tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/2015-iran-nuclear-deal-53691/articles2015 Iran nuclear deal – La Conversation2023-10-23T18:35:09Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2158522023-10-23T18:35:09Z2023-10-23T18:35:09ZThe Israel-Hamas war deepens the struggle between US and Iran for influence in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554866/original/file-20231019-22-45pt1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iranians stage a rally outside the former U.S. embassy in Tehran in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pro-regime-iranians-stage-a-rally-outside-the-former-us-news-photo/1244484898?adppopup=true">Contributor#072019/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Israel readies for a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-b084e9c453cc99f7bec6f66d7b5913d9">ground invasion of Gaza</a>, and Palestinian and Israeli civilian deaths continue to mount, a broader struggle for influence continues in the Middle East between the United States and Iran. </p>
<p>The U.S. has long played an important leadership role in the Middle East. American influence has hinged on <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-power-and-influence-middle-east-part-one">maintaining close ties</a> to diverse allies, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>And since the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/">1979 Iranian Revolution</a>, Iran’s leaders have sought to boost their regional influence and secure their domestic position in power by <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf">undermining America’s relationships</a> in the Middle East. </p>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/battle_lines/">built its own regional network</a>, composed largely of Shia Muslim entities, including Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.</p>
<p>Iran also has long <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">supported Hamas</a>, a Sunni Islamist movement and U.S.-designated terrorist group that controls Gaza. <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/iran-israel-and-war-in-the-middle-east/">Like Iran</a>, Hamas is committed to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">destruction of Israel</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/john-ciorciari">scholar of international politics</a>, I am interested in how this rivalry between the U.S. and Iran has evolved and how this war may affect it. </p>
<p>The long-standing Israel-Palestinian dispute is central to Iran’s regional strategy, which aims to drive a wedge between Israel and its neighbors and complicate U.S. relations throughout the Arab world. So far, the Israel-Hamas war appears to be having precisely those effects.</p>
<h2>Iran’s role in the Gaza war</h2>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/iran-israel-hamas-attacks.html">denied direct involvement</a> in Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, atrocities in Israel, in which Hamas fighters <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">killed about 1,400 people</a> and kidnapped more than 200. </p>
<p>U.S. officials and others have said that it <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-denies-it-had-role-in-hamas-attack-on-israel-claims-accusation-is-political/">is too soon to determine</a> Iran’s exact role in the violence. </p>
<p>Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/10/18/israel-hamas-war-how-iran-could-spread-gaza-conflict-through-middle-east/76d4e006-6dcf-11ee-b01a-f593caa04363_story.html">applauded the attacks</a>. </p>
<p>He has called Israel’s ensuing assault on Gaza “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-israeli-officials-should-face-trial-their-crimes-2023-10-17/">a genocide</a>,” as <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">Palestinian casualties</a> generate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/gaza-hospital-al-ahli-al-arabi-blast-explosion-protests-demonstrations-middle-east">large protests</a> against the Israeli offensive throughout the Middle East.</p>
<p>Israeli strikes on Gaza since Oct. 7 have <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">killed more than 3,780 people</a>, according to the United Nations. </p>
<p>Iran has also threatened “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/17/iran-warns-of-preemptive-action-against-israel-amid-gaza-war">preemptive</a>” action against Israel if it continues its offensive. </p>
<p>Israel and Hezbollah are now <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/19/world/middleeast/hezbollah-lebanon-israel-explained.html">exchanging daily artillery and rocket fire</a>. Israel has drawn a buffer zone near its border with Lebanon and has begun <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiEn_Ga_4SCAxVwlokEHVVMCQ4QvOMEKAB6BAgREAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reuters.com%2Fworld%2Fisrael-evacuate-residents-town-near-lebanon-border-after-flare-up-2023-10-20%2F&usg=AOvVaw1k3eGVpjw_jNIskM4HpFmI&opi=89978449">evacuating its citizens</a> there. </p>
<p>Israel also has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67093081">bombed key airports</a> in Syria, its longtime adversary, which also has strong ties to Hezbollah. </p>
<p>These actions bring Israel, one of America’s closest allies, perilously closer to a wider war with a coalition backed by Iran. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men stand on a city street with a police car nearby and burn a drawn Israeli flag. Behind them is a large billboard of a man with a white beard and black hat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian demonstrators burn an Israeli flag in Tehran on Oct. 17, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/tehran-iran-in-the-aftermath-of-the-bombing-of-gazas-al-news-photo/1734088645?adppopup=true">Hossein Beris/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Iran’s push for regional clout</h2>
<p>Over the past several decades, Iran has looked to grow its regional influence while exploiting the differences between the U.S. and Israel.</p>
<p>In Lebanon, Iran <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/">helped build Hezbollah</a> in the early 1980s, backing deadly <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/1696242955-iranian-official-admitting-tie-to-beirut-1983-attack-breaks-decades-of-denial">1983 attacks</a> on the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. </p>
<p>In Iraq, Tehran has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-iraq">built influence</a> by affiliating itself with friendly Shiite groups following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein, who was one of Iran’s top rivals. </p>
<p>In Syria, Iran and Hezbollah have helped the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/factbox-iranian-influence-and-presence-in-syria/">Assad regime gain an upper hand</a> in the country’s ongoing civil war by giving the government weapons, intelligence and troops.</p>
<p>And in Yemen, Iran has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">backed Shiite rebel groups</a> that are fighting the government, which is in turn supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<h2>Iran’s support for Palestinian militants</h2>
<p>In the Palestinian territories, meanwhile, Iran has supported militant groups since the 1980s. By the early 1990s, Iranian forces and Hezbollah were <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-iran-fuels-hamas-terrorism">training Hamas fighters</a> in Lebanon. </p>
<p>Iran boosted aid to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjI4vOj_4SCAxWSl4kEHZ58DCkQFnoECCUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Firanprimer.usip.org%2Fresource%2Firan-and-palestinians&usg=AOvVaw2tFw0DL41km7oV3K1act-j&opi=89978449">Hamas during the Second Intifada</a>, a violent Palestinian uprising from 2000 to 2005, and again after a 2006 election victory brought Hamas to power in Gaza. Iran <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/GazaCrisis_ENG-151-157.pdf">also gave weapons and money</a> to Hamas during its 2008-09 and 2014 armed conflicts with Israel. </p>
<p>Recurrent fighting in Gaza has helped keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict salient in Middle Eastern politics. This fighting and tension has advanced Iran’s aims of undermining U.S. and Israeli ties with Iran’s Arab rivals, such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The United States therefore scored a major diplomatic victory by brokering the 2020 <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a>, in which Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates agreed to have diplomatic relations with Israel. </p>
<p>Not to be outdone, Iran announced it made a deal to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal">restore diplomatic relations</a> with Saudi Arabia in March 2023, seven years after they broke ties. </p>
<p>After this announcement, U.S. officials tried to make a deal to formalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia – an agreement that the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say-2023-10-13/">Gaza war has put on ice</a>. Some analysts have <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-is-the-only-one-likely-to-benefit-from-hamas-attack-on-israel/">speculated that Iran</a> may have encouraged Hamas to attack Israel precisely for this reason. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Joe Biden sits next to Benjamin Netanyahu, behind a row of Israel and US flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">President Joe Biden meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv on Oct. 18, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-listens-to-israels-prime-minister-news-photo/1730656163?adppopup=true">Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>The diplomatic challenge ahead</h2>
<p>The Israel-Hamas war poses serious diplomatic challenges for the U.S. </p>
<p>Israel’s bombing, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/19/israel-security-officials-signal-readiness-for-ground-offensive-into-gaza">threatened ground invasion</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/18/israel-says-it-wont-block-humanitarian-aid-entering-gaza-from-egypt">restrictions of aid to Gaza</a> have energized its enemies and created additional tensions with its partners. </p>
<p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called the Israeli assault a “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/turkeys-erdogan-calls-israeli-siege-and-bombing-of-gaza-a-massacre">massacre</a>.” Qatar has <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231007-qatar-holds-israel-responsible-for-escalation-in-gaza/">blamed Israel</a> for the violence, while Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has said Israel’s campaign amounts to “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypts-sissi-says-israeli-gaza-campaign-has-gone-beyond-right-to-self-defense/">collective punishment</a>” of the people of Gaza. </p>
<h2>Preventing a wider war</h2>
<p>Fraying diplomatic ties among some partners became even more apparent after Hamas accused Israel of the Oct. 17 explosion outside a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/world/middleeast/gaza-hospital-israel-hamas-explained.html">Gaza hospital</a>. Although Israel and the U.S. have maintained that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-hospital-blast-what-we-know-about-explosion-2023-10-18/">Palestinians caused the explosion,</a>, possibly in error, anti-Israel demonstrations quickly swept across the Middle East. </p>
<p>Shortly before President Joe Biden arrived in Israel for a regional visit on Oct. 18, Jordan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-cancels-summit-with-biden-egyptian-leader-amman-2023-10-17/">canceled his planned summit</a> with el-Sisi, Jordanian King Abdullah II, and Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas. </p>
<p>The Biden administration has tried to balance strong support for Israel with a message of restraint.</p>
<p>During his visit to Israel, Biden defended Israel’s right to respond to protect its borders and people and tried to deter Iran and others from expanding the war. At the same time, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/joe-biden-urges-israel-not-be-consumed-by-rage-pledges-support-netanyahu-gaza-hamas">pressed Israel</a> to follow the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwir-5vN_4SCAxUUvokEHTspDo0QFnoECCAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheconversation.com%2Fhow-the-laws-of-war-apply-to-the-conflict-between-israel-and-hamas-215493&usg=AOvVaw2gJZ_OA0_IsqEijkwTksSG&opi=89978449">laws of war</a>, and he secured an Israeli agreement to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/20/1207370235/israel-rafah-border-crossing-gaza-humanitarian-aid">allow some aid</a> into Gaza through Egypt. The Egypt-Gaza border crossing opened to allowed some <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-captives-border-aid-f5976ed58ba508f14d45b72b428125ac">bottled war and medical supplies in to Gaza</a> on Oct. 21. </p>
<p>Despite tension and anger across the region, the Biden administration’s effort to deter Iran and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67128900">prevent a wider war</a> aligns with the priorities of most Arab governments, which <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/06/the-arabs-forlorn-envy-of-iranians.html">fear Tehran</a> and its allies are deeply wary about domestic and regional stability. </p>
<p>Perceptions that Tehran is causing escalation and regional instability could push other nations back toward Washington. Pressing for Israeli restraint may be the key both to mitigating the humanitarian crisis and to preventing Iran from emerging a winner from the war in Gaza.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Ciorciari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran’s long-term strategy includes eradicating Israel and driving a wedge between Israel and its regional neighbors. So far, the war seems to be accomplishing that goal.John Ciorciari, Professor of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1869852022-07-14T12:32:34Z2022-07-14T12:32:34ZEnriching uranium is the key factor in how quickly Iran could produce a nuclear weapon – here’s where it stands today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473964/original/file-20220713-9624-ktt0iy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C435%2C3199%2C1858&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A cascade of gas centrifuges at a U.S. enrichment plant in Piketon, Ohio, in 1984. Iran is using similar technology to enrich uranium.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/69/Gas_centrifuge_cascade.jpg">U.S. Department of Energy</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Iran’s nuclear program was a major topic in President Joe Biden’s July 13-16, 2022 trip to the Middle East. The most challenging part of producing nuclear weapons is making the material that fuels them, and Iran is known to have produced uranium that is near-weapons grade.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked Brandeis University professor <a href="https://www.brandeis.edu/facultyguide/person.html?emplid=45b03f10247276eeaf30fadbc8afc2261b06795d">Gary Samore</a>, who worked on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation in the U.S. government for over 20 years, to explain why uranium enrichment is central to Iran’s nuclear ambitions and where the Iranian effort stands now.</em></p>
<h2>What does it mean to enrich uranium?</h2>
<p>Natural uranium contains two main isotopes, or forms whose atoms contain the same number of protons but different numbers of neutrons. It’s about 99.3% uranium-238 and 0.7% uranium-235. The uranium-235 isotope can be used to generate nuclear power for peaceful purposes, or nuclear explosives for military purposes. </p>
<p>Enrichment is the process of separating out and increasing the concentration of U-235 to higher levels above natural uranium. Generally speaking, lower levels of enriched uranium, such as uranium with 5% U-235, are commonly used for nuclear reactor fuel. Higher levels of enrichment, such as 90% U-235, are most desirable for nuclear weapons. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Diagram of a single centrifuge for enriching uranium." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473966/original/file-20220713-2711-jxjxxz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A gas centrifuge separates uranium-235 atoms, which can sustain a nuclear chain reaction, from much more abundant atoms of uranium-238, which cannot. As the centrifuge rotates at high speed, uranium hexafluoride gas is pumped into it. The heavier U-238 molecules move toward the outer edge, and the lighter U-235 molecules move toward the center. The ‘product stream’ of gas enriched in U-235 is pumped through many more centrifuges, increasing the concentration of U-235 at each stage.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gas_centrifuge#/media/File:Countercurrent_Gas_Centrifuge.svg">Inductiveload/Wikipedia</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>For military purposes, why are higher levels of enrichment important?</h2>
<p>The higher the level of enrichment, the smaller the amount of nuclear material necessary to produce a nuclear weapon. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.iaea.org/">International Atomic Energy Agency</a> identifies 25 kilograms (55 pounds) of 90% enriched uranium as a “significant quantity” necessary for a simple nuclear weapon. But larger amounts of lower-enriched uranium can also work. </p>
<p>For example, the “<a href="https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/196219/little-boy-atomic-bomb/">Little Boy</a>” atomic bomb that the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945 used about 64 kilograms of uranium (141 pounds) enriched to <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2015/02/the-weight-of-a-butterfly/">an average of 80% U-235</a>. </p>
<p>From a nuclear weapons design standpoint, smaller amounts of higher-enriched nuclear material are more desirable because that reduces the size and weight of the nuclear weapon and makes it easier to deliver. As a result, modern nuclear weapons based on uranium typically use uranium enriched to 90% to 93% U-235, which is known as weapons-grade uranium, for the primary fuel. </p>
<h2>What had Iran achieved prior to the 2015 nuclear deal?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal">2015 nuclear deal</a> between Iran, the U.S. China, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and Germany put significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, in return for relief from a number of international sanctions. When the deal was adopted, Iran had mastered the basic technology for enriching uranium with gas centrifuges – cylinders that spin uranium in gas form at very high speeds to separate the heavier U-238 isotope from the lighter U-235 isotope. </p>
<p>At its two principal enrichment facilities, <a href="https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/natanz-enrichment-complex/">Natanz</a> and <a href="https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/fordow-fuel-enrichment-plant/">Fordow</a>, Iran was operating about 18,000 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges and about 1,000 second-generation IR-2 centrifuges. It had also accumulated a stockpile of roughly 7,000 kilograms (about 15,430 pounds) of low-enriched uranium (under 5%) and about 200 kilograms (440 pounds) of 20% enrichment uranium. </p>
<p>Based on these capabilities, Iran’s “<a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/irans-nuclear-breakout-time-fact-sheet">breakout time</a>” to produce about 25 kilograms (55 pounds) of 90% enriched uranium – enough for a single nuclear weapon – was estimated to be one or two months. </p>
<p>Breakout time is not intended to suggest that Iran would necessarily decide to produce weapons-grade uranium at these inspected facilities, because the risk of detection and of potential negative international reaction is very high. </p>
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<h2>How did the nuclear deal constrain Iran’s activities?</h2>
<p>The 2015 nuclear deal put physical constraints on Iran’s enrichment program for 10 to 15 years, including the number and type of centrifuges Iran could operate, the size of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and its maximum enrichment level. </p>
<p>For 15 years, no enrichment would take place at Fordow, and Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium would be limited to 300 kilograms (660 pounds) at a maximum enrichment level of 3.67%. And for 10 years, its centrifuges would be limited to about 6,000 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz. </p>
<p>In order to meet these physical limits, Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/world/middleeast/iran-hands-over-stockpile-of-enriched-uranium-to-russia.html">shipped out to Russia</a> most of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and its entire stockpile of 20% enriched uranium. It also <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2015-11-19/iran-dismantling-centrifuges-iaea-reports">dismantled for storage inside Iran</a> most of its IR-1 centrifuges and all of its more advanced IR-2 centrifuges. As a consequence of these limits, Iran’s “breakout time” was extended from a month or two before the deal to about one year after the deal.</p>
<p>After year 10 of the deal, however, Iran was allowed to start replacing its IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz with more advanced models, which it was permitted to continue to research and develop during the first decade of the deal. As these more powerful advanced centrifuges were installed, breakout time would probably have shrunk to about a few months by year 15 of the deal.</p>
<p>As part of the deal, Iran also agreed to enhanced international inspections and monitoring of its nuclear facilities. </p>
<h2>What has Iran done since President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the nuclear deal in 2018?</h2>
<p>Since the U.S. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">withdrew from the nuclear deal</a>, Iran has gradually exceeded the agreement’s limits. It has increased its stockpile of 5% enriched uranium; resumed producing 20% enriched uranium; initiated production of 60% enriched uranium, resumed enrichment at Fordow; and manufactured and installed advanced centrifuges at both Natanz and Fordow. </p>
<p>Iran has also begun to restrict international monitoring of its nuclear facilities. In June 2022, for example, Iran announced that it was disconnecting cameras installed under the 2015 nuclear deal to monitor its nuclear facilities.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi reacts to Iran’s removal of monitoring cameras from its nuclear facilities.</span></figcaption>
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<p>As of May 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency estimated that Iran had about 1,000 kilograms (2,200 pounds) of 5% enriched uranium, about 240 kilograms (530 pounds) of 20% enriched uranium and <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/06/gov2022-24.pdf">40 kilograms (88 pounds) of 60% enriched uranium</a>. </p>
<p>As a result of this growing stockpile of enriched uranium and the use of advanced centrifuges, Iran’s estimated breakout time has been reduced to a few weeks. So far, however, Iran has not decided to begin production of weapons-grade (90%) enriched uranium, even though it is technically capable of doing so. </p>
<p>Most likely, Iran is behaving cautiously because its leaders are concerned that producing weapons-grade uranium would trigger a strong international reaction, which could range from additional sanctions to military attack.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gary Samore Samore previously served as President Barack Obama’s White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and President Bill Clinton’s Senior Director for Non-proliferation and Export Controls.</span></em></p>Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons centers on producing weapons-grade uranium. Here’s what reports about Iran enriching uranium indicate about its progress toward the bomb.Gary Samore, Professor of the Practice of Politics and Crown Family Director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1770942022-02-15T13:40:19Z2022-02-15T13:40:19ZIran nuclear deal: to reset relations with Tehran, Biden must overcome a long legacy of mistrust at home<p>As officials from Washington and Tehran <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/nuclear-talks-with-iran-enter-the-endgame/21807592">return to Vienna</a> for talks that aim to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran hawks in the US Congress are determined to prevent that happening. In <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/593392-republican-senators-threaten-to-block-iran-deal">a letter sent to</a> the US president Joe Biden on February 7, Republican US senator Ted Cruz and 31 of his colleagues threatened to block any attempt to revive the agreement.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a> (JCPOA) signed in 2015 by Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US) was seen internationally as a major coup for the Obama administration. But Barack Obama was followed into the White House by Donald Trump, who pulled the US out of the agreement in 2018 and reimposed severe sanctions, under a policy of <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-10-15/michael-pompeo-secretary-of-state-on-confronting-iran">“maximum pressure”</a>. </p>
<p>This set relations between the US and Iran firmly back on a hostile path. A string of bellicose incidents by both sides resulted, including the assassination of Iran’s most powerful security and intelligence commander, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/world/middleeast/suleimani-dead.html">General Qassem Soleimani</a> in January 2020.</p>
<p>This isn’t the first time domestic political forces have sought to undo glimmers of rapprochement between these two countries which have been at loggerheads for so many years. As <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2022.2029239">our latest research</a> demonstrates, conditions at the international and domestic levels have rarely aligned in a way that would be favourable to attempts to ease tension. US-Iran relations have become “stuck”, with potentially damaging consequences for regional and international order.</p>
<p>This logjam is not irreversible. The underlying geopolitical sources of tension are real, but should not be overhyped by the US and its allies. A cold war with Iran is neither necessary nor inevitable. Biden may just have one last chance to avert new dangers and set this turbulent relationship on a more normal path before domestic forces once again slam the door shut.</p>
<h2>The shadow of geopolitics</h2>
<p>A quick review of US-Iran relations within the wider ebbs and flows of geopolitics provides a superficially compelling picture, revealing half a century of deep tensions, in which Iran’s nuclear aspirations are inextricably entangled.</p>
<p>The revolution of 1979 stripped the US of a vital regional ally in the cold war and, since then, events have often conspired to set relations on opposing paths. These include the hostage crisis during the early post-revolutionary years and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, in which the US mostly supported Iraq. </p>
<p>More recently, with the events surrounding 9/11, the Iraq war, the Arab spring uprisings and beyond, US-Iran relations have become embedded in a complex landscape of regional conflicts and rivalries. These have often involved shifting alliances between states and non-state actors, for example <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2021/07/21/Biden-slams-Iran-s-support-for-Hezbollah-US-extends-national-emergency-for-Lebanon">Iran’s support of Hezbollah</a> in Lebanon or <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/24/yemen-houthi-uae-israel-iran-abraham-accords/">the Houthis</a> in Yemen’s ongoing war.</p>
<p>In attempting a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/13/opinions/smarter-way-to-be-tough-on-iran-joe-biden/index.html">reset on the nuclear deal</a>, Biden and his European allies believe that negotiations are desirable and that peaceful coexistence is possible. And some commentators have argued that the threat from Iran – at least in military terms – has <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-15/americas-great-satan">been inflated</a>. Iran may have a large army and significant military capabilities in some areas, but in others they are ageing and stretched. Arab Gulf states are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep29333.pdf">spending more</a> and modernising faster. This situation is exacerbated by the impact of US sanctions and the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-covid-19-pandemic-response-mission-critical">fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic</a>.</p>
<p>After decades of misunderstanding and resentment, the stakes are high on both sides, and geopolitics are just <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2022.2029239">one side of the story</a>.</p>
<h2>False starts and missed opportunities</h2>
<p>To seize any geopolitical window of opportunity, US policymakers must overcome serious domestic obstacles. Public enmity towards Iran has proved <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/116236/iran.aspx">remarkably durable</a> in the US – partly due to pressure from powerful interest groups, including the <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v28/n06/john-mearsheimer/the-israel-lobby">pro-Israel lobby</a>. As one former official <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2022.2029239">put it</a>: “From a political standpoint, nobody pays a price to be tough on Iran.”</p>
<p>Time and again, presidents have sought to engage constructively (if tentatively) with Iran in their first year, only for political forces – including the simple need to win elections – to extinguish hopes of establishing a lasting rapprochement.</p>
<p>Biden need look no further than his experience in the Obama administration for a cautionary tale. Obama came into office committed to easing four decades of mistrust. This was part of a broader effort to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/us/politics/12prexy.html">“reset” US policy in the Middle East</a>. </p>
<p>A series of gestures were initiated, including a conciliatory <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HY_utC-hrjI.">statement</a> marking the Iranian New Year and a private exchange of letters with Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, expressing interest in dialogue. But under pressure from the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu – and with sanctions legislation gaining traction in Congress – the White House switched track, instead embracing an open-ended policy of economic coercion for the remainder of Obama’s first term. “Opposing sanctions might have been good policy,” policymakers privately <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2022.2029239">conceded</a>, “but it was bad politics.”</p>
<p>The crucial diplomatic breakthroughs leading to the JCPOA came during Obama’s second term. Only after the president was safely re-elected was he able and willing to absorb the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/25/iran-nuclear-deal-congress-fight-looms">ferocious</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-israel.html">backlash</a> from political opponents that followed.</p>
<h2>A decisive moment</h2>
<p>In Vienna, time is running out to save the 2015 nuclear deal. With talks reaching a “<a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/us-nuclear-talks-iran-decisive-moment-82374261">decisive moment</a>”, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-mary-louise-kelley-of-nprs-all-things-considered/">has warned that</a> the US is willing to consider ramping up pressure on Iran if no breakthrough is reached within “a few weeks”. But for Iran, any successful deal must include the removal of punitive US sanctions.</p>
<p>As pressure from Congress increases and Biden’s domestic political standing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/10/bidens-approval-rating-continues-erode-including-with-vital-parts-his-base/">continues to weaken</a>, with <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-things-to-know-about-why-russia-might-invade-ukraine-and-why-the-us-is-involved-175371">other issues</a> crowding the security agenda, the current administration’s best chance of resolving 40 years of enmity hangs in the balance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177094/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To revive the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, Biden must face down his political opponents in the US.Andrew Payne, Hedley Bull Research Fellow in International Relations, University of OxfordLouise Fawcett, Professor of International Relations, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1657742021-08-10T13:18:30Z2021-08-10T13:18:30ZIran nuclear capability is more likely bluff than bombs<p>The likelihood of Iran imminently developing a nuclear arsenal has been the subject of a great deal of speculation recently after Israeli defence minister, Benny Gantz, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gantz-iran-10-weeks-away-from-amassing-enough-material-for-nuke/">told the UN Security Council on August 4</a> that “Iran … is only around ten weeks away from acquiring weapons-grade materials necessary for a nuclear weapon”. </p>
<p>“Now is the time for deeds – words are not enough,” he said, adding: “The Iranian regime is threatening us and sparking a regional arms race.”</p>
<p>Gantz’s is not the first such warning about the imminent prospect of an Iranian nuclear capability. Antony Blinken, in his first official interview as US secretary of state in February 2021, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-breakout-time-will-fall-weeks-if-not-constrained-blinken-2021-06-07/">claimed that</a> Iran was “months” away from building a nuclear bomb. He forecast that if all the restraints of the nuclear deal were abandoned, it could have enough fissile material “within weeks”. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, the political aims that prompted Blinken’s stark warning were exactly the opposite of those of the Israeli government’s recent statement. The current warnings from the Israeli government are designed to put an end to nuclear negotiations. Iran itself appears to be <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/28/iran-biden-nuclear-deal-weapons-jcpoa-bluffing-enriched-uranium-stockpile-sanctions/">overstating its stockpiles</a> of fissile materials in order to pressure the US.</p>
<p>For the incoming Biden administration, the potential for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons constituted one of the key issues in the geopolitics of the Middle East. Improving relations with Iran was an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/world/middleeast/iran-biden-trump-nuclear-sanctions.html">important foreign policy</a> goal on Biden’s election platform. In this context, to find a path to return to the “nuclear deal” (JCPOA) with Iran has been an important priority. </p>
<p>For the Biden administration, the only path to effectively prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb is a return to an enhanced nuclear agreement with Iran. The Iranian government tried to <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran">set conditions</a> for a return to negotiations, such as the lifting of sanctions. The Biden administration, however, not only refused to relax the Trump policy of “maximum pressure”, but <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-forces-launch-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-militias-n1272489">launched airstrikes</a> against Iranian militias in Syria.</p>
<p>Negotiations involving the signatories of the original nuclear deal (the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-historic-deal-for-iran-and-the-world-44641">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a>, or JCPOA) were conducted in Geneva and, in six rounds of negotiations, a great deal of progress was made, resulting in four different texts involving 1,520 pages of agreement. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-historic-deal-for-iran-and-the-world-44641">A historic deal for Iran and the world</a>
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<p>But negotiations have stalled after <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-election-what-ebrahim-raisis-victory-will-mean-for-his-country-and-the-rest-of-the-world-163106">Raisi’s election in June 2021</a>. Iran <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/iran-warns-un-nuclear-agency-over-enrichment-plans/a-58181744">has since reported</a> further departures from the agreement. Talks are now stalled as Iran insists on guarantees that the US will not abandon the agreement in future.</p>
<h2>A developing threat?</h2>
<p>But how valid are the concerns about <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/sites/default/files/files/documents/BuildingNuclearWeapons.pdf">Iran’s progress in nuclear technology</a>? There is no evidence that Iran has enriched material to the point of 90% – the level needed for nuclear explosive devices. Independent analysts believe that Iran is not in a crash programme to develop nukes and that, thus far, the enrichment has been a pressure tool for political and economic concessions. </p>
<p>That may be changing, however. According <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-iaea-uranium-nuclear-deal/31283165.html">to the IAEA</a> Iran has 62.8 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20% purity and 2.4 kilograms enriched to 63% purity. But there are many other steps in constructing a nuclear device beyond accumulating fissile material.</p>
<p>Iran has indicated that it may build a plant to forge uranium into metal, something that <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-nuclear-program-11610564572">would be needed</a> to build a core for a weapon. Deploying the nuclear fuel in a weapon presents <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/sites/default/files/files/documents/BuildingNuclearWeapons.pdf">technical challenges</a>, many of which Iran isn’t believed to have mastered. Detonating the weapon requires a fission reaction. The nuclear payload must be attached to a missile, and the payload must be able to withstand reentry through Earth’s atmosphere as it descends to its target.</p>
<p>The recent warnings are nothing new. In 2015, before the implementation of the JCPOA, a Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control report by directors, Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin, used IAEA data <a href="https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/irans-nuclear-timetable">to claim</a> that Iran could produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear warhead within 1.7 months. It is possible that Iran’s goal is to maintain a state of “<a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/06/why-iran-may-be-in-no-hurry-to-get-nuclear-weapons.html">nuclear latency</a>”, which means having a capability without fully developing it to the point of assembling nuclear warheads. This is what former CIA chief Leon Panetta <a href="https://www.niacouncil.org/niac-round-up/iran-news-roundup-0109/">has argued</a>.</p>
<h2>Changing the balance</h2>
<p>Full nuclear status would in principle give Iran a significant deterrent against attack, but could have undesirable consequences. Leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would also curtail the existing nuclear cooperation with Russia on which Iran <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-29/iran-says-sanctions-could-force-shutdown-of-nuclear-power-plant">relies for its Bushehr power plant</a> because Russia would otherwise violate the NPT. </p>
<p>Iran is involved in military conflict with at least two nuclear powers (Israel and the US) in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and at sea. But it limits escalation by relying on proxies and avoiding over confrontation with its adversaries. While the US has been involved both on the side of Israel and Saudi Arabia in regional conflicts, Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could have the consequence of reducing the restraints on the side of it’s adversaries, in particular Israel and the US.</p>
<p>Also, it could set up a spiral of escalation if regional players such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia no longer believe they can rely on an extended deterrence from the US and decide to develop their own nuclear arsenals. </p>
<p>A status of nuclear ambiguity based on a latent capability gives Iran strategic advantages by both establishing coercive power while limiting the response. At the same time, it can be used to obtain economic and political concessions – which is what Iran seeks in the nuclear negotiations. The US is only prepared to go so far in its concessions to Iran but at the same time sees an agreement as the only effective means to constrain Iran’s nuclear programme. This is why a return to a modified JCPOA remains the most likely outcome in the near term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US and Israel are warning that Iran could build a nuclear bomb very soon. But is it that simple?Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1628352021-06-17T19:58:19Z2021-06-17T19:58:19ZConservative hard-liner elected as Iran’s next president – what that means for the West and the nuclear deal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407109/original/file-20210617-19-rurnrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C0%2C4000%2C2652&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ebrahim Raisi, seen here during a 2017 rally, is expected to win Iran's presidential election.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Iran/0ac72fd2552e431d81abf5a4ff94e9df/photo?Query=iran%20AND%20raisi&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=204&currentItemNo=100">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/world/middleeast/iran-election-khamenei-raisi.html">Iran’s conservative rulers’ effort to orchestrate</a> the outcome of the June 18 presidential election triggered a voter boycott – but the result may still bode well for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/09/world/middleeast/biden-iran-nuclear.htm">ongoing negotiations over the lapsed 2015 nuclear deal</a>. </p>
<p>Iran’s Interior Ministry on June 19 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/19/world/middleeast/iran-election-president-raisi.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage">announced that the winner</a> is Ebrahim Raisi, chief of Iran’s judiciary and close ally of the supreme leader. He was all but assured of victory after the candidates who could have posed a serious challenge to him – including three reformists – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/world/middleeast/iran-election-khamenei-raisi.html">were disqualified</a> and prevented from participating in the election.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/council-of-despair-irans-uncompetitive-presidential-election/">unprecedented</a> disqualifications <a href="https://www.iranfocus.com/en/iran-general/47115-apathy-in-presidential-election-is-not-because-of-disqualifications-iranian-officials-say/">outraged</a> large groups of liberal and moderate voters, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-iranians-wont-vote-new-survey-reveals-massive-political-disenchantment-162374">many boycotted the election</a>. As a result, the turnout <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-iran-judiciary-4d60554fd608a5dea2c76a303ec352d8">was just 49%</a>. </p>
<p>But who is Ebrahim Raisi, and how will his presidency alter Iran’s domestic and foreign policies? As an <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ErTIYroAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">economist and close observer of Iran</a>, I believe we can start to answer these questions by exploring his past.</p>
<h2>Loyal insider</h2>
<p>Raisi is a loyal regime insider with a long career in Iran’s judicial branch, which goes back <a href="https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/ebrahim-raisi-chief-justice-of-iran">more than four decades</a>.</p>
<p>He was only 19 when the <a href="https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/ebrahim-raisi-chief-justice-of-iran">Islamic revolution</a> deposed the shah in 1979. As a young Islamic activist, he caught the attention of several top revolutionary clerics, including Ali Khamenei, who became Iran’s <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/supreme-leader">supreme leader</a> a decade later. </p>
<p>Named the general-prosecutor of Kataj – a small city near Tehran – at age 20, Raisi quickly rose to more prominent positions. In 1989, when Khamenei replaced Ruhollah Khomeini as supreme leader, Raisi was promoted to chief prosecutor-general of Tehran.</p>
<p>This promotion reflected the <a href="https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/ebrahim-raisi-chief-justice-of-iran">high level</a> of trust that Khamenei had in him. While serving in these positions, Raisi also attended seminary and religious studies under Khamenei and other influential religious leaders.</p>
<h2>Executing dissidents and fighting corruption</h2>
<p>During the first decade of his career, Raisi convicted a large number of dissidents and political opponents of the Islamic regime and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ali-khamenei-donald-trump-ap-top-news-elections-judiciary-ee0e777abf19424281c363ef1978ac7f">sentenced many of them to death</a>. </p>
<p>Regime critics and his political opponents <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/2021/06/iran-election-dont-ignore-ebrahim-raisis-gross-rights-violations/">have condemned</a> his direct role in these executions, particularly the large number of political prisoners who were executed in 1988.</p>
<p>From 1994 to 2004, Raisi served as head of Iran’s general inspector office, which is responsible for preventing abuse of power and corruption in government institutions. It was in this position that he developed a <a href="https://www.fr24news.com/a/2021/06/iranian-ultra-conservative-raisi-favorite-in-anti-graft-polls.html">reputation as a crusader against government corruption</a>. Even as he was appointed as the first deputy chief justice in 2004 and finally promoted to chief justice in March 2019, he continued his fight <a href="https://lobelog.com/irans-goals-in-the-fight-against-economic-corruption/">against corruption</a> by prosecuting many government officials. </p>
<p>His critics have argued, however, that his fight against corruption has been highly <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/fighting-corruption-or-just-more-political-infighting-in-iran/">politicized and selective</a>. They claimed that he targeted individuals who were affiliated with his political rivals such as President Hassan Rouhani.</p>
<p>Raisi first ran for president in 2017 but <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/20/hassan-rouhani-wins-irans-presidential-election">was defeated</a> by Iran’s current President Hassan Rouhani, who after two terms is ineligible to run again.</p>
<p>In this year’s election, Raisi was the favorite candidate of the conservative right wing of the Islamic ruling elite and also enjoys the support of Ayatollah Khamenei, who has absolute power over all branches of government. Khamenei also directly appoints half of the 12-member <a href="https://irandataportal.syr.edu/the-guardian-council">Council of Guardians</a>, which oversees all political elections and has the power to disqualify candidates without any public explanation. Khamenei <a href="https://iranintl.com/en/iran/khamenei-defends-disqualification-key-presidential-candidates">publicly endorsed and defended the disqualifications</a>.</p>
<h2>Likely return to the nuclear deal</h2>
<p>One of the institutional weaknesses of Iran’s political system since the 1979 Islamic revolution is the potential for tension and disagreement between the elected presidents and the supreme leader.</p>
<p>That is, unlike in the U.S. system of government, the <a href="https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/02/The-Relationship-Between-the-Supreme-Leadership-and-Presidency-and-Its-Impact-on-the-Political-System-in-Iran-rasanah.pdf">Iranian president’s powers are extremely limited</a>. For example, a reformist president may want to engage more with the West or stay out of a foreign conflict, but the supreme leader could overrule or simply ignore him.</p>
<p>As a protege and close ally of the supreme leader, Raisi is expected to support Khamenei’s policies on both domestic and foreign policy – which means more coordination between the various branches of government. With the Parliament also dominated by Khamenei supporters, it also means that the conservatives will control all three branches of the government once again after eight years.</p>
<p>This harmony means Raisi will be a lot more effective as president because whatever policies he pursues will most likely be supported by the supreme leader. </p>
<p>And perhaps ironically, his victory could pave the way for a more compromising attitude on the side of Iran in the negotiations that are currently underway in Vienna for restoration of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal">2015 nuclear agreement</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">which was derailed</a> by former U.S. President Donald Trump in 2018. </p>
<p>The reason for this unconventional prediction is that both reformist and conservative factions in Iran are fully aware that a new nuclear agreement, which could end the severe economic sanctions imposed on the country, is <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/1623526450-iran-s-leading-presidential-candidate-voices-support-for-nuclear-deal">highly popular</a>. The team that signs the agreement will receive credit for ending the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/23/these-6-charts-show-how-sanctions-are-crushing-irans-economy.html">economic hardship</a> the country is currently enduring. For example, <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi">inflation is over 50%</a>, exports have plunged due to the sanctions and <a href="https://iranintl.com/en/iran/poverty-grows-iran-some-suggest-redistribution-wealth-taxation">over 60% of the population is now in poverty</a>, up from 48% just two years ago.</p>
<p>With Raisi president, the conservatives and the supreme leader have greater incentives to reach an agreement with the United States for lifting the sanctions as they can no longer blame a reformist president for the economic hardships.</p>
<p>The success of this strategy, however, is far from guaranteed.</p>
<p>First, if Khamenei, Raisi and their hard-line supporters insist on maintaining Iran’s <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/20/prospects-for-change-in-iranian-foreign-policy-pub-75569">confrontational foreign policy</a>, it seems unlikely to me that the economic sanctions against Iran will ease. Not all of them are tied directly to the nuclear deal, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/front-runner-iran-presidency-is-hardline-judge-sanctioned-by-us-2021-06-15/">sanctions against Raisi himself</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the growing alienation and frustration of large segments of Iran’s population – especially after reformists were banned from running for president – may still lead to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/01/latest-irans-evolving-protests">mass unrest</a> and political instability. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An Iranian woman holds out her hand, which has the name 'Raisi' on it written in Persian script" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian woman shows her support for Raisi by writing his name, in Persian, on her hand.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXIranElections/0318ab4f5253434582aed21829149655/photo?Query=iran%20AND%20president&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=12133&currentItemNo=12">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Supreme Leader Raisi?</h2>
<p>Raisi’s victory may have an even more significant impact on Iran’s politics in the long run because it might pave the way for him to become Iran’s next supreme leader. </p>
<p>Ayatollah Khamenei is in his 80s, and a succession to a new supreme leader is considered probable in the next four years. According to many regime insiders, Raisi became <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55257059">the most likely</a> person to replace Khamenei by winning the presidential election. </p>
<p>If Raisi eventually becomes Iran’s supreme leader, he would have far more powers to shape all types of policies. Based on his background and values, he is likely to resist political and social reforms and try to gain legitimacy for the Islamic regime by focusing on economic development in <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/06/irans-hard-liners-take-page-chinas-election-playbook">a similar fashion</a> to the authoritarian regimes in Asia, such as China, by focusing on economic growth while curtailing political and social freedoms. </p>
<p>Raisi – and eventually as the supreme leader – is unlikely to abandon Iran’s anti-Western foreign policy, but he has the potential to lower the tensions to a more manageable level in order to improve Iran’s economy.</p>
<p>In my view, he seems to have recognized that the continuation of current economic hardships poses the largest threat to the Islamic regime in the long run.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ebrahim Raisi was declared the winner of Iran’s June 18 presidential election, which critics called rigged after his top opponents were disqualified.Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1530112021-01-13T14:26:05Z2021-01-13T14:26:05ZIran: US policy of ‘maximum pressure’ has failed – why the west needs to re-engage Tehran<p>Amid all the sound and fury accompanying US domestic politics – and particularly the recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/01/06/us/washington-dc-protests">attack on the Capitol</a> in Washington, two developments in the Persian Gulf have highlighted one of the major foreign policy issues facing president-elect, Joe Biden, when he takes office on January 20: how to deal with Iran.</p>
<p>The Pentagon’s recent <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/07/politics/us-b52-bombers-iran-deterrence/index.html">deployment</a> of two additional B-52 bombers to the Persian Gulf on January 7 was followed a day later by the inauguration by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard of a <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-unveils-underground-strategic-missile-base-on-shores-of-persian-gulf/">new strategic missile base</a> capable of “resisting against enemies’ electronic warfare equipment”.</p>
<p>The insistence of US foreign policy officials that Iran is an <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-15/americas-great-satan">implacable foe</a> is of course not new: as former State Department and National Security Council officials David Benjamin and Steven Simon <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-15/americas-great-satan">point out</a>, successive post-Cold War national security strategies have consistently depicted Iran, above all others, as the archetypal enemy.</p>
<p>As such, policymakers have consistently implemented strategies entailing stringent unilateral sanctions, diplomatic isolation and belligerent rhetoric in order to curb its behaviour, but perhaps more broadly, as part of a wider quest for regime change.</p>
<p>Most recently, we have seen this through Donald Trump’s “<a href="https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/trump-applies-more-maximum-pressure-iran">maximum pressure</a>”, which Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insists is about helping the Iranian people “<a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-mike-pompeo-talks-with-michael-morell-on-intelligence-matters/">change course</a>”.</p>
<p>By equating the threat posed by Iran to that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the United States continues <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/10/world/middleeast/bombers-iran-deterrence.html">to waste</a> superfluous material resource and diplomatic capital which could otherwise be expended on more salient foreign policy issues.</p>
<p>Over the past few decades, Iran has proved its capacity to survive intense diplomatic and economic strangulation. So why does Washington still insist on wasteful, expensive measures in the hope of breaking the theocracy? The policies it has chosen and continues to choose are curious, not because of unconventionality, but because they persist despite repeated failures.</p>
<h2>Maximum pressure, minimal gain</h2>
<p>Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – better known as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 (the UN Security Counucil’s five permanent members plus China) – rested on the <a href="https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/after-the-deal-new-iran-strategy">assumption</a> that the agreement “failed to guarantee the safety of the American people from the risks created by the leaders of the Islamic Republic”. </p>
<p>Instead, Trump’s maximum pressure campaign aimed to force Iran to the negotiating table as it faced the risk of going bankrupt or capitulating to <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/trumps-maximum-pressure-strategy-against-iran-isnt-working-its-time-change-105057">Washington’s demands</a>. Unfortunately, this assumption also refused to acknowledge Iran’s ability to resist sanctions measures and retaliate with pressures of its own.</p>
<p>Iran’s answer to Trump comes in the form of <a href="https://www.mei.edu/blog/us-maximum-pressure-and-iranian-maximum-resistance-will-come-head-2020">maximum resistance</a>. Leadership in Tehran is swayed by the idea that regional escalation and nuclear non-compliance are more profitable than compliance and restraint. Rather than render itself bankrupt, Iran has sought to capture America’s attention with new military escalations, managing the threat to oil flow in the Gulf and gradually moving away from the JCPOA by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-55530366">resuming uranium enrichment</a>.</p>
<p>Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei, has stated that the solution to western pressure was to develop an “economy of resistance” to lessen the country’s reliance on oil revenues. While this has not protected Iran from external shocks such as oil price fluctuations and sanctions, the country’s economy has made <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09700161.2020.1841099?needAccess=true">some modest gains</a>. Production of steel, aluminium, copper and electricity has hugely expanded. Iranian tactics aim to promote self-reliance – in a nutshell, it’s business as usual.</p>
<p>Not only has Trump’s strategy failed to bring Iran to the negotiating table, the Pentagon’s deployment of nearly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-usa-middleeast/pentagon-to-deploy-thousands-of-additional-troops-to-middle-east-idUSKBN1Z21U4?edition-redirect=uk">3,000 additional troops</a> to the region as well as an <a href="https://quincyinst.org/2020/12/31/iran-attack-may-be-next-in-trumps-farewell-bag-of-tricks/">extra squadron</a> of fighter planes to Saudi Arabia puts American personnel at risk. </p>
<p>Tehran continues to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-admin-warns-iraq-it-plans-shut-u-s-embassy-n1241226">launch attacks</a> on American diplomatic missions and Iraqi military bases, as seen in the Iranian-backed militia’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iraq-security/rockets-fired-at-u-s-embassy-land-inside-baghdads-green-zone-damaging-compound-idUKKBN28U0PY?edition-redirect=uk">rocket attack</a> on the US embassy compound in Baghdad in December. It is precisely this that makes Iran a threat to the United States.</p>
<h2>Time for a sensible policy shift</h2>
<p>Washington risks standing alone in its view that Iran is an irrational “rogue” state and it’s increasingly evident that many of America’s allies – namely those in Europe – are unhappy about unilateral action from the US. There is a growing sense that America is seen as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/world/europe/war-iran-europe-iraq.html">the provocateur</a> and they rightly worry that its strident reactions could provide a pretext for unnecessary conflict.</p>
<p>This deeply rooted mantra that Iran poses an existential threat to international security is one that must be firmly hauled out. Washington must seek to engage Tehran through rigorous multilateral diplomacy by rejoining the JCPOA in exchange for sanctions relief so as not to damage the relationship or destabilise the region even more. It must work collaboratively on areas of mutual interest such as regional crises in Syria and Yemen as well as the threat posed by ISIS. Iran must also be engaged on transnational issues such as climate change, public health and disease surveillance.</p>
<p>The future path of US-Iranian relations will not be a linear process, and obstacles will persist, but a gradual transition to a more cooperative relationship would almost certainly better serve US <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-new-strategy-for-us-iran-relations-in-transition/">interests</a>. While Iranian actions currently demonstrate a clear breach of the nuclear deal, this is only a reminder of what will likely be the new trajectory if the JCPOA is not restored.</p>
<p>This is not to say that all fears are unjustified or that all threats foster irrationality, but overreactions to insignificant threats more often than not result in serious strategic consequences.</p>
<p>The recent turmoil in Washington demonstrates that perhaps the most prominent threat to the United States is closer to home than we think. It’s time to start thinking about contemporary global challenges without using archaic paradigms of the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153011/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ellis Mallett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>America’s hardline policy towards Iran has failed. The incoming US president has an opportunity to change course.Ellis Mallett, Doctoral Researcher in International Relations, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1503192020-11-18T16:05:51Z2020-11-18T16:05:51ZWhy US air strikes against Iran’s nuclear programme would make matters worse<p>Donald Trump asked his senior advisers to examine options for air strikes against Iran’s main nuclear installation, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/16/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear.html">New York Times reported</a> recently. According to the report, the meeting occurred the day after inspectors reported a significant increase in the country’s stockpile of nuclear material. Key advisers reportedly counselled against this course of action, warning of the possibility of rapid escalation into a regional conflict.</p>
<p>This situation is of the Trump administration’s making. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-historic-deal-for-iran-and-the-world-44641">Iran nuclear deal</a> (formally the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan) was the result of extensive negotiations, as Iran’s violations of its commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty had become apparent. Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities were severely restricted for ten years, and it gave up its entire stockpile of medium-enriched uranium as well 98% of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-historic-deal-for-iran-and-the-world-44641">A historic deal for Iran and the world</a>
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<p>On May 8 2018, the Trump Administration <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">announced its withdrawal</a> from the JCPOA and imposed sanctions. As Iran was and for some time remained in compliance with the nuclear deal, there was nothing to achieve with sanctions directed at the ballistic missile programme and Iran’s military actions and subversion abroad. Iran kept to its restrictions until July 2019, but after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/qassem-soleimani-air-strike-why-this-is-a-dangerous-escalation-of-us-assassination-policy-129300">killing of General Qassem Soleimani</a> by the Trump administration in January 2020, the country announced its rejection of all limitations on its nuclear programme. </p>
<p>However, this doesn’t mean that Iran will build a nuclear weapon. It remains committed to being a non-nuclear state under the non-proliferation treaty, and going nuclear has all kinds of repercussions, including the loss of any technology cooperation with Russia, any access to the international uranium market and making Iran an explicit target for US and Israeli nuclear capabilities.</p>
<p>Other states might react by also going nuclear, and if Saudi Arabia decides it cannot rely on the protection of the United States, it could develop its own weapons which would set off a spiral of nuclear proliferation. For all of these reasons, Iran is likely to remain in the NPT.</p>
<h2>No to military intervention</h2>
<p>The risks of military action against Iran are high, as Trump’s advisers pointed out to him. There is no basis in international law to use military force against a country just because it has a nuclear programme. There is no prospect that the UN Security Council would approve military action against Iran. And for the United States to engage in yet another military intervention that is likely to be widely interpreted to defy international law will have wide-ranging consequences for the position of the US and the international system as a whole.</p>
<p>If Iran chooses to leave the NPT, there would be no legal instruments available to censure Iran and there would be no international support for the use of force. Trump is not the first US president to explore the use of military action against Iran’s nuclear programme, but the military leadership has always been clear that airpower alone is unlikely achieve the objective. It may well be that the main purpose of Trump’s idea for a military attack is to prevent a Biden administration from reactivating the nuclear deal.</p>
<p>While air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities may delay the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, they will not prevent it. Iran’s nuclear programme cannot be stopped if Tehran is determined to go nuclear, short of a major invasion and regime change. Not only would such an action be disproportionate, but the United States government under any administration will lack the political capital for such an undertaking.</p>
<p>By describing a nuclear-armed Iran as an absolute threat that cannot be tolerated, the political elite in the US is digging a dangerous trap for itself, given that it lacks the instruments to deal with this threat effectively. The underlying cause of the strategic conflict between the United States and Iran is the nature of the regime, the oppression of its citizens and its aggressive foreign policy (involving the use of terrorism). In other words, it is about domestic governance and the illicit use of force to further political objectives. </p>
<p>While the US is justified in maintaining robust power projection capabilities, the strategic objective of US policy must be to induce Iran to act within the rule of law both domestically and in its foreign policy, which entails abandoning the use of military threats and terrorism as tools of diplomacy.</p>
<p>The strategic conflict with Iran is a long and complex game that requires patience and determination. The nuclear issue is only one and by no means the most significant element. But Washington needs to rely on the tools of soft power unless there is really no other choice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150319/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new US administration needs to rejoin the nuclear deal and engage in statecraft to improve relations with Tehran.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1298442020-01-16T18:38:26Z2020-01-16T18:38:26ZUS and Iran have a long, troubled history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310315/original/file-20200115-134764-71x1uk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C233%2C6490%2C2841&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/american-flag-iranian-political-map-shape-1610522878">Benny Marty/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Relations between the United States and Iran have been fraught for decades – at least since the U.S. helped overthrow a democracy-minded prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, in August 1953. The U.S. then supported the long, repressive reign of the shah of Iran, whose security services brutalized Iranian citizens for decades.</p>
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<p>The two countries have been particularly hostile to each other since Iranian students took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, resulting in, among other consequences, <a href="https://www.state.gov/iran-sanctions/">economic sanctions</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-countries-in-conflict-like-iran-and-the-us-still-talk-to-each-other-129591">severing of formal diplomatic relations</a> between the nations. Since 1984, the U.S. State Department has listed Iran as a “<a href="https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/">state sponsor of terrorism</a>,” alleging the Iranian government provides terrorists with <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm">training, money and weapons</a>. </p>
<p>Some of the major events in U.S.-Iran relations highlight the differences between the nations’ views, but others arguably presented real opportunities for reconciliation.</p>
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<h2>1953: US overthows Mossadegh</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mohammed Mossadegh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mohammed_Mossadegh_in_middle_age.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1951, the Iranian Parliament chose a new prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, who then led lawmakers to vote in favor of <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bp-and-iran-the-forgotten-history">taking over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company</a>, expelling the company’s British owners and saying they wanted to turn oil profits into investments in the Iranian people. The U.S. feared disruption in the global oil supply and worried about Iran falling prey to Soviet influence. The British feared the loss of cheap Iranian oil. </p>
<p>Unable to settle the dispute, President Dwight Eisenhower decided it was best for the U.S. and the U.K. to get rid of Mossadegh. Operation Ajax, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/16/world/secrets-history-cia-iran-special-report-plot-convulsed-iran-53-79.html">a joint CIA-British operation</a>, convinced the shah of Iran, the country’s monarch, to dismiss Mossadegh and drive him from office by force. Mossadegh was replaced by a much more Western-friendly prime minister, <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html?_r=0">hand-picked by the CIA</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators in Tehran demand the establishment of an Islamic Republic.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-Associated-Press-International-News-IRAN-/7598c27645984aa982d79f639e2b9986/18/0">AP Photo/Saris</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1979: Revolutionaries oust the shah, take hostages</h2>
<p>After <a href="https://www.theperspective.com/subjective-timeline/politics/us-iran-relations-ww2-hostage-crisis/">more than 25 years</a> of relative stability in U.S.-Iran relations, the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-politics-revolution/29752729.html">Iranian public had grown unhappy</a> with the social and economic conditions that developed under the dictatorial rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. </p>
<p>Pahlavi enriched himself and used American aid to fund the military while many Iranians lived in poverty. Dissent was often violently quashed by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/05/09/savak-a-feared-and-pervasive-force/ad609959-d47b-4b7f-8c8d-b388116df90c/">SAVAK, the shah’s security service</a>. In January 1979, <a href="https://apnews.com/343d87fdb960424e9ec0f4a90dc64fcb">the shah left Iran</a>, ostensibly to seek cancer treatment. <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ayatollah-khomeini-returns-to-iran">Two weeks later, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from exile</a> in Iraq and led a drive to abolish the monarchy and proclaim an Islamic government.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian students at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran show a blindfolded American hostage to the crowd in November 1979.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Iran-Hostage-Crisis-Timeline/298028f123e3417bad960911275bd097/41/0">AP Photo, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In October 1979, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/17/magazine/why-carter-admitted-the-shah.html">President Jimmy Carter agreed to allow the shah</a> to come to the U.S. to seek advanced medical treatment. Outraged Iranian students <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/11/05/archives/teheran-students-seize-us-embassy-and-hold-hostages-ask-shahs.html">stormed the U.S. Embassy</a> in Tehran on Nov. 4, taking 52 Americans hostage. That convinced Carter to sever U.S. diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980. </p>
<p>Two weeks later, the U.S. military launched a mission to rescue the hostages, but <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/">it failed, with aircraft crashes in the Iranian desert</a> killing eight U.S. servicemembers.</p>
<p>The shah died in Egypt in July 1980, but the hostages weren’t released until Jan. 20, 1981, after 444 days of captivity. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian cleric, left, and an Iranian soldier wear gas masks to protect themselves against Iraqi chemical-weapons attacks in May 1988.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-iranian-clergyman-wearing-a-turban-and-gas-mask-stands-news-photo/104045722">Kaveh Kazemi/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1980-1988: US tacitly sides with Iraq</h2>
<p>In September 1980, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm">Iraq invaded Iran</a>, an escalation of the two countries’ regional rivalry and religious differences: Iraq was governed by Sunni Muslims but had a Shia Muslim majority population; <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/18/the-sunni-shia-divide-where-they-live-what-they-believe-and-how-they-view-each-other/">Iran was led and populated mostly by Shiites</a>. </p>
<p>The U.S. was concerned that the conflict would limit the flow of Middle Eastern oil and wanted to ensure the conflict didn’t affect its close ally, Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/">supported Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein</a> in his fight against the anti-American Iranian regime. As a result, the U.S. mostly turned a blind eye toward Iraq’s <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq24.pdf">“almost daily” use of chemical weapons</a> against Iran. </p>
<p>U.S. officials moderated their usual opposition to those illegal and inhumane weapons because the U.S. State Department did not “<a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq25.pdf">wish to play into Iran’s hands</a> by fueling its propaganda against Iraq.” In 1988, <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/iran-iraq-war">the war ended in a stalemate</a>, with a combined total of more than 500,000 military deaths and 100,000 civilians dead on both sides.</p>
<h2>1981-1986: US secretly sells weapons to Iran</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=860&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=860&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=860&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1080&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1080&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1080&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lt. Col. Oliver North is sworn in to testify before Congress about a U.S. deal to sell weapons to Iran, in breach of an embargo, and use the money to support rebels in Nicaragua.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-AP-A-DC-USA-APHS-Iran-Contra-North/6873ba10cf0d45d6ac31f6063ad350d0/90/0">AP Photo/Lana Harris</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf">imposed an arms embargo</a> after Iran was designated a state sponsor terrorism in 1984. That left the Iranian military, in the middle of its war with Iraq, desperate for weapons and aircraft and vehicle parts to keep fighting. </p>
<p>The Reagan administration <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/08/world/iran-pipeline-hidden-chapter-special-report-us-said-have-allowed-israel-sell.html">decided that the embargo would likely push Iran</a> to seek support from the Soviet Union, the U.S.’s rival in the Cold War. Rather than formally ending the embargo, U.S. officials agreed to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/08/world/iran-pipeline-hidden-chapter-special-report-us-said-have-allowed-israel-sell.html">secretly sell weapons to Iran</a> starting in 1981. Later, the transactions were justified as incentives to help Iran persuade militants to release <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/arms-for-hostages-plain-and-simple.html">U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon</a>. </p>
<p>The last shipment, of anti-tank missiles, was in October 1986. In November of that year, a Lebanese magazine exposed the deal. That revelation sparked the Iran-Contra scandal in the U.S., in which Reagan’s officials were found to have collected money from Iran for the weapons, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/10/world/iran-contra-hearings-boland-amendments-what-they-provided.html">illegally sent those funds to anti-socialist rebels</a> – the Contras – in Nicaragua.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">At a mass funeral for 76 of the 290 people killed in the shootdown of Iran Air 655, mourners hold up a sign depicting the incident.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-AP-I-IRN-APHS166203-USS-Vincennes-Iran-A-/cb6c1e3b2e77457b97c5e10a9f225a81/7/0">AP Photo/CP/Mohammad Sayyad</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1988: US Navy shoots down Iran Air flight 655</h2>
<p>On the morning of July 8, 1988, the USS Vincennes, a guided missile cruiser patrolling in the international waters of the Persian Gulf, <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/07/the-vincennes-downing-of-iran-air-flight-655-the-united-states-tried-to-cover-up-its-own-destruction-of-a-passenger-plane.html">entered Iranian territorial waters</a> while in a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/10/middleeast/iran-air-flight-655-us-military-intl-hnk/index.html">skirmish with Iranian gunboats</a>. </p>
<p>Either during or just after that exchange of gunfire, the Vincennes crew mistook a passing civilian Airbus passenger jet for an Iranian F-14 fighter. They shot it down, killing all 290 people aboard. </p>
<p>The U.S. called it a “<a href="https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/VINCENNES%20INV.pdf">tragic and regrettable accident</a>,” but Iran believed the plane’s downing was intentional. In 1996, the U.S. agreed to pay US$131.8 million in compensation to Iran.</p>
<h2>1997-1998: The US seeks contact</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian President Mohammad Khatami.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/istanbul-turkey-november-12-iranian-reformist-276222344">Prometheus72/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In August 1997, a moderate reformer, Mohammad Khatami, won Iran’s presidential election. </p>
<p>U.S. President Bill Clinton sensed an opportunity for improved relations between the two countries. He <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iran/stories/iran010998.htm">sent a message to Tehran</a> through the Swiss ambassador there, proposing direct government-to-government talks. </p>
<p>Shortly thereafter, in early January 1998, Khatami gave an interview to CNN in which he expressed “<a href="http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html">respect for the great American people</a>,” denounced terrorism and recommended an “exchange of professors, writers, scholars, artists, journalists and tourists” between the United States and Iran. </p>
<p>However, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei didn’t agree, so not much came of the mutual overtures as Clinton’s time in office came to an end. In 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spoke to the U.S.-based American-Iranian Council and <a href="https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/2000/000317.html">acknowledged the government’s role in the 1953 ouster of Mossadegh</a>, but punctuated her remarks with criticism of Iranian domestic politics. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President George W. Bush delivers the 2002 State of the Union address.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:President_Bush_at_State_of_the_Union.jpg">Eric Draper/White House/Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm">2002 State of the Union address</a>, President George W. Bush characterized Iran, Iraq and North Korea as constituting an “Axis of Evil” supporting terrorism and pursuing weapons of mass destruction, straining relations even further.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=227&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=227&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=227&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Inside these buildings at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran, technicians enrich uranium.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Iran-IRAN-NUCLEAR/16101ec8c3e4da11af9f0014c2589dfb/139/0">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2002: Iran’s nuclear program raises alarm</h2>
<p>In August 2002, an exiled rebel group announced that <a href="https://www.iranwatch.org/library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/other-iaea-document/irans-nuclear-power-profile-iaea">Iran had been secretly working on nuclear weapons</a> at two installations that had not previously been publicly revealed. </p>
<p>That was a violation of the terms of <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nptfact">the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</a>, which Iran had signed, requiring countries to disclose their nuclear-related facilities to international inspectors. </p>
<p>One of those formerly secret locations, Natanz, housed centrifuges for enriching uranium, which could be used in civilian nuclear reactors or enriched further for weapons. </p>
<p>Starting in roughly 2005, U.S. and Israeli government cyberattackers together reportedly targeted the Natanz centrifuges with a custom-made piece of malicious software that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html">became known as Stuxnet</a>.</p>
<p>That effort, which <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Stuxnet-virus-set-back-Irans-nuclear-program-by-2-years">slowed down Iran’s nuclear program</a> was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html">one of many U.S. and international attempts</a> – mostly unsuccessful in the long term – to curtail Iran’s progress toward building a nuclear bomb.</p>
<h2>2003: Iran writes to Bush administration</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An excerpt of the document sent from Iran, via the Swiss government, to the U.S. State Department in 2003, appears to seek talks between the U.S. and Iran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.scribd.com/document/170613340/2003-US-Iran-Roadmap-proposal">Washington Post via Scribd</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In May 2003, senior Iranian officials <a href="http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00000467.htm">quietly contacted the State Department</a> through the Swiss embassy in Iran, seeking “a dialogue ‘in mutual respect,’” addressing four big issues: nuclear weapons, terrorism, Palestinian resistance and stability in Iraq.</p>
<p>Hardliners in the Bush administration <a href="https://archive.org/stream/ABCNews19781979/Libya-FT-1990-to-2007-c.txt">weren’t interested in any major reconciliation</a>, though Secretary of State Colin Powell favored dialogue and other officials had met with Iran about al-Qaida.</p>
<p>When Iranian hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran in 2005, the opportunity died. The following year, <a href="http://mideastweb.org/ahmadinejad_letter_to_bush.htm">Ahmadinejad made his own overture to Washington</a> in an 18-page letter to President Bush. The letter was widely dismissed; a senior State Department official told <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/cf/faculty-and-staff/faculty.cfm?pid=1006509">me</a> in profane terms that it amounted to nothing.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Representatives of several nations met in Vienna in July 2015 to finalize the Iran nuclear deal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/minoritenplatz8/19067069963/">Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs/Flickr</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2015: Iran nuclear deal signed</h2>
<p>After a decade of unsuccessful attempts to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Obama administration undertook a direct diplomatic approach beginning in 2013.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/world/middleeast/an-iran-nuclear-deal-built-on-coffee-all-nighters-and-compromise.html">Two years of secret, direct negotiations</a> initially bilaterally between the U.S. and Iran and later with other nuclear powers culminated in the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a>, commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear deal. </p>
<p>The deal was signed by Iran, the U.S., China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom in 2015. It severely limited Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium and mandated that <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance">international inspectors monitor and enforce Iran’s compliance</a> with the agreement. </p>
<p>In return, Iran was granted relief from international and U.S. economic sanctions. Though the inspectors regularly certified that Iran was abiding by the agreement’s terms, in May 2018 President Donald Trump withdrew the U.S. from the agreement.</p>
<h2>2020: US drones kill Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An official photo from the Iranian government shows Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a Jan. 3 drone strike ordered by President Trump.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/file-photo-dated-september-18-2016-shows-iranian-news-photo/1191356889">Iranian Supreme Leader Press Office/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On Jan. 3, 2020, on the orders of President Trump, an American drone fired a missile that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, leader of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/who-are-iran-s-secretive-quds-forces-n1110156">Iran’s elite Quds Force</a>, as he prepared to leave the Baghdad airport. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/qassem-soleimani-iran-elite-quds-force-leader-200103033905377.html">Soleimani is described</a> by analysts as the second most powerful man in Iran after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.</p>
<p>At the time, the Trump administration asserted that he was directing an imminent attack against U.S. assets in the region, but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/us/politics/trump-suleimani-explanations.html">officials have not provided clear evidence</a> to support that claim.</p>
<p>Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/world/middleeast/iran-fires-missiles-us.html">responded by launching ballistic missiles</a> that hit two American bases in Iraq. As Iran entered a heightened state of alert, preparing for a possible U.S. retaliation, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/world/middleeast/missile-iran-plane-crash.html">it accidentally shot down</a> a commercial Ukrainian airliner departing Tehran for Kyiv, killing all 176 people aboard.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Fields receives funding from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.</span></em></p>Some of the major events in US-Iran relations highlight the differences between the nations’ views, but others presented real opportunities for reconciliation.Jeffrey Fields, Associate Professor of the Practice of International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1294002020-01-15T13:54:11Z2020-01-15T13:54:11ZWhat Iranians think of the US and their own government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310036/original/file-20200114-151844-x97cln.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters during a demonstration in front of the British Embassy in Tehran, Iran on Jan. 12.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Iran-Plane-Crash/649e5ceebafd47e1aead7f237c80f1c8/7/0">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the Trump administration killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-killing-qasem-soleimani">with a drone strike</a> on Jan. 3, anti-American protests in Iran <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/qassem-soleimani-anti-us-protests-iran_n_5e0f5c0ce4b0843d36117117">subsequently spiked</a>, with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50991810">thousands mourning Soleimani’s passing</a>. </p>
<p>As someone who studies <a href="https://scholarship.richmond.edu/bookshelf/155/">the U.S. image and world opinion</a>, I am aware that this event is rapidly evolving, so it’s difficult to determine how things will settle. Polls aren’t yet available to reflect Iranians’ views on these recent incidents.</p>
<p>Good data are hard to come by, but <a href="https://www.iranpoll.com">IranPoll</a>, a Canadian-based polling company, sheds some light. IranPoll has focused on Iran exclusively for years and provides unique survey data, especially from <a href="https://cissm.umd.edu/research-impact/publications/iranian-public-opinion-under-maximum-pressure">surveys conducted from May to October 2019 of 1,000 Iranians</a>. </p>
<h2>Anti-Americanism</h2>
<p>Iranians have felt strongly antagonistic toward the United States in recent years. </p>
<p>Since President Donald Trump took office, unfavorability of the U.S. among Iranians steadily increased, from 71% in January 2016 to 86% in May 2019. </p>
<p>These findings overlap with Gallup’s Annual Global End of Year Survey. In 2017, <a href="http://www.gallup-international.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017_Global-Leaders.pdf">Gallup</a> reported that 81% of Iranians held unfavorable views toward Trump. </p>
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<p>America’s <a href="https://softpower30.com/what-is-soft-power/">soft power</a> – its ability to attract others to follow its example – is in a shambles among the Iranian public. </p>
<p>IranPoll compared survey data collected by <a href="https://www.zogbyanalytics.com">Zogby</a>, another polling firm, showing that Iranians have had a declining view of American values over the last 15 years. For example, two-thirds of respondents agreed in 2019 that “America is a dangerous country that seeks confrontation and control,” compared to just under half in 2005. </p>
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<h2>Shreds of the nuclear deal</h2>
<p>The United States withdrew from <a href="https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/">the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a>, better known as the Iran nuclear deal, back in May 2018. At that time, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/mike-pompeo-speech-12-demands-iran-180521151737787.html">12 conditions</a> that Iran would have to meet before America would consider going back to the bargaining table. </p>
<p>Iran hasn’t met these new restrictions, and has now <a href="http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Iran-scraps-limit-on-uranium-enrichment">withdrawn from the last restrictions</a> to which it agreed under the Obama administration. </p>
<p>So, is there any hope for support for the deal among the remaining signatories – Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, Russia and the European Union – to the agreement? Iranians don’t seem to think so. </p>
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<p>Although 61% of respondents were confident in 2016 that other countries besides the U.S. would “live up to their obligations toward the nuclear agreement,” this reversed after Trump scrapped the deal in 2018. As of October 2019, only 30% of Iranians were confident that other signatories would hold up their end of the bargain. </p>
<h2>Inside Iran</h2>
<p>U.S.-Iran relations are in turmoil. The stakes are quite high, given that the Iranian regime seems resolute now in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>But it’s not just the United States and Trump that Iranians have deep antipathy toward. Data shows that Iranians are ambivalent toward their own leadership.</p>
<p>On the one hand, the assassination of Soleimani <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/qassem-suleimani-killing-united-iran/">united Iranians</a> at a level not seen in decades. But after the Iranian government shot down a civilian plane, denied it, then finally admitted so, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/world/middleeast/iran-plane-crash-missile.html">public protests came out in force against the regime</a>. Following the momentum of the 2009 Green Movement, many youth in Iran <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-06-14/irans-green-movement-never-went-away">still desire more internal social reform</a>. </p>
<p>The gross domestic product per capita in Iran <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=IR">has fallen in recent years</a>, from about US$8,000 in 2012 to $5,265 in 2017. The average Iranian has felt the sting of economic sanctions and worries that the government is taking advantage of the situation through corrupt policies. </p>
<p>In an IranPoll in May 2019, 57% of respondents felt the economy was “run by a few big interests,” compared to just 31% who said that the economy was “run for all the people.” </p>
<p>Meanwhile, half of respondents feel that, compared to the last year, Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s efforts to fight economic corruption “remain unchanged” since last year. Another 19% feel Rouhani’s efforts have decreased.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Monti Datta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since President Donald Trump took office, Iranians have held a more unfavorable view of the US.Monti Datta, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of RichmondLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1293062020-01-06T18:30:51Z2020-01-06T18:30:51ZIn Iran showdown, conflict could explode quickly – and disastrously<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308656/original/file-20200106-123364-1k5psvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C0%2C1800%2C1199&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mourners at the funeral for Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani burn Israeli and U.S. flags.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-take-part-in-the-funeral-procession-of-irgc-quds-news-photo/1192142025">Hamid Vakili/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite the claims of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/jul/28/is-the-world-really-better-than-ever-the-new-optimists">optimists</a>, the odds that an international conflict will snowball into a bloody war haven’t gone down significantly since the end of World War II. Trump administration officials’ confidence that the present conflict with Iran can be managed could be dangerously misplaced.</p>
<p>Since a drone strike at Baghdad airport that killed a top Iranian general, Iranians have been <a href="https://twitter.com/Seamus_Malek/status/1213039666519166976">protesting in the streets</a> in massive numbers, and their country has <a href="https://apnews.com/e043255bd33ab318f71d1947716a5b94">pulled out of the 2015 deal</a> limiting its development of nuclear weapons. Iraq’s prime minister and Parliament have moved to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/iran-general-soleimani-iraq.html">kick the U.S. military out</a> of their country – troops who have in the meantime <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/01/05/us-suspends-training-iraqi-troops-to-focus-on-base-security/">stopped fighting the Islamic State group</a> and are instead focusing on keeping themselves safe.</p>
<p>Iran has vowed “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/baghdad-airport-strike-live-intl-hnk/h_996c3bed1255e7e3e30357771c7be380">harsh revenge</a>” for the Jan. 3 killing of <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/01/03/qassim-soleimani-shadowy-iranian-general-undermined-washington/">Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani</a>. </p>
<p>Policymakers in the Trump administration have said they believe that the use of force will <a href="https://twitter.com/OKnox/status/1213219771178770432">prompt Iran to back down</a>, or at least that <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/pompeo-says-administration-would-have-been-culpably-negligent-not-launch-n1110566">any escalation will be manageable</a>. <a href="https://braumoeller.info">My research</a> into how conflicts begin and how deadly they get <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ZW-QEygAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">shows</a> that while most wars don’t escalate very far, those that do can easily become catastrophic.</p>
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<p>As memories of World War II and the Cold War fade into history, policymakers and the public are increasingly prone to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/jul/28/is-the-world-really-better-than-ever-the-new-optimists">think of large-scale warfare as a thing of the past</a>. </p>
<p>But while most wars remain small, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/only-the-dead-9780190849535?cc=us&lang=en&">my own analysis</a> of trends in warfare concludes that the threat of wars with large numbers of casualties has not decreased. It’s dangerous to assume that Iran will not escalate the crisis further, much less that the U.S. could limit any violence that might ensue.</p>
<h2>Big wars are more common than people think</h2>
<p>Especially bloody deadly wars, while rare, are not actually as rare as most Westerners may think. </p>
<p>World War I and World War II are not even in the top three deadliest international wars in the past two centuries, based on the number of battle deaths as compared with the combined populations of the warring nations. </p>
<p>Two South American wars, the Paraguayan War of the late 1860s and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Chaco-War">Chaco War</a> from the mid-1930s, are the deadliest on record. The Paraguayan War, little known outside of military history circles, may have cost Paraguay <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/christmas/21568594-how-terrible-little-known-conflict-continues-shape-and-blight-nation">half – or more – of its total prewar population</a>. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/iraniraq-war/7C6E42D57383472EA9B9F6101BEABD94">Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s</a>, the most recent of the top five, was the third when ranked by death rates. Only then come the two world wars.</p>
<p>Not every conflict becomes a massive war, of course. It is possible that Iran could be deterred by the threat of large-scale American retaliation, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/pompeo-trump-iran.html">argued on Jan. 5</a>. But it is dangerous to assume there won’t be a war, even if it’s true that neither Iran nor the U.S. wants one.</p>
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<h2>Escalation is very hard to predict</h2>
<p>In late summer 1914, as World War I began, German Kaiser Wilhelm II famously promised his troops that they would be “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/04/30/135803783/wwi-the-battle-that-split-europe-and-families">home before the leaves have fallen from the trees</a>.” </p>
<p>In World War II, even after Hitler had invaded Poland in 1939, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00117.x">American diplomats believed</a> that economic pressure alone would suffice to bring Nazi Germany to its knees. In both cases, years of bloody warfare followed.</p>
<p>What I’ve found is that escalation typically results from chance occurrences that simply can’t be foreseen. </p>
<p><a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/Strange-Defeat/">Virtually no one predicted</a> the fall of France to the Nazis in the summer of 1940. No one could have known that President Harry Truman would decide, against the advice of his National Security Council, to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Korea/The-Korean-War">send U.S. forces across the 38th parallel</a> during the Korean War, and few observers anticipated that <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1988-11-01.pdf">doing so would bring China into the conflict</a>. </p>
<p>Major wars are “<a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/176226/the-black-swan-second-edition-by-nassim-nicholas-taleb/">black swans</a>” – rare but incredibly consequential events that cannot be predicted.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">U.S. Marines in northern Korea are stalled by a Chinese counterattack on Dec. 14, 1950.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-AP-I-PRK-APHS288575-Korean-War/9d490a77008e4800b4bf29a8c9bb6437/12/0">AP Photo</a></span>
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<h2>Chance plays a huge role in war</h2>
<p>The role of chance events in warfare can be dramatic. </p>
<p>Hitler’s successful invasion of France transformed what had been a problem of regional containment into a years-long global conflict with <a href="https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war">more than 16 million people killed</a> in battle. A <a href="https://www.history.com/news/the-assassination-of-archduke-franz-ferdinand-100-years-ago">driver’s wrong turn</a> in Sarajevo in 1914 turned what would have been a botched assassination attempt into World War I. </p>
<p>Chance works both ways, of course: The Union of Concerned Scientists has documented a hair-raising array of <a href="https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/close-calls-nuclear-weapons">nuclear near-misses</a> that mostly caused no harm but could have resulted in millions of deaths.</p>
<p>War can be volatile – while most remain small, big ones can come out of almost nowhere. I see in this imbalance a similarity to a concept called the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_principle">“80/20” rule</a>, in which 80% of outcomes come from 20% of cases: About 80% of world income, for example, is held by 20% of the global population. </p>
<p>In warfare, lethality of international conflict is considerably more concentrated. The data I analyzed shows that over the past 200 years, the deadliest 20% of wars are responsible for 98% of all battle deaths.</p>
<p>No one wants very large wars, and most wars do end up being relatively small. But the potential for chance events to blow up into massive conflicts means nobody really knows, and nobody can predict, when the next really big one will come along.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129306/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bear F. Braumoeller does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s very dangerous to assume that Iran will not escalate the crisis further, much less that the US could limit any violence that might ensue.Bear F. Braumoeller, Baranov and Timashev Chair in Data Analytics and Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1199922019-07-09T06:56:23Z2019-07-09T06:56:23ZIran’s nuclear program breaches limits for uranium enrichment: 4 key questions answered<p>Iranian officials this week <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48899243">revealed</a> that the country’s nuclear program will break the limit for uranium enrichment, set under the terms of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-iran-nuclear-deal-could-still-be-saved-experts-say-96466">deal struck in 2015</a> between Iran and world powers including the United States under former president Barack Obama.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/uranium-plutonium-heavy-water-why-irans-nuclear-deal-matters-20694">Uranium, plutonium, heavy water ... why Iran's nuclear deal matters</a>
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<h2>What is uranium enrichment?</h2>
<p>The nucleus of a uranium atom is a very rich source of energy. The splitting of a uranium atomic nucleus – a process called nuclear fission – produces more than 20 million times more energy than a strong chemical reaction such as burning a molecule of natural gas.</p>
<p>Atomic nuclei are made of two types of subatomic particles: protons and neutrons. All uranium atoms contain 92 protons, but can contain varying numbers of neutrons. Each specific combination of neutrons and protons is called an isotope. Isotopes are named according to the total number of protons and neutrons – hence, uranium-238 (U-238) contains 92 protons and 146 neutrons, whereas U-235 contains three fewer neutrons.</p>
<p>U-235 undergoes nuclear fission more readily than U-238, making it more valuable as a source of nuclear energy. What’s more, only U-235 can sustain a “nuclear chain reaction”, in which enough neutrons are released during nuclear fission to trigger fission in neighbouring atomic nuclei. This process is necessary to efficiently release large amounts of energy – either in a controlled way, such as in a nuclear power station, or in an uncontrolled explosion such as in a nuclear bomb.</p>
<p>Natural uranium, however, contains just 0.7% U-235, and 99.3% U-238. Commercial nuclear reactors designs generally require uranium fuel with U-235 concentrations of between 3.5% and 5%.</p>
<p>Uranium enrichment is the process of artificially increasing the proportion of U-235 in a sample of uranium to meet this requirement.</p>
<h2>What does the process involve?</h2>
<p>The technical details of uranium enrichment technology are highly classified, but we know the most efficient technique uses a process called centrifuge enrichment. </p>
<p>This involves reacting the uranium with fluorine to form a gas called <a href="https://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/Uranium-hexafluoride">uranium hexafluoride (UF₆)</a>. This is then spun at very high speeds in a series of centrifuges. </p>
<p>UF₆ molecules containing the heavier U-238 isotope are forced to the outside of the centrifuge, where they are removed. The remaining gas is thus richer in U-235, hence the term “enrichment”.</p>
<p>By feeding the mixture through a succession of centrifuges, the uranium becomes successively more enriched. Higher levels of uranium enrichment are therefore more expensive and time-consuming.</p>
<p>A typical 1-gigawatt commercial nuclear reactor contains one reactor and uses around <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org">27 tonnes of enriched uranium</a> fuel per year, although this depends on the quality of the nuclear fuel used. In a commercial market this costs around <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/economic-aspects/economics-of-nuclear-power.aspx">US$40 million</a>, which is a small fraction of the US$450 million revenue that would be generated if we assume an electricity price of 5 cents per kilowatt-hour.</p>
<h2>Does it inevitably lead to weapons?</h2>
<p>The technical details of nuclear weapons development are more closely guarded still. But we know that a uranium fission weapon requires tens of kilograms of highly enriched uranium, with U-235 concentrations of around 90%.</p>
<p>While the level of enrichment is much higher, there is no difference in the equipment used to make weapons-grade uranium, as opposed to nuclear fuel.</p>
<p>The same facilities used to produce 27 tonnes of 3.6% U-235 fuel for a commercial reactor could conceivably also be used to make one tonne of U-235 enriched to 90% – roughly enough for 20 nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>However, the post-processing of the UF₆ to make nuclear fuel is considerably different to that required for a weapon. In the case of nuclear fuel, it is formed into uranium oxide pellets and encased in zirconium alloy tubes. Weapons require pure uranium metal.</p>
<h2>What limit has Iran breached, and what does it stand to gain?</h2>
<p>Under the treaty, Iran agreed to enrich uranium to no more than 3.6%, and to only stockpile enough fuel to run its single commercial nuclear reactor for one year.</p>
<p>It has already breached the stockpiling limit, and has now broken the enrichment limit. </p>
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<p>In theory, these breaches could allow Iran’s nuclear reactor to run more economically and for a longer time before the fuel needs to be replaced. However, these higher-enrichment fuels require very specialised processing, and only a handful of companies worldwide have the technology to do this. The waste handling required for the spent fuel is also more sophisticated. </p>
<p>Whatever Iran’s ultimate aim, and despite the diplomatic tensions, its uranium enrichment levels are not yet near those required for nuclear weapons.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119992/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Sevior does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran has announced it will breach the limits on uranium enrichment agreed under the 2015 nuclear deal, after the US turned its back on the agreement. What does that mean for Iran’s nuclear program?Martin Sevior, Associate Professor of Physics, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1194162019-06-26T12:16:31Z2019-06-26T12:16:31ZUS-Iran tensions: no route for de-escalation in sight<p>Washington and Tehran are <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-donald-trump-is-backing-the-us-into-a-corner-on-iran-119327">locked</a> in a political, economic, and propagandist confrontation – and there is no apparent way out. </p>
<p>One route to de-escalation could be direct talks between the US and Iran, either on a bilateral basis or as part of multilateral discussions. </p>
<p>When US President Donald Trump <a href="https://time.com/5611845/donald-trump-iran-strike/">stepped back</a> from launching airstrikes inside Iran on June 20, he said he was willing to talk and included an offer of phone numbers to Iran’s leaders. But a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/iran-rouhani-calls-white-house-actions-mentally-retarded-190625080055923.html">war of words</a> followed after Trump imposed <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-48732672">new sanctions on Iran</a>, including on its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, his administration – which withdrew from a 2015 Iran nuclear deal in May 2018 and imposed comprehensive sanctions in November – has based the offer of talks on an effective surrender by the Islamic Republic of its nuclear programme, of its policy and operations in the Middle East, and of its political and economic autonomy.</p>
<p>In early June, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the US was <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/pompeo-says-u-s-ready-talk-iran-no-preconditions-n1013051">ready for “unconditional” discussions</a> with Iran. But he actually set <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/mike-pompeo-speech-12-demands-iran-180521151737787.html">12 points as prerequisites</a> for any talks: including Tehran giving up all uranium enrichment, for civil programmes, halting missile development, breaking ties with groups in the Middle East from Lebanon’s Hezbollah to Palestine’s Hamas and Islamic Jihad to Iraqi militias, ending its support of Yemen’s Houthi insurgency, and withdrawing its troops from Syria.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, Khamenei is not keen on that offer. In May, before <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-48627014">the attacks on two tankers in the Gulf of Oman</a> and the downing of a US drone, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190514-irans-khamenei-says-there-not-going-be-war-with-us">he said</a>: “Negotiating with the present American government is doubly poisonous … They are not decent humans, they don’t stand by anything.”</p>
<p>With Khamenei and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards striking firm poses declaring the Islamic Republic’s strength against US weakness, Iran’s “centrist” president, Hassan Rouhani, has had to follow suit, <a href="https://www.presstv.com/DetailFr/2019/06/01/597510/Iran-Rouhani-US-pressure-steadfastness-nation">proclaiming</a> in early June that Iran had “forced the enemies to retreat step by step”.</p>
<p>So has Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian lead negotiator in the 2015 nuclear agreement. He <a href="https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/1135591916660281344">tweeted</a> at the start of June about American sanctions: “This is Donald Trump’s ‘economic war’. And war and talks – with or without preconditions – don’t go together.”</p>
<h2>Rejecting mediation</h2>
<p>A second route is indirect talks, such as contacts via Oman in 2012 to set up negotiations between Iran and the 5+1 powers who brokered the 2015 Iran deal – the US, UK, France, Germany, China, and Russia.</p>
<p>In May, there was flutter about a reprisal of these talks, as Iran’s deputy foreign minister met the Omani Sultan and Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, set up a visit to Tehran after a Tokyo summit with Trump.</p>
<p>But on June 13, just before news about the attack on the two tankers in the Gulf of Oman broke, Khamenei slammed the door shut. When Abe said he was carrying a message from Trump, Khamenei <a href="http://english.khamenei.ir/news/6844/I-don-t-consider-Trump-worth-sending-a-message-to-we-won-t-negotiate">replied</a>: “I do not consider Trump as a person worth exchanging any message with and I have no answer for him, nor will I respond to him in the future.”</p>
<p>So what of the third route, bypassing the US and its hardliners through Iranian links with other countries?</p>
<p>Facing the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and Americans sanctions appearing to seek regime change, the European Union spent months developing a special purpose vehicle for non-dollar trade in Iranian oil and other commodities and goods. In early 2019, the EU launched a limited version of the mechanism, known as <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/instex-europe-sets-up-transactions-channel-with-iran/a-47303580">INSTEX</a>.</p>
<p>But Iran turned down the escape from economic isolation. Officials, undoubtedly guided by the supreme leader’s office, <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2019/02/iran-daily-tehran-turns-against-europes-vital-economic-link/">cited “humiliating conditions”</a>.</p>
<p>Those conditions? The EU’s concern over Iran’s continued missile development and launches, activity in the Middle East, and involvement in <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190109-eu-sanctions-iran-over-assassinations-peoples-mujahedeen-france-bomb-plot">alleged bomb and assassination plots in Europe</a>.</p>
<p>On June 10, three days before rejecting Japanese mediation, the Iranians did the same with German foreign minister, Heiko Maas. Even before Maas left Tehran, <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2019/06/iran-daily-tehran-rebuffs-germanys-mediation-criticizes-europe-as-well-as-us/">the foreign ministry pronounced</a>: “What the Europeans need to do and what they have done so far have failed to win our satisfaction.” </p>
<p>Khamenei had issued his verdict: he – and 75m Iranians – would endure a crippled economy rather than making any apparent concession over Tehran’s military and political approach.</p>
<h2>Hardliners to the left of me, jokers to the right</h2>
<p>De-escalation requires a willingness to soften a hardline position. At the highest levels of the Iran regime, there is no such desire.</p>
<p>In September 2013, Khamenei acceded to nuclear talks because Rouhani presented him with a dossier about how bad Iran’s economic crisis would become if discussions were not pursued. This time, Khamenei has blocked the path back to discussions, and Rouhani is effectively sidelined. In his place are revolutionary guards who appear to be willing to carry out “pinprick” operations – maybe an attack on tankers, definitely firing on a drone – to push against US sanctions and military capabilities.</p>
<p>But in Tehran, the hardline comes with consistency. In the Trump administration, it comes with unpredictability.</p>
<p>With Trump shifting between a tough-guy pose and his desire for a photo-op in Tehran, the US swings a fist but then leaves it dangling in mid-air.</p>
<p>With no route to de-escalation at the moment, the economic battle – and, as the administration was keen to point out in recent days, the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/22/politics/us-iran-cyberattacks-increase-department-homeland-security/index.html">cyber-battle</a> – continues. And so war, which comes not through design but through posturing and escalation, remains on the table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119416/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump stepped back from launching US airstrikes inside Iran, but the conflict is unabated and there appears to be no way out of confrontation for now.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1191462019-06-20T23:03:21Z2019-06-20T23:03:21ZIsrael could strike first as tensions with Iran flare<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280541/original/file-20190620-149806-1egq7i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israel has a powerful air force — and it's not afraid to strike neighbors it perceives as a national security threat.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Israel/5bf4ffd09cbf4d66bb1f3ac51b7aa77c/16/0">AP Photo/Ariel Schalit</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/world/middleeast/us-iran-drone.html">shot down a U.S. drone</a> on June 19, further escalating tensions between Iran and its adversaries.</p>
<p>Relations with Iran have been worsening for months. In early May, one year after the United States <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">withdrew from the nuclear deal</a> negotiated in 2015 between Iran, the U.S., the European Union and five other countries, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/08/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal.html?module=inline">said</a> that his country may also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-actions/iran-to-restart-some-nuclear-activity-in-response-to-us-withdrawal-from-nuclear-deal-idUSKCN1SC1FP">withdraw from the agreement</a>, which limits its ability to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for lifting sanctions. </p>
<p>In June, Rouhani announced that Iran will <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/us/politics/iran-nuclear-troops.html">restart</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/nuclear-weapons-and-irans-uranium-enrichment-program-4-questions-answered-118981">uranium enrichment</a>, which could put the country on track to develop a nuclear weapon within a year. Rouhani’s government insists its uranium will go to civilian <a href="https://gizmodo.com/iran-says-it-will-begin-enriching-uranium-beyond-nuclea-1835603079">nuclear power</a>, not weapons.</p>
<p>As a “<a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/watch-pompeo-says-trump-doesnt-want-war-with-iran-calls-troop-deployment-a-deterrent">deterrent</a>” to Iran, the United States is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-compliance.html">sending an additional 1,000</a> troops to the Middle East.</p>
<p>The U.S. is not the only country considering a military response in Iran.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Netanyahu-World-must-sanction-Iran-if-it-enriches-more-uranium-than-allowed-592810">Israel will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons</a>,” said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 17. Netanyahu also said Iran must be punished for violating the nuclear agreement.</p>
<p>Israel, which has faced <a href="https://theconversation.com/antisemitism-how-the-origins-of-historys-oldest-hatred-still-hold-sway-today-87878">threats to its national security</a> since its founding as a Jewish homeland in the Middle East in 1948, is known to take aggressive, preventive action to protect itself – including by launching <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg403af.13#metadata_info_tab_contents">preemptive strikes</a> on neighboring nations it perceives as threatening. </p>
<p>If international relations with Iran grow more volatile, Israel could take dramatic, unilateral action against its neighbor and longtime adversary.</p>
<h2>How the Begin Doctrine justifies preemptive strikes</h2>
<p>I’m an <a href="https://doreenhorschig.com">international security scholar</a> who studies Israel’s proactive use of its military to prevent nuclear buildup in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Israel has a counterproliferation policy, called the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-begin-doctrine-the-lessons-of-osirak-and-deir-ez-zor/">Begin Doctrine</a>, which allows it to wage preventive strikes against enemies with weapons of mass destruction programs. Using the Begin Doctrine as a justification for preemptive strikes, the Israeli government has for decades quietly decimated nuclear and chemical facilities across the Middle East.</p>
<p>When President Saddam Hussein’s potential nuclear military ambitions raised concerns in 1981, the Israeli government destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor in a surprise attack called <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/09/world/israeli-jets-destroy-iraqi-atomic-reactor-attack-condemned-us-arab-nations.html">Operation Opera</a>. </p>
<p>“On no account shall we permit an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against the people of Israel,” a government release <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/09/world/israeli-and-iraqi-statements-on-raid-on-nuclear-plant.html">stated</a> at the time. “We shall defend the citizens of Israel in good time and with all the means at our disposal.”</p>
<p>In 2007, Israel responded to Syria’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-iaea-syria-sb/iaea-finds-graphite-further-uranium-at-syria-site-idUSTRE51I45R20090219">failure to report</a> its uranium processing by striking a nuclear reactor in the Deir ez-Zor region. The United States, which was <a href="http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-04-23-554340650_x.htm">reportedly informed</a> ahead of the attack, made no effort to stop Israel.</p>
<p>Israel has also been accused of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/16/iran-scientists-state-sponsored-murder">sponsoring the assassinations</a> of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/11/secret-war-iran-timeline-attacks?intcmp=239">at least four Iranian nuclear scientists since 2010</a>. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/12/world/middleeast/iran-reports-killing-of-nuclear-scientist.html">incidents</a> have never been fully investigated, and Israel has neither confirmed nor denied responsibility for the targeted killings.</p>
<p>Israel has also deterred nuclear proliferation in the Mideast using less lethal, more high tech strategies. </p>
<p>In 2008 and 2009, Israel used <a href="https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precursor_to_the_next_stuxnet.pdf?om_ext_cid=biz_socmed_uk_pv_181011_blog_duqublog">computer malware</a> called Stuxnet to disrupt Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The program infected the software that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/timelines/zc6fbk7">controlled centrifuge speed at the Natanz nuclear plant</a>, alternately speeding up and slowing down the machines that produce enriched uranium to cripple production of the material. The Obama administration <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=4&_r=1&hp">secretly supported the cyberattacks</a>.</p>
<p>Though the United States, United Nations and other world powers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/09/world/israeli-jets-destroy-iraqi-atomic-reactor-attack-condemned-us-arab-nations.html">officially condemned</a> some of these <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/487">unprovoked Israeli military aggression</a>, other preemptive Israeli attacks have been met with silence from the international community. </p>
<p>The international community may even appreciate Israel’s role as a nuclear nonproliferation watchdog in the Middle East, my <a href="https://www.doreenhorschig.com/other-publications/">research suggests</a>. Israel has never been punished for attacking its neighbors’ weapons programs.</p>
<p>Decades after Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq’s nuclear plant, President Bill Clinton called it “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLqEQyyVNzI&t=1658">a really good thing</a>.” </p>
<p>“It kept Saddam Hussein from developing nuclear power,” he said at the 2005 Davos World Economic Forum. </p>
<p>“But it’s not clear to me they have that option in Iran,” he added. </p>
<h2>Israel vs. Iran</h2>
<p>That was 14 years ago. In 2005, Iran was just beginning its nuclear buildup.</p>
<p>Today, Israel’s government seems <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-warns-the-idf-has-immense-destructive-power-dont-test-us/">strong in its belief</a> that it has the option to strike Iran.</p>
<p>Iran’s Islamic fundamentalist government is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/irans-holocaust-denial-is-part-of-a-malevolent-strategy/2016/05/27/312cbc48-2374-11e6-aa84-42391ba52c91_story.html?utm_term=.b80ce916b4cf">openly hostile to Israel</a>. Citing fears that Iran would use nuclear weapons against Israel, Netanyahu has <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/9314923/Benjamin-Netanyahu-says-world-powers-are-demanding-practically-nothing-of-Iran.html">warned</a>, “Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would be infinitely more costly than any scenario you can imagine to stop it.”</p>
<p>He told Iran and other adversaries not to <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Israel-Air-Force-holding-large-scale-drill-simulating-multi-front-war-592910">“test” Israel</a>.</p>
<p>If the nuclear deal ruptures further and Iran does restarting uranium enrichment, <a href="https://theconversation.com/pompeo-confirmation-makes-mideast-war-more-likely-95698">Israel might launch targeted airstrikes</a> against it.</p>
<h2>Risks of an Israeli strike</h2>
<p>History suggests other countries are unlikely to actively deter Israeli military aggression in the guise of nuclear nonproliferation. </p>
<p>The Trump administration has expressed anti-Iranian sentiment and is a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/world/middleeast/trump-jerusalem-israel-capital.html">staunch backer of Netanyahu’s government</a>. </p>
<p>And while European powers will recognize preemptive Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities as a violation of international law and of the sovereignty of Israel’s neighbors, they also see Iran’s nuclear program as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-eu/eu-concerned-by-iran-missile-work-regional-security-role-idUSKCN1PT1VM">a grave global security concern</a>. </p>
<p>A nuclear Iran could escalate ongoing Middle East conflicts into nuclear exchanges, and, as some commentators say, spur other regional powers like <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/21/in-the-middle-east-soon-everyone-will-want-the-bomb/">Saudi Arabia and Egypt to develop nuclear weapons themselves</a>. </p>
<p>Of course, potential Israeli attacks on Iran present their own <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-begin-doctrine-the-lessons-of-osirak-and-deir-ez-zor/">serious risks</a>. Because most of Iran’s reactors are in full operations, air strikes may mean cutting off the power supply to Iranian citizens and could release large amounts of radioactive contaminants into the air. </p>
<p>Iran, <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IF10938.pdf">a militarily well-equipped country</a>, would surely retaliate against any Israeli attacks. That, too, would trigger a conflict that would spiral throughout the Middle East.</p>
<p>Of course, Israel faced similar dangers when it went after the weapons programs of Syria, Iraq and other neighbors. </p>
<p>If history is any guide, Israel may strike Iran while the world quietly watches.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119146/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Doreen Horschig receives funding from the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa for a different research project that is not connected to the article on Israeli aggression. </span></em></p>The US isn’t the only country considering a military response to Iranian aggression.Doreen Horschig, PhD Candidate in Security Studies, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1189812019-06-18T19:24:21Z2019-06-18T19:24:21ZNuclear weapons and Iran’s uranium enrichment program: 4 questions answered<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280049/original/file-20190618-118518-1rrwzqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">United Nations Security Council members listen to Iranian Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Eshagh Al-Habib, left, during a meeting on Iran's compliance with the 2015 nuclear agreement, Dec. 12, 2018, at UN headquarters. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/UN-Iran/ffffc6cd3d19438488232554ab1950df/162/0">AP Photo/Mary Altaffer</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: Iran has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48784786">breached a limit on enriching uranium</a> that was imposed in a <a href="https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/">2015 agreement</a> restricting its nuclear activities. Under the deal, the United States and five other world powers lifted economic sanctions they had imposed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. But President Trump <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">removed the U.S. from the deal</a> in 2018 and <a href="https://www.state.gov/iran-sanctions/">reimposed sanctions</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Miles Pomper, a senior fellow at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, explains what uranium enrichment is and why it is central to both peaceful nuclear energy programs and building nuclear weapons.</em></p>
<h2>1. What is uranium enrichment?</h2>
<p>Uranium can fuel nuclear power plants and nuclear bombs because some of its isotopes, or atomic forms, are <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fissile-material.html">fissile</a>: Their atoms can be easily split to release energy.</p>
<p>Freshly mined uranium contains more than 99% of an isotope called uranium 238, which is not fissile, plus a tiny fraction of uranium 235, which is fissile. Enrichment is an industrial process to increase the proportion of U-235. It’s usually done by passing uranium gas through devices called centrifuges, which rotate at high speeds. This process sifts out U-235, which is lighter than U-238. </p>
<p>Commercial nuclear power plants run on low-enriched uranium fuel, which contains 3-5% U-235. Further processing can produce highly enriched uranium, which contains more than 20% U-235. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/9D6e_dGjGIM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Moderate and conservative Iranian leaders have been debating whether to pursue nuclear weapons since the country’s 1979 revolution.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2. How is enriching uranium connected to making nuclear weapons?</h2>
<p>The same technology is used to enrich uranium for either nuclear power or nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons typically contain uranium enriched to 80% U-235 or more, which is known as weapon-grade uranium. </p>
<p>Nuclear weapons can also can be powered with plutonium, but Iran would need to irradiate uranium fuel in its Arak nuclear reactor and build an additional facility to separate plutonium from the spent fuel to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/science/irans-unsung-plutonium-concession-in-nuclear-deal.html">take that route</a>. Currently its uranium work poses a more immediate risk.</p>
<p>Both nuclear power and nuclear weapons rely on nuclear <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/chain-reaction.html">chain reactions</a> to release energy, but in different ways. A commercial nuclear power plant uses low-enriched uranium fuel and various design elements to generate a slow nuclear chain reaction that produces a constant stream of energy. In a nuclear weapon, specially designed high explosives cram together enough weapon-grade uranium or plutonium to produce an extremely fast chain reaction that generates an explosion. </p>
<p>Producing a nuclear weapon involves more than making highly enriched uranium or plutonium, but experts generally view this as the most time-consuming step. It’s also the stage that is most visible to outsiders, so it is an important indicator of a country’s progress.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=308&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=308&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=308&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280059/original/file-20190618-118526-16sg8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Building K-33 at the Oak Ridge site in Tennessee enriched uranium for U.S. nuclear weapons from 1954-1985. The plant was demolished in 2012.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://flic.kr/p/cHJ9Jd">DOE</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. How good is Iran at enriching uranium?</h2>
<p>Iran’s work on uranium enrichment has proceeded in fits and starts, but now experts generally believe that if it exits the nuclear deal, it could make enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. </p>
<p>These efforts began in the late 1980s, while Iran was engaged in a bloody war with Iraq. The first centrifuges and designs were provided by Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist who <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-01-31/long-shadow-aq-khan">ran a black market network</a> for nuclear technologies from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/world/a-tale-of-nuclear-proliferation-how-pakistani-built-his-network.html">1970s through the early 2000s</a>. These machines were poor-quality, frequently secondhand models and often broke down. And the United States and Israel reportedly carried out <a href="http://www.isisnucleariran.org/reports/detail/isis-resources-on-the-stuxnet-worm/">espionage operations, including cyberattacks</a>, to further disable Iran’s enrichment ability. </p>
<p>Iran continues to have technical problems in producing <a href="http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/update-on-irans-compliance-with-the-jcpoa-nuclear-limits/">more advanced centrifuges</a>. Nonetheless, it improved their performance sufficiently in the years leading up to the 2015 deal that observers widely believe Iran could produce enough material for a nuclear weapons program. The 2015 agreement deal set limits on Iran’s research and development activities to limit further progress, but Iran has been <a href="http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/iaea-iran-safeguards-report-analysis-iran-pushes-past-an-advanced-centrifug">testing the legal boundaries of these restrictions</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280060/original/file-20190618-118526-4jy4u5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this photo released May 22, 2019 by his office, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks to a group of students in Tehran, Iran. Khamenei publicly chastised the country’s moderate president and foreign minister Wednesday, saying he disagreed with the implementation of the 2015 nuclear deal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Iran-Persian-Gulf-Tensions/16da4da6c0a248e89f95be331d104881/18/0">Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>4. How does the Iran deal limit Iran’s activities?</h2>
<p>The agreement limits how much uranium Iran can enrich and to what level. It also specifies how much enriched uranium Iran can stockpile, how many and what types of centrifuges it can use, and what kinds of <a href="https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/joint-comprehensive-plan-action-new-standard-safeguards-agreements/">research and development activities it can conduct</a>. </p>
<p>All of these limits are designed to prevent Iranian scientists from amassing enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon – roughly 10 to 30 kilograms (22 to 65 pounds), depending on the device’s design and the bomb-makers’ sophistication and experience – in under a year. That delay is seen as long enough to give the international community time to respond if Iran decided to go nuclear. </p>
<p>The agreement also restricts Iran’s plutonium separation research, and requires it to accept <a href="https://www.iaea.org/">International Atomic Energy Agency</a> inspections to ensure that it is not using peaceful nuclear activities as a cover to produce weapons. </p>
<p>Under the agreement, restrictions on Iran’s enrichment activities were scheduled to start easing in 2026 and largely end in 2031, although international monitoring would continue after that.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118981/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Miles A. Pomper is affiliated with James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies </span></em></p>Iran’s leaders are threatening to breach a 2015 agreement that froze their country’s nuclear program. What is uranium enrichment, and what would it mean for Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons?Miles A. Pomper, Senior Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, MiddleburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/994962018-07-09T10:29:00Z2018-07-09T10:29:00ZWhy is the Strait of Hormuz important?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226558/original/file-20180706-122253-eowp96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Strait of Hormuz</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Stra%C3%9Fe_von_Hormuz.jpg">Wikipedia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Global shipping is constrained by geography. </p>
<p>Massive oil tankers and cargo ships – carrying <a href="https://business.un.org/en/entities/13">over 90 percent of global trade flows by weight</a> – converge in narrow straits. The result: The world’s key shipping lanes are often crowded.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-71806-4_2">a researcher who has focused on strategic maritime chokepoints</a> for over 15 years, I appreciate the vital importance of these waterways – not only economically, but also politically.</p>
<p>This geostrategic significance came into fresh focus when Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/07/06/why_iran_is_threatening_to_close_the_strait_of_hormuz_113583.html">recently threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz</a> following the Trump administration’s decision to leave the Iran nuclear deal.</p>
<h2>What is the Strait of Hormuz?</h2>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226551/original/file-20180706-122280-19f5w0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226551/original/file-20180706-122280-19f5w0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226551/original/file-20180706-122280-19f5w0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=648&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226551/original/file-20180706-122280-19f5w0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=648&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226551/original/file-20180706-122280-19f5w0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=648&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226551/original/file-20180706-122280-19f5w0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=814&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226551/original/file-20180706-122280-19f5w0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=814&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226551/original/file-20180706-122280-19f5w0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=814&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Strait of Hormuz.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Strait_of_hormuz_full.jpg">Wikipedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s key maritime chokepoints.</p>
<p>This narrow seaway connects the Indian Ocean with the Arabian/Persian Gulf. For all of recorded history, the seaway has connected Arab and Persian civilizations with the Indian subcontinent, Pacific Asia and the Americas. For example, before the rise of European seaborne empires in the 15th and 16th centuries, porcelain from China and spices from the Indochina peninsula often passed through the strait on their way to Central Asia and Europe.</p>
<p>Today the Strait of Hormuz separates the modern Iranian state from the countries of Oman and the United Arab Emirates, which have strong defense connections with the United States and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>All shipping traffic from energy-rich Gulf countries converges in the strait, including crude oil and liquefied natural gas exports from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. <a href="https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.php?RegionTopicID=WOTC">Twenty percent</a> of the world’s crude oil flows through this 21-mile wide waterway.</p>
<p>This maritime chokepoint became an arena of conflict during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Each side in the so-called <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1988-05/tanker-war">“Tanker War”</a> tried to sink the other’s energy exports. To avoid being targeted, Kuwaiti oil tankers were reflagged under the U.S. shipping registry. Although crude oil continued to flow, marine insurance rates for vessels operating in the strait spiked by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/16/business/insuring-war-risks-at-lloyd-s.html">as much as 400 percent</a>. Those higher costs likely contributed to higher gasoline and diesel prices worldwide.</p>
<h2>What is happening now?</h2>
<p>So are American consumers likely to suffer because of Rouhani’s threat?</p>
<p>Iran does not need superior military strength to fulfill its threat to disrupt trade flows through the strait. It could damage commercial shipping with relatively cheap anti-ship missiles, fast patrol boats, submarines and mines. </p>
<p>But analysis from <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/oceans/2007-05-01/smooth-sailingthe-worlds-shipping-lanes-are-safe">Admiral Dennis Blair and Kenneth Liberthal concluded</a> that Iran would have trouble stopping all shipping through the strait. Modern cargo vessels are massive and difficult to disable. Unlike in the 1980s, most oil tankers now have double hulls, making them more difficult to sink. </p>
<p>That said, even threats and modest disruption to commercial shipping could trigger economic damage in the form of higher marine insurance rates, crude oil supply concerns and unsettled stock markets. </p>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99496/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rockford Weitz receives funding from the Smith Richardson Foundation to research global maritime security challenges. </span></em></p>Iran has threatened to shut down this narrow seaway. Here’s why that could be a big deal.Rockford Weitz, Professor of Practice & Director, Fletcher Maritime Studies Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/978972018-06-12T10:38:32Z2018-06-12T10:38:32ZIran’s mild response to unprecedented truckers’ strike could be due to Trump’s influence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222416/original/file-20180608-191962-54ocpy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators show their support for anti-government protests in Iran in front of the White House in January.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Pablo Martinez Monsivais</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last month, the Trump administration <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/iran-crisis-nuclear-deal.html">backed out of the 2015 deal</a> his predecessor made with Iran that traded giving up nuclear ambitions for sanctions relief. </p>
<p>The U.S. is expected to soon <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44200621">tighten the screws</a> even further by imposing the “strongest sanctions in history” in an effort to limit Iran’s missile program as well as achieve broader aims of restraining its foreign policy or even regime change.</p>
<p>Even though the U.S. acted without the other five countries that signed the deal, this has already <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-economy-2018-story.html">hurt Iran’s economy</a> and pushed its currency to a record low. As a result, truckers and other aggrieved workers, who were already under pressure because of low wages, have begun protesting for better pay and conditions. </p>
<p>Does this suggest President Donald Trump’s harsh anti-Iran strategy is working? </p>
<p>Based on two decades <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ErTIYroAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">researching</a> Iran’s economy and politics, I believe this question requires careful examination. </p>
<h2>State of Iran’s economy</h2>
<p>In the years before Iran signed the nuclear agreement with the U.S., China, Russia and Europe in 2015, its economy <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/gdp-growth-annual">fell into a severe recession</a> as a result of the punishing sanctions then in place. </p>
<p>After the deal brought relief, Iran’s economy <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/overview">rebounded</a> and began to draw outside investment, lifting hopes among ordinary Iranians that things would improve. But the moderate gains in economic conditions – and the creation of few new jobs – fell short of initial <a href="http://www.cissm.umd.edu/publications/iranian-public-opinion-nuclear-agreement">expectations</a> about the deal’s benefits. </p>
<p>International investors <a href="https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/Oil-Giants-Are-Fleeing-Iran-On-Sanction-Fears.html">have since grown cautious</a> because of uncertainty about the new president’s commitment to the deal. When Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal on May 8, the old sanctions were reimposed – though European countries are <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2018/06/06/news/economy/iran-europe-sanctions-relief/index.html">asking for exemptions</a>. </p>
<p>As a result, growth has stalled, the Iranian rial is rapidly losing value and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/08/politics/donald-trump-iran-deal-announcement-decision/index.html">inflation is surging</a> as people convert their savings into gold and hard currencies. And the post-deal surge in oil exports, which more than doubled from four years earlier to 2.2 million barrels per day in early 2018, <a href="http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201805090021.html">is now at risk</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222279/original/file-20180607-137288-x4x5s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222279/original/file-20180607-137288-x4x5s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222279/original/file-20180607-137288-x4x5s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222279/original/file-20180607-137288-x4x5s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222279/original/file-20180607-137288-x4x5s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222279/original/file-20180607-137288-x4x5s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222279/original/file-20180607-137288-x4x5s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s currency has plunged in recent months and reached an all-time low in May.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Striking truckers</h2>
<p>The worsening economic conditions are why Iran’s truck drivers launched an unprecedented <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/iran-truckers-strike-labor-action-demands-wage-increase.html">nationwide strike</a> in mid-May for an increase in their wages. The government regulates the rate they get paid. </p>
<p>Since Iran’s trucking industry plays a crucial role in the domestic distribution of all essential goods, from gasoline to food, a prolonged strike <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/jubin-afshar/iran-truckers-join-nationwide-push-for-change">could cause considerable</a> economic damage and fuel further discontent. </p>
<p>Normally the Islamic regime does not tolerate political protests against its rule and core policies, as was demonstrated by its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2009/jul/29/iran-election-protest-dead-missing">severe crackdown</a> against mass protests after the 2009 elections. Yet at the same time, it shows <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/19/how-years-of-increasing-labor-unrest-signaled-irans-latest-protest-wave/">more tolerance</a> for protests for narrow economic and social causes as long as they are small in size and refrain from anti-regime slogans. </p>
<p>The truckers’ strike, however, is neither localized nor marginal.</p>
<p>Yet, surprisingly, the regime and its security forces have shown considerable patience toward the truckers’ protest. Even <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/can-the-iranian-diaspora-aid-regime-change-in-irans-islamic-republic-20180104-h0dpxt.html">opposition groups</a>, which are usually eager to publicize political crackdowns, have not reported a violent reaction or mass arrests so far. </p>
<p>The government even offered the truckers a <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/jubin-afshar/iran-truckers-join-nationwide-push-for-change">partial concession</a> in the form of a 20 percent freight rate hike. While that was less than half of what they were demanding, this type of concession by the regime has never happened before. </p>
<p>In the past, <a href="https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-illegal-banks-fail-depositors-protest/28849665.html">smaller strikes and protests</a> over economic grievances often dragged on for weeks without leading to either a concession or a crackdown by the government. </p>
<h2>Fear of US reaction</h2>
<p>So why has the government adopted a conciliatory approach to the truckers? I believe their restraint is mostly a result of the Islamic regime’s concern about Trump’s potential reaction to a violent domestic crackdown. </p>
<p>When Iranians <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html">took to the streets</a> after the 2009 elections, the regime was confident that the Obama administration would not take any action to support the protesters. Its leaders believed that the U.S. was in no mood for another intervention in a Middle Eastern country after Bush’s costly 2003 invasion of Iraq. So it used a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2009/jul/29/iran-election-protest-dead-missing">heavy hand</a> to suppress them, and in fact the U.S. did little besides issue strongly worded condemnations.</p>
<p>This time the government is worried that Trump will behave differently. That’s also why the regime <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-irans-protests-matter-this-time-89745">used caution</a> in its response to the economic protests in December and January, which quickly evolved into <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/heshmatalavi/2018/01/11/iran-protests-what-we-are-learning/#37b13cfc6f09">mass riots</a> in many small cities. </p>
<p>With Trump’s recent appointments of John Bolton as national security adviser and Mike Pompeo as CIA director, his foreign policy team is now dominated by hard-line policymakers who do not hide their <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/iran-nuclear-deal-bolton-trump-regime-change/558785/">desire for regime change</a> in Iran. It seems likely that Iran’s leadership is trying to avoid any violent punishment of its discontents for fear that it’ll be used as a pretext for a military strike or the promised ramp-up of sanctions. </p>
<h2>Spreading protests</h2>
<p>But the regime’s mild reaction to the truckers’ strike carries significant political risks of its own. </p>
<p>That’s because it seems to be encouraging more protests as the truckers’ partial success has emboldened <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/jubin-afshar/iran-gripped-by-strikes-and-protests">taxi drivers,</a> <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iranian-poultry-farmers-protest-in-tehran-against-rising-costs/4414109.html">ranchers and poultry farmers</a> to go on strike – although on a smaller scale so far – to express grievances over government policies that are hurting their businesses. </p>
<p>If these strikes and work stoppages continue to expand, not only could they paralyze the economy, but they could also pose a severe political threat to the ruling regime. </p>
<p>Unable to suppress the protests for fear of U.S. intervention, the government will likely have to appease more protesters’ demands, perhaps by offering more subsidies or allowing the protesting industries to raise the prices of their goods and services, most of which are also regulated by the state.</p>
<p>But that means more government spending that it can hardly afford, leading to <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/government-budget">larger budget deficits</a> and even higher inflation, which drives up the prices for many essential goods and services. </p>
<p>Finally, if people see that the risk of being physically harmed or arrested in protests has declined, they will be more likely to join these types of protests. In other words, the government’s tolerant response will invite more protests and strikes. Perhaps this is good for Iranians’ political freedoms but bad for a regime trying to maintain control. </p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>Essentially, Trump is putting Iran in a very uncomfortable position.</p>
<p>On the one hand, U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the threat of new sanctions is directly weakening Iran’s economy and making life worse for its citizens. At the same time, fears of military intervention and more sanctions are deterring the Iranian regime from using force against growing strikes and protests. </p>
<p>Unable to crack down on protesters, the regime will have to keep making concessions to workers and trade syndicates in the hope that this quells the unrest, putting a severe strain on government finances and creating conditions that might result in high inflation and more unrest. </p>
<p>In my opinion, this severe economic pressure could even force Iran to accept some limits on its foreign policy and military programs that the Trump administration has demanded. After all, had it not been for the severe international sanctions, Iran would have not conceded to the significant rollback of its nuclear program within the framework of the 2015 nuclear agreement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97897/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Iranian government reacted to a nationwide truck drivers’ strike with unprecedented restraint, apparently fearful a crackdown might provoke a Trump intervention.Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/964492018-05-14T21:56:33Z2018-05-14T21:56:33ZTrump’s high-stakes gamble on the Iran nuclear deal could work<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218869/original/file-20180514-100703-1ktq69u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iranian protestors burn a representation of a U.S. flag during a gathering after their Friday prayer in Tehran, Friday, May 11, 2018. Thousands of Iranians took to the streets in cities across the country to protest U.S. President Donald Trump's decision to pull out of the nuclear deal with world powers. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. President Donald Trump has announced the United States’ intent to withdraw from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. </p>
<p>Even though the <a href="https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/">U.S. State Department confirmed </a> Iran had adhered to the terms of the agreement, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">Trump refused to certify that Iran was compliant.</a> </p>
<p>Iran has every economic and political motive to sustain the agreement. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-trump.html">country is unlikely to reinstate its efforts to enrich uranium</a> since the start-up costs are significant, the promise of a payoff is so small and, most importantly, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/04/03/why-iran-wont-rush-to-a-bomb-if-trump-pulls-out-of-the-nuclear-deal/?utm_term=.b04ec0866224">such steps would impel the Europeans to abandon the agreement.</a> </p>
<p>Though Israel provided a great deal of proof that Iran had lied about its nuclear program in the past, no evidence was offered that Iran was continuing the past record of deceit. The vast majority of experts agree that there is a greater likelihood of an arms race in the Middle East without the agreement than with it.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/full-transcript-iran-deal-trump/559892/">Trump claimed:</a> “The Iranian regime is the leading state sponsor of terror. It exports dangerous missiles, fuels conflicts across the Middle East, and supports terrorist proxies and militias such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda.” </p>
<p>I am a strong supporter of the agreement. I believe the treaty is better than any of the alternatives. Yet I still want to offer a possible defence of withdrawal. There is a chance the reimposition of sanctions could work. However, it is a high-risk gamble.</p>
<p>What makes defending these moves difficult is that Trump’s actions are often immersed in lies and distortions. It is simply not true that Iran has been violating the agreement and secretly preparing to resume the production of nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>What is true is that the deal did not allow an unqualified right to inspect military facilities. It did not address the regime’s development of missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads. It did not constrain Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. In a worst-case scenario, Iran could ramp up not only its uranium enrichment, but its regional military aggression. </p>
<h2>Not a bilateral agreement</h2>
<p>When Trump signed the presidential memorandum reinstating sanctions, he provided an additional opportunity to clarify and strengthen the agreement.</p>
<p>But not one of the other six signatories to the agreement believe that it would be possible, let alone to do so in the 120 days before American sanctions were actually reimposed. They continue to support the nuclear deal and recently lobbied Trump not to withdraw.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump delivers a statement on the Iran nuclear deal from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House on May 8, 2018, in Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evan Vucci)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2018/iran-180511-presstv01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e2289%2edm0ao0750i%2e23vc">reaffirmed their commitment to preserving the 2015 nuclear agreement</a>. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov denounced the U.S. pullout as a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini committed the 28-nation bloc to the nuclear agreement.</p>
<p>Trump, meantime, has <a href="https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/reinstatement-of-iran-sanctions-22228/">begun the process</a> of reimposing sanctions, <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/.../full-transcript-iran-deal-trump/559892">targeting not only nuclear activities but Iranian energy, petrochemical and financial sectors </a>. </p>
<p>Some sanctions target only Iranian entities; others punish third countries doing business with Iran. Not only would foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies be banned from dealing with Iran, <a href="https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2018/05/president-trump-withdraws-us-from-iran">but there would be secondary sanctions on foreign companies</a> engaged in Iranian financial, nuclear and petrochemical transactions.</p>
<p>European financial and petrochemical companies will be in a quandary, caught between the policies of their own governments and the dark cloud of sanctions launched by the Americans.</p>
<h2>A flawed deal</h2>
<p>Trump has three sets of explanations for withdrawal.</p>
<p>First, he promised to tear up this “worst of all deals” and the “most one-sided transaction into which the U.S. has ever entered” when he was running for president.</p>
<p>Second, he’s a critic of the contents of the deal. </p>
<p>Third, he implies that Iran has not abided by its terms. But as mentioned, he offers no evidence.</p>
<p>There’s no question the deal has flaws. Four months ago, when Trump announced that he would not lift sanctions again, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/11/us-president-trump-could-pull-out-of-iran-nuclear-deal.html">he offered four areas where improvement was required</a>:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>All sites requested, not just nuclear sites previously identified, must be available to international inspection;</p></li>
<li><p>The agreement must guarantee that Iran will never again come close to possessing nuclear weapons;</p></li>
<li><p>Trump implied that when the expiration date of some of the terms pass, Iran would resume preparing for and producing nuclear weapons;</p></li>
<li><p>The deal must include new provisions to impel Iran to curtail its program of missile development; if not, Iran would be in breach of a new, revised agreement. </p></li>
</ol>
<h2>A chance to improve deal?</h2>
<p>The deal would benefit from such clarifications and inclusions. The agreement could, in fact, be much more explicit that the limitations on Iran developing a <em>military</em> nuclear program are intended to be “eternal.”</p>
<p>The negotiations on the existing agreement were never able to overcome the dilemma of how to allow Iran to develop and produce nuclear material for peaceful versus military purposes.</p>
<p>The inspection system could also be improved since the existing one does not provide a monitoring strategy that would prevent the development of new sites.</p>
<p>The previous negotiations failed to limit Iran’s development of its international missile program. Iran argued the program is necessary for its conventional, non-nuclear defence system, and could not be included in a nuclear agreement.</p>
<p>Iran convinced previous negotiators this issues was a deal-breaker, and the decision was made to focus only on nuclear, not on conventional military developments.</p>
<p>It’s this threat, rather than all the noise about the nuclear dimensions of Iran’s militarization, that <a href="http://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/israel/2018/may/netanyahu-on-iranian-nuclear-deal-fix-it-or-nix-it">upsets Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the most</a>. </p>
<h2>Trump’s strategy</h2>
<p>Trump’s tactics and strategy do have a rationale. Iran, like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are newly emergent bullies in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia largely sees eye-to-eye with the U.S. Turkey, though no longer an ally in practice, greeted the American withdrawal from the nuclear deal as an economic opportunity for the Turks.</p>
<p>Iran, on the other hand, is still considered an implacable enemy and, more seriously, a direct threat to America’s strongest ally in the region, Israel.</p>
<p>There’s a chance that the U.S. tactic could work and result in a stronger deal given a number of factors: The degree to which Iran is over-extended in the Middle East, the degree to which those who benefited enormously from the lifting of Iranian sanctions now have a vested interest in not restoring them, and the poor state of the Iranian economy even after sanctions were lifted due to risk-averse potential investors nervous about what Trump was planning.</p>
<p>Many worry that the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal sends the wrong signal to North Korea that America cannot be trusted to commit to any deal. Others argue, with some legitimacy, that it was Trump’s strong-arm tactics that forced North Korea to the bargaining table regarding its own nuclear arsenal.</p>
<p>As South Korea did in Asia, it’s possible Europeans can play the “good cop” role to back up Trump’s “bad cop” in the Iranian situation.</p>
<p>But that possibility seems remote. The Europeans have been working tirelessly to try to get the Iranians to offer concessions but have been unsuccessful. More publicly, they have been openly critical of Trump’s tactics and rationale and have insisted they’ll stay in the deal.</p>
<p>The prospects of correcting the deal are dim. However, they exist. Do we want to play high-risk poker over the issue of nuclear weapons?</p>
<p>Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has signalled that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-prepared-for-all-scenarios-if-trump-nixes-nuclear-deal-officials-say/2018/05/08/531047a0-5241-11e8-a6d4-ca1d035642ce_story.html?utm_term=.0118a87eec09">he won’t abandon the deal</a> as long as the Europeans stay in it, suggesting that the U.S. reimposition of sanctions won’t set Iran down the road to resuming its nuclear program.</p>
<p>The U.S. will now have to put enormous pressure on European companies and banking institutions to comply. It may become apparent that the Europeans no longer have faith in American leadership and are prepared to launch an effective resistance program to U.S. unilateral action. </p>
<p>Merkel recently stated that Europe could no longer rely on the U.S. for protection and must take its destiny into its own hands. </p>
<p>France has insisted that Europeans cannot continue as “vassals,” as the EU scrambled to save the accord and the billions of dollars in trade it unleashed. French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire said Europe should not accept that the U.S. is the “world’s economic policeman.” </p>
<p>On the military front, Israel has been emboldened and is now attacking Iranian facilities in Syria openly and widely, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-says-iran-hit-in-syria-after-iranian-rockets-golan-heights-2018-5-10/">especially after Iranian forces in Syria unleashed 20 Grad and Fajr</a> rockets against Israel.</p>
<p>Perhaps Trump doesn’t care. Perhaps he only wants to demonstrate he’s a tough guy who keeps his campaign promises.</p>
<p>Trump is engaged in a high-stakes gamble. If he’d demonstrated any sign that he understands the risks, it would be easier to give him the benefit of the doubt. But almost all evidence suggests that his gambit is based more on his disposition than on a well-considered strategy.</p>
<p>The possibility of hope seems drowned out by the enormous tears to be shed — as we lose one more initiative towards a better, even if very flawed, world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96449/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Howard Adelman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Donald Trump’s move to pull the U.S. out of the Iran nuclear deal has been met with dismay by the Europeans. But could his high-stakes gambit actually work in getting a better deal?Howard Adelman, Professor Emeritus Philosophy, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.