tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/ukip-5017/articlesUKIP – The Conversation2021-08-17T13:36:13Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1599542021-08-17T13:36:13Z2021-08-17T13:36:13ZBurnley: a case study for a lost Labour town<p>The Labour Party is preparing for its <a href="https://labour.org.uk/conference/">second conference</a> since Keir Starmer became leader, and it’s fair to say things haven’t improved much since Labour lost the 2019 general election. </p>
<p>There was the significant <a href="https://theconversation.com/hartlepool-by-election-inside-the-new-northern-conservatism-160393">by-election loss</a> in Hartlepool, the collapse of Labour’s vote when <a href="https://theconversation.com/six-reasons-why-the-tories-lost-the-chesham-and-amersham-byelection-163030">Lib Dems beat the Tories</a> in Chesham and Amersham, and a close-run thing in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/batley-and-spen-what-bitter-uk-by-election-won-by-sister-of-murdered-mp-tells-us-about-state-of-british-politics-163839">Batley and Spen by-election</a> – where some of the significant number of Muslim constituents diverted their votes from Labour.</p>
<p>Starmer, meanwhile, may well have clear ideas about how to rebuild and win support in such diverse constituencies, but is more often in the news for his administrative actions within the party: switching advisers, cutting staff and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/aug/14/director-ken-loach-expelled-labour-party">expelling supporters</a>.</p>
<p>While Labour has had its host of challenges to contend with over the past few years, to understand the real issues facing the party, it’s important to look back
– as it is long-term processes that have shaped the current state of Labour. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://lwbooks.co.uk/product/on-burnley-road-class-race-and-politics-in-a-northern-english-town">my new book</a>, I track what’s been happening in the northern English town of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-56932575">Burnley</a> in Lancashire and how this has played out politically. I worked for the council there for over 20 years from the mid-1990s. The Lancashire town shows how deindustrialisation has led to deepening poverty, demoralisation and resentment. </p>
<p>I’ve seen first hand how, over the years, these feelings and concerns resulting from people’s sense of abandonment, have been channelled towards <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-populism-popular-a-psychologist-explains-61319">right-wing populism</a> – which has also been the case in many other traditional Labour voting towns.</p>
<h2>Turning blue</h2>
<p>Burnley elected its first Conservative MP for more than a century in the <a href="https://www.lancashiretelegraph.co.uk/news/18099652.burnley-turns-blue-century/">2019 election</a>. But the crisis in the relationship between Labour and voters it relied on for support was evident from the mid-1990s. </p>
<p>Through the post-war decades, the Labour party had been dominant locally. But this proved no defence against the shock of deindustrialisation and the accompanying deep cuts to public sector budgets. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/188e43c2-2cad-11e1-8cca-00144feabdc0">Margaret Thatcher’s government</a> had reshaped the economy around services rather than manufacturing. This hit northern towns like Burnley hard. The town’s last coal mine closed in 1982, most of the remaining cotton mills shut during the early 1980s, and many other factories closed. </p>
<p>As I explain in my book, in the decade from 1981, the number of manufacturing jobs in Burnley fell from 17,786 – 45% of the town’s workforce – to 12,870. The 1990s saw further redundancies, and by 2003, manufacturing made up just 26% of the town’s jobs. </p>
<p>The political consequences of these changes <a href="https://www.isrf.org/2020/09/02/reflex-reaction-memory-deindustrialisation-and-right-wing-populism-in-a-northern-english-town/">did not happen immediately</a>. Instead, they were shaped by political actors who used people’s understandable anxiety and justified anger to create social divisions. Discontent was directed towards “out-groups” and turned on “others” – such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/blame-austerity-not-immigration-for-taking-britain-to-breaking-point-61133">immigrants and people of colour</a> – rather than on “the system”.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.electionscentre.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Lancashire-County.pdf">Between 1996 and 2003</a>, Labour’s share of the votes in Burnley’s local elections fell from 61% to 30%, staying around this level for the rest of the decade. And in 2002, Burnley became the first place to see a clutch of British National Party (BNP) councillors <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/gallery/2009/jun/10/bnp-elections-2009">elected</a> - and their representation grew the following year. </p>
<p>Though their momentum soon stalled and declined, the far-right BNP popularised antipathy to immigration and Europe and racist opposition to multiculturalism. The same themes shaped local politics in many other places – and then UKIP succeeded in generalising concern on these issues. </p>
<h2>Beyond Brexit</h2>
<p>And so with the build-up of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukip-how-press-coverage-drives-public-support-101128">UKIP’s support</a>, and British membership of the European Union an increasingly controversial issue, a small group of ambitious Conservative politicians saw they could draw votes from people for who whom “Europe” had become a coded way of expressing frustration with current social arrangements. And the rest, as they say, is history.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://theconversation.com/right-wing-populism-is-surging-on-both-sides-of-the-atlantic-heres-why-47876">right-wing populism</a> enabled Boris Johnson and his colleagues to build support for Brexit – <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-boris-johnsons-conservatives-swept-to-election-victory-in-labour-heartlands-128684">and themselves</a> – by mobilising the fear of outsiders and promoting illusory conceptions of national identity. </p>
<p>And it has become the formula the Conservatives have used to benefit from the deindustrialisation, disorientation and demoralisation in northern communities. Problems that many argue were <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/188e43c2-2cad-11e1-8cca-00144feabdc0">largely caused</a> by previous Conservative governments.</p>
<p>The challenge now then for Labour is to come up with a strategy and programme that will both engage those who’ve voted Tory in the past – and that wins “new support” for progressive change. And if my experience in Burnley is anything to go by, relating to people’s emotions, frustrations and concerns is where the real work is to be done.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159954/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mike Makin-Waite is a member of the Labour Party, writing here in a personal capacity.</span></em></p>Addressing serious disconnects between Labour and its ‘traditional’ constituencies remains a key challenge for Keir Starmer’s party.Mike Makin-Waite, ISRF Associated Academic, Independent Social Research FoundationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1610322021-07-30T13:48:07Z2021-07-30T13:48:07ZThe link between local pub closures and support for UKIP<p>The decline of the high street has been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/77b797fc-2fcf-420b-947c-a1a72109c231">hollowing out</a> British town centres in recent years. When pubs, community centres, libraries and banks close, it adds to a sense of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/04/rebuild-faded-towns-britain">local decline</a>. In my recently published <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414021997158">research</a>, I found that local decline contributes to a rise in support for radical-right political parties – and that the loss of local pubs plays a surprisingly important role in the shift.</p>
<p>When people think about what drives people to support radical-right parties, they often assume they are voting in that direction because of economic deprivation or because they oppose immigration. And it is the case that radical-right parties often put immigration high on their agendas and pledge to improve the lives of economically vulnerable people. But social vibrancy in local places is also important.</p>
<p>Pubs often represent the focal point of a local community. They are where social connections are established. But more than 25% of pubs have closed in the UK <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/business/activitysizeandlocation/articles/economiesofalesmallpubscloseaschainsfocusonbigbars/2018-11-26">since 2001</a>. This is due to, among other things, an increase in the cost of alcohol after a wave of government tax hikes and the 2007 national smoking ban. </p>
<p>I particularly looked at long-standing local pubs that have come to define the community, which I labelled “community pubs”. These community pubs often serve as the last bastion of British culture for white working-class identity. I classified them as independently-owned pubs that are located outside of high streets in poorer areas. I also included pubs owned by private companies that tend to cater to a working-class constituency. The most famous example of this is JD Wetherspoon, which has expanded hugely to own many local pubs in small districts, serving drinks at relatively low prices. </p>
<p>I found that people living in districts with one such pub closure per year are more likely to support UKIP than any other party by around 4.3 percentage points. The effect is magnified under conditions of material deprivation.</p>
<p>UKIP support was only tied to the closure of a certain type of pub though – what I see as “community pubs”. I didn’t find a higher level of support for UKIP associated with the closure of pubs frequented by middle or upper-class voters with higher education and more ethnic diversity. The decline of pubs operating under larger pub franchises (except the Wetherspoon Company) and those located in high streets of main cities – or in richer areas – does not affect levels of support for UKIP.</p>
<p>I also found that white British people with routine jobs (i.e. secretaries, manual labourers, filing clerks, etc) are the ones who are the most likely to support UKIP as the number of pub closures increases in their district. This confirms the fact that the relation between pub closures and UKIP support is a white working-class phenomenon.</p>
<p>The closure of cherished pubs seems to be contributing to the wider sense of marginalisation that has propelled parties like UKIP to the mainstream. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335703422_The_threat_of_social_decline_Income_inequality_and_radical_right_support">Social decline theory</a> tells us that deindustrialisation and globalisation have led to the gradual disappearance of manufacturing jobs and the rise of white-collar jobs. There is often a perception among white working-class communities that they are shifting to the periphery of society relative to a new dominant white class of professional elites and immigrants.</p>
<p>White working-class people are drawn to radical-right parties because they evoke a nostalgic past where manual labourers were considered crucial pillars of society – as encapsulated in slogans like “Make America Great Again” or “Take Back Control”.</p>
<p>There is therefore evidence of a local socio-cultural factor behind radical right support in Britain. Without discounting the material dimension, the disappearance of socio-cultural places like pubs or youth centres makes white working-class voters susceptible to “left-behind” narratives that radical-right parties use to garner support.</p>
<h2>A new theory of marginalisation</h2>
<p>There are already various theories that help explain support for the radical right, including the social decline theory mentioned above.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17448680903154915">Social capital</a> (or social isolation) theory links a lack of connectedness in the community with radical right support. Membership in voluntary associations like charities, labour unions or sport clubs reinforces people’s social trust. So, when communities lack socio-cultural places where people can meet and greet, we are more likely to see people supporting radical-right parties. These parties attract isolated people who have lost trust in others and in institutions. </p>
<p>We also know that local socio-cultural places shape people’s voting behaviour as they define their identity. Their disappearance increases social isolation and affects a community’s self-esteem. What gets lost with these closures is not only the individual pain of losing something valued but a sense that one’s socio-cultural group (and its distinctive traditions and values) has become marginalised and abandoned. </p>
<p>My research suggests there is an element of socio-cultural degradation at play too. Closing social places that are at the heart of local communities contributes to social isolation and feelings that one’s socio-cultural heritage is under attack. The loss of these places leads people who usually frequent them to question their place within society and may lead them susceptible to the “left behind” narratives that are the stock and trade of the radical right. This is a feeling that can lead people towards radical-right parties.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161032/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Diane Bolet received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for her PhD research on which this article was based.</span></em></p>Local pubs play an important role in local identity – itself a known driver in support for radical-right parties.Diane Bolet, Postdoctoral Researcher, Policy Institute, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1531462021-01-15T11:10:56Z2021-01-15T11:10:56ZWhy it’s no surprise that pro-Trump rioters sang Bob Marley songs outside the Capitol<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378627/original/file-20210113-23-1qxqzws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=44%2C0%2C5000%2C3315&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In recent decades, musicians have been quick to object to the use of their material by the far-right</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://webgate.epa.eu/thumb.php/56604544.jpg?eJw1jrEOgkAMht-ls0Ovtly5zbBgIpqIiToZTjgX4yAyie9uhTh9-fv9afuGYgUhNfe-W0BRQgAwniA4w3nCZg2BDFuT3eN2GfrGOpUlyTJkYf7Fw9Stp2pdQGBDNc9MvZ6D7T_Oeg_BI1qs_mJnAvQaJXe5F6dEy9h6FXWSGPMmecdoV-xVIBSSkZBQx9iq_RBVJSFyK_D5AiG9Mb8~">Etienne Laurent/EPA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Amid the serious criminal offences committed during the recent breach of the US Capitol, one prominent trespass was against good taste. Numerous commentators, including original I Three singers <a href="http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/entertainment/20210110/inappropriate-use-song-written-i-three-marcia-griffiths-surprised">Marcia Griffiths and Judy Mowatt</a>, took exception to Trump supporters <a href="https://www.dancehallmag.com/2021/01/07/news/pro-trump-protesters-vibe-to-bob-marley-after-us-capitol-riot.html">singing</a> Bob Marley classics “Three Little Birds” and “One Love”.</p>
<p>The sound of white nationalists appropriating Afro-Caribbean music (though <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jsh/article-abstract/38/1/157/927064?redirectedFrom=fulltext">all too familiar</a> in the UK of the 1970s-80s) was considered both offensive and surprising. Ideologically, such groups are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139505963.008">more often associated</a> with fetishising “white” classical music and eschewing “black” culture. One of the early warning signs of UK singer Morrissey’s far-right leanings was his 1986 comment “<a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/culture/music/morrissey-from-reggae-to-royalty-a-timeline-of-the-singer-s-most-controversial-opinions-a3857906.html">reggae is vile</a>”.</p>
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<p>Some may find it surprising to realise that the alt-right can enjoy Bob Marley as well as death metal and Wagner. But this might be less of an example of deliberate <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Twerking-and-Cultural-Appropriation-%3A-Cyrus/7b73eb8d9a4411f82eb3a7913426e52b3808ff55">cultural appropriation</a> than a pragmatic example of how music works when organising a crowd. </p>
<p>The lyrics of “One Love” unify its listeners, forming an in-group against an implicit other. The choruses of both songs are effortless to sing. Above all, the tempo is perfect. The Capitol mob neither goose-stepped nor surged: it shuffled slowly. Famously, it even <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2021/01/capitol-when-mob-entered-chamber-pictures-tourists/617586/">kept between the guide ropes</a>. Marley’s songs, with their relaxed, off-beat rhythm, are the perfect soundtrack for a movement that mostly mills about.</p>
<p>Still, this wasn’t the first time that the far-right’s choice of song has come out of left field. Here are five more instances when history has sounded a little out of tune.</p>
<h2>2014: UKIP Calypso</h2>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Mike Read’s 2014 “UKIP Calypso”</span></figcaption>
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<p>In 2014, the anti-immigration UK Independence Party featured a song at its annual conference penned by former BBC Radio 1 DJ Mike Read, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lYOBZ3Seeio">UKIP Calypso</a>” – a travesty of Trinidadian music sung in an accent that, in the views of many, bordered on minstrelsy. Bona fide calypso star Alexander D Great responded with his own song “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9BN0RgaCi9o">Copycat Crime</a>”.</p>
<h2>1934: La Marseillaise</h2>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">“La Marseillaise” in its more common anti-fascist incarnation: 1942’s Casablanca.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Yes, that Marseillaise: the anthem of liberty written by
Claude Joseph Rouget de Lisle in 1792 and France’s national song. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2013.845447">In 1934</a> the British Union of Fascists needed a song of its own. But its publication Fascist Week rejected Elgar’s “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tW0QqiT2LU">Land of Hope and Glory</a>”, a far-right favourite then as now, because “it stands for ideals we regard as obsolete”. The Italian fascist anthem “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLclQf9ecjc">Giovinezza</a>” was deemed too, well, Italian. Instead, asked Blackshirt magazine (the British Union of Fascists’ newspaper), “Who is to be the first ‘Rouget de Lisle’ to give the Movement a ‘Marseillaise’?”</p>
<p>The anti-democratic right had a precedent here: <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Miscellaneous_Essays_naval_moral_politic.html?id=VTtcAAAAcAAJ&redir_esc=y">in 1799</a>, reactionary Royal Navy chaplain Alexander Duncan also proposed imitating the Marseillaise. But the idea never caught on, and today Britain’s far-right <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oaA3Ewa6EeI">favours</a> “Keep St George In My Heart” sung to the tune of the hymn “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_in_My_Lamp">Oil in my Lamp</a>”, most commonly associated with small schoolchildren.</p>
<h2>2015: Nicolas</h2>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Marine Le Pen sings “Nicolas” in 2015.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Few far-right figures have embraced song in quite the manner of the leader of the French political party Rassemblement National (National Rally), Marine Le Pen. <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/video-marine-le-pens-love-song-for-nicolas-sarkozy-gddsnll5ln2">In 2015</a> she was filmed ironically serenading former French president and political rival Nicolas Sarkozy with the 1979 love song “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7DL_Fq7122I">Nicolas</a>”. But the joke may have been on the anti-immigration Le Pen – “Nicolas” was made a hit by French singer Sylvie Vartan, born in Bulgaria and of Armenian and Jewish heritage.</p>
<h2>1936: <em>Das Lied der Deutschen</em></h2>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">German players and fans sing their anthem at Euro 2006.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The most extreme case of misappropriation is surely the German national anthem. Its 1797 tune was penned by Haydn for the Habsburg emperor. So when August Heinrich Hoffman gave it new words in 1841, he was reappropriating a royalist song for republican ends. </p>
<p>Its infamous opening “<em>Deutschland, Deutschland über alles</em>” was a call for the disparate German states to form a liberal union, putting their shared identity above allegiance to petty monarchs. Its lyrics are essentially peaceful, unlike bloodthirsty lines found in “God save the King”, “The Star-Spangled Banner”, or the “Marseillaise” itself. But since its appropriation by the Nazis, broadcast worldwide at the Berlin Olympics, its message has been tainted, and now only the third verse is officially sung.</p>
<h2>2009: If You Tolerate This…</h2>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The Manics’ 1998 song in its official setting.</span></figcaption>
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<p>In recent decades, musicians have been quick to object to the appropriation of their material. Though Neil Young <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/music/2020/dec/08/neil-young-drops-lawsuit-against-donald-trump">has abandoned</a> his fight against Trump’s use of “Rockin’ in the Free World”, Tom Petty did successfully prevent the Bush campaign from playing “I Won’t Back Down” in 2000. As a former Bush spokesman said: “<a href="https://www.pophistorydig.com/topics/wont-back-down-petty/">we backed down</a>”. And when in 2009 the British National Party plumbed new ironic depths by pirating the Manic Street Preachers’ anti-fascist anthem “If You Tolerate This”, the band’s label were swift to <a href="https://www.nme.com/news/music/manic-street-preachers-138-1318336">take action</a>.</p>
<p>There’s little room for nuance when a movement takes a fancy to a slogan. The ultimate example is Bruce Springsteen’s “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EPhWR4d3FJQ">Born in the USA</a>” – meant as a critique of the Vietnam War and its effect upon veterans. Knowing this, some commentators sneer at its use by jingoistic nationalists and “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barack_Obama_citizenship_conspiracy_theories">birthers</a>”. But its verses require concentrated listening, whereas the macho, stadium-rock chorus is simplicity itself. </p>
<p>Perhaps we should suspend our knowing impulses, and accept that in practice, a song’s meaning is determined in performance, not in the intentions of its author.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153146/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oskar Cox Jensen receives funding from UK Research and Innovation via his work on Our Subversive Voice: see <a href="https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FT006390%2F1">https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FT006390%2F1</a></span></em></p>After rioters outside the US Capitol sang Bob Marley’s ‘Three Little Birds’, here are more global instances when history has sounded a little out of tune.Oskar Cox Jensen, Senior Research Associate, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1171112019-05-17T12:35:29Z2019-05-17T12:35:29ZEuropean elections guide: how to vote if you support Brexit<p>The European Elections weren’t supposed to involve the UK. But the UK is still a member of the EU, having failed to agree a Brexit deal, so it is obliged to hold elections for the European Parliament. Excluding the possibility of a vote to remain in a confirmatory referendum, any MEPs sent to the European Parliament by the UK will have very little time, if any, to influence European policy. </p>
<p>As a result, much of this vote will be based on sending messages to Westminster and for many it has become a proxy for a second referendum. Those who still want to leave the European Union have lots of options on May 23 but many will find it a difficult choice. The perceived failures of the Conservative Party are forcing Brexit supporters to consider fringe, populist parties over the established ones.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/european-elections-guide-how-should-remainers-use-their-vote-117108">European elections guide: how should Remainers use their vote?</a>
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<h2>The Brexit Party</h2>
<p>Despite only being formally established at the beginning of the year, the Brexit Party is predicted to be the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/nigel-farages-brexit-party-polling-higher-than-labour-and-tories-combined-before-eu-elections-11717553">big winner</a> at the European elections. Founded by Nigel Farage and other breakaway UKIP MEPs, the party supports leaving the European Union without a deal and trading with the EU on WTO terms until a suitable deal can be struck. The party has <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/top-stories/brexit-party-has-no-policies-1-6011379">no manifesto</a>. The leadership says it will publish one after the vote.</p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> Rather than championing specific policies, the Brexit Party’s main function is to serve a as protest option. If your main goal is to send a strong message to the major political parties and you aren’t too concerned what the specifics of that message are, then the Brexit Party may well be a valid vote choice for you. </p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> If you are concerned about a specific aspect of Brexit, such as the backstop or freedom of movement, and want to send more than a blunt statement, the lack of a manifesto means that you don’t really know what you are voting for policywise. And, without a manifesto, the party will have limited accountability to you after the election. There are also <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-deal-seven-reasons-why-a-wto-only-brexit-would-be-bad-for-britain-102009">serious doubts</a> about the viability of trading on WTO terms. </p>
<h2>UKIP</h2>
<p>Having won the most votes in the 2014 European elections in the UK, the outlook doesn’t look as bright for the party this time around. Since the 2016 referendum, UKIP seems to have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cff64e3c-ff84-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5">lost its identity</a>. A series of internal disputes, notably between current leader Gerard Batten and Nigel Farage, have dogged the party. However, as long as the UK remains in the EU, UKIP arguably still has a purpose. </p>
<p>UKIP’s central policy for Brexit is not all that dissimilar from the Brexit Party’s, although it is more fleshed out and actually written down in a manifesto. UKIP argues that the UK should leave without a deal and then either offer to trade with the EU on a tariff-free basis or on WTO terms, with reciprocal rights for citizens. </p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> If you don’t want to support one of the major parties with your vote, but you also want to send more than just a blunt protest message, UKIP’s more clearly defined policies regarding Brexit may be a better option for you than the Brexit Party, especially if you want some accountability for policies after the election. </p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> UKIP has been dogged by infighting for some time now and the party has lost its momentum as of late. Accusations of it lurching further to the right and associations with former English Defence League leader Tommy Robinson may be off-putting for some voters. And, much as with the Brexit Party’s proposed Brexit solutions, there are serious doubts about their viability. </p>
<h2>The Conservatives</h2>
<p>Much like the local elections just a few weeks ago, the Conservatives are expected to take a beating at the European elections. Even its own party members and elected representatives have claimed they will not be <a href="https://inews.co.uk/opinion/brexit-b-party-candidates-european-elections-conservative/">campaigning</a> for the party – or even <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1124136/brexit-party-latest-news-theresa-may-nigel-farage-conservative-leave-EU-elections-2019">voting</a> for it. Party leader Theresa May had hoped to avoid holding these elections altogether so there is <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1124819/EU-elections-latest-polls-tory-election-labour-lib-dem-european-elections-2019-brexit">no manifesto</a>. Instead, the Conservatives have sent an election leaflet to most households claiming that a vote for the party will send a message that you want the UK to leave with a deal and you want it to leave with it now.</p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> If you want the UK to leave the EU with a deal and you have had enough of the lack of progress being made in Westminster, then a vote for the Conservatives would send a strong message to this effect. </p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> If you don’t like the proposed withdrawal deal then the Conservatives aren’t really offering you anything aside from that. Moreover, given how unpopular the deal is in Westminster, even by sending this message, there is still no guarantee parliament will accept it. </p>
<h2>Labour</h2>
<p>Although many Labour supporters have been calling for a second referendum, the party leadership itself has remained committed to leaving the EU and has been hesitant to support a confirmatory referendum, to the disappointment of many. The party has a much broader and more <a href="https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/whats-labours-eu-election-manifesto-15020979">ambitious manifesto</a> for the European campaign than the other parties and it effectively reads like a draft for their next general election manifesto. </p>
<p>Labour continues to promote its own <a href="https://labour.org.uk/issues/labours-plan-brexit/">alternative plan</a> for Brexit – a comprehensive customs union with the EU. This is a much closer relationship than that being proposed by the Conservative leadership. There are provisions for a second referendum, but only if the government tries to leave without a deal and it can’t secure support for its plan or a general election.</p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> If you support leaving the EU with a deal, but don’t much care for the one currently on offer or can’t bring yourself to vote Conservative, then Labour’s alternative plan may be worth your support. </p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> Many within the Labour Party want to see a second referendum, and although there are a few caveats that need to be met first, it is still a possibility that Labour could possibly support this in the future. Additionally, while Labour’s Brexit plan is ambitious, there is no real consensus that it is achievable.</p>
<h2>The DUP</h2>
<p>If you live in Northern Ireland and are pro-Brexit there is another option. Despite its agreement to prop up the Conservative government, the DUP has repeatedly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-47736913">refused</a> to support the prime minister’s proposed Brexit deal.</p>
<p>The DUP wants to ensure that all of the UK leaves on the same terms, thus protecting the union. Party leaders have warned that if Northern Ireland doesn’t support the DUP in the European elections, Westminster will interpret the vote as a <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/politics/eu-elections-2019/weak-dup-vote-will-be-seen-as-a-rejection-of-brexit-says-foster-38108896.html">rejection of Brexit</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> For those voters in Northern Ireland who are concerned about the backstop and the stability of the union, a vote for the DUP will send a message to that effect.</p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> While it is fairly clear what the DUP is opposed to, it doesn’t really present a clear and viable alternative. So while a vote for the DUP may signal what you don’t want, it won’t provide an endorsement for any alternatives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117111/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Stafford does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are lots of options for Brexit supporters, but that won’t make it an easy choice.Chris Stafford, Doctoral Researcher, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1155262019-04-18T11:16:59Z2019-04-18T11:16:59ZBrexit party: Nigel Farage’s threat to disrupt EU business is a waste of his energy<p>The UK has been catapulted into a rather unusual position as a result of the latest Article 50 extension. The European parliament election, which is typically characterised by <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html">low turn out</a> and its treatment as a <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/08/09/turnout-european-parliament/">second order event</a>, has suddenly become a hot topic. </p>
<p>It now seems inevitable that the UK will be taking part in the vote this May. The government appears to acknowledge as much, having put in place the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/832/contents/made">legislation</a> needed to set the “appointed day of poll” as May 23. The only way out is for British members of parliament to swiftly approve Theresa May’s Brexit deal – and they’ve already rejected it <a href="https://www.economist.com/britain/2019/03/29/theresa-may-loses-again-again">three times</a>.</p>
<h2>Trojan horse?</h2>
<p>There is not much time to get campaigns rolling. But one party was very quick out of the blocks – Nigel Farage’s newly launched <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47907350">Brexit Party</a>.<br>
Frustrated by the lack of progress on Brexit, Farage is threatening to <a href="http://www.efddgroup.eu/medias/videos/do-you-really-want-me-back-in-this-place-reject-the-extension-and-let-s-get-on-with-brexit">stack the European parliament with eurosceptic MEPs</a> forming a destructive Trojan horse. The aim seems to be for these MEPs to do what they can to disrupt EU business in some kind of protest against being held in the EU against their will.</p>
<p>But EU leaders apparently saw this coming. When they met at the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39042/10-euco-art50-conclusions-en.pdf">European Council</a> to agree to extend Brexit until October 31, they included an unusual caveat. This stipulates that the UK must behave itself during the time in between the election and its departure from the EU. In particular, the council said it expected the UK “to act in a constructive and responsible manner throughout the extension” and to “refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”.</p>
<p>In some ways, this was rather redundant – the duty to “sincerely cooperate” with the EU and other member states is in fact <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12016M004">a legal duty</a>. Enforcing that commitment might be another matter. It would get quite complicated and nightmarish trying to challenge an uncooperative UK. How do you sanction a state that intends to leave anyway? </p>
<p>But in any case, there are limited opportunities to actually obstruct EU activity in the time available to Farage and friends. Sabotage through the ballot box might, therefore, not be the best use of a vote. The European parliament is unlikely to decide on many material matters in the months following an election, and if it does, it will do so by majority. Even if one party won all of the 73 European parliament seats allocated to the UK, it would be a long way short of dominating the 751-seat strong parliament.</p>
<p>But the make-up of UK seats could influence the position the UK takes in the European council, which is made up of national ministers who will have an eye on domestic politics. The UK membership may wish to avoid being seen to frustrate the will of the electorate expressed through these elections. This might make obstruction more feasible.</p>
<p>The council, along with the European parliament, is the <a href="https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu_en">main decision-making body in the EU</a>. In the coming months, these bodies are due to make various important decisions. Take, for example, a draft directive on <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0797">transparent and predictable working conditions</a>. These would limit probation periods and require employers to give more notice to employees in on-demand work about when they will be expected to be available.</p>
<p>Even if the UK pushed back as a council member, most matters – including this proposed directive – are decided by a qualified majority. The UK would only be able to obstruct if it ended up casting the deciding vote.</p>
<p>As <a href="http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/04/trick-or-treaty-legal-issues-of-second.html">Steve Peers</a>, a professor in the University of Essex’s School of Law, points out, the UK could block everything where it has a veto, which is the case in a few select areas of law, like defence policy and treaty amendment.</p>
<p>But first, the chances of such areas being considered any time soon are slight, and second, as Peers argues, member states might sidestep that problem by only agreeing on initiatives in principle, then enacting them once the UK is out of the way. And for some actions, it has <a href="https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/04/12/menelaos-markakis-a-trojan-horse-in-the-eu-the-curious-case-of-the-eu271/">been suggested</a> that the EU 27 could get creative and use the rules on “enhanced cooperation” that sometimes allow groups of some member states to work together on certain measures without including everyone. </p>
<h2>EU nationals (finally) get to have a say</h2>
<p>It’s fairly clear that troublemaking within the European parliament is probably futile. But it is not clear what can be actually achieved in five months of parliamentary representation for the UK. And that’s bad news for the mainstream parties, as it will be difficult to articulate how they would actually represent their constituents.</p>
<p>What can Conservative and Labour realistically offer in their manifestos? What will they propose on the campaign trail about what they intend to do in parliament if briefly elected? The primary role of an MEP is <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/powers-and-procedures/legislative-powers">playing a part</a> in the EU legislative process – but they are unlikely to be in a position to shape the legislative agenda, or have much influence on what are often quite <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/external/appendix/legislativeprocedure/europarl_ordinarylegislativeprocedure_howitworks_en.pdf">lengthy law-making</a> processes. </p>
<p>What this vote does offer is a voice to EU nationals in the UK. In the run up to the 2016 referendum, EU citizens were guaranteed <a href="http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/restoring_public_trust_in_immigration_policy_a_points_based_non_discriminatory_immigration_system.html">clear and unconditional</a> protection of their rights, by leading Vote Leave campaigners. But those same citizens did not get a referendum vote, and have lived in limbo ever since, with their rights <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/settled-status-scheme-for-eu-citizens-risks-being-next-windrush/">constantly under threat</a>.</p>
<p>In May’s elections, EU nationals are entitled to vote in their state of residence. With 2-3m adult EU nationals living in the UK, the Brexit Party will not have a monopoly on discontent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115526/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charlotte O'Brien has previously received funding from the ESRC, and has been awarded a new ESRC 'Governance After Brexit' grant. </span></em></p>The EU saw this coming and is ready for Farage’s ‘Trojan horse’.Charlotte O'Brien, Professor of Law, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1083752018-12-11T08:01:55Z2018-12-11T08:01:55ZUKIP: how the party is battling to stay relevant<p>The last fortnight has been bruising for UKIP leader Gerard Batten. He faced (but survived) a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46422821">vote of no confidence</a> at the party’s National Executive Committee and has managed to lose three of UKIP’s biggest names – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/dec/04/nigel-farage-quits-ukip-over-fixation-anti-muslim-policies">Nigel Farage</a>, <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ex-ukip-leader-paul-nuttall-quits-party-over-tommy-robinson-role-11573773">Paul Nuttall</a> and <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/ukip-suzanne-evans-resigns-tommy-robinson-gerard-batten/">Suzanne Evans</a>. Farage, Nuttall and Evans quit the party after Batten’s decision to hire far-right activist <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/ukip-suzanne-evans-resigns-tommy-robinson-gerard-batten/">Tommy Robinson</a> – real name Stephen Yaxley-Lennon – as an adviser on <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/tommy-robinson-appointed-as-ukips-grooming-gangs-and-prison-reform-adviser-a3997726.html">“rape gangs” and “prison reform”</a>.</p>
<p>While Batten is battling on, it is clear that UKIP as a political party is in crisis; it is failing to remain relevant in the post-Brexit political landscape. Over the last two years, the party has lacked a clear identity or purpose, and has struggled to attract much media or public interest since Farage stepped down as leader in 2016. </p>
<p>And so in order to try and maintain his party’s relevance, Batten decided to recruit Robinson, despite very loud and public warnings from many within his party, including the party’s executive committee. As Farage quit, he expressed concern that Batten and Robinson’s “new” UKIP could be heading in a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/dec/04/nigel-farage-quits-ukip-over-fixation-anti-muslim-policies">“violent and thuggish” direction</a>. Indeed, under Batten, the party does appear to be moving onto new political ground, fielding fewer candidates in elections and instead focusing on grass roots street activity. </p>
<p>While Robinson may supply the charisma and public profile that Batten lacks, accusations have followed that the party is heading in a <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/suzanne-evans-quits-ukip-with-fiery-statement-claiming-the-party-is-becoming-a-successor-to-the-bnp-a4006926.html">“perverse direction”</a>. </p>
<h2>Taking to the streets</h2>
<p>Batten seems to have decided that to keep UKIP in the public eye he needs to try and utilise the street tactics that Robinson deployed as leader of the English Defence League (EDL). On December 9, thousands attended a “Brexit Betrayal” march in central London, which was organised by Batten and Robinson. Robinson was well received by the crowd, which chanted “Oh, Tommy, Tommy!” while he stood beside a UKIP banner. It should be noted, however, that a rival anti-racism protest on the same day <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/09/antiracist-marchers-in-london-claim-they-had-more-than-double-the-support-of-far-right-protest">claimed a far greater attendance</a>.</p>
<p>But as UKIP attempts to harness Robinson’s knowledge of grass roots street activism, Batten’s party is also positioning itself within the fold of the extreme right. At the “Brexit Betrayal” march, UKIP flags flew alongside those of Generation Identity – a pan-European movement that <a href="https://www.generation-identity.org.uk">seeks to</a> protect the “indigenous population” by preserving “the cultural heritage that has characterised our countries”.</p>
<p>While Generation Identity has struggled to make much of an impact in the UK, it would now appear that Batten is happy for UKIP to rub shoulders with the burgeoning movement. In its battle to remain relevant, it seems UKIP is attempting to harness far right ethno-nationalist identity politics – something of a growth area. </p>
<p>Just four years ago, Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=c5oXAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1991&lpg=PA1991&dq=%22one+of+the+most+successful+challenges+to+the+established+political+parties+in+modern+British+history%22&source=bl&ots=K10yIe_8ZN&sig=h_WOPM2ce7j9jZfKVX5P-Gg4iyg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjwyfLItZXfAhUIQRoKHdwBCQ0Q6AEwAHoECAMQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22one%20of%20the%20most%20successful%20challenges%20to%20the%20established%20political%20parties%20in%20modern%20British%20history%22&f=false">described UKIP</a> as “one of the most successful challenges to the established political parties in modern British history”. Since the June 2016 Brexit referendum, however, the party has lost political momentum. Due to a combination of the UK’s <a href="https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/first-past-the-post/">“first past the post”</a> electoral system and a perceived case of “mission accomplished” following its EU referendum victory, UKIP has since made a negligible impact on Brexit politics.</p>
<p>So what’s next?</p>
<h2>Radical populism</h2>
<p>Batten, who is the fourth person to lead the party since Farage quit in 2016, stated early on in his leadership that he wanted UKIP to become a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45593648">“radical, populist party”</a>. And with tensions over Brexit reaching boiling point and a lack of national political leadership to cool them, the time is ripe for harvesting the public’s anger and encouraging street-based activity. </p>
<p>Using UKIP’s anti-Europe brand with Robinson’s street politics won’t win elections but it may get feet on the street and provide UKIP with a reason for its continuing existence. The “Brexit Betrayal” rally, for example, brought thousands of angry men and women out onto the streets, with demonstrators <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/thousands-rally-against-tommy-robinsons-brexit-betrayal-march-snvvvf38k">on both sides hurling insults</a> at each other. One man even brought a portable gallows with him, <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/tommy-robinsons-brexit-march_uk_5c0d2a31e4b0ab8cf6942c04?guccounter=1&guce_referrer_us=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_cs=yJwqCYdEEEwO9gPGi1rBIw">complete with noose</a> – for Theresa May the “traitor”.</p>
<p>Exact numbers attending the rally are hard to pin down, and were hardly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46495595">spectacular</a>. But for UKIP, it was an early opportunity to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/09/antiracist-marchers-in-london-claim-they-had-more-than-double-the-support-of-far-right-protest">unite the far right</a> under one banner.</p>
<p>As Paul Oakley, UKIP’s immigration spokesman, took to the stage, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-betrayal-march-tommy-robinson-ukip-attendance-figure-far-right-protest-a8675246.html">he said</a> (bizarrely paraphrasing <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C3zQ_cZ29jc">The Terminator</a> film): “We can’t be bargained with, we can’t be reasoned with, we don’t feel pity, or remorse, or fear.” UKIP’s battle to stay relevant is off to an uncompromising start.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex Oaten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By recruiting Tommy Robinson, UKIP does indeed appear to be lurching towards the far right.Alex Oaten, Teaching Fellow in Political Science, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1021242018-09-03T12:59:20Z2018-09-03T12:59:20ZWas Brexit really caused by austerity? Here’s why we’re not convinced<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234444/original/file-20180831-195331-1j3c9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tally ho!</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hand-holding-wood-united-kingdom-remain-1023922663?src=8FrB_EXpi_nCtHTV2-KIuQ-1-56">Thitisan</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Like most bad dramas, keeping up with every development in the Brexit saga is difficult. Nevertheless you may have seen recent reports in the media, including in <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-austerity-tipped-balance-towards-leave-new-study-suggests-100685">The Conversation</a>, that “austerity caused Brexit”. But we doubt that a clear answer can come from a look at economics alone. </p>
<p>The idea that austerity swayed voters for Brexit is based on <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/381-2018_fetzer.pdf">a paper</a> by Thiemo Fetzer, an associate professor of economics at the University of Warwick. His paper claims to show that the welfare cuts under David Cameron’s coalition government of 2010-15 had a decisive impact on the UK’s decision to leave the EU. Fetzer argues that material economic changes encouraged grievances with the political system and that this led many to support first UKIP and then Brexit. By his calculations, austerity was responsible for as much as a ten percentage point swing in favour of Leave – thus tipping <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results">the outcome</a>. </p>
<p>It’s easy to understand why these findings were so popular. For many, austerity confirms their suspicion that the government does not care about the poor and is willing to see them go to hell in a handcart, all for the promise of <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/11/how-tax-cuts-rich-have-cost-country-dear">lower taxes</a>. If austerity is also the cause of Brexit, these people see it as more evidence that their belief that the government doesn’t care is correct.</p>
<h2>Election dissection</h2>
<p>We are sceptical that austerity increased Leave’s vote by ten percentage points. Crucially, Fetzer mainly uses UKIP support in the years leading up to the 2016 referendum as a proxy for public support for leaving the EU. His ten-point claim comes from testing the effect of austerity on UKIP’s vote share in the local elections that took place each year since 2010. </p>
<p>But the study also includes estimates of the austerity effect on UKIP’s vote share at the 2014 European parliament elections and the general election of 2015. Importantly, these are much lower. Using the European elections, Fetzer finds that austerity boosted the Leave vote somewhere in the region of two to five percentage points. This could have been enough to change the outcome, given that Leave won by 3.8 percentage points. But this certainly makes it harder to claim that austerity had a decisive impact. The effect of austerity on UKIP support in the 2015 general election, meanwhile, is never explicitly stated in the paper. Yet it’s much closer to the European election swing than that of the local elections. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234443/original/file-20180831-195319-antfua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234443/original/file-20180831-195319-antfua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234443/original/file-20180831-195319-antfua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234443/original/file-20180831-195319-antfua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234443/original/file-20180831-195319-antfua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234443/original/file-20180831-195319-antfua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1044&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234443/original/file-20180831-195319-antfua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1044&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234443/original/file-20180831-195319-antfua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1044&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Aye aye, 'Kippers’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/45909111@N00/15376332220/in/photolist-pqKHSd-es3ARy-s7GN4L-rm1mn9-r7RsYJ-rpXyqZ-yCRTuN-bTqN3e-74yJvd-es3dj3-eieaS5-r8vthK-r8NF1E-pEVYC3-pV3Bof-ntSL2x-stVjhY-r1JziE-rEH7Fk-rhcAQy-ryEeJr-rfrMdi-ranxSv-nKbYhe-r3QgJs-pJvgUK-74ziWQ-dhB5sm-74vn2g-dYx4Fb-sw4dxB-74voor-oYSRaT-es3ei9-dhB9AC-74BQok-rpQokZ-5Hz9pP-zyPybq-qsY8bY-74FGBL-zyPycs-dhBcuU-74yHLo-74ySzU-74xoN5-rpQyft-6gtQ6r-rSxwjK-dhB7z2">Gwyddion M. Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We are also unconvinced of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21614073">UKIP’s rise</a> from 2012 onwards. Fetzer argues that something must have changed in “left-behind” voters’ demand for a UKIP-like party, because UKIP itself did not change – and austerity fills this gap. Yet other political scientists have <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/21537170-revolt-on-the-right">shown that</a> UKIP did change after 2010. Previously, the party had targeted educated, middle-class Conservatives. It now shifted its attention to less educated, worse off, insecure and pessimistic (white) voters. </p>
<p>UKIP also made great efforts to campaign where these people lived, bringing the message to their doorsteps. And it benefited from a new-found media hype, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukip-how-press-coverage-drives-public-support-101128">which boosted</a> party support. We suspect that UKIP-friendly voters had been there all along, that it was only supply and not demand that changed. And if austerity was not the cause of UKIP success with these voters, then the evidence that it caused the Leave vote is much weaker.</p>
<p>Elsewhere in his paper, Fetzer does go beyond using UKIP as a proxy for Brexit sentiment and looks directly at what was happening to support for leaving the EU in opinion polls. Here, he found that people affected by the welfare cuts were seven percentage points more likely to favour Brexit. This was <a href="https://www4.shu.ac.uk/research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.uk/files/hitting-poorest-places-hardest_0.pdf">only around</a> 10% of the population, however – most people were affected by the cuts more indirectly. To make a proper case for the link between Brexit and austerity, you would have had to look at voter preferences more broadly. </p>
<h2>The how and why</h2>
<p>It will nonetheless seem intuitive to many that a pivotal policy like austerity could have left a Brexit-sized impression on British politics. Yet studies of austerity are novel at this point, and there is a lot we don’t know. And while various studies <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-austerity-tipped-balance-towards-leave-new-study-suggests-100685">suggest</a> voter choices are affected by the state of the economy, the political science literature gives reason to doubt that this happens <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1558352">consistently</a> – even in response to the most obvious and highly publicised economic facts. </p>
<p>When voters do respond, they <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/681591">don’t all agree</a> on who to hold responsible. Take the large majority who weren’t directly affected by austerity, for example: did they know that their area was hit by government tax credit freezes and bedroom taxes, for example – or were they more likely to notice municipal issues, like pot holes and fortnightly bins? </p>
<p>We also take issue with a described chain of events, of austerity causing Brexit by driving discontent with established politics. Again, political science research <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379416301445">suggests</a> it may not be so simple. Yes, parties and politicians follow the views of their supporters, but they <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science-review/article/legitimacy-from-above-the-partisan-foundations-of-support-for-the-political-system-in-democracies/215330C63EE390E00E50549FC5C14E78">shape them, too</a>. Much of former UKIP leader Nigel Farage’s rhetoric has focused on corrupt elites, limited power and the UK’s lack of true democracy. It is hardly a surprise if the confidence of his supporters in the political system is <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-opposition/article/a-spiral-of-distrust-a-panel-study-on-the-relation-between-political-distrust-and-protest-voting-in-belgium/561B04EAC73E80409F138B8B03CFA979">diminished</a> as a result. If Fetzer has the link the wrong way around, austerity’s effect on discontent would have been much less relevant to the vote. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233467/original/file-20180824-149481-759sgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233467/original/file-20180824-149481-759sgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233467/original/file-20180824-149481-759sgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233467/original/file-20180824-149481-759sgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233467/original/file-20180824-149481-759sgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233467/original/file-20180824-149481-759sgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233467/original/file-20180824-149481-759sgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233467/original/file-20180824-149481-759sgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Farage of criticism.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/gageskidmore/33107793976/in/photolist-SrC6G5-SvhZDB-24LybfK-roeVHL-r6KPtE-58szEY-Rgfh5P-23FL1x5-awgJxm-24GN83j-rqG7pe-92kZe5-du7TB7-r6T9NP-ar74pR-Svi1Na-RdztmY-SrCdtm-RdzoAA-RdzfJy-RVseSs-RVsGYG-qrxWAH-23FKMNh-qhGDxd-SePsLL-du7Yjd-GAooj2-du7Rfs-aVeZXz-er6YCx-SpZ31h-pcDLhH-du81LC-r992YU-du2kfi-es3ARy-es3dDA-n6ebyV-roeXgW-rpXyqZ-gUrpnL-74yJvd-es3dj3-r51J8a-6atoiK-74ziWQ-74vn2g-221zEp7-74BRoM">Gage Skidmore</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To be clear, there’s no doubt Fetzer’s analysis is a good one. It will serve as inspiration for many to come. But most of the issues we have raised arise because he has taken an economist’s eye view of an issue that cannot be reduced to economics alone. </p>
<p>Whether by neglecting UKIP’s ability to adjust its messaging to appeal to different voters or underplaying other possible effects such as identity and values, the prescription is clear: a heavy dose of political science. It remains a possibility that austerity caused Brexit, but that’s unlikely to be the whole story.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102124/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lawrence McKay is co-funded by the ESRC and the Hansard Society. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jack Bailey is co-funded by the ESRC and YouGov. </span></em></p>The idea that welfare cuts galvanised Vote Leave risks identifying the wrong culprit.Lawrence McKay, Doctoral Researcher, University of ManchesterJack Bailey, Doctoral Researcher, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1011282018-08-06T14:31:06Z2018-08-06T14:31:06ZUKIP: how press coverage drives public support<p>Researchers have long been concerned with the relationship between media coverage and support for political parties – especially parties with extreme views, whether on the left or on the right. The <a href="https://twitter.com/drjennings/status/1024979357448720384">extensive body of research</a> so far has shown how media coverage largely benefits parties on the right (though it’s unclear why the far left does not similarly benefit) and can increase concerns over related issues, such as immigration.</p>
<p>The role of the media in national political debate has <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-mainstream-media-should-stop-giving-extreme-views-a-platform-101040">recently been the focus of discussion</a> following mainstream media appearances from an array of people from the far right of the political spectrum and the perceived normalisation of extreme views. It raises the question of whether this type of media coverage can, perhaps unwittingly, increase support for these same views. And at this particular time, there can be few more pressing questions than the role of journalism and the media in political life.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-mainstream-media-should-stop-giving-extreme-views-a-platform-101040">Why the mainstream media should stop giving extreme views a platform</a>
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<p>In a recent paper published in the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/does-media-coverage-drive-public-support-for-ukip-or-does-public-support-for-ukip-drive-media-coverage/81B77DDCA9B0DE26A8DF18B15158EF16?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=bjpols">British Journal of Political Science</a>, my colleague <a href="http://jmrphy.net/">Justin Murphy</a> and <a href="http://djdevine.net">I</a> revealed research into the dynamics between the poll ratings of the eurosceptic party, UKIP, and media coverage of the party over the period 2004 to 2017. </p>
<p>We used an online database of newspaper articles and <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/voting-intention-great-britain-recent-trends">Ipsos-Mori’s polling data</a> – and controlled for a range of factors, such as concern about immigration, election results and other key moments of UKIP’s coverage. We found that increased newspaper coverage for UKIP did indeed lead to increases in UKIP’s support – but, importantly, there was no evidence that popular support had increased media coverage. So what this means is that – at least in the case of UKIP and the print media – public opinion followed the media rather than vice versa.</p>
<p>From this statistical analysis, we also identified key periods where increased media coverage followed declining or stagnating levels of support – in other words, periods in which media interest in UKIP did not seem to be prompted by any objective party-related activity – an election campaign, for example. Translated into polling activity, we concluded that the maximum increase in UKIP’s poll ratings from this media coverage was a relatively humble 1%. A small but not insignificant amount.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=225&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=225&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=225&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">What the numbers say: media coverage is indicated by a solid line and polling by a dotted line.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">University of Southampton</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What the data tells us …</h2>
<p>The important message from this is about the dynamics of media coverage and support rather than the increase in poll ratings. Our paper, in line with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17457289.2012.693933">research from other countries</a> such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, shows that media coverage has a direct influence on support for parties such as UKIP, rather than support causing media coverage. This is problematic for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/08/ofcom-blow-green-party-election-debate-boost-ukips">Ofcom’s claim</a> in 2015 that UKIP’s extensive media coverage in the run up to the election was justifiable based on the party’s poll ratings, precisely because poll ratings may, in part, reflect previous coverage by newspapers.</p>
<p>This should raise some ethical questions on the part the press plays in the public’s discussion of politics. It does not appear, at least in this study, that the coverage of UKIP is proportionate to other objective phenomena like elections – at least not at key moments of UKIP’s growth. It highlights the power of the media in shaping public opinion – and that the media interest in UKIP could well be a function of their own previous coverage rather than movements in public opinion or external factors. </p>
<h2>… and what it doesn’t</h2>
<p>Like all research, the findings need to be put in context. We did not look at media coverage outside of newspapers, such as TV, radio or social media, which became increasingly important over the period of our study. While newspaper coverage – print and online – is likely a good indicator of overall media coverage, we cannot say anything about the role of these other media.</p>
<p>Similarly, we did not look at content, just the amount of press coverage, and so cannot say whether the media was “biased” towards UKIP. On the contrary it’s quite likely that much of the coverage was negative (at least until the later years of the study). This may have played into UKIP’s hands as an anti-establishment party.</p>
<p>We also leave it as an open question of why media coverage leads to UKIP support. There are several plausible mechanisms, explored in other academic research. It may simply be a matter of “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10584609.2010.516798%22">more is better</a>” – where more publicity makes people more aware of the party and therefore more likely to vote for it. On the other hand, the periods in which UKIP’s support increases surround events such as European elections, the lifting of work restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian workers, and, of course, the EU referendum.</p>
<p>Since coverage of issues that a party “owns” <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10584600490522743">can increase support</a>, it is possible that coverage increases support as it links to UKIP’s issues, such as Europe and immigration, with cues on the party’s position.</p>
<h2>Media matters</h2>
<p>Despite these limitations, both this study and the vast majority of work preceding it tell us one thing: media matters. This is true even in the UK, a political setting least likely to favour such a relationship – a two-party system that does not facilitate the success of new parties. But it is by no means the most important factor, at least in the case of UKIP. And we still do not really know precisely why media coverage fuels party support.</p>
<p>But most problematically, this research comes with no easy answers as to what we can do about it. And we probably won’t find the answers until we know the mechanism underlying the relationship. Despite not having a single sitting MP, UKIP routinely gets more <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/green-party-jonathan-bartley-complaint-bbc-local-elections-2017-ukip-disproportionate-coverage-a7723626.html">press coverage than the Green party</a>. One potential solution is to avoid chasing extreme positions and rather have coverage that reflects a party’s election results. Until then, articles about how parties increase their support perhaps unknowingly add just one more voter to the polling statistics – without the parties having to do any campaigning at all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101128/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Devine receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). He is affiliated with the Open Society European Policy Institute. </span></em></p>Research has shown that UKIP polling is driven by media coverage rather than the reverse.Daniel Devine, PhD Researcher, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/959692018-05-04T14:19:20Z2018-05-04T14:19:20ZLocal election stalemate, but Brexit continues to bubble away below the surface<p>At first glance it’s not obvious that Brexit had much of an impact on the May 2018 local elections in England. After all, potholes and bin collections have seemingly little to do with the ins and outs of the Brexit negotiations. However, alongside the collapse of support for UKIP, the geographic and cultural divides revealed by the Brexit vote remain influential in English politics. </p>
<p>London voted to Remain in the EU by a 20-point margin. By contrast, district councils being contested outside London <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/local-elections-council-tories-labour-results-polls-jeremy-corbyn-london-a8327986.html">voted to Leave by roughly 55 to 45</a>, a ten-point gap. And this Brexit divide has largely played out in the local elections. </p>
<p>Our early analysis shows the Conservatives lost as many seats as they gained across the Brexit divide. After the results of 108 councils had been declared, the party gained 94 seats within areas that voted Leave, but it lost 91 in Remain-voting areas. Labour managed to bridge this divide better, winning 53 seats in Remain areas and losing only ten in Leave areas, producing a net gain of 43. Both parties have had difficulties triangulating between their supporters, but this suggests the Conservatives have been less effective at bridging the Brexit divide, losing as many seats as they have gained. </p>
<p>Labour – hoping to capitalise on its softer Brexit position – had a broadly positive night in the capital, albeit one that was far from decisive. It <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/cv8k1e8g5dwt/wandsworth-london-borough-council">failed to take Wandsworth</a> despite making a net gain on the Conservatives of 15 seats. Barnet and Westminster, two other London councils touted as potentially turning red for the first time ever, also failed to do so, with Barnet going Conservative due in no small part to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/04/labour-antisemitism-scandal-blamed-for-tory-win-in-barnet">Labour’s problems with antisemitism</a>. </p>
<p>Labour had strong performances in Redbridge, Hammersmith and Fulham, Enfield and Ealing, but with three-quarters of the resulted announced, it ultimately hadn’t manage to turn any non-Labour councils in London into a majority.</p>
<p>Outside London, Remain citadels also seemed Labour’s best bet. But even here they failed to make a decisive breakthrough. Trafford district council in Greater Manchester, which Labour held only during the absolute peak of New Labour’s support between 1996 and 2002, went to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-43999868">no overall control</a> from a Conservative majority, with Labour’s nine-seat swing not enough to take it. </p>
<p>The results in London weren’t as bad as had been feared for the Tories. But although it wasn’t sufficient to precipitate decisive swings, there was clearly a Brexit effect in some areas. The party suffered heavy losses in Richmond-upon-Thames, as well as Tandridge just south of the capital, at the hands of the Liberal Democrats, and in Redbridge most notably at the hands of Labour. Although it’s difficult to extrapolate to general election constituencies, the Richmond result especially must concern the party for its parliamentary seats of Richmond Park and Putney. </p>
<p>Areas such as Swindon – which voted bang on the 55:45 average in the referendum outside London and had a significant, though ultimately unsuccessful, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000947">swing to Labour</a> in 2017 – hardly moved, with the Conservatives holding the council despite losing one seat to Labour. </p>
<h2>A post-UKIP electorate</h2>
<p>Both main parties clearly face a trade-off in their Brexit positions. Labour paid a price for its softer Brexit approach. In <a href="https://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/local-elections-2018-what-result-14606717">Walsall</a>, a hung council closely contested by Labour and the Conservatives that voted 68% to leave the EU, Labour lost a net seven seats to the Conservatives. The Tories suffered similar losses on many London councils.</p>
<p>Perhaps more important for the future will be the areas that voted more narrowly to Leave the EU – within a 50-55% margin – such as Colchester, Southampton and Worcester. The dial hardly moved for these areas in the local elections and they remain closely fought, with no dividend to be gained from a previous significant UKIP presence.</p>
<p>Eurosceptic voters clearly now have few alternatives with the collapse of UKIP – which has <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/uk-politics-43998600">only a handful of councillors left</a>. Nevertheless, it was a mixed picture for the former UKIP vote in key councils. The Conservatives took Basildon by swallowing half of UKIP’s former seats, but it lost ground to Labour in Thurrock, where three of UKIP’s five seats went red.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"992381981097775104"}"></div></p>
<p>The Conservatives have consistently taken more of the UKIP vote than Labour since the referendum. In the <a href="http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Article-50-one-year-on.pdf">2017 general election</a>, the Conservatives secured 51% of the 2015 UKIP vote, while 17% went to Labour. At these local elections, the Conservatives benefitted from this restructuring of UKIP supporters, gaining Basildon, bringing Dudley to an even split with Labour and almost decimating Labour’s leads in North-East Lincolnshire and Nuneaton and Bedworth – all of which were heavily Leave-voting areas. </p>
<p>The local elections have impacted in important ways on the Brexit parliamentary process. Theresa May’s precarious path to Brexit has meant crunch votes on a customs union with the EU were delayed until after these elections. </p>
<p>Governments are often expected to suffer defeats in mid-terms elections. So the broadly benign result probably prevents both extremes of the Conservatives’ Brexit divide from making too much of it. While May could be criticised for lacking the political skills to sell a positive Brexit vision in Leave-leaning places such as Thurrock, the fact that the Conservatives held on to key London councils such as Wandsworth and Westminster will temper criticism from the Remain wing of the party.</p>
<p>Brexit was clearly not the only factor at play in these elections, however it has left divides across the country. Nearly a year on, England is just as divided as it was at the general election – and at the referendum before that. </p>
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<p><em>This article has also been published by <a href="http://ukandeu.ac.uk/local-election-stalemate-but-brexit-continues-to-bubble-away-below-the-surface/">The UK in a Changing Europe</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Wager works at The UK in a Changing Europe, an initiative funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Bevington does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What impact did Brexit have on the local election results?Alan Wager, Research Associate, The UK in a Changing Europe, King's College LondonMatthew Bevington, Researcher, UK in a Changing Europe, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/943092018-04-04T19:13:28Z2018-04-04T19:13:28ZItaly’s Five Star Movement: Looking at an ‘unclassifiable’ political force from a marketing perspective<p>The March 4 Italian elections were marked by the breakthrough of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/05/five-star-leader-open-to-coalition-talks-despite-founders-warning">Five Star Movement</a>, which was the leading party with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/mar/05/italian-elections-2018-full-results-renzi-berlusconi">32% of the vote</a>. Known as “M5S”, after its name in Italian, the Movimento 5 Stelle, the
party was founded in 2009 by the comedian Beppe Grillo and his fans. For many national and international observers, it’s unclassifiable in terms of the traditional left-right conception of political parties. For this reason, it is simultaneously defined as anti-party, anti-system and populist. </p>
<p>However, the M5S is a result of a general feeling coming from Western societies, which are less centred than they were in the past on work and the culture of production, on which the traditional political consensus is based, and are more focused on the culture of consumerism – thus the now-common expression “consumer societies” used by sociologists and marketers. In this regard, the M5S stands apart from many European populist movements because it is above all a fandom, a movement of activists who are mobilised by the messages of a brand-name celebrity from the culture industry: Beppe Grillo.</p>
<h2>Origins and achievements</h2>
<p>The M5S is rooted in Grillo’s blog, <a href="http://www.beppegrillo.it/">beppegrillo.it</a>, which he launched in 2004. In the blog he discussed economic and social issues, but also denounces the failings of the Italian political class. By 2008 the blog had become, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2008/mar/09/blogs">according to <em>The Guardian</em></a>, one of the most influential in the world. </p>
<p>From a marketing point of view, Grillo is a celebrity operating as a commercial brand, with his texts and public following. Since 2004, the comedian’s fans have organised themselves into groups of local activists, “Friends of Beppe Grillo”, who participate in local debates. In 2007 Grillo used the blog to launch a political program. The discussions concerned issues of public interest intended for presentation to the then prime minister, Romano Prodi, so that he would integrate them into the governmental agenda. This did not happen. </p>
<p>During the period 2007–2008, Grillo organized in Bologna and Turin, and streamed live for other Italian cities, two “V-Day” protest rallies. Signatures were collected for peoples’ bills to reform the political class, intended to be presented to public institutions, but once again this was not followed up. The year 2008 saw for the first time the inclusion of civic lists in local elections for Beppe Grillo. On October 4, 2009, M5S was officially established. In 2010, the parties’ activists participated in regional elections – Campania, Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy, Piedmont and Veneto – with promising results.</p>
<p>In the 2013 national elections, and against all the odds, the M5S achieved the same scores as the traditional left-wing and right-wing parties, gaining about 25% of the vote. From 2013 to 2018, the M5S took a position within the opposition in the Italian Parliament, where it denounced acts it claimed were carried out against the interests of the Italian people and in favour of the groups holding power. In 2016, the party won local elections in major cities such as Rome and Turin. In 2018, in the March 4 elections, the M5S became the leading party <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/05/five-star-leader-open-to-coalition-talks-despite-founders-warning">with 32% of the vote</a>, followed by the Partito Democratico, with just 18%.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/SRUFwt5tFws?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Helena Norberg-Hodge of Local Futures speaks with Beppe Grillo, founder Five-Star Movement (subtitled).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A populist movement… in a consumer society</h2>
<p>M5S is part of the wave of “populist” parties that have emerged in Europe recently. They range widely across the political spectrum, including the left-wing, anti-austerity <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/12/podemos-pablo-iglesias-spain-re-election-inigo-errejon">Podemos</a> in Spain, the Europhobe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/09/ukip-group-fails-bid-restore-eu-funding-amid-inquiry">UK Independence Party</a> (UKIP), the extreme-right <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/29/germanys-far-right-afd-leader-margaret-thatcher-is-my-role-model">Alternative for Germany</a> (AfD) and the overtly neo-fascist <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/donald-trump-muslim-ban-greece-neo-nazi-golden-dawn-athens-march-protest-a7555706.html">Golden Dawn</a> in Greece. All these movements appeared in response to crises within the traditional parties.</p>
<p>Yet M5S also has characteristics in common with the party of current French president Emmanuel Macron, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/18/emmanuel-macron-marches-on-majority-french-parliament">La République en Marche</a>, in particular its transversality between left and right. M5S also distinguishes itself through its origins: it was created by the comedian Beppe Grillo, with the support of a digital entrepreneur, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/03/italy-five-star-movement-internet">Gianroberto Casaleggio</a>, and the movement’s fans. </p>
<p>What seems unclassifiable in terms of traditional political alignments has proved to be reasonably consistent with current general feeling within Western society, which is, above all, a consumer society. Moreover, it is not simply by chance while the M5S found it difficult to gain ground among those over 50, it found its support among the young.</p>
<h2>Fandom’s power</h2>
<p>The relationship of Beppe Grillo to his fansin this case – known as “grillini” – and they to each other often plays out through the Internet. Fandoms are the result of mass or popular consumer culture, where media texts, and celebrities in particular play a central role. The fans claim ownership of media content, used in turn for the creation of new content, with the aim of challenging the establishment’s political, economic and financial powers. In this scenario, a large part of the media and news programming acts as a defending wall for the dominant elites, while the Internet is the weapon with which supporters wage their guerrilla war against the system, as they spread counter-information and an alternative vision of life within society. </p>
<p>As a fandom, the M5S has come up against the status quo and the mechanisms that govern it. The M5S subverts the traditional classifications of left and right, while at the same time proposes a universal income for all citizens living below the poverty line and support for small and medium-sized businesses. The Internet – including Grillo’s blog as well as its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/world/europe/italy-election-davide-casaleggio-five-star.html">Rousseau platform</a> – is not only a means of communication, but is also an infrastructure for the movement’s operations, the selection of its candidates, the proposal and discussion of its ideas and the development of its programs. The Internet is the means by which the M5S aims to replace one of the fundamental institutions of modern democracies, representative democracy. Instead, it will be direct democracy, enabled by the Internet.</p>
<p>Therein lies the difference between the M5S and other European “populist” movements. While they may have acquired more fluid forms adapted to contemporary society, they remain linked to political categories and/or the history of the traditional parties. The M5S is pure expression of the power that consumer culture – the brand and its fans – exerts on Western societies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregorio Fuschillo is a member of the Five Star Movement.</span></em></p>While often lumped with other European populist parties, Beppe Grillo’s M5S is a movement of activist fans mobilized by the messages of his “celebrity brand”.Gregorio Fuschillo, Professeur assistant de marketing et de consumer culture « theory », Kedge Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/904932018-01-23T12:57:32Z2018-01-23T12:57:32ZThree paths UKIP could take now after Henry Bolton leadership standoff<p>One of the big arguments for bringing outsiders into politics is that they can bring insights from their previous roles. The current leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), Henry Bolton, might possibly be musing on this right now, given his extensive experience in the British Army, navigating hostile environments and promoting post-conflict stabilisation.</p>
<p>Bolton’s current woes have been long in the making. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/29/henry-bolton-elected-new-leader-of-ukip">Elected in September 2017</a> with only 30% of the vote, his success was in part due to being neither the far-right Anne Marie Waters nor one of the longer-standing figures in the party hierarchy: he was the centrist choice to move beyond the Nigel Farage era.</p>
<p>That disconnect is now proving to be his undoing, as opponents <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/01/22/ukip-deputy-leader-partys-brexit-spokesman-resign-pressure-grows/">line up to quit</a> their party posts and to press him to resign because of his relationship with former girlfriend Jo Marney, who it <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/henry-bolton-ukip-racism-row-meghan-markle-jo-marney-leader-ends-relationship-girlfriend-texts-a8159281.html">was reported sent offensive</a> racist text messages. His resilience under fire, and refusal to resign, means that it will now be up to an <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukip-leader-henry-bolton-leaves-fate-to-party-members-vote-11219265">emergency general meeting</a> of the membership to decide his future.</p>
<p>But what does the future hold for UKIP in general? Here are three possible paths.</p>
<h2>You complete me</h2>
<p>In times of such existential distress, there is an obvious temptation for the party to return to its glory days, and to the one man who seemed to be able to make it all hold together: Farage.</p>
<p>Farage’s looming presence was only deepened by Bolton’s choice to speak exclusively to Farage about the situation, on the <a href="http://www.lbc.co.uk/radio/presenters/nigel-farage/nigel-farage-tells-ukip-leader-henry-bolton-his-ac/">latter’s LBC radio show</a> on January 22. That Farage gave his approval to Bolton’s decision to go to the membership will have done no harm, even if the support was rather equivocal.</p>
<p>In the history of the party, Farage is the only leader to have successfully stayed in office over several electoral cycles, albeit by dint of a ruthless removal of anyone who might pose a threat to his position as UKIP’s figurehead. His return would signal the possibility of regaining their biggest media (and popular) asset, as well as the return of several key financial backers at a time when income is ever more of a problem.</p>
<p>Farage has form in this: he’s had two occasions when he’s been <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-resignation-that-never-was-why-ukip-needs-farage-for-its-next-big-fight-41641">dragged back</a> to the leader’s office, so why not a third?</p>
<p>But it is precisely this that makes it problematic: there are only so many times you can play the returning hero card, especially if the coterie you have built up has since dispersed. As much as Farage signals the good times, he also presents the past and a rehashing of old battles. In short, he wouldn’t answer the fundamental question of what does the party do now.</p>
<h2>Boldly going</h2>
<p>That suggests a second path, namely embracing the new reality and building a new populist movement. That was the pitch of Farage’s immediate successor, Paul Nuttall, who saw that UKIP could move into old Labour heartlands to represent the dispossessed and disaffected, speaking for them on a range of issues, not just Europe or immigration.</p>
<p>Nuttall’s project was grounded in an understanding of what had changed, but the snap general election in June 2017 <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukip-faces-a-difficult-future-after-voters-deserted-britains-brexit-party-78883">called time on him</a> before he could really embed that within the party structures. Since then, the party has essentially trodden water.</p>
<p>Which leaves an opening for a new leader to pick up the reins and sell a vision of a new UKIP, fighting for all those who feel that Westminster doesn’t care about them and that Brexit Britain is precisely the time and place to break free of the shackles of the same old politicians and elites.</p>
<p>In this reading, Farage is just the wrong person; a man with too much baggage. Sadly – for the party – who is right is a much more difficult challenge. One of the more striking features of UKIP’s machinations since June 2016 has been the lack of a new face, a strong figure to unite and lead. Unless one appears, this project will remain little more than a glint in the eye.</p>
<h2>Ashes to ashes</h2>
<p>All of which takes us to the future that many <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/22/founded-ukip-national-joke-disappear-henry-bolton-alan-sked">commentators</a> see: a collapse into irrelevance. Even Farage himself pronounced that the party could have disappeared <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukip-leader-henry-bolton-leaves-fate-to-party-members-vote-11219265">within 18 months</a> if things continue to be badly handled.</p>
<p>Not only is there the issue of what the party stands for, but other threats lurk. Its finances are in a <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/20/ukip-leader-fights-political-career/">poor state</a> and set to worsen further once the income from the party’s MEPs in the European Parliament comes to an end in March 2019.</p>
<p>Reports continue that Farage could <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jan/21/nigel-farage-and-ex-ukip-donor-in-talks-over-new-political-project">form a new movement</a>, with his backer Arron Banks, which would be an obvious competitor to UKIP. At the same time, Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour continues to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/13/jeremy-corbyn-brought-ukip-voters-back-labour">win back</a> supporters who had defected to UKIP with its rhetorical radicalism.</p>
<p>In stark terms, perhaps the party’s time has come now it has achieved its hardline goal of getting the UK out of the EU. </p>
<p>And yet, the party’s history is both long and littered with internal rifts, fights, court cases and changing of locks at the central office. UKIP has never really settled – even Farage’s time saw many tensions, pushed down rather than resolved – and it has persisted.</p>
<p>Over the past decades the party has built a community and a constituency. For all its troubles, it still polled over a million votes in the 2017 election: not bad for a party apparently with no point.</p>
<p>The path for UKIP is going to be difficult, whatever it decides to do, but it would be wrong to assume that it will not try its hardest to get there.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90493/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Usherwood receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, as Deputy Director of the "UK in a Changing Europe" programme. He sits on the academic advisory board of Modern Europe. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of the research councils.</span></em></p>How does UKIP keep itself relevant after Brexit?Simon Usherwood, Reader in Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/793932017-06-16T13:50:22Z2017-06-16T13:50:22ZHow the spectre of Yugoslavia looms over EU’s handling of the refugee crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174172/original/file-20170616-505-v1g0t2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Memorial to early 1990s war in Sarajevo, Bosnia. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/26781577@N07/16027223292/in/photolist-egsG6G-6abNp5-7JM6DS-qqgH75-9y4d8t-rU8BDr">Clay Gilliland</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With peak season approaching for refugees making treacherous journeys to and through Europe, don’t be surprised if we are told again that this is unprecedented. That would certainly be in keeping with what <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34173972">news organisations</a>, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-idUSKCN0QZ0TK20150831">politicians</a> and <a href="https://www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf">research bodies</a> have asserted in the past several years. </p>
<p>In fact, Europe has coped with comparable situations – not least the Balkan crisis of the early 1990s. It tends to be overlooked that the Yugoslav experience has informed EU refugee policy this time around. Arguably this has made the situation better than it might otherwise have been. </p>
<p>Contrary to popular belief, similar numbers of people <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/3c3eb40f4.pdf">from the</a> former Yugoslavia <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/latest/2002/6/3d0f6dcb5/2001-global-refugee-statistics.html">sought</a> asylum in northern Europe as Syrians have <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report">more recently</a> – as demonstrated below. Indeed, more sought asylum from the former Yugoslavia in Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and the UK than from Syria so far. </p>
<p><strong>Asylum applications from Yugoslavs and Syrians</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173636/original/file-20170613-30061-fihe29.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sources: UNHCR, Eurostat.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Looking at asylum seekers <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en">in general</a>, more did come to most northern European countries during the 2010s than the early 1990s. Yet the difference is not enormous: approximately 2.5m in 1991-96 versus 3.2m in 2011-16. </p>
<p>While Germany, Sweden, France and Austria have recorded more applications in the more recent period, the opposite is true for the Netherlands and the UK. And since most northern European countries’ populations rose between the early 1990s and the early 2010s, the overall difference will also be less as a proportion of populations as a whole. </p>
<p><strong>Asylum applications as a whole</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173642/original/file-20170613-30093-13g8863.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sources: UNHCR, Eurostat.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Mediterranean spectacle</h2>
<p>The northern European media have nevertheless given much more prominence to the latest crisis. Partly this is because those seeking protection in the early 1990s mainly came by car, bus or train. In more recent years, many asylum seekers have taken to the seas to get around Europe’s strict visa laws. Images of distressed boat migrants played out in the media before millions of viewers. It became a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01419870.2013.783710">border spectacle</a>, which encouraged perceptions of migrants’ illegality in the process.</p>
<p>The fear of Islamic terrorists posing as refugees also differs substantially nowadays. Although many Muslims from Bosnia and outside Europe applied for asylum in the early 1990s, their religious background was not such an issue. </p>
<p>Following 9/11 – and numerous other Islamic terrorist attacks in the West – debates about immigration and asylum have become far more security and culturally oriented. This has frequently been driven by anti-immigration parties such as <a href="http://www.ukip.org">UKIP</a> in the UK, France’s <a href="http://www.frontnational.com">Front National</a> and the <a href="https://www.parlement.com/id/vhnnmt7m4rqi/partij_voor_de_vrijheid_pvv">Partij voor de Vrijheid</a> in the Netherlands. </p>
<p>These parties did sometimes break through in northern Europe in the early 1990s. The Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria attained 22% of the <a href="http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2017_94.htm">national vote in 1994</a>, for example. Nevertheless these parties have become much more media savvy and presentable, as demonstrated by Marine le Pen in France and the <a href="http://eureferendum.com">Brexit success</a> in the UK. This has been heavily assisted by the economic crisis and a sense of disillusion with mainstream politics. </p>
<h2>EU in the dock</h2>
<p>The anti-immigration parties attach much blame to the EU for allowing too many people to come in and failing to control what happens at borders. The truth is rather more complicated. </p>
<p>During both crises, many European states have adopted a beggar-thy-neighbour attitude to asylum. States, including Germany, that encouraged joint European responses have borne most of the burden. In 1994 Germany <a href="http://www.lse-students.ac.uk/THIELEMA/Papers-PDF/JRS-16-3-BS-Interests-Norms.pdf">proposed</a> a pan-EU distribution system for asylum seekers. Other EU members, especially the UK and France, opposed this – despite receiving relatively few applicants. In the end, the EU shelved the idea.</p>
<p>The likes of the Germans and Swedes perceived that the EU’s lack of power over immigration asylum policy was part of the problem, so they sought reform. As a result, the EU’s influence on the immigration and asylum affairs of member states has since developed significantly. The <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A41997A0819%2801%29">1997 Dublin Convention</a> requires asylum seekers to apply for protection in the first EU country they enter, while the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en">1999 Common European Asylum System</a> attempted to harmonise the whole asylum process. </p>
<p>Another lesson post-Yugoslavia was that instead of relying on the likes of the British, you seek alternatives. So instead of any move towards proper collective responsibility for EU asylum seekers, the southern and central European states <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9783319398280">have taken</a> more responsibility while the north’s commitment has stayed the same. </p>
<p>Southern EU countries, notably Greece and Italy, agreed to this in the 2000s because they had few refugees and wanted to implement a comparable system to the northern states over time. Newer EU states joined too late to influence negotiations. You can see the consequences in this graph:</p>
<p><strong>Applications in Hungary, Greece and Italy</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173768/original/file-20170614-21350-1lffgzm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sources: UNHCR, Eurostat.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Not only has the EU therefore reduced northern member states’ asylum burden, with Angela Merkel to the fore it successfully negotiated an <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/">agreement</a> with Turkey last March. This helped greatly reduce the numbers making the sea voyage to Greece, cutting all <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-top-363348-2016-deaths-sea-5079">boat voyages</a> to Europe by roughly two-thirds in 2016. </p>
<p>This has not solved the problem. The numbers dying at sea actually <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/23/record-migrant-death-toll-two-boats-capsize-italy-un-refugee">increased</a> in the same period despite this agreement because the journey from Libya to Italy is much more dangerous. It remains difficult for the EU to strike a deal with Libya – the country’s civil war is ongoing and it has never signed the <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/uk/1951-refugee-convention.html">UN Refugee Convention</a>. Migrants also <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf">tend to be</a> treated appallingly in Libyan detention centres. </p>
<p>Many EU states are nevertheless seeking a way around this problem –a <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-leaders-approve-plan-to-curb-migration-from-libya-africa/">plan was agreed</a> earlier this year to curb refugee numbers from Libya. Expect further debate about such initiatives once peak season begins. </p>
<p>In short, what separates the current refugee crisis is not its scale. It is that it has occurred during a <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/02/europe%E2%80%99s-refugee">perfect storm</a> of other factors: the economic crisis, the rise of anti-immigration parties, and a media <a href="http://serious-science.org/newspapers-in-crisis-5974">increasingly desperate</a> for readers and arguably resorting to ever uglier coverage to keep them. </p>
<p>Look beyond this and the northern European countries have clearly tried to learn from the past. The real question is whether the fix is workable – in particular, the shifting of some of the burden to southern and central European states. It is not at all clear <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/refugee-hotspots-in-italy-and-greece-not-yet-adequate-say-eu-auditors/">whether they have</a> the capacity to cope with it. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is part of a series on sustainability and transformation in today’s Europe, published in collaboration with <a href="http://www.europenowjournal.org">EuropeNow Journal</a> and the <a href="https://councilforeuropeanstudies.org">Council for European Studies (CES)</a> at Columbia University. Each article is based on a paper presented at the <a href="https://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/conferences/upcoming-conferences/2017-ces-conference">24th International Conference of Europeanists</a> in Glasgow.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Irial Glynn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Everyone has forgotten there were almost as many asylum seekers in Europe in the early 1990s as today.Irial Glynn, Marie Curie Intra-European Fellow at the Institute of History, Leiden UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/788832017-06-09T07:20:55Z2017-06-09T07:20:55ZUKIP faces a difficult future after voters deserted Britain’s Brexit party<p>The UK Independence Party, which campaigned for Britain’s departure from the European Union, has collapsed in the country’s general election. The party that two years ago secured <a href="http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7186">more than 4m votes and 12% of the vote</a> – has been reduced to a small fraction of this. It lost its only seat, in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000642">Clacton</a>, to the Conservatives, with under 2% of the vote share overall. Even its leader, Paul Nuttall, managed only <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000582">7.7% of the vote</a> in Boston and Skegness.</p>
<p>This was not an unexpected development. Since the last general election, UKIP has had to deal with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/having-divided-and-conquered-nigel-farage-makes-a-perfectly-timed-exit-62012">loss of Nigel Farage</a>, its charismatic and highly visible leader, and the loss of its defining policy goal – leaving the European Union. As was clear at the time of <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/08/26/is-there-still-a-point-to-ukip-the-future-of-british-euroscepticism-post-brexit/">last year’s referendum</a>, the party was going to have to undergo a major reinvention to demonstrate its continuing relevance to the broad coalition of supporters that it had built up.</p>
<p>While this was not an impossible task, it was made all the more difficult by the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38125432">poor handling</a> of finding a successor to Farage, and then by the calling of a snap general election. Nuttall, who wanted to build on the success of the party in Labour heartlands, simply lacked any time to get his message bedded down with the electorate.</p>
<p>As a result, UKIP has lost not only its groundswell of support, but also its representation in the Commons, soon to be joined by their longstanding base of operations in the European Parliament, which has given it both credibility and financing.</p>
<h2>Proven resilience</h2>
<p>But the history of the party should give pause for thought, before we write it off. On several occasions before now, UKIP suffered very strong reversals of fortune and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-31923185/ukip-history-from-sked-to-kilroy-silk-and-farage">deep internal splits</a>. While bitterly fought, none of these situations brought about UKIP’s collapse. Therefore the key question is whether this time will be any different.</p>
<p>On the one hand, the removal of the EU issue is a real blow to activists. UKIP has never had an ideological core: instead it has attracted the disillusioned and the disaffected from across the political spectrum, especially in those parts of society that feel left behind by other political parties. Taking away one of the few things that was broadly agreed – that the EU is a bad thing – gives even less common ground to share.</p>
<p>Farage’s departure highlights the lack of credible and visible faces in the party: it was a mark of his time as leader that any such challenges to his dominance were kept firmly to one side. Even if <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/09/brexit-nigel-farage-referendum-politics-uk-election-result-may-corbyn.html">he were willing to return once more</a> to his role, there has been something of a changing of the guard at the top of the party, which might mean they would not want him back – even with <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/paul-nuttall-resigns-ukip-leader-election-results-2017-a7781306.html">the sudden vacancy in the top job</a>. Nuttall was not been able to build the same charismatic bond so far with voters or the media, which has tended to focus attention back on the policies of the party.</p>
<p>And there is a financial dimension to all this. The impending loss of EU funding (via its representation in the European Parliament) means that UKIP will be relying more than ever on member contributions and big donors. With membership falling sharply since last year, and several donors looking to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/14/ukip-donor-arron-banks-says-he-has-quit-party-to-set-up-ukip-20">move on</a>, there has to be a question mark over whether already-curtailed operations can continue.</p>
<p>But it is important to remember that UKIP’s success was built not on the personality of Farage, but on the widespread sense of dissatisfaction with other parties. There clearly remains much potential within the electorate for a more populist agenda; something that is likely to increase as the practical difficulties and implications of Brexit become more evident in the months and years to come. If UKIP can ride out this current storm and reestablish itself as a viable avenue for protest, then it stands a chance of making this just one more bump in the road of its development.</p>
<h2>Stern tests ahead</h2>
<p>This suggests a look at three key elements in the coming weeks.</p>
<p>First, is there a leadership in place that can provide a stable focus for the party as an organisation? Having suffered a number of defections in the past year, are there other senior figures packing their bags, or are there splits over who should lead? Nuttall’s departure provides an obvious scapegoat for the big downturn in support, but as was apparent last year, there is a shortage of candidates to step into the breach.</p>
<p>Second, can the party communicate a clear set of policies to voters, to demonstrate its relevance? Nuttall’s project to tap into old Labour areas looked promising – although pickings in the general election were thin – but if this is to continue under the next leader then it requires buy-in from the rest of the leadership and a recognition that such a refocus might alienate some of the current, more right-wing parts of the support base.</p>
<p>And third, will there be enough money to keep UKIP afloat? This is less urgent, but the party will need to show relatively quickly that it can still attract some high-profile donors to its cause, if only as a backstop to the coming tightening of finances. This also matters to show the Westminster bubble that UKIP still counts for something.</p>
<p>This is not game over for UKIP, but it will be as stern a test as it has ever faced.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Usherwood receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, as a Research Investigator on the "UK in a Changing Europe" programme. He sits on the academic advisory board of Modern Europe. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of the research councils. </span></em></p>The party lost its seat in parliament and polled less than two per cent of the vote.Simon Usherwood, Reader in Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/791692017-06-08T22:23:31Z2017-06-08T22:23:31ZUK election: hung parliament casts doubt over Theresa May’s future<p><em>As the results continue to come in, it appears Theresa May’s snap election gamble has backfired. A hung parliament looks on the cards. Theresa May’s leadership is in grave doubt. The shape of the next government remains unclear. Experts react to the news.</em></p>
<p><strong>Stuart Wilks-Heeg, head of politics, University of Liverpool</strong></p>
<p>Theresa May is in deep, deep trouble. We know why she called the election; she wanted a bigger majority and a strong mandate ahead of the Brexit negotiations. At the time, it looked like she couldn’t fail, and now it seems that she has failed spectacularly. The campaign has fatally undermined her leadership, and the one thing that could have saved her – if she came through with a strong majority for the Conservative party – hasn’t happened. I think she is finished politically – whether she resigns, or is pushed out by her own party remains to be seen. </p>
<p><strong>Michael Kitson, University Senior Lecturer in International Macroeconomics, University of Cambridge</strong></p>
<p>The election result will bring economic uncertainty and instability not strength and stability. Many will focus on the short-term froth of falls in the pound and in stock markets but of greater concern are the significant long-term problems facing the UK economy. </p>
<p>Brexit is the most pressing issue: a common refrain was that an increased majority would provide Theresa May with more bargaining power over the terms of withdrawal. Well that cunning plan has gone down the drain. If the Conservatives form a minority government, the prime minister (whoever that may be) will have to balance the demands of fervent Brexit hardliners on their backbenches while confronted with an emboldened opposition. </p>
<p>As it stands, there is no coherent plan for Brexit, a failure often justified under the convenient veil of “not showing one’s hand”. Of additional concern is that there is an absence of a “long-term economic plan” – a soundbite that left the government with George Osborne. The economic strategy of the Conservatives is at best inchoate and, at worst, incoherent. It is a mixture of austerity-lite combined with an ill-defined industrial policy that will do little to increase productivity in the economy. We must wait to see if a new economic strategy emerges but a minority government is more likely to expend energy on short-term survival rather than planning for growth. </p>
<p><strong>Robin Pettit, senior lecturer in comparative politics, Kingston University</strong></p>
<p>Some big names went tonight. Amber Rudd survived in Hastings and Rye, but only just, serving as an indication of the kind of night the Conservatives have had. Former SNP leader Alex Salmond was ousted, as was former Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg – perhaps in a delayed backlash by young voters against tuition fees. There are some parallels to be drawn here. These high-profile losses suggest that both parties campaigned on issues which were largely felt to be settled: the SNP on a second Scottish independence referendum, and the Liberal Democrats on a second EU referendum, once a deal had been negotiated – neither of which the British people particularly wanted. Rather, there seems to be an acceptance of Brexit more generally – just not of Theresa May’s version. </p>
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<h2>Labour</h2>
<p><strong>Richard Murphy, professor of practice in international political economy, City, University of London</strong></p>
<p>Labour has had an exceptional night. Many will be feeling euphoric. But the reality is that it has not won and it seems incredibly unlikely that it could put together any form of Progressive Alliance. With a hung parliament on the cards it is almost certain that the next election campaign has already begun. The battle for a majority is now underway. To achieve this Labour has three tasks to concentrate on.</p>
<p>The first is to present a coherent Brexit plan. The second is to end its infighting and build cohesion behind an agreed policy platform. Third, it has to shatter the magic money tree myth by getting people to understand that its macroeconomic policy reflects <a href="https://theconversation.com/jeremy-corbyn-and-the-economics-of-the-real-world-47314">the way the world really works</a>.</p>
<p>Labour has done well. But in a few months it may have to do even better to get into government. And to everyone’s surprise that is now politically and economically plausible. </p>
<p><strong>Ben Williams, tutor in politics and political theory, University of Salford</strong></p>
<p>The Tories had estimated that the vast bulk of the collapsing UKIP vote would go to them in this election, particularly in the industrial north. Some claimed the party had <a href="http://www.itv.com/news/calendar/2017-06-08/joe-pike-theresa-mays-yorkshire-visits-looked-to-have-been-for-nothing/">adopted</a> an “M62 strategy” and sought to gain multiple parliamentary gains along the corridor of this motorway spanning across Lancashire and Yorkshire. But that doesn’t seem to have happened and a whole range of key target seats – such as Chester, Halifax and Darlington – that the Conservatives hoped to gain have stayed Labour red as a result. Even the very marginal seat of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000543">Barrow</a>, held by arch-Corbyn critic John Woodcock, has remained Labour against the odds.</p>
<p>But while Labour has performed as strongly as ever in its inner-city northern city strongholds such as Manchester, Sheffield and Liverpool, it was seen as vulnerable in the northern suburbs and smaller towns. However, its vote has proved to be resilient, fuelled by a higher national turnout and an influx of younger voters, as has been evident across the country.</p>
<p>Labour has even gone on to make some surprising northern gains such as the long-shot of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000645">Colne Valley</a> in Yorkshire, as well as other seats that the Conservatives were expected to hold fairly comfortably, such as Bury North, Warrington South and Weaver Vale. But such gains were somewhat sporadic, and Labour failed to gain various other northern seats that the party held prior to 2010 and which would be required to form a majority Labour government, while also failing to regain the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000647">Copeland</a> seat it lost in a by-election in early 2017.</p>
<p>The results in the north, while not particularly brilliant for Labour, were crucially better than expected. This in itself indicates some degree of appeal and durability to Corbynism outside of its perceived inner-city and London strongholds.</p>
<h2>Brexit</h2>
<p><strong>Kathryn Simpson, lecturer in politics and public services, Manchester Metropolitan University</strong></p>
<p>Dubbed the Brexit election, this general election provided very little clarity and specific details on what Brexit negotiations would be and what a post-Brexit UK would look like. And the electorate has recognised this.</p>
<p>There will not be a <a href="https://theconversation.com/strong-and-stable-leadership-inside-the-conservatives-election-slogan-77121">strong and stable government</a> by the time Brexit negotations begin on June 19. That will have a robust impact on Brexit.</p>
<p>The Brexit clock started ticking when May triggered Article 50 in March. Taking six weeks out of the <a href="https://blogs.surrey.ac.uk/politics/2017/03/24/an-article-50-timeline-infographic/">two-year Brexit negotiating window</a> to conduct a general election was risky, as it has eaten into the time available to deal with the EU. Now, with so much uncertainty about how the next government will be formed, more time will inevitably be lost.</p>
<p><strong>Daniel Fitzpatrick, lecturer in politics, Aston University</strong></p>
<p>In an election called to secure a clear mandate for Brexit, the result is no obvious mandate for any party. The mandate for the Conservative version of hard Brexit is in tatters, while a second independence referendum in Scotland is moot given the swing away from the Scottish National Party towards the unionist parties – the Scottish Conservatives particularly.</p>
<p>Political commentators are fond of naming elections, as a shorthand for the dominant issue of the day: the 1983 “Falklands” election, the 2005 “Iraq” election. Psephologists will tell you that such retrospective rationalisations do little to convey the complexities of voting behaviour.</p>
<p>But, rarely has an election been characterised so one-dimensionally before the campaign even begun. Although labelled the “Brexit election” by the Conservatives, Theresa May did little to establish that narrative beyond her supposed leadership credentials, which, to put it mildly, faltered. It figured surprisingly little in the election campaigns of the other mainstream parties, except for the Liberal Democrats.</p>
<p>Taking a largely ambivalent stance on EU, Labour has gained Remain seats in London and the South East and retained and won back marginal Leave seats in the North. It looks like neither the so-called Leave or Remain vote offers a reliable indication of the new electoral map. It has figured in certain parts of the country, but nowhere near as decisive as imagined. </p>
<h2>Scotland</h2>
<p><strong>William McDougall, lecturer in politics, Glasgow Caledonian University</strong></p>
<p>The Conservative party are performing much better in Scotland than anywhere else. In that sense, Scotland is again having its own election, different from the rest of the UK. This is probably due to the fact that the Scottish Conservatives have been able to run a separate campaign, disassociating themselves from Theresa May and the poor campaign the Conservatives have run in the UK as a whole. They’ve been able to focus on an anti-independence, anti-SNP message. But that does mean that it’s less clear what else the Scottish Conservative MPs stand for. Once they start voting in Westminster, we’ll have a clearer idea of where they stand on other policies.</p>
<p>The Scottish Conservatives could now play quite a vital role in the Westminster parliament. It could make all the difference for May as she attempts to hold on to power. It’s ironic: people often say that Scotland never gets to influence UK election results, and now it could be the Scottish Conservatives who keep the party on top. It puts their leader Ruth Davidson in a strong position within the Conservative party, although it might not have an impact on the direction of Brexit: the new Scottish Conservative MPs are likely to behave themselves in that respect.</p>
<h2>Liberal Democrats</h2>
<p><strong>Matthew Cole, teaching fellow, department of history, University of Birmingham</strong></p>
<p>The immediate evidence is that the two-party system has returned with a vengeance after a 30-year slumber, sweeping away UKIP and penning the Lib Dems back in their 2015 electoral ghetto.</p>
<p>Already three of the eight seats they won in 2015 have been lost, all in the north of England. Party leader Tim Farron was made to endure a recount in his own constituency, and it looks likely that the party’s overall share of the national vote has fallen back from its dismal 2015 low of 7.7%. The hope of reaching out to the 48% of Britons who voted to remain in the EU became a bitterly ironic dream, spiked by the triggering of Article 50 before the campaign; the plan for a second referendum has been marginalised politically.</p>
<p>There are silver linings to the cloud, however. The Liberal Democrats have established a core of representation in the capital and in Scotland, adding experienced and media-friendly figures to their enlarged parliamentary team – notably Vince Cable. Tim Farron can also take some credit for challenging and undermining the harsh version of Brexit which failed to secure Theresa May’s ambitions for a landslide majority. And the hung parliament which is emerging may be a productive environment in which to dilute that plan. </p>
<p>Compared to their highest hopes this election outcome must be disheartening for Liberal Democrat campaigners; but set against their worst fears it may in due course come to look like a stage in a process of consolidation.</p>
<h2>Northern Ireland</h2>
<p><strong>John Garry, professor of political behaviour, Queen’s University Belfast</strong></p>
<p>It seems that the two big parties have swept away all the others in Northern Ireland. Apart from an independent unionist candidate retaining her seat, the hardline unionist party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), have had a great electoral night at the expense of the Ulster Unionist Party, which has lost its two seats. On the nationalist side, it has been a dreadful election for the moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which has lost its three seats. The more hardline nationalists, Sinn Fein, have dramatically increased their support. </p>
<p>With the cross-party Alliance also winning no seats, the overall picture emerging is of a more polarised politics in Northern Ireland. This bodes ill for the kind of compromise and conciliation that will be needed to re-establish a power-sharing government – a process that was effectively put on hold once Theresa May called this snap Westminster election.</p>
<p>It is ironic that both the DUP and Sinn Fein, which are finding it difficult to form a government in Northern Ireland, were regarded as potentially key players in the election night commentary on government formation at Westminster. Would Sinn Fein change its policy of abstention and possibly prop up a Jeremy Corbyn premiership? “No”, was <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3758550/gerry-adams-congratulates-jeremy-corbyn-after-shock-election-2017-exit-poll-result/">the quick response</a> from the Sinn Fein leadership. It’s more plausible that the DUP could play a crucial role in sustaining a Conservative administration.</p>
<p><strong>Neil Matthews, lecturer in British politics, University of Bristol</strong></p>
<p>This election has arguably produced the best of results for Northern Ireland. The granite-hard Brexit promised by Theresa May – a scenario which would have disproportionately severe consequences for the region – has been effectively shelved.</p>
<p>In the weeks before the election both the European Union and UK government were at pains to stress the importance of Northern Ireland to the Brexit negotiations, declaring it a “first order” issue. Both agreed that any deal should see as “soft” a border as possible between Northern Ireland (i.e. the UK) and the Republic of Ireland (i.e. the EU). The hard gains of the peace process and the Good Friday Agreement were not to be trampled on by Brexit. </p>
<p>Those hard gains were, however, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-northern-ireland-peace-process-george-mitchell-stormont-good-friday-agreement-a7600086.html">widely seen to be under threat</a> from May’s Brexit plan. If she returned from Brussels without a deal – a scenario countenanced by the Conservative manifesto – then any bespoke arrangement for Northern Ireland would have inevitably been chucked out with the bath water. With this election result a Brexit deal that is sympathetic to the unique needs of Northern Ireland remains very much alive.</p>
<p>And, of course, Northern Ireland’s hand in the Brexit negotiations is likely to be strengthened further by the makeup of the next parliament and the precarious position of the Conservative government. Short of a majority, the government could well strike-up an arrangement with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Those ten DUP MPs – a team of canny and battle-hardened negotiators – would inevitably look to extract a great deal from the Tories in return for their support. Among other things, this shopping list would include a “frictionless” Irish border, as well as no internal UK border (between Britain and Northern Ireland). </p>
<p>The DUP’s election campaign promise was “to make sure Northern Ireland gets the best Brexit deal”. This result goes some way to ensuring that. </p>
<h2>Wales</h2>
<p><strong>Laura McAllister, professor of public policy and the governance of Wales, University of Cardiff</strong></p>
<p>Labour has cemented <a href="http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/politics/general-election-2017-live-updates-13150349">its grip on Wales</a> with three important gains. Voters mainly opted for one of the two main UK-wide parties, with the combined total vote share for Labour and the Conservatives at 84% – the highest since the 1960s.</p>
<p>Labour’s share of the vote increased by 12% points, making something of a mockery of the very early polls, which suggested that the Conservatives would win Wales for the first time since the middle of the 19th century. The Conservative vote was up 6%, but it is seats that count and the party lost three.</p>
<p>Labour still lost the election overall, for the the third time in a row, but once again it won Wales convincingly, underlining the strength of its reach and the depth of its dominance. It was an unmitigated disaster for the Liberal Democrats, which lost their single seat in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/W07000064">Ceredigon</a> to Plaid Cymru. The Liberal Democrats now have no representation in Wales for the first time in the party’s history.</p>
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<p>Plaid Cyrmu’s overall vote share was down 2% points to 10%, but with four MPs it gained its highest ever number of seats. Despite disappointments in the southern valleys and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/W07000041">Ynys Mon</a>, Leanne Wood’s leadership of the party was probably saved by the bell with the Ceredigon result.</p>
<h2>The Midlands</h2>
<p><strong>Parveen Akhtar, lecturer in political science, Aston University</strong></p>
<p>The Tories had a rough night in the Midlands, and they won’t have been expecting one. Their chances looked very different for them in May, when former John Lewis boss <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/05/former-john-lewis-boss-wins-west-midlands-mayoralty-andy-street">Andy Street</a>, won a stunning victory against Labour’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/15/sion-simon-west-midlands-mayoral-candidate-seeks-to-tell-a-different-labour-story">Siôn Simon</a> to become West Midlands Mayor. On a low turnout of 26.7%, Street won 50.4% against Simon’s 49.6% – hardly a thrashing, but a stunning win nonetheless in traditional Labour territory. </p>
<p>Perfectly logical then that Conservatives should target key marginal seats in Birmingham, birthplace of Nick Timothy, one of the two brains that make up <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexspence/theresa-mays-poor-campaign-has-exposed-her-dependence-on?utm_term=.ehr9B8l7J#.yu0WoPL63">Team May</a>. But in the end, as across the country, the Conservatives’ efforts simply didn’t pay off.</p>
<p>Labour held on to key seats in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000560">Edgbaston</a>, <a href="http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/general-election-results-northfield-2017-13057432">Northfield</a> and <a href="http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/general-election-2017-erdington-results-13053464">Erdington</a>. In Edgbaston, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-40212954">Preet Gill</a> made history by becoming the first female Sikh MP in the UK; she won 24,124 votes, increasing Labour’s 2015 majority by 10%. She takes over from pro-Brexit Labour MP Gisela Stuart, who had held the seat since 1997.</p>
<p>Other big stories from the Midlands include Labour’s capture of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-coventry-warwickshire-40211171">Warwick and Leamington</a>, a bellweather constituency where Matt Western won 25,227 votes – a 1,206 majority over the Conservative candidate. The Tories can draw some small consolation from unseating Labour in <a href="http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/general-election-results-walsall-north-13066378">Walsall North</a>; they also retained <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000868">Nuneaton</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000974">Stoke-on-Trent South</a> and comfortably sailed to victory in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000931">Solihull</a>. But as per the national results, tonight was clearly Labour’s night.</p>
<h2>Vote share</h2>
<p><strong>James Tilley, professor of politics, University of Oxford</strong></p>
<p>Poll leads for the Conservatives ahead of the election varied enormously. Much of the variation, although by no means all, has been due to the way that the pollsters predicted people’s likelihood to turnout.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173084/original/file-20170609-20851-1ov0xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173084/original/file-20170609-20851-1ov0xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173084/original/file-20170609-20851-1ov0xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173084/original/file-20170609-20851-1ov0xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173084/original/file-20170609-20851-1ov0xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173084/original/file-20170609-20851-1ov0xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173084/original/file-20170609-20851-1ov0xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">How did you vote?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/oscepa/17233690119/sizes/l">oscepa/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The polls with the highest leads for the Conservatives tended to predict low voting rates among younger people and people in working class jobs. We’ve seen this pattern of non-voting for the past few elections, arguably because these groups had become disillusioned with Labour. The polls with the lowest leads for the Conservatives assumed that these two groups would turn out to vote at higher levels than in 2015. The argument here was that Labour under Jeremy Corbyn is a more attractive proposition to more economically left-wing people. So who was right? </p>
<p>Obviously, we won’t know the actual result and we won’t know exact rates of turnout by age and social class for several months until the British Election Survey reports back, but the exit poll does seem to suggest that young people have turned out in larger numbers than at the past few elections.</p>
<p>Generally campaigns are not thought to matter enormously, but this may be the exception that proves the rule. Labour has evidently either converted some people who said they would vote Conservative a few months ago, or mobilised people who said that they wouldn’t vote.</p>
<p>It’s likely that both conversion and particularly mobilisation have been higher among younger voters. While it’s not a successful night for Labour in that it is still predicted to have 50 fewer seats than the Conservatives, at this stage it appears a clear success for the Labour campaign strategy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79169/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Tilley receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Williams a member of the association of Teachers and Lecturers, the Higher Education Academy and the Labour Party.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Fitzpatrick receives funding from the ESRC and EPSRC. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Garry is the Principal Investigator on the ESRC funded ‘Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study 2016’ and the Principal Investigator on the ESRC funded ‘The UK/Ireland Border and the Stability of Peace and Security in Northern Ireland’ study focusing on Brexit and Northern Ireland. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laura McAllister is a board member of the Institute for Welsh Affairs think tank.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Kitson has received funding from BIS, HEFCE, EPSRC, ESRC, AHRC, NERC and the MRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Parveen Akhtar is the recipient of British Academy and Economic and Social Research Council research grants.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Murphy owns and directs Tax Research LLP. He has been funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, Friends' Provident Foundation, Joffe Trust and others. He has worked for a number of UK trade unions and has been an economic advisor to Jeremy Corbyn.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robin Pettitt is a member of the Women's Equality Party, and a member of Loughton Residents Association. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stuart Wilks-Heeg has previously received funding for research or consultancy on electoral matters from the UK Electoral Commission and the UK Cabinet Office.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kathryn Simpson, Matthew Cole, Neil Matthews, and William McDougall do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rolling coverage of the general election results from expert academics.James Tilley, Professor of Politics, University of OxfordBen Williams, Tutor in Politics and Political Theory, University of SalfordDaniel Fitzpatrick, Lecturer in Politics, Aston UniversityJohn Garry, School of History, Anthropology, Philosohy and Politics, Queen's University BelfastKathryn Simpson, Lecturer in Politics and Public Services, Manchester Metropolitan UniversityLaura McAllister, Professor of Public Policy, Cardiff UniversityMatthew Cole, Teaching Fellow, Department of History, University of BirminghamMichael Kitson, University Senior Lecturer in International Macroeconomics, Cambridge Judge Business SchoolNeil Matthews, Lecturer in British Politics, University of BristolParveen Akhtar, Lecturer in Political Science, Aston Centre for Europe, Aston UniversityRichard Murphy, Professor of Practice in International Political Economy, City, University of LondonRobin Pettitt, Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Kingston UniversityStuart Wilks-Heeg, Head of Politics, University of LiverpoolWilliam McDougall, Lecturer in Politics, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/787812017-06-07T11:45:36Z2017-06-07T11:45:36ZFact Check: are only one in eight counter-terrorism referrals to Prevent made by Muslims?<blockquote>
<p>We need to get the Muslim community itself to sign up to the Prevent programme. Only one out of eight referrals to Prevent come from within the Muslim community. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Paul Nuttall, leader of UKIP, speaking during the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b08t0l7v/bbc-election-debate-2017-live-with-mishal-husain">BBC Election Debate</a> on May 31.</strong></p>
<p>Paul Nuttall’s comment about the number of referrals under the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011">Prevent</a>, used a statistic that was incorrectly quoted and dropped into the debate without context. The only publicly available statistic – quoted in <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/muslims-stay-silent-on-extremism-tip-off-scheme-r8mjg3ncg0j">The Times</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/dec/25/prevent-programme-lacking-referrals-from-muslim-community">The Guardian</a> in December 2015 – stated that out of 3,288 referrals to the Prevent programme in the first half of 2015, only 280 or 8.6% came from within the Muslim “community, family, friends and faith leaders”. Using Nuttall’s comparison, this would make it one in 12 referrals. </p>
<p>The figures were provided by the National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC) in response to a freedom of information request and refer to the first half of 2015. They are not official published government data. Other information is <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-statistics">held</a> by the Home Office on the gender, age, ethnicity and religion of people arrested under counter-terrorism legislation, but it does not publish data on those who make the referrals. </p>
<p>When I asked the NPCC, its press office stated that: “Those figures were given out under freedom of information requests” – but the information provided cannot be found on the relevant <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/FreedomofInformation/FOIandSubjectAccessRequests/FOIDisclosureLogs.aspx">part of its website</a>. </p>
<p>It should also be noted that referrals are made in line with Prevent legislation to the police, MI5, and on the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/report-terrorism">online anti-extremism website</a>, and not to what Nuttall calls the “Prevent programme”. If an individual is deemed vulnerable to all types of extremism and terrorism, they may be referred to what’s called the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance">Channel</a> programme. Between 2007 and 2014, other <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/FreedomofInformation/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx">data published by the NPCC</a> indicates there have been a total of 3,934 referrals to Channel and that 56% of those referred between April 2012 and March 2014 were recorded as Muslims.</p>
<p>UKIP were contacted twice for comment by The Conversation about Nuttall’s claim, but didn’t respond.</p>
<h2>Missing context</h2>
<p>Nuttall’s claim also misses much of the context surrounding the available statistics. It is not clear how the religion of the person making the referral to the Prevent programme was determined. The Times article assumes that “community, family and friends” will be, by default, Muslims. However, use of the terms “community” and “friends” indicates a wider pool of informants. </p>
<p>The statistics also have to be considered within the context of the number of Muslims that can potentially report radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. If 8.6% of all referrals did come from the local community, this represents a high number of reports coming from the Muslim population, as the <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/religioninenglandandwales2011/2012-12-11">2011 census</a> states that Muslims make up only 5% of the British population. </p>
<p>But looking at the number of referrals made to the Prevent programme is not indicative of its success or failure. Salman Abedi, who detonated a suicide bomb in Manchester in late May, was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/24/security-services-missed-five-opportunities-stop-manchester/">reported to authorities</a> on several occasions by members of his community and friends, but this did not prevent the attack. Further focus needs to be placed on the intelligence processes.</p>
<p>However, there has been a marked deterioration in attitudes towards the Prevent strategy. A 2011 NPCC report <a href="https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/new-research-indicates-muslim-communities-welcome-engagement">stated</a> that “Muslims welcome engagement”, but increasing terror attacks have caused some to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/society-of-mosques-to-boycott-anti-terror-prevent-programme">question</a> Prevent amid claims it is targeting Muslims.</p>
<p>Another NPCC research <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/ACT%20Campaign/NPCC%20Counter%20Terrorism%20Research%20Key%20Findings.pdf">report</a> on counter-terrorism published in January 2017 highlighted concerns raised by Muslims and other ethnic minorities over anonymity and fear of unfair treatment by the police. Growing disdain has been shown for the continuing need for the Muslim population to apologise for terrorist attacks, when the rise of the far-right has not stimulated the same response. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>The statistics quoted by Nuttall are incorrect, misleading and divisive. By claiming that Muslims are not doing enough he implies that the Muslim population knows more than they are letting on and are able to do something about it. This is not an internal problem for Muslims alone. Placing the responsibility of reporting suspicion on the Muslim population demonises them and makes them the only actors responsible for stopping future attacks.</p>
<p>Understanding that Muslims – like any other group, religious or secular – are part of the larger population will help to contextualise any statistics provided on their participation in counter-terrorism programmes. Assumptions that the Muslim community is cohesive and aware of the actions of every other Muslim must also be dispelled. </p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p><strong>Sarah Marsden, lecturer in politics, philosophy and religion, University of Lancaster</strong></p>
<p>The author is right to point out the difficulty in unpacking the statistics on the Prevent policy and its implementation. A primary source of information on Prevent referrals comes from freedom of information requests. These respond to specific queries rather than systematically reporting data. This makes it difficult to make sense of a complex picture, and allows people like Paul Nuttall to make political capital against a backdrop of unclear information.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, there are more up-to-date figures than the article suggests. More <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/043%2016%20NPCC%20response%20att%2001%20of%2001%2014042016.pdf">recent statistics</a> suggest that as many as 10,250 people have been referred to Channel between 2007 and March 2016. Approximately 70% of these are for what is defined as “international (Islamist) extremism”. Of these, the <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/097%2016%20Channel%20Referrals.doc">majority</a> have been referred by statutory bodies, and notably, over 4,800 have come from the education sector. However, it is not clear what role individuals outside of these institutions play in what is a maturing system for managing <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-happens-to-people-who-are-suspected-of-being-radicalised-53652">Channel referrals</a>. For example, a parent may tell the person at a school who is responsible for Prevent that they are concerned about a child. The referral may then be taken forward by the school, but its origin would have been from a member of the community.</p>
<p>But the author is right to challenge the assumptions that sit beneath Nuttall’s criticism of Muslim communities. Placing responsibility for reporting those who may be involved in terrorism with Muslim communities is deeply divisive. It overlooks the responsibility we all share to prevent terrorism, and the not insignificant challenges facing efforts to identify those who may be “at risk” of radicalisation. It also risks stigmatising Muslims, many of whom are distrustful of Prevent because of the perception that it unfairly targets their communities. Indeed, this scepticism may be a more powerful explanation for reporting patterns than any unwillingness to take responsibility for community safety.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78781/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We asked two academics to check the claim made by UKIP leader Paul Nuttall.Sameera M. Khalfey, Research Fellow in Defence, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/786912017-06-06T15:50:55Z2017-06-06T15:50:55ZFact Check: do the niqab and burqa prevent intake of vitamin D from sunlight?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172241/original/file-20170605-31047-4kjmn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Group of women wearing burqas.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=7120404">Nitin Madhav/Wikimedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>UKIP would like to ban the burqa and niqab being worn in public because <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39693154">it says</a> they “are barriers to integration”. However, UKIP is also concerned about the health of women who wear these garments as – according to its <a href="https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ukipdev/pages/3944/attachments/original/1495695469/UKIP_Manifesto_June2017opt.pdf?1495695469">manifesto</a> – they prevent the “intake of essential vitamin D from sunlight”. As part of The Conversation’s Fact Check series, we asked two academics to check the science behind the claim.</em></p>
<p>The niqab and burqa, worn for cultural or religious reasons, cover the wearer’s body and face. They are made of opaque material that greatly reduces the amount of sunlight reaching the skin and hence the amount of vitamin D that the body can generate. However, this is not a problem as vitamin D needs can be satisfied by <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK56070/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK56070.pdf">diet and supplementation alone</a>. </p>
<p>There are a number of peculiar aspects of vitamin D that are necessary to understand so that deficiency is avoided.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/vitamins-minerals/Pages/Vitamin-D.aspx">Vitamin D, the “sunshine vitamin”</a>, is unusual among vitamins. All other vitamins can only be obtained from diet, but vitamin D can also be made in the body. Synthesis by the body is dependent on a step requiring sunlight, specifically ultraviolet (UV) light reaching the skin. Without sunlight on the skin, little vitamin D will be made by the body.</p>
<p>For many reasons, people may not get enough sunlight. This can be because of the clothing they wear, because they have darker skin, because their jobs keep them inside, because they live at latitudes where the sun remains low in the sky, or because they purposefully keep out of the sun because of the known dangers of excessive sun exposure, namely skin cancer. <a href="http://ajcn.nutrition.org/content/72/3/690.full.pdf+html">Obesity</a> also decreases the ability of the body to use vitamin D. Clearly, there are many reasons why vitamin D deficiency may occur.</p>
<p>But restricting sunlight does not cause a problem if a person gets enough vitamin D from their diet or supplementation (vitamin D pills). There are high levels of vitamin D in foods such as oily fish, and smaller amounts in liver and egg. In some countries, foods, such as breakfast cereals and milk, are fortified with vitamin D. If a person doesn’t get much sunlight, they will need to consume enough foods high in vitamin D or take vitamin D supplements. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172437/original/file-20170606-3686-129ti6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172437/original/file-20170606-3686-129ti6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172437/original/file-20170606-3686-129ti6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172437/original/file-20170606-3686-129ti6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172437/original/file-20170606-3686-129ti6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172437/original/file-20170606-3686-129ti6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172437/original/file-20170606-3686-129ti6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">You can avoid vitamin D deficiency by taking supplements.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/cod-liver-oil-omega-3-gel-142484191?src=pd-same_artist-142484185-ZTeHxwWkVIsy2kwauC88Ig-1">R_Szatkowski/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Without vitamin D, serious health problems are inevitable. Vitamin D is essential to control the correct levels of calcium in the body, necessary for good bone health. Deficiency of this vitamin is the cause of bone weakening and deformities, such as <a href="http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/Rickets/Pages/Introduction.aspx">rickets in children and osteomalacia in adults</a>.</p>
<p>Rickets are a problem in <a href="https://theconversation.com/vitamin-d-needed-to-fight-comeback-of-childhood-rickets-19729">many parts of the world</a>, including places with an abundance of sun but where people are not exposed to enough sunlight. Vitamin D deficiency occurs in countries where wearing of the niqab and burqa is prevalent, such as <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4949819/">Saudi Arabia</a>, but also in countries like <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1365-2265.2011.04320.x/abstract;jsessionid=7041A7D96DFB1370FF8D9E103D96D5BC.f03t03">Australia</a> where sun exposure is reduced for other reasons, such as effective public health campaigns about skin cancer. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>The niqab and burqa do prevent the intake of vitamin D from sunlight. But problems only occur when the person is unaware of the potential damage due to lack of sunlight and does not redress this by increasing their vitamin D intake through diet or supplements.</p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p><em>Zaki Hassan-Smith, honorary senior research fellow, University of Birmingham</em></p>
<p>I agree with the author’s analysis. Setting the claim in the context of scientific evidence here is important for a meaningful examination of the manifesto claim. </p>
<p>Covering the skin is one of a number of risk factors for vitamin D deficiency, and, indeed, in the UK in winter there is <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sacn-vitamin-d-and-health-report">inadequate sunlight for vitamin D production</a>. In summer the level of exposure varies according to a number of factors from skin type, latitude, altitude to time of day. Most of the UK population is at risk of low vitamin D for <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28334220">some of the year</a>. If we extrapolate the findings of a recent European study, over <a href="http://ajcn.nutrition.org/content/103/4/1033.long">30m people in the UK</a> are estimated to have vitamin D deficiency or insufficiency. And our recent study of 116 UK-based healthy volunteers found that <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0170665">only 14%</a> had normal serum vitamin D concentrations. So, the premise of the UKIP statement that wearing a niqab or burqa is an important risk factor for vitamin D deficiency is questionable in settings such as the UK, as, for most of the year, no one else is making any vitamin D via their skin. </p>
<p>Recent guidance from NICE on the prevention of vitamin D deficiency recommends that those “at risk” should take daily vitamin D supplements. Evidence-based public health measures on vitamin D are welcome, and universal supplementation strategies in at risk groups <a href="http://adc.bmj.com/content/97/11/952.long">can be effective</a>. Nobody needs to suffer from vitamin D deficiency, regardless of what they wear.</p>
<p><em>The Conversation is checking claims made by public figures and in the public domain. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert then reviews an anonymous copy of the article. Please get in touch if you spot a claim you would like us to check by emailing us at uk-factcheck@theconversation.com. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78691/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We asked two experts to check a claim in the UKIP manifesto.Peter McCaffery, Professor of Biochemistry, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/783792017-05-26T16:25:51Z2017-05-26T16:25:51ZCut immigration and the UK’s economic prospects will just get worse – here’s why<p>After having arguably been one of the most powerful fear factors exploited by the Leave campaign during the EU referendum, the debate on immigration is continuing apace during the UK general election campaign. Given its central role in the campaign thus far, immigration will clearly continue to shape Brexit policy after June 8 – and free movement is likely to remain one of the UK government’s red lines in the forthcoming negotiations with the EU.</p>
<p>Anti-immigrant politicians often say they simply <a href="https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2016/08/britain-ready-mature-immigration-debate-theresa-may/">want a “debate”</a> on migration. Yet targets around net migration are being proposed without a rational debate about the country’s future economic needs. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/37223e92-3319-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e">we have seen</a> in countries such as Germany and France over the past year, “political sentiment” is not a given – courageous political leadership can help shape that sentiment. Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron have both argued against hard immigration quotas as part of their election bids. As far as the UK is concerned, the facts are absolutely clear. Those of us who believe in the economic and social benefits of an open, welcoming society should not be shy about using them. </p>
<p>First, there is no evidence that EU immigration has damaged the living standards of UK workers. Jonathan Wadsworth and colleagues at the London School of Economics <a href="http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit05.pdf">showed convincingly that</a> across UK local authorities from 2008-15, EU immigrants had no statistically significant impact on the real wages of UK-born workers. Neither did it affect the job prospects of low-skilled UK-born workers. </p>
<p>Second, the reduction in immigration will undoubtedly hit the country hard. The UK economy is effectively at full employment. What unemployment remains is <a href="http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=61365">mainly structural</a> due to mismatches in both skills and demand and supply in different regions. It can only be reduced gradually through training and greater investment in areas of higher unemployment. </p>
<p>Indeed, this is why EU immigration, particularly in low and medium-skills jobs, has increased over time: EU migrants are, by definition, more geographically mobile within the UK and prepared to move to where jobs are available or match the available skills. The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-39448424">hospitality</a> and <a href="http://ukandeu.ac.uk/migrant-labour-and-agriculture/">agricultural</a> sectors are cases in point. </p>
<p>Cutting immigration will therefore hold back the economy, as most economic commentators <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Er85u-DsU6M">agree</a>. This was an important part of predictions that GDP growth would be lower after Brexit. Lower growth will in turn mean fewer resources for public spending. The Office for Budget Responsibility in November 2016, on a reasonably benign interpretation of Brexit, <a href="http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/efo/economic-and-fiscal-outlook-november-2016/">duly projected</a> a shortfall in the UK’s public finances totalling about £5.9bn per year by 2020-21. </p>
<p>Third, these negative economic effects could be magnified for some parts of the UK. For many years Scotland’s <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/articles/overviewoftheukpopulation/february2016">weaker population growth</a> relative to the UK has been a source of serious concern, affecting its ability to grow the economy. </p>
<p>In 2015 there were 181,000 non-UK EU nationals living in Scotland, which is 3.4% of the total population. Yet the 115,000 non-UK EU nationals aged 16 and over who were in employment in Scotland accounted for 4.5% of total employment. The upshot is that EU nationals have <a href="http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0051/00515360.pdf">higher employment rates in Scotland</a> compared to UK nationals for all age groups, except those aged 35 to 49 years old. </p>
<p>This means that if Scotland sees a significant decline in the number of EU nationals post-Brexit, it could hit the tax base severely and greatly limit the resources the Scottish parliament has at its disposal. The impact on the NHS, education and other core services might be profound. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171056/original/file-20170525-23224-15sr4r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171056/original/file-20170525-23224-15sr4r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171056/original/file-20170525-23224-15sr4r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171056/original/file-20170525-23224-15sr4r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171056/original/file-20170525-23224-15sr4r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171056/original/file-20170525-23224-15sr4r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171056/original/file-20170525-23224-15sr4r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171056/original/file-20170525-23224-15sr4r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Scottish parliament: budget cuts a-comin’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/edinburgh-scotland-may-15-exterior-scottish-260679551">cornfield</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For London, the problem could be even greater. Its workforce has grown from 4.3m people in 2005 to just under 5.2m over the past ten years. Of these, 682,300 workers were born in the EU (13% of London’s total workforce). This has <a href="http://www.pwc.co.uk/legal/pdf/facing-facts-the-impact-of-migrants-on-london-its-workforce-and-economy.pdf">more than doubled</a> over the past ten years from 326,700, with a further 12% of London’s workforce made up of migrants from outside the EU.</p>
<p>In both places, despite the rhetoric in some of the popular press, EU migrants are economically very active – with around 65% in total in employment or studying. Financial services are obviously a major part of London’s economic strength, and 15% of people in the sector are EU nationals. Meanwhile, 13% of NHS doctors in London are EU nationals – and London has <a href="http://www.pwc.co.uk/legal/pdf/facing-facts-the-impact-of-migrants-on-london-its-workforce-and-economy.pdf">more than the UK average of 10%</a> of NHS staff posts unfilled, so EU workers’ importance can’t be minimised. </p>
<h2>Blame the others</h2>
<p>Undoubtedly, immigration has been the scapegoat for a feeling of alienation in UK society. Again, the data offers a clear explanation. Despite <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11900934/UK-GDP-growth-stronger-previously-though-recovery-ONS.html">GDP recovering</a> since the 2008 financial crisis, median real wages and living standards <a href="http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/ea036.pdf">have declined</a> – performing poorly even <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/jul/27/uk-joins-greece-at-bottom-of-wage-growth-league-tuc-oecd">compared to</a> other European countries. As Rui Costa and Stephen Machin at the LSE <a href="http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/ea036.pdf">note</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Since the global financial crisis of 2007/08, workers’ real wages and family living standards in the UK have suffered to an extent unprecedented in modern history … </p>
</blockquote>
<p>What is therefore incumbent on politicians during this election campaign is to address the issues which have caused this to happen: low productivity growth, a shift in the distribution of GDP from real wages to profits and the lack of a culture of investment (including in skills). Regrettably, the debate on how to boost productivity growth has been far less visible in the campaign so far. </p>
<p>As for immigration, there are two immediate conclusions. A clampdown on immigration with arbitrary targets that do not recognise our labour supply and skills needs is likely to reduce economic growth and thus will exacerbate, not heal, social tensions. </p>
<p>Second, there are different needs in the various parts of the UK. A different approach to the post-Brexit immigration regime for certain sectors and economies such as Scotland and London is therefore going to be essential. The Scottish parliament’s Culture, Tourism, Europe and External Relations Committee <a href="http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/CurrentCommittees/103394.aspx">pointed out</a> that other countries such as Canada, Australia and Switzerland have run differentiated systems of immigration. We should consider this seriously.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78379/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anton Muscatelli is chair of the Scottish government's Standing Council on Europe.</span></em></p>Immigration targets are based on a lack of understanding of the UK’s labour needs and could seriously damage the economy.Anton Muscatelli, Principal and Vice Chancellor, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/777642017-05-18T12:52:28Z2017-05-18T12:52:28ZHow UKIP’s decline could provide a major boost for Theresa May<p>The British prime minister Theresa May called a <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-2017-how-the-main-parties-shape-up-ahead-of-snap-vote-76360">snap general election</a> in the expectation that it will deliver her a substantially increased parliamentary majority. This in turn would give her the “strong and stable government” she hopes for as she enters the crucial Brexit negotiations. </p>
<p>So far, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-39856354">opinion polls suggest</a> that the Conservatives have a large lead over Labour. But in order to attain the desired majority, they need to win a substantial number of seats from Labour. There were, however, fewer marginal seats following the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results">2015 general election</a> than after any previous election since World War II – just 42, for example, where Labour won by a majority of less than ten percentage points over the Conservatives. </p>
<p>If the Conservatives were to win all of them, they would have 374 MPs in the new parliament compared to Labour’s 195 and a majority over all parties of 98. </p>
<p>So how winnable are those 42 seats? The likelihood of many Labour voters from 2015 switching to the Conservatives in 2017 is small, so the Conservatives will have to gain most of the extra votes from other sources. One likely source is those who last time voted for UKIP. </p>
<p>Polls <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/general-election-2017-ukip-hand-tory-landslide-not-fielding-candidates-key-marginal-seats-labour-a7734521.html">currently suggest</a> that as many as half of those UKIP supporters might vote for another party in 2017. The most likely beneficiary of such a shift would be the Conservatives, who are implementing what UKIP supporters wanted – the UK’s exit from the European Union. But will that be enough?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169818/original/file-20170517-24725-107j3nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169818/original/file-20170517-24725-107j3nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169818/original/file-20170517-24725-107j3nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169818/original/file-20170517-24725-107j3nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169818/original/file-20170517-24725-107j3nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169818/original/file-20170517-24725-107j3nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169818/original/file-20170517-24725-107j3nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Axis of power.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">R Johnston</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This graph shows all of the constituencies won by Labour in 2015 with the Conservatives in second place and a Labour majority of less than 20 percentage points. These are arranged along the horizontal axis.</p>
<p>On the vertical axis, is the percentage of votes won in those constituencies by UKIP. </p>
<p>In those constituencies above the red diagonal line, UKIP’s vote share was greater than Labour’s majority over the Conservatives. Of the 80 constituencies shown, in only 21 (those below the red diagonal line) was UKIP’s vote share less than the Labour majority. </p>
<p>Some three-quarters of the seats shown are therefore vulnerable for Labour if a substantial proportion of UKIP’s 2015 supporters switch their allegiance to the Conservatives on June 8. Of course, some will remain loyal to UKIP, but in many of those constituencies the potential threat to Labour is great.</p>
<p>Now look at the 42 seats to the left of the vertical line, where Labour’s lead over the Conservatives in 2015 was less than ten percentage points. </p>
<p>In only three of them was UKIP’s share less than that majority, so even if all of UKIP’s supporters switched to the Conservatives in Harrow West, Westminster North, and Tooting, Labour would still beat the Conservatives (assuming no other change in voting patterns). </p>
<p>In all of the other 39 seats, UKIP’s 2015 vote share was larger than the Labour majority. Let’s assume that UKIP retains the support of 7% of the voters in each of those seats, with the remainder switching to the Conservatives. Then all of the constituencies above the dashed purple line are vulnerable – 34 seats where the Labour-Conservative majority was less than ten percentage points.</p>
<p>Of course, not all former UKIP voters who desert that party will switch to the Conservatives. Some may abstain and others may transfer to another party, even to Labour. So let’s assume that in each of the constituencies 14% of those who voted UKIP in 2015 either remain loyal or do not switch to the Conservatives. </p>
<p>This still leaves 20 seats (above the dashed orange line and to the left of the blue vertical line in the graph) where if the remainder switch to the Conservatives, Labour will lose unless they win more votes from other sources. </p>
<h2>UKIP U-turns</h2>
<p>A switch of 20 marginal seats from Labour to the Conservatives as a result of many UKIP 2015 voters switching their allegiance would give the Conservatives 352 seats in the new House and Labour 215, and a Conservative overall majority of 54. </p>
<p>The Conservatives might also hope to win at least some of the seats to the right of the blue vertical line and above the orange dashed line in the graph, which Labour held with a majority of 10-20 points in 2015. At least a further 20 seats could switch from Labour to the Conservatives (one in Wales, one in south-west England and the rest to the north of the Watford Gap), especially in those seats where UKIP <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/general-election-2017-ukip-hand-tory-landslide-not-fielding-candidates-key-marginal-seats-labour-a7734521.html">has decided not to field candidates</a> because they think their absence might mean that a Labour pro-Remain MP could lose to the Conservatives. </p>
<p>And of course the Conservatives hope to win as many as 12 seats from the SNP in Scotland, although a few may be lost in England to the Liberal Democrats.</p>
<p>It is clear, then, that the success or failure of Theresa May’s gamble in calling an election to enhance the Conservative majority could largely depend on how those who supported UKIP candidates in 2015 vote this time around. </p>
<p>There may be relatively few marginal seats being fought over by the Conservatives and Labour, but how former UKIP supporters vote on June 8 will be crucial to the outcome. And those battles will be fought far from London and the traditional Conservative heartlands.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77764/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ron Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the purple vote turns blue…Ron Johnston, Professor of Geography, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/775622017-05-17T20:14:58Z2017-05-17T20:14:58ZBeyond Brexit: ‘Global Britain’ looks to the emerging Anglosphere for new opportunities<p>What lies beyond Brexit? This is not just a question for the United Kingdom and the European Union, but also one that will reverberate around the world.</p>
<p>One answer is “the Anglosphere”.</p>
<p>Often spoken of as an alternative to the UK’s membership of the EU, the Anglosphere is the other side of the Brexit coin. But what is this novel ideology, which rose to prominence during the Brexit referendum? Where did it come from, and how will it affect Australia?</p>
<h2>Emergence of the Anglosphere</h2>
<p>The origins of <a href="https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/anglosphere-old-dream-brexit-role-in-the-world">the Anglosphere concept</a> were first presented in the late 19th century. </p>
<p>Imperial federation was proposed as an alternative to growing instability within the British Empire and growing competition from external rivals (not least the US). </p>
<p>However, although having some influential friends such as one of Australia’s founding fathers, Alfred Deakin, the proposition lacked sufficient precision in terms of its form and purpose. The dream faded.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the concept of the “English-speaking peoples” was not totally dead. Brief periods of political support manifested but quickly passed, particularly in pivotal moments of change. </p>
<p>During the second world war, and as the UK prepared to “abandon” its empire and join the European Economic Community, support for the English-speaking peoples as a political community was strengthened.</p>
<p>More recently, <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-power-of-the-anglosphere-in-eurosceptical-thought/">the Anglosphere has been advanced</a> by an influential international alliance of predominantly conservative politicians, commentators and public intellectuals. This loose grouping shares an insurgent ideological and geopolitical agenda that informs ambitions for an alternative world order, including Britain’s withdrawal from the EU and the EU’s eventual collapse.</p>
<h2>An opportunity for Britain</h2>
<p>During the Brexit referendum, senior politicians in the “Leave” campaign – such as Nigel Farage, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/08051604.pdf">Michael Gove</a>, <a href="https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2017/01-02/anglospheres-quiet-revolution/">Daniel Hannan</a>, and <a href="http://www.daviddavismp.com/david-davis-speech-on-brexit-at-the-institute-of-chartered-engineers/">David Davis</a> – also made explicit reference to the potential of the Anglosphere.</p>
<p>The Anglosphere provided a point of commonality between the different groups supporting Brexit. But such commonality can be deceptive. British national self-interest <a href="http://www.cityam.com/247909/global-free-trade-alliance-should-britains-stunning-post">has often overlooked</a> the diverse geopolitical and economic interests of the Anglosphere’s other constituent countries.</p>
<p>The Anglosphere was one of the big winners of Brexit. Three of Theresa May’s ministers – Boris Johnson, Liam Fox and David Davis – are devotees of it, and are currently shaping Britain’s new place in the world.</p>
<p>In January 2017, May argued that Brexit afforded new opportunities for a <a href="https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/01/theresa-mays-brexit-speech-global-britain/">“truly Global Britain”</a> to re-imagine existing and new international relationships. </p>
<p>May said a “profoundly internationalist” post-EU Britain should draw on its distinctive national history and culture to become “the best friend and neighbour” to Europe, while also reaching out across the world “to build relationships with old friends and new allies alike”.</p>
<h2>What does this mean for Australia and the world?</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2016/12/ted-yarbrough-the-anglosphere-is-the-perfect-launchpad-for-a-global-britain.html">Proponents of “Global Britain”</a> have often sought to support their vision by drawing attention to the potential for a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/13/uk-to-begin-talks-with-new-zealand-on-post-brexit-trade-deal">series</a> of <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2870196/canada-first-in-line-for-post-brexit-trade-deal-with-britain-after-eu-passes-long-awaited-ceta-agreement/">trade</a> <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/theresa-may-brexit-speech-pm-reveals-uk-will-leave-single-market-flags-australia-trade-deal-20170117-gttd98.html">deals</a> to be quickly concluded across the Anglosphere once the UK leaves the EU.</p>
<p>May and US President Donald Trump have also sought to reframe the “special relationship” in the context of Brexit. <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-press-conference-with-us-president-donald-trump-27-january-2017">They emphasised</a> that stronger ties are founded “on the bonds of history, of family, kinship and common interests”.</p>
<p>However, there is a lack of consistency in terms of which countries actually constitute the Anglosphere. Many of the most vocal proponents have sought to frame the Anglosphere around a <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/13/canzuk-after-brexit-canada-australia-new-zealand-and-britain-can/">“network of core constituent Crown countries”</a> that comprise Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Others have sought to frame it in terms of a new Anglo-American alliance re-asserting its global influence. </p>
<p>But outside of these so-called “core” Anglophone countries, it is not clear what place there is for, say, India, Ireland, Singapore or South Africa.</p>
<p>For <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/commonwealth-trade-ministers-meeting-towards-a-free-trading-future">many supporters</a>, greater engagement with the Anglosphere is congruent with a desire to rejuvenate the Commonwealth, particularly India. Such designs reveal historical and contemporary complexities both in geopolitical relations between the core Anglosphere countries and the pervasive resonance of racism and neo-colonialism across parts of the former British Empire. </p>
<p>Trump’s America is seen both as pivotal and a potential threat to the free-trade foundations of a post-Brexit Anglosphere. Other critics have suggested that “Global Britain” is akin to <a href="https://www.civilserviceworld.com/articles/news/liam-fox-tells-civil-servants-not-use-offensive-term-empire-20">“Empire 2.0”</a>, founded on an overly positive vision of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/08/india-britain-empire-railways-myths-gifts">colonial past</a> and resting on a nostalgia-infused, post-imperial “amnesia”.</p>
<p>You don’t have to look far to find people like Australia’s current and former foreign ministers, Julie Bishop and Gareth Evans, who think this is a bad idea. Yet the Anglosphere has supporters in high places – notionally former Australian leaders Tony Abbott and John Howard. Like these figures, the Anglosphere currently remains influential yet marginalised. </p>
<p>But that’s what most people thought about Brexit a year ago. As British withdrawal from the EU shapes an <a href="http://www.britac.ac.uk/events/anglosphere-and-its-others-english-speaking-peoples-changing-world-order">emerging world order</a>, its supporters think the Anglosphere is an idea whose time has come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77562/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The concept of ‘the Anglosphere’ gained in importance after the Brexit referendum as an alternative to the EU – and it could now impact Anglo nations, like Australia.Andrew Mycock, Reader in Politics, University of HuddersfieldBen Wellings, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/772692017-05-05T15:43:19Z2017-05-05T15:43:19ZLocal and mayoral elections 2017: results roundup<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168114/original/file-20170505-21018-65k4ek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Big gains for the Conservative party.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>If the general election on June 8 can be considered British politics’ “main event” for 2017, then the recent local council and mayoral elections on May 4 can be seen of something of a dress rehearsal. </p>
<p>Across the country, voters went to the polls in 88 council areas, with 34 councils up for grabs in England, and all of Scotland’s (32) and Wales’ (22) councils being decided. </p>
<p>Across six city-regions, including Greater Manchester, Liverpool, the West Midlands and the West of England, voters also had the opportunity to vote for a metro mayor – the democratic component of former chancellor George Osborne’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32726171">ambitious devolution agenda</a>, which has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/devolution-plan-could-be-a-poisoned-chalice-for-cities-41848">steadily unfurling since the summer of 2014</a>.</p>
<p>While municipal elections are never really big events in their own right – they often provide an indication of the country’s mood. And with the general election only six weeks away, it is likely that all parties will be certain to pounce on any positive results as a means to bolster their campaigns.</p>
<h2>Scores on the doors</h2>
<p>It didn’t take long for a relatively clear picture to emerge as to who the big winners and losers were – albeit with variations within the devolved states.</p>
<p>The Conservatives, with gains of over 400 councillors and eleven councils (at the time of writing) were clearly the main winners, and will likely approach the next six weeks with a renewed confidence <a href="https://theconversation.com/strong-and-stable-leadership-inside-the-conservatives-election-slogan-77121">that their message</a> is resonating with the country.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, UKIP have gone into tailspin – losing almost all of their councillors overnight – though they have taken the Burnley and Padiham West seat on Lancashire County Council. </p>
<p>But again, this is good news for Theresa May and the Tories, who have evidently wrestled back ownership of the Brexit agenda. For UKIP, however, with the referendum behind them and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38057251">a calamitous 12 months</a> since Nigel Farage stepped down as leader, they now face <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ukip-local-elections-results-2017-latest-douglas-carswell-mp-conservatives-a7719001.html">an existential crisis</a>.</p>
<p>For Labour the picture is, at best, mixed. In England, they <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/04/local-elections-2017-results-analysis/">have been decimated by the Conservatives</a>, losing more than 250 seats – all this within councils where Labour needs to be competitive. Indeed in Copeland, in the Lake District, the site of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/copeland-by-election-vote-cumbria-labour-historic-defeat-trudy-harrison-gillian-troughton-jeremy-a7596766.html">an embarrassing by-election loss in February</a>, Labour’s candidate Gillian Troughton <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cumbria-39814629">lost her council seat</a>. North of the border, Labour’s long-term decline looks set to continue, having <a href="http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/labour-loses-control-glasgow-city-10360847">lost control of Glasgow Council</a> for the first time in 37 years.</p>
<p>If there is a glimmer of hope for Labour, it is that <a href="http://www.itv.com/news/wales/2017-04-24/shock-poll-suggests-tories-ahead-in-wales/">the recent polls</a>, which showed them at real risk of losing their grip on Wales, turned out to be bleaker than reality. So although Labour have so far <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/3c6a4e42-9efd-4440-89df-647121c87452/wales-local-elections-2017">lost control of three councils</a>, no other parties have made major inroads. And the retention of Swansea will be at least some comfort.</p>
<p>These local elections also seem to have left the Lib Dems – who were hoping to bounce back after an electoral drubbing in 2015 – with more questions than answers. Having failed to take any councils, and having <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/42069d65-f3b1-41e2-b3e9-35ac9d799a1a/england-local-elections-2017//">lost 22 councillors</a> so far in England alone, they will be scratching their heads, wondering what’s happened.</p>
<h2>Metro mayors and the cities</h2>
<p>Crucially, with much of the council elections centred on the counties, the election of the metro mayors provides a useful barometer of the mood in the cities – something which could underpin the extent of any Conservative rout on June 8.</p>
<p>So despite a very mixed bag elsewhere, Labour’s confidence can be boosted with comfortable victories in <a href="http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/manchester-mayor-election-results-live-12991261">both Greater Manchester</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/ad45b570-6d7c-4e65-9771-159210d059b4/mayor-of-the-liverpool-city-region">the Liverpool City Region</a> for Andy Burnham and Steve Rotherham respectively. </p>
<p>But elsewhere the Conservatives have plenty to celebrate. As well as taking victory in the West of England – which includes Bristol – with Tim Bowles, they have also scored a <a href="http://www.gazettelive.co.uk/news/teesside-news/tees-mayor-election-result-live-12988694">shock election victory in Tees Valley with Ben Houchen</a> elected as the first Tees mayor.</p>
<p>And although turnout was far from stunning, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-39817224">coming in at just below 30%</a> in Manchester, Liverpool and the West of England, it was higher than <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/elections/2017/05/new-statesman-2017-local-elections-liveblog">the 10% forecast the night before</a> – which lends a greater legitimacy to those taking up office.</p>
<h2>Victory for devolution?</h2>
<p>Although Burnham and Rotherham join Sadiq Kahn in running three of the UK’s largest cities, the presence of Conservative leadership in a number of the core cities might not be a bad thing for the devolution agenda. </p>
<p>This is because, while it is expected that the new metro mayors will stand up for their regions – and stand up to government – particularly as we enter Brexit negotiations, that they are all not from the same political party may well provide the political stability that ensures their continued survival.</p>
<p>But whether the post will be as successful as the mayor of London remains to be seen and will undoubtedly be further coloured by the general election next month. </p>
<p>Beyond this, ultimately, the results make it clear that Brexit remains the main political driving force behind the elections, with many of the results reflecting the lines set out after the referendum of June 2016. </p>
<p>However, as the dust settles on this battle, and as we approach the main event, it’s becoming increasingly clear whose hand will most likely be raised in the air come Friday June 9.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77269/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex Nurse does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Everything you need to know about the recent local and mayoral elections.Alex Nurse, Lecturer in Planning, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/748552017-03-31T10:38:25Z2017-03-31T10:38:25ZWhy have there been so few protests against Brexit?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163297/original/image-20170330-15588-pu70j8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protestors on an anti-Brexit rally on March 25. </span> </figcaption></figure><p>According to some police estimates, which are rarely given to exaggeration, as many as <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/bbc-bias-pro-remain-pro-brexit-coverage-lack-of-too-much-unite-for-europe-trigger-article-50-a7651191.html">100,000 people</a> marched across London on March 25 in support of the European Union, together with an estimated <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/15181960.Hundreds_assemble_in_Edinburgh_to__march_for_Europe_/">1,000 to 1,500</a> in Edinburgh. The occasion was the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, but more significantly the demonstration took place just days before Theresa May’s UK government <a href="https://theconversation.com/article-50-triggered-heres-what-happens-now-74436">triggered</a> Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, starting the process of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. </p>
<p>The Leave camp won the referendum with a narrow majority of 51.9% of those who voted, but this translates into only 37.48% <a href="http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information">of the electorate</a>. Even though remainers are an even smaller part of the electorate, it might seem surprising to some that there have not been larger and more vigorous demonstrations against Brexit. </p>
<p>There were of course, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36692990">protests</a> outside the Westminster and Edinburgh parliaments in the days and weeks immediately after the referendum result in June 2016. Subsequently, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/03/pro-eu-protesters-join-march-for-europe-demos-around-uk">March for Europe</a> held on September 2, 2016 brought together thousands in London, Edinburgh, Birmingham, Oxford, Cambridge and Bristol. Yet since then, demonstrations have been infrequent and sparsely populated, even while the UK parliament was discussing the bill which allowed Article 50 to be triggered.</p>
<p>The contrast with the gigantic protests against the invasion of Iraq in 2002 and 2003, or even the recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/news-blog/live/2017/feb/04/london-protest-against-donald-trump-travel-ban-live-coverage">demonstrations</a> which followed Donald Trump’s travel ban is palpable. Even though the character of the US presidency will have nothing like the direct impact on everyday life in the UK as leaving membership of the EU. </p>
<p>Why this disparity? I suggest there are five main reasons.</p>
<h2>Splits among Remainers</h2>
<p>The first reason involves divisions within the Remain camp, between two ultimately incompatible positions about the EU itself. One holds that the EU <a href="http://labourlist.org/2015/09/theres-nothing-left-wing-about-being-anti-eu/">is essentially</a> a beneficent institution which exists primarily to prevent war, uphold workers’ rights, defend the environment and ensure freedom of movement. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/rich-ibbetson/eu-referendum_b_10526944.html">other</a> regards this as an illusion, and sees the EU instead as a means of imposing neoliberal austerity on small member states while maintaining its own racist barriers to refugees from outside the boundaries of “Europe”. For this group, voting to remain was a way to reject the racist, anti-migrant politics of UKIP and the Tory right which dominated the Leave campaigns – not a sign of positive support for the EU. They were the least likely of Remain voters take to the streets in protest against the result as this would be interpreted as support for the EU itself. </p>
<p>This fundamental division, about the very nature of the EU and the very different attitudes of Remainers towards it, is now likely to dominate the unfolding struggle over the form Brexit will take. </p>
<p>The second reason is that at least some opponents of Brexit accepted that, whatever their personal views, the vote was legitimately won and that it would be undemocratic to attempt to undo it. This is in stark contrast to the position of other Remain supporters, <a href="http://www.thecommentator.com/article/6355/remain_s_hatred_and_vitriol_following_brexit_vote">who have continued</a> to denounce Leave voters for their supposed ignorance, stupidity and racism. They have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/nov/13/trump-election-means-britain-turn-against-brexit">argued</a> that the vote can be ignored and rerun until the “correct” result is achieved – a strategy for which there are several precedents in the history of the EU, such as in <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/referendum-in-denmark-second-chance-for-voters-to-get-it-right-voters-in-denmark-go-to-the-polls-2323503.html">Denmark</a> and <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/5579684/Ireland-to-hold-second-referendum-on-Lisbon-Treaty.html">Ireland</a>. Such a disregard for democratic outcomes may well have acted as a barrier to potential demonstrators simply because they did not want to be associated with it. </p>
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<h2>The left absent</h2>
<p>The third reason concerns the role of the left. Mass demonstrations have generally been organised by the revolutionary or radical left. Examples since the mid-1960s include the <a href="http://www.workersliberty.org/story/2008/03/20/1968-vietnam-solidarity-and-british-left">Vietnam Solidarity Campaign</a>, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/music/2008/apr/20/popandrock.race">Anti-Nazi League/Rock against Racism</a>, the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Uncollectable.html?id=yDrVAAAACAAJ&redir_esc=y">Anti-Poll Tax Federation</a> and <a href="http://www.stopwar.org.uk/">Stop the War Coalition</a>. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://socialistworker.co.uk/art/42550/Launch+of+united+left+campaign+to+leave+the+EU">overwhelming majority</a> of the far left was opposed to the EU and campaigned for what was christened “Lexit”.</p>
<p>The activists involved in Lexit excluded themselves from their normal role in mobilising opposition to hard-right positions. The Labour Party, which has vastly more members than the far left – particularly since the election of Jeremy Corbyn – could have picked up the slack. Yet, beyond the largely europhile Parliamentary Labour Party, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/jeremy-corbyn-could-transform-the-brexit-debate-but-does-he-want-to-57838">leader</a> and the many of the new mass membership were, at best, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-labour-party-poll-eu-vote-leave-members-look-for-another-party-ukip-tories-latest-a7325581.html">deeply ambivalent</a> towards the EU and consequently unwilling or unable to take the lead in calling demonstrations.</p>
<h2>Fearful of attack</h2>
<p>The fourth concerns the people most directly affected by Brexit: the 2.9m EU citizens who live in the UK. The dominant, hard-right argument for Leave focused on this group, leading to <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-eu-referendum-racial-racism-abuse-hate-crime-reported-latest-leave-immigration-a7104191.html">some being targeted</a> for verbal abuse and actual violence. With these levels of hostility it would likely have taken quite extraordinary levels of courage and persistence to demonstrate. Some EU citizens have nevertheless taken to the streets, but the pressure not to and therefore avoid drawing attention to themselves is intense.</p>
<p>The fifth reason is the pressure exercised by the right-wing, Brexit-supporting media, aimed at Remainers. Celebrities such as Kate Beckinsdale and Jamie Oliver who expressed their opposition <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1348325/pro-eu-celebrity-luvvies-like-kate-beckinsale-and-jamie-oliver-join-chorus-of-super-rich-remainers-bemoaning-brexit/">were ridiculed</a> as out-of-touch with everyday concerns. Those members of the judiciary charged with interpreting constitutional law were denounced in almost Stalinist terms by the Daily Mail as <a href="https://theconversation.com/enemies-of-the-people-mps-and-press-gang-up-on-the-constitution-over-high-court-brexit-ruling-68241">“enemies of the people”</a>. </p>
<p>If the wealthy and powerful could be subjected to this level of abuse, then what might be unleashed against ordinary citizens?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74855/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Neil Davidson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although thousands have taken to the streets, protests against Brexit have been muted.Neil Davidson, Lecturer in Sociology, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/754122017-03-30T09:27:48Z2017-03-30T09:27:48ZThe British media’s progressives are coming round to Scottish independence<p>As Theresa May and Nicola Sturgeon had their <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/27/nicola-sturgeon-says-theresa-may-brexit-timescale-matches-referendum-plan">Brexit stand-off</a> in Glasgow on Monday March 27 ahead of the Scottish parliament <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/scottish-independence-referendum-indyref-2-nicola-sturgeon-vote-date-latest-a7654591.html">voting in favour</a> of a second independence referendum, Richard Dawkins stepped into the fray – on the side of the Scottish first minister. </p>
<p>The renowned English evolutionary biologist and controversialist tweeted: </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"846159626269790208"}"></div></p>
<p>What made this particularly pertinent is that the best-selling author of The God Delusion had added cerebral heft along with Stephen Hawking to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/aug/07/celebrities-open-letter-scotland-independence-full-text">roll-call of 200 celebrities</a> wheeled out before the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">2014 referendum</a> to appeal to Scots to stay in the union. </p>
<p>Dawkins’ shift is part of a sea change among the progressive liberal left on how they view Scottish independence, reflected in their UK media bastions <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk">The Guardian</a> and the <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com">New Statesman</a>. Nationalism is no longer anathema – well, the Scottish brand anyway. </p>
<h2>The left’s dilemma</h2>
<p>Scotland’s inclusive “civic nationalism” with its loosely social democratic values is now viewed as something to aspire to, particularly after its <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-36599102">resounding vote</a> 62%-38% to remain in the EU. It stands in stark contrast to the right-wing populism that has produced the Trump presidency and its “America First” nationalism; Marine Le Pen and the other nationalist movements in mainland Europe; and UKIP, which has effectively infected the soul of Tory party. </p>
<p>Added to this is the prospect of a decade of Tory government due to the enfeeblement of the Labour party. This has been particularly grave in Scotland, where the party that once saw the country as its back yard now has a solitary MP – no better than the Tories or Lib Dems. Sturgeon’s SNP holds the rest, having won 56 of Scotland’s 59 constituencies <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-36599102">in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Polly Toynbee of the Guardian made a passionate plea in August 2014 at the Edinburgh Festival for solidarity and Scots to stay in the union. By the general election of 2015 she <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/30/snp-confident-tories-want-scotland-gone">was conceding</a>: “No wonder SNP are confident – the Tories behave as if they want Scotland gone”. </p>
<p>And this week Toynbee <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/28/battle-line-theresa-may-car-crash-brexit-labour">reflected</a>: “On Monday May was in Scotland, arguing for the ‘unstoppable force’ of a ‘better together’ United Kingdom. But every word in defence of that union rang hollow, as all she said applies with equal force to the European Union she herself is breaking.”</p>
<p>Other Guardian writers have been even more forthright. John Harris
<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/04/hard-brexit-case-scottish-independence-second-referendum">said</a>, “Hard Brexit is making the case for Scottish independence”, while
Suzanne Moore <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/15/brexit-was-an-english-vote-for-independence-you-cant-begrudge-the-scots-the-same">wrote</a>, “Brexit was an English vote for independence – you can’t begrudge the Scots the same.” </p>
<p>Paul Mason recently felt the need to <a href="http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/paul-mason-calls-for-scottish-labour-members-to-back-independence-1-4239426">appeal to</a> “Scottish Labour to back independence”, while George Monbiot has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/15/theresa-may-dragging-uk-under-scotland-must-cut-rope">calling for</a> Scotland to “cut to rope”. The Guardian’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/28/scottish-parliament-votes-for-second-independence-referendum-nicola-sturgeon">reporting</a> of this week’s Holyrood vote has meanwhile been very even-handed – in contrast, for instance, to The Telegraph’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/28/indyref2-debate-vote-nicola-sturgeon-watch-live/">coverage</a> of Sturgeon’s “endless quest”. </p>
<p>Over at the New Statesman, Julia Rampen <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/03/who-would-oppose-scottish-independence-second-referendum-campaign">has been</a> asking: “Who would oppose Scottish independence second referendum campaign?” The magazine recently ran a piece by David Clark, one-time special advisor to Robin Cook at the Foreign Office, <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2017/03/4-ways-second-scottish-independence-campaign-would-be-different">which said</a>: “Scottish voters were warned that independence would leave them locked out of the EU. Now independence is their only hope of avoiding that fate.” In another piece, Simon Wren Lewis, a professor of economic policy at Oxford University, <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2017/03/brexit-makes-scottish-independence-much-more-economically-attractive">argued</a>: “Brexit makes Scottish independence more economically attractive.”</p>
<h2>The view on the right</h2>
<p>Sturgeon is even finding some sympathy on the soft right. Matthew Parris of The Times <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39301211">believes</a> the Scots should have a second vote if they want one. The Guardian’s Simon Jenkins agrees, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/17/independence-scotland-may-nicola-sturgeon-london-edinburgh">arguing that</a> “Anglo-Scottish relations should be released from the lingering fog of Anglo imperialism”.</p>
<p>The Spectator’s Alex Massie <a href="http://talkradio.co.uk/news/anyone-who-thinks-scottish-independence-referendum-poses-no-risk-deluded-says-journalist#U1s1aw9lxKx74QOt.99">has written that</a> “anyone in Whitehall or Westminster who thinks this is all fine, there is no risk, no danger here and so on, is deluding themselves”. Independence, if voted for, could, “one day be seen as one of the Brexit consequences”.</p>
<p>Of course, the majority of the UK press – the most “right wing” and “biased” in Europe <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/02/07/british-press-most-right-wing-europe/">according to</a> a recent YouGov poll of seven European countries – <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3903436/Enemies-people-Fury-touch-judges-defied-17-4m-Brexit-voters-trigger-constitutional-crisis.html">has been</a> in full “enemies of the people” mode against the Scottish nationalists. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163176/original/image-20170329-8553-vslfc7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163176/original/image-20170329-8553-vslfc7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163176/original/image-20170329-8553-vslfc7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=708&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163176/original/image-20170329-8553-vslfc7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=708&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163176/original/image-20170329-8553-vslfc7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=708&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163176/original/image-20170329-8553-vslfc7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163176/original/image-20170329-8553-vslfc7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163176/original/image-20170329-8553-vslfc7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Old faithful.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">telegraph.co.uk</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Telegraph’s Allison Pearson outdid even the tabloids with a <a href="http://www.thenational.scot/news/15158795.English_newspaper_s_call_for_Nicola_Sturgeon_s_beheading_sparks_anger/">recent splenetic attack</a> on Scotland’s first minister, headlined: “Nicola Sturgeon is a liar and a traitor – off with her head!” It was later changed to “Nicola Sturgeon – another treacherous queen of Scots – has miscalculated”, as no doubt even The Telegraph recognised its tastelessness.</p>
<p>Bolstering the unionist ranks have been two commentators somewhat on the left, <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/brexit-could-drag-all-of-europe-into-disaster-9hvgpjf02h8">David Aaronovitch</a> of The Times and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/02/beware-siren-calls-of-nationalism">Nick Cohen</a> of The Observer. Both are vigorous critics of nationalism and advocates of Western interventionism in the Middle East. </p>
<p>All the same, the shift in written opinion coming out of London has been discernible. As Theresa May triggered Article 50 and Sturgeon <a href="http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/scottish-news/nicola-sturgeon-issues-easter-ultimatum-10118041">warned</a> that she will be unveiling her strategy after Easter for bringing forward a second referendum, the battles lines between Edinburgh and London have been realigned. </p>
<p>Will the UK commentators fall into line and back unionism once a timetable for a vote has been agreed, or is a more permanent split developing? The signals will be fascinating to watch in the coming months.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75412/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Pia is a former spokesman for the Scottish Labour Party. </span></em></p>London’s media were unified against Scottish separatism in 2014. Second time around, the picture is more complicated.Simon Pia, Lecturer in Journalism, Edinburgh Napier UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/746512017-03-17T14:38:23Z2017-03-17T14:38:23ZDown but not out: diagnosing UKIP’s biggest problems<p>UKIP seems to have lurched from crisis to crisis since achieving its founding ambition – to take the UK out of the European Union. However, UKIP still has noteworthy support. It might be down, but it certainly isn’t out.</p>
<p>The first and most obvious setback for UKIP was the loss of its charismatic leader, Nigel Farage. Paul Nuttall, his replacement, has been accused of being a fantasist by many of his opponents. Either way, he is widely thought of as having failed his first big test as leader by losing a by-election in <a href="https://theconversation.com/stoke-isnt-the-end-for-ukip-but-the-big-problem-it-faces-is-now-clear-73613">Stoke</a> following the resignation of Labour MP Tristram Hunt. </p>
<p>Nuttall unwisely raised excessive expectations about winning the contest, and when that win failed to materialise he and his party looked like bigger losers than they were in reality. A win in the by-election would have confirmed the wisdom of his strategy to pursue Labour in its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/28/ukip-labour-paul-nuttall-douglas-carswell">heartland</a>.</p>
<p>Instead, the Stoke failure produced a lot of negative news coverage to the effect that <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/ukip-is-close-to-being-finished-says-the-partys-biggest-donor-2017-2">it was all over for the party</a>.</p>
<p>In truth, the anti-Labour strategy was always much riskier than it appeared. UKIP hoped to appeal to Labour voters who had deserted their party to support Brexit in the June referendum. But those voters couldn’t be relied upon.</p>
<p>A little known fact of the 2015 general election was that while a UKIP intervention in a constituency had the effect of reducing the Conservative vote share across the country, it actually served to increase the Labour vote share. This was because UKIP took more votes away from parties other than Labour – notably the Conservatives.</p>
<h2>Winning to losing</h2>
<p>The party also faces the “winners curse” after backing the Leave side in the referendum campaign. This has greatly reduced the political impact of the one issue that UKIP very much owned in the minds of the voters. The electorate is no longer focusing on whether the UK should leave the EU, but rather how it should leave. </p>
<p>Although Nuttall has argued that the party will act as the “watchdog” of Brexit, this claim has been weakened by the fact that <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21714986-government-promises-truly-global-britain-after-brexit-plausible-theresa-may-opts">Theresa May appears to be heading for a hard Brexit</a> – outside of the single market and the customs union.</p>
<p>The average voter would find it difficult to identify a distinctive UKIP issue which has not been adopted by May and the Conservatives already. The slogan “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36582567">take back control</a>” – used to great effect in the referendum campaign – is much more potent than “UKIP will keep an eye on the government”. </p>
<p>UKIP has also lost its status of being the clear “none of the above” choice for voters who are disgruntled with the performance of the three major parties. It had this status when the Liberal Democrats were in government during the coalition years, but now that the latter party has gone into opposition it is once again attracting disgruntled floating voters, but also “Remoaners” who do not accept the decision of the referendum.</p>
<p>UKIP therefore faces a new competitor, since the Liberal Democrats were only 1% behind the party in <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/news/2017/03/10/voting-intention-conservatives-44-labour-25-8-9-ma/">voting intentions in a YouGov poll</a> conducted on March 8 and 9 this year.</p>
<p>On top of all this, UKIP has been racked with infighting among its leadership. This was evident when Farage and the millionaire UKIP donor Arron Banks called for the party’s sole representative in the House of Commons, Douglas Carswell, to be sacked from the party. Banks even went as far as to say that <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/arron-banks-ukip-donor-douglas-carswell-stand-against-election-clacton-essex-nigel-farage-a7603516.html">he would run against Carswell</a> in the 2020 general election in his Clacton constituency if Carswell did not step down.</p>
<h2>Potential future opportunities</h2>
<p>After all these problems, it is really a remarkable achievement that the party obtained 11% of voting intentions in the YouGov poll referred to earlier. This is only slightly down on the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results">12.6% vote share</a> the party won in the 2015 general election. </p>
<p>This result is a product of the fact that there is still a wave of right-wing populism growing across Europe and in the United States which underpins support for UKIP. This <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/project/Brexit-Why-Britain-Voted-to-Leave-the-European-Union-Cambridge-University-Press-2017-with-Harold-Clarke-and-Matthew-Goodwin">wave of support</a> is based on a syndrome of economic grievances, socio-cultural threats and political distrust with establishment parties.</p>
<p>Since it was <a href="http://www.ukip.org/about">founded in 1993</a>, UKIP has portrayed itself as a “common-sense” party that champions the interests of ordinary people —- interests that it claims are subverted by a cartel of unresponsive cultural, economic and political elites. Those grievances have not yet gone away and if a hard Brexit helps to precipitate another recession then they will be a potent source support for the party in the future. UKIP may continue to have support, either in its present form or in the form of a newly rebranded radical right party.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74651/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Whiteley receives funding from the ESRC. </span></em></p>The upsetters have achieved their founding ambition, now they need to work out what to do next.Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/709562017-02-24T12:08:20Z2017-02-24T12:08:20ZHistoric win for the Conservatives puts them on course for a long period in office<p>The Copeland and Stoke Central byelections have delivered dramatic political developments for Britain. Both previously Labour-held seats, the byelections were triggered by two sitting MPs who took jobs outside politics.</p>
<p>The Cumbrian semi-rural seat of Copeland was seized by the Conservatives – the first time the main opposition party has lost a seat it was defending in a byelection since <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/24/labour-tories-copeland-ukip-challenge-stoke">1982</a>.</p>
<p>It has created yet another serious challenge for Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership of the Labour Party, and raises further questions as to whether he can hold onto the position in the long term. Conventional political wisdom would suggest that a government grappling with the aftermath of Brexit and a developing NHS crisis should not gain parliamentary seats from other parties. </p>
<p>Already the postmortems have begun. Corbyn’s internal critics are <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/our-voters-cant-stand-corbyn-labour-fears-copeland-will-fall-to-the-tories-2017-2">citing</a> these results as further evidence of his unelectability, and claiming that Corbyn himself was a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/24/jeremy-corbyn-labour-copeland-stoke-leader">major negative</a> on the doorstep in both seats.</p>
<p>This was notably the case in Copeland, where Corbyn’s anti-nuclear position allegedly proved difficult to sell in an area where the nuclear industry is a major employer.</p>
<p>The result has serious implications for Labour’s long-term prospects. To lose a seat the party held even in its defeat in the 2015 election indicates an ongoing decline. It suggests that, in terms of electoral logic, Labour simply cannot win a general election in the foreseeable future. In short, the Labour Party should be gaining (not losing) seats if it is to be a credible alternative government.</p>
<h2>Shoring up power</h2>
<p>Politics is often about momentum, and in contrast to Labour, the Conservatives certainly now have a spring in their step. In gaining a seat held by Labour since 1935 (although not always by huge margins), Theresa May’s party has achieved a spectacular, unprecedented result in Copeland.</p>
<p>The party can now reassert its “One Nation” credentials by highlighting political progress in the north of England. The relatively large 7% swing from Labour to Conservative in Copeland would also indicate a Conservative landslide if a general election occurred soon. Parallels are already being made with Labour’s left-wing image and subsequent <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/9/newsid_2500000/2500847.stm">heavy electoral defeat</a> in 1983.</p>
<p>Notable psephologists such as John Curtice have highlighted that the Copeland swing was bigger than the suggested uniform national swing, which indicates that a larger than anticipated number of Labour seats could turn <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2017/feb/23/stoke-and-copeland-byelections-voting-almost-over-as-labour-hope-to-hold-seats-politics-live">Conservative blue</a> based on the current public mood. </p>
<p>Copeland also represents the largest increase in a byelection vote for the governing party since Labour gained Hull North in 1966. Later that year, Harold Wilson called an early general election where the party increased its parliamentary majority. In the era of fixed-term parliaments, it remains to be seen whether Theresa May would be <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/early-general-election-can-theresa-may-actually-call-one-a7132846.html">tempted to instigate a similar scenario</a> in 2017.</p>
<h2>Better luck in Stoke</h2>
<p>Corbyn’s supporters claim the Stoke result, at least, marks a positive achievement. This was an area where 70% voted to leave the EU in last year’s <a href="http://talkradio.co.uk/news/ukip-leader-paul-nuttall-says-stoke-uks-brexit-capital-he-talks-election-chances-1701239274">Brexit vote</a> but Labour managed to hold the seat. </p>
<p>Stoke had become a prime UKIP target in the face of Labour’s own European divisions. Holding Stoke arguably indicates that Labour has a degree of resilience in fighting off the explicit UKIP aim of making inroads into the party’s traditional urban heartlands. Yet as a further negative, the Labour vote fell by 2% compared to 2015. This is not the trend usually associated with main opposition parties as the mid-term of a parliament approaches. It has also been observed by some, that if it were not for UKIP candidate Paul Nuttall’s <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ukip-paul-nutall-resign-crisis-stoke-by-election-hillsborough-latest-officials-a7589291.html">error-strewn and chaotic campaign</a>, then the outcome may have been very different in Stoke.</p>
<p>Corbyn is likely to survive for the moment at last. After two bruising leadership elections in less than two years, the second of which strengthened Corbyn’s position, there’s not much chance of anyone being willing to trigger a third attempt to remove Labour’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/19/corbyn-allies-byelections-stoke-on-trent-copeland-challenge-leadership-diane-abbott">increasingly embattled leader.</a> </p>
<p>It’s also worth noting that both byelections witnessed further recovery for the Liberal Democrats. While the party came nowhere near winning either seat, its steady increase in support indicates that it is recovering from the electoral nadir of 2015. These performances, as well as recent local council byelection results, suggest the Lib Dems are back in the game.</p>
<p>These byelections reflect the increasingly multi-party nature of UK politics. Yet the Conservatives have clearly emerged as the real winners. Labour now faces another crisis, of the type that have occurred far too regularly for the party’s liking over recent years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70956/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Williams is a member of the Association of Teachers and Lecturers, the Higher Education Academy and the Labour Party.</span></em></p>It held on in Stoke, but Labour has suffered a humiliating defeat to the governing party in Copeland.Ben Williams, Tutor in Politics and Political Theory, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/736132017-02-24T09:50:57Z2017-02-24T09:50:57ZStoke isn’t the end for UKIP – but the big problem it faces is now clear<p>Byelections are curious beasts in the political jungle. On the one hand, they are objectively minor political events: the replacement of a single MP for however long is left until the next general election. On the other, they become crucibles for bigger political debates; the national played out on a local stage.</p>
<p>So it was in Stoke Central in recent weeks. For the commentariat, here was the perfect counterpoint to the byelection in <a href="http://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-battle-of-richmond-what-will-it-mean-for-brexit/">Richmond</a> held in December. Richmond was a strongly pro-Remain constituency so when the Liberal Democrats won, a narrative could be built that their success reflected the divisions caused by the EU referendum. Stoke was an archetypal Leave constituency, the “Brexit capital of Britain”. As such, it was the ideal place for UKIP to shine and its new leader, Paul Nuttall, to be vindicated in his <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/26/interview-paul-nuttall-scouser-wants-lead-ukip-labours-turf/">new strategy</a> for the party.</p>
<p>The Stoke result, which saw the seat remain in Labour hands with a small swing away from UKIP, thus raises important questions for both Nuttall and those observing him. Is Stoke going to be UKIP’s graveyard?</p>
<p>First, let’s consider the big narrative that was applied to Stoke. Certainly, with nearly 70% of voters in the Leave camp last summer, the constituency looks to be the kind of place where UKIP could do well, given that it was the only national party to campaign wholeheartedly for exit from the European Union. Add in the generally high levels of dissatisfaction found in the town – as evidenced by low turnout in elections and the state of the local economy – and it is not hard to see why this feels like a classic “left-behind” part of the country, losing out on globalisation and modernisation.</p>
<p>UKIP played up to this, especially in the national media and in its choice of the party leader as candidate. Paul Nuttall isn’t Nigel Farage, either in style or in substance: a firm exponent of <a href="http://www.conservativehome.com/highlights/2014/12/the-five-tribes-of-ukip.html">“red UKIP”</a>, he sees the future of the party in supplanting Labour, rather than the Tories, in the political landscape. At a time when Jeremy Corbyn appears to be alienating more Labour supporters than he is winning over, this has looked like the most viable strategy for a party that needs to <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/08/17/is-there-still-a-point-to-ukip-the-future-of-british-euroscepticism-post-brexit/">reinvent</a> itself after securing its headline goal.</p>
<h2>Beyond Brexit</h2>
<p>And yet, as so often with big narratives, there are gaps and misinterpretations.
The most obvious is that Stoke was not contested over Brexit in the way that Richmond was. Indeed, neither Labour nor UKIP made much of the issue in their campaign literature or public statements, mainly because it wasn’t a topic on the doorstep. Instead, the debate was about public services and economic regeneration: Brexit was a given, by and large.</p>
<p>Equally obviously, the personalities of the two main candidates loomed very large in this byelection. Both Nuttall and his Labour opponent, Gareth Snell, were subject to intense media scrutiny over past actions and words, with neither emerging unsullied. In particular, Nuttall was marked out for his very <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/01/paul-nuttall-stoke-byelection-papers-gave-address-he-had-not-moved-into">limited connection</a> with the constituency and his <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-merseyside-39038307">confused involvement</a> with the Hillsborough disaster. Where Farage might have been able to shrug off such points, Nuttall has much more limited political experience and little political capital to use.</p>
<p>Put differently, Nuttall was the wrong candidate for the seat. In UKIP’s long history, it has almost always struggled to address this problem. Indeed, it is worth noting that the only successful byelections came from two Tory defectors – <a href="https://blogs.surrey.ac.uk/politics/2014/11/20/does-ukip-have-the-brains-bodies-and-legs-to-prosper/">Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless</a> – each with relatively strong local profiles and track records, as well as a more loose association with the party. Parachuting in an outsider might make sense for a party trying to get its bigger names into elected offices, but it <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17457289.2014.925461">plays badly</a> on the ground.</p>
<h2>Where now?</h2>
<p>Stoke Central looks very much like a missed opportunity for UKIP. Success here would have opened up a very much more credible line of attack for the party, especially since it would have made Corbyn’s position as Labour leader even more problematic. Even the poor turnout caused by Storm Doris should have played into the party’s hands, as more indifferent, moderate voters stayed at home. If the 2015 general election established a long list of second positions in constituencies for UKIP, then Stoke should have been an excellent opportunity to start converting these into first places.</p>
<p>But, then again, UKIP is nothing if not resilient. In the grand scheme of things, this defeat ranks well behind past failures. However, the big unanswered question is how the party responds now. Nuttall has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/24/ukip-paul-nuttall-not-going-anywhere-stoke-byelection-failure">indicated</a> that he will remain as leader – albeit with the unfortunate phrasing “I’m not going anywhere” – but as the past year has shown, the party is not above <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37561065">edging out</a> its leaders. In addition, there remains the Farage wildcard: talk abounds of him moving to form a <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/770880/Arron-Banks-Ukip-tipping-point-radical-survive">new movement</a> with UKIP’s erstwhile backer Arron Banks that could drain much of UKIP’s support base.</p>
<p>Stoke is thus not the end of UKIP, but it has thrown into stark relief the difficult position the party finds itself in.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73613/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Usherwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The party picked the wrong candidate and the wrong tactics in this byelection, and it showed in the result.Simon Usherwood, Reader in Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.