tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/ecuador-3622/articlesEcuador – La Conversation2024-03-27T17:26:37Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2239692024-03-27T17:26:37Z2024-03-27T17:26:37Z‘Bukelism,’ El Salvador’s flawed approach to gang violence, is no silver bullet for Ecuador<p>Ecuador’s unexpected <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-67964229">gang-related security crisis</a> has resurrected the debate on <a href="https://advox.globalvoices.org/2023/05/19/unfreedom-monitor-report-el-salvador/">what’s known as Bukelism</a>, the supposedly miraculous anti-crime strategy named after El Salvador President Nayib Bukele. </p>
<p>Bukelism is credited with dramatically reducing El Salvador’s drug-related homicide rates <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/08/opinion/el-salvador-bukele-election.html">from 38 per 100,000 people in 2019 to 7.8 per 100,000 in 2022</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/el-salvador-young-maverick-bukele-wins-presidential-election-but-countrys-future-remains-uncertain-111775">El Salvador: young maverick Bukele wins presidential election, but country's future remains uncertain</a>
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<p>This model has, however, come at the cost of an authoritarian drift in El Salvador and <a href="https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/from-bad-to-worse-nayib-bukeles-split-with-washington/">American sanctions for corruption</a>. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, on April 21, Ecuador will hold a <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-02-14/ecuador-sets-april-21-for-referendum-on-tightening-security">landmark referendum</a> to change its constitution in order to emulate the Salvadorean model. </p>
<p>If Ecuadorans vote in favour of these unprecedented reforms on security, they will not only give permanent and extensive powers to the country’s armed forces — along with immunity measures and the dismantlement of democratic checks and balances — but they will also normalize Bukelism, even though recent studies question its effectiveness.</p>
<h2>Eroding democracy</h2>
<p>Ecuador is among <a href="https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/nayib-bukeles-growing-list-of-latin-american-admirers/">a growing number of countries in the region</a> that want to implement this seemingly successful new style of the war on drugs. They’re apparently willing to disregard the impact on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/el-salvador">freedom of the press and democracy</a> to curb the narco-trafficking crisis. </p>
<p>In 2022, El Salvador declared states of emergency several times and incarcerated more than 73,000 people, giving it the <a href="https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/prisoners/">highest incarceration rate in the world</a>. </p>
<p>These strong-arm tactics against crime give the public a reassuring image of control, even though the massive arrests targeted <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/thousands-of-innocent-people-jailed-in-el-salvadors-gang-crackdown">thousands of innocent people</a> and 327 citizens were forcibly disappeared, according to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/el-salvador-policies-practices-legislation-violate-human-rights/#:%7E:text=Among%20its%20recommendations%2C%20Amnesty%20International,process%20and%20nullify%20judicial%20guarantees">a recent Amnesty International report</a>. In addition, almost 200 died in state custody.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.omct.org/es/recursos/comunicados-de-prensa/comit%C3%A9-de-las-naciones-unidas-pide-a-el-salvador-prevenir-las-detenciones-arbitrarias-e-investigar-todos-los-actos-de-tortura">United Nations has called on El Salvador to stop torturing detainees</a>. <a href="https://www.americas.org/52204/">Attacks on female journalists by authorities and supporters of Bukele’s methods have also increased dramatically</a>, illustrating how Bukelism’s aggressive rhetoric has had a significant impact on journalists, especially women, in a country <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/el-salvador-women-abortion-obstetric-problems-prison-fight/">where abortion has also been completely banned</a> since Bukele’s election.</p>
<p>Yet, even the country’s worst infringements on the rule of law, including hundreds of show trials and laws <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/06/el-salvador-press-censorship-gang-law">threatening journalists with 10- to 15-year prison sentences for criticizing law enforcement</a>, are often regarded as evidence of <a href="https://insightcrime.org/investigations/how-bukele-government-overpowered-gangs-major-findings/">Bukelism’s effectiveness</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/el-salvadors-facade-of-democracy-crumbles-as-president-purges-his-political-opponents-161781">El Salvador's façade of democracy crumbles as president purges his political opponents</a>
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<h2>Bukelism’s popularity</h2>
<p>According to experts like Laura Chinchilla, Costa Rica’s former minister of public security and justice, the popularity of Bukelism <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/02/el-salvador-elections-bukele-bitcoin-crime-gang-policy/">is rising</a> largely because it’s frequently described in the media as the only effective model to fight gangs. Chinchilla argues that the Salvadorean model <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cpw79166j9go">is only a “mirage</a>” that ignores other efficient security strategies that don’t dismantle the rule of law, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108/OXAN-DB201595">such as her country’s efforts a decade ago</a>. </p>
<p>This myth of Bukelism’s effectiveness creates a dilemma for other democratic countries plagued by drug-trafficking violence: should they opt for the successes of Bukelism despite human rights violations, or choose other strategies that uphold democratic norms?</p>
<p>But this is a false dilemma based on incorrect assumptions, because Bukelism is not as effective as it seems.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://icg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2022-10/096-el-salvadors-prison-fever.pdf">recent report</a> from the International Crisis Group, one of the world’s most trusted non-governmental organizations on security issues, shows that drug-related homicide rates had already fallen by 60 per cent before Bukele’s massive crackdown in 2022. The report also points out that democratic countries like Ecuador can’t duplicate Bukelism without trading off democracy. </p>
<p>In fact, by stifling political opposition, imposing presidential control over the judicial, executive and legislative branches and muzzling the media, El Salvador has slipped to the <a href="https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/el-salvador">bottom 25 per cent of countries worldwide in terms of democracy</a> since Bukele was first elected in 2019.</p>
<p>Freedom House’s well-known annual study of political rights and civil liberties worldwide rated El Salvador as “<a href="https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores">partly free</a>” in 2023, along with countries such as Kuwait, Malaysia and Hong Kong.</p>
<h2>Bukelism’s questionable results</h2>
<p>Data from the <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departamento-de-justicia-anuncia-operaci-n-contra-l-deres-clave-de-grupo-criminal-ms-13">U.S. task force Vulcan</a> also show homicide rates have been steadily declining in El Salvador since 2016 due to deals with drug-trafficking gangs. </p>
<p>Bukele’s 2022 crackdown “<a href="https://insightcrime.org/investigations/el-salvador-keeping-lid-on-prisons/">frenzy,” as the think tank Insight Crime calls it</a>, was therefore merely a reaction to the cartels’ decision to disregard the deals they had previously made with the government. </p>
<p>El Salvador’s small population and its unique geography are also key factors in Bukelism’s purported success that don’t always exist elsewhere. Ecuador, for example, has three times El Salvador’s population and a completely different landscape. What’s more, the country’s drug gangs <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/1/11/24034891/ecuador-drugs-cocaine-cartels-violence-murder-daniel-naboa-columbia-crime">can’t be compared to other Latin American drug cartels</a> in terms of financing, weapons and equipment. </p>
<p>The importance of these factors is evident in failed attempts to implement Bukelism elsewhere. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/04/honduras-gangs-crackdown-xiomara-castro">Recent data shows that neighbouring Honduras</a> has failed to achieve significant results adopting similar measures. After more than six months of duplicating El Salvador’s war on gangs, the country still has the <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/honduras-makes-few-advances-against-crime-during-6-month-state-of-exception/">second-highest homicide rate in Latin America</a>. </p>
<p>At the opposite end, Colombia seems to be on track to achieve its new “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/petros-total-peace-plan-turns-one-good-bad-and-ugly">total peace plan</a>” by negotiating with its <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cm5rlrgvkyno">most iconic drug cartels, including the Clan del Golfo</a>, and providing education for impoverished young people.</p>
<h2>Corruption is part of Bukelism</h2>
<p>But perhaps Bukelism’s biggest flaw is its widespread corruption. Despite <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-sanctions-officials-close-el-salvadors-bukele-alleged-corruption-2022-12-09/">U.S sanctions in 2022</a>, the rampant corruption among state entities, the armed forces and the private sector is too often ignored by the media.</p>
<p>This contributes to the false image of Bukele’s efficiency. Given that new laws restricting the <a href="https://rsf.org/en/serious-decline-press-freedom-el-salvador-rsf-and-its-partners-call-national-authorities-safeguard">freedom of the press</a> were recently adopted, and checks and balances such as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/el-salvador">judicial independence are under attack</a>, corruption is unlikely to receive the media attention it warrants in El Salvador.</p>
<p>This perfect storm of corruption, human rights violations, extended military powers, institutional impunity and <a href="https://ovcd.org/en/criminalisation/">criminalization of journalists</a> poses <a href="https://www.wola.org/analysis/states-of-exception-new-security-model-central-america/">serious risks</a> to the region.</p>
<p>Mexico embraced a model similar to Bukelism in the 2010s, and its war on drugs failed, transforming the country into <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/standing-firm/">one of the three worst in the world</a> in terms of the level of violence and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X17719258">human rights violations against environmental activists and journalists</a>.</p>
<p>Ecuador and other nations flirting with Bukelism must not make the same mistake.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marie-Christine Doran receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada-SSHRCC. </span></em></p>Ecuador is soon holding a referendum to decide whether to follow El Salvador’s controversial strategy to end drug trafficking.Marie-Christine Doran, Full Professor of Compared Politics, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259922024-03-19T14:03:12Z2024-03-19T14:03:12ZCocoa beans are in short supply: what this means for farmers, businesses and chocolate lovers<p><em>A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/african-cocoa-plants-run-out-beans-global-chocolate-crisis-deepens-2024-03-13/">shortage</a> of cocoa beans has led to a near shutdown of processing plants in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, the two countries responsible for <a href="https://theconversation.com/cocoa-prices-are-surging-west-african-countries-should-seize-the-moment-to-negotiate-a-better-deal-for-farmers-214305">60% of global production</a>. With chocolate makers around the world reliant on west Africa for cocoa, there is significant concern about the impact on the prices of chocolate and the livelihood of farmers. Cocoa researcher Michael Odijie explains the reasons for the shortage.</em></p>
<h2>Why has cocoa production declined sharply in west Africa?</h2>
<p>Three factors are at play: environmental, economic cycle related and human. </p>
<p>One environmental factor is the impact of the El Niño weather phenomenon, which has caused drier weather in west Africa. It has contributed to problems on farms, such as the swollen shoot virus disease. As a result, Ghana has lost harvests from nearly <a href="https://thecocoapost.com/ghana-loses-over-500000-hectares-of-cocoa-farms-to-swollen-shoot-disease/">500,000 hectares</a> of land in recent years.</p>
<p>The economic cycle of cocoa production refers to the inherent patterns of expansion and contraction in cocoa farming. For example, as cocoa trees age, they become susceptible to diseases, requiring high maintenance costs. Historically, farmers have tended to abandon old farms and start anew in fresh forests. Unfortunately, finding new forests is now increasingly difficult. Perhaps the most severe issue of all is the lack of fair compensation for sustainable cocoa production</p>
<p>The human factor includes challenges such as illegal mining, which has overtaken numerous farms in Ghana. Sometimes, farmers lease their land to illegal miners in exchange for payment. These mining activities degrade the quality of the land, making it unsuitable for cocoa cultivation. </p>
<p>The global market for chocolate and chocolate products is on the <a href="https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/industry-reports/cocoa-and-chocolate-market-100075">rise</a>. It is projected to grow faster than <a href="https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/chocolate-market#:%7E:text=The%20global%20chocolate%20market%20size,key%20driver%20of%20the%20market.">4% annually</a> over the next few years. This growing demand for cocoa underscores the urgency in addressing the intertwined issues that relate to the industry’s sustainability.</p>
<h2>Have west African governments intervened to help cocoa farmers?</h2>
<p>In February 2024, the Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocobod), regulator of the country’s cocoa sector, secured a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ghanas-cocobod-taps-200-mln-world-bank-loan-rebuild-disease-hit-cocoa-farms-2024-02-16/">World Bank loan</a> of US$200 million to rehabilitate plantations affected by the cocoa swollen shoot virus. The board will take over the disease-ridden farms, remove and replace the afflicted cocoa trees, and nurture the new plantings to the fruiting stage before returning them to the farmers.</p>
<p>This practice of Cocobod taking out loans to assist farmers is a longstanding one in Ghana. For instance, in 2018, Cocobod <a href="https://thecocoapost.com/cocobod-afdb-loan/">used part</a> of a $600 million loan from the African Development Bank to rehabilitate aging plantations and those hit by diseases. And at the start of the current harvest season in October, the <a href="https://www.cighci.org/ghana-announces-cocoa-producer-price-for-2023-24-crop-season/">producer price was raised</a>: farmers are paid more, a move made inevitable by the surge in global prices. Also, Ghana Cocobod has established a <a href="https://starrfm.com.gh/2024/03/cocobod-taskforce-arrests-illegal-mining-gang-leaders-in-atobrakrom/">task force</a> to shield cocoa farms from the harmful impacts of mining. It has cooperated with police to stem the smuggling of cocoa to neighbouring countries, particularly those that offer a stronger currency.</p>
<p>In Côte d'Ivoire, relatively little action has been taken. It appears the government is still assessing the situation. But there have been <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-02-16/ivory-coast-seizes-100-tons-of-cocoa-at-the-border-with-guinea">measures</a> to curb smuggling of cocoa, prompted by the fact that the shortage is driving up prices in neighbouring countries. Côte d'Ivoire does benefit from numerous sustainability programmes initiated by multinational corporations. The current shortage has accelerated these initiatives. Regrettably, some of the programmes do not disclose their data, making it difficult for academics to access and analyse their information.</p>
<p>African governments have yet to address significant structural issues in their interventions.</p>
<h2>How have cocoa farmers and cocoa-producing countries’ economies been affected?</h2>
<p>At the farm level, although the rise in prices may initially appear beneficial to farmers, the reality is not straightforward. A decrease in output leads to fewer harvests on average, which means that, overall, farmers are not earning more. This issue is compounded by recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanas-economic-crisis-expert-insights-into-how-things-got-so-bad-and-what-the-fixes-are-193153">economic challenges in west Africa</a>, such as high inflation and currency devaluation, particularly in Ghana. These factors have resulted in farmers becoming poorer.</p>
<p>Another impact of the output decline is a reduction in local processing. Major African processing facilities in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana have either ceased operations or reduced their processing capacity because they cannot afford to purchase beans. This likely means that chocolate prices worldwide will surge. This, in turn, adversely affects the local production units that have been emerging in recent years. </p>
<p>However, the bargaining power of west African cocoa-producing countries seems to have increased. Now is an opportune moment for these nations to unite and negotiate more favourable terms for their cocoa farmers. </p>
<h2>Will chocolate makers eventually turn to cocoa alternatives?</h2>
<p>It’s inevitable because continuing to cultivate cocoa under current conditions is unsustainable. I don’t perceive this negatively; I hope it occurs sooner rather than later. In fact, it is already underway with the rise of cocoa butter equivalents, cocoa extenders and artificial flavours (synthetic or nature-identical flavours that mimic the taste of chocolate without the need for cocoa). </p>
<p>The German company Planet A Foods is a leader in this area. It produces cocoa-free chocolate, using technology to transform ingredients such as oats and sunflower seeds into substitutes for cocoa mass and butter. </p>
<p>Overall, this is beneficial for everyone. The demand for cocoa has <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-real-cost-of-your-chocolate-habit-new-research-reveals-the-bittersweet-truth-of-cocoa-farming-in-africas-forests-206082">resulted</a> in mass deforestation and significant carbon emissions, issues that are likely to worsen due to climate change. Moreover, the push for cultivation has led to various forms of labour abuses. Exploring cocoa alternatives is certainly part of the solution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225992/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael E Odijie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Major African cocoa plants in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana have stopped or cut processing because they cannot afford to buy beans.Michael E Odijie, Research associate, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212172024-02-19T19:05:01Z2024-02-19T19:05:01ZAfter years of avoiding extradition, Julian Assange’s appeal is likely his last chance. Here’s how it might unfold (and how we got here)<p>On February 20 and 21, Julian Assange will ask the High Court of England and Wales to reverse a decision from June last year allowing the United Kingdom to extradite him to the United States. </p>
<p>There he faces multiple counts of computer misuse and espionage stemming from his work with WikiLeaks, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/20/julian-assange">publishing sensitive</a> US government documents provided by Chelsea Manning. The US government has repeatedly claimed that Assange’s actions <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/jul/29/julian-assange-us-rejects-australias-calls-to-free-wikileaks-founder-during-ausmin-talks">risked its national security</a>.</p>
<p>This is the final avenue of appeal in the UK, although Stella Assange, Julian’s wife, has indicated he would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/julian-assanges-appeal-against-us-extradition-is-life-or-death-wife-says-2024-02-15/">seek an order</a> from the European Court of Human Rights if he loses the application for appeal. The European Court, an international court that hears cases under the European Convention on Human Rights, can issue orders that are binding on convention member states. In 2022, an order from the court <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/jun/14/european-court-humam-right-makes-11th-hour-intervention-in-rwanda-asylum-seeker-plan">stopped the UK</a> sending asylum seekers to Rwanda pending a full review of the relevant legislation.</p>
<p>The extradition process has been running for nearly five years. Over such a long time, it’s easy to lose track of the sequence of events that led to this. Here’s how we got here, and what might happen next.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-hill-australias-bid-for-julian-assanges-freedom-presents-formidable-problems-for-joe-biden-213152">View from The Hill: Australia's bid for Julian Assange's freedom presents formidable problems for Joe Biden</a>
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<h2>Years-long extradition attempt</h2>
<p>From 2012 until May 2019, Assange resided in the Ecuadorian embassy in London after breaching bail on unrelated allegations. While he remained in the embassy, the police could not arrest him without the permission of the Ecuadorian government. </p>
<p>In 2019, Ecuador allowed Assange’s arrest. He was then convicted of breaching bail conditions, and imprisoned in Belmarsh Prison, where he’s remained during the extradition proceedings. Shortly after his arrest, the United States <a href="https://theconversation.com/assanges-new-indictment-espionage-and-the-first-amendment-117785">laid charges against Assange</a> and requested his extradition from the United Kingdom.</p>
<p>Assange immediately challenged the extradition request. After delays due to COVID, in January 2021, the District Court decided the extradition <a href="https://theconversation.com/julian-assanges-extradition-victory-offers-cold-comfort-for-press-freedom-152676">could not proceed</a> because it would be “oppressive” to Assange. </p>
<p>The ruling was based on the likely conditions that Assange would face in an American prison and the high risk that he would attempt suicide. The court rejected all other arguments against extradition.</p>
<p>The American government appealed the District Court decision. It provided assurances on prison conditions for Assange to overcome the finding that the extradition would be oppressive. Those assurances led to the High Court <a href="https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/2021005727/casereport_3d8af061-9914-4a2d-bd2d-fa5260deeb2c/html">overturning the order</a> stopping extradition. Then the Supreme Court (the UK’s top court) refused Assange’s request to appeal that ruling. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-rocky-diplomatic-road-julian-assanges-hopes-of-avoiding-extradition-take-a-blow-as-us-pushes-back-210806">A rocky diplomatic road: Julian Assange's hopes of avoiding extradition take a blow as US pushes back</a>
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<p>The extradition request then passed to the home secretary, who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2022/jun/17/julian-assange-extradition-to-us-approved-by-priti-patel">approved it</a>. Assange appealed the home secretary’s decision, which a single judge of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/jun/09/julian-assange-dangerously-close-to-us-extradition-after-losing-latest-legal-appeal">High Court rejected</a> in June 2023. </p>
<p>This appeal is against that most recent ruling and will be heard by a two-judge bench. These judges will only decide whether Assange has grounds for appeal. If they decide in his favour, the court will schedule a full hearing of the merits of the appeal. That hearing would come at the cost of further delay in the resolution of his case.</p>
<h2>Growing political support</h2>
<p>Parallel to the legal challenges, Assange’s supporters have led a political campaign to stop the prosecution and the extradition. One goal of the campaign has been to persuade the Australian government to argue Assange’s case with the American government. </p>
<p>Cross-party support from individual parliamentarians has steadily grown, led by independent MP Andrew Wilkie. Over the past two years, the government, including the foreign minister and the prime minister, have made stronger and clearer statements that the <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/julian-assange-the-state-of-play-at-the-end-of-2023/">prosecution should end</a>. </p>
<p>On February 14, Wilkie proposed a <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=chamber/hansardr/27604/&sid=0001">motion</a> in support of Assange, seconded by Labor MP Josh Wilson. The house was asked to “underline the importance of the UK and USA bringing the matter to a close so that Mr Assange can return home to his family in Australia.” It was passed.</p>
<p>In addition, Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/14/australian-mps-pass-motion-urging-us-and-uk-to-allow-julian-assange-to-return-to-australia">confirmed</a> he had recently raised the Assange prosecution with his American counterpart, who has the authority to end it.</p>
<h2>What will Assange’s team argue?</h2>
<p>For the High Court appeal, it is expected Assange’s legal team will once again argue the extradition would be oppressive and that the American assurances are inadequate. A recent <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/02/un-special-rapporteur-torture-urges-uk-government-halt-imminent-extradition">statement</a> by Alice Edwards, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, supports their argument that extradition could lead to treatment “amounting to torture or other forms of ill-treatment or punishment”. She rejected the adequacy of American assurances, saying:</p>
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<p>They are not legally binding, are limited in their scope, and the person the assurances aim to protect may have no recourse if they are violated.</p>
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<p>The argument that extradition would be oppressive remains the strongest ground for appeal. However, it is likely Assange’s lawyers will also repeat some of the arguments which were unsuccessful in the District Court proceedings. </p>
<p>One argument is that the charges against Assange, particularly the espionage charges, are political offences. The United States–United Kingdom extradition treaty does not allow either state to extradite for political offences. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-charges-does-julian-assange-face-and-whats-likely-to-happen-next-115362">Explainer: what charges does Julian Assange face, and what's likely to happen next?</a>
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<p>Assange is also likely to re-run the argument that his leaks of classified documents were exercises of his right to freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights. To date, the European Court of Human Rights has never found that an extradition request violates freedom of expression. For the High Court to do so would be an innovative ruling. </p>
<p>The High Court will hear two days of legal argument and might not give its judgement immediately, but it will probably be delivered soon after the hearing. Whatever the decision, Assange’s supporters will continue their political campaign, supported by the Australian government, to stop the prosecution. </p>
<p><em>Correction: An earlier version of this article incorrectly stated Julian Assange lived in the Ecuadorian embassy after breaching bail on unrelated charges. He had not been charged with any offences and was instead wanted for questioning in Sweden over sexual assault allegations. The Swedish investigation has since been dropped with no charges laid.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Holly Cullen has been a volunteer for the Australian Labor Party, including for Josh Wilson, MP.</span></em></p>Efforts to extradite Wikileaks founder Julian Assange from the UK to the US have gone on for years. Here’s what’s been going on and what might happen in court this time.Holly Cullen, Adjunct professor, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229592024-02-13T13:21:38Z2024-02-13T13:21:38ZIn the face of severe challenges, democracy is under stress – but still supported – across Latin America and the Caribbean<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575051/original/file-20240212-22-f6zizy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C179%2C5700%2C3615&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in El Salvador declare 'Yes to democracy. No to authoritarianism' during a demonstration on Jan. 14, 2024.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/women-walk-holding-up-a-sign-with-the-legend-yes-to-news-photo/1925903965?adppopup=true">PHOTOGRAFIA/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Threats to economic and physical security have become persistent and pervasive across Latin America and the Caribbean – and that is affecting the way people view the state of democracy in the region.</p>
<p>Those are among the findings of the latest <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/about-americasbarometer.php">AmericasBarometer</a>, a study of the experiences and attitudes of people across the Western Hemisphere that we conduct every two years along with other members of Vanderbilt University’s <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/">LAPOP Lab</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2023/AB2023-Pulse-of-Democracy-final-20231205.pdf">2023 round of AmericasBarometer</a>, which includes nationally representative surveys of 39,074 individuals across 24 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, reveals widespread pessimism and adversity, decreased satisfaction with the status quo, and yet also resilience in popular support for democracy.</p>
<h2>Elevated economic and physical insecurity</h2>
<p>Across the region, just shy of two-thirds of adults (64%) think the national economic situation in their country has worsened. Remarkably, 32% report that they have run out of food in the last three months, an indicator of food insecurity that tracks with <a href="https://www.paho.org/en/news/9-11-2023-new-report-432-million-people-suffer-hunger-latin-america-and-caribbean-and-region">estimates reported by the Pan-American Health Organization</a>.</p>
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<p>Two in five people feel unsafe in their neighborhoods, and nearly one-quarter – 22% – report having been the victim of a crime in the past 12 months. Homicide rates in the region <a href="https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/behind-a-rise-in-latin-americas-violent-crime-a-deadly-flow-of-illegal-guns/">have also been rising</a>.</p>
<p>In brief, despite variation among different countries, the average resident of the region has been facing elevated economic and physical security challenges for over a decade, our surveys have found.</p>
<p>The factors generating and sustaining this reality are complex.</p>
<p>In the mid-2010s, a global economic <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres15_e/pr752_e.htm">commodity boom ended</a>, and the region’s economic recovery has been thwarted by <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/latin-america-economic-growth/">structural issues</a>, including <a href="https://www.undp.org/latin-america/publications/trapped-inequality-and-economic-growth-latin-america-and-caribbean">low productivity and high income inequality</a>. Economic recovery has been further hampered by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/the-corruption-scandal-started-in-brazil-now-its-wreaking-havoc-in-peru/2018/01/23/0f9bc4ca-fad2-11e7-9b5d-bbf0da31214d_story.html">major corruption scandals</a>, <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/WH/Issues/2023/10/13/regional-economic-outlook-western-hemisphere-october-2023">crime and violence</a>, and <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/effects-covid-19-latin-americas-economy">the COVID-19 pandemic</a>.</p>
<p>The implications of a sustained economic slump are stark. In nearly every Latin American and Caribbean country, <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2023/AB2023-Pulse-of-Democracy-final-20231205.pdf">food insecurity has increased in the past decade</a>.</p>
<p>The uptick in crime and insecurity is similarly driven by a range of factors, including <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/GIVAS_Final_Report.pdf">economic crises</a> and the growth of <a href="https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/behind-a-rise-in-latin-americas-violent-crime-a-deadly-flow-of-illegal-guns/">well-armed transnational criminal syndicates</a>. In Ecuador, as one extreme example shows, a shocking <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2023/AB2023-Pulse-of-Democracy-final-20231205.pdf">36% of adults report having been the victim</a> of at least one crime in the past year, an 11-percentage-point increase from just two years ago.</p>
<h2>Disillusionment is a challenge to democracy</h2>
<p>These problems could spell trouble for democracy in the region.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-can-latin-america-halt-its-democratic-backsliding-and-how-can-the-us-help/">experts have predicted</a> that financial stress and food insecurity could contribute to political unrest in the region in the coming years. The threat of organized crime and gang violence may also <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/organized-crime-threat-latin-american-democracies">fuel a desire for authoritarian leadership</a>. </p>
<p>Globally, <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf">democracy appears to be on the defensive</a>. Within the Latin America and the Caribbean, countries such as Brazil, El Salvador, Haiti and Nicaragua have registered <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf">recent turns toward authoritarianism</a>.</p>
<p>Our results show that disillusionment with the democratic status quo is strikingly high in the region, <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2023/AB2023-Pulse-of-Democracy-final-20231205.pdf">with only 40% thinking democracy is working</a>. This low level of satisfaction has appeared in our surveys for the past 10 years.</p>
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<p>Although the root causes are debated, disillusionment with the status quo <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/13/opinion/international-world/democracy-latin-america.html">fuels support for populist leaders</a> with autocratic tendencies. El Salvador stands as an example of how disillusionment can undermine democracy. President Nayib Bukele was reelected on Feb. 4, 2024, with what appears to be over <a href="https://apnews.com/article/el-salvador-nayib-bukele-president-reelection-ef04e20d901908099f4f787b841aca89">80% of the vote</a> while overtly flaunting democratic norms.</p>
<p>During his first term, Bukele tackled high levels of gang violence with policies that <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/latin-america-erupts-millennial-authoritarianism-in-el-salvador/">undermined checks and balances and civil liberties</a>. He cheekily <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/presidente-bukele-dice-que-es-el-dictador-mas-cool-del-mundo-619795">referred to himself on social media as a “dictator”</a>, while his running mate spoke of their <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/world/americas/el-salvador-bukele-election.html">program to eliminate democracy</a>.</p>
<p>There is no denying that Bukele’s strongman approach has delivered results: Our survey finds that 84% of Salvadorans feel secure in their neighborhood, <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/raw-data.php">compared with just 54% in 2018</a>, the year before Bukele was elected. Food insecurity remains a challenge, <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2023/AB2023-Pulse-of-Democracy-final-20231205.pdf">with 28%</a> reporting they have experienced running out of food; yet that statistic is slightly lower in 2023 than it was in 2012, in contrast to the upward trend in nearly all other countries.</p>
<h2>Democracy retains popular support</h2>
<p>Despite general gloom about how well democracy is performing, there is reason for optimism: Support for democratic governance has largely held steady over the last decade of our survey.</p>
<p>Across the region, on average, <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2023/AB2023-Pulse-of-Democracy-final-20231205.pdf">58% say that they believe democracy is the best form of government</a>. This is approximately the same percentage we have recorded since 2016. In all but three countries – Guatemala, Honduras and Suriname – majorities say they prefer democracy.</p>
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<p>Although the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-can-latin-america-halt-its-democratic-backsliding-and-how-can-the-us-help/">possibility of democratic backsliding looms</a>, most countries in the region have yet to undergo significant overhauls to their political or economic systems. And as former U.S. ambassador to Peru, Colombia and Brazil <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/inflection-point-challenges-facing-latin-america-and-us-policy-region">P. Michael McKinley noted</a> in a recent article, a slate of radical proposals by new leaders in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico proved unpopular and were rejected by voters, courts and legislatures. In these cases, democratic institutions are doing their job.</p>
<p>Democratic governance also delivers something that strongman populist governments do not: widespread freedom of speech.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2021/2021_LAPOP_AmericasBarometer_2021_Pulse_of_Democracy.pdf">2021 AmericasBarometer regional report</a> highlighted <a href="https://theconversation.com/support-for-democracy-is-waning-across-the-americas-174992">the value the public places on freedom of speech</a>. Vast majorities say they would not trade away freedom of speech for material well-being.</p>
<p>In 2023, we see that in countries with strongman populist leaders, those who disapprove of the president report strikingly high levels of concern about freedom of speech. In El Salvador, <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2023/AB2023-Pulse-of-Democracy-final-20231205.pdf">89% of government critics say they have too little freedom</a> to express their political views without fear, up from 70% in 2016.</p>
<p>In the face of significant challenges, Latin America and the Caribbean is at a crossroads between the allure of strongman populist leadership and a commitment to democratic institutions and processes. For now, at least, an enduring belief in democracy may facilitate <a href="https://apnews.com/article/el-salvador-nayib-bukele-president-reelection-ef04e20d901908099f4f787b841aca89">efforts by leaders in</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/06/us/politics/biden-democracy-threat.html">outside the region</a> to champion and strengthen democratic governance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222959/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Noam Lupu co-directs the AmericasBarometer, which has been supported by grants from USAID, the US National Science Foundation, and the Inter-American Development Bank. The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or any other funding agency.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth J. Zechmeister co-directs the AmericasBarometer, which has been supported by grants from USAID, the US National Science Foundation, and the Inter-American Development Bank. The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or any other funding agency.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Plutowski is a staff member at LAPOP Lab, the lab responsible for the AmericasBarometer, which has been supported by grants from USAID, the US National Science Foundation, and the Inter-American Development Bank. The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or any other funding agency.</span></em></p>A survey of people across 24 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean found widespread concern over the economy and crime.Noam Lupu, Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of LAPOP Lab, Vanderbilt UniversityElizabeth J. Zechmeister, Cornelius Vanderbilt Professor of Political Science and Director of LAPOP, Vanderbilt UniversityLuke Plutowski, Senior Statistician and Research Lead, Vanderbilt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230532024-02-08T13:38:04Z2024-02-08T13:38:04ZAmericans spend millions of dollars on Valentine’s Day roses. I calculated exactly how much<p>Feb. 14 is Valentine’s Day – an occasion that traditionally combines romance with big business. One of the biggest businesses is selling roses, which Americans increasingly love. Back in 1989, about 1 billion cut roses were sold annually in the U.S. By 2023, that had risen to roughly 2.8 billion – enough to give <a href="https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/08/united-states-adult-population-grew-faster-than-nations-total-population-from-2010-to-2020.html">every adult in the country</a> a bouquet of 10. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.bu.edu/questrom/">business school</a> professor who studies the <a href="http://businessmacroeconomics.com/">economic impact</a> of holidays, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/jay-zagorsky-58a90825a/">I wondered</a> how much money Americans spend on roses each year while I was standing in line with two dozen red and pink ones for my sweetheart. </p>
<p>It’s not easy to find out. The National Retail Federation estimates <a href="https://nrf.com/media-center/press-releases/valentines-day-spending-significant-others-reach-new-record-nrf-survey">people will spend US$2.6 billion on Valentine’s Day flowers</a>, but that includes everything from azaleas to zinnias. The Society of American Florists says that <a href="https://safnow.org/aboutflowers/holidays-occasions/valentines-day/valentines-day-floral-statistics/">250 million roses</a> are produced for the holiday, but it doesn’t estimate spending.</p>
<p>So I decided to investigate. And what I found was surprising: The roses in my hand were tied to the war on illegal drugs.</p>
<h2>Where are those roses coming from?</h2>
<p>Roses sold in the U.S. were once largely homegrown but are now <a href="https://dataweb.usitc.gov/">mainly imported</a> from South America. To learn more, I turned to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which for decades has tracked the number of domestic farms and nurseries selling cut roses. These farms are different from nurseries growing rose bushes sold in pots to landscapers and gardeners.</p>
<p>Back in 1970, there were <a href="https://agcensus.library.cornell.edu/wp-content/uploads/1969-Horticultural_Specialties-U.S._TABLES-660-Table-05.pdf">almost 800 U.S. commercial farms</a> and nurseries growing cut roses. U.S. cut-rose growers were powerhouses, selling almost half a billion roses annually.</p>
<p>But since the 1970s, American cut-rose growers have withered away. The USDA’s latest <a href="https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2017/Online_Resources/Census_of_Horticulture_Specialties/hortic_1_0013_0013.pdf">Census of Horticultural Specialties</a> found about 110 farms and nurseries growing cut roses. These farms harvested only about 18 million roses, which is quite a comedown over 50 years.</p>
<p>So <a href="https://aei.ag/2022/02/14/valentines-flower-imports-trends/">where are roses coming from now</a>? In 2023, the <a href="https://dataweb.usitc.gov/">U.S. imported</a> about 2.8 billion cut roses. The Netherlands, site of the <a href="https://www.visitaalsmeer.nl/en/facts-flower-auction-aalsmeer/">world’s largest flower auction</a>, isn’t the answer. Instead, cut roses sold in the U.S. primarily come from two places: Colombia and Ecuador. <a href="https://emergingmarkets.today/colombia-blooms-the-growing-business-of-flower-exports-2023/">Colombia provides</a> almost 60% of our roses, and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220715-no-bed-of-roses-for-ecuador-s-flower-industry">Ecuador almost</a> 40%.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574189/original/file-20240207-20-x7p3w1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two security agents dressed in black inspect cardboard boxes filled with white and yellow flowers." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574189/original/file-20240207-20-x7p3w1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574189/original/file-20240207-20-x7p3w1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574189/original/file-20240207-20-x7p3w1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574189/original/file-20240207-20-x7p3w1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574189/original/file-20240207-20-x7p3w1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574189/original/file-20240207-20-x7p3w1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574189/original/file-20240207-20-x7p3w1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. Customs and Border Protection agriculture specialists inspect imported roses ahead of Mother’s Day in May 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/redondo-beach-ca-united-states-customs-and-border-news-photo/1253740698?adppopup=true">Jay L. Clendenin/Los Angeles Times/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why Colombia and Ecuador?</h2>
<p>The shift from U.S.-grown roses to South American ones happened a few decades ago, when the U.S. and Colombian governments were looking for new ways to <a href="https://tradevistas.org/rose-how-trade-policy-was-used-to-fight-drugs-from-colombia/">stem the flow of cocaine</a> into the U.S.</p>
<p>One part of the strategy was to convince farmers in Colombia to stop growing coca leaves – a traditional Andean plant that provides the raw ingredient for making cocaine – by giving them preferential access to U.S. markets if they grew something else.</p>
<p>So, in the early 1990s, Colombia and Ecuador signed the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. Signing gave these coca-producing countries duty-free access to U.S. markets in exchange for clamping down on growing illegal drugs.</p>
<p>Whether the act <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-flowers-you-buy-your-mom-for-mothers-day-may-be-tied-to-the-us-war-on-drugs-138162">stopped drug production is unclear</a>, but many businesses in Colombia and Ecuador started growing and shipping flowers north.</p>
<h2>Prices for roses</h2>
<p>The vast quantity of roses coming up from Colombia and Ecuador has kept rose prices in check. The <a href="https://www.marketnews.usda.gov/mnp/fv-help-02">USDA has tracked</a> the price of a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/plant/tea-rose">dozen red hybrid tea roses</a> – the ones you commonly see being offered to romantic partners on Valentine’s Day – sold in major supermarkets weekly since 2011. Back in 2011, a dozen roses would set a buyer back a bit over $10. In 2023, the same arrangement cost around two dollars more, a price increase of 20%. Inflation went up 35% over the same time, making roses comparatively cheaper.</p>
<p>While rose prices are low during much of the year, they have large seasonal swings. In a typical year, <a href="https://www.marketnews.usda.gov/mnp/fv-report-retail?&commodity=ROSE,+HYBRID+TEA&repDate=01/01/2023&repType=wiz&endDate=09/01/2023&run=Run&type=retail&compareLy=No&locChoose=locState&portal=fv&commodityClass=allcommodity&region=NATIONAL&class=ORNAMENTALS&organic=ALL&startIndex=1">supermarket prices for a dozen roses</a> double around Valentine’s Day. Last year, <a href="https://www.marketnews.usda.gov/mnp/fv-report-retail?&commodity=ROSE,+HYBRID+TEA&repDate=01/01/2023&repType=wiz&endDate=09/01/2023&run=Run&type=retail&compareLy=No&locChoose=locState&portal=fv&commodityClass=allcommodity&region=NATIONAL&class=ORNAMENTALS&organic=ALL&startIndex=1">prices ranged</a> from a low in August of about $8 to almost $23 before Valentine’s Day. While the USDA doesn’t track flower shop prices, visiting my local florist shows the cost of <a href="https://www.winstonflowers.com/rose-collection/cat5100126">premium long-stem roses in vases</a> is higher.</p>
<h2>Why the price increase?</h2>
<p>Prices rise around Valentine’s Day as all parts of the supply chain, from growers to wholesalers to retailers, are stressed during the buying surge.</p>
<p>The U.S. government tracks monthly the <a href="https://www.usitc.gov/">import price</a> of single roses. In 2023, before Valentine’s Day, the average cut rose stem cost 40 cents <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/bespoke/made-on-earth/the-new-roots-of-the-flower-trade/">coming off the cargo plane</a>. This is higher than the annual low in August of 25 cents a stem. This means in August, roses cost wholesalers $3 a dozen, while a dozen Valentine’s Day roses cost $5 after clearing customs.</p>
<p>The USDA not only tracks prices in supermarkets but also <a href="https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/b2773v71t">wholesale flower prices</a> in my city, Boston. Retail customers can’t buy flowers at these prices, since the <a href="http://www.newenglandflowerexchange.com/home.html">flower market caters</a> only to people in the trade. Just before Valentine’s Day 2024, <a href="https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/b2773v71t/zp38z133b/9880xb84f/BH_FV201.PDF">Boston wholesalers were charging</a> between $1 and $1.65 per stem of hybrid tea roses. <a href="https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/b2773v71t/2j62tn33p/k643ch93t/BH_FV201.TXT">Back in August 2023</a>, they were selling roses for between 90 cents and $1.50 per stem. These wholesale prices suggest supermarkets don’t make much if any money selling roses most of the year, earning profits only during the peak holiday times.</p>
<p>While none of the sources directly answered my question on how much money Americans spent on roses each year, it’s easy to calculate a rough value. In 2023, there were around 2.8 billion cut roses sold. Given the average price in supermarkets over the whole year for a dozen roses was a bit over $12, this means people in the U.S. are spending more than $3 billion annually.</p>
<p>And if you’re buying roses for your sweetheart, like I did for mine, then you’re contributing to the roughly half a billion dollars worth of roses bought to say “I love you” at Valentine’s Day.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223053/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jay L. Zagorsky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Coming to grips with the economics of roses can be a thorny issue.Jay L. Zagorsky, Associate Professor of Markets, Public Policy and Law, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214292024-01-22T14:55:15Z2024-01-22T14:55:15ZDeep-seated inequality is fuelling an escalation of violence across Latin America<p>For most of the 20th century, Latin America was portrayed as one of the world’s most peaceful regions. Coups and repressive military regimes had long been commonplace but widespread civil disorder and war were relatively rare. Today, however, the world’s media is slowly waking up to a <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/latin-america-erupts-the-danger-of-democratic-delinquency/">very different reality</a>.</p>
<p>Surging levels of violence now mean that mortality rates in Latin America often exceed those seen in the world’s conflict areas. In 2021, Latin America had the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/GSH23_ExSum.pdf">highest murder rate</a> in the world at almost three times the global regional average.</p>
<p>Ecuador is one country that has seen a particularly massive spike in violence in recent years. Masked gunmen <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-67930452">stormed</a> a live news broadcast on January 9 and the prosecutor investigating the attack was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-68014040">murdered</a> just days later.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ecuadors-crackdown-on-violent-crime-helped-turn-the-country-into-a-narco-state-220920">Ecuador's crackdown on violent crime helped turn the country into a narco state</a>
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<p>The explosion of violence in the region is being caused by a number of mutually reinforcing factors. Notably, deep-rooted inequalities and a weak state have allowed a destabilising narcotics economy to flourish.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Armed gangsters storm TV station in Ecuador.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Forever unequal</h2>
<p>Latin America has long been the most unequal area of the world in terms of income and wealth. But this inequality has worsened over recent decades. In 2021, Brazil’s wealthiest 1% <a href="https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04166852/document">owned</a> 47% of the country’s wealth, up from 45% in 2006. The increase was even greater for the top 0.01%, with their wealth share rising from 12% to 18%.</p>
<p>Unlike other middle-income areas, the economic structure of the region is still based on exporting primary products – something that has remained largely unchanged since colonial times. This dependence has deepened as Latin America feeds the growing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/specialization-latam-exports-china-shows-worrying-trend-un-report-says-2023-11-02/">demand from China</a> for its minerals and foodstuffs.</p>
<p>Relying on the export of primary products has <a href="https://www.oasisbr.ibict.br/vufind/Record/UNIFAP-1_25b9cf30e04a53a0d1b7befc7f7dd0d7">reinforced inequality</a> because the expansion of large-scale commercial farming and mining has blocked moves towards agrarian reform. </p>
<p>As a result, there has been a surge in the <a href="https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp-land-power-inequality-latin-america-301116-en.pdf">migration</a> of school-leavers to urban areas in search of work. However, by anchoring this highly capital-intensive economic model, any serious attempt at industrialisation and labour-intensive job creation – akin to what has taken place in much of south and south-east Asia – has been stymied.</p>
<p>The long history of anti-communism promoted by successive US administrations during and after the cold war, coupled with a Catholic church that has become deeply conservative in recent decades, has also hindered attempts at social democratic reform and inclusive development. This has seen the <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-gb/The+New+Latin+America-p-9781509540020">collapse of revolutionary movements</a> with a progressive agenda capable of bringing about the structural reforms the region so desperately needs. </p>
<p>Consequently, <a href="https://www.ilo.org/caribbean/newsroom/WCMS_867540/lang--en/index.htm#:%7E:text=The%20estimated%20average%20regional%20unemployment,level%20of%208%20per%20cent">underemployment</a> is rife – a major factor propelling <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/22/1221006083/immigration-border-election-presidential">soaring illegal immigration</a> to the US. Over half of workers in Latin America are employed informally with job instability, low income and no social protection.</p>
<h2>The illegal drug trade</h2>
<p>But a new factor – the narcotics industry – has emerged in recent decades with a deadly impact. Colombia is now the world’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/20/colombia-cocaine-decriminalize-petro/">largest producer of cocaine</a> and Mexico is fast becoming a global producer of <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400">heroin and fentanyl</a>.</p>
<p>The emergence of narcotics has built on and reinforced the deep-rooted inequality that affects the region. Young and underemployed migrants to urban areas provide the foot soldiers for the growth of extremely powerful narcotics gangs. The <a href="https://greydynamics.com/primeiro-comando-da-capital-pcc-from-sao-paulo-to-the-world/">Primeiro Comando da Capital</a> in Brazil is now one of the largest gangs in the world with over 30,000 members and a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/20fb5c77-baf1-45ab-a886-51cac68cfd4e">growing global reach</a>.</p>
<p>Narcotics gangs <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cd9d4d72-1266-4441-81e0-6259cba864ae">now exist</a> in every Latin American country and are driving homicide trends across the region. They seek to co-opt and corrupt rather than challenge the power of the state. But this is <a href="https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/aq-podcast-how-organized-crime-is-changing-in-latin-america/">likely to change</a>.</p>
<p>International development organisations that operate in the region have long been lamenting its “institutional fragility” and the falling level of citizen trust. They <a href="https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/the-pulse-of-democracy-in-the-americas-results-of-the-2023-americasbarometer/">call for</a> governance reforms, but nothing fundamental ever changes.</p>
<p>A main reason for this dismal governance is inequality – a bloated public administration characterised by <a href="https://americasquarterly.org/article/latin-americas-inequality-is-taking-a-toll-on-governance/">“clientelism”</a> (the practice of choosing or promoting people in return for political support).</p>
<p>But the flip side is the virtual absence of a professional ethic and collective memory inside the civil service. Public sector corruption thus remains endemic within the government, police, armed forces and prison system.</p>
<h2>Failing states</h2>
<p>The most striking feature of the weak governance encouraging this gradual slide towards failed states is now rampant corruption from top to bottom of the judicial system, thanks to the infiltration of drug gangs. Personal insecurity has become the daily norm for the urban poor and the rule of law simply does not exist for most citizens.</p>
<p>When a poor person is killed – whether by state repression, settling of scores among narcos, street robbery or extortion – no criminal investigation usually takes place unless relatives have the resources to hire a lawyer. The crime prosecution rate is minimal and the vast majority of inmates in overcrowded prisons are poor people awaiting trial.</p>
<p>As a result, the capacity of the state to counter the gradual spread of narcotics is extremely limited. This vulnerability has already produced the first example of a narco state – Honduras under the presidency of Juan Orlando Hernández (2014–2022). On leaving office in April 2022, Hernández was <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/juan-orlando-hern%C3%A1ndez-former-president-honduras-indicted-drug-trafficking">extradited</a> to the US to face charges of drug trafficking and money laundering. </p>
<p>The Latin American elite try to justify the current economic model as providing food security and mineral resources for the growing world population. Yet the elite remain in denial about the violent consequences of this model. </p>
<p>There is a risk that Latin America’s very role as a bread basket will convert it into a basket case of perpetual civil disorder.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221429/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Nickson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Latin America’s spike in violence is the result of systemic problems that have long gone unaddressed.Andrew Nickson, Honorary Reader in the Department of International Development, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209202024-01-18T12:14:15Z2024-01-18T12:14:15ZEcuador’s crackdown on violent crime helped turn the country into a narco state<p>An unprecedented surge in violence in Ecuador recently has captured global attention, especially after a gang took control of a television station <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/9/several-police-kidnapped-in-ecuador-after-state-of-emergency-declared">during a live broadcast</a> on January 9. Once considered to be a haven for peace and stability in the region, as of 2023 Ecuador has earned the infamous distinction of being <a href="https://www.nuso.org/articulo/como-ecuador-descendio-al-infierno-homicida/">the most violent country</a> in Latin America.</p>
<p>The recent gang violence in Ecuador is just a symptom of a deeper issue affecting countries across the region. The unrest is rooted in the erosion of state capacity as a result of government austerity measures across Latin America. It has created fertile ground for the growth of criminal gangs. </p>
<p>Austerity, the recipe adopted by recent governments in Ecuador, has enmeshed the country into global financial capital networks, compromising its sovereignty. As the painful consequences of austerity have become evident, the state now is <a href="https://www.planv.com.ec/historias/cronica/el-estatuto-la-permanencia-tropas-eeuu-ecuador-esta-pactado#:%7E:text=Ecuador%20y%20EE.UU.%20firmaron%2C%20el%206%20de%20octubre,si%20este%20debe%20ser%20aprobado%20por%20la%20Asamblea.">inviting foreign military intervention</a> and has signed an agreement with Washington for the permanent deployment of US troops in the country.</p>
<p>But austerity alone does not explain the escalation of violence. There are other variables that should be considered. One of them is financial deregulation as part of increased capital needs of <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/seven-myths-about-dollarization-latin-america">dollarisation</a>. As Ecuador adopted the US dollar as its currency, it made foreign investors more likely to invest in the country. </p>
<p>However, dollarisation facilitated also money laundering, and made Ecuador appealing for drug traffickers and international mafias. It is no surprise that Ecuador is now the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-58829554">primary conduit</a> for the shipment of cocaine to Europe from across the region.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the declaration of an “<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/understanding-ecuadors-internal-armed-conflict/a-67969203">internal armed conflict</a>” by the current administration may align with the Ecuadorean people’s plea for immediate solutions. But this tends to obscure the responsibility for the failure of previous and current governments in dealing with structural violence.</p>
<h2>Looking at the past to understand the present</h2>
<p>Regrettably, the current challenges in Ecuador partly stem from efforts to address criminality. For example, during the administration of Rafael Correa between 2012 and 2017, there was a <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-01-13/violence-in-ecuador-a-new-long-standing-problem.html">surge in the prison populations</a>. </p>
<p>This had the unintended effect of prisons evolving into focal points for criminal organisations. They have duly become centres for networking between criminals and dubbed <a href="https://www.nuso.org/articulo/como-ecuador-descendio-al-infierno-homicida/">“universities of crime”</a>. They host a spectrum of illicit activities, fostering coordination among various criminal organisations.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, violence decreased, <a href="https://www.primicias.ec/primicias-tv/seguridad/claves-caso-metastasis-ecuador/">the ties between criminal organisations and some state actors</a> grew stronger. Ironically, during Correa’s administration, efforts to combat narco politics coincided with the rise of “<a href="https://insightcrime.org/ecuador-organized-crime-news/los-choneros/">Los Choneros</a>”, Ecuador’s leading drug-trafficking gang.</p>
<p>The escape of the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/who-is-fito-jose-macias-ecuador-gang-leader-rcna133435">Los Choneros leader known as “Fito”</a>“ this month exemplifies the depth of the problem, revealing the power of organised crime both inside and outside prisons. </p>
<p>After the election of Correa’s vice-president, Lenín Moreno, to the presidency from 2017 to 2021, the previous equilibrium with between some state actors and criminal networks seems to have changed. This has resulted in chaos in prisons and violence spilling on to the streets. </p>
<p>The situation was exacerbated by widespread <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-10-22-00-people-in-ecuador-have-woken-up-to-a-fragmented-and-polarised-society/">social turmoil</a>. During this period as a result of austerity measures, and the shocks due to the pandemic precarity increased. </p>
<p>Guillermo Lasso’s government -between 2021 and 2023, declared a <a href="https://gk.city/2023/02/22/entrevista-luis-cordova-estados-unidos-guillermo-lasso/">war on drugs</a>, leading to a surge in homicides. This shift towards a militarised approach achieved a <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/ecuadors-explosive-war-on-gangs-lacks-exit-strategy/">limited success</a> in eradicating gang violence, and exhibited <a href="https://www.planv.com.ec/historias/analisis/el-presidente-lasso-el-gobierno-ingenuos-se-va-la-guerra">authoritarian responses</a> against the social protests denouncing the reduction of the social protection in the country.</p>
<p>In declaring an internal armed conflict, the current president Daniel Noboa’s strategy echoes the approach taken by El Salvador’s president <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-01-10/from-drug-routes-to-bukeles-influence-keys-to-the-security-crisis-in-ecuador.html#">Nayib Bukele</a>. This approach echoes the experiences of <a href="https://criticallegalthinking.com/2022/09/13/politics-in-the-streets-colombian-peoples-resistance-to-the-state-of-exception/#:%7E:text=Between%201949%20and%201991%2C%20the,that%20is%2C%20for%2017%20years.">Colombia’s attempts to</a> to combat violence by using the figure of a state of emergency. </p>
<p>The declaration of "internal war”, aligning with the population’s desperate need for <a href="https://insightcrime.org/es/noticias/analisis-primeros-dias-guerra-contra-pandillas-ecuador/">immediate solutions to tackle insecurity</a>, gives more authority to military forces, but it <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/ecuadors-explosive-war-on-gangs-lacks-exit-strategy/">lacks an strategy</a> beyond the promise to defeat armed groups.</p>
<p>The militarisation of public security can lead to an escalation in the <a href="https://gk.city/2024/01/12/estos-son-muertos-durante-conflicto-armado-interno-ecuador/">violence as criminal groups will more likely respond to violence in kind</a>. This escalation, can lead to a cycle of violence and repression in which civilians will inevitably end up in the crossfire of multiple armed actors. </p>
<h2>Poverty, precarity and the explosion of violence</h2>
<p>The focus on violence overshadows what makes easier for armed groups to recruit cadres: the precarity of marginalised communities. For example, the national <a href="https://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/documentos/web-inec/POBREZA/2023/Junio/202306_Boletin_pobreza_ENEMDU.pdf">poverty rate</a> has been on an upward trend from 24,5% in 2018 to to 27% in 2023. This phenomenon has disproportionately hit historically marginalised groups in the country (Indigenous people, Afro-Ecuadorians, and Montuvians), with almost 50% of these communities living in poverty. Yet, these same marginalised communities and the vulnerable youth are now facing vilification for being more vulnerable to being recruited by gangs.</p>
<p>The COVID pandemic made things much worse for many of these communities, making them even more susceptible to poverty or <a href="https://laperiodica.net/desercion-escolar-forzada-la-realidad-de-ninos-ninas-y-adolescentes-en-esmeraldas/">recruitment into armed groups</a>.</p>
<p>The recruitment of marginalised youth into criminal gangs sheds light on how austerity and external shocks are fuelling the growth of illicit activities. Increased precarity after the pandemic, withdrawing social protection, individualism and the <a href="https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/seguridad/snai-explica-grabacion-de-corrido-de-alias-fito-nota/">glamourisation of criminal figures in the media</a>, have contributed to the erosion of the social fabric. This in turn has facilitated the recruitment of people into organised crime.</p>
<p>The crisis of violence has unfolded in tandem with the retreat of the state in guaranteeing social and economic rights. While, armed groups emerge where states are seen as less legitimate, we must remember that the source of legitimacy of a state cannot be derived solely from violence. </p>
<p>The response to this crisis necessitates a strong state that can challenge armed groups on multiple fronts: the monopoly of violence and the welfare of the population. Stability entails the commitment to providing protection beyond just meeting violence with violence. In the 21st century, legitimacy cannot be dictated by raw violence alone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220920/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Poverty, insecurity and a naive and misguided drugs policy have led to a virtual civil war in Ecuador.Maria Gabriela Palacio, Assistant Professor in Development Studies, Leiden UniversityFabio Andrés Díaz Pabón, African Centre of Excellence for Inequality Research (ACEIR), University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213122024-01-17T23:06:58Z2024-01-17T23:06:58ZHow Ecuador went from an ‘island of peace’ to one of the world’s most violent countries<p>In 1991, Ecuadorian President <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rodrigo_Borja_Cevallos">Rodrigo Borja Cevallos</a> uttered a famous phrase, calling Ecuador an “island of peace” in the world. These words were repeated ten years later by President <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustavo_Noboa">Gustavo Noboa Bejarano</a> in his 2002 Report to the Nation. Today, however, they have completely lost their meaning – and worryingly so.</p>
<p>Ecuador has unexpectedly become one of the most violent countries in the world, described by the United Nations as a country “under stress”.</p>
<p>According to a study by the independent <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ocindex-2023/">Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime</a>, the country ranks as the 11th most violent in the world, alongside Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>In addition, Ecuador ranks 96th out of 146 countries (23rd out of 32 regionally) in the 2023 <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/">Rule of Law Index</a> (World Justice Project), which evaluates factors such as limits to government power, absence of corruption, political openness, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory compliance, civil justice and criminal justice.</p>
<p>Just five years ago, Ecuador was still considered one of the safest countries in Latin America, with a rate of 6.7 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. Today, it is nearing a rate of 45 deaths.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Video from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime with the results of the Global Organised Crime Index 2023.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Earlier this month, President Daniel Noboa <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/10/1224041752/ecuadorian-president-declares-a-state-of-emergency-amid-gang-violence-outbreak">declared</a> a state of emergency with a curfew throughout the country following the escape of the top leader of the most important criminal group, Los Choneros. This resulted in explosives attacks and kidnappings by criminal groups and the arrests of members of the country’s security forces and prison officials. </p>
<p>It was a clear demonstration of the level of firepower the criminal gangs are able to use against the state’s security forces. And rather than isolated incidents, it’s now clear this violence is becoming a war between criminal groups and the state over territory and control of populations. </p>
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Leia mais:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ecuador-went-from-being-latin-americas-model-of-stability-to-a-nation-in-crisis-220911">How Ecuador went from being Latin America's model of stability to a nation in crisis</a>
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<h2>The economics of drug trafficking drives crime</h2>
<p>The variable most responsible for this rise in violence and insecurity in Ecuador is drug trafficking. And not just cocaine, but also heroin and, more recently, the destructive synthetic drug fentanyl.</p>
<p>This is due to several factors: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the country’s location next door to the world’s largest cocaine producers </p></li>
<li><p>the dollarised economy, which is attractive for money laundering </p></li>
<li><p>the limited ability of the state to monitor the various air, sea and land drug transport routes into and out of the country </p></li>
<li><p>structural causes, such as unemployment, increasing inequality and lack of development </p></li>
<li><p>and the strong influence of the media, especially social networks, on young people who are increasingly seduced by the culture of drug trafficking and the lure of leadership, power and easy money.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Local drug lords have also formed strategic alliances with transnational drug trafficking cartels. In addition to bringing economic benefits, these connections have led to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a professionalisation in the management of criminal markets in Ecuador</p></li>
<li><p>increased specialisation in criminal tasks (custody, extortion, money laundering, illegal mining, among others) </p></li>
<li><p>better training of hitmen, explosives experts and specialists in criminal intelligence and counterintelligence </p></li>
<li><p>and more effective communication among guerrillas around the country, such as through graffiti art.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Crisis in the penitentiary system</h2>
<p>Another critical underlying factor was the reduction of the central government’s budget for reforming the country’s penitentiary system several years ago. </p>
<p>This led to the dismissal of prison officials and the elimination of directorates in the justice sector. In fact, under the government of former President Lenin Moreno, the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Religious Affairs was eliminated and the Secretariat of Human Rights and the National Service for Attention to Persons Deprived of Liberty (which runs the corrections system) were created. </p>
<p>All this has led to a lack of clarity in the management of serious prison problems and an increase in overcrowding in the country’s 34 detention centres. As a result, the prisons have become strategic strongholds for drug lords, beset by crime and violence. In the last three years, there have been 11 prison massacres, resulting in 412 deaths across Ecuador. </p>
<p>The prisons are also contributing to criminal enterprises on the streets. Live internet broadcasts of atrocities have become common, such as dismemberments and decapitations, as well as limbless corpses and vital organs exposed on bridges and in other public places.</p>
<p>In fact, there’s an increasingly popular expression in the country that “it is safer to live in prisons than on the streets”.</p>
<p>When it comes to this kind of violence, the local mafia groups have learned from the practices of Colombian and Mexican cartels. </p>
<p>The crudest displays of violence have come from the groups aligned with the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jalisco_New_Generation_Cartel">Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación</a>, formerly known as the Mata Zetas. This group has received military training (some members in the United States) and its practices are based in religious cultural beliefs, including cannibalism and the cult of <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/who-is-santa-muerte/">Santa Muerte</a>, which influence their chilling acts of violence.</p>
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Leia mais:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-mexicos-war-on-drugs-conversations-with-el-narco-129865">Inside Mexico's war on drugs: Conversations with 'el narco'</a>
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<h2>Assassination schools</h2>
<p>When a new executive decree was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/ecuadors-lasso-authorizes-civilian-use-guns-citing-insecurity-2023-04-02/">signed</a> by former President Guillermo Lasso in April that made it easier for civilians to carry and use weapons, criminal groups increased their attacks, especially assassinations by hitmen with military weapons purchased on the illicit market.</p>
<p>Surprisingly, the existence of four notorious schools of hired killers, located in the cities of Durán, Manta, Lago Agrio and Esmeraldas, has not been formally denounced by the government</p>
<p>Information from police sources indicates that these schools promote junior, intermediate and senior assassins and, depending on their experience in terms of number of assassinations, strict compliance with orders and the level of importance of the targets, their salaries vary between USD$200 and $10,000 per month.</p>
<p>The training of these assassins is not necessarily done in person, but virtually, through video games which are intended to help recruits lose their feelings of fear and remorse. This is a vital psychological preparation for young people who, due to poverty, unemployment and lack of study opportunities, are easily recruited to work as assassins for the various mafia groups.</p>
<p>The gangs have increasingly powerful mechanisms for attracting those in the most economically desperate areas of the country, who are forced (either by threats or economic necessity) to join the criminal underworld.</p>
<h2>A narco-state under construction</h2>
<p>Increasingly, criminal groups are able to wield influence over local governments, municipalities and mayors’ offices to hide their criminal endeavours in pseudo-legal ways and advance their strategic objectives of ultimately turning Ecuador into a narco-state.</p>
<p>And Ecuador’s citizens are the ones paying the price. The macabre murders, kidnappings and other acts of violence are forcing them to change their routines or adopt lives of complete seclusion. </p>
<p>There is an atmosphere of insecurity and mistrust creeping into society, which is being exacerbated by the traditional and social media, who continue to operate without a real commitment to journalistic ethics and social responsibility.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221312/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maria Fernanda Noboa Gonzalez não presta consultoria, trabalha, possui ações ou recebe financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que poderia se beneficiar com a publicação deste artigo e não revelou nenhum vínculo relevante além de seu cargo acadêmico.</span></em></p>Just five years ago, Ecuador was still considered one of the safest countries in Latin America. Now, there is a brutal war playing out between criminal gangs and the state.Maria Fernanda Noboa Gonzalez, Doutora em Estudos Internacionais, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) - EcuadorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209082024-01-17T14:17:05Z2024-01-17T14:17:05ZWhy Colombia sees legalising drugs as the way forward. Here’s what’s being proposed<p>Another drug war has begun in Latin America. The newly elected president of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, has declared a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ecuador-how-this-island-of-peace-in-latin-america-has-become-a-hotbed-of-violence-run-by-criminal-gangs-and-drug-cartels-211458">state of emergency</a> and the military is being used to tackle violence and drug trafficking in a country that is part of the transnational cocaine <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ecuador-bananas-cocaine-europe-drug-trafficking-6d6529e2b1d8f3cbd16aea74ade0b93d">smuggling trade</a>.</p>
<p>Ecuador will probably realise what other countries in Latin America have done: military solutions to the illicit drug problem <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-57565-0_15">do not work</a>.</p>
<p>For decades, the Colombian government has confronted <a href="https://jied.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.31389/jied.93">powerful drug cartels</a> and drug-related violence with a policy guided by a series of UN treaties that prohibit drugs and oblige governments to prosecute recreational drug use and production. These treaties are known as the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0955395903000033?casa_token=Parrh7UyjZ4AAAAA:xJoltbmUIqF3fJHVoV3fblBNdMjVMmiDhvo6OGP5ZNxHtn5dPrMgZ1WrXBVe_IvjWLrstoe_">“drug prohibition regime”</a>. Under the mantle of these treaties, the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/us-counter-drug-policy-western-hemisphere-it-working#:%7E:text=In%202016%2C%20the%20U.S.%20Congress,a%20sobering%20reality%3A%20close%20to">US has pushed Latin American governments</a> to implement tough laws on drug use, and crackdown on drug cartels in an attempt to tackle drug trafficking and drug addiction.</p>
<p>Governments, such as Mexico, Colombia, El Salvador and Honduras, have used their <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/psq.12832?casa_token=hXExQLJoXsYAAAAA%3ALfcCTqdguXWiurhJS4F4i3VxybWG70_ic4TXvYbJL1onmInxoRGP1MS45v0qAOxDDaxYpNlseHxKew">armies against drug cartels</a> since the 1980s. However, the use of the military in the region, with operations supported by the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-interamerican-studies-and-world-affairs/article/abs/dea-in-latin-america-dealing-with-institutionalized-corruption/8F4B90C46C1DB6FD6FBB4F4F7C48C11C">US Drug and Enforcement Agency</a>, has not prevented an increase in violence in the region. In the case of Mexico, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00031305.2014.965796?casa_token=QZ2uISCwM94AAAAA%3AkhpFZ38CEGMaFK-7YEYA3JADacoxpvjodW532f5WBlHJFWgjiAeuRPFDOrd0tN4OB0enYcGlppY">researchers have found a relationship</a> between the deployment of the military in anti-drug operations and the rise of homicides since 2007. Moreover, drug <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/drug-use-illicit.htm">addiction has not reduced in the US</a> (one expected outcome of the “war on drugs”). </p>
<p>Nowadays, Latin America and the Caribbean is the most violent region in the world. According to the 2023 report of the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/Global_study_on_homicide_2023_web.pdf">UN Office on Drugs and Crime</a> (UNODC), 34% of the homicides on the planet during 2021 happened in the Americas. Many of these homicides relate to the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10611-009-9195-z">global war on drugs</a>.</p>
<p>Some Latin American administrations have started to push back against policies that make <a href="https://www.talkingdrugs.org/drug-decriminalisation/">drugs illegal</a>. For example, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-39214085">Bolivia</a> legalised indigenous production of coca crops in 2011. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/19/uruguay-marijuana-sale-pharmacies">Uruguay</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/25/jamaica-decriminalises-marijuana">Jamaica</a> legalised some purchases of cannabis in 2014 and 2015 respectively. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/28/mexicos-high-court-strikes-down-laws-that-ban-use-of-recreational-marijuana">Mexico</a> and <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/cannabis-regulation-colombia/">Colombia</a> are discussing cannabis regulation. </p>
<p>Some of these governments, including Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia, tried to put forward a plan for a new global approach to drug use in 2016 at a UN general assembly special meeting but proponents of this failed to convince other countries to allow all types of drug decriminalisation. However, the assembly did reach <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/a-joint-commitment-to-effectively-addressing-and-countering-the-world-drug-problem">an agreement</a> to allow countries to regulate the medical uses of some previously illegal drugs such as cannabis. Now, these countries led by Colombian president Gustavo Petro will call for a new UN meeting to try to get more support for a new approach to the “war on drugs”.</p>
<h2>Colombia’s role</h2>
<p>Since the early 1960s, Colombia has been <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20043675?casa_token=Vak5pihEIyYAAAAA%3A1aOvm2PNGBIgkTk3zepMoYK_4rIVbEwQsWruBaHcH_gBp8I-VVMlTEoLpbXJm5De10ug2eVRJc4v29Vb8AuJ4DrfwScE9l-oQFzoGDGCOI20ddMObQ">the epicentre of the global war on drugs</a>. Infamously known as the centre of production of cocaine trafficked by regional criminal organisations, this country is experimenting with a peace process on two fronts: first, with the guerrillas, and second, <a href="https://urbanviolence.org/a-bargain-with-narcos/">with the drug cartels</a>. </p>
<p>Petro was elected with the promise to reduce the endless problem of violence. <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-09-07/colombias-petro-recruits-mexicos-lopez-obrador-in-his-quest-to-rethink-the-war-on-drugs.html">In September 2023</a>, Petro asked his Mexican counterpart, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, to help convene a new UN meeting to overhaul the international approach to illegal drugs. Petro was also responding to pressure from global research showing the existing policy was not working. For example, public health experts in <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(22)01060-1/fulltext">The Lancet</a> have argued that making drugs illegal has failed to stem drug use.</p>
<p>There is a longstanding debate about whether proposing the end of drug prohibition – and the war on drugs as a consequence – will stop violence and reduce harmful addiction. From 2011, a group of former world leaders and intellectuals (such as former presidents of Mexico and Colombia, César Gaviria, Juan Manuel Santos and Ernesto Zedillo) have pushed for the <a href="https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/the-war-on-drugs">end of drug prohibition</a>. The data seems to back up their claims that prosecuting drug consumption and production is not reducing addiction. According to the <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/number-with-drug-disorders-by-substance">Global Burden of Disease Data</a>, from the Institute For Health Metrics and Evaluation, since the late 1990s, the number of drug users with drug dependence has increased from 40 to 50 million users yearly around the world, despite the “war on drugs”.</p>
<p>But Petro faces an uphill battle to gather support to challenge the drug prohibition regime. In September 2023 Latin American governments signed the <a href="https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/newsroom/news/representantes-15-paises-llegan-cali-conferencia-latinoamericana-caribe-drogas">Cali declaration</a>, calling for a UN assembly on the global drug problem to be held in 2025, one year before Petro’s presidency ends. But the US, which is experiencing a <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/opioids/basics/epidemic.html">fentanyl opioid epidemic</a>, is not likely to be positive about making more drugs legal. </p>
<p>US president Joe Biden is less prone to tackle drug policy with police prosecution and his approach includes alternatives such as treating <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/the-administrations-strategy/the-biden-harris-administrations-first-year-drug-policy-priorities/">addicts in health clinics instead of incarceration</a>. If in November Donald Trump wins the presidential election, drug policy is likely to be <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-deploy-military-assets-inflict-maximum-damage-cartels-elected-2024">more militarised than ever</a>. The former president explored <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/03/us/politics/trump-mexico-cartels-republican.html">using US military force in Mexico</a> to tackle fentanyl smuggling through Mexico. </p>
<p>López Obrador helped to organise the September 2023 Cali conference, but domestically he is not pursuing <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-29/mexico-s-supreme-court-removes-ban-against-smoking-marijuana?leadSource=uverify%20wall">drug legalisation policies</a>. He has deployed the Mexican military to reinforce drug confiscation of fentanyl after pressure from the US government.</p>
<p>Petro might find an ally in Argentina’s new president, Javier Milei. The new Argentinian president has declared he <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-08-15/whats-going-on-inside-javier-mileis-head.html">favours drug legalisation</a>, inspired by his libertarian position. However, Argentina is facing increasing crime rates <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/new-strategies-in-rosario-argentina-as-monos-fight/">in some regions</a> and this security challenge might dissuade him from pursing drug legalisation. </p>
<p>Beyond the Americas, some European countries might back the initiative, such as <a href="https://transformdrugs.org/blog/drug-decriminalisation-in-portugal-setting-the-record-straight">Portugal</a> which decriminalised personal possession of all drugs in 2001. There, possession results in confiscation or a fine, but not imprisonment.</p>
<p>If political factors align, Petro might edge forward with his plans to tackle the global war on drugs differently. However, international tensions and the recent war in Ecuador have complicated the scenario. Hopefully, scientific evidence may force countries to consider new options.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220908/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Raul Zepeda Gil does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Colombia’s current president, Gustavo Petro, is pushing for a new global approach to drug addiction and use.Raul Zepeda Gil, Lecturer in Development Studies, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209112024-01-12T20:28:23Z2024-01-12T20:28:23ZHow Ecuador went from being Latin America’s model of stability to a nation in crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568975/original/file-20240111-15-p90s4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=36%2C85%2C8142%2C5371&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ecuador looks set to entrust its anti-gang fight to the military.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/military-elements-guard-the-car-with-president-of-ecuador-news-photo/1915341584?adppopup=true">Franklin Jacome/Agencia Press South/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-08-13/once-ecuador-was-a-peaceful-country-now-it-is-one-of-the-regions-most-violent.html">Ecuador was until relatively recently</a> seen as <a href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Ecuador-on-Track-to-Become-the-Safest-Country-in-Latin-America-20150621-0009.html">one of the safest countries</a> in Latin America.</p>
<p>That reputation has surely now been destroyed.</p>
<p>On Jan. 9, 2024, images of hooded <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/09/ecuador-gangs-wave-terror-state-of-emergency">gunmen storming a TV studio</a> were broadcast around the world. It was one of a number of violent incidents that took place that day, including <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/09/world/americas/ecuador-gang-prison-emergency.html">prison riots, widespread hostage-taking</a>, the <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/seven-police-kidnapped-in-ecuador-as-president-declares-security-emergency-101704828141894.html">kidnapping of several police officers</a> and a <a href="https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2024/01/ecuador-criminal-groups-launch-attacks-jan-9-following-declaration-of-state-of-emergency-and-curfew-update-3">series of car explosions</a>.</p>
<p>I have been <a href="https://pir.fiu.edu/people/faculty-a-z/eduardo-gamarra1/eduardo-gamarra.html">tracking how gang crime has affected states in Latin America</a> for 38 years. When I started, few would have projected that Ecuador would descend into the crisis it finds itself today. But the story of Ecuador reflects a wider story of how countries across Latin America have struggled with organized crime and transnational drug gangs and how they have responded.</p>
<p>Ecuador now looks set to follow the recent <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/19/bukele-salvador-gang-crackdown/">path of El Salvador under President Nayib Bukele’s leadership</a> in trying to crack the gang problem through the use of military and the suspension of democratic norms. In the aftermath of the Jan. 9 violence, Ecuadorean President Daniel Noboa named 22 gangs as terrorist organizations – a designation that makes them legitimate military targets. He has also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-67930452">imposed a 60-day state of emergency</a>, during which Ecuadorians will be subject to curfews while armed forces try to restore order in the streets and the country’s gang-controlled prisons.</p>
<h2>Ecuador: Victim of geography</h2>
<p>To understand why Ecuador has become the epicenter of gang violence, you need to understand both the geography and history of Latin America’s drug trade.</p>
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<p>Ecuador, a nation of 18 million people, is situated between Colombia in the north and Peru in the east and south. Colombia and Peru are the <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/colombia-sets-new-cocaine-production-record-un-832dac7c">two top producers of cocaine in the world</a>. Further, Ecuador has a near-1,400 mile (2,237-kilometer) coastline through which drugs from the continent can be <a href="https://insightcrime.org/investigations/ecuador-a-cocaine-superhighway-to-the-us-and-europe/">taken to markets in Europe and the United States</a>.</p>
<p>But it wasn’t until the <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/ecuador-war-on-drugs">U.S.-led “war on drugs</a>” put the squeeze on cartels in other countries that Ecuador became the preserve of narco gangs.</p>
<h2>Plan Colombia</h2>
<p>In the 1980s and 1990s, Colombia was the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.504">center of the international illegal drug trade</a>. This is hardly surprising, given that it was the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/pdf/andean/Andean_report_Part4.pdf">top producer of coca leaves</a>.</p>
<p>But beginning in 2000, a joint initiative between Colombian authorities and the U.S., known as <a href="https://www.americasquarterly.org/fulltextarticle/plan-colombia-a-retrospective/">Plan Colombia</a>, <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43813">pumped billions</a> of dollars into an effort to clamp down on the Colombian cocaine trade.</p>
<p>While it may have been successful in <a href="https://www.usglc.org/media/2017/04/USGLC-Plan-Columbia.pdf">supressing drug cartels</a> in Colombia itself, it has had a balloon effect elsewhere in the region: Squeeze in one place, the bulge appears elsewhere.</p>
<p>In this case, it was Mexico’s cartels that “bulged” first. Over the past decade, there has been a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-long-war-drugs-crime-and-cartels">massive growth in Mexican cartels</a>, led by the Sinaloa cartel and the Jalisco Nueva Generación, or Jalisco New Generation. In fact, a study last year found that Mexican cartels were in effect the country’s <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/cutting-cartel-recruitment-could-be-only-way-reduce-mexico-s-violence">fifth-largest employer</a>.</p>
<p>These cartels came to dominate the illegal drug trade in Latin America, not just for cocaine, but also the trafficking of heroin and more lately fentanyl. Aligning themselves with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/12/terrifying-days-of-terror-under-colombias-gulf-clan-cartel">Clan Del Golfo</a> – a Colombian paramilitary organization formed from the remnants of the gangs dismantled under joint Colombian-U.S. operations – the cartels helped traffic drugs through Ecuador and out of South America.</p>
<p>They were joined by European gangs, <a href="https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/ecuadors-crime-wave-and-its-albanian-connection/">notably from Albania</a>, who began to show up in Ecuador.</p>
<p>The impact locally of these outside gangs has been disastrous for Ecuador.</p>
<h2>Prior immunity</h2>
<p>European and Mexican organizations ran local operatives as enforcers and transporters. And these are the people who have become the backbone of Ecuador’s gang problem today.</p>
<p>Ecuadorian gangs such as <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/rise-fall-choneros-ecuador-drug-trafficking-pioneers/">Los Choneros</a> developed as a de facto subsidiary of the Sinaloa and other cartels. The <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20240111-what-we-know-about-fito-ecuador-s-notorious-gang-leader-who-escaped-jail">escape from jail</a> of Los Choneros’ leader, Jose Adolfo Macias, on Jan. 7, 2024, set off the latest explosion of violence. </p>
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<img alt="A man stands with his hands cuffed behind his back. Two men stand either side of him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568973/original/file-20240111-23-10j7t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568973/original/file-20240111-23-10j7t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568973/original/file-20240111-23-10j7t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568973/original/file-20240111-23-10j7t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568973/original/file-20240111-23-10j7t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568973/original/file-20240111-23-10j7t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568973/original/file-20240111-23-10j7t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Police officers arrest a gunman who burst into a studio of the state-owned TC television.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-officers-arrest-one-of-the-unidentified-gunmen-who-news-photo/1913161165?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>But Ecuador’s descent into violence and chaos has also been aided by the very fact that for so long it was immune from the worst of the gang violence of the region.</p>
<p>For many years, Ecuador had <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2024/01/10/how-ecuador-became-latin-americas-deadliest-country">one of the lowest homicide rates</a> in Latin America – an indicator of low gang activity. As a result, it hadn’t developed a robust police and military response to gangs. Ecuador, in comparison to Colombia, El Salvador and other countries, was seen as a “soft touch” to organized crime bosses. </p>
<p>This became ever more the case in 2009 when former President Rafael Correa <a href="https://en.mercopress.com/2009/09/19/last-us-forces-abandon-manta-military-base-in-ecuador">closed down the U.S. air base in Manta</a>, from where American AWAC surveillance planes had been monitoring and trying to disrupt drug trafficking.</p>
<h2>Militarizing the response</h2>
<p>Explaining how Ecuador became the epicenter of drug gang violence is one thing. Trying to find a way out for the country now is another.</p>
<p>Across Latin America, countries have employed different models to counter organized crime, with varying degrees of success. Colombia, with extensive U.S. assistance, transformed its military and police and went to war with the cartels. The strategy somewhat successfully dismantled organized crime groups in the country, even if it failed to halt drug trafficking itself or lower the high levels of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/06/08/us-war-drugs-helped-unleash-violence-colombia-today/">violence in Colombia</a>.</p>
<p>Mexican authorities have tried a different approach and have been reluctant to confront the country’s drug cartels head-on. Instead, Mexico has employed a more hands-off approach, allowing drug gangs to essentially govern their states – the state of Sinaloa is <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-the-sinaloa-cartel-rules/">run largely by the cartel</a> that shares its name. </p>
<p>Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has touted this “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amlos-hugs-not-bullets-failing-mexico">hugs not bullets</a>” approach, but under it the power of the cartels <a href="https://cbsaustin.com/news/nation-world/mexican-cartels-grow-in-power-and-influence-with-calls-to-change-tactics-in-fighting-back-kidnapping-killings-murders-homicides-matamoros-border-crisis">has only grown</a>.</p>
<p>And then there is the Salvadoran model.</p>
<p>For many years, El Salvador suffered from organized crime, with the <a href="https://www.bloomberglinea.com/english/who-are-the-maras-the-gangs-that-el-salvador-and-honduras-are-waging-war-against/">Maras gang</a> behind much of the country’s violence. Then in 2019 the electorate voted in Nayib Bukele on a law-and-order platform. Since then, he has <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/gamechangers-2022-el-salvador-gang-crackdown-steep-human-rights-cost/">militarized the country</a>, adopted draconian security measures and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/el-salvador-prison-gangs-bukele-42315f24691e0a3136d005ab7c0bee6a">jailed some 72,000 alleged gang members</a>, often without due process.</p>
<p>As a result, El Salvador is now perceived as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/09/25/el-salvador-crime-human-rights-prisons/">one of the safest places</a> in Latin America. This has been achieved at the expense of human rights, critics say. But, nonetheless, Bukele’s methods have enormous popular appeal.</p>
<h2>Path of El Salvador</h2>
<p>With an unprecedented wave of violence in Ecuador, it looks like President Noboa is looking to take his country down the same path as El Salvador. He has ordered the Ecuadorian military to “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20240109-gunmen-burst-into-ecuador-tv-studio-threaten-journalists-live-on-air">neutralize” the criminal gangs</a> that operate in the country.</p>
<p>Whether the approach will work is another matter; Ecuador is in a weaker position than El Salvador.</p>
<p>Whereas many of the gangs were imported into El Salvador – many members of Maras had been deported from the U.S. – in Ecuador, they are homegrown and have become more sophisticated. Further, Noboa – despite taking office in December – has only 15 months of his presidency left before a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/20/world/americas/ecuador-election-assassination-explainer.html">general election takes place in May 2025</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, the adoption of Bukele’s methods might be seen as an election winner.</p>
<p>Like in El Salvador, the majority of Ecuador’s citizens appear ready for an iron fist approach to counter the gangs – even at the expense of some civil liberties. If you speak to the average Ecuadorian, many would no doubt tell you that talk of human rights violations is bogus at a time when they live under the fear of being murdered simply by leaving their homes.</p>
<p>As one man <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ecuador-violence-prisons-television-studio-gangs-72a3df45debae4459663c462304bcf91">told The Associated Press</a> in the aftermath of Jan. 9’s violence, the government needs to employ “a firmer hand, to have no mercy, no tolerance or (respect for) the human rights of criminals.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220911/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eduardo Gamarra has received funding from foundations, US government agencies, multilateral organizations and private donors. </span></em></p>Widespread violence tied to Ecuadorian drug gangs has left the country looking at a draconian response.Eduardo Gamarra, Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2124142023-09-20T22:59:46Z2023-09-20T22:59:46ZA month after Ecuador’s historic vote to end oil extraction in Yasuní National Park, its lessons are as vital as ever to Canadians<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/a-month-after-ecuadors-historic-vote-to-end-oil-extraction-in-yasuni-national-park-its-lessons-are-as-vital-as-ever-to-canadians" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>One month ago, on Aug. 20, Ecuador voted to end all oil extraction in Yasuní National Park, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/21/ecuador-votes-to-halt-oil-drilling-in-amazonian-biodiversity-hotspot">marking a historic decision in the global effort to halt fossil fuel extraction in ecologically important regions</a>. As climate emergencies rise globally, Ecuador has set a global precedent by protecting one of <a href="https://en.unesco.org/biosphere/lac/yasuni">the most ecologically diverse areas on the planet, a UNESCO designated biosphere reserve</a>. </p>
<p>The move is set to end any current and future extractive projects in the region — protecting over <a href="https://en.unesco.org/biosphere/lac/yasuni">204 different mammals, 610 types of birds and just under 20,000 human inhabitants with 200-300 Indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation</a>. </p>
<p>This referendum is a testament to the change possible through citizen political involvement. It should signal the world over the possibility for action against extractive corporate interests as well as the policies that support these interests. </p>
<h2>Voting for our future</h2>
<p>As we reach <a href="https://www.unep.org/climate-emergency">a critical ecological tipping point</a> across the globe, our steps to protect the planet’s remaining ecosystem can no longer wait. The Amazon rainforest remains the world’s largest forest reserve. It <a href="https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-020-00508-4/d41586-020-00508-4.pdf">filters billions of tonnes of carbon dioxide</a> for the entire planet. A critical ecosystem service that provides us with the clean air that we breathe and helps stabilize our shared atmosphere on this planet. </p>
<p>The vote is set to remove any current oil projects over the next year and puts a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/21/historic-ecuador-voters-reject-oil-drilling-in-amazon-protected-area">ban on any future oil extraction in the region indefinitely.</a> The referendum keeps an estimated US$133 billion worth of oil from the park in the ground. </p>
<p>The country’s nationwide referendum was the result of a petition from Indigenous groups and environmental activists within the wider advocacy of <a href="https://www.yasunidos.org">the Yasunidos Collective, a collection of activists advocating for the end to fossil fuel extraction in the Yasuní</a>. </p>
<p>This comes at a pivotal moment as scientists have warned that if the world’s largest rainforest continues to shrink then it will change <a href="https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-020-00508-4/d41586-020-00508-4.pdf">from lush rainforest into a savanna</a>. Not only will this habitat be lost for millions of people, plants and animals but it will also signal the end of the Earth’s largest filtration system. The missing <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/carbon-sources-and-sinks/">carbon sink</a> and <a href="https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-020-00508-4/d41586-020-00508-4.pdf">increased carbon dioxide in our atmosphere will have detrimental effects</a> that would lead to potentially even greater unknown climatic events. </p>
<h2>Lessons for Canada</h2>
<p>In Canada, the people of Ontario face an opportunity for direct democracy to protect one of our country’s largest environmental assets. The Greenbelt is more than just a green space, it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/global-biodiversity-why-the-proposed-changes-to-ontarios-greenbelt-matter-211719">a bastion of ecological services providing unseen benefits to Canadians far beyond the Toronto area</a>. </p>
<p>It is also continually under threat as the Ford government seeks to finalize an <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontario-auditor-general-greenbelt-report-1.6930390">$8 billion deal for developers to build housing on 3,000 hectares</a>. This despite allegations of misconduct so serious that even <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9938653/doug-ford-housing-ministers-resignation-cabinet-shuffle/">the government has had no choice but to review some of the deals</a>.</p>
<p>The Ontario Greenbelt is one of the most biologically rich and diverse areas in all of Canada and an area that provides protection to many both in and near its ecosystem. It does this through <a href="https://www.greenbelt.ca/learn">absorbing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, draining water during extreme weather events and trapping heat caused by urbanization</a>. These services protect us from climate change and, in the process, also help to prevent the worst impacts of our current global warming.</p>
<p>The story of Yasuní is an inspiration against the face of climate catastrophe. The United Nations says <a href="https://www.unep.org/facts-about-climate-emergency">the planet has reached a climate emergency</a>, noting that the climate science is undeniable and the result of human activities. </p>
<p>In Canada we have witnessed — and had to breathe in — the effects of a huge jump in the number, and severity, of wildfires. The <a href="https://cwfis.cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/report/graphs">total number of fires in 2023 exceeded Canada’s 10-year average, with an almost seven-fold jump in the total burned surface area in 2023 compared to Canada’s 10-year average</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-canada-can-leave-83-per-cent-of-its-oil-in-the-ground-and-build-strong-new-economies-169217">How Canada can leave 83 per cent of its oil in the ground and build strong new economies</a>
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<p>Against this backdrop it could be easy to forget that in Canada, we are lucky to house one-quarter of the entire world’s <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/nature-legacy/about.html">wetlands, temperate rainforests and boreal forests; 20 per cent of its fresh water; the longest coastline in the world; and precious habitats for birds, fish and mammals</a>. This represents an ecological safeguard that, if nurtured and protected, will help provide a safe haven from increasing climate disaster. </p>
<p>That is, should we choose to begin to make the right decisions about long-term ecological wealth versus shortsighted economic prosperity. </p>
<h2>Building on this example</h2>
<p>The protection of the Yasuní reserve and the power of its people in Ecuador against a national government’s extractive agenda is a signal to citizens here in Canada. We do not have to be complacent with the status quo, or divided by party politics to find unity on important issues that face our reliance on this shared planet. </p>
<p>Direct democracy from the grassroots level can permeate to the top to mitigate climate change. The overall majority can decide whether to move forward with environmental projects that may have irreversible effects. It signifies the importance of Indigenous leaders in countering the fossil fuel industry amid environmental crisis and the power of people to change governmental policies. It is important to show how persistent resistance can make an impact.</p>
<p>To protect the planet for future generations to come, government agendas need to shift and be pushed by direct civil action. This means that protection of ecologically important areas should be seen as a key policy objective of national self-preservation. This is further reinforced by ever-growing <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/factsheet/nature-climate-action">calls from Indigenous leaders, academics and environmental activists demanding the conservation and restoration of natural spaces</a>. </p>
<p>It is time for Canadian citizens to step up and recognize that we can make a difference in our <a href="https://iasc-commons.org/about-commons/">shared commons</a>. The importance of the precedent set in Ecuador cannot be understated. It shows that collective action can work and that we do not need to only wait for governments to do the right thing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212414/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martina Jakubchik-Paloheimo works with Global Indigenous Development Trust, a Canadian Indigenous social enterprise and registered charity founded in 2014. As well as Inisha Nunka, an Indigenous led not-for profit founded by the Shuar peoples in Ecuador. She has previously received funding from The International Development Research Fund Canada under Grant 109418-021.</span></em></p>The decision of the people of Ecuador to halt oil extraction in the Yasuní is a trend-setting precedent of global importance and a victory that Canadians should build upon.Martina Jakubchik-Paloheimo, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Geography and Planning, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2114582023-08-16T07:29:49Z2023-08-16T07:29:49ZEcuador: how this ‘island of peace’ in Latin America has become a hotbed of violence run by criminal gangs and drug cartels<p>After <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-66457472">the assassination</a> of Ecuadorean presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio in Quito on August 9, former president Rafael Correa posted a message on his social media feed: “<a href="https://twitter.com/MashiRafael/status/1689463483732033536">Ecuador has become a failed state</a>.” It was a stark message as the country prepares to go to the polls on Sunday August 20.</p>
<p>Villavicencio’s shooting followed the murder on July 23 of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-66289355">Agustín Intriago</a>, the mayor of the port city of Manta, and <a href="https://gazettengr.com/candidate-assassinated-ahead-of-national-assembly-election-in-ecuador/">that of Rider Sánchez</a>, who was running for a seat in the national assembly when he was shot dead on July 17 while campaigning in the northern coastal province of Esmeraldas. </p>
<p>Sunday’s parliamentary and presidential election are being held as a result of outgoing president Guillermo Lasso dissolving parliament in May. Lasso <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/ecuador-president-dissolves-legislature-bringing-elections-forward-2023-05-17/">faced impeachment by opposition parties</a> over allegations of connections to corrupt government contracts, something he and his supporters <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/16/impeachment-hearing-begins-in-ecuador-against-president-lasso">vehemently deny</a>. Villavicencio campaigned on a pro-security and anti-corruption platform and, while not considered a frontrunner, his assassination deeply shocked the nation.</p>
<h2>Island of peace?</h2>
<p>Sitting between Colombia to the north and Peru to the south, two of the world’s largest producers of cocaine, Ecuador was until recently known as an “island of peace” in this war-torn region. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542798/original/file-20230815-19-70up5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Locator map of Ecuador showing Colombia and Peru." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542798/original/file-20230815-19-70up5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542798/original/file-20230815-19-70up5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542798/original/file-20230815-19-70up5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542798/original/file-20230815-19-70up5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542798/original/file-20230815-19-70up5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542798/original/file-20230815-19-70up5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542798/original/file-20230815-19-70up5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecuador sits between Colombia and Peru, two of the world’s biggest producers of cocaine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/world-map-south-american-continent-peru-2333922879">Libin Jose/Shutterstock</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>This had a great deal to do with the success of Correa’s policy while president from 2007-2017 of <a href="https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/3/26/18281325/ecuador-legalize-gangs">effectively legalising gangs</a> as “cultural associations” or urban youth groups. This allowed them to apply for government funding and grants in return for a pledge to end violence. </p>
<p>Correa’s policy saw the country’s <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ecuador-crime-lasso-corruption-politics-protests-violence/?loggedin=1">homicide rate fall sharply</a>. In the past five years, however, the murder rate has begun to increase sharply again, making Ecuador one of the region’s <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ECU/ecuador/murder-homicide-rate">most violent countries</a>.</p>
<p>Villaviciencio had already made plenty of enemies when he took up politics, having exposed multiple cases of corruption during his time as a journalist. In January, while still a member of the national assembly before its dissolution, Villavicencio <a href="https://apnews.com/article/725a9f1ba7bb9f5f9796b1e2fe121946">denounced 21 mayoral candidates</a> for alleged links to drug trafficking. He also revealed he’d received death threats from <em>Los Choneros</em>, one of Ecuador’s most powerful “mega-gangs”, involved in illegal activities ranging from <a href="https://insightcrime.org/ecuador-organized-crime-news/ecuador-profile/">narco-trafficking to contract killings and extortion</a>.</p>
<p>Villavicencio’s killer was shot by security forces in the immediate aftermath of the attack, and six further suspects have been detained. They are <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-66489199#">all of Colombian origin</a> and reportedly members of criminal groups. After decades of armed conflict, Colombia has a reputation for producing and exporting <a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/07/26/colombian-mercenaries-haiti-jovenel-moise-assassination/">contract killers</a>. Both <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-57762246">Haiti’s former president, Jovenel Moïse</a>, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/18/four-jailed-in-colombia-for-honeymoon-of-prosecutor">Paraguayan anti-corruption prosecutor Marcelo Pecci</a> were assassinated by Colombian mercenaries. </p>
<h2>Culture of violence</h2>
<p>As recently as 2018, Ecuador had <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/insight-crime-2018-homicide-roundup/?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=7466034b-64f2-44a1-ace5-13c89cd0dac0">one of the lowest annual homicide rates in Latin America</a>, at 5.7 people per 100,000. This compared favourably with neighbouring <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/984798/homicide-rate-colombia/#:%7E:text=In%202022%2C%20there%20were%20approximately,of%2026.8%20a%20year%20earlier.">Colombia at 25</a> people per 100,000, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/867725/homicide-rate-brazil/#:%7E:text=Brazil%3A%20homicide%20rate%202012%2D2021&text=In%202021%2C%20the%20homicide%20rate,in%20the%20country%20since%202012.">Brazil at 27.6</a> and <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/984669/homicide-rate-venezuela/">Venezuela at 81.4</a> – a rate which has since fallen to the (still-calamitous) level of 40 murders per 100,000 people.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542819/original/file-20230815-19-5xb8yc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bar chart showing homicide rate in Ecuador" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542819/original/file-20230815-19-5xb8yc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542819/original/file-20230815-19-5xb8yc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542819/original/file-20230815-19-5xb8yc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542819/original/file-20230815-19-5xb8yc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542819/original/file-20230815-19-5xb8yc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542819/original/file-20230815-19-5xb8yc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542819/original/file-20230815-19-5xb8yc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After falling in the early 2000s up to 2016, the homicide rate in Ecuador has risen rapidly over the past few years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Statista</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But following a recent sharp rise in drug trafficking and gang violence, Ecuador is now one of the region’s four most violent countries. The latest data shows the homicide rate <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/why-has-ecuador-become-so-violent-2023-08-10/#">increasing to 22 people per 100,000 in 2022</a> – above the average of 20 per 100,000 for Latin America (but still below that of Colombia at 27 per 100,000). </p>
<p>Much of this violence is directed from the country’s jails, which are now <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/americas/ecuador-drug-violence-crisis-explainer-intl/index.html#:%7E:text=The%20country%20has%20also%20lost,a%20series%20of%20macabre%20massacres.">virtually controlled by criminal gangs</a>. Despite being incarcerated, gang leaders control a wide range of criminal activities – including networks which move cocaine from Colombia and Peru through Ecuador’s massive ports into major drug markets in Europe and the US.</p>
<p>Ecuador itself isn’t a major drug-producer and, unlike Colombia, has no history of guerilla or paramilitary activity. Yet, in the past 15 years, the country developed into a major logistical hub for international criminal organisations. In an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-66469463">interview with BBC Mundo</a> in 2019, Ecuador’s former director of military intelligence, Colonel Mario Pazmiño, estimated that 40% of Colombia’s cocaine production transited via Ecuador – and data on seizures and raids on processing labs suggests Ecuador’s role as a transit hub has <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/insight-crimes-cocaine-seizure-round-up-2022/">increased further since then</a>.</p>
<p>Colombia’s 2016 peace agreement and the resulting dismantling of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) was a turning point. Until then, Farc controlled drug trafficking routes from southern Colombia to Ecuadorean ports. Its dismantling led to the creation of dissident groups in Colombia, and opened the door to Mexican criminal organisations attempting to gain control of Farc routes. </p>
<p>According to the UN’s 2023 Global Report on Cocaine, the <em>Cártel de Sinaloa</em> and <em>Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación</em> “<a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/cocaine/Global_cocaine_report_2023.pdf">largely control the trafficking corridors between Mexico and the US</a>” and are fighting for supremacy. Villaviciencio had campaigned on the growth of this drug trafficking and explicitly named the organisations involved, for which he was murdered.</p>
<h2>Bleak outlook</h2>
<p>The outlook for Ecuador isn’t promising. Global demand for cocaine continues to increase and production in Colombia is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombias-potential-cocaine-production-record-high-un-says-2022-10-20/">at a record high</a>. The UN estimates that one-third of Colombia’s illicit coca fields are located within 10km of its frontier with Ecuador. </p>
<p>This can only mean that Ecuador’s role in the drug supply chains continues to grow in importance, especially as peace efforts in Colombia continue. Venezuela, through which 24% of global cocaine production transits, <a href="https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/is-venezuela-becoming-a-major-cocaine-producer/#:%7E:text=The%20world%27s%20fourth%20cocaine%2Dproducing%20country&text=According%20to%20the%20same%20report,even%20as%20the%20country%20collapses.">has a similar problem</a></p>
<p>After three days of mourning for Villavicencio, campaigning has resumed ahead of the election on August 20. Opinions polls show that security is by far the biggest concern for voters, and all candidates are campaigning on the issue – understandable in the wake of Villavicencio’s murder. But in a country where <a href="https://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp">87% of people don’t trust democracy itself</a>, the outlook is gloomy, to say the least.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211458/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicolas Forsans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ecuador’s murder rate has shot up in recent years and now a presidential candidate has been assassinated.Nicolas Forsans, Professor of Management and Co-director of the Centre for Latin American & Caribbean Studies, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1771372022-05-03T17:17:35Z2022-05-03T17:17:35ZWeaving is helping strengthen ancestral knowledge among women and children in Ingapirca, Ecuador<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459182/original/file-20220421-11481-hl5ahc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=40%2C0%2C1489%2C898&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women trace ancestral memories using wool.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Monica Malo)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the remote Andean community of El Cisne in Ingapirca, Ecuador, one of the first things you’ll notice is children’s laughter. In a courtyard, women gather with their children to trace ancestral knowledge and memories — and they do this using wool.</p>
<p>The alpaca wool that helps them reconnect has been carefully sheared, cleaned and the combed into a soft material that will be easier to spin and work with.</p>
<p>While the practice of spinning and weaving has dwindled in the community, as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0907568221991617">other work takes precedence,</a> most of the women gathered here have some knowledge of the activity. They’ve learned by observing their own mothers, grandmothers, aunties and other adults.</p>
<p>Reviving and helping strengthen ancestral knowledge is one of our goals as researchers and educators facilitating a project called <a href="http://uncommoningintheandes.climateactionchildhood.net/index.php/about-the-project/">Uncommoning in the Andes</a>. The project is part of the <a href="https://climateactionchildhood.net/">Climate Action Childhood Network</a> — an international group of educators and researchers who create and experiment alongside young children and early childhood educators to generate responses to climate change.</p>
<h2>From land dispossession to environmental degradation</h2>
<p>El Cisne is a small community located in the highlands of Ecuador’s Cañar province. The community has resisted and adapted to waves of change over centuries of colonization.<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.04.016"> Land dispossession</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780199730414-0113">indentured servitude</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2012.646429">mass migration to the north</a> hollowed out the community, while <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19031190">widespread environmental degradation</a> has changed Cañari cultural and social relationships. </p>
<p>Since 2016, Uncommoning in the Andes has sought to foster relationships and create spaces for women and children to reconnect and reignite ancestral practices. The women and children make up the Asociación Ñucanchic Allpa Mamamanta Warmicuna and they meet twice weekly to talk about their history, the changing present and to reintroduce traditional practices such as farming and weaving into their daily lives with an aim to create cohesion and an alternative source of economic independence.</p>
<p>This work is slow, deliberate and difficult. The project’s weaving sessions attempt to foster acts of care and sharing across generations, as elderly hands guide young ones through the creation process.</p>
<h2>Weaving and the climate crisis</h2>
<p>Weaving was traditionally done by men in Ingapirca, while women focused on spinning and dying the wool. But after the nothern migration, women and elders stayed behind with the children and community roles shifted. </p>
<p>Uncommoning in the Andes organized a set of workshops with, Monica Malo, a local wool artisan who accompanied the woman as they remembered what it meant to weave. Passing on that knowledge helps further strengthen their agency as they’re now able to pass it on to their children.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of women weave, a child sits on one of the women's laps." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459351/original/file-20220422-14-wl3gle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459351/original/file-20220422-14-wl3gle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459351/original/file-20220422-14-wl3gle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459351/original/file-20220422-14-wl3gle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459351/original/file-20220422-14-wl3gle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459351/original/file-20220422-14-wl3gle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459351/original/file-20220422-14-wl3gle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The women and children involved in the Uncommoning in the Andes make up Asociación Ñucanchic Allpa Mamamanta Warmicuna.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Monica Malo)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Education, research and community can play an important role in reinvigorating children’s ancestral knowledge that are sustainable and based on a reciprocal relation with the Earth. These relations are <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/675703/hospicing-modernity-by-vanessa-machado-de-oliveira/">less damaging, less toxic and therefore offer alternative responses to climate change</a>.</p>
<p>The climate crisis isn’t affecting everyone equally, and <a href="https://cergnyc.org/publications/18_1_03_climatechange">children in the Global South experience more severe social, environmental and economic consequences</a>. They also have less opportunities to share how they are creatively responding to the climate crisis since their knowledge is less valued in neo-colonial societies.</p>
<p>Our project is as much about surrounding the next generation with ancestral knowledge as it is about providing spaces that enhance and value women’s roles.</p>
<h2>Uncommoning in the Andes</h2>
<p>Uncommoning in the Andes provides space for reflection, lighthearted commiserating and culture sharing. The women often start by talking about their daily routine — rising well before dawn to take care of the dairy cows. Women and children bring out little stools to milk the cows before the daily milk pick up (between 4:00 a.m. and 6:30 a.m.).</p>
<p>The meetings also serve as a place for oral storytelling, which the children soak up. Women speak of different weaving patterns and what each signifies, about the symbolism sewn into their clothing and the <a href="https://doi.org/10.13014/K2V40SCN">important role textiles had in ancient ceremonies and transactions</a>. </p>
<p>The children accompany their mothers to visit alpacas, running their small hands through the coarse hair. They sit together and watch videos of other women who have organized weaving collectives and are now earning an income from the sale of their creations. These gatherings also include the tradition of the <em>pamba mesa</em>, which is similar to a potluck.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Children pet alpacas" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459354/original/file-20220422-26-uz0qca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459354/original/file-20220422-26-uz0qca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459354/original/file-20220422-26-uz0qca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459354/original/file-20220422-26-uz0qca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459354/original/file-20220422-26-uz0qca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459354/original/file-20220422-26-uz0qca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459354/original/file-20220422-26-uz0qca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children enjoy visiting the alpacas and enjoy running their small hands through the alpaca’s coarse hair.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Monica Malo)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The project intends to support the women in creating collectives that resist <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3811011?seq=1">patriarchal colonialism</a> which are deeply ingrained in their memory and life. In addition to storytelling and culture sharing, woven throughout every gathering is <a href="https://plc.sas.upenn.edu/quechua">Quechua, the Indigenous language</a> spoken by the elders, which some young women understand and children are becoming familiar with.</p>
<p>Uncommoning in the Andes is just as important for children as it is for women. The children are listening, they’re participating and proposing new ideas. One woman’s daughter is even learning how to weave at home, a sign that knowledge, once revitalized, spreads and weaves towards the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177137/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cristina Delgado Vintimilla receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.</span></em></p>Women meet to weave, reflect, commiserate, share culture and tell stories in hopes of passing down ancestral knowledge.Cristina Delgado Vintimilla, Assistant professor, Early Childhood, Faculty of Education, York University, CanadaVeronica Pacini-Ketchabaw, Professor of Early Childhood Education, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1766982022-02-14T14:48:46Z2022-02-14T14:48:46ZUltra-processed foods: global analysis shows they aren’t well sign-posted<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445621/original/file-20220210-25-ljj0gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Straightforward guidance about ultra-processed foods is rare in national dietary guidelines. Only seven countries refer to “ultra-processed foods” explicitly. They are Belgium, Brazil, Ecuador, Israel, Maldives, Peru and Uruguay. </p>
<p>The term “ultra-processed food” is <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30744710/">clearly defined in the NOVA framework</a> as “formulations of ingredients, mostly of exclusive industrial use, that result from a series of industrial processes”. The framework puts foods into four categories according to their degree of processing. Ultra-processed food products include many soft drinks, biscuits, processed meats, instant noodles, frozen meals, flavoured yoghurts and bread products. Consumption of ultra-processed food has been linked to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-ultra-processed-foods-and-why-theyre-really-bad-for-our-health-140537">health and environmental harms</a>.</p>
<p>To better understand how national dietary guidelines communicate advice about ultra-processing, we conducted an <a href="https://www.ijhpm.com/article_4197.html">analysis of 106 guidelines around the world</a> to explore if – and how – they talked about ultra-processed foods. Dietary guidelines are a key component of nutrition policies and are important in transforming nutrition research into policy actions. An example would be informing school meal standards.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Hut with food in it and a food cycle" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Food Guides from Benin (2015) and Sierra Leone (2016)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We found dietary guidelines used a range of euphemisms to refer to the presence or absence of processing. These ranged from canned, to frozen, packaged, ready food and instant.</p>
<p>Many guidelines also used the term “processed”. But this captures a vast range of technologies, ranging from basic cooking (such as chopping and boiling), to beneficial processing (such as fermenting for preservation), through to sophisticated forms of industrial processing (such as hydrogenation, a chemical process often used to modify fats, and extrusion, a physical process to shape foods). These do not have the same health or environmental impacts, and conflating them in dietary advice is unproductive. </p>
<p>The absence of clear and actionable guidance is a risk for public health and the environment. Strong guidance around the harms of ultra-processing can help catalyse the development of other food and nutrition policies, such as taxes or restrictions on marketing to children. Collectively, these policies can foster healthier and more sustainable food environments.</p>
<h2>Figuring out healthy from unhealthy</h2>
<p>When trying to evaluate how healthy or sustainable a processed food is, two key considerations are the nature and purpose of processing. Freezing and canning are often used to preserve foods, and this can be beneficial from a food safety and food security perspective. But the use of artificial colours or thickeners can be used to imitate the taste and texture of whole foods, or to mask unpleasant attributes caused by processing.</p>
<p>Dietary guidelines can do a better job communicating these nuances to clarify the differences between beneficial and harmful forms of processing. </p>
<p>While seven countries used the term processed or ultra-processed, most referred to food processing euphemistically. Examples include, from South Africa, the phrase:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>eat more…unrefined ready-to-eat cereals, oats, mealie meal, maltabela, muesli</p>
</blockquote>
<p>or from Nepal:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>eat more wholegrain cereal products and less refined cereals. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>We found that advice to reduce consumption of “processed”, “highly processed” or “ultra-processed” foods was more common in low- and middle-income countries. In high-income countries, this was often limited to advice about processed meat.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map with green and red marks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Food processing messages.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most guidelines followed the advice of the Food and Agricultural Organisation and offered food-based advice. More than half of the examples of discouraged foods were ultra-processed. But some examples were minimally processed foods or minimally processed ingredients. Examples include meat, butter. </p>
<p>These food examples highlight contradictions between processing-focused and nutrient-focused advice. Meat, butter and natural yoghurt, for example, are high in fats, but minimally processed. Whereas diet soft drinks or low-fat flavoured yoghurt are low in “harmful nutrients” but ultra-processed. </p>
<p>We found that the term “processing” was more common than we expected. Nevertheless, we found that dietary guidelines often provoked confusion about ultra-processed foods, discouraging consumption of some minimally processed foods and potentially even encouraging consumption of ultra-processed ones.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph with different colour bars" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Food in eat less messages.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Clear advice about processing was rare. Yet all but one of the 106 guidelines we analysed provided nutrient-focused advice. Take this example from South Africa:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Use salt and food high in salt sparingly.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These contradictions in dietary advice risk confusing citizens.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph with eat more and eat less lines" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nutrient focus and processing focus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Changing the ultra-processed food system</h2>
<p>To avoid consumer confusion, and to facilitate the uptake of evidence about ultra-processed food policies such as school meal guidelines and front-of-pack labelling, we recommend three actions. </p>
<p>First, dietary guidelines can provide examples of less obvious ultra-processed foods. While soft drinks and fast foods are common examples, others include processed breads, flavoured yoghurts, sauces, breakfast cereals and ready meals.</p>
<p>Second, dietary guidelines can provide more explanation about how to identify ultra-processed foods based on the nature and purpose of processing. Beyond a focus on the composition of foods (in other words, their ingredients), ultra-processed foods are often heavily marketed with health claims or colourful cartoon packaging appealing to children. </p>
<p>Powerful food companies, which are often headquartered in high-income countries, are driving the global expansion of ultra-processed foods into industrialising countries such as South Africa and China. Greater scrutiny of the practices used to promote them is an important step towards reducing their consumption.</p>
<p>Finally, policy makers can use dietary guidelines to inform the development of other food policies to support citizens to reduce consumption of ultra-processed foods. This could include restrictions on advertising (especially to children), taxes or front-of-pack labels that discourage consumption. </p>
<p>It is also important to enable consumption of minimally processed foods, such as through subsidies or other initiatives, to make them more affordable and accessible. This could include support for living wages paid to workers in the food system, such as Australia’s recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/closing-the-loophole-a-minimum-wage-for-australias-farm-workers-is-long-overdue-171291">initiative</a> to pay farm workers the minimum wage. </p>
<p>These initiatives are essential to ensure that everyone has an equitable opportunity to access healthy and sustainable foods.</p>
<p><em>Daniela Koios, an author on the academic paper, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176698/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Lacy-Nichols has received funding from The George Institute of Global Health. She is a member of the People's Health Movement and the Healthy Food Systems Australia advocacy group. The findings of the research reported in this article, and the views expressed, are hers alone and not necessarily those of the above organisations.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Priscila Machado receives funding from an Alfred Deakin Postdoctoral Research Fellowship provided by Deakin University, and has received funding from the Australian Research Council and Sao Paulo Research Foundation. She is a member of the Nutrition Society of Australia, the World Public Health Nutrition Association and the Healthy Food Systems Australia advocacy group. The findings of the research reported in this article, and the views expressed, are hers alone and not necessarily those of the above organisations.</span></em></p>Dietary guidelines can do a better job clarifying the differences between beneficial and harmful forms of processing.Jennifer Lacy-Nichols, Research fellow, The University of MelbournePriscila Machado, Research Fellow, Institute for Physical Activity and Nutrition, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1692332021-10-05T13:33:50Z2021-10-05T13:33:50ZEcuador prison riot: 118 killed as gang violence spirals out of control in Latin America’s jails<p>One of the more distressing things about the savage riots that engulfed the Litoral prison in Ecuador on September 28 was that, several days after the violence was brought under control, the final death toll was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-58733202">still unknown</a> and many of the victims had still to be identified.</p>
<p>The most recent reports are that at least 118 inmates died in the fighting, at least six of whom had been beheaded by other inmates. By any standard, these are shocking figures and represent the worst death toll resulting from inter-prisoner violence in Ecuadorian prison history. The previous record was as recently as February, when <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/24/ecuador-increases-death-toll-prison-riots">79 prisoners were killed</a> in a series of riots in several prisons across the country. </p>
<p>In between these record-setting riots, another <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ecuador-deadly-prison-riots-1.6113924">22 prisoners were killed</a> at the Litoral prison in July. This means that in less than a year, 0.5% of the Ecuadorian prison population, which is a little under 40,000, has been murdered in these three sets of riots alone. </p>
<p>Inter-prisoner violence resulting in mass killings is not uncommon in the region. In 2019, over 50 detainees were killed in a riot in a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-49157858">prison in Para Province</a>, Brazil, including 16 who were decapitated. Many more were killed in other riots across the prison system as a whole in that, and in preceding years. In other words, while the number of deaths during a single incident in the recent riots in Ecuador is shocking high, it is merely another gruesome milestone in the increasingly deadly violence that plagues prisons in many South American countries.</p>
<h2>Gang violence</h2>
<p>What is at least as shocking as the deaths themselves is that nobody can truly be claimed to be shocked that they are taking place. The causes are well known. In most instances, they are the product of <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2012/09/22/a-journey-into-hell">conflicts between rival gangs</a> and groups, these groups usually being linked to criminal gangs operating within the countries more generally. </p>
<p>While the violence that takes place is often sparked by particular incidents occurring within the prisons, rarely is this the sole reason. The prison is a tinderbox waiting to be ignited by sparks flying from the frictions between the factions: prisons have become merely another “theatre” in which rival criminal gangs jostle for influence. And those sent to prison have little practical option but to join a faction – to support it, and to be “protected” by it. Not being associated with a gang is likely to place a detainee at greater risk than being a member. Neutrality is rarely an option.</p>
<p>There is something already deeply dysfunctional about a prison system (and there are many) in which inmates appear to have easy access to guns and grenades and other such weapons. Much is made of the prisons in Ecuador suffering from serious overcrowding – and this is certainly the case: the prisons are at <a href="https://www.prisonstudies.org/country/ecuador">roughly 133% of their capacity</a>, making conditions even more difficult than would otherwise be the case. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of the most recent riots, the government has announced plans to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/death-toll-ecuadors-worst-ever-prison-riot-rises-118-2021-10-01/">reduce the numbers of inmates</a> in its jails. Though very welcome news, seeking to release the elderly, women, those with disabilities, those with terminal illnesses and those able to be deported is hardly likely to make much of a dent in the overall problem of overcrowding. And it will have very little impact on the prevalence of gang warfare that is rife in prisons. Relatively few of those to be released are likely to be housed in the high-security prisons such as the Litoral penitentiary. Transferring those involved in the recent violence to spaces created in other establishments is at least as likely to spread such violence as it is to contain it.</p>
<h2>Loss of control</h2>
<p>It is the unfortunate truth that prison authorities have significantly less authority over the day-to-day life in prisons than they would have us believe. As a result, while introducing heightened measures of internal control might dampen down violence in the short term, experience suggests that this cannot be maintained for very long and the net effect is to prompt even more violence in the longer term. So what can be done?</p>
<p>Some suggest the answer lies in holding members of different gangs in different prisons, as opposed to different wings in the same prison as is usually the case. But this is unlikely to be a practical option, as it would usually mean holding some detainees further from their families and dependents, making them even more reliant on their gang membership and factions for day-to-day support. </p>
<p>The real need is to try to break that dependency, by providing alternative routes through prison life – or alternatives to prison life – than those that reinforce dependency on gangs and cartels. There is no point being naive about the difficulty of doing this. The gangs that drive the prison violence are usually deeply embedded in the communities from which the detainees come. They have a long and powerful reach, exercising power over families, friends and others who are vulnerable, meaning that some detainees may be in no position to resist the demands and instructions of others.</p>
<p>The causes of, and solutions to, extreme and systemic violence in prisons rarely lie only in prisons. Important as prison reform is, on its own it is never going to be enough. Systemic and organised prisoner violence on this scale needs to be recognised for what it is: a reflection and replication of the violence between lawless groups within the broader community. Unless and until that can be addressed, prisons that are overfilled by those caught up with illegal gangs and cartels will remain at risk of erupting into communal and deadly violence. And the state that puts them there must take responsibility for that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169233/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Malcolm Evans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gang violence is a serious problem in Latin American society – not just its jails.Malcolm Evans, Professor of Public International Law, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1440002020-08-16T20:14:21Z2020-08-16T20:14:21ZFrom the COVID-19 epicentre: lessons from Latin American cities’ successes and failures<p>Latin America is now the <a href="http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/latin-americas-coronavirus-crisis-why-it-disproportionally-affects-the-poor/">epicentre of the COVID-19 pandemic</a>. The fastest spread of the disease in the region’s cities follows a pattern of contagion that is anything but arbitrary. Disturbing images in international media depict the unfolding crisis, from disinfection campaigns in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to stockpiles of cardboard coffins in Guayaquil, Ecuador. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/deaths-and-desperation-mount-in-ecuador-epicenter-of-coronavirus-pandemic-in-latin-america-137015">Deaths and desperation mount in Ecuador, epicenter of coronavirus pandemic in Latin America</a>
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<p>By this week, <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/latin-america-caribbean-pass-europe-in-covid-19-deaths/1934209">about 30%</a> of the <a href="https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases">world’s reported cases</a> were in the region. But some centres have been much worse hit than others.
Two factors underpin these variations: levels of inequality, and the ways governments and communities are handling the crisis.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352858/original/file-20200814-18-1olzvi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="World map showing distribution of reported COVID-19 cases per 100,000 population for each country" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352858/original/file-20200814-18-1olzvi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352858/original/file-20200814-18-1olzvi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352858/original/file-20200814-18-1olzvi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352858/original/file-20200814-18-1olzvi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352858/original/file-20200814-18-1olzvi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352858/original/file-20200814-18-1olzvi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352858/original/file-20200814-18-1olzvi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Worldwide distribution of 14-day cumulative number of reported COVID-19 cases per 100,000 population. Darkest colours indicate highest rates of infection.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases">ECDC</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Across the region’s largest cities, the <a href="https://www.as-coa.org/articles/coronavirus-latin-america">first cases had appeared</a> by early March in well-off neighbourhoods. Not until May were <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/new-cases">exponential rates of infection recorded</a> in most Latin American countries. The surge in cases reflected the spread of coronavirus across cities and into their poorest neighbourhoods. </p>
<h2>The poor are more vulnerable</h2>
<p>Many of the urban poor have <a href="http://www.unla.edu.ar/novedades/estudio-de-la-unla-y-el-conicet-revela-que-apenas-un-tercio-de-las-trabajadoras-domesticas-sigue-cobrando-su-salario-en-cuarentena">not been able to manage risk</a> in the way that the better-off do. To make ends meet they often travel long distances in public transport to work in wealthier neighbourhoods. Those who have jobs are often employed in the informal economy: cleaning houses, fixing electrical problems, selling vegetables and so on. </p>
<p>By June 2020, infection rates were increasing in many middle-class neighbourhoods too –
for example, in <a href="https://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/coronavirus/noticias/actualizacion-de-los-casos-de-coronavirus-en-la-ciudad-buenos-aires">Buenos Aires</a>. However, self-isolation is a more realistic prospect in these areas. Medical care is also more accessible.</p>
<p>Inequality created ideal conditions for COVID-19 to spread. The disease <a href="https://blogs.iadb.org/ideas-que-cuentan/es/la-importancia-de-las-politicas-de-busqueda-activa-de-casos-covid-19-en-barrios-marginales/">disproportionately affects residents of informal settlements</a> in the largest cities. <a href="https://www.techo.org/mexico/informate/cidh-audiencia-regional-asentamientos-informales-america-latina/">One-fifth</a> of the Latin American population lives in such settlements.</p>
<p>As well as their work being insecure, their <a href="https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/regularization-informal-settlements-latin-america-full_0.pdf">living conditions</a> add to their vulnerability. Some of the problems faced can include overcrowding, malnutrition, deficient sewer systems, limited (and often paid) access to drinkable water, overwhelmed or unaffordable health services and indoor air pollution from cooking (with open fires or simple stoves, for example).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/so-coronavirus-will-change-cities-will-that-include-slums-137072">So coronavirus will change cities – will that include slums?</a>
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<p>Given these conditions, COVID-19 is far from a levelling force. It is the latest crisis to reveal old and hard truths about Latin America’s social and economic geography.</p>
<h2>Quality of governance laid bare</h2>
<p>The virus has not spread unabated in all Latin American cities. The quality of governance and the preparedness of services have greatly affected outcomes between cities and countries. </p>
<p>Some have paid a high price for the harmful impacts of inconsistent communications by authorities and political leaders, weak public health systems, liberalised employment conditions and lack of support for disadvantaged groups.</p>
<p>Mortality analyses conducted by the <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality">Coronavirus Resource Center</a> at John Hopkins University show six of the countries most affected by COVID-19 worldwide are now in Latin America. Brazil, Chile and Peru have reached 50 or more deaths per 100,000 population. Nowhere has it been made clearer how a chronically underfunded public health system leaves behind vulnerable people. </p>
<p>The mortality rate is lower in other parts of the region. In these countries, strict restrictions have been introduced and the public health systems bolstered since the start of the pandemic. Leading examples include Uruguay, with 1.07 deaths per 100,000 people, and Argentina (11.7/100,000).</p>
<p>In June, Time included Argentina’s response in “<a href="https://time.com/5851633/best-global-responses-covid-19">The Best Global Responses to COVID-19 Pandemic</a>”. In the capital, Buenos Aires, co-ordination between the three levels of government has been strong on public health as well as economic and social protection measures despite political differences. Shared communications have backed strict lockdown measures every fortnight since March 20 (read more about the Buenos Aires experience <a href="https://crawford.anu.edu.au/news-events/news/17295/covid-19-suppression-buenos-aires-five-factors-work-worlds-longest-lockdown">here</a>).</p>
<h2>Bottom-up efforts are vital too</h2>
<p>It is not just top-down approaches by government that make a difference to local outcomes. The bottom-up work of social organisations in Latin American cities has also been vital. </p>
<p>We see this work especially in informal settlements that lack public services. Often run voluntarily and by women, these organisations cook meals for people in need, make masks, source medications, spread public information and fix broken houses. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-mumbais-poorest-neighbourhood-is-battling-to-keep-coronavirus-at-bay-137504">How Mumbai's poorest neighbourhood is battling to keep coronavirus at bay</a>
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<p>Many of their actions are also directed toward the state. With an ethic of care, they seek to drive anti-neoliberal change and demonstrate a better urban future centred on people’s real lives and desires. </p>
<p>For example, across the region feminist social movements and politics are dismantling patriarchal perspectives about modern cities. Their collective response to the COVID-19 crisis is a demonstration of solidarity.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352453/original/file-20200812-20-uuvi3t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Posts by Latin American feminist groups" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352453/original/file-20200812-20-uuvi3t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352453/original/file-20200812-20-uuvi3t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352453/original/file-20200812-20-uuvi3t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352453/original/file-20200812-20-uuvi3t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352453/original/file-20200812-20-uuvi3t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352453/original/file-20200812-20-uuvi3t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352453/original/file-20200812-20-uuvi3t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Feminist movements debate ‘ecofeminism’ and ‘the city we want to return to’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ciudadfeminista.cl/%20https://www.ciudaddeldeseo.com/">Ecofeminism Encounters, Latin American Dialogue (https://www.ciudadfeminista.cl/, https://www.ciudaddeldeseo.com/)</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<h2>Remaking cities after the pandemic</h2>
<p>Looking forward to the post-pandemic city, there are valuable lessons to be learnt from Latin America. </p>
<p>First, debilitating inequality must be redressed. Poverty has been built into the way cities are developed. But this is now being denaturalised. </p>
<p>Second, co-ordinated and strong state-led action that made public health the priority has saved lives in cities like Buenos Aires. Bipartisan leadership and collaboration between levels of government can also help us deal with pressing urban challenges in the future. </p>
<p>Third, because of the ubiquitous albeit unequal way coronavirus has affected people across cities, there is potential for a post-pandemic future that focuses on collective well-being. </p>
<p>Many Latin American social organisations, and the networks between them, offer hope and direction for the challenge of recovery. Not only do they provide vital support in crisis management, they could play a democratising role in shaping politics and state responses to redress inequality over the long term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144000/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hayley Henderson previously received an APA scholarship while undertaking her PhD studies at The University of Melbourne on integrated planning in Buenos Aires, Argentina and Melbourne, Australia. </span></em></p>Latin America now has about 6 million COVID-19 cases – 30% of the global total. But some cities have fared much worse than others, largely due to the quality of government and community responses.Hayley Henderson, Postdoctoral Fellow, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1381622020-05-08T12:17:36Z2020-05-08T12:17:36ZThe flowers you buy your mom for Mother’s Day may be tied to the US war on drugs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/333473/original/file-20200507-49565-2e8d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=203%2C82%2C4817%2C3349&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Colombia is the world's second-biggest cut flower exporter. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Fernando Vergara</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What does Mother’s Day flowers have to do with cocaine? </p>
<p>Very little, most people would think. But as an economist, I <a href="http://businessmacroeconomics.com">often explain</a> to my students that the world is economically connected, often in strange ways. The flower business is one of those strange economic connections.</p>
<p>Mother’s Day, which this year falls on May 10, is typically big for the American floral industry, which depends on it for <a href="https://aboutflowers.com/holidays-occasions/mothers-day/mothers-day-floral-statistics/">over a quarter of all holiday flower sales</a>. It’s especially important to flower vendors this year as the coronavirus <a href="https://qz.com/1848936/the-global-flower-industry-is-wilting-ahead-of-mothers-day/">has ravaged the industry</a>, affecting both supply and demand. </p>
<p><a href="https://ccfc.org/about-ccfc/">About a third of cut flowers</a> purchased in the U.S. come from California, while the rest are imported. <a href="https://dataweb.usitc.gov/">About 80% of those</a> come from Colombia or Ecuador. </p>
<p>The story of how both countries became such an important source of flowers for the U.S. can be traced back to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/war-on-drugs-2718">U.S. war on drugs</a>.</p>
<p>In the late 2000s, the U.S. and Colombian government were looking for <a href="https://tradevistas.org/rose-how-trade-policy-was-used-to-fight-drugs-from-colombia/">new ways to stem the flow of cocaine</a> into the U.S. Part of the strategy involved law enforcement: <a href="https://www.state.gov/eradication-and-interdiction/">increasing interdictions</a> to stop drugs before they crossed the border and <a href="https://www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/enforce.cfm">ramping up arrests of people selling drugs</a> in the U.S.</p>
<p>Another part of this strategy, however, was to convince farmers in Colombia to stop growing coca leaves, a traditional Andean plant that provides the raw ingredient for making cocaine, by giving them preferential access to U.S. markets if they grow something else.</p>
<p>The goal of the program was to give these subsistence farmers a legal crop that would be roughly as profitable as growing coca leaves – whether flowers, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-coca-leaf-not-coffee-may-always-be-colombias-favourite-cash-crop-74723">honey or coffee</a>. This is formally called <a href="https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/146794NCJRS.pdf">crop substitution</a>. </p>
<p>In theory, by cutting back the supply of coca leaves, the price of the key raw material in cocaine rises. This cost increase is passed along the supply chain, raising the price of cocaine at every point.</p>
<p>Why is raising the price of cocaine important? A basic idea in economics is the “<a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lawofdemand.asp">law of demand</a>,” which says the higher the price of a product the less people buy, holding everything else constant. Pushing up the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3945407/">price of cocaine should reduce the amount</a> Americans consume. </p>
<p>Not just Colombia but also Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru – all coca-producing countries – get duty-free access to U.S. markets in exchange for clamping down on illegal drugs, under the <a href="http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/USA_ATPA/USA_ATPA_e.ASP">Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act</a>. </p>
<p>Has crop substitution worked? </p>
<p>Well, not to eradicate the cocaine market. Only last year <a href="https://apnews.com/0aa6474b944f4ff8eb9e7e9cffffce87">Colombia had a record coca crop</a>, and the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-does-cocaine-cost-in-the-us-2016-10">street price of cocaine</a> hasn’t budged. There are complicated reasons for this, including the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/31/opinion/failed-war-on-drugs.html">persistence of U.S. demand for drugs</a>, regardless of source, the ingenuity of drug trafficking organizations, and the <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/coca-yes-cocaine-no">cultural significance of coca leaf in the Andean region</a>.</p>
<p>But this failed U.S. drug policy did lead to a surge in cut flower exports to the U.S. from both Colombia and Ecuador. <a href="https://dataweb.usitc.gov/">Colombia exported</a> US$800 million worth of flowers to the U.S. in 2019, up from $350 million in 2000. Ecuador’s exports tripled from $90 million in 2000 to $270 million in 2019. As a result of the increased supply, flower prices in the U.S. <a href="https://beta.bls.gov/dataViewer/view/timeseries/CUUR0000SEHL02">rose less</a> than <a href="https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm">average inflation</a>. </p>
<p>So if you do manage to find flowers this Mother’s Day, both your mom and the farmers who grow them will thank you for it.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re too busy to read everything. We get it. That’s why we’ve got a weekly newsletter.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybusy">Sign up for good Sunday reading.</a> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138162/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jay L. Zagorsky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A program intended to reduce coca production ended up giving two Latin American countries a big boost to their flower power.Jay L. Zagorsky, Senior Lecturer, Questrom School of Business, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1370152020-04-24T12:21:36Z2020-04-24T12:21:36ZDeaths and desperation mount in Ecuador, epicenter of coronavirus pandemic in Latin America<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330169/original/file-20200423-47820-ct3iol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=184%2C92%2C4559%2C2966&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Coffins await burial at the Jardines de Esperanza cemetery in Guayaquil, Ecuador, April 10, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/coffins-with-bodies-await-to-be-buried-jardines-de-news-photo/1209598949?adppopup=true">Eduardo Maquilon/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Dead bodies are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/coronavirus-guayaquil-ecuador-bodies-corpses-streets/2020/04/03/79c786c8-7522-11ea-ad9b-254ec99993bc_story.html">lying at home and in the streets of Guayaquil, Ecuador</a>, a city so hard-hit by coronavirus that overfilled hospitals are turning away even very ill patients and funeral homes are <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/ecuador-bodies-of-coronavirus-victims-are-on-streets/1791407">unavailable for burial</a>.</p>
<p>Data on deaths and infections is incomplete in Ecuador, as it is across the region. As of April 22, Ecuador – a country of 17 million people – had reported <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/ecuador/">almost 11,000 cases</a>, which on a per capita basis would put it behind only Panama in Latin America. But the true number is likely much higher. </p>
<p>The government of Guayas Province, where Guayaquil is located, says <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-52324218?emci=10ae4262-b480-ea11-a94c-00155d03b1e8&emdi=71eb1005-b580-ea11-a94c-00155d03b1e8&ceid=4606001">6,700 residents died</a> in the first half of April, as compared to 1,000 in a normal year. A New York Times analysis estimates Ecuador’s real coronavirus death toll may be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/americas/ecuador-deaths-coronavirus.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article">15 times the 503 deaths officially tallied</a> by April 15.</p>
<p>In a pandemic that has largely hit wealthy countries first, Ecuador is one of the first <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=EC-XT">developing countries</a> to face such a dire outbreak. </p>
<p>Wealth is no guarantee of safety in an epidemic. Italy and the United States have both run <a href="https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2020-04-07/researchers-look-for-ways-to-divert-patients-from-ventilators-as-shortage-looms">short of necessary medical equipment like ventilators</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/health/kidney-dialysis-coronavirus.html">dialysis machines</a>. But experts agree poorer countries are likely to see <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/18/coronavirus-will-infect-half-the-global-population-eiu-predicts.html">death rates escalate quickly</a>. </p>
<p>Our own academic research on <a href="https://www.puce.edu.ec/">Ecuadorean politics</a>
and <a href="https://www.latrobe.edu.au/about/management/organisation/senior/vc-fellow-altman">human security in past pandemics</a> suggests that coronavirus may create greater political and economic turmoil in a country that already struggles with instability.</p>
<h2>Ecuador’s swift response</h2>
<p>The coronavirus outbreak in Guayaquil, Ecuador’s largest city and economic engine, began in February, apparently with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2020/mar/20/coronavirus-ecuador-city-blocks-runway-to-spanish-repatriation-flight-video">infected people returning from Spain</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330167/original/file-20200423-47794-1eqgwa5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330167/original/file-20200423-47794-1eqgwa5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330167/original/file-20200423-47794-1eqgwa5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330167/original/file-20200423-47794-1eqgwa5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330167/original/file-20200423-47794-1eqgwa5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330167/original/file-20200423-47794-1eqgwa5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330167/original/file-20200423-47794-1eqgwa5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330167/original/file-20200423-47794-1eqgwa5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A doctor checking for COVID-19 symptoms in a family in Guayaquil, Ecuador, April 14, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/doctor-talks-to-a-family-while-checking-for-covid-19-news-photo/1209901713?adppopup=true">José Sanchez/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Its rapid escalation prompted panicked officials to impose social isolation quickly as a containment strategy. Ecuador’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/09/ecuador-struggles-contain-coronavirus-economic-anxiety-also-spreads/">restrictions on movement are strict and getting stricter</a>. </p>
<p>Ecuadorians may not leave their homes at all between the hours of 2 p.m. and 5 a.m. Outside of curfew, they may only go out to get food, for essential work or for health-related reasons, wearing masks and gloves. Public transport is canceled. </p>
<p>In Quito, Ecuador’s capital, people may only drive one day a week <a href="http://www.quitoinforma.gob.ec/2020/04/03/nueva-modalidad-de-restriccion-vehicular/">as determined by their license plate</a>. </p>
<p>This is the second time in a year Quito residents have found themselves under lockdown. In October 2019, a nighttime curfew was established quell <a href="https://theconversation.com/ecuadors-fuel-protests-show-the-risks-of-removing-fossil-fuel-subsidies-too-fast-125690">massive protests</a> against austerity measures that were imposed in exchange for a large loan from the International Monetary Fund. </p>
<p>The protests, led by indigenous groups, dissipated after President Lenín Moreno backed away from austerity – but not before at least <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/16/ecuador-indigenous-protesters-bittersweet-triumph">eight people were killed</a>.</p>
<h2>Latin America’s looming epidemic</h2>
<p>Ecuador has been more proactive in responding to the epidemic than many neighboring countries. </p>
<p>In Brazil President Jair Bolsonaro has largely <a href="https://theconversation.com/just-like-trump-brazils-bolsonaro-puts-the-economy-ahead-of-his-people-during-coronavirus-136351">downplayed the severity of the coronavirus</a>, despite thousands of new <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/brazil/">COVID-19 infections reported every day</a>. In Venezuela the power struggle between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition government of Juan Guaidó impedes <a href="https://theconversation.com/catholic-church-urges-venezuela-to-unite-against-coronavirus-135591">any coordinated pandemic response</a>. </p>
<p>Most Latin American leaders who have taken decisive action against coronavirus see stay-at-home orders as the only way to avoid collapse of their <a href="https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/pandemic-times-squeezed-budgets-how-coronavirus-will-test-latin-america">fragile, underfunded health systems</a>. </p>
<p>Panama is <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/panama-sets-gender-based-movement-restrictions-to-control-coronavirus-spread">limiting outings</a> based on gender, allowing men and women to leave their homes three days each. Everyone <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/01/world/panama-coronavirus-sex-intl/index.html">stays home on Sundays</a>. </p>
<p>El Salvador’s president sent soldiers to enforce a <a href="https://elfaro.net/es/202004/ef_foto/24307/Cerco-militar-a-La-Libertad.htm">48-hour full lockdown of the city of La Libertad</a> that prohibited residents from leaving home for any reason – including to get food or medicine.</p>
<p>It’s unclear how such restrictions can persist in a region with <a href="https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/poverty-latin-america-remained-steady-2017-extreme-poverty-increased-highest-level">considerable poverty</a> and social inequality. Large numbers of Latin Americans live day-to-day on money they make from <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/03/it-s-time-to-tackle-informal-economy-problem-latin-america/">street trading and other informal work</a>, which is now largely banned. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/es/2020/04/17/espanol/opinion/coronavirus-colombia.html">Hunger threatens</a> across the region.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330181/original/file-20200423-47810-oobc03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330181/original/file-20200423-47810-oobc03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330181/original/file-20200423-47810-oobc03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330181/original/file-20200423-47810-oobc03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330181/original/file-20200423-47810-oobc03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330181/original/file-20200423-47810-oobc03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330181/original/file-20200423-47810-oobc03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330181/original/file-20200423-47810-oobc03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Colombians under mandatory quarantine hang red fabric out their windows to request food aid, Soacha, April 15, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-officer-stands-guard-as-members-of-the-local-news-photo/1219067324?adppopup=true">Leonardo Munoz/VIEWpress via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Limits of Ecuador’s response</h2>
<p>In Ecuador, where the average <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=EC">annual income is US$11,000</a>, the Moreno government is giving emergency grants of $60 to families whose monthly income is less than $400. It has opened shelters to get homeless people off the streets and commandeered hotels to <a href="https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/sociedad/emergencia-coronavirus-albergue-guayaquil/">isolate the infected</a>. </p>
<p>An active network of community organizations is also working to provide basic food and shelter to the needy, which includes most of the <a href="https://43bluedoors.com/2017/12/17/life-on-the-street/">quarter million Venezuelan refugees</a> who entered Ecuador in recent years. </p>
<p>Despite its active coronavirus response, Ecuador is unlikely to cope well if the epidemic spreads quickly from Guayaquil into the rest of the country. </p>
<p>Ecuador has <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2020/04/11/latin-americas-health-systems-brace-for-a-battering">a quarter as many ventilators per person as the United States</a>. Testing for COVID-19 is scarce and has largely been <a href="https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/after-expelling-cuban-doctors-brazil-requests-their-help-fight-covid-19">outsourced to private corporations</a>, making it prohibitively expensive. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330166/original/file-20200423-47810-57zo9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330166/original/file-20200423-47810-57zo9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330166/original/file-20200423-47810-57zo9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330166/original/file-20200423-47810-57zo9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330166/original/file-20200423-47810-57zo9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330166/original/file-20200423-47810-57zo9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330166/original/file-20200423-47810-57zo9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330166/original/file-20200423-47810-57zo9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Street vendors in Guayaquil, Ecuador, April 17, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/street-vendors-sell-fruits-and-vegetables-on-april-17-2020-news-photo/1210270539?adppopup=true">Eduardo Maquilón/Agencia Press South/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>President Moreno’s expulsion of 400 Cuban doctors from Ecuador last year – part of his emphatic <a href="https://theconversation.com/just-120-days-into-his-term-ecuadors-new-president-is-already-undoing-his-own-partys-legacy-85651">shift rightward for Ecuador</a> – has left big holes in its <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/coronavirus-cuba-doctors-trump-ecuador-brazil-bolivia/2020/04/10/d062c06e-79c4-11ea-a311-adb1344719a9_story.html">already understaffed hospitals</a>.</p>
<p>Ecuador’s <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ecuador/overview">economy</a> is in crisis after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-coronavirus-is-just-the-latest-blow-to-oil-producers-133498">collapse in oil prices</a> <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1106008/coronavirus-economic-impact-tourism-scenario-ecuador/">and tourism</a>. And while <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/06/ecuador-lessons-2019-protests">last year’s deadly protests</a> are over, politics – and political unrest – continue to polarize the nation. </p>
<p>On April 7 Ecuador’s highest court sentenced the popular but divisive leftist former President Rafael Correa to eight years in prison <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/world/americas/ecuador-correa-corruption-verdict.html">on corruption charges</a>. Correa, who now lives in Belgium, says the charges are fabricated to ensure he cannot <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-52208588">run for office again</a>. His conviction increases political divisions during a crisis that calls for unity.</p>
<p>Ecuador’s death rate is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/coronavirus-news.html">starting to slow</a> after more than a month of lockdown. But the specter of COVID-19 victims lying unburied at home, in hospital hallways, and on the streets, hangs as a specter across Latin America. </p>
<p>Guayaquil is a grim forecast of how this pandemic kills in the less wealthy world.</p>
<p>[<em>Get facts about coronavirus and the latest research.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=upper-coronavirus-facts">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter.</a>]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137015/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Dead bodies left at home and in streets. Quarantined people facing hunger. Political turmoil. Ecuador’s coronavirus outbreak is a grim forecast of what may await poorer countries when COVID-19 hits.Dennis Altman, Professorial Fellow in Human Security, La Trobe UniversityJuan Carlos Valarezo, Professor of International Relations, Pontificia Universidad Católica de EcuadorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1277742020-01-03T13:48:03Z2020-01-03T13:48:03ZUnrest in Latin America makes authoritarianism look more appealing to some<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308147/original/file-20191220-11946-xn0gwc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C16%2C3583%2C2372&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A demonstrator protesting new austerity measures in Ecuador confronts armed police officers during clashes in Quito, Ecuador, Oct. 11, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Ecuador-Political-Crisis/70b382ea2d5a4afea30c4792cc7910e0/218/0">AP Photo/Dolores Ochoa</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Months of sustained, sometimes violent anti-government protest in South America may have increased popular support for authoritarianism.</p>
<p>That’s the startling finding of a still-unpublished study I conducted using data from the <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/about-americasbarometer.php">AmericasBarometer</a>, a survey undertaken every two years in Latin American countries.</p>
<p>Although the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/07/latin-americas-upheaval-should-finally-shatter-conventional-wisdom-about-region/">massive demonstrations</a> that have shaken <a href="http://theconversation.com/whats-going-on-in-south-america-understanding-the-wave-of-protests-126336">Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Paraguay since late 2018</a> have distinct origins and impacts – from transportation prices to election fraud – there are some commonalities. </p>
<p>All are an expression of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/23/chile-protests-sebastian-pinera-apology-reform">deep frustration with the political status quo</a>, and many demonstrators cite <a href="https://theconversation.com/ecuadors-fuel-protests-show-the-risks-of-removing-fossil-fuel-subsidies-too-fast-125690">corruption, poverty and economic inequality</a> as overlooked <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/04/colombia-protest-duque-bogota">issues facing their nation</a>.</p>
<p>Some South Americans, particularly young people and <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0842en.pdf">leftists</a>, see these mass protest movements as positive. In Chile, 80% of people surveyed in October 2019 <a href="https://www.eldesconcierto.cl/2019/11/03/encuesta-termometro-social-octubre-2019-80-de-los-chilenos-y-chilenas-aprueban-la-idea-de-una-nueva-constitucion/">said they approved of demonstrators’ actions</a>. In more conservative Colombia, <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/encuesta-de-guarumo-dice-que-el-60-9-esta-en-desacuerdo-con-las-protestas-444288">34% did</a>.</p>
<p>But the protests have also been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/es/2019/11/04/espanol/opinion/protestas-chile-venezuela.html">polarizing</a>. For months, marches have disrupted people’s day-to-day activities and turned capital cities into conflict zones, creating some <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2378023118803189">resentment</a> – even fear that the social order is unraveling. </p>
<h2>Support for authoritarian government</h2>
<p>These feelings may be leading more South Americans to see autocratic governance as a necessity for maintaining law and order, my study of the AmericasBarometer’s survey <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/raw-data.php">data</a> suggests.</p>
<p>The AmericasBarometer, which is part of the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University, has documented a relationship between support for protests and autocratic tolerance for years. </p>
<p>In 2012, their <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2012/AB2012-comparative-Report-V7-Final-Cover-01.25.13.pdf_">surveys</a> found that 30% of Latin Americans disapprove of “people conducting peaceful protests.” That group was 9% more likely than others to agree that the country needs “a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people.” </p>
<p><iframe id="ofLbA" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/ofLbA/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2014.php">2014</a>, anti-protest respondents were 5% more likely to prefer an authoritarian government to a democratic one. </p>
<p>By <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2018/2018-19_AmericasBarometer_Regional_Report_10.13.19.pdf">late 2018</a> – after <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelas-opposition-is-on-the-verge-of-collapse-86187">large protests erupted</a> in <a href="https://theconversation.com/mass-protests-in-colombia-mar-presidents-first-100-days-but-reveal-a-nation-marching-toward-peace-107339">several Latin American countries</a> – this same group was 12% less supportive of democratic governance than those who view protests favorably.</p>
<p>Latin Americans who disapprove of protesting are also slightly more likely than others to say that it would be acceptable for a president to dissolve congress and govern without a legislature during difficult times. This is known as an “executive coup.” </p>
<p>In short, the AmericasBarometer surveys seems to indicate that protests increase tolerance for authoritarianism among Latin Americans.</p>
<h2>Fertile ground for autocracy</h2>
<p>Latin America has a complicated relationship with democracy. </p>
<p>Most countries in the region made heralded transitions away from <a href="https://theconversation.com/truth-justice-and-declassification-secret-archives-show-us-helped-argentine-military-wage-dirty-war-that-killed-30-000-115611">military dictatorship</a> in the 1980s. But public support for democracy in the region has been <a href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2018/2018-19_AmericasBarometer_Regional_Report_10.13.19.pdf">declining since 2010</a>. Today less than half of Latin Americans think <a href="https://time.com/5662653/democracy-history-latin-america/">democracy</a> is the best form of governance. </p>
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<p>Given this political context, I put the preliminary survey findings that mass protests increase support for autocracy to the test. I chose two countries gripped by protests in 2019 – Chile and Ecuador – to study the relationship between demonstrations and democracy.</p>
<p>Specifically, my experiment investigated whether extreme civil disobedience – mass protests that disrupt the economy, prevent leaders from governing or shut down public services, for example – increases people’s preferences for autocracy.</p>
<p>I ran surveys online in Chile and Ecuador, recruiting respondents via Facebook by placing ads on users’ newsfeeds – a research method previously used to study <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2101458">political behavior</a>. These participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups: a control group, in which respondents read entertainment news, and my test group, whose respondents read an article about protests threatening the country’s stability and citizens disobeying authorities.</p>
<p>After they finished reading the news, I asked respondents a series of questions measuring their support for autocracy. The results show that Chileans who read about civil disobedience were 10% more likely than the control group to prefer autocracy over democracy. Ecuadorians who read about social unrest were 2% more likely to support autocracy. </p>
<p>Taken together, after controlling for sex, income and education, I found that people in Chile and Ecuador were 7% more likely to favor autocratic government if they read about protests threatening the social order. </p>
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<h2>Protests and the fate of democracy</h2>
<p>My findings offer insight into some possible unintended consequences of South America’s ongoing mass protests. </p>
<p>These demonstrations have given a voice to some citizens long excluded by the political system, and mass civil disobedience has won protesters some major concessions from government. In Chile, there are promises of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/chiles-political-crisis-is-another-brutal-legacy-of-long-dead-dictator-pinochet-126305">more equitable constitution</a>. In Bolivia, <a href="https://time.com/5723753/bolivia-evo-morales-resigns/">President Evo Morales resigned</a> during protests that followed allegations of election fraud. </p>
<p>But for Latin Americans unsettled by this political and social upheaval, authoritarianism is apparently starting to look more appealing. </p>
<p>As a result, South American demonstrations aimed at strengthening democracy may actually end up weakening it.</p>
<p>[ <em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paula Armendariz Miranda is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota, where she is completing a dissertation on the personality roots of citizen support for authoritarianism. She is also a visiting scholar at Vanderbilt University and part of the editorial team at Comparative Political Studies.</span></em></p>All those democracy protests in South America may be having some unintended consequences.Paula Armendariz Miranda, Ph.D. Candidate, University of MinnesotaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1263362019-11-11T23:21:27Z2019-11-11T23:21:27ZWhat’s going on in South America? Understanding the wave of protests<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300882/original/file-20191108-194633-1wtsvo3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C388%2C4401%2C2134&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators clash with a police water cannon during a recent anti-government protest in Santiago, Chile. Several South American countries have been experiencing massive social unrest in recent months.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Esteban Felix)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The news that Bolivian President Evo Morales <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/10/americas/bolivia-new-election-audit/index.html">is resigning amid an election fraud scandal</a> highlights an unfortunate reality about South America. Even though the continent has made big economic strides in recent years, it’s often still plagued by political and civil unrest.</p>
<p>With more than 425 million people, South American countries are among the world’s largest producers and exporters <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/19127/biggest-producers-of-beef/">of beef</a> <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/world-leaders-in-soya-soybean-production-by-country.html">and soy</a> (Brazil), <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/171.htm">oil</a> (Venezuela), <a href="http://www.ico.org/trade_statistics.asp">coffee</a> (Colombia), <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/hs92/2204/">wine</a> (Argentina and Chile), <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/264626/copper-production-by-country/">copper</a> (Chile and Peru) and <a href="https://www.theoilandgasyear.com/market/bolivia/">natural gas</a> (Bolivia). </p>
<p>But South America has also long been known for its <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/why-political-turmoil-is-erupting-across-latin-america/2019/10/10/a459cc96-eab9-11e9-a329-7378fbfa1b63_story.html">political instability</a> and public policy tensions. </p>
<p>In the past century, several South American countries faced coups, military dictatorships and social uprisings. The last few months have shown that the turmoil is hardly a thing of the past.</p>
<h2>Wave of demonstrations</h2>
<p>In addition to Venezuela, where <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-reasons-why-trumps-venezuela-embargo-wont-end-the-maduro-regime-121538">political and economic crises</a> have resulted in a humanitarian disaster known around the world, there has been recent turbulence elsewhere in South America.</p>
<p>Paraguay has been experiencing massive protests against President Mario Abdo. Paraguayans are angry about <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/08/22/a-secret-hydropower-deal-with-brazil-causes-a-political-crisis-in-paraguay">an agreement with Brazil on the Itaipu hydroelectric power plant</a> that’s considered detrimental to the smaller country. </p>
<p>With the government at a 69 per cent disapproval rating, the opposition has started an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-paraguay-president/paraguayan-presidents-popularity-plummets-amid-brazil-linked-political-crisis-idUSKCN1V421O">impeachment process against Abdo and his vice-president that’s close to completion</a>. The impeachment comes just seven years after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/22/paraguay-fernando-lugo-ousted">former president Fernand Lugo was himself impeached</a> in 2012 amid land disputes that resulted in 17 deaths. </p>
<p>In Peru, President Martin Vizcarra <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/5972760/peru-president-dissolves-congress-corruption/">has dissolved congress</a> in an attempt to force new parliamentary elections. His actions have resulted in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Im5LX4Nc0sg">several demonstrations</a> around the country, including one that <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/11/reuters-america-update-2-mmgs-las-bambas-copper-mine-faces-production-halt-amid-protests.html">blocked access to a copper mine and caused production to cease</a>. </p>
<p>Vizcarra was the vice-president until last year, after <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/peru-kuczynski-resign-1.4587182">former president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski resigned</a> due to a possible connection to a bribery scandal involving Brazilian construction company Odebrecht. Another Peruvian president, Alan García, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47965867">killed himself last April</a> when the police arrived at his home to arrest him for involvement in the same case.</p>
<h2>Election results disputed</h2>
<p>Bolivia has also been experiencing a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/28/bolivian-election-protests-santa-cruz-block-roads-la-paz">massive wave of demonstrations</a>. The opposition <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/bolivia-opposition-leader-calls-for-new-election-amid-unrest/a-51100841">did not accept the results of recent elections</a>, which gave the victory to Morales in the first round of voting for his fourth term. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301110/original/file-20191111-194637-31ckza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301110/original/file-20191111-194637-31ckza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301110/original/file-20191111-194637-31ckza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301110/original/file-20191111-194637-31ckza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301110/original/file-20191111-194637-31ckza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301110/original/file-20191111-194637-31ckza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301110/original/file-20191111-194637-31ckza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301110/original/file-20191111-194637-31ckza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Morales attends a news conference in La Paz, Bolivia, on Nov. 10, 2019. Morales is calling for new presidential elections and an overhaul of the electoral system.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Juan Karita)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Leading the country since 2006, Morales accepted <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election/bolivia-split-as-opposition-calls-for-morales-to-step-down-rejects-audit-idUSKBN1XB4SA">a ballot audit</a> from the Organization of American States (OAS), which found the results of October’s elections could not be validated because of “serious irregularities.” He announced he was quitting for “the good of the country.”</p>
<p>Since the election, roads were closed across the country and daily riots were routine. Santa Cruz, the richest province in Bolivia, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20191029-dozens-injured-in-clashes-as-bolivia-s-election-standoff-enters-second-week">is experiencing an ongoing general strike</a>.</p>
<p>In Ecuador, President Lenin Moreno withdrew a subsidy on fuel, in place since the 1970s, due to an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). <a href="https://time.com/5705202/what-happens-next-in-ecuador/">The price of fuel has since skyrocketed</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/ecuador-unrest-led-mass-protests-191010193825529.html">provoking massive protests</a> that paralyzed parts of the country in October.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300885/original/file-20191108-194661-1ndlc29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300885/original/file-20191108-194661-1ndlc29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300885/original/file-20191108-194661-1ndlc29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300885/original/file-20191108-194661-1ndlc29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300885/original/file-20191108-194661-1ndlc29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300885/original/file-20191108-194661-1ndlc29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300885/original/file-20191108-194661-1ndlc29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Anti-government demonstrators scale the facade of a residence to reach the rooftop in search of a better vantage point to battle with police in Quito, Ecuador, in October 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Dolores Ochoa)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50010190">Moreno has accused</a> his predecessor, Rafael Correa, and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro of being behind the demonstrations, which continued <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/14/ecuador-protests-end-after-deal-struck-with-indigenous-leaders">even after the return of the subsidy</a>. </p>
<p>Chile, the South American country with the <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI">highest human development index</a> and one of the <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-richest-countries-in-south-america.html">highest GDPs per capita in the region</a>, is facing the biggest wave of public turmoil since the re-democratization of the nation in 1990. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/how-chile-went-from-an-economic-star-to-an-angry-mess/2019/10/29/9d575fe8-fa41-11e9-9e02-1d45cb3dfa8f_story.html">The triggers</a> were the increases in public transit fares and electricity bills at the beginning of October. </p>
<h2>Education, old-age pensions</h2>
<p>Issues relating to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/stunning-wealth-poor-services-behind-massive-chile-protests/2019/10/28/93e8e3e4-f93a-11e9-9e02-1d45cb3dfa8f_story.html">education</a>, mostly private and expensive, and the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/stunning-wealth-poor-services-behind-massive-chile-protests/2019/10/28/93e8e3e4-f93a-11e9-9e02-1d45cb3dfa8f_story.html">pension regime</a> are fuelling a lot of the unrest in Chile, particularly among youth and the elderly. The protests have resulted in at least 20 deaths and thousands injured amid charges of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/24/chile-protests-human-rights-un-investigation">state-sanctioned violence</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately, Brazil and Argentina, the largest countries in South America, are not currently dealing with similar turmoil even though both countries recently held elections that revealed deeply divided electorates.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301111/original/file-20191111-194669-1o0fytt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301111/original/file-20191111-194669-1o0fytt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301111/original/file-20191111-194669-1o0fytt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301111/original/file-20191111-194669-1o0fytt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301111/original/file-20191111-194669-1o0fytt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301111/original/file-20191111-194669-1o0fytt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301111/original/file-20191111-194669-1o0fytt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro smiles during an event in Brasilia, Brazil, in October 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Eraldo Peres)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In October 2018, Brazil elected right-wing former army captain <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/28/americas/brazil-election/index.html">Jair Bolsonaro</a>. The onetime congressman defeated the leftist candidate, resulting in the first defeat of the Workers Party since 1998.</p>
<p>Regardless of the defeat and the wear caused by several corruption scandals, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46013408">Brazil’s left-wing parties</a> still have a large number of seats in parliament as well as state governors. </p>
<p>In Argentina, the recent election of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/alberto-fernandez-wins-argentine-presidential-election/a-51011631">Alberto Fernandez</a> has brought back the leftist party of former president Cristina Kirchner, who became vice-president. Even in defeat, former leader Mauricio Macri received 41.7 per cent of the vote, showing that, just as in Brazil, the opposition against Fernandez is strong. </p>
<h2>Possible consequences</h2>
<p>The resurgent unrest in South America has some similarities from country to country.</p>
<p>Most started because of minor causes, like bus or subway fare increases, but pertain to broader public policy problems like corruption, access to education, health care or pensions. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-05/south-american-economies-dive-south-as-growth-outlook-dims">Economic issues</a> have played a significant role in the widespread dissatisfaction. </p>
<p>The strong economic indicators of years past in South America <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-latam-economics-recession-analysis/latin-america-lacks-ammunition-to-fight-global-economic-slowdown-idUSKCN1VA1YH">have weakened</a>. Many countries are now facing low GDP increases and high unemployment. </p>
<p>Even Chile is experiencing a decline in its economic outlook. The country is often considered <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/chiles-ascent-from-3rd-to-1st-world/article12298793/">the first developed Latin American nation</a>. It is a bit early to say if the recent events could change that status. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chile-protests-escalate-as-widespread-dissatisfaction-shakes-foundations-of-countrys-economic-success-story-125628">Chile protests escalate as widespread dissatisfaction shakes foundations of country's economic success story</a>
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<p>The unrest in South America is <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-10-24/protests-across-south-america-unleash-public-anger-at-elected-leaders">already being compared</a> to the Arab Spring, the wave of pro-democracy demonstrations in North Africa and Middle East. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/30/arab-spring-aftermath-syria-tunisia-egypt-yemen-libya">In 2010 and 2011</a>, the Arab Spring fuelled the fall of autocratic presidents in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, and generated civil war in Yemen. </p>
<p>Although there are similarities, South American countries are largely democratic, even if some of those democracies are fragile. The most recent South American elections have seen voters swinging between left- and right-wing parties.</p>
<p>The following weeks will determine the impact of these collective South American backlashes. Despite the amount of natural wealth in the region, instability in South America is commonly generated by economic crises, resulting in the type of massive civilian protests we’re seeing now. </p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126336/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lenin Cavalcanti Guerra does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the last century, several South American countries faced coups, military dictatorships and social uprisings. Despite economic improvements in recent years, the continent remains mired in unrest.Lenin Cavalcanti Guerra, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Johnson Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy, University of SaskatchewanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1256902019-10-31T22:13:41Z2019-10-31T22:13:41ZEcuador’s fuel protests show the risks of removing fossil fuel subsidies too fast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299722/original/file-20191031-187938-153qklo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=146%2C111%2C4310%2C2847&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers enforce a curfew in Quito, Ecuador during weeks of protests over higher fuel prices. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Fernando Vergara)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In early October, the city centre near the <a href="http://www.casadelacultura.gob.ec/">House of Ecuadorian Culture</a> in Quito, Ecuador, hummed with the sounds of uniformed school children, foreign tourists, civil servants and commuters. Some stopped to relax or eat in the groomed parks nearby.</p>
<p>Within the week, the area was engulfed in <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/video/2019/10/10/protests-grow-violent-in-ecuador-over-fuel-subsidy-removal.html">violent chaos</a>. Police fired tear gas into crowds of angry marchers that had taken over the culture museum. “It just keeps getting worse and worse,” said Maria Fernanda Sanchez, a Quito resident and bystander to the protests.</p>
<p>The protests started on Oct. 2 in response to the federal government’s “Decreto 883,” a packet of economic adjustments that eliminated a government fuel subsidy worth close to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/08/ecuador-moves-government-out-of-capital-as-violent-protests-rage">US$1.4 billion</a> per year. The package was designed to help meet the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-imf/ecuador-inks-4-2-billion-financing-deal-with-imf-moreno-idUSKCN1QA05Z">US$4.2 billion loan</a> <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/03/20/NA032119-Ecuador-New-Economic-Plan-Explained">requirements</a> from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but resulted in civil unrest as energy prices rose across the country. </p>
<p>This recent upheaval in Ecuador has important lessons for Canadian climate change policy. The mass protests shine a spotlight on the tension that can arise between policies that raise energy prices and day-to-day energy affordability.</p>
<h2>The Ecuadorian experience</h2>
<p>Ecuador’s removal of the 40-year-old fuel subsidy saw gas and diesel prices rise sharply. The price of gasoline rose to $0.80 per litre (US$2.30/gallon) from $0.64 per litre (US$1.85/gallon) and the cost of diesel more than doubled. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299717/original/file-20191031-187898-1uh775w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299717/original/file-20191031-187898-1uh775w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299717/original/file-20191031-187898-1uh775w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299717/original/file-20191031-187898-1uh775w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299717/original/file-20191031-187898-1uh775w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299717/original/file-20191031-187898-1uh775w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299717/original/file-20191031-187898-1uh775w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators scale a residence in Quito, Ecuador on Oct. 11, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Dolores Ochoa)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A violent storm of protests followed, led by lower-income earners, including Indigenous, student and labour unions. After 11 days of unrest and hundreds of millions of dollars in economic damages, Ecuadorian President Lenín Moreno <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/world/americas/ecuador-protests-lenin-moreno.html">backed down and reversed the policy</a>. </p>
<p>Moreno’s backtrack highlight the risks that come when fossil fuel subsidy reform (or broader fiscal climate policy) is implemented in a difficult political, social, and economic context. Fossil fuel subsidy reforms save governments money, but they are also a key ingredient to <a href="https://www.ecuadortimes.net/ecuador-also-joins-the-protest-on-climate-change/">tackling climate change</a>.</p>
<h2>Fossil fuel subsidies and climate change</h2>
<p>Fossil fuel subsidies artificially lower prices on oil, gasoline and other petroleum products for consumers and producers to below market levels, and encourage their use over climate-friendly alternatives.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.iea.org/weo/energysubsidies/">International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates</a> that global subsidies to consumers alone were US$400 billion in 2018, and this does not include subsidies to oil and gas producers where poor transparency clouds estimates. Together, the G20 subsidizes the production and consumption of coal, oil and gas by at least <a href="https://www.iisd.org/gsi/subsidy-watch-blog/all-change-and-no-change-g20-commitment-fossil-fuel-subsidy-reform-ten-years">US$150 billion</a> annually.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1039241">UN Secretary General António Guterres</a>, the IEA and others emphasise that fossil fuel subsides are hindering efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. “The continued prevalence of [global fossil fuel] subsidies — more than double the estimated subsidies to renewables — greatly complicates the task,” <a href="https://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2019/june/fossil-fuel-consumption-subsidies-bounced-back-strongly-in-2018.html">the IEA reported in June</a>. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-what-the-carbon-tax-means-for-you-114671">Here's what the carbon tax means for you</a>
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<p>Canada has already made significant strides in using fiscal policy such as carbon pricing to tackle climate change, but additional monetary and regulatory policies are <a href="https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/canada/">needed to hit the 2030 Paris target</a> and the <a href="https://globalnews.ca/video/5947368/trudeau-announces-liberal-plan-to-push-canada-to-net-zero-emissions-by-2050">2050 net-zero pledge</a>. </p>
<p>And Canada and the provinces continue to support fossil fuels with <a href="https://www.iisd.org/faq/unpacking-canadas-fossil-fuel-subsidies/">billions of dollars domestically</a>. Canada, along with its G20 peers, has reaffirmed its commitment to <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/g20/2019-06-29-g20_leaders-dirigeants_g20.aspx?lang=eng">remove any “inefficient” federal fossil fuel subsidies every year since 2009</a>. Canada went one step further and committed to a 2025 deadline. As part of Canada’s commitment, the federal government is <a href="https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/documents/pdf/climate-change/discussion-document-assessment-framework-inefficient-fossil-fuel-subsidies.pdf">currently identifying inefficient programs with a view to reforms</a>.</p>
<h2>Lessons from Ecuador</h2>
<p>Fossil fuel subsidy reform, carbon pricing and regulations, can all lead to a period of economic adjustment that sees prices rise — at least in the short-term — while <a href="https://institute.smartprosperity.ca/library/publications/accelerating-clean-innovation-canada">technology and innovation</a> catch up.</p>
<p>Ecuador’s response is not unique. France saw the escalation of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/frances-climate-change-commitments-trigger-rising-diesel-prices-and-street-protests/2018/11/17/fdc01fa6-e9b1-11e8-8449-1ff263609a31_story.html">yellow vest movement in 2018</a> after President Emmanuel Macron and his government increased a carbon tax that raised fuel prices. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-frances-gilets-jaunes-protesters-are-so-angry-108100">Why France's ‘gilets jaunes’ protesters are so angry</a>
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<p>Moreno’s reforms were not directly linked to environmental policy — the IMF loan agreement and desire to stop smuggling of fuel to neighbouring countries were the principle motivations. Yet they offer sharp lessons in what could go wrong when subsidy reform and fiscal policy is poorly implemented. </p>
<h2>Too fast, too furious</h2>
<p>Ecuador raised its fuel prices too quickly. <a href="https://www.imf.org/%7E/media/Files/Publications/fiscal-monitor/2019/October/English/text.ashx?la=en">Gradual, predictable, incremental roll-out is nearly universally recommended</a> by experts. </p>
<p>Government programs that support viable alternatives can also play a role. For example, governments could invest in improving public transport or making low-carbon vehicles more accessible. Innovation can be spurred by necessity, but governments need to act cautiously when causing change themselves.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299718/original/file-20191031-187907-s3abev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299718/original/file-20191031-187907-s3abev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299718/original/file-20191031-187907-s3abev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299718/original/file-20191031-187907-s3abev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299718/original/file-20191031-187907-s3abev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299718/original/file-20191031-187907-s3abev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299718/original/file-20191031-187907-s3abev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A mural, inspired by Eugene Delacroix’s painting ‘La Liberté guidant le peuple’ by artist PBOY depicts France’s yellow vest protestors.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Christophe Ena)</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Adverse impacts on the poor</h2>
<p>At first glance, fuel subsidies keep energy affordable for vulnerable populations. However, Ecuador’s blanket approach means that its scarce government revenue is subsidizing the driving habits of the middle and upper classes instead of targeting the lower-income residents.</p>
<p>These policies can also exacerbate existing social tensions. “The Indigenous peoples of Ecuador have long been repressed, and what happened aggravated deep social divides,” said Grace Jaramillo, a postdoctoral researcher of Latin American Political Economy at the University of British Columbia. Existing inequalities in income distribution can inflame mistrust in this type of policy, she said.</p>
<p>To counter these concerns, environmental fiscal policies can be coupled with increased social programming, rebates, refunds and tax credits to <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/745311489054655283/pdf/113262-PUB-PUBLIC-PUBDATE-3-22-17.pdf">maintain consumers’ overall spending power</a>. The money saved on subsidies can also be used to fund <a href="https://iisd.org/library/raising-ambition-through-fossil-fuel-subsidy-reform">climate-friendly programs that boost energy efficiency or renewable energy</a>.</p>
<p>Even when people receive rebates or other benefits, they still have reasons to switch to cleaner alternatives when fossil fuel prices rise — maintaining the environmental effectiveness of the policy. At the same time, incentives help with equity issues and increase the popularity of the program. Without widespread buy-in, good public policy may be pushed into retreat. Slow but steady action is better than no action at all. </p>
<h2>Poor explanations, no negotiations</h2>
<p>With little explanation on the reasons behind the subsidy reform, and no prior consultation with affected communities or social groups, the Ecuadorian policy was poorly understood and had gained very little support. </p>
<p>Complex technical policy will fail if the costs are obvious but the benefits are not. In the case of climate change policy, governments must target their explanations about the policy, its rebates and its intended outcomes to muster support. The costs of inaction on climate change should be made clear but so should the multiple benefits that accompany climate policy, including cleaner air, energy efficiency, more liveable cities and so on. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-puts-health-at-risk-and-economists-have-the-right-prescription-118797">Climate change puts health at risk and economists have the right prescription</a>
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<p>As Canada ratchets up its ambition to decarbonize the economy by 2050, Ecuador’s experience shows that without careful policy implementation the local and immediate needs and fears of citizens could trump the global, long-term, critical concerns of fighting global warming.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katherine Monahan works for the Smart Prosperity Institute, at the University of Ottawa, that is actively researching and disseminating market-based policy tools to fight climate change. Funders include the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Katherine is also a Fellow in Global Journalism at the University of Toronto. </span></em></p>The mass protests shine a spotlight on the tension between policies that raise energy prices and day-to-day energy affordability.Katherine Monahan, Fellow in Global Journalism at the University of Toronto, and Senior Research Associate at the Smart Prosperity Institute, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1243852019-10-09T16:50:28Z2019-10-09T16:50:28ZThe Latin American left isn’t dead yet<p>Argentina, Bolivia and <a href="https://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/politica/elecciones-dicen-encuestas-cara-octubre.html">Uruguay</a> will all hold presidential elections in October. And, for now, leftists are <a href="https://www.as-coa.org/content/guide-2019-latin-american-elections/argentina">strong contenders</a> in all three countries. </p>
<p>This is a somewhat unexpected development. Beginning in 2015, <a href="https://nacla.org/news/2016/12/09/right-turn">conservatives toppled</a> major leftist strongholds, including in Brazil, Argentina and Chile. The socially progressive Latin American left was <a href="https://aulablog.net/2019/01/09/a-right-turn-in-latin-america/">declared dead</a> <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/07/pink-tide-latin-america-chavez-morales-capitalism-socialism/">many times over</a>. </p>
<p>But the left-leaning populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-was-elected-to-transform-mexico-can-he-do-it-99176">victory in Mexico</a> in July 2018 showed that Latin American political winds don’t all blow in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/mexicos-left-turn-and-the-road-to-uncertainty-106847">same direction</a>.</p>
<p>So what can be learned from the failures and successes of Latin America’s leftist parties and governments in the very recent past?</p>
<h2>Latin America’s ‘left turn’</h2>
<p>About two-thirds of all Latin Americans lived under some form of leftist government <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/book/1866">by 2010</a> – a “pink tide” that washed over the region following the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998. </p>
<p>Only a few countries – notably Colombia and Mexico – remained under conservative political leadership during this period.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay have elections in October.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock.com/The Conversation</span></span>
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<p>Academics conventionally grouped this <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/welfare-and-party-politics-in-latin-america/BFE6B43ED35B5CB02919279F5620AB73">Latin American left</a> into <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=eKOwSqYH5rcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=uruguay+social+democratic+left&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiBl7LNpY_lAhXQl-AKHaIlB7QQ6AEwAHoECAEQAg#v=onepage&q=uruguay%20social%20democratic%20left&f=false">two camps</a>. </p>
<p>There was the moderate “social democratic” left of Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, which embraced an agenda of egalitarianism while accepting the basic precepts of market economics. </p>
<p>This group was generally contrasted with the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=3IVjDgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT5&ots=8jhwLduGbl&sig=eLyxmkw3j55zS5nuIfqGGkj6WI8#v=onepage&q&f=false">more radical “populist” left</a> that ran Venezuela, <a href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2016/00000048/00000004/art00003">Bolivia</a>, Nicaragua and Ecuador. These governments shared the moderate left’s commitment to progressive social change but had bolder aims: an alternative to market economics and profound changes to political institutions. </p>
<p>Such groupings did little to predict these countries’ divergent fates.</p>
<p>In a few places, leftist governments have remained popular, vibrant and electorally competitive after over a decade in power – namely <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bolivia/2018-02-14/key-evo-morales-political-longevity">Bolivia and Uruguay</a>. </p>
<p>But by 2015, <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/bolsonaro-and-brazils-illiberal-backlash/">Brazil</a>, <a href="https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Venezuela/Smilde%20Current%20History--final.pdf">Venezuela</a> and <a href="https://nacla.org/news/2018/07/25/nicaragua-view-left">Nicaragua</a> had all become political and economic catastrophes. <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/party-vibrancy-and-democracy-in-latin-america-9780190870041?cc=us&lang=en&">Chile’s leftist government</a> sharply declined in popularity. </p>
<h2>The conformist temptation</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ob2gBJoAAAAJ&hl=en">political science research</a> identifies some shared weaknesses of the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=d7yzgzQAAAAJ&hl=en">Latin American left</a>.</p>
<p>The first lesson comes from the Workers Party, which governed Brazil between 2003 and 2016. </p>
<p>Like many progressive parties, the Workers Party’s founding leaders were idealistic – committed to <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300050745/workers-party-and-democratization-brazil">upending Brazilian politics as usual</a>. </p>
<p>Under the Workers Party, Brazil experienced a massive <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11186-019-09351-7">expansion of social citizenship rights</a>. By 2008, Brazilian President Lula da Silva was arguably the <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-brazil-tilts-rightward-lulas-leftist-legacy-of-lifting-the-poor-is-at-risk-65939">world’s most popular president</a>.</p>
<p>But the Workers Party became <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/transformation-workers-party-brazil-19892009?format=PB&isbn=9780521733007">detached from the social movements</a> it once championed. Deeply immersed in the normal – even <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-brazil-is-winning-its-fight-against-corruption-71968">corrupt</a> – give-and-take of Brazilian politics, the party came to be molded by the flawed system it sought to change.</p>
<p>We call this pitfall the “conformist temptation.” </p>
<p>The Workers Party rule ended with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/impeachment-culture-wars-and-the-politics-of-identity-in-brazil-59436">2016 impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff</a>, Lula’s hand-picked successor. Although Rousseff herself <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-brazilian-president-dilma-rousseffs-real-crime-59363">faced no corruption charges</a>, the Workers Party left power associated with corruption scandals, campaign finance violations and economic mismanagement – the exact problems it had promised to fix.</p>
<p>Chile’s Socialist Party met a similar fate. </p>
<p>Under Presidents Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, moderate leftists who governed Chile almost uninterrupted from 2001 to 2018, the party <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/12/18/chile-just-elected-a-billionaire-president-these-are-the-4-things-you-need-to-know/">distanced itself from its supporters in social movements</a>.</p>
<p>In 2011, students and teachers began <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2011/08/student-protests-in-chile/100125/">protesting</a> Chile’s low levels of public education funding and <a href="https://www.borgenmagazine.com/economic-inequality-in-chile/">high inequality</a>. The <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1866802X1600800305">youth protest movement</a> grew, exposing Chileans’ disappointment at the Socialists’ limited progress on social reforms. </p>
<p>These divisions on the left <a href="https://theconversation.com/chile-heads-into-presidential-runoff-with-a-transformed-political-landscape-86453">allowed Chile’s strong right wing to win</a> Chile’s 2018 presidential election.</p>
<h2>The autocratic temptation</h2>
<p>Crises in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador result from a different fatal flaw. </p>
<p>In these three countries, leftist leaders succumbed to what we call the “autocratic temptation” – the idea that a charismatic leader or popular political movement not only can speak for an <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/latin-americas-authoritarian-drift-the-threat-from-the-populist-left/">entire nation</a> but that they can <a href="https://theconversation.com/bolivia-is-not-venezuela-even-if-its-president-does-want-to-stay-in-power-forever-93253">do so forever</a>.</p>
<p>Like many authoritarian leaders, Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega have lost touch with their constituents. When leaders become too insulated, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-dictators-dilemma-9780190228552?cc=us&lang=en&">research shows</a>, safeguards against corruption and irresponsible public policies weaken. </p>
<p>Authoritarian leaders are less likely to change course when things go wrong. </p>
<p>The consequences may be devastating – like Maduro’s egregious failure to adjust Venezuela’s exchange rate policies during its descent into economic crisis and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/venezuelas-crisis-in-5-charts/2019/01/26/97af60a6-20c4-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html">hyperinflation</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Weyland-24-3.pdf">Authoritarian leadership</a> has degraded democracy in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador in other ways, too. <a href="https://theconversation.com/ecuadors-populist-electoral-victory-for-moreno-shows-erosion-of-democracy-75157">Checks and balances on presidential authority</a> have been weakened and press freedoms restricted. In Venezuela and Nicaragua, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaragua-protests-threaten-an-authoritarian-regime-that-looked-like-it-might-never-fall-95776">electoral process was manipulated</a>.</p>
<p>The autocratic temptation to lionize a charismatic founding leader weakens the governing political party, too, by making it extremely difficult for new leaders to emerge and carry forward the party’s long-term transformative agenda.</p>
<p>In Nicaragua and Venezuela, that has meant that <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaraguans-try-to-topple-a-dictator-again-98123">autocrats have clung to power</a> despite popular demand that they leave.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://aulablog.net/2018/02/02/ecuador-referendum-marks-critical-juncture-for-moreno-and-correa/">Ecuador</a>, the current and former presidents – Lenín Moreno and Rafael Correa – are engaged in a bitter dispute. Protests have rocked Ecuador over Moreno’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-49955695">economic policy shifts</a> away from Correa’s agenda.</p>
<h2>Leftist exceptions</h2>
<p>So what explains the resilience of the left in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/when-movements-become-parties/F06BEE9DEA9BA4E7DCFBD9A87266FAB8#fndtn-information">Bolivia</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-party-activism-survives/93C5584DB63DF0A80B51F3EEB68BC8E9">Uruguay</a>, where leftist parties have reduced <a href="http://www.santiagoanria.com/data.html">inequality</a> and made tremendous progress toward <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/delegative-democracy-revisited-more-inclusion-less-liberalism-in-bolivia/">social and political inclusion</a>? Left-wing candidates are polling well in both countries’ <a href="http://www.startribune.com/evo-morales-not-trending-among-bolivia-s-youth-ahead-of-vote/562382812">presidential races</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Argentine presidential candidate Alberto Fernandez and running mate, former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, at a campaign rally, Aug. 7, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://pictures.reuters.com/CS.aspx?VP3=SearchResult&VBID=2C0BXZSUWZX3IE&SMLS=1&RW=1920&RH=996#/SearchResult&VBID=2C0BXZSUWZX3IE&SMLS=1&RW=1920&RH=996&POPUPPN=8&POPUPIID=2C0BF1MYIRFG1">Reuters/Agustin Marcarian</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In our assessment, what sets Bolivia and Uruguay apart is the strength of the ties between the leftist parties and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/when-movements-become-parties/F06BEE9DEA9BA4E7DCFBD9A87266FAB8#fndtn-information">allied social movements</a> there. That has encouraged the accountability and responsiveness lacking in Venezuela, Brazil and Chile. </p>
<p>Civil society in Bolivia and Uruguay also retained its capacity for independent mobilization, constraining any possible slide into autocracy or unbridled ambition. </p>
<p>That may explain why Bolivia has so far <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bolivia/2018-02-14/key-evo-morales-political-longevity">avoided the worst social and economic consequences of the autocratic temptation</a> – despite its charismatic indigenous president, Evo Morales, <a href="https://theconversation.com/bolivia-is-not-venezuela-even-if-its-president-does-want-to-stay-in-power-forever-93253">eliminating term limits and consolidating power</a> over the past 14 years. </p>
<p>In Argentina the left’s possible comeback has more to do with conservative president Mauricio Macri’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/sep/10/argentina-economic-crisis-imf-debt-default">economic mismanagement</a>. But the center-left ticket leading Argentina’s presidential race has also succeeded because the candidates formed a broad national coalition – one that includes an array of social movements, from labor unions to feminist groups.</p>
<p>The Latin American left has some life in it yet.</p>
<p>[ <em>You respect facts and expertise. So do The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=yourespect">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124385/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Progressives are leading in the presidential elections of Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia, bucking the region’s recent rightward trend. But there are lessons in the failures of leftists past.Santiago Anria, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Latin American Studies, Dickinson CollegeKenneth M. Roberts, Richard J. Schwartz Professor of Government and Director, Latin American Studies Program, Cornell UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1233072019-10-07T12:38:01Z2019-10-07T12:38:01ZLatin America shuts out desperate Venezuelans but Colombia’s border remains open – for now<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-venezuelas-crisis-7-essential-reads-89018">Economic collapse</a>, government <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-is-now-a-dictatorship-96960">repression</a>, violence and U.S. sanctions are <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelas-power-struggle-reaches-a-tense-stalemate-as-human-suffering-deepens-114545">making life unbearable</a> for ever more Venezuelans. Now, echoing anti-migrant rhetoric used worldwide, politicians and officials in neighboring countries have begun to portray Venezuelan migrants as a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/venezuelans-face-barriers-xenophobia-south-america-190809183548040.html">national security threat</a>.</p>
<p>Approximately <a href="https://r4v.info/es/documents/download/70639">3.5 million</a> people have fled Venezuela for Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and other Latin American nations since late 2015, when Venezuela’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-venezuelas-economic-collapse-80597">crisis began</a>. Their continued arrival has overwhelmed towns and social service providers across the region. </p>
<p>Invoking security concerns, <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/la-visa-que-complica-el-ingreso-de-los-venezolanos-ecuador-articulo-877787">Ecuador</a> on Aug. 26 began requiring Venezuelans seeking entry to present a clean criminal record in addition to a passport and a visa. All three of those documents are nearly impossible for ordinary people to get given Venezuela’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-power-struggle-plunges-nation-into-turmoil-3-essential-reads-110419">political upheaval</a>. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-venezuela-immigration/chile-offers-democratic-responsibility-visa-to-venezuelan-migrants-idUSKCN1TN0MN">Chile</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/venezuelans-rush-enter-peru-rules-imposed-190615065449364.html">Peru</a> passed similarly restrictive entry requirements earlier this year.</p>
<p>In Brazil, officials last year <a href="https://theconversation.com/refugees-from-venezuela-are-fleeing-to-latin-american-cities-not-refugee-camps-103040">blamed Venezuelans for increased violence along the border</a>. As a candidate in Chile’s 2018 presidential race, Chilean President Sebastián Piñera <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-immigration/chiles-presidential-hopefuls-bet-on-anti-immigrant-sentiment-idUSKBN1591CF">accused foreigners</a> of “importing problems like delinquency, drug trafficking and organized crime.” And a prominent Peruvian mayoral candidate recently claimed Venezuelans were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-migration-peru-politics/peruvian-politician-stokes-fears-of-venezuelan-immigrants-idUSKCN1L828V">stealing local jobs</a>. </p>
<p>In contrast, Colombia – which hosts <a href="https://r4v.info/es/documents/download/70639">1.4 million migrants</a>, 40% of the region’s displaced Venezuelans – has emerged as a leader in welcoming Venezuelans. The Colombian government has issued <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/legal-pathways-venezuelan-migrants-latin-america">special permits</a> allowing some <a href="https://r4v.info/es/documents/download/70639">676,093 Venezuelans</a> to work and benefit from government social services for up to two years. The capital <a href="https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%C3%B3micos/3950.pdf">is working</a> with local governments to improve Venezueleans’ access to health care, education and jobs. And the administration recently granted <a href="https://beta.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombia-grants-citizenship-to-24000-babies-born-to-venezuelan-mothers/2019/08/05/390f6042-a8b3-11e9-8733-48c87235f396_story.html">citizenship to children</a> born in Colombia to Venezuelan parents. </p>
<p>Thanks in part to Colombia’s welcoming response, the country has avoided the kind of xenophobic backlash seen elsewhere in the region. </p>
<p>But, as my <a href="https://brown.academia.edu/CyrilBennouna">field work in Colombia</a> indicates, the hospitality at the Colombia-Venezuela border is fragile.</p>
<h2>Solidarity and national interest</h2>
<p>Colombia has its own serious domestic concerns to deal with. </p>
<p>The 2016 peace deal with the FARC guerrillas that ended Colombia’s 52-year armed conflict is <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/24/death-by-bad-implementation-the-duque-administration-and-colombias-peace-deals/">advancing slowly</a>, with the government failing to deliver on some of its promises and dissident rebels recently calling for a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/30/call-to-re-arm-farc-threatens-colombias-peace-process-mumps-iran-failure-to-launch-boris-prorogue/">return to the battlefield</a>.</p>
<p>Nearly <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia">6 million Colombians are still displaced internally</a> from the war. And unemployment stands <a href="https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/colombia/unemployment-rate">at over 10%</a>. </p>
<p>In Colombia, I sometimes heard the country’s pro-migrant policies toward Venezuelans explained as a sort of neighborly solidarity, following from the two countries’ <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/14/heres-why-colombia-opened-its-arms-to-venezuelan-migrants-until-now/">long shared history</a>. During the final years of Colombia’s armed conflict, Venezuela <a href="http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=UNHCR&f=indID%3AType-Ref">hosted over 200,000 Colombian forced migrants</a>.</p>
<p>But Colombia’s hospitality toward Venezuelan migrants is also pragmatic. </p>
<p>The government sees the potential economic gains of so many new workers. Colombia’s National Planning Department <a href="https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%C3%B3micos/3950.pdf">estimates</a> Venezuelans could contribute up to a 0.5 percentage-point gain in the Colombian economy by 2021, even taking into account the costs of hosting newcomers. </p>
<p>And, as I learned from interviews with government officials, researchers and aid workers, the administration of Colombian president Ivan Duque also realizes that it cannot effectively seal its 1,381-mile border with Venezuela. </p>
<p>Much of this border is controlled by criminal organizations and the remaining guerrilla forces, such as the <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/eln-in-venezuela/">National Liberation Army</a>. Armed groups like these <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/organized-crime-wins-in-colombia-venezuela-border-closure/">profit</a> tremendously from border closures. People and goods must then pass through their illicit routes – for a hefty fee. </p>
<p>Driving migrants into the hands of armed groups risks fueling <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/08/colombia/venezuela-attacks-civilians-border-area">forced recruitment</a> and <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/fleeing-venezuelans-business-opportunity-organized-crime/">human trafficking</a>.</p>
<h2>Xenophobia becomes a security threat</h2>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343318811432">A recent global study</a> confirms that refugees are regularly the victims of such violence. And crime data from Colombia suggest that there is <a href="http://ideaspaz.org/media/website/migracion-final.pdf">no statistical relationship between Venezuelan arrivals and crime rates</a>. </p>
<p>Yet in several South American countries allegations of crime by an individual Venezuelan have provoked violent backlashes against the entire group. </p>
<p>After a local businessman was beaten and robbed in Brazil in 2018, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/02/brazil-army-venezuela-border-migrant-crisis-attacks">a mob attacked an encampment of Venezuelans</a>, prompting the Brazilian government to deploy soldiers. Over 1,000 migrants fled back to Venezuela. In Ecuador, the stabbing of a woman in January triggered <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-21/mobs-attack-venezuelan-migrants-as-ecuador-pledges-tougher-rules">a violent anti-Venezuelan riot</a>.</p>
<p>Migration-related violence typically occurs when countries <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343318804592">lack the capacity or will to respond to newcomers effectively</a>, studies show. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/41fe3ab92.html%20//">According to the United Nations Refugee Agency</a>, to promote public safety and migrant protections, countries that host refugees must legally recognize their rights and develop strategies to house, care for and integrate this vulnerable population. Then, these host governments must be able to follow through. </p>
<p>Without sufficient resources and planning, migration may overwhelm locals and spark resentment against migrants. Seizing on voter fear and exasperation, opportunistic politicians can stoke the kind of anti-migrant sentiment now flaring up in Latin America. </p>
<p>This may spell trouble ahead for Colombia. </p>
<h2>A crisis of funding</h2>
<p>In April, Colombia’s president <a href="https://id.presidencia.gov.co/Paginas/prensa/2019/190414-Declaracion-Presidente-Ivan-Duque-Plan-Impacto-mitigar-efectos-generados-crisis-migratoria-cierre-frontera-Venezuela.aspx">announced</a> a US$200 million plan to support border areas, including payments for local hospitals and incentives for businesses to hire migrants.</p>
<p>But the international humanitarian community leading the aid effort in Colombia has <a href="https://r4v.info/en/documents/download/71546">requested</a> $315,467,200 more from donor countries to fund health, nutrition, education and other programming. By October, humanitarian organizations had received just 43% of that amount. </p>
<p>The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/appeals-aid-venezuelan-refugees-190818195121800.html">described the effort to aid Venezuelans in Latin America</a> as “one of the most underfunded humanitarian appeals in the world.”</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Venezuela’s crisis <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/12/10/how-many-more-migrants-and-refugees-can-we-expect-out-of-venezuela/">shows no signs of ending</a>, and some Colombians are growing impatient. <a href="https://issuu.com/damg22/docs/gallup_2019_3">A Gallup poll</a> found that approval for Colombia’s open arms policy toward Venezuelans dropped from 61% in February to 41% in June.</p>
<p>A few Colombian politicians are beginning to echo the language used to justify border restrictions in Ecuador, Peru and Chile. </p>
<p>“<a href="https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/326002-venezolanos-xenofobia-campana-elecciones-colombia%20//">Venezuelans, yes, but not like this. Control migration</a>,” declare billboards erected by a Colombian candidate running for local office in a border region.</p>
<p>One Colombian congressman recently <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/gobierno-seguira-actuando-con-criterio-humanitario-en-la-frontera-canciller-colombiano-articulo-876327">called for the closure of the Venezuelan border</a>, saying migrants <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/02/15/695100627/venezuelas-health-crisis-spills-over-to-neighboring-countries">threaten safety and public health</a> and drain resources. </p>
<p>His calls haven’t gotten much traction. A number of political parties <a href="https://migravenezuela.com/web/articulo/pacto-politico-contra-la-xenofobia-en-elecciones-2019-/1015">have even signed a pact agreeing not to use xenophobic campaign messaging</a> in the lead-up to Colombia’s Oct. 27 regional elections. </p>
<p>But without substantially more foreign assistance to manage the Venezuelan migrant crisis, Colombia’s arms may only stay open so long.</p>
<p>[ <em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123307/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cyril Bennouna does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Citing national security, Ecuador, Peru and Chile have all made it harder for Venezuelan migrants to enter the country, and xenophobia is rising across the region – even in more welcoming Colombia.Cyril Bennouna, Fellow, Center on Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies; Fellow, Graduate Program in Development, Brown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1153252019-04-11T18:41:56Z2019-04-11T18:41:56ZJulian Assange Q+A: WikiLeaks founder arrested in London<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/julian-assange-2002">Julian Assange</a>, founder of WikiLeaks, has been arrested in London and charged with conspiracy to commit computer intrusion over his alleged role in the leaking of classified United States government documents. Assange has already been found guilty of failing to surrender British police, who took him from the Ecuadorian embassy, where he has been living for nearly seven years, having claimed asylum there. Here’s what we know so far. </p>
<p><strong>Why was Assange in the Ecuadorian embassy in the first place?</strong></p>
<p>Assange sought extraterritorial asylum in the Ecuadorean embassy in London in June 2012 when an arrest warrant was issued against him in Sweden for accusations of sexual assault. He claimed that these charges were part of an international effort to silence his organisation WikiLeaks, which has become famous for publishing leaked, and often classified, information about governments across the world.</p>
<p>Importantly, the government of Ecuador took the view at the time that if the UK arrested him, he would be sent to the US to face treason charges relating to WikiLeaks exposures. Assange claimed that he could face the death penalty for those charges. Since both Ecuador and the UK are parties to the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en">1951 Convention on Refugees</a>, they are obliged to consider whether there is a real risk that a person seeking asylum could lose their life if they were handed over to another authority when deciding whether they have to protect them.</p>
<p><strong>What were the charges against him in Sweden?</strong></p>
<p>The Swedish charges related essentially to a “preliminary investigation” into accusations of sexual offences, including an alleged rape. The proceedings began in 2012, but by August 2015, the Swedish prosecutors dropped parts of their investigation. The investigation into the allegation of rape was also dropped in May 2017. </p>
<p><strong>What are the charges against him in the US?</strong></p>
<p>The exact charges against Assange have not been clear up until now. This was partly why Ecuador and so many of his supporters backed his claims to political asylum. In the wake of Assange’s arrest, the US government has issued <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/wikileaks-founder-charged-computer-hacking-conspiracy">further details</a> about a federal charge of conspiracy to commit computer intrusion “for agreeing to break a password to a classified US government computer”. A statement from the Department of Justice accuses Assange helped former intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning crack a password that would enable her to download classified records to transmit to WikiLeaks. </p>
<p><strong>Assange has already been found guilty of failure to surrender. What does that mean?</strong></p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1116275669447716864"}"></div></p>
<p>In pursuit of the sexual assault charges, Sweden issued a European Arrest Warrant against Assange, which meant the UK authorities were required to act. Judges in the UK granted Assange bail at the time of this initial arrest, but with strict conditions. However, while the case was being considered, Assange entered the Ecuadorian embassy and was granted political asylum on June 16 2012. In failing to leave the embassy, he breached his bail conditions. When his asylum was revoked, he was immediately charged and subsequently found guilty of failing to surrender. He is yet to be sentenced but could face up to 12 months jail time under UK law.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1116338318768263168"}"></div></p>
<p><strong>Why were British police suddenly able to enter the Ecuadorian embassy?</strong></p>
<p>Simply put, the police could go into the embassy for the first time in nearly seven years because the Ecuadorian government revoked Assange’s asylum. The “premises of a diplomatic mission” including buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary to it are, inviolable according to the <a href="http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf">Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1116307375009431552"}"></div></p>
<p>However all such rights are subject to the right of a country to grant a waiver and the agents of a receiving state may enter diplomatic premises with the consent of the head of the mission. Such waivers are expected to be in writing and there will be a document to evidence this in the hands of the UK government.</p>
<p><strong>Why did the Ecuadorian government withdraw asylum from Assange?</strong></p>
<p>The Ecuadorian government issued a statement accusing Assange of “discourteous and aggressive behaviour” and of violating international asylum conventions. We don’t know exactly what he has done but Ecuadorian president Lenín Moreno said in a video statement that he had failed to abide by the norm of “not interfering in the internal affairs of other states”. </p>
<p>Assange has been a difficult guest in some ways. His continuous communication with the outside world and the way he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/us/politics/assange-timed-wikileaks-release-of-democratic-emails-to-harm-hillary-clinton.html">wrote himself into the legend</a> of the last US presidential elections would certainly have been against the intentions of Ecuador in granting him extraterritorial asylum.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1116290826559262720"}"></div></p>
<p>Extraterritorial asylum – which is asylum granted outside the territory of the state itself – is indeed a contested practice in international law and the UK had been quite accommodating in recognising what is, in essence, a subpractice of Latin American states within international law. </p>
<p><strong>What will happen to Assange now?</strong></p>
<p>Although the British authorities appear to have given some assurances to the Ecuadorean authorities that Assange will not be extradited to the US, they will probably embark on a very truncated extradition process in conjunction with the US authorities and he may soon be in the US. It is unclear what president Donald Trump’s position on his case is, but the president has spoken in his favour in the past. There might be a clash of political interests between the US intelligence community and the presidency about what to do with Assange. </p>
<p><strong>Can the UK demand that the US commit to not executing Assange if he is extradited?</strong></p>
<p>Yes, this demand can be easily made and will most likely be granted because it is simply not in line with modern democracies to apply the death sentence in political and crimes of conscience cases. The US government has said he faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison. Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115325/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gbenga Oduntan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Wikileaks founder has been removed from the Ecuadorean embassy after nearly seven years.Gbenga Oduntan, Reader (Associate Professor) in Law, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1005072018-08-21T10:33:15Z2018-08-21T10:33:15ZVenezuelan oil fueled the rise and fall of Nicaragua’s Ortega regime<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/petroleo-venezolano-provoca-el-auge-y-caida-del-regimen-de-ortega-en-nicaragua-101940">Leer en español</a></em>.</p>
<p>The downfall of Nicaragua’s President Daniel Ortega has been <a href="https://nacla.org/news/2018/07/25/nicaragua-view-left">dizzyingly fast</a>. </p>
<p>In January 2018, he had the <a href="https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/nicaragua/368452/daniel-ortega-popularidad-presidente-latinoamericano">highest approval rating of any Central American president</a>, at <a href="https://www.tn8.tv/nacionales/443603-presidente-daniel-ortega-mejor-evaluado-america-latina/">54 percent</a>. Today, Nicaraguans are calling for <a href="http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2018/07/18/5b4f9174e5fdea94188b45c3.html">Ortega’s resignation</a>.</p>
<p>Ortega, a former Sandinista rebel who previously ruled Nicaragua in the 1980s, first showed signs of weakness in early April, when students protested his mismanagement of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/11/nicaragua-rainforest-fire-costa-rica">massive forest fire</a> in Nicaragua’s biggest nature reserve. </p>
<p>By April 19, hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans, including <a href="https://www.latercera.com/mundo/noticia/excomandante-la-revolucion-sandinista-daniel-ortega-peor-somoza-asesinatos-una-represion-brutal/215798/">former Ortega supporters</a>, joined the demonstrations, after his government rammed through an unpopular social security reform. </p>
<p>Since then, <a href="https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2018/124.asp">police officers and pro-government forces</a> have killed more than 450 protesters and injured at least 2,500. </p>
<p>In an echo of Nicaragua’s past, foreign money has contributed to the country’s current unrest. In the 1970s, the U.S. supported the regime of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/1986/jun/28/usa.marktran">Gen. Anastasio Somoza</a> – a brutal dictator who was eventually overthrown by <a href="https://web.stanford.edu/group/arts/nicaragua/discovery_eng/timeline/">Ortega and his revolutionary peers in 1979’s Sandinista Revolution</a>. </p>
<p>This time, it’s not the U.S. that’s supporting an unpopular Nicaraguan dictator, it’s Venezuela. </p>
<h2>Oil diplomacy from Venezuela</h2>
<p>I am a former Nicaraguan resident, who was recently forced out of the country by violence. I am also a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Benjamin_Waddell">scholar</a> of Latin America’s political economy. And my research in Nicaragua suggests that Venezuelan oil money helps explain Ortega’s rise – and his current fall.</p>
<p>Ortega <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/08/1">was re-elected to the presidency in 2007</a> after two decades out of power. At the time, he was one of <a href="https://mondediplo.com/2011/11/04latinamerica">many left-leaning leaders</a> in the region. </p>
<p>Venezuela, then led by the socialist leader Hugo Chávez, immediately began <a href="https://confidencial.atavist.com/los-petrodlares-de-venezuela918v4">sending billions of dollars worth of cheap oil</a> – its biggest export and most valuable commodity – to Nicaragua. According to <a href="https://nestoravendano.wordpress.com/2012/10/07/la-economia-de-nicaragua-esta-en-juego-en-venezuela/">Nicaraguan economist Adolfo Acevedo</a>, between 2007 and 2016, Venezuela shipped US$3.7 billion in oil to Nicaragua.</p>
<p>“Oil diplomacy” was standard practice in Venezuela at the time. In the early 2000s, Venezuela was one of Latin America’s <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2017&locations=ZJ-CL&start=2007&year_low_desc=true">richest countries</a>. Chávez used his economic brawn to support allies in Cuba, Argentina, Ecuador and Brazil by sending them <a href="https://www.libertaddigital.com/economia/chavez-regala-53000-millones-de-dolares-a-sus-aliados-mientras-arruina-venezuela-1276382056/">financial aid and cheap crude</a>.</p>
<p>Venezuela offered the Ortega regime unusually favorable terms of trade. His government paid 50 percent of the cost of each shipment within 90 days of receipt. The remainder was due within 23 years and financed at 2 percent interest. </p>
<p>This cheap fuel was distributed at market prices by Nicaragua’s government gas company, DNP. The government’s nice profit margin helped spur a period of <a href="http://www.bancomundial.org/es/country/nicaragua/overview">remarkable economic growth in Nicaragua</a>. </p>
<p>Between 2007 and 2016, Ortega’s government spent nearly 40 percent of oil proceeds to bolster <a href="https://nacla.org/node/6313">ambitious social welfare programs</a>, including micro-financing for small businesses, food for the hungry and subsidized housing for the poor. </p>
<p>These initiatives contributed to <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Nicaragua-Succeeds-in-Slashing-Poverty-Rates-Inequality-20170705-0031.html">significant poverty reductions across Nicaragua</a>, earning <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/gracias-dios-al-comandante/">Ortega and his Sandinista party</a> widespread popular support.</p>
<p>Between 2007 and 2017, Nicaragua’s gross domestic product <a href="https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=NI">grew at an average of 4.1 percent a year</a>. The boom peaked in 2012, with a stunning 6.4 percent growth in GDP. </p>
<p>The year before, Venezuela had sent a record $557 million in oil to Nicaragua – the equivalent of 6 percent of the Central American country’s <a href="https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=NI">total gross domestic product</a>. </p>
<h2>Ortega’s oil wealth</h2>
<p>Beyond jump-starting the Nicaraguan economy, Venezuelan oil also directly benefited the Ortega family. </p>
<p>DNP, Nicaragua’s national oil distributor, is managed by Ortega’s daughter-in-law, <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/06/01/economia/2428449-albanisa-y-la-dnp-tras-importacion-de-fuel-oil-para-la-generacion-electrica">Yadira Leets Marín</a>.</p>
<p>According to investigative <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/the-right-to-know-about-albanisa/">reporting by the Nicaraguan newspaper Confidencial</a>, the 60 percent of earnings from Venezuelan oil sales not spent on social programs – roughly $2.4 billion – was channeled through a Venezuelan-Nicaraguan private joint venture called <a href="https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/daniel-inc-how-nicaraguas-ortega-financed-a-political-dynasty">Albanisa</a>, run by President Ortega’s son, Rafael Ortega.</p>
<p>The funds were invested in shadowy private businesses controlled by the Ortega family, including a wind energy project, an oil refinery, an airline, a cellphone company, a hotel, gas stations, luxury condominiums and a fish farm. </p>
<p>There is no public accounting of Albanisa’s investments or profits. But according to Albanisa’s former deputy manager, Rodrigo Obragon, who <a href="https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/daniel-inc-how-nicaraguas-ortega-financed-a-political-dynasty">spoke with Univision in May</a>, President “Ortega used Albanisa to buy everybody off in a way never seen before in the history of Nicaragua.” </p>
<p>Ortega’s personal wealth is unconfirmed. But reliable sources, including the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/nicaraguas-leftist-ortega-embraces-businessand-authoritarianism-1478251804">Wall Street Journal</a>, say that his family has amassed one of the <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2009/1014/p06s01-woam.html">largest fortunes in the country</a>.</p>
<h2>An uphill battle</h2>
<p>Ortega’s landmark social programs, coupled with the lucrative business ventures that allowed him to buy support, made him the most powerful Nicaraguan leader since Somoza. </p>
<p>During his 11 years in office, Ortega has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2014/01/nicaragua-scraps-presidential-term-limits-201412951043190534.html">abolished presidential term limits</a>, installed his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/31/world/americas/nicaragua-daniel-ortega-rosario-murillo-house-of-cards.html">wife as vice president</a> and <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/04/26/riots-threaten-nicaraguas-autocratic-president">banned opposition parties from running in elections</a>. </p>
<p>In late 2015, plummeting global oil prices sent Venezuela’s mismanaged economy into recession, and then <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-venezuelas-crisis-7-essential-reads-89018">into a full-on collapse</a>. </p>
<p>Chávez’s successor, President Nicolás Maduro, was forced to cut back on oil diplomacy. As a result, in 2017 and 2018 his government sent no oil shipments at all to Nicaragua.</p>
<p>In effect, Ortega had to <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/cobro-plan-techo-causa-inconformidad/">cut his landmark anti-poverty programs</a>, <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/01/31/politica/2369533-daniel-ortega-manda-reformas-leyes-que-afectan-la-tarifa-y-el-subsidio-energetico">eliminate subsidies on public utilities</a> and raise gas <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2017/10/02/economia/2306541-gasolinazo-provoca-alzas-en-serie-en-varios-sectores-de-nicaragua">prices at the pump</a>. </p>
<p>Support for his regime <a href="https://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/464323-cid-gallup-ortega-pierde-apoyo/">eroded quickly</a> after that.</p>
<p>Like the dictator he helped oust three decades ago, Ortega has relied on foreign money to buy his way through challenges. Now that Venezuelan money has dried up, he’s got little left to offer his people – one more reason, protesters say, Ortega’s time is up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100507/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Waddell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cheap Venezuelan oil boosted Nicaragua’s economy and funded President Daniel Ortega’s many anti-poverty programs. With Venezuela in crisis, the oil has dried up – as has support for Ortega’s regime.Benjamin Waddell, Associate Professor of Sociology, Fort Lewis CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.