_south_africa_elections1.pdf">indicate</a> that they are unlikely to
totally abandon the African National Congress (ANC), which has governed the country since the <a href="http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6">end of apartheid in 1994</a>, for existing political alternatives.</p>
<p>The reasons are familiar. Although the ANC has lost prestige, ground and <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-09-26-anc-to-secure-only-half-of-vote--survey/">voter loyalty</a>, many South Africans continue to <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/saf_r7_presentation_southafrica_voting_intentions_and_partisanship_30102018.pdf">cleave to their memories</a> of its past virtues and hope for it to return to better ways. Furthermore, President Cyril Ramaphosa will make copious and not unconvincing promises of <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-10-05-cyril-ramaphosa-blames-lack-of-new-jobs-on-corruption/">tackling corruption</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, although almost a decade of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/world/africa/zuma-south-africa-legacy.html">misrule by former President Jacob Zuma</a> should have rebounded to the major advantage of the Democratic Alliance (DA), the leading opposition party has failed to convince. And, the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/de-lille-da-like-animal-farm-some-are-more-equal-than-others-20181104">long running fight</a> with it mayor for Cape Town Patricia De Lille has made it look divided, poorly-led and tainted by racism. It’s unlikely to go much forward, even if it is unlikely that it will actually go backwards.</p>
<p>So, that effectively leaves the radical but smaller <a href="https://www.effonline.org/">Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)</a>. But, the red berets continue to look more like a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/eff-protests-helped-change-hm-operations-ahmed-kathrada-foundation-20180307">party of protest</a> than a party seriously preparing to govern. And, while its leader Julius Malema’s populist charisma may appeal to a minority, especially the black youth, he continues to frighten the many. End of term report: continues to improve but should be doing better.</p>
<h2>Ramaphosa’s daunting task</h2>
<p>It wasn’t so long ago that predictions were being made that the 2019 election will result in the <a href="https://raru.co.za/books/1899724-coalition-country-leon-schreiber-paperback">formation of a coalition</a>. That continues to be a possibility, although the ANC’s experience at running an electoral campaign will more probably edge it above 50%. But if that is so, it only delays dealing with its problems, and South Africans are left to speculate about future possibilities.</p>
<p>One option is that, following an election victory, Ramaphosa will dispense with the Zuma hacks who continue to populate his cabinet and appoint an honest and capable team to lead the country, tackle corruption and put the economy back on track. It’s a scenario which the overwhelming mass of the population will support, and if he were to meet anything resembling a success, the ANC will reap the benefit.</p>
<p>However, the obstacles in the way of this path are formidable. Ramaphosa is already battling concerted <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-09-08-magashule-part-of-secret-meeting-with-zuma-and-allies-to-chart-fightback-against-ramaphosa/">fight-back by the Zuma crowd</a>, and this is only the beginning. The looters, from the heights of the parastatals <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/eskoms-financial-report-may-expose-widespread-corruption/">Eskom</a>, the power utility, and <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/gordhan-shows-way-forward-for-cleaner-public-corporations/">Transnet</a>, the transport utility, to the depths of the most miserable <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-structural-flaws-contribute-to-the-crisis-in-south-africas-municipalities-102136">municipality</a> in the country, will fight as hard and as dirty as they can to hang on to newly acquired wealth. And, there are enough crooked lawyers around to help them do it (all in the name of <a href="http://www.dti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee.jsp">Black Economic Empowerment</a> course).</p>
<p>In any case, increasingly the ANC has come to function as an extended patronage, jobs and cash machine. Hopefully, Ramaphosa and his team will prove capable of cleansing the upper reaches of the state. But, carrying the fight downwards, into the provinces and local government, will simultaneously mean reforming the ANC. That may well prove beyond the bounds of practical politics, especially given that Ramaphosa himself will need to maintain his support base for an attempt at a second term as president.</p>
<p>A more likely second option, therefore, is that even if Ramaphosa does a reasonably decent job, the economy will at best enjoy only slow rates of growth and improvement. Overall, it will do little more than limp along if not actually decline. Even with the best will and efforts in the world, turning the economy around so that it makes a serious dent in <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-04-04-poverty-shows-how-apartheid-legacy-endures-in-south-africa/">inequality</a>, <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate">unemployment</a> and <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-official-poverty-numbers/">poverty</a> is going to prove a massive job. And it’s probably beyond a political party which, for all the appalling legacy of apartheid, itself bears heavy responsibility for the mess the country is in.</p>
<h2>Future prospects</h2>
<p>So, in coming years, the probability is high that South Africa will experience even higher levels of <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1991-38772018000100004">popular protest</a> and class tensions than is happening at the moment.</p>
<p>How politicians respond to these, and how they are handled, matters hugely. On the one hand, they will offer opportunities for genuine renewal, for doing things in a more progressive and democratic way. On the other, they will offer opportunities for cynical exploitation of popular frustrations by tellers of untruths and sellers of snake-oil, wrapped up in radical language, probably with some charismatic prophet at their head.</p>
<p>Whether latter-type calls come from within or from outside the ANC South Africans will have to see. But they will probably be made by appealing to the dispossessed, impoverished masses in rhetoric which obscures the greedy interests of a frustrated, kleptocratic, Zuma-style bourgeoisie.</p>
<p>It is then that South Africans will have to face down the risk of a local <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazil-can-its-poorest-region-call-a-halt-to-jair-bolsonaros-dangerous-politics-104380">Jair Bolsonaro</a>. Brazil’s new president is threatening a lurch to political authoritarianism of the most brutal kind. This after a campaign in which he rode to power on an extreme right programme in which he questioned the most basic of democratic values.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>Polls indicate that South Africans are unlikely to totally abandon the African National Congress.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1026712018-09-13T15:27:43Z2018-09-13T15:27:43ZSouth Africans come off second best as politicians play havoc with coalitions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236229/original/file-20180913-177947-pqhb86.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For the past two years political party coalitions have become the <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/product/leon-schreiber-coalition-country/kmjj-5380-g430?PPC=Y&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI9qfZ4My33QIVxbztCh1bSwxCEAAYASAAEgKT5vD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds">“new normal”</a> in South African politics. They became a key feature in 2016 after the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), wrested power from the governing African National Congress (ANC) by forming coalitions in three key metropolitan – Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/133536/da-announces-coalitions-with-smaller-parties/">Johannesburg</a>. </p>
<p>But the coalitions have proven to be volatile and unstable, most notably in <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/da-locks-down-mandela-bay-with-multi-party-coalition-20160817">Nelson Mandela Bay</a>. The metropolitan municipality council has found it difficult to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/nelson-mandela-bay-budget-still-not-approved-20180606">pass budgets</a>, <a href="https://www.rnews.co.za/video/200/political-impasse-sees-nmb-councillors-failing-to-agree-on-metro-s-r12-billion-budget">approve</a> and <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/city-of-johannesburg-will-fight-ancs-attempt-to-undo-change-12164279">agree</a> on a long-term strategic <a href="http://www.nelsonmandelabay.gov.za/datarepository/documents/nmbm-integrated-development-plan-idp-second-edition-2018-19.pdf">development plan for the city</a>. </p>
<p>After a series of crises, the coalition which had been cobbled together between the DA and three smaller parties finally collapsed in August. Another <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/trollip-confident-that-fourth-motion-of-no-confidence-will-fail-16560854">motion of no confidence</a> – the fifth in two years – was tabled against the DA’s executive mayor <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-08-27-athol-trollip-ousted-as-nelson-mandela-mayor/">Athol Trollip</a>. A slim majority of councillors voted in favour and he was ousted. Trollip has challenged the decision <a href="https://www.jacarandafm.com/news/news/another-blow-da-nelson-mandela-bay/">in court</a>. For now the city has a mayor from the United Democratic Movement which has <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/news/da-led-coalition-for-mandela-bay-a-step-closer-20160807">2% of the vote</a> in the council. </p>
<p>The coalition in South Africa’s second largest city <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/no-eff-deal-but-da-confirms-multi-party-coalition-20160818">Tshwane</a> is also on shaky ground. The executive mayor <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/08/30/da-backs-solly-msimanga-as-no-confidence-motion-looms">Solly Msimanga</a>, also from the DA, faced a motion of no confidence a mere three days after Trollip was ousted. But Msimanga survived to fight another day due to a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-08-30-breaking--tshwane-mayor-solly-msimanga-survives-no-confidence-vote/">technical</a> glitch in the voting procedures. </p>
<p>The coalition in Johannesburg <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-03-16-da-draws-line-for-mashaba-over-eff-pandering/">seems to be holding</a> – for now.</p>
<p>But the troubles in Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane are raising real concerns that the political chess games are affecting accountability, <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/08/28/tshwane-nmb-political-instability-impacts-governance-service-delivery">governance stability and service delivery</a> in the cities.</p>
<p>This is a serious state of affairs. If political parties can’t work together, passing resolutions and agreeing on developmental priorities becomes difficult. Once governance stagnates, a municipality cannot function effectively. This in turn affects its ability to provide services. When councils become political theatres, ordinary citizens suffer. This much has <a href="http://www.africansunmedia.co.za/Sun-e-Shop/Product-Details/tabid/78/ProductID/535/Default.aspx">been evident</a> in Nelson Mandela Bay.</p>
<h2>Political expediency</h2>
<p>Coalitions are usually formed on the basis of political expediency. The political marriages of convenience come about when political parties can’t get an outright majority. To secure power, parties scramble to find partners, at times without considering ideological, policy, or historical differences. As African political and governance scholar <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/8003/biegon.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">W. O. Oyugi</a> cited by African human rights expert Dr Japheth Biegnon has noted:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>coalitions are a necessary evil – an evil in the sense that normally no party ever coalesces except in circumstances in which not to do so would deprive it of a chance to exercise power</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This certainly holds true for the coalitions formed in South Africa since 2016. The cooperation forged among opposition parties was designed solely to get the ANC out of power. </p>
<p>What emerged were <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2017/12/06/da-coalition-partners-determined-to-make-power-sharing-agreement-work">uncomfortable coalition</a> governments led by the DA. It promised to root out corruption and improve the delivery of basic services, such as water and electricity, to communities. But it lacked the required majority to govern on its own so turned to building coalitions.</p>
<p>It partnered with a number of smaller parties. One of them, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), helped the DA take over governments in Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/133536/da-announces-coalitions-with-smaller-parties/">Johannesburg</a>.</p>
<p>The EFF, <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/eff-holds-the-strings-in-trollip-no-confidence-vote">acutely aware</a> of the power it wields in all these arrangements, has used the fragile political situation at local government level for its own political agenda. This has included promoting its radical stance on land expropriation and nationalisation with an eye on improving its performance in next year’s elections.</p>
<p>The EFF <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-08-17-malema-says-the-eff-wont-form-coalitions-but-will-support-da-in-hung-metros">declined</a> to formally join any coalition government, but effectively holds the position of <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/four-years-on-eff-is-the-kingmaker-of-sa-politics-10558288">political kingmaker</a>, especially in <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/news/who-won-what-in-which-metro-20160806">hung councils</a>. </p>
<p>Both the DA and the ANC realise that, potentially, they might need to work with the EFF in future. It is therefore not surprising that following the Tshwane motion of no confidence, Msimanga announced he would <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/msimanga-to-reach-out-to-eff-after-motions-of-no-confidence-fails-20180830">“reach out”</a> to the EFF.</p>
<h2>Lessons for the future</h2>
<p>There are two key lessons that political parties should take away from the current political turmoil if they want to bring about a semblance of bureaucratic stability. </p>
<p>Firstly, using local coalition politics to advance political agendas can severely hamper service delivery. Secondly, this undermines public trust in local government, creating fertile ground for political unrest.</p>
<p>Political parties will need to heed these lessons to ensure effective governance and political stability in the country. This is particularly important in view of the 2019 national and provincial elections, which are expected to result in even more <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/8003/biegon.pdf;sequence=1">coalition governments</a>.</p>
<p>If they don’t, ordinary citizens will suffer while politicians engage in a game of chess to secure power. As it is,
South Africans are <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/media-briefs/sasas/trends-democracy-satisfaction">increasingly dissatisfied</a> with democracy. This is due to a number of factors, including poor <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno71_south_africa_perceptions_of_democracy.pdf">service delivery</a> and a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-03-01-erosion-of-trust-in-main-pillars-of-sa-society-reaches-critical-levels/">lack of societal trust</a> in government.</p>
<p>Ultimately, coalitions need to work for the citizenry, and not politicians. </p>
<p><em>The author’s has just published a new book, <a href="http://www.africansunmedia.co.za/Sun-e-Shop/Product-Details/tabid/78/ProductID/535/Default.aspx">Delivering an Elusive Dream of Democracy: Lessons from Nelson Mandela Bay</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102671/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joleen Steyn Kotze receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the Konrad Audenauer Stiftung . </span></em></p>Troubles in South Africa’s coalition-led local governments are affecting accountability, governance stability and service delivery.Joleen Steyn Kotze, Senior Research Specialist in Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery at the Human Science Research Council and a Research Fellow Centre for African Studies, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/973312018-05-29T13:01:57Z2018-05-29T13:01:57ZLocal government in South Africa is in crisis. How it can be fixed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220602/original/file-20180528-80653-hvdjy9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's Auditor General Kimi Makwetu says most municipalities in the country are dysfunctional.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr/CGR</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most of South Africa’s 257 municipalities are in a disastrous financial position. According to the country’s Auditor General, only 33 (13%) are in full compliance with the relevant legal requirements, and produced quality financial statements and performance reports. </p>
<p>The most recent <a href="http://www.agsa.co.za/Reporting/MFMAReports/MFMA2016-2017.aspx">audit report</a> from Auditor General, <a href="https://www.agsa.co.za/MediaRoom/LatestAG%E2%80%99scolumn/tabid/238/Author/8/Default.aspx">Kimi Makwetu</a>, shows that nearly a third (31%) of the municipalities indicated that they are not financially viable. In business terms that means they are not going concerns anymore.</p>
<p>According to Makwetu this dire situation can be ascribed to a range of factors. These include a lack of appropriate financial and management skills, political interference and infighting in councils. The failure to fill key personnel positions is also a problem, as is the fact that there’s clearly a lack of political will to ensure accountability. </p>
<p>There are serious consequences to this unacceptable state of affairs. The most important is that municipalities are unable to deliver services such as clean water, sanitation and electricity. It also means there’s a lack of maintenance of infrastructure in towns and cities all over the country. The <a href="http://www.municipaliq.co.za/">rise in protests</a> by disgruntled citizens is a clear sign of people’s frustration and the failure of local government to provide basic services.</p>
<p>Local governments are also responsible for providing services such as refuse and sewage removal and disposal, storm water drainage systems as well as municipal roads and street lighting in a <a href="https://www.worklaw.co.za/">sustainable way</a>. The Constitution and the laws of the country make it clear that municipal officials and councillors are accountable to ensure good financial governance, and that there could be disciplinary or criminal proceedings if they fail to do so. For their part, citizens are entitled to receive good services from their respective municipalities. </p>
<p>How can the disastrous situation be turned around? There appears to be a complex set of problems which means that there are no quick fixes. What’s required is a comprehensive approach that deals with various elements of the local government system. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Firstly, it’s important to understand the role that the other spheres of government have to play to help cure the problems. </p>
<p>Although municipalities have a specific constitutional role to play, they are not expected to do so on their own. Provincial and national governments must support municipalities to perform their functions. They can do this in various ways, such as providing training, technical support and capacity building workshops. Financial governance capacity in key issues such as debt collection, risk management, internal audit and revenue management needs to be strengthened. </p>
<p>The provincial and national governments must also monitor the performance, including the financial performance of municipalities. If they all do this properly, more financial management problems could be identified and dealt with during the course of a financial year. </p>
<p>The Auditor General is also an important part of the support structure. His office is an important constitutional institution that does more than just audit the accounts of all three spheres of government. It also has an important role to play in the <a href="http://www.agsa.co.za/Reporting/MFMAReports/MFMA2016-2017.aspx">accountability chain</a> by identifying key problems and causes. It goes on to make recommendations to help municipalities solve their problems. </p>
<p>At the moment the Auditor General’s office doesn’t have the power to enforce its recommendations. But that’s about to change. Amendments to the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/CommitteeNotices/2018/january/draft_Public_Audit_Amendment_Bill/PA_Amendment_Bill_2017_6_Dec_2017-English.pdf">Public Audit Act, 2004</a>, being debated in Parliament will give the office more teeth to strengthen accountability. This is a welcome and necessary legislative improvement.</p>
<p>But a great deal of what needs to be done rests with municipalities themselves. Local government finance specialist Deon Van der Westhuizen, <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Local_Government_Finance.html?id=R-MiDAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">states that</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>one of the cornerstones of successful, continued service delivery is systemic discipline.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This implies effective revenue management, which includes timely debt collection, regular payment of suppliers and a well-structured and managed repairs and maintenance plan for the infrastructure of a municipality. </p>
<p>But to do this effectively and efficiently, appropriate financial management capacity is required. Where municipalities lack this, creative use of shared services between municipalities could be used. And private sector expertise to help improve financial management and audit outcomes should also be part of the solution. </p>
<p>In a worse case scenario, a municipality can be put <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/dr-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-municipality-under-administration-kzn-cogta-20180328">under administration</a>. This means that for a limited period of time the particular provincial government takes over the running of the municipality in order to solve the critical problems that prevent it from functioning properly. It’s a very drastic measure and should only be used sparingly since it interferes in the constitutional mandate of an elected municipal council. But in cases of serious systemic failure it might be the most appropriate course of action. It should, however, be only for a limited time and should be aimed at getting the municipal administration in a position where it could function on its own again.</p>
<p>Lastly, South Africans across the board need to work harder at ensuring that officials are held accountable. Accountability is one of the fundamental principles of the country’s constitutional democracy. Any person or government institution that does not give effect to accountability contravenes the Constitution. Good quality financial statements and annual reports are necessary to ensure that accountability and transparency are achieved.</p>
<p>The current situation is a national crisis and requires a joint effort across political, geographical and jurisdictional boundaries to get municipalities working properly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97331/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Brand previously received funding from the Hanns Seidel Foundation for research on local government finance that led to the publication of a book, Local Government Finance - a comparative study.</span></em></p>Nearly a third of South Africa’s municipalities are not financially viable.Dirk Brand, Extraordinary Senior Lecturer at the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/965472018-05-17T14:12:01Z2018-05-17T14:12:01ZGrowing Western Cape protests show citizens expect greater accountability<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218784/original/file-20180514-178743-ogi1aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters occupy a national highway in the Western Cape.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Western Cape, the <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-richest-and-poorest-provinces-of-south-africa.html">second wealthiest province</a> in South Africa after Gauteng, is the only one governed by the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA). The party won control of the province in 2009, under the leadership of its then leader Helen Zille. It has been in charge of the City of Cape Town since 2006.</p>
<p>In its competition with the African National Congress (ANC), which governs the country and the eight other provinces, the DA has often used the province and the city as <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-21-zille-says-western-cape-has-sas-best-story">examples</a> of the kind of good governance that it can bring to the rest of the country. The Western Cape outshone the eight other provinces on clean audits in the most recent local government <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1548177/western-cape-leads-pack-clean-audits-ag/">audit reports</a>. </p>
<p>The DA also claims to have made much greater progress than the ANC on a range of fronts, including <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zille-boasts-of-land-reform-farm-success-in-western-cape-20180222">land reform</a>. But, significant challenges remain in the province, as shown by the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/05/21/protests-flare-up-in-vrygrond-again">upsurge in protests</a> in recent weeks.</p>
<p>The protests were reportedly prompted by unhappiness over access to land, low-cost housing and the provision of <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/anc-blames-city-of-cape-town-for-mitchells-plain-protests">basic household services</a> such as water and sanitation. The spate of protests has taken place despite various efforts and the recent <a href="http://resource.capetown.gov.za/documentcentre/Documents/City%20strategies,%20plans%20and%20frameworks/Organisational%20Development%20and%20Transformation%20Plan%20(ODTP).pdf">implementation of a plan</a> aimed at reversing the legacy of apartheid spatial planning and improving service delivery. </p>
<p>We examined data from the <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/departments/sasas">South African Social Attitudes Survey</a>, conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council annually since 2003. It shows that there has been a decline in public confidence in local governance in the Western Cape over the past 12 months. In addition, there’s been growing dissatisfaction with the delivery of certain key services. The most marked changes are over people’s satisfaction with housing provision, water and sanitation and land reform. </p>
<h2>Satisfaction levels on the decline</h2>
<p>The data shows that there’s been a demonstrable decline in the number of people satisfied with the provision of low-cost housing in the province since the start of Zille’s second term as premier in 2014. While half the province’s population was satisfied with the provision of low-cost housing four years ago, only a third were satisfied by late 2017 (Fig. 1). </p>
<p>There have been similar dips in service delivery performance ratings in the Western Cape in the last year. For instance, approval of water and sanitation delivery fell from 86% in 2016 to 61% in 2017. Satisfaction with land reform declined from 46% in 2016 to 29% in 2017.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218783/original/file-20180514-133577-1n7pe2v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218783/original/file-20180514-133577-1n7pe2v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=286&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218783/original/file-20180514-133577-1n7pe2v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=286&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218783/original/file-20180514-133577-1n7pe2v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=286&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218783/original/file-20180514-133577-1n7pe2v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218783/original/file-20180514-133577-1n7pe2v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218783/original/file-20180514-133577-1n7pe2v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
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</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Confidence in local government has fared somewhat better, varying between 36% and 45% during Zille’s first term of office (2009-2014), and increasing during the first couple of years of her second term (from 38% in 2013 to 57% by 2016). But, there was a distinct decline in confidence in local government in the Western Cape between 2016 and 2017, falling from 57% to 44%. </p>
<p>These declines in public confidence are not necessarily due to provincial performance alone. It is more likely that these trends reflect a growing dissatisfaction with democracy and governance in South African society more broadly. For example, only 6% of Western Cape residents were satisfied with the general economic situation in 2017, and a sobering 20% expressed satisfaction with the way democracy is working. </p>
<p>These critical evaluations speak to a fundamental shift in the political mood in the province against which new developments, such as protest action, should to be contextualised.</p>
<h2>The protest vote</h2>
<p>The recent protests that occurred within the province are clearly at odds with the typical view of Western Cape residents towards mass action. This tends to be characterised by strong disapproval of any form of disruptive and violent action, as shown by the 2016 survey results (Fig. 2). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218782/original/file-20180514-178768-7wqeej.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218782/original/file-20180514-178768-7wqeej.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218782/original/file-20180514-178768-7wqeej.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218782/original/file-20180514-178768-7wqeej.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218782/original/file-20180514-178768-7wqeej.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218782/original/file-20180514-178768-7wqeej.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218782/original/file-20180514-178768-7wqeej.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
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</figure>
<p>By contrast, peaceful protest is seen in a favourable light (80% positive) and regarded by many (62%) as effective.</p>
<p>The fact that the protests have continued despite this prevailing view speaks to a sense of frustration and desperation in certain communities, particularly those that are poorer and more vulnerable. </p>
<h2>Responding to public needs</h2>
<p>Governing parties and officials need to take note of the frustration being expressed by ordinary South Africans, particularly given that the country goes to the polls next year in national elections.</p>
<p>The response to protests shouldn’t be heavy-handed policing. Instead, what’s needed is for governments – local, provincial and national – to understand the basis for protests and then to ensure a swift resolution of public concerns. Regular public engagement is needed, by municipalities in particular, and the use of innovative approaches (including social media) must be made a priority for communicating with communities.</p>
<p>A failure to do so is likely to reinforce a sense that the country is becoming less democratic and that the social distance between the elected and the electorate is widening. </p>
<p><em>Samela Mtyingizane, a Master’s Research Intern at the HSRC, was part of the research team. Readers requiring the detailed data from the <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/departments/sasas">survey</a> should please contact the HSRC at datahelp@hsrc.ac.za.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96547/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Roberts receives general financial support from various government and non-governmental agencies in securing the costs associated with the annual fielding of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). This funding has no bearing on the scope and interpretation of the survey analysis. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jare Struwig receives general financial support from various government and non-governmental agencies in securing the costs associated with the annual fielding of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). This funding has no bearing on the scope and interpretation of the survey analysis.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Narnia Bohler-Muller receives research funding from various government and non-government sponsors as part of competitive tender-based processes. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Gordon receives funding from DST-NRF Centre of Excellence in Human Development. He is affiliated with Human Sciences Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yul Derek Davids receives general financial support from various government and non-governmental agencies in securing funding for project related work at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The funding has no bearing on the scope and interpretation of the analysis of survey data and project related information.</span></em></p>Governing parties and officials need to take note of the frustration being expressed by ordinary South Africans.Benjamin Roberts, Senior Research Manager and Coordinator of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), Human Sciences Research CouncilJare Struwig, Chief Research Manager, Human Sciences Research CouncilNarnia Bohler-Muller, Executive Director of the Democracy, Govetnance and Service Delivery Programme at the Human Sciences Research Council and Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Fort Hare, University of Fort HareSteven Gordon, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Human Sciences Research CouncilYul Derek Davids, Chief Research Specialist, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery, Human Sciences Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/817012017-07-31T15:40:26Z2017-07-31T15:40:26ZSouth Africa should consider help from the IMF to fix its economy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/180185/original/file-20170728-23805-rg43no.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The prognosis that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-in-a-recession-heres-what-that-means-78953">South African economy</a> is in dire straits is pretty obvious even to the untrained eye. The solution to the country’s present predicament is also pretty much understood. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently produced a comprehensive <a href="http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2017/07/07/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2017">view</a> which deserves to be considered.</p>
<p>The IMF identifies three key ailments as causes of the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-can-expect-zero-growth-its-problems-are-largely-homemade-62943">anaemic economic growth</a>. These are low consumer and investor <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/business-confidence">confidence</a> and policy uncertainty. </p>
<p>Continued slow growth should be a matter of grave concern and ought to be treated as an emergency. </p>
<p>Thus far the short and medium term <a href="http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2017/07/07/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2017">outlook</a> suggests that growth outcomes will continue to be pedestrian. What is even more worrying is that over the past four years global economic growth has gained momentum, suggesting that the solution to South Africa’s vanishing growth lies in the country. </p>
<p>The new minister of finance, Malusi Gigaba, recently hinted that South Africa may be compelled to seek <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2017-06-30-gigaba-may-need-to-seek-outside-help-to-get-economy-going/">assistance</a> from the IMF. I think the conditions are right for serious consideration of the proposal even though IMF programmes are not very popular with politicians. </p>
<p>There are a number of reasons for this. Requests for IMF assistance suggest that those who manage the domestic economy have failed. The fund’s programmes also come with clearly defined milestones, often described as “conditionalities”. But in most instances, these are well-intentioned and aimed at success. </p>
<p>It’s better to enter an IMF programme early before the situation becomes frantic. As medical doctors might argue, it is easier to deal with an ailment in the earlier stages before it reaches an advanced stage.</p>
<h2>Desperate situation</h2>
<p>The alternative to asking for help now would be continued poor growth outcomes which would have serious social and economic costs. </p>
<p>The country’s poor economic growth record spawned a number of problems. </p>
<p>A shrinking economy means tax revenue shortfalls. The fiscal policy response would be higher taxes or bigger budget deficits.</p>
<p>And then again, interest payments, the fastest growing government expenditure item, would grow even faster. Already, about 11 cents out of every rand goes into <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2017/review/FullBR.pdf">servicing public debt</a>.</p>
<p>As the economy shrinks, more and more income would have to be spent on interest payments. Government’s ability to provide a social safety net in the form of social grants and other services, like education and health care, would be much more constrained. The service delivery <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/19/opinion-protesters-echo-global-cry-democracy-isn-t-making-lives-better">protests</a> that have become increasingly the norm would become even more widespread as the fiscus comes under serious strain. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the brigade of the unemployed would bear the brunt. Of course, the employed would also suffer because slow growth affects incomes.</p>
<p>Low and anaemic growth dries out consumer confidence. Job losses and subdued growth in incomes as a result of poor growth outcomes and prospects chips away at consumer confidence. </p>
<p>South Africa’s growth performance post 2008 has been very low. Over the past 10 years, the economy recorded an average of <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/country/south-africa">2% growth per year</a>. If this continues it will take more than 30 years to double average incomes in South Africa. </p>
<p>But if the country can increase growth to 5% as projected by the <a href="http://www.gov.za/ISSUES/NATIONAL-DEVELOPMENT-PLAN-2030">National Development Plan</a>, it would take only 14 years to double average income. The higher the growth rate the shorter the time required to double incomes and bring people out of poverty. </p>
<h2>Investor confidence deficit</h2>
<p>The investor confidence deficit is largely as a result of ever increasing political risk, policy uncertainty and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-jacob-zuma-is-fast-running-out-of-political-lives-80009">wrangling</a> in the ruling party and lately revelations of alleged <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-corruption-is-fraying-south-africas-social-and-economic-fabric-80690">looting</a> of public funds by the political elite. </p>
<p>But not everything’s broken. The performance of the country’s <a href="https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/south-africa-fast-facts/news-facts/wef_global_competitiveness">monetary authorities</a> in the management of monetary policy is admirable. </p>
<p>Where there appear to be lapses is the asset and liability management of the National Treasury. And here, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/corrupt-state-owned-enterprises-lie-at-the-heart-of-south-africas-economic-woes-79135">massive losses</a> of state owned enterprises readily come to the fore. </p>
<p>This is a blot on the canvas of fiscal policy management. And the much touted structural reforms that are required haven’t been forthcoming because the government lacks the capacity to formulate and implement the appropriate policies. In fact, even if it designed the correct ones, the investor community has little faith in its ability to carry them through. </p>
<p>Hence, the need for an IMF programme. </p>
<h2>The IMF has the solution</h2>
<p>An arrangement would achieve a number of objectives.</p>
<p>Firstly, the fund could help the country formulate policies that would unblock the problems that continue to inhibit economic growth and job creation. The mere adoption of an IMF programme would help address the question of policy uncertainty. </p>
<p>Secondly, the IMF is well placed to provide foreign exchange loans, bringing stability in the rand foreign exchange rate market. This in turn would improve investor confidence, leading to more investment in the country. Economic growth would pick up and there’d be an improvement in consumer confidence. </p>
<p>An IMF programme would send a clear and unassailable signal to investors that the country was committed to pursuing a given set of policy options. And it would make the commitment appear credible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Kofi Ocran receives funding from the NRF. He is also affiliated with Nelson Mandela University as a Research Associate.</span></em></p>The International Monetary Fund’s view of how to fix South Africa’s economy deserves to be seriously considered.Matthew Kofi Ocran, Professor of Economics, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/806902017-07-12T14:19:23Z2017-07-12T14:19:23ZHow corruption is fraying South Africa’s social and economic fabric<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177495/original/file-20170710-29712-1pi12q7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protests escalate as corruption and public sector incompetence in South Africa hamper the provision of basic services. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africans are not happy. According to the recent Bloomberg’s Misery Index, South Africa is <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/03/07/south-africa-is-the-second-most-miserable-country-on-earth_a_21875054/">the second-most miserable country on earth</a>. Venezuela tops the list of emerging countries. </p>
<p>This isn’t too surprising considering that the country is embroiled in multifaceted crises. It also has among the <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-unemployment-statistics-in-south-africa-explained/">highest unemployment</a> and <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-01-16-sas-rich-poor-gap-is-far-worse-than-feared-says-oxfam-inequality-report/">inequality levels</a> in the world. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, recent credit rating agency <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-a-downgrade-means-for-south-africa-and-what-it-can-do-about-it-75704">downgrades</a> as well as the fact that the country is in recession mean that these horrid conditions are unlikely to reverse soon.</p>
<p>Consequently, the poor in South Africa have little chance of improving their lives. They will therefore be even more reliant on the provision of state services. They will also increasingly be on the receiving end of the two extractive systems that are deeply embedded in country’s socio-political and economic systems.</p>
<p>The first is the patronage and state capture machinery as recently documented <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/news-national/1525127/read-damning-new-academic-state-capture-report/">in a report</a> by leading academics. The effect of this corruption is that the capital allocated for service delivery is wasted, the private sector is crowded out, and the monopolising positions of dysfunctional state owned enterprises distort the economy.</p>
<p>The second is where state capture merges with patronage politics at local government level. This is accomplished by managing and staffing municipalities with unqualified party loyalists – or close associates – who disseminate services inefficiently from a shrinking pool of capital, while further extracting rents through a sub-layer of corruption.</p>
<p>The effect is that the poor must pay an additional tax in the form of bribes for access to mispriced and inefficient state services. In addition, as the looting via state capture and <a href="http://www.municipaliq.co.za/index.php?site_page=press.php">municipal corruption intensifies</a>, service provision and delivery declines. This means that the poor are then subject to bribe inflation to gain access to shrinking capacity. <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-reasons-behind-service-delivery-protests-in-south-africa">Violent service delivery protests</a> inevitably escalate.</p>
<h2>Demographics and education</h2>
<p>South Africa’s five year average economic growth rate declined from 4.8% over the 2004-2008 period to 1.9% over the 2009-2013 period. Between 2014 and 2016 it averaged 1.1%. At the same time irregular, wasteful, and <a href="https://www.agsa.co.za/Portals/0/MFMA%202014-15/Section%201-9%20MFMA%202014-2015/FINAL%20MEDIA%20RELEASE%20(MFMA%202016)%20FN.pdf">unauthorised expenditure ballooned</a>. It’s therefore not surprising that the number of violent protests increased from an average of 21 a year between 2004 and 2008 to 164 a year between 2014 and 2016. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, South Africa’s demographics and education statistics don’t suggest that this trend is likely to reverse soon.</p>
<p>South Africa’s <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/the-grim-situation-facing-sas-youth-1878239">youth statistics are depressing</a>. Young people between the ages of 15 to 35 <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P02114.2/P02114.22015.pdf">comprise 55%</a> of the country’s 36 million working age population. Of the 19.7 million youths, only 6.2 million are employed while 3.6 million are unemployed but still actively looking for work, and 1.53 million have stopped looking for work. The remaining 8.4 million are at school, tertiary education, or are homemakers.</p>
<p>Youth unemployment is 36.9%. This is nearly double the unemployment rate among adults. Among black youth, 40% are unemployed compared to 11% of white youth.</p>
<p>Taking the level of education into consideration, <a href="https://equaleducation.org.za/2017/01/09/matric-results-and-south-africas-youth-unemployment-crisis/">2011 data</a> show that the unemployment rate for 25 to 35 year olds who had less than a matric was 47%, compared to 33% for those that had a matric, and 20% for those with a diploma or post-school certificate. But if one looks at the younger group of 20 to 24 year-olds, 16% are in school, 12% are in post-schooling education, 21% are employed, and 51% are unemployed and not in any education or training.</p>
<p>Considering that the percentage of black professional, managerial and technical workers in the 25 to 35 age bracket dropped by 2% over the past 20 years (meaning that this generation is less skilled than their parents), the statistics in the 20 to 24 age bracket indicates that this trend is likely to worsen.</p>
<p>Worryingly, studies show that countries, such as South Africa, that have a <a href="http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/expertpapers/Urdal_Expert%20Paper.pdf">youth bulge and poor education attainment</a> are likely to suffer <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268016303470?via%3Dihub">from political instability</a>. This is because if the demographic transition occurs in a stagnant economy with a high level of corruption then the low opportunity costs <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-04-18-the-great-reversal-stats-sa-claims-black-youth-are-less-skilled-than-their-parents/#.WVZNFIR97IV">increase the likelihood</a> of political violence by poorly educated young men.</p>
<h2>Fixing systemic failures</h2>
<p>South Africa’s current crisis is a systemic failure extending across national and local government. Although it’s possible that the political cost of corruption is now reaching unacceptable levels, reversing the effects of state decay on the poor will take short-run and long-run interventions. </p>
<p>Short-run measures will need to include holding public officials to account, reforming state owned enterprises and reversing the numerous institutional weaknesses at all levels of government.</p>
<p>But public and private stakeholders will also need to formulate long-run policies that will improve the quality and through-put of the country’s junior and secondary education systems, and entrench youth employment incentive schemes. In addition, skills training will need to be reformed and reinvigorated, and the technical vocational educational system will need to be reconstructed.</p>
<p>If South Africa is to recover, then the country’s badly frayed socio-economic fabric will need to be restitched, not just patched.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Gossel receives funding from the University of Cape Town. </span></em></p>The political cost of corruption is reaching unacceptable levels in South Africa. Reversing the effects of state decay on the poor will take short and long term interventions.Sean Gossel, Senior Lecturer, UCT Graduate School of Business, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.