tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/sunni-islam-25260/articlesSunni Islam – The Conversation2023-10-17T16:42:50Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2157372023-10-17T16:42:50Z2023-10-17T16:42:50ZHamas and Hezbollah: how they are different and why they might cooperate against Israel<p>As Israel prepares for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-has-been-blockaded-for-16-years-heres-what-a-complete-siege-and-invasion-could-mean-for-vital-supplies-215359">massive military operation</a> against Hamas in Gaza, risks of an escalating regional conflict loom large. The most critical additional threat to Israel is from Hezbollah, the militant group and political party based across Israel’s northern border in Lebanon.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/hamas-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-group-that-attacked-israel-215288">Hamas</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hezbollah-matters-so-much-in-a-turbulent-middle-east-88111">Hezbollah</a> are both backed by Iran and see weakening Israel as their primary raison d’etre. However, the two groups are not the same. Their differences will likely influence their actions – and Israel’s – in the days and weeks to come.</p>
<p>Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah has, to date, not gone to war purely for the Palestinian cause. That <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/16/it-will-be-worse-than-hamas-order-to-evacuate-strikes-fear-into-north-israel">could change</a>. Hezbollah has not yet fully entered the current conflict, but the group has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/oct/16/israel-hamas-war-live-update-news-today-gaza-water-fuel-aid-egypt-border-rafah-crossing-latest-updates?filterKeyEvents=false&page=with:block-652d4b808f081db0948426ca#block-652d4b808f081db0948426ca">exchanged fire</a> with Israel, across the northern border with Lebanon. Meanwhile, Iran has said that an expansion of the war may be “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-16/iran-says-expansion-israel-hamas-war-becoming-inevitable">inevitable</a>”. </p>
<h2>What is Hezbollah?</h2>
<p>Named the “<a href="https://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/lebanon/thestory.html">party of God</a>”, <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-hezbollah.html">Hezbollah</a>
bills itself as a Shia resistance movement. Its <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">ideology</a> is focused on expelling western powers from the Middle East and on <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-hezbollah-idUSTRE5AT3VK20091130">rejecting</a> Israel’s right to exist. </p>
<p>The group was founded in 1982 – in the middle of the 15-year Lebanese civil war – after Israel invaded Lebanon in retaliation for attacks perpetrated by Lebanon-based Palestinian factions. It was quickly backed by Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which supplied funding, weapons and training in an effort to expand Iranian <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">influence</a> in Arab states.</p>
<p>Hezbollah’s military force continued to develop after the Lebanese civil war came to an end in 1990, despite most other factions disarming. The group continued to focus on “<a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220527-its-worth-remembering-that-it-was-hezbollah-that-liberated-south-lebanon-from-israels-occupation-through-armed-struggle/">liberating</a>” Lebanon from Israel, and it engaged in years of guerrilla warfare against Israeli forces occupying southern Lebanon until Israel’s withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah then largely focused its operations on retaking the disputed border area of <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/227136/israel_hezbollah.pdf">Shebaa Farms</a> for Lebanon. </p>
<p>In 2006, Hezbollah engaged in a five-week war with Israel in an attempt to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/7/12/hezbollah-captures-israeli-soldiers">settle scores</a> rather than with an aim to liberate Palestine. That conflict killed over <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-hezbollah-lebanese-group-backing-hamas-its-war-with-israel-2023-10-16/">158 Israelis and over 1,200 Lebanese</a>, mostly civilians. </p>
<p>From 2011, during the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah’s power grew further as its forces assisted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, an ally of Iran, against mostly Sunni rebels. In 2021, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said the group had <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-lebanon-beirut-civil-wars-hassan-nasrallah-a3c10d99cca2ef1c3d58dae135297025">100,000</a> fighters (though other <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/for-a-change-hezbollahs-boast-of-100000-fighters-is-not-aimed-at-israel/">estimates</a> range between 25,000 and 50,000). It boasts a sophisticated military arsenal equipped with precision rockets and drones.</p>
<p>The group has also functioned as a political party in Lebanon and holds significant <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-lebanese-state">influence</a>, often described as a “<a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/9780230623293_6.pdf">state within a state</a>.” Eight members were first <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">elected</a> to the Lebanese parliament in 1992, and in 2018, a Hezbollah-led coalition formed a government. </p>
<p>Hezbollah retained its 13 seats at the 2022 election but the coalition lost its majority and the country currently has no <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/lebanese-hold-their-breath-as-fears-grow-hezbollah-will-pull-them-into-war/">fully functioning government</a>. Other Lebanese parties accuse Hezbollah of paralysing and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-lebanons-hezbollah-2023-10-08/">undermining</a> the state and of contributing to Lebanon’s persistent instability.</p>
<h2>What is Hamas?</h2>
<p>“Hamas”, which translates literally as “zeal,” is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4017719?typeAccessWorkflow=login">an Arabic acronym</a> for the “Islamic resistance movement”. The group was founded in 1987, in Gaza, as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, a prominent Sunni group based in Egypt. </p>
<p>Emerging during what’s known as the first intifada or uprising of Palestinians against Israeli occupation, <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-ae/Hamas:+The+Islamic+Resistance+Movement-p-9780745642963">Hamas</a> quickly adopted the principle of armed resistance and called for the annihilation of Israel. </p>
<p>Palestinian politics shifted significantly after 1993’s <a href="https://justvision.org/glossary/oslo-accords">Oslo accords</a>, a series of agreements negotiated between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) with the aim of establishing a comprehensive peace agreement. </p>
<p>Opposed to the peace process, Hamas’s armed wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, established itself as the primary force of armed <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538305?typeAccessWorkflow=login">resistance</a> against Israel. It launched a series of suicide bomb attacks that continued through the early years of the second intifada (2000-2005), before shifting to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-hamas-secretly-built-mini-army-fight-israel-2023-10-13/">rockets</a> as a primary tactic.</p>
<p>Like Hezbollah, Hamas operates as a political party. It won parliamentary elections in 2006, and in 2007, it gained control of the Gaza Strip in a bloody <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/5/4/timeline-hamas-fatah-conflict">battle</a> with rival party Fatah that left over 100 dead. Hamas has controlled Gaza ever since, showing little tolerance for political opposition. They have never held elections, and political opponents and critics are frequently arrested with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/10/23/two-authorities-one-way-zero-dissent/arbitrary-arrest-and-torture-under">reports</a> of torture. </p>
<p>Over this time, Hamas’s armed wing has become increasingly sophisticated. Its arsenal now comprises thousands of rockets, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-unprecedented-attack-against-israel-by-hamas-included-precise-armed-drones-and-thousands-of-rockets-215241">long-range missiles and drones</a>. </p>
<h2>How are Hamas and Hezbollah different?</h2>
<p>Hamas has increasingly received funding, weapons and training from Iran, but it is not in <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a06e7ea0-a7f8-4058-85b7-30549dd71443">Iran’s pocket</a> to the same degree as Hezbollah, which is backed almost exclusively by <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/">Iran</a> and takes its directives from the Islamic Republic.</p>
<p>What’s more, as a Sunni organisation, Hamas does not share the Shia religious link to Iran that characterises Hezbollah and most of Iran’s proxies. As a result, while Hamas no doubt benefits from Iran’s patronage, it tends to operate more independently than Hezbollah. </p>
<p>In contrast, Hamas has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231014-qatar-iran-turkey-and-beyond-the-galaxy-of-hamas-supporters">received support</a> in the past from Turkey and Qatar, among others, and operates with relative autonomy. The group was also long at odds with Iran over their opposing stances in <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-16/ty-article/.premium/hezbollah-isnt-hamas-so-israel-fights-them-differently/0000018b-34e4-d450-a3af-7dfcca110000">Syria</a>.</p>
<p>Right now, this is very much a war between Israel and Hamas. Hezbollah remains, however, a threat to Israel. If activated by Iran, its full involvement would rapidly change the course of the conflict and likely open up a regional war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215737/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julie M Norman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hezbollah’s full involvement in the latest Israeli-Palestinian conflict would likely open up a regional war.Julie M Norman, Associate Professor in Politics & International Relations & Co-Director of the Centre on US Politics, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1850712022-06-21T10:36:48Z2022-06-21T10:36:48ZWhy the Lady of Heaven film is dividing Muslim opinion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469988/original/file-20220621-15-ifh3ka.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Imam Ali shrine, in Najaf, Iraq, is one of the most sacred Shi'a sites.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/imam-ali-shrine-najaf-iraq-1705400182">CameraAction | Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Following <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-61729392">picketing by Muslim groups</a>, leading UK cinema chain Cineworld cancelled all screenings of blockbuster film, <a href="https://ladyofheaven.com/">The Lady of Heaven</a>. Produced in Britain, this historical epic tells the story of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammed. </p>
<p>Protesters have labelled the film “blasphemous” and <a href="https://5pillarsuk.com/2021/12/24/lady-of-heaven-pure-unadulterated-sectarian-filth/">“sectarian filth”</a>. Governments in Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Morocco have all denounced it. The Muslim Council of Britain has condemned it as <a href="https://mcb.org.uk/community/muslim-council-of-britain-mcb-responds-to-the-release-of-a-divisive-film-in-british-cinemas/">“divisive”</a>, and more than 130,000 people have signed <a href="https://www.change.org/p/remove-the-lady-of-heaven-from-uk-cinemas">a petition</a> calling for it to be banned. </p>
<p>For some, this is <a href="https://archbishopcranmer.com/lady-of-heaven-islam-life-of-brian-moment/">“Islam’s ‘Life of Brian’ moment”</a>, in reference to the Christian <a href="https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20190822-life-of-brian-the-most-blasphemous-film-ever">protests</a> against the 1979 Monty Python parody film about the life of Jesus. But The Lady of Heaven is not a parody of Islam. It does not intend to discredit or mock the Islamic faith. Written by a Shi’a Islamic scholar, Yasser al-Habib, it purports, in fact, to tell the “untold story” of one of Islam’s most venerated figures, using a contemporary storyline involving Islamic State (IS) as an introductory device.</p>
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<p>Scholarship shows, however, that the narrative the film hinges on represents a very specific interpretation of Islamic history. This not only places it outside the majority (Sunni) consensus, but is also an interpretation many Shi'a Muslims would find extreme.</p>
<h2>Sunni and Shi'a split</h2>
<p>Although Islam comprises many different denominations, tensions between its two largest sects, Sunnism and Shi'ism, have flared throughout history. To understand why this film has been labelled as “sectarian”, it is important to understand the divergences between mainstream Sunni and Shi’a theology. </p>
<p>The initial split between Sunnis and Shi'as occurred as a result of a succession dispute following the death of the Prophet Muhammed in 632AD. Sunni Muslims (the majority) believe that Muhammed’s companion, Abu Bakr, was elected as caliph. The minority Shi’a Muslims believe that the Prophet directly appointed his cousin and son-in-law, Ali, husband to his daughter, Fatima. It was this dispute that eventually led to the crystallisation of two distinct Islamic sects. </p>
<p>Fatima is thus a central figure in Shi’a Islamic thought. She had a direct bloodline to the Prophet. And she was the mother of Hussain, whose death at the Battle of Karbala in 680AD <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395717707092">is considered</a> one of the formative moments of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047407263_020">Shi’a Islamic belief</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/heroes-and-martyrs-of-palestine/06840B11626C45A8176D15FA2581F89B">practice</a>. </p>
<p>Fatima herself is said to have died not long after the Prophet. The manner of her death is a further contentious issue between Sunnis and Shi'as. </p>
<p>Some Shi’a scholars believe that two of the Prophet’s companions, Abu Bakr and Umar, injured Fatima behind a door while forcing entry to Ali’s house. They believe this caused her injuries, eventually leading to her death. Many Sunnis, conversely, find this suggestion that two of their most venerated figures contributed to the death of the Prophet’s daughter deeply offensive. </p>
<p>Some critics of the film have suggested that an opening scene of The Lady of Heaven contains a veiled reference to this interpretation of Fatima’s demise. In the scene, Islamic State fighters force entry into a young Iraqi Shi’a boy’s house. They push the boy’s mother (who is also called Fatima) behind the door and eventually execute her. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A close up shot of the mosaiqued wall of an Iraqi mosque." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469197/original/file-20220616-15-6tatfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469197/original/file-20220616-15-6tatfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469197/original/file-20220616-15-6tatfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469197/original/file-20220616-15-6tatfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469197/original/file-20220616-15-6tatfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469197/original/file-20220616-15-6tatfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469197/original/file-20220616-15-6tatfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, Imam Ali, is revered among Shi'a Muslims.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/shrine-imam-ali-ibn-abi-talib-1576615531">CameraAction/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Fatima reimagined in Shi’a thought</h2>
<p>The film’s website describes Fatima as “the first victim of terrorism”. Contemporary portrayals of Fatima and other early Islamic figures as revolutionary fighters tap into what my research shows is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09637494.2021.1995275">a very specific narrative</a> about the arc of Islamic history.</p>
<p>Fatima has long been revered as “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40326855.pdf?casa_token=V5serabIcaIAAAAA:4Vc2NLBQscfeeLJhOIJ24BuP4uTYA5slb6UnIBDiX_Q_urYmS5_nhQKxRz850xNRpfsf2ztWi3hxnMfPz-oe-y_k3oapz8cSkDXZNm4Af08JaPgh2lYp">an exemplar of chastity and religiosity</a>”. However, as Ruth Roded wrote in her 1994 book, <a href="https://doi.org/10.31826/9781463239442">Women in Islamic Biographical Collections</a>, until recently, she was considered a “marginal and even passive” figure in the events of early Islam. </p>
<p>It wasn’t until the 1950s, with Shi’a thinkers including Mohammed Bakr al-Sadr (the founder of the Islamic Da’wa Party in Iraq) and former Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, that Fatima’s role was revised. She was transformed, as Iranian studies specialist Rachel Kantz Feder <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2014.878508">has put it</a>, “from a weak victim to a courageous revolutionary heroine”. </p>
<p>This shift was part of a reimagining of Shi’a history, from quietist dissidence to emancipatory struggle, that took place throughout the 20th century. In his 2011 book, <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674064287#:%7E:text=Shi'sm%3A%20A%20Religion%20of,artistic%20nuances%2C%20and%20metaphysical%20details.">Shi'ism: A Religion of Protest</a>, Iranian-American scholar Hamid Dabashi argues that this shift helped inspire the Shi'a Islamic revolution in Iran. </p>
<p>The Lady of Heaven extends this revolutionary narrative, drawing explicit parallels between some of the Prophet’s companions (most notably Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman) and IS in modern-day Iraq. Malik Shlibak, one of the film’s producers, <a href="https://twitter.com/BBCNewsnight/status/1534661413985206279">recently commented on BBC Newsnight</a> that “they [Abu Bakr and Umar] were barbaric, ISIS-like figures”. </p>
<p>This is an extreme and marginal viewpoint, even within Shi’ism. Ayatollah Sistani, Shi'a Islam’s current highest-ranking scholar, <a href="https://imam-us.org/sayyid-sistanis-fatwa-about-the-companions-of-prophet-pbuhhp">issued a fatwa</a> denouncing the cursing of the Prophet’s companions in this manner. The man behind the film, Yasser al-Habib, a Kuwaiti-born, Shi'a cleric exiled in the UK, has long been a <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/qba75q/meet-the-controversial-shia-cleric-bringing-sectarian-tension-to-the-uk">divisive figure</a> among both Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. Al-Habib gained notoriety for <a href="https://www.eman-network.com/extremist-individuals/yasser-habib">his view</a> that the Prophet was assassinated by Abu Bakr, Umar, and his third wife Aisha, all of whom are venerated in Sunni Islam.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An overview of a large mosque compound at maghrib prayer time." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469200/original/file-20220616-11-lr7hna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469200/original/file-20220616-11-lr7hna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469200/original/file-20220616-11-lr7hna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469200/original/file-20220616-11-lr7hna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469200/original/file-20220616-11-lr7hna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469200/original/file-20220616-11-lr7hna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469200/original/file-20220616-11-lr7hna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Al-Masjid an-Nabawi or the Mosque of the Prophet, in Medina.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/almasjid-nabawi-maghrib-prayer-1148506721">Mohamed Reedi/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some commentators have <a href="https://themuslimvibe.com/faith-islam/in-history/the-lady-of-heaven-a-deliberately-divisive-waste-of-15-million-review">raised concerns</a> that the film could exacerbate Sunni misconceptions about Shi'a beliefs. In particular, it could intensify the historic trend of labelling Shi'as as “kafr” (unbelievers) in extreme Sunni discourse, a trend which has become increasingly visible in recent years, especially since the rise of IS.</p>
<p>With sectarian tensions flaring in the Middle East, this film is a potential touchpoint in a long history of Sunni/Shi’a animosity. </p>
<p>Enlighted Kingdom, the production company behind The Lady of Heaven, was contacted to comment for this article, but did not respond before it went to press.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185071/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emanuelle Degli Esposti has received funding from the British Academy, the Leverhulme Foundation, the British Institute for the Study of Iraq, the Council of British Research in the Levant, and SOAS, University of London. </span></em></p>The cinematic epic hinges on a very specific, and contentious, interpretation of early Islamic history.Emanuelle Degli Esposti, Research Associate, Centre of Islamic Studies, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1673132021-09-12T08:22:29Z2021-09-12T08:22:29ZWhy Algeria cut diplomatic ties with Morocco: and implications for the future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420075/original/file-20210908-25-1s4hkj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Moroccan foreign minister Nasser Bourita (R) welcomes his Israeli counterpart Yair Lapidis to Rabat, in August 2021.
The normalisation of relations between the two precipitated the breakup of Moroccan-Algerian diplomatic ties. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Alal Morchidi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The breakup of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/algeria-says-cutting-diplomatic-ties-with-morocco-2021-08-24/#:%7E:text=Speaking%20at%20a%20news%20conference,on%20the%20Western%20Sahara%20issue">in August</a> is the product of a long history of tension. The two nations have never had long periods of friendship, notwithstanding the many factors that bring them together. Indeed, they belong to the same <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/report-regional-integration-maghreb-2019-challenges-and-opportunities-private-sector-synthesis">Maghreb region</a>, share the same religion (Sunni Islam and Maleki rite) and identity, and speak a similar dialect. They also share a <a href="https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/algeria%E2%80%93morocco-border/g1229dss0?hl=en">1,550km common border</a>.</p>
<p>In fact, Algerian and Moroccan people are so close that it is difficult to distinguish them. But, historical, political and ideological dissimilarities since their respective independence weigh heavily in the relations between these “brotherly” countries. </p>
<p>How can one account for the tensions that have characterised their relations, which have now gone through a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1169bh2">second breakup in diplomatic relations</a>? The first, initiated by Morocco, was from 1976 to 1988.</p>
<p>I have researched relations between Algeria and Morocco for more than 40 years and published studies on the topic. Relations between the Algerian and Moroccan governments have seldom been cordial. This is due to the different nature of their anti-colonial struggle, their dissimilar political systems, and opposite ideological orientations. </p>
<p>In the last decade, Morocco exploited the lethargy of Algeria’s diplomacy and the paralysis of the political system to advance its interests, often to the detriment of Algeria. The reawakening of Algeria’s diplomacy and its decision to counter what it considers Morocco’s “hostile acts” resulted in the latest breakup.</p>
<p>Their tumultuous relationship has been an impediment to the integration of the region, which could bring sizeable benefits to both. Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia founded the <a href="https://maghrebarabe.org/fr/union-du-maghreb-arabe/">Arab Maghreb Union in 1989</a>. But since 1996, the union has become moribund due to repeated tensions in Moroccan-Algerian relations.</p>
<p>The divergences of recent years are potentially far more consequential. They could threaten the stability of the whole North Africa region.</p>
<h2>History of Algerian-Moroccan relations</h2>
<p>Algerian nationalists had relatively good relations with <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-relations-internationales-2011-2-page-77.htm.">King Mohammed V of Morocco</a> He died in 1961, one year before Algeria gained its sovereignty. Morocco became independent <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2020/11/326269/morocco-celebrates-64-years-of-independence-from-european-colonizers">in 1956</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Algerian-War">Algeria</a> in 1962. </p>
<p>King Mohammed’s son, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hassan-II">King Hassan II</a>, who succeeded him, made claims over Algerian territory. He invaded the country <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-21026-8_19">in 1963</a>. This resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Algeria’s ill-equipped fighters.</p>
<p>Although short, this war shaped the minds of the Algerian military-political establishment. There was an era of cooperation between 1969 and the mid-1970s. But the conflict in Western Sahara, invaded by Morocco under the so-called Green March <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-34667782">in 1975</a>, resulted in another era of tensions.</p>
<p>Indeed, in March 1976, Algeria’s recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, proclaimed by the Sahrawi nationalist movement, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Polisario-Front">Polisario Front</a>, saw Morocco break diplomatic relations with Algeria. Many other African countries recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Relations were restored <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14123260">in May 1988</a>. </p>
<p>The renewal of relations was based <a href="https://www.tsa-algerie.com/rupture-des-relations-avec-le-maroc-le-texte-integral-de-la-declaration-de-lamamra/">on a number of agreements</a>. These were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a commitment to enduring relations of peace </p></li>
<li><p>good neighbourliness and cooperation</p></li>
<li><p>hastening the building of the Great Arab Maghreb</p></li>
<li><p>Algeria’s noninterference in Morocco’s domestic affairs </p></li>
<li><p>solving the Western Sahara conflict through a referendum on self-determination. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>From Algeria’s perspective, Morocco has reneged on all of them. </p>
<p>In the background, there has been a continuous buildup of Algerian-Moroccan tensions.</p>
<h2>Growing tensions</h2>
<p>In the 1990s, Algeria underwent a bigger crisis than it had ever known. The country was <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/remembering-algeria-1992-first-arab-spring-never-became-summer">devastated</a> by civil strife opposing the state, and armed Islamist groups. In 1994, in the midst of that crisis, Moroccan authorities <a href="https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/56799/attack-hotel-asni-marrakech-straw.html">falsely accused Algerian intelligence</a> of being behind the deadly terrorist attacks at the Asni hotel in Marrakech.</p>
<p>Morocco imposed visas on Algerians, including those holding another citizenship. Algeria retaliated in imposing visas and closed its land borders with Morocco. In late 1995, Morocco froze the institutions of the Arab Maghreb Union due to Algeria’s support for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.</p>
<p>A shift in relations seemed to have occurred when <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118854">Abdelaziz Bouteflika</a> became president of Algeria in April in 1999. He planned on meeting King Hassan II to iron out differences. But the king died in July that year. His successor <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1559304">Mohammed VI</a> showed no inclination for a resolution of Western Sahara under United Nations terms.</p>
<p>Amazingly, during his presidency, Bouteflika not only neglected the question of Western Sahara, he also instructed officials not to respond to any Moroccan hostile actions.</p>
<p>Following his <a href="https://theconversation.com/bouteflika-steps-aside-as-algerians-push-to-reclaim-and-own-their-history-114380">forcible removal in April 2019</a>, Algeria reiterated its support for the principle of self-determination. </p>
<p>For its part, Morocco had been lobbying the <a href="https://au.int/en">African Union</a>, Europe and the US for support for its claims of sovereignty over Western Sahara. Two events in the last 10 months escalated tensions. The first was an attack on Sahrawi demonstrators <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/world/middleeast/morocco-military-operation-western-sahara.html">in El-Guergarat</a>, the buffer zone in the south of Western Sahara, by Moroccan troops. Then there was <a href="https://www.undispatch.com/western-sahara-conflict-upended-by-a-trump-tweet/">a tweet from President Donald Trump</a> announcing US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara.</p>
<p>These constituted part of Algeria’s decision to break up diplomatic relations with Morocco. </p>
<p>Trump had traded Moroccan occupied Western Sahara in exchange for <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Joint-Declaration-US-Morrocco-Israel.pdf">Morocco normalising relations with Israel</a>. Other Arab states did the same thing in the framework of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> brokered by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. </p>
<p>Before the Abraham Accords, Moroccan officials displayed relentless hostility toward Algeria to which the Algerian government did not respond. Trump’s tweet on <a href="https://twitter.com/ap/status/1337069459551506432?lang=en">10 December</a> seemed to galvanise Morocco’s hostile attitude toward Algeria. </p>
<p>Algeria perceived both decisions as a real threat to its national security. </p>
<p>Algiers’ threshold of tolerance against acts it considered hostile came <a href="https://fr.sputniknews.com/amp/international/202107191045896006-soutien-marocain-aux-separatistes-kabyles-le-debut-dune-dangereuse-escalade-entre-alger-et-rabat/">in mid-July</a> when Morocco’s ambassador to the UN distributed a note expressing support for a group fighting for the secession of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24042103">Kabyle coastal region of Algeria</a>. The group is listed as a terrorist group by Algeria. This resulted in Algeria recalling its ambassador in Morocco for “consultations” and <a href="http://www.mae.gov.dz/news_article/6594.aspx">asking Morocco to clarify</a> whether this was the ambassador’s sole decision or the government’s. It never received a response. </p>
<p>Another hostile act in the eyes of Algeria was a <a href="https://www.afrik.com/pegasus-plus-de-6000-algeriens-espionnes-par-le-maroc-dont-lamamra">vast spying scandal</a> revealed by a consortium of international newspapers and human rights organisations. They found that Morocco had targeted more than 6,000 Algerians, including many senior political and military officials.</p>
<p>Algeria decided to break diplomatic relations with Morocco as of 24 August.</p>
<h2>Implications of the breakup</h2>
<p>The breakup may result in geopolitical realignments. But all will depend on whether Morocco will escalate tensions and use the Israeli card against Algeria, or whether it will seek to reduce tensions. </p>
<p>Algeria has already begun strengthening its control at the Algerian Moroccan border. It could create serious problems for Morocco if it decided to expel the tens of thousands of Moroccans (many of whom are illegal migrants) from Algeria. </p>
<p>There are wider implications too.</p>
<p>The breakup has marked the death knell of the Arab Maghreb Union, which was already dormant. The strained relations will either mean the regional grouping remains at a standstill or a new grouping might emerge.</p>
<p>And the rivalries between Algeria and Morocco can be expected to intensify at the African Union over <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/The-Admission-of-Israel-as-an-Observer-in-the-African-Union.aspx">Israel’s observer status at the AU</a>, and over Western Sahara. </p>
<p>In the economic realm, the Algerian energy minister announced in late August that the contract for the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline (GME), which goes through Morocco, will not be renewed after it <a href="https://www.algeriepatriotique.com/2021/08/26/lalgerie-ne-renouvellera-pas-le-contrat-du-gazoduc-traversant-le-maroc/">expires on 31 October 2021</a>. The decision has now <a href="https://www.olcnbvc4jz.com/renouvellement-du-gazoduc-maghreb-europe-lalgerie-a-tranche/">been confirmed</a>. The pipeline goes directly from northwest Algeria and then crosses Mediterranean.</p>
<p>Instead, Algeria will distribute natural gas to Spain and Portugal via the pipeline, MEDGAZ.</p>
<p>The term impact of this breakup is unpredictable. What’s certain, however, is that Algerian-Moroccan rivalry will intensify.</p>
<p><em>The views and opinions expressed in the article are the sole responsibility of the author and are not endorsed by Business Kedge School or those of the Brookings Doha Centre.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yahia H. Zoubir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the last decade, Morocco exploited the lethargy of Algeria’s diplomacy and the paralysis of the political system to advance its interests, often to the detriment of AlgeriaYahia H. Zoubir, Visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and Senior Professor of International Studies and Director of Research in Geopolitics, Kedge Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1452532020-09-10T11:14:17Z2020-09-10T11:14:17ZIran’s secular shift: new survey reveals huge changes in religious beliefs<p>Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution was a defining event that changed how we think about the relationship between religion and modernity. Ayatollah Khomeini’s mass mobilisation of Islam showed that modernisation by no means implies <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/global-religious-and-secular-dynamics-the-modern-system-of-classification">a linear process of religious decline</a>. </p>
<p>Reliable large-scale data on Iranians’ post-revolutionary religious beliefs, however, has always been lacking. Over the years, <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198788553.001.0001/oso-9780198788553-chapter-10">research</a> and waves of protests and crackdowns indicated <a href="https://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15645.html">massive disappointment</a> among Iranians with their political system. This steadily turned into a deeply felt disillusionment with institutional religion. </p>
<p>In June 2020, our research institute, the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in IRAN (<a href="https://gamaan.org">GAMAAN</a>), conducted an online survey with the collaboration of <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/authors/ladan-boroumand/">Ladan Boroumand</a>, co-founder of the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran. </p>
<p><a href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/GAMAAN-Iran-Religion-Survey-2020-English.pdf">The results verify</a> Iranian society’s unprecedented secularisation.</p>
<h2>Reaching Iranians online</h2>
<p>Iran’s <a href="https://www.amar.org.ir/Portals/1/census/2016/Census_2016_Selected_Findings.pdf">census claims that 99.5% of the population are Muslim</a>, a figure that hides the state’s active hostility toward irreligiosity, conversion and unrecognised religious minorities. </p>
<p>Iranians live with an ever-present fear of retribution for speaking against the state. In Iran, one cannot simply call people or <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2013/06/11/iranians-views-mixed-on-political-role-for-religious-figures/">knock on doors</a> seeking answers to politically sensitive questions. That’s why the anonymity of digital surveys offers an opportunity to capture what Iranians really think about religion.</p>
<p>Since the revolution, literacy rates have risen sharply and the urban population has grown substantially. Levels of internet penetration in Iran are comparable to those in Italy, with <a href="https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-iran">around 60 million users</a> and the number grows relentlessly: 70% of adults <a href="http://ispa.ir/Default/Details/fa/2094/70">are members</a> of at least one social media platform. </p>
<p>For our survey on religious belief in Iran, we targeted diverse digital channels after analysing which groups showed lower participation rates in our previous large-scale <a href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/gamaan-referendum-survey-report-english-2019.pdf">surveys</a>. The link to the survey was shared by Kurdish, Arab, Sufi and other networks. And our research assistant successfully convinced Shia pro-regime channels to spread it among their followers, too. We reached mass audiences by sharing the survey on Instagram pages and Telegram channels, some of which had a few million followers.</p>
<p>After cleaning our data, we were left with a sample of almost 40,000 Iranians living in Iran. The sample was <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/2018/01/26/how-different-weighting-methods-work/">weighted</a> and balanced to the target population of literate Iranians aged above 19, using five demographic variables and voting behaviour in the 2017 presidential elections.</p>
<h2>A secular and diverse Iran</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UiIUbXNWeU&ab_channel=GAMAAN">Our results</a> reveal dramatic changes in Iranian religiosity, with an increase in secularisation and a diversity of faiths and beliefs. Compared with Iran’s 99.5% census figure, we found that only 40% identified as Muslim.</p>
<p>In contrast with <a href="https://books.google.nl/books/about/Staging_a_Revolution.html?id=urnBAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">state propaganda that portrays</a> Iran as a Shia nation, only 32% explicitly identified as such, while 5% said they were Sunni Muslim and 3% Sufi Muslim. Another 9% said they were atheists, along with 7% who prefer the label of spirituality. Among the other selected religions, 8% said they were Zoroastrians – which we interpret as a reflection of <a href="https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64581/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Content_LSE%20Middle%20East%20Centre%20Papers_Abdolmohammadi_Revival%20of%20nationalism%20Iran_2015.pdf">Persian nationalism</a> and a desire for an alternative to Islam, rather than strict adherence to the Zoroastrian faith – while 1.5% said they were Christian. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">GAMAAN Religion in Iran 2020 - identifications.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most Iranians, 78%, believe in God, but only 37% believe in life after death and only 30% believe in heaven and hell. In line with other <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691163789/the-iranian-metaphysicals">anthropological research</a>, a quarter of our respondents said they believed in jinns or genies. Around 20% said they did not believe in any of the options, including God.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">GAMAAN Religion in Iran 2020 - beliefs.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These numbers demonstrate that a general process of secularisation, known to encourage <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/323835">religious diversity,</a> is taking place in Iran. An overwhelming majority, 90%, described themselves as hailing from believing or practising religious families. Yet 47% reported losing their religion in their lifetime, and 6% said they changed from one religious orientation to another. Younger people reported higher levels of irreligiosity and conversion to Christianity than older respondents.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">GAMAAN religion in Iran 2020 - changing orientations.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A third said they occasionally drank alcohol in a country that legally enforces temperance. Over 60% said they did not perform the obligatory Muslim daily prayers, synchronous with a 2020 state-backed poll in which <a href="http://ispa.ir/Content/image_project/image_gallery/241820172434(0).jpg">60% reported</a> not observing the fast during Ramadan (the majority due to being “sick”). In comparison, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41420721?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">in a comprehensive survey conducted in 1975</a> before the Islamic Revolution, over 80% said they always prayed and observed the fast. </p>
<h2>Religion and legislation</h2>
<p>We found that societal secularisation was also linked to a critical view of the religious governance system: 68% agreed that religious prescriptions should be excluded from legislation, even if believers hold a parliamentary majority, and 72% opposed the law mandating all women wear the hijab, the Islamic veil. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">GAMAAN Religion in Iran 2020 - hijab.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iranians also harbour illiberal secularist opinions regarding religious diversity: 43% said that no religions should have the right to proselytise in public. However, 41% believed that every religion should be able to manifest in public.</p>
<p>Four decades ago, the Islamic Revolution taught sociologists that European-style secularisation is not followed universally around the world. The subsequent secularisation of Iran confirmed by our survey demonstrates that Europe is not exceptional either, but rather part of complex, global interactions between religious and secular forces.</p>
<p>Other research on population growth, whose decline <a href="https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/pvwpy/">has been linked</a> to higher levels of secularisation, also suggests a decline in religiosity in Iran. In 2020, Iran recorded its <a href="https://www.isna.ir/news/99023122614/%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B4-%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AE">lowest population growth, below 1%</a>. </p>
<p>Greater access to the world via the internet, but also through interactions with the global Iranian diaspora in the past 50 years, has generated new communities and forms of religious experience inside the country. A future disentangling of state power and religious authority would likely exacerbate these societal transformations. Iran as we think we know it is changing, in fundamental ways.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pooyan Tamimi Arab is the secretary of the non-profit research institute GAMAAN. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ammar Maleki is the director of the non-profit research institute GAMAAN. GAMAAN (gamaan.org) collaborated with and received funding for this research from Ladan Boroumand.</span></em></p>A huge new online survey of Iranians reveals only 40% identify as Muslim.Pooyan Tamimi Arab, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, Utrecht UniversityAmmar Maleki, Assistant Professor, Public Law and Governance, Tilburg UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/730982017-02-23T02:02:09Z2017-02-23T02:02:09ZWho exactly are ‘radical’ Muslims?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157752/original/image-20170221-18633-1v598vs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indian Muslim woman Shagufta Sayyd prays in Mumbai, India.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Trump administration has been using the phrase “radical Islam” when discussing the “war on terror.” From his inauguration address to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/02/06/trump-warns-anew-against-attacks-by-radical-islamic-terrorists-as-he-visits-centcom/?utm_term=.a07b8e15e91e">remarks to military leaders</a>, President Trump <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/politics/black-site-prisons-cia-terrorist.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1">has been warning</a> against “Islamic terrorists.” </p>
<p>Many different kinds of individuals and movements get collapsed into this category of radical Islam. A common one that is increasingly being used by <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/02/elections-france-security-170215090123247.html">politicians</a> and <a href="http://www.theweek.co.uk/world-news/6073/what-is-salafism-and-should-we-be-worried-by-it">journalists</a> both in Europe and the U.S. to equate with “radical Islam” is the Salafist tradition. </p>
<p>For example, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/headtohead/2016/01/transcript-michael-flynn-160104174144334.html">Michael Flynn</a>, who recently resigned as national security advisor, was clear that what unites terrorists is their belief in the “ideology” of Salafism. Sebastian Gorka, deputy assistant to the president, <a href="http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/number-26/why-al-qaeda-just-wont-die">also describes Salafism as a “fundamental understanding of Islam”</a> that <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/02/03/513213042/trump-assistant-on-presidents-foreign-policy">justifies terrorism</a>. </p>
<p>France and Germany are targeting this movement, vowing to “clean up” or <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/german-vice-chancellor-sigmar-gabriel-calls-for-ban-on-islamist-mosques/a-37036379">shut down Salafist mosques</a>, since several <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-idUSKBN15G3OY">arrested and suspected terrorists</a> had spent time in these communities.</p>
<p>As a scholar of religion and politics, I have done <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/politicizing-islam-9780190225247?cc=us&lang=en&">research in Salafi communities</a>, specifically in France and India, two countries where Muslims are the largest religious minorities. </p>
<p>Salafists constitute a minority of the Muslim population. For example, in France, estimates range from <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2012/03/30/01016-20120330ARTFIG00624-entre-5000et-10000-salafistes-en-france.php">5,000</a> to <a href="http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31911/MWP_2014_13.pdf">20,000</a> – out of a Muslim population of over 4 million. Security experts estimate a worldwide number of <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Wimhurst_IPSP.pdf">50 million</a> out of 1.6 billion Muslims. </p>
<p>But there’s not much understanding of Salafism, its history and its diversity. In fact, Muslims themselves often have different definitions of what it means to be a Salafist. </p>
<p>So, who are Salafists?</p>
<h2>Origins of Salafism</h2>
<p>The Arabic term salaf means “ancestors.” It refers technically to the first three generations of Muslims who surrounded the Prophet Muhammad. Because they had direct experience with the original Islamic teachings and practices, they are generally respected across the Muslim world. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Reaching Kaaba, a building at the center of Islam’s most sacred mosque, Al-Masjid al-Haram, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/blankqo/26512561856/in/photolist-GoPNXs-pW14oD-6ZaDHV-hvKbx-jRt5E-jRt6y-PG1uV-jRt4L-D4ZTvs-CyBaKL-533wx1-3dqdFx-PwSSo-9eaf3Z-9edjsA-9edj9A-9eaeLH-9ediY1-jCMXT-sg9Yh-pGJeXv-darE1-8q13id-fSnrrR-fSnqSp-fSkXJM-ToF8-2fD7F-yxzVTe-cArVN-8Z4vzm-4rdmfY-y7fr1-qHU3e-qJ4FT-7k9fo8-fSkZYr-fSnpzK-fSnoHK-52ucDd-52q41K-52udpS-52uic1-52pXhD-52q1dc-52uguh-52pYE6-52ufLf-52pYvn-52ucYf">Farid Iqbal Ibrahim</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Self-identified Salafists tend to believe they are simply trying to emulate the path of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. This might include an array of practices from dress to culinary habits as well as ethical teachings and commitment to faith.</p>
<p>Salafism as a movement is believed to have originated in the 19th and 20th centuries. Some historians claim it started as a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/global-salafism-9780199326280?cc=us&lang=en&">theological reform movement</a> within <a href="http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6572670">Sunni Islam</a>. The impetus was to return to the original teachings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad and the Quran – a consequence, in part, of social changes and Western colonialism.</p>
<p>They specifically cite the works of Egyptian, Persian and Syrian intellectuals from the 19th century as shaping Salafist movements. One recent study, however, argues that these intellectuals from the past <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-making-of-salafism/9780231175500">never even used the term Salafism</a>. In other words, there is no authoritative account of how or when exactly this movement originated.</p>
<p>Finally, it is also open to debate as to which Islamic groups, schools of thought and practices may be considered Salafist. This is because groups and individuals who are labeled Salafist do not always view themselves this way. And they <a href="http://religion.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-255">disagree amongst each other</a> over what defines authentic Salafist practice. </p>
<h2>Here’s what my research shows</h2>
<p>The vast majority of people who loosely affiliate with Salafism, however, are either <a href="http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31911/MWP_2014_13.pdf">simply nonpolitical or actively reject politics</a> as morally corrupt. From 2005-2014, I spent a total of two years as an ethnographic researcher in the cities of Lyon, in southeastern France, and in Hyderabad, in south India. I clearly observed this among these two communities. </p>
<p>Every week I participated in mosque lessons and Islamic study circles among dozens of Salafist women. These communities maintain strict separation between men and women, but I was able to interact with and interview a few men as well. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Who are Salafist women?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/pdenker/10094075635/in/photolist-gnYM1P-icVS6P-4DJqG-8NEWEG-4DWzqi-ptkhwn-9osD3P-ouBR41-49iQxS-qP81pM-3k8kR-6w8PRz-7i3G4x-cbeUJq-raGDVa-6KufRr-bbPwBc-dNubS-B1k938-2EE5tK-Avq4J-85xzWZ-wSA1AE-7rPQxu-axYJRS-6fDoNG-znfxhw-85HC1e-5pKoFm-7xQeWx-odkfuL-fPxGqz-ahr3KF-bRpiQ6-64qbTH-58nCDE-9dAToy-qHghDF-rnFBuJ-92gu5k-kKA5EN-5xfHJT-6fDoNC-5qBSwv-qdG7RJ-8kQRRf-84WVsy-aZnQgD-a9ny1x-quQp7">Patrick Denker</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Based on conversations and observation, I learned that they actually avoided politics. They did not attend protests or do advocacy, and in Lyon many did not vote in elections. </p>
<p>It is the case that there are Muslim women, including many converts, who actively embrace Salafism. They take up strict forms of veiling and work hard to practice their religion every day. </p>
<p>Let’s take Amal, a 22-year-old woman who grew up in a working-class neighborhood in southeastern France. I met her during my time as an ethnographic researcher on Muslim minorities in France. Amal identifies with the Salafist tradition in Islam. And if we go by the definitions being floated around, she would be considered a “radical Muslim”: She prayed five times daily, fasted all 30 days of Ramadan, and wore the “jilbab,” a loose, full-body garment that covers everything but the face. Steadfast in her religiosity, she also studied the Quran regularly and attended local mosques in the area. </p>
<p>She worked hard to live her life in accordance with the ethical teachings of Islam. This included spending part of her week tutoring Muslim girls in the neighborhood who homeschooled. Amal worried a great deal about their futures in France, since <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/The-Republic-Unsettled/">anti-veiling legislation</a> had constrained their opportunities. She also quietly worried about the future of Islam, believing it is under siege both by governments and by the ungodly and destructive work of the Islamic State.</p>
<h2>Religious does not mean radical</h2>
<p>As anthropologists of religion have shown, Salafi women <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-making-of-a-salafi-muslim-woman-9780190611675?cc=us&lang=en&">are not passive adherents</a>. Nor are they forced into strict practices by their husbands. Still, this doesn’t mean they’re all the same.</p>
<p>Among the French Salafist women I knew, most were the daughters and granddaughters of immigrants from the former French North African colonies. Almost a third were converts to Islam that chose specifically the Salafist tradition as opposed to mainstream currents of Islam. They were drawn to the clear expectations, rigorous routines and <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11133-011-9192-2">teachings about trusting God</a>. </p>
<p>While some of the women were raised in religious families, many broke away from their Muslim families or earned the wrath of their parents for turning to Salafism. Because the parents practiced a cultural form of Islam, or did not practice at all, they did not want their daughters to wear the jilbab. Despite this disapproval, the women focused a great deal on what it meant to have faith in God, and they emphasized that they had to continually struggle to strengthen that faith. </p>
<p>These struggles included various ethical behaviors including not talking too much, suppressing one’s ego and respecting people’s privacy. Along the way, some committed “sins,” like smoking or lying, and deviated from the teachings by not praying or fasting. Some even <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/20566093.2016.1085245">doubted their faith</a>, which they considered normal and acceptable.</p>
<p>In my research, non-Muslims as well as other Muslims claimed Salafists were judgmental of those who did not believe or practice like them. In my observation, the contrary was the case: Salafis emphasized that one’s faith and piety were deeply private matters that no one but God had the right to judge.</p>
<h2>Diverse views</h2>
<p>However, like any movement or tradition, Salafism is profoundly diverse and encompasses a number of debates and struggles for legitimacy.</p>
<p>So, there are those self-identified Salafists around the world who join political organizations or participate in political debates. These include, for example, <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/20/salafis-and-sufis-in-egypt/8fj4">several political parties in Egypt</a> and the <a href="http://ahlehadees.org/">Ahl-i-Hadees</a> in India.</p>
<p>A small minority, <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Wimhurst_IPSP.pdf">estimated to be 250,000 in number by security experts</a>, <a href="http://fathomjournal.org/fathom-forum-shiraz-maher-mapping-contemporary-salafi-jihadism/">rejects nation-states and embraces political violence</a>. They span continents but are centered in Iraq and Syria. </p>
<h2>Different from Wahhabism</h2>
<p>In today’s climate, however, it has become a political term. This is partly because of its connection to Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Salafism is sometimes referred to as Wahhabism, the Saudi Arabian variant of the movement that is intimately tied to the Saudi regime. They share some intellectual roots and theological emphases, but they also differ, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/global-salafism-9780199326280?cc=us&lang=en&">especially in how they approach Islamic jurisprudence</a>. While Wahhabis follow one of the main Sunni orthodox schools of law, Salafis tend to think through legal questions independently. So equating the two is a mistake. </p>
<p>For some Salafists, labeling them as Wahhabi is a way to dismiss their faith or even insult them. Identifying with Salafism does not mean one supports the politics of the Saudi state. In my research, in both India and France, people sometimes noted concerns about the Saudi government’s political corruption or human rights record. </p>
<p>Yet outwardly, practices might overlap. For example, many Salafist women wear the niqab (that covers the face). <a href="https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/13326/review_21.pdf?sequence=1">Saudi intellectual centers and sheikhs</a> provide literature and training in numerous countries. They circulate lectures as well as money for building mosques and schools. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mecca, Saudi Arabia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/71925103@N00/279803013/in/photolist-qJ4FT-7k9fo8-fSkZYr-fSnpzK-fSnrrR-fSnoHK-fSnqSp-fSkXJM-52ucDd-52q41K-52udpS-52pXhD-52q1dc-52uic1-52uguh-52pYE6-52ufLf-52pYvn-52ucYf-52ueiL-52pZtM-52pZ98-52q3Kn-52q3k6-52ufUs-52ud77-52ugKG-52ugkL-52uiy1-52q4gZ-52ug3q-52ugDm-52uePN-52ugSm-52q3sK-52q3zM-52pYYH-52uhVW-52ueEJ-52q4o8-52q2ee-52pYPM-52q3d2-52q1uV-52q4BB-52pZXi-52q17K-52pYdB-52ucvG-52q2XM">Camera Eye</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And of course, Mecca and Medina are the spiritual centers for Muslims more broadly. In this way there is a transfer of intellectual and spiritual resources from Saudi Arabia that supports Salafist communities around the globe.</p>
<h2>Avoiding stereotypes, assumptions</h2>
<p>Why is it important to recognize the complexity and diversity of the Salafist movement? </p>
<p>It is true that as one part of the global Islamic revival, <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21656189-islams-most-conservative-adherents-are-finding-politics-hard-it-beats">it appears to be growing</a>. And it likely will remain part of the social landscape in a number of cities for the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>But, it is important not to assume that people’s religious faith and practices are the same as terrorist violence. It fuels fear and hatred – like the kind that inspired the recent <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-mosque-shooting-toll-idUSKBN15E0F6">shootings at the mosque in Quebec</a> or the arson attack that <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-texas-mosque-idUSKBN15N2P6">burned down a mosque in Texas</a>. </p>
<p>So, from my perspective, when we hear politicians warn us of the “global Salafi threat,” or if we see a woman like Amal walking down the street in her jilbab, it’s vital to remember the dangers of simplistic (and mistaken) stereotypes of “radical Muslims.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73098/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Z. Fareen Parvez received funding from the New Directions in the Study of Prayer at the Social Science Research Council; the National Science Foundation; the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation; and the University of California at Berkeley’s Center for Race and Gender, Center
for Middle Eastern Studies, and Institute of International Studies.</span></em></p>Muslims from the Salafist tradition can often be seen as ‘radical.’ There is not much understanding of Salafism, its history and its diversity. Here’s what it means to be a Salafist.Z. Fareen Parvez, Assistant Professor of Sociology, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/726362017-02-09T15:12:53Z2017-02-09T15:12:53ZFaith and money from the Middle East fuelling tensions in the Horn of Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156015/original/image-20170208-9117-1gb0cd9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A squadron of UAE Mirage fighter planes such as this one at the Dubai Airshow are stationed in Eritrea for Yemeni operations.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Caren Firouz </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Relations between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula go back centuries, with trade playing a key component in binding their people
together. Religion has also played a part. The expansion of <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2014/11/wahhabism-isis-how-saudi-arabia-exported-main-source-global-terrorism">Wahhabism</a> – the interpretation of Islam propagated by Saudi Arabia – has been funded by the massive oil wealth of the kingdom.</p>
<p>Mosques, Koranic schools and Imams have been provided with support over many years. Gradually this authoritarian form of Islam <a href="http://africacenter.org/publication/islamist-extremism-east-africa/">began to take hold</a> in the Horn. While some embraced it, others didn’t.</p>
<p>Somalia is an example. While most Somalis practised a moderate form of Suffi Islam, the Islamic fundamentalists of al-Shabaab didn’t. Soon after taking control of parts of central and southern Somalia in 2009 they began imposing a much more severe form of the faith. Mosques were destroyed and the shrines of revered Suffi leaders were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8077725.stm">desecrated</a>. </p>
<p>The export of faith has been followed by arms. Today the Saudis and their allies in the United Arab Emirates are exerting <a href="http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20161224-uae-discreet-yet-powerful-player-horn-africa">increasing military influence</a> in the region. </p>
<p>But Saudi Arabia and other Arabian gulf states aren’t the only Muslim countries that have sought influence in the region. Iran, for example, has also been an active player. In the case of Eritrea, a struggle for influence between Riyadh and Tehran has played out over the past few years. This has also been true in neighbouring Somaliland and the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland.</p>
<p>These are troubled times in the Horn of Africa. The instability that’s resulted from Islamic fundamentalism, of which al-Shabaab are the best known proponents, have left the region open to outside influences. The French have traditionally had a base in Djibouti, but they have now been joined by the <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-strategic-attractions-djibouti-15533">Americans</a> and the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-builds-first-overseas-military-outpost-1471622690">Chinese</a>.</p>
<p>The growing Arab military, political and religious influence is only the latest example of an external force taking hold in the region.</p>
<h2>New powerful forces in the region</h2>
<p>The Eritreans had been <a href="http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/yemen_african_dimension_0">close to Iran</a> and supported their Houthi allies in the Yemeni conflict. This was of deep concern to the Saudis, who are locked in conflict with Tehran. This is a battle for influence that pits Iranian Shias against Saudi Sunnis. Eritrea is just one of the fields on which it’s being played out.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ASMARA33_a.html">US cable</a> leaked to Wikileaks put it in 2010, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Saudi ambassador to Eritrea is concerned about Iranian influence, says Iran has supplied materiel to the Eritrean navy, and recently ran into an Iranian delegation visiting Asmara. He claims Yemeni Houthi rebels were present in Eritrea in 2009 (but is not sure if they still are), and reported that the Isaias regime this week arrested six Eritrean employees of the Saudi embassy. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since then Eritrea has switched sides. Eritrean President, Isaias Afwerki paid a <a href="https://www.tesfanews.net/president-isaias-pay-state-visit-to-saudi-arabia/">state visit to Saudi Arabia</a> in April 2015. Not long afterwards Eritrea signed a 30-year lease on the port of Assab with the Saudis and their allies in the Emirates. The port has become a base from which to prosecute the war in Yemen. The United Nations <a href="http://untribune.com/un-report-uae-saudi-leasing-eritean-port-using-eritrean-land-sea-airspace-and-possibly-troops-in-yemen-battle/">reported</a> that 400 Eritrean troops were now in Yemen supporting the Saudi alliance.</p>
<p>The United Arab Emirates has constructed a <a href="https://www.tesfanews.net/analysis-uae-military-base-assab-eritrea/">major base</a> in Assab – complete with tanks, helicopters and barracks. In November 2016 it was reported that a squadron of nine UAE Mirage fighter planes were <a href="http://www.defenseworld.net/news/17633/UAE_Deploys_Mirage_2000_Jets_To_Support_Yemen_Ops#.WJhh8xCKSMk">deployed to Eritrea</a> from where they could attack Houthi targets on the other side of the Red Sea. In return the Gulf states <a href="http://www.madote.com/2015/05/djibouti-uae-diplomatic-crisis-brings.html">agreed</a> to modernise Asmara International Airport, increase fuel supplies to Eritrea and provide President Isaias with further funding.</p>
<p>Since then the United Arab Emirates has announced its intention to increase its military presence in the Horn. In January it signed an agreement to manage the Somaliland port of Berbera for 30 years. It also sought permission to have a naval base, Somaliland foreign minister Sa’ad Ali Shire <a href="https://www.alleastafrica.com/2017/01/11/uae-seeks-to-open-military-base-in-somaliland/">told reporters</a>. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It’s true that the United Arab Emirates has submitted a formal request seeking permission to open a military base in Somaliland</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The UAE are also <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/west-of-suez-for-the-united-arab-emirates/">active</a> in the neighbouring Puntland. They have been paying for and training anti-piracy forces for years, while also financing and training its intelligence services. </p>
<p>They are a powerful force in the region, projecting an Arab influence as far as Madagascar and the Seychelles. It’s not surprising that the United Arab Emirates was labelled <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/11/15/3-ways-the-u-a-e-is-the-sparta-of-the-modern-day-middle-east/?utm_term=.d353884f8103">“Little Sparta”</a> by General James Mattis – now President Donald Trump’s Secretary of Defence.</p>
<h2>Ethiopian concerns</h2>
<p>These are worrying times for the Ethiopian foreign ministry. Once the dominant force in the region, its influence over the Horn is now in question.</p>
<p>To its north the Eritreans remain implacable foes, as they have been since the <a href="http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2492&context=faculty_publications">border war</a> of 1998-2000 that left these neighbours in a cold no-war, no-peace confrontation. </p>
<p>Addis Ababa is concerned that Eritrea’s hand has become stronger in recent years. Its mining sector is looking <a href="https://www.tesfanews.net/eritrea-approves-social-and-environmental-impact-assessment-for-colluli-potash-project/">increasingly attractive</a> with Canadian based firms now joined by Australian and Chinese companies. </p>
<p>Asmara’s role in the ongoing war in Yemen has allowed Eritrea to escape diplomatic isolation. The government in Asmara is now benefiting from funds and weapons, <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/eritrea-yemen-un-idINKBN12Z2JQ">despite UN sanctions</a> designed to prevent this from taking place. </p>
<p>To Ethiopia’s west lies Sudan, which is also now involved in the war in Yemen, <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/400-more-sudanese-troops-arrive-yemen-1210506015">providing troops</a> to the Saudi and United Arab Emirates backed government. These ties are said to have been cemented after the Saudis pumped a billion dollars into the Sudanese central bank. In return the Sudanese <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/12/sudan-siding-with-saudi-arabia-long-term-ally-iran">turned their backs</a> on their former Iranian allies.</p>
<p>To Ethiopia’s east the situation in Somalia is also of concern. No Ethiopian minister can forget the <a href="http://www.coldwar.org/articles/70s/SomaliaEthiopiaandTheOgadenWar1977.asp">invasion of the Ogaden</a> under President Siad Barre in 1977, when Somalia attempted to re-capture the lands lost to their neighbours during the expansionist policies of Emperor Menelik II in the nineteenth century. Siad Barre may be <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/03/obituaries/somalia-s-overthrown-dictator-mohammed-siad-barre-is-dead.html">long gone</a> but Ethiopian policy since the invasion has been to keep Somalia as weak and fragmented as possible.</p>
<p>Ethiopia has intervened repeatedly in Somalia to hold al-Shabaab at bay as well as to maintain the security of its eastern region. Addis Ababa’s policy of encouraging the inherent fragmentary tendencies of the Somalis has paid dividends: the country is <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Somalia-s-regions-slowly-evolve-into-federal-states-/2558-2833956-snxq7e/index.html">now a federation</a> of states and regions. Some of these only nominally recognise the authority of the government in Mogadishu. Somaliland, in the north is close to being recognised as an independent nation. Others, like Jubaland along the Kenyan border, are under Nairobi’s influence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72636/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is affiliated to the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and the Royal African Society</span></em></p>The growing Arab military, political and religious influence is only the latest example of an external force taking hold in the Horn of Africa.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/626882016-07-22T00:26:12Z2016-07-22T00:26:12ZFactCheck Q&A: has the Grand Mufti of Australia condemned terrorist attacks overseas?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131171/original/image-20160720-7906-1t1fho2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pauline Hanson, speaking on Q&A.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Q&A</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Conversation is fact-checking claims made on Q&A, broadcast Mondays on the ABC at 9:35pm. Thank you to everyone who sent us quotes for checking via <a href="http://www.twitter.com/conversationEDU">Twitter</a> using hashtags #FactCheck and #QandA, on <a href="http://www.facebook.com/conversationEDU">Facebook</a> or by <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">email</a>.</strong></p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Excerpt from Q&A July 18, 2016 – watch from 3:31.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<blockquote>
<p>Isn’t it funny that your Grand Mufti won’t even come out and condemn the terrorist attacks that’s happened overseas… – <strong>Senator-elect Pauline Hanson, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s4485524.htm">speaking on Q&A</a>, July 18, 2016.</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Senator-elect Pauline Hanson faced heavy questioning on Monday night’s Q&A program during a broad-ranging and often heated debate about Islam, radicalisation and terrorism.</p>
<p>Hanson criticised the Grand Mufti of Australia, a senior Islamic scholar, for not condemning recent overseas terrorist attacks. In response to a question from a Muslim audience member, Hanson said that “your Grand Mufti won’t even come out and condemn the terrorist attacks that’s happened overseas”.</p>
<p>Is that right?</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"755015134221705216"}"></div></p>
<h2>Checking the source</h2>
<p>The Conversation asked Hanson’s spokesman for sources to support her assertion, but did not hear back before the publication deadline. </p>
<p>However, we can test her statement against publicly available evidence. </p>
<h2>Who is the Grand Mufti and what has he said about terrorism?</h2>
<p>The Grand Mufti of Australia is Dr Ibrahim Abu Mohammed, an Islamic scholar from the <a href="http://www.anic.org.au/about-us">Australian National Imams Council</a> (ANIC). ANIC is made up of Imams from across Australia representing their respective communities. </p>
<p>Following the Paris attacks in late 2015, ANIC issued a <a href="http://www.anic.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ANIC-MOURNS-LOSS-OF-INNOCENT-LIVES-TO-TERRORIST-ATTACKS.pdf">statement</a> that said the Grand Mufti “mourned the loss of innocent lives due to the recent terrorist attacks in France”. It also said that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We would like to convey our deepest condolences to the families and friends of the deceased. We reiterate that the sanctity of human life is guaranteed in Islam.
These recent incidents highlight the fact that current strategies to deal with the threat of terrorism are not working. It is therefore imperative that all causative factors such as racism, Islamophobia, curtailing freedoms through securitisation, duplicitous foreign policies and military intervention must be comprehensively addressed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/mufti-slammed-over-paris-attacks-comments-20151117-gl0x8e.html">Critics</a> <a href="http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/rendezview/who-is-to-blame-for-terrorism-you-apparently/news-story/5f5eb2bc8e5a785678e2b10412690d76">said</a> at the time <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/2015/11/18/grand-mufti-terror-statement_n_8586722.html">that</a> this initial response to the Paris attacks didn’t go far enough or appeared to blame Western society for the attacks.</p>
<p>Two days later, ANIC issued a <a href="http://www.anic.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/PRESS-RELEASE-THE-GRAND-MUFTI-OF-AUSTRALIA-CLARIFIES-STATEMENT-IN-RESPONSE-TO-PARIS-TERRORIST-ATTACKS.pdf">clarification</a> saying that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We wish to emphasise it is incorrect to imply that the reference to causative factors provides justification for these acts of terrorism. There is no justification for the taking of innocent lives. The sanctity of human life is guaranteed in Islam. Dr Ibrahim Abu Mohamed and ANIC have consistently and unequivocally condemned all forms of terrorist violence. The Grand Mufti on 15th September 2014 said about ISIS that: “These criminals are committing crimes against
humanity and sins against God.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Previous and subsequent statements issued by ANIC and the Grand Mufti have <a href="http://www.anic.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ANIC-CONDEMNS-ISTANBUL-AND-THORNLIE-ATTACKS.pdf">condemned</a> terrorist acts and other forms of <a href="http://www.anic.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/ANIC-CONDEMNS-THE-ACTIONS-PORTRAYED-IN-THE-PHOTO-OF-A-7-YEAR-OLD.pdf">violence</a> committed overseas.</p>
<p>The Grand Mufti also used <a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/dr-ibrahim-abu-mohammed-grand-mufti-of-australia/14th-july-2016/896332273809846">Facebook</a> to condemn the July 2016 attacks in Nice:</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131541/original/image-20160722-21034-mujf5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131541/original/image-20160722-21034-mujf5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131541/original/image-20160722-21034-mujf5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=245&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131541/original/image-20160722-21034-mujf5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=245&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131541/original/image-20160722-21034-mujf5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=245&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131541/original/image-20160722-21034-mujf5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=308&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131541/original/image-20160722-21034-mujf5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=308&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131541/original/image-20160722-21034-mujf5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=308&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/dr-ibrahim-abu-mohammed-grand-mufti-of-australia/14th-july-2016/896332273809846">Facebook page of the Grand Mufti of Australia.</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>More generally, the Grand Mufti has supported a fatwa (or Islamic legal ruling) <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/muslim-leaders-including-the-grand-mufti-of-australia-back-fatwa-against-isis-20160101-glxtbp.html">against joining Islamic State</a>. </p>
<h2>“Your Grand Mufti”</h2>
<p>It is worth noting that the phrase “your Grand Mufti” is also misleading. It may convey the idea that the Grand Mufti of Australia represents all Muslims in Australia. That is not the case. In Australia, Islam has no easily defined hierarchy and ANIC is not the only body <a href="http://www.darulfatwa.org.au/en/category/newsandevents/pressreleases/">representing Muslims</a> or Islamic scholars in Australia.</p>
<p>According to my research, many Muslims in Australia support and respect the position of the Grand Mufti; however, they do not always support the person in the position or respect their religious credentials. </p>
<p>Australian Muslim communities are not homogeneous and are made up of many different culturally diverse groups. A 2015 <a href="https://www.unisa.edu.au/Global/EASS/MnM/Publications/Australian_Muslims_Report_2015.pdf">report</a> on the demographic and social profile of Muslims in Australia, prepared by <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/riaz-hassan-4201">Professor Riaz Hassan</a> from the University of South Australia, noted that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>According to the 2011 Australian Census there were 476,290 Muslims in Australia,
of whom about 40% were Australian born. The rest came from 183 countries, making Australian Muslims one of the most ethnically and nationally heterogeneous religious communities. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>There are also significant divisions in faith. The same report <a href="https://www.unisa.edu.au/Global/EASS/MnM/Publications/Australian_Muslims_Report_2015.pdf">said</a> that while most Australian Muslims are Sunni, there is a significant minority of Shi’ite Muslims and smaller numbers of Bektashis, Ahmadis, Alawis and Druze.</p>
<p>Lastly, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2015/nov/24/why-its-wrong-to-demand-that-muslims-condemn-isis">many</a> <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/omar-alnatour/why-muslims-should-never-have-to-apologize_b_9526296.html">commentators</a> and <a href="http://indy100.independent.co.uk/article/why-muslims-should-not-have-to-condemn-terrorism-in-one-very-simple-explanation--ZJ480Y4sYx">observers</a> have advanced the view that it is unfair to expect Muslims and Muslim public figures to repeatedly publicly condemn every incident involving Muslims around the world.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Pauline Hanson’s statement that “your Grand Mufti won’t even come out and condemn the terrorist attacks that’s happened overseas” was not correct. <strong>– Clarke Jones</strong></p>
<hr>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This is a sound analysis. I have read this FactCheck, which is written in a fair and impartial manner, accurately conveying in its entirety the real situation with publicly available evidence. <strong>– Jan Ali</strong></p>
<hr>
<p><div class="callout"> Have you ever seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at checkit@theconversation.edu.au. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clarke Jones is the co-director of the Australian Intervention Support Hub, a collaboration between the ANU, Alfred Deakin University, the Attorney-General’s Department, the Australian Federal Police and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to work with community groups in developing appropriate responses to violent extremism. He has worked for over 15 years in several areas of national security, including policing, military and intelligence. His research covers violent extremism, radicalisation and prison radicalisation, deradicalisation and intervention.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Ali, with colleagues at WSU, has in the past received funding from NSW Police to conduct research on de-radicalisation.</span></em></p>After a question from a Muslim audience member, Senator-elect Pauline Hanson said “your Grand Mufti won’t even come out and condemn the terrorist attacks that’s happened overseas”. Is that right?Clarke Jones, Co-Director of the Australian Intervention Support Hub (AISH), Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/554372016-03-02T19:05:50Z2016-03-02T19:05:50ZOut of the ashes of Afghanistan and Iraq: the rise and rise of Islamic State<p><em>Since announcing its arrival as a global force in June 2014 with the declaration of a caliphate on territory captured in Iraq and Syria, the jihadist group Islamic State has shocked the world with its brutality.</em></p>
<p><em>Its seemingly sudden prominence has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? In the final article of <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series examining this question</a>, Greg Barton shows the role recent Western intervention in the Middle East played in the group’s inexorable rise.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Despite precious little certainty in the “what ifs” of history, it’s clear the rise of Islamic State (IS) wouldn’t have been possible without the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. Without these Western interventions, al-Qaeda would never have gained the foothold it did, and IS would not have emerged to take charge of northern Iraq.</p>
<p>Whether or not the Arab Spring, and the consequent civil war in Syria, would still have occurred is much less clear. </p>
<p>But even if war hadn’t broken out in Syria, it’s unlikely an al-Qaeda spin-off such as IS would have become such a decisive actor without launching an insurgency in Iraq. For an opportunistic infection to take hold so comprehensively, as IS clearly has, requires a severely weakened body politic and a profoundly compromised immune system. </p>
<p>Such were the conditions in Goodluck Jonathan’s Nigeria from 2010 to 2015 and in conflict-riven Somalia after the fall of the Barre regime in 1991. And it was so in Afghanistan for the four decades after conflict broke out in 1978 and in Pakistan after General Zia-ul-Haq declared martial law in 1977. </p>
<p>Sadly, but even more clearly, such are the circumstances in Iraq and Syria today. And that’s the reason <a href="http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf">around 80% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks</a> in recent years have occurred in five of the six countries discussed here, where such conditions still prevail.</p>
<h2>An unique opportunity</h2>
<p>The myth of modern international terrorist movements, and particularly of al-Qaeda and its outgrowths such as IS (which really is a third-generation al-Qaeda movement), is that they’re inherently potent and have a natural power of attraction. </p>
<p>The reality is that while modern terrorist groups can and do operate all around the globe to the point where no country can consider itself completely safe, they can only build a base when local issues attract on-the-ground support. </p>
<p>Consider al-Qaeda, which is in the business of global struggle. It wants to unite a transnational <em>ummah</em> to take on far-off enemies. But it has only ever really enjoyed substantial success when it has happened across conducive local circumstances. </p>
<p>The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s provided an opportunity uniquely suited to the rise of al-Qaeda and associated movements. It provided plausible justification for a defensive jihad – a just war – that garnered broad international support and allowed the group to coalesce in 1989 out of the Arab fighters who had rallied to support the Afghans in their fight against the Soviets. </p>
<p>Further opportunities emerged in the Northern Caucasus, where local ethno-national grievances were eventually transformed into the basis for a more global struggle. </p>
<p>The declaration of independence by Chechnya in 1991 led to all-out war with the Soviet military between 1994 and 1996, when tens of thousands were killed. After a short, uneasy peace, a decade-long second civil war started in 1999 following the invasion of neighbouring Dagestan by the International Islamic Brigade. </p>
<p>The second civil war began with an intense campaign to seize control of the Chechen capital, Grozny. But it became dominated by years of fighting jihadi and other insurgents in the Caucasus mountains and dealing with related terrorist attacks in Russia. </p>
<p>In Nigeria and Somalia, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab now share many of the key attributes of al-Qaeda, with whom they have forged nascent links. But they too emerged primarily because of the failure of governance and the persistence of deep-seated local grievances.</p>
<p>Even in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda struggled to transform itself into a convincing champion of local interests in the 1990s. After becoming increasingly isolated following the September 11 attacks on the US, it failed to gain support from the Afghan Taliban for its global struggle.</p>
<p>But something new happened in Iraq beginning in 2003. The Jordanian street thug <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/">Musab al-Zarqawi</a> correctly intuited that the impending Western invasion and occupation of Iraq would provide the perfect conditions for the emergence of insurgencies. </p>
<p>Al-Zarqawi positioned himself in Iraq ahead of the invasion and deftly rode a wave of anger and despair to initiate and grow an insurgency that in time came to dominate the broken nation. </p>
<p>Initially, al-Zarqawi was only one of many insurgent leaders intent on destabilising Iraq. But, in October 2004, after years of uneasy relations with the al-Qaeda leader during two tours in Afghanistan, he finally yielded to Osama bin Laden’s request that he swear on oath of loyalty (<em>bayat</em>) to him. And so al-Zarqawi’s notorious network of insurgents became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). </p>
<h2>From the ashes</h2>
<p>Iraq’s de-Ba'athification process of May 2003 to June 2004, during which senior technocrats and military officers linked to the Ba'ath party (the vehicle of the Saddam Hussein regime) were removed from office, set the stage for many to join counter-occupation insurgent groups – including AQI.</p>
<p>Without the sacking of a large portion of Iraq’s military and security leaders, its technocrats and productive middle-class professionals, it’s not clear whether this group would have come to dominate so comprehensively. These alienated Sunni professionals gave AQI, as well as IS, much of its core military and strategic competency.</p>
<p>But even with the windfall opportunity presented to al-Zarqawi by the wilful frustration of Sunni interests by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki">Nouri al-Maliki’s</a> Shia-dominated government from 2006 to 2014, which deprived them of any immediate hope for the future and confidence in protecting their families and communities, AQI was almost totally destroyed after the Sunni awakening began in 2006. </p>
<p>The Sunni awakening forces, or “Sons of Iraq”, began with tribal leaders in Anbar province forming an alliance with the US military. For almost three years, tens of thousands of Sunni tribesmen were paid directly to fight AQI, but the Maliki government refused to incorporate them into the regular Iraqi Security Force. And, after October 2008 – when the US military handed over management of these forces – he refused to support them.</p>
<p>The death of al-Zarqawi in June 2006 contributed to the profound weakening of the strongest of all post-invasion insurgent groups. AQI’s force strength was reduced to several hundred fighters and it lost the capacity to dominate the insurgency.</p>
<p>Then, in 2010 and 2011, circumstances combined to blow oxygen onto the smouldering coals. </p>
<p>In 2010, the greatly underestimated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a local Iraqi cleric with serious religious scholarly credentials, took charge of AQI and began working to a sophisticated long-term plan.</p>
<p>Elements of the strategy went by the name “breaking the walls”. In the 12 months to July 2013, this entailed the movement literally breaking down the prison walls in compounds around Baghdad that held hundreds of hardcore al-Qaeda fighters. </p>
<p>Islamic State, as the group now called itself, also benefited from the inflow of former Iraqi intelligence officers and senior military leaders. This had begun with de-Ba'athification in 2003 and continued after the collapse of the Sunni awakening and the increasingly overt sectarianism of the Maliki government. </p>
<p>Together, they developed tactics based on vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and the strategic use of suicide bombers. These were deployed not in the passionate but often undirected fashion of al-Qaeda but much more like smart bombs in the hands of a modern army. </p>
<p>And the US military withdrawal from Iraq in late 2011, well telegraphed ahead of time, provided an excellent opportunity for the struggling insurgency to rebuild. As did the outbreak of civil war in Syria.</p>
<h2>A helping hand</h2>
<p>Al-Baghdadi initially dispatched his trusted Syrian lieutenant, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, to form a separate organisation in Syria: the al-Nusra front. </p>
<p>Jabhat al-Nusra quickly established itself in northern Syria. But when al-Julani refused to fold his organisation in under his command, al-Baghdadi rebranded AQI (or Islamic State in Iraq) Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham/the Levant (ISIS/ISIL).</p>
<p>Then, a series of events turned IS from an insurgency employing terrorist methods to becoming a nascent rogue state. These included: the occupation of Raqqa on the Syrian Euphrates in December 2013; the taking of Ramadi a month later; consolidation of IS control throughout Iraq’s western Anbar province; and, finally, a sudden surge down the river Tigris in June 2014 that took Mosul and most of the towns and cities along the river north of Baghdad within less than a week.</p>
<p>IS’s declaration of the caliphate on June 29, 2014, was a watershed moment, which is only now being properly understood. </p>
<p>In its ground operations, including the governing of aggrieved Sunni communities, IS moved well beyond being simply a terrorist movement. It came to function as a rogue state ruling over around 5 million people in the northern cities of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and defending its territory through conventional military means.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took charge of AQI and began working to a sophisticated long-term plan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Furqan Media</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the same time, it skilfully exploited the internet and social media in ways the old al-Qaeda could not do – and that its second-generation offshoot, al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), had only partially achieved. </p>
<p>This allowed IS to draw in tens of thousands of foreign fighters. Most came from the Middle East and Northern Africa, but as many as 5,000 came from Europe, with thousands more from the Caucasus and Asia. </p>
<p>Unlike the case in Afghanistan in the 1980s, these foreign fighters have played a key role in providing sufficient strength to take and hold territory while also building a global network of support.</p>
<p>But without the perfect-storm conditions of post-invasion insurgency, this most potent expression of al-Qaedaism yet would never have risen to dominate both the region and the world in the way that it does. </p>
<p>Even in its wildest dreams, al-Qaeda could never have imagined that Western miscalculations post-9/11 could have led to such foolhardy engagements – not just in Afghanistan but also in Iraq. </p>
<p>Were it not for these miscalculations, 9/11 might well have precipitated the decline of al-Qaeda. Instead, with our help, it spawned a global jihadi movement with a territorial base far more powerful than al-Qaeda ever had.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the final article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55437/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton is co-director of the Australian Intervention Support Hub, a CVE capacity-building initiative supported by the Australian government and based at the ANU and Deakin University. He previously led an ARC Linkage grant project researching radicalisation and disengagement from violent extremism. He is currently a research professor at the Alfred Deakin Institute.</span></em></p>The final article of our series on the historical roots of Islamic State examines the role recent Western intervention in the Middle East played in the group’s inexorable rise.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation; Co-Director, Australian Intervention Support Hub, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/546442016-03-01T19:05:58Z2016-03-01T19:05:58ZHow the political crises of the modern Muslim world created the climate for Islamic State<p><em>How do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">Our series on the jihadist group’s origins</a> tries to address this question by looking at the interplay of historical and social forces that led to its advent.</em></p>
<p><em>In the penultimate article of the series, Harith Bin Ramli traces the Muslim world’s growing disaffection with its rulers through the 20th century and how it created the climate for both the genesis of Islamic State and its continuing success in recruiting followers.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Islamic State (IS) declared its re-establishment of the caliphate on <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/29/isis-iraq-caliphate-delcaration-war">June 29, 2014</a>, almost exactly 100 years after the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/archduke-franz-ferdinand-assassinated">was assassinated</a>. Ferdinand’s death set off a series of events that would lead to the first world war and the fall of three great multinational world empires: the Austro-Hungarian (1867-1918), the Russian (1721-1917) and the Ottoman (1299-1922). </p>
<p>That IS’s leadership chose to declare its caliphate so close to the anniversary of Ferdinand’s assassination may not entirely <a href="http://www.jonathanhtodd.com/2014/06/27/6-degrees-geopolitcal-separation-franz-ferdinand-isis/">be a coincidence</a>. In a sense, the two events are connected. </p>
<p>Ferdinand’s assassination and the events it brought about (culminating in the <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/treaty-of-versailles">1919 Treaty of Versailles</a>) symbolised the <a href="http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/2/463.full">final triumph of a new idea</a> of <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/">sovereignty</a>. This modern conception was based on the popular will of a nation, rather than on noble lineage. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1038&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1038&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1038&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated on June 28, 1914.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Archduke_Franz_Ferdinand_of_Austria_-_b%26w.jpg">Carl Pietzner [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In declaring the resurrection of a medieval political institution almost exactly 100 years later, IS was announcing its explicit rejection of the modern international system based on that very idea of sovereignty. </p>
<h2>Early secularisation</h2>
<p>Other than the Ottoman Sultanate’s <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-11-19/myth-caliphate">very late and disputed claim</a> to the title, no attempt has been made to re-establish a caliphate since the fall of the Abbasid dynasty at the hands of the Mongols in 1258. In other words, Sunni Islam has carried on for hundreds of years since the 13th century without the need for a central political figurehead. </p>
<p>If we go further back in history, it seems that <a href="http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100141493">Sunni political theory</a> had already anticipated this problem. </p>
<p>The Abbasid caliphs began to lose power from the mid-ninth century, effectively becoming puppets of various warlords by the tenth. And the caliphate underwent a serious process of decentralisation at the same time. </p>
<p><a href="http://ilsp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/hurvitz.pdf">Key contemporary texts on statecraft</a>, such as Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi’s (952-1058) Ordinances of Government (<em>al-Ahkam al-sultaniyya</em>), described the caliph as the necessary symbolic figurehead providing constitutional legitimacy for the real rulers – emirs or sultans – whose power was based on military might. </p>
<p>As in the case of the <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/buyids">Shi'i Buyid dynasty (934-1048)</a>, these rulers didn’t even have to be Sunni. And they were often expected to provide legislation based on practical and functional, rather than religious, considerations. </p>
<p>The Muslim world, then, had arguably already experienced secularisation of sorts before the modern age. Or, at the very least, it had for quite some time existed within a political system that balanced power between religious and worldly interests. </p>
<p>And when the caliphate came to an end in the 13th century, both the institutions of kingship and the religious courts (run by the scholar-jurists) were able to carry on functioning without difficulty.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AWilayah_Abbasiyyah_semasa_khalifah_Harun_al-Rashid.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It was the 19th-century Muslim revivalist and anti-colonial movement known as <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1819?_hi=3&_pos=1">Pan-Islamism</a> that was responsible for reviving the Ottoman claim to the caliphate. The idea was revived again briefly in early 20th-century British India as the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Khilafat-movement">anti-colonial Khilafat movement</a>. </p>
<p>But anti-colonial efforts after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, even those primarily based on religious beliefs, have rarely called for a return of the caliphate. </p>
<p>If anything, successors of Pan-Islamism, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, have generally worked within the framework of nation states. Putting aside doubts about their actual ability to commit to democracy and secularism, such movements have generally envisioned an Islamic state along more modern lines, with room for political participation and elections.</p>
<h2>Modern utopias and old dynasties</h2>
<p>So why evoke the caliphate in the first place? The simple answer is that it has never been completely dismissed as an option. </p>
<p>In Sunni law and political theology, once <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e989?_hi=0&_pos=3182">consensus</a> over an issue has been reached, it is hard for later generations to go against it. This was why Egyptian scholar <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/apr/09/religion-islam-secularism-egypt">Ali Abd al-Raziq</a> was removed from his post at <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Azhar_University">Al-Azhar University</a> and attacked for introducing a deviant interpretation after he wrote an argument for a secular interpretation of the caliphate in 1925.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thinkers such as Abul Ala Mawdudi tried to place a revived caliphate within some type of democratic framework.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAbul_ala_maududi.jpg">DiLeeF via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-inevitable-caliphate/">many</a> <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13267/new-texts-out-now_madawi-al-rasheed-carool-kersten">recent</a> <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/recalling-the-caliphate/">studies</a> show, the idea of the caliphate and its revival has had a certain utopian appeal for a wide spectrum of modern Muslim thinkers. And not just those with authoritarian or militant inclinations. </p>
<p>Some leading Muslim revivalists such as <a href="http://muhammad-asad.com/Principles-State-Government-Islam.pdf">Muhammad Asad (1900-1992)</a> and <a href="http://www.meforum.org/151/islams-democratic-essence">Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979)</a>, for example, have tried to place a revived caliphate within some type of <a href="https://www.academia.edu/421254/Democracy_in_Islam_The_Views_of_Several_Modern_Muslim_Scholars">democratic framework</a>.</p>
<p>But, in practice, the dominant tendency here too has really been to seek the liberation or revival of Muslim societies within the nation-state framework. </p>
<p>If anything, national aspirations and the desire to modernise society existed before the formation of the new political order after the first world war. The majority of the populations of Muslim lands welcomed the fall of the three empires, or at least didn’t feel very strongly about the survival of traditional ruling dynasties. </p>
<p>And, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, most dynasties that stayed in power did so by reinventing their states along modern, mainly secular, models. </p>
<p>But this did not always succeed. The waves of <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/7/newsid_3074000/3074069.stm">revolutions</a> and <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/1/newsid_3911000/3911587.stm">military coups</a> that swept the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world throughout the 1950s and 1960s amply illustrate that popular sentiment identified traditional dynasties with the continuing influence of colonial powers. </p>
<p>In Egypt, under the Muhammad Ali dynasty (1805-1952), for example, the control of the then-French Canal epitomised the interdependent relationship between the dynasty and Western power. This was why <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200852517252821627.html">Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970)</a> made great efforts to regain it in the name of Egyptian sovereignty when he became the country’s second president in 1956.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Inauguration of the Suez Canal at Port Said, Egypt, in 1869.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ASuezkanal1869.jpg">Public domain via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Dissolving political legitimacy</h2>
<p>Either way, the success of the new Muslim nation states could be said to be predicated on two major expectations. The first was improvement of citizens’ lives – not only in terms of material progress, but also the benefits of freedom and the ability to represent the popular will through participatory politics. </p>
<p>The second was the ability of Muslim nations to unite against outside interference and commit to the liberation of Palestine. On both counts, the latter half of the 20th century witnessed abysmal failures and an increasing sense of frustration with Muslim leaders. </p>
<p>In many places, populism eventually gave way to authoritarianism. And the loss of further lands to Israel in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War">1967 Six-Day War</a> revealed the inherent weakness and lack of unity among the new Muslim nations.</p>
<p>Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel after the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/6/newsid_2514000/2514317.stm">1973 Yom Kippur War</a> was widely seen as an act of betrayal, for breaking ranks in what should have been a united front. His decision to do so despite lacking popular support in Egypt only revealed the extent to which the country had evolved into a dictatorship. </p>
<p>Sadat’s consequent <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/6/newsid_2515000/2515841.stm">assassination</a> at the hands of a small radical splinter group of religious militants acted as a warning to other Muslim leaders. Now they couldn’t simply ignore or lock away religious critics, even if the majority of the population still subscribed to the secular nation-state model. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel was widely seen as an act of betrayal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APresident_Anwar_Sadat_of_Egypt_arrives_in_the_United_States.JPEG">US Department of Defence Visual information via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This idea was reinforced by Iran’s <a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution-of-1978-1979">1979 Islamic Revolution</a>, as well as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Mosque_seizure">failed religious revolution</a> in the holy city of Mecca the same year. </p>
<p>Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Muslim leaders around the world increasingly made compromises with religious reactionary forces, allowing them to expand influence in the public sphere. In many cases, these leaders increasingly adopted religious rhetoric themselves.</p>
<p>Showing support for fellow Muslims in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1987) or the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Intifada">First Palestinian Intifada</a> provided an opportunity to manage the threat of religious radicalism. National leaders probably also saw this as an effective way to deflect attention from the authoritarian nature of many Muslim states. </p>
<p>And, as demonstrated by <a href="https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/09/12/did-saddam-hussein-become-a-religious-believer/">Saddam Hussain’s turn to religious propaganda</a> after the 1990-91 Gulf War, it could be used as a last resort when other ways of demonstrating legitimacy had failed.</p>
<h2>The longer view</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Persian-Gulf-War">The Gulf War</a> also brought non-Muslim troops to Arabian soil, inspiring <a href="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-july-dec96-fatwa_1996/">Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad</a> against the Western nations that participated in it. And it eventually led to the US invasion of Iraq. That set off a chain of events that created in the country the chaotic conditions that enabled the rise of Islamic State. </p>
<p>If the IS leadership is really an <a href="http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/">alliance between ex-Ba'athist generals and an offshoot of al-Qaeda</a>, as has often been depicted, then we don’t have to go far beyond the events of this war to explain how the group formed. But the rise of Islamic State and its declaration of the caliphate can also be read as part of a wider story that has unfolded since the formation of modern nation states in the Muslim world. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/86c958c2-ff78-11e3-8a35-00144feab7de.html#axzz367SAUfPl">some commentators</a> have pointed out, it’s not so much the Sykes-Picot agreement and the drawing of artificial national borders by colonial powers that brought about IS. </p>
<p>The modern nation-state model – as much as it’s based on <a href="https://nationalismstudies.wordpress.com/2012/10/24/benedict-anderson/">a kind of fiction</a> – is still strong in most parts of the Muslim world. And, I believe, it’s still the preferred option for most Muslims today. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People of Arak toppled the Shah’s statue in Bāgh Mwlli (central square of Arak) during 1979 revolution.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AIranian_Revolution_in_Arak.jpg">Dooste Amin [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the long century that has passed since the first world war has been increasingly marked by frustration. It’s littered with the broken promises of Muslim rulers to bring about a transition to more representative forms of government. And it has been marked by a sense that Western powers continue to control and manipulate events in the region, in a way that doesn’t always represent the best interests of Muslim societies.</p>
<p>An extreme <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-arab-spring-five-years-on-a-season-that-began-in-hope-but-ended-in-desolation-a6803161.html">high point of frustration</a> was reached in the events of the so-called <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12813859">Arab Spring</a>. The wave of popular demonstrations against the autocratic regimes of the Arab world were seen as the first winds of change that would bring democracy to the region. </p>
<p>But, with the possible exception of Tunisia, all of these countries underwent either destabilisation (Libya, Syria), the return of military rule (Egypt), or the further clamping down on civil rights (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other Gulf monarchies). </p>
<p>I would hesitate to describe IS’s declaration of a caliphate as a serious challenge to the modern nation-state model. But the small, albeit substantial, stream of followers it manages to recruit daily shows it would be wrong to take for granted that the terms of the international order can simply be dictated from above forever. </p>
<p>When brute force increasingly has the final say over how people live their lives, it becomes harder for them to differentiate between the lesser of two evils.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the eighth article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/54644/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harith Bin Ramli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rise of Islamic State and its declaration of the caliphate can be read as part of a wider story that has unfolded since the formation of modern nation states in the Muslim world.Harith Bin Ramli, Research Fellow, Cambridge Muslim College & Teaching Fellow, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/550892016-03-01T12:50:56Z2016-03-01T12:50:56ZIran’s cynical pandering to its ethnic minorities will do it no good<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113386/original/image-20160301-31040-nv4w5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>Iran’s parliamentary election has yielded a victory for the so-called <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election-idUSKCN0W218K">reformists</a>, an apparent vote of confidence in Hasan Rouhani’s relatively moderate government after the deal to curb Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme. But the campaign was also marked by promises to finally start meeting the demands and hopes of Iran’s ethnic minorities – and now the election’s over, that won’t be forgotten.</p>
<p>Ethnic minorities make up about 40-50% of Iran’s population. The largest five major ethnic groups, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Turkmen, are large, territorially located, and transnational. They all have long histories of political struggle for their ethnic rights. </p>
<p>While Iran is a majority Shia country, 10% of the Iranian population practices Sunni Islam, and the majority of the Kurds, Baluchis, and Turkmen are Sunni. That means the central government needs ethnic votes not only to shore up its legitimacy, but also to strengthen its national security and territorial integrity. </p>
<p>In the absence of ethnic political parties, ethnic activists, elites, and candidates use sharper rhetoric to stir up ethnic grievances and mobilise minority communities during local and national elections. </p>
<p>This was particularly apparent in the 1997 presidential election, when the reformist movement played the ethnic card, promising civil rights for all Iranians and distributing election leaflets in Arabic, Azeri, and Kurdish. President Muhammad Khatami duly gained the largest share of the vote in the ethnic provinces. But even though ethnic groups enjoyed freedom of a sort under Khatami, his failure to keep his reformist promises only added to minorities’ dissatisfaction. </p>
<p>Despite the consequences, this pattern has been followed ever since. Embracing ethnic issues during election campaigns certainly helps raise ethnic minority people’s profile and amplify their demands. But unfulfilled promises only widen the gap between these groups’ expectations and their chances of getting what they want and need – and the wider that gap, the more Iran will struggle with serious ethnic tensions. </p>
<h2>Democracy undermined</h2>
<p>None of this is good for Iran’s democracy. Whereas many states use elections to unify citizens and to solidify a sense of togetherness among people of different socio-cultural and ethnic backgrounds, the ethnicisation of Iran’s local and national elections achieves precisely the opposite. It also drives divisions between the country’s main political factions, namely <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-at-stake-in-irans-parliamentary-elections-55354">reformists and conservatives</a>, who end up advancing diametrically opposed ethnic policies as a way of marking out their differences. </p>
<p>Given that Iran is increasingly entangled in the Middle East’s growing ethno-sectarian strife, it sees its own diversity as a potential threat to its national security. Iran’s ethno-sectarian groups straddle the borders of neighbouring states, meaning Tehran regards them as potential Trojan horses for foreign interference. </p>
<p>This is particularly important given Iran’s highly sectarian rivalry with predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia, which domestic politicians discuss in belligerent nationalist tones. That hardly sits well with Iran’s own Sunni minority, who find themselves implicitly labelled as a risk to the state they call home.</p>
<p>Many of the demands Iran’s ethnic groups make of their country are justified, perfectly legal and recognised by the constitution. But just like other major national security-related decisions, ethnic policies aren’t made by the government or by members of parliament but by the Supreme National Security Council, which is appointed rather than elected. Any electoral promises made by electoral candidates are hollow and opportunistic. </p>
<p>This isn’t to say that Iran’s political elites should stay away from ethnic issues, or avoid acknowledging minority concerns. But pandering to ethnic demands during elections only to leave promises unfulfilled will only widen the gap between minority groups and the state.</p>
<p>If this habit doesn’t change, the consequences might be severe. The long-term damage already done by this electoral opportunism might be irreversible – and the earlier Tehran actually starts to grapple with ethnic disenchantment, the better.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55089/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alam Saleh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Every time Iran has an election, its minority groups are suddenly the centre of attention – and then they’re quickly forgotten again.Alam Saleh, Lecturer in Middle Eastern Politics, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.