tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/vladimir-putin-6680/articlesVladimir Putin – La Conversation2024-03-26T17:02:01Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262702024-03-26T17:02:01Z2024-03-26T17:02:01ZTen years since its annexation, Crimea serves as a grim warning to any Ukrainian lands that fall under Russian occupation<p>Basking in his wholly expected re-election victory, Russian president, Vladimir Putin, <a href="http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/73670">addressed</a> a large crowd in Moscow’s Red Square on March 18 to mark the 10th anniversary of his country’s annexation of Crimea. </p>
<p>The familiar themes of rectifying a historical injustice, the unbreakable unity of the Russian people and the importance of Crimea to Russian identity were trotted out once again. The crowd duly applauded. </p>
<p>Yet compared to ten years ago, when the whole country appeared to be in the grip of <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/">collective ecstasy</a>, the celebrations seemed muted. Much has changed in the intervening ten years, not least that Putin’s miscalculations have put the status of Crimea in doubt again.</p>
<p>On the peninsular itself, life has changed profoundly. The “land of milk and honey” promised to the population of Crimea at the time of annexation has not materialised. International sanctions, high prices and increasing uncertainty have left the mainstay of the economy, tourism, <a href="https://www.worldfinance.com/special-reports/crimea-doesnt-pay-assessing-the-economic-impact-of-russias-annexation">in the doldrums</a>. And the democratic freedoms that existed under Ukraine have disappeared, not only for the Ukrainian and Tatar populations, but for the Russians too. </p>
<p>The security of Crimea is also under threat as at no time since 2014. Ukrainian rockets and drones have destroyed about 20% of the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet, including the flagship <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-forces-destroy-large-russian-landing-ship-military-says-2024-02-14/">Moskva</a>. And the Kerch bridge – the symbol of Putin’s triumph – has been subject to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/17/explosions-reportedly-hit-crimeas-kerch-bridge-as-russia-cites-emergency-situation?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other">repeated attacks</a>. </p>
<p>The Russian navy has been driven ignominiously from its bases in Crimea to the safer haven of <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/05/war-in-ukraine-russia-moves-warships-out-of-crimea-as-ukrainian-strikes-continue">Novorossisk</a> in Russia itself. Ships carrying Ukrainian grain can now exit the Black Sea due to defeats inflicted on the Russian fleet.</p>
<p>In one area, however, the Russians have enjoyed success. The Russification of the peninsula is continuing apace.</p>
<h2>‘Russian World’</h2>
<p>Russification of Crimea is not an ad hoc policy imposed after the occupation. It is rooted in the ideology of <a href="https://media.neliti.com/media/publications/229529-the-boundaries-of-russian-identity-analy-43c3a297.pdf">Russkii MIr</a> (“Russian World”). This concept, which is espoused by Putin, is itself part of a long historical tradition going back to the annexation of the Crimea by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Catherine-the-Great">Catherine the Great</a> in 1783. </p>
<p>The Russian World ideology insists that Russia is a supra-national civilisation that extends far beyond the present borders of the Russian Federation to include Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and other parts of the former Soviet Union. At the same time, the ideology is intolerant of any other expression of identity within its sphere and justifies the elimination of that identity, as is taking place in Crimea. </p>
<p>The Imperial Russian state (1721–1917), the Soviet State (1917–1991) and now the Russian Federation under Putin have at different times all sought to Russify the population of the Crimean peninsular. The Imperial government encouraged the migration of Tatars from the peninsular and Stalin completed the process in 1944 by <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/fr/document/suerguen-crimean-tatars-deportation-and-exile.html">deporting</a> the entire Tatar population – some 200,000 people. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.history.com/news/crimea-russia-ukraine-annexation">partial return</a> took place under Krushchev (premier of of the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1964), which greatly accelerated when the Crimea became part of a democratic Ukraine. Putin has now reversed that policy, seeking the destruction of both the Tatar and Ukrainian identities.</p>
<h2>Eradicating non-Russian identity</h2>
<p>Putin swore to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26652058">safeguard</a> the different national traditions that existed in Crimea when he launched the annexation. These promises were broken immediately and have continued to be broken ever since. </p>
<p>Ukrainian and Tatar languages have been suppressed, political activists <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/14/crimea-persecution-crimean-tatars-intensifies">arrested</a> and any expression of cultural identity other than Russian is forbidden. The national body of the Crimean Tatars, the Mejlis, has been suppressed and all other representative institutions are a sham, as those in Russia itself. </p>
<p>Religious persecution against the Ukrainians and the Tatars, which is <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-russias-church-backing-putins-war-church-state-history-gives-a-clue-178732">actively assisted</a> by the Russian Orthodox Church, is also an essential part of the Russification policies.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/do-claims-that-crimean-tatars-are-worse-off-under-putin-than-stalin-stand-up-an-expert-examines-the-evidence-217333">Do claims that Crimean Tatars are worse off under Putin than Stalin stand up? An expert examines the evidence</a>
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<p>What is striking about the Russification of Crimea is its comprehensive nature and the ruthlessness with which it is being carried out. A major instrument of Russification has been the imposition of Russian citizenship on the population of the peninsular. This has been achieved through a combination of incentives and crude threats. </p>
<p>Access to vital services such as health, education, banking, pensions and jobs are dependent on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/03/crimea-not-our-home-anymore">acceptance of Russian citizenship</a>. No passport means that these services are not available. The refusal of Russian citizenship has lead to confiscations of property, expulsion from the peninsular and even threats to take away the children of those retaining Ukrainian citizenship.</p>
<p>Acceptance of citizenship makes men eligible for military service. And Putin’s government has ruthlessly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/20/russia-forces-ukrainians-occupied-areas-military">mobilised men</a> from the Crimea and the Donbas. A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/03/russia-forcing-ukrainian-passports-us-report?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other">new citizenship law</a> in April 2023 extended these practices to the territories occupied since 2022.</p>
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<img alt="A man dressed in army attire with a cap featuring the Russian flag boarding a train." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584348/original/file-20240326-20-szdr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584348/original/file-20240326-20-szdr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584348/original/file-20240326-20-szdr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584348/original/file-20240326-20-szdr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584348/original/file-20240326-20-szdr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584348/original/file-20240326-20-szdr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584348/original/file-20240326-20-szdr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Conscripts called up for military service in the Russian Army in Tomsk, Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/tomsk-russia-october-11-2022-russian-2213582155">Dmitriy Kandinskiy/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>These changes have been accompanied by demographic changes that have taken place since the annexation. According to Russian figures, at least 200,000 Russians have <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/demographic-transformation-of-crimea-forced-migration-as-part-of-russias-hybrid-strategy/">migrated to Crimea</a> since 2014. Ukrainian <a href="https://eurasianet.org/russia-migration-helping-to-russify-crimea">figures</a> suggest that 50,000 Ukrainians and Tatars have left over the same period. </p>
<p>This is a form of ethnic cleansing designed to make the Crimea irrevocably Russian and protect it against any fair referendum that might return the peninsular to Ukraine. </p>
<p>The ten years since the annexation of Crimea has been a dismal exercise in the suppression of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society by a ruthless regime that tolerates no identities apart from the one that it prescribes. Russification in Crimea has also provided a model that has been imposed on Ukrainian territory taken since 2022 and is a grim warning to any future lands that fall under Russian occupation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226270/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shane O'Rourke does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since annexing Crimea ten years ago, Putin has set out to destroy non-Russian identities on the peninsular.Shane O'Rourke, Senior Lecturer in Modern History, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261582024-03-25T17:01:34Z2024-03-25T17:01:34ZVladimir Putin: why it’s time for democracies to denounce Russia’s leader as illegitimate<p>When Russians went to the polls on March 17 to 19, it was less an election than an acclamation. </p>
<p>Putin’s margin of victory – he claimed to have won 87.21% of votes cast – was the largest in the country’s history. It put the Russian president <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/18/putin-vote-share-outer-limits-russia-election">on a par</a> with other great post-Soviet “democrats” <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_Karimov">Ilam Karimov</a> of Uzbekistan and Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan whose vote shares rarely fell below 90% Aliyev ousted Azerbaijan’s democratically elected leader Abulfaz Elchibey in a 1993 military coup and subsequently won an election with 99% of the votes.</p>
<p>As the respected Russia-watcher J. Paul Goode said on X (formerly Twitter), Putin’s reelection was more of a <a href="https://twitter.com/jpaulgoode/status/1769490535624982567">“reality show”</a> than a real vote.</p>
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<p>Even before voting began in Russia’s 2024 presidential election, Putin had got rid of any real opposition with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/would-be-putin-challenger-duntsova-barred-running-election-campaign-team-2023-12-23/">Ekaterina Duntsova</a> and <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2024/02/22/liberal-candidate-boris-nadezhdin-banned-from-russian-presidential-election#:%7E:text=After%20a%20day%20of%20deliberations,aspects%20of%20the%20commission's%20move.">Boris Nadezhdin</a> refused entry to the ballot. The three remaining politicians nominally classed as being “opposition candidates” were there merely to provide a veneer of democratic choice. Interestingly, all said they support the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240315-russia-presidential-election-three-candidates-putin-slutsky-kharitonov-davankov-little-suspense">war in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.oscepa.org/en/news-a-media/press-releases/press-2024/russian-federation-flouts-international-commitments-once-again-with-decision-not-to-invite-osce-observers-to-presidential-election">Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</a> was denied the chance to send an international electoral observation mission. The head of Russia’s domestic election monitoring group Golos (Voice), Grigory Melkonyants, had been <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-grigory-melkonyants-golos-election-watchdog/">arrested</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/head-russian-election-monitoring-group-be-kept-jail-until-vote-is-over-court-2023-12-06/">jailed</a> in 2023. The group put out the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/independent-russian-vote-monitor-says-election-was-mockery-2024-03-18/">following statement</a>: “Never before have we seen a presidential campaign that fell so far short of constitutional standards.”</p>
<h2>The fraud</h2>
<p>Polling stations opened in occupied areas of Ukraine on March 14, a day earlier than the rest of the country. Voters there <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-occupied-election-voting-arrests-eb0b0d872cf55e561dc221bbc53d63d4">reported being coerced</a> by government agents who visited them at home to pressure them into voting.</p>
<p>There was also widespread reported ballot stuffing, something that appears to be supported by (non-verified) <a href="https://twitter.com/colleaguespb/status/1770487133532201009">video evidence</a>. Mathematical analysis of the election by a respected Russian psephologist (an expert in how people vote) estimated that <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240320-shpilkin-method-statistical-analysis-gauges-voter-fraud-in-putin-landslide">up to half</a> of all votes were fraudulent.</p>
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<h2>Divergent views</h2>
<p>International reactions were mixed. <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-and-North-Korea-applaud-Putin-s-election-victory">China and North Korea</a> were quick to congratulate Putin, followed by <a href="https://www.belarus.by/en/government/events/lukashenko-calls-putin-to-congratulate-him-on-his-convincing-victory_i_0000169020.html">Belarus</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/19/russia-election-2024-vladimir-putin-victory-who-which-leders-congratulated-him">Venezuela and Cuba</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-modi-india-russia-relations-b2514757.html">India</a>, which has its own elections running from mid-April to the beginning of June, also congratulated Putin, as did <a href="https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1769778213926883753">Houthi rebels in Yemen</a> and <a href="https://tass.com/world/1762087">Hamas</a> in Gaza.</p>
<p>Other, mainly western countries, were not so fulsome in their reaction to Putin’s electoral triumph. The UK foreign secretary, David Cameron, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-following-outcome-of-russian-presidential-elections">said in a statement</a> that: “Putin removes his political opponents, controls the media, and then crowns himself the winner. This is not democracy.” </p>
<p>The French foreign ministry meanwhile <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240318-french-fm-western-leaders-denounce-putin-illegal-election-win-russia-allies-congratulations">said</a>: “The conditions for a free, pluralist and democratic election were not met.” Germany’s foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-election-wasnt-real-election-germanys-baerbock-says-2024-03-18/">stated</a> that the vote “was not a real election”.</p>
<p>The diverse reactions to Putin’s win was to be expected. The global order is rapidly changing, with the rise of rival blocs such as the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) world is becoming <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/05/usa-china-multipolar-bipolar-unipolar/">multi-polar</a>. Other countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iran and Ethiopia, have been accepted as candidate members. </p>
<p>This is not to say that a complete realignment of global power structures is imminent. And Brics remains a talking shop of disparate states with a range of often <a href="https://unherd.com/newsroom/brics-is-an-alliance-in-name-only/">competing aspirations</a>. Groupings such as this aim to challenge US global hegemony rather than defeat or replace it. </p>
<h2>Declaring Putin illegitimate</h2>
<p>But Putin has regularly billed the invasion of Ukraine as a fight against “the west” and a defence against Nato. Many believe that the Russian president, who famously called the collapse of the Soviet Union as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/">“greatest geopolitical catastrophe”</a> of the 20th century. Many believe he would use a victory in Ukraine as a launching pad for <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/02/russias-appetite-may-extend-beyond-ukraine.html">further imperial expansion</a>.</p>
<p>So the decision of so many leaders in the west to declare the recent election in Russia as fraudulent and Putin as an “illegitimate” leader is an important moment in international affairs. It shows these leaders are prepared to follow the lead of the <a href="https://pace.coe.int/en/">Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Pace)</a>.</p>
<p>Declaring Putin illegitimate would be the final recognition that Putin is out to destroy the international order. Western states should follow Pace’s <a href="https://pace.coe.int/en/news/9254/pace-urges-the-international-community-no-longer-to-recognise-putin-s-legitimacy-as-president-beyond-2024">advice</a>. In October 2023, Pace called on member states “to recognise Vladimir Putin as illegitimate after the end of his current presidential term and to cease all contact with him, except for humanitarian contact and in the pursuit of peace”.</p>
<p>That western governments – and their intelligence agencies – are prepared to continue to reach out – as the US did via the CIA’s warning to Russia of a possible terrorist attack which materialised in the terrible events at <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68642162">Crocus City Hall</a> in Moscow at the weekend, is an example of how they might keep channels of communication open while still declaring the Putin regime to be illegitimate. </p>
<p>In the event, the Kremlin chose to ignore American <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/gunmen-open-fire-in-moscow-concert-hall/">warnings</a>. It has even ignored claims by <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-blame-game-over-the-moscow-terror-attack-has-begun/">Isis-K</a> that it was behind the attack in order to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-ukraine-moscow-concert-hall-terrorist-attack-russia/">link it to Ukraine</a> .</p>
<p>A declaration of illegitimacy would end a clear <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/its-time-to-declare-putin-an-illegitimate-president/">signal</a> to Russian elites that Putin has taken Russia down a dark and dangerous path. It would also reassure those in the Russian population who are concerned about their country’s slide into dictatorship that they have not been abandoned. </p>
<p>As I <a href="https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/HJS-Declaring-Putin-Illegitimate-Report.pdf">set out in a report</a> for the Henry Jackson Society earlier this month, a declaration of illegitimacy would allow western states to increase its support for Ukraine, close loopholes in sanctions regimes, support Russia’s neighbours and provide a haven for Russian diaspora groups to develop a plan for a <a href="https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/HJS-Getting-a-Foot-in-the-Door-%E2%80%93-Creating-a-Future-Russia-Now-Report-web.pdf">democratic Russia</a> in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226158/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many western governments have called Putin’s election ‘illegitimate’. Now they need to adjust their diplomatic relations accordingly.Stephen Hall, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2264722024-03-24T12:06:44Z2024-03-24T12:06:44ZISIS-K’s attack in Moscow risks escalating the Russia-Ukraine war<p>A music concert in suburban Moscow became the scene of a bloody terrorist attack on March 22 as gunmen with automatic weapons and Molotov cocktails <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/moscow-russia-shooting-03-23-24/index.html">killed more than 130 people</a> and injured dozens more. </p>
<p>Immediately after the attack, speculation emerged about who was responsible.</p>
<p>Although Ukraine was quick <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/ukraine-denies-involvement-in-moscow-terrorist-attack-as-putin-presses-upon-us-for-information/ar-BB1knhBz">to deny any involvement</a>, Russian President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/moscow-attack-putin.html">Vladimir Putin used a short televised statement</a> to his nation to suggest, without evidence, that Ukraine was prepared to help the terrorists escape.</p>
<p>However, ISIS — and specifically its Afghanistan subsidiary ISIS-K — later <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoniopequenoiv/2024/03/22/isis-claims-responsibility-for-moscow-shooting-that-left-40-dead/?sh=1edfabbc7d0d">claimed credit</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-would-islamic-state-attack-russia-and-what-does-this-mean-for-the-terrorism-threat-globally-226464">Why would Islamic State attack Russia and what does this mean for the terrorism threat globally?</a>
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<p>Russia has yet to acknowledge ISIS was responsible. But regardless of who the terrorists were representing, the Moscow attack demonstrates two key concerns.</p>
<p>First, terrorist organizations — meaning those who use violence for political purposes without the specific backing of a government — can use pre-existing conflicts and the resulting media attention to advance their interests. Second, the actions of these organizations have the potential to further exacerbate ongoing conflicts.</p>
<h2>The use of sub-state paramilitaries</h2>
<p>Many countries find it useful to employ sub-state entities and paramilitaries to achieve their objectives. <a href="https://theconversation.com/paramilitaries-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-could-escalate-and-expand-the-conflict-206441">Both Russia and Ukraine have used and continue to employ such groups</a> to conduct acts their soldiers are ill-suited to carry out or where plausible deniability is needed. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paramilitaries-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-could-escalate-and-expand-the-conflict-206441">Paramilitaries in the Russia-Ukraine war could escalate and expand the conflict</a>
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<p>While using these forces has certain <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003193227/serbian-paramilitaries-breakup-yugoslavia-iva-vuku%C5%A1i%C4%87">advantages for a country</a>, it’s simultaneously problematic because it leads to questions over who is actually behind the actions.</p>
<p>Attacks earlier this year by Yemen-based Houthi groups on ships in the Red Sea are an example of this issue. The Houthi are <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/irans-support-houthis-what-know">commonly seen</a> as an Iranian proxy group. Even though there are close ties between the Houthi and the Iranian state, the Houthi <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemens-houthis-and-why-theyre-not-simply-a-proxy-of-iran-123708">are not controlled by Iran</a>. Assuming Iran is directly behind the attack on Red Sea shipping is at best questionable and at worst outright false.</p>
<p>While assessing the role that a state has in <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/five-myths-about-sponsor-proxy-relationships">directing its proxies and paramilitaries</a> is difficult, this pales in comparison to the difficulty in linking states to international terrorist organizations. It is an ambiguity that terrorist groups can exploit.</p>
<h2>Media attention: Oxygen for terrorists</h2>
<p>Defining terrorism is an exercise fraught with peril. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/disciplining-terror/terrorism-fever-the-first-war-on-terror-and-the-politicization-of-expertise/12E123D58AA0437750CB882B066E2B6B">politicization of the term</a> since the post-9/11 war on terror has given new meaning to the expression that “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/is-one-mans-terrorist-another-mans-freedom-fighter/257245/">one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter</a>.”</p>
<p>Typically, however, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/defining-terrorism">policymakers</a> <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/is-terrorism-necessarily-violent-public-perceptions-of-nonviolence-and-terrorism-in-conflict-settings/9BA6C161346EEE1563A7DC2639066A02">and academics</a> define terrorist groups as non-state organizations that seek to use violence or the threat of violence against civilians to achieve political objectives, with some ambiguity on which entities can perform it.</p>
<p>In the 21st century, the diffusion of <a href="https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/scales-dynamics-outsourcing/14566">communication technologies</a> and the <a href="https://archive.org/details/whatsnextproblem0000unse/page/82/mode/2up">24-hour news cycle</a> has provided terrorist groups with newfound means to capture international attention.</p>
<p>Video can be uploaded in real time by terrorist groups, and international attention can soon follow. The news media, however, is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/7/9/the-problem-is-not-negative-western-media-coverage-of-africa/">highly selective</a> in what it covers.</p>
<p>Due to media selectivity, terrorist organizations seek <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272717301214">to maximize their audience</a>. One way to do so is by linking their activities to ongoing events. ISIS-K’s attack in Moscow demonstrates this trend.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s decision to attack the Moscow music venue was not purely opportunistic. ISIS and its subsidiary organizations <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-23/what-is-isis-k-moscow-terror-attack/103623852">blame Russia</a> for its role in destroying ISIS in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s strike against Moscow therefore fits its own agenda, while also advancing its goals. The problem is the potential for escalation.</p>
<h2>Escalating the Russia-Ukraine conflict</h2>
<p>There is still much that is unknown about the attack. One can, however, draw out some of the potential consequences.</p>
<p>American authorities had <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/23/europe/us-had-warned-russia-isis-was-determined-to-attack-intl-hnk/index.html">previously warned Russia</a> that an attack was imminent. The Russian authorities dismissed the warning.</p>
<p>Putin even stated before the attack that American <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-dismissed-us-warnings-about-a-potential-terror-incident-as-blackmail-just-3-days-before-concert-hall-attack/ar-BB1knpXu">warnings to that effect</a> were a form of blackmail. So even a genuine warning from the United States was seen by Russian authorities in the light of the broader Russia-Ukraine conflict.</p>
<p>The aftermath of the attack has the potential to magnify these concerns. Putin claimed that four people involved in the conflict were captured <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/moscow-attackers-were-helped-ukraine-180044785.html?guccounter=1">attempting to flee</a> to Ukraine.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-would-islamic-state-attack-russia-and-what-does-this-mean-for-the-terrorism-threat-globally-226464">Why would Islamic State attack Russia and what does this mean for the terrorism threat globally?</a>
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<p>That seems questionable: the Russia-Ukraine border is one of the most militarized locations in the country due to the war. The result, however, is that the alleged escape attempt has allowed Russian politicians <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/prominent-russians-blame-ukraine-for-moscow-shooting-amid-fears-of-war-with-west/ar-BB1kpnj8">to link the attack</a> to Ukrainian authorities, despite Ukrainian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-not-involved-moscow-attack-says-kyiv-military-intelligence-spokesman-2024-03-23/">protests to the contrary</a>.</p>
<p>Russian authorities will have to act; any state would in the aftermath of such an assault. But retaliation is all the more likely given <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/putin-russia-moscow-attack.html">Putin’s consistent messaging</a> as a protector of the Russian people.</p>
<p>Eliminating terrorism, however, is an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/europe/war-on-terror-bush-biden-qaeda.html">incredibly difficult if not impossible</a> task, as demonstrated by the American experience. The Russia-Ukraine war, however, is providing a convenient arena for Russian authorities to redirect the grief and outrage in the aftermath of the tragic attack.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226472/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine has denied any involvement in the terrorist attack that killed dozens of people in Moscow, but that doesn’t mean Russia won’t try to use the event as a way to escalate its war with Ukraine.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2264642024-03-23T23:29:15Z2024-03-23T23:29:15ZWhy would Islamic State attack Russia and what does this mean for the terrorism threat globally?<p>It appears almost certain the brutal assault on a Russian crowd settling down to watch a rock concert in Moscow on Friday night was an Islamist terrorist <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/moscow-attack-islamic-state-russia-terror-crocus/32874123.html">attack</a>. </p>
<p>At least 133 people were left dead and scores more were injured after gunmen with automatic weapons <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/moscow-concert-attack-live-updates-rcna144768">stormed</a> the Crocus City Hall in Moscow and opened fire, triggering a stampede.</p>
<p>Islamic State <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/22/europe/crocus-moscow-shooting/index.html">claimed responsibility</a> for the attack, <a href="https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/islamic-state-claims-moscow-attacks">initially</a> through its Amaq media channel and then directly. The modus operandi of the attack also fits with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/world/europe/isis-moscow-attack-concert-hall.html?smid=url-share">previous</a> Islamic State attacks. </p>
<p>It has been widely reported the attack was the work of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/23/world/moscow-shooting">Islamic State Khorasan</a> (ISIS-K), a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/gunmen-open-fire-on-moscow-concert-hall-crowd-set-building-on-fire-20240323-p5feng.html">branch</a> established in 2015 in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>So who is this group, why would they attack Russia and what does this mean for the broader terrorism threat?</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">Iran terror blast highlights success – and growing risk – of ISIS-K regional strategy</a>
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<h2>What is ISIS-K?</h2>
<p>ISIS-K is the Islamic State branch that has most consistently and energetically attempted terrorist attacks across Europe, including in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/23/theres-little-reason-to-doubt-attack-on-moscow-venue-was-by-islamic-state">Russia</a>. ISIS-K has <a href="https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/islamic-state-claims-moscow-attacks">planned</a> some 21 <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/one-year-islamic-state-worldwide-activity-map">attacks</a> in nine countries in the past year, up from eight the previous year. </p>
<p>ISIS-K had been under tremendous pressure from the Afghan Special Forces and American troops before the United States full withdrew from the country in 2021. Although that pressure has continued under Taliban rule, ISIS-K has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/us/politics/isis-k-moscow-attack.html?action=click&pgtype=Article&module=&state=default&region=footer&context=breakout_link_back_to_briefing">grown in strength</a> in recent years, with several thousand fighters now operating in almost <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/islamic-state-khorasan-province-is-a-growing-threat-in-afghanistan-and-beyond/">every</a> one of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. </p>
<p>If ISIS-K is indeed responsible for the Moscow attack, we should prepare for further attempted attacks – not just in Russia but across Europe.</p>
<p>European authorities have arrested ISIS-K operatives on multiple occasions. After years of warnings that Islamic State was rebuilding the capacity and resolve to resume an international terrorist campaign, Friday’s attack shows the threat is immediate and substantial.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-string-of-assassinations-in-afghanistan-point-to-isis-k-resurgence-and-us-officials-warn-of-possible-attacks-on-american-interests-in-next-6-months-201852">A string of assassinations in Afghanistan point to ISIS-K resurgence – and US officials warn of possible attacks on American interests in next 6 months</a>
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<p>Earlier this month, the US, together with five other nations, had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/world/europe/isis-moscow-attack-concert-hall.html?smid=url-share">shared</a> intelligence they had of ISIS-K planning for attacks in Moscow. But these warnings were, as recently as last week, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/22/europe/crocus-moscow-shooting/index.html">rejected</a> by President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin as being part of an attempt to discredit Russia. </p>
<p>The attack comes at the worst possible moment for Russia’s despotic leader, in the wake of his successful “election campaign” to claim a mandate for a further six years in power. </p>
<p>And it is perhaps for this reason that Putin’s five-minute televised <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/moscow-attack-putin.html">address</a> on Saturday, in which he directed blame toward Ukraine, came so late.</p>
<p>We don’t yet know whether the Kremlin will continue to <a href="https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1771461905053360366">blame</a> Ukraine or the West for the attack, or if it will pivot to accept Islamic State was responsible. </p>
<p>Either way, it’s likely to respond with a wave of violence, cracking down on Russia’s Muslim minority communities in the North Caucasus region and beyond.</p>
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<h2>Why would they target Russia?</h2>
<p>Both Islamic State in general, and ISIS-K in particular, have long proclaimed their intention of striking Russia. </p>
<p>They have <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-23/what-is-isis-k-moscow-terror-attack/103623852">cited</a> Russia’s earlier military occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s and its long history of crackdowns on Muslim communities in Russia, particularly in the North Caucasus. They have also cited Russia’s role in providing a lifeline to the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.</p>
<p>But it was also likely <a href="https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/islamic-state-claims-moscow-attacks">opportunity and personnel</a> that led the group to select a soft target in Moscow, as much as anything else. </p>
<p>Islamic State carried out multiple <a href="https://twitter.com/azelin/status/1771276860237709441">attacks</a> in Russia from 2016–19, while several more plots were disrupted from 2021–23. </p>
<p>Many of the ISIS-K militants <a href="https://eurasianet.org/iran-attack-signals-growing-central-asian-role-in-iskps-external-ops">arrested</a> across Europe, including in Russia, over the past two years have been Russian nationals and people from Central Asia with links to Russia.</p>
<p>The most recent arrests occurred this month when Russian authorities claimed they prevented a planned attack on a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-it-neutralized-isis-cell-plotting-attack-moscow-synagogue-2024-03-07/">synagogue</a> in Moscow.</p>
<p>And last month, a Russian national accused of having Islamic State links was arrested in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-detains-russian-citizen-accused-being-member-islamic-state-2024-02-29/">Poland</a>, while another was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-arrests-russian-nuclear-plant-islamic-state-probe-sources-say-2024-02-13/">arrested</a> working at a nuclear facility under construction in Turkey. </p>
<p>In recent years, the vast majority of successful ISIS-K <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-expainer/31431763.html">attacks</a> have been in Afghanistan, with many targeting the minority Shia Muslim Hazara community. </p>
<p>For instance, the group launched a massive suicide bombing outside the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kabul-bombings-a-dark-day-for-afghanistan-and-joe-biden-and-a-harbinger-of-worse-to-come-166883">Kabul airport</a> in August 2021, in the midst of the chaotic evacuation of Kabul, which resulted in around 170 civilians and 13 US military personnel being killed. </p>
<p>ISIS-K also carried out a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/blast-in-kabul-kills-2-russian-embassy-staff-/6731342.html">bombing of the Russian Embassy</a> in Kabul in September 2022, killing at least six.</p>
<p>In January of this year, ISIS-K <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-explosions-soleimani-death-anniversary/32758522.html">launched</a> a massive suicide bombing in Kerman, Iran, killing nearly 100 people at a ceremony to mark the fourth anniversary of the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani. </p>
<h2>What next for Putin and the broader terrorism threat?</h2>
<p>Terrorist attacks, including those in brutal regimes like Iran or Russia, are tragic assaults on ordinary people who are not to blame for the politics of policies of the governments they are forced to live under.</p>
<p>When attacked, authoritarian regimes tend to respond with brutal reprisals that are likely to lead to cycles of violence, with less restraint and accountability than is typically the case with counter-terrorism operations in open societies. </p>
<p>Friday night’s attack in Moscow was nightmarish, but sadly the horror is likely to be just the beginning.</p>
<p>Regardless of how Putin and the Kremlin choose to respond, the attack comes as a reminder that the threat of terrorism posed by groups like Islamic State and al-Qaeda is now on the rise again. After five years of mostly operating in western Asia, the Middle East and Africa, these groups now pose a renewed threat to the West.</p>
<p>The continued <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/23/theres-little-reason-to-doubt-attack-on-moscow-venue-was-by-islamic-state">growth</a> of both ISIS-K and al-Qaeda under Taliban rule in Afghanistan should concern us much more than we have been acknowledging.</p>
<p>Friday’s attack is a clear reminder we should not look away and continue to wash our hands of any attempt to improve things in Afghanistan. There are no easy answers, but turning away and doing nothing will only make the situation worse.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-can-we-expect-from-six-more-years-of-vladimir-putin-an-increasingly-weak-and-dysfunctional-russia-224259">What can we expect from six more years of Vladimir Putin? An increasingly weak and dysfunctional Russia</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226464/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton receives funding from the Australian Research Council. He is engaged in a range of projects funded by the Australian government that aim to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia and Africa.</span></em></p>After five years of operating mostly in western Asia, the Middle East and Africa, Islamist terror groups are again growing in strength in the West.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation; Scholar -In-Residence Asia Society Australia, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2257482024-03-18T16:52:03Z2024-03-18T16:52:03ZVladimir Putin’s gold strategy explains why sanctions against Russia have failed<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-sanctions-economy-1.7141305">There are more than 16,000 sanctions imposed against Russia</a>. Yet the Russian economy and war machine grew by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-gdp-boost-military-spending-belies-wider-economic-woes-2024-02-07/">3.6 per cent in 2023 and is projected to grow another 2.6 per cent in 2024</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90753">Nearly six per cent of Russia’s gross domestic product goes towards military spending</a>. At a time when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is scrambling to acquire arms, funds and recruits, Vladimir Putin seems <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/putin-s-confidence-heading-2024">confident in his ambitions for the future</a>.</p>
<p>How have <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-sanctions-economy-1.7141305">16,000 strategic sanctions issued by some of the most powerful economies in the world</a> failed to derail Putin? </p>
<p>As I recently watched the news break on CBC about Russia’s robust economy, an advertisement from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ZRGt5Mj4tU">the World Gold Council</a> popped onto the screen. And there was the answer, hiding in plain sight: Gold.</p>
<h2>The role of gold</h2>
<p>Sanctions against Russia needed to be strategic, targeting the environment it operates in.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/smart-sanctions-for-a-stupid-war-the-west-finally-gets-clever-about-russia-196105">Smart sanctions for a stupid war: The West finally gets clever about Russia</a>
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<p>Economic sanctions targeted shipping and trade into Russia, but the gold market is a massive environment left largely untouched. After Russia invaded Ukraine two years ago, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-cracks-down-on-gold-and-oil-networks-propping-up-russias-war-economy">the United Kingdom, a major gold broker with one of the world’s largest gold reserves, cut all Russian imports of gold into the U.K</a>. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.gold.org/what-we-do?gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQjwqdqvBhCPARIsANrmZhMH6km3d7zz-Sx3e4A64LwKNb1Qa7l7mivRcH9Fa7UXsCgnSri8IvIaAu9PEALw_wcB">World Gold Council</a>, Russia is now the second largest producer of gold at <a href="https://www.mining-technology.com/data-insights/gold-in-russia/">324.7 tonnes in 2023, behind China at 374 million tonnes. Russia is expected to increase production of gold by four per cent a year until 2026</a>.</p>
<p>Since 2013, Russia has been <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/03/11/why-russia-has-been-so-resilient-to-western-export-controls-pub-91894">preparing for western sanctions</a> and managed to isolate its economy from transactions requiring American dollars.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/international/russias-currency-bounces-back-after-moscow-mandates-payment-for-gas-in-gold-pegged-ruble">In early 2022, Russia pegged its currency, the ruble, to gold</a>, and 5,000 rubles will now buy an ounce of pure gold. The plan was to shift the currency away from a pegged value and into the gold standard itself so the <a href="https://bullionexchanges.com/blog/russia-pegs-ruble-to-gold-what-does-that-mean-to-the-world-order">ruble would become a credible gold substitute at a fixed rate</a>. </p>
<p>Usually the rationale for holding on to gold reserves is to use them to settle foreign transactions at home and abroad. Gold holders can trade it on one of several bullion exchanges; it can be swapped for currencies to settle transactions and then swapped back into bullion.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/maduro-to-tap-sanctioned-dealmaker-to-ship-gold-to-iran-1.1433389">Venezuela, for example — a heavily sanctioned country — sent gold bullion to Iran in exchange for technical assistance with oil production.</a></p>
<p>Usually countries want gold <a href="https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400229947.001">as a safety backing to insulate against broader global financial shocks</a>. Many central banks are purchasing gold at breakneck pace, with about <a href="https://www.gold.org/goldhub/research/gold-demand-trends/gold-demand-trends-full-year-2023/central-banks">1,073 tonnes purchased in 2022</a>. A single tonne is about US$65 million, which means $110.6 billion in gold went into central banks globally in 2023.</p>
<h2>Gold prices fluctuate</h2>
<p>China is the world’s leading producer of gold, and also the world’s second largest buyer of it. <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/gold/reporter/chn">China imported US$67.6 billion in gold in 2022</a>, whereas <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/che">Switzerland took top place by importing US$94.9 billion</a>. </p>
<p>China’s appetite for gold has a great deal to do with stabilizing its own currency. In 2022, if someone purchased a new condo in Shanghai, often the developer would throw in a few <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/12/gold-bars-used-to-lure-chinese-homebuyers-amid-market-slowdown">gold bars to sweeten the deal</a>. </p>
<p>The World Gold Council argues that gold is the safest place to invest in times of conflict. But if that were true, there would have been a permanent bull market for gold dating back to <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071414/when-and-why-do-gold-prices-plummet.asp">Tutankhamen, making the price today infinite</a>. </p>
<p>Its price rises and falls like anything else. Which is why Putin’s goal of turning the ruble into pure gold is not genius, it is desperate.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russia-has-put-the-rouble-on-a-gold-standard-but-its-unlikely-to-last-180632">Why Russia has put the rouble on a gold standard – but it's unlikely to last</a>
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<p>The U.K., the United States and Canada will not touch Russian gold. But others will. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/russia-with-gold-uae-cashes-sanctions-bite-2023-05-25/">The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) imported 96.4 tonnes (US$6.2 billion)</a> of Russian gold in 2022 following the British sanctions. That’s up 15 times from the 2021 imports of only 1.3 tonnes (US$84.5 million). </p>
<p>It’s no mystery why so many <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/private-jets-go-russia-dubai-after-putin-pledges-self-cleansing-2022-3">private jets left Russia for Dubai</a> following the war and ensuing sanctions. </p>
<p>The other big client of Russian gold is Switzerland. </p>
<p>In 2022, Switzerland imported 75 tonnes of Russian gold (US$4.87 billion). <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-20/swiss-imports-of-russian-gold-climb-to-highest-since-april-2020">In 2023, it imported about US$8.22 billion</a> in gold from the U.A.E., which doesn’t produce its own but buys enormous sums from Russia, and US$3.92 billion from Uzbekistan, Russia’s next-door neighbour. </p>
<p>Billions upon billions of dollars of Russian gold is being freely traded at top dollar while avoiding every one of those 16,000 sanctions. </p>
<p>That’s why global sanctions against Russia haven’t derailed a thing. In order for Putin’s plan for economic resilience through gold to work, however, gold needs to increase in value. His long-term goal is that gold, not the U.S. dollar, will be the global trading currency. </p>
<h2>Consumer activism</h2>
<p>Here’s where average citizens come in, and how they can help determine what’s to come.</p>
<p>Right now, if you’re a Costco member, <a href="https://www.costco.ca/1-oz-gold-bar-pamp-suisse-lady-fortuna-veriscan-new-in-assay.product.4000201245.html">you can order an ounce of Swiss gold for CA$3,045</a> (limit two per member, and no refunds). This is not a speculative investment. Physical gold will not quadruple in value by Christmas. </p>
<p>Instead, buying gold is a <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071414/when-and-why-do-gold-prices-plummet.asp">guard against inflation and currency devaluation</a> in times of uncertainty. It’s the doomsday currency, which is why the World Gold Council advertises gold on cable news networks in exactly that vein. </p>
<p>If North American consumers, central banks and investors are panicked enough to buy gold en masse, the price will go up, and Putin’s plan works. </p>
<p>In the last quarter of 2023, American consumers purchased more than <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/15/costco-sold-more-than-100-million-in-gold-bars-last-quarter.html">US$100 million in gold bars through Costco alone</a>. </p>
<p>Is there actual Russian gold in those bars? Between Switzerland’s 2022 gold purchases from Russia and the 2023 purchases from the U.A.E., it’s likely there is.</p>
<p>If people are worried about the ethics of purchasing Russian gold, they can always buy <a href="https://www.costco.ca/1-oz-gold-coin-2024-canadian-maple-leaf.product.4000258262.html">the single-source Canadian Maple Leaf gold coin</a>. It comes from Québec, and as demand for coins like this increases, so too does the price of gold overall. </p>
<p>Still, bars and coins cannot compete with the power of demand from the central banks, and currently it’s high.</p>
<h2>Tarnishing gold</h2>
<p>To thwart Putin’s plan, the lustre needs to be removed from gold. Increasing gold supply could lower the price. Australia, Canada and the U.S. have important roles to play as leading gold producers. </p>
<p>Rising interest rates also tend to lower gold prices. A mass sell-off of government holdings in gold could also cause a tailspin for the ruble, but likely for the U.S. and Canadian dollars as well.</p>
<p>No single policy can thwart Putin’s goals — it requires disrupting the supply of gold beyond Russia, and that might well mean involving the U.A.E.</p>
<p>But with 16,000 sanctions on the books against Russia, one more smart sanction against the Emirates might be the golden egg Zelenskyy needs right now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225748/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Huish received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>Russia has tied its currency to gold to evade sanctions. Shifting the ruble away from a pegged value and into the gold standard itself is aimed at making it a credible gold substitute at a fixed rate.Robert Huish, Associate Professor in International Development Studies, Dalhousie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259992024-03-18T01:30:49Z2024-03-18T01:30:49ZThe West can’t ‘solve’ its Russia problem. Here’s how it should handle 6 more years of Vladimir Putin<p>In perhaps the least surprising news of the year, Vladimir Putin has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-18/vladimir-putin-wins-russian-election-with-88pc-of-vote/103599008">triumphed</a> at the Russian ballot box and been enthroned for the fifth time as president. He will serve for six more years. </p>
<p>He will be 77 years old in 2030. According to the constitution, which he re-wrote to his benefit in 2020, he then could stand again for a further six-year term.</p>
<p>To put that in perspective, Putin already has ruled Russia as president or prime minister for 24 years, or the equivalent of eight Australian parliamentary terms. In that period, Australia has had eight prime ministers and changed governing party three times. The United States has had five different presidents; the United Kingdom seven different prime ministers. </p>
<p>In contrast to elections in the West, where the outcomes are genuinely in the hands of the voters and adjudicated by independent electoral commissions, Russia is different. As the former UK ambassador to Moscow, Laurie Bristow, <a href="https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/europe/ukraine/63275/the-fear-from-within">wrote</a>: </p>
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<p>In Russia, the purpose of elections is to validate the decisions of its rulers, not to discover the will of the people.</p>
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<h2>Putin’s jaded view of the West</h2>
<p>Putin now will appoint a new government. His picks will be intensely scrutinised for clues to a succession plan and future policies. Although he is a master of surprise, we should not count on Putin leaving any time soon. Only four leaders of modern Russia and the USSR have left the top job alive; the rest have died in office of natural or other causes.</p>
<p>Moreover, Putin’s actions over the past two years have been directed at moving Russia from authoritarianism to semi-totalitarianism. The Carnegie Endowment’s Andrei Kolesnikov has <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91955?utm_source=carnegieemail&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=announcement&mkt_tok=ODEzLVhZVS00MjIAAAGR4apcAHO5jccv8lB9ZHWg61lChZMHSIeEo-OKlrgfhkwC-iDRpIgkqaAeA7wrrAOonYpxL4TsRrimNthGDvajKsVNS4O4BYhnV_sVykmGqAO2">written persuasively</a> of these tectonic shifts that recall the darkest years of Soviet Stalinism.</p>
<p>Putin has explicitly presented his war of choice in Ukraine as a proxy for a wider, long-term conflict with the West. He believes the West is irresolute, in decline, and easily distracted and deflected. </p>
<p>Former US President Donald Trump’s “have at them” attitude towards US allies and partners, and the woeful Western vacillation over further military aid to Ukraine, will only embolden Putin further. Buoyed by his ritual success in this weekend’s election, he will embark on further risky and provocative adventurism.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-can-we-expect-from-six-more-years-of-vladimir-putin-an-increasingly-weak-and-dysfunctional-russia-224259">What can we expect from six more years of Vladimir Putin? An increasingly weak and dysfunctional Russia</a>
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<p>Consequently, Putin – and the ideology of “<a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/ideology-putinism-it-sustainable">Putinism</a>” – pose a serious challenge for Western governments and policymakers who are genuinely accountable to their electorates, the party room, the parliamentary opposition, a vocal and inquisitorial media and an independent judiciary.</p>
<p>As exiled Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar has argued, part of Putin’s statecraft is directed at making <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/russias-war-woke">common cause</a> with ultra-conservative Western political elements to contest global “wokeness”, demobilise support for Ukraine, and dull resistance to Russian territorial ambitions in its neighbourhood.</p>
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<h2>How democratic governments need to respond</h2>
<p>Putin is well aware that the inherent fractiousness of democracy and the need to court the fickle voters hobbles democratic governments’ long-term planning. </p>
<p>Moreover, our political culture is predisposed to wanting to “solve” issues. Sometimes, though, problems of the scale posed by Russia or the Middle East can only be managed, not solved – and then only through joint efforts with like-minded allies and partners. That requires persistence and resilience to rise above short-term politicking and the twitches of our “instant expert” social media culture.</p>
<p>It also demands constant investment in building and sustaining public understanding of what really is at stake, beyond the borders of Europe that were drawn in the bloodshed and misery of the second world war. </p>
<p>This is difficult anywhere, not least in the West, where we have had it comparatively easy for most of the post-second world war era. We need stalwart and principled leadership now more than at any other point in the last 50 years. Most of all, we need ongoing serious and informed public conversations about what we value in and wish for in democratic societies, and the price we are willing to pay to attain and preserve that. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-us-and-its-partners-cannot-afford-to-go-soft-on-support-for-ukraine-now-217538">Why the US and its partners cannot afford to go soft on support for Ukraine now</a>
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<p>That sort of discourse can be hard to generate in our politically rather apathetic society. However, it is vital when the institutions of our democracy are barraged by foreign information manipulation and interference designed to sow doubt and distrust and corrode popular faith in the integrity of our form of government.</p>
<p>Especially in Australia, we have allowed our already limited pool of Russia expertise to atrophy to near-extinction. It is well past time to re-invest, modestly but purposefully, in Russian language and associated studies at our universities. We need to boost “Russia literacy” and comprehension of a country that will remain a significant and disruptive player in the world. This matters to countries that matter to us.</p>
<p>We should also honestly and critically assess the mistaken assumptions and indifference that at times have undermined effective Western policies towards post-Soviet Russia. However, we should not succumb to the propaganda peddled by Putin and his proteges abroad that Moscow is a blameless victim of Western perfidy and deception aimed at destroying the Russian state. </p>
<p>Rather, as Australian professor Mark Edele writes in his recent book, <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/russias-war-against-ukraine-paperback-softback">Russia’s War Against Ukraine</a>: </p>
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<p>Russia never came to terms – either as a society or as a polity – with its transformation from a continental empire with global reach into a nation-state and a regional power.</p>
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<p>The Kremlin is marketing Russia as an <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/from-russia-with-love-how-moscow-courts-the-global-south/">ally of “the Global South”</a> in resisting resurgent neo-colonialism and championing “multipolarity”. </p>
<p>The Putin thesis is that Ukraine is a patsy of London and Washington, while Moscow is on the side of the formerly colonised. That argument is finding some ready ears, evident in the patchy support for sanctions on Russia. We cannot assume our own Indo-Pacific region is persuaded of the wrongness of the Kremlin’s claims.</p>
<p>The reality confronting us is that of a sullen and resentful Russia, convinced that history, morality and even divinity is on its side in a de facto existential war with the West. </p>
<p>Moreover, as Bristow, my former colleague in Moscow, has <a href="https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/europe/ukraine/63275/the-fear-from-within">written</a>: </p>
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<p>we would be unwise to assume that a rising generation of Russians will embrace a more democratic and pro-Western outlook. </p>
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<p>Yet, we must not turn away from those Russians – far from an irrelevant minority – who do not share Putin’s view that the future of their country lies in the perceived glories of its past. The challenge is to articulate what a better future would look like for Russia, beyond confrontation, and to keep that alternative clearly in view.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225999/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Tesch is the former Australian ambassador to the Russian Federation (2016–19).</span></em></p>Western governments must honestly assess the mistaken assumptions that have undermined effective policies in the past and articulate what a better future would look like for the Russian people.Peter Tesch, Visiting Fellow at the ANU Centre for European Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258502024-03-15T15:01:05Z2024-03-15T15:01:05ZUkraine war: ten years after Putin annexed Crimea, Russia’s grip on the peninsula looks shaky<p>It is ten years since Russia illegally <a href="https://theconversation.com/now-crimeas-in-the-bag-where-next-for-putin-and-russia-24521">annexed</a> Crimea on March 18 2014. Subsequent efforts to firmly integrate the peninsula into the Russian Federation, however, have been far from the success story that the Kremlin often likes to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60793319">portray</a>. </p>
<p>In fact, comparing the increasingly shaky grip that Moscow has on the peninsula today with the situation before the annexation would suggest that Russia’s strategic position has actually worsened over the past decade.</p>
<p>The Kerch bridge between Crimea and Russia opened to much fanfare in 2018 with the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgmJrvcKtVI&t=16s">driving</a> a truck across it. It has become a symbol not only of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66221252">Russian occupation</a> of Crimea, but also of Ukrainian resistance. Spectacular Ukrainian attacks in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63192757">October 2022</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/traffic-stopped-crimean-bridge-due-emergency-russian-backed-governor-2023-07-17/">July 2023</a> exposed the tenuousness of Russia’s connection to the peninsula. </p>
<p>Not only that, but <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66829826.amp">repeated missile and drone attacks</a> on Russian installations in Crimea and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/17/world/europe/ukraine-partisans-insurgency-russia.html">partisan activity</a> in Crimea have further heightened the sense of Russian vulnerability.</p>
<h2>Black Sea successes</h2>
<p>Most significant of all, Russia’s Black Sea fleet has suffered significant losses over the past two years. As a result of these Ukrainian successes, the Kremlin decided to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-attack-crimea-russia-ships-relocate/">relocate the Black Sea fleet</a> from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk on the Russian mainland. Compare that with the situation prior to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 when Russia had a secure lease on the naval base of Sevastopol until 2042. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Black Sea." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Since the invasion in February 2022, Russia and Ukraine have battled for supremacy in the Black Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/create/editor/CiRkZjY2ZjA5Yi1jM2RmLTRhM2MtYmUxZC1hZDFjZGQ4NTA5NmQ">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Moreover, the Turkish closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles shortly after the start of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 means that Russia can no longer freely move war ships in and out of the Black Sea. This makes losses, like those of the Black Sea fleet’s flagship cruiser <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61103927">Moskva</a> in April 2022 and recently the patrol boat <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68477318">Sergey Kotov</a> and the amphibian landing ship <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68292602">Caesar Kunikov</a>, even more of a strategic blow to Russian capabilities.</p>
<p>These attacks also have a significant symbolic value for Ukraine and its allies. While the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive on the mainland failed to deliver on expectations, Kyiv’s deft deployment of air and sea drones and of longer-range missiles ensured a remarkable <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/2023-review-ukraine-scores-key-victories-in-the-battle-of-the-black-sea/">change of fortunes</a> in the Black Sea. This was underlined recently when the <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1759145815946195025">Kremlin removed</a> its second commander of the Black Sea Fleet since the invasion of Ukraine. </p>
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<p>Momentum around Crimea clearly seems to be on Ukraine’s side. Earlier this month, Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov signalled that a major operation aimed at further loosening Russia’s grip on Crimea <a href="https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/budanov-announces-major-operation-in-crimea-1710143680.html">was imminent</a>.</p>
<p>Apart from the strategic military and symbolic value of these Ukrainian successes, there is also a clear economic benefit. After Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain initiative brokered by Turkey and the United Nations, the fact that Moscow lost naval superiority in the Black Sea enabled Kyiv to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/16/world/europe/odesa-cargo-ship-black-sea-ukraine.html">establish</a> its own shipping corridor. </p>
<p>This now carries key Ukrainian agricultural exports to global markets at levels <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/ukraines-dec-black-sea-food-exports-top-un-brokered-deal-its-peak-brokers-2024-01-10/">exceeding</a> those during the period when the grain deal was actually in operation.</p>
<h2>Russia nervous</h2>
<p>This is overall undeniably good news at a time when there are many grim assessments of Ukraine’s prospects in this illegal Russian war. The renewed and arguably more optimistic focus on Ukraine was also obvious in <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-must-reclaim-crimea-achieve-real-peace-macron-1879496">recent comments</a> by the French president, Emmanuel Macron. </p>
<p>Recognising the strategic importance of the peninsula, including for the security of EU members such as Romania and Bulgaria with their own Black Sea coastlines, Macron insisted that restoring Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea was essential for lasting peace in the region.</p>
<p>This contrasts sharply with a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-lawmakers-seek-nullify-soviet-transfer-crimea-ukraine-2024-03-11/">move by lawmakers in the Duma</a>, Russia’s parliament. Members introduced a draft bill on March 11 that seeks to annul the transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine by former Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev in 1954. </p>
<p>It is not clear what, if any, effect such a law would have on the international legal status of Crimea as part of sovereign Ukrainian territory. But it suggests a degree of nervousness in Moscow regarding its grip on the peninsula.</p>
<p>This does not mean, however, that Russia is in any imminent danger of losing Crimea, let alone of losing the war that it has illegally fought against Ukraine both overtly and covertly for a decade now. The importance of Crimea in this war <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/514abee5-c09b-34f6-9a3a-865a64540a65">was established</a> long before the beginning of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. </p>
<p>And Putin and his proxies have <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-moscow-could-go-nuclear-over-kyivs-threats-to-crimea-187188">threatened</a> the use of nuclear weapons on more than one occasion if Russian were in danger of being forced out of Ukraine. These threats may been overblown, but they indicate the level of determination with which Moscow is committed to holding onto Crimea. </p>
<p>Ukrainian efforts have clearly demonstrated, however, that the Kremlin’s, and Putin’s personal, commitment may not be enough to secure Russia’s hold forever. Kyiv’s western partners would do well to remember that among the spreading gloom over the trajectory of the war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225850/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p>While Ukraine’s fortunes on the battlefield have been mixed, its operations in Crimea and the Black Sea have been rather more successful.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258352024-03-14T17:40:02Z2024-03-14T17:40:02ZUkraine recap: Russian election special – and the winner will be … Vladimir Putin<p>Russian voters have been heading to the polls this week. But it would be misleading to say they were voting to choose a president. That’s already been done for them – it’ll be Vladimir Putin. </p>
<p>If there had ever been any doubt that the president of 24 years would be returned for another six, Russia’s supreme court removed that earlier this month when it upheld a decision of the Central Election Commission to ban anti-war candidate Boris Nadezhdin from running. Not that he was going to win – the director of independent Russian pollster the Levada Center, Lev Gudkov, estimated that Nadezhdin would have won about 4% of the vote had he been on the ballot. Another anti-war candidate, television journalist Yekaterina Duntsova, was banned from running last December.</p>
<p>Anyone else who might be a focus for opposition is either in jail, dead or exiled. </p>
<p>This year votes will reportedly be cast using a new digital system, which many fear will allow voters to be monitored. But Natasha Lindstaedt, a Russian politics specialist at the University of Essex, believes that with Putin forecast to hoover up 75% of the votes cast, the Kremlin will be more concerned at the idea that people will indicate their opposition to the Russian president by <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-elections-despite-fixing-the-opposition-vladimir-putin-wants-lots-of-people-to-vote-for-him-225626">failing to vote at all</a>.</p>
<p>Faced with a similar lack of opposition talent to back, Iranian voters recently stayed at home in droves. Turnout for the parliamentary election was a lacklustre 41% – the lowest for a parliamentary election since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Lindstaedt says the Kremlin has spent a reported €1 billion (£850 million) on propaganda in the lead up to the poll. It’s also important for Putin to reinforce the image of his legitimacy in case he needs to call on more Russians to fight.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-elections-despite-fixing-the-opposition-vladimir-putin-wants-lots-of-people-to-vote-for-him-225626">Russian elections: despite fixing the opposition, Vladimir Putin wants lots of people to vote for him</a>
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<p>If you want to read more about this week’s election, Adam Lenton – a Russia expert at Wake Forest University in North Carolina – offers this analysis which identifies <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-things-to-watch-for-in-russias-presidential-election-other-than-putins-win-that-is-225013">three key issues</a> to look out for.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/3-things-to-watch-for-in-russias-presidential-election-other-than-putins-win-that-is-225013">3 things to watch for in Russia's presidential election – other than Putin's win, that is</a>
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<p>If you are thinking that Putin will never relinquish his grip on power, you are probably right. Robert Person, a professor of international relations at the United States Military Academy West Point, says Putin’s got every reason to want to die in office – not least because any successor would likely want him out of the way. So, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-has-no-successor-no-living-rivals-and-no-retirement-plan-why-his-eventual-death-will-set-off-a-vicious-power-struggle-224485">Person writes here</a>, there’s no succession plan and no public figures who – for the present at least – appear capable of mustering sufficient support to effect a seamless transfer of power. </p>
<p>Were Putin to die tomorrow, he’d be succeeded by the prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin. But Mishustin is a virtual nonentity, a former tax official with no base of his own and a trust rating of just 18%. It’s hard to see him having the momentum to take the reins on a permanent basis. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-has-no-successor-no-living-rivals-and-no-retirement-plan-why-his-eventual-death-will-set-off-a-vicious-power-struggle-224485">Putin has no successor, no living rivals and no retirement plan – why his eventual death will set off a vicious power struggle</a>
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>One opposition group that is making its voice heard is made up of wives of Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. Previously, write Jennifer Mathers and Natasha Danilova, it had been soldiers’ mothers who were very vocal in their opposition to the war in Chechnya in the 1990s. This time round it’s the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russian-soldiers-wives-are-increasingly-outspoken-in-their-opposition-224325">wives of men who are serving</a>, reflecting perhaps the relatively older age profile of combatants in Ukraine. Many soldiers are in their 30s and 40s, rather than their late teens and early 20s, as in Chechnya.</p>
<p>Mathers and Danilova, experts in international relations at the universities of Aberystwyth and Aberdeen respectively, say the women have gradually increased the public pressure on the Kremlin as the conflict has moved into a third year, moving from largely online opposition to regular protests. Rather than set themselves against the war in itself, they are focusing on securing concessions such as more regular leave for their loved ones.</p>
<p>But, Mathers and Danilova note, there are signs that the Kremlin is beginning to up the pressure on these women, visiting their homes and mounting increasingly strident media attacks on their group.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russian-soldiers-wives-are-increasingly-outspoken-in-their-opposition-224325">Ukraine war: Russian soldiers' wives are increasingly outspoken in their opposition</a>
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</em>
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<h2>British boots on the ground?</h2>
<p>Red faces among Germany’s political and military leadership recently when it emerged that an unencrypted phone call between senior Luftwaffe officers had revealed that British troops are in Ukraine helping with the deployment and targeting of Storm Shadow cruise missiles. The call had been intercepted and passed to Russian state broadcaster RT. </p>
<p>The Kremlin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said the call was “proof” that the west was orchestrating the war against Russia. Closer to home, one question being asked was whether this makes the UK a co-combatant.</p>
<p>Christoph Bluth, professor of international relations at the University of Bradford, <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-troops-operating-on-the-ground-in-ukraine-what-international-law-says-224896?notice=Article+has+been+updated.">examines the international law involved</a> and finds that under principles established since the second world war, helping Ukraine in this limited way does not violate the UK’s neutrality. But Moscow will no doubt use it as a political opportunity to escalate its anti-Nato rhetoric, Bluth writes. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/british-troops-operating-on-the-ground-in-ukraine-what-international-law-says-224896">British troops operating on the ground in Ukraine – what international law says</a>
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<h2>Memory and culture</h2>
<p>There was some heartening news from Washington this week when it was revealed that Joe Biden had managed to scrape together US$300 million (£235 million) to supply the Ukraine military with at least some ammunition as it struggles to hold the line against better-supplied Russian forces. But the west’s slow response to pleas from the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, for more military aid remains a huge concern. As the map below shows, Russia continues to make gains west of the town of Avdiivka, which they captured in mid-February.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW Map showing the battle lines around Adviivka in eastern Ukraine" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russia continues to make gains west of the town of Avdiivka, which they captured in mid-February.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Gervase Phillips, a historian at Manchester Metropolitan University, see parallels with the Polish uprising in November 1830. Initially, support for the Polish people against the oppressive rule of the autocratic Tsar Nicolas I was widespread, and early success on the battlefield made this seem a worthy cause in liberal salons across Europe. </p>
<p>But, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-a-warning-for-kyivs-western-allies-from-the-failed-polish-uprising-of-1830-31-225625">Phillips writes</a>, this was not to last. The Poles’ European allies failed to back their intentions with military aid, and the uprising developed into a war of attrition in 1831. Eventually Russian troops fought their way to Warsaw and the uprising failed. Will Ukraine suffer the same fate?</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-a-warning-for-kyivs-western-allies-from-the-failed-polish-uprising-of-1830-31-225625">Ukraine war: a warning for Kyiv's western allies from the failed Polish uprising of 1830-31</a>
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<p>Pope Francis I certainly appears to think so. The Holy Father sparked outrage in Kyiv (and elsewhere) last weekend when in an interview with Swiss public broadcaster RSI, he said Ukraine should find the “the courage to raise the white flag”. “When you see that you are defeated … you need to have the courage to negotiate,” he added. This drew an immediate and caustic response from Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba: “Our flag is a yellow and blue one,” he said, adding: “This is the flag by which we live, die, and prevail. We shall never raise any other flags.”</p>
<p>Tim Luckhurst, a former BBC journalist now researching second world war newspaper history at the University of Durham, was reminded of the way Pope Pius XII <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-pope-francis-should-learn-from-his-wwii-predecessors-mistakes-in-appeasing-fascism-225491">failed to openly criticise Nazi Germany</a> during the worst excesses of the Holocaust, preferring instead to safeguard the rights of German Catholics. Meanwhile round-ups of Italian Jews took place within sight of the Vatican.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-pope-francis-should-learn-from-his-wwii-predecessors-mistakes-in-appeasing-fascism-225491">Ukraine war: Pope Francis should learn from his WWII predecessor's mistakes in appeasing fascism</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, as admirers of the late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny gathered in Moscow for his funeral, the biggest festival of documentary film in the former Soviet countries opened in Latvia with a minute’s silence. Artdocfest was first held in Moscow in 2007 and showcased some of the best Russian and foreign-language documentaries. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the Kremlin began to pressure its organisers and withdrew all state support. In March 2022, after Putin launched his invasion, the festival relocated permanently to Riga.</p>
<p>Jeremy Hicks, professor of Russian culture and film at Queen Mary University of London, gives us <a href="https://theconversation.com/artdocfest-is-a-crucial-outpost-of-free-expression-on-russias-doorstep-225515">a taste</a> of the best films being showcased at the festival.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/artdocfest-is-a-crucial-outpost-of-free-expression-on-russias-doorstep-225515">Artdocfest is a crucial outpost of free expression on Russia’s doorstep</a>
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<h2>Podcast: Putin’s conspiracy theories</h2>
<p>Aptly enough, the subject of our podcast The Conversation Weekly is how Putin has managed to exert such a firm grip on power in Russia. Host Gemma Ware talks with Ilya Yablokov, a specialist in disinformation at the University of Sheffield.</p>
<p>Yabolokov, who has written regularly for us on the Russian media, has been researching the way Russia’s conspiracy culture has become a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conspiracy-theories-help-to-maintain-vladimir-putins-grip-on-power-in-russia-225703">key tool for Putin’s regime</a>: “Conspiracy theories are one of the few ways of keeping the society together and to prevent the change of the regime,” he says. </p>
<p>Incidentally, one of those theories is that shadowy western agencies orchestrated Navalny’s death to make Putin look bad. True or not, that mission has been well and truly accomplished.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conspiracy-theories-help-to-maintain-vladimir-putins-grip-on-power-in-russia-225703">How conspiracy theories help to maintain Vladimir Putin's grip on power in Russia</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225835/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2257032024-03-14T11:08:01Z2024-03-14T11:08:01ZHow conspiracy theories help to maintain Vladimir Putin’s grip on power in Russia<p>As Russians head to the polls on March 15 for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-can-we-expect-from-six-more-years-of-vladimir-putin-an-increasingly-weak-and-dysfunctional-russia-224259">presidential election</a>, conspiracy theories are swirling everywhere. In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>, we speak to a disinformation expert about the central role these theories play in Vladimir Putin’s Russia.</p>
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<p>As soon as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/navalny-dies-in-prison-but-his-blueprint-for-anti-putin-activism-will-live-on-223774">death of Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny</a> in a Siberian penal colony was announced in February, conspiracy theories about who was behind it <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPn2zQWOU70">began circulating in Russia</a>.</p>
<p>“That he was killed by his puppet masters from the west, not the Kremlin. That he was killed by them because his murder would actually make Putin look awful in the eyes of global community,” explains Ilya Yablokov, a lecturer in digital journalism and disinformation at the University of Sheffield in the UK.</p>
<p>Yablokov studies the <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Fortress+Russia%3A+Conspiracy+Theories+in+the+Post+Soviet+World-p-9781509522651">spread of conspiracy theories in post-Soviet Russia</a>, and says the stories about Navalny are the most prominent of many circulating ahead of a presidential election that looks certain to keep Putin in the Kremlin until at least 2030. </p>
<p>Yablokov tells The Conversation Weekly that Russia’s conspiracy culture has become a key tool for Putin’s regime: “Conspiracy theories are one of the few ways of keeping the society together and to prevent the change of the regime.” </p>
<p>Fear of anti-Russian conspiracy now informs many pieces of domestic legislation, such as the 2022 changes to the <a href="https://cpj.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Guide-to-Understanding-the-Laws-Relating-to-Fake-News-in-Russia.pdf">criminal code</a> that were aimed at censoring criticism of the Russian military, and in particular its actions in Ukraine. Yablokov adds:</p>
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<p>Every possible activity that can shake up the regime and question its actions is forbidden on the grounds of an existing conspiracy against Russia and its regime.</p>
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<p>Conspiracy theories used to exist on the margins of Russian culture. Putin typically avoided mentioning them too much, except at key political moments such as elections or Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. But now, and in particular since the Ukraine war, they have moved to the centre of political debate. </p>
<p>Listen to <a href="https://pod.link/1550643487">The Conversation Weekly</a> podcast to hear Ilya Yablokov talk about Putin’s changing relationship with conspiracy theories, plus an introduction from Grégory Rayko, international editor at The Conversation in France. </p>
<p><em>A transcript of this episode will be available shortly.</em></p>
<p><em>This episode of The Conversation Weekly was written and produced by Gemma Ware and Katie Flood, with assistance from Mend Mariwany. Sound design was by Eloise Stevens, and our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. Stephen Khan is our global executive editor, Alice Mason runs our social media and Soraya Nandy does our transcripts.</em></p>
<p><em>Newsclips in this episode were from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPn2zQWOU70">Russia Media Monitor</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mgydMTmhs50">BBC News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nJGDsOswFc">Guardian News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0nYAM-Jbfh4">NBC</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAvMgUf8nyo">News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EdKDrIR8ASY&t=88s">CBS Mornings</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tim9AodGLhU">Channel 4 News</a>.</em> </p>
<p><em>You can find us on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/">theconversationdotcom</a> or <a href="mailto:podcast@theconversation.com">via email</a>. You can also subscribe to The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter">free daily email here</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a> or find out <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">how else to listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225703/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilya Yablokov does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russian disinformation expert Ilya Yablokov tells The Conversation Weekly podcast about the president’s shifting relationship with conspiracy theories.Gemma Ware, Editor and Co-Host, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256452024-03-13T19:15:28Z2024-03-13T19:15:28ZRussia is about to hold another presidential election. It needn’t bother<p>Time for an early announcement: Vladimir Putin has won the upcoming Russian presidential election on March 15–17. It’s hardly a spoiler. Russian elections have been performative exercises in phoney democracy for many years now, and this latest round of theatre promises to be no different.</p>
<p>Official state analysts peg Putin’s likely support at <a href="https://tass.com/society/1744691">around 75%</a>. His only rivals are state-permitted and largely endorse both his platform and leadership. They include the Communist Party’s ageing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-is-off-ballot-russias-presidential-election-2024-03-11/">Nikolai Kharitonov</a>, who is polling around 4%, and <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/03/11/what-do-we-know-about-russias-presidential-candidates-a84412">Leonid Slutsky</a>, the comparatively spry candidate from the misnamed Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (it’s actually an ultra-nationalist party), who is polling about the same. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most “liberal” candidate on the ballot is <a href="https://www.russian-election-monitor.org/who-is-vladislav-davankov-a-new-hope-for-opposition-in-the-presidential-election.html">Vladislav Davankov</a>, the deputy chair of the State Duma – Russia’s lower house of parliament. Davankov has called for peace talks in Ukraine “on our terms, and with no roll-back”, and his main campaign slogan is the rather vague “Yes to changes!”. He is expected to receive perhaps 5% of the vote.</p>
<p>As Russians obediently line up to cast what amounts to little more than a mandatory expression of fealty, the only real questions worth asking are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>is there any semblance of opposition left?</p></li>
<li><p>and what kind of leader Putin will be in his fifth full term as president?</p></li>
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<h2>No real opposition figures left</h2>
<p>There is increasing evidence that Putin will become even more repressive. The Kremlin has overseen the elimination or marginalisation of any charismatic individual who might serve as a hub for popular opposition, and hence pose a threat to Putin – either on the ballot, or off it.</p>
<p>The death of <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/putin-unrivalled#:%7E:text=Navalny%27s%20demise%2C%20in%20a%20far,penal%20service%20euphemism%20for%20torture.">Alexei Navalny</a> in a Siberian prison camp certainly sent that message, underscored by the arrests of several people who attended his funeral. </p>
<p>But throughout Putin’s tenure, plenty of other challengers, dissidents or opponents have been executed or attacked. They include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-02/sussex-who-killed-boris-nemtsov-and-why/6274442">Boris Nemtsov</a>, the popular moderate politician assassinated in 2015 </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/ten-years-putin-press-kremlin-grip-russia-media-tightens">Anna Politkovskaya</a>, the human rights journalist shot dead in her apartment in 2006 </p></li>
</ul>
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<li><p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/23/chechnya-natalia-estemirova">Natalya Estemirova</a>, the anti-war activist kidnapped and killed in 2009 </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/21/the-magnitsky-affair-and-russias-original-sin-putin/">Sergei Magnitsky</a>, the lawyer who uncovered evidence of massive corruption and died after being beaten and denied medical care in 2009</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-58637572">Aleksandr Litvinenko</a>, the former intelligence agent poisoned with polonium in 2006 </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/salisbury-nerve-agent/555071/">Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia</a>, who were poisoned with Novichok in the United Kingdom in 2018 </p></li>
<li><p>and the convenient plane crash that killed Wagner leader <a href="https://blogs.griffith.edu.au/asiainsights/wagner-chief-prigozhin-reportedly-killed-but-has-putin-cooked-his-own-goose/">Yevgeny Prigozhin</a> last year.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Other potential challengers have been ostracised or imprisoned. Nemtsov’s protégé, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68395030">Vladimir Kara-Murza</a>, for example, was arrested in 2022 and subsequently imprisoned for 25 years.</p>
<p>And so far this year, the Kremlin has jailed the elderly human rights campaigner <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-orlov-rights-activist-sentenced-prison-ukaine-war/32837174.html">Oleg Orlov</a> for “discrediting the military”; issued an arrest warrant for the exiled Russian author <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2024/01/13/russia-s-justice-ministry-adds-writer-boris-akunin-and-publication-kholod-to-foreign-agents-registry">Boris Akunin</a> for being a “foreign agent”; and labelled the exiled Russian chess grand master <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/chess-garry-kasparov-russia-extremist-list-honor/">Garry Kasparov</a> an “extremist and terrorist”. </p>
<p>In just the last day, Navalny’s former chief of staff, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/navalnys-aide-volkov-was-attacked-with-hammer-navalnys-spokesperson-2024-03-12/">Leonid Volkov</a>, has been hospitalised in Lithuania after being sprayed in the face with tear gas and beaten repeatedly with a hammer.</p>
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<h2>Elections mean very little</h2>
<p>The Kremlin has persisted with the charade of free elections throughout Putin’s rule, but with recent changes to this year’s ballot, those who have proven too popular have found themselves disqualified. </p>
<p>The ex-TV journalist <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/23/russia-bars-yekaterina-duntsova-from-contesting-in-presidential-election">Yekatarina Duntsova</a>, for example, was barred from running due to “violations” in the paperwork for her candidacy. She had been widely scorned as a Kremlin stooge, even though she planned to run on an anti-war platform.</p>
<p>So, too, was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-court-upholds-ruling-barring-anti-war-candidate-vote-2024-03-04/">Boris Nadezhdin</a>, who attracted significant attention for his pledge to end the war in Ukraine peacefully. But he also ran afoul of Russia’s Central Electoral Commission, which alleged he had failed to collect the necessary 100,000 signatures to qualify as a candidate.</p>
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<p>In the end, the political pantomime around who gets to contest Russia’s elections really doesn’t matter.</p>
<p>There has been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-election-fraud/31466758.html">ample evidence</a> of systemic electoral fraud in Russia for years. This includes ballot stuffing, “carouselling” (bussing voters to different booths to vote multiple times) and simple vote-rigging.</p>
<p>As early as <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203391104577124540544822220">2011</a>, United Russia – Putin’s de facto party of power in the parliament – was winning an unlikely 99% of the vote in Chechnya. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/19/vladimir-putin-secures-record-win-in-russian-presidential-election">2018 presidential elections</a>, millions of votes were recorded in districts that had surprisingly precise turnout figures of 85%, 90% and 95%. Some 1.5 million votes (about 2% of the total) simply appeared as “extras” after the final day of voting. </p>
<p>Evidently irked by repeated findings from monitors for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) about the lack of freedom in Russian elections, the Kremlin simply <a href="https://osce.usmission.gov/on-the-russian-federations-decision-to-deny-osce-election-observers-the-opportunity-to-observe-their-upcoming-presidential-elections/">denied</a> them access in 2024.</p>
<h2>Putin the autocrat</h2>
<p>It is often said that a marker of authoritarian governments is they generally tend to tolerate dissent. Autocratic governments, on the other hand, do not. That’s because they are the sole custodians of political power. Anyone seeking to challenge that is – by definition – an enemy.</p>
<p>Putin is embracing the autocratic type in his next stanza as president. That makes him incredibly dangerous. Now 71 years old, he has deliberately not anointed a successor, but has bound the fortunes of Russia’s leadership cadres to his own via <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/21/putin-angry-spectacle-amounts-to-declaration-war-ukraine">political blood pacts</a>. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-can-we-expect-from-six-more-years-of-vladimir-putin-an-increasingly-weak-and-dysfunctional-russia-224259">What can we expect from six more years of Vladimir Putin? An increasingly weak and dysfunctional Russia</a>
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<hr>
<p>He has created a polity comprised of serfs who compete for his attention, among whom he can place no trust. As the embodiment of Russia’s political gravity, his expectations of utter loyalty will increase. Every failure and setback will only serve to deepen a despotic determination to nourish his delusions of grandeur.</p>
<p>As Russia’s electoral circus unfolds in slow motion, we are already witnessing signs of this. In recent days, former president <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/dmitry-medvedev-unveils-map-with-new-russian-borders-in-anti-ukraine-screed">Dmitry Medvedev</a> prominently displayed a future map of Ukraine. The majority of it was swallowed by Russia, with Medvedev noting that “historic parts of Russia need to come home”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1764903672159617502"}"></div></p>
<p>Around <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/04bd3730-e8b4-40da-bc10-131843534504">40% of government spending</a> is now going to the war in Ukraine. And alarm bells have sounded in both Europe and the US that Putin’s ultimate aim is to fracture the West, either through war or the threat of it.</p>
<p>The only way to respond to Putin, therefore, is to resist him as vigorously as possible. After his sham election, he will preside over a regime that may exude strength, but is both fragile and brittle. Should this edifice come down, the results will be both terrible and terrifying for Russians. </p>
<p>But it increasingly seems that will be Putin’s legacy: not as Russia’s champion, but its wrecker.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225645/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin faces token opposition in the polls this weekend after his regime has viciously cracked down on opposition figures. He’s likely to be even more repressive in his next term.Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256262024-03-13T17:00:44Z2024-03-13T17:00:44ZRussian elections: despite fixing the opposition, Vladimir Putin wants lots of people to vote for him<p>Russians head to the polls this week in a presidential election that will almost certainly result in Vladimir Putin decisively winning yet another six-year term. When he does, it will make him the longest-serving leader since Joseph Stalin. Advance polling indicates he will earn 75% of the vote and face <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-is-off-ballot-russias-presidential-election-2024-03-11/">little or no meaningful opposition</a>. </p>
<p>His three main opponents are each polling at 5% or less, while any candidate thought likely to attract significant support – or who would use the campaign to robustly oppose the war in Ukraine – has been banned, imprisoned or killed.</p>
<p>Despite the clear path to victory for Putin, the Kremlin reportedly spent more than <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240227-kremlin-leaks-files-detail-putin-s-%E2%82%AC1-billion-propaganda-effort-ahead-of-presidential-vote">€1 billion (£850 million) on propaganda</a> in the lead up to the elections. Much of this budget was allocated to infotainment to promote nationalism, unity and traditional values. </p>
<p>But why would a regime in the midst of a war, that has <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/02/16/ukraine-war-has-cost-russia-up-to-211-billion-pentagon-says/">cost Russia more than US$200 billion</a> (£156 billion) feel the need to put so much effort into a sham election?</p>
<p>Putin may be trying to avoid the same pitfalls of other dictatorships such as Iran which saw <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/4/voter-turnout-hits-new-low-as-conservatives-dominate-irans-parliament">record low turnout</a> of 41% in its recent parliamentary elections, the lowest since its 1979 revolution, reflecting widespread disillusionment with the Islamic regime. </p>
<p>The same could be said for Venezuela, which registered a turnout of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/06/venezuela-goes-to-the-polls-nicolas-maduro-juan-guaido">31% for its 2020 parliamentary elections</a>. Putin is certainly trying to avoid any perceptions of illegitimacy, or a large protest vote in the wake of the death of his biggest opponent, Alexei Navalny. </p>
<p>Yet why bother to hold elections at all? Research <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/14/youd-think-dictators-would-avoid-elections-heres-why-they-dont/">has shown</a> that while elections can pose some risk to dictatorships in the short term, they can also help prolong autocracies. Despite all the questions over their validity, they are often presented in such as way as to lend the winner a degree of legitimacy – both at home and internationally – and it also helps the regime gather intelligence on its popularity. </p>
<p>But Putin seems to be going beyond the usual autocratic project of trying to project the popularity of his regime. Over the 24 years of his rule, elections have become an opportunity for Russians to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime. They are a spectacle, similar to a military parade, and indicative of Putin’s new totalitarian hold on Russia.</p>
<p>Though authoritarianism is on the rise, only a very few regimes are considered totalitarian today – among those that are, <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/totalitarian-countries">North Korea</a> stands out – with its one-party state run by the Kim family dynasty. Maintaining totalitarian rule requires a great deal of effort by the state to mobilise the public to be fervent supporters of the regime. Most totalitarian regimes also consume large amounts of resources to constantly spy on their people. </p>
<p>Authoritarian regimes may use propaganda and some degree of surveillance and repression but, for the most part, autocracies are willing to accept an apathetic and complacent public that is unwilling to rock the boat.</p>
<h2>How Putin deals with dissenting ‘scum’</h2>
<p>But things have changed in Russia, since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Within a month of launching the invasion, Putin was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-warns-russia-against-pro-western-traitors-scum-2022-03-16/">issuing warnings against</a> those who didn’t support his war aims. </p>
<p>“Any people, and especially the Russian people, will always be able to distinguish the true patriots from the scum and the traitors, and just to spit them out like a midge that accidentally flew into their mouths,” Putin said.</p>
<p>As the war moves into a third year, Putin knows he may need to call on more Russians to fight. As a result, propaganda has been intensified throughout Russian society to reinforce parallels with the “great patriotic war” (the second world war) which, for Russia, was an existential crisis, and which every school pupil discovers as their country’s finest hour. </p>
<p>Patriotic education is also designed to <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-02-17/putins-neo-totalitarian-project-current-political-situation">instil contempt for Ukrainian statehood</a> and students and teachers have been encouraged <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/20/putin-russia-schools-ukraine/">to denounce</a> any opposition to the war. </p>
<p>Public employees who depend on the state, have been asked to take part in <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-02-17/putins-neo-totalitarian-project-current-political-situation#_ftn8">anti-Ukrainian rallies</a>. Citizens have also been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/27/russia-denunciations-arrests-informants-war/">encouraged to inform</a> on neighbours who oppose the war.</p>
<p>Russia used to tolerate a moderate degree of dissent, but this is no longer the case. And the punishments have also changed. Rather than face a fine for protesting or speaking critically of the regime, these “offenders” now attract prison time. </p>
<p>After Russian human rights activist Oleg Orlov claimed that Russia had become totalitarian in February, he was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68413372">sentenced to two and a half years in prison</a>. Prison sentences have not just become more common, they are longer, too. Activist and journalist Vladimir Kara-Murza was <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/04/17/1168667764/vladimir-kara-murza-prison-sentence">sentenced to 25 years in prison</a> for denouncing the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. </p>
<p>Police raids have also <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/russia/">become more common</a>. In the past, it was only notable critics of the regime who could face arrest. Today, any citizen who expresses dissent can face retribution. </p>
<p>Weeks after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Duma <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-introduce-jail-terms-spreading-fake-information-about-army-2022-03-04/">passed legislation</a> to make it a crime to refer to the war in Ukraine as anything other than a “special operation” – with a 15-year prison sentence levied at those convicted. </p>
<p>Undoubtedly, since the invasion, Russia has demanded active support from its citizens, not just acquiescence. With the upcoming elections taking place, abstaining and being uninterested in politics is no longer tolerated. Even the occupied parts of Ukraine are being <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68535301">strongly encouraged (by armed men) to vote</a>. Putin wants to win in a landslide, and these elections are designed to be a coordinated and absurd display of his “popularity”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225626/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Like a lot of authoritarian leaders, Putin is aware that a low turnout will make him look weak in the eyes of the world.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244852024-03-13T12:44:11Z2024-03-13T12:44:11ZPutin has no successor, no living rivals and no retirement plan – why his eventual death will set off a vicious power struggle<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580235/original/file-20240306-16-vhol1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=15%2C15%2C5008%2C3230&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladimir Putin isn't waving goodbye just yet.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-waves-as-he-attends-a-a-news-photo/1247401905">Pavel Bednyakov/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two things are certain concerning <a href="https://news.umich.edu/putting-putin-in-his-place-a-dictator-at-war/">Russian dictator Vladimir Putin</a>. </p>
<p>First, he will be reelected as president in the rigged <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-election-registration-09a46c2cdbb18758838f67b62c710608">election scheduled to run from March 15 to 17, 2024</a>, by a resounding – if fraudulent – margin. </p>
<p>Second, he is not immortal. He will die one day, and he is likely to die in office rather than retiring willingly. Though we don’t know when that day will come, the world might want to consider the power struggle that will commence the day after Putin departs.</p>
<p>Ever since he <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/07/how-putin-changed-russia-forever/">took over as president in 2000</a>, Putin has been perfecting the machinery of electoral fraud to guarantee victory. Vote buying, ballot miscounting, distribution of pre-filled ballots, tampering with ballot boxes, voter monitoring and intimidation, and ballot stuffing are all methods that Putin’s agents employ to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/forensics-of-election-fraud/10D758699881361E5E58B62177A48394">guarantee a favorable result</a>. </p>
<p>He has also jailed political opponents, exiled others and denied yet others the ability to challenge him in fair elections. In the most extreme cases, he has had hands in the murders of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60878663">opposition figures like Boris Nemtsov</a> and, most recently, <a href="https://theconversation.com/yulia-navalnaya-widow-of-alexei-navalny-steps-forward-to-lead-the-russian-opposition-3-points-to-understand-224050">the prison death of Alexei Navalny</a>. There will be no surprises in this election: Putin’s victory will reaffirm his iron grip on Russia’s politics.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=rxMe6yoAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholar of Russian politics and foreign policy</a> who has studied Putin’s regime for the past 25 years, I have watched him <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2016.11.001">build a dictatorship in Russia</a> that rivals the repressive Soviet Union in both its brutality and corruption. </p>
<p>But ironically, Putin is a prisoner of the political system he has built around himself for the past 24 years. Like many dictators, he cannot walk away from power and enjoy a quiet retirement even if he wanted to. He is too attached to, and dependent on, the <a href="https://www.news.com.au/finance/work/leaders/how-russian-president-vladimir-putin-secretly-became-the-worlds-richest-person/news-story/302a422aca6502c7346cc26435ab2e75">mind-boggling wealth and power</a> he has accumulated during his time as a public servant.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man holding a microphone stands in front of a crowd waving Russian flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin can draw a big crowd.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaPutin/c73ce8bf235340c5907fadc647ee1f48/photo">Mikhail Metzel, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Protection against threats</h2>
<p>But even if Putin got to keep his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/20/russian-emails-vladimir-putin-llcinvest">palaces and yachts</a>, there would be no guarantee of safety in retirement. </p>
<p>If Putin gave up power, his successor might come after him. Putin’s personal authority, charisma and influence would always be a threat to his successor as long as he was alive, a tempting target for the next ruler, and Putin knows it.</p>
<p>The other reason most dictators won’t even name their successor is that it might initiate a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-dictatorships-work/8DC095F7A890035729BB0BB611738497">bitter power struggle</a> even before the dictator retires or dies. Imagine if Putin picked a successor: That person would immediately become the target of the unsuccessful contenders not chosen for the job. </p>
<p>There are bitter rivalries even among <a href="https://time.com/4012838/inside-vladimir-putins-circle/">Putin’s inner circle</a> of cronies. Usually Putin manages to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt4cg8c5">keep those struggles in check</a>, but the 2023 revolt by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/26/opinion/russia-putin-ukraine-wagner.html">Wagner warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin</a> against the Ministry of Defense shows how deadly these competitions can turn. Prigozhin was killed in an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-prigozhin-mutiny-wagner-ukraine-africa-03a8797d0c923d3db3f1dd8f604e9a38">August 2023 plane crash</a> whose real <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/who-killed-yevgeny-prigozhin">cause may never be known</a>, but Putin’s hand is widely suspected. </p>
<p>Behind each of the wealthy insiders who support Putin – <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2022/03/29/1088886554/how-putin-conquered-russias-oligarchy">his oligarchs</a> – stands a deep network of <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/stealing-russia-blind/">corrupt cronies</a> who would stand to lose their power, wealth and perhaps even freedom if a rival succeeded in taking over. Putin’s departure could set off a bloody power struggle whenever it happened, so why would he risk it ahead of time by naming his successor?</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/E5dtkKspznQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A superyacht thought to be owned by Vladimir Putin has been impounded in Italy under global sanctions related to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Power over others</h2>
<p>Putin is not likely to be removed by any palace coup. His control over Russia’s security services has allowed him to crush rivals and control the media, judiciary, regional leaders, parliament and community groups. He has also closely monitored threats from potential opposition figures inside and outside his regime, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/23/putin-coup-russian-regime/">made his regime “coup-proof,”</a> as one scholar put it.</p>
<p>His cultivation of <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/nationalist-and-imperial-thinking-define-putins-vision-russia">anti-Western Russian nationalism</a> has won him the loyalty of the military and citizenry – at least for now. </p>
<p>Putin also uses his <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05_russia_financial_crisis_gaddy.pdf">control over Russia’s natural resource wealth</a> to keep his oligarchs in line. He decides <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt4cg8c5.12">which oligarchs are appointed</a> to lead Russia’s major state-owned oil, gas, mineral and industrial producers. As long as they remain loyal to Putin and support his political and economic directives, these oligarchs are allowed to <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2022/03/22/1087654279/how-shock-therapy-created-russian-oligarchs-and-paved-the-path-for-putin">profit handsomely by plundering the income</a> their companies earn.</p>
<p>The oligarchs’ wealth and freedom are conditional on staying in Putin’s good graces. Cross him and they could lose everything. <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/yukos-case-old-russian-wrong-keeps-haunting-president-putin">Jailed tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky</a> learned that in 2003 when, after criticizing Putin, he was imprisoned and saw his Yukos oil company seized by the state.</p>
<p>And just in case any of them did step out of line despite their dependence on his largesse, there’s another reason none of the oligarchs cross Putin: For decades he has amassed a trove of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/russia-government-blackmail-kompromat/585850/">compromising materials or “kompromat”</a> with which to blackmail even his closest advisers.</p>
<p>In short, the entire Russian elite have nothing to gain and everything to lose by defecting from Putin’s coalition.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A person in a hard hat and a brightly colored vest walks past large piles of cut trees." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Russian timber and lumber company Segezha Group is run by a close associate of Vladimir Putin and is under sanctions from the U.S. in the wake of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/worker-walks-near-harvested-timbers-at-a-felling-site-of-news-photo/1543816008">Alexander Manzyuk/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>After death</h2>
<p>If Putin can’t retire and probably won’t be deposed, what happens when he finally does die in office? According to the Russian constitution, the <a href="http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-05.htm">prime minister automatically becomes acting president</a> with limited powers when the president can or will no longer serve. Remember, that was Putin’s first step toward <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/01/world/yeltsin-resigns-overview-yeltsin-resigns-naming-putin-acting-president-run-march.html">becoming president in 2000</a> when Boris Yeltsin resigned.</p>
<p>This time around, the transition would look much different. Russia’s current prime minister is <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/who-is-russias-new-pm-a-career-bureaucrat-with-no-political-aims">Mikhail Mishustin</a>, a rather bland and uncharismatic former tax official who lacks a strong power base of his own. Should he succeed Putin as acting president, it’s unlikely that he would become the permanent replacement.</p>
<p>Under the constitution, <a href="http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-05.htm">new presidential elections must be held within three months</a> of the president’s death or incapacitation. But the real scramble for power will take place behind the scenes and not at the ballot box. </p>
<p>It’s possible that the potentially violent power struggle could be resolved before the election, but three months is not much time for a successor to consolidate their grip and fill the void left by Putin. It’s also possible that a consensus candidate might be allowed to win the election while the real struggle between factions plays out in the ensuing months and years.</p>
<p>Or, an informal coalition of leaders attempts to rule collectively while holding the key positions of power like the presidency, premiership and security services. This sort of power-sharing arrangement has historical precedent in Russia: Coalitions proclaiming “collective leadership” <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/125599?seq=1">briefly held power after the deaths of both Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin</a>. But in each case, one member of the coalition was able to outmaneuver and eliminate their partners: <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/125599?seq=1">first Stalin</a> and later <a href="https://babel.ua/en/texts/69417-70-years-ago-nikita-khrushchev-headed-the-communist-party-although-no-one-took-him-seriously-after-stalin-s-death-this-is-how-he-defeated-his-competitors-malenkov-and-beria-and-seized-power-in-the-uss">Nikita Khrushchev</a>. These cases are reminders that autocratic succession is usually a messy affair.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four men in hats and overcoats walk down a street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vladimir Lenin’s successors in power in the Soviet Union, from left, Josef Stalin, Alexei Rykov, Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev. Stalin had the others killed and seized sole power for himself.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LENINSSUCCESSORSMOSCOW/86a64430a2e5da11af9f0014c2589dfb/photo">AP Photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the days, months and years after Putin’s departure may be even more turbulent than anyone expects. Never before has so much personal authority been concentrated in the hands of a single Russian leader with so few supporting institutions to help stabilize a leadership transition. There is no monarchical succession, <a href="https://imperialhouse.ru/en/imperialhouse-en/succession/385.html">as under the Romanovs</a>, the last royal family to rule the country. Nor are there the strong institutions of a <a href="https://pages.ucsd.edu/%7Emnaoi/page4/POLI227/files/page1_11.pdf">single-party state</a> to constrain rivals as in Soviet times. </p>
<p>There is only Putin.</p>
<p><em>The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense or United States government.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224485/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Person is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy. The views presented in this article are his own and do not represent the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or United States Government.</span></em></p>A West Point professor of Russian politics and foreign policy looks at the future of Russia without Putin.Robert Person, Associate Professor of International Relations, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242592024-03-13T00:48:29Z2024-03-13T00:48:29ZWhat can we expect from six more years of Vladimir Putin? An increasingly weak and dysfunctional Russia<p>There is very little drama in Russia’s upcoming presidential election this weekend. We all know Vladimir Putin will win. The only real question is whether he will receive more than 75% of the vote. </p>
<p>It could be tempting to see these results as a sign of the strength of the Russian system. Recent gains by the Russian army in Ukraine seem to further support this. </p>
<p>But my own research – soon to be published in a <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/why-the-russian-constitution-matters-9781509972210/">forthcoming book</a> – shows the election results and Russia’s military gains in Ukraine hide a much more problematic reality for the country. </p>
<p>Russia’s system of government is not only undemocratic, rights abusing and unpredictable. It is also increasingly dysfunctional, trapped in a cycle of poor quality and weak governance that cannot be solved by one man, no matter how much power he has. </p>
<h2>The constitutional dark arts</h2>
<p>The weakness stems from the hyper-centralisation of power in Russia around the president. </p>
<p>This centralisation is the product of an increasingly common logic that I call the “<a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/why-the-russian-constitution-matters-9781509972210/">constitutional dark arts</a>”. This logic generally holds that democracy and rights protection are best guaranteed in a constitutional system that centralises authority in one elected leader. This line of thinking is present in many populist, authoritarian countries, such as Hungary and Turkey. </p>
<p>The foundation of this kind of system in Russia is the 1993 Constitution. It was drafted by then-President Boris Yeltsin and his supporters (many in the West) as an expedient for dismantling communism and implementing radical economic reforms. As such, it contains a number of rights provisions and democratic guarantees, alongside provisions that centralise vast power in an elected Russian president. </p>
<p>Yeltsin (and his Western supporters) described this system as democratic because it made the president answerable to the people. They also argued that rights provisions would allow courts to limit any abuses by the centralised state. </p>
<p>These reformers hoped Yeltsin could use this concentrated power to build democracy in Russia. Thirty years later, however, we can see how this use of the “constitutional dark arts” backfired spectacularly. </p>
<p>Since 2000, Putin has ruthlessly deployed this centralised authority to eliminate any checks on power. He has also transformed elections, the media and the courts from sources of accountability into mechanisms to project the image of strong presidential power. </p>
<p>The upcoming presidential election is just the most recent example. </p>
<h2>Poor quality governance in Russia</h2>
<p>Although this centralised system has allowed Putin to dominate politics, it fosters weak and poor governance, particularly outside Moscow. At least two factors are at play. </p>
<p>First, centralised decision-making in Russia is often made using incomplete or false information. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is an example. It was based on intelligence that the operation <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-invasion-ukraine-intelligence-putin/31748594.html">would be over quickly</a> and Ukrainians would likely welcome Russian forces. </p>
<p>Second, centralised directives are delegated to under-resourced, incompetent and weak institutions. Russia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was disastrous, in large part due to the poorly resourced regional authorities who were <a href="https://www.afr.com/companies/healthcare-and-fitness/the-extraordinary-failure-of-russia-s-pandemic-response-20210706-p587eg">overwhelmed</a> by a crisis of this scale. </p>
<p>This dysfunction has been a central message of the political movement led by the opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Before his death last month, Navalny and his team harshly criticised the corruption and weakness of the Russian regime and its inability to fix roads, provide health care and adequately pay teachers or doctors. </p>
<p>This message was potent, making Navalny the first opposition politician to build a broad coalition that spanned Russia’s 11 time zones. </p>
<p>This broad coalition frightened the Kremlin to such an extent that it led to Navalny’s poisoning in August 2020. Although it remains to be seen how his political movement responds to his death, this central criticism of the government remains one of its most potent messages. </p>
<p>Although it’s impossible to get independent polling on domestic issues during the Ukraine war, it does appear Putin and his administration are concerned about this weakness. In his February 29 address to parliament, Putin tacitly acknowledged these problems, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-putin-election-promises-1875554">promising</a> new national projects to improve infrastructure, support families and enhance the quality of life. </p>
<p>These kind of promises, however, are unlikely to be implemented. Putin has traditionally promised these kinds of changes around presidential elections. But, when it comes to implementing them, Russia’s regional sub-units are often given <a href="https://tass.com/russianpress/692741">no resources</a> to do so. </p>
<p>With so much money now going to the war, it is unlikely the latest set of promises will be any different. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-had-a-vision-of-a-democratic-russia-that-terrified-vladimir-putin-to-the-core-223812">Alexei Navalny had a vision of a democratic Russia. That terrified Vladimir Putin to the core</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>An increasingly dysfunctional Russia</h2>
<p>With Putin soon to start his fifth presidential term, this centralisation and personalisation of power is only going to increase. </p>
<p>Externally, this centralisation is likely to produce an increasingly unpredictable Russia, led by a man making decisions on the basis of an increasingly paranoid world view and incorrect or manipulated information. As former German Chancellor Angela Merkel once described Putin, he is really “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/26/world/europe/vladimir-putin-russia.html">living in another world</a>”. </p>
<p>This is likely to lead to more foreign policy adventurism and aggression. It will likely foster harsher repression of any dissenting voices inside Russia, as well. </p>
<p>We are also likely to see an increasingly dysfunctional Russia, one in which roads, housing, schools, health care and other <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/01/10/total-disgrace-anger-frustration-as-mass-heating-failures-across-russia-leave-thousands-in-the-cold-a83676">infrastructure</a> will continue to deteriorate, particularly outside of Moscow. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/more-corrupt-fractured-and-ostracised-how-vladimir-putin-has-changed-russia-in-over-two-decades-on-top-206086">More corrupt, fractured and ostracised: how Vladimir Putin has changed Russia in over two decades on top</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This extends to the military, which remains <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/time-running-out-ukraine">weak</a> despite its recent battlefield gains. For instance, Russia’s <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/03/the-roots-of-russian-military-dysfunction/">overly centralised command structure</a> has decimated the officer class and led to stunning losses of equipment. Although Russia has managed to muddle through by relying on its vast human and industrial resources, these systemic problems are taking a serious toll on its fighting capacity. </p>
<p>Despite escalating repression, these problems pose an opportunity for a democratic challenger, particularly when Putin is inevitably replaced by another leader. </p>
<p>Russia’s dysfunctional government is also an important reminder for Western media, policymakers and commentators. While it should not serve as a reason for complacency, highlighting Russia’s poor governance is an important tool in combating the Kremlin’s carefully curated image of power and control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224259/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Partlett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A centralised system of government has allowed Putin to project power, but the country’s health care, schools, infrastructure and general quality of life have sharply deteriorated.William Partlett, Associate professor of public law, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250132024-03-12T12:31:57Z2024-03-12T12:31:57Z3 things to watch for in Russia’s presidential election – other than Putin’s win, that is<p>Russians will <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-presidential-election-who-what-when-2024-03-11/">vote in a presidential election</a> from March 15-17, 2024, and are all but <a href="https://apnews.com/rusia-putin-election-2024">guaranteed to hand Vladimir Putin a comfortable victory</a>, paving the way for him to remain in power until at least 2030. </p>
<p>While the result may be a foregone conclusion, the election offers an important glimpse into the Kremlin’s domestic challenges as it continues a war against Ukraine that <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-war-in-ukraine-enters-third-year-3-issues-could-decide-its-outcome-supplies-information-and-politics-220581">recently entered its third year</a>.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://politics.wfu.edu/faculty-and-staff/adam-lenton/">expert on Russian politics</a>, I have identified three key developments worth paying attention to during and after the upcoming election. Yes, we already know Putin will win. But nonetheless, this election is the largest public test of the Russian state’s ability to shape its desired result at home since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.</p>
<h2>1. Don’t mention the war (too much)</h2>
<p>The 2024 election is taking place during the largest interstate conflict to take place this century.</p>
<p>With Russian domestic media and politics all but gutted of dissenting voices, the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/03/opinions/why-putin-wants-a-forever-war-galeotti/index.html">war has become</a> the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-war-ukraine-economy-policy-7428ef7b">organizing principle of post-2022 Russian politics</a>, shaping all major policies and decisions.</p>
<p>Yet, while the context of the war looms large, its role is largely implicit rather than occupying center stage. And for good reason: Banging the drums of war is not particularly popular.</p>
<p>In fact, the Kremlin’s strategy throughout the conflict has relied upon the general public’s acquiescence and disengagement from the war effort in exchange for <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/28/alternate-reality-how-russian-society-learned-to-stop-worrying-about-war-pub-91118">a degree of normalcy</a> at home. </p>
<p>Officially, the war remains euphemistically termed a “special military operation,” yet it is also frequently framed by Moscow <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3874880-putin-says-ukraine-war-poses-existential-threat-to-russian-people/">as an existential struggle</a> for Russia and a <a href="https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/comments/zapad-vedet-rukami-ukraintsev-voynu-s-rossiey-i-nazyvaet-eto-prekrasnoy-investitsiey/">proxy war</a> between Russia and the West.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman walks past a billboard with Russian words on and another will a soldier's head in a helmet depicted." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A billboard promotes the upcoming Russian presidential election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaElection/44d797eb397e446684e1d02a8d485433/photo?Query=Putin&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=now-30d&totalCount=604&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Dmitri Lovetsky</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the Russian public <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2023/10/31/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-otsenki-oktyabrya2023-goda/">still doesn’t agree</a> on what its aims are. There <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/wartime-putinism">are relatively few</a> ardent supporters of the war, outweighed by a <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/in-russia-clear-signs-of-war-fatigue/">more general sense of fatigue</a> among the public. This is supported by survey data that shows that <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2024/03/05/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-massovye-otsenki-fevralya-2024-goda/">consistent majorities</a> in Russia would prefer to start peace talks – though this of course does not tell us what type of peace they prefer.</p>
<p>Yet the war is putting pressure on the government’s ability to juggle ensuring a disengaged population and bolstering support for a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90753">grinding war that demands unprecedented</a> resources.</p>
<p>Putin’s public communication in the buildup to the election reflects this tension. He announced his intention to run during an awkward, poorly staged interaction with an officer at a military award ceremony in December 2023. That choice <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91234">surprised some insiders</a>, who expected Putin to weave his announcement into a high-profile, choreographed event focusing on domestic achievements and not the ongoing war. </p>
<p>More recently, his state of the nation address on Feb. 29 <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91872">began and ended by lauding</a> the achievements of the war, yet the bulk of the address – the <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/65e069269a794724567533c5">longest of the 19</a> he has delivered since he first became president in 1999 – was devoted to a laundry list of achievements, programs and goals largely disconnected from the war itself.</p>
<h2>2. Pressure to deliver results for Putin</h2>
<p>While <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-autocrats-rig-elections-to-stay-in-power-and-get-away-with-it-95337">autocratic regimes like Russia’s have proved adept</a> at managing the electoral process to squeeze out rivals and mitigate against upsets, elections are still high-stakes events.</p>
<p>For officials, the election is a litmus test for their ability to muster administrative resources and deliver Putin an electoral windfall. Most <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/03/04/people-don-t-want-to-vote">reports suggest the Kremlin is hoping to engineer</a> that the turnout is at least 70%, with around 80% of the vote for Putin – which would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/19/vladimir-putin-secures-record-win-in-russian-presidential-election">surpass his 76.7% share</a> from 2018.</p>
<p>For observers of Russian politics, what will be of interest is not the result itself, but how the result is produced during wartime conditions.</p>
<p>Take, for example, securing high turnout. One prominent tactic used by local officials in Russia is pressuring state employees and workers at state-owned corporations to turn up at the polls en masse.</p>
<p>But with the economy on a war footing, and with an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-short-around-48-million-workers-2023-crunch-persist-izvestia-2023-12-24/">acute labor shortage</a>, it is unclear whether this tried and tested approach will work. Moreover, political disengagement and the certainty of a Putin victory means that interest in voting is at an <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/03/04/people-don-t-want-to-vote">all-time low</a>. For local officials, the pressure is on.</p>
<p>At the head of efforts to engineer the election is Sergey Kiriyenko, Putin’s <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/06/10/the-viceroy">technocratic domestic policy czar dubbed</a> “viceroy of the Donbas” due to his role administering the occupied territories of Ukraine. Recent <a href="https://vsquare.org/kremlin-leaks-putin-elections-russia-propaganda-ukraine/">leaked documents</a> obtained by the Estonian website Delfi reveal how Kiriyenko’s team spent over US$1 billion in “pre-rigging” the election, sponsoring creative content such as films, TV series and video games replete with pro-government and anti-Western messaging.</p>
<p>Of course, it’s hard to say in advance whether such efforts will directly bear fruit. But the scale of the Kremlin’s investment in shaping the broader ideological environment indicates a degree of uneasiness with the public’s disengagement.</p>
<p>There are also new technical regulations that will boost Putin’s vote. The election will be held across three days instead of one. Together with this, the <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/03/07/the-digital-steal-en">rollout of electronic voting</a>, first used in Moscow elections in 2019, will make it easier to maximize turnout. These changes also make it difficult for observers to monitor the degree of fraud.</p>
<p>Beyond these subtler forms of manipulation, however, there are also overtly coercive ways to ensure vote targets are met. This is particularly the case for the millions of Ukrainians <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/deportation-re-population-russia-occupied-ukraine-zaporizhzhia">currently under Russian occupation</a>, who are subject to intense pressure from the occupying authorities to acquire Russian citizenship and to vote.</p>
<h2>3. Silencing political opposition</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-putins-russia-the-death-of-navalny-has-left-the-opposition-demoralised-but-not-defeated-224303">death of longtime Putin critic Alexei Navalny</a> in February 2024 was a huge blow to the opposition but is representative of the state of political repression in Russia.</p>
<p>Since 2018, some <a href="https://www.proekt.media/en/guide-en/repressions-in-russia-study/">116,000 Russians have faced</a> political repression. Under such circumstances, the presidential election will be the least pluralistic in post-Soviet Russia, with only four candidates on the ballot box and no openly anti-war figures featured among them.</p>
<p>In previous elections, there has usually been a candidate from the so-called “liberal opposition.” For a while it <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/01/26/the-situation-took-a-wrong-turn">looked as though this trend might</a> continue in the form of independent Boris Nadezhdin, whose explicit anti-war program saw him <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/27/world/europe/russia-putin-election-boris-nadezhdin.html">gain unexpected traction</a> compared to other would-be candidates.</p>
<p>But by barring Nadezhdin from running, the Kremlin likely wished to avoid a repeat of 2018, when the Communist Party’s Pavel Grudinin <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/01/26/grudinin-russia-communist-party-gets-capitalist-makeover-lenin-sovkhoz-a60185">unexpectedly struck a chord</a> with voters for his down-to-earth populism. This forced state media to go into overdrive, turning the election into a mudslinging contest. </p>
<p>Yet the scale of public mourning for Navalny and the enthusiasm for Nadezhdin reveal that despite draconian wartime censorship and repression, there remains a <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/03/04/said-without-enthusiasm">sizable bloc of Russians eager</a> for authentic political alternatives.</p>
<p>For now, the closest candidate to an alternative appears to be <a href="https://www.russian-election-monitor.org/who-is-vladislav-davankov-a-new-hope-for-opposition-in-the-presidential-election.html">Vladislav Davankov</a> from the liberal-leaning party “New People,” who will likely draw votes from some of this anti-war constituency.</p>
<p>Indeed, the <a href="https://davankov2024.ru/program">first point on his manifesto</a> calls for “peace and negotiations,” though “on our own terms.” Fresh <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6552544">polling data</a> from state-owned VTsIOM suggests that he might well take second place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Lenton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While Putin is all but guaranteed to win, war fatigue, electoral engineering and extreme risk-aversion suggest that the Kremlin is anxious to get these elections over and done with.Adam Lenton, Assistant Professor of Politics & International Affairs, Wake Forest UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2254162024-03-11T18:49:24Z2024-03-11T18:49:24ZRecent gains point to a growing Russian advantage in the Ukraine war<p>The ongoing war in Ukraine is not featuring as prominently in western news media these days as it was earlier in the war, because it has been overshadowed by the unfolding human tragedy of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-rising-death-toll-from-hunger-a-stark-reminder-of-starvation-as-a-weapon-of-war-225197">war in Gaza</a>. </p>
<p>However, the war in Ukraine is still very much ongoing, and both sides are clearly suffering significant losses. Yet it appears that slowly but surely Russia is gaining ground on and off the battlefield. </p>
<p>The recent Ukrainian withdrawal from the stronghold of Avdiivka <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-withdraws-troops-avdiivka-1.7118227">did make the headlines</a>. On that sector of the front near the city of Donetsk, Russian forces have <a href="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375">pushed beyond Avdiivka and continue to gain ground</a>. </p>
<p>Russian forces have also made limited gains <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682">on other sectors of the front line</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Russian economy is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russias-economy-going-strong/video-68315706">increasingly mobilized for war</a>, and the government has been able to obtain <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-paused-shipments-russia-ukraine-report-2024-3">some military resources from abroad</a>, circumventing western sanctions.</p>
<p>All of this means that Russia is, relative to Ukraine, in an <a href="https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/a-year-later-and-things-are-very-different-in-moscow">increasingly strong position</a> as the war enters its third year.</p>
<h2>Russian advantage</h2>
<p>While Russian advances are clearly <a href="https://monitoring.stage.bbc.co.uk/product/c2050m20">costing their forces heavy losses</a>, the Ukrainian side too is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/20/us/politics/ukraine-prisoners-avdiivka-russia.html">taking significant losses</a>, often when defending increasingly untenable defensive positions. Russian forces typically have a <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/russia-army-ukraine-war-1.7122808">numerical advantage in terms of numbers of troops, artillery</a> and <a href="https://defence-industry.eu/russia-increases-artillery-ammunition-production-ukrainian-sources-say/">their munitions</a>. In terms of drones — where Ukrainian forces once had an advantage — <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/some-ukraine-drone-pilots-fear-early-advantage-over-russia-now-lost-2023-11-09/">Russian forces seem to have caught up or even outpaced Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>Some western commentators have portrayed Russian tactics as mindless attacks with hordes of infantry — <a href="https://cepa.org/article/surprised-that-ukraine-is-taking-combat-losses-you-shouldnt-be/">sometimes derogatorily described as orcs</a>. The reality is that the Russian army has adapted to the nature of the war today. It is now much better at co-ordinating the activities of artillery, drones and small groups of infantry. Even Ukrainian sources highlight how <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-skills-varied-avdiivka-from-well-trained-to-confused-soldiers-2024-3">at least some Russian troops are well-trained and capable</a>.</p>
<h2>Western support for Ukraine</h2>
<p>There is strong evidence of <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/cia-ukraine-russia/">western intelligence personnel already on the ground in Ukraine</a> — who were there long before February 2022. On top of NATO’s more overt military assistance, such revelations feed into the <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1567341">Russian narrative</a> that the war in the Ukraine is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/mar/05/nato-ukraine-russia-germany-military-leak">proxy war between NATO and Russia</a>.</p>
<p>A growing challenge for Ukraine is decreasing western public support for military assistance. <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/513680/american-views-ukraine-war-charts.aspx">In a Gallup poll from November 2023</a>, 41 per cent of U.S. respondents said that the United States is doing too much to support Ukraine — an opinion that rose to 62 per cent among Republican voters. Back in August 2022, these figures were 24 and 43 per cent respectively. This trend is evident in different polls too, as a recent <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/08/about-half-of-republicans-now-say-the-us-is-providing-too-much-aid-to-ukraine/">Pew poll highlights</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-the-us-public-thinks-about-giving-military-and-other-aid-223064">Ukraine war: what the US public thinks about giving military and other aid</a>
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<p>While there is still strong support within the European Union for providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2022/public-opinion-on-the-war-in-ukraine/en-public-opinion-on-the-war-against-ukraine-20240223.pdf">surveys find that support for military assistance is decreasing</a>. </p>
<p>The Ukrainian government has stated its army’s problems can be solved with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-anniversary-ammunition-shortage-kyiv-a8909760655d83d2ffc0d67ad2a491ec">more western equipment and munitions</a>. Certainly, more of both would improve the Ukrainian position. However, western equipment is not a universal panacea for Ukraine’s problems. Recent reports suggesting Russian forces have destroyed <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/03/06/abrams-avdiivka-russian-propaganda/">a number of U.S.-supplied Abrams tanks on the Avdiivka sector</a> of the front highlight, unsurprisingly, that western equipment is far from infallible.</p>
<p>NATO countries continue to <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9477/">commit additional military assistance to Ukraine</a>, although additional U.S. assistance is <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2024/03/06/house-lawmakers-mike-johnson-ukraine-aid-gaza/72871579007/">being held up in Congress</a>. The recent scandal in Germany regarding the possible supply of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-russia-taurus-missiles-4ff5e559c887448fc3ecd9e2e6f58812">Taurus missiles to Ukraine</a> highlights that a further escalation of western commitments to Ukraine is not a given. </p>
<p>Whether western countries are willing to commit their own personnel to increasingly active roles in the war is unclear. French President Emmanuel Macron recently stated that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/ukraine-war-briefing-macron-says-dont-be-cowards-as-he-digs-in-over-ground-troop-s">sending French combat troops to Ukraine remains an option</a>. However, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/macron-ukraine-russia-putin-1.7127500">most other NATO leaders</a> seem resolute that sending combat troops to Ukraine should not happen.</p>
<p>Yet, Macron’s position is apparently <a href="https://apnews.com/article/poland-nato-russia-france-abd144aee256a72388c196dae8acaf7f">not without some support</a>. Such a step would undoubtedly increase the possibility not only of a direct NATO-Russia war, <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-russia-increasingly-likely-to-use-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine-182368">but also the use of nuclear weapons</a>.</p>
<h2>Manpower issues</h2>
<p><a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-ukraine-peace/">Availability of personnel</a> is also a significant problem for Ukraine. Western-supplied equipment still has to be crewed. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stated that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68397525">31,000 Ukrainian troops have been killed since February 2022</a>, however, this at best only tells part of the story. This figure is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66581217">less than half U.S. estimates of Ukrainian troops killed</a>, likely does not include those missing in action, and certainly not those taken prisoner by Russia, nor the tens of thousands of wounded. <a href="https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-struggles-to-find-troops-for-the-frontline/">Replacing such losses is proving increasingly difficult</a>. </p>
<p>Zelenskyy recently gave permission for conscripts who have been serving since February 2022 to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-issues-decree-discharging-conscripts-2024-03-07/#">move into the reserves for at least 12 months</a> without further callup. Such a step will help improve wider morale, but won’t help with the recruitment crisis.</p>
<p>A significant number of Ukrainians <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/newsinteractives/features/desperate-to-avoid-the-draft">seek to avoid the draft by fleeing to neighbouring countries</a>. This is reminiscent of how <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-why-people-are-returning-despite-the-war-in-ukraine/a-67022321">young Russians fled</a> to avoid being conscripted in late 2022, although <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-why-people-are-returning-despite-the-war-in-ukraine/a-67022321">many have now returned</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="TiktokEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.tiktok.com/@cbcnews/video/7330765611217210629?is_from_webapp=1\u0026sender_device=pc\u0026web_id=7246426044156249606"}"></div></p>
<p>The sinking of Russian ships in the Black Sea has to some extent replaced less positive news for Ukraine from the front line. The loss of warships such as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2024/mar/05/ukraine-releases-footage-appearing-to-show-sinking-of-russian-warship-near-occupied-crimea-video">large patrol ship Sergei Kotov</a> to Ukrainian naval drone are setbacks for Russia. However, the war for the Donbas is primarily being fought on land, and such Ukrainian victories are unlikely to have a meaningful impact on the ground war. </p>
<p>As the Russian army advances, albeit slowly, the available evidence suggests that resolve remains strong on both the <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/2024/01/26/conflict-with-ukraine-assessments-for-november-2023/">Russian</a> and <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/512258/ukrainians-stand-behind-war-effort-despite-fatigue.aspx">Ukrainian</a> sides. Outwardly, the majority of NATO leaders <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm#">retain their commitments to support Ukraine</a>. Both sides are clearly still only willing to <a href="https://www.stopwar.org.uk/article/diplomacy-is-the-art-of-compromise-thats-whats-needed-for-peace-in-ukraine/">consider negotiations on their own terms</a>. How much longer that will continue to be the case remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225416/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Hill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia’s armed forces continue to gain territory in Ukraine, at high cost to both sides.Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History, University of CalgaryLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165722024-03-11T12:39:48Z2024-03-11T12:39:48ZIn Kyrgyzstan, creeping authoritarianism rubs up against proud tradition of people power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580831/original/file-20240310-16-c1fdtm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=31%2C31%2C6995%2C4962&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan loom over the people of Bishkek.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kyrgyz-women-walk-past-to-an-electronic-panel-with-photo-of-news-photo/1719479860?adppopup=true">Contributor/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The people of Kyrgyzstan have a <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/10/kyrgyzstan-its-easier-start-revolution-finish-it">well-earned reputation</a> for “street democracy.” </p>
<p>Since emerging from the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, citizens in the Central Asian republic have <a href="https://doi.org//10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_20">taken it upon themselves to oust presidents</a> who attempt to overstay their welcome or engage in corruption. </p>
<p>Indeed, between 2005 and 2020, the country experienced five presidential transitions – <a href="https://doi.org//10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_20">three as a result of popular protests</a> and two through the peaceful democratic transfer of power.</p>
<p>But a new trend appears to be in the air of Bishkek, the country’s capital. In contrast to how he is viewed in some other former Soviet states, <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/505793/empire-twilight-russia-loses-support-own-backyard.aspx">Russian President Vladimir Putin</a> <a href="https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/february_2019_kyrgyzstan_poll.pdf">is popular</a> <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-full-of-putin-fans-new-poll-says">among Kyrgyz</a>, and his strongman style appears to be <a href="https://rsf.org/en/kyrgyzstan-s-japarov-seeks-putin-style-media-legislation">influencing the country’s rulers</a>. In recent weeks, <a href="https://24.kg/english/287535_Repressive_laws_represent_major_setback_for_Kyrgyzstans_democratic_future/">legislation has been advanced</a> to extend their authority and crack down on dissent.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://search.asu.edu/profile/3172586">scholar of democracy, civic activism and post-Soviet geopolitics</a>, I’ve long known about Kyrgyzstan’s distinctive trajectory – and wondered how this track record of people power squares with recent moves toward authoritarianism. I learned more during a visit to the country in the fall.</p>
<h2>Protest spaces</h2>
<p>The epicenter of Kyrgyz street politics is Bishkek’s Ala-Too Square and the adjacent White House, which historically served as the official presidential office building.</p>
<p>In 2005, Kyrgyz citizens gathered there to protest against their first post-Soviet president, Askar Akayev, when he tried to circumvent term limits and extend his power. The “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/25/world/asia/president-flees-from-protests-in-kyrgyzstan.html">Tulip” revolution</a> drove Akayev into exile in Moscow. </p>
<p>Five years later at the same location, people gathered for the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-opposition-riots/26942558.html">People’s April Revolution</a> against corruption-charged President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A monument shows two people pushing a structure." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Monument to ‘Those Who Died For Freedom’ in Bishkek.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Brown</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bakiyev authorized <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/17/court-chaos-kyrgyzstan-trial">deadly force against protesters</a> before being toppled. About 90 protesters who were killed are commemorated to this day with a striking monument on Ala-Too Square. </p>
<p>The square became an epicenter of discontent again in 2020, when anti-government <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/05/world/asia/kyrgyzstan-election-protests.html">protests overturned what many citizens saw as a stolen election</a> and forced President Sooronbai Jeenbekov from power. </p>
<h2>A new brand of politics</h2>
<p>Kyrgyzstan’s current president, Sadyr Japarov, knows this history well: He lived it. </p>
<p>After serving in Bakiyev’s administration, he helped lead <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/31/what-was-true-cause-of-kyrgyz-demonstrations-pub-49853">mass demonstrations in 2012</a> against newly elected President Almazbek Atambayev.</p>
<p>After participating in an <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-nationalist-mps-and-rioters-attempt-to-storm-parliament">armed attempt to storm Parliament</a>, Japarov fled the country. Upon his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/1/12/sadyr-japarov-from-a-prison-cell-to-the-presidency#:%7E:text=In%202017%2C%20Japarov%20returned%20to,victim%20of%20the%20corrupt%20elites.&text=While%20in%20prison%2C%20he%20wrote,and%20vision%20for%20the%20country.">return to Kyrgyzstan in 2017</a> he was jailed, but he established a new political party from prison. </p>
<p>In January 2021, Japarov won the presidential election with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/kyrgyz-nationalist-wins-landslide-victory-presidential-poll-2021-01-10/">almost 80% of the vote</a>, having run on a populist platform that included pledges to crack down on corrupt elites and foreign corporations. </p>
<p>But Japarov also stressed the importance of Kyrgyzstan’s special relationship with Russia. And increasingly his style of leadership has taken a leaf out of Putin’s playbook. The presidential vote in 2021 was <a href="https://osce.usmission.gov/on-the-referendum-on-the-constitution-of-the-kyrgyz-republic/">accompanied by a referendum</a> that increased the power of the office and reduced the importance of Parliament.</p>
<p>Japarov is making that shift concrete: He is constructing <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-japarov-the-builder">a new presidential building</a> about 5 miles south of the city center, reducing the potential for street politics to factor so largely in the country’s future.</p>
<p>During my October visit, other signs were apparent of Japarov’s determination to reshape Kyrgyz politics. On Oct. 4, 2023, security forces <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-infamous-underworld-figure-killed-in-security-services-operation">shot and killed leading crime boss Kolya Kolbaev</a> in a Bishkek pub he owned. State media represented this as a crackdown on organized crime, consistent with Japarov’s election promises. But to many Bishkek citizens, it was less of a crackdown and more a takeover of Kolbaev’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/voices-of-doubt-unraveling-the-ambiguities-surrounding-kolbaevs-killing/">lucrative criminal operations by the Kyrgyz state</a>.</p>
<p>A week later, there was another potential display of Kyrgyzstan’s drift away from people power. Bishkek’s kindergartens, schools and colleges were abruptly <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/10/13/anti-drone-protection-internet-disruptions-in-bishkek-as-putin-seeks-to-restore-influence-among-allies-a82755">ordered to close or operate only</a> online on Oct. 12 and 13.</p>
<p>The measure coincided with Bishkek’s hosting the annual meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which Putin, making his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-putin-visits-kyrgyzstan-first-foreign-trip-since-icc-arrest-warrant-2023-10-12/">first international trip</a> since the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest, was due to attend.</p>
<p>Officially, the closures were simply to ease congestion. But I heard locals speculate that authorities acted to forestall any youth-led protests against the country’s prominent and potentially divisive guest. The authorities instituted a similar measure on Oct. 25 and 26 <a href="https://24.kg/english/278139_Educational_institutions_switch_to_online_classes_for_2_days_due_to_summits/">during a visit by China’s Premier Li Qiang</a>.</p>
<p>Also in October, Parliament discussed proposed laws that closely resemble legislation introduced by Putin in Russia. The bills would <a href="https://24.kg/english/287535_Repressive_laws_represent_major_setback_for_Kyrgyzstans_democratic_future/">curtail freedom of expression and empower the government to prosecute or shut down</a> any organization it identifies as being a “foreign representative.” </p>
<p>Despite protest from Kyrgyz and international media freedom groups, the <a href="https://kyrgyzstan.un.org/en/251211-un-special-rapporteur-expresses-concerns-draft-mass-media-law-kyrgyz-republic">United Nations</a> and the U.S. – which expressed its concerns in a letter, prompting Japarov to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-japarov-accuses-us-interfering-internal-affairs-blinken/32815575.html">accuse Washington of meddling</a> – the laws keep moving forward. In a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/in-farcical-vote-kyrgyz-foreign-representative-law-moves-ahead-again/">controversial Parliament vote in late February</a> 2024, 62 votes to advance the law were passed by the 50 members present, some of whom cast votes for their absent colleagues.</p>
<h2>The resilience of memory</h2>
<p>In intimidating Parliament, eliminating powerful rivals and cracking down on free media, Japarov is not only adopting many of Putin’s methods, he is taking a calculated bet against the country’s recent history of democratic activism. </p>
<p>On the surface, the odds are in the government’s favor. Compared with other post-Soviet states, Putin still <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/505793/empire-twilight-russia-loses-support-own-backyard.aspx">commands high approval ratings in Kyrgyzstan</a>. After a decade and a half of political turbulence – as well as widespread corruption and organized crime – Japarov’s “strongman” persona is appealing for many.</p>
<p>But for many other Kyrgyz citizens, cozying up to Russia raises concerns. </p>
<p>After all, Georgia and Ukraine were also founder members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Both have since been attacked by Putin’s Russia.</p>
<p>The 2022 <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">brutal invasion of Ukraine</a> has sparked direct parallels with Russian and Soviet attempts to eliminate Kyrgyz culture over two centuries.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A structure shows three pillars" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1334&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1334&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1334&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1676&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1676&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1676&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Monument to the 1916 Urkun rebellion at the Ata-Beyit memorial complex in Bishkek.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Brown</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bishkek – then known as Pishpek – came under Russian rule in the 1850s as the czar conquered a patchwork of Central Asian city-states and nomadic tribes under the guise of a “civilizing mission.”</p>
<p>The Kyrgyz people continued to defend their distinctive nomadic way of life. But overt resistance against Russian rule was met with brutal force. In 1916, when imperial Russia began forcibly conscripting Kyrgyz men to fight in World War I, <a href="https://ieres.elliott.gwu.edu/project/the-central-asian-revolt-of-1916-%EF%BB%BFa-collapsing-empire-in-the-age-of-war-and-revolution/">Kyrgyz rebelled</a>. In the crackdown that followed, over <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-1916-russia-mass-killings-genocide/27926414.html">100,000 Kyrgyz were killed</a>. Many women and children died crossing the Tian Shan mountains to seek refuge in China from Russian repression. </p>
<p>Soviet rule ostensibly offered the promise of better relations with Moscow. And in 1926, the Kyrgyz gained autonomy; full republic status followed in 1936. </p>
<p>In common with much of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyz citizens suffered from Stalin’s purges. In 1938, <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/stalin-s-killing-of-kyrgyz-intellectuals-remains-vivid/2124089">138 Kyrgyz intellectuals were killed</a> and buried in a mass grave outside Bishkek, where Stalin’s victims are remembered, alongside other Kyrgyz patriots, at the <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2023/12/ata-beyit-memorial-complex-near-bishkek-safeguards-sorrowful-past-and-honors-repressed/">Ata-Beyit memorial</a> near Bishkek. </p>
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<img alt="TKTK" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A frieze at Ata-Beyit depicting Soviet police arresting Kyrgyz intellectuals.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Brown</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>This commitment to preserving memory, combined with a deep distrust of authoritarian overreach, anchors Kyrgyz citizens. But it rubs up against where the country finds itself today: in a pivotal place amid shifting geopolitics.</p>
<p>The U.S. and Russia are vying for influence in Central Asia, while China, Turkey and the Persian Gulf states are also making significant investments in the region.</p>
<p>As Kyrgyzstan’s leaders seek to maintain sovereignty, develop and diversify the economy and improve the country’s standing in the world, they face difficult choices. For now, they seem to be following Putin’s path.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216572/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Brown is Director of the Melikian Center, which receives funding from the US Departments of Education, Defense and Education. He traveled to Bishkek as part of a research project that is supported by the U.S. Russia Foundation, a legacy organization of the U.S. Russia Investment Fund, founded by the U.S. Government.</span></em></p>Recent laws and pro-Putin sentiment by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov have sparked concern that the Central Asian country is backsliding on democracy.Keith Brown, Professor of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2243252024-03-07T13:03:47Z2024-03-07T13:03:47ZUkraine war: Russian soldiers’ wives are increasingly outspoken in their opposition<p>International Women’s Day is widely celebrated in Russia. But amid the bouquets of flowers and stilted speeches of congratulation <a href="https://tass.com/society/1586049">made by Vladimir Putin</a>, the state-controlled media will be doing its best to ignore one group of Russia’s women. These are the wives of some of its soldiers fighting in Ukraine, who have embarked on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/25/russia-military-wives-mothers-protest-against-putin-war-ukraine-troops-female">a series of regular, public demonstrations</a> that challenge the state and its narratives of societal unity around the war.</p>
<p>When Russia began its mass invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/why-no-collective-action-russian-mothers">it was widely expected</a> that soldiers’ mothers would participate in public protests against the war and demand the return of their sons, as they did in Russia’s war in Chechnya in the mid-1990s. But these mothers have <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-russian-soldiers-mothers-arent-demonstrating-the-strong-opposition-they-have-in-previous-conflicts-196605">all but disappeared from view</a> under increasingly harsh crackdowns on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/russia-kremlins-ruthless-crackdown-stifles-independent-journalism-and-anti-war-movement/">opposition to the war</a>.</p>
<p>Instead, it is soldiers’ wives who have have emerged as one of the few sources of open criticism of the state’s handling of Russia’s war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>The prominence of wives rather than mothers of soldiers reflects the fact the war is not being fought by conscripts in their late teens and early twenties. Instead, many of the soldiers are married men in their 30s, 40s and even 50s. These men were mobilised, as reservists, on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/21/putin-announces-partial-mobilisation-in-russia-in-escalation-of-ukraine-war">Putin’s order in September 2022</a>, and are serving open-ended deployments to Ukraine. These are men who previously served in the army as conscripts, aged up to about 60.</p>
<p>These mobilised soldiers, along with those recruited from prisons, are regarded as expendable by their military commanders. They are sent into the most dangerous combat missions, and are more likely to be injured and killed than professional soldiers, according to a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-829ea0ba-5b42-499b-ad40-6990f2c4e5d0">BBC-Mediazona project</a> that is attempting to track Russian casualties.</p>
<p>Our ongoing research suggests the main strategy that women in Russia’s military families have adopted in dealing with the state is “patriotic dissent”. Avoiding direct criticism of the war, they emphasise they are the loyal wives of men who are doing their duty for their country. They focus on trying to gain specific concessions from the state, such as periods of leave for their husbands or more extensive welfare support for military families. They also use social media, and especially Telegram, to share information including strategies for lobbying Russia’s ministry of defence. </p>
<p>But among the many Telegram channels set up by wives of mobilised soldiers, one called The Way Home has become the focus of more confrontational forms of protest. Angered by <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/09/15/russian-lawmaker-says-draftees-won-t-be-rotated-out-of-ukraine-until-war-is-done">the announcement in autumn 2023</a> that mobilised soldiers would be deployed to Ukraine indefinitely, the women behind the channel decided to go beyond pleading with the state.</p>
<p>In November 2023, The Way Home wives issued <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/11/27/families-of-russian-draftees-release-manifesto-and-petition-against-indefinite-mobilization">a manifesto</a> calling for an end to the mobilisation of civilians to fight in the “special military operation”. They also started taking their complaints beyond social media. </p>
<p>Some actions are relatively modest, such as <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/11/28/relatives-of-mobilized-russian-soldiers-launch-cross-country-sticker-protest-a83235">putting stickers on cars</a> calling for the return of their husbands. Others are much more difficult for the state to ignore. </p>
<p>Since January, small groups have gathered every Saturday to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-families-mobilized-soldiers-complicate-putin-reelection/32788726.html">lay flowers at eternal flames</a> around Russia, including at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin wall in Moscow. Wearing white headscarves and holding signs calling for an end to mobilisation, the wives have also urged widows of soldiers who have been killed in the war to join them.</p>
<p>So far, the state has ignored these demands for an end to mobilisation, and is attempting to placate the wives by expanding benefits for military families – including changing the rules to permit payments to be made to the unmarried partners of soldiers; a blatant contradiction of Putin’s emphasis on marriage and <a href="https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c20515fv">traditional family values</a>.</p>
<p>Protests are broken up but when the wives are detained, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/02/14/maria-andreeva-wife-of-a-russian-soldier-i-blame-myself-for-not-having-been-able-to-hold-him-back_6525029_4.html">they are released with a warning</a>. However, the women are clearly coming under pressure. Some have reported police visiting their homes to warn them against protesting. They have been verbally attacked by Russian <a href="https://en.zona.media/article/2023/12/07/putdomoi">media personality Vladimir Solovyov</a>, and Telegram has inserted a “fake” label on <a href="https://t.me/PYTY_DOMOY/452">The Way Home channel</a>.</p>
<p>Although The Way Home wives have demonstrated they are capable of holding public demonstrations that are critical of the state’s handling of the war, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-are-soldiers-protesting-wives-a-threat-to-kremlin/a-68280905">Russia’s political opposition</a> has so far dismissed their potential to become a political force. Instead, the wives are described as naive for failing to oppose the war itself, and complicit because they accept – and seek – money from the state in the form of welfare benefits. </p>
<h2>Long history of activism</h2>
<p>This dismissive attitude towards the activism of women in military families has a long history in Russia. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44582797">In 1917, women</a> – known as <em>soldatki</em> (soldiers’ wives and other female family members) – played an important role in the social unrest that overturned the monarchy and paved the way for the Bolshevik revolution.</p>
<p>But the soldatki were patronised by both Tsarist and Soviet political leaders. Described as ignorant because they couched their demands in terms of the welfare of their families rather than in the language of political ideology, they have also been left out of most historical accounts of the revolutions in 1917.</p>
<p>It is important to maintain a sense of perspective about these protests. The Way Home wives represent a small subsection of the hundreds of thousands of wives and mothers of Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine. They express strongly nationalistic views – their manifesto <a href="https://meduza.io/news/2023/11/27/nas-na-bali-i-vas-na-but-zheny-mobilizovannyh-opublikovali-manifest-i-petitsiyu-protiv-bessrochnoy-mobilizatsii">explicitly distances them from “migrants”</a> and other non-Russian soldiers deployed to fight in Ukraine, as well as from prisoners. They have not voiced sorrow or regret for the thousands of Ukrainians killed and injured by Russia’s attacks.</p>
<p>But it would also be a mistake to overlook the significance and the political nature of these soldiers’ wives’ actions. By calling for an end to mobilisation, The Way Home wives are challenging Putin’s strategy of waging “forever war” until Moscow achieves its aims.</p>
<p>These women are also exercising the fundamental right of citizens to hold their government accountable for its policies – there is no more political act than this. Ultimately, women’s “patriotic dissent” is a powerful form of resistance and it must be taken seriously.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224325/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opposition from soldiers’ wives is an underestimated form of resistance against Vladimir Putin.Jennifer Mathers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Aberystwyth UniversityNatasha Danilova, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250082024-03-05T17:56:48Z2024-03-05T17:56:48ZThe Martyrdom of Saint Alexei: Navalny’s death is the latest instance of a long tradition of self-sacrifice in Russia<p>Since the news of Alexei Navalny’s death broke on Friday 16 February 2024, a good deal of analysts and journalists have taken to framing it in terms of sacrifice and martyrdom.</p>
<p>To the best of our knowledge, there is nothing to suggest that the Russian dissident was driven by any sense of <a href="https://www-cairn-info.ressources-electroniques.univ-lille.fr/revue-cliniques-mediterraneennes-2023-1-page-7.htm">“morbid enjoyment”</a>. Baptised, he described himself as a <a href="https://www.lavie.fr/actualite/geopolitique/mort-dalexei-navalny-fol-en-christ-orthodoxe-dresse-contre-le-kremlin-93100.php">“typical post-Soviet believer”</a>. And yet, having survived an <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-poisoning-what-theatrical-assassination-attempts-reveal-about-vladimir-putins-grip-on-power-in-russia-145664">attempted Novitchok poisoning</a>, he was also fully aware of the risks he was taking when he returned to Russia in January 2021. Were he to be killed, he had said his death would be a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w4PxsTqcZtw">testament to the strength of his movement</a>.</p>
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<h2>The Russian ideal of self-sacrifice</h2>
<p>Navalny’s return to Russia can be explained by political considerations – namely, his refusal to go into permanent exile, as the Russian regime wanted. But insofar as he knew the risks to which he was exposing himself, his death – whether the result of “accidental” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/17/world/europe/navalny-health-prison-death.html">ill-treatment</a> or an <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2024/02/26/putin-killed-navalny-because-negotiations-for-his-release-in-prisoner-swap-were-nearing-completion-navalny-associate-maria-pevchikh-says">assassination in due form</a> – can be understood as self-sacrifice.</p>
<p>The phenomenon of martyrdom – particularly political martyrdom – is obviously <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/political-selfsacrifice/7FA97CDA5F984B12FD9D45CABC7F8081">not unique to Russia</a>. To regard it as an intrinsic component of a supposed “Slavic soul” is, in my view, a Western fantasy. That said, martyrdom and suffering <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qg1cj">occupy an essential place in Russian history and culture</a>.</p>
<p>From autocracy to communism, Russia has throughout history experienced eminently repressive political regimes, often one after the next. The serfdom of a large section of the population until 1861, as well as the military’s critical role in bloody colonisation campaigns, have further helped to forge a culture of suffering as a way of life. Such a Russian ideal is marvellously illustrated by the works of Dostoevsky, Anna Akhmatova and Vasily Grossman – a list that is far from exhaustive. In fact, the etymology of the Russian word <em>moutchenik</em> (martyr) is “suffering” (<em>muka</em>), whereas in French or English, for example, “martyr” comes from the Greek <em>martus</em>, “witness”.</p>
<p>However, Russia’s singularity has less to do with the existence of a culture of sacrifice in defiance toward authorities, which I name here “defiant sacrifice”, than in a specific tension between it and sacrifice in the name of the State between “martyrs” on the one hand and patriotic “heroes” on the other. Understanding this dual culture of sacrifice can help us better grasp Navalny’s tragic fate.</p>
<h2>The martyr factory</h2>
<p>The first culture of “defiant sacrifice” comprises several historical layers, the oldest of which is religious. Russia’s orthodox Christianity is indeed based on the <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/ccmed_0007-9731_1981_num_24_93_2161">life and death of the saints</a>, while the country is also marked by the repression of dissident religious movements.</p>
<p>The best-known example of the latter is that of the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/moscou-troisieme-rome--9782010107795-page-139.htm">Old Believers</a>, who opposed the reform undertaken by Patriarch Nikon in the mid-17th century to bring the Russian Orthodox Church into line with the Greek Church. The contested reform ultimately led to a schism within the Orthodox community, the <em>Raskol</em>. Convinced that the disappearance of the traditional Church marked the beginning of the reign of the Antichrist, the Old Believers <a href="https://www.rbth.com/history/332188-how-russian-old-believers-burned-alive">often set themselves on fire</a> to oppose authorities, whom they perceived as corrupt.</p>
<p>But Russia’s culture of sacrifice also extends to politics. In 1830-1840, <a href="https://www.cairn.info/histoire-de-la-russie-des-tsars--9782262042516-page-337.htm">the sociological stratum of the intelligentsia</a> emerges. The individuals constituting it are educated, but above all driven by political ideals inspired by the Age of Enlightenment.</p>
<p>On the death of Alexander I<sup>er</sup> in December 1825, a group of officers, the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/le-tsar-c-est-moi--9782130652182-page-397.htm">“Decembrists”</a>, demanded an end to the autocracy, with the view of ushering in a constitutional monarchy. The uprising, which saw its leaders executed, paved the way for what came to be known as the “revolutionary martyrs” from the second half of the 19th century onwards.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">During the Soviet era, the ‘Decembrists’ were often portrayed as heralding the revolution of 1917, and their fate was the subject of numerous hagiographies (Semion Levinkov, 1957).</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://cyclowiki.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:%D0%9B%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2-%D0%94%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8B-1957-b.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
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<p>Their example nurtured several generations of opponents, right up to the generation of those who chose the path of violence. One of their heiresses was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/obituaries/overlooked-sophia-perovskaya.html">Sophia Perovskaya</a>, who helped orchestrate the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 and was the only woman executed during Tsarism for a political crime. She, too, knew full well what price she might pay for her act.</p>
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À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ces-femmes-qui-ont-fait-la-revolution-russe-203955">Ces femmes qui ont fait la révolution russe</a>
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<p>The third dimension of Russian self-sacrifice was forged in the Soviet era, and is both religious and political in nature. Two groups stand out: the martyrs of the faith, including members of the Orthodox Church or other religious sects such as <a href="https://utorontopress.com/9781442644618/conscience-on-trial/">Jehovah’s Witnesses</a>, whose martyrdom has a fairly limited influence. On the other, the historian can also note “liberal” dissidents, whose action has contributed to the emergence of a public diplomacy based on suffering – a phenomenon not seen since the tsars’ anti-Semitic policies provoked a crisis between Russia and the United States in the early 20th century.</p>
<p>Examples include the <a href="https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/la-fabrique-de-l-histoire/dimanche-midi-place-rouge-4754717">seven Soviets who defied the KGB</a> on 25 August 1968, demonstrating in Moscow against the invasion of Czechoslovakia; the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/series-d-ete/article/2022/08/04/andrei-sakharov-une-vie-a-combattre-l-inertie-de-la-peur_6137100_3451060.html">physicist Andrei Sakharov</a>, placed under house arrest in 1980 for openly denouncing the invasion of Afghanistan and the hunt for dissidents; or <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1986/12/11/l-etrange-fin-d-un-grand-temoin_2932068_1819218.html">Anatoly Marchenko</a>, whose death in a prison camp in December 1986 prompted Gorbachev to free Sakharov and extend his <em>glasnost</em> policy.</p>
<p>All knew perfectly well that by speaking out against the Soviet state they were exposing themselves to immense risks, but felt that the cost of inaction would have been higher.</p>
<h2>The factory of heroes</h2>
<p>This defiant self-sacrifice coexists in Russian political culture with another type of self-sacrifice, this time <a href="https://www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2017/11/03/role-war-sacrifice-russias-mythic-identity/ideas/essay/">in defence of the Russian and Soviet state</a>.</p>
<p>Weaponising the past toward political ends is absolutely central to what appears to be a process of heroisation through sacrifice, even if its impact on the population remains difficult to quantify. The history of this process is linked to the emergence of Russia as an ideological entity in the 16th century, as ideas such of Moscow as the <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Definitions/Lexique/Quand-Moscou-proclame-troisieme-Rome-2022-05-18-1701215666">“third Rome”</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1848883">“Holy Russia”</a> gain ground. Throughout the centuries, Russians are brought up on the idea of <a href="https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA66355314&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&linkaccess=abs&issn=02756935&p=AONE&sw=w&userGroupName=anon%7E45a2d361&aty=open-web-entry">“Mother Russia”</a> (<em>Rodina</em>), which carves out a sacred homeland which must be defended at all costs.</p>
<h2>Navalny’s death and Russia’s future</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0265691419897533r">her book on the making of martyrs in Russia</a>, American civilisation scholar, Yuliya Minkova, describes the pervasiveness in Putin’s Russia of this phenomenon inherited from Stalinism, and the enduring tension between heroes of resistance and heroes of power.</p>
<p>Initially, during the years 2000-2014, a moderate Putinism had succeeded in defusing the risk of the emergence of martyrs who could have posed a risk to those in power. The first figure to bear the brunt of the repression, the oil tycoon <a href="https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/113639-003-A/un-livre-pour-ma-vie-mikhail-khodorkovski/">Mikhail Khodorkovsky</a>, was imprisoned between 2003 and 2013 following an eminently political trial, and had come to embody a Putin martyr during those years.</p>
<p>Khodorkovsky could have continued to languish behind bars had he not been pardoned by the president in December 2013. One of the reasons for his release was the death in prison in November 2009 of <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2012/12/11/affaire-magnitski-l-histoire-sordide-d-un-machiavelisme-d-etat_1804010_3214.html">Sergei Magnitsky</a>, an accountant who uncovered large-scale embezzlement while he was working for an American businessman, Bill Browder. Khodorkovsky’s new freedom worked in Putin’s favour, as the former businessman, exiled in London, lost his aura of “messiah” and dashed the hopes of uniting the opposition.</p>
<p>The Putin regime’s headlong rush after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 was accompanied by a confrontation unprecedented since the Cold War era between the defiant martyrs and patriotic heroes. Nowhere is this more visible than in the annual tussle between Russian progressives coming to lay flowers at the site where renowned opposition figure, Boris Nemtsov, was assassinated in 2015, and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-nemtsov-memorial-removed-activists-detained/31112141.html">the authorities removing them</a>.</p>
<p>Let’s not forget that Putin’s immediate justification for invading Ukraine was the need to prevent the “genocide” of the Russian-speaking population of Donbass, victims of a Ukrainian regime described as “Nazi”. Imaginary martyrs, <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affaire_de_l%E2%80%99enfant_crucifi%C3%A9">such as the child supposedly crucified by Ukrainian forces</a>, had been invented to encourage Russian soldiers to sign up in the name of a noble cause, and then, later, to respond to the call for mobilisation.</p>
<p>For a long time, Putin’s government had succeeded in limiting Navalny’s influence, going to great lengths to deny his very existence. Putin’s refusal to name him or, for days, of <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/02/17/navalnys-killers-refusing-to-hand-over-body-allies-say-a84125">returning his body to his family</a> was part of that strategy. By having him killed, the Russian leader has confirmed Navalny’s status as a martyr in the eyes of a section of the population – those who have not been “zombified” by propaganda and conspiracy theories about links between Navalny and the CIA – and at the same time, the criminal nature of the Russian regime.</p>
<p>Far from erasing Navalny’s message, Putin has on the contrary amplified it, undermining the effect of his own propaganda and undermining the already slim chances of a negotiated solution to the conflict in Ukraine: Navalny’s death has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/european-union-sanctions-russia-ukraine-war-28a5d7faabbcbc5fe3a0de3ec84fd87d">further strained relations between Russia and the West</a>. His widow, Yulia, has announced her intention to take up her husband’s torch. It remains to be seen whether she will be able to give substance to his project, <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/world/europe/2024/02/16/alexei-navalny-firebrand-campaigner-for-beautiful-russia-of-the-future/">“The marvellous Russia of the future”</a>, so that his sacrifice will not have been in vain.</p>
<p>One thing appears to be certain: the courage of the thousands of mourners who came to Navalny’s funeral on 1 March only reinforced the existing tension between the culture of heroes as martyrs, who sacrifice themselves for Russia’s democratic future, and the culture of heroes as combatants of the “special military operation”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225008/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andreï Kozovoï ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>In Russia, individual sacrifice is an integral part of the national psyche.Andreï Kozovoï, Professeur des universités, Université de LilleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2236962024-03-04T13:41:31Z2024-03-04T13:41:31ZSome nations have done well out of Russia being sanctioned – here’s why<p>Since the start of the Ukraine war, the US, EU, UK and other countries including Japan and Canada have increased sanctions on Russia. By late 2023, Russia became the <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/27015/number-of-currently-active-sanctions-by-target-country/">most sanctioned country</a> in the world with over 18,000 restrictions on different items – more than the combined number of sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Syria. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659">Restrictions</a> include financial measures such as the freezing of the Russian central bank’s assets in the countries imposing the relevant sanctions, limiting Russia’s access to income from oil and gas exports, sanctions on technologies employed in military production such as microelectronic components, the ban on Russia’s diamond and gold exports, and other measures designed to affect Russian shoppers and business. Hundreds of international corporations have stopped working in Russia.</p>
<p>Restricting trade with a particular country, however, does not translate into lower demand for the products sanctioned. Sanctions on Russia resonate in the global economy and there are also <a href="https://time.com/6155581/russia-sanctions-global-economic-impact/">“surprising winners”</a> whose economies have benefited. </p>
<p>For instance, restrictions have diverted <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2023/04/13/regional-economic-outlook-mcd-april-2023">trade routes</a> away from Russia to the neighbouring Caucasus and central Asia region leading to these economies, including Armenia and Kazakhstan, growing on average by 4.8% in 2022.</p>
<p>Once countries imposed bans on their exports to Russia, Putin <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/economy-and-ecology/beyond-russia-the-impacts-of-sanctions-on-the-region-6959/">started sourcing</a> supplies from other states including Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkey. This enabled Russia to have continuous <a href="https://silverado.org/news/report-russia-shifting-import-sources-amid-u-s-and-allied-export-restrictions/">access</a> to foreign goods and technology, for instance, vehicles and semiconductors.</p>
<p>The imposition of sanctions is an alternative to military conflict, and its objective is to maximise <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574001306020278?casa_token=yLZ1fJzrHiAAAAAA:vD4t3N0oOGb3-51QcQiVttYaXsxq61_4g1ne0Od5iKHkcSav_wqiY6vLpAjAtXqpyu4iOpE589Q">economic damage</a>. They can be economic or financial imposed by governments or international institutions on states, companies and individuals, and are employed when a particular <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions">state’s interests</a> are threatened or there are violations of international law.</p>
<h2>Russia looks for new partners</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2023/04/13/regional-economic-outlook-mcd-april-2023">Reports</a> indicate that bilateral trade between Russia and Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has increased since the war began. By September 2022, exports from <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2023/04/13/regional-economic-outlook-mcd-april-2023">Kyrgyzstan</a> to Russia rose to 34% of its total exports, up from 14% in 2021. </p>
<p>Similarly, restrictions to the Russian banking sector led to a significant increase in <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/economy-and-ecology/beyond-russia-the-impacts-of-sanctions-on-the-region-6959/">net money transfers</a> from Russia to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. For example, in <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2023/04/13/regional-economic-outlook-mcd-april-2023">Armenia</a> transfers reached 17% of GDP, and in Georgia they reached 8% of GDP. Such transfers may be done, for example, by Russians moving to third countries, people purchasing properties in those countries or by people attempting to maintain access to their money via foreign banks.</p>
<p>Changing how it imports goods has also enabled Russia to sustain military production. Countries including China, Turkey and the UAE have become <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/09/russia-sanctions-weapons-technology-exports-evasion-arms-production-missiles-chips/">hubs</a> to channel critical technologies to Russia and <a href="https://insightnews.media/is-kyrgyzstan-a-hub-for-re-export-of-goods-to-russia-in-sanctions-evasion-schemes/">bypass sanctions</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/17/hong-kong-s-technology-lifeline-to-russia-pub-89775">Reports</a> indicate that Hong Kong has become a hub to transfer western-built microelectronics to Russia. It doubled its semiconductor exports to Russia to about US$400 million (£316 million) worth in 2022. In the same year, Russian’s imports of semiconductors from <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/17/hong-kong-s-technology-lifeline-to-russia-pub-89775">China</a> steeply increased from about US$200 million to over US$500 million. Likewise, the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/17/hong-kong-s-technology-lifeline-to-russia-pub-89775">UAE</a> increased its exports of microchips to Russia from US$1.6 million in 2021 to US$24.3 million in 2022.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, through a military <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-ramps-up-military-rhetoric-as-kim-gives-up-on-reunification-with-south-213696">weapons deal</a>, Russia and North Korea have deepened their relationship with the increased military sales representing a new income source for the latter.</p>
<p>Other countries have gained from stepping into trade areas where Russia had dominated. In 2022, as sanctions affected the export of diamonds from Russia, there was a strong global demand leading to a <a href="https://businessweekly.co.bw/news/botswana-profits-from-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-report">20.4%</a> increase in Botswana’s diamond exports that year. Similarly, it has been reported that the UAE has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/russia-with-gold-uae-cashes-sanctions-bite-2023-05-25/">cashed in</a> as a thriving gold hub, increasing its gold imports from Russia from about 1.3 tonnes in 2021 to 75.7 tonnes, worth US$4.3 billion, between 2022 and 2023. In 2022, Russia became the UAE’s <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-20/russia-becomes-uae-s-top-gold-source-after-being-shut-out-of-west">main source</a> for gold imports.</p>
<p>As sanctions tighten on the Russian economy and the war continues, there’s a significant brain drain of highly skilled people from Russia. It’s estimated that <a href="https://epjdatascience.springeropen.com/articles/10.1140/epjds/s13688-023-00389-3">11.1%</a> of Russian software developers relocated between 2021 and 2022, for example. <a href="https://epjdatascience.springeropen.com/articles/10.1140/epjds/s13688-023-00389-3">Armenia</a> saw a 42% increase in developers, Cyprus 60% and Georgia 94%. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-economy-brain-drain-labor-shortage-workforce-exodus-capital-flight-2023-9?r=US&IR=T">Evidence</a> suggests that of those who have emigrated from Russia since the war began, 80% are university graduates with 100,000 IT professionals relocating in 2022. In the “receiving economies”, such levels of “brain gain” can have a significant effect as an influx of highly skilled people <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26651/w26651.pdf">impacts innovation</a>, entrepreneurship and, ultimately, economic growth.</p>
<h2>US increases oil purchases elsewhere</h2>
<p>Asian and Middle Eastern countries are not the only places to benefit. The <a href="https://time.com/6155581/russia-sanctions-global-economic-impact/">US</a> has money flowing into its economy as investors that might have put funds into Russia look for new opportunities. </p>
<p>In addition, since imposing restrictions on the imports of Russian crude oil and products in early 2022, the US has <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000186-9ef3-d045-afd6-bff35efd0000">increased</a> its imports from countries such as Brazil, Iraq, Mexico and Saudi Arabia. <a href="https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_a.htm">Data</a> shows that in the period between 2021 and 2022, while Brazilian crude oil and products exports to the US increased from 143,000 to 193,000 barrels per day, Iraq’s grew from 157,000 to 311,000, Mexico’s from 711,000 to 808,000 and Saudi Arabia’s from 430,000 to 559,000.</p>
<p>So far, sanctions have yielded some of the expected outcomes. For instance, in 2022, the Russian economy contracted by 2.1% with such <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/sanctions-and-russias-war-limiting-putins-capabilities">growth</a> linked to a 14% reduction in exports and a 11% drop in imports, compared to 2021. </p>
<p>On the one hand, sanctioning countries have had to shift trade sources which have brought financial benefits to trade partners. On the other, Russia has circumvented some restrictions by shifting import sources via third parties. The benefits that third countries obtain from redirected trade may be temporary or positive in the short term, but not necessarily in the long term. This will depend on how the Russian economy is able to perform under continuous restrictions and the uncertainty that such conditions and war entail.</p>
<p>Whatever the result for Russia itself, the shifting patterns of Russia’s needs and imports have certainly boosted some other countries economies, perhaps unexpectedly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose Caballero does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia has looked for new trading partners as sanctions bite, but also suffered a brain drain.Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248002024-02-29T17:30:08Z2024-02-29T17:30:08ZUkraine recap: fresh nuclear threats from Putin as France talks of western boots on the ground<p>Another day, another bloodcurdling threat from Vladimir Putin. The Russian president used his annual televised address to warn the west that he was prepared to defend his country, if necessary, by using nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>“They should eventually realise that we also have weapons that can hit targets on their territory,” Putin said, clearly referring to plans by some of Ukraine’s allies to supply medium- and long-rage missiles that could strike targets within Russia. “Everything that the west comes up with creates the real threat of a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, and thus the destruction of civilisation.”</p>
<p>There has been a discernible sense of urgency about western discussions of Ukraine over the past fortnight. The loss of the town of Avdiivka, a key strategic position close to Donetsk, after weeks of heavy fighting and massive losses on both sides, has set off something of a domino effect in the area. Russia has used the momentum to push the frontlines several miles to the west as part of its winter and spring offensive. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW map showing the battle lines around Avdiivka and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine, February 2024." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1117&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1117&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1117&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The fall of Avdiivka has allowed Russian troops to shift the battle lines more than five miles to the west.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>In the previous Ukraine recap, we noted that Joe Biden has managed to get his US$95 billion (£75 billion) aid package through the US Senate. But the package still has to pass the House of Representatives, whose speaker, Mike Johnson, has yet to confirm it will even be given a vote. It’s clear from military reports emerging from Ukraine that the lack of ammunition is rapidly becoming an existential crisis.</p>
<p>Putin also probably had in mind the statement by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, at a security conference in Paris on February 26, that while there was as yet “no consensus” among Kyiv’s western allies about committing troops to the defence of Ukraine: “Nothing should be excluded. We will do whatever it takes to ensure that Russia cannot win this war.”</p>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>This drew immediate pushback from most of the Nato leaders assembled at the conference, who raced to distance themselves from Macron’s position. Aside from anything else, there are major question marks about Nato’s ability to wage war in Europe against as formidable an adversary as Russia – which has, over the past two years, transformed into a war economy. </p>
<p>Kenton White, a Nato expert at the University of Reading, believes the increasingly ominous prospect of a confrontation between Nato and Russia will <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-wont-rule-out-using-western-ground-troops-in-ukraine-but-is-nato-prepared-for-war-with-russia-224086">require a major rethink</a> on the part of the western alliance. Hitherto, he writes, it has prepared to wage “come-as-you-are” wars, which would be fought with existing troops and weapons stocks. </p>
<p>Indeed, it appears such a rethink might already be happening. Nato is engaged in its largest exercises since the cold war – exercises designed specifically around the prospect of a war with a major power such as Russia. As Nato’s most senior military commander, Admiral Rob Bauer of the Royal Netherlands Navy, said last year: “We need large volumes. The just-in-time, just-enough economy we built together in 30 years in our liberal economies is fine for a lot of things – but not the armed forces when there is a war ongoing.” </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-wont-rule-out-using-western-ground-troops-in-ukraine-but-is-nato-prepared-for-war-with-russia-224086">Macron won't rule out using western ground troops in Ukraine – but is Nato prepared for war with Russia?</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, Stefan Wolff – a regular contributor to our coverage of the conflict over the past two years – struck a sobering note when he wrote that the west’s perceptions of the war had been <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">turned on their head</a> over the past 12-to-18 months by the lack of success of Ukraine’s counter-offensive. While Ukraine was scoring rapid successes on the battlefield in the summer and autumn of 2022, the talk was about finding an “off-ramp” to allow Putin a face-saving way out of an unwinnable war. But now, “increasingly, it’s the west that needs the off-ramp”.</p>
<p>Wolff, an expert in international security at the University of Birmingham, believes the west faces three choices. The preferable one in Ukraine’s eyes is for Nato to double down on its support, finding a way to ensure Ukraine gets the weapons it needs – not only to defend itself, but to inflict a comprehensive defeat on Russia. </p>
<p>However, talk is increasingly focusing on the second option – providing enough support to Ukraine to defend the territory it still has, which would involve making territorial concessions to Russia. The third, a comprehensive defeat of Ukraine, would have far-reaching consequences – none of them good.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">Ukraine war: the west is at a crossroads – double down on aid to Kyiv, accept a compromise deal, or face humiliation by Russia</a>
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<h2>Watching the war from space</h2>
<p>A feature of this war has been the way that thinktanks and analysts such as the Institute for the Study of War (whose maps we use in these regular updates) are able to pinpoint movements on the battlefield with such accuracy. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a pair of satellite views showing the same section of a city, one with intact buildings and green space and the other damaged or destroyed buildings and charred earth" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=757&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=757&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=757&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Satellite photography like these ‘before’ and ‘after’ images can provide a visceral sense of the destruction in the war in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/maxar-satellite-imagery-comparing-the-before-after-news-photo/1255499859">Satellite image (c) 2023 Maxar Technologies via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Sylvain Barbot and his team from USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences in the US, have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-at-2-years-destruction-seen-from-space-via-radar-223275">using open-source data</a> in order to analyse the development of the war from space. It has enabled them to build accurate before-and-after images of cities where the fighting has been fiercest, highlighting just how destructive the conflict has been.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-at-2-years-destruction-seen-from-space-via-radar-223275">War in Ukraine at 2 years: Destruction seen from space – via radar</a>
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<h2>Russia’s economic transformation</h2>
<p>Considering the regime of sanctions imposed by the west, Russia’s successful retooling of its economy to put it firmly on a war footing is nothing short of remarkable. This echoes a similar transformation achieved by Soviet Russia during the second world war – something that changed the course of the conflict, swaying it in favour of the Allies. </p>
<p>Now Russia’s economy is completely dedicated to winning the war in Ukraine – and this is the main thing driving the country’s economic growth. Renaud Foucart, an economist at Lancaster University, says that while this has kept Russia in the war and is arguably giving it the upper hand at present, it also means Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-economy-is-now-completely-driven-by-the-war-in-ukraine-it-cannot-afford-to-lose-but-nor-can-it-afford-to-win-221333">can’t afford to win</a>, as any attempt to transform back would be too costly.</p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-economy-is-now-completely-driven-by-the-war-in-ukraine-it-cannot-afford-to-lose-but-nor-can-it-afford-to-win-221333">Russia's economy is now completely driven by the war in Ukraine – it cannot afford to lose, but nor can it afford to win</a>
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<h2>Alexei Navalny and the Russian opposition</h2>
<p>For those of us who had been following the fate of Russian opposition figurehead Alexei Navalny, the news of his death in a prison camp in the Russian Arctic had a certain sad inevitability to it. Navalny flew back to Russia in January 2021 after recovering from being poisoned with Novichok on a flight across Siberia the previous year. No sooner had he and his wife, Yulia Navalnaya, disembarked from the flight to Moscow than he was detained, tried and sentenced.</p>
<p>Navalny spent the last three years being shunted to ever more unpleasant prisons across Russia, appearing every so often – usually via video link – to be sentenced to further prison time on spurious charge after spurious charge. Alexander Titov from Queen’s University Belfast <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-reported-death-of-putins-most-prominent-opponent-spells-the-end-of-politics-in-russia-223766">charts Navalny’s courageous career</a> – he was perhaps the biggest remaining thorn in Putin’s side.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-reported-death-of-putins-most-prominent-opponent-spells-the-end-of-politics-in-russia-223766">Alexei Navalny: reported death of Putin's most prominent opponent spells the end of politics in Russia</a>
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<p>So, where does Navalny’s death leave the opposition to Putin in Russia? According to Stephen Hall, who researches authoritarian regimes at the University of Bath, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-putins-russia-the-death-of-navalny-has-left-the-opposition-demoralised-but-not-defeated-224303">depressing answer</a> is that most opposition leaders are now either dead or in jail. Showing enormous strength, Yulia Navalnaya appeared at the Munich Security Conference hours after the news of her husband’s death had broken, to pledge to continue his work.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Keep on fighting’: Yulia Navalnaya vows to carry on her husband’s work after his death in a Russian prison camp, February 2024.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Other than Navalnaya, perhaps the most effective opposition to the Russian president and the war in Ukraine will be the wives and mothers of the troops. If casualties continue to mount – and especially if the Russian military starts to suffer the same sort of setbacks as it experienced in late 2022 – then their voices can only gain in resonance, Hall argues.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-putins-russia-the-death-of-navalny-has-left-the-opposition-demoralised-but-not-defeated-224303">In Putin's Russia, the death of Navalny has left the opposition demoralised but not defeated</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224800/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240862024-02-27T13:51:29Z2024-02-27T13:51:29ZMacron won’t rule out using western ground troops in Ukraine – but is Nato prepared for war with Russia?<p>The French president, Emmanuel Macron, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/feb/27/russia-ukraine-war-live-france-macron-ground-troops-latest-news#top-of-blog">has said</a> sending western troops to fight in Ukraine “could not be ruled out”. After hosting a meeting of 25 European leaders in Paris on February 26, Macron said that there was “no consensus” on committing ground troops to the conflict in Ukraine but added: “Nothing should be excluded. We will do whatever it takes to ensure that Russia cannot win this war.” </p>
<p>Until now, Nato has confined itself to training Ukrainian military forces and supplying them with defensive weapons. Member states fear that directly confronting Russian forces in Ukraine would risk a massive escalation. And Vladimir Putin and his senior ministers have regularly issued <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-are-the-risks-that-russia-will-turn-to-its-nuclear-arsenal-178139">threats that</a> Russia could resort to using its nuclear arsenal in the case of a larger conflict.</p>
<p>At present, Nato is also conducting its largest military exercise since the cold war. <a href="https://www.act.nato.int/article/steadfast-defender-2024-signals-alliance-unity-and-preparedness/">Steadfast Defender</a> runs from January until May and involves all 31 member states. Aimed at enhancing the alliance’s collective defence capabilities and readiness, it is the largest exercise since <a href="https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/165109/1/165109.pdf">Reforger in 1988</a>, which involved 125,000 troops from the US, Germany, Canada, France and Denmark.</p>
<p>General Christopher Cavoli, Nato’s supreme allied commander for Europe, <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/222847.htm">said</a>: “Steadfast Defender 2024 will be a clear demonstration of our unity, strength and determination to protect each other, our values and the rules-based international order.”</p>
<p>Importantly, one aspect of the exercises is the involvement of US and Canadian forces, which is designed to demonstrate the speed and size of Nato’s reinforcement capabilities. It acts both as a reassurance to European Nato member states and as a demonstration to potential enemies of the ability Nato has to put large forces into the field. Exercises are part of the communication of deterrence.</p>
<p>The exercise is meant <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-kick-off-biggest-drills-decades-with-some-90000-troops-2024-01-18/">to simulate</a> an, “emerging conflict scenario with a near-peer adversary”. This is a thinly disguised reference to Russia, which shows that Nato is beginning to take the threat of direct conflict with that country seriously.</p>
<p>During the cold war, Nato undertook regular large-scale exercises. For example, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/18/world/british-start-war-games-on-continent.html">Exercise Lionheart, led by the UK in 1984</a>, involved nearly 58,000 British soldiers and airmen of a total force of 131,565, including troops from the US, the Netherlands and what was then West Germany.</p>
<p>Since the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, Nato has searched for a new identity. Its <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/reportch1.pdf">focus shifted</a> in the 1990s from protecting common territory to protecting members’ common interests, as it did by intervening in the wars in <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52122.htm#">Bosnia in 1995</a> and <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm#">Kosovo in 1999</a>, when it officially approved this new <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm">strategic concept</a>.</p>
<h2>Need for unity</h2>
<p>A demonstration of Nato unity and military capacity is important, coming after two years of disunity over how to respond to the war in Ukraine and amid wrangling over supplies of arms by Ukraine’s western allies. It has become more significant following recent remarks <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html">by former president Donald Trump</a> that Nato members who did not meet the spending guidelines would no longer be protected by the US.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘I would not protect you’: Donald Trump threatens Nato members over defence spending.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Members are supposed to spend at least 2% of their annual GDP on defence – but it’s more complicated than that. Some nations’ defence spending is wholly allocated to Nato. Others, meanwhile, might set their defence spending at less than 2%, but their spending per head is greater than that of those who meet the Nato guideline. </p>
<p>For example, Luxembourg <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/nato-spending-by-country">falls short</a> of the 2%, spending only 0.72%. But in per head terms it spends US$921 (£726), which is more than Poland (3.9%) or France (1.9%). </p>
<p>The US may spend 3.5% GDP on defence, but not all of that is allocated to Nato. Much of the US’s strength is deployed in the Pacific and on its home territories. So it’s misleading to judge the value of Nato membership in these terms. </p>
<p>They key clause in the Nato treaty is article 5, which governs collective security and compels members to respond if a fellow member is attacked by a hostile third party. The US is the only Nato member state to have invoked article 5, following the 9/11 attacks. It received assistance from other Nato members in Afghanistan and more widely in the “war on terror”.</p>
<h2>Is Nato battle ready?</h2>
<p>A significant problem Nato faces however, is not in deploying the troops it has, but in supplying them. As has been demonstrated by the efforts to provide equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, Nato has neither the stockpiles nor the manufacturing capacity to supply a lengthy modern war. </p>
<p>This is because Nato has long planned on what’s known as a “come as you are” war, which means it has the capacity to fight for only as long as the equipment and supplies last. For this reason, Nato’s strategy has always been, in the event of a conflict, to bring it to a conclusion as quickly as possible. </p>
<p>Admiral Rob Bauer of the Royal Netherlands Navy, Nato’s most senior military commander and military adviser to its North Atlantic Council, spoke at the Warsaw Security Forum in October 2023. He <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66984944">said</a>: “We need large volumes. The just-in-time, just-enough economy we built together in 30 years in our liberal economies is fine for a lot of things – but not the armed forces when there is a war ongoing.”</p>
<p>A number of European countries have already distanced themselves from Macron’s remarks, including Poland, the Czech republic and Sweden, whose Nato membership has finally been approved by Hungary and which is set to become the alliance’s 32nd member.</p>
<p>But Russia has seized on Macron’s remarks, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/feb/27/russia-ukraine-war-live-france-macron-ground-troops-latest-news#top-of-blog">telling reporters</a> that even discussing the idea of western troops being sent to fight in Ukraine represents a “very important new element”. He added: “In that case, we would need to talk not about the probability, but about the inevitability (of a direct conflict).”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224086/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kenton White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sending ground troops to Ukraine could provoke a wider and vastly more dangerous war with Russia,Kenton White, Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240502024-02-27T12:32:06Z2024-02-27T12:32:06ZYulia Navalnaya, widow of Alexei Navalny, steps forward to lead the Russian opposition – 3 points to understand<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578049/original/file-20240226-31-5bo8d1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Yulia Navalnaya, the wife of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, attends the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 16, 2024, the day it was announced Navalny was dead.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yulia-navalnaya-wife-of-late-russian-opposition-leader-news-photo/2007795740?adppopup=true">Kai Pfaffenbach/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Alexei Navalny, one of Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s biggest critics and the country’s de facto opposition leader, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/16/russian-activist-and-putin-critic-alexei-navalny-dies-in-prison">died under suspicious circumstances</a> in an Arctic prison on Feb. 16, 2024. </p>
<p>Hours after his death was announced, Navalny’s wife, Yulia Navalnaya, appeared in a video on social media and said, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/navalnys-widow-yulia-i-will-continue-my-husbands-fight-free-russia-2024-02-19/">“I want to live in a free Russia, I want to build a free Russia.”</a>. </p>
<p>Navalnaya, who lives outside of Russia, accused Putin of killing her husband and also promised to “continue the work of Alexei Navalny.”</p>
<p>Since her husband’s death, Navalyana, who was generally not prominently involved in politics before, has shown other signs of stepping into politics. She is lobbying the European Union to enact new sanctions against Putin, for example. Navalnaya and her daughter also <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/22/biden-meets-with-navalnys-widow-and-daughter-00142738">met with President Joe Biden</a>, to whom she reiterated her desire to keep up her husband’s fight against Putin. </p>
<p><a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/shattered-cracked-or-firmly-intact-9780190602093?cc=us&lang=en&">My research</a> <a href="https://liberalarts.vt.edu/departments-and-schools/department-of-political-science/faculty/farida-jalalzai.html">examining female leaders</a> worldwide recognizes family connections as an important pathway to power. </p>
<p>Navalnaya’s story fits squarely within a larger pattern of other female political leaders and activists who become publicly prominent after their husbands die or are imprisoned for their opposition to an authoritarian regime. </p>
<p>Here are three points to understand about Navalnaya’s sudden rise in politics, and the obstacles she faces in accomplishing her goal of bringing democratic change to Russia. </p>
<h2>1. There’s a long history of women subbing for men</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15544770802212224">Widowhood was</a> the main route American women took to becoming a member of Congress for decades, when they assumed their husbands’ seats, from the 1920s through the 1960s. </p>
<p>While men also often benefit from being born into political families, women disproportionately rely on their marital connections and other family linkages – such as being daughters of powerful men – to gain a foothold in politics. </p>
<p>Women also often ascend in the political arena under tragic circumstances. </p>
<p><a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=82428&page=1">Sirimavo Bandaranaike</a>, for example, was the widow of Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Solomon Bandaranaike, who was assassinated in 1959. Sirimavo Bandaranaike began to lead her husband’s political party, and following elections in 1960, she became the first female prime minister in the world.</p>
<p>Similarly, in Nicaragua, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-02-26-mn-1241-story.html">Violeta de Chamorro</a>, became the widow of the prominent news editor and publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamorro in 1978. Unknown gunmen killed her husband following years of his reporting work that challenged the country’s repressive government.</p>
<p>Violeta de Chamorro then became involved in Nicaragua’s tumultuous politics and was elected Nicaragua’s president in 1990. She served in that role until 1997.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman in dark sunglasses and a white head cover leans against the top of a car that she rides on as she speaks into a microphone. Several men stand or sit around her." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Benazir Bhutto, former prime minister of Pakistan, campaigns before the Pakistani election in October 1990.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-prime-minister-of-pakistan-benazir-bhutto-news-photo/561490955?adppopup=true">Derek Hudson/Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Then there is the example of <a href="https://documentwomen.com/benazir-bhutto-first-muslim-women-leader">Benazir Bhutto</a>, former prime minister of Pakistan who served in the 1980s and ‘90s. Bhutto was the daughter of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was deposed in a military coup in 1978 and then <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/11/why-is-pakistans-top-court-probing-the-1979-hanging-of-former-pm-bhutto">executed in 1979</a>. </p>
<p>Today, women still sometimes take this route to power, often in Asia and Latin America. </p>
<p>Far closer to Russia, Belarus offers another recent example of how wives have assumed their husbands’ political posts when they are no longer able to continue their work. When Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko arrested leading critic Sergei Tikhanovsky and barred him from running in the 2020 presidential election, Tikhanovsky’s wife, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, ran in his place. </p>
<p>She lost her bid in 2020, during an election that featured rampant <a href="https://leads.ap.org/best-of-the-week/ap-exposes-election-fraud-in-belarus">voting irregularities</a>. </p>
<p>It is widely known that Tikhanovskaya, who initially said that she was not interested in politics, was allowed to run because Lukashenko thought she posed no real threat <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/6167">since she was a woman</a>. </p>
<h2>2. Women can use feminine stereotypes to their political benefit</h2>
<p>Navalnaya, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/yulia-navalnaya-vladimir-putin-new-enemy-alexei-navalny-russia-opposition/">an economist</a> and a former banker, focused on raising children and supporting her husband as he gained a political following within the last decade. </p>
<p>Navalnaya <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/16/navalny-family-yulia-wife-children/">said in 2013</a>, “I imagine myself as his wife, no matter what he is.” When asked about her own political ambition in another interview in 2021, she <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/yulia-navalnaya-russia-opposition-leader-navalny-widow-putin-rcna139441">stated that</a> it was “much more interesting to be a politician’s wife.” </p>
<p>Being a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/supermadres-maternal-legacies-and-womens-political-participation-in-contemporary-latin-america/C5E4C8A4448BED97202936E1DBDF4090">wife and mother are identities</a> that can translate well to being considered a mother of a nation or a movement during inflection points.</p>
<p>Navalnaya and other women in a similar position are considered <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/6167">accidental leaders</a>, only called into action under extreme circumstances. Though Navalnaya went with her husband to protests and rallies, her political activity was very limited until recently.</p>
<p>She was a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/yulia-navalnaya-russia-opposition-leader-navalny-widow-putin-rcna139441">key player</a> in getting Putin’s permission to take her husband to Germany to receive treatment when he was poisoned with the nerve agent Novichok in 2020. She increased her political role around that time, but to only highlight her husband’s plight and persecution. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A white, blonde haired woman wears a face mask and stands in a crowd of people, who all direct cell phone cameras at her." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Yulia Navalnaya, center, is surrounded by people as she leaves Moscow’s airport in January 2021, shortly after her husband Alexei Navalny’s apprehension by the Russian police for alleged fraud.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-prime-minister-of-pakistan-benazir-bhutto-news-photo/561490955?adppopup=true">Derek Hudson/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. Navalnaya will face limits to real power</h2>
<p>While Navalnaya has received <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68336393">much international interest and praise </a> for stepping in to fill her husband’s shoes, she is living in exile. </p>
<p>If she returned to Russia and continued to oppose Putin’s regime, she would likely face <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/kremlin-critics-what-happens-to-putins-most-vocal-opponents">imprisonment or even death</a>, the fate of Putin’s other prominent critics. </p>
<p>But Navalnaya might not be able to gain real political headway if she does not return to Russia. Moreover, leading a movement from abroad could be used by her enemies as evidence that she is merely a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-has-yet-establish-official-cause-navalny-death-spokeswoman-says-2024-02-19/">puppet of foreign governments</a>. </p>
<p>A grieving widow is now arguably Putin’s biggest critic, and her foray into the political limelight is not wholly unexpected. What remains unclear is whether Navalnaya can move beyond being a symbol and proxy of her husband and unite Russia’s opposition movement to face Putin.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224050/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Farida Jalalzai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The quick rise of Yulia Navalnaya in Russian politics closely mirrors the story of other female politicians who gain prominence after their husbands or fathers are no longer able to lead.Farida Jalalzai, Professor of Political Science; Associate Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences, Virginia TechLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2243032024-02-26T17:20:44Z2024-02-26T17:20:44ZIn Putin’s Russia, the death of Navalny has left the opposition demoralised but not defeated<p>The still mysterious death of Russian opposition figurehead Alexei Navalny was greeted by some Kremlin critics as proof that the era of democratic <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-reported-death-of-putins-most-prominent-opponent-spells-the-end-of-politics-in-russia-223766">politics was over</a> in Russia. That any change or reset back to democratic governance will henceforth not be due to the ballot box, but will depend on a wave of popular protest galvanising enough support to topple Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>Navlany’s death comes a few short weeks before Russia holds presidential elections. If Putin wins, the result will confirm him in office for another six-year term. </p>
<p>There are no serious opposition candidates, and the only registered opposition candidate to voice criticism of the war in Ukraine, Boris Nadezhdin, was recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/08/russian-anti-war-candidate-boris-nadezhdin-says-he-is-barred-from-election">disqualified from running</a>. Thanks to a 2020 constitutional amendment which removed term limits, Putin can stay in office until 2036.</p>
<p>So what becomes of Russia’s opposition, and the country’s fast-disappearing (if not defunct) democracy in the meantime. Who dares pick up Navalny’s standard in the campaign against Russia’s autocratic leader?</p>
<p>The death of democracy in Russia has been proclaimed several times. Within five years of Putin coming to power, analysts were already pointing to the lack of <a href="https://eusp.org/sites/default/files/archive/pss_dep/gelman_Political_Opposition_in_Russia.pdf">authentic opposition parties</a>. Meanwhile surveys by the Levada Center – Russia’s best-known opinion pollsters – found that by mid-2004 only 42% of Russians believed that political opposition still existed in the country.</p>
<p>By that stage, they had already seen the death of veteran opposition politician <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/enemies-kremlin-deaths-prigozhin-list/32562583.html">Sergei Yushenkov</a>, leader of the anti-Kremlin party Liberal Russia, who was shot in front of his Moscow home in April 2003. Deaths of other prominent opposition figures, including investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya and lawyer and activist Sergei Magnitsky, followed in fairly rapid succession. Critics who had left the country, such as Alexander Litvinenko and Boris Berezovsky, were targeted in exile.</p>
<p>In 2015, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/boris-nemtsov-russian-opposition-leader-murdered/">Boris Nemtsov</a>, a former Yeltsin-era deputy prime minister who had once been tipped to take over, was shot dead on a Moscow street the day before he was due to lead a march against Russia’s incursions in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea. </p>
<p>By the time Navalny was poisoned on a domestic flight over Siberia in August 2020, he had become the main focus of Russia’s opposition. His poisoning and then subsequent return to Russia in January 2021 and his rearrest and imprisonment on what were clearly questionable charges, sparked a degree of optimism that Putin had over-reached.</p>
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<h2>Putin tightens the screws</h2>
<p>But the invasion of Ukraine in February was accompanied by the introduction of harsh new laws aimed at stifling dissent. The arrest of other opposition figures in 2022 under these new laws was effectively a <a href="https://theconversation.com/stalin-style-show-trials-and-unexplained-deaths-of-opposition-figures-show-the-depth-of-repression-in-putins-russia-203893">decapitation</a> of the opposition in Russia.</p>
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<p>Under the new laws, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/moscow-police-arrest-children-for-laying-flowers-at-ukrainian-embassy">children were arrested</a> for the first time. The legislation imposed sentences of up to 15 years for spreading <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-war-latest-russia-law-b2028440.html">“false information”</a> – that is, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/russia-protests-more-than-1300-arrested-at-anti-war-demonstrations-ukraine">voicing opposition</a> to the war.</p>
<p>Sentences meted out to high-profile protesters – such as artist and writer Sasha Skochilenko, who was given a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67437171">seven year jail term</a> for replacing supermarket labels with anti-war messages soon after the invasion in April 2022 – appear to have discouraged many from taking to the <a href="https://re-russia.net/en/analytics/0125/">streets in protest</a> at the war.</p>
<p>Now most well-known Russian opposition figures are either in exile or prison. Anglo-Russian journalist and activist <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65297003">Vladimir Kara-Murza</a> was sentenced in 2022 for 25 years for “treason”, having condemned the invasion of Ukraine, as was opposition politician <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/09/russian-opposition-figure-ilya-yashin-jailed-for-denouncing-ukraine-war">Ilya Yashin</a>. </p>
<p>Others, including former oligarch <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/chasewithorn/2022/05/03/exiled-former-russian-oligarch-mikhail-khodorkovsky-the-world-will-not-be-a-safe-place-as-long-as-putin-remains-in-power/">Mikhail Khodorkovsky</a>, Putin’s first prime minister <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/03/putin-critic-and-ex-pm-kasyanov-leaves-russia-a77892">Mikhail Kasyanov</a>, and former world chess champion <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/apr/30/garry-kasparov-interview-chess-vladimir-putin-russia">Garry Kasparov</a> fled abroad. While each is a vocal Putin critic, exile makes it difficult to shape change.</p>
<h2>Green shoots?</h2>
<p>Despite this, there are some green shoots that could rise to defy Russia’s political winter.</p>
<p>The day the news of Navalny’s death broke internationally, his widow – <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7c501c5b-79c8-42ae-8190-94d7eeeeb9bb">Yulia Navalnaya</a> appeared in front of an audience of world leaders at the Munich Security conference.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Keep on fighting’: Yulia Navalnaya vows to carry on her husband’s work after his death in a Russian prison camp, February 2024.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Navalnaya vowed to carry on her husband’s work, saying:</p>
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<p>The main thing we can do for Alexei and for ourselves is to keep on fighting. To unite into one powerful fist and hit this insane regime. Putin, his friends, the bandits in uniform, the thieves and murderers that have crippled our country.</p>
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<p>Her <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/20/europe/yulia-navalnaya-russian-opposition-challenges-intl/index.html">tenacity</a> could make her an effective force to revive opposition at home and abroad.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, another group of Russian women is making its voice heard across Russia, with a message that carries a significant amount of moral force due to their status in a country at war. The <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/12/putin-faces-growing-threat-wives-and-mothers-mobilized-soldiers">Council of Mothers and Wives</a> campaigned fiercely against Putin’s decision to call up reservists in the autumn of 2022, and the Russian president’s approval ratings (and that of his government in general) took a <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/">significant hit</a>. </p>
<p>The Kremlin tried to reach out to the group, but its leaders refused to meet with the president, so a stage-managed meeting was held with a group of women hand-picked from pro-government organisations. The council, meanwhile, was declared a “foreign agent” and officially <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/07/28/russian-soldiers-mothers-group-announces-closure-after-foreign-agent-designation-a81989">closed in July 2023</a>. </p>
<p>Its focus was to bring troops home from Ukraine, rather than opposing the war itself. But the longer the war continues, the more wives and mothers will lose loved ones – and there will be plenty of women who fear this may happen to their own family.</p>
<p>Perhaps the voice of Yulia Navalnaya – a woman who lost her own husband to Vladimir Putin’s megalomania – will resonate among those women who fear the same may happen to their men.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224303/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most of Vladimir Putin’s opponents are either dead, in jail or in exile. But it might just be ordinary people who can take over the battle for democracy in Russia.Stephen Hall, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2205812024-02-26T13:39:02Z2024-02-26T13:39:02ZAs war in Ukraine enters third year, 3 issues could decide its outcome: Supplies, information and politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577714/original/file-20240224-28-7jc86z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C37%2C8281%2C5508&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Will war fatigue be a factor?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/february-2024-ukraine-odessa-a-gepard-anti-aircraft-gun-news-photo/2022536165?adppopup=true">Kay Nietfeld/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In retrospect, there was perhaps nothing surprising about Russia’s decision to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230214-february-24-2022-the-day-russia-invaded-ukraine">invade Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022</a>.</p>
<p>Vladimir Putin’s intentions were, after all, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russia-ukraine-invasion/2021/12/03/98a3760e-546b-11ec-8769-2f4ecdf7a2ad_story.html">hiding in plain sight</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-western-military-backing-ukraine-threatens-russia-2021-10-21/">signaled in the months running up</a> to the incursion.</p>
<p>What could not be foreseen, however, is where the conflict finds itself now. Heading into its third year, the war has become bogged down: Neither is it a stalemate, nor does it look like either side could make dramatic advances any time soon.</p>
<p>Russia appears to be on the ascendancy, having secured the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68322527">latest major battlefield victory</a>, but Ukrainian fighters have exceeded military expectations with their doggedness in the past, and may do so again.</p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://facultyprofiles.tufts.edu/tara-sonenshine">foreign policy expert</a> and former journalist who spent many years covering Russia, I share the view of those who argue that the conflict is potentially at a pivotal point: If Washington does not continue to fully support President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his military, then Ukraine’s very survival could be at risk. I believe it would also jeopardize America’s leadership in the world and global security. </p>
<p>How the conflict develops during the rest of 2024 will depend on many factors, but three may be key: supplies, information and political will.</p>
<h2>The supplies race</h2>
<p>Russia and Ukraine are locked in a race to resupply its war resources – not just in terms of soldiers, but also ammunition and missiles. Both sides are desperately trying to shore up the number of soldiers it can deploy. </p>
<p>In December 2023, Putin <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-army-expansion-a2bf0b035aabab20c8b120a1c86c9e38">ordered his generals to increase troop numbers</a> by nearly 170,000, taking the total number of soldiers to 1.32 million. Meanwhile, Ukraine is said to be looking at plans to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-draft-b2ca1d0ecd72019be2217a653989fbc2">increase its military by 500,000 troops</a>.</p>
<p>Of course, here, Russia has the advantage of being able to draw on a population more than three times that of Ukraine. Also, whereas Putin can simply order up more troops, Zelenskyy must get measures approved through parliament.</p>
<p>Aside from personnel, there is also the need for a steady supply of weapons and ammunition – and there have been reports that both sides are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68364924">struggling to maintain</a> <a href="https://www.wbaltv.com/article/after-2-years-of-war-questions-abound-on-whether-kyiv-can-sustain-the-fight-against-russia/46940958">sufficient levels</a>.</p>
<p>Russia appears particularly eager to boost its number of ballistic missiles, as they are <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-sourcing-ballistic-missiles-to-bypass-ukraine-air-defense-isw-2024-1">better equipped for countering Ukraine air defense systems</a> despite being slower than cruise missiles.</p>
<p>Increasingly, Moscow appears to be looking to North Korea and Iran as suppliers. After Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, visited Russia in 2023, the U.S. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67888793">accused Pyongyang of supplying Russia</a> with ballistic missiles. Iran, meanwhile, has <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/arsenal-of-autocracy-north-korea-and-iran-are-arming-russia-in-ukraine/">delivered to Russia</a> a large number of powerful surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and drones.</p>
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<img alt="Men in suits talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on Sept. 13, 2023, in Tsiolkovsky, Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-and-north-korean-leader-news-photo/1661841029?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Ukraine, meanwhile, is <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220610-ukraine-dependent-on-arms-from-allies-after-exhausting-soviet-era-weaponry">dependent on foreign military equipment</a>. </p>
<p>Supplies were stronger at the beginning of the war, but since then, Ukraine’s military has suffered from the slow, bureaucratic nature of NATO and U.S. deliveries. It wasn’t, for example, until the summer of 2023 that the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/europe-and-eurasia/ukraine">U.S. approved Europe’s request</a> to provide F-16s to Ukraine. </p>
<p>Ukraine needs more of everything, including air defense munitions, artillery shells, tanks and missile systems. It is also <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-ukraine-war-medical-care-frontlines/#:%7E:text=In%20an%20open%20letter%20recently,stabilization%20posts%20with%20supplies%20and">running short of medical supplies</a> and has seen hospital shortages of drugs at a time when <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/4371240-the-invisible-enemy-in-ukraine-superbugs/">rampant infections are proving resistant</a> to antibiotics.</p>
<p>Perhaps the biggest factor that remains in Russia’s favor when it comes to supplies is the onerous restrictions placed on Ukraine from the West, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-shouldnt-use-us-arms-inside-russia-us-general-says-2023-05-25/">limiting its ability</a> to attack Russian territory with U.S. or NATO equipment to avoid a wider war. For example, the Ukrainian military had a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System with a 50-mile range that could hit targets inside Russia, but it modified the range to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-altered-himars-rocket-launchers-to-keep-ukraine-from-firing-missiles-into-russia-11670214338">keep the U.S. military satisfied</a> that it would not cross a Russian red line.</p>
<p>If this policy could be relaxed, that might be a game changer for Ukraine, although it would raise the stakes for the U.S.</p>
<h2>The information war</h2>
<p>The Ukraine conflict is also a war of messaging.</p>
<p>To this end, Putin uses <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/putins-wartime-russia-propaganda-payouts-and-jail-151bb117">propaganda to bolster support</a> for the campaign at home, while undermining support for Ukraine elsewhere – for example, by planting stories in Europe that cause disenchantment with the war. One outrageous claim in the early weeks of the war was that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/19/politics/pro-russia-disinformation-report/index.html">Zelenskyy had taken his own life</a>. The rumor came from pro-Russia online operatives as part of an aggressive effort to harm Ukrainian morale, according to <a href="https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/information-operations-surrounding-ukraine">cybersecurity firm Mandiant</a>.</p>
<p>More recently, in France, stories appeared that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/30/france-russia-interference-far-right/">questioned the value of assistance to Ukraine</a> and reminded the public of the negative impact of Russian sanctions on the French. Stirring dissent in this way is a classic Putin play to raise doubts.</p>
<p>And investigative reporting points toward <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/16/russian-disinformation-zelensky-zaluzhny/">a disinformation network</a> being run out of the Kremlin, which includes social media bots deployed on Ukrainian sites spreading stories of Zelenskyy’s team being corrupt and warning that the war would go badly.</p>
<p>Given that Putin controls the Russian media and is quick to crack down on dissent, it is hard to really know what Russians think. But one reputable polling agency recently reported <a href="https://www.norc.org/research/projects/russian-public-opinion-wartime.html">strong support in Russia</a> for both Putin and the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Ukrainians, too, still <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/512258/ukrainians-stand-behind-war-effort-despite-fatigue.aspx">support the fight against Russia</a>, polling shows. But some war fatigue has no doubt lowered morale.</p>
<p>There are other signs of domestic strain in Ukraine. At the end of 2023, tensions grew between Zelenskyy and his top military commander, General Valery Zaluzhny who had complained about weaponry. Zelenskyy <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/08/world/europe/zelensky-general-valery-zaluzhny-ukraine-military.html">ended up firing the military chief</a>, risking political backlash and underscoring that not all is well in the top chain of command.</p>
<p>Should disunity and war fatigue continue into the war’s third year, it could serious impair Ukraine’s ability to fight back against a resurgent Russian offensive. </p>
<h2>The politics of conflict</h2>
<p>But it isn’t just domestic politics in Ukraine and Russia that will decide the outcome of the war. </p>
<p>U.S. politics and European unity could be a factor in 2024 in determining the future of this conflict.</p>
<p>In the U.S., Ukraine aid has become politicized – with aid to Ukraine <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/08/about-half-of-republicans-now-say-the-us-is-providing-too-much-aid-to-ukraine/">becoming an increasingly partisan issue</a>.</p>
<p>In early February, the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/12/politics/senate-foreign-aid-bill-ukraine/index.html">Senate finally passed an emergency aid bill</a> for Ukraine and Israel that would see US$60.1 billion go to Kyiv. But the bill’s fate in the House is unknown.</p>
<p>And the looming 2024 presidential elections could complicate matters further. Former president Donald Trump has made no secret of his aversion to aid packages over loans, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/14/us/politics/trump-ukraine-biden.html">calling them “stupid</a>,” and has long argued that Americans shouldn’t be footing the bill for the conflict. Recently, he has made bombastic statements about NATO and <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2024/02/13/how-donald-trumps-re-election-would-threaten-natos-article-5">threatened not to adhere</a> to the alliance’s commitment to protect members if they were attacked by Russia.</p>
<p>And uncertainty about American assistance could leave Europe carrying more of the financial load.</p>
<p>European Union members have had to absorb the majority of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/max-boot?utm_source=twtw&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=TWTW2024Feb23&utm_term=TWTW%20and%20All%20Staff%20as%20of%207-9-20">6.3 million Ukrainians who have fled the country</a> since the beginning of the conflict. And that puts a strain on resources. European oil needs also suffer from the sanctions against Russian companies.</p>
<p>Whether these potential war determinants – supplies, information and politics – mean that the Ukraine war will not be entering a fourth year in 12 months time, however, is far from certain. In fact, one thing that does appear clear is that the war that some predicted would be over in weeks looks set to continue for some time still.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220581/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tara Sonenshine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia appears to have seized the battleground initiative as the Ukraine war marks its second anniversary – but the conflict is far from over.Tara Sonenshine, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice in Public Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238882024-02-23T16:24:32Z2024-02-23T16:24:32ZVladimir Putin has never understood why Ukrainians want to control their own destiny<p>Ten years ago, Ukraine looked to the democratic world like a faraway place. But this was just before Ukraine’s “Euromaidan” protests toppled the country’s pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych, paving the way for the election of a pro-western president, Petro Poroshenko.</p>
<p>As scholar of east European studies Peter Vermeersch has put it, whereas Ukraine was once seen as “<a href="https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2023/01/12/interview-with-peter-vermeersch-in-the-eu-ukraine-is-perceived-as-the-eastern-edge-of-western-europe/">the western edge of eastern Europe</a>”, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24 2022, the country has transformed in the eyes of the world into “the eastern edge of western Europe”. It was a transformation that had taken place not least because of the popular will of much of the Ukrainian people. </p>
<p>In 2003, Leonid Kuchma, who was then acting president of Ukraine, published a book called <a href="https://archive.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/kuchma-tome-insists-ukraine-is-different-18112.html">Ukraine is not Russia</a>. With his choice of title, Kuchma – a person with an exemplary Soviet background as a former member of the central committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine – sent a powerful message about the divergence between otherwise “brotherly” nations.</p>
<p>What Kuchma had in mind, among other things, was the different political culture among Ukraine’s people. This became especially clear during and after the Euromaidan. </p>
<p>When the Russians invaded Donbas in 2014 in response to the overturning of their puppet president, hundreds (if not thousands) of ordinary people voluntarily joined up to fight for their country – many before the armed forces were actually formally deployed. They formed combat units, appointed commanders from among themselves and even procured weapons independently.</p>
<p>This process has gone even further since 2022. <a href="https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2022/04/11/interview-with-mykola-bielieskov-ukrainians-have-crossed-the-threshold-of-fear-theyre-fighting-for-victory/">Mykola Bielieskov</a>, an analyst at Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies, told me: “In the last 150 years, it has been solely the state’s task to prepare and support armies on the battlefield. However, since the first day of this war, Ukrainians have willingly shifted much of this burden onto their shoulders.”</p>
<h2>Ukraine’s democratic ideals</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp">World Values Survey</a> (WVS) – a global research project conducted by social sciences in more than 90 countries which explores the social and political impact of people’s changing values and beliefs – in 2020, 42.8% of Ukrainians said the importance of democracy was absolute. The corresponding number in Russia was 23.5%. Meanwhile, only 17.4% of Ukrainians believed that obedience to their leaders was the essential characteristic of democracy. In Russia that figure was 27.1%.</p>
<p>Ukrainians tend to be more politically active than Russians. According to an earlier survey by WVS which measured attitudes between 2010 and 2014, only 14.8% of Ukrainians said they had never participated in any peaceful demonstrations (this figure was recorded in 2011, before the Euromaidan protests). By comparison this figure in Russia was 51.7%. </p>
<p>The WVS findings are indirectly confirmed by a survey conducted in 2019 by the <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/15/european-public-opinion-three-decades-after-the-fall-of-communism/">Pew Research Center</a>. Pew found that 51% of Ukrainians supported the post-Soviet switch to a multi-party system, while 47% approved of a market economy, compared with 43% and 38% respectively in Russia. </p>
<p>Ukrainians also thought that an independent judiciary (81%) and free media (63%) were essential for democracy. These findings were broadly in line with the western European median at 87% and 67% respectively. </p>
<p>But they were significantly different from attitudes in Russia where 63% supported the idea of an independent judiciary and 38% held a free media to be a key feature of democracy.</p>
<h2>Putin’s blind spot</h2>
<p>The Russian president’s insistence that Ukrainians and Russians are essentially the same people flies in the face of these differing values. According to Putin’s logic, the citizens of Ukraine should respect authority and respond to strong leadership. </p>
<p>He seems to argue that the Euromaidan would not have happened without interference from the west. This is borne out by his speech to the Russian people <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events,/president/news/67828">on February 21 2022</a>, on the eve of the invasion, when he characterised the Euromaidan protests as a “coup d'etat” engineered by the west and bankrolled by the US.</p>
<p>Putin seems unable to accept that Ukrainians can think and behave differently when it comes to how they want to be governed. Instead, he reiterates that Ukraine <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603">was usurped by western-backed Russophobe extremists</a>. In his reasoning their rule is temporary and should be regarded as illegitimate. </p>
<p>He insists that Russians, as representatives the “same people”, have a moral right to remove the “unnatural” regime connived at by the west and imposed on Ukraine and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-putins-desire-to-install-a-puppet-government-draws-from-the-bolshevik-playbook-178060">install a pro-Kremlin government</a>.</p>
<h2>Deluded invasion</h2>
<p>Putin’s original plan in February 2022 was for the Russian invasion to topple the Ukrainian government <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/80002564-33e8-48fb-b734-44810afb7a49">in a matter of days</a>. As Roman Solchanyk – an authority on Ukraine-Russia relations based at Harvard – has written, Putin <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-biggest-mistake-was-believing-ukrainians-were-really-russians/">did not anticipate fierce resistance</a> from alleged “compatriots” whom Russians arrived to <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/putin-vows-that-as-in-1945-ukraine-will-be-liberated-from-nazi-filth/">“liberate” from “Nazi filth”</a>.</p>
<p>In his 2022 eve-of-invasion speech, Putin declared that the “wall that has emerged in recent years between Russia and Ukraine” was “the result of deliberate efforts by those forces that have always sought to undermine our unity … the overarching goal being to divide and then to pit the parts of a single people against one another”. It was clear he did not want to learn the lesson on divergences of Russian and Ukrainian identities <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/inside-putins-ukraine-obsession/">from the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan</a>. </p>
<p>Putin continues to deny that Ukrainians demonstrate a greater appreciation of liberty and democracy than Russians. Instead, he chooses to believe that the war “<a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/putin-says-hostile-actions-of-west-kyiv-led-to-ukraine-war/2974471">was unleashed by the west</a> and its satellites” who <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/putin-says-west-is-russia-s-enemy-not-ukraine-itself-/3097577">nurtured anti-Russian elites in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Two years on, it is clear from the way they have fought that Ukrainians are motivated to fight because their political activism in 2014 had won them a chance for a different future. Russians, meanwhile, are fighting because they follow their leader in his flawed vision of restoring the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223888/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ostap Kushnir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Russian president still insists that Ukraine has been taken over by hostile pro-western elites over the past decade.Ostap Kushnir, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.