tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/un-security-council-2703/articlesUN Security Council – The Conversation2024-03-27T15:02:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2266622024-03-27T15:02:58Z2024-03-27T15:02:58ZGaza war: is UN security council ‘demand’ for a ceasefire legally binding? Here’s what international law says<p>Despite the groundbreaking adoption of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/mar/26/the-guardian-view-on-the-un-security-councils-ceasefire-resolution-the-us-talks-tougher-on-israel">UN security council resolution</a> demanding a immediate ceasefire in Gaza, the war continues. The reaction from Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to the passing of the resolution <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-will-the-un-security-councils-call-for-a-gaza-ceasefire-affect-israeli-politics-and-relations-with-the-us-expert-qanda-226653">has been ferocious</a>. </p>
<p>Israel has stated publicly that it will <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/26/middleeast/israel-gaza-ceasefire-un-resolution-war-impact-intl/index.html">continue military action</a> until all hostages are returned and there is little sign of the ceasefire being implemented. So, what happens now? </p>
<p>Resolution 2728 was adopted by the security council on March 25, with 14 members voting in favour of the resolution and the United States abstaining. The resolution demands a temporary but <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147931">“immediate ceasefire”</a>. </p>
<p>It also demands the release of all hostages and the “lifting of all barriers to the provision of humanitarian assistance, at scale, in line with international humanitarian law”.</p>
<p>This was a significant moment in the history of the question of Palestine at the security council. The fundamental importance of the US change in stance from one of vetoing such resolutions as Israel’s ally to one of abstaining (still as Israel’s ally, but with significant reservations) and therefore allowing the resolution to pass should not be underestimated. </p>
<p>The political fallout has been felt immediately <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-will-the-un-security-councils-call-for-a-gaza-ceasefire-affect-israeli-politics-and-relations-with-the-us-expert-qanda-226653">both in Israel and in Washington</a>. But the legal and practical outcomes of this resolution are not yet clear.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-will-the-un-security-councils-call-for-a-gaza-ceasefire-affect-israeli-politics-and-relations-with-the-us-expert-qanda-226653">How will the UN security council's call for a Gaza ceasefire affect Israeli politics and relations with the US? Expert Q&A</a>
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<p>The legally binding nature of the resolution <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/us-says-ceasefire-resolution-non-binding-less-influential-security-council-members-object/">has been questioned</a> by the US. The US representative to the UN stated explicitly that they did not agree with everything in the resolution – and could not therefore vote in favour of it. But they did support, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-demands-immediate-ceasefire-gaza-2024-03-25/">she added</a>, “some of the critical objectives in this non-binding resolution”.</p>
<p>The question of whether the resolution is binding revolves around whether it falls under the remit of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7">chapter VII of the UN charter</a> which provides the legal basis for the security council to undertake any “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. </p>
<p>In the past, questions have been raised as to whether all resolutions of the security council are legally binding on member states or only those adopted under the specific powers provided for within chapter VII. The representative from South Korea <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15641.doc.htm">asserted at the time of the vote</a> that resolution 2728, “while not explicitly coercive under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations – reflects the international community’s consensus”.</p>
<p>Within the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text">UN charter itself</a>, articles 24 and 25 set out the general authority and powers of the security council and article 25 requires that all member states accept and implement the security council’s binding decisions. </p>
<p>The International Court of Justice (ICJ) addressed this question beyond doubt in the Namibia Advisory Opinion. The court considered security council resolution 276 ordering South Africa to withdraw from Namibia, after the UN <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/fr/mission/past/untagS.htm">determined in 1966</a> that the South African administration in what had formerly been known as <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45311030">South West Africa</a> was illegal. </p>
<p>The court declared that article 25 is not confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action under chapter VII, but <a href="https://legal.un.org/repertory/art25.shtml">applies to</a> “the decisions of the Security Council adopted in accordance with the Charter”. It also stated that all member states must comply with such decisions, including members which voted against it and members of the UN who are not members of the council.</p>
<p>The ICJ opinion <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/legal-bindingness-of-security-council-resolutions-generally-and-resolution-2334-on-the-israeli-settlements-in-particular/">also has discussed the difference</a> between what it calls “exhortatory rather than mandatory language”. It <a href="https://verfassungsblog.de/why-todays-un-security-council-resolution-demanding-an-immediate-ceasefire-is-legally-binding/">notes that</a>: “The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect.” </p>
<p>In the case of <a href="https://www.jns.org/full-text-un-security-council-resolution-2728/">resolution 2728</a> the mandatory language is clear: the security council “demands” a ceasefire.</p>
<p>Another issue to consider is whether such a legally binding resolution can apply to non-state actors such as Hamas. In 2010, in an <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/141">advisory opinion</a> on whether Kosovo’s declaration of its independent statehood was legal, the court determined that parties for which the security council “intended to create binding legal obligations” needs to be decided on a “<a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/node/101885">case-by-case basis</a>”. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/node/103912">opinion added</a> that “the language used by the resolution may serve as an important indicator in this regard”. Resolution 2728 demands that the ceasefire and international law be respected by “all parties”. </p>
<h2>What can be done under chapter VII</h2>
<p>So what can be done to enforce this legally binding resolution, if one or more of the parties refuses to comply with it? Under chapter VII, there are two main courses of action. Article 41 provides for measures not involving the use of armed force, including sanctions or severance of diplomatic relations. </p>
<p>If these are insufficient, and the security council is satisfied the situation represents a threat to the peace, <a href="https://legal.un.org/repertory/art42.shtml">article 42 provides</a> that the council “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”. </p>
<p>In regard to the situation in Gaza, it’s possible to argue that this has already been established historically. <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/54">Resolution 54</a> in 1948 <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/54">expressly determined</a> that the situation in Palestine was a “threat to the peace within the meaning of article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations”. In 2024, the security council continues to discuss the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147931">threat to international peace and security</a>.</p>
<p>So the adoption of resolution 2728 is hugely symbolic. Politically, particularly given the decision of the US not to use its veto to block the resolution, it represents a significant development at the international level. This alone should send a strong signal to Israel. </p>
<p>Yet enforceability remains uncertain, especially given that Israel has failed to comply with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-enforcement-power-does-the-international-court-of-justice-have-in-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-220523">ICJ ruling</a> that it should take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of genocide. </p>
<p>What happens next will mainly depend on political will. But the passing of this resolution does enhance the possibilities for further action under international law, especially if the five permanent members of the security council – including the US – have the appetite to act. Before resolution 2728 that would have been unimaginable. Now? Not so much.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226662/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda Cahill-Ripley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Security council resolution 2728 demands an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. But can the UN enforce it?Amanda Cahill-Ripley, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2266532024-03-26T18:10:35Z2024-03-26T18:10:35ZHow will the UN security council’s call for a Gaza ceasefire affect Israeli politics and relations with the US? Expert Q&A<p><em>Washington’s decision to abstain from voting on a UN security council resolution which calls for a ceasefire and an exchange of hostages with Hamas has angered Israel, which has traditionally counted on the US for unwavering support in international forums. We spoke with John Strawson, a Middle East expert at the University of East London, who has been researching and publishing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for several decades.</em></p>
<p><strong>The United Nations security council has passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire and the return of the hostages held by Hamas. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated that Israel’s military campaign will continue. Does he have the full support of his government in this or is there a risk that any of his more moderate coalition partners will break ranks?</strong></p>
<p>UN security council <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147931">resolution 2728</a> is a testimony to ambiguous drafting. It calls for an immediate ceasefire but only to cover the rest of Ramadan, which is only about two weeks. It also seems to link the ceasefire to the return of “all hostages” but is silent as to whether this is a condition for the ceasefire. </p>
<p>It should also be noted that Hamas is not mentioned nor are Israeli hostages. At the conclusion of the relevant paragraph there is a reference to all who are detained – again without reference to their identity. It’s also important to note that Hamas and other Palestinian sources refer to all Palestinian prisoners detained by Israel as “hostages”. As a result there are many possible interpretations of the obligations the resolution seeks to create. </p>
<p>Netanyahu <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/25/world/middleeast/israel-ceasefire-rafah-netanyahu.html">has denounced</a> the US for not vetoing the resolution. Any responsible Israeli leader would have used the ambiguities to say that Israel was already negotiating such a ceasefire and was waiting on Hamas’s reply to their proposals. But Netanyahu’s stance is about keeping his coalition going with the support of the far-right which will enable him to keep his job. </p>
<p><strong>New Hope party leader Gideon Saar has already quit after Netanyahu refused to appoint him to the war cabinet. Obviously this doesn’t bring down the government, but what does it mean in terms of the power dynamic in Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, particularly when it comes to the far-right parties?</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-washingtons-patience-is-wearing-thin-over-the-lack-of-leadership-from-both-israel-and-palestine-225915">Gideon Saar</a> is effectively launching his campaign to be prime minister. He has been a long-term opponent of Netanyahu on the right. He stood for the leadership of Likud, Netanyahu’s party, in 2019. Then in 2021 he broke away and sided in the Knesset with the broad anti-Netanyahu coalition that was able to govern for 12 months before being defeated in November 2022.</p>
<p>Saar wanted to be in the war cabinet where the key decisions are being taken. But the far-right minister of national security, Itamar Ben Gvir, insisted that if Saar was appointed he would need to be as well. But Benny Gantz, one of three voting members of emergency war cabinet had made it a condition that no one from the far-right would be allowed to join.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-washingtons-patience-is-wearing-thin-over-the-lack-of-leadership-from-both-israel-and-palestine-225915">Gaza conflict: Washington's patience is wearing thin over the lack of leadership from both Israel and Palestine</a>
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<p>Netanyahu is not yet ready to break relations with Gantz whose moderate politics plays well with foreign politicians. Saar knows this but wants to position himself to be the next leader of the right when the Netanyahu era is over. In the medium term it just illustrates how febrile Israeli politics are. </p>
<p><strong>Benny Gantz, who is a member of the war cabinet, has threatened to quit over proposed legislation that would exempt ultra-orthodox Jews from being conscripted into the army. The law would also put the government at loggerheads with Israel’s high court. What are the risks for the legitimacy of Netanyahu’s leadership?</strong></p>
<p>It is quite clear that Benny Gantz is trying to break up to the coalition. The ultra-orthodox parties in the ruling coalition really have one aim, which is to maintain the huge government financing of their communities. This is resented by the majority of Israelis especially given their general exemption from military service. </p>
<p>This is particularly stark when Israel is at war and more than 250 soldiers have been killed in action and thousands injured. Gantz knows that the last thing the Israel Defense Forces needs are thousands of reluctant recruits, but he also knows that it is a question of fairness that appeals to the vast majority of Israelis. Gantz is still <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240308-israel-poll-shows-gantzs-national-unity-party-leading-over-netanyahus-likud/">popular in the polls</a> and undoubtedly sees this issue as a weak spot for Netanyahu’s alliance.</p>
<p>Both the Sephardic and Ashkenazi chief rabbis have said that should the exemption be ended those affected should leave the country. Such statements give Gantz the opportunity of being seen as a patriot and taking the shine off Netanyahu’s nationalist credentials. So Netanyahu faces pressure from the ultra-orthodox, the far right, the more moderate right of Gideon Saar and from Benny Gantz at the centre. But the more these forces circle, the more Netanyahu doubles down on his rhetoric for complete victory over Hamas, seeing the war as his route to political survival. </p>
<p><strong>Netanyahu reacted to the US abstention by cancelling a visit from a high-level Israeli delegation to Washington for talks. But defence minister Yoav Gallant was already in Washington and is reportedly meeting with US officials. How does this affect the Israeli government’s unity?</strong></p>
<p>The Israeli delegation was asked by the Biden administration to discuss in detail the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/18/israeli-delegation-us-officials-plan-offensive-rafah-gaza-war">plans for the proposed Rafah operation</a> that Netanyahu has been talking about for weeks. The Americans wanted to know how it could be achieved without causing catastrophic civilian causalities among the 1.2 million people – mostly displaced – sheltering there. But instead of sending military experts, the delegation was headed by the minister for strategic affairs <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/07/world/middleeast/netanyahu-dermer-israel-war.html">Ron Dermer</a> (a Netanyahu confidant) and <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/tzachi-hanegbi">Tzachi Henegbi</a>, a former right-wing rabble rouser now serving as national security adviser.</p>
<p>Neither are military experts and Dermer has not even served in the IDF. What they could have told the US military team they were there to brief would be interesting to hear. But these armchair generals will now be staying at home. </p>
<p>Gallant, meanwhile, continues his Washington talks as if nothing has happened. Despite being a member of Likud, Gallant has steered his course especially carefully since March last year when Netanyahu tried but failed to sack him over his opposition to the government’s unpopular judicial reforms, which Gallant said would endanger national security. </p>
<p>Having survived in part due to mass demonstrations in his support, Gallant has occupied a unique position in the cabinet, as someone who stood up to Netanyahu and survived. He is liked in Washington and Netanyahu is probably relieved that he is keeping lines of communication open with the Biden administration. But it’s hard to hide the contrast between Gallant’s meetings and Netanyahu’s pique at Washington’s decision to abstain on the security council vote.</p>
<p><strong>What does this say about the future of US-Israeli relations?</strong> </p>
<p>The US has only really seen Israel as strategic ally since the early 1970s. Until then relations had been more problematic. When Israel declared independence in 1948 a US arms embargo was in force. In the 1948 war it was Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia that gave Israel its military advantage. </p>
<p>In the 1950s and 1960s it was mainly France who supplied Israel with arms – <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-us-discovery-israels-secret-nuclear-project">including nuclear weapons</a>. The 1956 <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez">Suez affair</a> – in which Israel attacked Egypt in coordination with Britain and France – was denounced by the US. But after the six-day war in 1967, the US became more engaged and interestingly has always promoted normalisation between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The 1978 <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david">Camp David Accords</a> when Israel and Egypt recognised each other underlined this. </p>
<p>My reading of this is the US entanglement with Israel since the 1970s has been about promoting a particular Middle East order. So we need to understand Israel-US relations in a regional context. </p>
<p>The Biden administration knows you can’t end a war without a peace plan – and that must mean a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, began his recent Middle East visit to Saudi Arabia, seeing Riyadh as central to a stable Middle East. Saudi recognition of Israel comes at the price of concrete steps to a Palestinian state. </p>
<p>The longer Netanyahu resists paying that price the more the agony of Gaza will continue. And all the while the US will have to ratchet up its pressure on the Israeli government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226653/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Strawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>John Strawson, a UK-based researcher on Israeli politics, answers questions about the US decision to abstain from voting on a UN security council resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza.John Strawson, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265952024-03-26T05:55:10Z2024-03-26T05:55:10ZThe UN Security Council has finally called for a ceasefire in Gaza. But will it have any effect?<p>Ceasefires are a uniquely complicated tool in armed conflict. This is because they exist at the intersection of war, law and politics.</p>
<p>Political scientist Cindy Wittke has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21599165.2019.1635885">suggested</a> that attempts to define what a ceasefire is and what it entails will ultimately reveal a “lack of fit” with international law. This is because they are notoriously difficult to negotiate and enforce. </p>
<p>This “lack of fit” has perhaps been most obvious in the UN Security Council’s deliberations over a ceasefire in Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza. Countless resolutions have been proposed with different wording, such as: </p>
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<li><p>“an <a href="https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/10/17/unsc-rejects-resolution-demanding-immediate-ceasefire-in-gaza/">immediate, durable and fully respected humanitarian ceasefire</a>” (October 16) </p></li>
<li><p>“<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142507">humanitarian pauses</a>” (October 18) </p></li>
<li><p>“<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/un-security-council-vote-rival-us-russian-plans-israel-gaza-action-2023-10-25/">pauses in fighting</a>” (October 25)</p></li>
<li><p>“<a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/g7-nations-urge-swift-action-to-help-palestinian-civilians-trapped-in-besieged-gaza-with-limited-aid">urgent and extended humanitarian pauses and corridors</a>” (November 15) </p></li>
<li><p>“an <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/us-vetoes-resolution-on-gaza-which-called-for-immediate-humanitarian-ceasefire-dec8-2023/">immediate humanitarian ceasefire</a>” (December 8) </p></li>
<li><p>a “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1145022">sustainable cessation of hostilities</a>” (December 22).</p></li>
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<p>Finally, on Monday, after nearly six months of linguistic wrangling, the Security Council has managed to pass a <a href="https://twitter.com/CraigMokhiber/status/1772320522283454799?s=20">resolution</a> that demands an “immediate ceasefire”. It emphasises “the urgent need to expand the flow of humanitarian assistance” entering the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>So, what will this resolution do in practical terms – and will it have any effect?</p>
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<h2>Enforcement mechanisms are limited</h2>
<p>According to international law, a resolution of the Security Council is binding on all UN member states. This includes Israel and Palestine, which has UN observer status. </p>
<p>The Palestinian Authority and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-welcomes-un-security-council-resolution-calling-gaza-ceasefire-2024-03-25/">Hamas</a> have <a href="https://twitter.com/HusseinSheikhpl/status/1772309055769366863?ref_src=twsrc%255Etfw%257Ctwcamp%255Etweetembed%257Ctwterm%255E1772309055769366863%257Ctwgr%255Eb798121ce5a970710e9a9d102d5983aa62abf363%257Ctwcon%255Es1_&ref_url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/3/25/israels-war-on-gaza-live-nine-killed-in-israeli-strike-on-deir-el-balah">welcomed</a> the ceasefire resolution. </p>
<p>However, Israel was <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/4553980-un-security-council-gaza-ceasefire-resolution-us-abstains/">furious</a> over the US decision to abstain from the vote, in effect allowing it to pass. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office argued the wording benefits Hamas, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-hamas-war-cease-fire-gaza-un-security-council-resolution-ramadan/">saying</a> it gives the group “hope that international pressure will allow them to accept a ceasefire without the release of our hostages”. </p>
<p>It also remains to be seen whether the Israeli government will comply with the resolution and if so, in what ways. </p>
<p>In reality, the resolution may make little practical difference to the lives of millions of Palestinians trapped in Gaza because the council has little way of enforcing it. Israel has already <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/02/israel-defying-icj-ruling-to-prevent-genocide-by-failing-to-allow-adequate-humanitarian-aid-to-reach-gaza/">ignored</a> the International Court of Justice’s <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203447">provisional measures</a> to “take immediate and effective measures to enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian aid”. </p>
<p>While military action to force Israel to adhere to the resolution seems highly unlikely, states could take other economic and diplomatic action to try to compel Israel to comply. These could include imposing sanctions, halting weapons sales or withdrawing diplomatic missions and support.</p>
<p>In addition, the resolution only <em>emphasises</em> the flow of humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip be increased. This wording gives Israel some wiggle room to continue to deny access to aid convoys <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/un-chief-assails-israel-for-blocking-gaza-aid-trucks-/7540563.html">stuck</a> at the Rafah and Kerem Shalom border crossings based on security grounds. </p>
<p>Even before the war began – but particularly since the Hamas attack on October 7 – Israel has been imposing obstacles on humanitarian aid entering Gaza during the inspection and distribution process. It continues to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/01/middleeast/gaza-aid-israel-restrictions-investigation-intl-cmd/index.html">frequently</a>, and seemingly arbitrarily, reject the entry of supplies such as anaesthetics, oxygen cylinders, ventilators, sleeping bags, dates and maternity kits.</p>
<p>However, the fact the US abstained <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/25/the-security-council-vote-is-a-significant-moment-but-the-us-says-its-gaza-policy-is-unchanged">undoubtedly</a> marks a dramatic shift in its diplomatic support for its chief ally in the Middle East. The resolution sends a clear message to the Israeli government that a red line has been reached in terms of what the US is prepared to accept and support. </p>
<h2>Where negotiations currently stand</h2>
<p>The Security Council resolution will also likely put greater pressure on both sides to come to an agreement through the negotiations being led by Qatar and Egypt. </p>
<p>Hamas’ latest <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/15/hamas-new-gaza-truce-proposal-outlines-exchange-of-captives-for-prisoners#:%7E:text=Hamas%2520has%2520presented%2520a%2520new,Jazeera%2520of%2520the%2520Hamas%2520proposal.">proposal</a> includes four points: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>a comprehensive ceasefire </p></li>
<li><p>withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip </p></li>
<li><p>the return of forcibly displaced Palestinians</p></li>
<li><p>the exchange of Palestinian prisoners for Israeli hostages. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>According to media reports, Israel has <a href="https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-793604">accepted</a> an American compromise for the number of Palestinian prisoners to be released in exchange for Israeli hostages. But media reports <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/large-gaps-remain-between-israel-and-hamas-in-hostage-truce-talks-report/">indicate</a> it is currently refusing to commit to a permanent ceasefire.</p>
<p>If this agreement does eventually come to fruition, it will no doubt include many details about how the terms will be implemented. This was the case for the <a href="https://www.armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2023/11/09/known-unknowns-or-the-things-that-you-thought-you-knew-about-a-ceasefire-in-gaza-that-it-turns-out-you-did-not/">temporary truce</a> that was negotiated between the parties in November, which included a choreographed exchange of Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners and the delivery of humanitarian aid. </p>
<p>The number of prisoners Hamas is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/large-gaps-remain-between-israel-and-hamas-in-hostage-truce-talks-report/#:%7E:text=Israel's%20negotiation%20team%20has%20rejected,sources%20told%20Al%20Jazeera%20Saturday.">currently seeking</a> in exchange for hostages has been a source of contention.</p>
<p>In 2011, Israel <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/hamas-hostage-gilad-shalit-release-took-5-years-2023-10">agreed to exchange</a> more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners for one Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit. </p>
<p>Arguably, foreseeing a similar scenario, Israel has <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-brutal-conditions-facing-palestinian-prisoners">arrested</a> thousands of Palestinians in both Gaza and the occupied West Bank on minor offences in recent months. Hamas <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/30/hamas-hostages-list-names-tracker-israel-gaza/">continues</a> to hold around 100 hostages, the majority men and many reservists in the Israeli military.</p>
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<h2>Why ceasefires matter</h2>
<p>International law is based on the premise that it imposes obligations on states, non-state parties and individuals that cannot be bargained away. However, as permanent members of the Security Council with veto power, the US, Russia, China, France and the UK have disproportionate power over how such laws come about or come into effect.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the international community is ordered around certain social, political and legal norms. These norms come not only in the form of international law, but also diplomatic and economic relations. This is what the UN terms “friendly relations among nations”. These norms ensure, to an extent, that states comply with their obligations under international law without the need for military force. </p>
<p>The Security Council resolution passed Monday, with vague terms and relatively little incentive for compliance, is currently the least worst option to push the sides toward a halt to the violence and allow aid into Gaza. </p>
<p>Other efforts towards a potentially more meaningful and practical ceasefire should – and will – continue. If they weren’t before, all eyes should now be firmly on Gaza.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marika Sosnowski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Though the resolution is binding, it is not enforceable under international law. This leaves the work to international negotiators to hammer out the details of an agreement.Marika Sosnowski, Postdoctoral research fellow, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2251972024-03-06T17:14:58Z2024-03-06T17:14:58ZGaza conflict: rising death toll from hunger a stark reminder of starvation as a weapon of war<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68434443">deaths of more than 100 Palestinians</a> who had been waiting for an aid convoy on February 29 were a grim reminder of the catastrophe unfolding daily in Gaza. While an independent investigation has yet to establish clear responsibilities for the tragedy, the toll from Israel’s assault on the Gaza Strip grows ever higher.</p>
<p>Five months into the conflict, deaths from hunger and thirst are <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/04/middleeast/gaza-children-dying-malnutrition-israel-ceasefire-talks-intl-hnk/index.html">beginning to mount</a>. A report from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs quoted claims by the Ministry of Health in Gaza on March 3 that 15 children had <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/3/6/israels-war-on-gaza-live-un-food-convoy-blocked-from-north-gaza-by-israel">died of malnutrition and dehydration</a> at Kamal Adwan hospital in northern Gaza, with another six considered to be at grave risk of dying. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO),
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, <a href="https://twitter.com/DrTedros/status/1764652624492515832">reported on March 4</a> that WHO visits to Al-Awda and Kamal Adwan hospitals found “severe levels of malnutrition, children dying of starvation, serious shortages of fuel, food and medical supplies, hospital buildings destroyed”. </p>
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<p>Addressing the UN security council on February 27, the deputy executive director of the World Food Programme, Carl Skau, warned of a <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-deputy-chief-warns-security-council-imminent-famine-northern-gaza-unless-conditions-change">“real prospect of famine by May”</a>, saying there were more than 500,000 people in Gaza at risk.</p>
<p>He said: “Even before October, two-thirds of the people in Gaza were supported with food assistance. Today, food aid is required by almost the entire population of 2.2 million people. One child in every six under the age of two is acutely malnourished.”</p>
<h2>Weaponising starvation</h2>
<p>Starvation has always been used as <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-weaponisation-of-food-has-been-used-in-conflicts-for-centuries-but-it-hasnt-always-resulted-in-victory-221476">weapon of war</a>. And there is now a considerable body of international law which prohibits it and provides for the prosecution of those responsible for deliberate starvation in conflict.</p>
<p>Article 54 of the Geneva conventions <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-54">clearly spells this out</a>. In May 2018, the UN security council unanimously adopted <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2018/sc13354.doc.htm">resolution 2417</a> after identifying 74 million people facing starvation as a result of armed conflict. </p>
<p>Resolution 2417 “strongly condemns the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare in a number of conflict situations and prohibited by international humanitarian law” and “strongly condemns the unlawful denial of humanitarian access and depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival”. </p>
<p>Intentional starvation is punishable as a war crime by the International Criminal Court (ICC) under article 8 of the <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/icc-statute-1998/article-8">Rome statute</a>. In December 2019, the 122 state parties to the ICC parties voted unanimously to <a href="https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10-g&chapter=18&clang=_en">extend the court’s jurisdiction</a> to the use of starvation as a weapon of war. </p>
<h2>Food insecurity</h2>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc5240-conflict-and-right-food-report-special-rapporteur-right-food">2022 report</a> to the Human Rights Council, the UN rapporteur on the right to food, Michael Fakhri, said that “conflict and violence were the primary causes of hunger, malnutrition, and famine”, rather than “because there was not enough food to go around”.</p>
<p>A report from the UN security council on February 13 2024 identified more than 330 million people at risk from food insecurity, most because of climate change – or, increasingly, armed conflict. The security council highlighted conflict or post-conflict famines in Syria, Myanmar, Haiti, and Yemen. </p>
<p>In Africa, the report said, 149 million people were living in food insecurity, notably in Sudan, where the World Food Program has said more than 25 million people scattered across Sudan, South Sudan and Chad are “trapped in a spiral” of food insecurity.</p>
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<h2>The right to food</h2>
<p>The right to food <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights">is enshrined</a> in the UN’s international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. This recognises the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living, which includes access to “adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions”. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, there is more than enough food produced in the world to feed everyone on the planet. But, despite being nine years into the UN’s <a href="https://www.un.org/nutrition/">“decade of action on nutrition”</a>, and despite eradicating hunger being the second of the UN’s sustainable development goals, world hunger is once again on the rise.</p>
<p>The UN’s <a href="https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2023/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2023.pdf">2023 report on its sustainable goals</a> says that 735 million people, more than 9% of the world’s population, suffer from hunger – 122 million more than in 2019. </p>
<p>The report also found that nearly 1.3 billion people rely entirely on imported food. This is where <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/issn/1477-0024/vol/22/iss/3">trade agreements</a> and international trade law can play a significant role in supporting access to food. </p>
<p>In June 2022, a ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization produced a <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/W17R1.pdf&Open=True">declaration on the emergency response to food insecurity</a>, reinforcing the WTO’s commitment to improve the functioning and long-term resilience of global markets for food and agriculture. The conference also declared that members “shall not impose export prohibitions or restrictions on foodstuffs purchased for non-commercial humanitarian purposes by the World Food Programme”.</p>
<p>But the realisation of the right to food as a human right, and the success of the UN’s pledge to eradicate hunger by 2030, will rely on international cooperation and a balance between liberalising trade and protecting states’ agricultural industries. </p>
<p>In February 2007, 500 experts gathered in Mali for the World Forum for Food Sovereignty. They produced <a href="https://nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/DeclNyeleni-en.pdf">the Nyéléni declaration</a>, which seeks to establish the “right of people to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems”.</p>
<p>The starving people of Gaza – and millions like them around the world – have been denied this basic right for decades. Their plight can be ignored for no longer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leïla Choukroune does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Children are particularly at risk from malnutrition as food supplies in Gaza run out.Leïla Choukroune, Professor of International Law, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2243452024-02-29T14:42:22Z2024-02-29T14:42:22ZDRC-Rwanda crisis: what’s needed to prevent a regional war<p>In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/deployment-sadc-mission-democratic-republic-congo#:%7E:text=The%20Southern%20African%20Development%20Community,by%20the%20resurgence%20of%20armed">South African, Burundian and Tanzanian troops</a> are fighting against the <a href="https://www.state.gov/escalation-of-hostilities-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">Rwandan army</a>, which has deployed in support of the rebellion by the March 23 Movement, or M23. </p>
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<p>Soldiers from <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/south-african-soldiers-killed-in-dr-congo-return-home-e082c87d">South Africa</a> and <a href="https://apanews.net/m23-rebels-claim-burundian-soldiers-killed-and-captured/">Burundi</a>, as well as from the United Nations peacekeeping <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/pr-monusco-denounces-attack-helicopter-which-wounds-two-un-peacekeepers-north-kivu">mission</a>, have recently suffered casualties. In the crossfire, civilians have fled: <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-least-78000-children-displaced-and-families-ripped-apart-fighting-escalates#:%7E:text=The%20DRC%20has%20long%20suffered,and%20over%20seven%20million%20displaced.">seven million</a> Congolese are now displaced due to this and multiple other crises in the DRC.</p>
<p>Diplomats are concerned: the conflict in the eastern DRC was the subject of a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15596.doc.htm">special meeting</a> at the United Nations Security Council on 20 February 2024 and a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/mini-summit-discusses-peace-efforts-for-east-democratic-republic-of-congo-/7491551.html">mini-summit</a> on the sidelines of the African Union annual meeting of heads of state on 16 February. </p>
<p>Rwanda, which has denied backing M23, <a href="https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/rwanda-clarifies-security-posture">says</a> the Rwandan rebel group – Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) – which includes combatants who participated in the 1994 genocide, has been fully integrated into the Congolese army. It also claims that the Congolese government is engaged in “massive combat operations” aimed at expelling Congolese Tutsi civilians.</p>
<p>The Congolese government has mounted a campaign against Rwanda. In December, while he campaigned for re-election, President Félix Tshisekedi <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67669187">compared</a> his Rwandan counterpart to Adolf Hitler and accused him of expansionist aims. </p>
<p>In January, the Burundian president Évariste Ndayishimiye closed his border with Rwanda and <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1531125/politique/entre-paul-kagame-et-evariste-ndayishimiye-chronique-dune-reconciliation-avortee/">accused</a> the country of backing rebels against him. He stopped just short of calling for Kagame’s ouster.</p>
<p>We have been <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/about-us/">working</a> on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for around 20 years. This wave of violence resembles previous ones, but is also different. <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691194080/the-war-that-doesnt-say-its-name">At the root</a> of the M23 conflict are countries such as Rwanda and Uganda, intent on projecting power and influence into the eastern DRC, while the Congolese government seems incapable and often unwilling to stabilise its own territory. Donors and United Nations peacekeepers provide humanitarian aid, but do little to transform these dynamics. </p>
<p>Resolving this crisis will require less hypocrisy from foreign donors, the end of Rwandan aggression, and a more accountable Congolese government. But the hopes of a grand bargain are far off, for now. The current peace processes – a <a href="https://www.eac.int/nairobiprocess">“Nairobi process”</a> for domestic negotiations and a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/eastern-drc-peace-processes-miss-the-mark">“Luanda process”</a> for regional talks – are dead or on life support. </p>
<p>The upcoming elections in Rwanda (July 2024) and the US (November 2024) will likely not help cool heads or focus minds. But it is clear that ending the violence will require a new approach, one that places the lives of innocent Congolese civilians at its centre.</p>
<h2>Beginning of regional escalation</h2>
<p>During the early days of his presidency, Tshisekedi’s army <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/l-arm%C3%A9e-rwandaise-op%C3%A8re-bien-en-rdc-selon-des-experts-de-lonu/2102125">collaborated</a> intensely with the Rwandan army, allowing troops to conduct operations against the FDLR on Congolese territory in 2019 and 2020. In late 2019, his government even <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/b150-averting-proxy-wars-eastern-dr-congo-and-great-lakes">recommended</a> dropping charges against the M23 commanders, then in exile. </p>
<p>Less than three years after winning power, however, Tshisekedi changed his approach, breaking his coalition with his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, and moving to cement his position in power. He declared a state of siege in two eastern provinces, shuffled generals around in the army, and sidelined key securocrats. He also shifted gears in his regional relations. </p>
<p>By mid-2021, Tshisekedi had begun to <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/70232-museveni-tshisekedi-commission-construction-of-drc-roads">privilege</a> relations with Uganda, then a bitter rival of Rwanda. Notably, Tshisekedi gave <a href="https://s42831.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/report-crg-ebuteli-uganda-operation-shujaa-drc-adf-securing-economic-interests-1.pdf">permission</a> to the Ugandan army to deploy somewhere between 2,000 and 4,000 troops to hunt down Allied Democratic Forces rebels, an Islamist Ugandan rebellion based in the eastern DRC. Shortly after that, he did the same for the Burundian army, which had its sights on RED-Tabara, rebels based in the DRC seeking to overthrow the government of Ndayishimiye.</p>
<p>Rwanda suddenly felt isolated, even vulnerable, surrounded by hostile neighbours. <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=s/2022/967&Lang=E">According to United Nations investigators</a>, it probably resumed throwing its weight behind the M23 in November 2021. It is above all these regional tensions, coupled with its goal of maintaining influence in the Congo, that pushed it to move. </p>
<p>Since then, the regional fault lines have shifted. Rwanda has patched up relations with Uganda, and the East African Community intervention force – Kenyan, South Sudanese, Burundian and Ugandan troops – that deployed in 2022 to help quell the violence was asked to leave just a year later. This is because their hosts saw them as dragging their feet, if not complicit with the M23. Tshisekedi, who came into office seeing east African countries as allies, has now turned southwards. </p>
<h2>Military changes in eastern DRC</h2>
<p>Beginning in late 2023, a new force from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) began <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/deployment-sadc-mission-democratic-republic-congo">deploying</a> troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi to take the fight to the M23, alongside the Burundian army.</p>
<p>Already, these forces have begun to take casualties. Two South African soldiers were <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/south-african-soldiers-killed-in-dr-congo-return-home-e082c87d">killed</a> on 14 February by a mortar strike; two others were <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/south-africa-commits-2-900-sandf-personnel-to-samidrc/">injured</a> when their helicopter took fire. Some sources indicate that Burundian soldiers have taken <a href="https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/2023/11/16/bujumbura-larmee-burundaise-reste-muette-sur-la-mort-de-ses-militaires-en-rdc-mais-les-enterre/">heavy losses</a>. </p>
<p>The rising degree of military sophistication also raises eyebrows. The US government has <a href="https://www.state.gov/escalation-of-hostilities-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">accused</a> Rwanda of deploying surface-to-air missiles, UN officials have reported armed drones striking their bases, while Tanzania has <a href="https://chimpreports.com/tanzania-army-employs-saba-saba-guns-against-m23-rebels/">sent</a> Soviet-era BM-21 Grad rocket launchers. The DRC has <a href="https://www.military.africa/2023/06/drc-receives-ch-4-drones-from-china/">bought</a> nine Chinese CH-4 combat drones (three of which have reportedly been shot down already). </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Congolese army has partnered with <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/dr-congo-conflict-pulls-in-more-players-to-tackle-rebels/a-68304390">private security contractors</a> as well as with an array of local militia, collectively dubbed Wazalendo (patriots), who are poorly trained and disciplined. There are credible <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=s/2023/990&Lang=E">reports</a> from late 2023 that, as in the <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=s/2022/967&Lang=E">previous year</a>, they are also partnering with the Rwandan FDLR rebels.</p>
<p>And yet, the Congolese government has been unable to make much headway. In early February, M23 forces surrounded the lakeside town of Sake, just 30km west of the provincial capital Goma. This most recent push has displaced another 135,000 people toward Goma; there are around <a href="https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-north-kivu-flash-update-1-new-surge-violence-masisi-forced-displacement-goma-08-february-2024">half a million</a> displaced people around the town now.</p>
<h2>Mixed signals</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/85966/a-decade-ago-the-obama-administration-acted-when-the-m23-terrorized-eastern-drc-will-biden-do-the-same/">Unlike</a> the previous M23 crisis, influential foreign actors have sent mixed signals. At the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15596.doc.htm">UN Security Council on 20 February</a>, the <a href="https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-the-situation-concerning-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-3/">US</a> and <a href="https://onu.delegfrance.org/france-condemns-the-m23-offensive-launched-on-february-7-against-the-town-of">France</a> called on Rwanda to withdraw their troops from the DRC. The US has gone the furthest of all of Rwanda’s donors, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1703">sanctioning</a> a Rwandan general, suspending all military aid, and attempting to broker a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/01/biden-congo-war-00129620">ceasefire</a> in December 2023. </p>
<p>And yet, the US remains, by far, the <a href="https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDDACAidataglancebyrecipient_new/Recipients?:embed=y&:display_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no?&:showVizHome=no">largest donor</a> to Rwanda, which receives the equivalent of around a third of its budget in aid. Other countries have pushed much less or not at all. While the M23 rebellion was going on, the British Commonwealth held its big biannual meeting in Kigali in 2022 and the UK struck a controversial <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/10/uk-abandon-rwanda-asylum-transfer-plan?gad_source=1&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIy-Gol_PBhAMVwCWtBh2uhg8nEAAYAiAAEgKsSPD_BwE">asylum deal</a> with Rwanda.</p>
<p>The EU <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/#:%7E:text=and%20medical%20equipment.-,Support%20to%20the%20deployment%20of%20the%20Rwanda%20Defence%20Force%20in,Force%20in%20Cabo%20Delgado%20province.">gave</a> US$22 million to support the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique. On 19 February, the EU announced a <a href="https://www.innovationnewsnetwork.com/eu-and-rwanda-strike-deal-for-sustainable-raw-materials-value-chains/44015/">deal</a> to boost mineral exports from Rwanda.</p>
<p>This last piece of news caused an uproar in the DRC, touching on the popular belief that minerals are the root of the crisis. While the causes of the violence are far more complex than that, they have a point: the <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/uga">largest export</a> from Uganda (56% in 2021), Rwanda (23%), and Burundi (29%) in recent years has been gold, almost all of which is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-12-28/where-does-gold-come-from-in-africa-suspected-smuggling-to-dubai-rings-alarms?embedded-checkout=true">smuggled</a> to their countries from the DRC.</p>
<p>In the long term, the DRC government will need to undertake a host of reforms to quell these cycles of conflict. They include reforming the Congolese army, a new demobilisation programme for armed groups, an economic development programme that would allow Congolese to benefit from their resources, a plan for communal reconciliation, and an end to discrimination against Kinyarwanda speakers. But none of that can happen as long as Congo’s neighbours continue to destabilise it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224345/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason Stearns has received funding, through his work for the Congo Research Group, from the Swedish government, the European Union, the Schmidt Family Foundation, the United States Agency for International Development, and Bridgeway Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Z. Walker has received funding, in his role at the Congo Research Group, from the Swedish government, Dutch government, the European Union, the Schmidt Family Foundation, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Bridgeway Foundation.</span></em></p>Regional countries are embroiled in a geopolitical struggle over influence and survival.Jason Stearns, Assistant Professor, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser UniversityJoshua Z. Walker, Director of Programs, Congo Research Group, Center on International Cooperation, New York UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2241322024-02-27T22:52:56Z2024-02-27T22:52:56ZOther nations are applying sanctions and going to court over Gaza – should NZ join them?<p>Despite the carnage, United Nations resolutions and international court rulings, the war in Gaza has the potential to get much worse. Unless Hamas <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/world/509603/israel-sets-march-deadline-for-gaza-ground-offensive-in-rafah">frees all Israeli hostages</a> by March 10, Israel may launch an all-out offensive in Rafah, a city of 1.5 million people, cornered against the border with Egypt.</p>
<p>The US has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/20/us-vetoes-another-un-security-council-resolution-urging-gaza-war-ceasefire">continued to block</a> UN Security Council resolutions calling for an immediate ceasefire. But President Joe Biden has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a869bfd8-7303-4178-998a-7257eca1f167">cautioned Israel</a> against a Rafah ground assault without a credible plan to protect civilians.</p>
<p>More direct calls for restraint have come from the UN <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/un-chief-warns-of-gigantic-tragedy-if-israeli-military-expands-fight-to-rafah-/7480114.html">secretary-general</a> and the <a href="https://twitter.com/karimkhanqc/status/1757081372680700206?s=46">prosecutor of the International Criminal Court</a>. To its credit, New Zealand, along with Australia and Canada, added its voice in a <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-prime-ministers-australia-canada-and-new-zealand">joint statement</a> on February 15:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A military operation into Rafah would be catastrophic […] We urge the Israeli government not to go down this path […] Palestinian civilians cannot be made to pay the price of defeating Hamas.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>New Zealand also reiterated its commitment to a political settlement and a <a href="https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/038/88/pdf/nr003888.pdf?token=7OZgOAUvsg2og5R5UP&fe=true">two-state solution</a>. Given how hard some other countries are pushing for a ceasefire and peace, however, it is fair to ask whether the National-led coalition government could be doing more.</p>
<h2>NZ absent from a crucial case</h2>
<p>So far, New Zealand’s most obvious contribution has been to <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-deploying-nzdf-team-protect-red-sea-shipping">deploy a six-member defence force</a> team to the region to deter Houthi rebel attacks on commercial and naval shipping in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>This collaboration with <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/03/a-joint-statement-from-the-governments-of-the-united-states-australia-bahrain-belgium-canada-denmark-germany-italy-japan-netherlands-new-zealand-and-the-united-kingdom/">13 other countries</a> is on the right side of international law. But the timing suggests it is more about preventing the Israel-Gaza situation from spreading and destabilising the region than about protecting international waterways <em>per se</em>.</p>
<p>Furthermore, there is a risk of New Zealand’s response appearing one-sided, considering its relative silence on other fronts.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uns-top-court-didnt-call-for-a-ceasefire-in-gaza-how-does-nz-respond-now-221977">The UN’s top court didn’t call for a ceasefire in Gaza – how does NZ respond now?</a>
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<p>For example, following the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/26/world-courts-interim-ruling-on-genocide-in-gaza-key-takeaways-icj-israel">interim ruling</a> by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the application of the Genocide Convention to Israel’s devastation of Gaza, a second opinion is <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203274">being sought from the court</a> over the legality of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory.</p>
<p>Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad Al-Malki <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240219-palestinians-accuse-israel-colonialism-apartheid-un-top-court-icj">told the court</a> his people were suffering “colonialism and apartheid” under Israeli occupation. It is the latest round in a monumental debate central to any lasting peace process.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240209-pre-01-00-en.pdf">More than 50 countries</a> are presenting arguments at the ICJ, the most to engage with any single case since the court was established in 1945. But New Zealand is not present in the oral proceedings.</p>
<p>This absence matches New Zealand’s abstention at the United Nations General Assembly vote that referred the case to the ICJ. A country that prides itself on an independent foreign policy seems to have lost its voice.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-egypt-refuses-to-open-its-border-to-palestinians-forcibly-displaced-from-gaza-223735">Why Egypt refuses to open its border to Palestinians forcibly displaced from Gaza</a>
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<h2>An even-handed foreign policy</h2>
<p>New Zealand does call for the observance of international humanitarian law in Gaza. It has been less vocal, though, about calling for accountability for war crimes, no matter which side commits them.</p>
<p>The International Criminal Court, New Zealand’s <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/united-nations-general-assembly-report-of-the-international-criminal-court-2/">permanent representative to the UN has said</a>, is “a central pillar in the international rules-based order and the international criminal justice system”.</p>
<p>Directly supporting that sentiment would mean calling for independent investigations of all alleged crimes in the current Israel-Gaza conflict.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">Israeli siege has placed Gazans at risk of starvation − prewar policies made them vulnerable in the first place</a>
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<p>Given countries it considers friends and allies do more to register their disapproval of the situation, New Zealand needs to consider whether its own current sanctions system is adequate. </p>
<p>The White House has <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/02/01/message-to-the-congress-on-imposing-certain-sanctions-on-persons-undermining-peace-security-and-stability-in-the-west-bank/">begun to sanction</a> individual Israeli settlers in the occupied Palestinian territories, accusing them of undermining peace, security and stability. Britain has also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/12/uk-places-sanctions-on-israeli-settlers-for-forcing-palestinians-from-their-land">placed sanctions</a> on a small number of “extremist” settlers. France has recently <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/israel-palestinian-territories/news/2024/article/israel-palestinian-territories-france-adopts-sanctions-against-violent-israeli#:%7E:text=France%20is%20adopting%20sanctions%20against,ban%20on%20entering%20French%20territory.">identified and sanctioned</a> 28 such individuals.</p>
<p>So far, however, New Zealand has remained silent. This prompts an obvious question: if sanctions can be applied to both <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-sanctions-also-mark-one-year-russia%E2%80%99s-invasion-ukraine">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2022/12/new-zealand-imposes-travel-bans-on-22-iranian-security-forces-members-connected-to-mahsa-amini-s-death-violent-response-to-protests.html">Iran</a> for their actions, should New Zealand now follow the lead of its allies and take active measures to express its disapproval of what is happening in Gaza and the occupied territories?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224132/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>International pressure on Israel to halt its onslaught in Gaza is mounting. New Zealand has so far chosen to stay on the sidelines, despite allies taking more decisive stands.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238432024-02-19T19:04:37Z2024-02-19T19:04:37ZMoving closer to Australia is in New Zealand’s strategic interest – joining AUKUS is not<p>Despite inheriting positive bilateral ties with Australia and the US, New Zealand’s coalition government has indicated it wants an even closer alignment with traditional allies.</p>
<p>In what has been described as “the most challenging strategic environment for decades”, Foreign Minister Winston Peters and Defence Minister Judith Collins <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-aust-foreign-affairs-defence-ministers-meet">held discussions</a> with their Australian counterparts in Melbourne this month. </p>
<p>This was the first time in trans-Tasman relations that ministers in these portfolios have met in such a “two-on-two” format.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-australia-new-zealand-ministerial-consultations-anzmin-2024">statement</a> issued after the talks said “the two countries share close bonds of history and geography, liberal democratic values, regional and global interests and strategic outlook”.</p>
<p>The statement also agreed the AUKUS security partnership “made a positive contribution toward maintaining peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific”.</p>
<p>These words may have signalled a potentially momentous break with New Zealand’s previous foreign policy.</p>
<h2>A distinctive worldview</h2>
<p>There has long been bipartisan acknowledgement that Australia is New Zealand’s closest and most important ally. But there appeared to be little recognition at the meeting that New Zealand’s evolving sense of national identity – anchored in the Pacific – has generated a distinctive worldview. </p>
<p>For much of the post-war era, the New Zealand-Australian alliance has been one of unity rather than uniformity. It has accommodated relatively independent New Zealand stances on non-nuclear security, opposition to the illegal US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and relations with China.</p>
<p>It may be a stretch to say the alliance promoted a principled, independent New Zealand foreign policy, but it has certainly not proved to be an impediment.</p>
<p>However, those days may now be coming to an end. A tighter alignment with Australia – given Canberra’s own very close relationship with Washington – could make New Zealand itself more reliant on US strategic input.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-defence-dilemma-facing-nzs-next-government-stay-independent-or-join-pillar-2-of-aukus-212090">The defence dilemma facing NZ's next government: stay independent or join 'pillar 2' of AUKUS?</a>
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<h2>China not the only threat</h2>
<p>Close ties with Australia do not mean it is necessarily in New Zealand’s strategic interests to join AUKUS. </p>
<p>Established in 2021, the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/13/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus-2/">trilateral security pact</a> between Australia, the US and UK purports to defend “a shared commitment to the international rules-based order” in the Indo-Pacific region. </p>
<p>But it is clearly intended to counter the challenge of China’s assertiveness, and consists of two “pillars”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nzs-first-national-security-strategy-signals-a-turning-point-and-the-end-of-old-certainties-210885">NZ’s first national security strategy signals a 'turning point' and the end of old certainties</a>
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<p>Pillar one involves Australia receiving eight to ten nuclear-powered submarines from the US and UK over the next three decades. New Zealand is now actively exploring whether to join pillar two, envisaging the sharing of cutting-edge defence technologies.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/508108/possible-aukus-membership-nz-working-through-what-it-can-bring-to-alliance">According to Collins</a>, New Zealand’s “defence has been absolutely gutted in the last three years and we’ve got to build that back”.</p>
<p>While last year’s <a href="https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-11/national-security-strategy-aug2023.pdf">national security strategy</a> acknowledged New Zealand’s “stability, security and prosperity” depends critically on an international rules-based order, it is also evident China is not the sole threat to this order.</p>
<h2>Gaza and Ukraine</h2>
<p>Firstly, there is the unconditional support of the US and UK for the Israeli government’s disproportionate and relentless military response in Gaza to the October 7 terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>An estimated 28,000 Palestinians have been killed, prompting the International Court of Justice to order Israel to prevent acts of genocide there.</p>
<p>New Zealand has voted twice in the UN General Assembly for an immediate humanitarian truce or ceasefire. It also recently joined Australia and Canada in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/canada-australia-new-zealand-call-immediate-ceasefire-gaza-2024-02-15/">calling for a ceasefire</a> before any ground assault on Rafah.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-the-middle-east-to-the-south-china-sea-nzs-new-government-inherits-a-defence-dilemma-221585">From the Middle East to the South China Sea: NZ's new government inherits a defence dilemma</a>
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<p>But the government has nevertheless overlooked US complicity (through military aid and use of its Security Council veto) in the Gaza catastrophe. That complicity has allowed Iran and China to strategically capitalise on global anger over the plight of the Palestinians.</p>
<p>As well, Wellington has accepted a US request to <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-deploying-nzdf-team-protect-red-sea-shipping">send a Defence Force team</a> to the Red Sea to help repel Houthi attacks on civilian shipping. </p>
<p>New Zealand and Australia have a huge stake in reversing the illegal and brutal Russian attempt to annex parts of Ukraine. The Biden administration, however, has struggled since late 2023 to sustain vital military aid to Kyiv. </p>
<p>Serious opposition within the US Congress from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/dec/13/hakeem-jeffries-pro-putin-caucus-ukraine">some members of the Republican party</a> raises questions for its allies – including its AUKUS partners – about US commitment to the international rules order.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-number-8-wire-days-for-nzs-defence-force-are-over-new-priorities-will-demand-bigger-budgets-211182">The 'number 8 wire' days for NZ's defence force are over – new priorities will demand bigger budgets</a>
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<h2>Would AUKUS help or hinder NZ interests?</h2>
<p>There is also a concern among <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/pou-tiaki/131807249/pacific-criticises-aukus-deal-keeping-america-engaged-in-the-region">Pacific Island</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/19/asean-aukus-china-us-rivalry/">ASEAN</a> states that New Zealand’s possible participation in AUKUS pillar two could heighten great power rivalry.</p>
<p>Elevating a view that only the US and its Anglosphere partners can counter Chinese influence in the vast region carries several risks.</p>
<p>It may undercut regional leadership, and de-emphasise local national security concerns such as climate change. It might also hurt New Zealand’s diplomatic standing as a Pacific nation projecting an independent, rules-based, non-nuclear foreign policy that is distinguishable from its traditional allies.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-the-us-public-thinks-about-giving-military-and-other-aid-223064">Ukraine war: what the US public thinks about giving military and other aid</a>
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<p>The current security situation faces multiple challenges – including US exceptionalism, China’s assertiveness, Russian expansionism and UN Security Council dysfunction.</p>
<p>The key question is whether access to the start-of-the-art defence technologies of AUKUS pillar two will help address or aggravate these challenges for a relatively small actor like New Zealand.</p>
<p>On balance, and mindful that AUKUS does not have a monopoly over new defence technologies, there is little evidence that participation in pillar two will significantly advance New Zealand’s distinctive interests and values in the Indo-Pacific region or elsewhere.</p>
<p>And it should certainly not be regarded as a quick fix for under-investment in the country’s defence sector by governments over many years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223843/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert G. Patman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Signing up to ‘pillar two’ of the AUKUS alliance sits uneasily with New Zealand’s distinctive worldview – and could aggravate its wider foreign policy challenges.Robert G. Patman, Professor of International Relations, University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2199282023-12-14T15:40:32Z2023-12-14T15:40:32ZGaza update: deadlock in the UN security council means no relief for suffering Palestinian civilians<p>Day by day, as Israel continues its assault on Gaza, the death toll mounts. According to the Gaza health ministry more than 18,500 people have now been killed in the Israeli army’s air and ground assault – and the Israel Defence Forces have lost 115 personnel, including ten killed on December 12. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the UN seems incapable of any effective response. The UN secretary general, António Guterres, invoked Article 99 of the UN charter last week for only the sixth time in the body’s history, to force the security council to discuss the conflict as a matter that “may aggravate existing threats to the maintenance of international peace and security”. But still, despite overwhelming support for a ceasefire in resolutions voted on by the general assembly, the US has once again wielded its veto in the security council.</p>
<p>Emma McClean, an expert in international law at the University of Westminster, believes that the geopolitical considerations driving the US, UK and France on the one hand and Russia and China on the other means that the security council is now at deadlock and the UN has <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-deadlock-in-the-security-council-shows-that-the-un-is-no-longer-fit-for-purpose-219772">exhausted all its options</a> for meaningful action. In the face of Israeli intransigence over a ceasefire, the UN is now powerless to act, she says.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-deadlock-in-the-security-council-shows-that-the-un-is-no-longer-fit-for-purpose-219772">Gaza war: deadlock in the security council shows that the UN is no longer fit for purpose</a>
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<p>But, to a large extent, Israel’s intransigence is dependent on the support of Washington. And Joe Biden has now made it fairly clear that, while he backs Israel in its fight to eradicate Hamas as a military and political force, it’s not a blank cheque. Biden has his own political interests to consider with an election race looming next year. He is currently trailing the presumptive Republican nominee, Donald Trump, and so must take his own voting base into account. </p>
<p>Dafydd Townley, a US politics expert at the University of Portsmouth, says that thus far the issue is not featuring as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-us-israel-relationship-is-in-period-of-transition-as-biden-says-israel-is-losing-support-219571">major election issue</a> just yet. But as costs mount and US television audiences see day by day reports focusing on the humanitarian disaster unfolding in Gaza, Biden is likely to want to put a degree of distance between himself and Benjamin Netanyahu.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-us-israel-relationship-is-in-period-of-transition-as-biden-says-israel-is-losing-support-219571">Gaza war: US-Israel relationship is in period of transition as Biden says Israel is losing support</a>
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<p>It doesn’t help that Netanyahu and some of his political allies are indulging in rhetoric that – while appealing to Israeli hawks – could be seen as tantamount to threatening ethnic cleansing in Gaza. When he announced the beginning of the land assault on the Strip on October 27, the Israeli prime minister made a sinister allusion to a Bible story: “‘You must remember what Amalek has done to you,’ says our Holy Bible.” Amalek crops up several times in the Bible – usually in an apocalyptic frame of reference: “Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.”</p>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
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<p>The agriculture minister, Avi Dichter, referred to the assault on the Gaza Strip as “Gaza Nakba 2023”. This is a direct reference to what Palestinians call “the Nakba”, or “the catastrophe” in 1948, when armed Zionist militias systematically destroyed Palestinian cities and towns and forced 750,000 people to flee their land. Afaf Jabiri, an expert in Middle East politics at the University of East London, writes that – in effect – the vast majority of displaced people in Gaza have already been <a href="https://theconversation.com/attack-on-gaza-israeli-rhetoric-fuels-fears-of-ethnic-cleansing-as-idf-assault-continues-to-push-south-218727">forced from their homes once</a> and were living in refugee camps. Now there are few safe places for them to flee to.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/attack-on-gaza-israeli-rhetoric-fuels-fears-of-ethnic-cleansing-as-idf-assault-continues-to-push-south-218727">Attack on Gaza: Israeli rhetoric fuels fears of ethnic cleansing as IDF assault continues to push south</a>
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<h2>The Israeli perspective</h2>
<p>While the IDF’s assault on Gaza has the support of the majority of the people in Israel, its architect – the prime minister – does not. John Strawson, an expert in Israeli politics from the University of East London, has recently returned from a trip to Israel and writes that he found people <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-israelis-feel-angry-at-their-government-and-abandoned-by-the-international-community-219425">angry at their government</a> and a widespread feeling that the international community has abandoned Israel since October 7 and is focusing on the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza rather than the 135 hostages still believed to be held in Gaza.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-israelis-feel-angry-at-their-government-and-abandoned-by-the-international-community-219425">Gaza war: Israelis feel angry at their government and abandoned by the international community</a>
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<p>Many women in particular were angry at the international feminist movement for what they perceive as a lack of solidarity over the rapes and other sexual crimes committed against women during the Hamas assault. Dyan Mazurana and Anastasia Marshak of Tufts University in the US are scholars who work directly with victims of war-related sexual violence and other serious crimes. </p>
<p>They believe that some experts may have hesitated because <a href="https://theconversation.com/hamas-use-of-sexual-violence-is-an-all-too-common-part-of-modern-war-but-not-in-all-conflicts-219301">Hamas hasn’t been known in the past</a> to use sexual violence in its attacks against Israeli civilians. “These violent acts suggest an intent to utterly destroy their victims, while also terrorizing the Israeli public and humiliating Israeli men, Israel’s military and the state of Israel,” they write, adding that given the level of planning involved in the October 7 attacks, it’s highly unlikely that the use of sexual violence was not part of Hamas’s strategy.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hamas-use-of-sexual-violence-is-an-all-too-common-part-of-modern-war-but-not-in-all-conflicts-219301">Hamas' use of sexual violence is an all-too-common part of modern war − but not in all conflicts</a>
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<p>As Israel continues its push south the death toll will almost certainly include hostages. And, as Leonie Fleischmann of City University of London notes, its almost certain that Hamas will drive a harder bargain for their release than they exacted during the humanitarian pause in Gaza. In 2011, Israel released 1,027 Palestinian prisoners, including 300 who had killed Israelis, in exchange for just one Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, who had been held captive for five years.</p>
<p>But as she <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-what-do-we-know-about-the-hostage-prisoner-exchanges-and-are-they-likely-to-resume-218889?notice=Article+has+been+updated.">notes here</a>, the ferocity of Israel’s ground offensive will make it very difficult for any further prisoner-hostage swaps unless there is a further pause or even a ceasefire – which remains unlikely as things stand.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-what-do-we-know-about-the-hostage-prisoner-exchanges-and-are-they-likely-to-resume-218889">Gaza war: what do we know about the hostage-prisoner exchanges and are they likely to resume?</a>
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<h2>Peace in prospect?</h2>
<p>Despite US pressure as noted above, Israel is said to want a further two months to complete its military operation on the Gaza Strip. And the question of what happens afterwards remains opaque. Julien Tourreille and Charles-Philippe David of the University of Quebec in Montreal believe that the least worst option might be to set up some kind of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-should-consider-a-transitional-administration-for-gaza-219476">transitional authority there</a> – similar to arrangements that brought an end to fighting in East Timor and Kosovo in the 1990s.</p>
<p>But this would, of course, involve an agreement in the UN security council. You can make your own judgement about how likely is to happen.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-should-consider-a-transitional-administration-for-gaza-219476">Why we should consider a transitional administration for Gaza</a>
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<p>The big fear throughout this crisis has been that it might escalate into a regional war, bringing in Lebanon and Iran. And there are daily reports of attacks by Hezbollah fighters on Israeli positions, while in Iraq and Syria, US military bases have been targeted by Iran-backed militias.</p>
<p>Bashir Saade, an expert in Middle East politics and religion at the University of Stirling, evaluates Hezbollah’s strategy as spelled out recently in speeches by its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah’s aim, <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-how-hezbollah-has-opened-a-second-front-inside-israel-216391">he writes</a>, is to force Israel to fight on two fronts and inside its own borders. Meanwhile, regular attacks on US bases in the region by Hezbollah and other armed Islamist groups will encourage the US to put pressure on Israel to agree to a ceasefire. Again, how this plays out remains to be seen.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-how-hezbollah-has-opened-a-second-front-inside-israel-216391">Gaza war: how Hezbollah has opened a second front inside Israel</a>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
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A selection of analysis from our coverage of the war in Gaza over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2197722023-12-14T13:26:39Z2023-12-14T13:26:39ZGaza war: deadlock in the security council shows that the UN is no longer fit for purpose<p>As Israel launched its ground offensive in Gaza on October 27 – having conducted airstrikes in the weeks following the horrific attack by Hamas on October 7 – the UN general assembly convened an emergency session. With reports of upwards of 7,000 civilian deaths in Gaza, the general assembly passed a <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N23/319/20/PDF/N2331920.pdf?OpenElement">resolution</a> calling for “an immediate, durable and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities”.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the UN security council, which has primary responsibility for international peace and security, remained silent.</p>
<p>By October 27, the security council had voted on four resolutions, all of which had failed. For a resolution to pass, it must receive at least nine affirmative votes and not be vetoed by a permanent member. All five permanent security council members (the P5) – France, China, Russia, the UK and the US – wielded their veto, revealing deep fractures in addressing the crisis. </p>
<p>The first of the four resolutions, proposed by Russia, which came to a vote on October 17, was vetoed by France, the UK and the US. The resolution called for a humanitarian ceasefire but failed to condemn Hamas. The US also objected to the lack of recognition of Israel’s right of self-defence. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/311/26/PDF/N2331126.pdf?OpenElement">second resolution</a>, proposed by Brazil and voted on October 18 fared better. But it still attracted a US veto due the failure to mention Israel’s right of self-defence. </p>
<p>Billed as a consensus resolution – opting for the more palatable language of “humanitarian pauses” – the disappointment at the US veto was palpable. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N23/310/62/PDF/N2331062.pdf?OpenElement">Brazil</a> remarked: “Council paralysis in the face of a humanitarian catastrophe is not in the interest of the international community.” </p>
<p>A week later, on October 25, the security council met to vote on <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N23/320/23/PDF/N2332023.pdf?OpenElement">draft resolutions</a> from the US and Russia. The US resolution, unsurprisingly, focused on the right of self-defence and prompted a double veto by Russia and China. </p>
<p>China, in particular, objected to the inclusion of the “deeply divisive” issue of self-defence and observed that the resolution did not reflect the consensus of the Brazil resolution on addressing the humanitarian situation. </p>
<p>The US vetoed the Russian resolution which, like its predecessor, did not garner sufficient affirmative votes to be adopted. The security council was deadlocked with the US firmly opposed to a humanitarian ceasefire.</p>
<p>Close on the heels of a warning from the UN secretary general, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-chief-says-gaza-becoming-graveyard-children-2023-11-06/">António Guterres</a>, that “Gaza is becoming a graveyard for children”, came the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-no-ceasefire-gaza-just-brief-local-pauses-2023-11-09/">announcement</a> of “tactical, local pauses” for humanitarian aid. And on November 15, Malta successfully tabled a <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/359/02/PDF/N2335902.pdf?OpenElement">resolution</a> in the security council calling for “urgent and extended humanitarian pauses and corridors”, which was <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/israel-rejects-un-call-for-extended-humanitarian-pauses-for-gaza-/7357247.html">roundly rejected</a> by Israel. </p>
<p>Moreover, a proposed amendment calling for, in the words of the general assembly resolution, “an immediate, durable and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities”, was vetoed by the US. Like with Ukraine, the security council had reached the end of the road, stymied by the use of the veto. It would not meet again until prompted to do so by Guterres.</p>
<h2>Invoking Article 99</h2>
<p>Under Article 99 the secretary general may “bring to the attention” of the security council “any matter which, in in his opinion, may threaten international peace and security”. On <a href="https://www.un.org/en/situation-in-occupied-palestine-and-israel/sg-sc-article99-06-dec-2023">December 6</a>, Guterres brought the human suffering wrought by the “hostilities in Gaza and Israel” to the attention of the security council as a matter that “may aggravate existing threats to the maintenance of international peace and security”.</p>
<p>The invocation of Article 99 is significant. As the most powerful tool available to the secretary general, it has only been used six times since 1950. But it does not necessarily prompt security council action. Indeed, under the UN charter, the security council retains discretion as to how, and if at all, to act. </p>
<p>So while the security council met in 1950 to discuss Korea as a result of the then secretary general <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/formersg/trygve.shtml">Trygve Lie</a> bringing the matter to its attention, the subsequent inaction of the security council prompted the general assembly to step in with the “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144717#:%7E:text=The%20emergency%20special%20session%20is,maintenance%20of%20international%20peace%20and">Uniting for Peace</a>” resolution. Invocation of this resolution allows the general assembly to hold emergency sessions when the security council fails “to exercise its primary responsibility” for international peace and security. </p>
<p>When the security council met on December 8, members spoke of a humanitarian imperative for security council action, with a draft <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/397/75/PDF/N2339775.pdf?OpenElement">UAE resolution</a> demanding “an immediate humanitarian ceasefire” securing 13 affirmative votes. Yet, the US vetoed the resolution. It cited the absence of Israel’s right to self-defence and the lack of condemnation of Hamas and asked why the resolution “fails to encourage a resumption of humanitarian pauses to allow for the release of hostages and an increase in aid”. </p>
<h2>Dead end</h2>
<p>In response, the general assembly reconvened its October emergency session, held under the 1950 “Uniting for Peace” resolution. The <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N23/397/09/PDF/N2339709.pdf?OpenElement">proposed resolution</a> mirrored the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/397/75/PDF/N2339775.pdf?OpenElement">UAE resolution</a> that had been vetoed by the US days before in the security council. By a clear majority, the general assembly demanded an “immediate humanitarian ceasefire”. </p>
<p>This time 153 states voted in favour, compared to 120 for the previous resolution. With the number of abstentions dropping by approximately half and a mere ten states voting against the resolution, the global consensus for “an immediate humanitarian ceasefire” was clear. </p>
<p>But Israel was equally clear in holding its position that a ceasefire would not only prolong “death and destruction” but would only benefit Hamas. It was obviously a position shared by the US given its use of the veto. And therein lies the problem.</p>
<p>Yes, there is a global consensus for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire – this is evident in the voting records of both the general assembly and the security council. And yes, the US will be held to account by the general assembly for its use of the veto in the coming days under the “<a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3972149?ln=en">standing mandate</a>” established following the security council impasse over Ukraine. </p>
<p>But there is little more that the UN can do in the face an avowed aversion to ceasefires by Israel – it has now exhausted every avenue available to it to stop the fighting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219772/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma McClean does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Geopolitical concerns have once again brought the UN security council to a standstill.Emma McClean, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194762023-12-12T17:03:39Z2023-12-12T17:03:39ZWhy we should consider a transitional administration for Gaza<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/why-we-should-consider-a-transitional-administration-for-gaza" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The massacre perpetrated against Israel by Hamas on Oct. 7 opened a new chapter in the tragedy that is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. </p>
<p>For more than 75 years, too many opportunities to achieve lasting peace have been squandered, whether through the intransigence of some, the extremist excesses of others, the unbalanced commitment of a third party or even global disinterest in the conflict.</p>
<p>More than 150 members of the United Nations General Assembly, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-sustainable-ceasefire-israel-gaza-1.7056626">including Canada</a>, recently voted in favour of a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/12/middleeast/ceasefire-vote-gaza-israel-un-intl">resolution calling for a ceasefire</a>. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-middle-east-67687628?ns_mchannel=social&ns_source=twitter&ns_campaign=bbc_live&ns_linkname=6578d92a87855b2dac7d421c%26US%20votes%20against%20resolution%2C%20UK%20abstains%262023-12-12T22%3A05%3A31.507Z&ns_fee=0&pinned_post_locator=urn:asset:2e285aa8-1cc6-4cc4-a867-38f595685178&pinned_post_asset_id=6578d92a87855b2dac7d421c&pinned_post_type=share">Ten members voted against</a> the resolution, including Israel and the United States. The U.S. also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-vote-delayed-demand-gaza-humanitarian-ceasefire-2023-12-08/">vetoed a UN Security Council resolution</a> for a ceasefire.</p>
<p>Yet U.S. President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/11/18/joe-biden-gaza-hamas-putin/">recently expressed an intention to resolve the conflict</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Our goal should not be simply to stop the war for today – it should be to end the war forever.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These developments, including an apparent determination by the U.S. to re-engage its efforts to bring about lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians as thousands die in the conflict, requires an examination of what would be the most effective course of action.</p>
<h2>The least bad option</h2>
<p>Obviously, the chances of success may seem remote. But what
are the alternatives? A return to the pre-Oct. 7 status quo would mean accepting the more or less long-term repetition of a new cycle of appalling violence. </p>
<p>Eliminating the threat posed by Hamas cannot be achieved by Israel’s reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, and even less by the disappearance of all Palestinians from the enclave, as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/17/israel-government-right-gaza-endgame-conquest/">suggested</a> by the most radical elements on the Israeli political scene. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-08/palestinian-authority-working-with-us-on-postwar-plan-for-gaza">The return</a> of a moribund and <a href="https://pune.news/international/unpopular-ineffective-palestinian-authority-cant-drive-two-state-solution-97139/">ineffective Palestinian Authority</a> in the wake of Israel Defense Forces military operations in Gaza is not credible and doomed to failure. </p>
<p>Arab countries in the region <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/03/there-might-be-no-day-after-in-gaza-pub-90920">don’t want to assume responsibility</a> for the security and administration of Gaza, while interference by a single major foreign power like the U.S. would constitute a form of imperialism.</p>
<p>Faced with these unthinkable options, the best — or least bad — solution seems to be to consider setting up a transitional administration in Gaza with three objectives: to ensure security, to work towards reconstruction and to lay the foundations for political stability and economic development. </p>
<p>Such a model was successful in the pacification and reconstruction mission in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmiset/background.html">East Timor</a> in 1999 <a href="https://unmik.unmissions.org/mandate">and in Kosovo</a> the same year. The United Nations might even consider reviving its <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/trusteeship-council">Trusteeship Council</a>, which has been dormant since 1994.</p>
<h2>Requirements</h2>
<p>To ensure legitimacy and a mandate, such an administration would have to rest on two pillars involving the UN Security Council: a regional agreement under Chapter 8 of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-8">UN Charter</a>, and the implementation of a peace-enforcement force based on Chapter 7 to restore order and ensure security on the other. </p>
<p>Such a multinational approach would give hope to Gazans and reassure the Israeli government that Hamas and other extremist groups cannot return.</p>
<p>In the long term, it could even encourage the emergence of a full and functional administration of the territory, offering the concrete prospect of a political solution to the long-standing dispute with the creation of a future Palestinian state (starting with Gaza and extending to the West Bank).</p>
<p>The success of such an approach, as was the case in the past in Bosnia and Kosovo (involving NATO and the European Union), depends on the creation of a peacekeeping force with a strong mandate from the UN Security Council. </p>
<p>This force would have to be large enough to ensure security and, if necessary, impose peace — meaning at least 50,000 well-armed, well co-ordinated UN troops, with clear rules of engagement, provided by the countries involved (excluding Russia, for obvious reasons) and placed under a single command designated by the council, as was the case during the <a href="https://www.unc.mil/About/About-Us/">Korean War</a>. </p>
<p>This last requirement is necessary to avoid any repetition of the catastrophic scenario of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/0199253102.003.0007">failed intervention in Somalia</a> in 1993. The creation of such a well-integrated and well-organized military structure is absolutely essential to avoid any paralysis in decision-making.</p>
<h2>Economic prospects</h2>
<p>Rebuilding Gaza and offering economic prospects to its inhabitants will obviously require considerable financial resources.</p>
<p>The transitional administration, or even a <a href="https://research.un.org/en/docs/tc/reform">revamped Trusteeship Council</a>, would need to raise substantial sums of money and report regularly on how these funds are being used (as well as on developments in the security of the region). </p>
<p>These funds could come from the usual western powers, but also from the wealthy Gulf countries, which might be prepared to help Palestinians financially without having to become overly involved politically at the risk of damaging their improving relations with Israel. </p>
<p>International institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the <a href="https://www.undp.org/">United Nations Development Programme</a> would also need to be involved — a task made easier if it happens within a UN-led framework and mission.</p>
<h2>The return of Canada?</h2>
<p>The most cynical or pessimistic may argue that setting up such an initiative is too complex and doomed to failure. </p>
<p>But we propose Prime Minister Justin Trudeau champion this transitional administration, travel the world extolling its merits, pledge strong Canadian participation in the creation of an international peacekeeping force and propose to the Security Council the reactivation of the Trusteeship Council for Gaza.</p>
<p>He should solicit the support of our powerful neighbour and convince the U.S. to invest in command infrastructure for this new mission, which would likely be instrumental in reassuring Israel about the seriousness of such an approach. </p>
<p>Trudeau could enlist the support of Europe and try to win over the leaders of the Global South, including President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (which could also serve to mend fences between Canada and India).</p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Georges-Clemenceau">Georges Clemenceau, head of the French government at the end of the First World War</a>, once said that it’s easier to make war than peace. The protracted nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict bears witness to this. </p>
<p>But given the mass-scale violence in the region on and since Oct. 7, there’s an urgent need for the world to determine how to build a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.</p>
<p>The horrific and ongoing loss of human life compels us to be ambitious. The security of the Middle East as a whole is at stake, and taking action could also help ease tensions within western societies that are increasingly divided by the conflict. </p>
<p>It also provides Canada an opportunity <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/2677447276">to truly “make a comeback” on the international stage</a>. Helping resolve the conflict is closely tied to Canadian values.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219476/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The best — or least bad — solution to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict involves setting up a transitional administration in Gaza. Here’s how it could work.Julien Tourreille, Chargé de cours en science politique et chercheur à la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Charles-Philippe David, Président de l'Observatoire sur les États-Unis de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand et professeur de science politique, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2169382023-11-08T16:19:26Z2023-11-08T16:19:26ZInternational reaction to Gaza siege has exposed the growing rift between the West and the Global South<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558336/original/file-20231108-21-w6vjh8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C74%2C4985%2C3248&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dark clouds over the United Nations in New York.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrator-waves-a-palestinian-flag-outside-of-united-news-photo/1715810273?adppopup=true">Adam Gray/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The lopsidedness was stark: 120 countries voted in favor of a <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142847">resolution before the United Nations</a> on Oct. 26, 2023, calling for a “humanitarian truce” in the war in Gaza. A mere 14 countries voted against it. </p>
<p>But the numbers tell only half the story; equally significant <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/27/united-nations-votes-overwhelmingly-in-favour-of-humanitarian-truce-in-gaza">was the way the votes fell</a>. Those voting against the resolution included the United States and four members of the European Union. Meanwhile, about 45 members abstained – including 15 members of the EU, plus the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Japan. </p>
<p>Seldom has the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231013-israel-gaza-bloodshed-divides-the-world-isolates-west">isolation of the West</a> been so apparent. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/profile/jorge-heine/">scholar who has written</a> on <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">the rise of the Global South</a> – countries mainly, but not exclusively, in the Southern Hemisphere that are sometimes described as “developing,” “less developed” or “underdeveloped” – what strikes me is the degree to which this <a href="https://www.bisa.ac.uk/articles/brandt-line-after-forty-years-more-north-south-relations-change-more-they-stay-same">major fault line between the political North and South</a> has risen again to the fore. It reflects long-in-the-making forces in world affairs.</p>
<p>While the leaders of countries <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/10/10/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-terrorist-attacks-in-israel-2/">like the U.S.</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/14/sunak-promises-israel-unqualified-support-in-face-of-evil-but-fails-to-mention-plight-of-gaza">the U.K.</a> <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/visiting-german-leader-says-nations-only-place-in-hard-times-is-alongside-israel/">and Germany</a> have been among the most strident supporters of Israel during the crisis, the same is not true for non-Western nations.</p>
<p>Key rising powers from the Global South have been among the most adamant nations outside the Arab world in their criticism of this unwavering Western support of Israel. </p>
<p>Indonesia and Turkey – both with large Muslim populations – have <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/11/what-driving-turkeys-erdogan-pro-hamas-fiery-israel-criticism">both been</a> <a href="https://setkab.go.id/en/indonesia-condemns-attacks-in-gaza/">heavily critical</a> of Israel’s bombing campaign in Gaza, a response to 1,400 Israelis being killed by Hamas militants on Oct. 7.</p>
<p>But they have been joined by the leaders of Brazil, South Africa and other Global South nations in taking a firm stand. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil went as far as to <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231027-brazil-slams-israels-war-on-gaza-as-genocide/">label the campaign in Gaza a “genocide</a>” – a comment <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/south-africa-recalls-ambassador-to-israel-and-accuses-country-of-genocide-in-gaza">echoed by South Africa’s government</a> when, on Nov. 6, 2023, it recalled its ambassador to Israel in protest. While the U.S. has used the word genocide in relation to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/12/politics/biden-iowa-genocide/index.html">Russia’s action in Ukraine</a>, the Biden administration has pointedly said the term <a href="https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-november-7-2023/">doesn’t apply to current events in Gaza</a>.</p>
<h2>The Global South’s coming of age</h2>
<p>The international reaction to the war in Gaza reflects a deeper, long-standing trend in world politics that has seen the fracturing of the established <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-does-rules-based-order-mean">U.S.-dominated, rules-based order</a>. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/21/china-global-influence-takeaways/">growing influence of China</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-has-exposed-the-folly-and-unintended-consequences-of-armed-missionaries-197609">fallout of the war in Ukraine</a> – in which many Global South countries have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/23/why-global-south-nations-stay-neutral">remained neutral</a> – has upended international relations.</p>
<p>Many analysts point to an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/05/usa-china-multipolar-bipolar-unipolar/">emerging multipolar world</a> in which members of the Global South have, as I have written, forged a new <a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/2021/11/16/heine-publishes-el-no-alieamiento-activo-y-aerica-latina/">active nonaligment path</a>.</p>
<p>And 2023 has been the year that has seen the coming of age of this more assertive Global South. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="white blankets with red paint on them lie next to Palestinian flags ons a beach." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558391/original/file-20231108-19-hwjehb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shrouds stained with red paint line a beach in Rio in protest of Israel’s bombing of Gaza.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-of-some-of-a-total-of-120-shrouds-stained-with-red-news-photo/1760941144?adppopup=true">Carl de Souza/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some of this is structural. In August, Johannesburg hosted a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/brics-summit-2023-seeking-alternate-world-order">summit of the BRICS group</a> – a bloc that consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – during which 21 countries from across the Global South applied to join. Six were <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/brics-summit-south-africa-six-new-countries-join-alliance">invited to do so</a>: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – and they will formally join in January 2024. </p>
<p>This 11-strong BRICS+ group will <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/brics6-to-control-30-of-global-gdp-46-population-note/articleshow/103181021.cms">represent 46% of the world’s population</a> and 38% of the world’s gross domestic product.</p>
<p>In contrast, the Group of Seven leading economies, or G7, represents <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1372860/g7-country-share-world-population/">less than 10% of the world’s population</a> and <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1372791/g7-combined-gdp-share-world/">30% of the global economy</a>.</p>
<p>On Nov. 7, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with his G7 counterparts in an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/japan-us-g7-blinken-gaza-russia-834aa74998f4c1fa92f2d3326831345a">attempt to forge a consensus</a> on how to deal with the crisis in the Middle East. Speaking in Japan, he urged that the Western-dominated G7 speak with “one clear voice” on the Middle East crisis.</p>
<p>The question is, can the BRICS+ – and more generally the Global South – do likewise given that it includes an array of countries with very different political and economic systems? </p>
<h2>Latin America’s pushback</h2>
<p>The reaction to the Israel-Hamas violence suggests to me that the Global South is able to speak with, if not one voice, at least a chorus that is not discordant.</p>
<p>Historically, <a href="https://theafrican.co.za/world/africa-shares-long-history-of-solidarity-with-palestinian-people-616995a6-3eef-4121-abc9-5fbd46db450a/">many African</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/15/which-countries-have-criticised-israeli-attacks-on-gaza">and Asian nations</a> have tended to support the Palestinian cause – Indonesia <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/why-indonesia-wont-recognize-israel-at-least-for-now/">does not even recognize the state of Israel</a>.</p>
<p>But perhaps more surprising has been the strong <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/latin-america-ramps-up-condemnations-israels-attack-gaza-2023-11-02/">reaction in Latin America</a> to Israel’s actions in Gaza. </p>
<p>In short order, Bolivia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/bolivia-severs-diplomatic-ties-with-israel-citing-crimes-against-humanity-2023-10-31/">broke diplomatic relations</a> with Israel, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/chile-recalls-israel-ambassador-talks-after-gaza-attacks-2023-11-01">and Chile</a> <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/colombia-recalls-ambassador-to-israel-over-massacre-of-gazans/">and Colombia</a> called their ambassadors from Jerusalem for consultations – an established diplomatic tool to indicate disapproval of a country’s conduct.</p>
<p>Brazil, in its capacity as then chair of the United Nations Security Council, <a href="https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/statement-by-the-permanent-representative-of-brazil-to-the-united-nations-on-the-draft-resolution-s-2023-773">introduced the resolution</a> supporting a cease-fire in Gaza. Mexico’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Alicia Buenrostro, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/latin-america-ramps-up-condemnations-israels-attack-gaza-2023-11-02">called for the “occupying power</a>” of Israel to cease its claim to the Palestinian territories.</p>
<h2>Western denialism</h2>
<p>The question is: If the Global South is speaking this way on the issue, is the West listening? The voting patterns of Western representatives at the U.N. suggest the answer is “no.”</p>
<p>In turn, this only adds to the general discontent across the developing world with the current structure of the U.N. Security Council and its <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2019/09/24/representation-problems-in-the-current-un-security-council">lack of representativeness</a>. </p>
<p>The fact that no country from Africa or Latin America is among the permanent members that enjoy veto power – compared with Western Europe, which is represented by both France and the U.K. – has long been a source of irritation in the Global South. So, too, is the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/02/israel-palestine-hamas-gaza-war-russia-ukraine-occupation-west-hypocrisy/">perceived “double standard</a>” being applied by the West to conflicts around the world. Whereas in Ukraine much is made of the humanitarian suffering being inflicted on the Ukrainian people, the same does not seem to apply to what is happening in Gaza, where Palestinian health authorities report more than <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/6/number-of-palestinians-killed-in-israeli-attacks-on-gaza-tops-10000">10,000 people have been killed</a> in less than a month, 40% of them children.</p>
<p>More generally, there appears to be a degree of denial in the West over the tectonic shift in world order toward a more assertive Global South. </p>
<p>Western commentators and <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/08/15/term-global-south-is-surging.-it-should-be-retired-pub-90376">analysts from think tanks</a> in London and Washington even contend that the very term “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7f2e0026-56be-4f3d-857c-2ae3a297daab">Global South” should not be used</a> – with much of the criticism against the term directed at its alleged imprecision, but also because it would contribute to greater international polarization.</p>
<p>Yet, the term was never meant to be geographical. Rather, it is a geopolitical and geohistorical one – and one that is coming into its own with great verve as the Global South provides an alternative voice to the West, first over the conflict in Ukraine and now over Gaza. And no amount of Western denialism will be able to block it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216938/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jorge Heine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At the United Nations and elsewhere, the response by the US and Western Europe to events in Israel and Gaza have been out of step with that of governments in Africa, South America and Asia.Jorge Heine, Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165822023-10-30T12:01:21Z2023-10-30T12:01:21ZIsrael-Hamas war: hard experience says a land war won’t go well – and faltering international support suggests the world knows it<p>For the past four decades, Israel’s experience of fighting paramilitary militias has been grim.</p>
<p>Its last major operation was in southern Lebanon, which started with <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/lebanon-war-1982">Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982</a>. While initially successful, the subsequent occupation of southern Lebanon led directly to the rise of the Hezbollah Shia militias, persistent losses for the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), a withdrawal to a nine-mile security zone within three years and from Lebanon as a whole in 2000.</p>
<p>In 2006 Israeli military units went back into Lebanon to counter Hezbollah rockets but ended with exhausted troops withdrawing in some disarray and the IDF resorting to a massive air war that did huge damage to the infrastructure of much of the country.</p>
<p>Then there is Gaza.</p>
<p>Before the current war, the IDF fought <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/7/timeline-israels-attacks-on-gaza-since-2005">four other wars in Gaza</a> since 2007, primarily to control Hamas’s use of rockets and its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/28/a-spiders-web-of-tunnels-inside-gazas-underground-network-being-targeted-by-israel">growing network of infiltration tunnels</a>. The most significant one was <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/israelpalestine-operation-protective-edge-gaza-13-june-26-august-2014">Operation Protective Edge in 2014</a> which involved troops in a ground assault. In the event, they found the fighting extremely difficult, with the elite Golani Brigade experiencing serious casualties from the start.</p>
<p>Once again, there was intense use of air power and, as in the other wars, it was civilians that suffered most. Overall, the Israelis lost more than 300 killed in those four wars but for the Palestinians in Gaza, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/oct/25/israel-hamas-war-assault-gaza-doomed-to-failure">death toll exceeded 5,300</a>.</p>
<h2>Bitter experience</h2>
<p>Experiences in other wars are relevant to what happens now in Gaza. After the 9/11 attacks there was considerable international support for the US. War <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/afghanistan_3849jsp/">against the Taliban seemed</a> inevitable though very few security analysts warned of the US-led coalition falling into a trap. The warnings were ignored and 20 years later the western troops finally retreated in disarray. Then came the Iraq war from 2003, with warnings once again ignored and, once again, with disastrous results.</p>
<p>As to Gaza, there are multiple concerns about <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/afghanistan_3849jsp/">what comes next</a>, the current incursions being far short of a full-scale ground intervention. There are sharp differences of belief of what should come next within the military and within Benjamin Netanyahu’s government as well as within Israel as a whole, with much of it heightened by the concern over the loss of international support.</p>
<p>There is also concern about the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/24/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-invasion.html">experience of urban warfare</a> elsewhere. Just six years ago, it took nine months for the US-led coalition to take back the Iraqi city of Mosul from Islamic State. The US led the huge air assault, aided by France, the UK and other partners. The ground forces then were Iraqi troops and militias and they lost 8,200 troops.</p>
<p>A further 10,000 civilians were killed, and the old city was wrecked. It was <a href="https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-battle-of-stalingrad">likened to Stalingrad</a> in early 1943.</p>
<p>Just last year, a small force of Ukrainian soldiers held off a large Russian force for nearly three months in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/24/world/europe/ukraine-war-mariupol-azovstal.html">siege of the Azovstal steel works in Mariupol</a> using a network of 24 kilometres of Soviet-era tunnels. Hamas <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/28/us/politics/gazas-tunnels-israel-ground-war.html">has constructed vastly more tunnels under Gaza</a> and is no doubt ready for months of combat.</p>
<h2>Dwindling international support</h2>
<p>Three weeks ago, Israel suffered a grievous loss and rightly got huge initial support, but that is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/29/uae-calls-emergency-un-security-council-meeting-to-seek-pause-to-gaza-fighting">already fading</a>. Worse still, there is a terrible inability of the current Israeli government to understand what it is dealing with in a ground invasion of Gaza. But the death toll tells us all we need to know. If we look at the five Gaza wars since 2007, including the current devastating war, the Israelis have lost 1,700 people, but the Palestinians have lost more than 13,000 – and the numbers are rising by hundreds every day.</p>
<p>For now, the public mood in Israel <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/29/world/europe/israel-reservists-hamas-war.html">still supports the Netanyahu government</a>, however unpopular it might have been just a month ago. But the small but persistent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/families-israeli-hostages-taken-by-hamas-tour-europe-keep-focus-plight-2023-10-26/">campaign by families of the hostages</a> for them to be the priority is having an effect.</p>
<p>Above all, it is the change of mood internationally that is a deep concern in Israel and, indeed, in the Biden administration. This was shown by the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-resolution-vote-israel-hamas-gaza-truce-7eec00b0e28ef2036636b166b48ca030">weekend debate in the UN general assembly</a> when only 12 states supported the US and Israel in voting against a “humanitarian pause”. Also, eight EU states were among the 120 supporting the motion and the 45 who abstained even included Britain.</p>
<p>In some previous Israeli military actions, the end has effectively come about when international support for Israel has collapsed or got close to that. If the ground war against Hamas had started within a few days of the shock of October 7, and if that operation had been successful and Hamas had collapsed, then Netanyahu could have claimed success.</p>
<p>That has not happened and will not happen now. Instead, there is every prospect of a bitter war with many thousands more Palestinians killed, tens of thousands of young Palestinians all too ready to fight in the future, and a peaceful resolution of the Israel/Palestine conflict delayed by at least another generation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216582/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Rogers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>History is full of examples that show why a ground war in Gaza is a bad idea – but is the Netanyahu government listening?Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2138722023-09-27T13:57:00Z2023-09-27T13:57:00ZSomali piracy, once an unsolvable security threat, has almost completely stopped. Here’s why<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>In 2011, pirates carried out <a href="https://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures">212 attacks</a> in a vast area spanning Somali waters, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, actions that the World Bank said cost the world economy <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/6b9570fe-2f52-546f-af4b-605e4ebf04e6">US$18 billion a year</a>.</p>
<p>Armed pirates hijacked ships as far away as 1,000 nautical miles from the Somali coast. They held the ships and crews for ransom. The World Bank estimates that Somali pirates received <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/publication/pirate-trails-tracking-the-illicit-financial-flows-from-piracy-off-the-horn-of-africa">more than US$400 million</a> in ransom payments between 2005 and 2012.</p>
<p>The piracy problem appeared unsolvable. Anti-piracy naval missions undertaken by the world’s most formidable navies, and self-protection measures adopted by the shipping industry, didn’t seem to work. It was, therefore, generally held that the solution lay ashore: major state-building in Somalia to remove the root causes of piracy. </p>
<p>The only problem was that no one was willing to undertake such a mission in the wake of America’s failures in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/11/23/142699506/u-s-easing-out-of-nation-building-business">Afghanistan and Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>And then there was an astonishing turnaround. The number of attacks fell to 10 in 2012 and only <a href="https://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures">two ships were hijacked</a> between 2013 and 2023. </p>
<p>For three decades, I have conducted research on international diplomacy, military strategy, use of force and peacebuilding. Together with a colleague specialising in military strategy, I <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2023.2227356">analysed the Somali piracy case</a>. Academics and practitioners agree that four factors interacted to stop the pirates:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>the conduct and coordination of several anti-piracy naval operations by the world’s most capable navies, including all <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members">five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council</a>: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China</p></li>
<li><p>the implementation of costly self-protection measures, not least the use of armed guards, by most flag states and shipping owners</p></li>
<li><p>development of a comprehensive legal toolbox enabling pirate prosecution and imprisonment</p></li>
<li><p>regional capacity-building making it possible to imprison pirates regionally and in Somalia.</p></li>
</ol>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lift-for-maritime-sector-in-kenya-and-djibouti-after-fall-in-piracy-128073">Lift for maritime sector in Kenya and Djibouti after fall in piracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The surprising thing is not that the four measures on their own proved sufficient to stop Somali piracy. What makes the Somali case special is the international community’s ability to agree to them and pay for their implementation. </p>
<p>The Somali case is important because it’s one of the few success stories in recent years where the use of limited force contributed to a sustainable outcome. Further, Somali pirates were stopped even though the conditions onshore in Somalia didn’t improve in any major way.</p>
<h2>Collective action</h2>
<p>Theoretically, the international community’s collective effort shouldn’t have happened because safety from piracy is a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2021/12/Global-Public-Goods-Chin-basics">costly public good</a>. </p>
<p>This means that it’s very expensive to provide but no one can be prevented from enjoying it once it has been produced. The result is a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/collective-action">collective action problem</a> that’s rarely overcome in international politics. Most actors prefer to free-ride rather than contribute to the production of the public good. </p>
<p>With respect to Somali piracy, all states and shipping owners had an incentive to leave it to others to solve the problem for them. The implementation of the four factors was very expensive for the states contributing to naval operations, and for shipowners who had to pay for self-protection measures, including hiring of armed guards.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2023.2227356">Our study</a> sought to understand how and why the collective action problem was overcome. The hope was to learn something that could help with overcoming similar problems in the future.</p>
<h2>What worked</h2>
<p>We found that three factors explain why the amount of free-riding was minimised in the Somali case. </p>
<p>The first was that the Somali pirates attacked ships belonging to all five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all the major shipping companies. This induced France to take the lead in military action against the pirates. The US subsequently led with respect to formulating a comprehensive strategy to implement the four factors presented earlier. </p>
<p>The involvement of European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) in the anti-piracy naval operations made it hard for member states not to contribute. A total of 18 member states contributed ships. China and Russia supported the American-led strategy and launched their own naval operations because their ships were attacked as well.</p>
<p>Second, the US established an institution, the Contact Group on Somali Piracy, tailor-made to formulate and implement a broad anti-piracy strategy. The US handpicked who would lead various working groups so that it contained all the actors – state and non-state – that were required to implement the necessary measures. These actors provided the expertise and the material resources required to implement the four factors presented earlier.</p>
<p>Third, the Somalia federal government and federal member states cooperated closely with anti-piracy efforts. They allowed the use of force against pirates in its national waters and on land. Somali authorities also cooperated with respect to the construction and running of pirate prisons paid for by international donors. This made it possible to overcome the piracy problem without engaging in the major state-building operation that had generally been viewed as a necessary condition for success when the piracy problem peaked in 2011.</p>
<h2>Shared interests</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, this success story will be hard to replicate. Somali piracy aligned great power, as well as private sector, regional and local state interests to an unusual degree. This is, for example, not the case in the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2023-06/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-2.php">Gulf of Guinea</a> off the west African coast. Here, local states are less cooperative with respect to tackling piracy than Somali governmental actors were. </p>
<p>It’s also not the case with respect to tackling the <a href="https://africacenter.org/in-focus/africa-crisis-coups/">coups in west Africa</a>, where Russia, the three western members of the UN Security Council and regional states have conflicting interests. </p>
<p>It was the high degree of shared interests among the many actors involved that made the Somali anti-piracy campaign so effective.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213872/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Viggo Jakobsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The success of the Somali case illustrates what a high degree of shared interests among international actors can achieve.Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Associate professor, Royal Danish Defence CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2139132023-09-25T16:21:33Z2023-09-25T16:21:33ZUkraine war: mixed signals among Kyiv’s allies hint at growing conflict fatigue<p>It is now almost 600 days since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the war that has followed has tested the resilience of both countries. But it has also tested those in the west that have supported Ukraine from the start. </p>
<p>This much was evident from the mixed reception Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, received last week when he visited the US and Canada. Meanwhile, tensions in Europe over support for Ukraine have flared up again. </p>
<p>With the Ukrainian counteroffensive still not living up to – the perhaps inflated – expectations, we are beginning to see the first serious signs of a fraying consensus in the west about how seriously different governments are committed to supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes.</p>
<p>Zelensky’s North American visit started with a <a href="https://gadebate.un.org/en/78/ukraine">speech at the UN general assembly</a> in New York in which he made a passionate appeal to fellow world leaders to uphold international law and order and support his country. While there remains widespread backing for the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity, it gets fuzzier when it comes to how to end the war. </p>
<p>There are two camps: many western leaders following Ukraine’s line that the country’s territorial integrity needs to be restored first. Others – including a large number of countries in the global south – prefer to emphasise the importance of dialogue and an early cessation of violence.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Volodymyr Zelensky’s savages Russia at the United Nations.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This pattern was repeated the following morning at the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15416.doc.htm">UN security council’s open debate</a> on the war in Ukraine, with a predictable clash between Zelensky and the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, who presented very different accounts of causes and dynamics of the war. But before the debate could conclude, the security council <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15418.doc.htm">turned its attention</a> to the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, a clear indication that Ukraine is not the only urgent issue on the global agenda.</p>
<p>Zelensky continued to Washington DC where he <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3534283/biden-administration-announces-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/">secured another military aid package</a> worth US$325 million (£192 million). This aid can be allocated by US president Joe Biden directly under the so-called <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3509657/aim-9m-missiles-250-million-in-additional-security-assistance-headed-for-ukraine/">presidential drawdown authority</a>. </p>
<p>A further US$24 billion in aid, which is subject to congressional approval, is more problematic. The Republican House majority leader, Kevin McCarthy, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-09-21-23/h_799534c38ffd8d5f474b2cf1592bdb02">would not commit</a> to putting a bill to that effect on the legislative schedule before the end of the year. </p>
<p>McCarthy <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/20/us/politics/mccarthy-zelensky-republicans.html">also denied</a> the Ukrainian president an opportunity to address a joint session of the House and the Senate, another sign of growing Republican resistance to the enthusiastic support offered to Ukraine by the Biden administration.</p>
<p>Moving up to Canada, Zelensky received a <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/zelensky-gets-standing-ovation-as-he-calls-on-canada-to-stay-with-ukraine-moscow-must-lose/ar-AA1h8kwm">universally warm reception</a> and left with a <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-volodymyr-zelenskyy-canada-trudeau-visit/">military aid package</a> worth C$650 million (£394 million).</p>
<h2>Europe: growing division</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, in Europe, three of Kyiv’s neighbours inside the EU – Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/16/europe/ukraine-grain-imports-pland-slovakia-hungary-intl/index.html">defied</a> the end of an EU-wide ban on grain imports from Ukraine. Poland then went one step further and also put a – temporary – halt on any <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/20/europe/poland-ukraine-weapons-grain-intl-hnk/index.html">weapons deliveries</a> to Ukraine. This was decried by Zelensky <a href="https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/%5Bvariable%3Acurrent_session%5D/ua_en_rev.pdf">in his speech</a> before the UN general assembly as “political theatre” and a gift for Moscow. </p>
<p>The grain dispute between Poland and Ukraine has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/12/ukraine-poland-tensions-grain-war">simmering for some time</a>, and it was a question of when, not if, it would ultimately escalate. Importantly, it foreshadows other potential obstacles in Ukraine’s path to EU membership. </p>
<p>Some of these are potentially within Ukraine itself. As Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_4426">noted in her annual state-of-the-union</a> address at the European parliament, “accession [to the EU] is merit-based”, she acknowledged “the great strides Ukraine has already made”. </p>
<p>But accession negotiations will not be opened before a positive recommendation from the commission on Kyiv’s progress concerning seven conditions set in June 2022 when Ukraine was granted candidate status. This decision is <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/06/22/ukraine-has-fully-met-two-of-the-seven-conditions-needed-to-start-eu-accession-talks">expected</a> before the end of 2023.</p>
<p>Once accession talks start, the interests of individual EU member states will play a greater role in determining the speed at which Ukraine can progress. The current spat with Poland is but one indication of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8de02993-9713-4350-9bc5-9bd9e8e91b44">potential trouble ahead</a>, albeit in the particularly sensitive area of the EU’s common agricultural policy. This will be deeply affected if Ukraine – a global agricultural superpower – joins.</p>
<p>Poland’s prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, clearly wants to be seen to be <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/poland-says-it-will-stop-arming-ukraine-how-did-we-get-here-and-what-does-it-mean-for-the-war/ar-AA1h3bvR">protecting his country’s farmers</a> from uncompetitive practices by Ukrainian exporters, particularly in the run-up to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/23/europe/morawiecki-ukraine-zelensky-insult-poland-intl-hnk/index.html">a parliamentary election</a> next month. </p>
<p>But this is also about leadership and the potential challenge that Ukrainian EU membership would pose to Poland’s ambitions to be the main voice of the bloc’s eastern members. </p>
<p>Such an open attack on Zelensky and his policies significantly shifts the dial in what is considered acceptable criticism of the highly charismatic Ukrainian president. It comes in the wake of growing western unease about the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/22/us/politics/ukraine-counteroffensive-russia-war.html">course</a> and <a href="https://app.23degrees.io/view/x67vE7NsM3NeQu7z-atlas-slideshow_v4-atlantic/fY83zKIZpbLi3ll5-choro-ukraine-aid-tracker-final-data">cost of the war</a>.</p>
<p>This is not to say that Ukraine has not made progress since its offensive began just before the summer. In recent days, Ukraine <a href="https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2023">has made further gains</a> in the south and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66887524">launched a spectacular attack</a> on the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea fleet in occupied Crimea at the weekend.</p>
<p>But Ukraine’s recent successes are almost certainly not enough to dispel the growing sense that the war is becoming a lasting stalemate. Until now, western support has underwritten Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself. But it has done no more than that and is not sufficient to enable a Ukrainian victory. </p>
<p>If the events of last week are a sign that this support begins to weaken, the prevention of a Ukrainian defeat can no longer be taken as a given. Nor could it be argued that this was merely a defeat for Ukraine – it would also mean that the western alliance did not have the stamina to prevail in the current confrontation with Russia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213913/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. She is affiliated with the Regensburg University, Germany as a Philipp Schwartz research fellow</span></em></p>As the war nears 600 days, there are signs that support for Ukraine could be beginning to waver in some parts.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2139852023-09-21T02:00:04Z2023-09-21T02:00:04ZStripping Russia’s veto power on the Security Council is all but impossible. Perhaps we should expect less from the UN instead<p>Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/20/world/europe/zelensky-un-security-council.html">lambasted</a> the UN Security Council yet again, saying in a speech this week that as long as Russia has veto power on the body, it will remain powerless to do anything to stop the war in Ukraine – or any other conflict.</p>
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<p>Ukrainian soldiers are doing with their blood what the UN Security Council should do by its voting. […] Veto power in the hands of the aggressor is what has pushed the UN into deadlock.</p>
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<p>Every time a member of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – the US, Russia, France, the UK and China – engages in abhorrent actions, we see a wave of voices decrying the powerlessness and failure of the UN to stop conflict and atrocities. </p>
<p>Most recently, this has been focused on the Russian war in Ukraine. We also saw this criticism in relation to the US- and UK-led <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq">invasion of Iraq</a> in the early 2000s. </p>
<p>The central part of this criticism is that the five permanent members of the Security Council (commonly referred to as the “P5”) have a veto power, which can prevent UN action when they have engaged in wrongdoing. The other 10 rotating members of the Security Council do not.</p>
<p>This veto power is what has prevented Russia from being expelled from the UN, as Zelensky has repeatedly <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3259390-zelensky-calls-for-russian-expulsion-from-un-security-council/">called for</a>, because suspension or expulsion of a member from the UN requires <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-2">action from the Security Council</a>.</p>
<p>This criticism is entirely reasonable – the P5 shouldn’t be able to prevent the UN from acting against them. However, this isn’t a failure of the UN itself, but rather a design feature baked in to the whole UN system. </p>
<p>And reform of the UN is functionally impossible, which is why we need to stop expecting so much from the global body.</p>
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<h2>Some are more equal than others</h2>
<p>Article 2(1) of the UN Charter <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1">says</a> the UN is based on the principle of sovereign equality. This, in principle, should mean all nations are equal under international law. </p>
<p>In reality, even when just considering the rest of the UN Charter, it is clear this is not the case. Yes, all nations in the UN General Assembly have one vote and all those votes have equal weight, but this is somewhat insignificant because the work of the General Assembly isn’t legally binding. </p>
<p>The only UN body that has the power to make binding international law is the Security Council. And this only happens when it is acting under <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7">Chapter VII</a> of the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. </p>
<p>In order for a resolution to pass in the Security Council, it must have the support of at least nine members – and, critically, no opposing vote from a member of the P5. This is what is meant by the P5 veto power. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-international-law-powerless-against-russian-aggression-in-ukraine-no-but-its-complicated-177905">Is international law powerless against Russian aggression in Ukraine? No, but it's complicated</a>
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<p>When the UN Charter was being drafted at the end of the second world war, the allied powers and France agreed to enshrine themselves into the document as the P5.</p>
<p>Notably, the group included the “Republic of China”, the government led by Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, which held the Security Council seat until the General Assembly expelled Taiwan and gave the seat to the People’s Republic of China in 1971. And when the Soviet Union disbanded in the early 1990s, Russia inherited its seat on the Security Council through the <a href="https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(1994)054-e">Alma-Ata Protocol</a>. </p>
<p>The charter gave the P5 the ultimate responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, while also functionally removing them from scrutiny because they possess veto power. </p>
<p>This wasn’t a design oversight or failure, it was an intentional decision. This is clearly seen when you <a href="http://opiniojuris.org/2008/08/14/the-curious-article-273-of-the-un-charter/">examine</a> the wording of Article 27(3). This article requires a Security Council member to refrain from voting on a matter if they are party to a dispute – but it does not apply to resolutions invoking Chapter VII (that is, a legally binding resolution). </p>
<p>The fact the charter includes a restriction on the veto but only in relation to non-binding resolutions demonstrates an intention to place the P5 beyond scrutiny. </p>
<h2>So, what about veto reform?</h2>
<p>If the existence of the veto prevents any Security Council action from being taken against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine (or against any other P5 state when they engage in similar conduct), why don’t we just reform it? </p>
<p>Well, this can’t be done because the drafters of the UN Charter made reform incredibly difficult. Namely, the P5 ensured they have a right to veto any proposed reforms to the UN structure by <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-18">requiring</a> all charter amendments to be ratified by each of them, in addition to getting a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. </p>
<p>In essence, this means reforming the UN Charter is off the table because the P5 would be able to veto a reduction of their veto power. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-be-too-quick-to-condemn-the-un-security-council-power-of-veto-29980">Don't be too quick to condemn the UN Security Council power of veto</a>
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<p>The only avenue left for reform is to dissolve the UN Charter and reform the UN under a new treaty that limits or abolishes the power of the veto. </p>
<p>Given the state of global solidarity is very different today compared to the end of WWII when the UN was established, I’m loathe to test this approach. A P5 that is restrained by the Charter when it suits them is less dangerous than a P5 that opts out of international law entirely, leaving them completely unrestrained in their aggression. </p>
<h2>Tempering our expectations</h2>
<p>Yes, this means the UN is powerless to address Russian aggression in Ukraine, in the same way it was powerless to address US and UK aggression in Iraq. And yes, this seems to go against the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/preamble">initial purpose</a> of the global body, which was created to:</p>
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<p>to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.</p>
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<p>The Security Council, too, was given the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-5">mandate of maintaining international peace and security</a> when it was created, as Zelensky has <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115632">repeatedly pointed out</a>.</p>
<p>But in accepting that mandate, the P5 ensured they wouldn’t be subject to it. In creating the UN, they placed themselves above the law and above the power of the UN specifically so they could avoid scrutiny of their actions. They also ensured they could prevent any reform of the UN to limit their power. </p>
<p>As a result, maybe it is time we start treating the UN for what it is – a diplomatic congress aimed at making the world a little better through encouraging cooperation. Rather than what we hope it to be – a world government capable of effecting peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tamsin Phillipa Paige received funding from the federal government for her UN Security Council research. </span></em></p>Because reform of the current UN Charter is off the table, the only avenue left is to dissolve the charter and draw up a new treaty that limits or abolishes the power of the veto.Tamsin Phillipa Paige, Senior Lecturer, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113062023-09-18T21:13:45Z2023-09-18T21:13:45ZCanada’s war crimes investigation may not deter Russia, but it matters to Ukrainians<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/canadas-war-crimes-investigation-may-not-deter-russia-but-it-matters-to-ukrainians" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>In June 2022, United States Attorney General Merrick Garland <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/21/world/europe/merrick-garland-ukraine-war-crimes.html">travelled to Ukraine</a> to call for the prosecution of Russian war crimes. </p>
<p>“The United States is sending an unmistakable message” to those who have committed atrocities, he said. “There is no place to hide.” </p>
<p>There’s only one problem: American hands are tied when it comes to the international prosecution of war crimes. That’s because it opted out of the International Criminal Court (ICC) due to objections over the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works">court’s jurisdiction</a> that allows it, <a href="https://how-the-icc-works.aba-icc.org/">under certain conditions</a>, to pursue people outside their own state borders. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38005282#">Russia has also withdrawn from the ICC</a>. Ukraine isn’t a member; it signed but didn’t ratify the court’s statute.</p>
<p>That means it will fall to <a href="https://asp.icc-cpi.int/states-parties">third-country signatories to the ICC</a> like <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/icc-cpi/index.aspx?lang=eng">Canada</a> to investigate and prosecute Russian war crimes in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Institutionalizing war crimes</h2>
<p>Around the First World War, the great powers began codifying the laws of war in <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/hague-conventions">several conventions</a> <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions">and treaties</a>. </p>
<p>Building on centuries of law, these agreements specified when countries could go to war and under what conditions, spelled out the treatment of both combatants and non-combatants and limited the use of weapons and other practices during warfare. </p>
<p>These fledgling agreements did little to prevent the outbreak of another global conflict, but they did provide the foundation for the world’s first international tribunals in Tokyo and Nuremberg following the Second World War.</p>
<p>That marked a decisive moment for international law, representing the first time national leaders were held accountable for war crimes on the world stage.</p>
<p>Under American stewardship, the immediate post-Second World War period witnessed a massive expansion of international law. </p>
<p>New treaties were drafted <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">criminalizing genocide</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml">crimes against humanity</a>. New organizations like the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/">United Nations</a> were born. </p>
<p>A liberal rules-based international order began to emerge, setting fundamental limits on state sovereignty — particularly in the conduct of war, and even within national boundaries. </p>
<p>But this progress halted with the start of <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/cold-conflict">the Cold War; the standoff between the Soviet Union and the U.S. put the prosecution of war crimes on ice</a>. </p>
<p>Few leaders were held accountable for their crimes as superpowers shielded them from prosecution. </p>
<h2>UN creates the ICC</h2>
<p>Following the Soviet collapse, and the emergence of the U.S. as the sole remaining global superpower, the UN Security Council organized <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/international-tribunals">international tribunals</a> to address genocide, war crimes and other atrocities committed during conflict. </p>
<p>These tribunals were situational, focused on conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The UN then used its renewed power to formalize them in the Rome Statute, <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf">the founding document of the ICC</a>.</p>
<p>This was made possible by a legal innovation: the creation of a permanent international tribunal that would enable signatories to bring war criminals to justice.</p>
<p>Even third parties, with no apparent interest, could investigate and refer war criminals to the international body under certain circumstances. </p>
<p>But in a dramatic about-face, the George W. Bush administration <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/05/06/united-states-unsigning-treaty-war-crimes-court">withdrew the U.S.</a> from the ICC, fearing the court <a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2450&context=faculty_scholarship">might complicate</a> its so-called war on terror. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the ICC came into existence in 2002, and the court began issuing arrest warrants and prosecuting war criminals. </p>
<p>Without the U.S., however, its activities remained restricted. For the next decade, prosecutions were limited to the African continent, leading to allegations of <a href="https://iccforum.com/africa">systemic bias</a>. </p>
<p>There are still questions about whether the ICC can hold war criminals to account more broadly — and they’ve only intensified during the war in Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Canada’s role</h2>
<p>In March 2022, 39 countries, including Canada, <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-qc-situation-ukraine-receipt-referrals-39-states">referred the war in Ukraine to the ICC</a>. At the same time, the RCMP <a href="https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/news/2022/a-statement-the-partners-canadas-war-crimes-program-the-conflict-ukraine">launched an investigation</a> into alleged war crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine.</p>
<p>This is the first <a href="https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/SDIR/meeting-9/evidence">real-time war crimes investigation</a> in Canada’s history, and one of the first globally. </p>
<p>The ICC has laid charges against Russian President <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and">Vladimir Putin</a>, accusing him of human rights abuses in Ukraine.</p>
<p>These developments mark a major change in Canada’s appetite for investigating war crimes. Before joining the ICC, Canada had a checkered history of holding war criminals accountable, even when they arrived on its shores. Canada was accused, for example, of providing <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nazi-war-criminals-in-canada-1.1026670">shelter to Nazi war criminals</a> and collaborators. </p>
<p>Canada’s probe into alleged ongoing war crimes in Ukraine suggests it now has the <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/stories-histoires/2022/war-crimes-investigated_crimes-guerre-enquetes.aspx?lang=eng">political will</a> to investigate these atrocities even when they happen outside of its borders.</p>
<p>Given Canada’s <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/icc-cpi/index.aspx?lang=eng">role in the creation of the ICC</a>, the country’s leadership on this front is appropriate. </p>
<p>Efforts to hold Russia accountable have also engaged a keen and highly activist group: Ukrainian Canadians. </p>
<p>As they <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">welcome refugees</a> and lobby the government, Ukrainian Canadians have helped collect war crimes testimonials that could one day be used to prosecute Russia.</p>
<p>Newly arriving Ukrainians to Canada <a href="https://ukraine.rcmp.ca/responseForm?lang=en">are greeted by posters and pamphlets printed in English, French, Russian and Ukrainian</a> asking them to report their recollections to the RCMP while their memories are still fresh.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, despite the unprecedented steps Canada and other states are taking to put Russia on notice, it’s doubtful they’ll ultimately result in any concrete forms of Russian accountability. </p>
<h2>Creating a historical record</h2>
<p>Although some of these measures have apparently made top <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/11/lula-putin-g20-brazil-arrest">Russian officials more circumspect</a> when travelling internationally, it’s highly unlikely alleged Russian war criminals will end up before Canadian courts.</p>
<p>Globally, the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/04/icc-investigation-russia-ukraine-putin-war-crimes/">impact also seems limited</a>. Russia remains a nuclear power and UN Security Council member, further underscoring the improbability of future prosecutions. </p>
<p>However, the RCMP investigation is important. It signals a new path for Canada that prioritizes international law and corrects for past policy failures that saw the country provide safe harbour to war criminals. </p>
<p>For Ukrainian-Canadians, the investigation validates their experiences. Canada is helping create a historical record. The investigation will form one of the pre-eminent repositories of testimonials from recently arrived refugees. </p>
<p>Canada has taken on the sacred duty of creating and safeguarding a dark moment in Ukrainian history — and this matters to the victims of Russia’s war. </p>
<p>As Alexandra Chyczij, president of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, told us in an interview: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“What is important today is that the massive evidence of the myriad, systemic Russian crimes against humanity, war crimes and terrorism – committed under the direction of the Russian political leadership – be documented, collected and preserved.”</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211306/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The war crimes probe signals a new path for Canada that prioritizes international law and corrects past policy failures, while validating the experiences of Ukrainians.Jamie Levin, Assistant Professor of Political Science, St. Francis Xavier UniversityKiran Banerjee, Assistant Professor of Political Science & Canada Research Chair, Dalhousie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122992023-09-05T21:03:20Z2023-09-05T21:03:20Z4 ways to rein in China and Russia, alleged superpower perpetrators of atrocity crimes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545779/original/file-20230831-27-66cu2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C0%2C3051%2C2018&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin toast during their dinner at the Kremlin in Moscow in March 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Pavel Byrkin, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the latest meeting in South Africa of BRICS — a grouping of the world economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — Russian President <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/20/europe/putin-brics-no-show-analysis-hnk-intl/index.html">Vladimir Putin was a no-show.</a> </p>
<p>Because the International Criminal Court issued an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/17/icc-arrest-warrant-vladimir-putin-explainer">arrest warrant</a> for him earlier this year over atrocity crimes allegedly committed against Ukrainian children, Moscow was apparently concerned Putin might actually be <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/08/21/putin-was-meant-to-be-at-a-summit-in-south-africa-this-week-why-was-he-asked-to-stay-away">taken into custody</a> if he travelled to Johannesburg. </p>
<p>Mass atrocity crimes include genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Amid the challenges facing the world today, the urgency of preventing mass atrocity crimes has taken centre stage. </p>
<p>In 2023, we’re grappling with an unprecedented number of forcibly displaced people — <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/insights/explainers/100-million-forcibly-displaced.html">more than 100 million</a> — in part <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/">due to a surge</a> exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Progress stagnating</h2>
<p>While there has been some success in efforts to curb these human rights abuses, such as the introduction of the United Nations’ <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml">Responsibility to Protect</a> doctrine and the creation of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-international-criminal-court">International Criminal Court</a>, recent developments have raised concerns that progress has not only stagnated but regressed. </p>
<p>Particularly troubling is the spectacle of two UN Security Council members — China and Russia — that stand accused of perpetrating mass atrocity crimes. </p>
<p>China has grown increasingly <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/how-are-chinas-neighbors-viewing-beijings-military-plans/a-64921927">bellicose and aggressive</a>, threatening its neighbours and persecuting minorities within its borders. Beijing’s actions against its Uyghur Muslim population have sparked global outrage, <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/china/case-study/current-risks/chinese-persecution-of-the-uyghurs">with allegations</a> of genocide, forced labour, mass detentions, cultural repression and destruction of mosques. </p>
<p>Similarly, Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine has raised grave concerns about human rights abuses. Many <a href="https://www.raoulwallenbergcentre.org/images/reports/2023-07-26-Genocide-Ukraine-Report.pdf">scholars and experts</a> are labelling Russia’s war as being genocidal in intent given its massacre of civilians in Ukrainian towns <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/22/video/russia-ukraine-bucha-massacre-takeaways.html">such as Bucha</a>, widespread cases of torture that were confirmed by the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/06/widespread-use-torture-russian-military-ukraine-appears-deliberate-un-expert">United Nations</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/targeted-destruction-ukraines-culture-must-stop-un-experts">ongoing attempts that seem aimed at destroying</a> Ukraine’s culture.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman in a blue patterned dress looks at a large memorial wall with Ukrainian names etched on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A woman visits a memorial wall honouring people killed by Russian troops in Bucha, Ukraine. Bucha was occupied by the Russian forces for about a month in the early days of the invasion.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Jae C. Hong)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>China, Russia ties</h2>
<p>The emerging alliance between authoritarian China and Russia is a grave cause for concern. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent trip to Moscow, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/xi-putin-pledge-new-world-order-chinese-leader-leaves-russia-rcna76048">he told Putin</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Now there are changes that haven’t happened in 100 years. When we are together, we drive these changes.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A future global order shaped and led by these two autocrats gives a new ominous meaning to English novelist George Orwell’s <a href="https://www.sparknotes.com/lit/1984/quotes/character/obrien/">famous quote</a>: “If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face — forever.”</p>
<p>As Putin and Xi work to transform the international order, every country should contemplate the grave threat this could pose to human rights, democratic norms and the very essence of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">UN Charter</a>, especially with regards to acts of aggression. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1637828614879150082"}"></div></p>
<p>The disconcerting reality of great power perpetrators is a disheartening testament to the erosion of the global commitment to prevent such horrors.</p>
<p>The current situation underscores the dire need to rekindle the flames of progress and ensure that human rights norms and institutions are not abandoned. </p>
<p>The onus lies on the international community to reassert its commitment to preventing mass atrocities, regardless of the culprits’ geopolitical stature and economic power. To achieve this, four fundamental pillars must be pursued.</p>
<h2>Four ways to uphold global human rights</h2>
<ol>
<li><p>Awareness and education must be disseminated to amplify the voices of those allegedly targeted by Russia and China. An informed populace can apply pressure on their governments to uphold human rights and hold perpetrators accountable. They can also demand <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/china-83-major-brands-implicated-in-report-on-forced-labour-of-ethnic-minorities-from-xinjiang-assigned-to-factories-across-provinces-includes-company-responses/">companies stop doing business</a> with both countries until their behaviours and policies change. Both Moscow and Beijing are going to great lengths <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/06/22/technology/xinjiang-uyghurs-china-propaganda.html">to spread propaganda</a> <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15226.doc.htm">and disinformation</a> by targeting global audiences.</p></li>
<li><p>Diplomatic initiatives must be pursued to ensure that <a href="https://time.com/6160282/arab-world-complicit-china-repression-uighurs/">economic interests</a> don’t eclipse the need to prevent mass atrocities. Countries must band together to circumvent and counter Moscow and Beijing’s plans to achieve global hegemony that will be a death knell for human rights and democracy.</p></li>
<li><p>Strengthening the mechanisms of justice is paramount. The International Criminal Court must be empowered to investigate and prosecute all perpetrators, regardless of their positions of power. This includes exploring avenues for the court to use even when faced with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/icc-member-states-say-russia-putting-prosecutor-wanted-list-is-deplorable-2023-05-20/">sanctions and threats</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Countries must continue to uphold <a href="https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml">Article 51</a> of the UN Charter — “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” — and support Ukraine in its efforts to stop Russia’s genocidal invasion. False claims of peace talks mask Russia’s <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/essay/the-war-in-ukraine-is-a-colonial-war">intention to recolonize</a> Ukraine, which will only be achieved through mass violence and the destruction of Ukrainian identity. This will also send a message to Beijing that <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/19/china-helping-arm-russia-helicopters-drones-metals-xi-putin/">its role in helping</a> Russia invade Ukraine, to say nothing about a prospective <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3230014/mainland-china-airs-documentary-signalling-military-preparation-taiwan-attack-and-willingness">Chinese attack</a> on Taiwan, will come with consequences.</p></li>
</ol>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-causes-an-ongoing-chinese-tantrum-in-the-taiwan-strait-188205">Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan causes an ongoing Chinese tantrum in the Taiwan Strait</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The international community must acknowledge that the era of great power nations perpetrating atrocity crimes is upon us and that it poses a real threat to global peace and security.</p>
<p>Countries that commit genocide within and outside their borders — not to mention <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/12/08/china-detains-journalists-dangers-2021-report/">imprisoning journalists</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66408444">political opposition leaders</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chronicle">civil society groups</a> — are a danger to humanity. </p>
<p>When they are permanent members of the UN Security Council and working together in unison, they represent a totalitarian threat that cannot be ignored.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212299/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kyle Matthews has received funding from the Government of Canada (Department of Canadian Heritage) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. He is affiliated with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, the Canadian International Council and the BMW Foundation. </span></em></p>The spectacle of two UN Security Council members — China and Russia — allegedly perpetrating mass atrocity crimes is deeply troubling. Here’s how the international community must step up.Kyle Matthews, Executive Director, The Montréal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127142023-09-04T11:46:22Z2023-09-04T11:46:22ZUkraine war: two good reasons the world should worry about Russia’s arms purchases from North Korea<p>US national security council official <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/30/europe/russia-north-korea-advancing-arms-deal-intl/index.html">John Kirby noted</a> on August 30 that arms transfer negotiations between North Korea and Russia are “actively advancing” as the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, seeks to feed his war machine.</p>
<hr>
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<hr>
<p>Under an array of western-led sanctions, Russia and its military contractor, the Wagner Group, have already allegedly turned to Pyongyang for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/white-house-says-north-korea-supplying-russia-with-artillery-shells-2022-11-02/">artillery shells</a> and what has been reported as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-russias-wagner-group-bought-north-korean-weapons-ukraine-war-2022-12-22/">“infantry rockets and missiles”</a> in the past year.</p>
<p>While these sales and a flourishing business relationship with North Korea may have an important impact on the battlefields of Ukraine, my research on North Korea’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2022.2043598">arms trading</a> and <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/emerging-insights/missions-missiles-north-koreas-diplomats-and-sanctions-busting">procurement networks</a> suggests that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is likely to seek technology from Russia in exchange. This would be a huge boost to the DPRK’s weapons programmes and, at the same time, greatly to the detriment of the UN sanctions regime that seeks to limit those programmes.</p>
<h2>Flourishing military relationship</h2>
<p>Recent developments have suggested a burgeoning arms trading relationship, despite denials from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nkorea-denies-arms-dealings-with-russia-says-it-has-no-plans-do-so-2022-11-07/">North Korea</a> and the recently deceased <a href="http://yevgeny">Wagner Group owner, Yevgeny Prighozin</a>. </p>
<p>In September 2022, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/white-house-says-north-korea-supplying-russia-with-artillery-shells-2022-11-02/">the US suggested</a> that the DPRK was supplying Russia with artillery shells in “significant” numbers. And in January 2023 – two months after North Korea allegedly supplied the Wagner Group with the battlefield rockets and missiles – Kirby <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2023/01/new-photos-show-north-korea-sent-weapons-to-russian-paramilitary-group-pentagon/">shared satellite imagery</a> of a train at the DPRK-Russian border carrying the deadly cargo.</p>
<p>In March, Ashot Mkrtychev, a Slovakian national, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1377">was sanctioned by the US Treasury department for</a> working with DPRK officials to procure “two dozen kinds of weapons and munitions for Russia”. This suggests that the two countries have several avenues of contact. </p>
<p>In July, the US sanctioned North Korean arms dealer <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2023/07/us-sanctions-north-korean-for-facilitating-arms-sales-to-russias-wagner-group/">Rim Yong Hyok</a> for facilitating unspecified arms transfers to the Wagner Group. A <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2019/171">2019 UN report</a> lists an individual with the same name having been the deputy representative of the North Korean arms trading company Komid in Syria.</p>
<p>This is a theatre in which the Wagner Group <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html">has operated extensively</a>, suggesting this may be where at least one arms trading connection was forged.</p>
<h2>Brothers in arms</h2>
<p>It was, however, the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90315">visit of Sergei Shoigu</a>, Russia’s defence minister, to Pyongyang that was the most significant sign of a flourishing relationship. Shoigu – in town to mark the 70th anniversary of the Korean war armistice – was front and centre of the celebrations, attending a military parade and other pageantry, overshadowing the Chinese delegation.</p>
<p>Most significantly, Shoigu <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-meets-russian-defence-minister-2023-07-27/">was guided around an arms exhibition</a> by the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un. The exhibition featured intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range hypersonic missiles and newly unveiled advanced drones, among a range of other weapons systems.</p>
<p>North Korean arms exports have <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Target-Markets-North-Koreas-Military-Customers/Berger/p/book/9781138654938">grown steadily</a> along with its defence industrial base since the 1970s. Many transfers were made to cold war ideological allies, but the country also increasingly sold weapons for hard currency and barter to soothe its economic woes. Iran was one of North Korea’s biggest customers in the 1980s during its war with Iraq. </p>
<p>Since 2006, the country has been under an increasingly complex regime of UN sanctions imposed to counter the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. The UN <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/north_korea">arms embargos have prohibited</a> the import of major weapons systems from North Korea from 2006, and the import of all arms from North Korea from 2009.</p>
<p>Russia – a UN security council permanent member with veto power – actively endorsed the creation of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-sanctions-un-nuclear-weapons">DPRK sanctions regime</a> for more than a decade through its votes for sanctions resolutions. The most recent package of sanctions was passed in 2017.</p>
<p>But the country’s implementation of the sanctions regime – alongside fellow permanent security council member China – has been far from assertive. There is little evidence of Russian government action against North Korea’s procurement networks in Russian territory.</p>
<p>Indeed, both countries have increasingly <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2022/07/to-sanction-north-korea-sanction-those-that-wont-russia-and-china/">dragged their feet</a> over further sanctions resolutions.</p>
<h2>Pyongyang hungry for tech</h2>
<p>Clearly, Russia stands to benefit on the battlefield in Ukraine. But its purchases will undermine the North Korea sanctions regime and help to generate revenue for the Kim regime. It could also spur a broader renaissance for North Korea’s arms export enterprise.</p>
<p>North Korea desperately wants commodities such as food, oil, fertiliser and other goods. The sanctioned Slovakian individual mentioned above, for example, worked with DPRK officials to procure weapons for Russia “<a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1377">in exchange for</a> materials ranging from commercial aircraft, raw materials and commodities to be sent to the DPRK”.</p>
<p>But more worrying than sanctioned commodities, North Korea has long relied on arms sales to fund its weapons development – including its nuclear and long-range missile programmes.</p>
<p>This has been termed <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/topics/proliferation-financing.html">“proliferation financing”</a>. Great efforts have been made by civil society to <a href="https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/projects/counter-proliferation-financing-technical-assistance-programme">encourage governments and the private sector</a> around the world to implement UN sanctions.</p>
<p>Russia has a vast military, nuclear and missile industrial complex, which – although much of it is struggling because of sanctions – could provide Pyongyang with much-needed technological fruits. While evidence of state-sanctioned transfers of WMD technology by Russia is scant, changing circumstances could potentially affect this.</p>
<p>Russia has shown itself to be a bountiful market for North Korean procurement. <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2022/132">A 2022 UN report</a> highlighted the role of a North Korean diplomat in Moscow in procuring a range of technologies for ballistic missiles, and even attempting to procure 3,000kg of steel for North Korea’s submarine programme, between 2016 and 2021.</p>
<p>The irony of Russia’s new interest in North Korean weaponry is that – <a href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85t00313r000100150007-0">historically alongside China</a> – Moscow was North Korea’s top arms supplier before the sanctions era. It also more broadly bankrolled the North Korean regime through aid before the collapse of communism and the end of the cold war.</p>
<p>If Moscow does move towards becoming a regular customer for embargoed North Korean arms, it will help Putin sustain his illegal war on Ukraine. But the potential technological payoff for Pyongyang could pose longer-term hazards for the world and must also be considered.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Salisbury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite the UN sanctions against North Korea, Russia is apparently trading weapons and technology which could help Pyongyang’s missile programme.Daniel Salisbury, Visiting Research Fellow, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2087742023-07-10T14:46:00Z2023-07-10T14:46:00ZDRC violence has many causes – the UN’s narrow focus on ethnicity won’t help end conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535574/original/file-20230704-17-up8tx7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers from South Sudan prepare to be deployed to help restore peace in the DRC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Samir Bol/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo’s <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement">2023 mid-term report</a> reduces the very complex causes of violence in the eastern part of the country to inter-communal violence. This widely disregards armed groups’ motivations to resort to violence. </p>
<p>This narrow approach will perpetuate the cycles of violence in a country whose population hasn’t known peace for <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">three decades</a>. A failure to account for the other major reasons for the conflict in the experts’ brief to the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council">UN Security Council</a> could lead to the adoption of inappropriate measures to stabilise the DRC. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=4SlemykAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">researched</a> the micro and macro causes of conflict in eastern DRC since 2017 to understand the motivations of individuals, groups and communities. In my view, most of the violent confrontations are consequences of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-drcs-colonial-legacy-forged-a-nexus-between-ethnicity-territory-and-conflict-153469">legacy of colonialism</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">state fragility</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-drcs-army-and-police-arent-yet-ready-to-protect-citizens-114326">dysfunctional and corrupted security services</a>. </p>
<p>From South Kivu to North Kivu and Ituri in the eastern region, the legacy of colonialism has categorised local communities into native and non-native. This has created conflict along the lines of belonging and its associated rights. The Congolese state <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">hasn’t tackled this issue</a> – and state authority is absent in many areas. </p>
<p>The Congolese army is largely dysfunctional and corrupted. It’s among those <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2018.1486719">feeding violence</a> at local levels. It has <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/16/dr-congo-kidnappings-skyrocket-east">failed to protect civilians</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/KivuSecurity/status/1304083139334156289">picked sides</a> in inter-community violence. </p>
<h2>Inside the report</h2>
<p>In recent years, the UN group of experts has narrowed all this complexity into inter-communal violence, with limited details on what drives it. Yet the mandate of the group – established in 2000 – is to <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/en/sc/repertoire/2000-2003/00-03_5.pdf#page=16">investigate and analyse</a> connections between resource exploitation and the persistence of conflict. Its reports should help the UN understand the bigger picture in eastern DRC. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement">latest report</a> highlights five major events:</p>
<p><strong>Violence in the west</strong>: Maindombe, one of the western provinces, had appeared to be more stable than the north and south Kivus and Ituri in the volatile east. But it’s estimated that more than <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/30/dr-congo-rampant-intercommunal-violence-west">300 civilians have been killed</a> in Maindombe between June 2022 and March 2023. The violence is between the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=7">Teke and Yaka ethnic communities</a>. The former consider themselves the original inhabitants of the region and the Yaka as non-native. </p>
<p><strong>The Allied Democratic Forces:</strong> Designated as a <a href="https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-isis-affiliates-and-leaders-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-mozambique/">terrorist organisation in 2021</a> by the US, this group is active in Beni (North Kivu) and parts of Ituri province. The group has secured strategic and financial support from other terrorist groups, including Somalia’s Da’esh and IS-Somalia. The report notes that dismantling the terror group’s complex funding mechanisms and networks needs greater collaboration among countries.</p>
<p><strong>Rwanda and M23:</strong> In North Kivu, the UN report has called attention to the violence perpetrated by the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=13">Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group</a>. The conflict has forced thousands of civilians to flee, deepening a humanitarian crisis. The UN experts warn that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">M23</a> has the military capacity to wage and sustain conflict due to recruitment campaigns in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. This report is the first to name <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=17">high-ranking Rwandan military generals</a> involved in fighting alongside M23 rebels.</p>
<p><strong>The rise of the Twirwaneho:</strong> In South Kivu, the UN report <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=30">documents clashes</a> among groups claiming to be protecting their ethnic communities. The report highlights the Twirwaneho, an armed (self-defence) group affiliated to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">Banyamulenge</a>, a minority ethnic group in South Kivu.</p>
<p><strong>The Codeco threat:</strong> The report also documents atrocities committed in Ituri province against civilians and internally displaced people. Here, it highlights the rebel group <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=25">Codeco’s</a> attacks. It terms the violence inter-communal. </p>
<h2>The report’s loopholes</h2>
<p>The report is consistent with previous reports in terming ethnic communities’ “antagonism” as the source of violence. The DRC has more than 250 ethnic groups. But based on <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/category/article-type/working-paper/">my research</a>, it’s my view that violence in the country is intrinsically complex. Using a single lens can be misleading.</p>
<p>In my view, there are four major loopholes in the report. </p>
<p>First, the UN experts disregard the prominent roles played by other major actors in the conflict, such as the national army. It also ignores the <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">regional ramifications</a> of the violence. This includes the support provided by <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/b150-averting-proxy-wars-eastern-dr-congo-and-great-lakes">Rwanda to Burundian rebel groups in South Kivu</a>. State fragility also helps explain why the DRC’s conflict has persisted for three decades. Adding these factors would broaden understanding of the root causes of the conflict and its persistence. </p>
<p>Second, the UN experts tend to jump to conclusions based on largely questionable premises. For instance, evidence of “<a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=34">mass recruitment</a>” and the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement#page=32">formation of new alliances</a> between Twirwaneho, M23 and Red-Tabara rebel groups isn’t clear. Since 2017, Red-Tabara, for instance, has been <a href="https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/174098/1/05_GIC_Mayhem-in-the-mountains_WEB-2.pdf#page=79">attacking the Banyamulenge</a>. </p>
<p>Third, the report shows signs of bias. For instance, it highlights the Twirwaneho and ignores other groups active in South Kivu. I’ve covered this bias in <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/why-the-un-fails-to-prevent-mass-atrocities/">a study</a> that analyses 324 incidents recorded by <a href="https://kivusecurity.org/">Kivu Security Tracker</a> and 29 reports from the UN’s peacekeeping mission in the DRC, Monusco. Monusco is one of the main sources of the UN experts’ information. </p>
<p>Fourth, in North Kivu, the experts have only documented atrocities and human rights abuses committed by M23 and the Rwandan Defence Forces. They’ve left out those committed by the Congolese military, and other local and foreign militias. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>A close look at the UN report indicates that the experts struggle to document atrocities in a timely manner. It took more than a year to document violence in South Kivu and Ituri that erupted in 2017 and this is happening in Maindombe. </p>
<p>UN experts shouldn’t see violence in eastern the DRC as solely tit-for-tat militia confrontations, and fail to account for their motivations to resort to violence. For instance, some armed groups in the east exist to chase out those seen as “foreigners”. </p>
<p>A simplified perspective won’t help to bring peace if the negative role played by security services is superficially covered. Moreover, the DRC has failed to establish a comprehensive disarmament and demobilisation scheme.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delphin R. Ntanyoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The causes of violence in the DRC are complex. Narrowing them down to the single lens of ethnicity can be misleading.Delphin R. Ntanyoma, Visiting Researcher, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2052612023-05-29T16:49:06Z2023-05-29T16:49:06ZNATO should tread carefully in Southeast Asia, where memories of colonialism linger<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528098/original/file-20230524-29-vt5vrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=53%2C610%2C6000%2C3026&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An American guided-missile cruiser off the coast of Japan near Mt. Fuji. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(David Flewellyn/U.S. Navy via AP)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_183254.htm">NATO’s incursion into the Indo-Pacific region</a> is a move that will exacerbate regional conflicts and tensions. That’s because NATO cannot be separated from the history of European colonialism and imperialism that shaped modern Asia — and plays a major role in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s41257-019-0026-6">Chinese nationalism</a> today. </p>
<p>In 2022, NATO declared that China was a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/nato-and-the-china-challenge/">“challenge” to the alliance’s “interests, security and values.”</a> Recently, NATO has argued that <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/3867682-nato-increasingly-concerned-china-may-arm-russia-against-ukraine/">possible Chinese assistance to Russia</a> in its war against Ukraine makes China a military threat to Europe. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/japan-working-towards-opening-nato-liaison-office-tokyo-2023-05-09/">NATO is opening a liaison office in Japan</a> and is partners with Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea. This may be a first step to deeper European involvement in Asia’s security architecture.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3220247/nato-office-japan-risks-further-entangling-ties-china-analysts">Japan argues that the war in Ukraine has destabilized the world</a>, and has invited NATO into the Indo-Pacific to deter China. However, NATO is widely distrusted in the non-western world. </p>
<h2>NATO: An American puppet?</h2>
<p>Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has acted as an extension of American power. NATO’s <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020589300064733">bombing of Kosovo and Serbia in 1999 violated the United Nations Charter</a>. NATO’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0262728020964609">intervention in Afghanistan</a> was authorized by the UN, but it assisted the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/the-long-lasting-impact-of-the-u-s-invasion-of-iraq">illegal and devastating U.S. invasion of Iraq</a> by freeing American military resources.</p>
<p>The UN Security Council also gave the green light to NATO’s intervention in Libya, but NATO states <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/38/1/105/12085/A-Model-Humanitarian-Intervention-Reassessing-NATO">violated the terms of that resolution to pursue their own political and economic objectives in the North African country</a>. The result was the destruction of Libya and the spread of instability across North Africa. There are no states in Africa that would call NATO “a defensive alliance.”</p>
<p>Very few countries support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, the non-western world — <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2023.2202925">including most of Southeast Asia</a> — <a href="https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2022/03/28/global-south-blame-us-nato-ukraine-war-russia/">generally accepts Russia’s claim that it invaded Ukraine to protect itself against the expansion of NATO</a>. To much of the world, the reality of western militarism makes Russia’s arguments entirely plausible.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A teenaged boy carries a gun as he jumps from a tank." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528101/original/file-20230524-21-jd07zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528101/original/file-20230524-21-jd07zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528101/original/file-20230524-21-jd07zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528101/original/file-20230524-21-jd07zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528101/original/file-20230524-21-jd07zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528101/original/file-20230524-21-jd07zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528101/original/file-20230524-21-jd07zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Libyan youth carrying a gun jumps from a destroyed tank at the site of a NATO air strike at the outskirts of Benghazi, Libya in March 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Nasser Nasser)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>China fuels regional prosperity</h2>
<p>Most Southeast Asian states have set aside their historical grievances with the West. They are committed to an international system that — somewhat accidentally — has served them well. </p>
<p>Regional states are concerned about the rise of China and its acts of intimidation. Yet <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chart-week-global-trade-through-us-china-lens">China is the No. 1 trading partner of most Asian states</a>. Regional prosperity depends on China’s success. </p>
<p>Asians are cautious about <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Asians-can-think-for-themselves-on-Taiwan">western provocations over issues like Taiwan</a>. Asians want the U.S. present to balance China’s power, but that doesn’t mean they want a European military alliance operating in their region. </p>
<p>In particular, states that are part of <a href="https://asean.org/">the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)</a> want to manage regional security without outside interference. </p>
<p>Southeast Asians’ perception of a predatory international system is based on their experiences with European colonialism. Their focus on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/0551274042000261524">protecting state sovereignty</a> is directly linked to this history. Their <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/07/28/improving-the-asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/">stated preference</a> is to build economic and diplomatic connections to manage regional conflict.</p>
<p>China has <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/12/28/unsure-of-us-commitment-asian-countries-pursuing-self-reliance-2/">also prospered under the existing system and has a stake in its continuation</a>. But it’s considered a threat because it will not be subservient to western power, especially American. </p>
<p>Consequently, it’s been encircled by more than <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2023/2/14/david_vine_us_bases_china_philippines">300 American military bases</a> and subjected to intense U.S. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/gauging-the-impact-of-the-china-us-trade-war/">economic</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war-semiconductors-export-controls-biden/">technological sanctions</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A row of soldiers in battle fatigues walk along a grassy path." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528102/original/file-20230524-41372-q4xy6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528102/original/file-20230524-41372-q4xy6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528102/original/file-20230524-41372-q4xy6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528102/original/file-20230524-41372-q4xy6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528102/original/file-20230524-41372-q4xy6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528102/original/file-20230524-41372-q4xy6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528102/original/file-20230524-41372-q4xy6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division walk after disembarking from a Blackhawk UH-60 helicopter at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, on May 4, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Lee Jin-man)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Century of humiliation</h2>
<p>Chinese nationalism <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3150233/china-history-matters-still-century-humiliation">has been stoked by what’s known as the “century of humiliation”</a> from 1839 to 1949, when European powers, the U.S. and Japan took part in seizing Chinese territory, imposing unequal treaties and brutalizing the Chinese people. </p>
<p>NATO is a European military alliance that is establishing a strong working relationship with Japan. This plays directly into China’s concerns that the same powers that humiliated it in the past are lining up for a second attempt. </p>
<p>Asian states that find the Russian explanation for the war in Ukraine plausible will clearly be concerned that NATO’s move into the region is duplicating the same hostile dynamic of backing an adversary into a corner.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An Asian man and a balding man raise their champagne glasses with a colourful mural behind them and a large bouquet of flowers on the table in front of them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528103/original/file-20230524-28-khwk6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528103/original/file-20230524-28-khwk6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528103/original/file-20230524-28-khwk6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528103/original/file-20230524-28-khwk6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528103/original/file-20230524-28-khwk6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528103/original/file-20230524-28-khwk6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528103/original/file-20230524-28-khwk6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping toast during a dinner at the Kremlin in Russia in March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Pavel Byrkin, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For the past several centuries, <a href="https://www.caltech.edu/about/news/why-did-western-europe-dominate-globe-47696">world politics have been defined by western colonialism and violence</a>. That <a href="https://thecorrespondent.com/32/the-past-is-still-present-why-colonialism-deserves-better-coverage">era never really ended</a>. </p>
<p>After the Second World War, Europe passed the torch of global <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/02/18/694700303/the-history-of-american-imperialism-from-bloody-conquest-to-bird-poop">western imperialism to the U.S.</a> Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. — often assisted by NATO states — has frequently engaged in illegal violence around the world, most notably with its invasion of Iraq. </p>
<p>Therefore, it’s not surprising NATO claims that it’s merely a “defensive alliance” are viewed skeptically in the non-western world. What is surprising is that western powers <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2023.2193420">seemingly cannot understand why their insistence that they represent a “rules-based international order” fails to resonate with much of the globe</a>. </p>
<p>NATO’s growing presence in the Pacific evokes a painful history that the western world has never confronted or fully acknowledged. NATO ignores how its recent actions affect how it’s perceived in the larger world and how those actions lend credence to states that see NATO as a threat. </p>
<p>Its presence in the Indo-Pacific can easily be construed as a new attempt to reassert western military domination of the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205261/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>NATO’s growing presence in the Pacific evokes a painful history that the western world has never confronted or fully acknowledged.Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2049302023-05-09T15:28:24Z2023-05-09T15:28:24ZThree scenarios for the next phase of the Ukraine war and what each means for China<p>Beijing is positioning itself to increase its global power at the end of the Ukraine war. But the question right now for China’s president Xi Jinping is which scenario is most likely to happen, what role China can play, and what each outcome will mean for China. </p>
<p>As the war continues, the strength of the Sino-Russian alignment will be tested as never before. Whether Russia wins or loses, or whether the war remains unresolved resulting in a frozen conflict, all pose a dilemma for China, which has been deliberately raising its profile as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-china-gains-from-acting-as-peacemaker-204629">peacemaker during the conflict</a>. There are various scenarios that are the most likely ways the war could proceed, or end.</p>
<h2>Scenario 1 – Ukraine wins</h2>
<p>Russia’s loss in Ukraine would send a powerful signal confirming both the west’s resilience and weakness of authoritarian aggressors. Such a development would explicitly undermine one of the key narratives shared within the Chinese Communist party, at least since the 2008/09 global economic crisis, that the west is in decline and its rivals, China in particular, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/">are in the ascendancy</a>. </p>
<p>The victory of Ukraine supported by the west would put Xi in a particularly uncomfortable position, challenging his favourite phrases of the “<a href="https://www.thinkchina.sg/china-us-strategic-showdown-will-east-wind-prevail-over-west-wind">east wind prevailing</a>” and “changes unseen in a century”.</p>
<p>However, wars tend to end messily. Were Russia to be defeated, much would hinge on the nature of the defeat. If defeat implied the departure of not only Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, but also his inner circle, a new Russian government might deprioritise relations with China and reprioritise good relations with the west, which would be a blow to Beijing.</p>
<h2>Scenario 2 – Russia wins</h2>
<p>Russia’s victory amid crumbling support for Ukraine in the west would empower China. Beijing might be tempted to move to much more risky behaviour, especially in its neighbourhood. </p>
<p>Under such circumstances, Taiwan would probably face massive pressure from Chinese armed forces, forcing the US, which has pledged to support Taiwan, to decide whether to respond militarily. Moreover, China’s position towards Europe would be much stronger, allowing Beijing to successfully discourage European states from siding with the US both globally and in east Asia.</p>
<p>It could also be argued that a weakened or defeated Russia could be an opportunity for China. For example, it could take a more active role in central Asia, or force Moscow to accept further dependence on China in economic and financial sectors.</p>
<h2>Scenario 3 – stalemate</h2>
<p>It is entirely plausible that the war will continue in a state of stalemate for some time. In some ways, this might suit China as it can continue to benefit from cheap Russian commodities. </p>
<p>Russian dependence on China which has been growing since 2014, will be even greater – making Russia permanently reliant on China <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2023/04/13/russias-kowtowing-to-china-energy-and-beyond/">for raw materials</a>. This was always the stuff of nightmares for Russian policymakers in the 1990s. But under this scenario it could turn into a reality. </p>
<p>The frozen conflict scenario allows Beijing to continue its policy of alleged neutrality while promoting its peacemaker role, without having to make any difficult choices.</p>
<h2>China’s current position</h2>
<p>China has already attempted to position itself as a peacemaker. Its “peace plan” announced in February was less a plan and more a reaffirmation of existing positions. However point 12 spoke of “offering assistance” with <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html">post-conflict reconstruction</a>, a reminder that in 2019 China was Ukraine’s <a href="https://emerging-europe.com/news/china-becomes-ukraines-largest-trading-partner/">top trade partner</a>. </p>
<p>Despite China’s robust partnership with Russia, it is attempting to position itself as peacemaker in the event that Russia loses, in order to be in prime position to reap the rewards of economic reconstruction of Ukraine. Xi’s <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/27/china/china-ukraine-xi-jinping-zelensky-call-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html">recent call</a> with Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky would seem to point to this.</p>
<p>While the peace plan was lacking in detail, it symbolises China’s increasingly active stance in global affairs. Note its <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded">high levels of contributions</a> among the permanent UN security council members to UN peacekeeping, in terms of both <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2_country_ranking_report.pdf">troops and financial contributions</a>,and <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/mixed-report-card-china-s-influence-united-nations">its involvement in Africa as well as in the Middle East</a>. This all forms part of Xi’s global security initiative which seeks to broaden the <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html">scope of China’s diplomacy</a>, upholding multilateralism and the role of the UN, while pushing back against western ideas of a liberal international order, based around Washington.</p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p>The challenges for Xi consist of how to square China’s support for Russia’s reading of the global order with Chinese principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Strategically, China’s tangible support for Russia may bring the US and European nations closer together and strengthen transatlantic unity, a result Beijing has been trying to avoid for the past two decades. </p>
<p>In the shorter term, Beijing is exploiting a sanctioned Russia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/india-china-snap-up-russian-oil-april-above-price-cap-2023-04-18/">by benefiting from cheap Russian commodities</a>. Chinese companies have seized emerging opportunities in the Russian market. But the continuation of the war means the disruption of global supply chains, including <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/89307">deliveries of grain and fertiliser</a> on which China is heavily reliant.</p>
<p>The impact of war on China’s policies in east Asia remains ambiguous. Russia’s invasion has diverted US resources away from the Asia-Pacific. But Beijing’s threat to Taiwan has become more acute in the light of developments in Ukraine. </p>
<p>The US responded by mobilising its <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-antony-blinken-beijing-north-korea-china-9f9432c118f297fc27a9be01c460316e">Asian alliance network</a> and accelerating the importance of security cooperation groups of nations such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/apr/26/joe-biden-to-visit-australia-in-may-as-sydney-hosts-2023-quad-leaders-summit">the Quad</a> (Australia, India, Japan and the US) or <a href="https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/AUKUS-moves-to-next-phase">Aukus</a> (Australia, the UK and US). The Taiwanese government has also intensified its efforts to reinforce the island’s defences. </p>
<p>China sees Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a proxy war - a war against the west (and specifically against US power) - just as Russia does. A victory or a defeat for Russia in the war is not simply an issue for Russia, but rather could represent either the victory or the defeat of the <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3942099-a-global-proxy-war-ukraine-is-now-the-center-of-our-eurasian-competition-with-russia-and-china/">liberal international order</a>.</p>
<p>The bottom line for Beijing is, however, to avoid Russia’s complete failure in Ukraine. The role of peacemaker is one way to prevent such a development. Should this not succeed, Beijing may decide to step up its support for Moscow, ranging from financial assistance to arms deliveries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204930/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is looking at how the Ukraine war could end, and working out just what place Beijing wants in a post-war world.Natasha Kuhrt, Senior Lecturer in International Peace & Security, King's College LondonMarcin Kaczmarski, Lecturer in Security Studies, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2013252023-04-26T11:05:40Z2023-04-26T11:05:40ZAfrica’s oceans are being protected to serve the interests of big foreign corporates<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517141/original/file-20230323-20-j8ckry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French marine commandos operate on a speed boat off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AYMERIC VINCENOT/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa’s valuable ocean resources have drawn the interest of foreign nations, particularly those <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0964569119301620?via%3Dihub">in</a> <a href="https://www.subsea.org/list-of-oil-and-gas-companies-in-africa/">the West</a> and <a href="https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr98_inroadsandoutposts_may2022.pdf#page=18">Asia</a>. </p>
<p>How they exploit these resources can be problematic because these oceans offer a wide range of important resources – from fish to minerals and hydrocarbons – that are <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/sites/www.un.org.africarenewal/files/Africa%27s_Blue_Economy_A_policy_handbook.pdf#page=pagex">also crucial</a> to the continent’s economy and food security. </p>
<p>But, in some countries, foreign interests dominate. For instance, the continent’s <a href="https://www.offshore-energy.biz/africa-turning-into-hotspot-for-oil-gas-exploration-as-investments-reach-5-1-bln-in-2022/">oil exploration</a>, <a href="https://www.shippingandfreightresource.com/bollore-africa-logistics-now-a-part-of-the-worlds-largest-container-lines-stable/">shipping</a>, <a href="https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr98_inroadsandoutposts_may2022.pdf#page=9">ports infrastructure</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-marine-rules-favour-big-industry-leaving-small-scale-fishers-in-the-lurch-171829">industrial fishing</a> sectors are sometimes dominated by foreign companies. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/angola-oil-and-gas">Angola’s oil production</a>, for example, is dominated by the major international oil exploration and production companies including Total (France) with a 41% market share, Chevron (US) with 26%, Exxon Mobil (US) with 19%, and BP (UK) with 13%.</p>
<p>And so, despite these waters being vital to African countries and their citizens, foreign actors will act in a way that’s in their best interests - at times to the detriment of African countries and citizens.</p>
<p>One illustration of this relates to maritime (ocean) security. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that coastal countries <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm">are responsible</a> for managing the security of their territorial waters (up to 12 nautical miles from their shorelines) and that of their exclusive economic zones, between 12 and 200 nautical miles from their shoreline. This includes protection against unlawful acts at sea, such as illegal fishing, piracy and armed robbery, terrorism and other related crimes. </p>
<p>However, the same convention <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf#page57=pagenumber">allows other countries</a> to act, against <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_legal_framework.htm#:%7E:text=UNCLOS%20provides%20that%20all%20States%20have%20an%20obligation,and%20seize%20the%20property%20on%20board%20%28art.%20105%29.">piracy</a>, for example, in the exclusive economic zones.</p>
<p>Drawing on our expertise on African maritime governance and security, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2023.2167706#metrics-content">we reviewed</a> literature, databases of policy documents and maritime security reports, to explore how non-African countries selectively frame what constitutes threats. How these threats are framed determines the response to them and how those response are resourced. The effect is that it undermines a holistic notion of maritime security that would benefit the African people.</p>
<p>We argue that the focus by non-African countries is on piracy and armed robbery at sea which threaten resource extraction, transportation and safety. They hardly focus on the protection of Africa’s marine resources, in particular from pollution and illegal fishing caused by foreign powers. </p>
<p>This approach is illogical. It fails to recognise that there’s a <a href="https://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Soundings_No_8.pdf">link</a> between deprivation and maritime crimes, including piracy and armed robbery at sea. African coastal communities, many of whom are already <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-depleting-fish-stocks-may-pose-a-threat-to-regional-security-105168">marginalised and deprived</a>, are highly dependent on marine resources. The depletion of these resources only <a href="https://theconversation.com/west-africas-fisher-women-are-experts-at-coping-with-job-insecurity-but-policymakers-are-using-their-resilience-against-them-188027">worsens their situation</a>. Failure to prioritise the protection of African marine resources will push people further into poverty and continue the cycle of insecurity at sea.</p>
<h2>Fighting piracy</h2>
<p>The foreign focus on piracy is clear. Over 20 United Nations Security Council Resolutions or presidential statements have been issued on piracy in the Gulf of Aden (East Africa) and the Gulf of Guinea (West and Central Africa).</p>
<p>Piracy is a problem. It can involve kidnap for ransom and, in extreme cases, can lead to the death of crew members. Between 2005 and 2012, pirates in the Gulf of Aden received an estimated <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2023.2167706#metrics-content">US$500 million</a> ransom. Almost <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2023.2167706#metrics-content">2,000 sailors</a> were kidnapped and many were killed. </p>
<p>At the heights of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, pirates accrued about <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/nigeria/publications/UNODC_GMCP_Pirates_of_the_Niger_Delta_between_brown_and_blue_waters.pdf#page=11">US$4 million</a> every year. </p>
<p>The first UN resolutions on piracy in Africa were introduced in the <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1816">Gulf of Aden</a> in 2008 and in the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/573/21/PDF/N1157321.pdf?OpenElement">Gulf of Guinea</a> in 2011. Since then, <a href="https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_written_advice_to_security_council_on_piracy_in_the_gulf_of_guinea_-_approved.pdf#:%7E:text=The%20Commission%20welcomes%20the%20decrease%20in%20the%20incidents,activities%20beyond%20their%20nodal%20point%20in%20West%20Africa.">piracy incidents</a> have reduced in both Gulfs. </p>
<h2>Fish and the environment</h2>
<p>But the problem is, the focus of African nations needs to be on the protection of fish stocks and the environment which affects the livelihoods and food sources of African citizens. Some threats – like <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/how-oil-spill-illegal-poaching-leave-nigerias-fishing-industry-vulnerable/">oil pollution</a> and illegal fishing – are often perpetrated by foreign entities. </p>
<p>Fish is a source of <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-marine-rules-favour-big-industry-leaving-small-scale-fishers-in-the-lurch-171829">food and income</a> for millions of Africans. When there’s less fish catch, poverty increases as do the number of out of school children and poor health. </p>
<p>Yet, as we found during our research, no UN resolutions exist for environmental degradation or marine resource plunder. This is typically caused by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/dec/06/this-place-used-to-be-green-the-brutal-impact-of-oil-in-the-niger-delta">pollution</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0eb523ca-5d41-11ea-8033-fa40a0d65a98">illegal fishing</a> perpetrated by foreign companies and distant water vessels. </p>
<p>An agreement to put an end to harmful fisheries subsidies, which enable overfishing and illegal fishing, was adopted at the World Trade Organisation’s ministerial conference in 2022. But, to date, <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/fish_e/fish_acceptances_e.htm">only four countries</a> have accented to the agreement.</p>
<p>Along with pollution, overfishing and illegal fishing are key factors that contribute to the depletion of Africa’s fish stocks, pushing people into poverty. In West Africa, for instance, the income of small-scale fishers <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/05/16/safety-and-sustainability-for-small-scale-fishers-in-west-africa">decreased by up to 40%</a> between 2006 and 2016. Reduced catch also led to a decrease in the availability, and an increase in prices, of fish for local consumption. </p>
<h2>Illegal fishing</h2>
<p><a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2022/01/illegal-fishing-emerges-as-africas-main-maritime-security-threat/">Illegal fishing</a>, perpertrated largely by foreign fleets, exacerbates the depletion of fish stocks. It has a <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2021/Depleting-fish-stocks-fueling-transnational-crime">massive impact</a> on economies. In West Africa it costs six countries <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2017.00050/full?source=post_page">an estimated US$2.3 billion</a> every year. </p>
<p>Despite the international coalition’s success in neutralising piracy in the Gulf of Aden, illegal fishing by foreign vessels <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/illegal-fishing-somalia">continues</a> to pose a significant threat to the food and economic security of millions of Africans. </p>
<p>What’s ironic is that illegal fishing <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19480881.2012.730747">has been cited</a> as a major contributory factor to piracy in the Gulf of Aden. And in the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/nigeria/documents/UNODC_Pirates_of_the_Niger_Delta_between_brown_and_blue_waters.pdf">Gulf of Guinea</a>, historical pollution by foreign oil companies, and resulting deprivation, gave way to militancy which <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/nigeria/publications/UNODC_GMCP_Pirates_of_the_Niger_Delta_between_brown_and_blue_waters.pdf">morphed into</a> piracy. </p>
<p>Conceivably, as more people are pushed into poverty, more people are pushed towards criminal activities, including piracy-related activities. </p>
<h2>Shifting focus</h2>
<p>Focusing mainly on piracy isn’t the solution. Its <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-a-symptom-not-a-cause-of-insecurity">root causes</a> – depleted fish stocks, loss of livelihoods and poverty – need to be addressed.</p>
<p>Maritime safety and security in Africa will only be achieved when the same level of attention and resources that are given to countering piracy by African governments and their foreign counterparts is extended to sustainable fisheries and curbing of marine pollution. </p>
<p>Achieving this balance requires several clear actions.</p>
<h2>5 steps to be taken</h2>
<p>First, the African Union and Regional Economic Communities must take collective action to push for an end to exploitative relationships in the continent’s ocean resources. This includes urging the UN to recognise illegal fishing and associated crimes as grave security threats.</p>
<p>International partners must go beyond rhetoric and stop financing the exploitation of the continent’s resources through <a href="https://theconversation.com/eu-targets-fragile-west-african-fish-stocks-despite-protection-laws-125679">subsidies that allows for legal exploitation of depleted</a> species and illegal fishing.</p>
<p>Secondly, African states should adopt a holistic approach to maritime security that encourages cooperation and collaboration across sectors, as outlined in the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/33832-wd-african_union_3-1.pdf">AIMS 2050</a> and <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37286-treaty-african_charter_on_maritime_security.pdf">Lomé Charter</a>. This approach should use piracy countermeasures to combat illegal fishing and associated activities. </p>
<p>Third, to understand the impact of threats to maritime security and resource extraction, African voices (at the community level) should be reflected in the formulation of policies and strategies. </p>
<p>Fourth, while successful in reducing piracy, the current approach to maritime security in Africa is not sustainable. The root causes of insecurity, such as youth unemployment and environmental degradation, should be addressed. This requires urgent attention with a focus on <a href="https://theconversation.com/review-of-nine-african-blue-economy-projects-shows-what-works-and-what-doesnt-143841">social and ecological well-being</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, the reduction in incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea, especially in the Gulf of Guinea, is due to <a href="https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_written_advice_to_security_council_on_piracy_in_the_gulf_of_guinea_-_approved.pdf#:%7E:text=The%20Commission%20welcomes%20the%20decrease%20in%20the%20incidents,activities%20beyond%20their%20nodal%20point%20in%20West%20Africa.">cooperation, collaboration and coordination between regional navies and their partners</a>. This approach is widely recognised as sustainable. It should be maintained, and indeed extended to address other security threats at sea.</p>
<p>Taking these steps will ensure that no one is left behind and that the continent’s prospects for future prosperity are not undermined.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201325/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood receives funding from the Scottish Funding Council. She is affiliated with the African Studies Association UK. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Freedom C. Onuoha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The current focus by extra-regional actors is an elite project that undermines a maritime security strategy that would benefit the African people.Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, Lecturer, University of St AndrewsFreedom C. Onuoha, Professor of Political Science, University of NigeriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2039152023-04-18T19:05:05Z2023-04-18T19:05:05ZApproach with caution: why NZ should be wary of buying into the AUKUS security pact<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521441/original/file-20230418-24-j5mbhf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=181%2C245%2C5781%2C3535&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the strategic rivalry between the United States and China intensifies, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/28/new-zealand-may-join-aukus-pacts-non-nuclear-component">invitation to discuss</a> participation in the AUKUS security agreement presents New Zealand with a potentially momentous decision: how best to secure its own strategic interests and values in the Indo-Pacific region.</p>
<p>AUKUS is the <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21116075-2-aukus-treaty-text">2021 agreement</a> between Australia, the UK and the US for the “exchange of naval nuclear propulsion information”. It has been presented as the foundation for an enhanced security partnership linked to a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and a rules-based international order.</p>
<p>While it does not explicitly say so, the pact is a response to the perceived threat of China’s increasing assertiveness in the region. The Chinese government has condemned AUKUS as reflecting a “Cold War mentality”, involving a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/14/china-aukus-submarines-deal-embarks-path-error-danger#">path of error and danger</a>”; it is a threat to both “regional peace” and the “international nuclear nonproliferation regime”.</p>
<p>As a first major initiative, Australia will buy at least three US Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines by the early 2030s. By the mid-2050s, it will receive five or more new SSN-AUKUS submarines that combine US technology and a UK design. The cost of Australia’s nuclear submarine programme will be more than A$268 billion over the next 30 years.</p>
<p>AUKUS also envisages the sharing of information in cutting-edge defence technologies, including artificial intelligence, quantum capabilities and cybersecurity. This is where New Zealand has expressed some interest at a so-called “pillar two” non-nuclear level.</p>
<p>Rational political decision-making involves choosing the best option among available alternatives, about which a certain degree of uncertainty exists. So, the question is: what is the most rational decision for New Zealand?</p>
<h2>The argument for AUKUS</h2>
<p>The claim that a new Cold War between China and the US is under way is shaped by the conviction that a rising great power is almost inevitably trying to displace the US as the dominant global power.</p>
<p>This is happening at a time when significant parts of international law are in free fall, globalisation is at risk of stalling, and the UN Security Council is increasingly unable to resolve critical problems.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australia-signs-up-for-nuclear-subs-nz-faces-hard-decisions-over-the-aukus-alliance-201946">As Australia signs up for nuclear subs, NZ faces hard decisions over the AUKUS alliance</a>
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<p>A growing arms race and points of extreme geopolitical tension, from North Korea to Taiwan, highlight the need for an arrangement like AUKUS to provide a counterweight of like-minded partners to ensure greater stability.</p>
<p>In this climate, the argument goes, New Zealand’s preferred option of “hedging” between the superpowers has been squeezed. As a relatively small nation, it must now choose which side to support.</p>
<p>Given New Zealand’s history, liberal democratic values and existing security ties with the AUKUS partners, it makes sense for Wellington to align with the agreement’s long-term strategy to deter and contain China’s expanding military power.</p>
<p>Failure to do so risks New Zealand not having access to emerging state-of-the-art defence technologies.</p>
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<h2>The argument against AUKUS</h2>
<p>The counterargument is that the Cold War analogy is inaccurate. The increasingly interconnected post-Cold-War era is fundamentally different from the period between 1947 and 1989, with its rival global economic systems and competing but comparable alliance systems.</p>
<p>The binary assumption that the fate of the Indo-Pacific will be largely shaped by the outcome of US-China rivalry – and by the capacity of the US and its closest allies to counterbalance Chinese ambitions in the vast Indo-Pacific region – is questionable.</p>
<p>Regional states such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, and EU states like France and Germany, remain concerned about China’s assertive diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. But they seem to have little confidence that AUKUS, a security arrangement involving three English-speaking states, is capable of a serious response in a region inhabited by billions of people.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-keating-lashes-albanese-government-over-aukus-calling-it-labors-biggest-failure-since-ww1-201866">Paul Keating lashes Albanese government over AUKUS, calling it Labor's biggest failure since WW1</a>
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<p>Furthermore, while China’s global ambitions are real, they should not be over-hyped. The country’s impressive rise to superpower status has been built on full participation in the world capitalist economy and an outstanding trade performance. This has created a high level of economic interdependence for China and its trade partners.</p>
<p>Besides, AUKUS will not be able to do much in the short term to counter China’s designs on Taiwan. Despite the defence minister’s assurances, New Zealand’s participation would create real uncertainty about its independent foreign policy and its commitment to non-nuclear security in a region where many states have criticised AUKUS for fuelling nuclear proliferation.</p>
<p>Finally, the assumption that AUKUS is the only pathway to new military technologies overlooks Wellington’s already excellent bilateral ties with Australia and the US, its involvement in the Five Eyes partnership, and deepening links with NATO (including the prime minister’s <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/131794205/pm-chris-hipkins-to-attend-nato-leaders-summit">planned visit</a> to this year’s NATO summit).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/finland-nato-and-the-evolving-new-world-order-what-small-nations-know-203278">Finland, NATO and the evolving new world order – what small nations know</a>
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<h2>The case for caution</h2>
<p>On balance, we believe the evidence points to New Zealand’s interests and values being best safeguarded by maintaining a cautious approach to AUKUS.</p>
<p>We accept New Zealand shares a great deal with Australia, the UK and the US, and should not be “neutral” in the face of authoritarian pressures from China. We also agree New Zealand’s military should be fit for purpose.</p>
<p>However, it must be recognised New Zealand holds a distinctive worldview, one committed to defending an international rules-based order and to deepening it (through measures like UN Security Council reform) to enhance the security of all nations.</p>
<p>While it is correct in principle to explore talks about AUKUS, New Zealand should have no illusions about the huge implications such involvement would have for its vision of a fairer, more secure and nuclear-free world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203915/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s global ambitions are real but they should not be over-hyped. New Zealand’s strategic interests lie outside any direct participation in AUKUS.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoRobert G. Patman, Professor of International Relations, University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1989672023-02-01T19:43:21Z2023-02-01T19:43:21ZWhat international law says about Israel’s planned destruction of Palestinian assailants’ homes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507572/original/file-20230201-12-kckx64.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C44%2C5872%2C3888&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Palestinians block roads to protest home demolition</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-man-crosses-a-blocked-street-during-a-strike-news-photo/1246688007?phrase=East%20jerusalem%20palestinian%20home&adppopup=true">Ahmad Gharabli/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After a deadly attack <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64430491">that killed seven people</a> outside an East Jerusalem synagogue, the Israeli government responded by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-seals-off-home-palestinian-synagogue-shooter-2023-01-29/">sealing off the home</a> of the Palestinian suspect in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/29/israel-prepares-to-demolish-family-home-of-palestinian-gunman">preparation for its destruction</a>. The family home of a 13-year-old accused in a separate East Jerusalem shooting has <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israel-prepares-to-demolish-home-of-palestinian-gunman-who-killed-7-in-east-jerusalem">likewise been earmarked for destruction</a>.</p>
<p>This is not unusual. Israel has <a href="https://statistics.btselem.org/ar/demolitions/demolition-as-punishment?tab=overview&demoScopeSensor=%22false%22">demolished the homes of thousands of Palestinians</a> in recent years. <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-apparent-shift-us-pushing-israel-to-stop-demolishing-terrorists-homes/">Bulldozing properties of those deemed responsible</a> for violent acts against Israeli citizens <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=79877&page=1">or to deter such acts</a> has long been government policy.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/11/515632">it is also illegal</a> under international law. As an <a href="https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/goldman/bio">expert on international humanitarian law</a>, I know that holding the family of assailants responsible for their acts – no matter how heinous the crime – falls under what is know as <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/collective-punishments">collective punishment</a>. And for the past 70-plus years, international law has been unequivocal: Collective punishment is strictly prohibited in nearly all circumstances. Yet, when it comes to the demolition of Palestinian homes, international bodies have been unable to enforce the ban.</p>
<h2>Not necessary, not legal</h2>
<p>Rules governing how occupying powers can treat civilians are covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention – one of four treaties adopted after the end of World War II, largely as a response to the horrific excesses of Japanese and German occupying armies. </p>
<p><a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-33#:%7E:text=No%20protected%20person%20may%20be,and%20their%20property%20are%20prohibited.">Article 33</a> of the 1949 convention states: “No protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.” It adds: “Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.”</p>
<p>Since Israel is an occupying power in the eyes of the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/tags/occupied-palestinian-territories">the United Nations</a>, as well as under the terms of both the Fourth Geneva Convention and the earlier 1907 Hague Convention, then Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation would fall under the “protected persons” designation of the Geneva Conventions.</p>
<p>The Geneva Conventions reiterate their position on protected persons further in <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-53">Article 53</a>: “Any destruction by the occupying power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons […] is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.”</p>
<p>That slight caveat would apply to instances in which, for example, an armed resistance group used a home belonging to a protected person to fire at an occupying power’s army. But clearly that is not the case in the deliberate destruction of a home belonging to an assailant who launched an attack elsewhere.</p>
<p>Collective punishment is banned not only by the instruments of international humanitarian law, but also by human rights conventions that apply during peacetime and armed conflicts, including occupation. </p>
<p>And such prohibitions are not a quirk of international law – they are common to <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780429318986/collective-punishment-human-rights-law-cornelia-klocker">almost all major legal systems</a> in the world.</p>
<h2>A narrow reading</h2>
<p>Given how clear the international laws are, the question arises: How does Israel square the practice of punitive home destruction with international law?</p>
<p>The answer is not very well, in the opinion of most <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/10/commission-inquiry-finds-israeli-occupation-unlawful-under-international-law">international humanitarian law experts</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/21/israel-stop-punitive-home-demolitions">human rights observers</a>. </p>
<p>Israel <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949/state-parties/IL">ratified the Geneva Conventions in 1951</a>. But successive Israeli governments have claimed that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38458884">its protections do not apply</a> to those living in Palestinian territories, the status of which it disputes. </p>
<p>Other <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/israel/opt-legality-house-demolitions-under-international-humanitarian-law#:%7E:text=Houses%20can%20be%20demolished%20only,purposes%20as%20a%20military%20operation.">arguments put forward by the Israeli government in defense of the demolitions</a> include that they affect only the properties of individuals engaged in terrorism, and that the aim is deterrence, not punishment.</p>
<p>But as early as 1968, Theodor Meron, a legal adviser to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2015-05-19/ty-article/.premium/israel-knew-all-along-that-settlements-were-illegal/0000017f-e70e-d62c-a1ff-ff7f9ff80000">warned that in his opinion</a> the destruction of homes of terror suspects in the occupied territories contravened the Geneva Conventions. In a top-secret document, Meron rejected a “narrow, literal” interpretation of international law in regards the destruction of homes.</p>
<h2>UN hamstrung by US veto power</h2>
<p>The United Nations has long condemned the destruction of Palestinian homes, with the body’s special rapporteur Michael Lynk <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/israels-collective-punishment-of-palestinians-illegal-and-an-affront-to-justice-special-rapporteur-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-opt-press-release/">repeatedly pointing out</a> that collective punishment violates international law.</p>
<p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has dismissed such condemnation by the United Nations, claiming that <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-pans-despicable-un-vote-says-jews-cannot-be-occupiers-in-their-own-land/">the body shows “anti-Israeli” bias</a>.</p>
<p>Either way, the United Nations is not in a strong position to take action. The U.N.’s Security Council is the one international body that can take effective measures to censure and take coercive action against member states. But the U.S. has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/19/a-history-of-the-us-blocking-un-resolutions-against-israel">long vetoed resolutions</a> critical of its ally, Israel. Washington is also unlikely to assert unilateral pressure on Israel to end its practice of home demolitions under its current policy. The International Criminal Court <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/world/middleeast/icc-israel-war-crimes.html">ruled in 2021</a> that it had jurisdiction over territories occupied by Israel, but any investigation would be likely hampered by the noncooperation of the Israeli government, which <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-56687437">refuses to acknowledge the court’s authority</a>.</p>
<p>As a result, despite the destruction of the homes being against the letter and spirit of the Geneva Conventions, there is little that can stop the Israeli government from doing so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Goldman is affiliated with the International Commission of Jurists</span></em></p>A decision to bulldoze the home belonging to the family of a man accused of killing seven people outside a synagogue in East Jerusalem has sparked questions over the legality of Israeli policy.Robert Goldman, Professor of Law, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1929882022-10-28T12:31:32Z2022-10-28T12:31:32ZWhy the US should tread carefully as it weighs supporting armed intervention in Haiti again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492238/original/file-20221028-40947-ervy7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1449%2C1225&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Haitians are wary of International forces.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/port-au-prince-haiti-a-tank-from-the-un-peacekeeping-force-news-photo/56738051?adppopup=true">Jaime Razuri/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Haiti appears to be on the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/europe-middle-east-canada-caribbean-haiti-dfe6ad983214cc66312df9da252272c6">precipice of foreign intervention</a> yet again.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/gang-blockade-cripples-haiti-fuel-supplies-hospitals-prepare-close-2022-09-27/">Gangs have been blockading</a> the country’s biggest fuel terminal since mid-September 2022, strangling Haiti’s food and energy supplies. The World Food Program says that Haiti’s <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129537">need for humanitarian aid</a> is urgent. </p>
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<p>The government of Prime Minister Ariel Henry <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haitis-pm-henry-calls-foreign-help-amid-gang-blockade-2022-10-06/">began in early October to call</a> for foreign troops to come help it gain the upper hand against the gangs. The first international response has been a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/the-u-n-adopts-resolution-to-end-violence-in-haiti-sanctions-powerful-gang-leader">U.N. resolution</a> placing sanctions on the primary gang leader, former police officer Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier. </p>
<p>More direct involvement may be on the horizon. The <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/u-confident-u-n-security-200732958.html">Biden administration has indicated</a> that the U.S. and Mexico plan to <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129777">submit another proposal</a> for the U.N. Security Council’s consideration that would authorize a “non-UN international security assistance mission” to quell violence and facilitate the distribution of aid. </p>
<p>Conditions in Haiti today are alarming, but as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=5vop3swAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholar of 20th-century Haitian history</a>, I am concerned that foreign intervention runs the risk of making a bad situation worse – as has happened repeatedly there for more than 100 years. I believe any response should carefully consider how past aid and military interventions have shaped the dire situation Haitians face today. </p>
<h2>US occupation</h2>
<p>Foreign influences have long exerted power over Haitian internal affairs.</p>
<p>Initially enslaved in a brutal French sugar colony, <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/haitian-revolution-1791-1804/">Haitians won their freedom and independence</a> in 1804 after 13 years of war and revolution.</p>
<p>But a state of free Black people was <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-haitis-founding-father-whose-black-revolution-was-too-radical-for-thomas-jefferson-101963">viewed suspiciously</a> by the surrounding slave-holding empires in North and South America. There were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/rhz1226">many efforts</a> to weaken, control or contain the young country. </p>
<p>The most expansive of these efforts was the U.S. occupation of Haiti.</p>
<p>In 1915, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/08/06/haiti-us-occupation-1915/">U.S. occupied Haiti</a> and ruled it as a client state for 19 years. The pretext for the invasion was to calm political turmoil in Haiti, but <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/B/bo26032761.html">scholarship has shown</a> how the U.S. was primarily interested in protecting and expanding its economic interests in the region.</p>
<p>Many white Americans justified the occupation because of their paternalistic ideas about Black people. And many U.S. Marines in Haiti shared a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa050">Jim Crow mentality</a> about race, which shaped governing styles and exacerbated tensions between light-skinned and dark-skinned Haitians. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X15598262">U.S. military claimed to be a modernizing force</a> in Haiti, but the changes it made weakened the country’s institutions. It <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/163329/afghanistan-withdrawal-haiti-earthquake-crisis">undermined Haitian political autonomy</a> by establishing a puppet government that rubber-stamped legislation drafted by U.S. officials. </p>
<p>The U.S. invested heavily in the capital city of Port-au-Prince while letting the rest of the country fall into decline. When U.S. troops departed in 1934, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2015.09.004">power had been concentrated in the central government</a>, leaving Haiti’s provinces weak and the country with few counterweights to executive authority. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492163/original/file-20221027-18054-u58xu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Members of the armed forces march down a city street in the early 20th century." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492163/original/file-20221027-18054-u58xu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492163/original/file-20221027-18054-u58xu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492163/original/file-20221027-18054-u58xu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492163/original/file-20221027-18054-u58xu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492163/original/file-20221027-18054-u58xu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492163/original/file-20221027-18054-u58xu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492163/original/file-20221027-18054-u58xu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. Marines marched in Philadelphia before sailing for Port-Au-Prince in 1915.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/philadelphia-pa-marines-are-shown-marching-from-the-news-photo/515952260?phrase=haiti%201915&adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Duvaliers</h2>
<p>This centralized system became a <a href="https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/16865">major liability</a> when, in 1957, François Duvalier was elected president of Haiti.</p>
<p>Duvalier, a Black nationalist, found support by mobilizing racial animosities that had been heightened by the U.S. occupation. He had little respect for democratic norms and leaned on a <a href="https://www.coha.org/tonton-macoutes/">violent paramilitary</a> to crush his opponents.</p>
<p>Within a few years, Duvalier had established a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2019.1617488">kleptocratic dictatorship</a> that ruled over a major decline of Haiti’s economic and political life. After his death in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, took over as “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1971/04/23/archives/papa-doc-a-ruthless-dictator-kept-the-haitians-in-illiteracy-and.html">president-for-life</a>.”</p>
<p>The younger Duvalier, who <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0096144221992030">portrayed himself as a modernizer</a>, enjoyed ever-increasing amounts of support from the international community, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/will-haiti-reckon-duvalier-years">especially the United States</a>. But reforms remained superficial and Haiti’s government was still a dictatorship.</p>
<p>In 1986, a popular uprising fueled by grassroots organizing, spiraling economic crises and social discontent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-11943820">pushed the Duvalier family into exile</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492168/original/file-20221027-37192-yhkl3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A young man in a suit stands stiffly with a military officer by his side." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492168/original/file-20221027-37192-yhkl3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492168/original/file-20221027-37192-yhkl3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492168/original/file-20221027-37192-yhkl3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492168/original/file-20221027-37192-yhkl3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492168/original/file-20221027-37192-yhkl3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492168/original/file-20221027-37192-yhkl3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492168/original/file-20221027-37192-yhkl3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier, known as ‘Baby Doc,’ ruled Haiti after his father’s death in 1971.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/jean-claude-duvalier-et-sa-femme-mich%C3%A8le-bennet-lors-du-news-photo/967709276?adppopup=true">Alain Mingam/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Struggles with democracy after dictatorship</h2>
<p>Since then, Haitian political life has been a push-and-pull of democratic aspiration and authoritarian repression. In the wake of the dictatorship, Haiti reinvented itself as a <a href="https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Haiti/haiti1987.html">constitutional democracy</a>, but the political transition remains incomplete to this day. </p>
<p>Duvalier loyalists and allies in the military <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-11-30-mn-16902-story.html">violently disrupted</a> the first attempt at an election in 1987. When voting finally took place in 1990, the people <a href="https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Haiti/90pres.html">elected</a> a left-leaning populist and former Catholic priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in a landslide victory that saw historic levels of voter participation.</p>
<p>But once again, anti-democratic elements in the elite and the military intervened, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/10/02/us-calls-for-haitians-return-to-power/1ad1daa3-16bb-4401-ba37-e7f1488ab9db/">overthrowing Aristide</a> after just a few months in office and establishing a violent military junta. </p>
<p>President Bill Clinton sent troops back to Haiti in 1994 to push out the junta and reinstall Aristide. </p>
<p>Aristide was <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2022/5/23/headlines/ex_ambassador_admits_france_us_orchestrated_2004_coup_in_haiti_to_oust_aristide">overthrown again in 2004</a>, launching new waves of sweeping political violence. A U.S., French and Canadian coalition sent an “interim international force” of troops to restore order and help organize new elections. </p>
<p>They were soon were replaced by a blue-helmeted U.N. peacekeeping mission led by Brazil, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minustah">known as MINUSTAH</a>. Initially planned as a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/un-sc-establishes-un-stabilization-mission-haiti-initital-six-month-period-adopts">six-month intervention</a>, those forces remained in Haiti until 2017.</p>
<p>When Port-au-Prince was struck by a devastating earthquake in 2010, MINUSTAH forces were already on the ground. The international community launched a massive, <a href="https://theconversation.com/haiti-what-aid-workers-can-learn-from-the-previous-earthquake-as-they-struggle-to-rebuild-the-country-166304">ill-coordinated</a> relief and recovery effort, but, much like the American occupation a century earlier, the <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/02/28/172875646/what-happened-to-the-aid-meant-to-rebuild-haiti">primary benefactor</a> was the private sector in the U.S. and other major donor countries.</p>
<p>MINUSTAH’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/americas/united-nations-haiti-cholera.html">most enduring legacy</a> was a cholera epidemic caused by poor sanitation practices at a U.N. base in Haiti’s countryside. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492177/original/file-20221027-40102-gr5134.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Posters of former Haitian leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492177/original/file-20221027-40102-gr5134.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492177/original/file-20221027-40102-gr5134.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492177/original/file-20221027-40102-gr5134.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492177/original/file-20221027-40102-gr5134.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492177/original/file-20221027-40102-gr5134.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492177/original/file-20221027-40102-gr5134.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492177/original/file-20221027-40102-gr5134.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A supporter of former Haitian leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide displays posters of him in 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporter-of-former-haitian-president-jean-bertrand-news-photo/453617532?adppopup=true">Hector Retamal/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The current crisis</h2>
<p>MINUSTAH and the Obama State Department oversaw Haiti’s 2010 presidential elections and had <a href="https://www.ozy.com/news-and-politics/when-hillary-chose-the-president/68614/">a major hand</a> in securing the victory of President Michel Martelly, a pop star-turned-politician who <a href="https://cepr.net/clinton-e-mails-point-to-us-intervention-in-2010-haiti-elections/">quickly gained</a> a reputation for corruption.</p>
<p>He was succeeded by his chosen successor, Jovenel Moïse, who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-politics/haiti-opposition-condemns-countrys-slide-into-rule-by-decree-idUSKBN1ZE098">dissolved parliament</a> in 2020. According to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/15/haiti-gang-violence-women-children-port-au-prince-unicef-flee-homes">human rights agencies, he worked</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/haiti-jovenel-moise-dictator-immigration/2021/02/10/67fb4b06-6a53-11eb-9ead-673168d5b874_story.html">with</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/haiti-moise-coronavirus-barbecue/2020/08/14/2554fce4-cf4d-11ea-8c55-61e7fa5e82ab_story.html">local gangs</a> to terrorize his opponents.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/assassinations-and-invasions-how-the-us-and-france-shaped-haitis-long-history-of-political-turmoil-164269">Moïse was assassinated in July 2021</a> – a murder that has <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/07/1110257719/haiti-assassination-president-jovenel-moise-anniversary-gangs-refugees">yet to be solved</a>. Without a parliament, there is <a href="https://haitiantimes.com/2021/07/07/line-of-succession-unclear-following-moise-assassination/">no constitutional line of succession</a>.</p>
<p>Haiti’s government has since lurched forward under the leadership of Henry, an unelected and unpopular official who has been <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/haitian-prime-minister-ariel-henry-linked-to-suspect-in-president-jovenel-moises-assassination-report-says">linked to Moïse’s alleged assassins</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492178/original/file-20221027-37683-u5b2xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A funeral for a Caribbean leader" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492178/original/file-20221027-37683-u5b2xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492178/original/file-20221027-37683-u5b2xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492178/original/file-20221027-37683-u5b2xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492178/original/file-20221027-37683-u5b2xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492178/original/file-20221027-37683-u5b2xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492178/original/file-20221027-37683-u5b2xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492178/original/file-20221027-37683-u5b2xw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Officials attend a ceremony in honor of slain Haitian leader Jovenel Moïse in July 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/officials-attend-a-ceremony-in-honor-of-late-haitian-news-photo/1234075334?adppopup=true">Valerie Baeriswyl/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite these concerns, <a href="https://theintercept.com/2022/10/19/haiti-armed-intervention-dan-foote-interview/">Henry has enjoyed the backing of the U.S.</a> over his rivals. A coalition of <a href="https://www.haitilibre.com/docs/accord-30-08-2021.pdf">Haitian civil society groups drafted a proposal</a> for a new interim government to take power and organize elections.</p>
<p>But negotiations with Henry’s government have <a href="https://canada-haiti.ca/content/end-illusion-negotiations">gone nowhere</a>. Given the vacuum of legitimate authority, the gangs Moïse empowered have begun asserting themselves as <a href="https://haitiantimes.com/2022/10/15/exclusive-cherizier-reveals-transition-plan-for-haiti/">independent political actors</a>. Chérizier has joined <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/06/world/americas/haiti-opposition-group-montana-accord.html">many local leaders</a> in demanding Henry either resign or share power.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/10/27/1132041996/many-people-living-in-haiti-are-actively-resisting-international-intervention">Critics</a> are <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-fight-for-haitis-future">worried</a> that Henry, unrestrained by a democratic mandate or a functioning parliament, plans to use foreign troops to reinforce his political position.</p>
<p>And while <a href="https://theconversation.com/assassinations-and-invasions-how-the-us-and-france-shaped-haitis-long-history-of-political-turmoil-164269">past foreign interventions</a> in Haiti have often been launched in the name of stability and democracy, they have not proved capable of providing either.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claire Antone Payton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Waves of US troops and international peacekeeping forces have repeatedly failed to make Haiti more stable for more than 100 years.Claire Antone Payton, Manager of the Memory Project, Karsh Institute of Democracy, University of VirginiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.