tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/turkish-election-2015-17469/articlesTurkish election 2015 – The Conversation2016-01-01T10:19:48Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/516422016-01-01T10:19:48Z2016-01-01T10:19:48Z2015: the year in elections<p><em>It’s been a dramatic year in elections around the world: old leaders were toppled, upstarts and novices seized the helm, and embattled governments somehow managed to cling on. Here, the experts who covered them take stock of what’s happened – and look at what’s in store for 2016.</em></p>
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<h2>Zambia: praying for rain</h2>
<p><strong>Stephen Chan, SOAS</strong></p>
<p>Zambia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-a-stormy-election-dark-clouds-still-loom-over-zambia-36705">2015 election</a> was triggered when the incumbent president, Michael Sata, died in office. Constitutionally, after a period of acting presidency by the vice-president, Dr Guy Scott – who, for a short time, had the distinction of being a <a href="https://theconversation.com/guy-scotts-whiteness-is-not-the-issue-in-zambia-33690">white president of a black country</a> – any chosen successor had to face the polls. Edgar Lungu was picked after a fractious process and ultimately beat off a strong challenge from opposition leader, Hakainde Hichilema. </p>
<p>Lungu’s time in office may be brief, since he was elected only to fill out the term until full elections in September 2016. He has had to preside over a grave economic downturn and has <a href="http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-10-16-divine-intervention-lungu-calls-for-a-day-of-prayer-and-fasting-to-save-the-kwacha">called days of prayer</a> instead of coming up with technocratic solutions. A catastrophic shortage of rain exacerbated power shortages as hydroelectric production literally dried up and the country’s brief economic bubble has burst. </p>
<p>He is dogged by rumours of ill health and Zambians now joke about whether he will join the country’s roster of presidents who have died in office. Whoever wins the 2016 elections may come up with an economic plan to overcome the curse of plunging international copper prices – but may yet be reduced to praying for rain.</p>
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<h2>Israel: zero sum game</h2>
<p><strong>Yoav Galai, University of St Andrews</strong></p>
<p>This year’s election was framed by identity politics as a zero-sum game. That much was clear from the decision of four different (mostly) Arab parties to run together as the “Joint List”, a banner under which they became the third-largest party in parliament.</p>
<p>Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party trounced the Labour opposition – and Netanyahu is now set to become the longest running prime minister in Israeli history. Unlike his previous coalition government, he had no need to cross ideological lines to compose a coalition – and this government is his most right-wing yet.</p>
<p>This was a big surprise; even on the day of the elections the polls predicted a draw with Labour. Netanyahu then delivered a warning that “the Arabs are coming to the polling stations in droves”. The false and racist statement painted the participation of Israel’s Arab minority in the national elections as illegitimate, but it worked wonders.</p>
<p>Some of the racist inclinations of the other side became visible too. At an anti-Netanyahu rally in March, prominent left-wing intellectual Yair Garbuz <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium-1.646038">drew a direct line</a> between criminality, anti-Arab racism and Mizrahi Jews, the majority of Israel’s Jewish population who have roots in Arab countries – and, looking back at the election, Labour leader Shelly Yechimovich <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium-1.648196">conceded</a> that Garbuz’s statements may have been partly to blame for her party’s loss.</p>
<p>With a fragile majority of one, the coalition can easily be pushed into extremism by the Nationalist Religious Jewish Home party and by the Likud’s more right-wing ministers. With no clear plan regarding Palestinians except the normalisation of settlement activity, attention has returned to zero sum identity politics, with the general categories of Arabs and left as the targets of legislation and policy.</p>
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<h2>Nigeria: matters of urgency <a id="nigeria"></a></h2>
<p><strong>Catherine Gegout, University of Nottingham</strong></p>
<p>When Muhammadu Buhari was <a href="https://theconversation.com/buhari-wins-but-the-new-president-of-nigeria-faces-an-enormous-challenge-39291">elected president of Nigeria</a> in March, he certainly had his work cut out. Nigeria’s economy badly needs to be diversified; petroleum exports revenue represents <a href="http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm">more than 90% of total export revenue</a>, even as only half of all Nigerians <a href="http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2015/10/20/the-way-forward-for-electricity-supply-in-nigeria/">have access to electricity</a>. Education is in a dismal state, especially in the north, where <a href="https://theconversation.com/buhari-wins-but-the-new-president-of-nigeria-faces-an-enormous-challenge-39291">only 6% of children have primary education</a>. </p>
<p>There have already been some promising moves. Buhari has renewed Nigeria’s beleagured fight against corruption, including <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34580862">oil corruption</a> and both he and his deputy <a href="http://www.africareview.com/Special-Reports/What-African-presidents-are-paid-and-why-it-matters/-/979182/2802868/-/c59muuz/-/index.html">took a symbolic pay cut</a>. He must now start honouring his promise to improve <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/president-buhari-nigeria-women-politics">gender representation</a> in politics. Currently, only 16% of cabinet members are women, and only 6% of senators and members of the House of Representatives. </p>
<p>Then there’s the fight against Boko Haram. Approximately <a href="http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/11/26/nigeria-boko-haram-cannot-be-crushed-by-december">1,500 people have been killed since June 2015</a>, there is the serious prospect of <a href="http://www.jeuneafrique.com/284717/politique/jean-yves-le-diran-ministre-francais-de-la-defense-le-rapprochement-entre-daesh-et-boko-haram-est-un-risque-majeur/">true co-operation between the group and Islamic State</a> and the group is still <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/102274/is-education-boko-haram-s-biggest-victim">targeting the north’s few schools</a>.</p>
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<h2>United Kingdom: political carnage</h2>
<p><strong>Louise Thompson, University of Surrey</strong></p>
<p>Almost every poll of the British electorate failed to predict the result on the night, which was ultimately heralded by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/john-curtice-how-we-called-the-election-right-on-polling-night-more-or-less-41556">shocking exit poll</a> that turned out to be correct. </p>
<p>The election ultimately <a href="https://theconversation.com/britains-election-is-over-so-what-does-it-all-mean-41261">returned a familiar face</a> to Downing Street in the form of David Cameron, but the turmoil of the losing parties had huge implications for the British political system. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/lib-dem-wipeout-prompts-clegg-to-hint-he-will-step-down-41512">Liberal Democrats</a> went from a party of government to a party of the (very) backbenches, while Labour’s loss (and near-wipeout in Scotland) was followed by a messy post-election leadership battle and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-corbyn-wins-the-class-of-1983-looks-set-to-reshape-labour-once-again-47291">surprise ascendancy of left-winger Jeremy Corbyn</a>. The result is an opposition more divided than any party in recent memory. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aftershocks-of-the-snps-success-will-be-felt-throughout-the-next-parliament-41127">Scottish National Party</a> took almost all the Scottish seats. It has so far maintained this momentum at Westminster, marking itself out as the party to watch. </p>
<p>One thing is certain: there will be even more division and discord at Westminster in 2016, as Labour infighting continues and the parties prepare for the impending EU referendum campaign.</p>
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<h2>Poland: right turn</h2>
<p><strong>Simona Guerra, University of Leicester, and Fernando Casal Bértoa, University of Nottingham</strong></p>
<p>Even though Poland has low levels of unemployment and inflation and an overall positive macro-economic outlook, its people still <a href="https://theconversation.com/surprise-election-loss-for-polish-president-spells-trouble-for-governing-party-42367">threw out</a> the incumbent Civic Platform party president in favour of the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) candidate. A socially conservative party, PiS doubled down on its success in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-polands-political-landscape-was-redrawn-overnight-49697">October’s legislative polls</a>, when it <a href="http://www.the-plot.org/2015/12/09/polish-politics-in-2015-all-the-power-to-the-right/">won in almost all regions</a> and across different demographics.</p>
<p>Since then, PiS has been on a tear, not least with some rather sobering appointments. Controversial nationalist <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/10/polish-defence-minister-condemned-over-jewish-conspiracy-theory">Antoni Macierewicz</a> is still minister of defence despite allegations of explicit anti-semitism, while Zbigniew Ziobro became minister of justice despite having already been in the spotlight after a number of <a href="https://polishpoliticsblog.wordpress.com/2015/11/30/how-will-polands-law-and-justice-party-govern/">politicised prosecutions</a>.</p>
<p>The party also holds serious sway over the Polish Constitutional Court, which has sole authority to declare laws unconstitutional – and because of impending retirements and amendments, PiS is moving forward the controversial debates on the court’s future. As Poland becomes more Eurosceptic, more protective of Polish interests and more disinclined to accept refugees, PiS now has a chance to implement its own distinctive version of law and justice.</p>
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<h2>Denmark: holding together (just)</h2>
<p><strong>Martin Vinæs Larsen, University of Copenhagen</strong></p>
<p>Denmark’s parliamentary election ended with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/danish-government-voted-out-but-who-moves-in-depends-on-a-battle-of-wills-on-the-right-43417">victory for the Liberal-Conservative bloc</a>, which ousted the Social Democratic prime minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt.</p>
<p>But her successor at the helm, the Liberals’ <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17930161">Lars Løkke Rasmussen</a>, saw his own party severely weakened at the election. Instead, he had to rely on the right-wing populist party, the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/19/danish-peoples-party-dahl-border-controls-election">Danish People’s Party</a>, to gain a majority. The People’s Party had an outstanding election, becoming the second largest party in the new parliament.</p>
<p>The outlook was therefore somewhat bleak for the new prime minister, who now leads one of the smallest minority governments in the country’s history. In spite of this, he has managed to manoeuvre through the difficult parliamentary situation, shepherding through several important reforms of the labour market and new laws dealing with the refugee crises. But it remains to be seen how long he can hold his right-wing coalition together.</p>
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<h2>Sri Lanka: end of an era</h2>
<p><strong>Oliver Walton, University of Bath</strong></p>
<p>Mahinda Rajapaksa’s nine years in power <a href="https://theconversation.com/sri-lanka-stunned-as-rajapaksa-election-gamble-fails-to-pay-off-35971">came to an abrupt end</a> in January, when the former president suffered an unexpected defeat at the hands of his one-time ally Maithripala Sirisena. </p>
<p>Sirisena’s victory was widely seen as marking a revival of democratic governance in Sri Lanka, and was consolidated with another victory in <a href="https://theconversation.com/sri-lankas-election-thwarts-rajapaksa-and-sets-the-scene-for-deeper-reform-46059">August’s parliamentary elections</a>. </p>
<p>The new government has begun a constitutional reform process and cooperated with a UN-mandated mechanism for investigating war crimes, but concerns persist over the continued heavy military in the north and continuing <a href="http://www.freedomfromtorture.org/feature/out_of_the_silence/5979">evidence</a> of arbitrary detention and torture. </p>
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<h2>Guatemala: all change</h2>
<p><strong>Neil Pyper, Coventry University</strong></p>
<p>Guatemala’s presidential race produced a surprise outcome, while also <a href="https://theconversation.com/latin-american-leaders-wobble-and-topple-as-patience-with-corruption-runs-out-48778">shaking up the rest of Central America</a>. Until almost the eve of September’s first round, it seemed inevitable that Manuel Baldizon of the Renewed Democratic Freedom (Libre) party would win relatively comfortably. </p>
<p>But mass protests about a corruption scandal that eventually brought down the outgoing president, Otto Perez Molina – as well as his vice president and numerous ministers – drastically eroded support for Baldizon, as questions about wrongdoing within his party mounted. They also led to the rapid rise of political outsider Jimmy Morales, a well-known television personality. Morales topped the poll in the first round and won the subsequent run-off by a landslide. </p>
<p>He takes office in January, but faces the unenviable task of satisfying the public appetite for fundamental overhaul of the political system.</p>
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<h2>Greece: accepting austerity</h2>
<p><strong>Sotirios Zartaloudis, Birmingham</strong></p>
<p>Alexis Tsipras’ decision to <a href="https://theconversation.com/greek-election-tsipras-trounces-his-opponents-but-at-what-cost-47790">call snap elections in September</a> turned out to be a masterstroke of Machiavellian political ingenuity. </p>
<p>On one hand, the Syriza prime minister managed a very efficient manoeuvre to get rid of his anti-Euro internal opposition; on the other, he saved face for his anti-austerity U-turn, and now has the legitimacy he needs to implement the three extra years of harsh measures he agreed to before the elections. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen how his transformation from a hard-left radical to a pro-austerity premier will turn out, but so far, he has escaped punishment from the electorate despite reneging on almost all of his pre-2015 promises.</p>
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<h2>Singapore: marching on</h2>
<p><strong>Afif Pasuni, University of Warwick</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/singapores-ruling-party-heads-off-dissent-with-media-blitz-47332">Singapore’s election</a> was expected to trouble the country’s one-party system. It ultimately failed to change much – and the People’s Action Party (PAP) is still going strong after more than half a century of rule. Thanks to consistent economic progress, the party’s critics failed to gain much of a foothold.</p>
<p>But even though it won the election, the party is at a crossroads. Strict media controls and persistent socio-economic interventions are still the norm, but there are also signs that the government’s tight grip is relaxing. Still, while the state is not blithely ignoring to the demands of its critics, 2015 reminded us that surprises are still an alien concept in Singaporean politics.</p>
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<h2>Canada: a new generation rises</h2>
<p><strong>Steve Hewitt, University of Birmingham</strong></p>
<p>Led by three-term prime minister Stephen Harper, Canada’s Conservatives <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-canadas-conservative-party-is-brazenly-playing-the-terrorism-card-45916">waged an election campaign based on fear</a>, focusing on the threat posed by Syrian refugees specifically and Muslims more generally. The party duly held on to its base vote, but they were not able to go beyond it – while optimism helped Justin Trudeau’s Liberals increase their vote by over 4m. </p>
<p>Justin Trudeau’s election represents a generational change in terms of attitudes toward drugs. Whereas no other national leader in a Western democracy has both admitted using drugs and then promised to legalise them nationally, after Trudeau admitted in 2010 that he had smoked pot, he not only refused to apologise but also pledged to legalise marijuana if his Liberal Party won the election. That promise was <a href="http://news.liftcannabis.ca/2015/12/04/22122/">reiterated</a> in this year’s <a href="http://speech.gc.ca/">throne speech</a>. </p>
<p>Trudeau is a sign of things to come as a new generation takes power around the world. As in the 2015 UK result and recent US presidential elections, most major Canadian cities – often increasingly diverse with citizens drawn from around the world along with youth and dynamism – voted for left-of-centre parties, while older and more homogenous suburban and rural voters opt for right-of-centre parties. The divide is growing, and it won’t start to close anytime soon. </p>
<p>This is the politics of the 21st century – and Justin Trudeau has harnessed it capably. </p>
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<h2>Turkey: deep trouble</h2>
<p><strong>Bahar Baser, Coventry University</strong></p>
<p>Turkey’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-your-guide-to-turkeys-general-election-42438">June election</a> was ripe with possibility, both good and bad. The pro-Kurdish leftist party, the HDP, was taking a major risk by participating in the elections for the first time, and the results of the elections were expected to determine whether the country would start moving towards a more authoritarian presidential system. </p>
<p>In the end, the HDP <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-the-kurds-after-turkish-election-success-of-hdp-42979">passed the 10% threshold</a> needed to enter parliament and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its absolute majority – but the country’s various parties could not agree on a coalition government, and a snap second election was called for November. </p>
<p>Between the two polls, the Kurdish peace process stalled completely and the Turkish army and police forces began cracking down on Kurdish majority areas, causing numerous civilian casualties in the process. Then there was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ankara-bombing-kills-dozens-calling-for-peace-in-turkey-48942">massive bombing in Ankara</a>, the worst in Turkey’s recent history. </p>
<p>But instead of haemorrhaging votes as some predicted, the AKP <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-election-erdogan-and-the-akp-get-majority-back-amid-climate-of-violence-and-fear-49963">won an outright majority in November</a> by charming nationalist voters, paving the way for a transition to a more authoritarian system under one-party rule. The HDP once again cleared the 10% threshold, but with fewer votes.</p>
<p>All this bodes ill for 2016. The PKK and the Turkish state will be forced to find a way forward, while a crackdown on freedom of speech and human rights is already underway. And all the while, Turkey must struggle to manage its increasingly complex position in the Syrian crisis. </p>
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<h2>Myanmar: a new dawn?</h2>
<p><strong>Andrew Fagan, University of Essex</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyi-victory-will-test-commitment-to-human-rights-in-myanmar-50041">first credible general elections</a> to be held in Myanmar for more than 50 years took place this November. Everyone predicted that Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) would win, but few expected the landslide scale of the victory. Crucially, the large number of votes the NLD secured from Myanmar’s multitude of ethnic minorities, who this time around have placed their hopes for real change in the NLD rather than their own ethnicity-based political parties. </p>
<p>Still, despite voting for the NLD, many remain unconvinced by its commitment to genuinely ending the discrimination and persecution of Myanmar’s minorities . This is especially the case with respect to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-persecution-of-rohingya-muslims-is-producing-a-ready-supply-of-slaves-46108">Rohingya</a>, who are classified by the UN as one of the most persecuted minorities in the world. The NLD’s commitment to human rights will ultimately be measured by its ability to confront and overcome ethnic and religious conflict. </p>
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<h2>Argentina: let’s change</h2>
<p><strong>Juan Pablo Ferrero, University of Bath</strong></p>
<p>Mauricio Macri won Argentina’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/argentina-departs-from-the-kirchner-model-but-mauricio-macri-now-has-to-govern-a-divided-nation-51060">first ever presidential run-off</a> by a narrow margin, making him the first ever democratic president to come from a third party. His coalition, Let’s Change, ran on a minimalist platform that targeted middle-class concerns, emphasising meritocracy and difference over equality and social rights. </p>
<p>Macri’s win matters for the whole region because it is the first presidential election lost by a coalition of the centre-left – playing into the narrative that Latin America’s leftist political era is <a href="https://theconversation.com/latin-americas-leftism-looks-paler-than-ever-as-trailblazers-stumble-and-fall-51528">coming to a close</a>. </p>
<p>Still, any hopes Macri will dismantle Argentina’s post-neoliberal consensus are premature – any such attempt will face organised resistance from social movements and opposition parliamentarians. The country is divided in two opposing cultural blocs roughly equal in political heft and with roughly equivalent representation throughout the system, so making policy without resorting to presidential decrees will be tough. </p>
<p>The government’s main challenge will be to turn its electoral victory into a broader political consensus that can keep Argentina governable – and the opposition must reflect about why the same sectors of the middle class that supported its ascent have now brought it down. </p>
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<h2>Venezuela: the dream is over</h2>
<p><strong>Marco Aponte-Moreno, University College London</strong></p>
<p>Venezuela’s congressional election marked <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-this-the-end-of-the-socialist-dream-in-venezuela-49859">the end of 16 years of hegemony</a> for the late Hugo Chávez’s socialist party. </p>
<p>In a historic vote with a turnout of almost 75%, the opposition obtained a supermajority of two-thirds of the legislature. These results will allow the opposition to call a referendum to remove the country’s unpopular president, Nicolás Maduro, from office once his term reaches its midpoint in mid April 2016.</p>
<p>The opposition will also try to pass an amnesty to release jailed opposition leaders and remove judges installed by court-packing. Meanwhile, for many voters, the decisive issue was Venezuela’s dire economic performance. Addressing <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/venezuelas-food-shortage-keeps-getting-worse-2015-8?IR=T">desperate shortages</a> of food and basic goods will be a challenge for the opposition and the “chavistas” alike. </p>
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<h2>Spain: ¡sí, se puede!</h2>
<p><strong>Paul Kennedy, University of Bath</strong></p>
<p>Spain’s political system had shown signs of fracturing for some time, but on December 15 the country’s two-party system was <a href="https://theconversation.com/spain-votes-for-change-but-has-no-idea-what-government-itll-end-up-with-52583">finally consigned to the history books</a>. The ruling People’s Party remained the largest in parliament but came up well short of a majority; the once-governing Socialists were very nearly one-upped by leftist insurgents Podemos.</p>
<p>The upshot is that no obvious political partners have the seats to assemble a parliamentary majority – and given the Catalan nationalists’ wholehearted push for independence, bringing them into a coalition will be more politically tricky than ever before. Whoever gets to do it, governing Spain for the four years until the next scheduled election will be a fraught business indeed.</p>
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<p><em>Stay with The Conversation in 2016 for our coverage of elections in the US, Peru, the Philippines, and many more.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51642/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Gegout has received funding from the British Academy and the European Union. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oliver Walton receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steve Hewitt has in the past received funding from the British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Afif Pasuni, Andrew Fagan, Bahar Baser, Fernando Casal Bértoa, Juan Pablo Ferrero, Louise Thompson, Marco Aponte-Moreno, Martin Vinæs Larsen, Neil Pyper, Paul Kennedy, Simona Guerra, Sotirios Zartaloudis, Stephen Chan, and Yoav Galai do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For better or for worse, various countries around the world charted a new course last year. What lies ahead for 2016?Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonAfif Pasuni, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of WarwickAndrew Fagan, Co-Director of Postgraduate Studies, Human Rights Centre, University of EssexBahar Baser, Research Fellow, Coventry UniversityCatherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of NottinghamFernando Casal Bértoa, Nottingham Research Fellow (politics), University of NottinghamJuan Pablo Ferrero, Lecturer in Latin American Studies, University of BathLouise Thompson, Lecturer in British Politics, University of SurreyMarco Aponte-Moreno, Senior teaching fellow in leadership, UCLMartin Vinæs Larsen, PhD Student, Department of Political Science, University of CopenhagenNeil Pyper, Associate Head of School, Coventry UniversityOliver Walton, Lecturer in International Development, University of BathPaul Kennedy, Lecturer in Spanish and European Studies, University of BathSimona Guerra, Lecturer in Politics, University of LeicesterSotirios Zartaloudis, Lecturer in Politics, University of BirminghamSteve Hewitt, Senior Lecturer in the Department of History , University of BirminghamYoav Galai, PhD candidate in the School of International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/517462015-12-07T01:45:24Z2015-12-07T01:45:24ZTurkey’s democracy leaves little room for democrats<p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
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<p>The war of rhetoric between Turkey and Russia dramatically escalated recently when Vladimir Putin <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/putin-turkey-shot-jet-protect-isil-oil-supply-151130191513006.html">accused</a> Turkish forces of shooting down a Russian jet to protect Turkey’s <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-12-01/is-turkey-is-buying-oil-smuggled-by-islamic-state/6991526">oil trade with Islamic State</a> (IS). Such accusations add to a <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/russia-has-a-new-enemy-no-1-turkeys-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan/articleshow/49982174.cms">long line</a> of similar charges made against the former prime minister and now president, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a>, and his Justice and Development Party (AKP).</p>
<p>Though Erdoğan and his AKP cadres deny any ties to IS, their policies and actions in Syria are shrouded in secrecy. Pushes for transparency and attempts by journalists and legal practitioners to hold the government to account have proven <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/freedom-of-press-vital-for-fight-against-corruption-transparency-intl.aspx?pageID=238&nID=91198&NewsCatID=339">virtually futile</a> and at times <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-mainstream-medias-mask-has-finally-slipped-15187">dangerous</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey’s snap elections on November 1 were seen as a chance to reverse this trend. However, hopes of reinvigorating the democracy <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Report%20-%202-3-14.pdf">stifled</a> by the illiberal politics of the Erdoğan-AKP nexus were short-lived. The AKP won a <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-election-erdogan-and-the-akp-get-majority-back-amid-climate-of-violence-and-fear-49963">resounding victory</a>.</p>
<h2>Democratic process, undemocratic outcomes</h2>
<p>Given what has already happened, the AKP’s win could well lead to democracy sliding further away from Turkey, even to the point of its demise. It’s perplexing that such a potentially undemocratic outcome has been sanctioned through the democratic process.</p>
<p>Under the AKP, Turkey has witnessed a rollback of political and civil rights in recent years. This includes forced takeovers of critical media outlets and holdings, <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/weapons-syria-journalists-prison-story-behind-turkey-s-great-espionage-trial-205370695">jailing of journalists</a>, violent police crackdowns on anti-government protests, whitewashing of <a href="http://www.diplomaticourier.com/turkeys-foray-into-financial-corruption/">serious corruption allegations</a> against party officials, and the general <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gezi_Park_protests">deterioration of the rule of law</a>. </p>
<p>An increasingly authoritarian government has, over its 13 years of single-party reign, gradually insulated itself from legal and societal challenges.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/104236/original/image-20151203-22452-1fe3ya9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/104236/original/image-20151203-22452-1fe3ya9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/104236/original/image-20151203-22452-1fe3ya9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/104236/original/image-20151203-22452-1fe3ya9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/104236/original/image-20151203-22452-1fe3ya9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/104236/original/image-20151203-22452-1fe3ya9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/104236/original/image-20151203-22452-1fe3ya9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2013, Turkish police attacked peaceful protesters with tear gas in Gezi Park, next to Taksim Square.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zsombor Lacza/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The AKP has made no secret of its plans for a constitutional overhaul. Unlike much-sought-after liberalising changes, the AKP’s model will deliver the opposite. </p>
<p>The planned shift from a parliamentary to a presidential system amounts to “super-presidentialism”. Authority will be concentrated in the hands of the president without the checks and balances of the US system. Ultimately, this ensures Erdoğan will attain <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/akps-presidential-system-will-lead-to-one-man-rule.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79041&NewsCatID=341">“one-man rule”</a> and potentially end democracy in Turkey.</p>
<h2>Ballot box treated as a blank cheque</h2>
<p>Erdoğan and his AKP view the ballot box as the only form of accountability and legitimacy they need. In Turkey, democracy has traditionally lacked institutionally robust mechanisms of vertical and horizontal accountability. Elections have become a winner-takes-all <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majoritarianism">majoritarian</a> system. </p>
<p>The thinking is that electoral victory legitimates all government policies and actions. In other words, beyond the ballot box, there should be no moral or legal constraint on its rule.</p>
<p>Predictably, the AKP’s electoral victories since 2002, coupled with Erdoğan’s strong sense of mission, have increased their distaste for criticism and opposition. An overwhelming majority throughout its rule has enabled the AKP government to be largely unhindered and unaccountable to political and judicial scrutiny.</p>
<p>Firmly back in control, the AKP has promised to follow through with its constitutional project. Transparency is ever decreasing. The clampdown on personal and political freedoms continues.</p>
<p>In this environment, critics of the government are lambasted as resisting or acting against the “national will”. The angry, condescending and authoritarian tone in response to any criticism, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/02/turkish-court-asks-gollum-experts-if-erdogan-comparison-insult">especially of Erdoğan</a>, illustrates the party’s majoritarian or even <a href="http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/42/2/1.abstract">plebiscitarian interpretation</a> of democracy.</p>
<p>Herein lies the fundamental challenge for democracy: there is nothing that cannot be questioned and revised when supported by enough numbers. At its most extreme, this applies to the institution of democracy itself. Since democratic principles and processes open politics to all perspectives for debate, there is no safeguard against actors who peddle anti-democratic values from attaining power via the democratic process.</p>
<p>Erdoğan and the AKP know this. Aware that they are unable to shake the normative draw of democracy, they operate under its guise. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/104235/original/image-20151203-22480-10tuzu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/104235/original/image-20151203-22480-10tuzu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=634&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/104235/original/image-20151203-22480-10tuzu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=634&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/104235/original/image-20151203-22480-10tuzu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=634&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/104235/original/image-20151203-22480-10tuzu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/104235/original/image-20151203-22480-10tuzu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/104235/original/image-20151203-22480-10tuzu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Turkish journalist Hasan Cemal resigned from the newspaper Milliyet in 2013 after criticism from Erdoğan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Armineaghayan/Wikipedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They are unwilling to strengthen democratic institutions, while manipulating its processes. Instead of openly violating democratic rules, the incumbents routinely abuse the resources of the state by denying the opposition media exposure, <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/erdogan-gags-turkey-weapons-nationalist/">harassing critical media</a> and using their majority to pass legislation unilaterally for self-seeking agendas. </p>
<p>Journalists, opposition politicians and other government critics may be spied on, harassed or arrested. None of this is alien to the Turkish experience.</p>
<p>For the AKP, democracy involves nothing more than victory at the ballot box. This “proves” the nation’s leaders have legitimacy in the eyes of the people whom they dominate from the saddles of high power. Though their words are coloured by the language of democracy, their track records are anything but democratic. </p>
<p>The AKP-Erdoğan situation is not unique to Turkey. They belong to a global breed of undemocratic actors who are paradoxically sustained within the democratic framework. The days when the game of democracy was for democrats only are long gone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51746/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tezcan Gumus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Firmly back in control after winning snap elections, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his AKP government are reducing democratic process to a rubber stamp for their undemocratic project.Tezcan Gumus, PhD Candidate, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/499632015-11-01T22:03:43Z2015-11-01T22:03:43ZTurkey election: Erdoğan and the AKP get majority back amid climate of violence and fear<p>Turkey’s president, Recep Tayip Erdoğan, appears to have strengthened his grip on the country after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won an outright majority in a snap election just five months after an inconclusive poll. It is a result that will shock and frighten many in the country.</p>
<p>Unofficial preliminary <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/reelection/results">results</a>, appeared to give the AKP 49.3%, followed by the centre-left Republican People’s Party (CHP) on 25.7%, the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) on 12.1% and the pro-Kurdish left-wing Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) on 10.5%. The AKP is predicted to take 312 seats in the 550-seat parliament, the CHP 135 seats, the HDP 60 and the MHP 43.</p>
<p>This result is a big surprise, since pre-election polls forecast a result <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/11/01/uk-turkey-election-idUKKCN0SP17S20151101">not much different from that of the June election</a> – and it undoubtedly owes a lot to the toxic atmosphere in which the election was held. </p>
<p>As reported widely <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-election-could-bitterly-divided-nation-be-only-a-few-steps-away-from-a-dictatorship-a6711106.html">around the world</a>, the campaign was anything but fair. The AKP not only controls the army, but also holds sway over the judiciary and much of the media. The party and President Erdoğan effectively dominated pre-election airtime on the country’s public broadcaster, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), which once again displayed <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_erdogan-ak-party-dominate-pre-election-airtime-on-public-broadcaster_402618.html">blatant favouritism</a> toward the government and Erdoğan. </p>
<p>More worryingly still, <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_abundant-claims-of-vote-rigging-on-election-day_403100.html">reports are circulating</a> of vote-rigging. The news agencies announced the results very rapidly. The election was called for the AKP within only a few hours, despite the fact that many votes were not even delivered to the <a href="http://anfenglish.com/news/45-votes-come-out-of-a-ballot-box-for-29-voters-in-mutki">counting boots</a>. Social media was abuzz with allegations of election fraud, as angry Turks documented their claims with <a href="http://umutgazetesi.org/antepte-kameralara-yansiyan-oy-hirsizligi/">photographs</a> and <a href="http://hayattv.net/secim-ihlalleri-01-kasim-2015-secimleri/">videos</a>. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://anfenglish.com/news/international-observers-detained-in-istanbul">delegation</a> from Greece that was watching the elections was detained in Istanbul on the day of the vote, heightening the general atmosphere of tension. And people who live in Kurdish majority areas had to vote amid a heavy police presence. </p>
<h2>Presidential system</h2>
<p>Many observers are convinced that one of the fundamental reasons Erdoğan <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkeys-president-calls-snap-election-1440445939.">called this snap election</a> in the first place was to restore the AKP as the single ruling party, which will enable him to change the regime to a presidential system and strengthen his position. </p>
<p>Turkey has been through turbulent times in between the two elections. According to official records, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/why-the-surge-in-terrorism.aspx?PageID=238&NID=88524&NewsCatID=425">more than 700 people have lost their lives</a> in political violence since June. The Kurdish peace process has collapsed, and the clashes between the PKK and the Turkish Army have restarted. </p>
<p>There have also been two suicide attacks. The first, in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33619043">Suruç</a>, near the Syrian border, killed at least 24 people and wounded nearly 100 more. Then there was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ankara-bombing-kills-dozens-calling-for-peace-in-turkey-48942">bombing of Ankara’s central railway station</a> on October 10, which killed 102 people and injured more than 400 – the deadliest terrorist attack in <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/11/turkey-bomb-blasts-ankara-mourning-scores-killed">Turkey’s history</a>. The bombs appeared to have targeted a “Labour, Peace and Democracy” rally organised by opposition parties and leftist groups. </p>
<p>No organisation has yet claimed responsibility for either attack, but the AKP government has tried to associate both with the PKK and other anti-government organisations, albeit with no evidence or proof. </p>
<p>Besides the Kurds and the leftists, the AKP has targeted other groups. Its relationship with the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13503361">Hizmet Movement</a>, a global faith-based civic network, fell apart in late 2013 after the Erdoğan government began raising disturbing concerns about its involvement in a “<a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_conceptual-contradictions-when-it-comes-to-rhetoric-about-parallel-state-by-ahmet-erdi-ozturk-_337284.html">parallel state</a>”, a supposed shadow “<a href="http://hizmetnews.com/16145/turkeys-akp-planning-to-blame-hizmet-movement-for-deep-states-crimes/#.VjaAkq7hBhA">fifth column</a>” controlled by the movement. Since then, the AKP government has been clamping down on Hizmet-connected media groups and businesses.</p>
<p>Ominously, that crackdown has begun to extend to the wider media. After the June elections, several newspapers were taken over by government-appointed trustee boards. These events have drastically eroded Erdoğan’s international support – the Economist went so far as to publish an article explaining why Erdoğan should leave, calling him “<a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21677201-turks-should-vote-against-ruling-justice-and-development-party-november-1st-sultan-bay">the sultan at bay</a>”.</p>
<h2>The devil they know</h2>
<p>Turkey may no longer be saddled with an uneasy coalition government, but the intense polarisation the AKP has caused will not be resolved any time soon. During the last few months, the AKP was skating on thin ice, working hard to poach votes from the MHP by creating a paranoid atmosphere of violence and authoritarian crackdowns. It has been brazenly trying to turn Turkey into a police state, one where the opposition has no room to breathe and where religious and ethnic tensions deepen every day. </p>
<p>It seems this strategy has worked. People turned to the devil they know; even with an ever-quickening slide towards dictatorship underway, most voters probably just wanted to end the uncertainty that’s gripped the country for so long.</p>
<p>Now there are big questions to answer. It remains to be seen how well the AKP and Erdoğan can actually govern a society as deeply divided as Turkey is now, and just how harshly they are prepared to treat opposition in the name of stability.</p>
<p>On the other hand, now Erdoğan and the AKP have what they wanted, perhaps they’ll finally see sense, tone down their rhetoric and pick up the Kurdish peace process once again. </p>
<p>That may be a futile hope – but at least Kurdish voices have not been completely shut out of politics. Even with the AKP riding high, the relatively young HDP is still going to have an opposition presence in parliament, and it’s now the third-largest party in terms of MPs. That gives it a great chance to and grow its voter base to gradually become the strongest opposition party by the next elections. </p>
<p>As things stand, the HDP is now the biggest challenge to Erdoğan’s authoritarianism – a crucial role. Selahattin Demirtaş, the party’s co-leader, sent a strong message to the country during his <a href="http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/hdp-den-secim-sonrasi-ilk-aciklama-94008.html">election night speech</a>: “No need to be afraid. We are here and we will keep resisting together.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49963/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After being humiliated at a summer election, Turkey’s ruling party set about winning over the population with fear. It seems to have worked.Bahar Baser, Research Fellow, Coventry UniversityAhmet Erdi Öztürk, PhD Candidate/Research Asistant, University of LjubljanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/496192015-10-30T05:30:26Z2015-10-30T05:30:26ZAs another election looms, can Turkey be saved from itself?<p>Turkey is about to hold its second general election in a year, after the first failed to produce a government. Since the vote in June, the country has been hit by violent unrest. </p>
<p>Whatever the outcome of the impending vote, urgent reform is needed to reinvigorate the progress towards democracy that appeared to have been made with the EU accession process of the early 2000s and the Peace Process (2009-2011; 2013-June 2015) with the Kurdish political movement.</p>
<p>The level of ideological polarisation on display in Turkey in the past few years has been deeply worrying. It has even been <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/umut-ozkirimli/ankara-bombing-and-end-of-turkish-republic">argued</a> that Turkey no longer constitutes a sustainable nation state. It has become a state of several nations, divided into vengeful communities who no longer have the will to live side-by-side in peace. </p>
<p>This troublesome political climate is largely the result of the demise of the peaceful negotiations between the incumbent AKP (Justice and Development Party) administration and the two major representatives of the Kurdish political movement – the HDP (Peoples’ Democracy Party) and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). </p>
<p>As the Peace Process failed, the armed struggle between the PKK and the Turkish security forces resumed, with tragic consequences for the social fabric of the country. The ensuing violence has robbed Turkey of a historic opportunity to resolve the decades-long dispute between the Turkish state and Kurdish citizens. </p>
<p>During the now collapsed negotiations, the HDP consistently argued that peace in Turkey is only possible if everyone has equal legal status and that the rights of all communities are recognised in the constitution.</p>
<p>This vision does not appear to be shared by the AKP or the mainstream media though. Both <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/09/erdogan-turkey-hdp-akp-pkk-kurdistan-statement/">continue to argue</a> that the Kurdish rights issue can be resolved through military action against the PKK.</p>
<h2>Peace interrupted</h2>
<p>Despite having taken a liberal, reformist attitude in the 2000s, the AKP has become increasingly nationalist, conservative/Islamist and uncompromising in its stance on the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/ruwayda-mustafah-rabar/what-is-kurdish-question">Kurdish question</a>. Where the party once pioneered attempts to integrate Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslims in Turkey and contributed to a democratic model that included these marginalised groups, it now seems to prioritise the rights of the Sunni majority. It is seen as promoting a conservative Turkish identity and letting national security define its approach to government. </p>
<p>Today, the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683849.2014.954747">Turkish democratic model</a> appears to have completely lost its validity. NATO, the US and the EU have <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30484729">raised concerns</a> about press freedom and the way <a href="https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/eur440222013en.pdf">protesters</a> have been treated by the government.</p>
<p>Then there is the government’s apparent desire to reignite its war with the PKK and its reluctance to take action against Islamic State. Turkey’s international image has certainly been severely tarnished in the last few years. </p>
<p>The archaic political order, based on one nation, one language and a narrow vision of society, is based on the link between Turkey and its conservative interpretation of Islamic principles. It cannot therefore accommodate the democratic demands of those who reject top-down social engineering such as Kurds, Alevis, seculars, liberals, LGBT people and various strands of the socialist left. </p>
<p>This fundamental question has not been addressed in the pompous speeches made by government spokespeople in the run up to this election. </p>
<p>Turkey desperately needs to establish a democratic consensus to mend the wounds in the psyches of its increasingly divergent populations. A new political order is needed to prevent these groups from splintering into separate nations. This must be based on multiculturalism and human security. Only through a broad coalition of social forces can the country end the intense polarisation that plagues it and progress towards conflict resolution and peace building.</p>
<h2>Beyond election politics</h2>
<p>Most <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/turkey-kurds-pkk-elections-erdogan-war-backfiring.html">independent surveys</a> indicate that the November 1 election will produce a result similar to those seen in June. Back then, the AKP took the most votes but not enough to form a government alone.</p>
<p>This time, there are two possibilities: either the AKP will form a coalition government with one of its opponents and get used to political compromise after almost 13 years of uninterrupted one-party rule, or president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will call for another election within a few months. That would further deepen the current crisis. </p>
<p>All scenarios for Turkey’s future, including the possibility of the AKP winning a parliamentary majority, demand that a plural and democratic centre ground be found. People need to be able to find peaceful solutions to their problems via the parliament rather than seeking potentially violent outlets for their frustrations. Otherwise, can Turkey even call itself a democracy at all?</p>
<p>Even an AKP administration can no longer afford to unilaterally impose its will on matters such as the Kurdish rights issue – at least not if it wants to keep Turkey from falling apart.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49619/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Only radical change can prevent civil war in a country fractured by the actions of its own government.Omer Tekdemir, Visiting Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of WestminsterOğuzhan Göksel, Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations, İstanbul 29 Mayıs UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/489442015-10-10T20:45:28Z2015-10-10T20:45:28ZAnkara bombs: Turkey is being torn apart by bad leaders and bad neighbours<p>It had already been a <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-bombing-risks-further-unrest-in-a-country-already-living-on-the-edge-45020">deadly summer</a> of political instability in Turkey. And now this. Another bloody massacre – this time at the hand of <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/10/middleeast/turkey-ankara-bomb-blast/">twin bomb attacks on a peace rally in Ankara</a>, which have killed at least 97 people.</p>
<p>It is the worst terror attack in Turkey’s history, and the culmination of a dreadful wave of violence. In just a few months, hundreds of civilians, Turkish security personnel and PKK members have been killed. Barely a single day passes in Turkey nowadays without some incident of lethal political violence. </p>
<p>Freedom from fear is the very basic principle of human security, which should be protected by any state that wants a true sense of legitimacy over its population and territory. In Turkey, that freedom is under enormous pressure from all sorts of internal and external forces.</p>
<h2>Stirred up</h2>
<p>There are plenty of competing explanations for the political violence engulfing the country, but none can seriously overlook the impact of Turkey’s dreadfully bad political leadership.</p>
<p>The terrible, violent summer reflects nothing so much as an elite’s greed for power and willingness to treat civilians as dispensable. This has become particularly apparent since Turkey’s inconclusive <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-general-election-upset-the-rise-of-the-akp-interrupted-42942">June 7 election</a>, and the way that <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/18/turkish-pm-ahmet-davutoglu-coalition-talks-collapse">various political parties and leaders</a> did all they could to prevent the formation of a viable coalition government.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the power game is simple enough. At the elections <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-erdogan-is-forcing-his-people-to-take-sides-46567">hastily called for November</a>, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP needs to garner only a few per cent more than it did in June to win the majority it needs for Erdogan to bolster his powers and make himself the country’s executive president.</p>
<p>To that end, pro-government media has been in overdrive throughout the summer, deliberately fuelling an environment of division, paranoia and mistrust in hopes of winning votes out of pure fear. </p>
<p>All the while, south east Turkey has endured dreadful vioence. Some towns – <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34227067">Cizre</a>, for instance, which was under seige for days – have suddenly found themselves on the front line of renewed fighting between the security forces and the PKK.</p>
<p>The demise of the peace process is not just a failure of diplomacy – it signals that the armed conflict is still hugely <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-turkeys-president-profiting-from-escalating-violence-45921">politically and financially lucrative</a> to Turkey’s political and military leaders. And the violence they’re profiting from is rapidly corroding social life and human security across the country.</p>
<h2>The war next door</h2>
<p>But the political instability caused by Turkey’s bad leaders has been greatly exacerbated by its bad neighbours, especially the continuing civil war in Syria and its deadly ramifications – an influx of jihadist fighters, a massive refugee crisis, and spiralling military interventions. </p>
<p>Since the end of the Cold War, global security has never been so seriously threatened as it is by today’s situation in Syria, which is now host to a head-to-head clash between the interests of Russia, the Assad regime and Iran on the one hand and the US, the EU, their Arab allies, and NATO on the other. </p>
<p>All sides claim to be fighting against the Islamic State and other Islamist extremists, but it’s clear that what’s really at stake is a lot more than just the fate of the jihadists or the political future of Syria. Already there’s an ominous spat underway over Russian planes’ <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-airstrikes-expose-the-faultlines-in-turkeys-relationship-with-russia-48770">incursion into Turkish airspace</a>; NATO has already raised the prospect of <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/8/nato-prepared-troops-turkey-russia-jets1.html">sending troops to Turkey</a> as a defensive gesture.</p>
<p>And while it was always inevitable that the Syrian disaster would affect its northern neighbour to some degree, Turkey’s continuing internal political instability is proving something of an Achilles heel. By deliberately forcing their country into a period of chaotic and violent turmoil, Turkey’s leaders have made it more susceptible than ever to the Syrian conflict and the mighty geopolitical currents swirling around it.</p>
<p>And yet they press on with their cynical political ploys – seemingly unmoved by the cost to their people, and unaware that they could just be becoming pawns in a much bigger game.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48944/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpaslan Ozerdem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After a terrible summer of violence and political deadlock, things only seem to be getting worse for Turkey. Why?Alpaslan Ozerdem, Chair in Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/429792015-06-10T05:19:19Z2015-06-10T05:19:19ZWhere next for the Kurds after Turkish election success of HDP?<p>The resounding success of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-votes-for-change-but-dont-expect-the-erdogan-power-drive-to-end-42950">People’s Democratic Party</a> (HDP) in Turkey’s recent election has raised hope for the pro-Kurdish movement in the country.</p>
<p>While the HDP took 13% of the vote, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its majority, holding onto just 258 of the 276 seats it needed to secure another term of one-party governance. It has been suggested that the reversed fortunes of the AKP are largely a result of Erdoğan’s <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkeys-erdoan-calls-on-other-parties-to-be-realistic-after-his-party-loses-its-majority-10304127.html">plan</a> to take power further away from the parliament and bolster his own position if his party won.</p>
<p>The HDP is the result of an alliance between the Democratic Regions Party (BDP) and other smaller pro-Kurdish groups on the left of the political spectrum. Its charismatic cleader, human rights lawyer <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/08/turkey-election-2015-kurdish-obama-is-the-countrys-bright-new-star">Selahattin Demirtas</a>, promotes a broad, pro-European and <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/how-selahattin-demirtas-became-a-rival-to-erdogan-in-turkey-a-1036595.html">social justice agenda</a>. But the party is also particularly committed to achieving reconciliation between the Kurds and the wider population in Turkey. </p>
<p>By reducing support for the AKP, Turkish voters have clearly rejected Erdoğan’s presidentialist, neo-Ottoman project, but will Demirtas succeed in advancing matters on the Kurdish front?</p>
<h2>Historic problem</h2>
<p>The Kurdish question has been on the political agenda since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I. The 1920 <a href="http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/history/sevres-treaty-of.html">Treaty of Sèvres</a> offered the Kurds the possibility of independence from Turkey under the auspices of the League of Nations. But that never materialised.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.historyofturkey.com/independence/">Turkish War of Independence</a> unfolded between 1919 and 1923 and a new, secular Turkey emerged. Having fought the allies and rejected the Sèvres settlement, Turkey became intent on suppressing any form of ethno-cultural diversity in the name of an ideologically rigid nationalism that admitted no minorities in the country other than a handful of religious groups of non-Islamic faith. And even these groups were less than fully protected.</p>
<p>The rise of the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20971100">Kurdistan Workers Party</a> (PKK) in the 1970s led to a violent conflict with the military in the south-east of the country, and an additional wave of repression for the Kurds more generally. Several pro-Kurdish organisations have been banned ever since, resulting in a string of decisions against Turkey by the <a href="http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Political_parties_ENG.pdf">European Court of Human Rights</a>.</p>
<p>The violence declined with the capture and imprisonment of PKK’s leader <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/280453.stm">Abdullah Öcalan</a> in 1999. But it was not until recently that the government officially began talks (initially mediated by Norway) with the PKK and other pro-Kurdish representatives – and a ceasefire was announced.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>Since 2002, the prospect of Turkey’s <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/turkey-eu-perspective-remains-doldrums.html">accession to the European Union</a> has led the Erdoğan government to give ground to the Kurdish minority. Kurdish culture and identity was allowed to be acknowledged in TV broadcasting and even to be taught in schools.</p>
<p>Despite this progress, the prospect of a permanent political settlement has remained elusive. But, now that the HDP has secured a place in parliament, a new constructive phase in the peace process could be on the horizon.</p>
<p>The HDP has moved away from the separatist ambitions formerly associated with the Kurdish movement. It is now firmly and openly embracing the language of democracy and human rights as a basis for reconciliation within Turkish society.</p>
<p>Several pro-Kurdish organisations have come to support democratic regional autonomy for Kurdish provinces. Other forms of cultural autonomy have also been suggested for more dispersed Kurds living in western Turkey or adjacent areas. This could include national councils to represent their interests or cross-regional advisory bodies.</p>
<p>The HDP is expected to back some of these aims. <a href="http://www.diclehaber.com/en/news/content/view/453676?from=3534286294">In its election manifesto</a> it pledged to support self-rule through regional assemblies, as part of its plans to resolve the Kurdish question. </p>
<p>The stakes are high and at the heart of this political debate will be the chances of fostering a pluralist and inclusive notion of Turkish identity that is capable of accommodating pro-Kurdish, non-separatist visions for the future of the country.</p>
<p>Many hope that international human rights standards and time-honoured constitutional models in Europe and beyond will provide a context for supporting such a transformative process. </p>
<p>Neither exclusionary nationalism nor separatism have proved workable but this vision of the future could offer a viable alternative.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gaetano Pentassuglia is part of a pool of international independent experts and Turkish academics that support the scholarly work of the Human Rights Research Network in Turkey in partnership with the Turkey Program at the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights, Lund, Sweden. The views expressed in this article are the responsibility of the author and do not represent the opinions or policies of any academic group or institution.</span></em></p>The rise of the pro-Kurdish HDP has brought fresh hope to those seeking a peaceful resolution to a decades-long dispute.Gaetano Pentassuglia, Reader in International Law and Human Rights, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/429422015-06-08T20:46:29Z2015-06-08T20:46:29ZTurkey’s general election upset: the rise of the AKP interrupted<p>The general election that took place on June 7 was no doubt one of the most critical in modern Turkish history. </p>
<p>For a significant part of the electorate, the election represented a chance to put a stop to the increasingly authoritarian, religiously conservative, and unabashedly <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Hi8tBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135&lpg=PA135&dq=neo+liberal+policies+AKP&source=bl&ots=P3tIQxn8Og&sig=8G-FTsfOhKPuzEhlj4Ps8KZtb7A&hl=en&sa=X&ei=9L11VaiPNs3YggT2yILQCw&ved=0CF0Q6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=neo%20liberal%20policies%20AKP&f=false">neo-liberal grip</a> of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) over the country. </p>
<p>At stake was the future of Turkey as a liberal democracy.</p>
<p>Of particular concern was the prospect of the AKP securing enough seats in the parliament to be able to push for a constitutional change that would bestow President Tayyip Erdoğan with a more powerful executive presidency.</p>
<p>The results are not good news for the AKP. They may have received the largest share of the votes — <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33047047">40.85%</a> — but they failed to secure enough seats to have a majority and to make the constitutional amendment for a more powerful presidency.</p>
<p>So how can the results be explained and why do they matter? What do they mean for the future of AKP in Turkish politics and, more generally, what do they say about the future of democracy in Turkey?</p>
<h2>A winning streak between 2002 and 2014</h2>
<p>In 2002, in the first-ever general election it participated in, the AKP got 34% of the popular vote and became the first party to govern Turkey without a coalition since 1991. </p>
<p>This was a huge success for a party that had been <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1018363/Justice-and-Development-Party">founded</a> just over a year before as a democratic, conservative but non-confessional challenge to establishment Turkish politics. </p>
<p>The party’s electoral success <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608746.2014.920571">continued</a> in the 2007 general election (46.6% of the popular vote) and in 2011 (almost 50%). In August 2014, in the first-ever direct election of the Turkish president, Erdogan, the leader of the AKP, won with almost 52%.</p>
<p>The electoral popularity of the AKP was unprecedented but not all that surprising to those who follow Turkish politics closely. </p>
<p>The 1990s in Turkey — often referred to as the “lost decade” — were defined by poor economic performance and unstable coalition governments.</p>
<p>Into this dispiriting situation, the AKP emerged not as an Islamist but a center-right party eager to carry on a reformist, democratic, pro-growth policy agenda. </p>
<p>In a relatively short amount of time, the party managed to build a wide<a href="http://turkishstudies.org/documents/pdf/publications/RepublicanPeoplesPartyAndThe2007GeneralElections.pdf"> coalition of supporters</a> from citizens who had grown estranged from the inward-looking, pro-military and nationalist policies that had dominated Turkish politics for so long. </p>
<p>Political and economic developments of the years following the AKP’s coming to power only enhanced their popularity.</p>
<p>The real gross domestic product (GDP) of Turkey (or GDP at constant prices) <a href="http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2013/06/how-well-did-the-turkish-economy-do-over-the-last-decade.html">rose</a> by 64% between 2002 and 2012, and real GDP per capita by 43%. </p>
<p>During the first few years of its government, the party seemed to be enthusiastically promoting Turkey’s bid for EU accession. Turkey had applied for a membership in the European Community back in 1987 and – after many years of lobbying – was finally granted candidacy in 1999. Ever since its foundation, Turkish political elites had wanted to position <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.464.9517&rep=rep1&type=pdf">Turkey as a part of Europe</a>: the AKP’s dynamic involvement in this process was widely welcome. </p>
<p>The political power of the military, whose intervention in parliamentary and executive affairs had been a mainstay of Turkish politics (there were three <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/04/20124472814687973.html">military coups</a> between 1960 and 1980), was being curtailed. </p>
<p>And although it later proved to be a rather inept plan lacking specificity and real effort, talks of a <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/12/01/kurdish-opening-in-turkey-origins-and-future/2ndb">“Kurdish opening” </a>gave hope to Kurdish citizens and liberal segments of the electorate that the long-festering sore of Kurdish insurgency in the east of the country would finally be addressed. </p>
<p>The AKP also rolled out a set of popular <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608746.2014.979031">social policies</a>. It extended the level of <a href="http://turkey.angloinfo.com/healthcare/health-system/health-insurance/">free medical services</a> for the poor. It also provided <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2597/476030PUB0Cond101Official0Use0Only1.pdf?sequence=1">cash transfers</a> for the poor, single women, and the disabled.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Happier days for Tayyip Erdogan in Davos.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8a/Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan-WEF_Davos_2009.jpg/1024px-Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan-WEF_Davos_2009.jpg">World Economic Forum, swiss-image.ch/Photo by Andy Mettler</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Abroad, Prime Minister and then President Tayyip Erdogan was <a href="http://www.worldleaders.columbia.edu/participants/recep-tayyip-erdo%C4%9F">embraced</a> as the architect of a new Turkey that set an example for the larger Middle East with its success in combining Islam, democracy and a thriving free-market economy.</p>
<h2>The authoritarian turn</h2>
<p>In the past few years especially, however, the AKP and its captain Erdogan – now the president of Turkey, residing in a 1,100-room <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29912398">presidential palace</a> which cost over US$600 million to build – openly embraced a more narrow view of democracy. </p>
<p>Erdogan appeared to think that having the support of 50% of the electorate gave him and his party the mandate to push ahead with an increasingly conservative agenda. </p>
<p>Moreover, this electoral authoritarianism has taken on a noticeably Islamic character. </p>
<p>From launching education reforms meant to raise “pious generations” to the active promotion of traditional family-based lifestyles, from placing restrictions on alcohol consumption to advocating for a ban on abortions, AKP and Erdogan made it clear that they meant business when it came to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13608746.2014.920571">legislating their religious values</a>.</p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20in%20the%20World%202014%20Booklet.pdf">Freedom House report</a>, as of 2014 Turkey had already become a case of “modern authoritarianism.” </p>
<p>If the rulers in a traditional authoritarian system openly and violently suppress freedoms, the rulers of the modern authoritarianism, the report notes, use more subtle, but ultimately more effective techniques: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Central to modern authoritarian strategy is the capture of institutions that undergird political pluralism. The goal is to dominate not only the executive and legislative branches, but also the media, the judiciary, civil society, the economy, and the security force.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indeed, as the report notes, under the AKP government, the past few years saw a notable intensification of these techniques, including:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“jailing reporters (Turkey leads the world in the number of imprisoned journalists), pressuring independent publishers to sell their holdings to government cronies, and threatening media owners with reprisals if critical journalists are not silenced.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The city park that proved a lightening rod</h2>
<p>In June 2013, the government cracked down on what started as a peaceful protest by mostly well-educated, non-political, middle-class youth against plans to erect yet another shopping mall in one of the few remaining green areas in Istanbul. </p>
<p>The attempt to protect Gezi Park was initially a popular reaction to the juggernaut of a construction boom that rarely consulted local residents. </p>
<p>Once the police used disproportionate force to clear out the protestors, opposition spread. If people had initially gone to Taksim Square to protect the people’s park against privatization, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22753752">they stayed</a> to show the government what a people’s democracy looks like. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">And this wasn’t the only protest in June 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a1/2013_Taksim_Gezi_Park_protests_%2815th_June%29.jpg/640px-2013_Taksim_Gezi_Park_protests_%2815th_June%29.jpg">Fleshstorm</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The government <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/erdogan-gezi-conspiracy-taksim-governance-authoritarian-akp.html">dismissed the protests</a> as the work of an international and national conspiracy backed by the financial lobby, the US and Israel. An <a href="http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/gezi_eylemlerinin_bilancosu_aciklandi-1138770">estimated 2.5 million citizens</a> participated in the protests. </p>
<p>The Gezi protests tarnished the legitimacy of Erdogan’s government, and things were only made worse for the AKP by the corruption scandal involving <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/turkish-ministers-sons-arrested-corruption-investigation">the sons of three cabinet ministers</a> and several businessmen, as well as Erdogan himself and his son. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, the results of the recent election should not come as a big surprise. But the vote was not just a negative verdict on the AKP; it was also a positive boost for the opposition parties.</p>
<h2>The success of the opposition parties</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Not as much orange as the AKP would have liked.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Basak Kus</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The 2015 general election has ended the single party rule of the AKP and put the opposition parties at the center of the Turkish politics.</p>
<p>Most significantly, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP - founded in 2012), representing a coalition of Kurdish voters and left-wing liberals, entered parliament for the first time with 13% of the votes and 80 seats. Their campaign emphasized pluralism and the rights of minorities and oppressed groups. Erdogan’s <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-03/atheists-gays-and-boozers-erdogan-tars-rivals-as-polls-narrow">attempts</a> to denigrate the HDP by calling it a party of gays and atheists failed. </p>
<p>The country’s oldest party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), won 25% and 132 seats. More importantly, perhaps, the CHP played a skillful role in the campaign by respectfully engaging with the HDP during the campaign and signaled its support for HDP’s passing the electoral threshold. </p>
<p>By all signs, the CHP is undergoing a significant transformation. The battle between the more pro-military, exclusively secular, and nationalistic wing of the party and the more liberal and pluralist side seems to have tilted in favor of the latter. During its campaign, the party highlighted social justice issues such as poverty and debt and quit its dogmatic stance on a variety of religious and ethnic issues. It also began to show interest in <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2011/08/03/10178/meet-the-new-republican-party-in-turkey/">engaging Washington</a> in policy conversations. </p>
<h2>What lies ahead?</h2>
<p>Turkey may still be AKP land, with the party having won the largest share of votes in 59 Turkish cities, but if one looks at the parliament, it is a different, much more variegated picture.</p>
<p>There are many challenges ahead. What would a coalition government look like? Opposition leaders have not shown a willingness to enter a coalition with the AKP. Indeed, the leader of the MHP has already called for holding early elections.</p>
<p>Yet, there is so much to be hopeful about. The election results ended one-party rule and put an end to Erdogan’s bid for absolute power. The HDP’s entering parliament is particularly meaningful. During the campaign, the HDP gave voice not only to Kurds, but also to gays and women:<a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/more-turkish-female-mps-enter-parliament-ever-1030929946"> 40%</a> of the new HDP members of parliament are women. </p>
<p>The results are also important for the future of Turkey’s foreign relations. </p>
<p>A politically stable Turkey is critical to regional stability. </p>
<p>Over the past few years, observers from the US and EU have raised concerns regarding the increasing tide of authoritarianism and threat to civil liberties. The actions of the Turkish government at home undermined its democratic credentials abroad. </p>
<p>Indeed, the Turkish government’s religious agenda was believed to have spilled over to its foreign policy. This view solidified particularly after the Syrian crisis, leading to questions about the “Sunnification” of Turkish foreign policy. </p>
<p>A more democratic rule, and a political leader who is open to dialogue and committed to a secular foreign policy, will benefit not only the citizens of Turkey, but also allies of the country in building coalitions to tackle the ever more challenging situation in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basak Kus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The June 7 elections were no doubt one of the most critical in modern Turkish history.Basak Kus, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/429502015-06-08T09:33:40Z2015-06-08T09:33:40ZTurkey votes for change – but don’t expect the Erdoğan power drive to end<p>There was never any real doubt that the ruling Islamist AK Party would get the most votes in the Turkish parliamentary election of June 7, and so it has. But the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33042284">shocking result</a> is nevertheless a body blow to the ambitions of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party.</p>
<p>The AKP won around 41% of the vote to take 258 seats in the 550-seat parliament. This is a substantial drop in support since the last parliamentary election in 2011, and a dramatic change in fortunes since Erdoğan was <a href="https://theconversation.com/erdogan-wins-presidential-vote-after-dominating-turkish-media-30376">elected president</a> in August 2014 with more than half the electorate behind him.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, new party the HDP has ended up with more than 13% of the vote and 80 seats in parliament, which will play no small part in ending Erdoğan’s presidential ambitions.</p>
<p>The stark fact is that Erdoğan himself has become a liability. This general election was not really about parliament at all; the real issue was Erdoğan’s attempts to use the vote to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-rise-and-rise-of-recep-tayyip-erdogan-and-a-slide-towards-autocracy-in-turkey-39456">secure more power</a> for himself. </p>
<p>Erdoğan’s transparent aim – even while he was supposed to take a neutral position on the parliamentary election – was for the his party to win a two-thirds majority. That majority would then rubber stamp his plans to transfer power from parliament to the presidency, no questions asked. His plan B was to win 330 seats, which would have enabled the AKP to take its plans for constitutional change to a public referendum.</p>
<p>But both plans are now in tatters. Erdoğan now has no prospect of a smooth transition to presidential rule, and his party is facing the destabilising prospect of minority rule or governing in a coalition. He might well face a backlash from within his own party, both from his former allies in the Gülen movement and from party political rivals.</p>
<h2>How the mighty fall</h2>
<p>It seems clear that Erdoğan’s political style has lost its shine. Many secular liberal Turks are worried by his increasingly erratic and authoritarian behaviour – as witnessed by the protesters at <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-urban-uprising-has-smashed-national-wall-of-fear-14916">Gezi Park</a> in 2013.</p>
<p>Meanwhile Kurds have lost patience with the AKP over its <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-ruling-akp-rejects-parliamentary-motion-to-probe-isil.aspx?pageID=517&nID=78650&NewsCatID=338">questionable policies</a> on Islamic State and apparent indifference to the plight of Syrian Kurds in <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/islamic-state-attack-kurdish-syrian-town-threatens-derail-akp-pkk-relations-417634929">Kobanê</a>.</p>
<p>Erdoğan and the AKP are now reliant on their core support in socially conservative central Anatolia. They may have benefited from the economic growth of the past decade but could be vulnerable to any change in economic fortunes – which is made more likely by the political uncertainty now on the cards.</p>
<p>All this has created an opportunity for the brightest rising star in Turkey’s political firmament – Selahattin Demirtas of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-the-political-party-that-could-change-turkeys-future-42057">Halklarin Demokratik Partisi</a> (People’s Democracy Party, or HDP).</p>
<p>Until recently seen as a “Kurdish” party, the HDP has now broken through into the mainstream. Demirtas’ liberal rhetoric has taken votes across the board and acted as a lightning rod for voters determined to stop Erdoğan’s power grab.</p>
<p>And just as Erdoğan’s propensity for attracting corruption allegations, attacking media freedom and locking dissenters up on spurious “charges” is becoming tiresome for many Turkish people, his mercurial behaviour and wild accusations are also a cause for considerable concern for the EU and Turkey’s other allies.</p>
<p>Eyebrows were raised in Brussels in 2013 when Erdoğan blamed the Gezi Park unrest on an <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25497127">ill-defined foreign conspiracy</a>, his deputy going so far as to blame “<a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/turkey-s-deputy-pm-blames-jewish-diaspora-485530">the Jewish diaspora</a>”. More recently he has <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-accuses-nyt-bbc-and-cnn-of-trying-to-weaken-divide-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nID=83393&NewsCatID=338">castigated the BBC and the New York Times</a> for daring to question him, blamed criticism of the AKP on the “<a href="http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/27053787.html">Armenian lobby</a>” and decried the HDP as being <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/journalists-armenians-gays-are-representatives-of-sedition-erdogan-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=83447&NewsCatID=338">full of atheists and homosexuals</a>. The EU, its member states and the US have long since stopped expecting Erdoğan to say anything sensible.</p>
<h2>Now for plan C</h2>
<p>However, the uncomfortable truth for all Turkey’s allies is that Brussels and Washington require meaningful dialogue with Ankara in order to be able to deal with a whole checklist of geopolitical crises in the region. Terrorism, Islamic State, Syria and Ukraine are just the start. The <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/ap-interview-turkish-cypriot-leader-optimistic-talks-054029602.html">Cyprus issue</a>, <a href="http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa">energy security</a>, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-urgently-needs-to-integrate-its-syrian-refugees-35984">Syrian refugee crisis</a> and the <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2014/12/05/Turkey-sees-rise-in-human-trafficking-due-to-migration.html">people-trafficking</a> routes that pass through Turkish territory en route to the EU are all pressing matters too.</p>
<p>So two questions remain: what will Erdoğan do next and can Turkey form a functioning government without months of uncertainty and possible civil unrest?</p>
<p>It seems unlikely that a man such as Erdoğan, with such acute political instincts and an obvious desire for more power, will give up easily. It is widely presumed he has a plan C and D but his options are becoming more limited: whether other parties will be able to work with the AKP (or among themselves) in coalition is unclear. Turkey has 45 days in which to form some kind of government or another election will have to be called. The political argy-bargy is already underway but there is no obvious coalition forming – yet.</p>
<p>The international implications of this domestic uncertainty are more long term. Erdoğan’s executive presidency ambitions may have been thwarted for now but Turkey’s democratic and economic wellbeing depend on the establishment of a stable government and the implementation of liberal democratic constitutional reform. This is what Turkey deserves and what its international partners need.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42950/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natalie Martin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ruling AKP gets a hammering at the polls as pro-Kurdish HDP enters parliament for first time.Natalie Martin, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/425832015-06-05T05:13:29Z2015-06-05T05:13:29ZTurkey gets a taste for European-style radicalism ahead of election<p>The election taking place in Turkey on June 7 is an important turning point for the country’s political system. A central issue in this contest is whether more power should be transferred from the Turkish parliament to the president – as is hoped by incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.</p>
<p>Standing against Erdoğan’s ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) is a new party called the HDP (<a href="http://theconversation.com/meet-the-political-party-that-could-change-turkeys-future-42057">People’s Democracy Party</a>). This was formed out of a collection of 36 once independent members of parliament.</p>
<h2>What is the HDP?</h2>
<p>The HDP has emerged as a radical democratic project, built on the foundations laid by pro-Kurdish political parties (from HEP to the BDP). It seeks to challenge the established order, aiming to radically transform the AKP’s neo-liberal and conservative understanding of democracy with a so-called passive revolution. For many, it is Turkey’s equivalent to Greece’s Syriza and Spain’s Podemos political parties and social movements.</p>
<p>The HDP manifesto for the parliamentary election calls for bringing humanity back into politics. There is a strong emphasis on equal rights for women, LGBT people and workers and on social security for all. There are plans to increase the minimum wage, tackle youth unemployment and provide everyone with a basic package of free water and electricity. The party also emphasises free healthcare and education as well as peace – including by ending <a href="http://www.theglobalentrepreneur.com/turkey-armenia-open-border/">trade embargoes</a> against Armenia.</p>
<p>When it comes to the EU, the HDP says it would pursue full membership “within the scope of our principles” – suggesting that like Syriza in Greece, the party has some scepticism about neo-liberal aspects of the union by offering an alternative EU project. </p>
<p>Significantly, the party would also shift the state away from religion and promote freedom of belief, ending the requirement for all children to have a religious education and abolishing the government’s Directorate of Religious Affairs – the body the oversees the practice of Islam in Turkey.</p>
<p>The HDP also has bold ideas about Kurdistan. Turkish politics has, for 30 years, been characterised by the battle between the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) and the Turkish armed forces. Over this time, 40,000 people have died and three million have been displaced as the PKK fought for a separate, “free” Kurdistan.</p>
<p>The HDP’s view is that Kurdish rights are more likely to be achieved by radically reforming Turkish democracy. It wants to decentralise Turkish politics, setting up regional assemblies to ensure that all “ethnic identities” have the right to self governance. </p>
<h2>A transnational movement</h2>
<p>The rise of the HDP comes as the radical left is sweeping to power elsewhere in Europe, seeking to give a voice to the voiceless. The best known is of course Syriza in Greece, which won the February 2015 election by offering an alternative to established politics.</p>
<p>Most recently, in Spain, left-wing collective Podemos won 15 seats in Andalusia’s regional parliament – its first serious election since it secured five seats in the European parliament and joined the European new left. Podemos has its roots in protest movements and later became connected to anti-austerity social movements.</p>
<p>The HDP has links with these groups and is continuing the transnational trend on the periphery of the EU. Yiannas Bournous, a member of Syriza’s central committee, attended the HDP’s election rally in İzmir a few weeks before polling day and a Syriza delegation <a href="http://www.syriza.gr/article/id/58789/Kobane-must-win.html#.VW23oWRViko">visited Kobanê</a> in 2014 to show the party’s support for the Kurds there.</p>
<p>On top of its political heritage, the HDP also has links with the serhıldan (the Kurdish intifada), Kurdish street movement and the more recent, <a href="https://blog.gnip.com/occupy-gezi-twitter/">Occupy Gezi</a> movement.</p>
<p>Like its European counterparts, the HDP is seeking to bring greater democratic power to citizens, giving them a greater say in the issues that affect them, from the environment, individual rights such as abortion and employment security.</p>
<p>Then there is young, charismatic co-chairman Selahattin Demirtaş – who won 9.8% of the votes cast in Turkey’s presidential election of August 2014. He has been compared to Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras and Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias.</p>
<p>Demirtaş is popular among not only his own party but many groups who feel ostracised by the Turkish political structure, which is dominated by the centre right and centre left – from Alevis, Christians and Jews to ethnic minorities such as Georgians, Arabs, Turkmens, Albanians and Lazs.</p>
<p>Even as Turkey seeks to emulate the EU by evolving into a modern, neo-liberal society, these groups are often the most excluded and alienated members of society. They do not have a particularly high public profile and are not represented by the mainstream parties.</p>
<p>The HDP has thrived by building an allegiance between the Kurdish movement and other social and political democratic forces struggling against this exclusion.</p>
<p>Just as Syriza and Podemos have appealed to the people who feel forgotten by their governments, the HDP is doing the same through offering a new model of life with a radical plural democratic political project.</p>
<p>Success may be harder for this new player though. It stands little chance of getting into government but if it can pass the (extremely high) election threshold of 10% of the national vote, it can win a place in parliament and begin to have an influence over the democratic direction of the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42583/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Omer Tekdemir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With plans to shake up democracy, it’s no wonder the HDP is being compared to Syriza and Podemos.Omer Tekdemir, Visiting Research Fellow of Political Theory, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/420572015-06-04T11:19:21Z2015-06-04T11:19:21ZMeet the political party that could change Turkey’s future<p>Turkey’s social and political scene has long been subject to polarisation, protests and police investigations. Many expected the atmosphere of confusion to evaporate after last year’s presidential election was <a href="https://theconversation.com/erdogan-wins-presidential-vote-after-dominating-turkish-media-30376">won by former prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a>. But as the country prepares for its general election ten months on, doubt still persists. </p>
<p>This election represents a fork in the road for Turkey. Which path the nation follows will rest on the success or failure of the pro-Kurdish, left-leaning People’s Democracy Party (HDP). A <a href="http://riturkey.org/2015/05/7-haziran-secim-ongoruleri/">recent report</a> by the Research Institute on Turkey – which relies on quantitative analysis of election surveys – showed that the outcome for the HDP in this election will have a greater impact on the future of Turkish politics than any other factor.</p>
<h2>Taking a risk</h2>
<p>The HDP is the political wing of the People’s Democratic Congress. The congress is an organisation with members from a range of left-wing movements, including trade unions, NGOs and smaller political parties. There are currently 35 deputies in the Turkish parliament, who were fielded as independent candidates by the People’s Democratic Congress to get around Turkey’s electoral threshold. The threshold requires that political parties win 10% of the vote before their representatives can take up seats in the parliament. </p>
<p>This election, the People’s Democratic Congress has made the bold decision to field 550 candidates from the HDP. This means the party will need to meet the threshold, or forfeit its seats. The HDP is pursuing a <a href="http://www.diclehaber.com/en/news/content/view/453676?from=3534286294">leftist, pro-minority rights agenda</a>, and tackling topics such as the Armenian genocide, LGBT rights, conscientious objection and the status of the Diyanet (the body that administers religious affairs), which have traditionally been taboo in Turkey. </p>
<p>If the HDP does not pass the threshold, Turkey will enter a turbulent and highly uncertain period. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) – founded by president Erdoğan, and led by him for over a decade – is likely to gain enough seats to call a referendum on whether to hand over greater executive powers to the president. This could accomplish Erdoğan’s goal of transforming the presidency from a largely ceremonial role into one which enables him to control parliamentary, executive and legislative systems. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/83926/original/image-20150604-11713-1sno5ik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/83926/original/image-20150604-11713-1sno5ik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=770&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83926/original/image-20150604-11713-1sno5ik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=770&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83926/original/image-20150604-11713-1sno5ik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=770&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83926/original/image-20150604-11713-1sno5ik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=967&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83926/original/image-20150604-11713-1sno5ik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=967&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83926/original/image-20150604-11713-1sno5ik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=967&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A powerful figurehead.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan_WEF_Turkey_2008_edited.jpg#/media/File:Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan_WEF_Turkey_2008_edited.jpg">DsMurattalk/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But if the HDP does pass the threshold – winning between 800,000 and 1.2 million more votes than the independent candidates did last election – it could gain about 60 seats in the parliament. Since the HDP opposes giving more powers to the president, the parliamentary arithmetic suggests that if the HDP overcomes the threshold, Erdoğan’s presidential reforms will not pass. </p>
<p>Having the HDP in parliament would bring about three positive developments. After many years of mainstream politics, the Turkish parliament would have representatives from right across the political spectrum: the HDP is <a href="https://hdpenglish.wordpress.com/2015/04/08/full-list-of-hdp-candidates-for-general-elections-on-june-7/">fielding a range</a> of communist, socialist, Marxist, Muslim, non-Muslim and feminist candidates. What’s more, the <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2014/europe/turkey-and-the-pkk-saving-the-peace-process.aspx">ongoing Kurdish peace talks</a> – which are being mediated by the HDP – would become a priority. </p>
<p>HDP co-leader Selahattin Demirtaş would be a new voice for freedom and for the interests of minority groups/. This is what Turkey urgently needs, as the AKP and Erdoğan continue to <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_erdogan-shifts-again-from-no-kurdish-problem-to-kurds-have-problems_376088.html">use polarising language</a>, which risks deepening existing rifts between different religious and ethnic groups within Turkish society. </p>
<h2>A fair fight?</h2>
<p>It is doubtful that all political parties are running their election campaigns under equal conditions. This <a href="http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/sites/default/files/papers/Ozturk_Election_in_Turkey.pdf">was also a concern</a> during the presidential elections of August 2014. It is <a href="http://www.osce.org/tr/odihr/elections/turkey/160906?download=true">well known</a> that opposition parties are not allocated the same time or space as the AKP to make their case to the people. </p>
<p>President Erdoğan is <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_world-press-criticizes-erdogan-led-campaign-to-stifle-critical-media_382984.html">extremely aggressive against</a> media outlets that criticise the government. The Council of Europe <a href="http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.asp?newsid=5596&cat=31">has issued a warning</a> about media bias during the Turkish elections, and news agencies such as Reuters have even <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/27/us-turkey-election-media-idUSKBN0OC1IW20150527">described it</a> as a war on critical media.</p>
<p>The HDP is also stigmatised by the ruling AKP party. Even Erdoğan – who, as president, is supposed to remain neutral – has <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-hits-at-hdp-mayors-.aspx?PageID=238&NID=81904&NewsCatID=338">made speeches criticising</a> the HDP for allegedly supporting terrorism, developing agendas that threaten national interest and promoting LGBT candidates. The HDP’s buildings and stands have been attacked <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/21/turkey-election-kurds-idUKL5N0YC35O20150521">more than 70 times</a> over the past few months. Some <a href="http://www.agos.com.tr/en/article/11615/hdp-the-president-and-the-government-are-responsible-of-the-attack">suggest that</a> the attacks were the result of systematic propaganda against the HDP. </p>
<p>HDP buildings <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/21/turkey-election-kurds-idUKL5N0YC35O20150521">were bombed</a> in Mersin and Adana. In a democratic country, one would expect this kind of political violence to cause a public uproar, but in Turkey it has become routine. </p>
<h2>Mustering support</h2>
<p>Despite these challenges, the HDP has been gaining ever-greater support from Kurdish voters, minority groups, the Turkish and Kurdish diasporas and other voters who are disillusioned with mainstream politics. The HDP is <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/03/uk-turkey-election-kurds-idUKKBN0OJ1VT20150603">commonly referred to</a> as a “Kurdish party”, and has its roots in the Kurdish nationalist movement. It promises a more legitimate peace process; one that includes elected representatives in parliament who can raise Kurdish concerns. But the HDP is also the only political party which represents such a wide range of groups, which have been consistently overlooked by the mainstream parties. </p>
<p>The HDP is also running a campaign abroad. After the 2014 presidential election, the party adopted a transnational strategy, in an effort to appeal to potential voters from Turkish and Kurdish diasporas. This is now possible due to changes in voting regulations. After demanding the right to vote outside of Turkey for the last three decades, Turkish expatriates were finally able to vote from their countries of residence <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-expats-begin-voting-in-presidential-elections.aspx?pageID=238&nID=69813&NewsCatID=338">for the first time</a> in the 2014 presidential election. Although the ballot boxes were <a href="http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/506767--voting-for-turkish-elections-begins-at-customs-offices">only open at customs</a> offices, these changes have transformed election campaigns into international affairs. </p>
<p>It <a href="http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/carc/diasporas-and-securitisation/documents/diaspora-politics-and-germanys-kurdish-question.pdf">is estimated</a> that there are around two million Kurds in the diaspora; these include economic migrants, asylum seekers and political refugees. There are also members of Turkish leftist groups and Alevi muslims abroad, whose numbers are estimated to be <a href="http://researchturkey.org/transformation-of-the-alevi-movement-in-diaspora-a-case-study-in-munich/">in the millions</a>. Oppressed and deprived of equal rights <a href="http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/carc/diasporas-and-securitisation/documents/diaspora-politics-and-germanys-kurdish-question.pdf">in Turkey</a>, these groups have great potential for the HDP as a voter base. </p>
<p>The diaspora vote had a lower turnout than expected for the presidential elections in 2014: the <a href="http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics-papers/EPP031.pdf">reason behind this</a> is that many voters thought that the results of the election were a foregone conclusion. But with every vote needed to get the HDP past the 10% threshold, the diaspora may have had greater motivation to mobilise this time around. Diaspora voting ended on May 31.</p>
<p>It seems the HDP’s “new life” theme can appeal to a people of different ideologies, across the political spectrum. Ultimately, the HDP’s performance in this election will have major consequences for Turkey. If it passes the threshold, Turkey will not become a beacon of democracy and social justice overnight. But it will have a more colourful opposition, emboldened and ready to take the country in a new direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42057/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Can the left-wing HDP cross Turkey’s electoral threshold to transform the nation’s parliament?Bahar Baser, Research Fellow, Coventry UniversityAhmet Erdi Öztürk, PhD Candidate/Research Asistant, University of LjubljanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/424382015-06-03T05:17:16Z2015-06-03T05:17:16ZExplainer: your guide to Turkey’s general election<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/83539/original/image-20150601-6955-jyd3xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Turkey's big day. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ardac/15075078213/sizes/o/">ardac/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Following a month of fierce campaigning, the people of Turkey are preparing to head to the polling stations for the nation’s general election. This is set to be one of the most important elections in the history of the Turkish Republic, since its results may mean <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/02/sundays-poll-could-upend-turkish-politics-and-weaken-the-parliament">political overhaul</a>. On June 7, the people will decide whether the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will win an absolute majority, or be required to form a coalition government for the first time since coming to power in 2002. </p>
<p>Turkey is a secular parliamentary democracy. Legislative power is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, while executive power is exercised by the prime minister and the Council of Ministers. Turkey also has a president whose role, at present, is largely ceremonial. </p>
<p>The make up of the national assembly is determined using a system of proportional representation. Political parties must win a minimum of 10% of the national vote in order to take up any seats: the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/turkey-the-worlds-most-unfair-election-system">highest electoral threshold</a> of any country in the world. </p>
<h2>The current government</h2>
<p>The assembly is composed of 550 deputies, elected every four years. The prime minister is usually the leader of the political party which has the majority of the seats, or can form a majority coalition government. At the moment, the assembly <a href="http://www.electionresources.org/tr/assembly.php?election=2011">consists of</a> the AKP with 327 seats, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) with 135 seats, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) with 53 seats, as well as 35 independent deputies, who are part of a leftist umbrella organisation called the People’s Democratic Congress (HDK). </p>
<p>Ahmet Davutoglu – leader of the AKP – currently serves as prime minister. Davutoglu was foreign affairs minister between 2009 and 2014, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (founder of the AKP). During this period, Davutoglu’s foreign policy – aimed at ensuring “zero problems with our neighbours” – was <a href="http://www.iemed.org/observatori-en/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/med.2012/Ozcan_en.pdf-en">highly regarded internationally</a>.</p>
<p>In 2014, amendments were introduced to the country’s 1982 constitution, dictating that the president would be directly elected for a five-year term. Former prime minister Erdoğan went on to be voted in as president in August 2014. </p>
<h2>Hot topics</h2>
<p>The official election campaign began in May 2015. The key players in this election include all the usual mainstream political parties. The exception is the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) – the political wing of the HDK, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/socialist-groups-to-gather-in-new-party.aspx?pageID=238&nid=20756">formed in 2012</a> – which is entering the general election for the first time. </p>
<p>As party leaders, the AKP’s Davutoglu, the CHP’s Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the MHP’s Devlet Bahceli and the HDP’s Selahattin Demirtas are all key figures in this election, and have been attending public rallies up and down the country. So far, three issues have been occupying the pre-election debate in Turkey: Erdoğan’s ambitious presidential system, Kilicdaroglu’s social and economic policies and Demirtas’ liberal and inclusive policies.</p>
<p>As president, Erdoğan is constitutionally required to be neutral throughout the campaign. But instead, he has taken on an active role ahead of this election, overshadowing Davutoglu to promote reforms which would <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/19/erdogan-first-cabinet-meeting-turkish-president">hand over extended executive powers</a> to the presidency. In particular, Erdoğan is asking the Turkish people to give the AKP 330 seats in the assembly. This would give the party the three-fifths majority required to call a referendum on the constitutional changes needed to implement Erdoğan’s Putin-style presidential system. </p>
<p>At this election, the AKP does not appear to be offering anything new. With Erdoğan so fixated on gaining further powers for the presidency, Davutoglu is left singing the same old tune about the AKP’s record over 12 years in government. Throughout this time, the party has managed to <a href="http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/community_acquis_turkey/e50015_en.htm">secure a starting date</a> for negotiations to allow Turkey into the European Union, completed huge infrastructure projects across Turkey, achieved an unprecedented economic growth, constructed airports, bridges and sky scrapers and sustained political stability. </p>
<p>But Erdoğan’s <a href="http://world.time.com/2013/06/24/erdogans-paradox-turkish-leader-struggles-between-authoritarianism-and-democracy/">authoritarian style</a>, the <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/turkish-prime-minister-erdogan-facing-corruption-scandal-protests-a-959453.html">corruption cases</a> brought against him and his ministers, <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/03/whos-going-to-save-turkeys-economy-erdogan-akp/">increasing poverty levels</a> and a weakening economy have all undermined the image of the AKP as a competent party – once victimised by the Turkish secular establishment for having religious roots – in the eyes of the public.</p>
<h2>Who’s who?</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, CHP leader Kilicdaroglu – a former clerk – has chosen not to get involved in ideological exchange with Erdoğan over the question of presidential powers. In past elections, he <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/turkish-opposition-draws-up-alarming-poverty-map.html">was criticised</a> for going head-to-head with the president over the corruption scandals that surfaced in 2013, and over Turkey’s high levels of poverty – a move which <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chp-sticks-with-economic-projects-not-ideology.aspx?pageID=449&nID=82788&NewsCatID=409">ultimately cost Kilicdaroglu votes</a>.</p>
<p>Instead, he is concentrating on reaching out to the electorate. Although it may sound unrealistic, Kilicdaroglu pledges to end poverty in Turkey within four years. This does not mean that the CHP is without sensible policies: pledges to increase the minimum wage and boost the retirement pension have been <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/m%C3%BCjge-k%C3%BC%C3%A7%C3%BCkkele%C5%9F/back-to-future-in-turkish-politics-chp-in-search-of-social-democrat-identity">very popular so far</a>.</p>
<p>The newest face in Turkish politics is HDP’s co-chair Demirtas, whose personal aptitude in delivering his message of tolerance, inclusivity and a fully fledged democracy to a greater audience has taken many people by surprise. Witty, eloquent and charismatic, Demirtas’s appearance either at public rallies or on TV broadcasts <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/demirtas-a-kurdish-pop-star-in-turkish-politics.aspx?PageID=238&NID=82382&NewsCatID=409">is attracting</a> not only people from different walks of life, but also people who have affiliations with the other parties.</p>
<p>The HDP claims to be the party of Armenians, Islamists, Alevis, workers, women, environmentalists, LGBT activists, and representative of all oppressed groups. What’s more, the deputy candidate list is <a href="http://en.firatajans.com/news/peoples-and-oppressed-groups-represented-in-the-hdp-list-of-candidates">a true reflection</a> of those groups. If HDP passes the 10% threshold, it will be the first time in the history of Turkish Republic that deputies representing some of these groups are democratically elected <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/firstever-openly-gay-parliamentary-candidate-stands-for-election-in-turkey-10274746.html">without disguising their true identities</a>.</p>
<h2>Ülkücülük</h2>
<p>But as we enter the very last days of campaigning, it is the right-wing MHP which is gaining the most attention. Support for the MHP is fed with Turkish nationalism, based on the idealism of “ülkücülük”. </p>
<p>The idea of “ülkücülük” emerged in opposition to the Turkish Communist movements in the 1970s. It represents a distinctive kind of nationalism, where the well-being of the state is seen as the ultimate embodiment of the nation. According to “ülkücülük”, the state’s interests are ultimately inseparable from the nation’s interest. </p>
<p>While all the other political parties presented their manifesto in April, the MHP leader Bahceli waited until May. He claimed this was a choice intended to prevent the other political parties from copying the party, and ensure that the MHP’s election promises would not get lost among the other parties’ manifestos. </p>
<p>The MHP does put forward some progressive policies. Like Kilicdaroglu, Bahceli has promised to increase the minimum wage. The party has also pledged to officially grant Cemevis (Alevi muslims’ houses of worship) the status of official places of worship. This status has been withheld since the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, meaning that the Alevi citizens of Turkey do not have the right to worship freely or form associations in the way they wish. Turkish authorities have been <a href="http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=4093">heavily criticised</a> by the EU because of this. </p>
<h2>The Kurdish problem</h2>
<p>Given the MHP’s position of tolerance toward the Alevi of Turkey, you might expect the party to adopt a similar line on Turkey’s long-standing and deep-rooted Kurdish problem. But this where the nationalist side kicks in: the party stands against any form of resolution to the Kurdish problem, and Bahceli is <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_pkk-similar-to-boko-haram-as-both-abduct-children-says-bahceli_349493.html">particularly sceptical</a> about talking to the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK).</p>
<p>Just like the Alevi, the Kurds have long been denied any form of constitutional rights. After <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-is-paying-for-decades-of-divisive-politics-as-it-fights-to-end-its-civil-war-33197">nearly 30 years of fighting</a> between the PKK and the Turkish Security Forces (TSK), the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 and the subsequent call for a ceasefire have helped put an end to this bloody chapter in Turkish politics. </p>
<p>Erdoğan could be criticised for his authoritarian style, his <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-blocks-twitter-after-erdogan-vowed-eradication.aspx?pageID=238&nID=63884&NewsCatID=338">power-hungry outbursts</a> and his <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_erdogan-slams-brakes-on-kurdish-peace-process-ahead-of-polls_377445.html">recent combative approach</a> to peace talks with the PKK and HDP. But his valiant stance toward solving the Kurdish problem should be recognised. Up until the election campaign began, Erdoğan and the AKP had been talking to Öcalan trough the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation, and holding meetings with the Kurdish representatives to establish a solution for this problem.</p>
<p>If the AKP fails to gain a majority, it looks like the MHP will be the first party whose door Erdoğan and Davutoglu will be knocking on to form a coalition. As it stands, all three opposition leaders have <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opposition-parties-rule-out-coalition-scenarios-with-akp-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=83127&NewsCatID=338">ruled out</a> forming a coalition with the AKP. </p>
<p>If Bahceli can be persuaded by the AKP, his first demand is likely to be the termination of the peace talks with the Kurds. On the other hand, if the HDP passes the threshold, people of Turkey would not only have a political party representing a range of new voices and interests, but also accelerating the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42438/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gulay Icoz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Want to know who’s who and what’s what? Look no further.Gulay Icoz, Teaching Assistant, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.