tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/european-union-eu-539/articlesEuropean Union (EU) – La Conversation2024-03-28T18:54:31Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261632024-03-28T18:54:31Z2024-03-28T18:54:31ZMoldova: Russia continues its mischief-making in breakaway Transnistria<p>In mid-February, the leader of Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria, Vadim Krasnoselsky, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91855">summoned</a> deputies “of all levels of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic”. The purpose of their meeting, he announced, would be to discuss “pressure from the Republic of Moldova that is violating the rights and worsening the socioeconomic situation of Transnistrians”.</p>
<p>The meeting was set for February 28, the day before Vladimir Putin’s “state of the union” address. This was taken by some – including the influential Washington-based thinktank the Institute for the Study of War – to signal an intention to announce that Transnistria would <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-transnistria-may-organize-referendum-annexation-russia-support-russian-hybrid">formally declare its intention</a> to join Russia. </p>
<p>The Transnistrian congress met as planned. But its <a href="https://en.president.gospmr.org/press-sluzhba/novosti/deklaratsiya-vii-syezda-deputatov-vseh-urovney-pridnestrovskoy-moldavskoy-respubliki.html">resolution</a>, while full of praise about Transnistria and complaints about Moldova, fell well short of expectations. In the end, the assembled deputies merely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/29/transnistria-moldova-breakaway-region-russia-protection-appeal">appealed to Russia</a> – as well as the Interparliamentary Assembly of States Parties of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the UN, the EU, the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Red Cross – to protect Transnistria and prevent an escalation of tensions with Moldova.</p>
<p>Transnistria declared independence from the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic in 1990, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union was gathering pace. A brief violent conflict ended with a <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/13611.pdf">Russian-mediated ceasefire in 1992</a>. This ceasefire mandated negotiations on the reintegration of Transnistria into Moldova, which included, among others, Russia and Ukraine. Efforts to agree on a deal proved <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/abs/resolvable-frozen-conflict-designing-a-settlement-for-transnistria/B0AB82E94A32D1557CA951C483692B28">futile</a> over the following three decades and have completely <a href="https://sceeus.se/en/publications/conflict-solving-mechanisms-and-negotiation-formats-for-post-soviet-protracted-conflicts-a-comparative-perspective/">stalled</a> since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Thus, the Transnistrian region of Moldova has remained in a limbo state for more than 30 years now. Its separate identity is not even recognised by Russia and it remains formally part of Moldova. </p>
<p>This limbo state has contributed to fears – in Moldova and the west – that Russia has <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3821027-moldova-could-become-russias-next-target-romanias-general-staff.html">territorial ambitions in the region</a>. These have worsened since the invasion of Ukraine two years ago. Talk of Kremlin-backed <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-soccer-plot-raises-fears-of-fresh-russian-attempts-to-destabilise-neighbouring-moldova-199942">plots to destabilise the country</a> is not uncommon. </p>
<p>In the event, the Russian president <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73585">failed to mention</a> Transnistria even once in his state of the union address the day after deputies had gathered in Transnistria. With the initial “excitement” of a potential crisis around Moldova gone, the predominant view among <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/all-quiet-moldovan-front">regional</a> and <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/03/the-fire-that-didnt-burn-transnistrias-unanswered-call-for-russian-support/">international</a> analysts was that this was a storm in a tea cup rather than a full-blown crisis. </p>
<p>This is also the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/moldova-russia-transnistria-mihail-popso-vladimir-putin-ukraine-war/">view</a> of Moldova’s foreign minister, Mihail Popșoi. In an interview with Politico at the beginning of March, a month after taking office, Popșoi said that “the probability that the Russians would be able to advance and reach our territory is much lower now than it was two years ago”.</p>
<h2>Russian ambitions</h2>
<p>But this is, at best, only half of the more complex geopolitical context in which Moldova finds itself. Wedged between Ukraine and Romania, a member of Nato, Moldova’s future prospects are heavily intertwined with the outcome of the war against Ukraine. At present there appears to be little chance of Russia expanding its land bridge to Crimea all along the Black Sea coast to the Ukrainian border with Moldova. But that’s not to say that the Kremlin has completely given up on this ambition. </p>
<p>Just days after the deputies’ meeting in Transnistria, the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/putin-allys-remarks-raise-fears-russia-invading-another-european-nation-1875291">complained</a> about Moldovan violations of Transnistria’s rights. He alleged Moldovan discrimination against the Russian language as well as economic pressure on the Russian enclave. This eerily echoes Russian justifications for the invasion of Ukraine both in 2014 and 2022.</p>
<p>Transnistria is not the only card Russia is playing. Four days after Lavrov’s comments, Putin <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/leader-restive-moldova-region-tells-putin-local-rights-being-crushed-2024-03-06/">met</a> the leader of the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-russia-moldova-gagauzia-evghenia-gutul/">Gagauzian region in Moldova</a>, Yevgenia Gutsul, at the so-called World Youth Festival, which was held near the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi at the beginning of March. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584498/original/file-20240326-28-95855x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW map of Moldova showing the breakaway regions of Transnistria and Gaugazia." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584498/original/file-20240326-28-95855x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584498/original/file-20240326-28-95855x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584498/original/file-20240326-28-95855x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584498/original/file-20240326-28-95855x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584498/original/file-20240326-28-95855x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584498/original/file-20240326-28-95855x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584498/original/file-20240326-28-95855x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of Moldova showing the breakaway regions of Transnistria and Gaugazia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Gutsul – and other powerful Russian allies including the fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-shor-kremlin-businessman-destabilize/32114352.html">who was convicted</a> of fraud in the “theft of the century” of US$1 billion (£792 million) from three Moldovan banks a decade ago – have been <a href="https://apnews.com/article/moldova-protest-russia-eu-chisinau-0de486d4f5fb0cbd8cd939c1eaa3040b">fomenting protests</a> against the Moldovan government since September 2022. These protests reflect many ordinary Molovans’ existential fears over a cost-of-living crisis that has engulfed one of Europe’s poorest countries since the COVID pandemic and has worsened since the Russian aggression against Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Moldova’s European aspirations</h2>
<p>At the same time, the Moldovan president, Maia Sandu, has <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/moldovan-president-launches-campaign-to-promote-eu-referendum/">proposed</a> a referendum on joining the European Union. Sandu, who faces a reelection campaign later this year, hope that this will boost her popularity among Moldova’s generally – but not unequivocally – pro-European electorate.</p>
<p>Wanting to capitalise on popular discontent with economic conditions in Moldova, Russia has been <a href="https://iwpr.net/global-voices/shor-moscows-man-moldova">supporting</a> Shor’s protests and linking the unrest to Sandu’s pro-European foreign policy. Relying on allies in both <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/putin-lights-a-gagaus-fuse-under-moldova-part-two/">Gagauzia</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/21/moldova-transnistria-ukraine-russia-war-odesa/">Transnistria</a>, Moscow’s aim is primarily the destabilisation of the country ahead of presidential elections at the end of 2024 and parliamentary elections in the spring of 2025. </p>
<p>In this context, even non-events such as the resolution passed by the Transnistrian deputies at the end of February are useful to Moscow. They increase uncertainty not only in Moldova but also among the country’s western allies. And this feeds into a broader narrative in which a status quo that has been stable for decades is suddenly questioned – with potentially unpredictable consequences.</p>
<p>There is no evidence that the Kremlin has any concrete plans, let alone any capabilities, for military action against Moldova. Nor does it need to, as long as it has local allies to do its bidding against the country’s president and her government. This does not give Moscow a lot of leverage in its war against Ukraine but it is helpful in the broader efforts to weaken support for, and from, the European Union. </p>
<p>The more Russia can peddle a narrative that connects European integration with economic decline and constraints on language and cultural rights, the more division it can sow – and not just in Moldova, but potentially also in other EU candidate countries from the western Balkans to the south Caucasus.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226163/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p>Russia has long harboured territorial ambitions in this former Soviet republic.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265302024-03-27T09:52:04Z2024-03-27T09:52:04ZWhy EU information campaigns are failing to deter migrants from leaving<p>It was everywhere on the news and social media. In September 2023, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230918-italy-extends-detention-period-to-deter-migrant-crossings-after-lampedusa-surge">10,000 migrants arrived on the island of Lampedusa</a>, more than doubling the island’s population of 6,000 and overwhelming its resources. The migrants – mostly men from sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East – had to sleep outside, with the island’s reception centre only designed for 400 people.</p>
<p>Days after, Italy’s Prime Minister, Georgia Meloni, visited the island with European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen, who presented a <a href="https://cyprus.representation.ec.europa.eu/news/10-point-plan-lampedusa-2023-09-18_en">ten-point plan</a> to stem the migrant flow. These included calls to “increase awareness and communication campaigns to disincentivise the Mediterranean crossings” and to “step up cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)”.</p>
<p>Notwithstanding the fanfare with which these announcements were made, their methods were hardly new.</p>
<p>A leading actor in the field, the IOM has been organising <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294882_9">such campaigns</a> for decades. One of the most notable ones was <a href="https://www.migrantsasmessengers.org/">“Migrants as Messengers”</a>, which took place across Senegal, Guinea and Nigeria from December 2017 to March 2019. Throughout the campaign, town halls screened video testimonies of migrant returnees, followed by Q&As with migrants who would act as “messengers” to deter them from embarking onto the perilous journey.</p>
<p>In 2022, the UNHCR also launched the <a href="https://www.tellingtherealstory.org/en/">“Telling the Real Story” campaign</a> across a number of African countries. Drawing mainly on a website and a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/tellingtherealstory/">Facebook page</a>, the campaign aims at “telling the real story” by emphasising the terrible ordeals that await would-be irregular immigrants, such as human smuggling and trafficking.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/dN8LI2iVEwQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">“Telling the Real Story”, a video aimed at dissuading would-be emigrants.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The argument is always the same: would-be emigrants in Africa are unaware of the risks and must be informed so that they make the right decision – which is to stay at home or migrate only if they have the right to do so. This message is complemented by information on the opportunities in the country of origin and on Africans’ duty to contribute to the development of their country.</p>
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<strong>
À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sauvetage-des-migrants-naufrages-en-mediterranee-comment-la-politique-de-lue-doit-evoluer-222453">Sauvetage des migrants-naufragés en Méditerranée : comment la politique de l’UE doit évoluer</a>
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<h2>Hundreds of campaigns</h2>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.bridges-migration.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/EU-funded-information-campaigns-targeting-potential-migrants.pdf">report</a> from the <a href="https://www.bridges-migration.eu/">European research programme “Bridges”</a>, the EU has spent more than €23 million since 2015 to organise nearly 130 information campaigns.</p>
<p>While Europe is at the forefront of such initiatives, it is not alone. Australia has distinguished itself with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/11/government-launches-new-graphic-campaign-to-deter-asylum-seekers">particularly biting messages</a>, with a 2014 <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/foi/files/2019/fa-190801764-document-released-p4.PDF">campaign</a> directly addressing people tempted by irregular immigration in stark terms: “NO WAY. You will not make Australia home”. Years later, in 2019, the strategy was enthusiastically touted by the then US president, <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7186189/Trump-praises-Aust-asylum-seeker-policy.html">Donald Trump</a>.</p>
<p>Campaigns can also be organised by private companies or NGOs. For example, the social enterprise <a href="https://seefar.org/">Seefar</a> carried out an extensive information campaign on the risks of migration in Senegal in 2021, reaching 1,987 young people across the country, according to the organisation. In addition to its rescue missions in the Mediterranean, the Spanish association Proactiva Open Arms also ran an awareness campaign in the same country, the <a href="https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2020/04/ngos-dilemma">“Origin” project</a>.</p>
<p>However, all these initiatives and players are faced with a major problem: no one is able to demonstrate the effectiveness of these campaigns.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/le-sauvetage-en-mer-au-defi-de-la-securisation-des-frontieres-le-cas-de-la-manche-170238">Le sauvetage en mer au défi de la sécurisation des frontières : le cas de la Manche</a>
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<h2>Difficult to assess effectiveness</h2>
<p>As the budgets devoted to them increase, however, some studies have begun to take a serious look at the impact of campaigns.</p>
<p>In 2018, an <a href="https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/evaluating_the_impact.pdf">IOM study</a> pointed out that campaigns are difficult to evaluate because they have a dual objective: to slash irregular immigration, but also to provide information.</p>
<p>Sometimes only one of the two objectives is achieved: in 2023, a <a href="https://publications.iom.int/books/irregular-migration-west-africa-robust-evaluation-peer-peer-awareness-raising-activities-four">study</a> devoted to the IOM’s “Migrants as Messengers” showed that this campaign did increase the level of information, while failing to reduce departures.</p>
<p>Overall, although it has been organising such campaigns for 30 years, the IOM has carried out only a few, belated impact studies. This is because seriously gauging campaigns’ effectiveness is expensive – but it also appears that European states prefer to multiply campaigns rather than fund evaluations.</p>
<p>The situation is even more confusing with other actors. Seefar, for example, <a href="https://seefar.org/the-migrant-project/#salamat-article">claims that</a>, in follow-up interviews, 58% of its campaign viewers reported having given up their migration project. But in the absence of basic information regarding this finding, like the number of interviews or the timeline over which interviewees were followed, it is difficult to know whether this is more than a wet-finger approach to justify the funds received by this private company.</p>
<p>In terms of independent research, a <a href="https://www.udi.no/globalassets/global/forskning-fou_i/rapport_11_19_web.pdf">study by the Institute for Social Research in Oslo</a> in 2019 looked at migrants from Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia in transit through Sudan with the intention of continuing on to Europe.</p>
<p>The aim was to evaluate a campaign launched in 2015 by Norway, entitled <a href="https://www.sciencenorway.no/forskningno-immigration-policy-norway/social-media-campaign-for-asylum-seekers-draws-angry-trolls/1448896">“Stricter asylum regulations in Norway”</a>, which used Facebook to inform potential migrants of the slim chances of obtaining asylum in that country. As with any advertisement, Facebook’s algorithm was designed to identify Internet users searching for information on immigration, Europe or visas, and to offer them targeted deterrent messages.</p>
<p>The study confirmed that migrants are connected and use social networks to obtain information and organise their migration. But while they have sometimes heard of European campaigns, most have not seen them. They know about the terrible living conditions of migrants in Libya, for example, but this does not dissuade them from leaving to escape the impasse of their situation.</p>
<h2>Migrants deported from Europe called to testify</h2>
<p>In 2023, a <a href="https://www.bridges-migration.eu/publications/why-information-campaigns-struggle-to-dissuade-migrants-from-coming-to-europe/">team of political scientists from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel</a> analysed the information available to young people tempted to emigrate from the Gambia to Europe, and how the campaigns affected their decision to leave. As in Sudan, the information on the risks of irregular immigration happened to correspond to what these young people already know. But in the absence of prospects at home, they will leave anyway, fully aware of the facts.</p>
<p>Another study carried out <a href="https://www.bridges-migration.eu/publications/a-comparative-study-on-the-role-of-narratives-in-migratory-decision-making/">with Afghans in transit through Turkey</a> came to similar conclusions.</p>
<p>However, this work also revealed another problem: the recipients of these campaigns do not take them seriously because they believe them to be biased by Europe’s political objectives – and so they prefer to get their information from relatives, or even smugglers.</p>
<p>This result has prompted new strategies. Following the example of “Migrants as Messengers”, campaigns known as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08865655.2022.2108111">“peer to peer”</a> (“de pair-à-pair”) ask migrants expelled from Europe to talk about their experience to <a href="https://jaspertjaden.com/policy/2019_migrants-as-messengers_the-impact-of-peer-to-peer-communication-on-potential-migrants-in-senegal/">those who might be tempted to imitate them</a>. This is part of a technique known as <a href="https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2611/">“unbranding”</a>, a marketing concept that refers to the omission of the brand name on a product in order to sell it better. In the case of the campaigns, this amounts to concealing the European and international institutions <a href="https://migrantprotection.iom.int/en/spotlight/articles/initiative/constantly-evolving-awareness-raising-campaign-aware-migrants">that fund them</a>.</p>
<p>Another strategy is not to target potential migrants, but the local actors who influence perceptions of migration, starting with the media and artists. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) works with <a href="https://theconversation.com/quand-la-lutte-contre-limmigration-irreguliere-devient-une-question-de-culture-112200">musicians popular with young Africans</a>, as well as with journalists.</p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="https://www.unesco.org/fr/articles/un-forum-dechanges-avec-des-journalistes-et-managers-de-medias-pour-une-narrative-diversifiee-et-de">Unesco</a> trains Senegalese journalists to talk about migration.</p>
<h2>Trade-offs with freedom of expression</h2>
<p>Against a backdrop of precariousness for media and cultural professionals, the support of international organisations is welcome, but raises the question of freedom of expression and freedom of the press on this politically sensitive subject.</p>
<p>In Morocco, the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/RMJMigrations/">Network of Moroccan Journalists on Migration</a> has been set up to deal with migration issues independently, although this does not prevent these journalists from taking part in training activities organised by international organisations and supported by European funding.</p>
<p>In Gambia, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08865655.2022.2156375">recent study</a> highlighted the dilemmas faced by local journalists who are asked to spread messages about the dangers of immigration while trying to maintain their independence.</p>
<p>In the eyes of their advocates, these campaigns are justified on the grounds that the migrants who die in the Mediterranean are the victims of misleading information from smugglers. Providing information would therefore save lives. But there are no studies to support this hypothesis: on the contrary, it appears that migrants leave in the full knowledge of the risks they are exposing themselves to.</p>
<p>Faced with this uncomfortable reality, it is possible that information campaigns only serve to give European leaders the feeling that they are acting to prevent the tragedies that result from their own policies. After all, it is partly <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1465116516633299">due to a lack of opportunities to migrate</a> legally that many migrants try their luck irregularly, with all the risks that this entails.</p>
<p>The scarcity of available evaluations shows that the effectiveness of the campaigns is not a priority for European states. This migration policy tool would therefore have primarily symbolic value – as proof that Europe is concerned about the fate of the many people it does not want on its soil.</p>
<p>But this political strategy nonetheless has very real effects on local players, and on the ability of societies in the South to debate independently the major political issues raised by international migration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226530/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mélodie Beaujeu is a member of Désinfox-Migrations, an association fighting disinformation around migration. The latter has received funding from the Porticus foundation as well as the Foundation for France.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Antoine Pécoud ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The argument is a familiar one: African citizens are unaware of the risks tied to the perilous journey across the Mediterranean and the West must therefore enlighten them.Antoine Pécoud, Professeur de sociologie, Université Sorbonne Paris NordMélodie Beaujeu, Consultante et chercheuse, affiliée à l'Institut Convergences Migrations, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261652024-03-19T18:17:39Z2024-03-19T18:17:39ZThe EU should stop ‘westsplaining’ and listen to its smaller eastern members – they saw the Ukraine war coming<p>It’s rare for the words of Lithuanian government officials to make the top of the news outside the country. Lithuania’s views aren’t even a top priority among its allies. But perhaps it’s time that changed. </p>
<p>Following February’s Munich security conference, Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis warned:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We don’t lack capacity, we lack the political will and urgency necessary to support Ukraine and maintain our collective security. Russia, on the other hand, has the will to destroy Ukraine and reestablish the Russian Empire. When will we start using our capacity to deter this?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Lithuania is a small country of just 3 million people, so perhaps we wouldn’t expect it to lead Europe’s response to Russian aggression. However, the Soviet occupation of Lithuania, imbued with persecution, repression and a totalitarian regime, are deeply understood even by young generations. It would seem like common sense to give greater weight to the views of Lithuania and its neighbours than other nations. So why doesn’t this happen? </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1759271051177943311"}"></div></p>
<p>Vytautas Landsbergis, who was formerly the first president of the country’s parliament after independence from the USSR, predicted this war as long ago as 2008. Interviewed by a European news <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDQ3a0aNSqE">website</a> about the “situation in Georgia”, he bluntly responded: “It is not the situation in Georgia only; it is a very bad situation in Europe, and for Europe’s future, and very promising badly … Who is next after Georgia? … The next is Ukraine.”</p>
<p>This view stood in stark contrast to what the EU foreign ministers agreed upon at the time when they expressed “grave concern” over the war. They criticised Russia’s disproportionate response but pressed Georgia to sign the six-point ceasefire agreement, which basically allowed Russian “security forces” to implement “additional security measures”. The ceasefire agreement led to the Russian occupation of 20% of Georgia’s territory, which continues to this day. </p>
<p>In 2014, when Russia occupied Crimea, other European Union states agreed on certain sanctions but continued all the while to build their energy partnerships with the aggressor. Lithuania instead built its own liquefied natural gas terminal, named “independence”, which allowed it to break from its dependence on Russian gas.</p>
<p>In 2015, when EU countries were cautious to name the Russian Federation as an aggressor in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine, the Lithuanian ambassador to the UN clearly <a href="https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuania-in-the-un-security-council-minsk-accords-must-be-respected-by-all-parties-including-russia">stated</a>: “Russia is a direct party to this conflict and bears the primary responsibility for the conflict that is tearing into Ukraine’s flesh.”</p>
<h2>How to respond to Russia?</h2>
<p>By 2022, Russia had launched a full-scale attack against Ukraine. Words of support came from every direction but concrete support was less forthcoming. During the first days of the war, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-russia-germany-still-blocking-arms-supplies/">Germany</a> refused to send weapons to Ukraine and even prevented Estonia from sending its old howitzer artillery weapons by withholding approval.</p>
<p>Lithuania, meanwhile, along with Latvia, Estonia and Poland, were sounding the alarm about the threat the situation posed to the <a href="https://twitter.com/GLandsbergis/status/1496706310221574149?s=20">rest of the region</a> and called for Europe to support Ukraine “with every means available”. For many in the region, Europe should commit unambiguously to helping Ukraine win the war. </p>
<p>Until recently, even French president Emmanuel Macron was suggesting that Ukraine should compromise on some of its sovereignty to accommodate Putin’s demands. Such comments were coldly received in Baltic and eastern European states. </p>
<p>When Macron changed his strategy to say that he did not rule out sending troops to Ukraine, he faced <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/27/sweden-rules-out-sending-troops-to-ukraine-after-nato-membership-agreed">backlash</a> from several European capitals. However, he found an ally in Lithuania.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A map of Europe with Lithuania highlighted." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Can you point to Lithuania on a map? Vladimir Putin certainly can.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithuania#/media/File:EU-Lithuania.svg">Wikipedia/NuclearVacuum</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Entrenched westsplaining</h2>
<p>This historical perspective highlights the stark difference of opinion between countries like Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic as compared to western European countries such as France or Germany. This suggests that “westsplaining” still prevails in the European Union.</p>
<p>Eastern European candidates have never been chosen for crucial roles like the Nato secretary general, for example. In fact, they are even <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-eastern-european-union-rutte-secretary-general-commission-russia-ukraine-war-defense/">briefed against</a>, including by former European Commission vice president <a href="https://wnl.tv/2023/11/15/estse-premier-kaja-kallas-concurrent-voor-mark-rutte-bij-opvolging-navo-topman-stoltenberg/">Frans Timmermans</a> and at least one <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-eastern-european-union-rutte-secretary-general-commission-russia-ukraine-war-defense/">Commission official</a> off the record. </p>
<p>Western Europe still does not view eastern Europe and the Baltics as equal partners. As a result, the EU – dominated by the west – still doesn’t truly perceive Russia as a direct threat to European security.</p>
<p>In a positive sign of recognition, EU Commission president Ursula Von der Leyen <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/speech_22_5493">mentioned</a> in her annual state of the union address in 2022: “We should have listened to the voices inside our union – in Poland, in the Baltics, and all across central and eastern Europe.”</p>
<p>This fleeting moment of acknowledgement should form the basis of a much more meaningful debate about who makes the decision in the EU and on what basis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Viktoriia Lapa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lithuania doesn’t often set the agenda, yet it has been warning that Russia would invade Ukraine since 2008.Viktoriia Lapa, Lecturer, Institute for European Policymaking, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2254162024-03-11T18:49:24Z2024-03-11T18:49:24ZRecent gains point to a growing Russian advantage in the Ukraine war<p>The ongoing war in Ukraine is not featuring as prominently in western news media these days as it was earlier in the war, because it has been overshadowed by the unfolding human tragedy of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-rising-death-toll-from-hunger-a-stark-reminder-of-starvation-as-a-weapon-of-war-225197">war in Gaza</a>. </p>
<p>However, the war in Ukraine is still very much ongoing, and both sides are clearly suffering significant losses. Yet it appears that slowly but surely Russia is gaining ground on and off the battlefield. </p>
<p>The recent Ukrainian withdrawal from the stronghold of Avdiivka <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-withdraws-troops-avdiivka-1.7118227">did make the headlines</a>. On that sector of the front near the city of Donetsk, Russian forces have <a href="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375">pushed beyond Avdiivka and continue to gain ground</a>. </p>
<p>Russian forces have also made limited gains <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682">on other sectors of the front line</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Russian economy is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russias-economy-going-strong/video-68315706">increasingly mobilized for war</a>, and the government has been able to obtain <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-paused-shipments-russia-ukraine-report-2024-3">some military resources from abroad</a>, circumventing western sanctions.</p>
<p>All of this means that Russia is, relative to Ukraine, in an <a href="https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/a-year-later-and-things-are-very-different-in-moscow">increasingly strong position</a> as the war enters its third year.</p>
<h2>Russian advantage</h2>
<p>While Russian advances are clearly <a href="https://monitoring.stage.bbc.co.uk/product/c2050m20">costing their forces heavy losses</a>, the Ukrainian side too is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/20/us/politics/ukraine-prisoners-avdiivka-russia.html">taking significant losses</a>, often when defending increasingly untenable defensive positions. Russian forces typically have a <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/russia-army-ukraine-war-1.7122808">numerical advantage in terms of numbers of troops, artillery</a> and <a href="https://defence-industry.eu/russia-increases-artillery-ammunition-production-ukrainian-sources-say/">their munitions</a>. In terms of drones — where Ukrainian forces once had an advantage — <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/some-ukraine-drone-pilots-fear-early-advantage-over-russia-now-lost-2023-11-09/">Russian forces seem to have caught up or even outpaced Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>Some western commentators have portrayed Russian tactics as mindless attacks with hordes of infantry — <a href="https://cepa.org/article/surprised-that-ukraine-is-taking-combat-losses-you-shouldnt-be/">sometimes derogatorily described as orcs</a>. The reality is that the Russian army has adapted to the nature of the war today. It is now much better at co-ordinating the activities of artillery, drones and small groups of infantry. Even Ukrainian sources highlight how <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-skills-varied-avdiivka-from-well-trained-to-confused-soldiers-2024-3">at least some Russian troops are well-trained and capable</a>.</p>
<h2>Western support for Ukraine</h2>
<p>There is strong evidence of <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/cia-ukraine-russia/">western intelligence personnel already on the ground in Ukraine</a> — who were there long before February 2022. On top of NATO’s more overt military assistance, such revelations feed into the <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1567341">Russian narrative</a> that the war in the Ukraine is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/mar/05/nato-ukraine-russia-germany-military-leak">proxy war between NATO and Russia</a>.</p>
<p>A growing challenge for Ukraine is decreasing western public support for military assistance. <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/513680/american-views-ukraine-war-charts.aspx">In a Gallup poll from November 2023</a>, 41 per cent of U.S. respondents said that the United States is doing too much to support Ukraine — an opinion that rose to 62 per cent among Republican voters. Back in August 2022, these figures were 24 and 43 per cent respectively. This trend is evident in different polls too, as a recent <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/08/about-half-of-republicans-now-say-the-us-is-providing-too-much-aid-to-ukraine/">Pew poll highlights</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-the-us-public-thinks-about-giving-military-and-other-aid-223064">Ukraine war: what the US public thinks about giving military and other aid</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>While there is still strong support within the European Union for providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2022/public-opinion-on-the-war-in-ukraine/en-public-opinion-on-the-war-against-ukraine-20240223.pdf">surveys find that support for military assistance is decreasing</a>. </p>
<p>The Ukrainian government has stated its army’s problems can be solved with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-anniversary-ammunition-shortage-kyiv-a8909760655d83d2ffc0d67ad2a491ec">more western equipment and munitions</a>. Certainly, more of both would improve the Ukrainian position. However, western equipment is not a universal panacea for Ukraine’s problems. Recent reports suggesting Russian forces have destroyed <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/03/06/abrams-avdiivka-russian-propaganda/">a number of U.S.-supplied Abrams tanks on the Avdiivka sector</a> of the front highlight, unsurprisingly, that western equipment is far from infallible.</p>
<p>NATO countries continue to <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9477/">commit additional military assistance to Ukraine</a>, although additional U.S. assistance is <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2024/03/06/house-lawmakers-mike-johnson-ukraine-aid-gaza/72871579007/">being held up in Congress</a>. The recent scandal in Germany regarding the possible supply of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-russia-taurus-missiles-4ff5e559c887448fc3ecd9e2e6f58812">Taurus missiles to Ukraine</a> highlights that a further escalation of western commitments to Ukraine is not a given. </p>
<p>Whether western countries are willing to commit their own personnel to increasingly active roles in the war is unclear. French President Emmanuel Macron recently stated that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/ukraine-war-briefing-macron-says-dont-be-cowards-as-he-digs-in-over-ground-troop-s">sending French combat troops to Ukraine remains an option</a>. However, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/macron-ukraine-russia-putin-1.7127500">most other NATO leaders</a> seem resolute that sending combat troops to Ukraine should not happen.</p>
<p>Yet, Macron’s position is apparently <a href="https://apnews.com/article/poland-nato-russia-france-abd144aee256a72388c196dae8acaf7f">not without some support</a>. Such a step would undoubtedly increase the possibility not only of a direct NATO-Russia war, <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-russia-increasingly-likely-to-use-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine-182368">but also the use of nuclear weapons</a>.</p>
<h2>Manpower issues</h2>
<p><a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-ukraine-peace/">Availability of personnel</a> is also a significant problem for Ukraine. Western-supplied equipment still has to be crewed. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stated that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68397525">31,000 Ukrainian troops have been killed since February 2022</a>, however, this at best only tells part of the story. This figure is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66581217">less than half U.S. estimates of Ukrainian troops killed</a>, likely does not include those missing in action, and certainly not those taken prisoner by Russia, nor the tens of thousands of wounded. <a href="https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-struggles-to-find-troops-for-the-frontline/">Replacing such losses is proving increasingly difficult</a>. </p>
<p>Zelenskyy recently gave permission for conscripts who have been serving since February 2022 to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-issues-decree-discharging-conscripts-2024-03-07/#">move into the reserves for at least 12 months</a> without further callup. Such a step will help improve wider morale, but won’t help with the recruitment crisis.</p>
<p>A significant number of Ukrainians <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/newsinteractives/features/desperate-to-avoid-the-draft">seek to avoid the draft by fleeing to neighbouring countries</a>. This is reminiscent of how <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-why-people-are-returning-despite-the-war-in-ukraine/a-67022321">young Russians fled</a> to avoid being conscripted in late 2022, although <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-why-people-are-returning-despite-the-war-in-ukraine/a-67022321">many have now returned</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="TiktokEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.tiktok.com/@cbcnews/video/7330765611217210629?is_from_webapp=1\u0026sender_device=pc\u0026web_id=7246426044156249606"}"></div></p>
<p>The sinking of Russian ships in the Black Sea has to some extent replaced less positive news for Ukraine from the front line. The loss of warships such as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2024/mar/05/ukraine-releases-footage-appearing-to-show-sinking-of-russian-warship-near-occupied-crimea-video">large patrol ship Sergei Kotov</a> to Ukrainian naval drone are setbacks for Russia. However, the war for the Donbas is primarily being fought on land, and such Ukrainian victories are unlikely to have a meaningful impact on the ground war. </p>
<p>As the Russian army advances, albeit slowly, the available evidence suggests that resolve remains strong on both the <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/2024/01/26/conflict-with-ukraine-assessments-for-november-2023/">Russian</a> and <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/512258/ukrainians-stand-behind-war-effort-despite-fatigue.aspx">Ukrainian</a> sides. Outwardly, the majority of NATO leaders <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm#">retain their commitments to support Ukraine</a>. Both sides are clearly still only willing to <a href="https://www.stopwar.org.uk/article/diplomacy-is-the-art-of-compromise-thats-whats-needed-for-peace-in-ukraine/">consider negotiations on their own terms</a>. How much longer that will continue to be the case remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225416/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Hill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia’s armed forces continue to gain territory in Ukraine, at high cost to both sides.Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History, University of CalgaryLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2252052024-03-10T16:43:35Z2024-03-10T16:43:35ZSeeing green: some older-car owners show that there’s more than one way of being eco-friendly<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580114/original/file-20230927-29-x8d4j0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C9%2C2048%2C1143&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Une Renault 16 garée à Nevers, 2017. La voiture écolo par définition ?
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/152930510@N02/38493865784/">crash71100/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ongoing climate emergency requires us to fundamentally rethink how we get around. Transportation accounts for approximately <a href="https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/topics/in-depth/transport-and-mobility?activeTab=fa515f0c-9ab0-493c-b4cd-58a32dfaae0a">25% of European greenhouse-gas emissions</a>. Of this, road transportation represents <a href="https://www.iea.org/energy-system/transport">by far the largest percentage</a>. While the Covid-19 epidemic briefly interrupted the rise in emissions, they’ve since resumed their upward climb. </p>
<p>Public authorities have been working to persuade residents to abandon combustion-powered cars in favour of electric vehicles. As of 2023, <a href="https://www.acea.auto/fact/electric-cars-tax-benefits-purchase-incentives-2023/">20 EU member states offered incentives</a>, and most of the other members have put tax incentives or exemptions in place. </p>
<p>A number of cities have established <a href="https://urbanaccessregulations.eu/low-emission-zones-main">low-emission zones</a>, which restrict access to vehicles that exceed a certain pollution threshold – leading examples include London, Paris and Brussels. Inspired by these and others, New York City is scheduled to start a <a href="https://fortune.com/2023/12/04/new-york-city-congestion-pricing-plan-how-much-traffic-15-dollars/">“congestion pricing” plan in 2024</a>. Projections indicate that it could generate US$1 billion in annual revenues that will be used to improve the city’s subway and bus systems. </p>
<p>In France, the 2021 <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/loi/278460-loi-22-ao%C3%BBt-2021-climat-et-resilience-convention-citoyenne-climat">“Climate and Resilience” law</a> will require 33 urban areas with more than 150,000 inhabitants to start implementing low-emissions measures. Only cars that meet the latest ecological standards (mainly electric or hybrid) will be allowed in urban centres, and the restrictions are intended to be progressively tightened as technology improves. </p>
<p>While the production of electric vehicles produces greenhouse gasses, a <a href="https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Global-LCA-passenger-cars-FS-EN-jul2021.pdf">2021 study</a> from the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) found that the life-cycle emissions of battery-electric vehicles registered today will be significantly lower – nearly 70% in Europe and the US – than those of similar gasoline-powered cars. So the logic seems inescapable: out with the old, in with the new. </p>
<h2>Making use of what already exists</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.theses.fr/2022UBFCH020">doctoral thesis in sociology</a>, carried out between 2017 and 2022, explored the ownership and use of cars more than 20 years old. It revealed that, far from being hostile to the imperatives of sustainability, some owners of older vehicles were strongly committed to a certain idea of ecology. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550641/original/file-20230927-27-94ktec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550641/original/file-20230927-27-94ktec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550641/original/file-20230927-27-94ktec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550641/original/file-20230927-27-94ktec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550641/original/file-20230927-27-94ktec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550641/original/file-20230927-27-94ktec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550641/original/file-20230927-27-94ktec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chantal’s Renault Clio, 52 years old.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">G. Mangin</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In our research, we interviewed 40 or so vehicle owners and the vast majority expressed the importance of re-use as opposed to mass production and consumption. For them, it’s about promoting an ecology that prioritises the use of functional (or repairable) tools over buying new ones. This was perceived as being more financially accessible and also responsible.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“It’s not easy to explain to our dear ecologists that keeping and running an ‘old’ car instead of building a new one saves hectolitres of water, kilos of steel, rubber and plastic. That’s the whole problem with looking only at the pollution from exhaust gases, rather than analysing the whole life cycle, from manufacture to use to recycling.” (Richard, writing in “Youngtimers” magazine).</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Redefining what is sustainable through an ethics of “care”</h2>
<p>Like any technical object, to function correctly and last, a car needs to be carefully maintained. Older cars often require constant attention, particularly safety-related components such as brakes.</p>
<p>Today, however, dealerships often no longer have the mechanics trained to work on older vehicles. Maintenance thus has largely become the responsibility of owners, who develop detailed knowledge that allows them to believe that their car will be with them for a long time to come. In so doing, they build an <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/lectures/58828">attachment to the car they look after</a>. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I look after my car to keep it looking good and to keep driving it… I’d like to drive a Golf like this for 300,000 kilometres. My car can go on for another 30 years.” (Larry, 64, retired decorator, drives a 1993 Volkswagen Golf 3)</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Suspicion that the ecological transition is “greenwashing”</h2>
<p>Resisting the switch to a less-polluting vehicle is also a sign of scepticism about manufacturers’ ecological intentions. For better or worse, electric vehicles are suspected of being <a href="https://theconversation.com/fin-de-la-voiture-thermique-pourquoi-le-tout-electrique-na-rien-dune-solution-miracle-192264">far more polluting than they appear</a>, in particular because their production requires the <a href="http://www.editionslesliensquiliberent.fr/livre-La_guerre_des_m%C3%A9taux_rares-531-1-1-0-1.html">extraction of precious metals such as lithium or cobalt</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550642/original/file-20230927-19-sv3xj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550642/original/file-20230927-19-sv3xj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550642/original/file-20230927-19-sv3xj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550642/original/file-20230927-19-sv3xj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550642/original/file-20230927-19-sv3xj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550642/original/file-20230927-19-sv3xj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550642/original/file-20230927-19-sv3xj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Peugeot 205 of Mickaël, a 22-year-old mechanic.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">G. Mangin</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Electronic and digital equipment is also the <a href="http://www.editionslesliensquiliberent.fr/livre-Bon_pour_la_casse-359-1-1-0-1.html">subject of mistrust</a>. The logic of early replacement is criticised and with it a perceived strategy of rendering past models obsolete.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“They’re not designed to last, no… the aim is to consume! The Saab 900 is a robust car. Why? Because we weren’t into that kind of consumption.” (Yannis, 40, company director, drives a 1985 Saab 900)</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Driving “less but better”</h2>
<p>Compared with more recent cars, those that are more than 15 years old are less comfortable, have fewer safety features and required greater attention from the driver. They necessarily have to be more observant and anticipate problems that can crop up.</p>
<p>Because such cars are at odds with the modern imperatives of efficiency, for their owners they become the ideal tool for keeping at bay the <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/lectures/990">feeling of acceleration that characterises our era</a> – they become a means to immerse oneself in “gentle” mobility that conjures up an imaginary world of contemplative travel.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“My parents have the [electronic pass] to go through the tollbooth and then everything is deducted from their account… Me, I find it frightening.” (Lucas, 22, philosophy student turned carpenter, drives a 1982 Renault 4)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Even more than goods and an economic system, those devoted to older cars use them to keep an entire system of mobility at arm’s length. At the same time, many support an ambitious overhaul that would prioritise alternative forms of mobility, in particular the bicycle. They all say they would do without a car on a daily basis if they could.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I’m not nostalgic. I think that the society of the past, the society of conquest, was wrong. It forgot the finiteness of things. Cycling is one example – with a bicycle, you can go to places where cars don’t go any more, you can get away from traffic jams, that’s all there is to it. You can plan ahead again.” (Fabrice, 47, teacher-researcher, owns Citroëns from the 1970s to 2000).</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The component of a restrained lifestyle</h2>
<p>For some, driving an old car is a way of being mobile in a more restrained way, favouring quality (of the journey, of the object…) over a form of abundance.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I think we’ve gone too far on certain things, that we’re going too far with regard to the planet too, pollution and all that. I don’t want to get into that, or at least I don’t want to any more. One of my dreams is to be energy independent. So there’s something ecological about my approach.” (Bruno, 56, special-needs educator, drives a 1986 Renault 4).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This ethic of sobriety is often at the root of a more frugal lifestyle, and presupposes a reflective attitude to our actions and their consequences. While having everyone use “older cars” would be directly in contradiction with the ecological transition we face, the relationship of their <em>owners</em> to their mobility nevertheless invites us to take the road more seriously, especially in a context where almost half of the vehicles put into circulation are no longer owned but rented through short-term contracts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gaëtan Mangin ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>While electric cars have significantly lower emissions over their entire lifecycle, research shows that owners of older cars can experience mobility in a more restrained way.Gaëtan Mangin, ATER en sociologie, Université d'Artois, docteur en sociologie, Université de Bourgogne – UBFCLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2140102024-03-08T14:01:57Z2024-03-08T14:01:57ZHow we’re breathing new life into French forests through green corridors<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573401/original/file-20240205-15-peliih.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C40%2C5439%2C3587&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A pine plantation and hedgerow as seen from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexandre Changenet, 2023</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the summer of 2008, during a family holiday road trip, we passed by the Aquitaine region in southwestern France. As we drove through a sprawling woodland, a mesmerizing sight unfolded before my eyes: a meticulously ordered army of trees, standing tall and proud. It could have been an army regiment classified by age.</p>
<p>This uniformity – in stark contrast to the wild and varied Mediterranean forests I was accustomed to – left me utterly captivated. Beneath the leafy canopy, the undergrowth seemed sparse, with only the occasional glimpse of heather and its discreet flowers, repeating like an infinite copy-paste.</p>
<p>I immediately thought that if I were a wild animal, this forest might not be the most stimulating place to call home. There was little biomass to sustain life, and while the simplified food chain offered few competitors, there were no companions, either. The woods felt monotonous.</p>
<h2>A European plan to revive thousands of acres</h2>
<p>Fast forward to last April, I returned to the same location, this time accompanied by more than 100 experts from <a href="https://forest-restoration.eu/">SUPERB</a>, an ambitious 20 million euro project funded by the Horizon programme to restore thousands of hectares of forest landscape across Europe.</p>
<p>The initiative, which relies on 12 forests including the Aquitaine site, will go some way in making good on the EU’s Nature Restoration bill, which commits the bloc to restoring at least 30% of degraded habitats by 2030, 60% by 2040 and 90% by 2050. It will also provide policy-makers with critical insights into the continent’s wildlife, life support systems and carbon sequestration capacity.</p>
<p>Spanning <a href="https://nouvelle-aquitaine.cnpf.fr/sites/socle/files/cnpf-old/30_foret_landes_gascogne_1.pdf">1 million hectares of planted forests</a>, the Aquitaine site plays an important part in the local economy, with 90% of its plantations private. Historically, the landowners here had thrived on long-term thinking and patience. Trees took their time to grow, but the rewards were bountiful. In the harvest, the first trees to be cleared are typically used for the manufacture of pulp and paper. Small trees are for pallets and packaging, while bigger trees are exploited for structural wood, beams or panelling parquet.</p>
<p>For generations, locals had employed top-notch forest management techniques, yielding high returns. But the forest and its wood-based economy are now under threat. During my week there, I realised that what had once appeared orderly and disciplined had by then struck me as odd and unbalanced. With time, relentless production had depleted the soil and flora. The climate was also growing more arid by the day. Landowners complained of increasingly frequent natural calamities – wildfires, pest outbreaks, and destructive windstorms.</p>
<p>I was there with colleagues to check on the restoration progress and learn from local scientists’ restoration experience. In our conversations, one word echoed repeatedly: <em>resilience</em> – the ability to rebound after disturbances, regardless of their origin. Another word for it when it comes to forest management is <em>biodiversity</em>, the dry term we scientists use for thriving wildlife. Since December 2021, SUPERB has been on a mission to bring it back to the woods of Aquitaine.</p>
<h2>Life through green corridors</h2>
<p>To revive dull, homogeneous nature, one typically has to mess it up, or at least according to our human eyes. At several levels: that of the landscape, by ensuring that forests, pastures and agricultural land rotate and balance one another out; at the species level, so that a multitude of trees, shrubs, and herbs can provide shelter for wildlife; and at the population level, where even large numbers of trees of the same species can react differently to environmental challenges, thereby maximising their survival chances.</p>
<p>However, this poses economic and logistical challenges. Unevenly aged trees and different tree species can hardly be harvested simultaneously, and large machinery face access difficulties. This is where SUPERB’s hedgerows come in. Working across 20 000 hectares, our team has spent the past months planting 10 km-long hedgerows to connect pockets of existing broad-leaf species, such as oaks. The idea is to form a physical barrier to increase resilience to pests and diseases and potentially other threats that may increase with a warming planet such as winds, storms, wildfires and drought.</p>
<h2>Swaying resistant landlords</h2>
<p>While many landowners are already committed to planting mixed hedgerows around their pine plantations, others are more prudent, and will need strong evidence to adopt this practice that costs money and breaks with tradition.</p>
<p>Scientists from French partners, including INRAE and the European Institute of Planted Forests, did their best to reassure them. Throughout the week, they had three drones scan the landscape from above, revealing the contrast between homogeneous pine forests and diverse hedgerows. On the ground, our team encountered traps for insects, pitfall traps for snakes, microhabitats for lizards, tree caves for bats, and audio recording and camera traps for other organisms. Even the soil’s diversity was examined through DNA analysis of its hidden microorganisms.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580226/original/file-20240306-28-u8jo2s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580226/original/file-20240306-28-u8jo2s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580226/original/file-20240306-28-u8jo2s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580226/original/file-20240306-28-u8jo2s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580226/original/file-20240306-28-u8jo2s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580226/original/file-20240306-28-u8jo2s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580226/original/file-20240306-28-u8jo2s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580226/original/file-20240306-28-u8jo2s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Upper panel: A natural forest. Middle panel: a forest intensively managed for wood production (far from its natural state). Bottom panel: A forest managed with ‘closer to nature’ methods.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://doi.org/10.36333/fs12">Larsen et al., 2022/European Forest Institute</a>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the pursuit of understanding ecosystem and bolstering resilience, much remains to be uncovered. While we await a complete understanding, the <a href="https://efi.int/publications-bank/closer-nature-forest-management">“closer to nature” management approach</a>, which seeks to “prioritize ecological integrity, biodiversity and sustainable practices over intensive human interventions” is gaining traction, emulating what nature does best. Yet translating this knowledge into actionable management plans for the forest managers is the other area that SUPERB is working on.</p>
<p>As the coordinator of the SUPERB project, I had the privilege of visiting all its demonstration sites, from woods in Castille in Leon to the alpine landscapes of the Vindelälven-Juhttatahkka biosphere in Sweden, down to the mountainous region of Vysočina and North Moravia in Czech Republic. Each forest brought its own set of challenges such as bark-beetle attacks, fragmented trees, wildfires, and abandoned lands. It became evident that customized approaches were necessary to address restoration, even when facing similar problems.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is the result of The Conversation’s collaboration with <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/research-and-innovation/en/horizon-magazine">Horizon</a>, the EU research and innovation magazine. In June, the author published <a href="https://projects.research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/en/horizon-magazine/europe-seeks-flourishing-forests-through-restoration">an article</a> with the magazine.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Madga Bou Dagher a reçu des financements de Horizon Europe 2020 for SUPERB project. </span></em></p>The SUPERB project, part of the EU’s Horizon programme, aims to restore thousands of hectares of forest landscape across Europe.Madga Bou Dagher, Professor in Forest genetics, European Forest InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2245512024-03-05T15:56:29Z2024-03-05T15:56:29ZFrom the end of CAP quotas to the present day, 20 years of failed European agricultural policies<p>For days, those images of farmers were all you could see on TV. The script was well-worn one: farmers leaving their farms to block roads and roundabouts, and checking on refrigerated lorries. They converged in Paris or <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/economie/crise/blocus-des-agriculteurs/direct-colere-des-agriculteurs-des-tracteurs-attendus-a-bruxelles-ou-les-dirigeants-europeens-se-reunissent-pour-un-sommet_6338776.html">Brussels</a>, but also set up shop throughout Europe outside government quarters, camping tractors and forestry trucks at junctions and on motorways.</p>
<p>Are these examples of yet another agricultural crisis? Or is it better to read them as a modern version of France’s <a href="https://www.sudouest.fr/economie/agriculture/colere-des-agriculteurs-le-cauchemar-de-tous-les-gouvernements-18306654.php">Jacqueries</a>, the peasants’ revolt against the nobles that took place in northern France in 1357–8? Perhaps not. It’s true that the anger of the farming community is expressed in waves, depending on price trends or climate disasters. But observers of the sector note that this crisis differs from previous ones for at least two reasons.</p>
<p>On the one hand, there has been a rather unusual convergence of <a href="https://www.publicsenat.fr/actualites/economie/colere-des-agriculteurs-fnsea-ja-coordination-rurale-qui-sont-les-syndicats-agricoles">all the farming unions</a> on the ground, with similar if not common demands. And for the first time in history, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/protesting-farmers-jam-brussels-with-tractors-ministers-meet-2024-02-26/">demonstration is becoming “coordinated” at European level</a> since almost all the countries have experienced social movements linked to the agricultural world at the same time. Previously, these were often local and concerned only one sector (milk, meat, etc.): until now, no agricultural crisis has had such cohesion.</p>
<p>A cursory glance at the situation might lead us to believe that agricultural crises follow one another with varying frequency. In truth, <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-sesame-2017-1-page-60.htm">the agricultural world has been in a permanent crisis for the last 20 years</a>. At its root: the gradual dismantling of the original <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/politique-agricole-commune-pac-25756">Common Agricultural Policy</a> (CAP). Dating back to 1962, the CAP was set out in the Treaty of Rome of March 1957, one of the bedrocks of the European Economic Community (EEC). It had the distinctive feature of being genuinely common and, above all, of offering producers a steering wheel and safety nets.</p>
<h2>Fewer guarantees against unforeseen events</h2>
<p>At its beginnings, the <a href="https://agriculture.gouv.fr/la-politique-agricole-commune-pac-60-ans-dhistoire">European policy</a> had boasted ambitious goals: increased competitiveness, security of supply, more stable markets and decent incomes for farmers. It was a common policy because it had regulatory tools at European level that enabled the EEC Member States to think about their agricultural policy not only at a national level, but also <a href="https://www.touteleurope.eu/histoire/histoire-de-la-politique-agricole-commune/">supranational one</a>.</p>
<p>Market regulation was the first pillar of the CAP. Annual quotas were defined at a European level and then broken down by country and then by individual farms. These mechanisms offered farmers a degree of visibility and relative price stability, which was reassuring for a sector that was subject to <a href="https://www.pleinchamp.com/les-guides/le-guide-de-l-assurance-recoltes%7Esecuriser-l-agriculture-face-aux-aleas-climatiques">climatic hazards and diseases</a>. The European regulation also controlled <a href="https://www.ina.fr/ina-eclaire-actu/video/cnc9206141989/explication-de-la-reforme-de-la-politique-agricole-commune">production volumes and by extension, prices</a>. The theory was that policy-makers would chip away it year after year until quotas officially disappeared in 2015.</p>
<p>Accounting for a quarter of the CAP budget, the second pillar of agricultural policy supports rural development and occasionally helps to influence production through aids and subsidies. The last sectors to be governed by quotas were <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/replay-radio/histoires-d-info/quand-les-agriculteurs-manifestaient-contre-les-quotas-laitiers-1984_1774893.html">milk</a> and sugar, while the fruit and vegetable sectors abandoned them much earlier. This deprived the CAP of a powerful lever. Europe, now having embarked on a more liberal path, has in fact favoured a more open and deregulatory approach that, for many observers, has given way to <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/futurs/2015/03/29/la-fin-des-quotas-laitiers-une-mesure-vache_1230958/">more volatility</a> in agricultural commodity markets.</p>
<p>As a result, European agricultural markets have <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-l-homme-et-la-societe-2012-1-page-181.htm">slackened</a>, with the lack of regulation at a European level (particularly on volumes) prompting <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/2015/08/agriculture-le-grand-tournant-1107922">intra-European competition</a> that can be damaging. Farmers, pitted against each other when they used to know who would produce what volume for what remuneration, have been unable to compensate for the erosion of prices and have had to grapple with more uncertain incomes. In concrete terms, Irish milk found itself in direct competition with Danish, Belgian and French milk. As our <a href="https://www.quae.com/produit/1699/9782759233588/gouverner-les-cooperatives-agricoles">research</a> shows, this has led the major cooperatives and manufacturers to enter into a race for size in order to pre-empt markets and <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-recma-2020-4-page-23.htm?ref=doi">take up positions</a>.</p>
<p>Some sectors have subsequently experienced crises of overproduction, leading to a collapse in prices. What’s more, since Europe no longer allows strategic food stocks (<a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/eu-food-stocks-should-gear-up-for-a-rise-of-food-protectionism/">even though their usefulness was demonstrated during the Covid crisis</a>) markets are left without the buffering or cushioning mechanisms that existed in the past.</p>
<h2>Forcing to negotiate (in an unfavourable position)</h2>
<p>The destabilisation of the market impacts upon all the links in the agricultural chain: each player will have a strategic interest in hedging its position by shifting part of its problems and the risks inherent in the sector to another player (for instance in grain or milk markets, <a href="https://www.farmersjournal.ie/dairy/news/report-recommends-more-milk-price-volatility-tools-for-farmers-793519">industrial or distributors tends to deport the volatility of international prices on farmers</a> since they are not able to bargain on prices and volumes). This goes some way to explaining why trade negotiations within agricultural sectors <a href="https://www.rtl.fr/actu/debats-societe/colere-des-agriculteurs-derniere-ligne-droite-tendue-dans-les-negociations-commerciales-7900347658">are often tense</a>, with everyone trying to preserve their margins at someone else’s expense.</p>
<p>The centre of gravity of market regulation has thus shifted from Europe and its common tools to national and international markets, giving free rein to unbalanced power relations. Take a dairy farmer producing one million litres of milk will generate between €400 and 500,000 euros in revenue for his farm. He may have to “negotiate”, for example, with the dairy company Lactalis, which is worth 25 billion euros and which itself negotiates with the Leclerc group, which is worth 45 billion euros. In other words, the balance of power is clearly in favour of the downstream sectors (processing and distribution) and farmers have <a href="https://www.ladepeche.fr/2023/12/23/prix-du-lait-la-colere-sexprime-devant-lactalis-11660564.php">no power</a> to negotiate or influence discussions.</p>
<h2>Insufficient responses</h2>
<p>Faced with this unequal balance of power, both Europe and France have tried to respond. The first response was fairly mechanical and consisted of beefing up the upstream sector by allowing producers to group together so that they could carry more weight. We have therefore seen some <a href="https://www.artisansdumonde.org/documents/organisationsprod_oct2015.pdf">producer organisations</a> emerge, but they typically suffer hostility from some manufacturers in particular.</p>
<p>The second response compelled distributors to cover farmers’ costs (more than income). In France, the 2019 <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/economie/crise/blocus-des-agriculteurs/on-vous-explique-les-lois-egalim-qui-cristallisent-la-ranc-ur-des-agriculteurs_6332368.html">Egalim laws</a> include a concept (the threshold of resale at a loss) which is supposed to guarantee a floor price to farmers so that they do not lose money. But it has to be said that some players are trying <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/societes/ces-centrales-d-achat-a-l-etranger-accusees-de-contourner-les-regles-pour-ecraser-les-prix-20240129">above all to get round these laws</a> in order to maintain their negotiating position and be able to preserve their margins.</p>
<p>So part of the answer to the farmers’ malaise seems to lie halfway between Europe, which needs to regain a much stronger capacity to regulate, or even intervene, and the Member States, which need to rebalance, even artificially, the <a href="https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x8rxxcf">negotiating powers between players in the various agricultural sectors</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224551/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Xavier Hollandts ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The end of CAP quotas has forced European farmers to compete with each other. The result: lower incomes, greater uncertainty and less bargaining power with distributors.Xavier Hollandts, Professeur de stratégie et entrepreneuriat, Kedge Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231512024-03-04T13:36:15Z2024-03-04T13:36:15ZA far-right political group is gaining popularity in Germany – but so, too, are protests against it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578973/original/file-20240229-18-u1ukal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People in Hamburg, Germany, protest against right-wing extremism and the AfD party on Feb. 25, 2024. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/at-a-demonstration-against-right-wing-extremism-on-february-news-photo/2033875417?adppopup=true">Hami Roshan/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hundreds of thousands of people have been <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2024/02/19/we-are-the-firewall-thousands-protest-against-far-right-in-german-city-wolfsburg">protesting across cities in Germany</a> since early 2024, standing up against the Alternative for Germany party, a relatively new, far-right, nationalist party that is known as the AfD. </p>
<p>What has driven so many Germans to suddenly protest against a small, extremist political party?</p>
<p>The protesters in Germany are directly responding to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/turning-back-clock-germanys-afd-economy-2024-02-01/">AfD’s radical policy</a> positions and the fact that it is currently in second place <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/germany/">in the polls</a> for the upcoming federal election, which will take place on or before Oct. 26, 2025. </p>
<p>While the AfD did not win any parliament seats in its first federal election in 2013, the group’s popularity <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/german-election-far-right-afd-loses-nationally-but-wins-in-east/">has been rising</a>. The AfD held about 13% of the seats in parliament from 2017 through 2021 and was the third-largest party in parliament. Since 2021, it has held about <a href="https://www.bundestag.de/en/parliament/plenary/distributionofseats">11% of the seats</a>. </p>
<p>After the next federal election, the AfD could become the second-largest party. While this limited power would not let it enact any extreme policies that could potentially reduce freedom and respect for civil liberties in Germany, the AfD could use its position in parliament to disrupt the policymaking process, criticize establishment parties and attract new voters for future elections.</p>
<h2>What is the AfD and why is it so controversial?</h2>
<p>Several politicians and journalists formed the AfD in direct response to the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-eurozone-crisis-and-implications-for-the-united-states/">Eurozone crisis</a> of the 2010s. </p>
<p>That crisis was triggered by several European governments in the European Union, including Greece, Portugal and Ireland, that developed large budget deficits.</p>
<p>The European Union’s 27 member countries promise to be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/main-elements-fiscal-reforms-agreed-by-eu-governments-2023-12-20/">fiscally responsible</a>. Otherwise, poor public management in one country could trigger an economic crisis throughout the entire European Union.</p>
<p>This is what happened during the Eurozone crisis. Poor public management in some member-states led to a European-wide crisis. </p>
<p>To mitigate the crisis, other European governments had to bail out other governments. The AfD’s founding members were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/turning-back-clock-germanys-afd-economy-2024-02-01">outraged that Germany</a>, as a leading member of the European Union, would become in part responsible for financially rescuing them. </p>
<p>Over time, the AfD has not only become increasingly skeptical of the European Union, but it has also become very clearly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37274201">anti-immigration</a>. Compared to other countries in Europe, Germany has a relatively large immigrant population. As of March 2023, about <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-migration-immigration-9948d6e87835242f9f7867d7ef817287">23% of the people</a> who live in Germany either are immigrants or their parents are or were. Germany is also the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/us/countries/germany">largest host country</a> for refugees in Europe.</p>
<p>The true extent of AfD’s anti-immigration policies came to light in January 2024, when a German <a href="https://correctiv.org/en/top-stories/2024/01/15/secret-plan-against-germany/">investigative news report</a> revealed that high-ranking AfD members attended a secret meeting with neo-Nazi activists to discuss a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/10/politicians-from-germany-afd-met-extremist-group-to-discuss-deportation-masterplan">master plan</a>.” </p>
<p>According to this plan, the German government would deport immigrants en masse to their countries of origin. This plan also included deporting <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/germany-afd-secret-meeting-deportation/">non-German-born citizens</a> of Germany. </p>
<p>The meeting was especially controversial because a few members of the Christian Democratic Union, one of Germany’s long-standing conservative parties, were also in attendance. </p>
<p>Once the investigative report became public, the AfD publicly <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-far-right-deportations-parliament-7a29129a6f50853791004d21ffea2a92">distanced itself</a> from the meeting and the plan. </p>
<p>Yet, it has been hard for the party leaders to convince the public that they do not support the supposed mass deportation policy, in part because high-ranking AfD members have suggested <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67948861">such policies</a> in the past. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A white, bald middle aged man points his finger and stands at a podium that has the words 'AfD' and German writing on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=537&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=537&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=537&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Markus Frohmaier, a leader of the AfD political group in Germany, speaks to party members at a conference on Feb. 24, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/february-2024-baden-württemberg-rottweil-markus-frohnmaier-news-photo/2028779666?adppopup=true">Christoph Schmidt/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Germans’ response to the AfD</h2>
<p>Once news of the mass deportation meeting circulated in mid-January, hundreds of thousands of people throughout Germany <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/21/1225882007/tens-of-thousands-protest-in-germany-against-the-rise-of-the-far-right">began to protest</a> against the AfD and its anti-immigration policies. </p>
<p>Many of the protesters are also protesting to defend democracy and human rights in Germany. </p>
<p>Protesters have compared the AfD’s growing prominence to that of the Nazi party. They have been carrying signs that say the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nazis-no-thank-you-germans-take-streets-call-afd-ban-2024-01-17/">AfD is so 1933</a>,” “<a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/2024-01-22/ty-article-magazine/.premium/will-germanys-far-right-party-be-banned-after-bombshell-fascist-mass-deportation-plan/0000018d-3112-d268-addd-3b7b21960000">No Nazis</a>” and “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/support-germanys-far-right-afd-reaches-six-month-low-after-protests-2024-01-30/">Deport the AfD</a> Now.” </p>
<p>They believe the only way to prevent the rise of a far-right party again in Germany is to protest the far-right movement before it becomes too popular.</p>
<p>Symbolically, the protesters are protesting under the slogan “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-afd-far-right-protests-bundestag-berlin-90d8497434a424ded198ce3d6d5fabb9">We are the firewall</a>” to illustrate how they are protecting Germany from the rise of far-right nationalists once again.</p>
<p>Some are also pushing for the German government to ban the AfD. Yet, while Germany has <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/germanys-laws-antisemitic-hate-speech-nazi-propaganda-holocaust-denial/">laws against extremist groups</a> that were developed after World War II, it is unclear whether such laws should be used to ban the party, as some observers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/feb/08/germany-ban-far-right-afd-panel">caution that banning</a> the AfD might backfire and make it more popular.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large crowd of people stand close together with umbrellas and hold signs. One of them says 'No tolerance for intolerance.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators in Hamburg protest right-wing extremism and the AfD on Feb. 25, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/at-a-demonstration-against-right-wing-extremism-on-february-news-photo/2033875510?adppopup=true">Hami Roshan/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What the AfD can still accomplish</h2>
<p>While the AfD is currently posing an electoral threat to more mainstream parties in Germany, it is unlikely that it will take control over the German government any time soon. </p>
<p>Germany is a multiparty system; no single party can control German politics at any given time. Parties must share power when governing the country.</p>
<p>It is unlikely that any of the current establishment parties will work with the AfD to govern Germany, primarily because the AfD supports policies that are <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-what-do-the-terms-right-and-left-mean-if-both-cdu-and-spd-are-in-the-center/a-37601594">so far removed</a> from what typical German parties would find acceptable. </p>
<p>Additionally, the Christian Democratic Union is currently the most popular party, according to opinion polls. CDU members have previously emphasized that they <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-cdu-leader-rules-out-cooperation-with-far-right-afd/a-66642647">will not cooperate</a> with the AfD in any circumstance. </p>
<p>And other <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/centrists-alarmed-as-poll-shows-growing-support-for-german-far-right-party">establishment parties</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/frank-walter-steinmeier/t-17345761">politicians have also</a> distanced themselves from the AfD.</p>
<p>Yet, while the AfD may not be able to make sweeping policy changes in the short run, it does pose an electoral threat to the establishment parties in Germany. As such, other German parties may start to alter their own policy platforms to appease some potential AfD voters. </p>
<p>The Christian Democratic Union is already proposing to send asylum seekers to other countries while their <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-conservatives-angela-merkel-migration/">applications are being processed</a>. However, their ability to make this policy change is unlikely, as it would require changes to European Union law.</p>
<p>In the long run, if the AfD is able to continue to grow in popularity at the local level, this may help it grow its voter base and become more successful in federal elections. </p>
<p>The AfD is more popular in states in <a href="https://theconversation.com/german-election-continuing-popularity-of-far-right-afd-has-roots-in-east-west-divide-167844">eastern Germany</a>, especially among voters who feel disenchanted with the reunification of communist East Germany and West Germany in 1990, and disenchanted with the drawbacks of Germany being a leading member of the European Union. </p>
<p>Some people fear that if the AfD continues to grow, it could undermine democracy in Germany, much like far-right populist parties have recently done in other <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/hungarys-democratic-backsliding-threatens-the-trans-atlantic-security-orde">democracies in Europe</a> and <a href="https://time.com/6245795/brazil-bolsonaro-lula-trump-insurrection/">in the rest of the world</a>.</p>
<p>And as democracy continues to decline in Europe and globally, protections for civil liberties and political rights will continue to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-freedom-declines-17th-consecutive-year-may-be-approaching-turning-point">decline as well</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223151/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julie VanDusky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hundreds of thousands of people in Germany are taking to the streets to push back against the far-right, nationalist policies of the AfD, which currently holds 11% of the seats in parliament.Julie VanDusky, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226702024-02-28T16:18:15Z2024-02-28T16:18:15Z‘Urban mines’: how to unlock our electronic junk’s potential<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573118/original/file-20230927-21-ul4bm0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C18%2C2038%2C1410&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Could this heap of junk prevent us from having to open a new mine?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hellebardius</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Instead of developing new mining infrastructures, what if we recovered the metal deposits contained in the electronic objects we no longer use, such as smartphones or computers? There are very good reasons for focusing on the potential of these <a href="https://theconversation.com/recycler-100-des-metaux-un-objectif-atteignable-192573">“urban mines”</a>, also known as secondary mines to distinguish them from the “primary” mines where resources in the ground are exploited directly.</p>
<h2>A strategic challenge for the European Union</h2>
<p>Not only would these alternative resources address a shortage of mining infrastructure, they could also help to slash <a href="https://theconversation.com/le-volume-de-dechets-electroniques-explose-et-leur-taux-de-recyclage-reste-ridicule-143701">electronic waste</a>, otherwise known as “e-waste”. The fastest-growing waste stream in the world, electronic junk wreaks havoc on ecosystems around the globe and poses a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0048969720332654">major threat to health</a> by leaching toxic substances into the land and water, especially in Asia.</p>
<p>Better recycling electronic items could also reduce mining’s high environmental impact. In fact, for some metals, recycling is more energy efficient than mining. Extracting aluminium through recycling, for example, requires <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11837-021-04802-y">10 to 15 times less energy</a> than primary production.</p>
<p>The issue is especially important as several of the recyclable metals are critical resources for the European Union’s twin transitions to a digital and net-zero economy. Deposits such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare earths are essential for the production of electronics, electric vehicles and renewable energy components such as solar panels. Yet they are barely exploited in the bloc and exposed to a high risk of supply tensions. To this end, since 2011, the European Union has assessed and released every three years a list of critical raw minerals that should constitute a priority for urban mining.</p>
<p>The fifth list, <a href="https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials_en">published in 2023</a>, identified 34 critical metals, including rare earth elements, lithium, copper, and nickel. Unfortunately, the gap between the European Union’s recommendations and urban mining practices is glaringly obvious.</p>
<h2>A life cycle riddled with obstacles to recycling</h2>
<p>An object’s recovery potential is limited at every stage of its life cycle by technical, organisational, regulatory, and economic obstacles. From its very design, certain practices limit its metals’ recyclability, such as the use of metals in particular alloys, since not <a href="https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/39534359/Design_for_Recycling_Evaluation_and_Effi20151029-964-yq8ltw-libre.pdf">all alloys can be recycled</a>, or hybridisation, since <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0255270111002029">composite materials are harder – not impossible – to recycle</a>. For instance, for liquid food packaging, most cartons are made from cardboard and PolyAl, a blend of aluminium and polyethylene (a type of plastic).</p>
<p>For many years, the cardboard from food cartons was recovered and recycled, but not the PolyAl, leading to incomplete recycling. In this specific case, the companies Tetra Pak and Recon Polymers ultimately developed a separation process, opening a <a href="https://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/un-nouveau-debouche-pour-le-polyal.N1217752">recycling plant specifically for PolyAl in 2021</a>. But many other products continue to be difficult to recycle, precisely because this aspect was not taken into account at the design stage.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cairn-sciences.info/quel-futur-pour-les-metaux--9782759809011-page-287.htm"><em>Dispersive uses</em></a>, which involve using small quantities of metals in products to modify their properties, are another practice that evades recycling. Take silver nanoparticles: their industrial application ranges from the disinfection of medical equipment, water treatment, to odour prevention in textiles. Likewise, a few grams of dysprosium, a rare earth metal, may also be used to boost magnets’ pull. In sum, some metals boast so many applications that it is impossible to ensure their circularity.</p>
<h2>Electronic hibernation – abandoning our devices in the attic</h2>
<p>Once objects have been designed and used, there is a second obstacle, which stems from consumers, who tend to hold on to their electronic objects, whether they work or not, rather than dropping them at a specific recycling facility. This phenomenon is known as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0956053X16307607"><em>electronic hibernation</em></a>. As far back as 2009, a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301479709001637">pioneering study</a> estimated that American households stored an average of 6.5 hibernating electronic items in their attics and basements. This figure has increased exponentially over the years.</p>
<p>In 2021, a <a href="https://www.gstatic.com/gumdrop/sustainability/electronics-hibernation.pdf">study conducted by Google</a> identified seven key barriers preventing consumers from recycling their electronic devices:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Low awareness of existing handoff options (recycling)</p></li>
<li><p>Expectations regarding financial or social compensation</p></li>
<li><p>Device nostalgia</p></li>
<li><p>Desire to keep spare products</p></li>
<li><p>Data retrieval factors</p></li>
<li><p>Desire to ensure data removal</p></li>
<li><p>Inconvenience of handoff options.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>A more recent study <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800922003962">conducted in Switzerland</a> tempers these results slightly: 40% of respondents said they would be willing to part with their old cell phone for less than five dollars. However, it would be interesting to conduct the same survey in countries less wealthy than Switzerland.</p>
<p>Finally, the third stumbling block concerns collection systems and recycling infrastructures. In France, from where I write, most targeted waste channels (electronic waste, packaging, tires, etc.) are run by eco-organisations, private bodies that have either organisational or financial responsibility. These are regularly embroiled in controversy: analyses indicate that the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-mouvements-2016-3-page-82.htm">material recovery of waste flows managed by eco-organisations is often suboptimal</a>, in particular because of their profitability objectives.</p>
<h2>Engaging engineers, designers, politicians, and consumers</h2>
<p>Despite these obstacles, a number of initiatives aim to support companies in their eco-design efforts, including the <a href="https://upcyclea.com/en/cradle-to-cradle/">cradle to cradle</a>, which encourages companies to maintain “the quality of raw materials throughout the multiple life cycles of the product and its components.”</p>
<p>Beyond such schemes, however, <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-flux-2017-2-page-51.htm">every participant</a> in the value chain needs to examine their responsibility in waste:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>For engineers and product designers, this means adopting a more sustainable approach to design, taking into account the entire product life cycle right from the beginning of the design stage: it is the purpose of eco-design and eco-conception.</p></li>
<li><p>Companies, meanwhile, need to take a longer-term approach rather than focusing exclusively on short-term profitability, particularly in a context of volatile metal prices.</p></li>
<li><p>For consumers, this means greater awareness of the need to sort waste for disposal in specific channels, particularly electronic waste.</p></li>
<li><p>And finally, governments and local authorities would do well to put in place regulations tailored to the sector’s complexity, potentially including ambitious targets for specific recycling rates by type of metal, as well as some form of territorial planning to better coordinate flows. Ensuring that <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0921344916300283">recycling facilities more accessible</a> is also a key factor in promoting good recycling behaviours.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The difficulty of moving toward a circular economy</h2>
<p>We have not yet ventured to report metal recycling rates. One of them, the end-of-life recycling rate (EOL-RR), refers to the percentage of discarded metal that is recycled. Another indicator, the recycled content (RC), considers the proportion of recycled metal in total metal production.</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, these two indicators give very different recycling rates. For instance, chromium (Cr), copper (Cu) and zinc (Zn) have a life recycling rate of <a href="https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/8702/Recycling_Metals.pdf">over 50%</a>, which means that more than half of the quantities put into circulation are recycled. However, their recycled content is <a href="https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/8702/Recycling_Metals.pdf">between 10 and 25%</a>, as primary extraction of these metals is constantly increasing: the share of recycled metal in the total flows therefore remains low.</p>
<p>Consequently, even if we were able to achieve an optimal exploitation of urban mining deposits and high recycling rates for all metals (measured in EOL-RR), we would still be a long way from a circular economy, as demand for metals continues to rise exponentially. For instance, global production of copper (Cu) has almost doubled since 2000, rising from <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/254917/total-global-copper-production-since-2006/">14 to 25 million metric tons/year</a>.</p>
<p>The effective recycling of metals contained in urban mines is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a truly circular economy. We will need to see a significant decrease in the volume of mineral resources used in industry before urban mining can partially replace, rather than add to, the exploitation of primary deposits.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fanny Verrax ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Mining precious metals is expensive and environmentally destructive. As an alternative, researchers are increasingly eyeing recycling old smartphones, computers and other electronics.Fanny Verrax, Associate professor in Ecological Transition and Social Entrepreneurship, EM Lyon Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2236012024-02-27T12:41:40Z2024-02-27T12:41:40ZRussia: Serbia’s history is key to understanding its close relationship with Moscow<p>Over the past few weeks, international attention has focused on Ukraine in the run-up to the <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/world/europe/2024/02/21/russia-ukraine-war-latest/">second anniversary</a> of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. But Ukraine is not the only part of Europe where Russia is seeking to assert its influence and control. </p>
<p>Often overlooked by the international community in a world beset by international crises, Serbia, another aspiring <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/serbia_en">member of the European Union</a>, finds itself at a crossroads between pursuing its future within the bloc or staying within Moscow’s orbit. </p>
<p>Despite the promise of greater prosperity within the EU, <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-02-27/closer-to-west-serbias-foreign-policy-after-russian-invasion">many fear</a> that Serbia is moving closer to the Kremlin again. Indeed, <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbias-vucic-presents-anti-drone-system-acquired-from-russia/">Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić </a> announced in February that he had purchased an anti-drone system, combat vehicles and infantry equipment from Russia. </p>
<p>The country has been historically <a href="https://www.natoassociation.ca/keys-to-understanding-russias-relationship-with-serbia/">close to Russia</a>. In modern times, this relationship was cemented by Russia backing Serbia’s opposition to Kosovan independence. The Kremlin was against the province becoming an independent nation and suggested this would be a breach of international law.</p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88828">remains popular</a> among many Serbs, and the country has refused to follow the rest of Europe in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-serbia-is-shifting-closer-to-russia-heres-why-192472">imposing sanctions </a> on its old ally over the Ukraine invasion.</p>
<p>Many non-Serbs in the western Balkans distrust Russia, particularly because of its long-term support for Serbia – and those fears were exacerbated by the full-scale <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-past-and-the-furious-how-russias-revisionism-threatens-bosnia/">invasion of Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>Indeed, before the invasion Russia showed whose side it was on in the Balkans when Moscow wielded its UN Security Council veto in 2015 to prevent a resolution that would have recognised the <a href="https://www.hmd.org.uk/learn-about-the-holocaust-and-genocides/bosnia/srebrenica/">Srebrenica massacres</a> as genocide on the 20th anniversary of those atrocities during the Balkan war. Around 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were slaughtered in Srebrenica.</p>
<p>The narrative of genocide denial in the Russian media was even used to counter accusations of atrocities by Russian forces in Ukraine, notably Bucha. A report on Russian state-controlled <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/bosnia-and-herzegovina/euvsdisinfo-russian-media-deny-srebrenica-genocide-deflect-responsibility-bucha_en?s=219">First TV said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Recall that [Srebrenica] has become synonymous with the genocide of the Muslim population, which, according to the west, was committed by the Bosnian Serbs in July 1995. But over time, many facts appeared confirming that a well-planned operation was carried out in Srebrenica, behind which stood western intelligence services.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Russia has long had a role in the western Balkans and sees its partnership with Serbia as a means of countering <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russias-influence-balkans">western influence in the region</a>. This means Russia pulling Serbia away from forging closer ties with the EU and as former US ambassador to Nato, Kurt Volker, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/09/why-did-russia-veto-recognizing-srebrenica-as-a-genocide-putin-bosnia/">said at the time</a>: “Moscow wants to make it clear that the Balkans won’t be part of mainstream Europe.”</p>
<p>Recent elections in Serbia, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240202IPR17327/serbia-did-not-fulfil-its-commitments-to-free-and-fair-elections-say-meps%20European%20Parliament">condemned by EU observers</a> as being “below the expected standards for an EU candidate country”, added to concerns especially when demonstrators were condemned as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/04/serbia-opposition-doubles-down-on-election-claims-as-full-results-released">“thugs”</a> by Vučić , who thanked the Russians for tipping him off in advance that the protests were taking place.</p>
<p>Serbia also refuses to align with the rest of Europe in imposing sanctions on Russia with Vučić <a href="https://www.novinite.com/articles/224314/Serbia+Stands+Firm%3A+Refuses+to+Impose+Sanctions+on+Russia+Despite+Western+Pressure">recently telling Tass</a>, Russia’s state-run news agency: “You have many friends in Europe, but they all imposed sanctions against you. The only country that did not introduce sanctions is little Serbia.” </p>
<p>Vučić has also signed <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/serbia-receives-another-arms-delivery-from-russia-despite-international-sanctions-over-ukraine">cooperation agreements with Moscow</a>. Russia’s soft power remains strong in the country where the population regards Russia as its “greatest friend” and one survey found <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88828">63% blame the west</a> for Russia’s war in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>EU and the Balkans</h2>
<p>The EU is at its heart a peace process, first formed from the carnage of the second world war. That peace was shattered by the Balkan wars of the 1990s and the genocide that took place during the conflict, notably during the war in Bosnia. That failure still haunts EU decision makers. </p>
<p>In June 2003 at the EU Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki in Greece, European leaders decided to identify the countries of the region, as potential candidates for membership, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_03_163">including Serbia</a>. </p>
<p>In September 2013 a stabilisation and association agreement between Serbia and the EU came into force. A conference in January 2014 signalled the start of the formal <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/serbia_en">accession process</a>, setting out areas of reform Serbia needed to complete before being accepted as a member.</p>
<p>Serbia’s accession is particularly important for regional stability, given its size and role in past conflicts. If the EU is a project that wants to deliver peace and stability, it is difficult to see this as being successful in the western Balkans without including Serbia. </p>
<p>But talks have been far from smooth. Neighbouring Croatia which was earmarked by the EU as a future member at the same time as Serbia, in 2003, became a full EU member in 2013, but Serbian negotiations to become part of the EU have edged forward slowly. There is also a challenge with 40% of Serbs favouring an <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/01/19/hedging-its-bets-serbia-between-russia-and-eu-pub-88819#:%7E:text=Serbia%20is%20pursuing%20EU%20membership,its%20leverage%20in%20the%20region">end to membership talks</a>.</p>
<p>Vučić’s efforts to seek favour with Moscow will harm his country’s chances of EU memberships talks <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/01/19/hedging-its-bets-serbia-between-russia-and-eu-pub-88819#:%7E:text=Serbia%20is%20pursuing%20EU%20membership,its%20leverage%20in%20the%20region">progressing any further</a>. That could have profound regional consequences and weaken efforts to isolate Russia. </p>
<p>In recent years the EU has experienced an awkward partnership with Hungary, whose pro-Kremlin leader Viktor Orbán recently <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-threatens-silence-hungary-orban-if-blocks-ukrainian-aid-funds-article-7/">held up EU plans</a> to send aid to Ukraine. Disunity has caused Nato and the EU problems in the face of <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/hungarys-ties-to-russia-make-europeans-increasingly-uncomfortable/">Russian aggression</a>. That leaves the EU concerned about having another partner with worryingly close links to Russia. </p>
<p>The looming US election, which could result in a Trump presidency that threatens a US <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html">withdrawal from Nato</a>, could exacerbate those concerns. Conversations are stepping up in European capitals over how to ensure that the EU and other European democracies can work together to ensure stability on the continent in the face of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/12/european-leaders-call-for-stronger-defence-ties-donald-trump-nato-remarks-russia">Russian aggression</a>. </p>
<p>That work will continue to focus, rightly, on Ukraine. However, as in the past, there are pitfalls in disregarding the challenges in the western Balkans and failing to pay attention to “little Serbia” could have far reaching consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Gethins is affiliated with.
I am a member of the SNP.
I am a founder and member of the Management Board of the Scottish Council on Global Affairs.
I am a Trustee of the John Smith Trust.</span></em></p>Europe should not ignore the importance of Serbia as a Russian ally.Stephen Gethins, Professor of Practice in International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194812024-02-27T01:14:35Z2024-02-27T01:14:35ZPoland has opened its arms to nearly 1 million Ukrainian refugees, but will they be able to stay for the long term?<p>Two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European landscape has been completely transformed by Ukrainian migrants fleeing their homeland. </p>
<p>According to the European Union, around <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukraine-refugees-eu/">4.2 million Ukrainians</a> currently receive temporary protection in EU countries, which entitles them to residence permits, working rights and access to health care and education. </p>
<p>The largest number are in Germany, where 1.2 million Ukrainians were living as of November 2023. Surprisingly, the second-largest number of refugees (960,000) are in Poland, a country with <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-mono/10.4324/9781003196327-2/poland-position-map-forced-mobility-european-context-karolina-sobczak-szelc-marta-pachocka-konrad-p%C4%99dziwiatr-justyna-sza%C5%82a%C5%84ska-monika-szulecka?context=ubx&refId=6660469b-8bf9-4be8-9247-9e8ed9a51310">no significant history of accepting forced migrants</a>. </p>
<p>In the weeks after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Poland immediately opened its borders and became the primary recipient of Ukrainian refugees. By <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/poland/acaps-briefing-note-refugee-influx-ukraine-25-may-2022">May 2022</a>, 3.5 million Ukrainians – or 53% of all people who fled the country – had crossed the border into Poland. </p>
<p>Many have since returned to Ukraine or settled elsewhere, but many have stayed. Why has Poland been so open to this large number of migrants – and how long will they be able to stay?</p>
<h2>Why Poland?</h2>
<p>The large number of refugees was no doubt facilitated by the <a href="https://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/rzesz/ASSETS_charakteryst_pogran.pdf">530-kilometre border</a> shared by the two countries. But Ukraine and Poland have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422.2024.2310245">much more in common</a>. They share a <a href="https://warsawinstitute.org/poland-ukraine-history-divides/">complex, intertwined history</a> marked by territorial wars, mutual antagonisms and historical disagreements, as well as <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/poland/acaps-briefing-note-refugee-influx-ukraine-25-may-2022">linguistic and cultural similarities</a> and first-hand experience of communist rule.</p>
<p>During Poland’s post-1989 transition to democracy, migrants from Ukraine became an important part of the labour force. Then, in 2014, conflict sparked by Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine <a href="http://www.ceemr.uw.edu.pl/vol-7-no-2-2018/articles/employment-foreigners-poland-and-labour-market-situation">drove more Ukrainian migrants</a> to Poland. </p>
<p>Before the 2022 Russian invasion, roughly 2 million foreigners lived in Poland – <a href="https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Spotlight-APRIL-2022.pdf">some 1.35 million of them Ukrainians</a>. These Ukrainians were largely male workers, benefiting from the <a href="http://www.ceemr.uw.edu.pl/vol-7-no-2-2018/articles/employment-foreigners-poland-and-labour-market-situation">huge demand for labour</a> in a country with an ageing and shrinking workforce. </p>
<p>Given this history of migration, it stands to reason Poland would show solidarity with Ukrainians after the invasion. And the large Ukrainian migrant population already familiar with living in Poland <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422.2024.2310245">volunteered to help</a> the refugees when they arrived – mostly women with children. </p>
<p>This spontaneous welcome and support was also offered by <a href="https://theconversation.com/polands-hospitality-is-helping-many-ukrainian-refugees-thrive-5-takeaways-200406">ordinary Polish citizens and local NGOs</a>. They even opened their homes to refugees and <a href="https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Pomoc-pol-spol-UKR-ENG-22.07.2022-C.pdf">helped them find (or offered) employment</a>. The level of support from the public was unprecedented.</p>
<p>What drove this huge swell of public empathy? While some were <a href="https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Pomoc-pol-spol-UKR-ENG-22.07.2022-C.pdf">motivated</a> by their previous contact with migrants, <a href="https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Pomoc-pol-spol-UKR-ENG-22.07.2022-C.pdf">the collective memory</a> of Soviet invasion and occupation was also important.</p>
<p>As the war has dragged on, some Poles have begun to worry about the impact of refugees on the country’s finances and health care. While public support was nearly universal (94%) for <a href="https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2023/09_2023.pdf">admitting Ukrainian refugees in March 2022</a>, it slipped to 65% in September 2023. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Polish volunteers rushed to aid recent Ukrainian refugees arriving at the Wroclaw railway station in early 2022. Maksym Szyda/Shutterstock.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/polish-generosity-risks-hardening-anti-immigrant-sentiments-towards-ukrainian-refugees-in-the-long-term-179161">Polish generosity risks hardening anti-immigrant sentiments towards Ukrainian refugees in the long term</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>A notable shift from the government</h2>
<p>The Polish government also swiftly adopted a <a href="https://ukraina.interwencjaprawna.pl/the-act-on-assistance-for-ukrainian-citizens/">special-purpose law</a> that gave Ukrainians temporary protection status and access to the same publicly funded services as Poles, such as welfare and employment rights, <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/01/12/almost-14000-ukrainian-businesses-created-in-poland-in-the-first-nine-months-of-2022/">including business ownership</a>. This law is rooted in the 2001 <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729331/EPRS_BRI(2022)729331_EN.pdf">EU Temporary Protection Directive</a>, which was activated after the invasion for the first time.</p>
<p>By December 2023, <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">more than 1.64 million Ukrainians</a> had applied for asylum or temporary protection in Poland – by far the highest number in eastern Europe. Their protection status was <a href="https://www.prawo.pl/samorzad/pomoc-obywatelom-ukrainy-przedluzona-do-30-czerwca-2024,525359.html">recently extended</a> until June 30 of this year, with a further extension expected. </p>
<p>This was a startling move for the right-wing, anti-immigration, populist government led by the Law and Justice party. After all, this is the same Polish government that <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/diminishing-solidarity-polish-attitudes-toward-european-migration-and-refugee-crisis">did not implement the EU relocation scheme</a> in response to the 2015–16 European migration crisis. It also responded with force when neighbouring Belarus <a href="https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/ODI-Public_narratives_Poland_country_study-revMay23.pdf#page=18">manufactured another crisis</a> in 2021 by sending hundreds of migrants from the Middle East and Africa to the Polish border.</p>
<p>We believe this paradox can be explained by the Ukrainian refugees being aligned with the government’s then-criteria for acceptance. They were perceived as being “genuine” refugees (for example, women, children and elderly people fleeing war) and shared cultural traits with Poles. </p>
<p>This open-door response contrasted with the earlier rhetoric of right-wing politicians and media, who presented non-European refugees as a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10767-018-9287-9">security risk</a> and a <a href="https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/ODI-Public_narratives_Poland_country_study-revMay23.pdf#page=34">threatening “other”</a> forced on the government by EU quotas. </p>
<h2>Better opportunities beyond Poland</h2>
<p>Because Ukrainian refugees now hold various residency permits, thanks to their EU-mandated temporary protection status, they can cross borders easily. There have been more than <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">17 million crossings</a> from Ukraine to Poland since the invasion, and nearly 14.7 million crossings in the other direction.</p>
<p>Between August 2022 and June 2023, some <a href="https://ewl.com.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Report_From-Poland-to-Germany_New-trends-in-Ukrainian-refugee-migration_.pdf">350,000 Ukrainian refugees</a> also left Poland for other countries. About 100,000 resettled in Germany, lured by stories of <a href="https://ewl.com.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Report_From-Poland-to-Germany_New-trends-in-Ukrainian-refugee-migration_.pdf">better wages and welfare benefits</a>. </p>
<p>Given their high mobility, it remains to be seen how many Ukrainian migrants decide to stay in Poland. The ability to work is key. In 2022, one survey showed the employment rate of Ukrainian refugees in Poland to be <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/b0f40584-en/1/3/1/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/b0f40584-en&_csp_=f32aa69b63450530407ffa5853cb88a4&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book#section-d1e13274-b045ae91b8">65%</a> – the highest for displaced Ukrainians in Europe. A year later, it had only dipped slightly to <a href="https://nbp.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/raport_migranci_z-Ukrainy_2023.pdf">62%</a>. </p>
<p>According to other Polish surveys, between <a href="https://nbp.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/raport_migranci_z-Ukrainy_2023.pdf">48%</a> and <a href="https://openfield.pl/pdf/raport_ua_2023_eng.pdf">70% of Ukrainian refugees also hold tertiary qualifications</a>. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/b0f40584-en/1/3/1/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/b0f40584-en&_csp_=f32aa69b63450530407ffa5853cb88a4&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book#section-d1e13274-b045ae91b8">just like in other OECD countries</a>, many Ukrainians in Poland have been working below their qualifications. </p>
<p>About <a href="https://openfield.pl/pdf/raport_ua_2023_eng.pdf">half the refugees</a> in one survey said they couldn’t find a job in 2023, double the rate the year before. And only 7.7% said they wouldn’t take a job below their qualifications, compared with 20% the year before. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-the-good-bad-and-ideal-refugees-176926">Ukraine: The good, bad and ideal refugees</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Will they return home?</h2>
<p>Whether refugees ultimately return to Ukraine, however, depends on several factors. Surveys show upwards of <a href="https://nbp.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/raport_migranci_z-Ukrainy_2023.pdf">39%</a> of migrants intend to remain in Poland permanently or for the long term. The <a href="https://nbp.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/raport_migranci_z-Ukrainy_2023.pdf">main reasons</a> include the ability to work and provide for themselves and their families, job satisfaction, the opinions of their children, and better housing.</p>
<p>Although more Ukrainians are gaining Polish language skills, about a third report needing <a href="https://nbp.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/raport_migranci_z-Ukrainy_2023.pdf">formal language training and assistance in finding employment</a>.</p>
<p>How Poland responds to these needs will influence whether Ukrainian refugees feel welcome to stay and further integrate into Polish society, particularly under the newly elected, more liberal Polish government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219481/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marta Pachocka is an expert of the Team Europe Direct Poland.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sabina Kubiciel-Lodzińska has collaborated academically (without financial reward) with the research company Openfield on a research report comparing pre-war Ukrainian migrants and refugees in Poland. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kate Golebiowska does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Polish public support for resettling Ukrainian refugees has slipped in recent months, while many new arrivals have had difficulty finding work that aligns with their qualifications.Kate Golebiowska, Senior Research Fellow, Charles Darwin UniversityMarta Pachocka, Assistant Professor, SGH Warsaw School of Economics and Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, Warsaw School of EconomicsSabina Kubiciel-Lodzińska, Assistant Professor, Opole University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2233902024-02-15T16:17:04Z2024-02-15T16:17:04ZKosovo: consolidating its statehood remains an uphill struggle 16 years after independence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575352/original/file-20240213-20-g81uw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5421%2C3715&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/flag-kosovo-on-soldiers-arm-collage-1249661251">Bumble Dee/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia on February 17 2008. It was a day full of joy and hope for a country that <a href="https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/kosovoii/homepage.html">suffered</a> atrocities including ethnic cleansing, genocide and rape at the hands of Serbian forces during the Kosovo War (1998–1999).</p>
<p>The country is now <a href="https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve/">recognised</a> internationally by more than 100 states and has become a member of some international organisations. Kosovo has also established itself as one of the most functional and vibrant <a href="https://www.idea.int/blog/kosovos-democracy-has-come-long-way-it-needs-support">democracies</a> in the Balkans. </p>
<p>But neighbouring Serbia doesn’t recognise Kosovo’s independence and ethnic Serbs living in the country’s north have largely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/why-kosovos-stand-off-with-serbs-goes-15-years-after-statehood-2023-02-13/">rejected</a> Kosovo’s state authority. So, in 2011, the EU and the US brought the two countries together for talks on normalising relations. </p>
<p>The talks initially yielded some agreements that were hailed as “historic”. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/serbia-kosovo-historic-agreement-brussels">Brussels agreement</a> in 2013, for example, defined the conditions for large-scale devolution of northern Kosovo and opened the way to membership of the EU. </p>
<p>But, since then, ambiguous language and a lack of goodwill between Serbia and Kosovo has meant that these intentions haven’t delivered significant changes.</p>
<h2>Accommodating Serbia</h2>
<p>The breakdown in cooperation has been exploited by Serbia to undermine Kosovo’s standing as a sovereign state. Serbia has strengthened its <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/12/07/serbia-strengthening-parallel-structures-kosovo-deputy-pm-says/">parallel structures</a> (a set of Belgrade-run institutions in Kosovo) which are in the country’s Serb-dominated north, lobbied against Kosovo’s bid to join <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/09/kosovo-fails-in-unesco-membership-bid">Unesco</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/general-news-12c2b452f3d644dcabe63bad05040783">Interpol</a>, and orchestrated an aggressive <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/01/05/serbian-president-claims-nine-more-kosovo-recognition-withdrawals/">derecognition</a> campaign against Kosovo.</p>
<p>Instead of normalising relations between Pristina and Belgrade, some people argue that the talks have become a tool for the EU and the US to normalise their relations with Serbia’s president, Alexander Vučić. </p>
<p>Concerned about Serbia’s potential to destabilise the Balkans, Brussels and Washington have adopted a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/14/europe/serbia-vucic-kosovo-balkans-west-intl-cmd/index.html">lenient posture</a> towards Vučić, aiming to pull Serbia away from Russia’s influence. Russia’s war in Ukraine and its potential security implications for the Balkans (where Serbia is considered <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/14047/html/">Moscow’s proxy</a>) has, contrary to any reasonable expectation, amplified this approach.</p>
<p>The Kosovo government’s attempts to extend state control of ethnic Serbian municipalities in northern Kosovo, for example, have been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/west-kosovo-ban-serbs-dinar/32795252.html">criticised</a> by the EU and US. On February 1, Kosovo’s central bank restricted all cash transactions anywhere in the country to euros, effectively banning the Serbian dinar.</p>
<p>But the EU and US attitude has emboldened Vučić to <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/05/serbs-stage-mass-resignation-from-kosovo-state-institutions/">intensify his efforts</a> to undermine Kosovo. He has used Kosovo Serbs living in the north to stoke tensions and make the country ungovernable. </p>
<p>In June 2023, three Kosovan police officers were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbias-security-forces-detain-three-kosovo-police-officers-kosovo-official-says-2023-06-14/">detained</a> by Serbian forces who accused them of crossing the border illegally. And tensions boiled over in September when a group of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-serbia-radoicic-extradition-impossible/32729208.html">heavily armed men</a> mounted an attack in northern Kosovo, leaving one Kosovan police officer and three gunmen <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66905091">dead</a>. A Kosovan Serb politician called Milan Radoicic has <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-release-monastery-attack-radoicic/32622767.html">claimed</a> to be the mastermind of the attack. </p>
<p>The international community condemned the attack and called for further investigations to hold those responsible to account. However, there still hasn’t been any official public assessment of the attack, nor have any sanctions been imposed on Serbia. Meanwhile, the EU has imposed <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/06/14/eu-announces-measures-against-kosovo-over-unrest-in-north/">sanctions on Kosovo</a>, accusing the government of failing to take steps to defuse the crisis in the north.</p>
<h2>Other priorities</h2>
<p>This imbalanced approach to the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is expected continue in 2024. There is <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2024/02/08/ep-adopted-resolution-on-serbia-calling-for-an-investigation-into-december-elections/">growing frustration</a> with Vučić’s autocratic grip in Serbia, but in the view of Brussels and Washington there doesn’t seem to be any better alternative than talking with Belgrade. Vučić is perceived as someone with enough popular legitimacy to sell Serbs a final settlement with Kosovo.</p>
<p>Kosovo’s concerns about the current approach to the dialogue between the two countries are legitimate having seen Serbia’s actions in the past. But it hasn’t much room for manoeuvre.</p>
<p>The stream of countries recognising Kosovo’s independence has stalled. In fact, Israel is the only country to establish <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/02/01/kosovo-establishes-relations-with-israel-breaking-blockade-on-recognitions/">diplomatic ties</a> with Kosovo in the last six years.</p>
<p>Stopping Serbia from sliding further towards autocracy would be the best option for achieving peace, stability and countering Russia’s influence in the Balkans. But that would require time and a total revision of the current dialogue format.</p>
<h2>An uphill struggle</h2>
<p>With a war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict stretching resources and causing political tension, Brussels and Washington will seek to put out any potential flames in the Balkans. The current US and EU administrations are likely to push Kosovo to bend to their demands and give Vučić something that he would be happy to live with.</p>
<p>Pristina has already <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">agreed</a> to some form of self-government for Kosovo Serbs. And, with European Parliament and US elections looming this year, where anti-establishment parties are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/24/anti-european-populists-on-track-for-big-gains-in-eu-elections-says-report">on track for big gains</a>, current leaders may rush to strike an imperfect deal between Kosovo and Serbia.</p>
<p>There’s also a chance that the EU and the US could find themselves being drawn into crisis management elsewhere if war in Ukraine and the Middle East continues to cause ripples way beyond their borders. Kosovo could be caught between meeting the international community’s demands to grant more sovereignty to Kosovo Serbs and a potential abandonment by its western partners if it doesn’t deliver on their requests.</p>
<p>Whichever way Kosovo chooses, the consolidation of its statehood will remain an uphill struggle.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223390/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Altin Gjeta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kosovo is under pressure from the US and EU to give in to some of Serbia’s demands.Altin Gjeta, PhD Candidate in Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212972024-02-01T17:04:20Z2024-02-01T17:04:20Z3 years on from coup, economic sanctions look unlikely to push Myanmar back to democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572880/original/file-20240201-21-z6rg6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=39%2C377%2C4427%2C2551&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sanctions have failed to prevent Myanmar's military from obtaining hardware.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/military-hardware-is-displayed-during-a-parade-to-celebrate-news-photo/1249572841?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html">Myanmar’s military seized back control</a> of the country in February 2021 after a decade-long democratic interlude, the international community reached for a familiar tool: economic sanctions.</p>
<p>The coup led several countries, <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/burma">including the United States</a> and <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/11/myanmar-burma-council-adds-4-persons-and-2-entities-to-eu-sanctions-list-in-eighth-round-of-sanctions/#:%7E:text=The%20Council%20has%20imposed%20restrictive,February%20and%2020%20July%202023.">European Union member states</a>, to impose or reinstate trade embargoes and other financial proscriptions against Myanmar’s military.</p>
<p>On Feb. 1, 2024 – coinciding with the third anniversary of the military coup – the U.S. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-marks-anniversary-of-myanmar-coup-with-new-sanctions/7465629.html">announced a fresh round of sanctions</a>. It comes as the Myanmar government continues to be embroiled in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">grinding civil war</a> with <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/burma-myanmar/could-myanmar-come-apart">ethnic minority insurgent groups</a>. But to date, sanctions have not encouraged the ruling generals back toward a democratic path or tipped the war in favor of pro-democratic resistance groups.</p>
<p>Moreover, as experts on <a href="https://cnwillis.com/">East and Southeast Asia</a> and <a href="https://poliscikeith.com/">economic sanctions</a>, we know that the history of Myanmar – and our own research – suggests that economics sanctions are unlikely to have that impact any time soon.</p>
<h2>Current sanctions against Myanmar</h2>
<p>The current sanctions against Myanmar share much in common with those imposed prior to 2010, when the country began a <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/battle-democracy-myanmar_en?s=110">process to restore democratic government</a>. The actions taken since 2021 by the U.S., EU and others – which include targeted and sector-specific sanctions – are aimed at undermining the military junta’s ability to <a href="https://www.state.gov/sanctions-against-the-myanma-oil-and-gas-enterprise-and-concerted-pressure-with-partners/">violently repress the country’s pro-democracy movement</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="6JbEj" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/6JbEj/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>At the same time, those imposing sanctions appear to be more cognizant than in previous periods of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.764581">potential negative impacts on the Burmese people</a>.</p>
<p>The sanctions imposed after the 2021 coup are more targeted and designed to affect the military government and its enterprises. In earlier periods, the <a href="https://poliscikeith.com/">financial measures were broader</a> and affected the entire Myanmar economy.</p>
<p>This is by design. The legal basis for post-2021 U.S. economic sanctions on Myanmar, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/02/12/2021-03139/blocking-property-with-respect-to-the-situation-in-burma">Executive Order 14014</a>, serves as the foundation for a multitude of targeted measures, which include restrictions on individuals and businesses connected to supplying Myanmar’s air force with jet fuel. </p>
<p>Signed on Feb. 11, 2023, the new U.S. sanctions regime reflects changes in how the <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Treasury-2021-sanctions-review.pdf">Biden Administration intends</a> to use financial penalties to target Myanmar’s generals, not its people. </p>
<p>The U.S. has also made it a priority to work collaboratively with international partners on imposing complementary rather than competing sanctions.</p>
<p>Evidence of this coordination emerged <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-promotes-accountability-for-human-rights-violations-and-abuses/">on Dec. 10, 2021</a>, coinciding with <a href="https://www.un.org/en/observances/human-rights-day">Human Rights Day</a>, with the U.S. rolling out a package of measures in conjunction with the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union. For example, the EU’s “<a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures_en">restrictive measures</a>” – the bloc’s parlance for economic sanctions – include many of the same sanctions imposed by the U.S., such as restrictions on the export of military and dual-use equipment, asset freezes, visa and travel restrictions, and restrictions on the export of telecommunications equipment.</p>
<p>The U.S. has also imposed targeted sanctions via the <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/1631">Specially Designated Nationals list</a>, a blacklist of people with whom U.S. citizens and firms are banned from doing business. Listed entities in Myanmar include military leaders, business people and their families. The idea is to focus the economic pain on individuals and entities involved in the coup and subsequent repression of democracy campaigners, rather than on the country as a whole.</p>
<h2>Past sanctions against Myanmar</h2>
<p>Certainly, history suggests that the U.S. needed to update its sanctions policy. Myanmar observers have long debated the effectiveness of the old Myanmar sanctions regime, with <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/busting-myth-myanmar-sanctions-success-story/">many concluding</a> that it had little impact on the junta’s decision to return to democracy. Rather, Myanmar’s democratic elections <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.764581">were part of the military’s road map</a> and not the result of sanctions pressure.</p>
<p>One reason for this skepticism over earlier sanctions was that they targeted imports from key sectors of Myanmar’s economy, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/9797/chapter-abstract/157012800?redirectedFrom=fulltext">such as garments and textiles</a>, that were not connected to the junta. These economic sanctions harmed private enterprises in Myanmar.</p>
<p>The latest sanctions <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0078?_gl=1*1mmoid*_gcl_au*MTYyMjQ3ODI3OC4xNzA1MDgyMDky">target military-owned or -linked enterprises</a>, such as Myanma Economic Holdings Public Company, Myanmar Economic Corporation Limited, Myanma Gems Enterprise, Myanma Timber Enterprise and the Myanmar Pearl Enterprise. </p>
<p>The post-2021 sanctions, though, are still plagued by some of the same problems of their predecessors. </p>
<p>They lack the weight of the United Nations, which has not called for sanctions against Myanmar. This stands in contrast to sanctions against other countries flouting international norms, like <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-north-korea-sanctions/">North Korea</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/international-sanctions-iran">Iran</a>. </p>
<p>The U.N. Security Council is <a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-myanmars-junta-have-been-tried-before-can-they-work-this-time-158054">unlikely to sanction Myanmar</a> as permanent members <a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-myanmar-military-killing-rights-suu-kyi-029f8503bf1eb6ec0e97e8521775184a">China and Russia refuse to condemn</a>, let alone sanction, Myanmar’s military rulers.</p>
<p>As a result, the international community has been split in its response to Myanmar’s democratic backsliding and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/myanmar">human rights violations</a>. While Western countries have decided to isolate Myanmar through targeted trade and financial sanctions, countries in East and Southeast Asia have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02185370600832497">maintained diplomatic and trade ties</a> with the military government. </p>
<p>And there is an incentive for countries in Southeast Asia to not take part in any sanction regime. As we show in our forthcoming book, “<a href="https://poliscikeith.com/">Trading with Pariahs</a>,” Myanmar’s trade ties tend to be strongest within its region. </p>
<p>During the first sanctions regime from 1988 to 2015, Southeast Asian economic ties with Myanmar became stronger as the country’s trade with sanctions-imposing Western states declined. </p>
<p>For countries in East and Southeast Asia, maintaining ties with Myanmar provided not only economic opportunities but also a strategy for monitoring and perhaps ameliorating Myanmar’s internal situation. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, <a href="https://asean.org/asean-10-meeting-the-challenges-by-termsak-chalermpalanupap/">admitted Myanmar</a> in 1997 despite the refusal of the junta to allow democratic elections and address human rights abuses. The approach favored by Myanmar’s neighbors was to try and bring Myanmar’s generals in from the cold rather than ostracizing them internationally.</p>
<p>And despite Singapore’s recent declaration that it <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/06/22/whats-next-for-sanctions-on-myanmar/">will stop arms transfers to Myanmar</a>, ASEAN member countries and those in East Asia continue to refrain from sanctioning Myanmar, preferring engagement to isolation.</p>
<h2>Can sanctions work?</h2>
<p>While U.S. sanctions have the potential to hurt the military, there are reasons to believe that they won’t be able to bring the government to its knees. It is likely that the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221087080">uneven termination of the United States’ earlier sanctions</a> provided insufficient time for American firms to fully engage and invest in Myanmar’s market, limiting the potential for future leverage now.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men in uniform take part in a military parade." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C276%2C5241%2C3228&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Myanmar’s military are bogged down in civil war, but not yielding to sanctions pressure.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MyanmarUSSanctions/8798420feac44ad88a7359ff1e70a23f/photo?Query=myanmar%20sanctions&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=346&currentItemNo=1">AP Photo/Aung Shine Oo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Those countries that do have significant leverage are unlikely to sanction Myanmar. And this undermines efforts by the U.S. or the West to isolate the country. </p>
<p>The challenge for the West can be seen in its sanctions on jet fuel trade. Amnesty International’s “<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/myanmar-new-shipments-of-aviation-fuel-revealed-despite-the-militarys-war-crimes/">Deadly Cargo” report in 2023</a> highlighted how Myanmar’s military can still secure reliable shipments of jet fuel despite the U.S. sanctions on the product.</p>
<p>The reason is more than 95% of Myanmar’s refined petroleum oils – needed for jet fuel – come from regional trading partners. Since 2021, China, Thailand, Singapore and Russia have <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/11/myanmar-amnesty-aviation-fuel/">provided much of the Myanmar’s military’s jet fuel</a>, enabling it to continue bombing campaigns throughout the country.</p>
<p>Even though the U.S. Treasury <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1701?_gl=1*nc1bho*_gcl_au*MTYyMjQ3ODI3OC4xNzA1MDgyMDky">has expanded its sanctions on jet fuel</a> to include both military and commercial, the impact of these sector-wide sanctions remains unclear. </p>
<p>While the nature of the current U.S. sanctions is starkly different from prior efforts to pressure Myanmar’s generals, the effectiveness and potential for success appear quite similar. Given the dearth of economic ties between Myanmar and countries outside its region, the potential for change in Myanmar seems unlikely without significant efforts by those countries with an ability to weaponize their extensive economic interdependence: China, Japan and ASEAN member states. </p>
<p>ASEAN is not blind to the erosion of human rights, and it has signaled its awareness of the regime’s atrocities and support for civilians by <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/06/myanmar-wont-be-allowed-to-lead-asean-in-2026-in-blow-to-generals.html">denying Myanmar its turn as ASEAN’s chair in 2026</a>. </p>
<p>However, the regional bloc is unlikely to impose economic sanctions on Myanmar in the foreseeable future, casting further doubt on the ability of Western sanctions to improve human rights and democracy meaningfully.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Economic proscriptions by the US and EU are hampered by lack of support among Myanmar’s major trading partners in the region.Charmaine N. Willis, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Skidmore CollegeKeith A. Preble, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209122024-01-31T18:29:04Z2024-01-31T18:29:04ZSome EU countries use the eurozone as a credit card, with Germany picking up the tab – new research<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572293/original/file-20240130-25-mfonz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=98%2C73%2C5365%2C3563&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mapped out.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/euro-banknotes-on-europe-map-concept-1924905488">Oleg Elkov/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Europe is home to many languages, varied geography and different cultures. And until fairly recently, it was also a place where almost every country had its own currency.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5038955_The_Launch_of_the_Euro">arrival of a common currency</a> in 1999 changed all that. Now <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/euro/countries-using-euro_uk">344 million citizens</a> in 20 of the 27 EU member states use the euro, making it the world’s second most used international currency after the US dollar. </p>
<p>One purpose of the euro is to simplify cross-border payment transfers between eurozone member states. This is achieved <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/target/target2/html/index.en.html">using a system</a> called “Target 2” (T2) which settles private sector bank-to-bank and commercial transactions between EU countries. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm16120506">my research</a> shows that this apparently innocuous settlement system is effectively being used to save the eurozone from imploding. </p>
<p>The problem is that some eurozone members – Italy and Spain, for example – import much more from other members than they export, particularly from Germany, the economic engine that has kept the eurozone economies going since 1999. </p>
<p>This results in a trade deficit, also known as a negative balance of trade. And this in turn creates a debt owed by Italy and Spain to Germany. </p>
<p>Luckily for them though, T2 converts this potentially risky debt into an apparently risk-free loan owed by the central banks of Italy and Spain to the central bank of Germany. The trouble is that there is no legal requirement in T2 to ever pay ot back. </p>
<h2>United in debt?</h2>
<p>Part of the reason for this imbalance is that the eurozone <a href="https://www.eurrec.org/ijoes-article-117074">does not satisfy</a> the economic conditions for being an “optimal currency area” (OCA) – that is, a geographical area over which a single currency and monetary policy can operate on a long term basis (in contrast to the UK and US, for example).</p>
<p>The different business cycles within the eurozone (with some countries booming economically, while others are in a slump) mean that trade surpluses and deficits will build up because inter-regional exchange rates can no longer be changed. </p>
<p>The normal way for a country to deal with a trade deficit is to devalue its currency, but this is not possible in the eurozone, since exchange rates between members were fixed in perpetuity in 1999. The most economically efficient countries, like Germany, accrue surpluses, while the more inefficient countries, like Italy and Spain, build up deficits. </p>
<p>To rectify this, surplus regions would have to recycle their surpluses back into deficit regions via transfers to keep the eurozone economies in balance. This is what happens in OCAs like the UK when the national government transfers tax revenues collected in England to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to correct regional imbalances. </p>
<p>But the largest surplus country in the eurozone, Germany, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07036337.2021.1877690">refuses to accept</a> that the EU is a “transfer union”. This is because the eurozone was set up on the explicit basis that market forces, not fiscal transfers, would be used to remove productivity differences between member states – and Germany was determined that it would not cross-subsidise inefficient members. </p>
<p>Yet deficit countries, including Italy and Spain, are using T2 for this very purpose. For them, T2 has effectively become a giant credit card. But unlike a regular credit card, neither the debt nor the interest that accrues on the debt ever needs to be repaid. </p>
<h2>Silent European debt mountain</h2>
<p>My research also shows that the size of the deficits being built up is causing citizens in those countries to lose confidence in their banking systems, leading them to transfer their funds to banks in surplus countries. T2 is being used to <a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/work393.pdf">facilitate this capital flight</a> to Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Large blue euro sign in front of skyscraper." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572301/original/file-20240130-19-vbdy3h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572301/original/file-20240130-19-vbdy3h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572301/original/file-20240130-19-vbdy3h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572301/original/file-20240130-19-vbdy3h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572301/original/file-20240130-19-vbdy3h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572301/original/file-20240130-19-vbdy3h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572301/original/file-20240130-19-vbdy3h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">European Central Bank HQ is in Frankfurt, Germany.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/european-central-bank-euro-administers-monetary-1269309565">Yavuz Meyveci/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Then there is the fact that no member state individually controls the European Central Bank. This implies that they do not (and cannot) stand behind their government debts or currency in the way genuine sovereign nations do – by printing more money to repay their debts when their tax base proves to be insufficient. Eurozone member states are therefore “sub-sovereign” states, since they are effectively using a “foreign currency”. </p>
<p>The present situation is not viable in the long term. And my research suggests only two realistic outcomes. </p>
<p>The first is a full fiscal and political union, with Brussels determining the levels of tax and public spending in each member state. The second is that the eurozone breaks up. Either way, it will cost German taxpayers well over €1 trillion (£854 billion). </p>
<p>The current <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-economy-must-be-fixed-here-are-three-top-priorities-221464">faltering of the German economy</a> – in part, due to the massive increase in energy costs following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and, in part, due to China <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-engineers-under-pressure-from-china/a-48173351">no longer needing</a> German machine tools for its factories – could mean that Germany does eventually capitulate to <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41253-022-00203-y">French demands</a> for fiscal and political union. </p>
<p>But if it does, it will be a union based on the protectionist model favoured by France, with much greater state intervention and regulation in the economy and with large state subsidies for favoured sectors and firms. </p>
<p>This is very different from the “ordoliberal” (or “ordered liberal”) model preferred by Germany which supports free markets but seeks to prevent powerful private interests from undermining competition. </p>
<p>However, there are no examples in history where a country – let alone a continent – has regulated its way to economic success. For now, T2 is the silent bailout system that people rarely talk about – but upon which the very survival of the euro depends.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220912/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Blake does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>German economic power is propping up the euro. But this cannot continue indefinitely.David Blake, Professor of Finance & Director of Pensions Institute, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2222122024-01-31T11:32:02Z2024-01-31T11:32:02ZFrench tractor protests are the latest rebellion of EU farmers against unfair competition and red tape – will their strategy pay off?<p>More than 500 tractors made their way to the motorways linking to Paris on Monday, as walls of hay rose here and there in the capital’s arteries. </p>
<p>French farmers have vowed to blockade the Paris region until their demands are met, keeping up the pressure ahead of an extraordinary European summit on 1 February. On Wednesday, over one hundred roads were blocked and 10,000 people demonstrating across the country, according to the <a href="https://www.bfmtv.com/societe/carte-rungis-lyon-toulouse-le-point-sur-les-blocages-des-agriculteurs-ce-mercredi_AN-202401310045.html">French interior ministry</a>. Prime Minister Gabriel Attal, just named to lead the government, is grappling with his first crisis, with grievances focused on new environmental norms, fuel taxes, free trade and wages. Formerly education minister, the 34-year-old has attempted to quell the unrest by granting emergency subsidies for organic farmers, cattle farmers hit by <a href="https://www.anses.fr/en/content/cases-epizootic-haemorrhagic-disease-france">epizootic hemorrhagic disease</a> and bad weather, and suspending a tax hike on tractor fuel. To the trade-unions steering the protests, however, this is too little, too late.</p>
<h2>The roots of discontent</h2>
<p>The demonstrations have been in the making for some time. In late 2023, farmers had already started <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2023/11/30/on-marche-sur-la-tete-l-operation-retournement-des-agriculteurs-en-colere_6203095_4500055.html">turning road signs upside down</a> to protest against governmental “red tape”. The name of the farmers’ initiative echoes the sentiment: “On marche sur la tête”, meaning “We’re walking on our heads”. It’s a common idiom that refers to an upside-down world. </p>
<p>Speaking to the TV channel TF1 on 22 January, Luc Smessaert, a cattle farmer in the Oise region north of Paris, <a href="https://www.tf1info.fr/societe/video-reportage-agriculteurs-en-colere-l-exemple-edifiant-du-millefeuille-des-normes-sur-les-haies-2283505.html">voiced such feelings</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Nowadays, [a] hedge is subject to 14 different European and French laws — the code on urbanism, heritage, and environment. Farmers don’t even want to plant hedges anymore”.</p>
</blockquote>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/0-zNqdRU9HM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The “On marche sur la tête” movement.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2021, organic farmers photographed themselves naked in their fields holding a sign <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ddM797AoXX0">“La Bio à Poil”</a> – the literal meaning in French is “in the nude”, but there’s also the sense of being exposed and vulnerable – to raise awareness over the <a href="https://theconversation.com/une-vraie-souverainete-alimentaire-pour-la-france-220560">political ambiguity</a> around agro-ecological practices.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/WgDxqdoffIw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">In 2021, farmers in France stripped down to protest against a decrease in EU subsidies for organic agriculture (in French).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Europe-wide grievances</h2>
<p>Unlike the “Gilets Jaunes” or pension-reform protests, the uproar isn’t unique to France. Since 2022, farmers in northern (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/nov/16/nitrogen-wars-the-dutch-farmers-revolt-that-turned-a-nation-upside-down">the Netherlands</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67976889">Germany</a>), southern (<a href="https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2024/01/italy-farmers-protesting-on-major-roads-and-in-city-centers-nationwide-as-of-jan-30">Italy</a>) and eastern Europe (<a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/polish-farmers-rally-against-green-deal-ukrainian-food-imports/">Poland</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/romania-farmers-truckers-protests-ukraine-grain-government-fail/">Romania</a>, and <a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2178174/we-don-t-protest-unless-it-s-necessary-farmers-gather-in-vilnius-for-2-day-rally">Lithuania</a>) have been setting up shop outside government quarters and camping tractors and forestry trucks on main roads. Buoyed by the actions of their French peers across the border, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belgian-farmers-block-zeebrugge-port-french-protests-spill-over-reports-2024-01-30/">Belgian farmers</a> had also blocked the roads to Zeebrugge port on 30 January. </p>
<p>The discontent takes place days after the European Commission launched its much-trumpeted <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/895691/european-commission-launches-strategic-dialogue-on-the-future-of-agriculture-in-europe">strategic dialogue on the future of agriculture</a> and just ahead of the European elections.</p>
<p>While these movements are not new, they are becoming <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/environnement/agriculture/colere-des-agriculteurs-la-mobilisation-actuelle-est-la-plus-musclee-de-ces-dernieres-annees-20240124_SB5TNAGGP5EW3PKIDTWA2LPC7E/">increasingly confrontational</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pesticides-les-alternatives-existent-mais-les-acteurs-sont-ils-prets-a-se-remettre-en-cause-146648">Pesticides : les alternatives existent, mais les acteurs sont-ils prêts à se remettre en cause ?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>French farmers know they largely have the public’s support, and it’s relatively easy for them to gain the attention of politicians and the media. However, <a href="https://www.ouest-france.fr/economie/agriculture/colere-des-agriculteurs-anatomie-dune-crise-qui-couve-depuis-longtemps-54e61b72-b9c4-11ee-9ea4-b02fbeb9c343">past examples</a> show that such movements can be quickly forgotten once the heat of the protest past. So did earlier protest movements serve a purpose?</p>
<h2>What the tractor protests say about farming today</h2>
<p>Whatever farmers grow in France and however they do it, they are having to juggle an increasing number of competing demands. How to “feed France” while “caring for the environment” while complying with ever more regulatory standards? How to cope with the immediate impacts of frost, floods and drought, and also face up to new challenges such as an <a href="https://agriculture.gouv.fr/mhe-la-maladie-hemorragique-epizootique">epizootic outbreak</a>?</p>
<p>How to meet society’s expectations for <a href="https://www.agencebio.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Rapport-activite-2022_Agence-BIO.pdf">more organic farming</a>, even as <a href="https://www.lafranceagricole.fr/agriculture-biologique/article/841135/le-marche-des-produits-bio-s-essouffle">inflation rises and consumption declines</a>? Conversions agroecological methods are costly, after all, and often require <a href="https://www.agencebio.org/questions/a-quoi-correspond-la-mention-en-conversion-vers-lagriculture-biologique/">several years</a>. So how to live in the meantime? </p>
<p>Many farmers believe current economic conditions make it impossible to reconcile the demands of <a href="https://agriculture.gouv.fr/actifagri-transformations-des-emplois-et-des-activites-en-agriculture-analyse-ndeg145">sustainability</a> and <a href="https://www.ccomptes.fr/system/files/2023-04/20230412-Politique-installation-nouveaux-agriculteurs.pdf">development</a>, yet be able to pass their <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-pour-2022-3-page-40.htm">farms on to the next generation</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/une-vraie-souverainete-alimentaire-pour-la-france-220560">Une vraie souveraineté alimentaire pour la France</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What protests have achieved in the past</h2>
<p>Juggling these contradictions place a considerable physical, psychological and emotional burden on farmers, culminating in the <a href="https://www.francebleu.fr/emissions/5-minutes-avec/les-agriculteurs-d-occitanie-sont-percutes-par-un-cumul-de-crises-pour-un-sociologue-toulousain-2780313">societal and moral crisis</a> we are experiencing today. A look at the responses to previous protest movements shows that farmers’ anger is generally heard, at least in part.</p>
<p>The “La Bio à poil” movement has helped farmers <a href="https://www.bio-provence.org/IMG/pdf/gains_syndicaux_fnab_2022.pdf">secure a number of wins</a>, including a 1-million euro promotion campaign for the sector and subsidies for pig farming. As part of the reforms of EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, the organic farmers’ union also clinched higher subsidies for its conservation practices. In 2022, they said they were happy with the progress made.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/WgDxqdoffIw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">“La Bio à poil” movement at the Invalides, Paris (2 June 2021).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Actions by the “On marche sur la tête” movement led to the government backing down on <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2023/12/06/taxes-sur-les-pesticides-et-l-irrigation-le-renoncement-du-gouvernement-a-les-augmenter-suscite-les-critiques_6204274_3244.html">tax hike on pesticides</a>, originally intended to spread the burden of depollution costs faced by water providers. Likewise, the <a href="https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/agriculture-peche/agriculture-la-fnsea-obtient-l-abandon-de-la-hausse-de-taxes-sur-les-pesticides-et-l-eau-4081485">head of the country’s mainstream agriculture trade union</a>, the FNSEA, said it was “satisfied” of its win on what they called a “major demand”.</p>
<p>As far as the current upsurge of anger is concerned, measures and compensation will no doubt be announced. But will they be enough to solve the impossible equation facing agriculture in the long term? Not to mention the risk that new measures may increase perceived contradictions and <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-gouvernement-et-action-publique-2017-1-page-33.htm">paperwork</a>. </p>
<h2>The importance of today’s strategies</h2>
<p>Since 2019, we have been following 42 farmers from the Centre–Val de Loire region, to research <a href="https://hal.science/hal-04253918">how they navigate these tensions</a>. </p>
<p>We found that such political movements provide them with an important outlet, allowing them to express the anger they feel. In France, <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-sesame-2019-2-page-60.htm">suicide</a> has hit the <a href="https://statistiques.msa.fr/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Etude-mortalite-par-suicide_ok.pdf">farming world</a> more than the general population. Uniting with others in similar situations allows them to break free from the feeling of <a href="https://iaap-journals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1464-0597.1993.tb00748.x">isolation</a>. They also allow farmers to <a href="https://hal.science/hal-04150078">define for themselves</a> of what a viable agricultural model for all would look like. For politicians and the rest of us, such protests provide us with an opportunity to show our attachment to the farming world as well as a <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-geographie-economie-societe-2013-1-page-67.htm">certain rural ideal</a>. </p>
<h2>Confronting our own contradictions</h2>
<p>If anything is to come out from these protests, politicians and citizens will also need to play their part in facing up to their own contradictions. A <a href="https://www.ifop.com/publication/barometre-dimage-des-agriculteurs-3">November 2023 survey</a> found that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The French are asking for more financial support from the public authorities (56%), but there is still a high proportion in favour (25%) of maintaining aid to farmers as it is.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So what is to be done? It could be a matter of empowering farmers in the face of <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/economie/crise/blocus-des-agriculteurs/colere-des-agriculteurs-la-confederation-paysanne-demande-une-interdiction-du-prix-d-achat-des-produits-agricoles-en-dessous-du-prix-de-revient_6321894.html">supermarkets and retailers</a> pushing for cutthroat prices. It could also be a matter of consumers making an effort to consume locally and at the right price, and accepting a countryside in which farming is a <a href="https://hal.science/hal-03262804">profession</a> and not just <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tmw5qxcTFpM">landscapes</a>. And it might also be a question of providing greater support for R&D to ease the agro-ecological transition.</p>
<p>Next month’s International Agricultural Show in Paris will undoubtedly be a test of strength for the government, farmers and their unions, and a decisive stage alongside the European elections scheduled for June.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222212/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sandrine Benoist ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Why are French farmers blocking the roads? An academic who has been studying discontent within the farming world since 2019 provides some clues.Sandrine Benoist, Enseignante-chercheuse, Université d'Orléans, IAE OrléansLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2201082024-01-29T14:53:46Z2024-01-29T14:53:46ZSilent fields: a cocktail of pesticides is stunting bumblebee colonies across Europe, study shows<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569872/original/file-20240117-17-yrwj53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C436%2C2657%2C1697&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Theresia Krausl</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The European Parliament <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20231117IPR12215/no-majority-in-parliament-for-legislation-to-curb-use-of-pesticides">voted against</a> a proposal to curb the use of agricultural pesticides in November 2023. These chemicals, designed to protect crop yield from pest insects and other organisms, can contaminate the water and air and threaten the people and wildlife that maintain the vitality of our landscapes.</p>
<p>In some respects, Europe and its governing bodies lead the world in setting and achieving sustainability goals. The EU parliament’s failure to restrict pesticide use stands in contrast to this notion, not to mention <a href="https://www.cbd.int/gbf/targets/7/">international pledges</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06773-3">Our research</a> shows that efficient use of pesticides in farming will be essential to maintaining the health of bumblebees in particular – <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.ento.53.103106.093454#_i2">one of the most important</a> pollinators of crops and wildflowers.</p>
<h2>Lab results v the real world</h2>
<p>Decades of laboratory experiments have tested thousands of pesticides to show that they can be individually fatal to bees. Such toxicity tests evaluate the potential harm of these compounds before they are used to inform pesticide regulations.</p>
<p>But do the effects documented in laboratory tests represent what happens when these chemicals are used in the environment? Field-based tests of pesticides are rare and, like laboratory tests, they typically look at single compounds. This is a problem because field-based monitoring has shown that bees are actually exposed to multiple compounds through their foraging across agricultural landscapes. </p>
<p>Many different pesticides, including those highly toxic to bees, have been found in bee bodies, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-96249-z">their food</a> and the structures that make up their nests, like <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0269749118310893">wax</a> and <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-019-47805-1">soil</a>. </p>
<p>Although it may seem logical to assume that chemicals shown to be toxic in the lab will have similar effects in the field, we know that where chemicals end up and persist in the environment varies and that the impact on bees can differ depending on numerous <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fevo.2019.00051/full">social and ecological factors</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A bobbly matrix of wax with bumblebees clambering over it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569869/original/file-20240117-29-r202j2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569869/original/file-20240117-29-r202j2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569869/original/file-20240117-29-r202j2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569869/original/file-20240117-29-r202j2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569869/original/file-20240117-29-r202j2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569869/original/file-20240117-29-r202j2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569869/original/file-20240117-29-r202j2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A well-established colony in the wild may contain several hundred bumblebees.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maj Rundlöf</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Until now, it was unclear how exposure to multiple pesticides across landscapes affected how pollinators grow, survive and reproduce. Our new work shows that this real-world exposure significantly threatens the health of bumblebees.</p>
<h2>Colonies at risk</h2>
<p>We placed over 300 commercially-reared bumblebee colonies at 106 sites on farmland in eight European countries. We collected pollen samples from the colonies and screened them for 267 pesticides. </p>
<p>We found that the pollen that bumblebees collected and stored in their nests was contaminated with multiple pesticides, an average of eight different compounds per colony – the most contaminated colony contained 27 different compounds. We calculated the risk posed by pesticides to each colony by accounting for the amount and toxicity of different pesticides found in their pollen.</p>
<p>We also tracked the performance of bumblebee colonies by weighing them before, during and after they were deployed in agricultural landscapes and by counting all the bees at the end of the experiment.</p>
<p>Colony growth, measured as the change in a colony’s weight over time, was lower in colonies with a <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06773-3/figures/1">higher pesticide risk</a>. Bumblebees also <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06773-3/figures/1">produced fewer offspring</a> in these colonies than in those with a low pesticide risk. These effects were worse in landscapes with lots of cropland, demonstrating the importance of semi-natural habitats and other flower-rich areas for pollinator populations. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A rural path with colourful wildflowers on one side." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569829/original/file-20240117-15-b5my4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569829/original/file-20240117-15-b5my4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569829/original/file-20240117-15-b5my4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569829/original/file-20240117-15-b5my4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569829/original/file-20240117-15-b5my4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569829/original/file-20240117-15-b5my4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569829/original/file-20240117-15-b5my4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Leaving more space for nature in farmland could benefit bees.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/natureinclusive-circular-sustainable-agriculture-wild-flowers-1766178365">INTREEGUE Photography/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To protect pollinators, <a href="https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.2903/sp.efsa.2022.EN-7125">a proposal</a> from the European Food Safety Authority would ensure that bumblebee colonies do not lose more than 10% colony strength, measured as the number of bees in a colony, due to pesticide use. Yet, over the course of our study, 64% of the bumblebee colonies we studied <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06773-3/figures/7">lost more than this</a> compared to colonies in the least risky places. </p>
<p>Despite having among the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-020-00141-4">most stringent</a> pesticide regulatory processes in the world, our study showed that the EU is failing to protect the organisms these chemicals are not supposed to target, like bees.</p>
<h2>Monitor pesticides like drugs</h2>
<p>The proposal struck down in late 2023 may go for a second reading in the European Parliament. But with 299 MEPs having previously voted against it, we are not optimistic about its chances. Instead, we draw hope from <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_281">ongoing efforts</a> to improve environmental risk assessments of farming chemicals and developments at COP28, the most recent UN climate change conference in Dubai. </p>
<p>Pesticide risk assessments can benefit from lessons learned regulating pharmaceuticals. Like pesticides, pharmaceuticals undergo pre-approval testing with phased pre- and clinical trials before they are licensed for use. But once a drug has been licensed, long-term monitoring safeguards against unexpected effects when used at scale. This type of post-approval monitoring under real-world conditions is <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/science.aan2683">urgently needed for pesticides</a>.</p>
<p>This shouldn’t replace pre-approval testing. Our experience has simply shown that pesticides that clear laboratory tests, such as neonicotinoids, are only revealed to be harmful through post-approval field testing <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14420">using bees other than honeybees</a>, which are unusual for their large colony sizes and complex social behaviour. Our approach for monitoring pesticides and their effects on non-target species could be part of future pollinator risk assessments.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A tractor equipped with a tank spraying chemicals on a crop." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569833/original/file-20240117-23-4qfbsc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569833/original/file-20240117-23-4qfbsc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569833/original/file-20240117-23-4qfbsc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569833/original/file-20240117-23-4qfbsc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569833/original/file-20240117-23-4qfbsc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569833/original/file-20240117-23-4qfbsc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569833/original/file-20240117-23-4qfbsc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chemicals licensed for use can have unexpected effects in the environment.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/tractor-sprayer-works-on-field-1168167448">MrGoSlow/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of course, it would be better to change the way pesticides are used in agriculture altogether and lessen the demand on farmers to use them. We are tentatively optimistic about commitments made at COP28, including a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/cop28-us-uae-climate-friendly-farming-effort-grows-17-bln-2023-12-08/">US$17 billion fund</a> to develop methods of farming that are resilient to climate change and less reliant on chemicals.</p>
<p>One of the largest initiatives, with partners including The Nature Conservancy, Google, and the Brazilian state of Para, would encourage regenerative farming practices, such as reduced tillage and lower pesticide use.</p>
<p>This, we hope, is progress.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Imagine weekly climate newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charlie C. Nicholson receives funding from the Swedish research council Formas (grants 2018-02283, 2023-01025). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Knapp receives funding from the Swedish Research Council Formas (grant 2022-00476) and the Strategic Research Area “Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services in a Changing Climate” (BECC), which is funded by the Swedish government. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maj Rundlöf receives funding from Formas, a Swedish Research Council for Sustainable Development, the Swedish Research Council, the Strategic Research Area “Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services in a Changing Climate” (BECC), funded by the Swedish government, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, the Swedish Chemicals Agency, the Swedish Board of Agriculture, the German Environment Agency and the European Union through Horizon Europe. As an external expert, she provides advice to national and European authorities and other stakeholders in relation to pesticide and bees and other pollinators.</span></em></p>Studies have struggled to capture how pesticides affect bees outside of a lab.Charlie C. Nicholson, Researcher in Biology, Lund UniversityJessica Knapp, Lecturer in Ecology, Trinity College DublinMaj Rundlöf, Researcher in Ecology, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216962024-01-29T13:08:07Z2024-01-29T13:08:07ZNiger and Russia are forming military ties: 3 ways this could upset old allies<p>In July 2023, Niger’s military took over in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">a coup</a> just two years after the country’s first transition to civilian power. The coup has brought into sharp focus the role of foreign countries in Niger’s politics.</p>
<p>Before the coup, France and the US were the <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/coup-niger">main security allies</a> of Niger. But the coup leaders, led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, were open about their antagonism to France, the country’s former colonial ruler, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/12/25/niger-suspends-cooperation-with-international-francophone-body">ordered the French military to leave</a>.</p>
<p>Now the attention of many people in Niger has shifted to Russia.</p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">coup</a>, several analysts have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/niger-russia-sahel/a-66494597">highlighted</a> the role of Russia. Some analysts and regional experts believe Russia might have played a role <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4135841-the-niger-coup-exposes-russias-grand-strategy-for-africa/">directly or indirectly</a> in the military takeover. </p>
<p>Others (including myself) <a href="https://theconversation.com/scramble-for-the-sahel-why-france-russia-china-and-the-united-states-are-interested-in-the-region-219130">argue</a> that Russia is increasing its grip on the country and actively seeking to benefit from the coup. This was evident when Russia and Niger recently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">agreed</a> to develop military ties. </p>
<p>Although the details of this partnership are still sketchy, Russia promised to increase the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">“combat readiness”</a> of Niger’s military. In addition, there are discussions to partner in the areas of agriculture and energy. </p>
<p>I have been <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">researching</a> the security dynamics of the region for over a decade. The Niger junta’s romance with Russia has potential implications for peace and security in the region and beyond. </p>
<p>I have identified three main potential implications for Niger and other allied countries:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>escalation of tensions between Niger and France</p></li>
<li><p>discontent between Niger and its regional allies</p></li>
<li><p>likely disruption of a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/648851468123254494/pdf/957770PID0P1500Box391429B00PUBLIC0.pdf#page=3">US$13 billion</a> gas pipeline project from Nigeria to the European Union through Niger.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Russia in the region</h2>
<p>After the 2023 coup, France and the regional economic bloc Ecowas <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">threatened</a> to use force to reinstate the deposed president. </p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against such a move. </p>
<p>The military junta then expelled French soldiers. France responded by closing its embassy in Niger. </p>
<p>The US also reduced its military and economic cooperation. Washington cut aid to the country by more than <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231010-france-turns-a-page-as-troops-begin-leaving-coup-hit-niger">US$500 million</a> and removed the country from its <a href="https://credendo.com/en/knowledge-hub/usas-removal-uganda-niger-gabon-and-central-african-republic-agoa-has-only-limited">duty free export</a> programme. </p>
<p>The European Union also <a href="https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/eu-adopts-new-niger-sanctions-framework/">instituted sanctions</a>. Niger then cancelled its security and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231127-niger-junta-revokes-anti-migration-law-in-setback-to-eu-strategy">migration agreements</a> with the European bloc.</p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/west-african-bloc-maintains-sanctions-against-niger/3079035">sanctioned</a> Niger. Another major ally, Nigeria, <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/08/03/coup-nigeria-cuts-off-power-supply-to-niger-republic/">cut electricity</a> and instituted further sanctions. </p>
<p>The sanctions, coupled with an increase in insecurity, weakened and isolated Niger. </p>
<p>Rather than budge, the junta looked for alternative partners – like Russia and China. It also recently joined Mali and Burkina Faso to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">announce a withdrawal</a> from Ecowas. </p>
<p>For its part, Russia was positioning itself as a reliable ally. In December 2023, a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/04/russian-officials-visit-niger-to-strengthen-military-ties/">Russian delegation visited Niger</a> and in January 2024, Niger’s Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">visited Moscow</a> to discuss military and economic ties. </p>
<p>Russia is no stranger to the region. Over the last three years it has set up <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">security arrangements</a> with the juntas running Niger’s neighbours: Mali and Burkina Faso. This has been done through the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, a private security company supported by Russia, whose operations in Africa were renamed <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/12/17/africa-corps-russia-s-sahel-presence-rebranded_6352317_124.html">Africa Corps</a> in early 2024. </p>
<p>Russian military advisers have been operating in Mali since 2021. In addition, the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">Wagner group has 400 mercenaries</a> in the country. Russia also <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/08/10/mali-gets-more-military-equipment-from-russia/">delivered military hardware</a> to the country in 2022. </p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>There are three main potential implications for Niger and other allied countries. </p>
<p>First, a potential escalation of tensions between Niger and France. This will happen if Niger grants Russia uranium exploration rights that affect French companies with existing licences. Niger <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-24/top-uranium-producer-niger-launches-mining-sector-overhaul?leadSource=uverify%20wall&embedded-checkout=true">has suspended new mining licences</a> and is currently auditing existing ones. This could affect French companies. France has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-warn-attack-embassy-niger/">vowed</a> to protect its economic interests in Niger. </p>
<p>It depends on how the partnership between Russia and Niger develops, in particular how Niger intends to pay for its share of any military cooperation. If this involves the Wagner group, as is the case in security partnerships between Russia and Burkina Faso and Mali, the issue of <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/the-wagner-groups-playbook-in-africa-mali/">mining concessions</a> will come into play. Mali and Burkina Faso have paid for Wagner’s involvement by <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/03/a-heavy-price-to-pay-2/">offering</a> mining concessions in return for arms, ammunition and mercenaries. </p>
<p>Second, any security tie involving the Wagner group would create further discontent between Niger and its regional allies, especially Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. </p>
<p>Following the coup, Niger announced it was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67605967">leaving</a> the G5 Sahel, which was set up to coordinate security operations in the Sahel. This has turned attention to the country’s participation in the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a>. </p>
<p>Both institutions were set up to fight insurgency in the region and Niger has been an active contributor. The other countries in the joint task force, such as Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republic, will be wary of working with Niger if it is in active partnership with Wagner, which is <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/massacres-executions-and-falsified-graves-wagner-groups-mounting-humanitarian-cost-mali">notorious</a> for human rights abuses.</p>
<p>The third likely major fallout from Russia’s involvement revolves around Niger’s relationship with the EU. The EU is currently constructing a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/648851468123254494/pdf/957770PID0P1500Box391429B00PUBLIC0.pdf#page=3">US$13 billion</a> gas pipeline from Nigeria to the bloc through Niger. The pipeline project was designed to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian gas.</p>
<p>Based on Russia’s animosity with the EU, I believe Russia could use the security alliance to disrupt the project in order to secure its gas delivery to the EU. </p>
<p>The junta can use the pipeline project as leverage against the EU by demanding major financial concessions, putting the delivery of the project at risk and strengthening Russia’s position. </p>
<p>Migration is another area of contention when it comes to the EU. Niger now <a href="https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/01/24/nigers-gateway-to-the-desert-open-again-for-migrants-1">allows</a> mass illegal migration through its territory for onward journey to Europe. This will create more problems for the EU. </p>
<p>The active presence of Russia in Niger could change the security and economic landscape of the region and affect all parties. </p>
<p>I maintain my <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-ecowas-must-do-these-3-things-to-break-the-stalemate-212403">initial position</a> that rather than use force, the Niger junta should be encouraged to restore democracy as soon as possible. At the same time, some of the sanctions should be lifted to encourage dialogue and reduce the influence of Russia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger’s recent military romance with Russia could escalate tensions with France, regional allies and the European Union.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2175172024-01-25T13:18:18Z2024-01-25T13:18:18ZA Western-imposed peace deal in Ukraine risks feeding Russia’s hunger for land – as it did with Serbia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562953/original/file-20231201-26-35fbaf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C5%2C3808%2C2529&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman with flowers walks past a building fortified with sandbags in the Podil neighborhood of Kyiv, Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIX%20Russia%20Ukraine%20War%20Daily%20Life/36cd7048eb8347298d1f560a490b4bd7?Query=ukraine%20daily%20life&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=988&currentItemNo=125">AP Photo/Jae C. Hong</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The conflict in Ukraine will soon be heading into its third year with no sign of a ceasefire. Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that many in the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-european-officials-broach-topic-peace-negotiations-ukraine-sources-rcna123628">West are growing impatient</a> <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-endgame-analysis-1.6911021">with the emerged stalemate</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/18/world/europe/europe-military-aid-ukraine.html">reluctant to provide</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/18/world/europe/europe-military-aid-ukraine.html">continued military support</a> to Ukraine.</p>
<p>However, wars do come to an end, often with one side making <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/how-end-russias-war-ukraine/fallacy-1-settle-now-all-wars-end-negotiating-table">concessions in exchange for peace</a>. And over the course of the Ukraine war, influential voices in the West – be it those of the late <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/24/henry-kissinger-ukraine-russia-territory-davos/">Henry Kissinger</a>, former President <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/03/trump-blurts-out-peace-plan-hand-russia-chunks-of-ukraine.html">Donald Trump</a> or high-ranking NATO official <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ukraine-membership-cede-territory-russia/">Stian Jenssen</a>, to name a few – have raised the prospect of Ukraine having to cede land to Russia in exchange for peace.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://baker.utk.edu/overview/faculty-and-staff/">expert on Western military interventions</a> in transnational ethnic conflicts, I have seen how well-intentioned peace agreements offered to the perceived aggressor can inadvertently plant the seeds for renewed conflict. This is because such agreements can deliver in peace what the aggressor pursues in war: territory. </p>
<p>Rather than resolve the root cause of conflicts, this can reward <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/revanchist-seeking-revengeand-not-just-with-territory-11642775416">revanchism</a> – that is, a state’s policy to reclaim territory it once dominated – and embolden an aggressor to use war to achieve its aim. This is especially true when the West rewards aggression with generous peace agreements. </p>
<p>Take the former Yugoslavia. </p>
<p>It has been more than 20 years since the end of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/excerpt-world-and-yugoslavias-wars">the Yugoslav wars</a>, a series of conflicts that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. During these wars, Serbia sought to unify large swaths of territories populated by Serbs and non-Serbs into a “Greater Serbia.”</p>
<p>The wars ended with <a href="https://study.com/academy/lesson/the-ten-day-war-slovenian-independence.html">military victories for Slovenia</a> <a href="https://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/Croatia.pdf">and Croatia</a> over Serbia, and <a href="https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/infopres/e-bpfy.htm">NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo</a>. In the cases of the latter countries, NATO intervention was followed by numerous Western-imposed peace plans.</p>
<p>But two decades on, the region <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/3/are-kosovo-and-serbia-on-the-brink-of-war">borders on renewed conflict</a> as Serbia insists that its survival is dependent on it ability to solely <a href="https://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki_sadrzaj/dokumenta/strategije/2021/Prilog2-StrategijaNacionalneBezbednostiRS-ENG.pdf">represent and protect</a> all Serbs, wherever they live.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men and women hold candles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Candles for three killed Serbs in the northern Serb-dominated part of the ethnically divided town of Mitrovica, Kosovo, Sept. 26, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/KosovoSerbiaShootout/99c7b994087c4ba7ac7543d03e180b4b/photo?Query=armed%20attack%20serbia&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=33&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Bojan Slavkovic</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of course, each war is different, and the circumstances surrounding the invasion of Ukraine are unique.</p>
<p>But I believe the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo show that Western-sponsored treaties, when they sacrifice land for peace, can store up trouble for later – especially when it comes to revanchist nations.</p>
<h2>Russia and Serbia revanchism</h2>
<p>Russian and Serbian revanchism has been evident ever since the countries they once dominated – the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, respectively – broke up in the early 1990s.</p>
<p>In 1992, Russia <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/08/02/transdniestria-moldova-and-russia-s-war-in-ukraine-pub-87609">seized Transnistria</a>, the Moscow-backed breakaway part of Moldova that borders southwestern Ukraine, under the pretext of securing peace. The same year, Russia <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Georgia2.htm">intervened in Abkhazia and South Ossetia</a>, autonomous regions within Georgia populated by pro-Russia but non-Georgian peoples, to “end the ethnic fighting.” In 2008, Russia expanded further into Georgia. The same scenario recurred in 2014 when Russia sent forces to Crimea and the Donbas to “protect” ethnic Russians from “<a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know">Nazi</a>” hordes.</p>
<p>Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia has similarly sought to reclaim its dominance of that region. It has done this under various pretexts. Serbia’s decadelong wars began in 1991 and included fighting in Slovenia purportedly to “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/06/28/yugoslav-army-attacks-slovenia-meets-resistance-at-border-posts/bdf68be0-2013-4ba5-98b6-9c22c5699d81/">keep Yugoslavia together</a>”; in Croatia, it was to protect ethnic Serbs from the “<a href="https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/23666/Serbsxasxvictimsx-xgenocidexinxthexrhetoricxofxSlobodanxMilosevic.pdf?sequence=1">fascist</a>” regime; in Bosnia, Serbia claimed to be preventing the founding of an “<a href="https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1751&context=ree">Islamic state</a>”; and in Kosovo, the stated aim was to fight “<a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/fear-and-loathing-belgrade-what-serbian-state-media-say-about-kosovars">terrorists</a>.”</p>
<p>Yet, a quarter of a century on – and despite hopes that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/06/yugoslavia-milosevic-revolution-2000">the fall of former Serbian and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic</a> in 2000 might usher in a more peaceful era – political elites in Serbia continue to pursue the unification of all Serb-populated lands, or at minimum gain the West’s acceptance of a “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/serbia-balkans-expansionism-russia-montenegro-elections/">Serb world</a>” – that is, a sphere of Serbian influence in Bosnia, Kosovo and Montenegro where Serbia dominates.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in uniform gestures." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Kosovo police officer guards a road near the village of Banjska in northern Kosovo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/KosovoSerbiaTension/c26eccb374754e3db37a3bc2e6a15ce4/photo?Query=serbia%20war&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=6098&currentItemNo=46">AP Photo/Bojan Slavkovic</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Walking the Balkan path</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/bosnia-herzegovina-dayton-accords/">various peace treaties</a> meant to stabilize and bring lasting peace to Bosnia and Kosovo have, to various degrees, failed, due in no small part, I would argue, to the very terms of settlement.</p>
<p>In Bosnia, the U.S.-brokered <a href="https://www.osce.org/bih/126173">Dayton Accords of 1995</a> brought the Bosnian War to an end. But it also reorganized the state into two subnational units: the majority-ethnic Serbian Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p>
<p>The accords awarded 49% of the recently independent Bosnia’s territory to the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-republika-srpska/a-64373205">Republic of Srpska</a> despite Serbs constituting 31% of the general population and having <a href="https://hmh.org/library/research/genocide-in-bosnia-guide/">committed genocide and ethnic cleansing</a> in pursuit of crafting a Serb state within Bosnia.</p>
<p>Now, the Republic of Srpska seeks to secede and contravene the Dayton Accords through the establishment of <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/bosnia-and-herzegovina-report-2022_en">parallel institutions</a> and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2022-05-11/top-global-official-bosnian-serbs-are-trying-to-secede">the withdrawal of its members</a> from Western-brokered institutions.</p>
<p>In Kosovo, with each European Union-sponsored peace agreement to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo, security threats from Serbia escalate, as evidenced by a recent <a href="https://www.state.gov/condemnation-of-violent-attacks-on-kosovo-police/">armed attack</a> led by Milan Radoičiċ, an associate of Serbia’s president. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, what critics see as Western <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/sep/29/the-flare-up-of-violence-in-kosovo-shows-the-folly-of-the-wests-appeasement-of-serbia">appeasement of Serbia’s revanchism</a> has led to further concessions in regard to Kosovo. In contrast to Bosnia, the Kosovo model involves incremental appeasement through various peace agreements – the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kosovo%20S2007%20168.pdf">Ahtisaari Plan</a>, <a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/2022">Brussels 1</a> and <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">2 Agreement</a>, <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-implementation-annex-agreement-path-normalisation-relations-between_en">Ohrid Agreement</a>, and the <a href="https://usercontent.one/wp/www.burimramadani.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/www.burimramadani.com_EU-Draft_Statue_October-2023.pdf">Draft-Statute proposal</a>. These plans offer political concessions to Serbia in exchange for the recognition of Kosovo’s independence.</p>
<h2>The same fate for Ukraine?</h2>
<p>To suggest that a similar fate to Bosnia or Kosovo <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/11/27/why-ukraine-should-not-accept-a-dayton-accords-style-peace">may await Ukraine</a> is not beyond the realms of reality.</p>
<p>Any such solution could be an off-ramp to war, but it would hand Vladimir Putin what he wants: control over Russian-speaking people and key strategic territory in Ukraine.</p>
<p>If the West follows either the Bosnia or Kosovo model for peace for Ukraine, the result would likely be the same: First, it would result in the reorganization of Ukraine into two political-administrative units, one under control of a pro-Western government in Kyiv, the other under the influence or direct control of Moscow. Second, it would see the promotion of complex political arrangements, such as ethnic veto powers, dual sovereignty and international representation, that yield institutional dysfunction and political instability. And third, there would be no robust security deployments or guarantees from the U.S. or NATO to deter future Russian aggression.</p>
<h2>From Kosovo to Kyiv</h2>
<p>The current <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts">Western support</a> for Ukraine’s defense will likely lead to its heavy involvement in any peace negotiations. </p>
<p>But ultimately, the implications of a Western-imposed peace in Ukraine may, if the past is any indicator, do little to appease Russian revanchism and may, in fact, encourage Russian elites to pursue a similar policy in Estonia and Latvia – states where Russians make up a quarter of the population. </p>
<p>The West may hope that a plan based on land for peace helps Ukraine by stopping the bloodshed, while at the same time appeases Russia and solves a geopolitical problem for the EU and the U.S. </p>
<p>But if the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo are anything to go by, it could on the contrary only whet Russia’s appetite for more territorial claims, and leave Ukraine feeling betrayed.</p>
<p><em>Drita Perezic, a security sector expert with the <a href="https://balkansgroup.org/en/about-us-2/">Balkans Policy Research Group</a>, contributed to this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elis Vllasi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fragility of peace settlements in the Balkans provides a cautionary tale. US and EU policymakers may inadvertently make matters worse by acceding to the aggressor’s territorial ambitions.Elis Vllasi, Senior Research Associate & Lecturer in National Security & Foreign Affairs, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215012024-01-23T18:59:47Z2024-01-23T18:59:47ZWhy are Apple, Amazon, Google and Meta facing antitrust lawsuits and huge fines? And will it protect consumers?<p>Following a lengthy investigation, the United States Justice Department is set to file a lawsuit against Apple for <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-17/justice-department-to-file-apple-antitrust-case-as-soon-as-march">potentially breaching antitrust laws</a>.</p>
<p>The department alleges Apple is using hardware and software limitations that make it harder for rival companies to compete with iPhones and iPads. </p>
<p>If the filing goes ahead, it will mean each of the “big four” tech companies – Amazon, Meta, Google and Apple – will have been sued by the US federal government within the past five years for monopolistic business practices. </p>
<p>As the digital market continues to grow, many countries including the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, the US, China, South Korea, India and Australia have all either introduced, or plan to introduce, competition legislation <a href="https://iccwbo.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2023/09/2023-ICC-Global-report-on-competition-enforcement-in-the-digital-economy-1.pdf">specific to tech firms</a>. </p>
<p>But what are antitrust laws? And how are the tech giants breaching them?</p>
<h2>What are antitrust laws?</h2>
<p>Antitrust laws originated with the US <a href="https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3112&context=dlj">Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890</a>. This law banned business arrangements which restrained trade, and <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/catoj9&id=743&men_tab=srchresults">prohibited attempts to monopolise</a>.</p>
<p>Over time, the Sherman Antitrust Act evolved into what are today’s antitrust laws, adopted in countries all over the world. </p>
<p>Antitrust laws are <a href="https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2977&context=faculty_scholarship">enforced at domestic levels</a> and allegations of breaches of these laws pertain to domestic markets. These laws – also known as competition laws – prohibit business practices that promote unfair monopolies, stifle competition and reinforce dominance or power. </p>
<p>In recent years, technology products – whether apps or physical products like phones and computers – have been under an enormous amount of scrutiny. Calls for regulating the development and use of technology have a <a href="https://www.themandarin.com.au/222945-ai-regulation-its-time-to-act-australia/">dominant focus on artificial intelligence</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the business practices of tech giants are garnering less public attention. So it’s noteworthy that the antitrust lawsuits filed against the big four focus on the companies, not just their products. </p>
<p>The allegation is these companies are concentrating the market and therefore charging higher markups for their goods and services, while having less incentive to innovate <a href="https://www.publicaccountant.com.au/features/a-lack-of-competition-is-hurting-consumers-and-the-economy-2">in ways that benefit consumers</a>.</p>
<h2>How are tech giants breaching antitrust laws?</h2>
<p>Of the big four, Apple is not the first to be accused of breaching antitrust laws.</p>
<p>In the past decade, the European Union has fined Google <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/google-last-ditch-effort-overturn-26-bln-eu-antitrust-fine-2023-09-19/">a total of €8.25 billion</a> (A$13.6 billion) for three separate breaches of EU’s antitrust laws.</p>
<p>These related to misuse of Google Shopping to disadvantage competitors <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/MEMO_17_1785">in 2017</a>, unfair dominance of the Android operating system market <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4581">in 2018</a>, and abusive practices in online advertising <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1770">in 2019</a>. The advertising business accounts for <a href="https://theconversation.com/ais-threat-to-google-is-more-about-advertising-income-than-being-the-number-one-search-engine-200094">80% of Google’s income</a>.</p>
<p>While Google and its parent company Alphabet did enact some changes to their practices following these EU rulings, to date Google <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/google-pay-multibillion-fine-antitrust-shopping-case-eu-106286458">has not paid</a> these fines and continues <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/google-last-ditch-effort-overturn-26-bln-eu-antitrust-fine-2023-09-19/">to appeal them</a> in <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/14/eu-court-backs-antitrust-ruling-against-google-but-reduces-fine.html">various instances</a>.</p>
<p>In 2020, the US Justice Department also filed an antitrust lawsuit against Google for monopolising multiple <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-google-monopolizing-digital-advertising-technologies">digital advertising technology products</a>.</p>
<p>The ongoing lawsuit claims Google monopolised the “ad tech stack” – the key technologies publishers and advertisers use to sell and buy ads. It is alleged Google neutralised or eliminated ad tech competitors through acquisitions, which forced publishers and advertisers to use its products. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-is-taking-on-google-in-a-huge-antitrust-case-it-could-change-the-face-of-online-search-148519">The US is taking on Google in a huge antitrust case. It could change the face of online search</a>
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<hr>
<p>In 2021, the US Federal Trade Commission and more than 40 US states sued Meta, claiming the tech company eliminated competition by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/technology/facebook-antitrust-monopoly.html">buying up its rivals</a>. </p>
<p>The two biggest purchases under scrutiny are Instagram, which was purchased for US$1 billion in 2013, and WhatsApp, which was purchased for US$19 billion in 2015. The lawsuit alleges these purchases eliminated competition which had the potential to challenge Meta’s dominance. </p>
<p>In 2023, the US Federal Trade Commission and 17 state attorneys general sued Amazon, claiming the tech company used anticompetitive and unfair strategies to maintain a <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/09/ftc-sues-amazon-illegally-maintaining-monopoly-power">position of dominance in the market</a>.</p>
<p>The US lawsuits against <a href="https://www.vox.com/technology/2023/9/11/23864514/google-search-antitrust-trial">Google</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/oct/24/instagram-lawsuit-meta-sued-teen-mental-health-us">Meta</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/09/26/amazon-antitrust-lawsuit-ftc/">Amazon</a> are ongoing, with no decisions handed down as yet. </p>
<h2>What is Australia doing to protect consumers?</h2>
<p>The Australian federal government has also been investigating global tech giants. Since 2021, the government has investigated legislative methods <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/oct/30/what-is-the-australian-government-doing-to-crack-down-on-big-tech-and-why">for protecting Australian consumers</a>.</p>
<p>One example is the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) news media bargaining code. The code requires digital platforms operating in Australia to <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/by-industry/digital-platforms-and-services/news-media-bargaining-code/news-media-bargaining-code">compensate domestic news publishers</a> for the use of their content. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-2021-was-the-year-governments-really-started-to-wise-up-against-big-tech-172871">How 2021 was the year governments really started to wise up against big tech</a>
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<p>Despite these advancements, Chandni Gupta, Deputy CEO and Digital Policy Director at the Consumer Policy Research Centre, <a href="https://lsj.com.au/articles/what-the-us-federal-trade-commission-v-amazon-case-means-for-australia/">points out</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There are gaps in both Australia’s privacy laws and the consumer law, which can leave Australians with far fewer protections online than consumers in the US and other countries.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The ACCC released its second Digital Platform Services Inquiry <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/publications/serial-publications/digital-platform-services-inquiry-2020-2025/digital-platform-services-inquiry-march-2021-interim-report">interim report in 2021</a>. The report’s findings indicate Google’s Play Store and Apple’s App Store have significant market power in the distribution of mobile apps in Australia, and measures are <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/dominance-of-apple-and-googles-app-stores-impacting-competition-and-consumers">needed to address this</a>. Examples of measures the ACCC proposed include increasing transparency and providing greater choice of default apps for consumers.</p>
<p>In 2023, ACCC chair Gina Cass-Gottlieb publicly addressed <a href="https://thewest.com.au/technology/gina-cass-gottlieb-goes-after-apple-microsoft-amazon-google-and-meta-in-call-for-competition-law-fix-c-12231673">the dangers of the big four</a>. The commissioner referred to the tech giants as “serial acquirers” and raised concerns about their measures for extending and protecting their market power. </p>
<p>Antitrust laws exist to maintain fair competition among businesses. Breaches of these laws mean companies are influencing the market to the detriment of other, usually smaller companies.</p>
<p>If governments are successful in holding tech giants to account, this could drastically redefine the tech market, making way for more equitable competition and more ethical business practices.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221501/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zena Assaad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Governments around the world keep filing antitrust lawsuits against the ‘big four’ tech companies. Here’s why that matters for everyone who uses their products.Zena Assaad, Senior Lecturer, School of Engineering, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214642024-01-19T16:54:17Z2024-01-19T16:54:17ZGermany’s economy must be fixed – here are three top priorities<p>The <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/792a1a09-701c-4c9d-aa77-0d9575d5bda9">latest figures</a> on German gross domestic product (GDP) are far from reassuring. Output was 0.3% lower in 2023 than the year before, turning Germany into the worst-performing large economy in the world.</p>
<p>By comparison, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)‘s <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD">latest calculations</a> show the US economy growing 2.1% in 2023 and China 5%. The European Union as a whole achieved 0.7%, dragged down by Germany, its largest contributor. </p>
<p>Germany has been hit hard by the rise in energy costs, especially having relied almost entirely on cheap Russian energy until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Sizeable inflationary pressures have put pressure on German companies’ production processes, which are optimised for efficiency.</p>
<p>Rising interest rates have made it harder for German companies to secure financing, as well as increasing their operating costs and weakening domestic and foreign demand. </p>
<p>And China has slowed down and also started to invest in self-sufficiency, reducing its dependence on foreign technology and the import of foreign products and services. This is clearly a problem for German companies that have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/06/world/europe/germany-china-business-economy.html">relied massively</a> on the Chinese market over the past two decades.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.unido.org/news/germany-worlds-leading-manufacturer-according-unidos-cip-index">According to</a> the UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) Index, Germany remains the world’s leading manufacturer, having maintained the top rank since 2001. Yet China has entirely filled the gap over the past years, as illustrated below. </p>
<p><strong>German vs Chinese manufacturing</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570323/original/file-20240119-25-vrg2ix.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Chart comparing German and Chinese manufacturing" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570323/original/file-20240119-25-vrg2ix.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570323/original/file-20240119-25-vrg2ix.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570323/original/file-20240119-25-vrg2ix.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570323/original/file-20240119-25-vrg2ix.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570323/original/file-20240119-25-vrg2ix.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570323/original/file-20240119-25-vrg2ix.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570323/original/file-20240119-25-vrg2ix.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The UNIDO index measures countries’ capacity to produce/export manufactured goods, technological progress and global influence on manufacturing.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The results of the <a href="https://www.imd.org/centers/wcc/world-competitiveness-center/rankings/world-competitiveness-ranking/">IMD World Competitiveness Ranking</a> confirm that Germany has been losing ground among top economies. Ranked 15th overall in 2022, it dropped seven positions in 2023, deteriorating across all the dimensions considered in the ranking: economic performance, business efficiency, government efficiency and infrastructure.</p>
<p>So what can be done for Germany, at a time of huge geopolitical friction and with many countries <a href="https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/news/industrial-policies-are-mostly-motivated-by-protectionism-not-geopolitics-83358">adopting industrial policies</a> to distort and limit trade to protect local industries? Three strategic priorities stand out:</p>
<h2>1. Diversify, diversify, diversify</h2>
<p>Germany must fix its over-reliance on China as its biggest trading partner. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/china-remains-germanys-main-trading-partner-seventh-year-2023-02-08/">China has been</a> Germany’s most important trading partner since 2015, and trade between the two countries rose to a record level in 2022. </p>
<p>Berlin has recognised its excessive dependence on China for some time, but manufacturing footprints take time to change, and it can’t be done without a fallout in terms of economic performance.</p>
<p>Take Volkswagen. <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/17/volkswagen-nissan-and-hyundai-on-track-for-worst-china-sales-in-years.html">It remains</a> a major player in China with around 3 million vehicles sold a year, but it was selling over 4 million units as recently as 2018. This is because China’s swift transition to electric cars has benefited local players like BYD. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1386906c-5dd1-4167-bc96-72940fc473bf">market share</a> of foreign cars in China has fallen from 64% in 2020 to 44% in 2023. The challenge for German companies like Volkswagen is to transform this into an opportunity for greater diversification.</p>
<p>Diversifying while maintaining existing trade and investments in China will be difficult, however, as we should expect the Asian country to charge a higher price to foreign companies for the access to its domestic market. Yet at such a time of geopolitical uncertainty, diversification must be the first strategic priority. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/news/cost-of-decoupling-from-china-for-german-economy-severe-but-not-devastating/">recent study</a> from the German-based Kiel Institute for the World Economy suggests that if there was an abrupt halt to trade with China, it would cause Germany’s economy to shrink by 5% – a slump comparable to the global financial crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<h2>2. Borrow to invest</h2>
<p>In 2009, Germany added a “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debt_brake_(Germany)">debt brake</a>” to its constitution. <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-germanys-debt-brake/a-67587332">The rule</a>, which severely restricts Germany’s ability to borrow and run deficits, was seen as incentivising sensible spending and ensuring that the public finances would remain healthy.</p>
<p>This became the mantra used by Angela Merkel and the so-called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troika_(European_group)">Troika</a> of the European Commission, European Central Bank and IMF in the years following the global financial crisis as Greece and other countries struggled with their debts. </p>
<p>The landscape has now fundamentally changed, however. Germany’s constitutional court <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-court-make-key-ruling-budget-manoeuvre-2023-11-15/#:%7E:text=BERLIN%2C%20Nov%2015%20(Reuters),billion)%20hole%20in%20its%20finances.">recently blocked</a> the transfer of €60 billion (£51 billion) from a pandemic budget to a climate fund precisely because of the “debt brake” clause. This has led to a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/60674329-5be3-4802-a05a-851ee2990efd">budget crisis</a> that is yet to be resolved. </p>
<p>More generally the debt brake has become a major challenge because Germany, and the EU as a whole, are competing against other countries that are subsidising their companies. For instance, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4752">Brussels recently launched</a> an investigation on the likely presence of major market distortions resulting from Chinese state subsidies in the automotive sector. </p>
<p>The only way forward for Germany is to invest heavily in infrastructure, research & development (R&D), and more efficient state operations to help companies transform themselves and stay competitive globally. To finance this, greater reliance on debt is unavoidable. </p>
<h2>3. Attract investments from abroad, bet on Europe to innovate</h2>
<p>Recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/foreign-direct-investment-germany-dives-35-bln-euros-h1-2023-09-12/">Bundesbank figures</a> show that foreign direct investment in Germany decreased to €3.5 billion in the first half of 2023 from €34.1 billion in the same period in 2022. This is a dramatic fall and the lowest inflow figure in almost 20 years. It calls for careful reflection on Germany’s loss of competitiveness and its ability to attract foreign investment.</p>
<p>The only way to fix this downtrend is to bet on innovation driven by EU-led R&D investments. Innovation has long been the engine of German (and EU) economic performance. Germany is <a href="https://sciencebusiness.net/news-byte/horizon-europe/eu-rd-intensity-falls-2022-despite-increased-spending">one of the</a> highest spenders on R&D in the bloc, at slightly over 3% of GDP per year. </p>
<p>Yet this is in the same ballpark as a decade ago, while the US and Japan now invest close to 3.5% of GDP. Stepping up R&D and keeping pace with the latest technological developments is a must for Germany (and the EU).</p>
<p>In a world where countries from China to the US are increasingly subsidising their corporations, and enacting policies to protect their local economies, Germany must make long-term investments in infrastructure, government efficiency and stimulating corporate ecosystems. This will attract greater investment from abroad, which will be crucial for Germany and its EU counterparts to innovate and thus stay competitive in the global arena.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221464/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niccolò Pisani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The EU’s biggest economy is on its uppers. Turning it around may involve additional pain in the short term.Niccolò Pisani, Professor of Strategy and International Business, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207412024-01-19T13:41:25Z2024-01-19T13:41:25ZThe US is struggling to handle an immigration surge – here’s how Europe is dealing with its own influx<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570216/original/file-20240118-29-pkmecl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Workers from the Spanish nonprofit Open Waters rescue 178 migrants from different countries, off the coast of Italy in September 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/migrants-of-different-14-nationalities-are-rescued-by-the-news-photo/1698787922?adppopup=true">Jose Colon/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As record-high numbers of <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/1924-law-slammed-door-immigrants-and-politicians-who-pushed-it-back-open-180974910/">undocumented migrants</a> cross the United States-Mexico border illegally, one key question is how the U.S. got into this situation, and what lessons can be learned from how other countries respond to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/04/us/border-eagle-pass-ambulance-workers.html?action=click&pgtype=Article&state=default&module=styln-us-immigration&variant=show&region=MAIN_CONTENT_1&block=storyline_top_links_recirc">border security</a> and immigration problems. </p>
<p>Having worked <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/faculty/tara-sonenshine">both inside the U.S. government</a> and in the private sector, I have observed the growing importance of welcoming foreign citizens to one’s country for <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/immigrants-contribute-greatly-to-us-economy-despite-administrations-public-charge-rule">improving economic growth</a>, scientific advancement, labor supply and cultural awareness. </p>
<p>But migrants entering and staying in the U.S. without visas or proper documentation can create problems – for the <a href="https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/press-release/immigrants-overwhelmingly-say-they-and-their-children-are-better-off-in-the-us-but-many-also-report-substantial-discrimination-and-challenges-a-new-kff-los-angeles-times-survey-reveals/">migrants themselves</a>, and for overtaxed governments that lack the ability to quickly process asylum cases in <a href="https://www.gao.gov/blog/u.s.-immigration-courts-see-significant-and-growing-backlog#:%7E:text=This%20backlog%20has%20more%20than,immigration%20judges%20and%20court%20staff.">immigration courts</a>, for example, or to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/17/nyregion/migrants-shelter-snow-nyc.html">provide temporary shelter</a> and other basic services for large numbers of arriving migrants. These strains are happening now in many places in the U.S.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570214/original/file-20240118-27-na6vez.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and white photo shows a large crowd of people, mostly men wearing hats, crowded on the second story of a small boat, which is coked." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570214/original/file-20240118-27-na6vez.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570214/original/file-20240118-27-na6vez.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570214/original/file-20240118-27-na6vez.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570214/original/file-20240118-27-na6vez.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570214/original/file-20240118-27-na6vez.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570214/original/file-20240118-27-na6vez.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570214/original/file-20240118-27-na6vez.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Immigrants arrive at Ellis Island in 1923, one year before Congress reformed immigration laws in the U.S., making it harder to enter the country.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/immigrants-arriving-at-ellis-island-aboard-the-machigonne-news-photo/171811445?adppopup=true">Underwood & Underwood/Underwood Archives/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>U.S. immigration trends</h2>
<p>In 1924, after decades of the U.S. welcoming foreign-born citizens to its shores, Congress passed the Immigration Act, <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act#:%7E:text=The%20Immigration%20Act%20of%201924%20limited%20the%20number%20of%20immigrants,of%20the%201890%20national%20census">restricting the numbers</a> and types of people who could legally enter and stay in the U.S. </p>
<p>That legislation ushered in even more xenophobia and division in the U.S. over the ethnic origins of immigrants – cutting <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/1924-law-slammed-door-immigrants-and-politicians-who-pushed-it-back-open-180974910">off large-scale immigration</a>, especially from <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act">Europe and Asia</a>, until jobs needed to be filled – and there weren’t enough people in the U.S. to fill them. </p>
<p>In the 1960s, immigration laws were reformed again, ushering in waves of immigration from Asia because the U.S. needed people to work at unfilled jobs.</p>
<p>Today, once again, some U.S. politicians are pushing for new ways to <a href="https://theconversation.com/republicans-are-pushing-for-drastic-asylum-changes-an-immigration-law-scholar-breaks-down-the-proposal-219173">restrict immigration</a>. Much of their work focuses on making it harder for migrants to get asylum – meaning legal permission to remain in the U.S. if they have a legitimate fear of persecution in their home countries. </p>
<p>Overall, U.S. border officials encountered more than 1.1 million people <a href="https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics">illegally crossing</a> the U.S. border from April 2022 through March 2023 – a sharp rise from previous years, when the number of people illegally crossing each year hovered at less than 300,000. </p>
<p>U.S. authorities are now <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2023/12/29/immigrants-ice-border-deportations-2023/#">stepping up deportations</a>, quickly sending more undocumented people back to their home countries.</p>
<h2>A shifting response to immigration</h2>
<p>Globally, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e1cabc36-d050-4674-a16c-fff60c548174">international migration to rich countries</a> reached an all-time high in 2022. </p>
<p>So, how do other countries, including Canada and Germany, respond to migrants crossing their borders without a visa or proper documentation? </p>
<p>One answer has been to reform their <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-worlds-biggest-economies-cautiously-open-their-doors-to-more-foreign-workers-664c3549">immigration systems</a> to make deportation easier.</p>
<p>Germany, for example, has been wrestling with increases in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-illegal-immigration-set-to-exceed-record-high/a-67175099">undocumented immigration</a>. </p>
<p>Germany Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-immigration-policy-whats-changing-in-2024/a-67753472">at the end of 2023</a> that he supports <a href="https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/migration/illegal-entry/illegal-entry-node.html">large-scale deportations</a> for migrants who are rejected for asylum. </p>
<p>Germany deported close to 8,000 people, many of them fleeing the war in Ukraine, in the first part of 2023. In total, an estimated <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-illegal-immigration-set-to-exceed-record-high/a-67175099#:%7E:text=Police%20data%20shows%20that%2092%2C119,that%20illegally%20entered%20in%202016.">92,119 immigrants entered</a> Germany illegally from January through September 2023. </p>
<p>New German <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-immigration-policy-whats-changing-in-2024/a-67753472#:%7E:text=A%20reform%2C%20dubbed%20the%20Repatriation,their%20property%2C%20such%20as%20phones">government reforms</a> will increase that figure and no longer require officials to announce deportations in advance. </p>
<p>Italy, which is also battling a huge influx of undocumented <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-lies-behind-italys-immigration-crisis-2023-09-13/">migrants from North Africa,</a> recently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-pass-tougher-measures-deter-migrant-arrivals-2023-09-18/">doubled the amount</a> of time that it can detain undocumented migrants, rising from three months to at least six months. This decision is seen as an <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230918-italy-extends-detention-period-to-deter-migrant-crossings-after-lampedusa-surge">effort to deter more migrants</a> from illegally entering Italy. </p>
<p>In November 2023, Italy signed an agreement <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/07/europe/italy-albania-migrant-refugee-deal/index.html">to build two new immigration detention centers</a> across the Adriatic Sea in Albania. </p>
<p>This allows Italy to skirt a European Union policy that requires its member countries to consider and process all <a href="https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system/country-responsible-asylum-application-dublin-regulation_en">asylum applicants’ requests</a> within a year of their arrival. Since Albania is not part of the European Union, it could quickly deport the migrants that Italy sends there. </p>
<p>In December 2023, the European Union’s 27 countries also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/20/world/europe/eu-migration-asylum.html">voted on a major overhaul of asylum laws</a>. These changes will make it easier for countries to deport migrants who fail to get asylum. They also direct the European Union to give money to countries that allow more asylum seekers to stay in those countries. </p>
<h2>Other approaches</h2>
<p>Right now, Italy and Greece bear much of the brunt of migration in the EU.</p>
<p>More than <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/greece-wants-eu-to-slap-sanctions-on-countries-that-won-t-accept-return-of-illegal-migrants/7297844.html">31,000 undocumented migrants</a>, mainly from Syria, crossed into Greece in 2023, up from 18,000 undocumented people who entered the country in 2022.</p>
<p>The parliament in Greece is considering new laws that would enable the country to issue tens of thousands of undocumented migrants <a href="https://apnews.com/article/greece-migrants-residence-work-permits-0851a9592f1811487d1fde49a63be5ae">residence and work permits</a> to address labor shortages. </p>
<p>Greece is also pushing the European Union to slap economic sanctions on countries, like Pakistan, that refuse to take back the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/migration-greece-deportations-eu-f4964595a5d9554cea7999df9f882795">undocumented migrants that Greece</a> deports to their home countries.</p>
<p>Closer to home, Canada is also experiencing a surge of undocumented migration into Quebec and other places, prompting some Canadians to <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-behind-the-dramatic-shift-in-canadian-public-opinion-about-immigration-levels-219193">feel growing anxiety</a>, in part because of perceptions that the sudden population growth is also raising the country’s already-high housing costs. Canada <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/deportations-surge-as-regularization-stalls-for-the-undocumented/article_05fb6e0a-9461-11ee-8601-b3de32d91e09.html">deported 7,232 undocumented people</a> in the first six months of 2023 – a rise compared to the 7,635 deportations Canada carried out in the entire year of 2021.</p>
<p>Canada also announced in December 2023 that it is planning to allow people who entered the country with valid, short-term visas, and who continue living in Canada after these visas expire, to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-create-citizenship-path-undocumented-immigrants-globe-mail-2023-12-14/">apply for permanent residency</a>. This would mainly affect foreign students and temporary workers.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570218/original/file-20240118-23-1y6fq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a grey uniform and a black police vest speaks to a small group of people who wear jackets and have suitcases as they approach him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570218/original/file-20240118-23-1y6fq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570218/original/file-20240118-23-1y6fq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570218/original/file-20240118-23-1y6fq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570218/original/file-20240118-23-1y6fq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570218/original/file-20240118-23-1y6fq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570218/original/file-20240118-23-1y6fq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570218/original/file-20240118-23-1y6fq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Canadian officer speaks to migrants as they arrive in Quebec in March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-officer-speaks-to-migrants-as-they-arrive-at-the-roxham-news-photo/1247840460?adppopup=true">Sebastien St-Jean/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>An uncertain way ahead</h2>
<p>Back in the U.S., the fight over immigration continues, with Republicans eager to crack down and Democrats who generally want to avoid harsh new standards that could lead to more deportations and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/democrats-seek-restrain-new-immigration-powers-fearing-abuse-trump-rcna13031">mass roundups</a> of undocumented immigrants. </p>
<p>Traditionally, Democrats have been supportive of immigration and the rights of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/joe-biden/biden-immigration-border-plan-voters-senate-negotiations-rcna12515">wave of migrants</a> who arrive in cities like New York and <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/chicago-leaders-demand-help-from-white-house-to-deal-with-surge-of-migrants-in-city">Chicago without any money</a>, jobs or places to live is severely straining city governments’ capacity and budgets. Local leaders like New York Mayor Eric Adams are pleading with the federal government to help with a crisis that, as Adams said in September 2023, has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/07/nyregion/adams-migrants-destroy-nyc.html">no clear end</a> in sight.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220741/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tara Sonenshine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Germany and Italy are among the countries that are looking for ways to handle rises in undocumented migration and, in many cases, are making it harder for people to remain in their countries.Tara Sonenshine, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice in Public Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2206282024-01-12T18:02:56Z2024-01-12T18:02:56ZUS election: how a Trump victory could embolden Russia, China and Israel<p>A potential second term as president for Donald Trump is likely to result in an America-first, America-alone <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/10/donald-trump-foreign-policy-america-first/616872/">foreign policy</a>. </p>
<p>The ramifications for the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/03/us-elections-2024-trump-biden-policy-diplomacy-china-europe/">rest of the world</a> could be huge, potentially endangering international security around the globe. So it’s no wonder that the result of the November vote seems of more interest than normal to non-Americans.</p>
<p>Trump is neck and neck with President Joe Biden, each receiving 43% in YouGov‘s New Year’s <a href="https://d3nkl3psvxxpe9.cloudfront.net/documents/econTabReport_wOkNqe4.pdf">poll</a> showing voters’ plans for the upcoming presidential election.</p>
<p>A second term for the likely Republican nominee would have catastrophic effects on international diplomacy, according to Le Monde columnist, Sylvie Kauffman: “The G7 and NATO summits will once again become moments of unpredictable circus – or <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2024/01/10/the-destabilizing-shockwave-of-a-trump-re-election-would-reach-far-beyond-europe_6419250_23.html">absolute emptiness</a>.”</p>
<p>Continuing the focus of his first presidency, Trump has <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/trump-fbi-atf-dea-control-border-nevada-rally-1234931576/">vowed</a> to move thousands of US troops stationed abroad, FBI agents, and Drug Enforcement Administration officials, to tackle the immigration crisis on the Mexican border.</p>
<p>Not only will this affect the US military presence around the globe – and potentially undermine allies’ security – it will also have a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/united-states-america/us-mexico-relations-and-their-impact-migrant-safety">devastating effect</a> on Mexico, which will have to deal with an increasingly log-jammed border with the United States.</p>
<p>Trump intends to launch what he describes as the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/11/us/politics/trump-2025-immigration-agenda.html">largest deportation</a>” effort in US history of illegal immigrants and end <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-vows-end-birthright-citizenship-children-immigrants-us-illegally-2023-05-30/">automatic citizenship</a> for children born in the US to immigrants living in the country illegally.</p>
<p>In the same way that Trump <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-economic-impact">re-negotiated</a> the North American free trade agreement into the United States, Mexico, Canada agreement in 2019, it’s likely he would restructure Biden’s economic agreements such as the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-biden-asia-united-states-c6878c7d14112e45a870a3e8735f7e71">Indo-Pacific</a> economic framework.</p>
<p>What will concern most diplomats in Europe is Trump’s <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/agenda47/agenda47-preventing-world-war-iii">declared intention</a> to start “fundamentally re-evaluating NATO’s purpose and NATO’s mission”. It’s been <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2024/01/trump-2024-reelection-pull-out-of-nato-membership/676120/">suggested that</a> Trump will withdraw from Nato, or at least revise its doctrine that an attack on one member is an attack on all.</p>
<h2>Ending support for Ukraine</h2>
<p>He has already <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1844450/ukraine-war-russia-winning-putin-us-election">stated</a> that he would stop the “endless flow of American treasure to Ukraine” and demand European partners repay the US$75 billion (£58 billion) of aid that the US pledged to Ukraine.</p>
<p>What is concerning to many is whether Trump will try to uphold <a href="https://www.wsj.com/video/watch-trump-says-as-president-hed-settle-ukraine-war-within-24-hours/0BCA9F18-D3BF-43DA-9220-C13587EAEDF2">his promise</a> to end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours. It’s almost certain that Trump will discontinue the US’s membership of the 50-nation <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3462714/ukraine-defense-contact-group-members-remain-unified-in-support-to-kyiv/">Ukraine Defence</a> Contact Group dedicated to supporting Ukraine’s defence from Russia, weakening Ukraine’s potential to defend its territory.</p>
<p>US support of Ukraine extends beyond just logistics. In August 2023, the US agreed to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3504621/us-will-train-ukrainian-f-16-pilots-ground-crews/">train Ukrainian</a> pilots of the US-produced F-16 jets provided to Ukraine by its European allies. A continuation of this agreement will be vital to any Ukrainian hopes of withstanding Russian advances. </p>
<p>The war would not end simply because Trump wishes it, and any Russian gains from the conflict might encourage Russia to try to regain former territory in Moldova or any of the Baltic states.</p>
<p>And that the lack of opposition to any Russian territory grab is likely to encourage China to attempt to annex Taiwan. Trump, despite promising an aggressive <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/agenda47/president-trump-will-stop-china-from-owning-america">trade relationship</a> with China, has <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/trump-won-t-say-if-he-would-provide-military-support-to-taiwan-against-an-invasion-from-china-193143877586">refused</a> to confirm whether he would send troops to help defend the island should China invade.</p>
<p>While much of Trump’s first term in office <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html">reversed many</a> of the Obama administration’s changes, a second term would be aimed at ensuring centralisation of power in the Trump presidency and rolling back the Biden administration’s initiatives.</p>
<p>One significant difference this time around is that Trump and his allies have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-2025-second-term.html">been planning</a> his term next since he left the White House. Trump would be surrounded exclusively with his loyalists, be free of any restrictive voices of reason and be more organised than his first term.</p>
<p>It is unlikely that Trump will continue <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/wrapup-blinken-uae-saudi-israel-monday-seeking-avert-wider-middle-east-war-2024-01-07/">Biden’s attempts</a> to moderate Israeli operations in Gaza. Trump has been a long-time ally of Israel and became the first US president to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/world/middleeast/trump-jerusalem-israel-capital.html">formally, and controversially, recognise</a> Jerusalem as the Israeli capital in 2017.</p>
<p>On the day of the attack on October 7 in Israel, Trump <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12606613/Trump-calls-Hamas-CRUSHED-act-savagery-Israel-blames-weak-Biden-emboldening-terrorists-rousing-Iowa-rally.html">called</a> on Hamas to be “crushed” by Israel for it staking of hostages, but <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4331958-trump-mixed-messages-on-how-hed-handle-israel-hamas-war/">stated</a> that Israel needed “do a better job of public relations, frankly, because the other side is beating them at the public relations front”.</p>
<h2>Pulling out of green policies</h2>
<p>There is also determination to push back on Biden’s clean energy objectives. Trump’s energy policies are summed up by his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/mar/05/i-am-your-retribution-trump-rules-supreme-at-cpac-as-he-relaunches-bid-for-white-house">campaign slogan</a> of “drill baby drill!”, are aimed at ensuring the US has the lowest-cost energy and electricity prices.</p>
<p>It is possible that Trump will pull out of policies agreed at COP28 in the same way that <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/">he announced</a> the US’s withdrawal from the Paris agreement in 2017. Although the US re-joined the agreement in 2021, Trump has <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/trump-2024-presidency-climate-change-rcna131928">pledged</a> to withdraw again should he be elected.</p>
<p>In August 2023, Trump <a href="https://www.foxbusiness.com/video/6334380407112">revealed</a> a radical new economic agenda. It included a 10% tariff on imports into the US, and a <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/agenda47/agenda47-cementing-fair-and-reciprocal-trade-with-the-trump-reciprocal-trade-act">Trump Reciprocal</a> Tariff Act to put further tariffs on any nation that taxes US exports.</p>
<p>Although a great deal of concern focuses on Trump’s potential re-election, his main opponents for the Republican nomination, Nikki Haley and Ron DeSantis, have both <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/biggest-winners-losers-fifth-gop-debate-1859692">outlined</a> aggressive immigration policies and support for Israel, although only Haley has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67942133">indicated</a> that she would continue to support Ukraine.</p>
<p>While the election is still ten months away, the possibility of Trump being re-elected has already affected US foreign policy. Last month, President Biden <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/us-president-joe-biden-shelves-trade-pact-with-uk-2024-election/">decided</a> against signing a trade deal with the UK until after both countries have had their next elections. While this is significant, it is nothing compared to the impact that Trump’s re-election will have on the rest of the globe should he return to the White House.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dafydd Townley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump’s foreign policy plans include forcing an end to the Ukraine war and moving thousands of troops to the Mexican border.Dafydd Townley, Teaching Fellow in International Security, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191302024-01-08T13:58:09Z2024-01-08T13:58:09ZScramble for the Sahel – why France, Russia, China and the United States are interested in the region<p>The Sahel, a region <a href="https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569">3,860km wide located south of the Sahara Desert</a> and stretching east-west across the African continent, has been a focus of attention around the world recently. </p>
<p>In the last decade, issues such as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15365.doc.htm#:%7E:text=drivers%20of%20insecurity.-,From%201%20January%20to%2030%20June%202023%2C%20the%20region%20recorded,displaced%20persons%20exceeding%206%20million.">terrorism</a>, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1132332#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CIndeed%2C%20the%20central%20Sahel%20continues,in%20Ukraine%2C%E2%80%9D%20she%20added.">insecurity</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137072">trafficking</a> have characterised the region. </p>
<p>Military takeovers have been a major source of concern in the region and beyond in the last few years. Since 2020, the region has had <a href="https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/understanding-crisis-democracy-west-africa-and-sahel">four successful coup d’états</a> and three failed ones. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/08/03/fact-sheet-military-coup-in-niger/">coup in Niger</a> particularly attracted attention. This is because Niger was seen as a “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/west-africa/nigers-coup-and-americas-choice">darling of the west</a>” and a model for democratic governance in the region. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges facing the region, the scramble for the Sahel remains intense. </p>
<p>The main actors in this scramble are the <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/index_en">European Union</a>, France, Russia, China and the United States.</p>
<p>The EU relies on Sahelian countries, especially Niger, to stop mass illegal immigration into the bloc. Niger is a major transit country in the region. Niger had security and defence partnerships with the EU until recently when the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/niger-ends-security-and-defence-partnerships-with-the-eu/">country unilaterally cancelled the deals</a>. This is a source of concern to the EU. </p>
<p>Why are these foreign powers interested in the Sahel?</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">scholar</a> in international relations and having <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Olayinka-Ajala-2181806326">researched</a> the region for over a decade, I see the main reasons as follows: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>availability of natural resources</p></li>
<li><p>strategic location of the region in Africa</p></li>
<li><p>economic interests of the countries involved in the scramble</p></li>
<li><p>defence and security cooperation in the form of arms sales.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Foreign powers all have their reasons to be involved in the scramble for the Sahel.</p>
<h2>France</h2>
<p>Most of the countries in the Sahel region were colonised by France. Unlike Britain, France has maintained strong links with former colonies. They cooperate in the economy, defence and resource extraction, to mention a few areas. </p>
<p>France has the <a href="https://www.ieri.be/en/publications/wp/2019/f-vrier/france-still-exploiting-africa">first right</a> to buy any natural resources discovered in all its former colonies. Although the relationship between France and its former colonies appeared cordial, recent coups in Francophone countries and <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-in-africa-why-macrons-policies-increased-distrust-and-anger-212022">anti-France sentiments</a> across Africa have revealed the opposite. </p>
<p>The coups have been followed by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/huge-protests-niger-call-french-forces-leave-after-coup-2023-09-02/">large demonstrations</a> against France and in support of the putschists. </p>
<p>Despite these cracks, France is keen to maintain its grip on these countries, especially pertaining to military cooperation and resource extraction. France was reluctant to pull its military out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger despite the countries severing military partnerships. It continues to extract natural resources in these countries.</p>
<h2>Russia</h2>
<p>The relationships between Russia and many Sahelian countries were established during the cold war and colonial era. More recently, the emphasis by western countries on <a href="https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-72-the-impact-of-counter-terrorism-measures-on-muslim-communities.pdf">human rights</a>, especially during counterterrorism operations, has pushed Sahelian countries closer to Russia.</p>
<p>While western allies demand the rule of law, democracy, and human rights in return for security and economic support, Russia portrays itself differently. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine">invasion</a> of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 also increased Russia’s interest in the Sahel because it is keen to maintain allies in Africa. </p>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">openly backed</a> military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against any military intervention in Niger when the military took power. Furthermore, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, the controversial private military company which is controlled by Russia, cooperates with some countries in the Sahel. Niger has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231204-niger-s-junta-ends-key-security-agreements-with-eu-turns-to-russia-for-defence-deal">cancelled defence agreement with the EU</a> and switched to Russia. All of these factors explain Russia’s interest in the Sahel. </p>
<h2>China</h2>
<p>Like Russia, China portrays itself as an alternative to the traditional ally (France) of Sahelian countries. With a mantra of “<a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=94683">non-interference</a>” and “<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/praxis/files/2020/05/1.-Condon.pdf">respecting sovereignty</a>”, China has entrenched itself as a “partner” of countries in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The Sahel region is rich in natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas and lithium. Chinese state-owned enterprises <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">operate</a> in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>For instance, Mali potentially has <a href="https://www.mining-technology.com/features/top-ten-biggest-lithium-mines/?cf-view">one of the largest</a> lithium reserves in the world and China’s Ganfeng Lithium has <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">invested</a> heavily in the country. In addition, despite China’s development in military hardware, most of the weapons are untested. China is keen to use the conflicts in the Sahel to <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_93_Rajosefa_The_Future_of_Strategic_Competition_in_the_Sahel_Region.pdf">test</a> its arms products. </p>
<h2>The United States</h2>
<p>In 2019, the US opened its <a href="https://intellinews.com/us-in-danger-of-losing-control-of-its-extensive-drone-base-in-niger-289069/#:%7E:text=The%20Agadez%20drone%20base%2C%20officially,by%20the%20US%20Air%20Force.">largest drone base</a> in Africa in Agadez-Niger. A year before that, I had <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">written</a> about the security implications of the base for the region. </p>
<p>Unlike France and China, which both have extensive economic interests in the Sahel, the US has a strong military interest. Niger, in particular, is strategically located and the US can easily fly surveillance and reconnaissance drones from the country to cover the Sahel, west and central Africa. </p>
<p>As France is being militarily dislodged by its former colonies in the region, the US has been trying to fill the void to prevent Russia and China from establishing further military presence. </p>
<p>The US took several months to label the military takeover in Niger a coup so as not to lose strategic military cooperation and dominance. </p>
<p>The year 2023 has been particularly challenging for the countries in the Sahel. With issues ranging from economic instability to insecurity, the region remains fragile. Despite the instability and fragility, the scramble for the region remains intense with traditional allies such as France losing its grip and other powers stepping up. </p>
<p>The Sahel is one to keep an eye on in 2024 and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Foreign powers’ interest in the Sahel is driven by its natural resources and strategic location for security and illegal migration control.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2202462023-12-21T17:42:28Z2023-12-21T17:42:28ZUkraine recap: as cracks appear in western support, 2024 looks set to be a desperate fight for survival<p>While it may seem glib to repeat the notion of a new cold war, winter 2023-2024 has brought with it the sense that there is now an ever-more uncertain faultline between the west and an increasingly aggressive Russia – perhaps more vividly than at any time since the late 1980s. While it is considered a given that a united and determined response from Nato would have the capacity to outgun Russia in the event of the war in Ukraine escalating, US military planners need to factor in the need to maintain a sufficient deterrent force to counter any Chinese moves on Taiwan.</p>
<p>All of which increases the stakes in Ukraine. If Russia were to conquer the whole of Ukraine (remembering it already effectively controls neighbouring Belarus), its border with Nato would extend across Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. Moldova, which – while having cordial relations with Nato is not a member, so not protected by the group’s mutual self-defence principle – would be more exposed. There have already been attempts to destabilise the country via the Russian separatist enclave of Transnistria.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of eastern Europe showing what military dispositions will look like if Russia conquers UKraine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=882&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=882&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=882&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1109&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1109&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/567062/original/file-20231221-21-z08ndo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1109&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">What Europe will look like if Russia conquers the whole of Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These are the harsh realities that the Nato as a whole – as well as the US and the European Union separately – must confront as members debate the extent to which they will continue to supply Ukraine with armaments. They will be conscious that Russia has ramped up its military production significantly, allocating one-third of its 2024 budget to defence spending. Meanwhile both the US and the EU are deeply divided over continuing to supply Kyiv with the weapons it needs.</p>
<p>In his end-of-year press conference this week, Volodymyr Zelensky called for a further 500,000 new troops next year. But the concern is that they will have nothing to fight with, given the struggles going on both within the US congress and the EU to pass bills to provide more than £100 billion in further aid for Kyiv. </p>
<p>Stefan Wolff of the University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko of the University of Odesa believe the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-kyiv-digs-in-for-the-long-haul-with-prospects-looking-bleak-for-2024-220005">key for Ukraine in 2024</a> will be to hold their lines and prevent Russia from occupying any more territory, while they train their new conscripts. This would give Kyiv’s western allies an opportunity to find a way around the roadblock in funding Ukraine’s war effort. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-kyiv-digs-in-for-the-long-haul-with-prospects-looking-bleak-for-2024-220005">Ukraine war: Kyiv digs in for the long haul with prospects looking bleak for 2024</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Neither Ukraine nor Russia have rowed back on their war aims. Zelensky stressed that his ten-point peace plan was the only acceptable position, while Vladimir Putin, in his own end-of-year press conference, insisted that his plan was still “denazification, demilitarisation and a neutral status for Ukraine”. That Putin held a press conference at all is an indication he thinks Russia’s position is more favourable than it was this time last year, when he didn’t.</p>
<p>Accordingly, it was a bullish Russian president who fronted up for a four-hour combined press conference and phone-in. It made for required viewing for Russian television audiences, in that it appeared on every network. Precious Chatterje-Doody, an expert in international affairs from the Open University, says that despite questions such as “Tell us, when will our lives get better?” and “Hello, How can one move to the Russia that they talk about on Channel One?”, the affair was clearly carefully stage-managed to give the impression of a leader who is in complete control and confident of success.</p>
<p>And, with an economy that looks to be in pretty robust shape and an approval rating north of 80%, he can afford to be, <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-four-hour-qanda-is-a-valuable-insight-into-the-russian-presidents-version-of-reality-219985">she writes here</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-four-hour-qanda-is-a-valuable-insight-into-the-russian-presidents-version-of-reality-219985">Putin's four-hour Q&A is a valuable insight into the Russian president's version of reality</a>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>Zelensky was recently in Washington to plead Ukraine’s case for continuing US backing. But he had to leave empty handed for now after meetings at the White House and a closed-door sessions with senators as well as Republican House leader, Mike Johnson. “I admire him, but he didn’t change my mind at all about what we need to do,” Republican senator Lindsey Graham told the BBC. “I know what needs to happen to get a deal. I want to secure our border.”</p>
<p>Jessica Trisko Darden, an associate professor of political science at Virginia Commonwealth University has the background on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-things-to-know-about-us-aid-to-ukraine-219872">US aid roadblock</a> and what Ukraine might need to do to overcome it.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/5-things-to-know-about-us-aid-to-ukraine-219872">5 things to know about US aid to Ukraine</a>
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<h2>Nato divisions</h2>
<p>When Zelensky arrived in Washington, Republican congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene made her position clear on X (formerly Twitter): “With Zelensky in town and Ukraine money running dry, why doesn’t anyone in Washington talk about a peace treaty with Russia??” she tweeted. “A deal with Putin promising he will not continue any further invasions. Answer: Washington wants war, not peace. Isn’t that awful?! I’m still a NO.”</p>
<p>Setting aside the fact that Putin had already invaded Georgia, years before he sent his war machine into Ukraine and has broken a host of treaties in recent years, Greene also seems blissfully unaware that the4 vast majority of funding earmarked for military aid to Ukraine stays in the US and pays for US military materiel which is used to degrade Russia’s military capabilities.</p>
<p>But the possibility of years of increased defence spending is certainly putting pressure on Ukraine’s western allies, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-with-stalemate-on-the-battlefield-nato-needs-unity-and-commitment-more-than-ever-219761">writes Kenton White</a>, an expert in strategic studies and international relations at the University of Reading. Apart from anything else, the arms already donated to Kyiv have come close to exhausting the production capacity of Nato member states. (Apparently the number of Javelin missiles sent by the US to Ukraine in the first six months of the war represented seven years of regular production.)</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-with-stalemate-on-the-battlefield-nato-needs-unity-and-commitment-more-than-ever-219761">Ukraine war: with stalemate on the battlefield Nato needs unity and commitment more than ever</a>
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<p>The EU is also experiencing difficulties in getting its own aid package through. Hungary is the main stumbling block here. Hungary’s president, Viktor Orbán, is firmly in Putin’s camp and is not only wielding his country’s veto when it comes to the €50 billion (£25.7 billion) EU financial package for Ukraine, but has signalled he will make trouble for Ukraine when it comes to joining the EU.</p>
<p>Last week he “left the room” when the European Council voted to begin accession talks with Kyiv. But, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-opening-eu-accession-talks-is-an-important-boost-for-zelensky-despite-orbans-obstruction-219987">Stefan Wolff writes</a>, these talks are likely to last a decade or more and will be subject to the final agreement of all member states. Still, Wolff believes that the EU will find a way of “working around” the barriers put up by Hungary and the fact that it has signalled it wants Ukraine in the tent cannot but be a fillip for Zelensky at a time of uncertainty.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-opening-eu-accession-talks-is-an-important-boost-for-zelensky-despite-orbans-obstruction-219987">Ukraine: opening EU accession talks is an important boost for Zelensky despite Orbán's obstruction</a>
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<p>Luigi Lonardo, an expert in EU legal matters at University College Cork, meanwhile. details the military, economic and political imperatives <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-ukraine-needs-from-its-european-partners-and-the-us-in-2024-220252">facing Kyiv next year</a>, as well as some key issues that could affect continuing western support.</p>
<p>Lonardo spells out the clear European interest in preventing Russia from seizing any more territory in Ukraine and points to the critical need for countries such as Slovakia and Hungary, which have signalled they may not continue to support EU aid for Kyiv, to fall into line with the majority of members. Without EU support, he says, and in the event Donald Trump wins office at the end of the year and cuts off US military backing, Ukraine’s prospects for regaining control of its pre-2014 borders look all but impossible.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-ukraine-needs-from-its-european-partners-and-the-us-in-2024-220252">What Ukraine needs from its European partners (and the US) in 2024</a>
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<h2>Putin’s popularity</h2>
<p>Meanwhile Putin’s polling numbers remain strong. According to Russian research institute the Levada Center, the president’s approval rating is 85%, while in September the war in Ukraine received an approval rating northwards of 70%. Of course, it’s tempting to assume that you can’t trust opinion polling coming out of Russia, but – as Alexander Hill, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russians-still-support-vladimir-putin-and-the-war-in-ukraine-219484">Russia specialist from the University of Calgary notes</a> – Levada is deemed a “foreign agent” by the Russian government. And its results are backed by other polling organisations.</p>
<p>As already noted, Russia’s economy has handled the western sanctions remarkably well, news from the battlefield is a great deal better than it was this time last year and of course there’s a “rally round the flag” effect you’d expect in any country. That and the fact that the media is now almost completely under the control of the Kremlin.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russians-still-support-vladimir-putin-and-the-war-in-ukraine-219484">Why Russians still support Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine</a>
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<p>So when Putin runs for election for a fifth term of office early next year, you’d get pretty short odds on him winning again. His strategy is straight out of the autocrats’ playbook. Rule number one: first eliminate the opposition.</p>
<p>It was with this principle in mind no doubt that Putin had dissident politician Alexei Navalny poisoned in 2020 and then arrested when he returned to Russia in 2021. Navalny has since been found guilty of an array of charges, the most recent of which was “extremism”, which carries a sentence of 19 years. Added to the sentences he was already serving, this leaves him facing more than three decades inside.</p>
<p>If he survives that is. At present nobody seems to know where Navalny is after he is reported to have disappeared a fortnight ago, leading to speculation he may have been done away with. Kevin Riehle, an expert in intelligence and security at Brunel University London, thinks it more likely that Navalny has been transferred to a more remote and secure prison complex where his contact with the outside world will be minimal.</p>
<p>But as Riehle concedes, Putin’s opponents have a <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-disappears-from-jail-another-in-the-long-line-of-russian-dissidents-to-fall-foul-of-vladimir-putin-220147">habit of coming off badly</a> and the more prominent the opponent, the worse fate they can expect.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-disappears-from-jail-another-in-the-long-line-of-russian-dissidents-to-fall-foul-of-vladimir-putin-220147">Alexei Navalny disappears from jail – another in the long line of Russian dissidents to fall foul of Vladimir Putin</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220246/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A round up of our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2202522023-12-21T12:01:30Z2023-12-21T12:01:30ZWhat Ukraine needs from its European partners (and the US) in 2024<p>As 2024 approaches, the top priority of the Ukrainian government is best summed up as ending the war against Russia while regaining as much territory as possible.</p>
<p>President Volodymyr Zelensky <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-vows-end-russian-occupation-crimea-2023-08-23/">claims</a> that Ukraine will only stop fighting when it regains its pre-2014 borders, including Crimea.</p>
<p>This objective appears highly unlikely in 2024, but if it wants any hope of achieving it, Ukraine will need help from its European partners – the main ones being the EU, which has generally shown strong support to Kyiv (with some notable exceptions) and the UK. Ukraine’s objectives are largely overlapping with those of its allies, and help will likely need to come in three forms.</p>
<p>First, military support. Despite Russia having the bigger army, Ukraine has so far <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4351d5b0-0888-4b47-9368-6bc4dfbccbf5">been able to stop</a> the Russian army advancing further than the Dnipro river in the south and the Donbas region in the east. This is mainly because of sophisticated <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62002218">military equipment</a> sold or gifted by its partners, and because of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/04/us/politics/russia-generals-killed-ukraine.html">intelligence information</a> transferred by Nato and the US. </p>
<p>To avoid being outmatched, Ukraine will need continuous support by its allies in 2024 because, having nearly exhausted its own equipment, it is “almost totally reliant on western assistance for artillery and rocket artillery systems and ammunition”, as <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12150#:%7E:text=Since%20the%20beginning%20of%20the,on%20TDF%20and%20Reserve%20units.">reported</a> by a study from the US Congress.</p>
<p>The EU has already <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Russias-Against-Ukraine-Foreign-Reaction/dp/3031186931">distributed finance</a> to its member states to deliver military equipment to Kyiv, and now, for the first time in its history, the EU <a href="https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/act-support-ammunition-production-asap_en">will finance</a> member states to assist with the production of military equipment. The EU finances member states both through a special common fund called the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/05/05/eu-joint-procurement-of-ammunition-and-missiles-for-ukraine-council-agrees-1-billion-support-under-the-european-peace-facility/">European Peace Facility</a> (for the transfer of existing weapons), or through its <a href="https://csfederalismo.it/images/2023/Research-Paper/CSF-RP_EU-Defence-Union-ASAP_FFabbrini_Nov2023.pdf">budget</a> (for assisting with production costs).</p>
<p>Second, economic support. Because of the war, Ukraine is in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-approves-2024-wartime-budget-aims-strengthen-army-2023-11-09/">huge financial debt</a>. But unlike other countries in the same condition, its dire economic situation is much harder to manage due to the war efforts. The US Congress <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/06/us/politics/senate-ukraine-aid-bill.html">decided</a> to block financial aid to Kyiv, and now the EU has done the same.</p>
<p>However, the reason for the EU’s decision not to commit more money was not that the US had not done so. It was, instead, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán – sometimes <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20231215-russian-s-trojan-horse-in-the-eu-orban-wants-a-european-union-that-would-please-putin">called</a> Russia’s “Trojan horse in the EU” – who <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67724357">vetoed</a> the transfer of €50 billion (£43 billion) in EU aid to Ukraine.</p>
<p>Third, political support. This is the ideological underpinning of the other two forms of support. It is also necessary to influence public opinion. It is important for Kyiv that public opinion in Europe remains overwhelmingly in its favour, so that democratic leaders have another incentive to stand with Ukraine. Political support may come in the form of public statements (“<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pl/speech_22_7684">we stand with Ukraine</a>”), as well as by visiting or hosting Zelensky.</p>
<p>These are acts which show that, two years into the conflict, the commitment of European partners to the Ukrainian cause remains strong – despite the economic cost for their constituencies, shifting international attention towards the <a href="https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2023/1120/1417424-russia-israel-gaza-ukraine-politics/">war between Israel and Hamas</a>, and the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/olaf-scholz-gets-viktor-orban-out-the-room-to-approve-ukraine-accession-talks/">manifest disunity of European leaders</a>.</p>
<p>Another important symbolic decision was the EU’s choice to formally <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67722252">open membership talks</a> with Kyiv. But it is, at this stage, largely symbolic because the accession process typically takes nearly a decade.</p>
<h2>Will aid continue?</h2>
<p>In 2024, there will be three elections that have the potential to determine what might change: the presidential elections in Russia in March, the EU parliamentary elections in May, and the US presidential elections in November. The US and EU have been Ukraine’s most influential supporters so far, but electoral changes could mean a different policy. (The UK is also likely to have a general election, but both <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/feb/16/keir-starmer-visits-kyiv-labour-backing-ukraine">main parties</a> seem committed to continuing aid.)</p>
<p>Military aid looks likely to remain untouched at least until the European elections. It is in the European nations’ interest to stop Russia moving further into Ukraine. Advances could allow Vladimir Putin to cut off more access to the <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/08/14/the-ukraine-wars-black-sea-geopolitics/">Black Sea ports</a>, for instance, or even <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-russia-war-latest-putin-sky-news-blog-12541713">target</a> Moldova.</p>
<p>So far, this has overridden political contentiousness, even though some opposition figures have suggested that providing weapons to Ukraine only prolongs the war and <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15439.doc.htm">exacerbates insecurity</a>. With the exception of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SbhLupWtbik">previous Polish govervnment</a>, the new <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-robert-fico-announce-halt-military-aid-ukraine/">Slovakian one</a> and Hungary, no other EU member government has announced that it would stop – or is considering stopping – the sale or gift of weapons to Ukraine. </p>
<p>This is likely to continue even if Donald Trump, who is essentially a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/16/trump-quotes-putin-in-bid-to-portray-biden-as-authoritarian-00132157">pro-Putin candidate</a>, were to be elected US president and were to announce an end to US military support to Ukraine, as has been hinted.</p>
<p>Ongoing financial aid from the EU is also looking possible. The situation in the US is more uncertain, where the bipartisan support of Ukraine that existed at the beginning of the war <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67637679">seems to have evaporated </a>. There is some likelihood that a Trump presidency would try to block both military and financial aid, according to some sources. This has been suggested in the policy agenda <a href="https://www.heritage.org/press/project-2025-publishes-comprehensive-policy-guide-mandate-leadership-the-conservative-promise">drafted</a> by America First Policy Institute, which is staffed by former Trump officials.</p>
<p>The Ukrainian government hopes that its <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/ukraine/">membership of the EU</a> will materialise soon. The commission <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3790">has said</a> that it must fulfil the conditions for membership as any other candidate would. The next legislature (2024-2029) in the EU will likely decide at least the timeframe for membership, if not the specific conditions.</p>
<p>Ukraine faces a formidable challenge in reclaiming its pre-2014 borders. To achieve this, continued military support, economic aid and unwavering political backing from European partners, particularly the EU and the UK, are crucial. While a policy shift in the EU is unlikely, the concrete possibility of a Trump presidency in 2024 holds a lot of uncertainty for Ukraine – and that has got to be one Zelensky’s biggest worries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luigi Lonardo is the Principal Investigator of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence 'European Integration and Citizens' Rights', which receives funding from the European Commission. </span></em></p>With four elections among Ukraine’s key partners in 2024, commitment to aid for President Zelensky could be in doubt.Luigi Lonardo, Lecturer in EU law, University College CorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.