tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/the-new-superpower-73080/articlesThe New Superpower – The Conversation2021-05-04T20:06:43Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1600932021-05-04T20:06:43Z2021-05-04T20:06:43ZChina does not want war, at least not yet. It’s playing the long game<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398546/original/file-20210504-15-16da3x6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">KYDPL KYODO/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-would-be-wise-not-to-pound-war-drums-over-taiwan-with-so-much-at-stake-159993">Talk of war has become louder</a> in recent days, but the “drumbeat” has been heard for some time now as China’s military capabilities have grown. China does not want war, at least not yet. It’s playing the long game and its evident intentions have become more unnerving. </p>
<p>Scholars like <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/four-flashpoints">Brendan Taylor have identified four flash points</a> for a possible conflict with China, including Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and Taiwan, but conventional war is not likely at this stage. </p>
<h2>Where tensions are currently high</h2>
<p>The armistice between North and South Korea has <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/cold">held for nearly 70 years</a>. The pandemic has severely constrained North Korea’s economy and its testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles has ceased, for now. China has a stake in keeping Kim Jong-un’s regime in power in the North, but the prospects of reverting to a hot war have flowed and ebbed. </p>
<p>Just south of Korea, in the East China Sea, China has intensified its <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf">military activities</a> around the Japanese-claimed but uninhabited Senkaku Islands. China appears to be wearing down Japan’s resolve to resist its claims over what it calls the Diaoyu Islands. </p>
<p>The United States has assured Japan the islands fall under their mutual defence security guarantee. But a confrontation with China could test US backing and possibly set the stage for escalated confrontation elsewhere.</p>
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<img alt="Japanese plane flies over Senkaku Islands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force surveillance plane flies over the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kyodo News/AP</span></span>
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<p>Similarly, China’s industrial-scale island building in the South China Sea has resulted in extensive <a href="https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/">military hardware and infrastructure</a>. This will enable the Chinese to consolidate their position militarily and assert control over the so-called <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-does-the-nine-dash-line-actually-mean/">nine-dash line</a> — its vast claim over most of the sea. </p>
<p>The US Navy continues to conduct freedom of navigation operations (<a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide">FONOPS</a>) in the sea to <a href="https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/australia-fonops-and-the-south-china-sea">challenge China’s claims</a>. With thousands of marked and unmarked Chinese vessels operating there, however, the risk of an <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1296844/south-china-sea-conflict-risk-us-navy-collision-world-war-3">accident triggering an escalation is real</a>.</p>
<p>In 2016, an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/indonesia-cites-2016-south-china-sea-arbitral-tribunal-award-at-un-is-that-a-big-deal/">international tribunal</a> rejected China’s claims to the waters in a case brought by the Philippines. Despite being a signatory to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, China has ignored the tribunal’s ruling and continued to intrude on islands claimed by both <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-vows-continue-maritime-exercises-south-china-sea-2021-05-02/">the Philippines</a> and <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/indonesia-china-dispute-natuna-12244200">Indonesia</a>. </p>
<p>Recently, <a href="https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/220-chinese-vessels-stake-out-another-reef-in-spratly-islands">220 Chinese vessels were anchored for months at a reef</a> inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. China’s actions appear premised on the dictum that <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/asias-nightmare-could-china-take-over-south-china-sea-180026">possession is nine-tenths of the law</a>. </p>
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<p>Like <a href="https://www.bworldonline.com/the-ghost-of-the-2012-scarborough-shoal-stand-off/">China’s seizure of the Scarborough Shoal in 2012</a> that preceded its <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-expands-island-construction-in-disputed-south-china-sea-1424290852">massive island construction further south</a>, China could conceivably take the unwillingness of the US to challenge its latest moves as a cue for more assertive action over Taiwan. </p>
<p>This is, after all, <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/xi-flirting-with-taiwan-seizure-to-secure-legacy-us-20210328-p57eq9">the main prize</a> Beijing seeks to secure President Xi Jinping’s legacy.</p>
<h2>Why Taiwan’s security matters</h2>
<p>Taiwan presents the US and its allies with a conundrum. It is a liberal open democracy and <a href="https://techwireasia.com/2021/02/the-dominance-of-the-worlds-largest-chipmaker-tsmc/">the world’s leading computer chip maker</a>. It also sits in the middle of what military strategists refer to as the “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/why-chinas-military-wants-to-control-these-2-waterways-in-east-asia/">first island chain</a>” stretching from Japan in the north to the Philippines in the south. Its strategic significance is profound. </p>
<p>Having adopted a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/one-china-policy-primer.pdf">“One China” policy</a> since 1979, the US <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp_20160713_taiwan_alliance.pdf">security guarantee for Taiwan</a> is conditional and tenuous. Reflecting growing unease over China’s actions, polls show <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/poll-shows-increase-in-american-support-for-defending-taiwan/">strong US public support for defending Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>So far, ambiguity has served US interests well, providing some assurance to Taiwan while discouraging the PRC from invading. </p>
<p>This guarantee has been important for Japan, as well. With its pacifist constitution, and occasional concern over US commitment to its defence, Japan would be closely watching how the US approaches its Taiwan policy.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-would-be-wise-not-to-pound-war-drums-over-taiwan-with-so-much-at-stake-159993">Australia would be wise not to pound 'war drums' over Taiwan with so much at stake</a>
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<h2>China is so far avoiding open war</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, China has metamorphosed both economically and militarily. An exponential <a href="https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/us-china-scorecard.html">growth in China’s military capabilities</a> has been matched by a steep rise in the lethality, accuracy, range and quantity of its weapons systems. On top of this, Beijing has ratcheted up its <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-china-using-warlike-tactics-against-taiwan-former-defence-minister/">warlike rhetoric and tactics</a>. </p>
<p>Last month, Xi made a <a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinping-sends-message-to-us-on-chinas-rising-power-in-boao-address-159324">muscular speech to the Boao Forum Asia</a>, calling for an acceptance of China not only as an emerging superpower but also as an equal in addressing global challenges. </p>
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<img alt="China's navy has been significantly upgraded." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">China has significantly upgraded its navy since Xi took power eight years ago.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Li Gang/Xinhua/AP</span></span>
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<p>Sometimes actions speak louder than words. And China’s actions so far have avoided crossing the threshold into open warfare, refusing to present a <a href="https://diplomacybeyond.com/to-a-man-with-a-hammer-everything-looks-like-a-nail-chinas-foreign-ministry-spokesperson-zhao-lijian-hits-back-at-us/">“nail” to a US “hammer”</a>. This is for good reason. </p>
<p>If war did break out, China would be vulnerable. For starters, it shares <a href="https://www.chinahighlights.com/travelguide/countries-bordering-china.htm">land borders with 14 countries</a>, bringing the potential for heightened challenges, if not open attack on numerous fronts. </p>
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<p>Then there are the economic concerns. China has significant <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3095951/china-increasingly-worried-about-losing-face-japan-bankrolls">Japanese</a>, <a href="https://www.nordeatrade.com/en/explore-new-market/china/investment">US and European industrial investments</a>, and is also overwhelmingly dependent on energy and goods passing through the Malacca Strait between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the Indo-Pacific’s jugular vein. </p>
<p>This reliance on the Malacca Strait — referred to by one analyst as the “<a href="https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-malacca-dilemma/">Malacca dilemma</a>” — helps explain why China has invested so much capital in its <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a> and studiously avoided open conflict, at least until it is more self-reliant. </p>
<p>To avoid outright war, China evidently reckons it is better to operate a <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/04/a-short-history-of-chinas-fishing-militia-and-what.html">paramilitary force</a> with white-painted ships and armed fishing vessels in the thousands to push its claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea and constrict Taiwan’s freedom of action. </p>
<p>It also recently <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-new-coast-guard-law-and-implications-maritime-security-east-and-south-china-seas">passed a new law</a> allowing its coast guard to act more like a military body and enforce maritime law — again in violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.</p>
<p>China is also expanding its <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2020/12/grey-zone-warfare-can-taiwan-counter-china/">“grey zone” warfare</a> against Taiwan, which includes <a href="https://www.cyberscoop.com/taiwan-china-hacking-apt40/">cyber attacks</a>, repeated incursions of its air space and territorial waters, and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/taiwans-growing-diplomatic-isolation/">diplomatic isolation</a> to undermine Taiwan’s resolve and ability to resist.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-hybrid-warfare-and-what-is-meant-by-the-grey-zone-118841">Explainer: what is 'hybrid warfare' and what is meant by the 'grey zone'?</a>
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<h2>Would America’s allies help defend Taiwan?</h2>
<p>This persistent and escalating challenge by Chinese forces has demonstrated <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/04/assessing-the-patterns-of-pla-air-incursions-into-taiwans-adiz/">Taiwan’s inability to fully control its waters and air space</a>. Beijing is continuing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-military-amphibious/">to build a fleet of amphibious</a> capabilities to enable an invasion of Taiwan. </p>
<p>US pundits are also no longer confident the Americans would win in an outright war over Taiwan, with Washington’s top military officer in the region <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/china-could-invade-taiwan-in-next-six-years-top-us-admiral-warns">arguing one could happen within six years</a>.</p>
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<p>Taiwan lacks allies other than the United States, but Japan is mindful of the consequences of a US failure to defend Taiwan. Its <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/tools-owatatsumi">ocean surveillance and coastal defence capabilities</a> would be exposed if China took Taiwan. But Japan’s constitution <a href="https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/04/983deef11264-japan-govt-studies-sdf-response-in-event-of-taiwan-strait-conflict.html">precludes direct involvement in defending Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>Under its Anzus obligations, the US could call on Australia for military support to defend Taiwan. The mutual assistance provisions <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-08/does-anzus-commit-us-to-come-to-australias-aid-fact-check/5559288?nw=0">are not automatically invoked</a>, but the implications of Canberra standing on the sidelines would be profound. </p>
<p>Warnings about rhetorical drumbeats of war remind us the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0047117802016002001">US is no longer the world’s only superpower</a> and suggest Australia should prepare for a more volatile world.</p>
<p>Rather than rely solely on the US, Australia should bolster its own defence capabilities. At the same time, it should collaborate more with regional partners across Southeast Asia and beyond, <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/Pages/plan-of-action-for-the-indonesia-australia-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-2020-2024">particularly Indonesia</a>, <a href="https://www.theglobaleye.it/quad-bolstering-the-quad-beyond-its-military-dimensions-east-asia-forum/">Japan, India</a> and <a href="https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/4836-south-korea-and-australia-move-to-deepen-energy-defence-and-industry-ties">South Korea</a>, to deter further belligerence and mitigate the risk of tensions escalating into open war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160093/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Blaxland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are four potential flash points where conflict with China could break out. Beijing, though, has yet to present a ‘nail’ to the US ‘hammer’.John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1390282020-05-21T20:02:12Z2020-05-21T20:02:12ZBehind China’s newly aggressive diplomacy: ‘wolf warriors’ ready to fight back<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336658/original/file-20200521-102671-1fr2702.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wu Hong/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When former President Hu Jintao visited Australia in 2003, he <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/full-text-hus-speech-20031024-gdhnfs.html">began his address to parliament</a> by describing the exploits of a 15th century Chinese admiral, Zheng He:</p>
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<p>Back in the 1420s, the expeditionary fleets of China’s Ming Dynasty reached Australian shores … They brought Chinese culture to this land and lived harmoniously with the local people, contributing their proud share to Australia’s economy, society and its thriving pluralistic culture.</p>
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<p>This account of explorer Zheng’s voyages <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/shifting-sands-of-diplomacy/news-story/21f8e1dd533f88726a11e8f6e30d0cc7">has largely been dismissed</a> by western historians. </p>
<p>But it indicates the extent of the regional ambition wrapped up in the Communist Party’s control of history today, including how the Chinese empire once presided over myriad subservient tribute states. </p>
<p>And this is crucial for its promotion of nationalism – an increasingly vital part of the party’s own legitimacy as its economy falters.</p>
<h2>Projecting power under Xi Jinping</h2>
<p>Since <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/asia/communists-conclude-party-congress-in-china.html">becoming general secretary</a> of the Communist Party in 2012, President Xi Jinping has emphasised this “rejuvenation” of China, recalling two earlier golden eras during the Tang and High Qing dynasties.</p>
<p>At first, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs largely persisted with the traditional, polite diplomacy that had seen China’s influence grow steadily and quietly, commensurate with its economic heft. </p>
<p>But things changed as Xi’s new team pushed aside officials <a href="https://www.scmp.com/topics/xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign">viewed as corrupt</a> or inadequately responsive to his demands to more forcefully assert China’s rejuvenation, both at home and to the rest of the world.</p>
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<p>The Foreign Ministry was losing its influence as Xi’s tight inner circle centralised decision-making. Foreign diplomats came to understand they needed to go to party insiders if they wanted to understand or seek to influence Chinese policies.</p>
<p>A watershed moment came with the blockbuster success of the patriotic, Rambo-style film <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-40811952">Wolf Warrior 2</a> in mid-2017. <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinese-evacuations-and-power-projection-part-2-a-movie-genre-is-born/">Its slogan</a>, taken from a Han dynasty saying, is: </p>
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<p>Whoever offends China will be punished, no matter how far they are.</p>
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<p>At the end of the film, the red cover of a Chinese passport is displayed, accompanied by the <a href="https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/wolf-warrior-2-sets-box-office-records-in-china/3994889.html">message</a>: </p>
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<p>Citizens of the PRC: When you encounter danger in a foreign land, do not give up! Please remember, at your back stands a strong motherland. </p>
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<p>At the huge exhibition accompanying the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/18/xi-jinping-speech-new-era-chinese-power-party-congress">19th party congress</a> a few months later, the foreign ministry proudly exhibited a <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/inquirer/party-time-for-xi-jinping/news-story/a8353d69ba29e4bc1fa5a702e6fc313c">new hotline system</a> that Chinese people abroad could use to call for help, “no matter how far they are”.</p>
<p>The People’s Liberation Army command <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence/chinas-xi-restructures-military-consolidates-control-idUSKBN17L0D8">was restructured</a> and equipped to project power, including through a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2019/12/15/china-is-building-an-incredible-number-of-warships/#1bb569ab69ac">blue-water navy</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-strategic-djibouti-a-microcosm-of-chinas-growing-foothold-in-africa/2019/12/29/a6e664ea-beab-11e9-a8b0-7ed8a0d5dc5d_story.html">its first overseas base</a> in Djibouti, east Africa.</p>
<p>And Xi ordered massive new resources for diplomacy, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2c750f94-2123-11e8-a895-1ba1f72c2c11">doubling the foreign ministry budget</a> from 2013-18, and since then raising it by double digits annually. </p>
<p>Top diplomat <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2116978/its-good-day-chinas-diplomats-foreign-policy-chief">Yang Jiechi was also promoted</a> to the Politburo and a new Central Foreign Affairs Commission was established, underlining Xi’s determination to elevate a more assertive foreign policy as a national priority.</p>
<h2>Hawkish diplomats reinforce the message</h2>
<p>China’s international messaging also changed rapidly. At the party to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Chinese Foreign Ministry last year, Minister Wang Yi <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/world/the-times/coronavirus-xi-wolf-envoys-sink-teeth-into-west/news-story/7191b4e464458adb9d746d2bab41b748">urged the country’s envoys to adopt a “fighting spirit”</a> in the face of international challenges. </p>
<p>Although Twitter and Facebook are banned in China, <a href="https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/five-things-to-know-about-beijings-disinformation-approach/">diplomats quickly acquired</a> accounts and followers, and began to use them to hammer the countries where they were posted. </p>
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<hr>
<p>When diplomat Zhao Lijian returned from a posting to Pakistan last year, <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/04/01/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/china-diplomat-aggressive-foreign-policy/#.XsYTXRMzYyk">Reuters reported</a> that “a group of young admirers” at the Foreign Ministry cheered him. </p>
<p>He had <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/04/01/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/china-diplomat-aggressive-foreign-policy/#.XsYTXRMzYyk">catapulted into global attention</a> by labelling the US as racist and in a Twitter spat, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3018676/susan-rice-calls-chinese-diplomat-zhao-lijian-racist-disgrace">telling</a> former National Security Advisor Susan Rice she was “a disgrace” and “shockingly ignorant.” </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1150632230080978945"}"></div></p>
<p>In January, Zhao was promoted to a Foreign Ministry spokesman, highlighting that his was the path to diplomatic success. </p>
<p>In this new role, Zhao <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/13/asia/china-coronavirus-us-lijian-zhao-intl-hnk/index.html">has tweeted to his 623,000 followers</a> that US soldiers brought COVID to Wuhan when competing in the 2019 Military World Games. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1238123542627201032"}"></div></p>
<p>He <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/china-clashes-with-new-zealand-for-supporting-taiwan-rejoining-who-2020-5?r=US&IR=T">rebuked</a> New Zealand for seeking Taiwan’s readmission to the World Health Organisation’s annual global health assembly, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/05/11/world/asia/11reuters-china-taiwan-new-zealand-mofa.html">calling on it to</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>immediately stop making wrong statements on Taiwan, to avoid damaging our bilateral relationship.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Qin Xiaoying, formerly director of the Communist Party’s international propaganda department, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-diplomacy-insight/in-china-a-young-diplomat-rises-as-aggressive-foreign-policy-takes-root-idUSKBN21I0F8">commented</a> that now is </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the first time since 1949 that ‘new hawks’ have the power to reshape China’s diplomatic policy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>They have won their spurs by assiduously enlisting the support of countries that have received Chinese development loans to win votes in global bodies. </p>
<p>For instance, when 22 nations, including Australia, urged the UN Human Rights Council to call on China to end its massive detention program of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, Beijing <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/which-countries-are-for-or-against-chinas-xinjiang-policies/">swiftly signed up</a> 37 countries, including many with majority Muslim populations, to defend its rule there.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336645/original/file-20200521-102632-61uage.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=444%2C394%2C2885%2C2036&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336645/original/file-20200521-102632-61uage.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336645/original/file-20200521-102632-61uage.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336645/original/file-20200521-102632-61uage.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336645/original/file-20200521-102632-61uage.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336645/original/file-20200521-102632-61uage.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336645/original/file-20200521-102632-61uage.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zhao Lijian has become a more recognisable face since being promoted to Foreign Ministry spokesman.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">CARLOS GARCIA RAWLINS / Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Changing the narrative on coronavirus</h2>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic soon provided those hawks with an even better opportunity to prove their loyalty and value to Xi. </p>
<p>Wu Ken, the ambassador to Germany, provided a handy template to follow in December by warning that if Huawei was excluded from building Germany’s 5G network, “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-14/china-threatens-germany-with-retaliation-if-huawei-5g-is-banned">there will be consequences</a>”, and pointing to the importance of China’s market for German cars.</p>
<p>In late January and early February, Xi <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-vulnerable-is-xi-jinping-over-coronavirus-in-todays-china-there-are-few-to-hold-him-to-account-131760">appeared to be on the back foot</a> as the virus began to erode China’s health and economy, and with it his own previously unquestioned authority. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-vulnerable-is-xi-jinping-over-coronavirus-in-todays-china-there-are-few-to-hold-him-to-account-131760">How vulnerable is Xi Jinping over coronavirus? In today's China, there are few to hold him to account</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But as China began to receive criticism globally for its response to the virus, these newly assertive diplomats swung into action, proving their worth as front-line fighters.</p>
<p>Cheng Jingye, the ambassador to Australia, attacked Canberra’s call for an investigation into the cause of COVID, <a href="https://www.decanter.com/wine-news/china-australian-wine-diplomatic-row-437321/">asking</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Maybe also the ordinary [Chinese] people will say why should we drink Australian wine or to eat Australian beef?</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336688/original/file-20200521-102662-soyttd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336688/original/file-20200521-102662-soyttd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336688/original/file-20200521-102662-soyttd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336688/original/file-20200521-102662-soyttd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336688/original/file-20200521-102662-soyttd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336688/original/file-20200521-102662-soyttd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336688/original/file-20200521-102662-soyttd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China’s ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye. The Chinese embassy mocked Australia’s call for a coronavirus inquiry as ‘nothing but a joke’ this week.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Lu Shaye, the ambassador to France, was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/15/france-summons-chinese-envoy-after-coronavirus-slur">summoned</a> by the French Foreign Ministry over a post on the embassy website claiming the French were “leaving their residents to die of hunger and disease.”</p>
<h2>Politics above all else</h2>
<p>The Foreign Ministry told Reuters this year, citing a Mao Zedong slogan: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We will not attack unless we are attacked. But if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This may even come at a cost to China economically. But politics – and especially the push for rejuvenation – is upstream of all else in Xi’s “New Era”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139028/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rowan Callick does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Under Xi Jinping, China has tied its national rejuvenation to an aggressive diplomatic stance toward the world. This may come at a cost economically, but politics is paramount in Xi’s new China.Rowan Callick, Industry Fellow, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1346602020-04-23T00:54:30Z2020-04-23T00:54:30ZIs it time for a ‘new way of war?’ What China’s army reforms mean for the rest of the world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329370/original/file-20200421-82677-1jryvv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jason Lee/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/202800-appear-weak-when-you-are-strong-and-strong-when-you">once said</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Looking at the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) today, it’s hard to say which of these tactics is most germane.</p>
<p>Getting the answer right will have enormous consequences for the United States and the future of the Indo-Pacific region. Underestimating the PLA breeds complacency and risks costly overreach. Overestimating the Chinese military grants it unwarranted advantage. </p>
<p>Similarly, for the Chinese leadership, miscalculating its military capability could lead to disaster. </p>
<p>As such, any serious appraisal of Chinese military power has to take the PLA’s progress – as well as its problems – into account. This was the focus of a recent study we undertook, along with retired US Army lieutenant colonel Dennis Blasko, for the Australian Department of Defence.</p>
<h2>The PLA’s new-found might</h2>
<p>By all appearances, the PLA has become a more formidable force over the past decade. The massive military parade in Beijing last October to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China showed off <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/01/china-displays-a-military-show-of-strength-at-70th-anniversary-parade.html">more than 700 pieces</a> of modern military hardware. </p>
<p>One of these weapons, displayed publicly for the first time, was the <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-41/">DF-41</a>, China’s most powerful nuclear-armed ballistic missile. It is capable of hitting targets anywhere in the US.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Ayi8ddu_eZg?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Under President Xi Jinping, China has also expanded its military footprint in the South China Sea. Military experts say China has used the global distraction of the coronavirus pandemic to shore up its position even further, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3080756/vietnam-accuses-beijing-seriously-violating-sovereignty-south">drawing rebukes</a> from neighbours. Tensions have heightened in recent days as the US and Australia have <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-22/tensions-rise-in-south-china-sea-after-us-australia-exercises/12171806">sent warships</a> into the sea for drills.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-chinas-swift-rise-as-naval-power-australia-needs-to-rethink-how-it-defends-itself-119459">With China's swift rise as naval power, Australia needs to rethink how it defends itself</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In the past few years, China has also stepped up its military exercises around Taiwan and disputed waters near Japan, and last December, <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/china-aircraft-carrier-type-001a/">commissioned its second aircraft carrier</a>, the Shandong, into service with the PLA Navy.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf">most recent annual assessment</a> of the PLA by the Pentagon acknowledges China’s armed forces are developing the capability to dissuade, deter or, if ordered, defeat third-party armed forces (such as the US) seeking to intervene in “a large-scale, theatre campaign” in the region. </p>
<p>The report also expects the PLA to steadily improve its ability to project power into the Pacific and beyond. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-strong-words-the-us-has-few-options-left-to-reverse-chinas-gains-in-the-south-china-sea-97089">Despite strong words, the US has few options left to reverse China's gains in the South China Sea</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>A <a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rising-to-the-china-challenge">recent study</a> commissioned by the US Congress goes further, saying China’s strategy aims to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>disrupt, disable or destroy the critical systems that enable US military advantage.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The report called for a “new American way of war”.</p>
<p>All of these highlight the increasing capabilities of the PLA and underscore the challenges China’s rising hard power pose to the United States and its regional allies. But what of the challenges the PLA itself faces?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329912/original/file-20200423-47788-4f0emx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329912/original/file-20200423-47788-4f0emx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329912/original/file-20200423-47788-4f0emx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329912/original/file-20200423-47788-4f0emx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329912/original/file-20200423-47788-4f0emx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329912/original/file-20200423-47788-4f0emx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329912/original/file-20200423-47788-4f0emx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Chinese destroyer taking part in a naval parade off the eastern port city of Qingdao last year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jason Lee/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Overcoming the ‘peace disease’</h2>
<p>Interestingly, many of these problems are openly discussed in official Chinese publications aimed at a Chinese audience, but are curiously absent when speaking to a foreign audience. </p>
<p>Often, pithy formulaic sayings of a few characters summarise PLA shortcomings. For example, the “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1701440?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=fjss20">two inabilities</a>” (两个能力不够), a term that has appeared hundreds of times in official Chinese media, makes reference to two shortcomings: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the PLA’s current ability to fight a modern war is insufficient, and </p></li>
<li><p>the current military commanders are also not up to the task.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Another frequent self-criticism highlights the “peace disease” (和平病), “peacetime habits” (和平积习) and “long-standing peace problems” (和平积弊). </p>
<p>The PLA was last at war in the <a href="https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1985/03/09/080371.html?pageNumber=3">mid-1980s</a>, some 35 years years ago. Today’s Chinese military has very little combat experience. </p>
<p>Put more pointedly, far more soldiers serving in the PLA today have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/01/china-celebrates-70-years-military-parade-xi-jinping-hong-kong">paraded down Chang’an Avenue</a> in Beijing than have actually operated in combat.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinpings-grip-on-power-is-absolute-but-there-are-new-threats-to-his-chinese-dream-118921">Xi Jinping's grip on power is absolute, but there are new threats to his 'Chinese dream'</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Owing to these and many other acknowledged deficiencies, Xi launched the most ambitious and potentially far-reaching reforms in the PLA’s history in late 2015. </p>
<p>This massive <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/Chapter%202%20Section%202-%20China's%20Military%20Reorganization%20and%20Modernization,%20Implications%20for%20the%20United%20States_0.pdf">structural overhaul</a> aims to transform the PLA from a bloated, corrupt and degraded military to one increasingly capable of fighting and winning relatively short, but intensive, conflicts against technologically sophisticated adversaries, such as the United States.</p>
<p>But, recognising how difficult this transformation will be, the Chinese political and military leadership has set out a decades-long timeline to achieve it. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329916/original/file-20200423-47810-1wg81gz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329916/original/file-20200423-47810-1wg81gz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329916/original/file-20200423-47810-1wg81gz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329916/original/file-20200423-47810-1wg81gz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329916/original/file-20200423-47810-1wg81gz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329916/original/file-20200423-47810-1wg81gz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329916/original/file-20200423-47810-1wg81gz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">DF-17 ballistic missiles on parade in Tiananmen Square last year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Xinhua News Agency handout/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf">Xi’s estimations</a>, by 2020, the PLA’s mechanisation will be “basically achieved” and strategic capabilities will have seen major improvements; by 2035, national defence modernisation will be “basically completed”; and by mid-century, the PLA will be a “world-class military.”</p>
<p>In other words, this transformation – if successful – will take time. </p>
<p>At this relatively early point in the process, authoritative writings by PLA leaders and strategic analysts make clear that much more work is needed, especially more realistic training in joint operations, as well as improved leadership and greater communications integration across the services. </p>
<p>PLA modernisation depends more on “software” — human talent development, new war-fighting concepts and organisational transformation — than on the “hardware” of new weapons systems. This underscores the lengthy and difficult nature of reform. </p>
<h2>‘Know the enemy and know yourself’</h2>
<p>The many challenges facing the PLA’s reform effort suggest the Chinese leadership may lack confidence in its current ability to achieve victory against a strong adversary on the battlefield. </p>
<p>However, none of this means we should dismiss the PLA as a paper tiger. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/us/politics/equifax-hack-china.html">recent indictment of PLA personnel</a> for the 2017 hack of Equifax is a cautionary reminder of the Chinese military’s expansive capabilities. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329919/original/file-20200423-47826-1ootooe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329919/original/file-20200423-47826-1ootooe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329919/original/file-20200423-47826-1ootooe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329919/original/file-20200423-47826-1ootooe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329919/original/file-20200423-47826-1ootooe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329919/original/file-20200423-47826-1ootooe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329919/original/file-20200423-47826-1ootooe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Better hardware is not what China needs at the moment – it needs to improve its software.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ROMAN PILIPEY/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Rather, it means a prudent assessment of the PLA must take its strengths and weaknesses into account, neither overestimating nor underestimating either one. Should strategic competition between the US and China continue to escalate, getting this right will be more important than ever.</p>
<p>So, is China appearing weak when it is strong, or appearing strong when it is weak? Much current evidence points to the latter. </p>
<p>But this situation will change and demands constant reassessment. Another <a href="https://suntzusaid.com/book/3/18">quotation</a> from Sun Tzu is instructive:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He added, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134660/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bates Gill receives funding from the Australian Department of Defence Strategic Policy Grants Program, which supported research resulting in this article.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Ni receives funding from the Australian Department of Defence Strategic Policy Grants Program, which supported research resulting in this article.</span></em></p>China has embarked on ambitious reforms to modernise the People’s Liberation Army to be able to defeat the US in a potential conflict. But many challenges remain.Bates Gill, Professor of Asia-Pacific Security Studies, Macquarie UniversityAdam Ni, China researcher, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1307882020-02-04T19:00:23Z2020-02-04T19:00:23ZWhy the coronavirus has become a major test for the leadership of Xi Jinping and the Communist Party<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313237/original/file-20200203-41527-pu9la4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=367%2C22%2C2303%2C1587&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wu Hong/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last week, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared coronavirus a global health emergency. In the <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)">same statement</a>, the agency said it</p>
<blockquote>
<p>welcomed the leadership and political commitment of the very highest levels of Chinese government, their commitment to transparency and the efforts made to investigate and contain the current outbreak.</p>
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<p>Indeed, Chinese authorities have put in place unprecedented measures to slow the spread of coronavirus, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/01/27/800158025/45-million-chinese-now-under-quarantine-as-officials-try-to-halt-coronavirus-spr">including quarantining Wuhan and surrounding cities</a>, home to over 45 million people. </p>
<p>While some have <a href="https://twitter.com/DrTedros/status/1222982869871669251">praised Chinese authorities</a> for these tough measures, others have criticised the local and central governments for cover-ups, a lack of transparency, being slow to react and mishandling the early stages of the outbreak. </p>
<p>For some, China’s authoritarian political system <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/01/world/asia/china-coronavirus.html">is to blame for making the situation worse</a> and delaying action until it was too late. </p>
<p>Now, the crisis is being seen as a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/01/29/xi-jinping-better-red-than-expert-coronavirus-is-challenging-that/">key test of President Xi Jinping’s leadership</a> and the ability of the Communist Party to effectively respond to and manage a health emergency.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313459/original/file-20200204-41554-1eb3cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313459/original/file-20200204-41554-1eb3cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313459/original/file-20200204-41554-1eb3cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313459/original/file-20200204-41554-1eb3cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313459/original/file-20200204-41554-1eb3cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313459/original/file-20200204-41554-1eb3cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313459/original/file-20200204-41554-1eb3cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">There wasn’t national attention on the outbreak until late January, weeks after the government reported the first cases to the WHO.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Plavevski/EPA</span></span>
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<h2>Too slow to react</h2>
<p>Suspicions of the new virus first emerged in early December. But it wasn’t until the end of the month that the Chinese government reported 27 cases of pneumonia to the WHO. The <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-12/31/c_138669240.htm">state media mentioned</a> this only briefly. </p>
<p>A day later, police in Wuhan <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/china-arrested-doctors-who-warned-about-coronavirus-outbreak-now-death-tolls-rising-stocks-are-plunging">detained eight doctors</a> for spreading “rumours” about a new outbreak of suspected SARS.</p>
<p>China <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-01/11/c_1125448269.htm">reported the first death</a> from the outbreak on January 11, but without accompanying warnings to the public to take extra precautions. No new infections were reported until January 20, when <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/20/c_138721568.htm">Xi issued a directive</a> for party committees and governments at all levels to take effective measures to combat the outbreak. </p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fear-spreads-easily-thats-what-gives-the-wuhan-coronavirus-economic-impact-130780">Fear spreads easily. That's what gives the Wuhan coronavirus economic impact</a>
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<p>During this time, it was business as usual in Wuhan, with the government <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-contends-with-questions-over-response-to-viral-outbreak-11579825832">organising a New Year banquet</a> for 40,000 families.</p>
<p>By the time Xi issued his directive, it had been seven weeks since the virus was first recorded and three weeks since it was reported to the WHO. </p>
<p>Crucially, it was also 10 days after the official start of the Spring Festival (Lunar New Year) travel period, the <a href="http://www.gov.cn/shuju/2019-03/01/content_5369667.htm">largest annual human migration in the world</a>.</p>
<p>At this point, the central government finally sprang into action, locking down Wuhan, shutting down public transport, building new hospitals and giving more leeway to the media to report on the unfolding crisis.</p>
<p>But it may have been too late. According to some estimates, <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-01-27/5-million-people-left-Wuhan-before-the-lockdown-where-did-they-go--NACCu9wItW/index.html">five million people</a> had already left Wuhan before these measures took effect.</p>
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<h2>Silence, followed by censorship</h2>
<p>The initial reaction of the Chinese authorities to the outbreak was to rely on traditional forms of censorship rather than transparency. </p>
<p>This is clear from the initial suppression of whistleblowers – the detention of the eight doctors for spreading “rumours” – as well as the subdued reporting from the state media before January 20.</p>
<p>One possible reason for the silence is Beijing believed it could contain the outbreak without any extra measures, particularly at the start, when the nature of the virus was uncertain. The authorities may have believed mass panic would do more harm than the virus itself. </p>
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<p>
<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-fears-can-trigger-anti-chinese-prejudice-heres-how-schools-can-help-130945">Coronavirus fears can trigger anti-Chinese prejudice. Here's how schools can help</a>
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<p>But after containment appeared unlikely, the central government wasted crucial time deciding what to do. Without clear direction from Beijing, the authorities in Wuhan chose not to act, which allowed the infection to spread.</p>
<p>Media coverage of the outbreak finally exploded after Xi’s January 20 directive, including by non-state media. However, strict censorship returned after two weeks, ostensibly to combat misinformation.</p>
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<h2>Playing the blame game</h2>
<p>As anger deepens over how the crisis has been handled, the public will want to see <a href="https://www.yicaiglobal.com/news/2-officials-fired-over-dereliction-of-duty-in-anti-epidemic-effort">officials lose their jobs</a> and even be prosecuted. </p>
<p>The process of finding people to blame has started within the Communist Party. And already, we are seeing local government officials <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/02/03/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/xi-jinping-china-coronavirus-2/#.Xji66lMzZBw">being sacked</a>.</p>
<p>But the central government’s role should also be scrutinised. Beijing must have known about the outbreak by December 31, when it reported the cases of pneumonia to the WHO. Serious questions need to be asked, then, about why the central government chose not to respond publicly for another three weeks.</p>
<p>When things go right in a dictatorship, the credit goes to the leader. But when things go wrong, the blame can also rise to the top.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinpings-grip-on-power-is-absolute-but-there-are-new-threats-to-his-chinese-dream-118921">Xi Jinping's grip on power is absolute, but there are new threats to his 'Chinese dream'</a>
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<p>In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the party was able to push the blame for the Great Leap Forward and the subsequent Great Famine onto local cadres. However, Mao’s prestige within the party also suffered greatly as a result.</p>
<p>Xi has followed Mao’s leadership style in many aspects, not least the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/2158612/why-xi-jinping-personality-cult-china-brings-back-memories-mao">cult of personality</a> he has built around himself. He has also been <a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinpings-grip-on-power-is-absolute-but-there-are-new-threats-to-his-chinese-dream-118921">consolidating power</a> since he became party general-secretary in late 2012. </p>
<p>Sensing the potential political damage from the current crisis, the state media is now trying to shield Xi from direct criticism and blame. </p>
<p>Instead, it is focusing on the responses of other top leaders, particularly Premier Li Keqiang. In fact, for nearly a week from late January to early February, Xi did not appear on the front page of the party mouthpiece, People’s Daily, in stories related to the outbreak. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313236/original/file-20200203-41516-1kfykdh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313236/original/file-20200203-41516-1kfykdh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313236/original/file-20200203-41516-1kfykdh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313236/original/file-20200203-41516-1kfykdh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313236/original/file-20200203-41516-1kfykdh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313236/original/file-20200203-41516-1kfykdh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313236/original/file-20200203-41516-1kfykdh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Premier Li Keqiang was mocked online for leading workers in a cheer when he visited Wuhan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shepherd Zhou/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<h2>Propaganda and trust</h2>
<p>All propaganda must have heroes and villains. The virus is the villain in this story, and the biggest heroes are the front-line doctors who are working long hours in dangerous conditions to fight it. The people, government and party have also been cast as heroes, united against a common threat.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1224524960539873280"}"></div></p>
<p>The party knows the public has low trust of authorities when it comes to transparency, as it has an extensive history of cover-ups of everything from <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2083483/chinese-local-governments-admit-major-cover-2012-flood">natural disasters</a> to <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/aug/20/inside-china-tianjin-explosions-cover-up-exposes-b/">accidents</a> to outbreaks of <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/24/asia/china-sars-coronavirus-intl-hnk/index.html">other diseases like SARS</a>.</p>
<p>It hopes the focus on unity and heroes, coupled with more timely updates, will restore people’s trust in the government’s handling of this outbreak. </p>
<p>However, this is unlikely given the scale of public anger at the moment. This, in turn, may explain the state media’s search for other villains, particularly the US and other western countries that are <a href="http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/0203/c90000-9653793.html">shutting their borders to China</a>.</p>
<h2>A key test for the party</h2>
<p>The party’s prestige and legitimacy are both on the line. Crises like this are a serious test of the party’s assertions about the inherent superiority of China’s political system.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the Chinese people are likely to judge the party harshly, despite its efforts at narrative control. </p>
<p>One thing is for certain: the unfolding crisis is a human catastrophe, and Beijing has much to answer for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130788/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Chinese government is accused of reacting too slowly to the health crisis and silencing its critics. Now, the public is angry and wants party leaders to be held accountable.Yun Jiang, Senior Research Officer, Australian National UniversityAdam Ni, China researcher, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1191742019-08-14T02:18:45Z2019-08-14T02:18:45ZInside China’s vast influence network – how it works, and the extent of its reach in Australia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287941/original/file-20190814-9404-1sgzgzl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">According to the ABC, newly elected MP Gladys Liu is tied to an organisation that's part of the Chinese Communist Party's United Front, which exerts influence among the Chinese diaspora.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>As China grows more powerful and influential, our New Superpower series looks at what this means for the world – how China maintains its power, how it wields its power and how its power might be threatened. Read the rest of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/the-new-superpower-73080">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>The operations of the Chinese Communist Party are generally opaque, especially to outsiders. But in recent years, the party’s reach and influence with the Chinese diaspora has become much more obvious, particularly in Australia. </p>
<p>Most recently, Liberal MP Gladys Liu, the <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/gladys-liu-becomes-first-chinese-australian-woman-to-enter-lower-house">first Chinese-Australian woman</a> to win a seat in the lower house, was <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-14/liberal-gladys-liu-linked-to-secretive-chinese-influence-network/11288210">revealed to have ties</a> to the World Trade United Foundation, a body whose officeholders are closely tied to pro-Beijing politicians in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>This follows the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-12/sam-dastyari-resigns-from-parliament/9247390">resignation of former Senator Sam Dastyari</a> over his contacts with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/feb/06/political-donor-huang-xiangmo-blocked-from-returning-to-australia">Chinese political donor Huang Xiangmo</a> in 2017, and last year’s passage of a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/world/australia/australia-security-laws-foreign-interference.html">new foreign interference law</a>, which was sparked by concerns over Chinese influence.</p>
<p>What connects all these elements is the Communist Party’s little-known <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/long-reach-Chinas-united-front-work">United Front Work Department</a>. The successes of this department have been crucial to building the party’s legitimacy at home and, to a significant extent, abroad, especially with overseas Chinese communities.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-we-keep-turning-a-blind-eye-to-chinese-political-interference-94299">Why do we keep turning a blind eye to Chinese political interference?</a>
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<h2>What is the United Front?</h2>
<p>The United Front Work Department, or UFWD for short, is a special department of the Communist Party. It is responsible for organising outreach to key Chinese interest groups, including ethnic Chinese abroad, and representing and influencing them.</p>
<p>In its simplest terms, the UFWD is about uniting those who can help the party achieve its goals and neutralise its critics. Its work is often summed up as “making friends”, which sounds benign, and often is. But it can have other meanings, such as helping to stifle dissent at home and abroad. </p>
<p>Within China, the United Front system historically consisted of intellectuals, business people, religious believers, ethnic minorities, returned overseas Chinese and former members of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nationalist-Party-Chinese-political-party">Nationalist Party (known as the KMT or GMD)</a>. More recently, this group has expanded to include social media personalities, independent professionals (notably lawyers), managers in foreign-funded businesses, overseas Chinese, and young Chinese studying abroad. </p>
<p>Overseas Chinese, including those in Australia, have a special place in this system and are actively courted by dedicated UFWD representatives.</p>
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<h2>How its mission is changing under Xi Jinping</h2>
<p>The United Front has become much more prominent since <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586">Xi Jinping became Communist Party general secretary in 2012</a>. Xi has been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2018.1433573?journalCode=cjcc20">instrumental</a> in raising its status in the Chinese political system and publicly supporting a dramatic expansion of its roles and target groups. </p>
<p>Under his watch, the UFWD’s work has become much more centred on promoting the party’s key ideals. These include the consolidation of Xi’s leadership and spread of his ideology (known as “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-thought-explained-a-new-ideology-for-a-new-era.html">Xi Jinping Thought</a>”), and the broader goals of ensuring social stability and China’s national rejuvenation. </p>
<p>Importantly, the latter includes reinforcing China’s claims over the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/article/2186449/explained-south-china-sea-dispute">South China Sea</a>, Hong Kong, Macau, and particularly Taiwan. </p>
<p>While China already has sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macau, the United Front has been crucial in helping the party exert influence over local politicians, trade unions, and business groups in both regions. However. the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-hong-kong-protesters-have-turned-militant-and-more-strategic-and-this-unnerves-beijing-121106">current unrest</a> in Hong Kong shows this approach may have lost some of its effectiveness.</p>
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<p>United Front is also one of the ways the party stakes its claim to popular legitimacy and to representing all Chinese people throughout the world. </p>
<p>One way the department does this is by carefully vetting members of key social and occupational groups, such as doctors and lawyers, who provide the government with expert opinion on proposed laws and other issues during “consultative conferences.” </p>
<p>Those selected to take part in these conferences are assumed to have considerable influence and prestige. And they include a number of overseas Chinese, including some Australian-Chinese.</p>
<p>All members of these conferences are carefully screened by the UFWD for their political reliability and willingness to accept party leadership and its positions.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/academic-chongyi-feng-profits-freedom-and-chinas-soft-power-in-australia-78751">Academic Chongyi Feng: profits, freedom and China’s 'soft power' in Australia</a>
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<p>Many provocative ideas and issues that can’t be raised in the party itself or in the People’s Congresses are often floated in the consultative conferences.</p>
<p>This system of garnering expert advice and channelling it back to the party is central to its claims to be democratic. The party maintains that this system of consultation is superior to Western democracy because it is more representative and doesn’t suffer from the “chaotic” results of Western-style elections. </p>
<p>This system is even more important since the party has given up on its own longstanding experiments with <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-10-14/country-lessons">village-level electoral democracy</a>. These elections failed to deliver on the initial promise of bringing greater efficiency and legitimacy to the party, and instead often became dominated by local special interests pushed by powerful families, clans or even gangs.</p>
<h2>How United Front is exerting its influence</h2>
<p>Under Xi, there has also been a dramatic shift in what the UFWD is expected to achieve. Much of its work since the 1980s has focused on incorporating new interest groups into the political system (such as entrepreneurs and professionals) to prevent the emergence of any organisations outside the party’s control. </p>
<p>Now, it is much more about assimilation – all members are expected to believe the party’s central ideology and promote Xi as China’s “core leader”.</p>
<p>In a sense, we are seeing a process similar to that of the 1950s, when United Front was first used to organise groups like intellectuals, religious believers, and business people and provide them with nominal political representation in the consultative conferences - in some cases as government ministers. </p>
<p>The next step was forcing them to accept the Communist Party takeover of their businesses, churches, or associations. The United Front also demanded they fully accept socialist ideology through campaigns of intense, and sometimes violent, “thought reform,” which left many dead.</p>
<p>Today, it is minorities such as the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/13/world/asia/china-muslim-detainment-xinjang-camps.html">Uyghurs</a>, Tibetans, and Christians who are again under intense pressure to allow the party to take full control of their organisations. This often includes the demolition of property and the severing any links with foreign religious groups and NGOs. The UFWD is the organiser in the background.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-australia-china-relations-institute-doesnt-belong-at-uts-78743">The Australia-China Relations Institute doesn't belong at UTS</a>
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<p>The flow-on effects of these changes in Australia is an intensification of the party’s efforts to unite with and influence the Chinese diaspora, and use them to promote the party’s causes and positions. Or at the very least, not to oppose them. </p>
<p>We have seen a dramatic proliferation of United Front-linked organisations in Australia, such as the <a href="http://www.acpprc.org.au/english/aboutus.asp">Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China</a>, as well as new religious bodies and industry and cultural associations. </p>
<p>The marginalisation of sensitive issues like Taiwan among Chinese-Australian communities, the lack of support for China’s Muslims and other persecuted religious minorities, and the very muted responses to the protests in Hong Kong, seems to indicate that these efforts are bearing fruit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119174/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gerry Groot is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies in the Department of Asian Studies, University of Adelaide and and Adjunct Researcher with the Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University</span></em></p>United Front’s mission is to unite those who can help the Communist Party achieve its goals and neutralise its critics. This includes many influential members of the Chinese diaspora.Gerry Groot, Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1196422019-08-11T20:01:59Z2019-08-11T20:01:59ZChinese propaganda goes tech-savvy to reach a new generation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287320/original/file-20190808-144892-1ulvtm9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">As younger Chinese become increasingly addicted to their mobile devices, the government's propaganda offices have had to rethink their strategies.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Roman Pilipey/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>As China grows more powerful and influential, our New Superpower series looks at what this means for the world – how China maintains its power, how it wields its power and how its power might be threatened. Read the rest of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/the-new-superpower-73080">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Earlier this year, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/15/chinas-most-popular-app-brings-xi-jinping-to-your-pocket">new app was launched</a> in China to put the patriotism of Chinese citizens to the test.</p>
<p>Named “<a href="https://www.xuexi.cn/">Study Xi to Strengthen the Nation</a>”, the app quizzes users on all things related to President Xi Jinping – his policies, activities, achievements, theories and thoughts. Users can earn points and win prizes for correct answers and compete with colleagues and friends to see who knows the most about China’s leader. </p>
<p>The app is the latest example of a rethink by the Communist Party when it comes to its propaganda efforts and how best to justify the legitimacy of its one-party rule, extol the virtues of the party, and promote patriotism to an audience of young, tech-savvy Chinese.</p>
<p>For those institutions responsible for the production of effective propaganda, this is a real challenge. After all, propaganda in the 21st century has to go beyond forcing people to sit in study sessions on Friday afternoons, read the People’s Daily newspaper, or watch China Central Television (CCTV) in group meetings.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/extremist-mobs-how-chinas-propaganda-machine-tried-to-control-the-message-in-the-hong-kong-protests-119646">Extremist mobs? How China's propaganda machine tried to control the message in the Hong Kong protests</a>
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<h2>From sermons to ‘indoctritainment’</h2>
<p>Thanks to a number of developments, the old propaganda messages of previous generations can easily be repackaged for millennials. Like the rest of the world, Chinese millennials are keen adopters of the latest mobile technologies and suffer from short attention spans. They are also just as enthusiastic as their Western counterparts about posting jokes, music videos and short, sharp, attention-grabbing memes on social media.</p>
<p>The Chinese government, meanwhile, is putting more of an emphasis on humanising its approach to leadership. Politicians are keen to be seen as relatable rather than authoritative figures. </p>
<p>So, to get its messaging across in a new way, party propaganda has morphed from dry sermons to what I like to call <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Media_in_China.html?id=_kTKAgAAQBAJ">indoctritainment</a>. And these campaigns are often high-end productions. </p>
<p>Increasingly, ideological messages are more effective if they are delivered using a platform that’s already been trialled and proven in marketing. In 2016, for instance, CCTV launched a promotion of the Communist Party in the form of a public awareness advertisement to mark the 95th anniversary of the founding of the party. </p>
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<p>The one-minute video, titled “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2m-9NnLF-Tw">I am a Chinese Communist Party member</a>,” features heartwarming vignettes of individuals from different walks of life – teacher, cleaner, surgeon, policeman, local public servant, fisherman – who are all good Samaritans doing their bit to help others. </p>
<p>The message is clear: the party is being re-branded as an organisation made up of unsung heroes. As the voice-over explains: </p>
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<p>I am the first one to arrive, I am the last one to leave, I’m the one who thinks of myself the least, and cares about others the most … I am the Chinese Communist Party, and I am always there with you. </p>
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<p>Another video promoting the Chinese military, “<a href="https://youtu.be/WyiqBaDscGo">I am a Chinese soldier</a>”, demonstrates the point. Even without the English subtitles, it’s not hard to see what the producers were going for: a patriotic Hollywood movie or romantic tear-jerker.</p>
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<h2>The pop culture treatment, with American accents</h2>
<p>Another tactic is the use of popular culture as a way of conveying sometimes dense or dull Chinese government policies, especially if the intended audience is global. </p>
<p>In 2015, a video called “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhLrHCKMqyM">The 13 what</a>” used catchy pop music, colourful animation, and American-accented English to explain China’s 13th five-year national plan. </p>
<p>Channelling David Bowie, Monty Python and the psychedelia of the 1960s, the three-minute video was produced by a digital media production team operating under the auspices of the government’s main propaganda offices in Beijing.</p>
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<p>Two years earlier, the same studio also produced the widely circulated five-minute video clip, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6BosGD5Bk98">How leaders are made</a>”. Xi Jinping appears in the clip as a cartoon character, as do US President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron. </p>
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<p>Light-hearted, zany, and (again) featuring American English, the video informs viewers that Xi has worked long and hard to move up China’s political ladder. The implication is that Xi’s power is just as legitimate as that of his Western counterparts. </p>
<p>Within a short period after its release, the video had been viewed more than a million times on Youku, China’s version of YouTube. </p>
<h2>Propaganda by way of screen bullets</h2>
<p>Increasingly, the Communist Party’s propaganda material goes viral only after it appears on popular video-sharing websites with “<a href="http://www.sixthtone.com/news/791/chinas-video-streaming-sites-embrace-bullet-screens">bullet screens</a>”. This is an interactive feature that enables viewers to “shoot” text comments across the screen as the video is being streamed. It’s very popular with younger audiences.</p>
<p>One of China’s biggest bullet screen platforms is <a href="https://www.bilibili.com/">Bilibili</a>, often referred to as “the B site”. </p>
<p>The site used to be occasionally <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-bans-streaming-video-as-it-struggles-to-keep-up-with-live-content-80008">shut down</a> for streaming what the government considers “morally unsound” material. </p>
<p>To stay on the party’s good side, Bilibili now plays host to a wide suite of propaganda produced by CCTV or the Chinese Department of Propaganda. In 2015, the Communist Youth League of China also began to hold regular <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YoWDa6SLrVA">courses</a> on the site aimed at promoting patriotism among young people.</p>
<h2>But how effective is it?</h2>
<p>Just how successful these strategies have been is still not entirely clear. While the “Xi Jinping thought” app has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/15/chinas-most-popular-app-brings-xi-jinping-to-your-pocket">captured the imagination</a> of many outside China, party members who have been encouraged - in some cases requested - to download the app seem less than enthusiastic. </p>
<p>And some of these new propaganda efforts have backfired and attracted cynical responses online, even ridicule.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinpings-grip-on-power-is-absolute-but-there-are-new-threats-to-his-chinese-dream-118921">Xi Jinping's grip on power is absolute, but there are new threats to his 'Chinese dream'</a>
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<p>But judging by the many <a href="https://www.bilibili.com/video/av28243234/">comments</a> viewers have left on the B site, it seems fair to conclude that some of the tactics have had the intended effect of endearing the party and its leaders to the young and impressionable. </p>
<p>This is a reminder of how naïve it is to assume that technologies are inherently democratising, and that digital disruption is likely to spell the end of communism in China. Such assumptions still permeate most Western media stories about the Communist Party’s new propaganda strategies, but this is clearly not the case.</p>
<p>As the party’s propaganda strategies become more nuanced and sophisticated, so should our frameworks for understanding them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119642/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wanning Sun receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>To stay relevant, the Chinese Communist Party is rethinking its approach to propaganda. The reviews are decidedly mixed, but overall, younger Chinese seem drawn to the messaging.Wanning Sun, Professor of Media and Cultural Studies, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1206542019-07-24T04:10:39Z2019-07-24T04:10:39ZDespite China’s denials, its treatment of the Uyghurs should be called what it is: cultural genocide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285452/original/file-20190724-110170-mlac66.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Uyghurs in Australia are pressing Canberra to take a firmer stance with China on its treatment of the Muslim minority. Thus far, Australia's response has been relatively muted. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tracey Nearmy/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>As China grows more powerful and influential, our New Superpower series looks at what this means for the world – how China maintains its power, how it wields its power and how its power might be threatened. Read the rest of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/the-new-superpower-73080">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>In China’s far western region of Xinjiang, Chinese Communist Party officials are persecuting one of the worst human rights abuses of our time, what I labelled an act of cultural genocide in last week’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t-axd1Ht_J8">ABC Four Corners report</a>.</p>
<p>Pressure is mounting on the Australian government to go <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/deeply-concerned-marise-payne-to-pursue-china-over-detention-of-million-uighurs">beyond statements of concern</a> and challenge China over its treatment of the Uyghur minority, particularly those Australian citizens and permanent residents being held in the vast network of “re-education camps” in Xinjiang.</p>
<p>Two Australian Uyghur men <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/breakfast/australian-uyghurs-meet-politicians-in-bid-to-bring-family-home/11341058">are meeting federal politicians</a> in Canberra today to push for the government’s assistance in helping family members trapped in China.</p>
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<p>Australia was one of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/190708_joint_statement_xinjiang.pdf">22 countries</a> to sign a recent letter to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressing concern about the “arbitrary detention” of Uyghurs, but otherwise, its response has been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-17/uyghur-china-response-four-corners-xinjiang-detention/11316752">muted</a>. </p>
<p>In recent days, the Chinese government has defended its actions with a dubious propaganda <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-22/china-report-says-xinjiangs-uyghurs-forced-to-convert-to-islam/11330490">report</a> claiming that Uyghurs were historically forced to become Muslims and have been an integral part of China for thousands of years.</p>
<p>China repeatedly makes false and anachronistic claims like this about the ancient unity of the “Chinese people,” which includes ethnic minorities like the Uyghurs. Its aim is to project modern notions of sovereignty, nationhood and fixed borders back through history. </p>
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<p>In reality, the 11 million or so Uyghurs are an <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/eurasian-crossroads/9780231139243">indigenous Turkic-speaking people</a> who have inhabited what they call “East Turkestan” for over a millennium. Along with the Tibetans, the Uyghurs have born the brunt of China’s settler colonial project, which seeks to assert its control over remote regions that are closer to Moscow and Tehran than Beijing.</p>
<p>Since March 2017, the Chinese government has interned over a million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in massive, prison-like camps (including possibly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/feb/11/revealed-17-australian-residents-believed-detained-in-chinas-uighur-crackdown">17 Australian residents</a>), where they are subjected to coercive ideological remoulding. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/thank-the-party-inside-china-s-muslim-brainwashing-camps-20180517-p4zftn.html">Detainees</a> are forced to denounce their religion, forbidden to speak their language, and taught how to adopt the norms of China’s Han ethnic majority, while praising President Xi Jinping and the Communist Party for salvation.</p>
<p>In their <a href="http://www.jpolrisk.com/brainwashing-police-guards-and-coercive-internment-evidence-from-chinese-government-documents-about-the-nature-and-extent-of-xinjiangs-vocational-training-internment-camps/">own words</a>, party officials are “washing brains” and “cleansing hearts” in order to “cure” those bewitched by extremist thoughts. In Xinjiang today, non-Han thoughts and behaviour are pathologised as deviant and thus in need of urgent transformation.</p>
<h2>What is genocide?</h2>
<p>A litany of words and phrases have been used to describe this process. The Chinese government calls the camps free “<a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1141882.shtml">vocational education and training centres</a>” where Uyghurs willingly learn Chinese language and employment skills in order to assist with their “<a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2018/08/18/china-suggests-its-camps-for-uighurs-are-just-vocational-schools">rehabilitation and reintegration</a>”.</p>
<p>Scholars, journalists and rights defenders have spoken about cultural and religious “persecution” in Xinjiang, arguing the party-state’s policies amount to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/what-congress-can-do-now-to-combat-chinas-mass-ethnic-cleansing-of-uighurs/2019/05/23/fe906c68-7d6a-11e9-a5b3-34f3edf1351e_story.html?utm_term=.420c643aa36c">mass ethnic cleansing</a>, <a href="http://www.jpolrisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang/">cultural re-engineering</a>, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-hard-edge-the-leader-of-beijings-muslim-crackdown-gains-influence-11554655886">forced assimilation</a>, <a href="https://www.news.com.au/world/asia/chinese-officials-bizarre-interview-about-brainwashing-camps-in-xinjiang-province/news-story/cc8201e1180743dbc86f3cc649e835bf">brainwashing</a>, or even <a href="http://www.jpolrisk.com/state-sponsorship-of-uyghur-separatists-the-history-and-current-policy-options-for-east-turkestan-xinjiang-china/">ethnocide</a>. </p>
<p>In August 2018, Gay McDougall, the vice chair of UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, referred to Xinjiang as a “<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23452&LangID=E">no-rights zone</a>”. </p>
<p>Yet, I believe the scale, sophistication and intent of China’s policies in Xinjiang merits a stronger description.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-world-has-a-hard-time-trusting-china-but-does-it-really-care-119807">The world has a hard time trusting China. But does it really care?</a>
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<p>The term genocide was coined by lawyer <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/axis-rule-in-occupied-europe-laws-of-occupation-analysis-of-government-proposals-for-redress/oclc/786521">Rafael Lemkin</a> in 1944 in reaction to Nazi Germany’s coordinated strategy to annihilate the Jews, gypsies and other non-Aryan peoples. Four years later, the UN General Assembly adopted the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf">Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</a>, with Australia one of the first counties to ratify it. The People’s Republic of China ratified it in 1983.</p>
<p>The convention defines genocide as </p>
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<p>acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group </p>
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<p>It also obligates signatories to punish those who engage in genocidal acts through a “competent” domestic or international penal tribunal.</p>
<p>Whether genocide includes only physical acts or can extend to attacks on cultural heritage has elicited <a href="https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_12/section_1/5139">intense debate</a>, but for <a href="http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15573.html">Lemkin</a>, the term includes </p>
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<p>drastic methods aimed at the rapid and complete disappearance of the culture, moral and religious life of a group of human beings.</p>
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<p>Genocide also requires specific intent. In the words of political scientists <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780312293253">Kenneth J. Campbell</a>, genocide is a</p>
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<p>premeditated, calculated, systematic, malicious crime authorised by the state’s political leaders. </p>
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<p>This is exactly what Communist Party officials did when they authorised and then legalised the mass internment of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in “<a href="https://www.prcleader.org/leibold">concentrated transformation-through-education centres</a>,” ripping more than 10% of the population away from their communities so they could be deliberately re-programmed.</p>
<h2>Various methods for erasing culture</h2>
<p>Yet, facts arguably matter more than words when it comes to China’s policies in Xinjiang. </p>
<p>We now have ample evidence (including internal <a href="https://www.prcleader.org/leibold">party documents</a>) of the deliberate efforts to destroy Uyghur culture and identity. Everyday actions like avoiding pork, speaking Uyghur, wearing a headscarf or praying quietly are now labelled “<a href="http://news.ifeng.com/a/20141224/42785382_0.shtml">manifestations of religious extremism</a>,” or what party officials call “malignant tumors” requiring urgent excising in a radical form of cultural surgery.</p>
<p>In the city of Kashgar, for example, a <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180813115300/http:/kashi.gov.cn/Government/PublicInfoShow.aspx?ID=2851">party document</a> highlights the need to sever the lineages, roots and cultural connections of Uyghurs in order to eliminate the fountainhead of potential extremism. </p>
<p>German researcher <a href="http://www.jpolrisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang/">Adrian Zenz</a> has uncovered evidence of the party’s efforts to separate Uyghur children from their parents in state institutions, where they can be assimilated and indoctrinated by officials. In these institutions, cultural, religious, and linguistic knowledge is intentionally ruptured.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-the-uyghurs-and-why-is-the-chinese-government-detaining-them-111843">Explainer: who are the Uyghurs and why is the Chinese government detaining them?</a>
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<p>In some parts of Xinjiang, mosques and shrines are being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/07/revealed-new-evidence-of-chinas-mission-to-raze-the-mosques-of-xinjiang">bulldozed</a>, while others are transformed into empty sites guarded by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/china-surveillance-xinjiang.html">facial recognition cameras</a> and imams on the party payroll. </p>
<p>In the name of strengthening “bilingual education”, <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/language-07282017143037.html">Chinese</a> is now the language of instruction across Xinjiang, from preschool to university. The use of Uyghur language, script, signs and pictures prohibited. Speaking Uyghur is now considered <a href="https://supchina.com/2019/01/02/the-patriotism-of-not-speaking-uyghur/">unpatriotic</a> and can get one sent off for re-education.</p>
<p>Perhaps most disturbing, <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/05/18/china-pushes-inter-ethnic-marriage-xinjiang-assimilation-drive/">inter-ethnic marriages</a> are being actively promoted to slowly breed out Uyghurness, with cash and other material <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-23/chinas-minority-report">inducements</a> offered to Han men who take a Uyghur bride. </p>
<p>One can find numerous videos and messages promoting Han-Uyghur inter-marriage on <a href="https://twitter.com/jleibold/status/1120824721124184064">Chinese social media</a>, asserting Xinjiang is now safe and home to many beautiful and eligible Uyghur women who would appreciate a doting Han husband.</p>
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<p>Finally, the Chinese government has intensified its <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/08/chinese-official-floats-plan-to-stabilize-fertility-among-some-uighurs/">family planning regime</a> in Xinjiang to <a href="http://www.shehui.pku.edu.cn/upload/editor/file/20180829/20180829171343_5582.pdf">slow the growth of the Uyghur population</a> and eliminate what party officials call “low quality births”. </p>
<p>Beginning in 2017, the region adopted a <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1058905.shtml">uniform two children policy</a> that nullified preferential rules allowing rural Uyghur women to have additional births. In the past, Uyghur women were given <a href="http://www.139dd.net/zcms/content/show?ContentType=Article&ID=1616452">3,000 RMB</a> (roughtly A$620) to forgo a third birth and agree to some sort of “long-term contraceptive measure.” </p>
<p>The Communist Party’s calculated war on Uyghur identity is quite literally tearing families and communities apart, while the rich tradition of diversity and tolerance in China is left in tatters.</p>
<p>The resilient nature of culture and memory means that attempts at genocide, thankfully, are rarely successful. Yet the pain they inflict is real.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120654/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Leibold is the lead Chief Investigation on the Australian Research Council (ARC) funded grant "Urbanising Western China" (DP180101651)</span></em></p>China says it is helping the Uyghurs, but its actions meet the threshold of cultural genocide: ‘a premeditated, calculated, systematic, malicious crime authorised by the state’s political leaders’.James Leibold, Associate Professor of Politics and Asian Studies, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1196462019-07-15T19:41:26Z2019-07-15T19:41:26ZExtremist mobs? How China’s propaganda machine tried to control the message in the Hong Kong protests<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284078/original/file-20190715-173334-axyple.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">When protesters took to the streets in Hong Kong, China's state media had several tactics for how to describe it: some outlets ignored it, while others railed against 'extremists'.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jerome Favre/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>As China grows more powerful and influential, our New Superpower series looks at what this means for the world – how China maintains its power, how it wields its power and how its power might be threatened. Read the rest of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/the-new-superpower-73080">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>China is known for the strict control it exercises on information, especially online. Discussion of events that might reflect unfavourably on the government is often censored, or framed in such a way that it becomes pro-government propaganda. </p>
<p>That’s why so many Chinese citizens remain unaware of, for example, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/rewriting-history-in-the-peoples-republic-of-amnesia-and-beyond-90014">1989 Tiananmen Square massacre</a>.</p>
<p>Online discussion of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/28/world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html">recent protests</a> in Hong Kong against a now-suspended <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-47810723">extradition bill</a> was no different. But this was also a rare occasion when China’s news propaganda machine was mobilised to simultaneously target several audiences both inside and outside China.</p>
<p>China’s propaganda network is made up of a constellation of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/challenging-official-propaganda-public-opinion-leaders-on-sina-weibo/08ABB0AEA1036A42FBCECDB279E6798A">domestic</a> and <a href="https://www.westminsterpapers.org/article/10.16997/wpcc.292/">international</a> news outlets. They span social media, mobile apps, websites and traditional media. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-protests-why-chinese-media-reports-focus-on-britains-colonial-past-119917">Hong Kong protests: why Chinese media reports focus on Britain's colonial past</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p>The news is tailored to particular audiences according to different agendas. Everything, however, comes under the direction of the Central Publicity (formerly translated as “Propaganda”) Department of the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1137776717903388674"}"></div></p>
<p>Over the past few weeks, we’ve seen the China extradition bill elevated from a local Hong Kong controversy to a story of international concern following the protesters’ <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/28/stand-hong-kong-g20-appeal-extradition-law-crisis-appears-10-intl-newspapers/">lobbying campaign</a> targeted at the G20 summit. </p>
<p>As events escalated from peaceful rallies focused on a single issue to at times violent confrontations seeking a range of demands, including the <a href="https://time.com/5626145/hong-kong-protests-carrie-lam-resignation/">resignation of Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam</a>, the agendas of several spheres of China’s propaganda converged. </p>
<p>Here’s how it unfolded.</p>
<h2>China’s de-facto media and new media allies in Hong Kong</h2>
<p>The first day protesters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-politics-extradition/thousands-march-in-hong-kong-over-proposed-extradition-law-changes-idUSKCN1RC0DG">took to the streets</a> was March 31. That was two days after the <a href="https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20192313/es3201923139.pdf">extradition bill</a> was published in <a href="https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/english/search_gazette/search.php?Year=2019&Date=20192313&nt=&Title=Fugitive+Offenders+and+Mutual+Legal+Assistance+in+Criminal+Matters+Legislation+%28Amendment%29+Bill+2019&type=ls&submit=Search">the Gazette</a>, the official publication of the Hong Kong government. </p>
<p>The same day, two Chinese-language newspapers that have long acted as de-facto official media of the Chinese government in Hong Kong (but not openly declared as such) swung into action. </p>
<p><a href="http://epaper.wenweipo.com/flipping_book/index.php#/wenweipo/20190331/0/2">Wen Wei Po</a> and <a href="http://www.takungpao.com.hk/paper/20190331.html">Ta Kung Pao</a> both used either the entire or the majority of the second pages in the news sections to proclaim the merits of the bill. They also, to a lesser extent, attacked the bill’s opponents.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pressure-builds-with-more-protests-in-hong-kong-but-whats-the-end-game-118907">Pressure builds with more protests in Hong Kong, but what's the end game?</a>
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<p>These outlets are on the semi-periphery of China’s propaganda machine, targeting a local audience in Hong Kong. They cannot ignore negative news about China or the Beijing-endorsed Hong Kong government, despite the fact China has <a href="https://www.hkja.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Annual_report_2017-1.pdf">co-opted</a> most traditional media outlets in Hong Kong in recent decades. They seek instead to counter it with a positive spin while discrediting opposing voices. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1150097834366029824"}"></div></p>
<p>Their messages were reinforced by relatively new digital media outlets in Hong Kong that are supportive of the Chinese regime. These outlets form the periphery of China’s propaganda in the city and focus a great deal of coverage on bashing the government’s perceived enemies. </p>
<p>After the extradition bill was published, outlets like the <a href="https://www.silentmajority.hk/">Silent Majority of Hong Kong</a> and <a href="https://hkgpao.com/">Hong Kong G Pao</a> pumped out positive propaganda stories about it and the Hong Kong police and negative propaganda about the opponents of the bill. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.silentmajority.hk/articles/date/1553961600/1554047999">One of the three articles</a>, published by the Silent Majority of Hong Kong on May 31, for example, <a href="https://www.silentmajority.hk/articles/1000788">attacked</a> the publisher of the Apple Daily Newspaper, one of few media outlets in Hong Kong that is openly critical of Beijing, for the “nonsense” he expressed that the bill would harm press freedom. </p>
<p>The articles employed the outlet’s usual tactics: singling out individuals and pitching them against the interests of society. Silent Majority also encourage readers to “like” their stories, forming supportive public opinion while helping the news to spread.</p>
<h2>China’s central media outlets followed suit</h2>
<p>The core news propaganda outlets of the Chinese state, such as People’s Daily, and CCTV, didn’t address the Hong Kong protests until April 17, more than two weeks later. </p>
<p>These outlets target the domestic audience inside mainland China, and as such, tend to ignore stories like this on sensitive subjects or those that paint the party in a bad light. </p>
<p>The mission of core state media is to foster a positive image of China, either for a domestic or international audience. Usually this involves reporting on China’s achievements. When China comes under pressure, the core media attempt to justify the government’s actions as reasonable.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-cyber-attack-hampered-hong-kong-protesters-118770">How a cyber attack hampered Hong Kong protesters</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The establishment of a group in Hong Kong that supported the extradition bill gave the online edition of the People’s Daily an <a href="http://hm.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0417/c42272-31035012.html">opportunity</a> for positive propaganda on April 17. One story read, in part:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The group calls on citizens to participate in a signature petition organised by it to support the passage of the amendment bill, so as to improve the legal system and demonstrate justice and avoid Hong Kong becoming a place for criminals to evade legal responsibility.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Targeting an international audience, the English-language China Daily dismissed concerns about the bill in an <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/29/WS5cc6f5c2a3104842260b92b0.html">editorial</a> on April 29, the day after the second protest against it. Part of it read:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…the opposition camp and its foreign backers have gone to great lengths to present scary scenarios the amendments could lead to in order to garner support for their own political agenda. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>On June 12, protesters encircled Hong Kong’s legislative chamber and clashed with police. The following day, China’s national news agency, Xinhua, <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/2019-06/13/c_1124615065.htm">published a story</a> claiming that the majority of the Hong Kong public supported the bill. </p>
<p>Then, on July 1, a group of protesters occupied Hong Kong’s legislative chamber. The action drew <a href="http://news.cctv.com/2019/07/02/ARTINcLD5YyMxfhxiz4C3cHG190702.shtml">strong</a> and <a href="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2019-07/03/nw.D110000renmrb_20190703_5-01.htm">extensive</a> <a href="https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/22/37/120/1562183300084.html">statements</a> of <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201907/04/WS5d1d3350a3105895c2e7b860.html">condemnation</a> from China’s core propaganda outlets in the following days.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The rule of law in Hong Kong cannot be challenged.</p>
<p>Resolutely support the SAR Government in pursuing serious violations of the law.</p>
<p>Attack on HK legislature a ‘political act’ with ‘hidden agenda’.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1149770404791291904"}"></div></p>
<h2>Why language matters in coverage, too</h2>
<p>These three layers of propaganda target different audiences and operate in different information environments. They follow different tactics. </p>
<p>This involves using different language. The news about the extradition bill in China’s core propaganda outlets is full of statements from official state agencies and other organisations that are supportive of the bill. The language is formal and repeats stock phrases, including:</p>
<ul>
<li>violence</li>
<li>rule of law</li>
<li>extremists</li>
<li>stability and prosperity</li>
<li>one country, two systems</li>
<li>foreign interference</li>
<li>national security.</li>
</ul>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-world-has-a-hard-time-trusting-china-but-does-it-really-care-119807">The world has a hard time trusting China. But does it really care?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>The same stock phrases are supplemented by more accusatory words in the semi-peripheral layer of China’s news propaganda, including:</p>
<ul>
<li>riot</li>
<li>terrorism</li>
<li>mob</li>
<li>independentist </li>
<li>colour revolution.</li>
</ul>
<p>Some of the digital-only outlets on the periphery, operating in the clickbait-driven online environment, show little restraint in using abusive, colloquial language, such as by calling opposition politicians “scoundrels.” They sometimes also fake facts and doctor images to attack opponents. This differentiates them from the traditional news media, which follow journalistic principles more closely. </p>
<p>Studying China’s core state media alone overlooks the complementary way each layer of the propaganda machine works with the others. Using different communication tactics in different spheres, each outlet reinforces the others to create a coherent world view. </p>
<p>What they have in common, though, is an adherence to the main party line – and with this, the party hopes to control the message on the Hong Kong protests, even as it struggles to control the streets.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Hiu-long Chu, a Masters student of Social Work at the Australian College of Applied Psychology, contributed to this report.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119646/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joyce Y.M. Nip does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pro-Beijing media used different messages to target specific audiences inside and outside China during the Hong Kong protests, but each had the same goal – putting the right spin on the news.Joyce Y.M. Nip, Senior lecturer, Department of Media and Communications; Department of Chinese Studies, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1198072019-07-10T20:16:58Z2019-07-10T20:16:58ZThe world has a hard time trusting China. But does it really care?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283498/original/file-20190710-44505-kihtv2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=790%2C0%2C2904%2C2000&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wes Mountain/The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>As China grows more powerful and influential, our New Superpower series looks at what this means for the world – how China maintains its power, how it wields its power and how its power might be threatened. Read the rest of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/the-new-superpower-73080">here</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>One of the earliest guests I had on <a href="https://omny.fm/shows/the-little-red-podcast/playlists/podcast">The Little Red Podcast</a>, the podcast I co-host with former China correspondent Louisa Lim, said something that stuck with me about the view of China in the rest of the world. John Fitzgerald, a well-known historian of China’s diaspora, confidently <a href="https://omny.fm/shows/the-little-red-podcast/control-and-capture-taming-overseas-chinese-media">declared</a> that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) “couldn’t care less” about what non-Chinese Australians thought of it and its actions. </p>
<p>Looking through the <a href="https://lowyinstitutepoll.lowyinstitute.org/themes/china/">results</a> of the recent Lowy Institute Poll on Australians’ attitudes toward China, this is probably a good thing for the party.</p>
<p>The Australian public’s confidence in China’s ability to act as a responsible power has fallen off a cliff. In just one year, it dropped from more than half of Australians to just 32%. That’s a dire number. </p>
<hr>
<p><iframe id="LIH73" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/LIH73/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<hr>
<p>That wasn’t the only surprise in the poll. Four-fifths of respondents agreed with the proposition “China’s infrastructure investment projects across Asia are part of China’s plans for regional domination”, and 73% <a href="https://lowyinstitutepoll.lowyinstitute.org/themes/pacific-islands/">believed</a> Australia should try to prevent China from expanding its influence in the Pacific.</p>
<p>The poll was released in late June, at a time when China’s image was taking a hit internationally. <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-why-the-one-country-two-systems-model-is-on-its-last-legs-118960">Millions of people</a> took to the streets in Hong Kong to protest a now-defeated extradition bill that could have seen Hong Kong residents sent to China on suspicion of crimes. </p>
<p>Then came <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-08/wife-of-australian-writer-yang-hengjun-held-in-china/11286706">news in Australia</a> that the wife of an Australian writer who has been detained since January was herself interrogated by Chinese officials and blocked from leaving the country.</p>
<p>Even for a country that purportedly doesn’t care what the rest of the world thinks, trust is hard to come by these days.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1148619757458866176"}"></div></p>
<h2>A matter of trust</h2>
<p>It’s not entirely clear why so many Australians now distrust the Chinese state to the point where they believe our government should actively counter it (although perhaps not go to war with it).</p>
<p>There’s little evidence to suggest that one issue alone has caused this sharp decline in trust. For instance, the Communist Party’s most egregious recent violation of human rights, the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/detained-and-in-danger-the-tortured-australian-families-who-fear-for-their-missing-loved-ones-20181115-p50g5q.html">detention</a> of up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-the-uyghurs-and-why-is-the-chinese-government-detaining-them-111843">1.5 million Uyghurs</a> simply for being, well, Uyghurs has touched relatively few Australians. </p>
<p>Nor has the Australian government felt the need to act – it has said <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/uighur-human-rights-crisis-australia-urged-to-impose-sanctions-on-china">little on the matter</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinpings-grip-on-power-is-absolute-but-there-are-new-threats-to-his-chinese-dream-118921">Xi Jinping's grip on power is absolute, but there are new threats to his 'Chinese dream'</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Rather, the decline in trust seems to be the result of an accumulation of negative news on China — some well-informed, some half-baked (such as the 60 Minutes <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AGl3HxEMJhI">expose</a> on a Chinese “military base” in Vanuatu). And for some, it’s based on personal experiences. </p>
<p>Last month, for instance, Australian National University <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jun/04/australian-national-university-hit-by-huge-data-breach">revealed</a> a massive data breach in the school’s computer system, including tax file numbers, bank accounts and passport details. The sophistication of the attack, which came after multiple attempts, meant there was <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-behind-huge-anu-hack-amid-fears-government-employees-could-be-compromised-20190605-p51uro.html">only possible one suspect</a>, according to senior intelligence officials: China. </p>
<p>Stealing people’s bank details might be profitable for the hacking team, but it doesn’t win hearts and minds for the Chinese state. Actions like this do more to damage China’s image than the words of noted China critics <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-we-keep-turning-a-blind-eye-to-chinese-political-interference-94299">Clive Hamilton</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQB9uPIBfHY">Clive Palmer</a>.</p>
<p>This sort of intimidation has been on the rise under Xi’s leadership in recent years. Academics who are critical of China now expect to be targeted by the CCP. </p>
<p>A podcast like mine, banned in China, doesn’t help. In the wake of an <a href="https://omny.fm/shows/the-little-red-podcast/muzzling-the-academy-policemen-spooks-and-vanishin">episode</a> about China’s real-time censorship of its own historical record, I was hit by a denial-of-service attack that our university’s IT service struggled to fix. I gave up doing research inside China a while ago, after it became clear that my former colleagues and friends in rural China were increasingly at risk.</p>
<p>Even colleagues who have <a href="https://www.policyforum.net/an-open-letter-from-concerned-scholars-of-china-and-the-chinese-diaspora/">signed petitions</a> calling on the Australian government take an evidence-based approach to China policy have been warned off continuing their in-country research by their Chinese research partners, ending collaborations which often stretched back decades.</p>
<p>To the outside world, this obsession with <a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinpings-grip-on-power-is-absolute-but-there-are-new-threats-to-his-chinese-dream-118921">control</a> looks like weakness rather than strength. A sanitised image of life inside China will do nothing to build trust in China as a responsible power.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283456/original/file-20190710-44437-i6rs3p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283456/original/file-20190710-44437-i6rs3p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283456/original/file-20190710-44437-i6rs3p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283456/original/file-20190710-44437-i6rs3p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283456/original/file-20190710-44437-i6rs3p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283456/original/file-20190710-44437-i6rs3p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283456/original/file-20190710-44437-i6rs3p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This is the image of China that Xi Jinping wants to export to the world: happy, prosperous and non-threatening.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">How Hwee Young/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Misplaced attempts at soft power</h2>
<p>So how does China go about winning back a 20-point drop in trust?</p>
<p>To answer this question, I have to borrow a famous line from the film, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIP6EwqMEoE">The Princess Bride</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>When it comes to the concept of soft power, the Chinese state misses the basic point that it doesn’t work particularly well. Money can’t buy you love, or in <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-soft-power/">Joseph Nye</a>’s terms, if your ideology and your culture have no appeal, cash won’t fix that. </p>
<p>Yet, the Communist Party is now a firm believer in soft power, built around its confidence that China’s ancient culture can return it to its legitimate status as the preeminent civilisation in the world. This confidence may be misplaced, as anyone who sat through the ponderous, state-backed, blockbuster film <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rQQzYnwRufw">The Great Wall</a> can testify. </p>
<p>To date, the target of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping">China’s soft power push</a> appears to be a largely Chinese audience. The purpose of its designated soft power tools, from <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-confucius-institutes-and-do-they-teach-chinese-propaganda-114274">Confucius Institutes</a> to the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/see-difference-cgtn-australian-gambit">English-language news service CGTN</a>, is to impress on both the domestic constituency and Chinese communities abroad that China now looks and acts like a rejuvenated great power. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-confucius-institutes-and-do-they-teach-chinese-propaganda-114274">Explainer: what are Confucius Institutes and do they teach Chinese propaganda?</a>
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<p>This officially approved cultural soft power package might not sell to non-Chinese audiences in Australia or, well, anywhere. But China has recently been trying another tactic – <a href="https://theasiadialogue.com/2016/03/25/chinas-rising-economic-soft-power/">economic soft power</a>. This is specifically aimed at the developing world: China positions itself as a nation that overcame colonial oppression to emerge from grinding poverty and become an economic powerhouse.</p>
<p>Under former President Hu Jintao, the party tiptoed away from the notion that China would pursue a “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/promise-and-pitfalls-chinas-peaceful-rise">peaceful rise</a>”, because they worried the word “rise” sounded threatening, even preceded by “peaceful.”</p>
<p>Now, under Xi’s watch, there is a new catchphrase to describe China’s rise. Anchors on CGTN happily ask European and African interlocutors about the merits of “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/is-there-really-a-china-model/">the China model</a>” for economic development, in which the state acts as chess master, guiding the economy and society at every turn. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1148599824729739265"}"></div></p>
<p>Some nations are buying into this. Last weekend, a taskforce of Solomon Islands MPs and bureaucrats presented their recommendation to parliament over whether to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. While many Solomon Islanders, including Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/diplomatic-switch-solomon-islands-relations-taiwan-or-china">are reluctant to switch</a>, the country’s close economic ties with China make such a move feel inevitable. </p>
<p>A Chinese development model that promises an escape from poverty has appeal across the Pacific – and beyond.</p>
<h2>Trust on both sides of the wall</h2>
<p>Whether Beijing is able to turn around this trust problem depends, in part, on how much China begins to trust itself in the rest of the world.</p>
<p>Forthcoming research my ANU colleagues and I are conducting with Hong Kong-based researchers examines attempts by Chinese state actors to influence the 2019 Australian federal election. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-chinas-swift-rise-as-naval-power-australia-needs-to-rethink-how-it-defends-itself-119459">With China's swift rise as naval power, Australia needs to rethink how it defends itself</a>
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<p>Preliminary results indicate that the Communist Party didn’t give a hoot which party won. The goal of Chinese propaganda during the election, rather, was to create a sense of distrust among Australian-Chinese communities by depicting Australia as a racist, unwelcoming place.</p>
<p>We should be mindful of attempts by elements of the Communist Party to <a href="https://www.afr.com/news/policy/foreign-affairs/united-front-work-department-chinas-magic-weapon-for-winning-friends-20180523-h10gcp">influence</a> our political processes. Yet it’s crucial to remember the CCP targets many groups in Australia, including private businesses run by former Chinese citizens, religious groups and student organisations, not because they are all loyal party stooges, but because the party does not trust them.</p>
<p>The challenge for China, if it wants to be trusted by the rest of the world, is how to move beyond Mao Zedong’s <a href="https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch02.htm">famous dictum</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the utmost importance for the revolution. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This thinking should have no place in a globalised world, but in CCP circles, it’s back in vogue.</p>
<p>The challenge for Australia’s leaders is to recognise China’s current political reality, but not be drawn into the same binary, simplistic thinking. There’s enough of that going around.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119807/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Graeme Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How does China go about winning back the hearts and minds of the world? Its obsession with control and misplaced soft power efforts are clearly not doing it any favours.Graeme Smith, Research Fellow, Department of Pacific Affairs, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1194592019-07-02T01:25:10Z2019-07-02T01:25:10ZWith China’s swift rise as naval power, Australia needs to rethink how it defends itself<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282129/original/file-20190702-105200-1nxsxzj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China has always had a formidable army, but only since 1996 has it begun to develop as a maritime power.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wu Hong/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>As China grows more powerful and influential, our New Superpower series looks at what this means for the world – how China maintains its power, how it wields its power and how its power might be threatened. Read the rest of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/the-new-superpower-73080">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Visiting Wellington in April 1996, I fell into conversation with a very wise and experienced New Zealand government official. We talked about the still-unfolding <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/06/21/us-and-china-nearly-came-to-blows-in-96/926d105f-1fd8-404c-9995-90984f86a613/?utm_term=.db42babd4680">Taiwan Straits crisis</a>, during which Washington had deployed a formidable array of naval power, including two aircraft carrier battle groups, to the waters around Taiwan. The aim was to compel China to abandon a series of missile firings near Taiwan intended to intimidate voters in forthcoming presidential elections.</p>
<p>In this, the Americans had clearly been successful, but my Kiwi friend was worried. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Success has consequences, and the consequences here are plain: the Chinese will now do whatever it takes to make sure the Americans can never do that to them again.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That remark sparked one of the trains of thought which led to the arguments in my new book, <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/how-defend-australia">How to Defend Australia</a>.</p>
<p>His remark has been proved right. China has always had a formidable army, but only since 1996 has it begun to develop as a maritime power, as well. In that time, it has made massive and, it seems, very effective investments in the air and naval forces required to fight at sea. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-naval-upgrade-may-not-be-enough-to-keep-pace-in-a-fast-changing-region-105044">Australia's naval upgrade may not be enough to keep pace in a fast-changing region</a>
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<p>Today, it is quite plainly the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/world/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-pacific.html">world’s second maritime power</a>, behind only the United States. And it now threatens America’s maritime preponderance in the western Pacific, on which US strategic primacy in the region ultimately and absolutely depends.</p>
<p>This is a remarkable achievement in such a short time, with immense implications for the security of countries throughout the region, so it is important to be clear about how it has happened and what it means, including for our own defence. </p>
<p>This is especially important because China’s achievement has been largely misunderstood by traditional naval powers like America, Britain and Australia, whose approach to maritime strategy is markedly different from China’s.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Was the visit last month by Chinese warship to Sydney Harbour a ‘reciprocal visit’, as Scott Morrison explained, or a show of force?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bianca De Marchi/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>China’s ‘sea denial’ strategy</h2>
<p>When it comes to maritime strategy, traditional naval powers emphasise “<a href="http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/semaphore-australias-need-sea-control">sea control</a>” and power projection. This means their maritime forces are designed primarily to defend major platforms like aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, with which they aim to project power against distant adversaries. </p>
<p>China’s primary strategic aim has been the opposite. It has developed its naval forces to prevent adversaries – particularly the United States – from projecting power against China the way the Americans did in 1996. This is what naval strategists call “<a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/china-shifts-pacific-waters-with-its-aircraft-carrier-trials-20110829-1jib4.html">sea denial</a>”, which boils down simply to the capacity to find and sink the other side’s ships. </p>
<p>In doing this, the Chinese have had three big advantages:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>First, they have been able to exploit inherent advantages of “sea denial” over “sea control”. Since the late 19th century, a whole range of systems, weapons and technologies - including radio, radar, aircraft, submarines, sea mines, torpedoes, guided missiles and space-based surveillance - have made it progressively easier to find and sink an adversary’s ships, and correspondingly harder to defend them.</p></li>
<li><p>Second, the Chinese were able to access an array of Soviet military technologies and develop them further as their own technological base expanded and deepened. </p></li>
<li><p>And third, they have had a lot of money to spend, without breaking the bank, thanks to their fast-growing economy.</p></li>
</ul>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinpings-grip-on-power-is-absolute-but-there-are-new-threats-to-his-chinese-dream-118921">Xi Jinping's grip on power is absolute, but there are new threats to his 'Chinese dream'</a>
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<p>As a result, Beijing is now well-placed to prevent America doing again what it did in 1996. A US naval carrier approaching Taiwan today would be at serious risk of attack from China’s formidable ships, aircraft and submarines, as well as from its notorious, carrier-killer, land-based ballistic missiles. </p>
<p>So much so, in fact, that Washington would now be very unlikely to risk such an operation.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China’s navy is now only second to the US in terms of strength.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bianca De Marchi/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>America’s loss of military might</h2>
<p>This comes as a surprise to those who still believe that America’s military is unchallengeable. </p>
<p>Of course, it is still very powerful, with an unmatched capacity to deploy and sustain armed forces far from its own shores. But that doesn’t mean it can automatically defeat any adversary it faces, especially when that adversary enjoys the advantages of fighting on its home ground, as Russia would, for example, in a war over Ukraine or the Baltic states, or China would in east Asia. </p>
<p>And wiser heads in the US military establishment understand this all too well. The Pentagon’s recent <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF">Indo-Pacific strategy report</a> concedes that China is “likely to enjoy a local military advantage at the onset of conflict” in east Asia.</p>
<p>In fact, that understates the problem. America has no credible military strategy to overcome China’s “early local advantages” to achieve the kind of swift, low-cost victory in a potential war at sea that everyone has taken for granted for so long.</p>
<p>The only serious attempt to develop such a strategy - the US military’s “<a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf">Air Sea Battle Concept</a>” - was abandoned soon after it was promulgated six years ago. The reality today is that America relies on the implicit threat of nuclear escalation, embodied in its refusal <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/01/2002108002/-1/-1/1/DANGERS-OF-A-NO-FIRST-USE-POLICY.PDF">to rule out using nuclear weapons first</a>, to compel China to concede victory when US conventional forces cannot. </p>
<p>And how credible is that threat when China can retaliate against any nuclear attack with a nuclear counter-strike?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-strong-words-the-us-has-few-options-left-to-reverse-chinas-gains-in-the-south-china-sea-97089">Despite strong words, the US has few options left to reverse China's gains in the South China Sea</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This swift shift in Asia’s maritime strategic balance has profound implications for the region’s strategic future. It does not just undermine America’s ability to defend Taiwan from Chinese military pressure, it undermines the credibility of US security guarantees to all its allies in the western Pacific, including Australia. </p>
<p>And that, in turn, undermines the foundation of America’s strategic leadership in east Asia, and paves the way for China to take its place - just as China intends. </p>
<p>It is this major change in the regional military balance, along with China’s relative economic weight, which makes the rapid eclipse of the old US-led order in our region now so likely.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1047009969210576896"}"></div></p>
<h2>China’s new maritime challenge</h2>
<p>As this happens, however, China faces a new strategic challenge. Its cost-effective maritime denial strategy has been enough to undermine US regional primacy, but it will not be enough to take America’s place and establish dominance of its own in east Asia. </p>
<p>For that, it will need to be able to project its own military power across the vast expanse of the Asia-Pacific region. And that requires China to build its own carriers and amphibious forces – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-navy/">as it is now doing</a> – and expand its capabilities to defend them from future potential adversaries.</p>
<p>This poses a whole new problem for China because now the boot is on the other foot. China has been able to leverage the inherent advantages of “sea denial” over “sea control” to counter US power projection in the region, but future adversaries can do the same to thwart China’s own power projection. </p>
<p>And that has very important implications for Australia’s future defence strategies. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-china-us-tensions-on-the-rise-does-australia-need-a-new-defence-strategy-106515">With China-US tensions on the rise, does Australia need a new defence strategy?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The bad news is that we can no longer depend on America to ensure that a major power like China does not threaten us militarily in the decades ahead, or to defend us if one does. We must therefore explore – more seriously than we have ever done before – whether we can defend ourselves from a major Asian power.</p>
<p>It is a daunting task, but the good news, as I argue in my book, is that we can exploit the advantages of maritime denial over maritime control against China if it tries to project its power against us, or our close neighbours by sea. </p>
<p>By rigorously optimising our forces for a maritime denial strategy, we might be able to sustain an effective defence against a major power. That would come at a high price – <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-must-double-defence-spending-to-address-worsening-strategic-outlook/">much higher than we are paying for defence now</a> – but it is a price we could afford if we decided the risks we face in Asia in the future were high enough to justify it. </p>
<p>Are they? That’s the big defence debate we need to have now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119459/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hugh White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s naval strategy has been to prevent America from ever projecting its power by sea in the Asia-Pacific region again. Now that it’s worked, the region needs to take notice.Hugh White, Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1189212019-06-27T20:44:45Z2019-06-27T20:44:45ZXi Jinping’s grip on power is absolute, but there are new threats to his ‘Chinese dream’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281554/original/file-20190627-76701-11dcnnt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=796%2C5%2C2688%2C1970&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wes Mountain/The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>As China grows more powerful and influential, our New Superpower series looks at what this means for the world – how China maintains its power, how it wields its power and how its power might be threatened. Read the rest of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/the-new-superpower-73080">here</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Chinese leader Xi Jinping took power as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/15/xi-jinping-communist-party-chinese">head of the Chinese Communist Party</a> – the most important position in China – in late 2012. Today, nearly seven years on, he is one of the most recognisable figures on the world stage.</p>
<p>Yet, while he already commands the destiny of some 1.4 billion Chinese people, and seeks to shape, in his words, “<a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201807/30/WS5b5e54b6a31031a351e90db0.html">a common future for mankind</a>”, he remains an enigmatic leader.</p>
<p>In a short period of time, Xi has concentrated power to himself and established a remarkably influential role, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41730948">nearly unprecedented</a> among Chinese leaders since 1949.</p>
<p>Yet, while he is certainly powerful, he is also vulnerable. He faces massive challenges on the grandest of scales: a <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinese-president-xi-jinping-warns-of-new-long-march-as-trade-war-intensifies">simmering trade war</a> with the US, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-46977541/china-s-economic-slowdown-explained">slowing economic growth</a>, increasing concern among China’s neighbours about his more <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/world/asia/south-china-sea-navy.html">assertive use</a> of the country’s economic and military might.</p>
<p>Given these enormous internal and external challenges, the biggest question for Xi is how he will maintain his absolute grip on power and legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people. </p>
<p>He has promised them a better life in a stronger and more prosperous China. And he has gone a long way to deliver on those promises. But many challenges loom ahead. </p>
<h2>From princeling to party leader</h2>
<p>This year, the People’s Republic of China turns 70. And Xi, its paramount leader, turned 66 last month. No other Chinese leader’s life so closely parallels the life of the PRC – and that explains a lot about Xi’s mindset and his ambitions for China.</p>
<p>As the son of a vice premier and revolutionary hero, Xi was born into great privilege in June 1953. He was considered a “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/who-are-chinas-princelings/">princeling</a>”, the term for the children of the country’s most powerful elites. In his youth, he attended the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/from-pampered-schoolboy-to-survivor-chinese-president-xi-jinpings-difficult-early-years-20150925-gjulpa.html">August 1st School</a> for the children of high-ranking cadres in Beijing and spent time inside the walls of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-06/zhongnanhai-1/10849514">Zhongnanhai</a>, the seat of Communist Party power. He was destined for leadership.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281514/original/file-20190627-76743-106kw2p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281514/original/file-20190627-76743-106kw2p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281514/original/file-20190627-76743-106kw2p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281514/original/file-20190627-76743-106kw2p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281514/original/file-20190627-76743-106kw2p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281514/original/file-20190627-76743-106kw2p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281514/original/file-20190627-76743-106kw2p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Xi Jinping’s father meeting the Panchen Lama in 1951.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>All of this came crashing down in 1962 when Mao Zedong <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-17/why-maos-cultural-revolution-still-haunts-xi-jinpings-china/9047782">purged Xi’s father</a> from the party, accusing him of harbouring dangerous “rightist” views. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281504/original/file-20190627-76743-14bn4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281504/original/file-20190627-76743-14bn4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=860&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281504/original/file-20190627-76743-14bn4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=860&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281504/original/file-20190627-76743-14bn4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=860&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281504/original/file-20190627-76743-14bn4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1080&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281504/original/file-20190627-76743-14bn4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1080&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281504/original/file-20190627-76743-14bn4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1080&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Xi Jinping (left) with his brother, Xi Yuanping, and father, Xi Zhongxun, in 1958.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When the Cultural Revolution descended on China in the late 1960s, the younger Xi was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-cultural-revolution.html">sent to the countryside</a>. He spent seven formative years – from age 15 to 22 – in rural Shaanxi province, working with the local peasantry.</p>
<p>By 1979, when Deng Xiaoping <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-01/40-years-of-reform-that-transformed-china-into-a-superpower/10573468">launched China on its historic reform drive</a>, Xi embarked on his own fast track to the top. Over the next 30 years, he ascended through party and government ranks, serving in increasingly senior postings, mostly in the rapidly growing eastern provinces of China. </p>
<p>In early 2007, he became the party chief of Shanghai, but was only in that post for seven months before he was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/world/asia/22china.html">elevated</a> to the Politburo Standing Committee, making him one of the nine most powerful men in China. Five years later, he was installed as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and, the following year, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21766622">became China’s president</a>.</p>
<p>In those 60 years, Xi experienced China’s own coming of age, from its early struggles with nation-building, to the depths of Maoist excess, to its spectacular rise to great power status. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-ambition-burns-bright-with-xi-jinping-firmly-in-charge-86307">China's ambition burns bright – with Xi Jinping firmly in charge</a>
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<p>This life experience has made him what he is today: a confident risk-taker who remains insistent on the communist party’s indispensable role in the country’s success and tenaciously focused on achieving China’s expansive national ambitions.</p>
<h2>Surveillance, crackdowns and absolute power</h2>
<p>Once in power, Xi moved to solidify his position. He saw weakness at the heart of the party, owing to lax ideological discipline and pervasive corruption. And so he launched attacks on both. </p>
<p>Much of his early popularity among the Chinese public came from his high-profile <a href="https://theconversation.com/understanding-chinese-president-xis-anti-corruption-campaign-86396">anti-corruption drive</a> targeting the country’s elites. This campaign not only sent fear across ranks of the party and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it also helped Xi remove rivals and roadblocks to his grand plans for national revival.</p>
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<p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/understanding-chinese-president-xis-anti-corruption-campaign-86396">Understanding Chinese President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign</a>
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<p>Xi’s supporters also made powerful use of the party’s propaganda machinery to create an aura of wisdom and benevolence around Xi – one not seen since the days of the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/08/great-helmsman-dictator-china-anniversary-mao-40-years-after-death">Great Helmsman</a>”, Chairman Mao.</p>
<p>And Xi set out visionary goals centred around the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/xi-jinpings-chinese-dream.html">Chinese Dream</a>” and the “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-30/xi-urges-china-s-youth-to-embrace-nationalism-on-key-anniversary">great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation</a>”, which tapped into a deep reservoir of national pride and further solidified his popularity.</p>
<p>By 2015, he was able to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1854607/china-aims-modern-fighting-force-overhaul-peoples">launch</a> a massive reorganisation of the PLA to transform it from a bloated, corrupt, untested and inward-looking military to one far more capable of projecting China’s power abroad and far more loyal to Xi and the party. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281515/original/file-20190627-76726-6sdj7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281515/original/file-20190627-76726-6sdj7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281515/original/file-20190627-76726-6sdj7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281515/original/file-20190627-76726-6sdj7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281515/original/file-20190627-76726-6sdj7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281515/original/file-20190627-76726-6sdj7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281515/original/file-20190627-76726-6sdj7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The new-look People’s Liberation Army.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wu Hong/EPA</span></span>
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<p>At the same time, he has also overseen the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ccd94b46-4db5-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a">most sweeping crackdown on dissent</a> since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/thirty-years-on-china-is-still-trying-to-whitewash-the-tiananmen-crackdown-from-its-history-118178">Tiananmen protests in 1989</a>, introducing all manner of surveillance, censorship, and other intrusions into people’s lives to ensure order and obedience to the party’s authority.</p>
<p>He also centralised decision-making authority ever closer to himself, <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/18/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/chinese-premier-li-keqiang-re-elected-influence-expected-wane/#.XRQZn9MzYyk">eclipsing the authority</a> of Premier Li Keqiang. Xi is now in charge of nearly all the key bodies overseeing economic reform, foreign affairs, internal security, innovation and technology, and more. </p>
<p>And, just to be sure everyone understands who is boss, Xi orchestrated the inclusion of “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics/china-to-enshrine-xis-thought-into-state-constitution-amid-national-fervor-idUSKBN1F812P">Xi Jinping Thought</a>” into the party’s constitution to guide the country into a “new era” of national rejuvenation. He also saw to the <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/11/592694991/china-removes-presidential-term-limits-enabling-xi-jinping-to-rule-indefinitely">removal of term limits </a>on his presidency, in effect allowing him to stay in power for life.</p>
<p>Xi has been equally bold as a leader on the international stage, setting out an extremely ambitious foreign policy agenda. </p>
<p>His record includes launching the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/chinas-world-bank">Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</a>, asserting <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-china-playing-a-long-game-in-the-south-china-sea-42625">Chinese claims in the South China Sea</a> via massive land reclamation projects and an expanding military footprint, and, boldest of all, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinas-vision-for-globalisation-beijing-style-77705">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, a geopolitical play connecting China through trade, investment and infrastructure across Eurasia and beyond.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281512/original/file-20190627-76701-17lpcu8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281512/original/file-20190627-76701-17lpcu8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281512/original/file-20190627-76701-17lpcu8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281512/original/file-20190627-76701-17lpcu8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281512/original/file-20190627-76701-17lpcu8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281512/original/file-20190627-76701-17lpcu8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281512/original/file-20190627-76701-17lpcu8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Under Xi’s watch, China has greatly expanded surveillance over its citizens.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Roman Pilipey/EPA</span></span>
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<h2>Xi who must be obeyed?</h2>
<p>It would seem Xi has had a remarkable run. But, strangely, his actions make it appear otherwise. A quick checklist of Xi’s moves in the past seven years suggests an increasingly nervous leader:</p>
<ul>
<li>increasingly consolidating power to himself </li>
<li>imposing obedience within the party and public </li>
<li>reasserting party control over the PLA </li>
<li>blanketing the country with intrusive surveillance systems</li>
<li>demanding an obsequious and unquestioning media </li>
<li><a href="https://theconversation.com/patriotic-songs-and-self-criticism-why-china-is-re-educating-muslims-in-mass-detention-camps-99592">imprisoning hundreds of thousands of Muslim Uighurs</a> in “re-education” camps.</li>
</ul>
<p>He surely has much to worry about. His reforms and crackdowns have created many enemies and much disgruntlement, especially among elites. Income disparity has grown as wealth has become concentrated in fewer hands. The pace of China’s economic growth is slowing. Localised unrest is common. </p>
<p>Analysts say much bolder economic reform is needed to avoid the stagnation of the “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-13/xi-s-leading-china-s-economy-into-the-middle-income-trap">middle income trap</a>.” China is also facing a perilous <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2052220/chinas-demographic-future-has-big-problem">demographic future</a> as the population ages and people have fewer children. And Xi’s ambitions at home and abroad are increasingly being met with push-back – not least from the United States – leading some in China <a href="https://www.afr.com/news/politics/world/has-xi-jinping-now-passed-his-peak-20180727-h137m4">to question</a> whether he has over-reached.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281517/original/file-20190627-76734-c9451n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281517/original/file-20190627-76734-c9451n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281517/original/file-20190627-76734-c9451n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281517/original/file-20190627-76734-c9451n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281517/original/file-20190627-76734-c9451n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281517/original/file-20190627-76734-c9451n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281517/original/file-20190627-76734-c9451n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Xi Jinping has sought to reclaim China’s status on the global stage, raising fears about its long-term objectives.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexei Druzhinin/Sputnik pool/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the biggest challenge is how to continue maintaining economic growth and social stability without losing the party’s absolute political control. It’s the same challenge every Chinese leader since Deng has faced. </p>
<p>Embarking on political and economic reforms would help ensure a more prosperous, stable and just future for the country. But doing so would surely undercut the one-party rule of the communist party. </p>
<p>On the other hand, foregoing these changes in favour of tighter control risks future stagnation and possibly instability.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rewriting-history-in-the-peoples-republic-of-amnesia-and-beyond-90014">Rewriting history in the People’s Republic of Amnesia and beyond</a>
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<p>Xi has chosen to double-down on the latter course. He clearly sees the party’s extensive system of ideology, propaganda, surveillance and control as absolutely necessary to achieving the Chinese Dream – the country’s re-emergence as a powerful, wealthy and respected great power.</p>
<p>From this perspective, we will likely see a continued tightening of the party’s grip on power for as long as Xi is in charge, which could well last into the late-2020s or beyond. </p>
<p>Whether or not the outside world ultimately respects Xi’s autocratic approach to power and leadership, he is convinced it is best for China and, by extension, benefits the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118921/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bates Gill is also an Associate Fellow with the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House, London). </span></em></p>As China’s challenges mount, can Xi Jinping continue to maintain economic growth and social stability without losing the party’s absolute political control?Bates Gill, Professor of Asia-Pacific Security Studies, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.