tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/oromo-protests-32908/articlesOromo protests – La Conversation2024-02-18T07:07:33Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229282024-02-18T07:07:33Z2024-02-18T07:07:33ZOromia makes up a third of Ethiopia’s landmass and is key to its fortunes: expert unpacks its significance<p><em>Ethiopia’s largest and most populous region, Oromia, has been in the news following reports of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/23/im-scared-to-leave-addis-ababa-ethiopias-oromia-region-gripped-by-kidnapping-pandemic">a rise in kidnappings for ransom</a>. The region is <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">no stranger to war and strife</a>. Its people have long fought against political marginalisation. But the region is more than just the site of conflict.</em></p>
<p><em>We asked <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/gov/yimeni-bizuneh-getachew.aspx">Bizuneh Yimenu</a>, who’s researched the region for over a decade and studied its significance in the context of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">Ethiopian federalism</a>, to explain Oromia, its people and its economic and political importance.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the general overview of Oromia?</h2>
<p>Situated in the heart of Ethiopia, Oromia isn’t just a geographical entity but a cultural, economic and political powerhouse. It significantly shapes Ethiopia’s identity and trajectory. </p>
<p>It is the largest of Ethiopia’s 12 regions and covers a vast area. At over <a href="http://www.ethiodemographyandhealth.org/oromia.html">350,000 square kilometres</a>, it’s larger than Côte d'Ivoire or Italy. </p>
<p>The region spans Ethiopia’s central, western and southern parts. Oromia makes up <a href="https://epo.acleddata.com/oromia/">34% of Ethiopia’s landmass</a>. It shares borders with all other Ethiopian regions except Tigray, in the country’s north. It shares international boundary lines with Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. </p>
<p>Its capital is Finfinne, also known as Addis Ababa – which is additionally Ethiopia’s capital and the headquarters of the African Union. </p>
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<p>Oromia’s diverse geography includes highlands, lowlands, forests and fertile plains. This contributes to its agricultural richness.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.ethiopianreview.com/pdf/001/Cen2007_firstdraft(1).pdf#page=91">the last census</a>, over 60 ethnic groups live in the region. </p>
<p>Oromia has a population of about <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/cities/">40 million</a> people, about 38% of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/cities/">105 million</a>. There are also Oromo communities in Kenya and Somalia.</p>
<h2>What is Oromia’s cultural and economic significance?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">Oromo</a>, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, speak Afaan Oromo, one of the <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-languages-are-spoken-in-africa.html">five most spoken African languages</a>. Oromo traditions and customary practices have endured for centuries. </p>
<p>Oromia is known for its traditional democratic governance system, <a href="https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=utk_socopubs">the Geda system</a>, in which power is transferred peacefully every eight years. It regulates the community’s political, economic, social and religious activities. In 2016, Unesco recognised the system as an <a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/gada-system-an-indigenous-democratic-socio-political-system-of-the-oromo-01164">intangible cultural heritage</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">What is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect</a>
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<p>Economically, Oromia is one of Ethiopia’s breadbaskets. The region’s crop production accounts for about <a href="https://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/media/6511/file/Oromia%20regional%20brief.pdf#page=1">50% of total national production</a>. A <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/cea/5991#tocto1n5">majority</a> of residents work in the agricultural sector.</p>
<p>The region’s fertile soil supports crops like coffee, teff, maize and barley, which are popular for domestic consumption and export. </p>
<p>Outside agriculture, the region has many factories and industries that produce textile and garments, leather products, chemicals, construction materials and pharmaceuticals. </p>
<p>Oromia is additionally a <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/37159/">source</a> of export minerals, <a href="https://oromiatours.com/Nature-and-Map.html#:%7E:text=Oromia%20hosts%20many%20of%20Ethiopia%27s%20more%20alluring%20natural,gold%20and%20platinum%20to%20iron%20ore%20and%20limestone.">ranging from gold and platinum to iron ore and limestone</a>. In the 2021-2022 financial year, Oromia generated <a href="https://www.2merkato.com/news/alerts/6686-ethiopia-oromia-earns-usd-324-million-from-mining">US$324 million</a> from mining. </p>
<p>The capital, Addis Ababa, is a hub for domestic and international travel, and connected to economically essential cities in other regions, like Diredawa and Hawassa.</p>
<p>International highways, such as the Ethio-Djibouti road, the main route for Ethiopia’s foreign trade, intersect Oromia. This road is the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa">lifeblood of the country’s economy</a>. It enables the movement of goods to and from the port of Djibouti, connecting <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-quest-for-access-to-the-sea-success-rests-on-good-relations-with-its-neighbours-219621">landlocked Ethiopia</a> to global markets.</p>
<h2>What role has Oromia played in Ethiopia’s political development?</h2>
<p>Oromia holds substantial political importance within Ethiopia. As the largest and most populous region, it often sets the tone for national discourse and policymaking.</p>
<p>Its political influence in Ethiopia can be traced to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/29790544">the 1960s when Oromo nationalism</a> emerged due to subjugation and a lack of autonomy. This movement pushed Ethiopia’s transition from <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">a centralised unitary system to a federal one</a>. </p>
<p>In 2015, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">protests in the region</a> to push for greater autonomy and political representation helped drive political change. In 2018, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/12/13/2018-for-ethiopias-oromos-power-pain-protests-review/">Abiy Ahmed</a>, an Oromo, became Ethiopia’s prime minister. </p>
<p>Before Abiy’s entry, Ethiopia had been governed by a Tigray-dominated government for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopias-new-leader-could-be-a-game-changer-94424">27 years</a>. Tigrayans make up about <a href="https://www.atlasofhumanity.com/tigray">6%</a> of the population.</p>
<p>Abiy’s appointment symbolised a significant step towards addressing the grievances of the Oromo people. </p>
<p>Overall, the political dynamics within Oromia have consistently been at the forefront of discussions surrounding federalism, identity and governance in Ethiopia. </p>
<h2>What are some of the challenges specific to the region?</h2>
<p>Despite its cultural richness and economic importance, Oromia faces challenges that have hindered its development and stability. </p>
<p>One challenge is the prevalence of conflict and tension. This includes <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/oromo-rebels-accuse-ethiopian-forces-attacks-following-peace-talks-2023-05-17/">the war between</a> the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/11/08/ethiopia-oromo-liberation-army-ola-the-other-group-fighting-federal-forces/">Oromo Liberation Army</a>, a rebel group, and the Ethiopian government. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">'Ethiopia's other conflict': what's driving the violence in Oromia?</a>
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<p>Oromia has also suffered from <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-tragic-ambush-by-armed-men-claims-13-lives-in-horo-guduru-wollega-oromia-region/">cross-border attacks launched by the Fano militia</a>, a rebel group operating in neighbouring Amhara. The attack is part of the militia’s agenda of expanding Amhara territory.</p>
<p>Additionally, the regional government has faced <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/ethiopia">allegations of human rights abuses</a>. It has been accused of extrajudicial killings and the unlawful detention of opposition leaders.</p>
<p>In recent months, there has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/23/im-scared-to-leave-addis-ababa-ethiopias-oromia-region-gripped-by-kidnapping-pandemic">a rise in kidnappings blamed on Oromo Liberation Army rebels</a>. This has exacerbated grievances and contributed to a climate of fear and uncertainty.</p>
<p>The underlying causes of conflict in Oromia are deeply rooted and complex. They stem from a combination of:</p>
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<li><p>historical injustices</p></li>
<li><p>marginalisation under previous regimes</p></li>
<li><p>ethnic tensions</p></li>
<li><p>competition over resources. </p></li>
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<p>Resolving these issues requires a comprehensive approach emphasising dialogue, reconciliation and inclusive governance.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen?</h2>
<p>Two things are needed to address Oromia’s challenges effectively. </p>
<p>First, immediate attention should be given to the region’s security. This can be ensured through a peace deal with the Oromo Liberation Army. Previous rounds of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/22/ethiopia-talks-with-rebel-group-ola-end-without-deal">peace talks held in Tanzania between the rebel group and the national government</a> have ended without agreement. </p>
<p>Both the government and the Oromo Liberation Army have <a href="https://x.com/OdaaTarbiiWBO/status/1650255474502008832?s=20">expressed a readiness</a> to resolve their differences through dialogue.</p>
<p>Second, it’s essential that regional and national stakeholders, and the international community collaborate. Initiatives focused on promoting peace and reconciliation should be prioritised to foster a more inclusive future for all residents of the region. Considering Oromia’s significance to Ethiopia, its stability should be a priority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222928/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bizuneh Yimenu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Oromia is a cultural, economic and political powerhouse. It significantly shapes Ethiopia’s identity and trajectory.Bizuneh Yimenu, Teaching Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2167612024-02-01T14:24:10Z2024-02-01T14:24:10ZEthiopian protest music: the songs of Hachalu Hundessa reveal the struggles of the Oromo people<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571833/original/file-20240129-25-vi0wpy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hachalu Hundessa's songs gave a soundtrack to the Oromo resistance.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screengrab/Maalan Jira!/YouTube</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Oromo are the largest ethno-national group in Ethiopia, accounting for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/10/1/oromo-struggle-memories-of-an-atrocity">over 40 million people</a> or more than <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">one-third of the population</a>. However, they have been politically oppressed, economically exploited and culturally marginalised <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">under successive Ethiopian regimes</a>. Since the 1960s, the Oromo have sought self-determination through various forms of resistance, such as armed struggle under the banner of the <a href="https://www.olf-olahq.org/">Oromo Liberation Front</a>. </p>
<p>Music has played a key role in the Oromo resistance movement. As is the case in many other societies – especially those where open political debate is risky – music serves as an instrument of defiance, allowing artists and their fans to stand up against dominant socio-economic, cultural and political forces. From legendary musicians to amateur singers, Oromo artists have used protest songs as part of their struggle for freedom, justice and equality.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/hachalu-hundessa-charismatic-musician-who-wasnt-afraid-to-champion-ethiopias-oromo-142062">Hachalu Hundessa</a> (also written in the Oromo language as Haacaaluu Hundeessaa) was one of those musicians. Through his poetically eloquent protest songs, the young singer-songwriter came to represent the Oromo struggle. Then, in June 2020, he was murdered. Three men <a href="https://nilepost.co.ug/news/109568/three-found-guilty-of-killing-ethiopian-singer-hachalu-hundessa">were convicted</a> for the crime a year later, but no motive was given. Many believe it was a political assassination.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hachalu-hundessa-charismatic-musician-who-wasnt-afraid-to-champion-ethiopias-oromo-142062">Hachalu Hundessa: charismatic musician who wasn't afraid to champion Ethiopia's Oromo</a>
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<p>Hundreds of thousands of young people across Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest regional state, <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-07-01-hachalu-hundessas-murder-sparks-unrest-in-ethiopia/">took to the streets in protest</a>, demanding justice for Hachalu. Members of Oromia’s large diaspora also staged protests in US and European cities. The Ethiopian government used the protests and ensuing violence (<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/01/ethiopia-cracks-down-following-popular-singers-killing">reports</a> at the time suggested that <a href="https://amp.dw.com/am/%E1%89%A0%E1%8A%A2%E1%89%B5%E1%8B%AE%E1%8C%B5%E1%8B%AB-%E1%8B%A8%E1%89%B0%E1%8C%88%E1%8B%B0%E1%88%89-%E1%88%B0%E1%8B%8E%E1%89%BD-%E1%89%81%E1%8C%A5%E1%88%AD-81-%E1%88%98%E1%8B%B5%E1%88%A8%E1%88%B1%E1%8A%95-%E1%8B%A8%E1%8A%A6%E1%88%AE%E1%88%9A%E1%8B%AB-%E1%8D%96%E1%88%8A%E1%88%B5-%E1%8A%A0%E1%88%B5%E1%89%B3%E1%8B%88%E1%89%80/a-54018050?__twitter_impression=true">more than 80 people</a> were killed) to justify <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/01/ethiopia-cracks-down-following-popular-singers-killing">its crackdown</a> on Oromo opposition political parties.</p>
<p>As a political geographer, I focus on the struggles of the dispossessed and their covert and overt forms of resistance – one of which is protest songs. After his death, I studied three of Hachalu’s works: Maalan Jira! (Do I even exist!), Jirra! (We are still there/alive!) and Jirtuu? (Are you there?). My interest goes beyond mere scholarly analysis; there is emotional attachment there, too. I was part of the <a href="https://www.opride.com/2016/12/31/oprides-oromo-person-year-2016-qubee-generation/">Qubee Generation</a>, the youth cohort that spearheaded the 2014-2018 Oromo protest movement to which Hachalu’s songs added inspirational impetus.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14725843.2023.2251693">the resulting paper</a>, I show how Oromo protest music like Hachalu’s reveals a history and geography of violence through land dispossession and political persecution. It is also more than just a record of events in time and space: protest music forges collective identity and spurs political movements. I also strive to comprehend what a musician like Hachalu Hundessa represents – and what it means to destroy a body that embodies the power of resistance.</p>
<h2>Three key songs</h2>
<p>Hachalu Hundessa was born in Ambo Town, some 120 kilometres to the west of the capital city, Addis Ababa, in 1984. He was active in Oromo student movements when he was at secondary school and was imprisoned by the government when he was just 17 years old, spending five years behind bars because of his activism. While in prison he worked on his first album, Sanyii Mootii. It was released in 2009 and immediately made him popular.</p>
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<img alt="A group of men, several carrying banners and one wearing a t-shirt that calls for justice for Hachalu Hundessa, raise their fists in the air" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Members of Minnesota’s Oromo community protesting in the wake of Hachalu Hundessa’s murder in 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brandon Bell/Getty Images</span></span>
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<p>The first song I analysed was Maalan Jira! (Do I even exist!), the title track from his 2015 album. He tells of the <a href="https://journalajaees.com/index.php/AJAEES/article/view/917">occupation of Finfinne</a> (what is today Addis Ababa) in the 1880s that dispossessed the Tulama Oromo clans, displaced them from their ancestral homes and sacred places and dismantled their social institutions. </p>
<p>He takes the listener or viewer through a mental map of history. The lyrics can be viewed as a struggle to dismantle institutions and discourses of settler-colonial systems long imposed by the Ethiopian state upon the Oromo. The murder of Hachalu, then, can be interpreted as an attempt at silencing counter-histories in Ethiopia. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Malaan Jira, the title track from Hachalu’s 2015 album.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The second song in my paper, Jirra! (We are still alive!), was released in October 2017, when the Oromo protest movement was at its peak. He underscores the determination of the Oromo, locating the resistance in physical places. He does this by naming places where the movement had a strong presence, articulating the convergence of different corners of Oromia towards the goal: liberation.</p>
<p>The third song, Jirtuu? (Are you there?) again exposes the historical events related to land dispossession and political oppression. At a live performance in December 2017, during a fundraiser in Bole for Oromos displaced by <a href="https://theworld.org/stories/2017-12-15/hundreds-thousands-displaced-ethiopians-are-caught-between-ethnic-violence-and">clashes with the neighbouring Somali region</a> that year, he asked the crowd: “Where are you?”, then encouraged them: “Say we are in Bole!” The crowd cheerfully echoed his statement.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/D1qiF8Q_usI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A live performance of Jirra!</span></figcaption>
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<p>This was not just a singalong. Bole is a district of Addis Ababa, home to wealthy people who settled on land expropriated from Oromo farmers. The performance was a declaration of the Oromos’ right to self-determination and a call that they should one day control the <a href="https://thisisafrica.me/arts-and-culture/ethiopias-imperial-palace-opened-to-the-public-after-more-than-a-century/">Imperial Palace</a> – the offices and residence of the Ethiopian prime minister. </p>
<p>The lyrics include:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Kaafadhu farda keetiin loli, Arat Kiiloof situu aane (Fight with your horse, you deserve Arat Kilo – the national palace); Kaafadhu Eeboo keetiin loli, Arat Kiiloof situu aane (Fight with your spear, you deserve Arat Kilo)</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Why this matters</h2>
<p>My analysis reveals the power of Hachalu’s protest songs in unsettling dominant narratives and institutions, and in serving as a strong instrument of the Oromos’ political and social movements. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-musicians-fled-the-country-after-the-1974-revolution-how-their-culture-lives-on-206214">Ethiopia's musicians fled the country after the 1974 revolution - how their culture lives on</a>
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<p>His music intertwines time, space and identity. It renders the reconstruction of the past and imaginations of the future amid contemporary uncertainties. In doing so, music serves as an archival library of the past, a platform of the present, and a mirror of the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216761/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asebe Regassa Debelo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Through his poetically eloquent protest songs, the young singer-songwriter came to represent the Oromo struggle.Asebe Regassa Debelo, Senior research and teaching fellow, Department of Geography, University of ZurichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1470382020-10-01T14:38:03Z2020-10-01T14:38:03ZDigital democracy is still a long way off in Africa: it takes more than technology<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360247/original/file-20200928-16-1iimkex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African leaders blunt the transformative power of smartphones through censorship and internet shutdowns.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/John Hrusha</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>From the mid-2000s onwards, the digital revolution raised hopes of democratic transformation and strengthening in Africa. But it hasn’t quite turned out like that. Now, almost a decade after the <a href="https://blog.transparency.org/2011/08/02/digital-technologies-and-the-arab-spring/">“Arab Spring”</a>, techno-optimism has given way <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/social-media-disruption-nigerias-whatsapp-politics/">to techno-pessimism</a>. </p>
<p>African leaders have proved able to blunt the transformative potential of smart phones through censorship and internet shutdowns. When the internet is on, social media attracts more attention for spreading fake news than preventing election rigging.</p>
<p>What was once thought of as <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/385959">“liberation technology”</a> has turned out to be remarkably compatible with the maintenance of the status quo. Or has it? Does this more pessimistic reading overlook genuine progress?</p>
<p>A new publication I co-edited with Lisa Garbe – <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/decoding-digitaldemocracy-in-africa/"><em>Decoding #DigitalDemocracy in Africa</em></a> – draws together the latest research on the extent to which digital technology has changed Africa … and the ways in which Africa is changing digital technology.</p>
<p>The articles show that we should not miss the wood for the trees: despite disappointment, digital technology has had profound impacts on African politics and society. But, they also highlight how much more needs to be known about digital technology on the continent.</p>
<h2>Digital access and inclusion</h2>
<p>A lot of recent analysis has focused on the <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/features/covid-19-implications-of-the-pandemic-for-the-digital-divide-in-africa/#:%7E:text=COVID%2D19%20has%20emphasised%20the,pronounced%20on%20the%20African%20continent">digital divide in Africa</a>, and the many people excluded from online access by poverty and lack of coverage. </p>
<p>Yet researchers have also found that closing this divide <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0736585306000359?casa_token=5YvB4vBqfcYAAAAA:B1iKNTpvSANE2Qwf_gw9FxLh-_DOTDEM-Q-HYjW7YcEgjvx-mvdwFLTY5nWEjd6jpg33RTPzBw">cannot be achieved by cheaper technology alone</a>. Using digital technology to access information and resources is only possible when a set of political, legal, and economic conditions are in place.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360248/original/file-20200928-24-10qqfw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Facebook and other tech giants are more concerned with growing user numbers than addressing social ills caused by their technology.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Ali Haider</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For example, the content that citizens can access increasingly depends on giant tech companies, especially for poorer citizens. In his contribution on <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/facebooks-ongoing-scramble-for-africa/">Facebook’s Free Basics</a> - a service that provides basic online services without data charges - Toussaint Nothias explains that tech corporations’ dominant position enables them to shape how individuals use the internet under the pretence of making it more affordable.</p>
<p>This raises tough questions about whether multinational companies engage ethically in Africa. As Julie Owono’s contribution points out, Facebook has been accused of “dumping” products such as Free Basics, stymieing the production of local alternatives. This has raised concerns of a fresh “scramble for Africa”, with multinational companies expending more energy and resources in securing new users than tackling hate speech and misinformation.</p>
<h2>Social media, democracy and accountability</h2>
<p>From the recent <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-06-26-audacious-zambian-protesters-outsmart-the-police/">“virtual protest”</a> in Zambia to <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-09-11-campaigning-together-but-on-their-own/">#ZimbabweanLivesMatter</a>, the potential of social media to empower dissenting voices is clear. </p>
<p>Idayat Hassan and Jamie Hitchen’s analysis of WhatsApp and Facebook use ahead of <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/how-hashtag-activism-moves-offline-in-the-gambia/">elections in The Gambia</a> shows that even in rural areas with limited connectivity, social media content contributes to offline political mobilisation.</p>
<p>It is important not to lose sight of this more positive impact amid the growing focus on fake news and hate speech.</p>
<p>Sadly, though, further problems are on the horizon. Azeb Madebo reveals how the Ethiopian diaspora has <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/social-media-the-diaspora-and-the-politics-of-ethnicity-in-ethiopia/">fuelled the polarisation</a> between the Oromo community on the one hand, and the Ethiopian government and Ethiopian nationalists on the other. </p>
<p>Not all fake news is believed of course, but when stories play into widely held <a href="https://www.cddwestafrica.org/whatsapp-nigeria-2019-elections/">fears, prejudices and assumptions</a>, they can exacerbate distrust and encourage a cycle of violence.</p>
<p>It is, therefore, significant that there is relatively little regulation of content moderation. Julie Owono shows that in part this can be attributed to the limited local capacity of content providers such as Facebook or Twitter. Neither has invested heavily in African experts capable of identifying fake news and hate speech circulated on their platforms. </p>
<p>In part, it is also rooted in the limited funding available for civil society groups, considerable linguistic diversity, and the volume of information being shared. As a result, organisations such as <a href="https://africacheck.org/">Africa Check</a> highlight instances of fake news but cannot hope to cover all harmful content.</p>
<p>There are no easy answers to these problems though, because when governments do try and combat free speech, Ashwanee Budoo finds that misinformation is often abused as an excuse to clamp down on <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/how-fighting-fake-news-hurts-free-spech/">freedom of expression</a>.</p>
<h2>Free speech, censorship and Internet shutdowns</h2>
<p>While growing internet coverage has enabled citizens to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2014.885505?casa_token=UaJPiCWtiLkAAAAA%3A4LCwyxQQGcDpQehzEYCU3skFgOQR3mXCdue7sy-4uIS8I8yZcgSdT_3EvgNdfRRVZ2Qe4yeXZtMv">challenge authoritarian rule</a>, non-democratic leaders have also manipulated or disrupted online access. According to Lisa Garbe, internet shutdowns have become the <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/what-we-do-not-know-about-internet-shutdowns-in-africa/">“new normal”</a> in some authoritarian states. This is especially so during politically contested periods such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/internet-shutdowns-in-africa-threaten-democracy-and-development-142868">elections or major protests</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, while internet shutdowns are important, they are the thin end of the wedge. A number of steps have been taken to prevent citizens from being able to express themselves online. There is a growing use of <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2018/09/hide-and-seek-tracking-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-to-operations-in-45-countries">spyware across the continent</a> to snoop on government critics.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360316/original/file-20200928-20-1xqtcfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">High data costs fuel digital exclusion in Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Tanzania, restrictive laws about what can be said online go hand in hand with government pressure. A prominent lawyer <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/africa/article/2001387599/no-room-for-opposition-tanzania-lawyer-loses-job-at-top-firm-and-position-at-the-roll-of-advocates">was recently fired</a> because of her “activism”. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/feb/27/millions-of-ugandans-quit-internet-after-introduction-of-social-media-tax-free-speech">Uganda</a>, <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1377582/benin-is-taxing-use-of-social-media-apps-like-facebook-whatsapp/">Benin</a> and several other states have imposed a social media tax that has excluded many users. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, those who can afford internet access still face restrictions on governments information. Thus, Lisa-Marie Selvik argues that digital technology has done little to give many African citizens the right to <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/decoding-digitaldemocracy-in-africa/">basic government information</a>.</p>
<h2>What we know and what we don’t know</h2>
<p>Some sixteen years on since the creation of Twitter, it is becoming clear what we do and don’t know about digital democracy in Africa. We know that digital technology is acting as a disruptive force that simultaneously has <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/authors/nic-cheeseman/">“liberating” and destructive</a> potential. </p>
<p>The continent has yet to develop an effective way to stop the flow of fake news. And the full benefits of digital democracy are being thwarted by digital exclusion that is driven by the <a href="http://www.connectingafrica.com/author.asp?section_id=761&doc_id=756372#:%7E:text=The%20quarterly%20comparison%20by%20Research,1GB%20in%20Zimbabwe%20cost%20%2420.">high cost of data</a>, the strategies of authoritarian governments, and in some cases the approach of major tech companies themselves.<br>
But, what we don’t know is just as important. We urgently need more research in a number of areas.</p>
<p>To what extent has social media exacerbated ethno-regional tensions? How much online content is actually produced by governments and the trolls that work for them? Who should be responsible for content moderation and how can ethno-linguistic diversity be accounted for? What are the political and socio-economy consequences of restricting internet access, and how can this be resisted? Does the finding that how an individual behaves online <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/j.1681-4835.2015.tb00479.x">does not dramatically change</a> their offline political activity in Uganda hold more broadly? And is social media reinforcing existing gender norms rather than challenging them?</p>
<p>These questions should inspire the research agendas of the future.</p>
<p><em>Idayat Hassan, Director of CDD-West Africa, contributed to the publication and is a co-author of this article</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147038/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The full benefits of digital democracy are being thwarted by digital exclusion that is driven by the high cost of data.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLisa Garbe, Doctoral Researcher, University of St.GallenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1420622020-07-06T15:12:32Z2020-07-06T15:12:32ZHachalu Hundessa: charismatic musician who wasn’t afraid to champion Ethiopia’s Oromo<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345805/original/file-20200706-3943-1sndiv6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the Oromo community in Minnesota in the US protest after the death of Hachalu Hundessa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brandon Bell/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Anyone who steps into the public sphere in Ethiopia is also a potential political leader. In this atmosphere, an outspoken musician runs a high risk of falling foul of the authorities.</p>
<p>One such <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-53233531">story</a> unfolded last week – the inexplicable, and still unresolved, murder in Addis Ababa of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53280905">Hachalu Hundessa</a>, the 34-year-old <a href="https://www.opride.com/longform/opride-oromo-person-year-2017-haacaaluu-hundeessaa/">singer</a> from the southern region of Oromia. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">Oromo</a> make up Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group and are frequently referred to as a ‘marginalised majority’ that has been locked out of power until the last <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-poll-has-been-pushed-out-by-covid-19-but-theres-much-more-at-play-138322">election</a>. </p>
<p>The country is still stunned. Addis Ababa has erupted in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53298845">protests</a> that have left scores dead and dozens arrested. With the arrests of Oromo leaders, protests have spread as far as Minneapolis and London, cities with <a href="https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22694/1/Webster-Kogen_22694.pdf">Oromo diasporas</a>. </p>
<p>Politically motivated killings are certainly nothing <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/ethiopia">new</a> for Ethiopia, but this particular murder has touched the biggest nerve in decades, in part because Hachalu Hundessa was perceived to be a man of the people.</p>
<p>The murder is consistent with an ongoing story of musicians as political dissidents in a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/hachalu-hundessa-murder-reveals-ethiopia-political-divide-200705083049836.html">tinderbox regime</a>. As perhaps the most beloved Oromo musician, he was a pre-eminent cultural figure for a third of the population – some 35 million people. His murder illustrates the total enmeshing of cultural, political and economic challenges in a country experiencing seismic changes.</p>
<p>Hachalu Hundessa always considered himself to be at risk, and people loved him because he didn’t let that risk keep him quiet.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345825/original/file-20200706-4013-1of3zs7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345825/original/file-20200706-4013-1of3zs7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345825/original/file-20200706-4013-1of3zs7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345825/original/file-20200706-4013-1of3zs7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345825/original/file-20200706-4013-1of3zs7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345825/original/file-20200706-4013-1of3zs7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345825/original/file-20200706-4013-1of3zs7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The singer in his music video for the hit song Maalan Jira!</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screengrab/YouTube</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Undeclared spokesman for the Oromo</h2>
<p>The singer’s fan base numbered many millions in Ethiopia. The message boards on social media seem to think that the death of this charismatic talent is part of a proxy battle between the two most prominent Oromo leaders, current Prime Minister <a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-put-ethiopia-on-the-road-to-democracy-but-major-obstacles-still-stand-in-the-way-140750">Abiy Ahmed</a> and Oromo activist-media magnate Jawar Mohammed. Jawar Mohammed is the former head of the <a href="https://oromiamedia.com">Oromia Media Network</a> and the most prominent activist in the Oromo separatist-inspired movement. </p>
<p>It seems that the three Oromo men – and music, media and politics – are locked together in this tragedy.</p>
<p>The singer had spent five years in prison as a young student protester, and used his substantial charisma and personal magnetism to speak up for Oromo rights once he became famous. His most celebrated <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bH61mCEclSw">concert</a> in 2017 raised awareness of ethnic violence and displacement. The event led him to becoming an undeclared spokesman for the Oromo cause. </p>
<p>But Ethiopia has nine main regions and the Oromo speak their own language, so even a non-Ethiopian person who considers themselves well-versed in Ethiopian music might be excused for not knowing his repertoire that well. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">Why the Oromo protests mark a change in Ethiopia's political landscape</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Oromo music is less exportable than classic <a href="https://theculturetrip.com/africa/ethiopia/articles/ethio-jazz-the-amazing-story-of-ethiopian-jazz-from-london-to-addis/">Ethio-jazz</a> or contemporary <a href="https://www.musicinafrica.net/magazine/reggae-ethiopia">reggae</a> because the Oromo population around the world is not huge. His best-known song, <em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wv3he6CGF3E">Maalan Jira</a></em> (What Existence is Mine) from 2015, is still marked on YouTube as “new”.</p>
<p>By Ethiopian standards, the song is familiar and timeless, focusing on Oromo issues but appealing to all Ethiopians through its use of a musical style that shares many characteristics with the music of the northern and western regions. <em>Maalan Jira</em> cycles through a 6/8 metre (that is, a fast pulse of six notes in a cycle) with an autotuned vocal track and the faint sound of a <a href="https://bit.ly/31ODd1z">massenqo</a> (the one-stringed spike fiddle) in the background. In the video men and women dance against a pastoral backdrop, with cattle – a mainstay of the Oromo way of life – playing heavily into what otherwise looks like a video about courtship and unrequited love. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Wv3he6CGF3E?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The most famous song of Hachalu Hundessa’s young career.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One reason Ethiopians love Hachalu Hundessa’s music is the clear use of the literary device of “<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11841-010-0201-9">wax and gold</a>” in his lyrics. The term comes from Amharic, the working language of Ethiopia, referring to a poetic and literary sensibility that presents deep truths within superficial trappings. It must surely be at play here, with a deeper meaning about sovereignty and independence. </p>
<p>This is how music contributes to the political discourse in Ethiopia, a country where musicians often find themselves <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1070040/ethiopias-government-is-going-after-teddy-afro-the-billboard-chart-topping-popstar/">in grave danger</a> if they don’t toe the government’s line. Ethiopia’s biggest pop star, Teddy Afro, was imprisoned in 2008 on manslaughter charges for an alleged hit-and-run, but he was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-afro/pop-star-teddy-afro-freed-from-jail-in-ethiopia-idUSTRE57C4NT20090813">released</a> when the charge couldn’t be sustained. For decades, and especially during the military <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ethiopia/history-dergue.htm">dictatorship</a> of 1974-1991, musicians went underground or emigrated before they could be the next target. </p>
<h2>A man brimming with empathy</h2>
<p><em>Maalan Jira</em> asks the Oromo people to consider loss and land and their role in Ethiopian history, giving a condensed retelling of the Oromo struggle. The song shows us what Hachalu Hundessa was so popular for – songs that inspired millions of Oromo to feel confident about their under-represented place in Ethiopian society. But it doesn’t tell us why he meant so much to people. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopians-are-losing-faith-in-abiys-promises-for-peace-126440">Why Ethiopians are losing faith in Abiy's promises for peace</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>To learn this, one might consider his substantial personal magnetism, which comes through even to those who haven’t listened to Ethiopian music before. Across the range of Ethiopian media that outsiders don’t know about – try <a href="https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=Ethio-tube&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8">Ethio-tube</a> or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJAGgmn7wjz0nsZufLlLO0A">Oromp3</a> – we see a self-confident figure brimming with empathy whom the people love. </p>
<p>Try this <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TenEV86sP2Q">performance</a> in Addis Ababa or this <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kd0j-im9YNw">visit</a> to a community center in Canada. Most of these clips have half a million views on YouTube, and many of the people leaving comments make reference to their hearts being broken.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142062/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilana Webster-Kogen receives funding from the Jewish Music Institute.</span></em></p>The outspoken singer always considered himself to be at risk, and in Ethiopia people loved him because he didn’t let that risk keep him quiet.Ilana Webster-Kogen, Senior lecturer, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/706592017-01-05T17:58:17Z2017-01-05T17:58:17ZEthiopia’s political ripple a big test for infrastructure-led Chinese approach<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150945/original/image-20161220-26718-s8z46v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Addis Ababa’s light-rail network built by China Railway Engineering Corporation has become a key transport link for city residents. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Solan Kolli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nearly three months into the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37600225">state of emergency</a> declared by Ethiopia, the atmosphere on the streets of its bustling and impressively modern metropolis and capital, Addis Ababa, feels tense. </p>
<p>At 2,355m above sea level, the climate is pleasantly mild most of the year. Its broad thoroughfares are studded with magnificent cultural attractions. These are infused with the glow of an ancient yet resilient civilisation that could withstand both Jesuit and Wahhabi encroachment.</p>
<p>Yet, at present, tourists are understandably few and far between. There have been reports of hundreds of deaths in districts surrounding the capital in recent weeks. But these have been played down as an exaggeration by Prime Minister Heilemariam Desalegn. </p>
<p>Violence broke out during an <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37534387">Oromo religious festival</a>, and in some instances foreigners seem to have been <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-ethiopia-killings-oromo-protesters-20161011-snap-story.html">targeted</a>. In response, the predominantly ethnic-Tigrean government clamped down on social media, took a few TV channels off the air, and restricted the movement of the opposition leader and foreign observers.</p>
<p>For the past few years, Ethiopia has been able to partly shed its association with abject poverty and famine. Arguably inspired by China, the country became a developmental success story and <a href="http://mgafrica.com/article/2016-02-05-worlds-fastest-growing-economy-ethiopia-is-new-flavour-of-the-month-for-africa-watchers">one of the fastest-growing countries</a> in the world. At much the same time, Addis Ababa was able to capitalise on being the gateway to the politics of the African continent and foreign aid.</p>
<p>It is evident just how rapidly China’s stakes here have grown over the past few years. Just as evident is China’s different approach to development as compared with the West. It is also easy to see why the recent instability in Ethiopia is a real test to China’s approach. </p>
<p>Behind the veneer of Ethiopia’s parliamentary federalism lies an authoritarian system of state-led development that is preferred by Beijing over the country’s ragtag opposition forces. The question is whether the fruits of fast economic growth can be distributed sufficiently effectively in Ethiopia so as to forestall ethnic rural unrest. </p>
<h2>Showcase infrastructural projects</h2>
<p>Rather than providing grants directly aimed at poverty alleviation or promoting civil society, Chinese state-owned enterprises have been busy erecting showcase infrastructural projects. The aim is to attract further private business investment and to boost tourism. </p>
<p>The new sparkling African Union conference centre in Addis was fully funded by China. A new six-lane 87km highway to Adama has cut travel time from three hours to just one hour. And the international arm of China State Construction will soon give the capital a state-of-the-art stadium and upgrade its airport. </p>
<p>But perhaps a more persuasive productivity-booster is Addis Ababa’s new light-rail network completed in 2015 by China Railway Engineering Corporation. Often, the Chinese developmental approach is portrayed as construction frenzy ahead of genuine consumer demand. </p>
<p>Yet, far from being at risk of becoming a white elephant, it is already heavily used by local commuters just over a year after inauguration. In a city where taxi fares are exorbitant and buses are often in bad repair, the network is making a real difference to ordinary people’s lives.</p>
<p>But Beijing also runs a real risk here. In 2007, for example, 65 Ethiopians and nine Chinese expatriates were murdered by Somali separatists in an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/25/ethiopia">attack on a Sinopec-run oilfield</a> in the east of the country. There is clearly a strong case for Heilemariam to broaden his government’s ethnic support base and heed various regional and rural concerns about disenfranchisement as a result of foreign investment. </p>
<h2>No zero-sum game between the US and China</h2>
<p>Unlike the Chinese Foreign Affairs ministry, the US State Department has expressed <a href="http://www.ethionewsflash.com/index.php/2016/10/13/u-s-expresses-concern-over-ethiopias-state-of-emergency/">concern</a> over the imposition of the state of emergency. </p>
<p>But the Ethiopian government is likely to remain in the US’s good books. This is primarily because of its role in countering the spread of fundamentalist terrorism in the Horn of Africa. In fact, it is that role that has helped endear Ethiopia to the world, and facilitated Western relief aid.</p>
<p>On the other hand, it would be a mistake to conclude China’s growing stakes in Ethiopia immediately offset Western interests. For one thing, Ethiopia’s recent troubled history suggests the enemies of government often denounce oppression. But they do not necessarily champion human rights when they seize power themselves.</p>
<p>In addition, Western aid is still far greater and more vital to the running of the country than anything China provides. For all the speculation about the Chinese currency replacing the US dollar as global reserve currency soon, most hotels here do not seem to readily exchange China’s currency for Birr yet.</p>
<p>There is, in short, no zero-sum game between the US and China over Ethiopia, at times quite to the contrary. Neither power is interested in Ethiopia purely for exploitative colonial-style mineral extraction, or is purely motivated by altruism. The budding, somewhat desultory Chinatown in Addis Ababa’s Rwanda Vegetable Market hardly comes across as an insular colonial outpost. And the Chinese embassy compound is vastly outsized by the American one.</p>
<p>What plays out instead are perhaps different approaches to the low-income world where the US has prized the diffusion of individual freedoms and human-rights norms and China has prized collective economic betterment. And both the US and China are set to lose out if chaos spreads in the Horn of Africa.</p>
<h2>China’s approach may be benefiting Ethiopia</h2>
<p>Amid capital scarcity, China’s different approach seems to benefit Ethiopia. Put simply, it opens up another avenue for development where the World Bank and IMF doctrines have until recently been the only show in town. </p>
<p>In concrete terms, it means Chinese companies nowadays bid for projects often with concessional terms – where, in the past, only Western companies had the technological capacity to deliver.</p>
<p>Hydro-electricity is perhaps the best example for that: a healthy competition seems to be building up between Italy’s Salini Impregilo and Sinohydro when it comes to damming Ethiopia’s rivers. Local and foreign NGO oversight would still be vital in order to minimise the dislocation and environmental degradation that both companies can cause. </p>
<p>But, at the same time, with better planning, the untapped potential of hydro-power might mean cleaner and lower-cost energy in a part of the world where power cuts are all too common.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70659/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niv Horesh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In Ethiopia, the US pushes the diffusion of individual freedoms and China jockeys for collective economic betterment. Both the US and China could lose out if chaos spreads in the Horn of Africa.Niv Horesh, Visiting Research Fellow, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/680842016-11-03T15:26:29Z2016-11-03T15:26:29ZThe death knell of Zuma’s rule echoes transitions elsewhere in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144375/original/image-20161103-25319-1osxm4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa and Ethiopia are part of a wave of protests sweeping across parts of Africa that are known as Africa Uprising. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Tiksa Negeri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sometime after the next South African president is sworn in, the country will look back on the Jacob Zuma years and reflect on the two defining moments of this period of degeneration: the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/marikana-massacre-16-august-2012">Marikana massacre</a> in 2012, and the release of the Public Protector’s <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">State of Capture</a> report after the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-withdraws-application-for-state-capture-report-interdict-20161102">court humiliation</a> of Zuma and a cabal of his supporters. </p>
<p>The Marikana massacre was the most dramatic symbol of popular resistance to state failure, although it was by no means an isolated event. The state capture report represents the victory of a broad front of political elites drawn from all parties, key business networks and several civil society coalitions who gathered in 1980s-style <a href="http://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/da-eff-and-save-south-africa-march-against-state-capture/">“united frontism”</a> in the country’s capital Pretoria. This may just be a prelude to a rearrangement of power positions at the apex after Zuma falls - or gets pushed - onto his sword. Or it foreshadows deeper regime change. </p>
<p>Either way, South Africa has become part of a much wider pan-African dynamic commonly referred to now as <a href="http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/africa-uprising-popular-protest-political-change/">Africa Uprising</a> – the third wave of major popular uprisings since the 1950s. These uprisings are led mainly by urban youth and, although diverse, they essentially express aspirations that most regimes cannot currently address. In particular demands for democratic decision-making, an end to state capture and greater redistribution. </p>
<p>The first wave took place in the 1950s/1960s which led to the end of colonialism. The second was in the 1980s/1990s which got rid of dictatorships that followed the growth years of the 1960s, reinforced by <a href="https://www2.gwu.edu/%7Eerpapers/teachinger/glossary/cold-war.cfm">Cold War dynamics</a>. The third wave has affected over 40 countries over the <a href="http://www.crasc.dz/arb/index.php/fr/accueil/36-mars-2016/303-africa%E2%80%99s-third-wave-of-protests">past decade</a>, and the outcome is as yet unclear.</p>
<h2>Opponents gather strength</h2>
<p>If Zuma had proceeded with his court action to <a href="http://www.news24.com/Video/SouthAfrica/News/watch-live-zuma-withdraws-state-capture-report-interdict-20161102">stop publication</a> of the report, he would have directly taken on his own party and the people of South Africa. This remarkable eventuality was a step too far, even for him. </p>
<p>For the leadership of the African National Congress, it must have been comforting seeing him engineer his own almost total political isolation, thus saving them from finding the courage to recall him like they did former <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-20-anc-recalls-mbeki">President Thabo Mbeki in 2008</a>. </p>
<p>There has been growing evidence over the past few weeks that the tide has begun to turn against Zuma in the the party’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/officials/national-executive-committee-0">National Executive Committee</a>. This became very apparent when its chief whip Jackson Mthembu kept his job after leading the public <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/10/23/Mthembu-calls-for-entire-ANC-leadership-to-step-down">charge against Zuma </a> from his parliamentary base two weeks earlier. Mthembu didn’t suffer the same fate as Paul Mashatile, another ANC stalwart and then leader of the country’s economic powerhouse Gauteng, who paid the price for coming out publicly <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-02-paul-mashatile-joins-savesouthafrica-there-was-nothing-we-could-do-before-now">against Zuma </a> before the local government elections in August. </p>
<p>And there have been the first indications that the usually fearful and limp-wristed business community has had enough. There could be no clearer evidence of this than the standing ovation that AngloGold Ashanti chairman Sipho Pityana got at a mining conference. This was followed by CEOs coming out against <a href="http://m.news24.com/news24/Columnists/GuestColumn/pityana-south-africans-have-had-enough-20161102">charges being brought against</a> the Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan.</p>
<p>A rapid series of events over the past few weeks suggest that the tide has turned against Zuma. After the head of the country’s National Prosecuting Authority Shaun Abrahams dropped the <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/npa-drops-charges-against-gordhan-2085233">charges against Gordhan</a> thus further weakening Zuma, rumours circulated within the ANC, parliamentary and well-connected business circles that “No. 1 (a colloquial reference to Zuma) was planning a major strike that will change the game”. Most assumed this would be a scorched-earth cabinet reshuffle to get Gordhan out. After the publication of the Public Protector’s damning report this seems unlikely.</p>
<p>It would, nevertheless, be a mistake to underestimate Zuma.</p>
<h2>Dangerous times ahead</h2>
<p>The issue is no longer whether Zuma will leave or not. The challenge now is a power vacuum without a clear political project to fill it. This is the new contestation, a dangerous time when the moves are opaque. ANC factions are out in the open, but none seem able to lead decisively. Populist forces would be keen to fill this vacuum.</p>
<p>One of the country’s largest unions, <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/11/01/Zumas-position-now-untenable-and-he-must-resign-Nehawu">the National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union</a>, has made a commendable intervention calling on Zuma to resign and for the deputy President <a href="http://whoswho.co.za/cyril-ramaphosa-1113">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> to take over. But, given the myriad divisions in the ANC, it’s a safe bet that Ramaphosa is not about to step into the breach with a coherent coalition of forces behind him. </p>
<p>By contrast, if a downgrade triggers a recession and protests mount, mass mobilisation may well be triggered. South Africans should not underestimate what happens as politicised students head home into their communities across the country for the holidays. As in Ethiopia recently, this could turn a student moment into people’s movement.</p>
<h2>Africa’s third wave of uprisings</h2>
<p>So is South Africa part of the third wave of African uprisings? It’s important to recognise that these have not unfolded uniformly with a shared platform. What is common is action against ruling elites, but this has played out differently in different countries, with some victories for democracy and some setbacks.</p>
<p>The most recent have been protests in Ethiopia that started with student demonstrations and spread out into a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">people’s movement</a>, with significant support from the Ethiopian diaspora. The governing party has admitted that changes are needed. There has been a cabinet reshuffle and <a href="http://www.zeethiop.com/mobile/watch.php?vid=4bcb977a6">20 cabinet ministers</a> have been fired.</p>
<p>There are similar stories across the continent, with different results. In some power positions have been rearranged at the apex, as in Ethiopia. But in Tanzania President John Magufuli is completely <a href="http://www.enca.com/africa/tanzanias-magufuli-most-un-african-leader?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_term=Autofeed#link_time=1449142617">changing the ballgame</a>.</p>
<p>The North African chapters of the Arab Spring have decomposed into dictatorships largely because middle class-led movements did not translate into real organisational power capable of resisting re-militarisation.</p>
<p>In August 2016, 272 activists from movements across Africa met in Arusha and issued the <a href="http://africacsi.org/2016/08/24/the-kilimanjaro-declaration/">Kilimanjaro Declaration</a>. A key sentence read:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[t]hat the wealth belongs to all our people, not to a narrow political and economic elite. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>State capture is not just a South African phenomenon. Nor are the country’s movements unique. But I believe that South Africa is part of Africa Uprising, and like the previous waves, the country can assume that things will change fundamentally. What it should not do is allow the current political vacuum to be filled by those who only want to rearrange power positions in the apex or alternatively impose a populist solution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68084/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Swilling receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>The growing revolt against South Africa’s president, amid state capture allegations, is not an isolated event, but part of a much wider pan-African uprising led by the continent’s disaffected youth.Mark Swilling, Distinguished Professor of Sustainable Development, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.