tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/south-african-parliament-35706/articlesSouth African parliament – The Conversation2021-08-25T15:10:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1666822021-08-25T15:10:58Z2021-08-25T15:10:58ZSouth Africa’s new Speaker of parliament has sparked controversy – for good reason<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417570/original/file-20210824-19-1xmi0kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's controversial new Speaker of Parliament, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ruvan Boshoff/Xinhua via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Thursday 19 August the members of South Africa’s National Assembly convened physically <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/national-assembly-elects-ms-nosiviwe-mapisa-nqakula-speaker">for the first time in a while</a>. They met in several locations in parliament to achieve sufficient distancing in the pandemic. And there was only one item on the order paper: the election of a Speaker. </p>
<p>This was duly done and the former minister of defence, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, was <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-08-19-new-national-assembly-speaker-nosiviwe-mapisa-nqakula-extends-hand-of-cooperation-to-all/">elected to the office</a>. </p>
<p>The Speaker in South Africa presides over proceedings in the National Assembly. They also are the titular head of parliament as a whole, including the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/national-council-provinces">National Council of Provinces</a>. The Speaker is elected by a majority of members of the assembly, and may be removed in the same way. </p>
<p>The Speaker is responsible for providing political leadership and strategic direction to the National Assembly. And they should do so in a nonpartisan manner. </p>
<p>Why was this an important temperature check for the state of health of South Africa’s constitutional democracy?</p>
<p>This question must be answered against the background of the ingrained identity politics which characterise the country’s long history of racial oppression and its <a href="https://origins.osu.edu/sites/origins.osu.edu/files/origins-archive/Volume2Issue2Article3.pdf">relatively recent reversal</a>. It would, therefore, have been unrealistic in the first years of democracy to expect conscientious adherence to the unwritten rules and conventional spirit that ideally should prevail in parliament. But the expectation was that this would gradually be achieved. </p>
<p>Indeed, those who served in the position immediately after the country’s first democratic election <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994">in 1994</a> did so with distinction. However, over most of the past 15 years the Speaker has been both weak and partisan, and was responsible for allowing the executive, particularly that of former president Jacob Zuma, to conduct themselves in ways that have brought the government into disrepute.</p>
<p>The election of the new Speaker was thus a significant moment for the governing African National Congress (ANC) to show that it was moving away from its <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-anc-itself-is-the-chief-impediment-to-ramaphosas-agenda-108781">“wasted years”</a> under Zuma.</p>
<p>It failed the test. Mapisa-Nqakula’s elevation to this significant constitutional office reflects extremely poorly on the party leadership. It contrasts starkly with President Cyril Ramaphosa’s oft-stated commitment to uncorrupt governance and to the <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nation-address-16-feb-2018-0000">values of the constitution</a>.</p>
<h2>A brief history of the role</h2>
<p>The title given to the highest authority in parliament originated in the English parliament in the late 1300s. It then described the person who “spoke” on behalf of the monarch. After the <a href="https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-glorious-revolution-of-1688/">“Glorious Revolution” of 1688</a>, the Speaker became the presiding officer in the House of Commons. </p>
<p>South Africa inherited that office and title as a former British colony, together with almost all other members of the <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/">Commonwealth</a>. </p>
<p>Any legislature needs someone to chair its proceedings, to manage and administer the support services, to oversee the exercise of discipline among its members, and to represent it in discussions with the executive and judicial arms of government.</p>
<p>Various approaches are taken towards the impartiality and independence of the office of Speaker. </p>
<p>In the UK, an MP is elected as Speaker immediately <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/about/faqs/house-of-commons-faqs/speakers-election/">after a general election</a>. The person is generally a member of the governing party, but does not have to be. On election the MP ceases to be a member of the party caucus. </p>
<p>In the US the <a href="https://history.house.gov/People/Office/Speakers-Intro/">Speaker of the House of Representatives</a> is drawn from the senior ranks of the majority party in the lower house of Congress. They play a partisan role, balanced with a degree of fair play towards all members of the house. </p>
<p>Most other national constitutions position their equivalent of the Speaker between these two approaches.</p>
<h2>What the job entails</h2>
<p>As the parliamentary <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/na-presiding-officers">website </a> provides, the Speaker’s responsibilities include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>preserving parliamentary integrity and the decorum of the house, </p></li>
<li><p>ensuring the smooth running of legislative business and the functioning of committees, </p></li>
<li><p>presiding impartially over sittings and maintaining order. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The Speaker represents parliament as a whole. Their responsibilities include ensuring sufficient budget for its activities, monitoring expenditure and the provision of support for all MPs, and initiating or responding to any litigation in the courts. </p>
<p>In terms of South Africa’s <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a>, the Speaker heads the legislative branch of government, and should act as its champion at all times, both nationally and internationally. This is particularly the case in its relationship with the executive.</p>
<p>Effective fulfilment of all these functions requires a highly efficient, dignified, respected and wise MP. The experience of the past 27 years has been patchy.</p>
<h2>Rollcall of speakers</h2>
<p>An exemplary start was made by <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/dr-frene-noshir-ginwala">Frene Ginwala</a>, who served for the first decade of democratic government. She ruled with a firm yet fair hand, and presided over many initiatives to transform parliament from its lapdog role under apartheid to the vision set in the constitution. The ideal is that parliament represents the electorate and also plays an effective role in regulating the exercise of executive power. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.gov.za/speech-max-sisulu-mp-speaker-national-assembly-ceremonial-court-session-honour-late-former-chief">Max Sisulu</a> (2009-2014) and latterly <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/thandi-modise/">Thandi Modise</a> (2019-2021) broadly followed the Ginwala approach. </p>
<p>Regrettably, the double tenure (2004-2008 and 2014-2019) of <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/baleka-mbete-honourable">Baleka Mbete</a> fell far short of the expectations of the Speaker’s office. On her watch, particularly in her second term, she was frequently accused of treating opposition MPs less favourably than government MPs. She was also accused of <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-sas-parliament-redeem-itself-as-an-oversight-mechanism">blocking parliamentary investigations</a> into actions of the ruling ANC, in particular Zuma. </p>
<p>Indeed, in May this year, she testified at the Zondo Commission into state capture that she had <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2021-05-18-i-ignored-authorless-arms-deal-report-and-would-do-it-again-says-baleka-mbete/">ignored an anonymous whistle-blower’s report alleging corruption</a> in 2007. And, she said, if called upon to decide how to respond to any such report today, she would do so again.</p>
<h2>Flawed system</h2>
<p>The problems surrounding the role of the Speaker in South Africa are rooted in the autocratic racism of our past. The ability to transcend it is eroded by <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-ripe-for-electoral-reform-why-its-time-might-have-come-157149">the electoral system </a> and by the organising principle of the ANC. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Election-types/">party-list proportional representation model</a> means that only loyal party members will be elected to any legislature in the country. This leads to the tendency to put party interests before those of the country. </p>
<p>This is substantially compounded by the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248962959_The_Lack_of_Internal_Party_Democracy_in_the_African_National_Congress_A_Threat_to_the_Consolidation_of_Democracy_in_South_Africa">“democratic centralist”</a> basis on which the ANC is modelled. This approach maintains that a degree of disagreement and debate is tolerated within closed party meetings, but that, once a decision or policy is adopted by the majority, every party member has to adhere uncritically to that line. </p>
<p>The consequences for any Speaker are self-evident.</p>
<p>By definition, someone who is appointed as Speaker will be a senior member of the ruling party, steeped in its history, culture and traditions. This is unacceptably reinforced when the Speaker remains an office bearer of the party, as was seen with Mbete, who was national shairperson of the ANC while serving as Speaker. </p>
<p>Mapisa-Nqakula was elected to serve as Speaker after being dropped from the cabinet following an utterly undistinguished period of 15 years <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/from-fired-minister-to-speaker-of-parliament-mapisa-nqakula-is-ancs-candidate-20210811">as a cabinet minister in three portfolios</a>.
She is herself the subject of investigation by a committee of Parliament for <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/investigations/exclusive-jets-hotels-and-wigs-mps-investigate-graft-allegations-against-nosiviwe-mapisa-nqakula-20210819">alleged unethical conduct</a>. And she’s been under a cloud for unaccountable and suspect misuse of her authority a number of times. </p>
<p>Parliament’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/opposition-parties-distance-themselves-from-thandi-modises-apology-to-zondo-commission-20210602">failure</a> to hold the Zuma administration to account has been graphically and repeatedly illustrated in evidence to the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">Zondo commission</a>. Given this shockingly delinquent failure by parliament to fulfil its constitutional obligations, the prospects are at best bleak of the new Speaker tolerating, let alone initiating, any more active and effective scrutiny in the next few years. </p>
<p>The temperature check reveals an ailing system of public governance, unable to shift from the burdens of the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166682/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hugh Corder is Professor Emeritus of Public Law at UCT. He has received funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa. He is a director of Freedom under Law and a member of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution. </span></em></p>The ANC’s choice of parliamentary Speaker reflects poorly on the party leadership and contrasts starkly with President Cyril Ramaphosa’s commitment to uncorrupt governance.Hugh Corder, Professor of Public Law, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1483792020-11-01T07:57:35Z2020-11-01T07:57:35ZSouth Africa has another go at an expropriation law. What it’s all about<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366387/original/file-20201029-17-xy1661.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young Sandi Sile on an abandoned structure in Makhanda, South Africa, in 2013. Questions remain about how the new law will treat abandoned land. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When South Africa officially became a constitutional democracy in South Africa on <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1">4 February 1997</a> it heralded profound change in the way the country is governed. Once a racially oppressive pariah state, it became one based on freedom, human rights and the rule of law. </p>
<p>All laws that were not in keeping with the new constitution had to be changed to give effect to the rights enshrined in the new supreme law. One such law is the Expropriation Act, which governs how the government can acquire land owned by private citizens for public purposes such as building roads and railways. </p>
<p>The constitution changed the compensation standard from requiring the government to pay “market value” for such land to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321670076_What_is_just_and_equitable_compensation_for_land_reform">“just and equitable”</a> compensation. The requirement that expropriation be in the public interest (which includes a commitment to land reform and other reforms) was included. The requirement that a fair procedure be followed when expropriating was included in section 33 of the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-02.pdf">bill of rights</a>. </p>
<p>The constitution laid down a framework in which expropriation must happen, but did not provide the details of how. This is the role of legislation. Such legislation is necessary to bring the process in line with the constitution.</p>
<h2>Long, arduous process</h2>
<p>The first attempt at an Expropriation Bill was 12 years ago, in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjk_fL937jsAhWQx4UKHaT3As0QFjAAegQIAhAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fpmg.org.za%2Ffiles%2Fbills%2F080416b16-08.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2E61_FpIKOugF8btpYSAGm">2008</a>, but it was shelved because of the concern that it obscured the role of the courts in expropriation and would therefore be declared unconstitutional. </p>
<p>Another attempt was made in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjiw5Tn37jsAhWBqqQKHXj-A4wQFjAAegQIAhAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gov.za%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fgcis_document%2F201409%2F36269gen234.pdf&usg=AOvVaw08hwxR5n2yTB8RbEdyd3gM">2013</a>. The 2013 bill was refined and became the 2015 bill, which made it onto the table of the president the same year, to be signed into law. But it was officially <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26932/">withdrawn</a> in 2018 because the process of amending section 25 of the constitution was still not completed. Communities living on land in terms of customary law also had <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-12-24-draft-expropriation-bill-a-disappointment-for-land-rights-organisation/">reservations</a> about its constitutionality, including the public participation process. </p>
<p>The country is having another attempt at passing an expropriation law that is in keeping with the constitution. The 2015 version, with slight amendments and the addition of clauses 12(3) dealing with “nil compensation”, was published again in December 2018.</p>
<p>This new bill, the <a href="https://www.dalrrd.gov.za/docs/media/2020%2010%2011%20JOINT%20STATEMENT%20BY%20IMC%20ON%20LAND%20REFORM%20EXPROPRIATION%20BILL.pdf">2020 Expropriation Bill</a>, was recently published in the government gazette. Importantly, this bill is not a result of the process to amend section 25 of the constitution to enable expropriation at nil compensation.</p>
<h2>Section 25 amendment</h2>
<p>Section 25 sets down the requirements that the state has to comply with if it wants to expropriate property: it must be done in terms of a law of general application; it must be for a public purpose or in the public interest; and lastly, “just and equitable” compensation must be paid. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/29530/">proposed section 25 amendment</a> makes it explicit that it might be “just and equitable” in some instances to pay nil compensation. But the state must still justify why not paying compensation is “just and equitable”. All other requirements must still be complied with. </p>
<p>Section 25 of the constitution provides the framework in which the 2020 Expropriation Bill will operate, once it becomes law. </p>
<h2>Why expropriation?</h2>
<p>Expropriation is a mechanism for the state to acquire property for public projects, such as the building of the railways, mass housing and roads. It is not only used in land reform instances, and is not only restricted to land.</p>
<p>Because expropriation is an administrative action by the government, the procedure must be just and give affected people an avenue for recourse in the case of abuse.</p>
<p>The 2020 Expropriation Bill sets out the procedure that the authorities must follow when expropriating property, how compensation must be calculated and paid, and where and when decisions can be challenged. </p>
<p>It includes a comprehensive mediation process, and guarantees access to the courts as the final form of oversight.</p>
<h2>Some contentious issues</h2>
<p>The bill has gone through consultative processes at the <a href="https://nedlac.org.za/">National Economic Development and Labour Council</a>, which facilitates consensus and cooperation between government, labour, business and the community in dealing with South Africa’s socio-economic challenges.</p>
<p>Still, there are a few unclear provisions that will most probably be focused on during the parliamentary public participation process. These are the definitions of “expropriation”, the provision for nil compensation and expropriating land from communities.</p>
<p><strong>Definition</strong></p>
<p>The definition of “expropriation” provides that an act will only be an expropriation if the state <em>acquires</em> the property. The concern is whether, if the property is expropriated for land reform purposes and transferred to a private beneficiary, it will be deemed an “acquisition by the state”. The bill obscures this a bit in clause 9(1)(a) where it seems to suggest that a private beneficiary can also “acquire” the property.</p>
<p>The legally correct route would be for the state to first acquire the property and then transfer it to the beneficiary. These actions can happen simultaneously in the Deeds Office and should not delay the transfer. The bill must reflect this.</p>
<p><strong>Nil compensation</strong></p>
<p>Clause 12(3) and (4) provides that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>it may be just and equitable for nil compensation to be paid where land is expropriated in the public interest, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including but not limited to …</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It then lists the instances where the state possibly foresees nil compensation to be applicable. The bill clarifies that this is, for example, land that is </p>
<blockquote>
<p>not being used and the owner’s main purpose is … to benefit from appreciation of market value. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This might still be vague, but it does give a more precise indication that it is not property earmarked for development.</p>
<p>Similarly, it’s not clear how “abandoned land” will be handled. Will this bear the technical legal meaning that the owner abandoned the land with the intention of no longer being owner? Or will it also include land that the owner left because it was no longer safe to stay on? </p>
<p><strong>Communities</strong></p>
<p>Owners of land earmarked for expropriation have specific time-frames in which they must respond. It seems as if the time-frames in the bill were written with a single owner of land in mind, and not for situations where whole communities living on land in terms of customary law are concerned. </p>
<h2>The next steps</h2>
<p>What is desperately needed in the land reform context for expropriation to be a useful tool is redistribution legislation that authorises the expropriation, and sets out what must happen after the state has acquired the land. </p>
<p>In the meantime, the bill will now go to the committee of the National Assembly that will hopefully start the public participation process. The bill will also have to go to the National Council of Provinces, the house of parliament that ensures that provincial interests are taken into account on the national level. </p>
<p>Considering all that, the bill will probably only be finalised some time next year, if all goes well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148379/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elmien du Plessis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The proposed new law has a long history. The country has been trying for almost 12 years now to come up with expropriation legislation that is in line with the constitution.Elmien du Plessis, Associate Professor of Law, North-West UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1015512018-09-17T14:53:31Z2018-09-17T14:53:31ZEx-offenders in South Africa should get a resettlement grant. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236460/original/file-20180914-177941-1a8dv28.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Stigmatising and shaming ex-offenders hampers efforts to reintegrate them into society.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s prison authorities <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mps-reject-social-grants-for-ex-convicts-20170201">have proposed paying unemployed ex-offenders</a> a social grant for a transitional period after serving their sentences. The grant would provide thousands who re-enter society every year with some income while they try to put their lives back together. </p>
<p>Ex-offenders with a criminal record find it hard to reintegrate into society when they’re released. More often than not, they are returned to prison because they can’t make it on the outside. Most ex-offenders are stigmatised and find it impossible to find a job. <a href="https://acjr.org.za/resource-centre/Ex-prisoners%20Views%20on%20Imprisonment%20and%20Re-Entry.pdf">Research on former prisoners shows that</a> finding employment is perhaps the most daunting obstacle facing released ex-offenders in South Africa. </p>
<p>The grant proposal by the Department of Correctional Services is an innovative idea and should be taken seriously. But the department has met with a lot of opposition. Members of parliament from the country’s biggest parties have rejected it outright. Many argued that a grant would be <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mps-reject-social-grants-for-ex-convicts-20170201">equavalent</a> to “rewarding” ex-offenders for their crimes.</p>
<p>The rejection of DCS’s proposal is a pity. <a href="http://hdl.handle.net/11660/9289">My own research</a> found that ex-offenders in South Africa suffer from being stigmatised and shamed. This has meant that all previous integration efforts have failed. Accepting the grant proposal would ease the transition and go some way to alleviating the problem.</p>
<h2>Stigma and shame</h2>
<p>Criminologists see the reintegration of returning ex-offenders as important to helping curb the tendency of criminals to re-offend. Reintegration strategies need to address the shame inherent in stigmatisation. </p>
<p>The Australian criminologist John Braithwaite made <a href="http://genup.net/connect/action-portal?id=101">the valuable distinction</a> between two kinds of societal responses to crime and, by extension, ex-offenders.</p>
<p>The first is a culture in which offenders are stigmatised and driven away from mainstream culture. Most Western countries (including the US and the UK, as well as South Africa) fall into this category.</p>
<p>In the second – what he called integrative shaming cultures – offenders are also shamed but once the punishment has run its course, they’re accepted back as a full member of that society. What’s notably absent from this response is stigma. China and Japan take this approach. </p>
<p>Research shows that in these cultures, recividism is much lower. Re-offending rates in China at the turn of the century stood at 6%-8% compared to 86%-94% in post-apartheid South Africa.</p>
<p>Based on Braithwaite’s insights it’s clear that in South Africa stigma drives ex-offenders into the arms of criminal subcultures. Given this, what should South Africa do?</p>
<h2>Reintegration?</h2>
<p>South Africa’s <a href="http://www.crimestatssa.com/">runaway crime rates</a> and unsustainable rates of re-offending are the direct result of the country’s inability to successfully integrate ex-offenders. </p>
<p>Given the prevailing culture it’s no surprise that past reintegration programmes have failed. As my research points out, cultures that stigmatise ex-offenders are by definition “selfish” and not “caring”. This makes reintegration close to impossible. </p>
<p>Every effort must be made to ease the impact of stigma, including the marginalisation and discrimination of ex-offenders.</p>
<p>Research in China found that ex-offenders in communities in which <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248967367_Crime_prevention_in_a_communitarian_society_Bang-jiao_and_Tiao-jie_in_the_People's_Republic_of_China">‘<em>bang-jiao</em>’ (re-integration) neighbourhood committees</a> are active are at least 50% less likely to re-offend than in areas without them. The mandate of ‘bang-jiao’ committees is to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248967367_Crime_prevention_in_a_communitarian_society_Bang-jiao_and_Tiao-jie_in_the_People's_Republic_of_China">“assist and guide those who have misbehaved”</a> and actively contribute to their constructive resettlement with warmth, love and acceptance.</p>
<p>In the US, research by criminologist <a href="https://nypost.com/2016/04/04/statistical-proof-that-america-doesnt-care-about-ex-cons/">Christopher Uggen and his group of co-workers</a> has shown that ex-offenders are almost obsessed with rejoining society as responsible citizens. For the most part, however, their efforts are rebuffed.</p>
<p>If ex-offenders have served their time and have shown genuine remorse and a willingness to reform their ways, they should be lent a helping hand in making a renewed effort at living an honest and honourable life. This is not a plea to “reward” criminals. It’s about designing an intervention that encourages ex-offenders to get back on track. </p>
<p>And to stop any potential abuse of the system, the initiative should arguably be extended only to <a href="http://users.soc.umn.edu/%7Euggen/Uggen_Wakefield_Chap_05.pdf">first time and elderly offenders</a>.</p>
<h2>Tackling recidivism</h2>
<p>If South Africa is serious about curbing the country’s unsustainably high and rising rate of recidivism, it should seriously consider sensible suggestions about integrating ex-offenders. </p>
<p>The proposal to provide newly released ex-offenders with some bridging income is one such idea.</p>
<p>Politicians should refrain from knee-jerk, politically expedient and for the most part ignorant reactions. Integration is a tall order in a country where ex-offenders are routinely stigmatised and shamed. This applies equally to the challenges that face both returning ex-offenders and the communities that have to absorb them.</p>
<p>Integration will remain a pipe dream unless a more broad-based approach – one that moves away from punitive stigma as the sole response to crime – is considered and implemented.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101551/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Casper Lӧtter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Politicians’ knee jerk dismissal of an idea that could help rehabilitate ex-offenders is
unhelpful.Casper Lӧtter, PhD candidate in Social Philosophy, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/990342018-07-05T15:38:26Z2018-07-05T15:38:26ZWhy South Africa’s new political party funding bill is good news for democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226262/original/file-20180705-122253-bm9r5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's 2016 municipal elections. A new bill aims to make party funding transparent.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cornell Tukiri/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Who funds South Africa’s political parties? The answer has always been shrouded in secrecy – both before and post 1994 when the country became a constitutional democracy. </p>
<p>South Africa is one of very few democracies in the world that don’t regulate the private funding of political parties. Most countries have laws that encourage parties to disclose who their funders are. <a href="https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/political-party-funding-iv-the-global-picture">All ten of the largest democracies</a> in the world have disclosure laws. </p>
<p>Legislation to control private funding in South Africa is long overdue for two reasons: its absence opens the door to corruption and citizens need to know who is paying the piper.</p>
<p>The country does have some regulation around public funding, including a <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=985">law</a> passed in 1997 that governs how <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/About-Us/Represented-Political-Parties/">Parliament</a> should distribute state funds to parties. </p>
<p>But, worldwide, it’s the anonymity of private funders that creates the most controversy. This is because parties typically spend much more private than public money during election campaigns.</p>
<p>The issue became a serious <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/JAE3.2Kotze.pdf">debating topic in 2003</a> when the think tank, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa <a href="http://www.ggln.org.za/media-and-publications/publications/state-of-local-governance/2017/itemlist/user/981-institutefordemocracyinsouthafricaidasa">(IDASA)</a>, began a campaign for greater transparency. Three years later the <a href="https://issafrica.org/">Institute of Security Studies</a> argued that the absence of enforceable party funding legislation was a threat to the integrity of South Africa’s democracy. The media has also been consistently critical of instances of corruption resulting from the lack of regulation of private funding. </p>
<p>Until recently there was insufficient political will to legislate private party funding. But that’s changing. The <a href="http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/PoliticalParty.pdf">Political Party Funding Bill</a>, which has been tabled for public comment, promises to inject much needed transparency into the upcoming campaigning for the country’s 2019 national and provincial elections.</p>
<p>A recent judgment passed down by the Constitutional Court has added urgency to the push for reform. The court called for the current law to be amended and for a clear policy to be developed on the private funding. </p>
<p>In its current form, the Bill would certainly strengthen transparency. Designed to regulate both private and public funding, the Bill proposes that donations from certain groups, such as foreign governments or organs of state, are banned. It also sets out what funding can be used for. </p>
<p>The hope is that the Bill won’t be watered down or rendered meaningless before it is passed.</p>
<h2>Change of heart</h2>
<p>Most of the country’s political parties have historically resisted disclosure. The African National Congress and the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance have been particularly unsupportive of change. The DA even went as far as arguing that political parties are <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-09-29-00-court-rules-that-voters-must-know-who-funds-parties">entitled to privacy</a>, and that donors to smaller parties should be shielded from a possibly “vengeful” governing party.</p>
<p>Yet transparent governance and multiparty democracy depend on knowing where donations come from. That’s because private contributions to a political party are made in anticipation that the party will advance a particular social interest, policy or viewpoint. A public armed with information about who is providing candidates with the most support are in a much better position to detect any post-election special favours they may be given in return.</p>
<p>But, the ground has shifted. The <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/anc-welcomes-adoption-political-party-funding-bill-national-assembly">ANC</a> as well as the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/party-funding-bill-adopted-in-national-assembly-20180327">DA</a> now agree that funders should be disclosed. Only the smaller opposition party, the Economic Freedom Fighters, is <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-03-28-mps-support-bill-for-political-parties-to-declare-their-funders/">refusing to support the Bill</a>.</p>
<h2>Public funding</h2>
<p>Public funding – provided by the state and dispensed by Parliament, allows political parties to conduct their daily activities. It’s designed to strengthen their capacity and give them a fair chance of success. It’s also meant to reduce their dependence on private funding. </p>
<p>But, how the money should be allocated is controversial. </p>
<p>Under the current system parties get money based on “proportionality” – that is on the basis of their performance in the last election. This meant that in 2015 the ANC got close to R60 million (USD4,3million$), the DA R16 million (USD$1,2 million) in 2015. </p>
<p>Under the currently system 90% of the money gets allocated based on how many MPs each party has in the National Assembly. The other 10% gets distributed among parties contesting in the provinces.</p>
<p>The proportionality approach is fairly universal. But there are problems with it. The most obvious problem is that it can entrench the dominance of the governing party and make it hard for smaller or newer parties to challenge it. </p>
<p>One way of getting around this would be to make sure that money should be distributed in a way that doesn’t prejudice smaller parties. </p>
<h2>Private funding</h2>
<p>Private funding is a much trickier proposition because support can come in many different forms and influence can be traded in many ways. For example, indirect funding can take the form of tax exemptions and subsidised access to media. </p>
<p>Proper scrutiny should therefore include monitoring indirect as well as direct political party funding.</p>
<p>The proposed law has been praised as <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26684/?via=homepage-feature-card">progressive</a> although some of criticised it for requiring disclosure of all private donations of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-06-22-00-toughen-up-party-funding-bill-ngos-say">R100 000</a>(US$7,300). This is seen as being <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26684/?via=homepage-feature-card">too high</a> for the smaller parties.</p>
<p>The success of the Bill will depend on whether it’s watered down before it’s passed, and on how rigorously it’s implemented once it becomes law. Success will also depend on the public’s willingness to monitor party funding and to press for greater disclosure.</p>
<p>The country’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996">Constitution</a> states that the Republic is founded on the values of “accountability, responsiveness and openness”. There can be no doubt that revealing party funding gives effect to the spirit of the Constitution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mia Swart has received funding from the National Research Foundation and is a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institute.</span></em></p>Legislation to control the private funding of political parties in South Africa is long overdue.Mia Swart, Research director, Human Sciences Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/814902017-08-06T16:16:38Z2017-08-06T16:16:38ZSouth Africa takes steps to adjust copyright law to the digital age<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/180385/original/file-20170731-22172-x5oiue.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The digital age has added new challenges to copyright law.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s Parliament is debating the <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/B13-2017_Copyright_170516.pdf">2017 Copyright Amendment Bill</a> which is aimed at aligning the country’s laws with the <a href="https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/digital-age/7562">digital age</a>. </p>
<p>I, as well as other experts and civil society organisations, have submitted comments praising many of the bill’s provisions. But we advocate for an important change – for the new law to adopt an “open” fair use right, instead of the “closed” version in the current act.</p>
<p>By an “open” fair use right, we refer to one that would authorise any fair use of a copyrighted work, not just uses for prescribed purposes like criticism and review. The reason this is important is that, in the digital world we live in today, there are an increasing number of technological uses that are fair in that they do they do not substitute for the work in the market but that are not for traditional purposes like criticism.</p>
<p><a href="http://commlawreview.org/Archives/v8i1/The%20Impact%20of%20Modern%20v8i1.pdf">Modern copyright law</a> was first drawn up in the era of the printing press. At its core it gave exclusive rights for making and selling a copies of a particular work. Every time the work was reprinted it was made available to a new consumer or new group of consumers. So protecting copies created an economic system whereby copyright owners had a clear and distinct point at which they got paid for their work.</p>
<p>In the digital age, a large and growing number of technologies rely on intermediate copies that do not express the work to the public in any way. These new and important uses include cloud computing, text mining, detecting plagiarism and constructing search engine indexes. All of these kinds of uses make copies of works, but not the kinds of copies that compete with rights owners. Rather, they create entirely new services for users that couldn’t exist without the right to copy. </p>
<p>The copying at the heart of these technologies is sometimes referred to as <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1257086">“non-expressive use”</a>. The term refers to the fact that such uses may reproduce protected works, but do not do so in a way that expresses (or communicates) the work to the public, and therefore cannot substitute for the work in any market. Such uses are fair by definition. </p>
<h2>What ownership means in a digital world</h2>
<p>Non-expressive uses rely on the ability of machines to read thousands (sometimes millions) of works to abstract metadata from them. The metadata is fundamentally different to the original, primary work. The metadata is fact – not expression. </p>
<p>Non-expressive uses have enormous potential to advance human progress without prejudicing the interests of authors or copyright owners. Language translation software makes communication across borders and cultures simple and easy for anyone with a <a href="http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/smartphone">Smartphone</a>. But to teach computers to translate you must feed them with millions of examples of text from copyrighted sources. We have web applications that can recognise pictures of animals and name them, and that can recognise patterns in music and play along. But to teach computers to learn we have to provide them with data in the forms of millions of examples and pictures or songs to learn from. These examples do not substitute for the works - they cannot be enjoyed by a consumer instead of the original – but they are nonetheless “copies” in the literal meaning of the word. </p>
<p>Allowing non-expressive uses of copyrighted works is consistent with the goals of copyright. Copyright law is not an end in itself. It was established to motivate and reward the creation of new and original expression. That’s why the law distinguishes between facts and ideas (unprotectable) and expression (protectable). A work is only regarded as having been copied when a substantial part of its original expression has been reproduced. If the purpose of copyright is to protect original expression, it stands to reason that non-expressive use shouldn’t infringe copyright.</p>
<h2>What’s missing</h2>
<p>South Africa has a general exception that authorises a “fair dealing” with a work. But it’s closed – not open. It applies only to uses for the purposes of research or private study, personal or private use, criticism or review, and reporting current events. Non-expressive uses are not on the list. </p>
<p>The alternative to a closed list of exceptions is a general public interest exception, known in the US as “fair use”. Many countries, including in Singapore, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, and Philippines, have adopted open fair use or fair dealing clauses in their laws. Such laws have been interpreted to permit non-expressive uses. And, importantly, they provide the flexibility needed to recognise other (e.g. future) fair uses of works that benefit society without harming authors. The openness of the fair use is thus often referred to as the secret sauce of the US and other fair use country’s innovation-enabling environments. </p>
<h2>What changes need to be made</h2>
<p>South Africa could make suitable provision for non-expressive use by simply adding the words “such as” before the list of authorised purposes in its existing fair dealing clause. This would make the clause similar to the US fair use right in that it would be open to application to purposes not specifically mentioned in the Act, but which are nonetheless fair to authors.</p>
<p>An alternative to an open fair dealing right, or as a clarification, South Africa’s law could be amended with a specific provision to protect non-expressive uses. Such a provision would safeguard many uses we know of today, but would have the disadvantage of lacking the flexibility we may need to permit the uses of tomorrow.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property at American University has received funding from non-profit foundations and individual and corporate gifts. Funders include the Open Society Foundation, Ford Foundation, Sloan Foundation. Hewlett Foundation, Google Inc. (unrestricted gift), and individual donors. </span></em></p>An alternative to an open fair dealing right, or as a clarification, South Africa’s copyright law could be amended with a specific provision to protect modern Internet uses.Sean Michael Fiil-Flynn, Law Professor, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/814132017-07-24T08:06:44Z2017-07-24T08:06:44ZExplainer: why amendments to South Africa’s ‘Money Bills Act’ matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179164/original/file-20170721-18148-1riojii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's previous finance minister, Pravin Gordhan, delivering his medium term budget last October.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nic Bothma/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s public finances may be in their worst state since the first democratic elections in 1994. One source of these woes was the 2008 financial crisis. But its effects have been compounded by bad political decisions which have led to slower economic growth, under-performance of tax revenue collection and higher borrowing.</p>
<p>At the top of the list of bad decisions has been appointments to critical institutions that appear to have been based on patronage with the intention of facilitating corruption. In the public finance space these include the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-07-21-gupta-e-mails-reveal-suspected-multibillion-rand-tax-avoidance-scheme/">South African Revenue Service</a>, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-gordhan-idUSKBN1710YW">Ministry of Finance</a>, and the board members and managers of key state-owned entities.</p>
<p>The poor management and loss of investor confidence that’s followed <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-04-05-public-enterprises-played-a-big-part-in-south-africas-credit-ratings-downgrade">played a significant role</a> in South Africa’s recent credit rating downgrades. The downgrades compounded the broader public finance challenges by increasing borrowing costs for national government and state-owned enterprises.</p>
<p>In this environment, there’s increasing appreciation for the general oversight role and powers of Parliament, which has <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-06-19-parliament-directs-committees-to-investigate-state-capture-allegations/">initiated investigations into various state entities</a>.</p>
<p>Parliament has overall oversight of public finances, including the national budget, a role that is becoming increasingly important. Which is why it’s worth paying attention to the processes by which Parliament exercises oversight, and the institutions involved.</p>
<p>The Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/PBO/act-9-2009-money-bill-amendment-procedure.pdf">Act</a> (“Money Bills Act”) of 2009 is a vital piece of the puzzle. Parliament has <a href="https://pmg.org.za/call-for-comment/572/">asked</a> for public comment on a series of <a href="https://pmg.org.za/bill/716/">proposed amendments</a>. Here’s why they matter.</p>
<h2>What’s at stake</h2>
<p>The Act guides Parliament’s oversight of taxes and borrowing, how those funds are distributed to different spheres of government (national, provincial and local), and national spending priorities. For example, the Act sets out the processes through which the national budget is <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-nitty-gritty-of-south-africas-annual-budget-72901">approved</a> by Parliament. It created a <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/parliamentary-budget-office">Parliamentary Budget Office</a> to <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2016-08-11-the-important-role-of-the-parliamentary-budget-office/">provide</a> credible, independent and non-partisan advice to members of parliament (MPs). And it instructs provincial parliaments (“legislatures”) on how their oversight processes should work.</p>
<p>Amendments have been <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/14144/">mooted</a> almost since Parliament started implementing the Act seven years ago. The latest proposals are primarily the result of suggestions by Parliament’s legal advisers and deliberation among MPs from the finance and appropriations committees.</p>
<p>The main amendments relate to three broad sets of issues: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>how Parliament committees deal with public finance legislation and proposals; </p></li>
<li><p>the institutional structure of the Parliamentary Budget Office; and, </p></li>
<li><p>oversight processes of provincial legislatures. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>One of the main concerns with the current Act is the time frames provided for oversight. Public finance issues can be complex and Parliament must facilitate public comment and engagement. But the Act allows little time for this. </p>
<p>Various amendments relax time constraints by adding the phrase, “or as soon as reasonable thereafter”. More time is important. But an open-ended statement like this could simply introduce uncertainty. </p>
<h2>The parliamentary budget office</h2>
<p>The intention of the original Act was that the office should be independent from Parliament’s administration. But this has never been properly implemented. The proposed amendments make independence even more explicit. They envisage making the Parliamentary Budget Office a “juristic person” and its director the accounting officer, while detailing the director’s financial management responsibilities. This is welcome to the extent that it removes any room for doubt, debate or misrepresentation.</p>
<p>In the current Act, the finance and appropriations committees are responsible for overseeing aspects of the office’s functioning. The amendments propose, instead, an “advisory board” of committee chairpersons and two “house chairpersons”. </p>
<p>In fact, this has been happening. But it’s problematic. The Parliamentary Budget Office should support MPs across the political spectrum. But currently all chairperson positions are held by representatives of the African National Congress (ANC). This is particularly problematic when it comes to the appointment of an acting director: representatives of one political party should not make that decision on their own.</p>
<p>Other amendments concern the Parliamentary Budget Office’s access to information from organs of state. There is <a href="https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/Independent-Fiscal-Institutions-Developing-good-practices.pdf">general agreement</a> across the world that this is critical, but the original Act didn’t address it explicitly. So these amendments are welcome, even though they could be strengthened.</p>
<h2>Provincial legislatures</h2>
<p>The current Act sets out norms and standards for provincial legislatures that they “must adhere to”. This could be unconstitutional, because it infringes on provincial legislatures’ right to determine their own processes.</p>
<p>As a result, an amendment rephrases this as, “must take into account”. Corresponding changes are made to the schedule of norms and standards, but the usefulness of the end result is questionable. </p>
<p>Perhaps a simple statement that decisions on provincial finances must be consistent with decisions already taken in the national parliament would be more appropriate. </p>
<h2>What’s missing</h2>
<p>A number of important issues haven’t been dealt with in the proposed amendments. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Oversight of taxes: The amendments don’t address incoherence in Parliament’s oversight of taxes. At present, the Minister of Finance announces tax proposals in February and these are treated for the most part as if they come into effect immediately. In fact, Parliament’s finance committees produce a report within 16 days indicating whether they agree or disagree with the proposals. And the actual legislation is only promulgated between July and October. Does it make sense that a major tax proposal could be blocked so late in the fiscal year? The sensible thing, taking into account bureaucratic challenges for the Treasury and Revenue Service, would be for tax legislation to be tabled with the Budget.</p></li>
<li><p>Integrity and independence of the Parliamentary Budget Office: The original Act refers to the technical and management competences required of the office’s director. But a Parliamentary Budget Office should also be led by a person of the highest integrity. It would therefore be appropriate for an amendment to specify that the director should be a “fit and proper person”. A related issue is an amendment that allows the director’s contract to be renewed based on performance. Given that it’s unclear who the director accounts to on a yearly basis, it’s not clear how performance would be assessed. Lastly, nothing in the current Act, or amendments, explains how the Parliamentary Budget Office’s budget is set. Since an inadequate budget can compromise administrative and political independence, some minimum protections should be put in place. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The current Parliamentary Budget Office hasn’t <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africas-public-finance-watchdog-failed-its-mandate-on-nuclear-65128">pursued it’s mandate</a> as it should have. At some point in the future the stability of South Africa’s public finances may depend on it doing so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81413/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Seán Mfundza Muller worked for the Parliamentary Budget Office for two years from 2014 until his resignation in 2016, during which time he was involved in advising on amendments to the Money Bills Act. All analysis in the article is based on publicly available information.</span></em></p>The amendments to South Africa’s Money Bills Act don’t go far enough - for one, they do not address incoherence in Parliament’s oversight of taxes.Seán Mfundza Muller, Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/726912017-02-08T15:47:10Z2017-02-08T15:47:10ZSouth African soldiers deployed for parliament’s opening. Why this bodes ill<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156057/original/image-20170208-17345-x37yzy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma has drawn sharp criticism for his decision to have a military presence to help police <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/02/07/441-soldiers-to-join-cops-for-security-at-SONA1">“maintain law and order”</a> during the opening of parliament. Opposition parties have protested against what they are calling “the militarisation of parliament”. The Conversation Africa’s politics and society editor Thabo Leshilo asked Jane Duncan about the implications of the decision.</em></p>
<p><strong>Critics have called the unprecedented military presence planned for the opening of South Africa’s parliament unseemly. Is it?</strong></p>
<p>Not only is it unseemly, it’s dangerous for democracy. According to British Sociologist <a href="http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520060395">Anthony Giddens</a>, the separation of police and military functions is an essential feature of a modern democracy. There are good reasons for this. </p>
<p>Militaries usually protect countries from external threats, while the police are responsible for responding to internal threats. As a result of their differing mandates, their training differs too. Militaries are trained to use force more readily than police. In the words of former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee, they are focused on “<a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/huckabee-purpose-military-kill-people-break-things-n405676">killing people and breaking things</a>”. </p>
<p>Police, on the other hand, are meant to use minimum force and to escalate their use of force only in exceptional circumstances. And public order police are meant to be <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/CQ38Tait_Marks.pdf">trained in negotiation skills.</a> </p>
<p>This is why the domestic deployment of the military is almost always a sign of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/1/4/501/1440981/Militarization-and-Policing-Its-Relevance-to-21st?redirectedFrom=fulltext">growing state repression</a>. Yet globally we are seeing a “turning inward” of military power, where militaries are being deployed <a href="http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6040&context=faculty_scholarship">domestically</a> with increasing regularity. The uses of armed forces in policing functions expanded from the 1980’s onwards in the <a href="http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/14295/163648/file/SSR_Paper_7%20(1).pdf">US, Canada and a number of Western countries.</a></p>
<p>Much of this has to do with the fact that there are <a href="http://file.prio.no/publication_files/prio/Gates,%20Nyg%C3%A5rd,%20Strand,%20Urdal%20-%20Trends%20in%20Armed%20Conflict,%20Conflict%20Trends%201-2016.pdf">fewer wars than before</a>, although there’s been an uptick since 2013. As a result, militaries are losing their reason to exist, and the arms industry is losing profits.</p>
<p>In countries with limited budgets it becomes difficult to justify maintaining a military at all if soldiers aren’t being deployed. One way to justify their existence is to deploy them domestically in a variety of law and order functions, and to open up new markets for military hardware by selling them to police forces for domestic use. </p>
<p>This is one of the factors that’s driving police militarisation in countries like the US. The Long Range Acoustic Device or a <a href="http://gizmodo.com/what-is-the-lrad-sound-cannon-5860592">sound cannon</a>, is a case in point. It’s a military weapon, but is increasingly being used to control crowds. </p>
<p>Surveillance technologies are another example. Many being used by governments to spy on their citizens and the citizens of other countries are weapons-grade. They are therefore listed as dual use technologies as they have both military and civilian uses.</p>
<p>When taken together, these developments are leading to a creeping militarisation of society where the presence of military personnel, hardware and software, logics, strategies and tactics, become normalised. There are powerful political and economic interests at work in making sure that society becomes militarised. South Africa is no exception to this general rule.</p>
<p><strong>What could be the real reasons for the decision?</strong></p>
<p>There’s the broader global context. Since the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/">9/11 attacks </a> in the US, and particularly since the <a href="https://global.britannica.com/topic/Financial-Crisis-of-2008-The-1484264">2008 global recession</a>, the world has become a much more unstable place. </p>
<p>The recession has led to <a href="http://www.polity.co.uk/book.asp?ref=9780745688589">anti-austerity protests</a>. In response, more governments have moved from using corporatist, negotiated means of stabilising social relations, to using <a href="https://nyupress.org/books/9780814741009/">force</a>. When it comes to the policing of protests and other forms of dissent, the authorities are more likely to use force rather than to negotiate. This ideological shift has become apparent in South Africa too, especially <a href="http://www.jacana.co.za/downloads/submaterial/0.%202014/SUB_3_1_JULY_2014/PDFS/H1_Securocrats%20AI.pdf">under Zuma.</a></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156059/original/image-20170208-17325-1q7wff7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156059/original/image-20170208-17325-1q7wff7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156059/original/image-20170208-17325-1q7wff7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156059/original/image-20170208-17325-1q7wff7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156059/original/image-20170208-17325-1q7wff7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156059/original/image-20170208-17325-1q7wff7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156059/original/image-20170208-17325-1q7wff7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South African soldiers during a crime operation in Ottery, Cape Town,</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Then there’s the local context. South Africa has a particularly nasty history when it comes to the military being deployed domestically. Under apartheid the then South African Defence Force was used to quell <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Pretorias-Praetorians-Civil-Military-Relations-Africa/dp/0521109892">resistance</a>. This is why the drafters of the democracy-era <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/documents/WhitePaperonDef/whitepaper%20on%20defence1996.pdf">White Paper on Defence</a> said “never again”, unless under a narrow range of exceptional circumstances.</p>
<p>But some defence experts such as the late <a href="http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/political%20science/volume3n1/ajps003001003.pdf">Rockland ‘Rocky’ Williams</a> have argued that there’s no reason to believe that domestic deployment would automatically lead to the politicisation of the military.</p>
<p>In the case of the deployment of the military at parliament, though, it is apparent that the decision is politically driven as it’s being used to threaten an increasingly vocal political opposition to the president. </p>
<p>We have seen a resurgence of the militarists in South Africa. But the only way they can gain ground is to expand their role. How else can they make the case for <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=39213:mapisa-nqakula-wishes-for-a-defence-budget-that-is-two-percent-of-gdp&catid=111:sa-defence&Itemid=242">2% of Gross Domestic Product</a> in times of peace? This resurgence should concern South Africans greatly because it suggests that the government intends to use force rather than negotiation to address social problems and political tensions. After all, to a hammer, everything looks like a nail.</p>
<p><strong>What do both occurrences tell us about President Jacob Zuma and the ANC. What do they portend for the country?</strong></p>
<p>The domestic deployment of the military is meant to take place only in exceptional circumstances. No case has been made for why it’s necessary for the opening of parliament.</p>
<p>But the decision should come as no surprise to the South African public. The government has been trying to justify a domestic role for the military for some time. Deployed initially in border control functions, there’s been an increase in the joint deployment of the South African National Defence Force and the police in a range of domestic policing functions. One example is the controversial crime-fighting blitz <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-09-07-the-numbers-behind-operation-fiela">Operation Fiela</a> in 2015. </p>
<p>According to Department of Defence records joint deployments of the policy and military were confined to fairly mundane functions before Zuma’s presidency. These included poaching of marine resources and rural patrols. But under Zuma’s presidency there’s been a huge uptick in joint deployments. In addition, they are increasingly being used in political contexts, such as to police strikes, elections, ANC meetings and parliament. This suggests that the Zuma administration is attempting to normalise the use of the military in policing political dissent. It should not be allowed to do so.</p>
<p>But the Zuma administration is playing a wild card. The military is industrialised and unionised. There <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2009-08-27-soldiers-violent-protest-condemned">is evidence</a> that a significant number of soldiers see themselves not just as soldiers but as workers who are exploited. Therein lies a problem for the ANC government. If the current administration put soldiers in front of exploited, protesting workers (or other protesters), and they are told to shoot, what would they do? What if they refused? Can they really risk a rebellion in the military, which really would amount to mutiny?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72691/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Duncan receives funding from the Open Society Foundation. She is affiliated with the Right 2 Know Campaign. </span></em></p>The domestic deployment of the military is almost always a sign of growing state repression.Jane Duncan, Professor in the Department of Journalism, Film and Television, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.