tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/sino-african-22927/articlesSino-African – The Conversation2021-06-27T08:43:19Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597472021-06-27T08:43:19Z2021-06-27T08:43:19ZRethinking how we look at Africa’s relationship with China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406800/original/file-20210616-21-oolbp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The framing of Africa's relationship with China needs a rethink</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The topic of China-Africa relations presents an opportunity to rethink the territorial parameters of African studies. In particular, it can help shift attention away from the Atlantic world as the dominant focal point of connections between Africa and the wider world. </p>
<p>The problem is that current scholarship and public opinion have often drifted into old frameworks and colonial motifs.</p>
<p>To take one example, China’s ambitions have frequently been construed as part of a new ‘Scramble for Africa’ with African countries falling victim once more to an outside global power. Another example is the uncritical use of the Orientalist stereotype of ‘dragon’ to symbolise China and its perceived aggressiveness.</p>
<p>I explore these issues of framing, narration and analysis in a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13696815.2020.1824770">article</a>. I argue that these approaches have created problematic misrepresentations that have resulted in different parts of the continent’s long history with China being ignored. </p>
<p>More specifically, the Cold War was a robust period of Afro-Asian networking and solidarity against Western neo-colonialism. Older still are local histories of Chinese immigrant communities on the continent in countries like South Africa. These experiences need to be better integrated into our understandings of China-Africa relations in the present. </p>
<h2>The uses of history</h2>
<p>History can be a useful reference for understanding what is happening today. But simply rehashing imperial narratives as a guiding framework can obscure local perspectives and alternative histories. </p>
<p>In the case of China-Africa relations, the repackaging of old paradigms can conceal a more layered set of foundations and archives. </p>
<p>One example of this more complex history is that of the Cold War. During this period China became a supporter and ally of African liberation movements and postcolonial states. Diplomatic meetings like the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf#:%7E:text=In%20April%2C%201955%2C%20representatives%20from,%2C%20economic%20development%2C%20and%20decolonization.">1955 Asian-African Conference</a> in Bandung, Indonesia, set the stage for these relationships. The conference triggered a long history of transnational interactions during the latter half of the twentieth century, reaching high points with <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18001.shtml">Premier Zhou Enlai’s tour of ten African countries</a> in 1963 and 1964. </p>
<p>The best known example of China’s influence during this period was the popularity of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25663811">Maoism</a>, which gained traction as a revolutionary and development ideology. With its emphasis on the peasantry as a vanguard for political and economic change, Maoism resonated with African activists and intellectuals. They saw themselves as confronting a similar set of conditions across the continent. Julius Nyerere’s Maoist-influenced Tanzanian state and ujamaa program demonstrated how Chinese approaches to development could inspire African economic projects.</p>
<p>Yet it is also important to recognise the long-standing presence of Chinese communities on the continent. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1j7x628">Chinese immigration</a> to southern and eastern Africa began over a century ago. South African journalist Ufrieda Ho has addressed this history in her memoir, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1j7x628">Paper Sons and Daughters</a>. Her multi-generational account describes her family’s experience in South Africa before, during and after apartheid, capturing both the presence and marginality of Chinese South Africans, who have been left out of mainstream historical narratives. These social histories have also largely been absent from discussions of China-Africa relations.</p>
<h2>A new approach</h2>
<p>The invisibility of these local histories is partly due to prevailing academic definitions of ‘African’ identity. This identity remains deeply racialised with ‘Africanness’ and ‘Blackness’ seen as synonymous.</p>
<p>However, the problem with this type of race-territory correspondence becomes clear when ‘European’ identity, for example, is always assumed to be ‘white’. Indeed, this logic betrays a lingering colonial worldview and taxonomy that fixed race and place together. </p>
<p>A more expansive, decolonized understanding of ‘African’ identity could remedy these engrained habits of perception. A number of communities that have deep histories on the continent, whether Chinese South Africans, Indian communities in East and southern Africa, or Lebanese communities in West Africa, point to other racial and cultural ways of being ‘African’. </p>
<p>Specific to China and Africa today, this rethinking of ‘Africanness’ can provide a way of repositioning China-African relations beyond the diplomatic rhetoric of trade and development to emphasize instead local histories of African-Chinese communities that long precede our global present. </p>
<p>Returning to the Cold War, the idea of ‘Afro-Asianism’, which first surfaced during the mid-1950s as a result of the Bandung conference, offers another usable past that can contribute to this new orientation.</p>
<p>Afro-Asianism was sustained in different ways by the <a href="https://www.aapsorg.org/en/">Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation</a> founded in Cairo in 1957, the <a href="https://www.aaihs.org/the-afro-asian-writers-association-and-soviet-engagement-with-africa/">Afro-Asian Writers Association</a> established in Tashkent in 1958, and the <a href="https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/non-aligned-movement-nam/"> Non-Aligned Movement </a>that started in Belgrade in 1961. As an ideology, it promoted self-determination and the moral ideals of liberation struggles, including racial and gender equality, human rights, and economic justice. </p>
<p>Reviving this idea could open the door to a new form solidarity against the exploitation and abuses witnessed on both sides of the ‘China-Africa’ equation. These problems can be seen in land agreements by African governments that do not benefit pre-existing residents. It can also be seen in anti-Black racism in China. </p>
<p>A refurbished ethos of Afro-Asianism could provide an antidote to such problems and foster new forms of community and internationalism. Furthermore, redefining African identity to include the historical presence of Chinese communities could encourage and sustain more meaningful understandings of transnational connections over a longer period of time.</p>
<p>To rethink how we look at Africa’s relationship with China requires that we move beyond historical cliches, with African countries always falling victim to outside powers. Fortunately, there are multiple histories of substantive networking and cosmopolitan conviviality between Africa and China to make this possibility happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159747/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher J. Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African identity needs a revision to move beyond current understanding of its relationship with ChinaChristopher J. Lee, Associate Professor of History and Africana Studies, Lafayette College Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1572542021-04-13T14:43:15Z2021-04-13T14:43:15ZFifty years, five problems - and how Nigeria can work with China in future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392810/original/file-20210331-13-1oqs43e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vendors in front of their shop in China Town, Ojota, Lagos</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/vendors-sit-in-front-of-their-shop-in-the-deserted-china-news-photo/1203737316?adppopup=true">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since establishing diplomatic relations on <a href="http://ng.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/cne/t142490.htm">10 February 1971</a>, Nigeria’s relationship with China has developed into one of the most important bilateral relationships maintained by either country. </p>
<p>Apart from the exchange of high level visits, Chinese companies and money have found their way into Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy. They are involved in <a href="https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1007%2Fs11366-016-9453-8?author_access_token=WPKvbExnHCczCqgM0LI_Hve4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY7OLvXN-XgPiWgO5WDqKEtaTSOh-plEmXHRWQp1VgNkOrh4kU-Bs4v4HZ-lddROqoFazhV8tFcaZvfUEQCEf6kV1IHlJiRJsOMU13MAf4YvUQ==">a variety of major projects</a> in Nigeria. </p>
<p>As at 31 March 2020, Chinese loans to Nigeria stood at <a href="https://www.dmo.gov.ng/facts-about-chinese-loans-to-nigeria">US$3.121 billion</a>, which is 11.28% of the country’s external debt of US$27.67 billion. The growing trade and presence of Chinese finance in Nigeria has also led to changing narratives about <a href="https://za.boell.org/en/2018/10/09/nigerian-migrants-china-changing-narrative">increased</a> migration on both sides.</p>
<p>Over the years, Nigeria’s relationship with China has broadened and deepened with China’s growing power and interest in securing its regional interests (particularly within the South China Sea), and taking its place as a major global actor. Although Nigeria has largely stayed away from China’s fairly assertive regional posture, it’s affirmation of a commitment to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354">‘One-China Policy’</a> has been important to China. Nigeria demonstrated this by the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-nigeria/taiwan-says-nigeria-wants-it-to-move-its-trade-office-from-abuja-idUSKBN14W0IX">forced relocation</a> of Taiwan trade office from Abuja to Lagos in 2017.</p>
<p>The governments of both Nigeria and China often describe their relationship as a <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/06/c_137585555.htm">“win win”</a> partnership – a term China often <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-06-28/President-Xi-China-Africa-cooperation-always-produces-win-win-results-HTaBDoIaDC/index.html">uses</a> to describe its relationships with other African countries.</p>
<p>During former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Nigeria in 2006, his host and then Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, <a href="https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1007%2Fs11366-016-9453-8?author_access_token=WPKvbExnHCczCqgM0LI_Hve4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY7OLvXN-XgPiWgO5WDqKEtaTSOh-plEmXHRWQp1VgNkOrh4kU-Bs4v4HZ-lddROqoFazhV8tFcaZvfUEQCEf6kV1IHlJiRJsOMU13MAf4YvUQ==">remarked</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>From our assessment, this twenty-first century is the century for China to lead the world. And when you are leading the world, we want to be close behind you. When you are going to the moon, we don’t want to be left behind.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Bitter sweet mixture</h2>
<p>But 50 years of Nigeria-China relations has been a bitter-sweet mixture. At independence, Nigeria’s pro-British and pro-West foreign policy <a href="https://www.ijrhss.org/papers/v6-i11/1.pdf">had no dedicated space or support</a> for communist China.</p>
<p>During the <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/nigerian-civil-war-1967-1970/">Nigeria-Biafra war</a>, the Nigerian government received arms support the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319766091_Strange_Bedfellows_An_Unlikely_Alliance_between_the_Soviet_Union_and_Nigeria_during_the_Biafran_War">from USSR</a> - but not China. It has been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/75/298/14/102588?redirectedFrom=PDF">reported</a> that China supported Biafra in terms of small arms and ammunition via Tanzania.</p>
<p>After the war, the Nigerian government <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338739945_Gowon's_Three_R's_and_Yar'Adua's_General_Amnesty_an_Analysis_of_Policy_Failures_Security_Challenges_and_Consequences_in_the_West_African_Atlantic_Seaboard">implemented</a> the 3Rs - reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. It also visited countries in the West and East. It was within this context that Nigeria, along with other African countries, supported the <a href="https://china.usc.edu/united-nations-admits-peoples-republic-china-october-25-1971">1971 resolution</a> to accept China as a full-fledged member of the UN.</p>
<p>An economic exhibition followed in <a href="http://ng.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/cne/t792194.htm">1972</a> and <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095902167">Yakubu Gowon</a>, Nigeria’s leader, visited Beijing <a href="https://www.wathi.org/two-distant-giants-china-and-nigeria-perceive-each-other/">in 1974</a>. But it was not until the early 1990s that China assumed an <a href="https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1007%2Fs11366-016-9453-8?author_access_token=WPKvbExnHCczCqgM0LI_Hve4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY7OLvXN-XgPiWgO5WDqKEtaTSOh-plEmXHRWQp1VgNkOrh4kU-Bs4v4HZ-lddROqoFazhV8tFcaZvfUEQCEf6kV1IHlJiRJsOMU13MAf4YvUQ==">important role</a> in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The backlash from the West over the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/24/world/nigerian-military-rulers-annul-election.html">annulment</a> of the June 1993 presidential election forced Nigeria to look more towards China.</p>
<p>Thus, China became an important element for Nigeria’s response to Western sanctions and other forms of pressures, and strategies to force a preferred political outcome. China’s <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2019/conflict-mediation-chinese-characteristics-how-china-justifies-its-non-interference-policy/">non-interference policy</a> in the domestic affairs of other countries fitted well into <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54929254">Sani Abacha</a>’s ultimate goal of becoming a civilian president. The period also coincided with the early beginnings of Beijing’s own “going global” policy that saw it unleash abroad its economic influence and multinational companies.</p>
<p>Under Abacha, an agreement was signed in 1995 with the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation to take up projects -although some reports trace the company’s entrance into the Nigerian market to 1981. What is clear is that Nigeria is the company’s <a href="https://dailytrust.com/we-built-businesses-in-29-states-in-40yrs-ccecc">first overseas market </a>; and currently CCECC works in 29 of Nigeria’s 36 states.</p>
<p>Over the last 50 years, the Sino-Nigerian relationship has developed clear patterns. Roughly, the first 20 years may be described as a political phase. The ensuing decade was a mixed era of political and economic features while the last 20 years or so show an intensification of China’s economic presence in Nigeria. Clearly, the relationship has become more economic as China evolved from a political power to a global economic giant.</p>
<p>However, after a half century of official relationship, the time has become ripe for a review of the balance sheet. </p>
<h2>The “win-win” smiles</h2>
<p>China is one of the most important <a href="https://www.dmo.gov.ng/facts-about-chinese-loans-to-nigeria">lenders of development finance to Nigeria</a>. Chinese firms and finance play a prominent role in Nigeria’s infrastructure development. This is <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/sr_423_chen_final.pdf">notably in the construction</a> of railway lines and road (re)construction across the country. Some <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-maltreatment-of-nigerians-in-china-may-not-end-soon-137828">examples</a> are the $874 million, 187km Abuja-Kaduna rail; the $1.2 billion, 312km Lagos-Ibadan expressway; the $1.1 billion Kano-Kaduna railway lines and the $600 million airport terminals in Abuja, Lagos, Port Harcourt and Kano. </p>
<p>Nigeria is also <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5ea7317f6ed4781cebc9c0ce/1588015487828/WP+36+-+Chen+-+Manufacturing+Nigeria.pdf">one</a> of Africa’s top destinations for Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI). Although accurate figures are <a href="https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/deciphering-chinese-investment-in-nigeria">difficult</a> to ascertain, it is estimated that about 5% of Chinese FDI stocks in Africa and 4.6% of FDI inflow in 2019 <a href="http://www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa">goes to Nigeria</a>.</p>
<p>Data on trade between the two nations for the first 30 years of their relationship is not available. Nevertheless, more reliable data has been available since 2003. Since then trade between the two nations has increased from <a href="http://ng.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/cne/t142490.htm">US$1.86 billion</a> to an estimated <a href="https://punchng.com/chinese-companies-investments-in-nigeria-hit-20bn-cccn/">US$20 billion</a> in 2019. Trade flows are in China’s favour, with China running a trade surplus of about US$17.5 billion for the years 2015 to 2018. Nigeria sells crude oil to China and, in turn, buys manufactured goods.</p>
<p>China also contributes to the development of Nigeria’s human capital. Many Nigerian students now <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/09/c_138296964.htm">study</a> in Chinese schools – with a few on scholarship. Chinese companies are also building <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-12/03/c_138602919.htm">education</a> and <a href="https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2016/10/huawei-innovation-experience-center-nigeria">training</a> facilities in Nigeria.</p>
<h2>The underbellies of win-win</h2>
<p>The relationship is not without its problems. Aside from <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-maltreatment-of-nigerians-in-china-may-not-end-soon-137828">racism</a> against Nigerians and other black people in China, there are four other problems.</p>
<p>First is the negative impact of Chinese imports on Nigerian industries, of which the biggest casualty has been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-china-arrests/nigeria-arrests-45-illegal-chinese-textile-traders-idUKL5E8GNDBM20120523?edition-redirect=uk">textiles</a>.</p>
<p>For example, in Kano - which is considered to be one of the main textiles cities in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4006534?seq=1">northern Nigeria</a>, an estimated <a href="https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2015/09/02/chinese-textile-materials-send-28000-kano-dyers-out-of-business/">28,000 Nigerians</a> lost their jobs to Chinese imports as at 2015. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s shoe industry has also taken <a href="https://dailytrust.com/how-chinese-products-are-killing-made-in-aba-shoes">a big hit</a>. </p>
<p>The second problem relates to the bad treatment of Nigerian workers by their Chinese employers. There have been many <a href="https://books.google.com.ng/books?id=A3XhCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA191&lpg=PA191&dq=between+the+dragon%27s+gift+and+its+claws&source=bl&ots=Bg8CxNqchq&sig=ACfU3U0RQwuwsBqTK7oqr8dUQV6zpZcsvQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj9-9C-7KzvAhV04uAKHf3lARwQ6AEwEHoECBEQAw#v=onepage&q=between%20the%20dragon's%20gift%20and%20its%20claws&f=false">instances of maltreatment</a> of these workers. This raises questions about the ability of Nigerian government to develop – or enforce – appropriate labour laws and conduct regular inspection of work places.</p>
<p>Third is the issue of <a href="https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2011/06/17/chinese-prisoners-invade-nigeria/">unsubstantiated claims </a> about Chinese companies in Nigeria. A good example is the claim that <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/rep-raises-concern-over-import-of-chinese-prisoners-to-work-in-nigeria/">China uses its prisoners</a> in construction projects in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The fourth problem relates to Chinese loans to Nigeria, which often generate concerns among citizens. These range from those that believe they are unsustainable to those that claim that the agreements <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/406420-amaechi-explains-sovereignty-clause-in-500m-chinese-railway-loan.html">allow China to take over</a> Nigerian assets. These persist because of the secrecy surrounding the loans.</p>
<h2>Preparing for the next 25-50 years</h2>
<p>Nigeria now needs to prepare for the next 25 to 50 years.</p>
<p>China can continue to play an important role in Nigeria’s development. However, Nigeria must urgently address the negative side of the relationship. </p>
<p>First, Nigeria’s regulatory institutions, including the courts, standards setting bodies, ministries and agencies, must apply the laws of the country without fear or favour.</p>
<p>China has <a href="https://www.today.ng/news/nigeria/chinese-companies-obey-nigerian-labour-laws-foreign-minister-338004">said</a> it will not tolerate Chinese companies disregarding Nigeria’s labour laws. But, it is up to the local regulatory institutions to assert the supremacy of the Nigerian law.</p>
<p>Secondly, Chinese textile firms must be <a href="https://shipsandports.com.ng/between-nigerias-1-2bn-smuggled-textiles-and-chinas-2bn-investment/">encouraged</a> to create employment.</p>
<p>Lastly, people-to-people relationship must also be encouraged and strengthened.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157254/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi has previously received research funding or travel support from organisations like the KU Leuven, Research Foundation Flanders (FWO), Social Science Research Council (SSRC), University of Edinburgh, Lagos State University, Lagos State Government, Chatham House (i.e. Robert Bosch Stiftung), Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED), Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETfund), Population Media Center (PMC), Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), Think Tank Initiative, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. He is currently an American Council of Learned Societies’ African Humanities Program (ACLS-AHP) postdoctoral fellow, conducting research for a book entitled ‘Imageries of Mao Zedong's China in Ghanaian newspapers, 1957-1976.’ </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ufo Okeke Uzodike is affiliated with African Heritage Institution (AfriHeritage). The institute is a not-for-profit, non-partisan and independent think tank devoted to economic, social and peace research, capacity building, and networking. AfriHeritage’s history dates back to 2001 when operations commenced (nationally and across Africa) under the name “African Institute for Applied Economics'' (AIAE). Its name was changed in 2012 to African Heritage Institution in order to broaden its focus beyond economic issues. Its vision is for a renascent Africa that is democratic, prosperous and a frontline player in the global economy; and its Mission committed its management to work for positive social change through sustained advocacy to promote transparent and effective management and governance of the Nigerian and African economies. </span></em></p>Nigeria and China should work more on the relationship between their citizens so that the two countries can continue to have good bilateral relations.Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, Faculty member, Department of Political Science, Lagos State UniversityUfo Okeke Uzodike, Honorary Research Professor, Durban University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1378282020-05-28T13:47:35Z2020-05-28T13:47:35ZWhy maltreatment of Nigerians in China may not end soon<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/335378/original/file-20200515-138665-unek2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">WANG ZHAO/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Racism against <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/transtexts/281#ftn20">Nigerians </a> – and other <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/198889-nanjing-antiafrican-protests-racial-nationalism-or-national-racism/AC0B9378E1434D7DD300F011C3FD2877">Africans</a> – is not new in China. Africa-China history is marked by solidarity, but also dented by <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/from-campus-racism-to-cyber-racism-discourse-of-race-and-chinese-nationalism/6FAD01C5D277D7D4E862980957D95E78">old and new racism</a>. Nothing at this moment suggests that the current situation will drastically change. </p>
<p>Some recent events are low moments in the <a href="https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1007%2Fs11366-016-9453-8?author_access_token=WPKvbExnHCczCqgM0LI_Hve4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY7OLvXN-XgPiWgO5WDqKEtaTSOh-plEmXHRWQp1VgNkOrh4kU-Bs4v4HZ-lddROqoFazhV8tFcaZvfUEQCEf6kV1IHlJiRJsOMU13MAf4YvUQ==">ever-oscillating</a> relationship between China and Nigeria. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=06W8FdHsNNE">A video</a> emerged on 10 April of a Nigerian diplomat in China, Razaq Lawal, publicly criticising his compatriots’ maltreatment in Guangzhou by Chinese officials. Lawal protested that Nigerians were kept in COVID-19 quarantine beyond the normal 14 days for Chinese citizens. Chinese officials were also seizing their passports. He pointed out that the Nigerian government did not treat Chinese citizens living in Nigeria any differently from its own citizens. </p>
<p>The video drew the ire of Nigerians and the Nigerian government. The speaker of Nigeria’s House of Representatives, Femi Gbajabiamila, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sSwx8M4yGb8">demanded</a> answers from the Chinese ambassador to Nigeria, Zhou Pingjian. At about the same time the Nigerian Medical Association was <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/health/health-news/386163-coronavirus-nigerian-doctors-reject-countrys-plan-to-invite-chinese-medical-team.html">protesting</a> a government decision to invite a Chinese medical team to assist in the fight against COVID-19. </p>
<p>Based on my <a href="https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781784711450/9781784711450.00015.xml">research </a>on relations between the two countries (especially in terms of labour relations) over the past decade, I believe that incidents like this may keep recurring. That’s despite the assertion by Nigeria’s foreign minister, Geoffrey Onyeama, that Nigeria would “<a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/389523-coronavirus-nigeria-to-engage-china-over-maltreatment-of-nationals-minister.html">take definitive steps against China”</a>.</p>
<p>I identify three main reasons.</p>
<h2>Why things won’t change</h2>
<p>Official relations date back to February 1971, when Nigeria established diplomatic relations with China. But contact between ordinary Nigerians and Chinese <a href="http://rdcu.be/ojiF">predates</a> the 1967-70 Biafran Civil War. Though some argue that China <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/75/298/14/102588?redirectedFrom=PDF">supported</a> the Biafran forces against the Nigerian government, no post-war government in Nigeria has confirmed Beijing’s involvement. </p>
<p>Along with other African countries, Nigeria supported China as the genuine representative of the Chinese people in 1975. This led to the replacement of Taiwan at the United Nations. High-level bilateral visits followed, setting the stage for increased trade. Although accurate figures are difficult to find, Nigeria-China trade galloped from about $1.8 billion in <a href="http://ng.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/cne/t142490.htm">2003</a> to $13.5 billion in <a href="http://www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade">2018</a>. </p>
<p>As the relationship grew, more Nigerians established business and other <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0268580920905461">relationships</a> in China. </p>
<p>Nigerians’ maltreatment must, however, be understood within the broader maltreatment of Africans in China. This <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/antiblack-racism-in-postmao-china/862AF22CB97347DD0EF289792919640B">can be traced to the 1960s</a>, when African students began to arrive in China. It intensified in the 1970s and 1980s when there were protests against – and by – Africans in China. </p>
<p>Coincidentally, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-friction-china-africans/out-of-africa-and-into-china-emigres-struggle-idUSTRE57K00K20090821">landmark incident</a> that led to the death of a Nigerian happened in 2009 in Guangzhou, where Nigerians were recently maltreated. It led to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-friction-china-africans/out-of-africa-and-into-china-emigres-struggle-idUSTRE57K00K20090821">protests</a> by Nigerians and other Africans, “demanding justice from the Chinese police after officers chased the man out of a high-rise window in a tightening security crackdown on illegal over-stayers in the city this year”. </p>
<p>In 2012, there was <a href="https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/06/20/africans-protests-highlight-tensions-in-guangzhou/">another protest</a> by Africans in Guangzhou over the death of a Nigerian in police detention. </p>
<p>It’s my view that Nigeria’s reluctance to call out Chinese actions over the years is the main reason why the status quo persists.</p>
<p>While publicly painting a picture of equality, China continues to dominate relations with Nigeria, as I observed in a <a href="https://www.academia.edu/1515866/CAN_PAX_NIGERIANA_SURVIVE_CHINESE_AFRICANA">2015 paper</a> co-authored with Bukola Ajayi. We see this in imbalanced trade, Nigeria’s growing dependence on China, and China’s growing importance in Africa. We also drew attention to the issue of counterfeit, adulterated and sub-standard drugs and other products imported from China into Nigeria. </p>
<p>Back then, I commented on Chinese labour relations in Nigeria and the challenges of fostering the International Labour Organisation’s decent work agenda. My <a href="https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781784711450/9781784711450.00015.xml">paper</a> pointed to the weakness of the Nigerian government to respond to the maltreatment of its citizens by Chinese companies. I argued that this created a space for both civil and uncivil responses by non-state actors. </p>
<p>In April 2020 – five years later – we witnessed another report of <a href="https://chinaafricaproject.com/2020/04/22/reports-of-arson-attacks-against-chinese-businesses-in-nigeria-and-arrest-of-archbishop-protesting-treatment-of-africans-in-guangzhou-highlights-growing-tensions">maltreatment</a>. </p>
<p>The second reason is due to Chinese investment in Nigeria.</p>
<p>A good number of <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2019/11/28/how-the-chinese-are-taking-over-nigerias-economy/">Chinese multinationals and small companies</a> operate in Nigeria. Chinese companies in Nigeria are building much needed <a href="https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1007%2Fs11366-016-9453-8?author_access_token=WPKvbExnHCczCqgM0LI_Hve4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY7OLvXN-XgPiWgO5WDqKEtaTSOh-plEmXHRWQp1VgNkOrh4kU-Bs4v4HZ-lddROqoFazhV8tFcaZvfUEQCEf6kV1IHlJiRJsOMU13MAf4YvUQ==">roads and railways, airports, and telecommunications infrastructure</a>. There are currently about 218 registered <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5ea7317f6ed4781cebc9c0ce/1588015487828/WP+36+-+Chen+-+Manufacturing+Nigeria.pdf">Chinese firms</a> in Nigeria. They are involved in construction, furniture, food and beverages, beauty, and product assembling plants, among others. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Nigeria’s trade deficit against China remains huge. Between 2015 and 2018, for instance, the <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/how-china-made-excess-of-n6-83trn-from-nigeria-in-4-years/">trade deficit</a> stood at N6.83 trillion (which exchanges for about $17.5 billion today) in favour of China. This affirms that China benefits more at the moment. Though accurate data remains difficult to get, it is estimated that total trade between both countries between 2015 and 2018 was about <a href="http://www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade">$49 billion</a>. This means that goods imported from China into Nigeria in that period were about $17.5 billion more than those exported from Nigeria to China. In any case, a significant amount of Nigeria’s export to China is a primary product: crude oil.</p>
<p>With the <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2020/04/22/bonny-light-crude-oil-crashes-as-nigeria-runs-into-deeper-revenue-crisis/">crash</a> in the crude oil price and a global <a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturn-since-the-great-depression/">economic downturn</a> caused by the new coronavirus, Nigeria needs Chinese investment and loans now more than ever. </p>
<p>The third reason concerns China’s financing of development projects. </p>
<p>China is a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/14f5438e-c32b-11e8-84cd-9e601db069b8">major financier</a> of large projects in Nigeria. <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/sr_423_chen_final.pdf">These</a> include the $874 million, 187km Abuja-Kaduna rail; the $1.2 billion, 312km Lagos-Ibadan expressway; the $1.1 billion Kano-Kaduna railway lines and the $600 airport terminals in Abuja, Lagos, Port Harcourt and Kano. </p>
<p>An estimate puts the current cost of Chinese projects at <a href="https://punchng.com/chinese-projects-succour-for-nigerian-artisans-pain-for-professionals/">$47 billion</a>. Many of these are financed by Chinese loans. It will be difficult for a country that relies so much on China to take action against Beijing.</p>
<p>With the <a href="https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/3079/1/">poor labour standards</a> in China itself and institutions’ weakness in Nigeria to check periodic abuses of Nigerians by Chinese companies, the chances seem low that Nigerian politicians and government will – or can – seriously respond to Nigerians’ maltreatment in China. </p>
<h2>What to do?</h2>
<p>The latest treatment of Nigerians in China is a dent on Nigeria-China relations. But if relations are to make progress, at least two important issues must be addressed. First, the Chinese government must do more to educate its people, making ordinary Chinese sensitive to issues of racism.</p>
<p>Second, Chinese citizens in China must understand that their actions could have implications for their compatriots in Africa. This could affect China’s long-term relevance in Africa as a partner. </p>
<p>But these issues concern not just ordinary Chinese citizens. Racism may be a symptom of much bigger problems for the Chinese government. This could be an opportunity for the Xi Jinping government to learn, and more importantly act.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137828/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi has previously received research funding or travel support from organisations like the KU Leuven, Research Foundation Flanders (FWO), Social Science Research Council (SSRC), Centre for African Studies at the University of Edinburgh, Lagos State University, Chatham House (i.e. Robert Bosch Stiftung), Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED), Think Tank Initiative, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. He has recently been offered the American Council of Learned Societies’ African Humanities Program postdoctoral fellowship to conduct research for a book entitled ‘Imageries of Mao Zedong's China in Ghanaian newspapers, 1957-1976.’</span></em></p>In spite of increased economic, political and social interactions, Nigeria-China relations are dented by old and new racism.Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, Faculty member, Department of Political Science, Lagos State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/924492018-03-06T13:15:44Z2018-03-06T13:15:44ZWhat ‘blackface’ tells us about China’s patronising attitude towards Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208457/original/file-20180301-152569-1ppwk0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A skit on China's English language TV station CCTV's Spring Festival Gala featuring 'blackface' actors has gone viral.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>You could compile a <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1535574/racist-maid-advert-draws-anger-hong-kong">long list</a> of <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-blackface-and-brownface-offend-65881">‘blackfaces’</a> in East Asian media over the <a href="https://www.thebeijinger.com/blog/2018/02/17/cctv-toothpaste-short-history-blackface-china">last decade</a>. But the latest version this Euro-American racist archetype in Chinese media is by far the most <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-media-struggles-to-overcome-stereotypes-of-africa-92362?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=twitterbutton">controversial</a> – a skit on China’s English language TV station CCTV’s Spring Festival Gala featuring ‘blackface’ actors. Like the others on the <a href="https://qz.com/1101699/africans-in-china-are-infuriated-over-a-museum-exhibit-comparing-africans-to-animals/">growing list</a> of racist incidents, this one has also <a href="https://theconversation.com/of-washing-powder-afrophobia-and-racism-in-china-60274">gone viral</a>. </p>
<p>Beyond the ‘blackface’, the skit’s story is rather simple but still problematic. Carrie, an 18-year-old Kenyan stewardess trainee, asks her Chinese teacher to pass as her boyfriend to avoid a blind date organised by her mother. Carrie doesn’t want to get married yet. She wants to work and then go to China to study.</p>
<p>In the skit’s resolution, Carrie confesses to her mother and explains her desire to go to China. It becomes clear that she sees China as a way to escape tradition (and her mother’s traditional views on marriage). </p>
<p>Carrie’s mother then starts praising China’s role in Africa and agrees to Carrie’s plans, shouting </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I love the Chinese! I love China!</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The skit was intended to highlight the positive aspects of China-Africa relations. Instead, it presented a narrative in which China is seen as a solution to Africa’s backwardness. </p>
<h2>China, the saviour</h2>
<p>This episode echoes the broadcast of a similar story featured on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxr99UDYAug">‘If You Are the One’</a> – a highly popular Chinese TV dating show a few years ago. </p>
<p>In my <a href="https://africansinchina.net/2013/08/09/%E9%9D%9E%E8%AF%9A%E5%8B%BF%E6%89%B0-africans-in-china-in-chinese-media-you-are-the-one/">analysis</a> of the show at the time I explained how <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxr99UDYAug">Xiao De</a> (a participant from Guinea Bissau) was portrayed as a free-spirited girl, trapped by tradition. Xiao De saw going to China as a way to escape her fate (an arranged marriage), study, and become independent. </p>
<p>In the dating show, Xiao De is looking to marry a Chinese man. As with Carrie, moving to China and marrying a Chinese is her way of escaping tradition and entering modernity — a Chinese version of it. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208046/original/file-20180227-36700-1bmugmd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208046/original/file-20180227-36700-1bmugmd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=712&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208046/original/file-20180227-36700-1bmugmd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=712&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208046/original/file-20180227-36700-1bmugmd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=712&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208046/original/file-20180227-36700-1bmugmd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=895&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208046/original/file-20180227-36700-1bmugmd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=895&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208046/original/file-20180227-36700-1bmugmd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=895&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Xiao De in her last appearance in ‘If You Are the One’</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These skits reproduce a narrative that is representative of China’s general approach to Africa. Both official and popular Chinese narratives about Africa consistently try to construct an image of the continent as China’s <a href="https://www.google.co.za/search?id%3D%22208045%22+align%3D%22centre%22+caption%3D%22Paolo+Uccello%27s+depiction+of+Saint+George+and+the+dragon,+c.+1470,+a+classic+image+of+a+damsel+in+distress.%22+/%3E&rlz=1C1NHXL_enZA711ZA711&tbm=isch&source=iu&ictx=1&fir=ibanAKDQ6f1mmM%253A%252C_tmjTF3Otcm0kM%252C_&usg=__DUltEDS4-tLDsOpeS7-Bpx49-6o%3D&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj-zo_R2srZAhVEDcAKHbipC1IQ9QEILDAC#imgrc=ibanAKDQ6f1mmM:">‘damsel in distress’</a>. </p>
<p>Africa is depicted as a young and beautiful woman who needs to be saved by a male hero. In the end, the woman usually marries her rescuer. The narrative is also always gendered – China is portrayed as the (modern) male hero and Africa the princess in jeopardy. </p>
<p>Multiple versions of this have been repeated over the decades. In short, behind the Gala’s ‘blackface’ lies a consistent top-down, ego-boosting effort to see and represent China as a way for Africa to enter modernity. </p>
<h2>Africa as the past, China as the future</h2>
<p>The Spring Festival Gala is a programme full of skits. While the skits are normally comedic, they generally intend to inform and educate the audience about a particular topic, from military affairs and everyday life. More <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/racism-and-the-belt-and-road-in-cctvs-spring-festival-gala/">controversially</a>, they also sometimes focus on other cultures. </p>
<p>The ‘blackface’ skit was the first in the Gala’s history to portray China-Africa relations. If it’s intention was to educate its viewers about the complexities and realities of contemporary sub-Saharan life, it failed miserably. For example, the skit’s story is supposedly set in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, but all you can see in the background is a savannah. There are in fact no savannah’s in site in modern-day Nairobi.</p>
<p>Representing ‘Africa as the past’ means associating ideas about Africa strictly with nature and tradition. </p>
<p>But stereotypical views about Africa aren’t only evident in China’s media — they pervade everyday life in China, a fact that African students who have lived in China can attest to.</p>
<p>The CCTV skit was merely catering to age-old stereotypes held by many ordinary Chinese people. </p>
<p>Naivety and ignorance are often cited as justifications for this stereotyping. As one argument has it, ordinary Chinese only reproduce what is offered to them by Hollywood.</p>
<p>This is to some extent true. But, there is evidence from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RmRNfonkdug">museum exhibitions</a> to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=92&v=uV1IRVWnQGA">film festivals</a> that point in another direction. Even people in positions of power in China seem to hold these views. Blaming Hollywood seems a poor defence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92449/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roberto Castillo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s offensive ‘blackface’ skit intended to highlight the positive aspects of China-Africa relations, has done the opposite.Roberto Castillo, Assistant Professor in Cultural Studies, Lingnan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/923622018-02-26T13:40:47Z2018-02-26T13:40:47ZChina’s media struggles to overcome stereotypes of Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207815/original/file-20180226-140217-309rbs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Spring Festival Gala with some Chinese actors in blackface.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For most Chinese people, the <a href="https://www.travelchinaguide.com/essential/holidays/spring-festival.htm">Spring Festival</a> is a time to honour family ties, friendships and acquaintances. </p>
<p>This is what producers of this year’s Annual Spring Festival Gala on China’s national broadcaster, CCTV, probably had in mind when they agreed to include a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAhaj5sG8fc">comedy skit</a> about the growing ties between China and African countries called “Celebrating Together” (同喜同乐). </p>
<p>In a celebration of Sino-African friendship, what could go wrong? In fact, quite a lot. </p>
<p>The 13-minute long skit opens with dozens of African performers, alongside antelopes and a lion, dancing to the tune of Shakira’s “Waka Waka”, all rejoicing over the opening of the China-built Nairobi to Mombasa Railway. They are joined by a group of Kenyan train attendants and the female lead, a Gabonese actress speaking fluent Mandarin. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/siEPxHafx-4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">CCTV’s 2018 Lunar New Year TV Gala.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And, then, a well-known Chinese actress in full blackface comes on stage wearing a colourful yellow dress, fully equipped with oversized butt pads, carrying a fruit plate on her head and leading a cheerful monkey played by an unidentified African actor. </p>
<p>In less than 12 hours, descriptions of the skit were all over <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43081218">international media</a> – always ready to run a “China, the foe” story. Turning to the Twittersphere, the public opinion thermometer of the 21st century, journalists found a divided audience: many called it racist, others argued it was not.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"964312803573141504"}"></div></p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"964149617297248257"}"></div></p>
<p>The skit might not have been ill-intentioned. But it was both culturally and racially insensitive. It also reeked of propaganda and relied on all the stereotypes about Africa that Chinese media claim to be debunking in their public diplomacy activities in the continent.</p>
<h2>Chinese representation of Africa</h2>
<p>It is not the first time that a Chinese state-sanctioned production has misrepresented Africa and African people in such a grotesque way. Last summer, the movie <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt7131870/">“Wolf Warrior 2”</a>, the highest-grossing Chinese film ever, managed to bring together in a single movie all the clichés of Hollywood’s white-saviour subgenre: an unnamed African country affected by a deadly disease descends into chaos as civil war erupts. That is, until a Chinese mercenary comes to the rescue. </p>
<p>All film scripts in China <a href="http://americanfilmmarket.com/working-in-film-in-china/">must be pre-approved</a> before production starts and they must get a final green light before they’re released. CCTV’s Spring Festival Gala also goes through multiple stages of supervision. Sometimes movies and TV acts are tossed out because a red flag is raised. That clearly didn’t happen this time.</p>
<p>Neither “Wolf Warrior 2” nor the Spring Festival Gala were conceived with global audiences in mind. They are cultural artefacts that speak to domestic audiences and, as such, they are tuned to the so-called <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=FL3RCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA20&lpg=PA20&dq=jiang+zemin+main+melody&source=bl&ots=VQfyj0-OQz&sig=qv0ow-GvWaCvwBAVR2bCDnI9lpI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjejLPgjcPZAhULC8AKHXhcB88Q6AEIQzAI#v=onepage&q=jiang%20zemin%20main%20melody&f=false">“main melody”</a>, a concept often attributed to China’s President in the 1990s, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20038774">Jiang Zemin</a>. Cultural products that dance to the main melody need to be aesthetically attractive to the masses, but remain politically aligned with the doctrine of the Communist Party.</p>
<p>China has a different repertoire for global audiences. As part of its quest to improve its image overseas, Beijing has promoted the expansion of companies like CGTN, Xinhua, China Daily and StarTimes. All have a strong presence in Africa, where they claim to be presenting a different view of the continent and its people.</p>
<p>These efforts are hit hard every time a gaffe, such as the CCTV’s skit, goes on air.</p>
<h2>Savannas and safaris</h2>
<p>Chinese media portray Africa in stereotypes not dissimilar to the rest of the world. The continent is routinely treated as a single unit, erasing its linguistic, racial and cultural diversity. It is often associated with cliched images such as savannas and safaris and its transformations over the last 30 years reduced to a market logic under the tagline “Africa rising”. </p>
<p>While misrepresentations of Africa are not an exclusive problem of Chinese media, two things set China apart.</p>
<p>As the release of <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1825683/">“Black Panther”</a> has shown, many in the US are ready to engage in an open discussion about how the US movie industry has, for decades, failed to address racial biases. </p>
<p>In China, criticism of the CCTV African skit <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/02/sensitive-words-spring-festival-gala-2018/">on social media has been censored</a>. This is not surprising, given that, every year, Chinese censors work hard to erase negative comments of a show that has gone from being a must-watch for many Chinese families to a source of memes and jokes for younger generations.</p>
<p>This suggests that China needs to have a conversation about racial insensitivity, which is too common and too often dismissed as cultural specificity. The cultural specificity argument goes like this: while something might be considered offensive in the “West” (for example, blackface), it is not in China, and, therefore, there is no need to feel offended by it. </p>
<h2>Hard to say sorry</h2>
<p>For a long time Beijing has kept a double narrative going in its media strategy – one for domestic consumption and another one for global audiences. This worked in a pre-Internet era.</p>
<p>If China wants to be viewed as a responsible global actor, it needs to find appropriate ways to prevent controversies such as the one created by the offensive CCTV skit. It could, for example, seek out African specialists at Chinese universities to offer expert advise.</p>
<p>More importantly, when errors are made – and Chinese leaders need to accept that nobody is infallible – Beijing needs to be ready to acknowledge them. </p>
<p>Foreign companies, and sometimes foreign media, are forced to issue an apology when their actions are deemed to hurt Chinese people. Will CCTV be offering one? For now, that seems unlikely. Speaking to the press, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lunar-newyear-china-blackface/china-denies-racism-says-hyping-up-tv-blackface-skit-futile-idUSKCN1G60ZE">dismissed the controversy</a> and taken the usual path: attacking those who brought up the issue.</p>
<p>Next time Beijing may want to change its approach. By apologising, it would show the world that it is becoming an empathetic global power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92362/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dani Madrid-Morales does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In China, like in other parts of the world, Africa is routinely treated as a single unit, erasing its linguistic, racial and cultural diversity.Dani Madrid-Morales, PhD Fellow in Media and Communication, City University of Hong KongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/748532017-03-22T06:56:54Z2017-03-22T06:56:54ZAfrica offers a point of cooperation for Xi and Trump<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161582/original/image-20170320-9124-1wtxg6v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping at the recent Asian-African Conference in Jakarta.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Darren Whiteside</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump will meet for the first time at Trump’s opulent Mar-a-Lago golf resort in Florida on <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-xi-to-meet-trump-in-mar-a-lago-on-april-6-7/2017/03/30/5faf60b2-151c-11e7-bb16-269934184168_story.html?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.90d38aedc9cf">April 6-7</a>. There’s no indication yet that they will discuss Africa. But both major powers have extensive and often complementary interests that are of benefit to the continent. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/world/asia/xi-jinping-trump-mar-a-lago.html?_r=0">familiar list</a> of more intractable economic and security issues will likely be on the table. It could be a positive counterpoint if both Beijing and Washington affirm a willingness to explore trilateral cooperation with African governments.</p>
<p>Trump has shown little awareness so far of the history of cooperation between China, the US and Africa. He also seems unaware of the extraordinary degree of bi-partisan support for US engagement in Africa and Sino-American cooperation. But if he’s the consummate dealmaker he purports to be then low risk, high returns of greater US-China-Africa cooperation should be irresistible. </p>
<p>Xi would have to take the lead. He has a much deeper knowledge of African affairs than Trump and has travelled extensively on the continent. Last year he <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-and-africa-theres-strategy-but-the-search-for-substance-goes-on-51937">co-chaired</a> the Sixth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation with South African President Jacob Zuma. He’s also able to draw on assessments that have already been done of key areas where practical and mutually beneficial cooperation among China, the US and Africa has occurred or could be beneficial.</p>
<h2>History of co-operation</h2>
<p>It’s been several years since Xi’s then special representative on African affairs Zhong Jinhua and US Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan Princeton Lyman began informally discussing African issues of mutual concern. They were, at the time, working to resolve the Sudan crises. This work continued later under the auspices of the independent Carter Centre in Atlanta. Zhong and Lyman, who is Special Advisor to the President of the US Institute for Peace, also served as their nation’s ambassadors to South Africa.</p>
<p>Mohamed Ibn Chambas, a distinguished Ghanaian lawyer, diplomat, academic, and currently special representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel, is the other coequal African partner in this exploration.</p>
<p>On March 3 Chambas, Lyman, Zhong and Carter Centre Associate Director John Goodman <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-03-03/where-china-united-states-and-african-governments-can-work-together">published</a> the project’s initial report. It concludes that Africans, Americans, and Chinese agree on five broad goals:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Economic growth and development</p></li>
<li><p>Combating disease</p></li>
<li><p>Mitigating conflict</p></li>
<li><p>Enhancing political stability</p></li>
<li><p>Fighting violent extremism and organised crime.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Economic growth and development may be the least promising area for immediate practical steps in trilateral cooperation. But the report cites numerous examples of progress in the other areas.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161584/original/image-20170320-9108-18dybhy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161584/original/image-20170320-9108-18dybhy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161584/original/image-20170320-9108-18dybhy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161584/original/image-20170320-9108-18dybhy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161584/original/image-20170320-9108-18dybhy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161584/original/image-20170320-9108-18dybhy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161584/original/image-20170320-9108-18dybhy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Donald Trump.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Jonathan Ernst</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For instance, since 2010 China and the US have coordinated efforts in a larger multilateral effort to eliminate piracy off the Horn of Africa. The report also envisions growing opportunities for trilateral cooperation to ensure greater maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. This includes, as the report explains, applying antipiracy lessons learned in the successful Gulf of Aden antipiracy campaign.</p>
<p>An inter-regional cooperation centre called for in the “Yaounde Code of Conduct” is a promising partner for China and US assistance. The code was drawn up by 22 central and west African states to protect the region’s waters. It was subsequently endorsed at the African Union Summit in Lome, Togo. </p>
<p>The code urges that a forum among these states should regularly share information about maritime activities. This could possibly evolve into a cooperation centre, similar to one that exists for states with interests in the Gulf of Aden. </p>
<p>The trilateral report also suggests extending intra-regional security cooperation north of the Gulf of Guinea. This would address the extremist threats posed by organisations causing havoc across the region – among them al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram. China and the US are already separately rendering counter-terrorism assistance to African governments. Greater coordination will be needed in this realm, too.</p>
<p>And the report recommends that China and the US to provide greater support for the AU’s goal to end the continent’s wars by 2020. </p>
<p>It’s been difficult for both Washington and Beijing to share information to avoid duplication and facilitate effectiveness. Mutual suspicions run deep. These have been exacerbated by Trump’s <a href="http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/trumps-foreign-policy-incoherence/">rhetoric and incoherent policies</a>. And his recent budget proposals would <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-federal-budget-2018-massive-cuts-to-the-arts-science-and-the-poor/2017/03/15/0a0a0094-09a1-11e7-a15f-a58d4a988474_story.html?utm_term=.15f5dce84ab9">cut US support for critical programs</a> vital for Africa and in areas where Sino-US cooperation could be vital. </p>
<p>Ironically, US policies toward Africa and China have enjoyed exceptional bi-partisan support in Congress and successive US Presidents for decades. Trump’s renunciation of America’s commitment to cooperate with China and other nations to mitigate climate change and help Africa adapt would be especially <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-vs-africa-how-the-thecontinent-can-counter-destructive-policies-71569">damaging</a>.</p>
<p>But there are conflict and security issues that Trump appears willing to invest in. These are highlighted in the report. And although Trump proposes deep cuts for international health, China and the US worked quickly and effectively in helping Africans overcome the deadly 2014 Ebola crisis in West Africa, before it spread abroad – including to the US.</p>
<p>Let’s hope Xi at least nudges Trump in the direction of cooperation. If managed correctly, it could greatly benefit all three parties.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74853/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If US President Donald Trump is the consummate dealmaker he purports to be, he should find the low risk, high returns of greater US-China-Africa cooperation irresistible.John J Stremlau, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/697332016-12-21T19:52:24Z2016-12-21T19:52:24ZChina’s new commercial media is complicating the Party’s good news narrative about Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148638/original/image-20161205-19414-1rbh2bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A stack of Southern Weekly newspapers (left) are displayed at a newsstand in Beijing,</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the Chinese government started introducing <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5237748.stm">economic reforms</a> in the early 1980s the Chinese media has experienced widespread decentralisation and commercialisation. It has become huge, dynamic and at times contradictory. </p>
<p>Although all media outlets are under the control of the Communist Party-led state, the market economy has given rise to an unprecedented proliferation of media outlets. This has, to some extent, undermined the party media system. While some papers such as the <a href="http://www.people.com.cn/">People’s Daily</a> still operate purely as state mouthpieces, commercial media outlets are guided by commercial imperatives as well as political duties. </p>
<p>Many Chinese journalists also now understand and practice their work differently. They accept the western idea of professional journalism. They believe that they have a responsibility to serve the public, in addition to the Party or economic elites. </p>
<p>It’s against this backdrop that I undertook a comparative study of the coverage of Africa in the <a href="http://www.people.com.cn/">People’s Daily</a> and the more commercialised <a href="http://www.infzm.com/">Southern Weekly</a>. This revealed very different portrayals of the continent. </p>
<p>The extensive and largely positive coverage in the People’s Daily suggests that China’s leadership would like to construct a positive image of Africa and African countries for readers in China. Southern Weekly, meanwhile, presents a more narrow and negative image of the continent. </p>
<p>These differences have implications for the way that African countries and people are represented to Chinese news audiences. These representations shape public attitudes towards the continent.</p>
<h2>A tale of two agendas</h2>
<p>People’s Daily is a national, state media outlet distributed across the country. It serves as the most direct window into the opinions of China’s national leadership. Most of the paper’s subscribers are government organisations and it has an annual distribution of more than <a href="http://www.people.com.cn/GB/50142/104580/index.html">three million</a>, according to its website. </p>
<p>The Southern Weekly is based in the highly commercialised Guangdong province, next to Hong Kong. It was established in 1984 and is known for its hard-hitting investigative journalism and its commercialised operation. It enjoys a <a href="http://www.infzm.com/aboutus.shtml">readership</a> of 1.7 million, which has been rising by 15% each year since its launch.</p>
<p>Unlike People’s Daily which is mainly read by officials or civil servants, Southern Weekly is mostly sold over the counter. It has 19 distribution bureaus across the country and a brand name worth <a href="http://www.infzm.com/aboutus.shtml">RMB8,389 billion</a>, according to its website. </p>
<p>The frequency with which these two papers cover stories about Africa is significantly different. In 2014, for example, People’s Daily reported on Africa and Sino-Africa relations 634 times. Southern Weekly, in contrast, had only five reports over the year. </p>
<p>There are also differences in terms of content and focus between the two publications, as the two graphs below show. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148643/original/image-20161205-19367-vf9rms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148643/original/image-20161205-19367-vf9rms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148643/original/image-20161205-19367-vf9rms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=265&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148643/original/image-20161205-19367-vf9rms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=265&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148643/original/image-20161205-19367-vf9rms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=265&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148643/original/image-20161205-19367-vf9rms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148643/original/image-20161205-19367-vf9rms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148643/original/image-20161205-19367-vf9rms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">These graphs show the thematic focus of the coverage of Africa in the People’s Daily (left) and Southern Weekly (right) between 2003 and 2014.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One significant difference is that between 2003 and 2014 People’s Daily consistently reported on Sino-African politics and diplomacy (62%), with a focus on meetings between leaders. For Southern Weekly, however, coverage of this kind took up only 34% of its total Africa coverage. </p>
<p>People’s Daily’s coverage of Africa was more comprehensive and balanced. It was more likely to leave a positive impression on readers.</p>
<p>Southern Weekly focused more on what was making international headlines at the time. It appealed to its readers by telling engaging but sensational stories, which were likely to leave a negative impression. </p>
<p>The coverage of the <a href="http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/index.html">Ebola outbreak</a> demonstrates this well. Following the outbreak in 2014 both papers increased their reports on disease. The Southern Weekly’s reports increased to 40% of its total coverage of Africa. On the other hand People’s Daily’s coverage only took up 14% of its total African coverage. </p>
<p>Fluctuations in People’s Daily’s coverage demonstrate how its message is closely related to Sino-African cooperation dynamics. </p>
<p>For example, peaks in its coverage of Africa in 2006 and then again in 2010 and 2011 coincided with major foreign policy initiatives. In 2006, the Chinese government released China’s first white paper on Sino-African relations. The second peak followed the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation at the end of 2009. This meeting led to agreement on an action plan to further strengthen China-Africa cultural cooperation between 2010 and 2012.</p>
<p>In contrast, there was not much difference in Southern Weekly’s coverage over those years. The range of reports on Africa was also much narrower, with a focus on war and conflicts. 2011 was unique for its high frequency due to the outbreak of civil war in Libya. </p>
<p>This shows that the commercial paper is more likely to cover big news stories than to follow the government’s priorities. And the commercial paper does not follow the political paper’s practice of prioritising positive news. </p>
<h2>Public perceptions matter</h2>
<p>The Chinese government has invested heavily in the Sino-African relationship, including the construction of a positive image of Africa, but commercial newspapers have their own agenda and priorities. These often clash with the government’s.</p>
<p>These contradictory representations help to form a picture of the Chinese public’s view of Africa. </p>
<p>They point to the possibility that the Chinese government may face challenges from a public that may not agree with its activities in Africa. Even for an unelected government, popular legitimacy is still a major concern. </p>
<p>With the rise of limited and largely negative coverage of the continent, Chinese citizens may come to disagree with the government’s aid activities in Africa. The government may also find less enthusiastic participation in its cultural exchanges with Africa. </p>
<p>For the increasing number of African migrants to China, the risk is that they may also find themselves less welcome. </p>
<p><strong>Author’s note: this article is based on research which will shorty be published as ‘Media Construction of African Image(s) for the Chinese Media Public’ in K. Batchelor and X. Zhang (eds). <em>China-Africa Relations: Building Images through Cultural Cooperation, Media Representation, and Communication</em> (Routledge)</strong></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69733/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Xiaoling Zhang receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, UK. </span></em></p>The Chinese government has an interest in presenting a positive narrative about Africa to its citizens. But the new commercial media is challenging this by prioritising sensational stories.Xiaoling Zhang, Curriculum Deputy Director, Faculty of Social Science, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/634162016-11-17T19:06:42Z2016-11-17T19:06:42ZChinese literature in Africa: meaningful or simply ceremonial?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146062/original/image-20161115-31148-nr9nmh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A South African Buddhist celebrates the Chinese New Year at Nan Hua Buddhist temple in Bronkhorstpruit, South Africa</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sino-African relations have garnered a great deal of public interest in recent decades. Commentary tends to focus on <a href="http://www.reporting-focac.com/5-must-read-china-africa-books.html">trade, economic investment and aid</a> and is often negative in tone. Based on interviews I conducted in Benin in early 2015, culture is perceived as the most positive aspect of the relationship. Cultural exchange is a crucial domain of interaction, and one in which China is investing heavily.</p>
<p>China has a <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/culture/2014-09/30/content_18687863.htm">growing ambition</a> to become a major world cultural power and to compete with Western cultural influence. If China aims to counter the cultural hegemony of the West, the translation and exporting of its literature plays a vital role. </p>
<p>The export of its cultural products is key if China is to gain visibility on the global stage. In 2006 the Chinese government announced a strategic <a href="https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2006/09/13/outline-of-the-national-11th-five-year-plan-period-cultural-development-plan/">five-year plan</a> for cultural development. Numerous projects were launched to promote China’s publication exports. The most well known of these is the <a href="http://www.chinabookinternational.org/aboutcbi/Project/">China Book International</a> programme. This is sponsored by the government to sell its printed media abroad.</p>
<p>As Chinese scholar Li Mingjiang has <a href="http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/2/287.extract">observed</a>, the distribution of Chinese literature abroad is a tool for “cultivating a better image of China” and “correcting foreign misperceptions”.</p>
<p>To understand the dynamics of Sino-African cultural exchanges better we <a href="https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/research/groups/ctccs/projects/building-images.aspx">did a survey</a> of Chinese literature available in translation across Africa.</p>
<p>The results are far from exhaustive. They suggest that the strategy has had limited success. But they also highlight isolated cases that exemplify the potential for mutual enrichment.</p>
<p>The research suggests that the translation of Chinese literature in Africa primarily fulfils a ceremonial and diplomatic function. The ceremonies around <a href="http://windowofshanghai.library.sh.cn">book donations</a> to African libraries are a key example. Much more needs to be done to generate meaningful cultural interaction and exchange. </p>
<h2>Limited success so far</h2>
<p>A great deal of translated Chinese literature comes from publishing houses in France, the UK and the US, and not directly from China. The available literature is therefore generally in European languages – primarily English and French. UNESCO’s <a href="http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=7810&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html">Index Translationum</a> cites 2331 translations from Chinese into English and 1508 into French.</p>
<p>Filtering Chinese literature through Western intermediaries and languages determines which books are distributed in African countries. It also affects where the books end up. For example, many of the titles published in French are tucked away in the libraries of various <a href="http://www.institutfrancais.com/fr">Instituts Français</a> in Francophone countries rather than in public libraries and bookshops. </p>
<p>There is also a noticeable shortage of translations into African languages. The <a href="http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=7810&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html">index</a> shows that, apart from a few translations into Arabic, there is not a single translation of a Chinese literary text into an African language. This excludes a wide range of African readers and creates a barrier to more direct intercultural dialogue between China and African countries. </p>
<p>One possible difficulty in increasing the number of translations is the lack of authors and translators with the necessary linguistic skills. Another major contributing factor is the lack of a developed print industry and availability of printed publications in many African countries. </p>
<h2>Promising signs</h2>
<p>One recent promising case demonstrates the potential benefits of meaningful cultural exchange.</p>
<p>A collection of poetry by the award-winning Chinese poet <a href="https://paper-republic.org/authors/jidi-majia/">Jidi Majia</a> has recently been published in Kiswahili. The collection, <a href="http://twawezacommunications.org/maneno-ya-moto-kutoka-china-book-launch/">Maneno Ya Moto Kutoka China</a>, is heralded as the first creative work of Chinese literature to be translated into the lingua franca of Kenya, Tanzania and much of southeast Africa. </p>
<p>Jidi Majia is a prize-winning Chinese poet of the minority Yi nationality who claims an affinity with African writers. Choosing to translate a contemporary poet from a minority community in China might appear to be an unusual choice for a first publication in Kiswahili. The <a href="http://en.fltrp.com">Chinese publisher</a> said the decision was taken to ensure that the writings of a poet from a Chinese minority group can be seen by different peoples of different cultures. </p>
<p>This type of publication opens a window to Chinese culture for African people wishing to read in their native and national languages. African scholars also argue that publishing in Kiswahili and other African languages is important for <a href="http://qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/9165/8_15_ogechi.pdf">enhancing adult literacy</a> and combating the scarcity of reading material available in these languages.</p>
<h2>No coherent strategy</h2>
<p>Despite a few examples, the translation of Chinese literature into African languages remains extremely limited. Rather than being part of a coherent translation strategy, these projects depend on individual collaborations.</p>
<p>What might a coherent strategy look like? I would suggest that there should be efforts to build collaborations between Chinese and local African publishing houses without going via a European or Western intermediary. At the moment, these are rare. But they do begin to outline what meaningful relationships may look like. These relationships could engage the African literary community of editors, translators and authors. At the same time China could gain a more direct line of access to a broad African readership.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63416/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research stems from the project 'Building Images: exploring 21st century Sino-African dynamics through cultural exchange and translation', which was funded by the AHRC from 2014-2016; Dr Catherine Gilbert was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow on this project from 2014-2015.</span></em></p>Much of the recent commentary on Sino-African relations has a negative tone. But genuine cultural exchange holds the promise of mutual enrichment.Catherine Gilbert, Teaching Fellow in Comparative Literature, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/509342015-11-26T07:32:16Z2015-11-26T07:32:16ZChina-Africa summit: what to look for beyond the hype and hypocrisy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103300/original/image-20151126-28303-can2xp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China's choice of South Africa to host the China-Africa summit underscores the special relationship between the two countries.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Petar Kujundzic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Beijing’s selection of South Africa to host the China-Africa heads of state <a href="http://au.int/en/partnerships/africa_china">summit</a> may indicate Chinese President Xi Jinping’s personal commitment to the continent. This is the first time the summit is being held at this level in Africa.</p>
<p>It may also show his desire to reassure Africa that, despite recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-economic-slowdown-threatens-african-progress-49544">sharp declines</a> in China’s trade and investment, the Chinese view is that this partnership is of long-term importance. And perhaps it signals China’s deepening special relationship with South Africa.</p>
<p>So, what are we to expect?</p>
<p>The Chinese government supports regional and sub-regional integration in Africa for many practical reasons. These relate to the scale and viability of its investments and the need to overcome the bewildering complexity of working with 54 sovereign states.</p>
<p>Xi might be open to a more robust political dialogue on issues of African democracy, elections and good governance for two other related reasons:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>to advance peace and security; and</p></li>
<li><p>to develop more politically capable states.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>For his part, South African President Jacob Zuma is likely to avoid drawing attention to the significance of holding <a href="http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys_1/">the summit</a> in a democracy. This won’t be out of a sense of false modesty but rather a misplaced respect for the several ageing African autocrats in attendance. </p>
<p>It will also be in deference to his Chinese friends, from whom Zuma is reportedly seeking major funding for several <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/zuma-china">grand national projects</a>.</p>
<h2>Deciphering the platitudes</h2>
<p>The only formal work for the leaders will be to endorse the latest version of a familiar triennial <a href="http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t954620.htm">action plan</a>. This will cover joint economic, development and cultural initiatives.</p>
<p>The only drama is likely to be the media speculation about the size of the new loan package Xi is expected to announce. China made a <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/%7E/media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/01/foresight-africa/china-africa-cooperation-sun.pdf?la=en">US$20 billion</a> commitment to the continent in 2012, augmented by another $10 billion a year later.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, we should listen carefully to the pro-democracy comments leaders offer as the preferred political foundation for pan-African integration and Sino-African co-operation. From these we should try to discern new political realities beneath the hypocrisy and hype.</p>
<p>China has always been an outspoken advocate of African unity. And Xi is expected to reiterate commitment to Africa’s Agenda 2063 for:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He is also likely to repeat China’s support for <a href="http://www.au.int/">African Union</a> commission chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s vision for a United States of Africa. The vision, which has been endorsed by all member states, has as a central goal: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and rule of law. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Xi invokes similar terms when he speaks of China <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-21">becoming</a>, by the middle of the century:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… a modern socialist country that is prosperous, democratic, and culturally advanced.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such promises may not matter to millions of socially active Chinese citizens, who have taken part in the more than 200,000 annual <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=EQEVAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA10&lpg=PA10&dq=Public+Protests+in+China,+200+000&source=bl&ots=UDlAgTJTRo&sig=uS0ZXFfu2sxIINrxON844V4paXY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiB6sPyw6vJAhVCyRQKHXDfCaMQ6AEIJzAC#v=onepage&q=Public%20Protests%20in%20China%2C%20200%20000&f=false">public protests</a>. The protests are often as severely suppressed as anti-government demonstrations in African countries.</p>
<h2>The right to intervene</h2>
<p>African countries have granted the African Union unprecedented <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/">powers</a> for a regional or international organisation: the right to intervene in any of its members for humanitarian and human rights reasons. </p>
<p>China continues to declare its strict adherence to non-interference. But it is showing a willingness to support African preventive intervention and more assertive peace enforcement. This is especially since two dramatic events:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>its costly 2011 <a href="http://worldblog.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/03/6181345-china-organizes-hasty-retreat-from-libya">emergency evacuation</a> of nearly 36,000 Chinese oil workers from Libya; and</p></li>
<li><p>last year’s forced abandonment of its huge investments in <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55056">South Sudan</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The African Union’s <a href="http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf">Constitutive Act</a> also endorses an approach to political capacity-building in Africa that strongly favours civic over ethnic nationalism. </p>
<p>Africa, after all, is the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/05/16/a-revealing-map-of-the-worlds-most-and-least-ethnically-diverse-countries/">most ethnically diverse</a> and conflict-prone region in the world. It is also plagued by complex emergencies and costly multilateral peacekeeping operations. </p>
<p>China appears to be quite different. More than 90% of its people are ethnic Han. But there are also more than 55 ethnic minorities. Many of these are seeking greater <a href="http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/are-ethnic-tensions-rise-china">self-determination</a>.</p>
<p>The African Union’s unanimously adopted <a href="http://www.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf">African Charter</a> on democracy, elections and governance came into effect in 2012. It is a far more progressive and ambitious attempt to advance pan-African civic nationalism than has ever been undertaken in China. And it is an experiment that even a few Chinese diplomats and scholars I have spoken to think might someday hold lessons for political reform in China.</p>
<p>China ostensibly shares the African Union’s commitment to civic nationalism, but ignores its own constitutional <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm">provisions</a> for the protection of basic human rights and civil liberties. These include freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly. Virtually all African states have founding documents with similar provisions. But, unlike China, they hold regular national elections, albeit of varying degrees of integrity.</p>
<p>Democratic elections are a necessary, if limited, condition for peacefully and legally accommodating factional domestic conflict. This is a step China may not be prepared to take domestically. But it has begun deploying election observation missions in Africa. I met one when leading an <a href="http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/observed.html">observation</a> team to the 2013 Madagascar elections. Democratic elections were a key milestone in the <a href="http://www.sadc.int/files/2613/8675/7746/Launch_Statement_Round_TWO_Madagascar_09-12-2013docx.pdf">Southern African Development Community’s</a> “road map” to help secure a peaceful transition and prevent further deadly conflict.</p>
<p>China is the world’s most economically successful authoritarian government. It will continue favouring like-minded authoritarian regimes, notably non-resource-rich Ethiopia and Rwanda.</p>
<p>But it also shows surprising interest in, and support for, a variety of African democratic experiments. Listening to Xi, and watching how he and his subordinates respond to democratic developments in Africa, may be more indicative of the endurance of the partnership than fluctuations in trade and investment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50934/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Africa-China summit will provide an opportunity to get a feel for how Chinese President Xi Jinping is responding to democratic developments in Africa.John J Stremlau, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.