tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/africa-democracy-38780/articlesAfrica democracy – The Conversation2023-01-18T14:50:47Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1975542023-01-18T14:50:47Z2023-01-18T14:50:47ZAl-Shabaab is just a symptom of Somalia’s tragedy – the causes are still in place<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504205/original/file-20230112-52283-w708x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abdurashid Abdulle Abikar/AFP via GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For at least 14 years now, the militant group Al-Shabaab has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabaab">terrorised</a> the southern region of Somalia. Its ambition is to impose a tyrannical dictatorship over the entire country through fear and brutality. To achieve its aims, it has sought to oust the Somali government and its foreign military allies. </p>
<p>I have been a student of Somali political economy for over three decades. I <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/1690.htm">predicted the collapse</a> of the Somali state and political order 33 years ago. That analysis foretold the miserable conditions Somalis have endured since. The political and humanitarian catastrophe predates the terrorist group’s rise – thus, Al-Shabaab is a symptom rather than the cause of Somalia’s misfortune. </p>
<p>There are two main forces responsible for the catastrophe that is Somalia. The dominant faction of the Somali political class is the chief culprit. Their agenda has been to attain power and loot the country’s resources for private gain. </p>
<p>Second is the international community, who are the junior partners of the political class. Based on my observations, representatives of western and African governments fear that Somalia could become a base for “terrorists”, which might destabilise the strategic Horn of Africa. But they are unwilling to engage with civic and independent-minded Somalis. </p>
<p>Most of the expatriate people I have encountered in my research and interacted with in my civic activities see tribalism as a Somali’s defining political character. Such a view dates back to the colonial era when colonisers segmented African people into ethnic camps to divide and rule them. </p>
<p>Out of this has emerged a strange marriage of convenience between the Somali political class and the diplomatic community. Each pretends progress is being made. The truth is that little progress has been made in reforming the political disorder. And much less has been done to tackle the country’s urgent human and development needs.</p>
<p>It’s likely that the terrorist group will be defeated one day. But there are no signs that the political elite is willing or capable of changing, short of a radical shift in international pressure or a determined public. As I argue in my recent <a href="https://africaworldpressbooks.com/framing-somalia-beyond-africas-merchants-of-misery-by-abdi-ismail-samatar/">book</a>, unfortunately the tragedy might fester for decades, with or without Al-Shabaab. </p>
<h2>Al-Shabaab’s midwife</h2>
<p>In its first decade of independence, Somali leaders <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Africas-First-Democrats-Somalias-Abdirazak/dp/0253022304">stood out in Africa</a> for democratic rule by respecting the rule of law, the independence of public institutions and electoral terms. Nevertheless, Somalia’s first president, Aden Abdulle Osman, was deeply concerned about the behaviour of a segment of the political class. He registered his <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253022301/africas-first-democrats/">worries</a> in his diary on 5 July 1964: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>God save Somalis from the scavenging beasts in human form that are the so-called representative of the people. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The democratic project ended when those who defeated President Osman in the 1967 election turned the country into a quasi single-party state. The mess they generated led to the murder of President Abdirashid Sharmarke by one of his bodyguards in 1969. The military quickly seized power, and foreclosed a return to a representative and accountable system of government for the next 21 years. </p>
<p>After half a decade in power, the dictatorship intensified the tribalisation of public power. The political opposition followed suit. Civil service and promotions in the military, and access to state resources, became based on an individual’s genealogical identity or loyalty to the regime. From the late 1970s to 1990, the military dictatorship confronted a fragmented and equally tribalised and armed political opposition. The state became the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia_1990.pdf">agent of terror</a>. Whole communities were punished and towns destroyed because of their cultural pedigree. This was long before Al-Shabaab’s rise. </p>
<p>The military regime <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/161268">collapsed</a> in January 1991, but opposition groups failed to agree on a common civic agenda. The opposition group most active around Mogadishu, the United Somalia Congress, forced out the dictator. Among the consequences of the factional bloodletting that followed was the destruction of livelihoods and the making of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/31/world/somalia-1992-picking-up-pieces-as-famine-subsides.html">first famine</a> in the country since independence in 1960. This was long before Al-Shabaab appeared on the horizon.</p>
<p>Warlords and tribalistic political fiefdoms replaced the dictatorship, and much of the educated elite fled. The balkanisation of the country and society <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03736245.2019.1612769?journalCode=rsag20">impoverished everyone</a> except the very few who controlled the means of violence. Illiteracy rose dramatically and the population’s state of health took a nosedive, depriving the young majority of a productive future. </p>
<p>Most of the country’s current population were born after the fall of the military; few therefore know what civic politics and leadership look like. That makes them easy pawns of the sectarian elite.</p>
<p>It took almost 16 years for a religious group known as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050701452382">Union of the Islamic Courts</a> to defeat the warlords. This event gave hope to the population that a more inclusive and accountable system of authority would be restored. But America and its regional allies were alarmed by the possibility of an “Islamist” foothold in the Horn of Africa. Consequently, Ethiopia <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/7/21/ethiopian-troops-enter-somalia">invaded</a> Somalia and installed in Mogadishu the tribal-based Somali Federal Government, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-interim-government-relocate-nairobi">formed in Nairobi</a>. The Union of the Islamic Courts forces broke into smaller units, adopted guerrilla tactics and successfully resisted the invasion.</p>
<p>America and its allies recognised that the Ethiopian occupation was doomed and subsequently engineered a split among the Union of the Islamic Courts. This schism marked the birth of Al-Shabaab as an autonomous organisation dedicated to take revenge on their former allies, western supporters of the Somali governments, and anyone who opposed them.</p>
<h2>A devil’s pact</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab is only the latest manifestation of the consequences of 50 years of exclusivist political ideology and inept leadership. </p>
<p>It is estimated that the Somali defence force is about 20,000 strong. But several factors have prevented it from taking the challenge to Al-Shabaab’s militias. The lack of necessary resources and quality leadership is partly to blame. Another problem is the prominence given to tribal identity over patriotism and competence in the running of the national force. </p>
<p>In addition, tribalised provinces have their own armed forces because they mistrust the federal government and each other. Finally, Somalia has been under a UN <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Impact-of-the-Global-Arms-Trade-in-Somalia-A-%C3%87anci-Medugu/4df6f722153e1270753c89ec2809047d0d1aba53">arms embargo</a> since the civil war began nearly three decades ago. The embargo has limited the capacity of the Somali government to sustain the war against Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>The current governing leadership has not learned any lesson from past failures. The regime is using the National Security Agency to demonise the business community, under the cover of the war with Al-Shabaab. And it has <a href="https://hornobserver.com/articles/1746/Somalias-president-plans-to-use-clan-militia-to-degrade-al-Shabaab-Sources">mobilised tribal militias</a> in the fight. These acts deepen divisions among Somalis at a time when when the regime should be unifying the population for a common cause. Finally, such strategy bodes ill for the establishment of a post Al-Shabaab inclusive civic dispensation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdi Ismail Samatar is Extraordinary professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Pretoria, a professor of Geography at the University of Minnesota. He is also a senator in the Somali Parliament.</span></em></p>It’s likely that the terrorist group will be defeated one day. But there are no signs that the political elite is capable of changing.Abdi Ismail Samatar, Extraordinary Professor, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1930832022-11-09T14:12:46Z2022-11-09T14:12:46ZTunisia’s once-vibrant democracy is on its deathbed: but it can be saved<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493623/original/file-20221105-19-1a7j3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators protest in Tunisia's capital Tunis in 2021 against President Kais Saied's steps to tighten his grip on power.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fethi Belaid/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the lessons the 21st century is bringing home is that the winners of elections can gradually <a href="https://www.amazon.com/How-Democracies-Die-Steven-Levitsky/dp/1524762938">kill democracies</a>. Healthy democracies have institutional checks and balances which act as a restraint on elected governments. The key institutions include parliament and independent judicial systems. </p>
<p>But when power gradually concentrates in the executive, it disturbs this delicate balance. There is a growing trend of autocrats using the rules – constitutional formalities – to cover up their power grabs. Taking power “constitutionally” makes it look as if they are doing things in the interests of citizens. It makes it harder to challenge the autocrat. I’ve used the <a href="http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/12/towards-a-concept-of-constitutional-authoritarianism-the-venezuelan-experience/">expression</a> “constitutional authoritarian populism” to describe such regimes. </p>
<p>Venezuela could be considered a poster child of how a presidency can concentrate power. It has achieved this through emergency decrees, constitutional modification processes, and rulings by constitutional courts. All these measures have been accompanied by populist rhetoric. </p>
<p>Tunisia is the most recent example of the trend. The 2011 <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring">revolution</a> paved the way for a democratic transition in Tunisia. A new constitution in 2014 then instituted a system of checks and balances, with power-sharing agreements between the legislative and the executive. Tunisia was considered a remarkable example of democratic transition in the aftermath of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-arab-spring-changed-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-forever-161394">Arab Spring</a>, avoiding the fate of Egypt. </p>
<p>It wasn’t an instant fix for the country’s problems. People’s mistrust in the government lingered. When President Kais Saied was elected in 2019, it was on the promise of restoring that trust and increasing accountability. Instead the former constitutional law professor went on to dismantle the checks and balances system. </p>
<p>On 24 July 2021, Saied dismissed the prime minister and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/30/world/africa/tunisia-president-dissolve-parliament.html">suspended</a> parliament for 30 days (blocking access to the parliament building with tanks). Based on decrees, he also assumed the legislative function. Amid social unrest, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/07/26/kais-saieds-power-grab-in-tunisia/">Saied said</a> those measures were adopted </p>
<blockquote>
<p>until social peace returns to Tunisia and until we save the state.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Tunisia’s democratic backslide shows why it is necessary to adopt a human rights perspective to interpret constitutional decisions. And that is what the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights did. It <a href="https://www.african-court.org/cpmt/storage/app/uploads/public/633/48f/dcc/63348fdcc9449943680203.pdf">ruled</a> on 22 September 2022 that the decisions adopted by Saied violated human rights. The court ordered that the presidential decrees be repealed to restore the supremacy of the constitution.</p>
<p>A human rights approach is the best antidote to constitutional authoritarian populism. Because autocrats will manipulate the law to justify authoritarian measures, it is necessary to go back to the classical legal tradition and recall that an unjust law cannot be deemed <a href="https://scholarworks.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=suurj">binding</a>.</p>
<h2>Constitutional pretence</h2>
<p>President Saied invoked the constitution to adopt authoritarian measures based on the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/07/26/kais-saieds-power-grab-in-tunisia/">extraordinary powers</a> vested in the presidency by the 2014 constitution. </p>
<p>The exceptional powers enjoyed by the president are intended to be used to protect the constitution in extraordinary circumstances. They were not designed to dismantle the constitutional order – as Saied <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/27/tunisia-presidents-seizure-powers-threatens-rights">did</a> when he dismissed the prime minister and suspended the parliament. In practical terms, the extraordinary powers abolished the 2014 constitution, concentrating power in the presidency. </p>
<p>But those authoritarian measures were justified as a means of protecting the people from the alleged <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/07/27/1020998605/tunisias-nascent-democracy-is-in-crisis-but-trouble-has-been-brewing-for-a-decad">inefficiency</a> of the prime minister. Saied drafted a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/07/06/tunisias-new-constitution-will-only-worsen-its-political-crisis/">new constitution</a> and tried to make it look like a popular decision by holding a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220726-tunisia-constitutional-referendum-marked-by-low-turnout-as-opposition-boycotts">referendum</a> on 25 July 2022. </p>
<p>In my view, the referendum was rigged. It was conducted in <a href="https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/events/?id=3354">violation</a> of basic electoral integrity conditions. These include particularly the lack of an independent electoral management body.</p>
<p>The authoritarian measures have continued with the modification of the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/saieds-new-rules-tunisias-elections">electoral rules</a>. It won’t be possible to hold free and fair elections using these rules.</p>
<p>Saied has masked his authoritarian measures with a constitutional veneer to avoid challenges, mainly from the international community. Piercing this constitutional veil reveals the authoritarian essence of the measures adopted since 2021.</p>
<h2>Masters of legality</h2>
<p>Why do modern authoritarians love constitutional formalities? This is not a novelty. As the German political philosopher <a href="https://files.libertyfund.org/files/676/Rommen_0017.pdf">Heinrich Rommen</a> observed, modern dictators “are masters of legality”. More recently, the Venezuelan journalist and writer Moisés Naím has referred to the “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Revenge-Power-Autocrats-Reinventing-Politics/dp/1250279208">pseudo-law</a>” to describe how autocrats like to hide behind legal formalities.</p>
<p>Several reasons explain why autocrats are masters of constitutionality. First, constitutions are not only legal institutions but also <a href="https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/libro?codigo=143377">instruments</a> that can bring legitimacy. Using them as a veneer could protect the autocrat’s legitimacy. And the veneer makes it easier for autocrats to say they are protecting “the people”.</p>
<p>The second reason is more legal. When authoritarian measures have a veneer of constitutionality, there’s not much the international community can do. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/principle-of-nonintervention/7EE9EC769A3F2CEE10E3DEE1CB30E274">non-intervention principle protects domestic disputes</a>.</p>
<p>Tunisia’s democracy can be saved. But the first step is to put human rights at the centre, following the ruling of the African Court.</p>
<h2>The human rights perspective</h2>
<p>As the African Charter <a href="https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49">recalls</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Therefore, any measure adopted through constitutional formalities that violate human rights is, in essence, unconstitutional. Following the painful experiences of the second world war, the German doctrine explained why constitutional provisions could be <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43668170">unconstitutional</a>, for instance, if they denied human dignity.</p>
<p>Similarly, the new constitution approved by President Saied is unconstitutional and cannot overrule the 2014 constitution. Also, any election conducted under the current conditions – including the <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202112140252.html">announced</a> parliamentary election for December 2022 – should not be deemed free and fair.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193083/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>José Ignacio Hernández G. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tunisia’s democratic backslide demonstrates how autocrats can use constitutional cover to entrench authoritarianism.José Ignacio Hernández G., Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1900442022-09-06T14:29:31Z2022-09-06T14:29:31ZRaila Odinga should be thanked - his election losses helped deepen Kenya’s democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482952/original/file-20220906-22-1tkrvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Raila Odinga, the Azimio La Umoja (One Kenya Coalition Party) coalition presidential candidate.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Ed Ram/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission announced on 15 August 2022 that Deputy President William Ruto had won the 2022 presidential election following a close, tense race. The commission gave the <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-08-16-ruto-declared-president-elect/">count</a> as 50.49% for Ruto against rival Raila Odinga’s 48.85%. This was immediately <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-s-odinga-challenges-presidential-poll-result-in-supreme-court/6711323.html">disputed</a> by Odinga’s campaign and four of the seven electoral commissioners, who described the final tallying process as <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/four-iebc-commissioners-disown-chebukati-presidential-results-3915420">“opaque”</a>. </p>
<p>As he had done in <a href="https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=scr">2013 and 2017</a>, Odinga petitioned the Supreme Court. He alleged several irregularities, including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/05/kenyas-supreme-court-upholds-william-rutos-win-in-presidental-election">fraud, voter suppression and impunity</a> by the commission’s chair, Wafula Chebukati. He claimed that Chebukati had breached the constitution and acted unilaterally.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220905-kenya-s-supreme-court-upholds-ruto-s-presidential-victory-over-odinga">unanimous</a> ruling, read out by Chief Justice Martha Koome on 5 September 2022, rejected all these claims. Accordingly, Ruto will be officially <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/treasury-sets-aside-sh200m-for-swearing-in-ruto-next-week-3938094">sworn in</a> on 13 September 2022, as the fifth president of Kenya, East Africa’s most stable democracy.</p>
<p>Casual observers may be tempted to regard Odinga, taking the <a href="https://theconversation.com/odinga-is-running-his-fifth-presidential-race-why-the-outcome-means-so-much-for-kenya-180605">fifth shot</a> at the presidency, as a sore loser. This is especially so given the supreme court’s dismissal of a key plank of his 2022 petition as <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/hot-air-cj-koome-says-on-claims-that-venezuelan-jose-camargo-tampered-with-iebc-systems-n305075">“nothing more than hot air”</a>. On the contrary, it is important to recognise the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/experts-challenges-to-kenya-presidential-poll-results-have-improved-election-integrity/6723206.html">role</a> that his legal petitions have played in helping improve, entrench and deepen democracy in the country. </p>
<p>Also, as indicated by the court ruling, Odinga’s recent petition will most likely result in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/05/africa/supreme-court-kenya-elections-intl/index.html">“far-reaching” reforms</a> in the electoral commission. That would be good for the electoral system in particular and democracy in general in Kenya.</p>
<h2>Odinga’s enduring legacy</h2>
<p>At the very least, Odinga’s petitions have achieved important reforms and shifts in public attitudes. Kenyans now recognise the courts as the final arbiter of election conflicts. This is significant in a country where a post-election dispute in 2007 led to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/06/world/africa/06kenya.html">widespread violence</a> in which <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2008/01/244932-250000-kenyans-displaced-post-electoral-violence-un-estimates">more than</a> 1,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands internally displaced.</p>
<p>Odinga has granted the judiciary the opportunity to establish and enhance its independence. His petition to the Supreme Court after the 2017 presidential election alleged significant levels of fraud. It claimed the commission had failed to electronically transmit the results as required by Kenyan law, in order to minimise fraud. The Supreme Court’s ruling in 2017 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/world/africa/kenya-election-kenyatta-odinga.html">emphasised</a> that there were problems with transmission and verification of the results. </p>
<p>This contributed to the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/experts-challenges-to-kenya-presidential-poll-results-have-improved-election-integrity/6723206.html">reforms</a> that were made in preparation for 2022. Thanks to his 2013 petition and other cases related to this petition, for example, the court ruled that results at the polling station were final. This made it mandatory to post polling station results at each station for the public to view and to compare with the online portal run by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. Compared with 2017, this made the election in 2022 more <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-62785434">efficient and transparent</a>.</p>
<p>During the 2022 election cycle, there was <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/05/no-internet-shutdown-during-polls-our-economy-depends-on-it-koimett/">no internet shut-down</a>, there was no arrest of opposition leaders, and there was no hint that the incumbent, Uhuru Kenyatta, was opportunistically seeking ways to change the constitution to stay in power indefinitely.</p>
<p>Despite the controversy over the official results, <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/news/kenya-elections-largely-peaceful-and-transparent-say-commonwealth-observers">the election was</a> transparent, peaceful and credible. Voters conducted themselves with dignity. The results were transmitted in record time.</p>
<p>Finally, but no less important, these changes helped Odinga’s supporters in particular and Kenyans in general appreciate the role that peaceful resolution of election conflicts can play in deepening democratic governance.</p>
<h2>Who are the winners?</h2>
<p>There are scarcely any losers in the conclusion to Kenya’s election. Kenya’s is a relatively young democracy with a judiciary that is still struggling to build its capacity and enhance and safeguard its legitimacy. Its 2022 election court decision is a win for judicial independence and legitimacy in Kenya.</p>
<p>The opposition also won. Although disappointed by the court’s ruling, its leader, Odinga, <a href="https://twitter.com/RailaOdinga/status/1566751566178263041?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1566751566178263041%7Ctwgr%5Eab29da4580da2314f41bd32168adcec13ee142a2%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F2022%2F09%2F05%2Fafrica%2Fsupreme-court-kenya-elections-intl%2Findex.html">accepted</a> it and in doing so he reaffirmed his fidelity to the rule of law. Odinga and his team have been known to argue that theirs is a struggle to bring transparency to the country’s electoral process and <a href="https://twitter.com/RailaOdinga/status/1566751566178263041?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1566751566178263041%7Ctwgr%5Eab29da4580da2314f41bd32168adcec13ee142a2%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F2022%2F09%2F05%2Fafrica%2Fsupreme-court-kenya-elections-intl%2Findex.html">strengthen</a> the country’s democratic institutions. Though they did not capture enough votes to win, they succeeded in improving the country’s electoral system and its democracy. That should be considered a win for them.</p>
<p>Kenyans in general also won. Kenya is no stranger to post-election violence. However, since it adopted a new constitution in 2010 and introduced an independent judiciary, the latter has helped to minimise post-election violence. Reflective of a country that has developed relatively strong democratic institutions, an independent judiciary and a relatively robust electoral system, the opposition has accepted the court’s ruling and has promised to continue to institutionalise democracy. </p>
<p>This is a win for all Kenyans and an important lesson in nation building and peaceful coexistence for the country’s neighbours.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Regular, fair, transparent, inclusive, and credible elections are an important element of a fully functioning and effective democratic system. They provide a legal mechanism for citizens to choose individuals to serve in government. They discipline recalcitrant, corrupt and poorly performing public officials. Finally, such elections compel candidates for public office to canvass issues that affect the lives of citizens. </p>
<p>For elections to do this, however, they need finality. This is partly because there is always the possibility that some parties will dispute the official results. So a country needs a legal mechanism to peacefully resolve all elections-related conflict to the satisfaction of all citizens.</p>
<p>The Kenyan judiciary has proven itself capable of exercising independent judgement and bringing finality to elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190044/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku, J.D. (law), Ph,D. (economics), is affiliated with Weber State University (Ogden, Utah, USA), where he is Brady Presidential Distinguished Professor of Economics; The Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.), where he is a Nonresident Senior Fellow; and the African Economic Research Consortium (Nairobi, Kenya), where he is a Resource Person.</span></em></p>Odinga’s legal petitions have entrenched the rule of law and and deepened democracy in Kenya.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1875412022-08-04T14:30:31Z2022-08-04T14:30:31ZKenya election 2022: the candidates, issues and role of money in a fierce contest<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475600/original/file-20220722-26-1kflhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenyans are gearing up for an important general election on 9 August 2022, which brings to an end President Uhuru Kenyatta’s turbulent two terms. </p>
<p>It will be the country’s seventh general election since the resumption of multiparty electoral democracy 30 years ago. And it’s the third under the 2010 constitution. The progressive constitution was part of reforms designed to address political animosities that ignited deadly election violence in 2007.</p>
<p>With a population of 48 million, Kenya has 22 million registered voters. Nearly 40% of these are young voters. Voters are required to simultaneously vote for a president, senator, member of parliament, woman representative, county governor and county assembly member. </p>
<p>Three presidential candidates, out of the four cleared to run, have captured the country’s imagination. Two are clearly ahead of the pack but there is no clear front-runner. That there is no clear favourite to win after months of campaigning is a credit to the competitiveness and relative freedom of the democratic space. But it does mean that this will be a tense few days until a decision is made on who will govern the East African economic powerhouse for the next five years. </p>
<h2>The candidates</h2>
<p>One of the two leading candidates is Raila Odinga, a former prime minister who leads one of the two main coalitions. The 77-year-old veteran Kenyan politician is contesting the election for the fifth time. He has come close to victory twice before. The 2007 poll result was hotly disputed, leading to widespread violence in which 1,100 people were killed.</p>
<p>Odinga is the son of post-independence Kenya’s first vice-president, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. Long seen as an anti-establishment candidate, Odinga has a common touch that resonates with Kenyans who have felt locked out of the power matrix controlled by two ethnic groups since independence in 1963 – the Kikuyu and Kalenjin.</p>
<p>This time, though, he is the establishment candidate.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/odinga-is-running-his-fifth-presidential-race-why-the-outcome-means-so-much-for-kenya-180605">Odinga is running his fifth presidential race. Why the outcome means so much for Kenya</a>
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<p>The other front-runner is William Ruto, 55. The sitting Deputy President is leader of the United Democratic Alliance, the largest party under the Kenya Kwanza (Kenya First) coalition. Against sustained pushback by the incumbent, Uhuru Kenyatta, Ruto is determined to succeed him.</p>
<p>Ruto has reinvented himself as the agent of class consciousness, an issue hitherto absent in Kenya’s political discourse and competition. By rebranding him as the antithesis of the status quo and personification of the hopes of the poor, his messaging has resonated with the marginalised.</p>
<p>Ruto frequently quotes the Bible. But this seemingly ecclesiastical bent masks a consummate political strategist.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/william-ruto-how-kenyas-new-president-took-on-powerful-political-dynasties-178787">William Ruto: how Kenya's new president took on powerful political dynasties</a>
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<p>While George Wajackoyah of the Roots Party has captured the public’s imagination, he and David Waihiga of the Agano Party are fringe presidential aspirants. Fringe candidates play a significant role in testing democratic spaces for maturity. Their often atypical ideologies and beliefs give democracies a break from regular political themes.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-fringe-presidential-candidates-what-they-offer-in-elections-185072">Kenya’s fringe presidential candidates: what they offer in elections</a>
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<h2>Money and the elections</h2>
<p>Becoming a politician in Kenya is financially very attractive. The salary paid to politicians, plus fringe benefits like car, house and travel allowances, offices and lifetime pension, are often too good to pass up. There’s another factor that could be driving the interest in political power. It is likely that the money going to counties from the national government will increase from 15% of the country’s total revenue to 35%. For some, this is a good enough reason to get into politics – to follow the money where it can be found, ostensibly to serve society. The truth is often different.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/money-influence-and-heroism-the-allure-of-political-power-in-kenya-177171">Money, influence and heroism: the allure of political power in Kenya</a>
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<p>The allure of elective office in turn fuels competition between candidates. Some candidates are willing to outspend others during the primaries of dominant parties or coalitions in order to secure a safe-seat ticket. This is bad for democracy. The transactional nature of politics reduces opportunities for debate and dialogue between elected officials and their constituents.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/want-to-run-for-office-in-kenya-heres-how-much-itll-cost-you-183683">Want to run for office in Kenya? Here's how much it'll cost you</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187541/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
That there is no clear favourite to win shows the campaigning has been relatively free and competitive.Julius Maina, Regional Editor East AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1875922022-07-31T06:48:58Z2022-07-31T06:48:58ZKenya’s election red flags in five essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476268/original/file-20220727-13-bgetb7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyans take to the streets in the capital, Nairobi, to call for peaceful August 2022 elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Luis Tato/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya is no stranger to highly contested elections. Several of the country’s past polls have seen high levels of conflict. The violence that broke out after the 2007 elections stands out in particular. It caused more than a thousand fatalities and led to a national crisis. This was eventually resolved through a coalition government and constitutional reform.</p>
<p>Patronage politics, a history of violent conflict and high-stakes elections increase the risks of poll violence, which often erupts along identity lines. </p>
<p>Still, Kenyans continue to turn up to vote. Elections are valued as a moment when voters can reject those they believe have failed – or will fail – to protect and promote their national, community and individual interests. In the last general election in 2017, <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/siEABKREDq.pdf#page=3">78% of registered voters</a> turned up to vote. In 2013, the voter turnout stood at 86%. </p>
<p>But this does not mean that voters don’t have concerns about the process. </p>
<h2>Fears of rigging</h2>
<p>As Kenyans approach the 9 August 2022 poll, many lack confidence in the electoral process.</p>
<p>Deviations from electoral rules – from vote buying to election disruptions – persist. Research has explored how citizens justify their participation in electoral malpractice. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fears-of-election-rigging-may-fuel-further-abuses-in-kenya-democracy-could-be-the-loser-176113">Fears of election rigging may fuel further abuses in Kenya: democracy could be the loser</a>
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<h2>Elites vs the rule of law</h2>
<p>A failed attempt to <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyan-judges-stop-presidents-reforms-as-attempt-to-dismember-the-constitution-166587">overhaul Kenya’s constitution</a> less than a year before elections illustrates the struggles between the rule of law and the crude tribal instincts of Kenya’s political elite.</p>
<p>The current pact between President Uhuru Kenyatta and presidential candidate Raila Odinga is a form of power sharing. However, it further divided society and fragmented elites by isolating Kenyatta’s deputy, William Ruto, and his supporters. </p>
<p>This situation provides evidence of the personality politics that has often driven Kenya to the precipice since independence. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-next-election-is-in-view-the-struggle-between-elites-and-rule-of-law-is-intensifying-167378">Kenya's next election is in view: the struggle between elites and rule of law is intensifying</a>
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<h2>Predictors of conflict</h2>
<p>Political leaders and aspirants have used group-based grievances to mobilise voters and, at times, violent militias.</p>
<p>Land tenure has remained closely connected to communal identity in Kenya. Regions where land conflicts are prominent – and politicians are mobilising based on these conflicts – are areas to watch for signs of violence. </p>
<p>Research has highlighted other key drivers of communal conflict that could inform efforts to predict and prevent election violence. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/drivers-of-electoral-violence-in-kenya-red-flags-to-watch-out-for-180703">Drivers of electoral violence in Kenya: red flags to watch out for</a>
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<h2>Gendered violence</h2>
<p>In the run-up to the August 2022 election, aggressive language has featured on the campaign trail. It has perpetuated patriarchal attitudes, which stand in the way of women’s participation in and engagement with politics.</p>
<p>Women face a host of obstacles, from inadequate political support from their parties to a lack of financial resources and gender-based violence. Kenya’s electoral process has often highlighted the fact that male politicians don’t shy away from aggressive confrontations in campaigns against a woman.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-election-sexist-language-shows-that-patriarchy-refuses-to-give-way-178066">Kenya election: sexist language shows that patriarchy refuses to give way</a>
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<h2>Judiciary’s role</h2>
<p>Kenya’s judiciary, however, has shown its capacity to help ensure that the elections are free, fair and credible. The country’s courts have exhibited a significant level of maturity and independence in recent years. </p>
<p>An efficient, equitable and accessible justice system is the foundation of a democracy based on the rule of law.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyas-judiciary-can-break-the-cycle-of-electoral-violence-182710">How Kenya's judiciary can break the cycle of electoral violence</a>
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Patronage politics, a history of violent conflict and high-stakes elections increase the risks of poll violence in Kenya.Kagure Gacheche, Commissioning Editor, East AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1843882022-06-06T15:06:32Z2022-06-06T15:06:32ZSomalia’s election was different: why that’s not necessarily a bad thing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466957/original/file-20220603-15435-2gctq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Clan elders gather in Belet Weyne, Somalia's fifth largest city, for a weekly meeting to discuss various issues affecting their region.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/au_unistphotostream/8544939496/">Flickr-AU UN IST Photo / Tobin Jones</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the end of a tough electoral process marked by <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/attacks-intensify-as-somalia-prepares-for-presidential-election/a-61293528">intensified violence</a>, Somalia has a new president. </p>
<p>President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud wasn’t elected in a free and universal “one person, one vote” election, as stipulated in the <a href="http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Somalia-Constitution2012.pdf">provisional constitution of 2012</a>. Instead, he emerged winner from a clan-specific selection process unique to Somalia. </p>
<p>The 275 members of the House of People and the 54 senators of the upper house were each chosen by 101 elders and representatives of their clans. The members of both chambers then jointly elected the president. </p>
<p>As strange as this electoral process may seem in the eyes of some foreign observers – it worked. With the country <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351123525_Is_civil_war_coming_to_Somalia">on the brink of civil war</a>, it was the traditional structures of society – the elders and the political leaders of the clans – who prevented it from drifting into old dictatorial structures.</p>
<p>These traditional players have kept the country in a balance of power that had been shaken by a politicisation of state infrastructure. They have proven themselves as social forces. They have elected a man who is a modern traditionalist against an aggressive nationalist.</p>
<p>As for Somalia’s future, the most important insight is that the 2012 provisional constitution has, in large part, failed. The electoral process chosen in the end flouted what was set out in it. It contributed hardly anything to the success of the electoral process apart from the number of members in the House of People and the Senate, as well as the rules for the presidential election of both houses.</p>
<p>The test will be how to marry the social power of the clan system with a democratic future. This will require ensuring that Somalia’s social realities are incorporated into the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12399-021-00835-y">internationally-backed</a> constitution. For instance, neither clans nor the traditional law “Xeer”, two of the decisive factors in this election, are captured in the constitution in terms of their social significance. </p>
<p>Constitutional reform would also have to question some Western values built into the current draft, a subject I am <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Rene-Brosius/projects">researching</a> for my PhD. These include the idea of a strong state, as it prevails in Germany, for example.</p>
<p>In addition, to prevent the danger of new violent conflicts in the next elections, it is already necessary to create a socially recognised and accepted electoral system. In particular, one that is free of the current high levels of corruption.</p>
<h2>How the intricate election works</h2>
<p>The distribution of parliamentary seats among the many different clans – the <a href="https://www.c-r.org/accord/somalia/political-representation-somalia-citizenship-clanism-and-territoriality">so-called 4.5 system</a> – was agreed on more than 20 years ago after many peace and reconciliation conferences. The formula says that of the 275 seats in parliament:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>61 seats go to each of the four largest clan groups, the Darood, Dir/Isaaq, Hawiye and Rahanweyn/Digil-Mirifle (with internal allocation keys for each), and </p></li>
<li><p>31 seats go to all minorities together, such as the Bantu, Benadari, which is about half of the seats of a large clan. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The first major change for this election was an increase in the number of delegates. These rose from 51 to 101. The aim was to confer greater legitimacy to the electoral process. According to this, there were theoretically 33,229 eligible voters in the 2022 election, in a country of 12 million to 15 million inhabitants.</p>
<p>By increasing the number of delegates, however, the aim was not only to improve legitimacy. It also doubled the number of people who had to be persuaded through cash contributions. While there is no automatic requirement for delegates to receive cash contributions from candidates, it was known and common practice from previous elections, including elections before the military dictatorship, for candidates for parliament to convince representatives of their clans to vote for them through cash contributions. </p>
<p>With the increase in the number of delegates per parliamentary seat, this practice should at least be made more difficult or expensive. With handouts ranging from a few US$1,000 to several US$10,000 per delegate in the voting group, costs of several US$100,000 could quickly arise for a parliamentary seat. </p>
<p>A combination of the changes in the number of delegates and the consequences of this in the funding of seats made this the most expensive election ever held in the country.</p>
<p>It also didn’t overcome the issue of corruption, particularly given the massive foreign interests in the poll. Numerous candidates were able to rely on financial support from abroad, especially from the Arab world, in their campaigns.</p>
<p>The election differed from previous polls in another way too. The presidents of the federal states appeared as political actors in the election process for the first time. This followed the introduction of federalism until 2016 (apart from Puntland, which had already existed since 1998). </p>
<p>They also had the important role of supervising the selection of the 101 delegates in each case and ensuring the implementation of the election agreement of 17 September 2020. </p>
<p>This resulted in a more complex set of interests than ever before.</p>
<h2>The challenge ahead</h2>
<p>Based on my research I would argue that a state that claims a monopoly on the use of force and the law is unlikely to gain a foothold in Somalia in the foreseeable future. Such a monopoly on lawmaking and the use of force would not only absorb considerable state resources, but would also encounter considerable problems of <a href="https://eajprogram.org/images/2020/07/12/AJAT_SOM_Report.pdf">acceptance among the population</a>. </p>
<p>Rather, Somalia should rely on a system in which state action only sets in when existing social regulations do not achieve satisfactory solutions. This is internationally understood as the principle of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315536565_Die_Anwendung_des_Subsidiaritatsprinzips_in_der_offentlichen_Verwaltung">subsidiarity</a>.</p>
<p>For Somalia, that could mean that only where traditional sources of law and conflict resolution mechanisms do not offer (human rights-compliant) results should the state become active. This ‘gap-filling state’ would offer another source of legitimacy - democracy - in addition to tradition and religion. </p>
<p>It is a principle relied on between states that form the European Union. For example, the EU may only step in if the measures cannot be sufficiently achieved at member state level. A good example from the recent past is, the supply of vaccines during the COVID pandemic. While large member states like Germany would certainly have had fewer problems with the supply, the task was shifted to the European level so that vaccine supply was also possible for smaller countries like Malta or Greece at the same level. </p>
<p>This territorial-hierarchical approach to the relationship of certain political levels to each other can apply in Somalia’s context. This means that one would have to transfer the idea of subsidiarity between (artificially created) political levels to socially existing social forces. </p>
<p>However, this approach would need to assert itself socially and gain trust.</p>
<p>Somalia could adopt a system in which rights and duties are based on clan affiliation rather than place of residence. A member of a particular clan could then only have a say within his clan, regardless of his place of residence. This could apply to the entire legal system, but also to elections. </p>
<p>This idea of ethnic federalism is not new. In other regions of Africa, such as Nigeria or Ethiopia, attempts are also being made to create self-regulation through comparable points of reference <strong>link</strong>. </p>
<p>For many this approach would violate the Western idea of state-building. The solution for Somalia lies somewhere in the middle. Finding this middle is the great challenge for the constitutional review announced by the new president.</p>
<p>Hundreds of thousands of people followed the individual election steps in the livestreams. In my view this shows that the very young Somali society has great democratic potential.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>René Brosius does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Somalia’s big test will be how to marry the social power of the clan system with a democratic future.René Brosius, PhD Candidate, Bayreuth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1838332022-05-31T15:07:47Z2022-05-31T15:07:47ZSomalia’s election raises more questions than answers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465261/original/file-20220525-24-tv3wso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Newly elected Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud waves after he was sworn-in, in the capital Mogadishu, on May 15, 2022.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Hasan Ali Elmi / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Somalia now has a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-swears-lawmakers-paving-way-presidential-vote-2022-04-14/">new parliament</a> – and a president elected by its <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-sense-of-history-and-urgency-as-somalia-moves-to-elect-a-new-president-182959">329 lawmakers</a>. This followed more than a year’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/14/somalia-to-hold-overdue-presidential-election-on-may-15">delay</a>.</p>
<p>Somalis are asking whether President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud – who <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19556383">previously ruled</a> the country between 2012 and 2017 – will in his second stint chart the path to the promised land of reconciliation and development. Many will wonder whether this opportunity will be squandered, as it was during his previous tenure. </p>
<p>In my analysis, the outcome will depend on the interplay between the inertia of the profoundly corrupt process that produced parliament and the president, and the will of the new leadership to dare to introduce a transformative agenda. But the president’s first step of appointing several sectarian individuals to his office, and to the national security office appear to foreclose his promises of an inclusive political road map. </p>
<p>President Hassan has a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to set an example by offering a consistent civic voice matched by progressive policies and institutional reform. </p>
<h2>A flawed electoral process</h2>
<p>Somalia has <a href="https://africaworldpressbooks.com/framing-somalia-beyond-africas-merchants-of-misery-by-abdi-ismail-samatar/">arguably one of the most fraudulent political systems</a> in the world. Its people have been denied the vote <a href="https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/somalia-1960-present/">since</a> 1969. The partnership between a corrupt elite and the terrorist organisation Al Shabaab has created a countrywide open political prison in which the citizens are cowering observers. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab dominates South-Central Somalia and has infiltrated cities. Meanwhile, the political class operates in a few areas, such as Mogadishu, as they hunker in their barricaded villas and circulate in severely restricted spaces in their bullet-proof Land Cruisers. These conditions are the byproducts of past blunders. </p>
<p>About two decades ago, warlords and sectarian politicians concocted a vile tribal formula supposedly reflecting people’s political identity. This formula balkanised Somalis into tribal political groups denying them the possibility of civic identity as apartheid South Africa did to the African population. </p>
<p>Two political changes emerged from this formula. First, the country was divided into tribe-based federal provinces. Second, traditional authorities were granted the right to represent their groups in the political arena. In the process tribal chiefs have become the de facto selectors of parliamentary representatives.</p>
<p>Once the tribal provinces had been established, conflict emerged between the governors of those regions and traditional leaders, both angling for power. The governors, who control the provincial administration and security forces, used this leverage to weaken the chiefs’ role during the recent “election”. Consequently, they were able to appoint MPs loyal to them. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the former president and his political allies handpicked and installed loyalist governors in three of the five provinces. Thus, “electing” new MPs resulted in an epic struggle between the former president and his regional allies, and two opposition governors and other politicians. Such politicking corrupted every government agency. </p>
<p>Another major problem was the infusion of corrupt money into the parliamentary and presidential campaigns. The selection of candidates in most provinces did not attract much money as governors singularly controlled the levers of power and selected loyalists. In a few cases where there was real competition between candidates, the payment of bribes was almost the single most important winning factor. </p>
<p>These shenanigans delayed the election. Finally, the two houses of parliament selected their officers only two months ago. A week later parliament appointed a joint committee to organise the election of a president in two weeks: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somali-lawmakers-choose-countrys-new-president-may-15-2022-05-05/">May 15 was D-day</a>.</p>
<h2>Corruption</h2>
<p>The list of hopeful presidential candidates was very long. In a country where the average person earns less than $2 a day, each of the 39 presidential candidates paid the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-s-lone-female-presidential-candidate-/6570667.html">astonishing sum</a> of $40 000 to register as a presidential candidate. This requirement was determined by the former president and his team. Once registered, candidates lobbied the MPs who would be electing the president. </p>
<p>In the absence of political parties or ideologies, the only distinction between candidates was the size of their campaign chests and genealogical identity. </p>
<p>Five candidates dominated the money game: two former presidents, the incumbent, a regional governor, and a former prime minister. Courting the MPs intensified the week before the election, but it was the eve of Election Day that MPs went scavenging for the big bribes. Candidates reportedly paid bribes ranging from $30 000 to $90 000 per MP. </p>
<p>This culture of corruption permeates all levels of society and everything that comes under the domain of the state. Confronting this demon will require far-sighted and determined leadership, and a revolutionary movement. </p>
<h2>The hope</h2>
<p>To earn the confidence of the people, the new president must, at a minimum, take on the following:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Endeavour to reverse the tribalisation of political identity. </p></li>
<li><p>Radically restructure the tribally-based federal system to undo the exclusive tribal fiefdoms. </p></li>
<li><p>Admit the role of corruption in the election and appoint an independent election commission consisting of the most credible Somalis to lead the country out of the current cul de sac.</p></li>
<li><p>Craft and apply radical strategies to defeat Al-Shabaab or reconcile with it. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The first signal of the president’s intention and agenda will be his nomination of the prime minister. If he selects a candidate with integrity, civic capital, and independence that will indicate his commitment to serious reform. But if, as he did during his previous presidency, appoints a client who would be a front for his machination, the charade will lock 15 million desperate citizens into perpetual purgatory. </p>
<h2>Somali dilemma</h2>
<p>In a letter from prison in 1929, Antonio Gramsci, the renowned Italian theorist and political activist <a href="https://abahlali.org/files/gramsci.pdf">remarked</a> that he was </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… a pessimist because of intelligence, but an optimist because of will. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>After studying Somalia for three decades, I am convinced that the intellect can clearly envision the path to progressive reform. However, what seems lacking is an organised will on the part of those concerned about the fate of the Somali people. A certain degree of fatalism and fear has crippled the civic minded, and it is as if the risk of change is dreaded more than the persistence of despair and slow death.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdi Ismail Samatar is a senator in the Somali Parliament. He is the author most recently of Framing Somalia: Beyond Africa’s merchants of misery (2022)</span></em></p>The obstacles the new government must confront to earn the confidence of the people are challenging.Abdi Ismail Samatar, Research Fellow, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1787852022-03-09T14:28:21Z2022-03-09T14:28:21ZUkraine war: fresh warning that Africa needs to be vigilant against Russia’s destabilising influence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450612/original/file-20220308-15-1pnuo6f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian president Vladimir Putin and African leaders at the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum in Sochi in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Alexei Druzhinin / SPUTNIK / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s commonly held that Russian president Vladimir Putin’s objective <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine-178512">for invading Ukraine</a> is to install a puppet regime that is pliable to Moscow’s interests. If so, this would be consistent with the approach Russia has taken with its forays into Africa in recent years. </p>
<p>Drawing from its Syria playbook, Russia has propped up proxies in Libya, Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan. Moscow also has its sights on another half dozen African leaders facing varying degrees of vulnerability. </p>
<p>In the process, African citizen and sovereign interests have given way to Russian priorities.</p>
<p>This <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/russia-in-africa-undermining-democracy-through-elite-capture/">elite cooption strategy</a> effectively serves <a href="https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/marshall-center-books/russias-global-reach-security-and-statecraft-assessment/chapter-10-russia-and-africa-expanding-influence-and">Russia’s strategic objectives in Africa</a>. These include, first, to gain a foothold in the southern Mediterranean and Red Sea, putting Russia in a position to threaten NATO’s southern flank and international shipping chokeholds. </p>
<p>Second, to demonstrate Russia’s Great Power status whose interests must be considered in every region of the world. </p>
<p>And third, to displace western influence in Africa while undermining support for democracy.</p>
<p><a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/09/17/russia-asymmetric-strategy-expanding-influence-in-africa-security-moscow/">Russia has often used extralegal tools</a> to pursue its objectives on the continent. It has deployed mercenaries, run disinformation campaigns, interfered in elections and bartered arms for resources. This low-cost, high yield approach has enabled Moscow to expand its influence in Africa more rapidly, arguably, than any other external actor since 2018 when <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/16/late-to-party-russia-s-return-to-africa-pub-80056">Russia ramped up its Africa engagements</a>.</p>
<p>Regrettably for African citizens, these tactics are all inherently destabilising. Moreover, the result is disenfranchisement and diminished African sovereignty.</p>
<p>Russia’s expanding influence portends a bleak vision for Africa. In effect, Russia is attempting to export its governance model – of an <a href="https://www.power3point0.org/2018/01/31/russias-kleptocratic-projection-of-power/">authoritarian, kleptocratic, and transactional regime</a> – onto Africa. </p>
<p>This is especially problematic since there are at least a handful of African leaders who are more than happy to go down this path. Never mind that this diverges wildly from the <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/blogs/do-africans-want-democracy-and-do-they-think-theyre-getting-it">democratic aspirations held by the vast majority of African citizens</a>.</p>
<p>The United Nations’ vote on Russia’s invasion in Ukraine provides a useful prism to understand relationships between Moscow and particular African countries. It reveals a spectrum of governance norms and visions for Africa. It is through these lenses and interests that groups of African countries can be expected to engage with Russia moving forward – with far-reaching consequences for democracy, security and sovereignty on the continent.</p>
<h2>Puppets, patrons and pushback</h2>
<p>The UN General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian aggression garnered only one dissenting African vote – Eritrea. This was accompanied by strong denunciations of the Russian attack on Ukraine by the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States. The current chair of the AU, Senegal’s President Macky Sall, and AU Commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat also criticised Russia’s unprovoked war.</p>
<p>In total, 28 of Africa’s 54 countries voted to condemn the Russian invasion, 16 abstained and 9 did not vote. All in all, the vote was a remarkable rebuke of Moscow from a continent where many African leaders’ worldviews are shaped by a posture of non-alignment, raw legacies from the Cold War, African diplomatic politesse, and a desire to remain neutral in Great Power rivalries.</p>
<p>The vote also revealed a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Africa-Year-in-Review-2021.pdf#page=16">widening segmentation of governance norms in Africa</a>. And it shows that African relations with Russia from here on in will not be uniform – nor abruptly reversed.</p>
<p>The African countries that abstained, or did not vote, did so for a variety of reasons. The most obvious category of country unwilling to condemn Russia was those with African leaders who have been co-opted by Moscow. These included Faustin-Archange Touadéra in the Central African Republic, Lt. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Sudan, and Colonel Assimi Goïta in Mali. </p>
<p>These leaders lack legitimacy domestically. They depend on Moscow’s political and mercenary support to hold onto power.</p>
<p>A second category among the countries that abstained or did not vote is those with leaders who have patronage ties with Russia. Those in power in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe benefit from Russian arms, disinformation or political cover. These leaders, moreover, have no interest in democratic processes that may threaten their hold on power.</p>
<p>Others who abstained or did not vote likely did so for ideological reasons rooted in their traditions of non-alignment. These included Morocco, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa. While they may maintain ties to Moscow, they are appalled by Russia’s imperialistic actions. By and large, they support the upholding of international law to maintain peace and security.</p>
<p>Those who voted to condemn the invasion included leading African democracies and democratisers. These comprised Botswana, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Seychelles, Sierra Leone and Zambia. They represent a mix of motivations. But I calculated that the median Global Freedom score for this group of 28 countries based on Freedom House’s annual (0-100) ratings is 20 points higher than those that did not vote to condemn.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZxZlaiuicYM">powerful speech by Kenya’s ambassador to the United Nations</a>, Martin Kimani, in defence of respecting sovereignty, territorial integrity, and resolving differences through non-violent means, epitomises the views of this group and its support for a rules-based order. Many have also taken the lead in condemning the surge in coups and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438721000296?via%3Dihub">third termism on the continent</a>.</p>
<h2>Priorities for action</h2>
<p>If the past is any indication, Russia can be expected to escalate its influence campaign in Africa in reaction to its international isolation following the Ukraine invasion. </p>
<p>To mitigate Russia’s malign influences, African and international actors wishing to advance a democratic, rules-based order for the continent should take some decisive steps.</p>
<p>First is to invest in democratic institutions and democratic partners. Democratic checks and balances are the best bulwark against nefarious external influences.</p>
<p>Second, coups and third termism must be strongly condemned. </p>
<p>Third, building the capacity and space of African journalists is especially vital. Without a free and informed discourse, it is difficult to have a national dialogue on priorities and preferences. Or to hold political leaders accountable for their actions. </p>
<p>Fourth, is to enforce the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/convention-elimination-mercenarism-africa">African Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism</a>, which went into effect in 1985. This legally prohibits African states from allowing mercenaries into their territory and should be employed to bar <a href="https://theconversation.com/rising-instability-in-mali-raises-fears-about-role-of-private-russian-military-group-174634">Wagner</a> from the continent. </p>
<p>Fifth, there must be investment <a href="https://africacenter.org/publication/africas-militaries-a-missing-link-in-democratic-transitions/">in Africa’s professional militaries</a>. This will bolster democracy. A growing number of African militaries have become politicised. This has contributed to the upsurge of coups as well as the use of militaries as a coercive tool against political opponents. </p>
<p>Strengthening African citizens’ agency is also key. Russia’s malign influences can be mitigated by strengthening African civil society to ensure independent voices are not muffled. Civil society can also heighten scrutiny and transparency of opaque contracts that tend to provide the patronage that props up coopted regimes.</p>
<p>Another means of enhancing African agency is to support the efforts of African regional organisations such as the African Union. The AU and the regional economic communities have adopted charters advancing democratic norms and processes. These bodies can help uphold democratic norms when there are violations. And they can reduce the scope for external interference.</p>
<p>Internationally, democratic governments need to sustain long-term partnerships with their African counterparts. African countries with legitimately elected leaders shouldn’t be put in a position to choose between international partners. It’s reasonable that African governments will want to have multiple external relationships subject to their context and interests. This is especially so given the legacies of colonialism and the struggles for independence that defined the creation of many African countries. Rather, the focus of these partnerships should be on maximising a shared vision of what a rules-based order should look like and how it can be put into practice.</p>
<p>In the end, Russia doesn’t have much to offer African leaders other than coercive tools. If these are diminished, then so too will be Russia’s destabilising influences on the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178785/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Siegle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia is attempting to export its governance model of an authoritarian, kleptocratic and transactional regime onto Africa.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1757392022-02-16T15:13:19Z2022-02-16T15:13:19ZTwitter in Kenya’s last poll: a great way to reach voters, but not a game-changer<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442662/original/file-20220126-17-10003yg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nairobi senator Johnson Sakaja's impromptu address in the streets of Nairobi is captured on smart phones. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenyans will head to the polls in August this year for what is expected to be a hotly contested presidential election. Opposition leader Raila Odinga is running for the fifth time, but on this occasion with the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/13/why-are-kenyans-protesting-their-government/">support</a> of his former rival, President Uhuru Kenyatta, who is ineligible to stand again. Significantly, Kenyatta has <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-02-07-im-no-push-over-uhuru-warns-ruto-vows-jubilee-return/">overlooked</a> his deputy, William Ruto. </p>
<p>Ruto and Odinga will be the candidates to watch in the 2022 presidential elections. But there will also be hundreds of politicians campaigning for positions in Kenya’s parliament and in local government. In addition to drawing on patronage networks and holding mass campaign events, Kenyan politicians will use social media to broadcast their policy messages, rally support and position themselves against their opponents.</p>
<p>Social media’s role in <a href="https://theconversation.com/analysis-across-africa-shows-how-social-media-is-changing-politics-121577">politics</a> and elections has grown significantly in the last decade. The most obvious examples are negative, like <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-twitter-propaganda-predicted-2016-us-election-polls-119444">Russian Twitter propaganda</a> during the 2016 US elections. There were also <a href="https://theconversation.com/whatsapp-skewed-brazilian-election-showing-social-medias-danger-to-democracy-106476">misinformation</a> campaigns via WhatsApp in Brazil’s 2018 presidential election, and the Cambridge Analytica and Facebook <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html">scandal</a>.</p>
<p>Platforms like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp are –- as Kenyan writer and political analyst Nanjala Nyabola <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/digital-democracy-analogue-politics-9781786994318/">writes</a> –- reframing democracy and the way citizens engage and organise in digital space. Through these platforms, politicians can engage directly with voters, which is especially important for independent candidates, who may not have the backing of a major party. </p>
<p>But how do politicians use digital media? To answer that question, we looked to Twitter, which is popular in Kenya. The platform allows users to broadcast messages of up to 280 characters.</p>
<p>In our <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africatoday.68.2.02?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad760942d714d4390d735015559d55c1f">research</a>, we analysed 15,691 tweets by 86 Kenyan politicians during the 2017 elections. We evaluated the extent to which Twitter can “democratise” political communication by disrupting the hold that political parties have on the electoral market. </p>
<p>We found that social media has the potential to allow for more direct communication between politicians and citizens. But our analysis of candidates’ tweets in the 2017 election does not suggest that Twitter democratised political discourse and politics in Kenya. While we expect candidates in the upcoming election to continue to expand their reach and visibility through social media, Twitter may not yet replace patronage networks and traditional campaigning. </p>
<h2>Candidates who used Twitter</h2>
<p>Our analysis of the 2017 tweets sought to answer three questions:</p>
<ul>
<li>Which candidates use Twitter?</li>
<li>What do candidates say on Twitter?</li>
<li>Do candidates use Twitter to engage with potential voters, or just to broadcast at them? </li>
</ul>
<p>Here’s what we learned.</p>
<p>Not all candidates who ran for office in Kenya in 2017 had Twitter accounts. Only 147 (45%) of the 327 candidates running for president, governor, senator, or <a href="https://afrocave.com/role-of-women-representatives-in-kenya/">women representative</a> had Twitter profiles. </p>
<p>We found greater use of Twitter among aspirants for higher offices. Seven of the eight candidates running for president in 2017 had Twitter accounts, while only 28% of senate candidates did.</p>
<p>Ruling Jubilee party candidates and male candidates were more likely to have Twitter accounts.</p>
<p>Even among those Kenyan candidates who had Twitter accounts, not all posted to Twitter during their campaign. We found only 26% of the official candidates running for president, governor, senator, or women representative tweeted during the campaign period.</p>
<h2>What politicians said</h2>
<p>Like <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/digital-democracy-analogue-politics-9781786994318/">most tweets</a> (page 89), the majority of the tweets posted by the candidates in our study were in English. Some were in Kiswahili, and some were in a mixture of these two languages.</p>
<p>The politicians often mentioned their county in tweets. The word “county” was the most frequent term in the thousands of tweets in our dataset. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442660/original/file-20220126-21-msl2sa.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Examples of tweets by candidates in dataset that included the word county.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For example, Lenny Kivuti, an opposition party candidate for governor in Embu County, posted multiple tweets during his 2017 campaign about various local influencers he met. This includes the <a href="https://twitter.com/HonLennyKivuti/status/872852226141814784">tweet</a> above about meeting the county <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/opinion-analysis/ideas-debate/changing-boda-boda-menace-to-opportunity-3496268">bodaboda</a> chairmen, as well as tweets about meeting local <a href="https://twitter.com/HonLennyKivuti/status/853189530333085696">taxi owners and drivers</a> and even Nairobi-based <a href="https://twitter.com/HonLennyKivuti/status/850029697622847493">professionals</a> originally from Embu County. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-2017-elections-how-new-media-stole-the-mainstreams-thunder-88613">Kenya's 2017 elections: how new media stole the mainstream's thunder</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Engaging or broadcasting</h2>
<p>Our data show whether candidates used Twitter to broadcast messages or interact with potential voters. Candidates can use Twitter to broadcast their values or strengths to potential voters. For example, former Nairobi governor Evans Kidero (who ran unsuccessfully for reelection in 2017) <a href="https://twitter.com/KideroEvans/status/874265397045886976">tweeted</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We invest in our children’s future because education validates their dreams. #KideroNaElimu #KideroMueke-5Tena. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This tweet elicited 25 replies, but Kidero replied to none of them.</p>
<p>Looking at our data capturing Twitter replies, we saw Kenya’s ruling party candidates rarely “engaged” with other users. Independent candidates were much more engaged and interactive with others on Twitter.</p>
<p>Joseph Nyagah was an independent presidential candidate who tried to appeal to a diverse audience and actively engaged in conversations with everyday Twitter users. His many replies to Twitter users – totalling 394 across the 62 days of our study – suggest it may be interesting and important for researchers to study more closely how independent candidates use Twitter less as a broadcasting platform and more as an avenue to engage with citizens.</p>
<p>The candidate in our dataset with the most replies (1,754) was also an independent: Miguna Miguna, an unsuccessful candidate for governor of Nairobi.</p>
<p>Without major party backing, photojournalist and activist Boniface Mwangi campaigned as an independent MP candidate for Starehe constituency in Nairobi. He raised significant funds and organised youth to register to vote <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1054500/kenyas-boniface-mwangi-helped-lead-the-political-class-to-engage-citizens-with-social-media/?utm_source%20=yPL&yptr=yahoo">via Twitter</a>.</p>
<p>We did not examine election outcome data alongside our Twitter data to see if there was a correlation between candidates’ engagement and electoral success. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-social-media-are-levelling-kenyas-political-field-and-lessons-learnt-144697">How social media are levelling Kenya's political field -- and lessons learnt</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Old and new resources</h2>
<p>Traditional <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/multiethnic-democracy-9780198852735?view=Grid&facet_narrowbyprice_facet=50to100&facet_narrowbybinding_facet=Hardcover&lang=en&cc=us">campaigns</a>, major party support, and ethnic dynamics and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-why-elite-cohesion-is-more-important-than-ethnicity-to-political-stability-131937">inequality</a> remain strong influences in contemporary Kenyan politics. Add to that the increasing role of <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/08/02/why-independent-candidates-dominate-kenyas-local-elections-electionske-2017/">county-level competition</a> in shaping national-level politics.</p>
<p>Twitter will be part of many Kenyan candidates’ campaign activities ahead of the August 2022 elections. It is not yet clear that it will truly level the political playing field between independent candidates and candidates backed by political parties with significant resources. But the surge of independent candidates and their social media innovations suggest change is coming.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175739/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Twitter will be part of many Kenyan candidates’ campaign activities ahead of the August 2022 elections.Kim Yi Dionne, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, RiversideJennifer De Maio, Professor of Political Science, College of Behavioral Sciences, California State University, NorthridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1729672021-12-09T09:54:04Z2021-12-09T09:54:04ZTanzania must face up to calls for reform if it wants to keep the peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435556/original/file-20211203-15-1srqw4k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zanzibar's anti-riot police officers stand guard over protesters cornered during opposition protests in Stone Town, Zanzibar.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sixty years after independence, Tanzania is still guided by the path created in its early years, one dominated by an all-powerful ruling party. The line between the state and the party is blurred. </p>
<p>Tanganyika inherited a multi-party political system. But in 1964, the union of Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar to form Tanzania marked a shift from liberal to more state-centric policies. President Julius Nyerere’s administration saw a need for a stronger state in order to defend national interests. </p>
<p>In 1967, the <a href="http://library.fes.de/fulltext/bibliothek/2-tanzania-s0019634.pdf">Arusha Declaration</a> formally rooted socialist policies into Tanzania’s politics. This further entrenched one-party dominance. </p>
<p>The country faced a combination of international and domestic challenges in the 1970s. They included <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/160747">poor economic policies</a> and the international oil crisis. As a reaction, the state became more insular and sought to further cement the ruling party’s hold. In 1976, for example, <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---coop/documents/publication/wcms_672857.pdf">cooperative societies</a> were abolished, mostly for political reasons which were disguised as economic. The move protected the ruling party’s hold on power. </p>
<p>Due to international pressure and the failure of domestic policies, Tanzania had to embark on a liberalisation and democratisation processes. It adopted structural adjustment policies in line with the <a href="https://www.ned.org/docs/Samuel-P-Huntington-Democracy-Third-Wave.pdf">democratisation trend</a> in African countries after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The country also amended its constitution to allow multi-party politics. A number of political parties were registered in the early and mid 1990s. <a href="https://www.andrewleunginternationalconsultants.com/files/brookings-2015-africa-foresight-report.pdf#page=53">The elections</a> between 1995 and 2015 were considered credible thanks to the improved democratic space in which opposition parties could participate. </p>
<p>Tanzania’s ability to maintain peace and stability since independence has been attributed to the “nation building” efforts of Nyerere. The nation-state is well composed, with no ethnic contestations. It has had a peaceful transition from one president to another and respected term limits without a fuss.</p>
<p>The last six years, however, under President John Magufuli, has exposed the entrenched autocratic system that one-party dominance created. Despite multi-party politics, the line between the state and the ruling party has been increasingly blurred. With the expansion and consolidation of opposition parties, the ruling party has become more autocratic and ready to use state force to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26661997">keep its grip on power</a>. </p>
<p>This desperation is threatening the peace and stability of the country. Intensified partisan politics has led to polarisation along party lines. Added to this is policy instability due to weak institutions. A situation where <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52983563">personalities can sway important institutions</a> is also a threat to economic progress. </p>
<h2>Democratic seesaw</h2>
<p>Since the 1990s, each electoral cycle has improved the opposition parties’ vote share. In 1995, in the first elections after the re-introduction of multi-party politics, the main opposition party gained 24% of the presidential <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/tan1995results2.htm">votes</a>. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-ruling-party-wins-election-again-but-poll-is-annulled-in-zanzibar-49934">2015</a>, the opposition party gained 40%. </p>
<p>But after 2015, Tanzania experienced a sharp <a href="https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10079042/3/Paget%20Paget,%20The%20Authoritarian%20Turn%20in%20Tanzania,%20April%202017.pdf">authoritarian turn</a>. The Magufuli administration <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47334545">banned</a> political parties’ rallies, banned live broadcasting of parliament, banned pregnant school girls from returning to school and restricted freedom of expression. Under his administration <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54484609">opposition</a> party leaders were arrested and detained and faced assassination attempts.</p>
<p>Magufuli’s administration also <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-covid-19-response-puts-magufulis-leadership-style-in-sharp-relief-139417">denied</a> the COVID-19 pandemic and <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)00362-7/fulltext">refused</a> vaccines. The peak of this authoritarianism was in the 2020 elections, which was marred by violence and massive <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/49290/tanzania-dark-days-ahead-says-opposition-as-magufuli-sworn-in-for-second-term/">rigging</a>. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-magufuli-has-steered-tanzania-down-the-road-of-an-authoritarian-one-party-state-149760">elections</a> gave the ruling dominant party 98.8% of the parliamentary seats and 84.4% of the presidential vote.</p>
<p>After the death of Magufuli in March 2021, President Samia Suluhu Hassan took over power as per the constitution. The transition was smooth, which is one of the positive aspects of Tanzanian politics. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-hassan-faces-her-first-political-test-constitutional-reform-165088">Tanzania's Hassan faces her first political test: constitutional reform</a>
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<p>To her credit, President Hassan has embraced and welcomed scientific measures against COVID-19 and allowed pregnant girls to go back to school. Nevertheless, she has kept to the same autocratic path with a few cosmetic changes based on rhetoric. She has continued to ban public political <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/07/tanzania-sees-only-glimpses-change-new-president">rallies</a>, criminalised calls for constitutional <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/clamour-for-new-katiba-tanzania-3461544">reforms</a> and detained the chairman of the main opposition party, <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/president-samias-halo-is-slipping">Freeman Mbowe</a>.</p>
<h2>Challenges and opportunities</h2>
<p>Two <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-90206-7_7">immediate challenges</a> Tanzania faces are managing the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hostilities-between-tanganyika-and-zanzibar-still-challenge-tanzanian-unity-76713">union with Zanzibar</a> and <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/OXAN-DB232146/full/html">demands for constitutional reforms</a>. The issues include distribution of resources between the mainland and the island, and the rights of Zanzibar as an autonomous country.</p>
<p>At 60, Tanzania should appreciate the changing times, expectations and politics by engaging in constitutional reforms. This is arguably the most important thing it can do to maintain peace and stability. A constitutional reform process would provide space for different groups, such as opposition parties, to express their views and concerns. It could address grievances and be an opportunity to unify the nation. </p>
<p>The emerging partisan politics and the polarisation it creates is a new threat. It does not provide space for democratic contestation, as opposition parties are restricted from political activities. If unaddressed, the polarisation and increasing grievances could destabilise the country. The future of politics in Tanzania depends on the ability of the policy makers and politicians to take advantage of a more enlightened 2021 citizenry as compared to 1961.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aikande Clement Kwayu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The emerging partisan politics and the polarisation it creates is a new threat for Tanzania.Aikande Clement Kwayu, Independent researcher & Honorary Research Fellow, University of Wisconsin-MadisonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597302021-05-04T13:24:14Z2021-05-04T13:24:14ZWhy Zambia’s upcoming poll risks tipping the balance against democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397557/original/file-20210428-13-1thnp7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Image of a polling station sign in Kasama, Northern Province, in 2015.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nicole Beardsworth</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zambia is one of the fastest eroding democracies in the world. This is according to the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-dem), one of the most trusted sources of information on indicators of democratic progress or regression. The project’s 2020 <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf">report</a> notes that Zambia has registered a remarkably rapid decline in the quality of democracy since the last election in 2016. </p>
<p>Nor is there great optimism about the next set of elections, due to take place in less than four months. Observers have serious concerns ahead of the polls. One of the main ones is about the quality of the <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/02/27/2021-elections-a-scam-voter-numbers-inflated-in-provinces-likely-to-vote-for-pf-sishuwa/">voters’ roll</a>.</p>
<p>The electoral commission decided in 2020 to <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/08/sadc-elections-monitoring-body-objects-to-new-voters-register/">scrap</a> the voters’ roll that had been in use for over a decade. It then allocated just 38 days to register more than 8 million people in the middle of the rainy season. </p>
<p>The commission <a href="https://twitter.com/NixiiB/status/1354048226404528129">has refused</a> to make the roll available for an independent audit, ignoring widespread calls to do so. Such an audit of the roll was allowed in 2016.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ccmgzambia.org/">Christian Churches Monitoring Group</a> – the most reputable local election observation organisation – set about trying to verify the existence of voters and check them against the new roll. But it had to abandon its efforts after the <a href="https://ccmgzambia.org/ccmg-statement-on-cancellation-of-the-people-to-list-test/">electoral commission warned</a> that this contravened local legislation. </p>
<p>The limited information available in the public domain suggests that the registration process has indeed been skewed towards regions that vote for the ruling party.</p>
<h2>2016 voting patterns and the 2021 register</h2>
<p>Zambia appears to have become more politically polarised along ethnic lines since 2016. This is in part due to regional voting patterns which appeared – on the surface at least – to have split cleanly along ethno-regional lines. </p>
<p>In 2016, support for the ruling Patriotic Front and President Edgar Lungu was drawn predominantly from the largely Bemba-speaking north and Nyanja-speaking east of the country. The Patriotic Front’s support has traditionally come from Bemba-speakers. But Nyanja-speaking easterners have rallied around the Patriotic Front following Lungu’s rise. He originates from the east, has backing from prominent Nyanja-speakers and has elevated easterners in cabinet and government.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1: The ruling Patriotic Front party’s vote share in the 2016 Presidential race.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In comparison, the main opposition party’s support was drawn substantially from the Tonga-speaking southern and Lozi-speaking western regions. The so-called Bantu Botatwe (affiliated groups from the south and west) have long supported political parties that represent their economic and political interests, but these parties have never come to power or sponsored a president. </p>
<p>These regional patterns of support have not gone unnoticed in Lusaka. Since the 2016 elections, there has been a growing rhetoric of distrust from the ruling party towards the south and west of the country. <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2019/08/06/katuba-voted-for-a-tribe-i-feel-sad-to-be-tonga-says-pfs-moonga/">Senior</a> members of the ruling party have increasingly made <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/29/lungu-must-act-on-dora-before-tribalism-triggers-violence-tiz/">disparaging remarks</a> against citizens from those regions. </p>
<p>In addition, the cabinet and senior positions in the <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2021/02/04/mwenye-condemns-segregative-appointments-explains-his-legal-opinion-against-lungu-musa/">civil service</a> and <a href="https://zambiareports.com/2021/04/15/president-lungu-swears-7-judges-3-courts/?">judiciary</a> appear to have been skewed towards people who come from the north and east. </p>
<p>By comparison, there is almost no representation of people from the south and west of the country.</p>
<p>Crucially, an analysis of the new 2021 voters’ roll by Zambian academic Dr Sishuwa Sishuwa – recently <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/04/irony-and-panic-as-zambias-authoritarianism-turns-to-intellectuals/">threatened</a> with arrest for sedition by a key ruling party figure – suggests that significantly more citizens have been registered for the next poll in regions that support the ruling party. Meanwhile, far fewer voters have been registered in opposition-supporting regions. </p>
<p>These dynamics are important, and worrying. For a long time Zambia has had a policy of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1959945">regional</a> balancing in key government appointments. This has largely held regional grievances <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.610585">in check</a>. </p>
<p>But perceptions of persecution of groups who have historically supported the opposition are deepening, and may well become more entrenched with the elections.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 2: Opposition UPND’s vote share in the 2016 Presidential race.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Credibility gap</h2>
<p>In 2016, Lungu cleared the 50% electoral threshold with just 13,000 votes, with Hakainde Hichilema <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971605100306">close</a> at his heels. Given the clear disparities in the recent registration numbers across regions, it is difficult to interpret them as anything but an attempt to pack the voters’ roll with ruling party supporters. This also serves to disenfranchise opposition voters. </p>
<p>The reluctance of the electoral commission to subject the roll to an independent audit – as it did in 2016 – increases these suspicions.</p>
<p>The Catholic Church, a key player in the country’s politics, has expressed <a href="https://www.vaticannews.va/en/africa/news/2021-03/zambia-bishops-concerned-about-august-elections.html">deep reservations</a> about the registration process. The Christian Churches Monitoring Group has also <a href="https://ccmgzambia.org/ccmg-statement-on-analysis-of-the-voters-register/">highlighted major gaps</a> and deficiencies with both the process and the registration rates. </p>
<p>Hichilema has <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/75948/zambias-new-voters-register-is-a-scam/">noted his serious concern</a> with the register. This distrust of the election commission runs deep within the opposition, which may well lead to increased tensions ahead of and following the polls.</p>
<p>There are additional worries too. The government has used COVID-19 restrictions to curtail the <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/26/chingola-police-nab-27-upnd-cadres-for-unlawful-assembly-on-independence-day/">opposition’s</a> ability to campaign. This includes <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2020/10/07/zambia-police-denies-upnd-and-ndc-permit-to-hold-a-protest-against-ecz/">demonstrations</a> or party meetings even in <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/11/02/ndola-police-nabs-3-upnd-officials-for-holding-private-meeting/">private homes</a>. </p>
<p>The electoral commission’s January statement appeared to suggest that movement restrictions during campaigns would be <a href="https://twitter.com/NixiiB/status/1354048226404528129">enforced</a>. </p>
<p>There’s increasing concern about heavy-handed tactics by the police who have repeatedly used excessive force to disperse opposition gatherings. Two people were killed in Lusaka late last year when police <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-23/zambian-police-fire-teargas-as-opposition-leader-questioned">opened fire on a crowd</a> of opposition supporters. </p>
<p>Arrests for insulting or defaming the president have increased. Since March 2020, at least six people, including a 15-year-old boy, have been <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/11/24/police-nab-kitwe-man-for-insulting-lungu/">arrested</a> over such offences. This has reduced space for dissent alongside <a href="https://rsf.org/en/zambia">shrinking</a> space for media and non-governmental organisations wary of running afoul of the government’s agenda.</p>
<p>In 2019 the government set about trying to change the constitution to further strengthen the presidency relative to the judiciary and legislature. It <a href="https://presidential-power.net/?cat=131">failed</a> in late 2020, catching the administration by surprise. </p>
<p>In the wake of this, the ruling party introduced a new Cyber Security and Cyber Crime law. It has been roundly <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/03/21/church-asks-lungu-not-to-sign-cyber-bill-into-law/">criticised</a> as failing to meet basic <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-04-05-free-speech-zambias-new-internet-law-fails-basic-human-rights-scrutiny/">human rights</a> standards, further <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/03/01/cyber-insecurity-potential-impact-of-the-cyber-security-and-cyber-crimes-bill-of-2021-on-an-already-shrinking-civic-space-in-zambia/">shrinking civic space</a> and placing whistleblowers and journalists at unjustified risk. </p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>The divide between the opposition United Party for National Development and ruling Patriotic Front continues to widen, and distrust runs deep. Concerns with the electoral commission’s management of the process have most outside observers worried about the diminishing likelihood of a fair election.</p>
<p>The increasing <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2021/03/19/our-officers-fear-cadres-to-protect-their-jobs-police/">impunity</a> of ruling party-aligned “cadres” and their politicised accusations against <a href="https://twitter.com/2021Zambian/status/1382304037253550081">civil servants</a> and citizens is a growing concern, as much of the violence surrounding the <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2019/11/13/kambwili-kampyongos-hate-speech-influenced-violence-in-2016-elections-reveals-report/">2016 election</a> was perpetrated by these groups of <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/05/2021-polls-could-be-marred-by-violence-if-govt-doesnt-act-on-inquiry-avap/">young men</a> who are sponsored by politicians. </p>
<p>Zambia’s status as a peaceful, democratic and free country is increasingly at risk. The 2021 election holds the potential to tip the balance if politicians aren’t careful and the international community pays little heed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole Beardsworth works for the University of Pretoria. She is also an Honorary Research Fellow in Politics at the University of Warwick, where she receives funding from the Global Challenges Research Fund and the Institute for Advanced Studies to conduct research on the Zambian elections.</span></em></p>Distrust of the electoral commission runs deep in the opposition, which may well lead to increased tensions ahead of and following the polls.Nicole Beardsworth, Lecturer, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1556852021-02-19T18:45:15Z2021-02-19T18:45:15ZWhat’s behind fresh unrest in Somalia – and what needs to be done<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385300/original/file-20210219-15-1npo4ao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of different Somali opposition presidential candidates protest over delayed elections in Mogadishu on February 19, 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Somali government troops have clashed with opposition supporters on the streets of Mogadishu amid growing anger over <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-politics/gunfire-erupts-in-mogadishu-as-somali-government-forces-seal-off-streets-idUSKBN2AJ0MI?il=0">delayed elections</a>. There is growing anxiety over the expiry of the term of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as “Farmaajo”, without the prospect of an immediate replacement. Dr Mohammed Ibrahim Shire explains how the country got here, and what needs to be done to end the stalemate.</em></p>
<h2>What’s behind the protests and the army’s presence on the streets?</h2>
<p>A week ago an alliance of Somali opposition leaders <a href="https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-s-opposition-calls-for-large-protests-over-elections-standoff">called</a> for anti-government protests. The coalition includes former Somali presidents and ministers, many with diverging interests and agendas. The government banned the planned protest citing a recent COVID-19 surge as a reason. But it was later allowed, provided that the protests were peaceful and participants adhered to the country’s public health and social measures.</p>
<p>But the day before the planned protests things took a downward turn. Somalia’s constitution <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Somalia_2012.pdf?lang=en">guarantees</a> the right to peaceful demonstrations. At the same time the government sees it as its duty to police the protests. This is to ensure that participants are protected from disruption by others – especially Al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>The opposition alliance, however, refused police protection and instead deployed their own armed militias. Some belonged to <a href="https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Yusuf_Mohammed_Siad">Yusuf Mohammed Siad</a> – also known as Indha’ade – a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-banana-war-leaves-eight-dead">controversial figure</a> and a former warlord. </p>
<p>In response, government banned the planned protest, <a href="https://horseedmedia.net/2021/02/19/rooble-dibadbax-hubaysan-waa-maya-video/">arguing</a> that state duties couldn’t be delegated to armed militias. </p>
<p>The ban exacerbated simmering tensions and led to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/19/somalia-heavy-gunfire-erupts-at-opposition-march-in-mogadishu">gun battle</a> in the capital overnight. Both sides traded accusations over the unprovoked street attacks.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the opposition pushed ahead with the planned protest, defying the ban on public gatherings. This turned into a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/19/somalia-heavy-gunfire-erupts-at-opposition-march-in-mogadishu">confrontation</a> as protesters clashed with security forces.</p>
<h2>How did we get to this point?</h2>
<p>Somalia’s current disarray stems from the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/somalia-facing-delayed-elections-as-poll-agency-leaders-disagree-3241776">failure</a> of the federal government and leaders of the five federal states to agree on the implementation of the September 17 revised election model.</p>
<p>Somalia has a unique electoral system built around a clan-based model. Clan elders indirectly choose the Lower House members, while the five federal states elect the Upper House members. Members of both houses select a president, who then nominates a prime minister.</p>
<p>In February last year Farmaajo signed <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/somali-president-signs-historic-election-bill-law">a new electoral law</a> to establish universal suffrage. This provoked cries of protest from the opposition, who argued that it would not be feasible to hold a one-person-one-vote poll without introducing a term extension for Farmaajo. </p>
<p>This view was backed by Halima Ismail, chairwoman of the National Independent Electoral Commission. She <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202006290366.html">told parliament</a> in June that conducting national elections under the new model would require a delay until August 2021. </p>
<p>A series of national consultative meetings were held between government and regional leaders to try and resolve the issue. An informal agreement materialised that resulted in abandoning the one-person, one-vote model, and instead adopting a complex indirect system used in the past. This involves delegates chosen by clan elders electing lawmakers who then elect the president. </p>
<p>All parties finally signed up to a electoral framework. The Somali parliament approved the revised electoral model, legalising and superseding the February electoral model as the framework for the 2020-2021 elections.</p>
<p>However, as government and regional leaders embarked on moving from the design phase to the implementation phase, many disagreements came to the fore. In particular, three contentious issues emerged that brought everything to a standstill.</p>
<p>The first one is the make up of the Federal Electoral Implementation Team. As soon as the Somali government appointed the team, federal state members such as Puntland and Jubbaland rejected it. They accused the government of filling it with government members drawn from the office of the president, security agencies and the diplomatic corps.</p>
<p>The second contentious topic is who would manage the parliamentary seats of Somaliland. </p>
<p>The third stumbling block was how to handle the 16 parliamentary seats allocated for Gedo province in Jubbaland state. The Jubbaland administration in Kismayo remains hugely unpopular in Gedo and parts of the Jubba regions. Residents argue that the Jubbaland administration is supported by neighbouring Kenya and does not represent the people of Jubbaland.</p>
<p>This tension occurred against the backdrop of a broader geopolitical dynamic between Somalia and Kenya. Somalia accuses Kenya of political meddling in the Jubbaland state, and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/somalia-kenya-must-arrest-and-return-escaped-jubaland-minister-to-face-trial-in-mogadishu/">sponsoring and harbouring fugitive</a> Jubbaland minister, Abdirashid Janan. Kenya denies the charge.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The only feasible solution is to ensure that the September 17 deal is implemented. In theory, all parties have agreed on this revised electoral model, but it’s hampered by the three contentious issues.</p>
<p>A 14-member technical committee set up to resolve these issues announced that it had found ways to <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/somalia-committee-claims-election-issues-resolved/2148406">resolve</a> the electoral impasse. It has called for an urgent meeting of the government and regional leaders. The Somali government has agreed and called for an urgent meeting in Mogadishu.</p>
<p>It’s a good sign that Somalia’s international partners have also welcomed the technical committee’s solutions. That said, it’s up to the Somali government and regional leaders to agree and adopt the proposed solutions and hold elections as soon as possible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155685/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Ibrahim Shire does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The current tensions have been driven by a delay in elections.The only feasible solution is to ensure that they take place.Mohammed Ibrahim Shire, Senior Lecturer in Security and Risk, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1532052021-01-13T14:02:54Z2021-01-13T14:02:54ZBobi Wine has shaken up Ugandan politics: four things worth knowing about him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378503/original/file-20210113-13-dmiay0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, also known as Bobi Wine, addresses supporters in Uganda's capital Kampala. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Luke Dray/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Regardless of how Ugandans decide to vote in the January 14 presidential elections, the incumbent Yoweri Museveni will most likely be declared the winner. Museveni has ruled the country for five consecutive terms. He has historically been able to <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/05/16/uganda-cost-of-fake-democracy/">manipulate</a> elections in his favour, because he controls Uganda’s military, judiciary, and Electoral Commission with an iron fist.</p>
<p>Throughout this electoral campaign, however, the long-standing Ugandan president has been upstaged by a formidable young challenger: popular musician-turned-parliamentarian Robert Kyagulanyi, aka Bobi Wine. Since being elected as a Member of Parliament in 2017, the 38-year-old leader of the National Unity Platform has become the new face of Uganda’s opposition.</p>
<p>There are four things worth knowing about Bobi Wine and Uganda’s politics.</p>
<h2>Building a movement, defying expectations</h2>
<p>Bobi Wine has repeatedly been underestimated by government supporters and critics since he first ran for parliament. He was forced to run as an independent after the two major opposition parties, the Forum for Democratic Change and the Democratic Party, turned him away.</p>
<p>He nevertheless easily won the by-election in the Kyandondo East constituency within Kampala with <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/53602-kyadondo-east-bobi-wine-headed-for-landslide-victory">78%</a> of the vote. Since then, he has proved himself to be a skilled politician who has successfully built a strong political movement – from scratch.</p>
<p>Within his first two years in office, he forged a reputation as a principled and fearless opponent of Museveni’s policies. He was a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLDMrbk5VIU">leading voice</a> against the president’s ultimately successful effort to remove <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/us-turns-blind-eye-ugandas-assault-democracy/">presidential age limits</a> from the constitution. He also led protests against the government’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44798627">proposed tax on social media</a> in July 2018.</p>
<p>Over the course of that same year, he endorsed opposition candidates who went on to <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/bobi-wine-beats-besigye-in-bugiri/">win</a> four consecutive parliamentary by-elections. </p>
<p>By 2018, he had created a political pressure group called <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/can-bobi-wine-unite-uganda-and-bring-down-a-dictator/">People Power, Our Power</a>. When the government blocked its registration as a formal political party, Bobi Wine outmanoeuvred the Electoral Commission by aligning himself with a smaller, pre-existing one, which he <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/how-bobi-wine-nup-deal-was-negotiated-1908714">re-christened</a> as the National Unity Platform. Almost immediately more than 20 MPs left more established opposition parties to <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/21-mps-join-bobi-wine-1921682">join</a> his party.</p>
<h2>A target of unprecedented state repression</h2>
<p>Bobi Wine has been a regular target of state <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/besigye-lauds-opposition-presidential-candidates-for-bracing-security-brutality-3254412">repression</a>. </p>
<p>The Museveni regime responded to his early successes by repeatedly <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/62237-police-cancels-another-bobi-wine-concert">blocking</a> him from holding concerts and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/30/uganda-bans-red-beret-bobi-wines-signature-headgear">banning</a> the public from wearing People Power’s trademark red berets.</p>
<p>Since being elected, Bobi Wine has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-presidential-candidate-bobi-wine-arrested-reports-3243652">arrested</a> countless times. He has never been convicted on any of the charges. Some of his movement’s members and supporters have been <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/63683-one-shot-dead-as-police-battles-bobi-wine-supporters-in-nansana">killed</a>, sometimes in <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/ziggy-wyne-death-bobi-wine-speaks-out-1841472">suspicious</a> <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/police-accused-of-killing-people-power-movement-supporter-1876952">circumstances</a>. </p>
<p>Many have been arrested. Perhaps most notoriously, in August 2018, as he campaigned for a fellow independent candidate in a by-election in Arua in northwestern Uganda, Bobi Wine and at least 35 of his political associates were <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/uganda-bobi-wine-arrested/568549/">arrested</a> following dubious <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/can-bobi-wine-unite-uganda-and-bring-down-a-dictator/">reports</a> that Museveni’s motorcade had been stoned. That same night the opposition leader’s driver, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/uganda-investigate-death-of-opposition-politicians-driver/">Yasin Kawuma</a>, was murdered with a bullet that Bobi Wine <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/opinion/uganda-museveni-repression.html">believes</a> was intended for him.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of these arrests, the Kyadondo East MP was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-museveni-critic-bobi-wine-charged-in-military-trial/a-45082938">charged with treason</a> and possession of illegal firearms. Over his next ten days in custody, he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/04/bobi-wine-ugandan-pop-star-politician-describes-torture-by-soldiers">beaten so brutally</a> by government security forces that he could not stand, sit or walk. He eventually sought <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/9/1/bobi-wine-arrives-in-us-for-medical-treatment">treatment for his injuries</a> in the US.</p>
<p>International <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/chris-martin-and-damon-albarn-join-campaign-to-free-uganda-star-bobi-wine">outrage</a> at this incident has not stopped the Museveni regime from escalating its tactics of repression during this election cycle.</p>
<p>The arrests have continued unabated throughout the current campaign. In addition, campaign rallies have been restricted and the government has met opposition supporters with deadly force on multiple occasions. Most tragically, following Bobi Wine’s arrest in mid-November, nationwide protests erupted during which state security forces killed <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/12/uganda-stop-killings-and-human-rights-violations-ahead-of-election-day/">at least 54 people</a>.</p>
<p>In response to these abuses, in early January, Bobi Wine and two other co-claimants filed a 47-page complaint to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/world/africa/uganda-election-bobi-wine-icc.html">International Criminal Court</a> against Museveni and nine of his regime’s security officials, accusing them of gross human rights violations dating back to 2018.</p>
<h2>Generational dimension</h2>
<p>Uganda’s changing demographics have a great deal to do with Bobi Wine’s electoral appeal. The East African country of 46.5 million people has one of the world’s youngest populations, with a median age of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/uganda-population/">16.7</a>. Just over one in five Ugandans are between the ages of 15 and 24 and 77% of the country’s population is <a href="https://www.issuelab.org/resources/4998/4998.pdf">under the age of 30</a>.</p>
<p>Although these young people have benefited from reforms to public education introduced by the Museveni regime, they see little hope for the future. By some estimates, youth unemployment in Uganda is as <a href="https://theconversation.com/insights-into-why-ugandas-strategy-to-create-jobs-for-young-people-hasnt-fully-worked-149576">high</a> as 70%. Frustrated young people can, therefore, easily identify with Bobi Wine, who grew up in the Kampala ghetto of Kamwokya. Like him, they have only known life under Museveni. He was not even four when Museveni first came to power in 1986.</p>
<p>Bobi Wine has skilfully appealed to this demographic. He frames his political movement in generational terms: the “Facebook generation”, which he represents against the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/11/uganda-if-we-do-not-take-risks-we-risk-everything/">“entrenched interests of the ‘Facelift generation’”</a> of the Museveni regime. He has been able to speak to – and articulate – the deep sense of anger and grievance that young Ugandans feel towards the Museveni regime. In so doing, Uganda’s “Ghetto President” has come to be the face and voice of young people’s collective desire for generational political change.</p>
<h2>Populism</h2>
<p>In the final weeks of the campaign, Museveni derided Bobi Wine as a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/some-countries-have-voted-for-change-out-of-excitement-museveni--3250376">populist</a> politician. While this adjective was intended to dismiss his young adversary, there is some truth to this label. In my <a href="https://www.academia.edu/44894954/_Politics_Unusual_Generational_Populism_and_the_Making_of_People_Power_in_Uganda">research</a>, I argue that Bobi Wine’s inclusionary brand of populism has also been a key to his political success.</p>
<p>His use of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569317.2020.1844372">populist rhetoric</a> has effectively forged a new collective sense of identity among his mostly youthful supporters around the nodal point of “the people” and in antagonistic opposition to the country’s political elite .</p>
<p>But Bobi Wine’s brand of populism is novel because his conception of “the people” is defined not in ethno-nationalist terms (as with right-wing politicians in the US or Western Europe). Rather it’s defined largely in generational ones. This has helped him to build a burgeoning political coalition across ethno-regional lines.</p>
<p>If Bobi Wine’s brand of generational populism proves successful, its repercussions could be felt across Africa. It could serve as a model for opposition politicians who are operating in countries with similar demographic characteristics and facing many of the same political obstacles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Melchiorre does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opposition presidential candidate Robert Kyangulanyi has repeatedly been underestimated by government supporters and critics since he first ran for parliament.Luke Melchiorre, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1499272020-11-11T14:55:56Z2020-11-11T14:55:56ZPasha 86: Why it’s wrong to be pessimistic about democracy in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/368832/original/file-20201111-17-1hrc8of.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The state of democracy on the continent is often depicted as generally negative. But the reality is more nuanced. African countries represent a spectrum, from relatively stable democracies like Botswana, Ghana and South Africa to problem spots where opposition and transfers of power are not tolerated. There is no single trend. Tanzania, Ivory Coast and Guinea may appear to be backsliding towards authoritarianism, but they don’t represent the entire continent. </p>
<p>In today’s episode of Pasha Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy at the University of Birmingham, discusses influential forces such as urbanisation, and what can be done to deepen democracy on the continent. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Photo:</strong>
Democracy word in a dictionary. Democracy concept. By Casimiro PT <a href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/democracy-word-dictionary-concept-1079017649">Shutterstock</a></p>
<p><strong>Music:</strong>
“Happy African Village” by John Bartmann, found on <a href="http://freemusicarchive.org/music/John_Bartmann/Public_Domain_Soundtrack_Music_Album_One/happy-african-village">FreeMusicArchive.org</a> licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/">CC0 1</a>.</p>
<p>“African Moon” by John Bartmann, found on <a href="https://freemusicarchive.org/music/John_Bartmann/Public_Domain_Soundtrack_Music_Album_One/african-moon">FreeMusicArchive.org</a> licensed under <a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/">CC0 1.0 Universal License.</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Is authoritarianism on the rise on the continent? Or is democracy doing well? Nic Cheeseman discusses.Ozayr Patel, Digital EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1464902020-09-22T14:50:08Z2020-09-22T14:50:08ZA contested legacy: Julius Nyerere and the 2020 Tanzanian election<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358840/original/file-20200918-22-zar446.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Julius Nyerere's ideas and legacy remain objects of debate in contemporary politics, especially in an election year.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tanzanians will head to the polls on 28 October in which the incumbent, John Magufuli, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c0repynkl22t/john-magufuli">faces</a> a determined opposition. Elected to a first term in 2015, Magufuli’s time in office has lived up to his nickname <em>tinga tinga</em>, Kiswahili for “the bulldozer”. He has been applauded by some for advancing a series of <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/President-Magufuli-out-to-leave-mega-projects-legacy/1840340-4838814-dbnbu0z/index.html">major developmental projects</a>. Others have denounced him for his arguably <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/oct/29/tanzania-president-magufuli-condemned-for-authoritarian-stance">more autocratic, repressive rule</a> </p>
<p>Magufuli leads <a href="https://www.ccmtz.org/history-chama-cha-mapinduzi-party-tanzania/">Chama Cha Mapinduzi</a>, one of the longest serving ruling parties in Africa. It is also the party of Tanzania’s socialist founding father, <a href="https://www.juliusnyerere.org/about">Julius Nyerere</a>, who looms large over the country’s politics more than 20 years after his death.</p>
<p>As the French anthropologist Marie-Aude Fouéré has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/julius-nyerere-ujamaa-and-political-morality-in-contemporary-tanzania/E3E68E60A9DE29197F82B230E8EA3CEB">noted</a>, Nyerere remains </p>
<blockquote>
<p>a political metaphor for debating and acting upon the present. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Magufuli has repeatedly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2020.1779223">played up</a> the similarities between himself and Nyerere. His supporters cite his attacks on corruption among the ruling political class and his enthusiasm for completing infrastructural projects as evidence that he is the <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/1840340-5303282-9raarh/index.html">“Nyerere of our time”</a>.</p>
<p>Others are less reverent. They include Tundu Lissu, the presidential candidate for the main opposition party, Chadema. His family was forcibly relocated under Nyerere’s <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-7679.1975.tb00439.x">villagisation scheme</a> of the 1970s. He brands Nyerere an autocrat who built an <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/the-standard-insider/article/2001386054/magufuli-vs-lissu-what-it-takes-to-stop-a-political-bulldozer">“imperial presidency”</a>. </p>
<p>There is ample evidence of the ruling party’s tightening grip on power under Magufuli. In the lead up to the 2020 election, opposition rallies have been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/magufuli-criticised-as-tanzania-bans-rallies--1351138">blocked</a>. The press has been <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-tanzanias-media-law-muzzles-free-speech/a-54532521">muzzled</a>, and prominent opposition politicians have been violently <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tanzania-opposition-cries-foul-over-attacks-on-leaders-as-election-looms/a-53764518">attacked</a>. </p>
<p>In August, the Magufuli-controlled National Electoral Commission’s registration of candidates was marked by <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/08/26/tanzania-elections-opposition-report-widespread-nomination-interference/">irregularities</a>. Many opposition politicians were disqualified from contesting in October. </p>
<p>Lissu himself only <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-the-edge-of-democracy-what-the-upcoming-general-election-holds-in-store-for-tanzania-144601">returned from exile in July</a> after surviving an assassination attempt in 2017. For him, Magufuli’s brand of authoritarianism has its <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/former-tanzania-mp-magufuli-and-nyerere-era/5118744.html">roots</a> in the Nyerere era.</p>
<p>As these contrasting depictions of Nyerere attest, his ideas and legacy remain objects of debate in contemporary politics, especially in an election year.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2020.1799158?forwardService=showFullText&tokenAccess=T6GPRITEAJQZSX8FQJIP&tokenDomain=eprints&target=10.1080%2F03057070.2020.1799158&doi=10.1080%2F03057070.2020.1799158&doi=10.1080%2F03057070.2020.1799158&doi=10.1080%2F03057070.2020.1799158&journalCode=cjss20">research</a>, I explore the political history of the Nyerere era. I examine his socialist project through the prism of Tanzania’s first and most prestigious national university, the <a href="https://www.udsm.ac.tz/">University of Dar es Salaam</a>.</p>
<p>Charting the rise and fall of leftist student activism at the university throughout the 1970s and 1980s allows us to better understand the aspirations of Nyerere’s socialist project and its ultimate limits and legacy.</p>
<h2>The Arusha Declaration</h2>
<p>African universities were <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-student-movements-history-sheds-light-on-modern-activism-111003">key</a> to processes of decolonising and developing post-colonial states at independence. The young nations relied on them to produce new professional classes and state bureaucrats. Given their national importance, African presidents were commonly appointed as chancellors. </p>
<p>As both president and chancellor of the university, Nyerere’s idea was that it should produce “servants” committed to building the Tanzanian nation. As he put it, its <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4187669?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">role</a> was not to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>build sky-scrapers here at the university so that a few very fortunate individuals can develop their own minds and live in comfort. We tax the people to build these places only so that young men and women may become efficient servants to them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It was partly for this reason that he was deeply <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4187669?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">disappointed</a> by the student protests of late 1966. In October of that year, students marched on the streets of Dar es Salaam against mandatory induction into the government-run National Service scheme. They were expected to spend their first two years after graduation working in nation-building programmes on 40% of their normal stipend. </p>
<p>Worried that the university was producing a generation of self-centred elitists, Nyerere decided to take dramatic measures. All the protesters were expelled from the university. To demonstrate the value of personal sacrifice for the Tanzanian nation, he cut his own salary by 20%.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of these protests, in February 1967, Nyerere released the <a href="http://library.fes.de/fulltext/bibliothek/2-tanzania-s0019634.pdf">Arusha Declaration</a>. This explicitly committed his government to socialist policies, including nationalisation and rural collectivisation. </p>
<p>Soon after, he vowed to transform the university into a socialist institution. The ruling party created a youth wing branch on campus. A general course on the political economy of development was made mandatory for all students.</p>
<p>These reforms and the Arusha Declaration inspired the emergence of a small, but vocal group of leftist students on campus. These notably included the Yoweri Museveni-led University Students’ African Revolutionary Front. It started a student journal, organised public lectures and teach-ins, and raised money for African liberation movements.</p>
<p>But, over time, the government became increasingly concerned by the prominence and independence of these leftist student groups. In the 1970s and 1980s, student politics came to be marked by an unmistakable irony: in the years following the supposed socialist transformation, leftist student activism at the university actually declined.</p>
<p>This is largely because the government exercised increasing control over university activities. Ruling party loyalists were appointed to high-ranking positions in the university administration. Following public displays of student dissent in 1970 and 1978, independent student bodies were dissolved. </p>
<p>Slowly, but surely, the university was brought more squarely under the control of the ruling party.</p>
<h2>Political order over independence</h2>
<p>This approach to public dissent was the rule rather the exception in Nyerere’s Tanzania. Trade unions, rural development collectives and party youth organisations were banned or brought under party control if they displayed too much independence. Faced with increasing <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2011/12/21/tanzania-at-50-does-nyerere-deserve-the-blame-and-praise-for-the-countrys-economic-failure-and-political-success/">economic challenges</a>, Nyerere regularly felt the need to prioritise political order and obedience over desires for mass-driven socialist transformation.</p>
<p>But to label Nyerere as merely an authoritarian, as Lissu suggests, is to gloss over the complexity of his years in power. As chancellor, he distinguished himself from the vast majority of his African counterparts. All too often, he sought to win students over through argument, rather than coercion.</p>
<p>His legitimacy among the student community did not rest on patronage or intimidation. Rather, many were committed to his socialist ideology, which he called <em>ujamaa</em>. It emphasised equality, self-reliance, national unity, and African liberation.</p>
<p>They respected the fact that Nyerere consistently communicated these ideas to them directly. His frequent visits and candid exchanges with students on campus helped maintain his popularity among them.</p>
<p>This legitimacy is reflected in the fact that on the rare occasions when students took to the streets to protest post-1966, it was never against Nyerere’s socialist project. Rather, it was to rail over its perceived betrayal by the political elite.</p>
<p>Examining Nyerere’s legacy through this prism, therefore, complicates characterisations of his domestic legacy as singularly autocratic. It is true that his regime did stifle leftist student activism. But many students believed in and were inspired by his socialist ideals and his sense of political morality.</p>
<p>Nyerere’s legacy still looms large over the country’s politics, and not just within Chama Cha Mapinduzi. The upstart opposition party, Alliance for Change and Transparency has <a href="https://thenextsystem.org/learn/stories/economic-justice-and-african-socialism-interview-zitto-kabwe">declared</a> its desire to revive and update the Arusha Declaration if elected to power in October. They explicitly <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/04/zitto-kabwe-chadema-act-julius-nyerere">commit</a> themselves to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>building a socialist society with equality as its basic principle. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The resonance of this message with young Tanzanians suggests Nyerere’s legacy is far more complex than either Magufuli or Lissu recognise.</p>
<p>For all his shortcomings, Nyerere’s ideas continue to inspire Tanzanians fighting for a more equal and democratic future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Melchiorre received funding from International Development Research Council (IDRC) for this project.</span></em></p>For all of the shortcomings of Nyerere’s regime, his ideas continue to inspire Tanzanians fighting for a more equal and democratic future, over 20 years after his death.Luke Melchiorre, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1319372020-02-20T13:24:47Z2020-02-20T13:24:47ZKenya: why elite cohesion is more important than ethnicity to political stability<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316133/original/file-20200219-10985-uyrefr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta (left) shakes hands with the opposition coalition leader Raila Odinga to symbolise a truce in March 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenyan politics is often depicted as a battle between different ethnic “<a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=BWSwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT63&lpg=PT63&dq=big+men+cheeseman+dictionary&source=bl&ots=k77TdO0CjU&sig=ACfU3U3YUa-b2AJSq_G5OTIX-qK90Og2vw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi-wNfI59PnAhWGSxUIHfCJB_sQ6AEwCXoECAsQAQ#v=onepage&q=big%20men%20cheeseman%20dictionary&f=false">Big Men</a>” who can mobilise their supporters with a click of their fingers. The ability of successive generations of the Kenyatta family to rally the support of the Kikuyu community, and of Odingas to command the loyalty of Luos, means that it is also seen to be dominated by a small number of dynasties – a <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-elections-are-much-more-than-just-a-ruthless-game-of-thrones-81957">Game of Thrones</a>, if you will. </p>
<p>But this is a gross over simplification. Our new <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Oxford-Handbook-Kenyan-Politics-Handbooks/dp/0198815697/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=handbook+kenyan+politics&qid=1581777297&sr=8-1">Handbook of Kenyan Politics</a> – which features 50 chapters on different aspects of political life – tells a very different story. Ethnic leaders often fail to carry the support of their own group, either because they are not seen to have the <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Who-should-lead-the-Kenyan-opposition/440808-3873434-12ql970z/index.html">community’s interest at heart</a>, or because a rival appears to have a more credible chance of winning power. </p>
<p>And while the role of ethnicity is overstated, class is much more important than is commonly thought. Class here might more accurately be called elite cohesion, given the lack of clearly demarcated social classes. </p>
<p>This finding might surprise some readers, but while ethnicity clearly shapes how people think and vote it is the degree of elite cohesion that determines whether the country is politically stable or not. </p>
<p>The long period of relative stability in the country from the 1970s to the early 1990s was founded on the willingness of members of the elite from different ethnic groups to put aside their differences and use their influence to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228276928_Democratization_Sequencing_and_State_Failure_in_Africa_Lessons_from_Kenya">demobilise movements and militias</a> that might otherwise have threatened the status quo. </p>
<p>They did so to protect the highly unequal political and economic system on which their own privileged positions depend. It is when this elite pact ruptures, as it did around the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228276928_Democratization_Sequencing_and_State_Failure_in_Africa_Lessons_from_Kenya">2007 general elections</a>, that violence and unrest come to the fore. </p>
<p>Kenya is not alone. In general, we are far too quick to jump to “ethnic” explanations, and far too slow to recognise the way that elites collude to preserve their privileges. Our book sheds light on how this happened in Kenya.</p>
<h2>How ethnicity matters</h2>
<p>The classic view of Kenyan politics as an ethnic census runs something like this. First, power is secured by, and used to the advantage of, the president’s own ethnic group. This generate a “<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255669297_The_Political_Economy_of_Kenya's_Crisis">winner-takes-all</a>” logic. </p>
<p>Second, the knowledge that losing power means losing access to resources increases the stakes of political competition and hence the purported drive to stick together along ethnic lines.</p>
<p>Third, heated and controversial elections increase the divisions within Kenyan society, further strengthening ethnic identities. </p>
<p>Parts of this story are certainly true. Successive governments have tended to favour their own. Voting patterns, too, reveal clear ethnic patterns, and the last three elections have been <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331943100_Kenya's_2017_elections_winner-takes-all_politics_as_usual">extremely divisive</a>. But the reality is more complicated. </p>
<p>Politicians can’t simply rely on the support of co-ethnics. Many ethnic groups actually split their vote between two or more candidates. This means that politicians must persuade voters to support them. In doing this, they often face stiff competition both from within and without their own ethnic group. As a result, they have to demonstrate that they are willing to fight for their community, have a good <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Development-Elections-Leadership-Politics-Government/440808-2631464-format-xhtml-9wv3coz/index.html">track record on development</a>, and can be trusted. </p>
<p>An example of what can happen if leaders don’t pay attention to these rules is the fate of Luhya leader <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-21581017/musalia-mudavadi-why-i-want-kenya-s-top-job">Musalia Mudavadi</a> in the 2013 presidential election. Having left Raila Odinga’s opposition alliance in the hope of being picked as the presidential candidate with the support of the then president Mwai Kibaki, Mudavadi was humiliated when key Kibaki allies changed their minds at the last minute and formed the new Jubilee Alliance. </p>
<p>In the end Mudavadi stood on his own. But his reputation was fatally tarnished because he was not seen to be a credible candidate, or to have been true to his own ethnic group. As a result, his own community <a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=69187">turned its back on him</a>, with more Luhyas voting for Odinga – a Luo – than for their “own man”. </p>
<h2>Mutual economic interests</h2>
<p>The chapters in the book also highlight the fact that ethnic differences have not prevented the emergence of a self-conscious political and economic elite that is capable of coordinating its actions to maintain the system on which its privileges depend. </p>
<p>As Kenyan political scientist <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/kenya-class-ethnicity-kenyattaodinga-deal/">Nicholas Nyangira</a> argued in the 1980s, the route to power in Kenya involves first establishing control over an ethnic group – and then bargaining with other members of the elite for acceptance, using one’s support base as leverage. </p>
<p>Once part of the elite, leaders have typically used their influence over their own communities to demobilise and co-opt protest movements and militias. Even after some of the most heated periods of inter-elite struggle, such as the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of some Kikuyu leaders to <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-817696-il6m7dz/index.html">prevent Daniel arap Moi</a> – a Kalenjin – from replacing Jomo Kenyatta as president after his death in 1978, members of the elite came back together to stabilise the system. </p>
<p>Whenever this elite pact has ruptured, the consequence has been major political instability. In 2007, for example, the controversy over who had won flawed presidential elections resulted in leaders who had previously controlled their communities instead calling on them to take to the streets. Along with a heavy handed state response, this resulted in the death of <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/un-600000-displaced-in-kenya-unrest/">over 1,000 people and the displacement of almost 700,000 more</a>. </p>
<p>Yet even in these most tense and dangerous of moments, the elite found a way to come back together. The violence in 2007 was ended by a power-sharing agreement that brought all major leaders into the government. </p>
<p>Another dangerous political stand-off following controversial elections in 2017 was resolved when, to the surprise of many, the two main candidates – Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta – publicly <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/kenya-class-ethnicity-kenyattaodinga-deal/">shook hands</a> and announced that they had buried the hatchet. </p>
<h2>The role of inequality</h2>
<p>It is clear from these events that Kenya will remain politically stable so long as the mutual economic interests of the elite outweigh their ethnic differences.</p>
<p>What’s equally true is that the country will simultaneously remain incredibly unequal. </p>
<p>According <a href="https://kenyanwallstreet.com/higher-taxes-kenyas-rich-can-lower-extreme-inequality-oxfam/">to Oxfam</a> less than 0.1% of the population – just 8,300 people – owned more wealth than the bottom 99.9% in 2018. While a dynamic economy is projected to create around 7,500 millionaires over the next 10 years, Kenya currently features the <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Kenya-8th-on-extreme-poverty-list/3946234-4635310-79pa9rz/index.html">eighth highest number of people living in extreme poverty</a> in the world.</p>
<p>In addition to paying themselves some of the <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/siasa/2019-05-11-new-house-allowance-puts-mps-salary-way-above-world-super-powers/">highest salaries</a> earned by any politicians in the world, Kenyan leaders use their control over the legislature to set low taxes – the highest rate of income tax <a href="https://www.taxkenya.com/income-tax-rates-in-kenya/">is just 30%</a> – and to give tax exemptions to politically connected companies. </p>
<p>Because it determines whether ethnic tensions are contained or exacerbated, and keeps millions in poverty, elite cohesion, much like ethnicity, is a matter of life and death.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131937/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman co-edited the Handbook of Kenyan Politics, published by OUP in 2020.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Lynch co-edited the Oxford Handbook of Kenyan Politics, published by OUP in 2020. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karuti Kanyinga co-edited the Handbook of Kenyan Politics, published by OUP in 2020.</span></em></p>Even in the most tense and dangerous of moments, the elite has found a way to come back together.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamGabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickKaruti Kanyinga, Associate Director, Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1314052020-02-17T13:23:26Z2020-02-17T13:23:26ZHow history explains election violence: Kenya and Zambia tell the story<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315230/original/file-20200213-11040-rgd0oz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Zambia's president-elect Edgar Lungu in 2016. The country is known for peaceful polls, but this one was marked by clashes.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Dawood Salim/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Why do the first multiparty elections after authoritarian rule turn violent in some countries but not in others?</p>
<p>That’s the question we set out to anwer in our <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343319884983">research</a> on electoral violence and the legacy of authoritarian rule in Kenya and Zambia.</p>
<p>We compared Zambia’s founding elections in 1991, which were largely peaceful, and Kenya’s in 1992. During these polls there was large-scale state-instigated electoral violence along ethnic lines. </p>
<p>What explains the divergent outcomes in electoral violence? One answer is that political legacies generated during authoritarian rule have a tendency to transcend into the multiparty era. </p>
<p>Our analysis suggests that violence was a more viable electoral strategy in Kenya than in Zambia because of the type of authoritarian rule that existed in Kenya before the polls. This created political legacies that underpinned political competition and mobilisation during the first multiparty elections. </p>
<p>We concluded from this that, to understand why some countries are more prone to experience electoral violence, the impact of history and the longer-term processes of institutional development need to be considered.</p>
<h2>A comparison</h2>
<p>Most analysis on election-related violence is focused on factors that concern the immediate conditions of election. These include how fiercely contested a given election is, what formal electoral rules are in place, whether monitors and peacekeepers oversee the process, and how electoral management bodies work.</p>
<p>Our research sought to dig deeper into history. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343319884983">It showed</a> how dynamics of governance during authoritarian eras have lasting effects on whether multi-party elections turn violent or not. </p>
<p>A historical lens on Kenya’s and Zambia’s transitions from single-party rule to multi-party democracy in the early 1990s helped us understand how pervasive the informal institutions that underpin electoral conduct can be. And how they carry over from an authoritarian period to a multi-party setting. </p>
<p>In both countries, the incumbents at the time of transition – <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=32WYDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=moi+warns+multi-partyism+strife&source=bl&ots=m1CRl7upG_&sig=ACfU3U0L1bFOxDgKlNBwVM4AITpu5ncm0A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjXnoqzsc7nAhV8A2MBHZGCCs8Q6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=moi%20warns%20multi-partyism%20strife&f=false">Daniel arap Moi</a> in Kenya and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40396331?seq=1">Kenneth Kaunda</a> in Zambia – warned that a turn to multi-party election would usher in chaos, violence and inter-ethnic strife. </p>
<p>Yet, Zambia’s 1991 founding election remained largely <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/05/world/zambia-s-democratic-shock-to-africa.html">free from violence</a>. Kaunda stepped down after 27 years at the helm and the presidency transferred to the opposition candidate Frederick Chiluba.</p>
<p>But in Kenya’s 1992 election state-instigated <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">electoral violence</a> along ethnic lines resulted in 1,500 people people being killed. A further 300,000 were displaced. And Moi and his ruling party, the Kenya African National Union remained in.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">Kenya’s history of political violence: colonialism, vigilantes and militias</a>
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<h2>Authoritarian regimes</h2>
<p>How rulers secure popular support – and who is included in governing coalitions – varies significantly across authoritarian regimes. So does the level of repression by which dictators control the majority excluded from power. These features are important for explaining electoral violence. The reason for this is that in ethnically divided societies more exclusionary governance strategies under authoritarian rule over time cultivate perceptions of politics as a zero-sum game that last into the multi-party era.</p>
<p>In Kenya single-party rule rested on a relatively exclusive approach to maintain a ruling coalition. This was based on a narrow support base and active suppression of those who were not included in power. </p>
<p>In Zambia, single-party rule was more inclusive. It was based on a broader ethnic support base and with deliberate efforts to counter ethnic divisions. When comparing post independence countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya was not at the extreme end of the exclusionary spectrum. But it was significantly more exclusionary than Zambia.</p>
<p>The political legacies from authoritarian rule worked through two main pathways. First, political legacies structure the options for building cross-ethnic coalitions and for cooperation. They thereby make electoral violence more or less likely. For instance, by emphasising ethnicity over other political cleavages, coalitions are built on an exclusionary basis. This engenders inter-ethnic relations that are fragmented and competitive. </p>
<p>In Zambia, the opposition in the first multiparty elections could draw support from all ethnic groups. But in Kenya the opposition was fragmented and polarised along ethnic lines. In addition, in Zambia, the legacy of more cooperative inter-ethnic elite relations reduced the perceived risks associated with the transition. This enabled bargaining between competing elites. For example, a series of meetings were held where the contenders solved contentious issues around the electoral process.</p>
<p>Political legacies also place constraints on how politicians go about mobilising support. For example, ruling coalitions that are more exclusionary use rhetoric to exploit ethnic cleavages. In Kenya, electoral rhetoric played on historical injustices and ethnic divisions. The violence served to solidify the incumbent’s support base and to punish opposition voters. </p>
<p>In Zambia, the use of an ethnically-hostile rhetoric was simply out of the question.</p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>Varying historical experiences, thus, offer countries different baseline risks of facing large-scale electoral violence. </p>
<p>But we concluded in our paper that it’s possible to change the pattern. Kenya’s experience illustrates this. The level of violence has differed significantly in post-1992 elections. For instance there was <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">large scale post-election violence</a> after the 2007/8 poll. But elections in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/30/world/kenya-s-ruling-party-is-defeated-after-39-years.html">2002</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21723488">2013</a> were significantly more peaceful. </p>
<p>This suggests that specific circumstances tied to the immediate electoral contest can prevent violence from happening. We argue that policy efforts need to engage in a two-pronged approach. In the first instance measures need to be designed to address pervasive forms of mobilisation. The second part of the approach is that there needs to be an assessment of the risk tied to an impending election.</p>
<p>In Zambia, elections were largely free from violence after 1991 and until 2015. Yet, Zambian politics has become increasingly volatile, with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/zambia-suspends-election-campaigning-violence-160710141136702.html">instances of electoral violence</a> in 2016. </p>
<p>There has been a definite shift towards more authoritarianism. This is evident in the centralisation of political power in the hands of the president. There is also more intimidation of the opposition, and a breakdown of inter-party deliberation. As a result there are growing fears that the 2021 election will usher in violence. </p>
<p>Zambia seems to be treading a thin line. A turn to more violent electoral practices is a cause of great concern. Outbreaks of violence have profound and lasting effects that shape future electoral politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131405/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Swedish Research Council (grant 348-2013-5408 and 2016-05833) and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (grant P16-0124:1) funded this research.</span></em></p>Political legacies generated during authoritarian rule have a tendency to transcend into the multiparty era.Johan Brosché, Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityHanne Fjelde, Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityKristine Höglund, Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1318502020-02-16T14:31:55Z2020-02-16T14:31:55ZAl-Bashir and the ICC: there are better ways to achieve justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315492/original/file-20200214-10980-9tf82m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudan's ousted President Omar al-Bashir appears in court in Khartoum on December 14, 2019. He was later sentenced to two years in prison for corruption.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Mahmoud Hajaj/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s been widely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/11/sudan-says-it-will-send-former-dictator-omar-al-bashir-to-icc">reported</a> that Sudan is considering handing its former leader, Omar al-Bashir, over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. </p>
<p>There’s no certainty about what will happen next. And there’s also a case to be made for a different course of action.</p>
<p>First, it’s not clear that all members of the provisional government in Sudan are on board. And there is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51462613">speculation</a> that the military will not honour an agreement to extradite al-Bashir or others to the international court.</p>
<p>The 11-member provisional government <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/sudan-politics/update-1-sudan-announces-nine-month-plan-to-rescue-economy-tame-inflation-idUSL5N26E2WP">was announced</a> in August 2019. It is made up of an even mixture of military and civilian representatives, and currently headed by the military. The government includes – and is likely secretly controlled by – Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemeti”. Hemeti’s Rapid Support Forces are accused of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/sudan-fresh-evidence-of-government-sponsored-crimes-in-darfur-shows-drawdown-of-peacekeepers-premature-and-reckless/">atrocities in Darfur and elsewhere</a>. Violence <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/dozens-killed-violence-sudan-west-darfur-state-200102075611506.html">continues to the present day</a>. </p>
<p>There is also a strong argument to be made for al-Bashir to be tried in Sudan, and not by the ICC. This, of course, depends on whether Sudan proceeds with indictments for atrocity crimes against him and others in its own judicial system. If it does, the ICC should not exercise jurisdiction. As a court of last resort, the ICC is authorised to take cases only where states cannot or will not prosecute them. This is called “complementarity” and it is central to the court’s organisation and legitimacy.</p>
<p>The ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda suggested as much herself last year when <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/icc-prosecutor-fatou-bensouda-calls-for-transfer-of-al-bashir-to-the-hague">she told</a> the UN Security Council:</p>
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<p>Consistent with the bedrock principle of complementarity enshrined in the Rome Statute, I am ready to engage in dialogue with the authorities in Sudan to ensure that the Darfur suspects face independent and impartial justice, either in a courtroom in The Hague, or in Sudan. Continued impunity is not an option. The victims of the Darfur situation deserve to finally have their day in court.</p>
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<p>Another important factor to consider is cooperation between Sudan and the ICC could come with unacceptable constraints. In the past, the ICC <a href="https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/03/19/why-the-icc-wont-prosecute-museveni/">has been criticised</a> for cutting deals with authoritarian leaders who, in fact, could just as easily stand in the dock as the accused they are handing over. </p>
<p>At this juncture, more than ever, the ICC needs to be careful not to further destroy its credibility by cooperating with the sorts of bad actors who should be before a court themselves.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>The ICC issued an <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">arrest warrant</a> for al-Bashir in 2009. Sudan is not a member state of the ICC, and the case came before the court based on a <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm">2005 referral</a> from the UN Security Council. But the UN referral didn’t have a lot of support, and the ICC proved unable to take custody of al-Bashir. </p>
<p>For years the ICC frustratedly reminded member states across Africa and the middle east about their duty to arrest al-Bashir when he travelled. The court also <a href="http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20180321/arrest-bashir-icc-member-state-jordan-fails-arrest-sudanese-president-summary-filings">adjudicated</a> cases on the matter. But to no avail.</p>
<p>When al-Bashir was ousted from power in April 2019, calls for his extradition to The Hague were renewed.</p>
<p>In June 2019, a peaceful protest in Sudan was crushed by government-sponsored violence. Hundreds were killed and raped. As I wrote <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-bashir-and-the-icc-is-it-worth-getting-your-man-if-you-jeopardise-your-mission-119317">mid-last year</a>, cooperating with human rights abusers in power in Sudan for the arrest of al-Bashir was a bad bargain. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/al-bashir-and-the-icc-is-it-worth-getting-your-man-if-you-jeopardise-your-mission-119317">Al-Bashir and the ICC: is it worth getting your man, if you jeopardise your mission?</a>
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<p>The military forces that violently reasserted power last year also opposed cooperation with the ICC. Instead, al-Bashir faced charges of corruption and other financial crimes. In September 2019, he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/14/sudanese-court-sentences-omar-al-bashir-to-2-years-in-prison">sentenced</a> to two years’ prison by a Sudanese court. Since these are not the crimes that the ICC has indicted him for, his sentence in Sudan did not affect the ICC’s interest in his case.</p>
<p>But there were signs late last year that al-Bashir’s fate may be changing. The country’s attorney general <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/world/africa/sudan-darfur-investigation.html">announced</a> that Sudan would investigate atrocity crimes committed in Darfur since 2003. This investigation could implicate al-Bashir and others indicted by the ICC.</p>
<p>More recently negotiations between Sudan’s provisional government and Darfur rebel groups appear to have re-introduced the idea of turning over al-Bashir. The <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20200211-sudan-hand-over-officials-wanted-icc-ex-president-bashir-refuses-co-operate">spokesman</a> for Sudan’s provisional government, which is made up of a mix of military and civilian leaders, announced that individuals indicted by the ICC will be extradited to The Hague.</p>
<h2>Preferred directions, in Sudan and elsewhere</h2>
<p>In my view the ICC’s best course is to monitor and support anti-impunity in Sudan. It already does this in another country, Colombia. The ICC has been <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/pr-search.aspx?k=colombia">working with</a> the government and members of Colombian civil society to observe implementation of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/colombia-signs-historic-peace-deal-with-farc-rebels">2016 peace accords</a> and the transitional justice process. </p>
<p>This flexibility has two advantages. It allows countries to craft their own paths forward following violence. It also keeps the resources, promises, and threats that accompany international prosecution close and available, should domestic alternatives fail.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the ICC has other meaningful opportunities it should pursue that would underpin its institutional relevance. It has been approached about <a href="https://theconversation.com/migration-in-the-mediterranean-why-its-time-to-put-european-leaders-on-trial-120851">European Union policies</a> towards migrants, and it’s been asked to investigate whether European arms sales are <a href="https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Fallbeschreibungen/CaseReport_ECCHR_Mwatana_Amnesty_CAAT_Delas_Rete.pdf">aiding and abetting war crimes</a>.</p>
<p>Advocates for greater ICC involvement in western countries’ treatment of migrants suffered a defeat this week, as the ICC rejected a 2017 request to investigate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/feb/13/international-criminal-court-told-australias-detention-regime-could-be-a-against-humanity">Australia’s immigration policies</a>. The ICC noted that while conditions in Australia’s immigration camps are in <a href="https://uploads.guim.co.uk/2020/02/14/200213-Andrew-Wilkie-Response-from-International-Criminal-Court-Australian-Government-treatment-of-asylum-seekers_(1).pdf">“violation of fundamental rules of international law,”</a> they nonetheless fall outside of the court’s jurisdiction.</p>
<p>This is a mistake. By declining to intervene on behalf of vulnerable and victimised populations, the ICC misses a chance to act where its mission <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/morejustworld">to create a more just world</a> could have real impact. That is does so where its ideological and political alliances are strongest only compounds the error.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131850/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kerstin Bree Carlson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ICC must not further destroy its credibility by cooperating with the sorts of bad actors who should be before a court themselves.Kerstin Bree Carlson, Associate Professor International Law, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1314832020-02-10T13:28:25Z2020-02-10T13:28:25ZA great judgment, but court victories won’t deliver democracy in Malawi<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314471/original/file-20200210-109912-gx92e1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malawi's President elect Peter Mutharika waves to supporters during the swearing in ceremony in Blantyre in May last year after the contentious poll.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AMOS Gumulira/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a landmark ruling last week, the constitutional court in Malawi <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malawi-election-court/malawi-court-annuls-president-mutharikas-2019-election-victory-idUSKBN1ZX2F2">annulled the 2019 elections</a> citing massive irregularities during the process. The judges ordered new elections within five months. They also highlighted fundamental challenges that have long plagued Malawi’s <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/02/04/malawi-court-orders-fresh-elections-what-now/">first-past-the-post electoral system</a>. </p>
<p>The lengthy, meticulously detailed and unanimous ruling by a five-judge panel has attracted widespread acclaim within Malawi and abroad. With the exception of one case in Kenya, it is not normal for courts in Africa to annul election results even when there is evidence of massive irregularities. Once results are announced it is often taken for granted that no court would overturn them.</p>
<p>The constitutional court in Malawi observed that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Given the gravity of … irregularities, the conduct of the Electoral Commission in managing these elections was severely lacking and demonstrated incompetence for failing in multiple dimensions to follow clearly laid out legal processes for such elections.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The court challenge followed numerous protests organised throughout Malawi after the May 2019 election. These played a crucial part in the overall scheme of things. <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/01/30/year-mass-malawi-protests-election-ruling/">Mass demonstrations</a> held in the past nine months signalled to the judiciary and the international community that Malawi had changed. The clear message was that Malawians were no longer willing to simply accept a fate handed out to them.</p>
<p>Malawi’s judiciary deserves to be praised. But the power, agency and influence of the Malawian people cannot be underestimated.</p>
<p>What will be the effect on democracy in Malawi? Relying on the courts alone to resolve political disputes is not a viable alternative to democratic consolidation. President Peter Mutharika and the Malawi Election Commission have unsurprisingly wasted little time in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51383984">appealing the ruling</a>. The supreme court, to which they have appealed, has the power to overturn decisions of lower courts – including the constitutional court.</p>
<p>The judges of the supreme court will, however, be under great pressure to not quash the detailed legal arguments put forth by the constitutional court. </p>
<h2>New round</h2>
<p>As the country gears up for new elections, there are reasons to be concerned. The outcome of future elections will not be viewed as more legitimate if the electoral rules remain unchanged. One significant <a href="https://t.co/YxOWtk8Cc5?amp=1">flaw</a> is that the laws do not require a 50+1 majority for victory.</p>
<p>A new round of elections offers an opportunity to strengthen civil and political freedoms. It also promises to ensure greater accountability for those in power in relation to their performance and promises. Ultimately, this could lead to increased responsiveness of the state in delivering public services. </p>
<p>But is there adequate administrative capacity to undertake radical changes at such short notice? What will the Malawi Election Commission do differently now? </p>
<p>The most urgent change that’s needed is to ensure that elections don’t result in narrow mandates for the winning candidate. Zambia amended its electoral laws a few years ago to ensure that only a candidate who gets <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37086365">more that 50% of the votes is declared winner</a>. Alternatively, a second round is conducted for the top two candidates if none failed to secure more than 50% in the first round.</p>
<p>A similar amendment was submitted to Malawi’s parliament but was <a href="https://malawi24.com/2017/12/15/501-bill-rejected/">rejected</a> due to internal party politics. The proposed amendment was derived from a <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/presidential-elections-malawi-towards-majoritarian-501-electoral-system">report</a> by the Malawi Special Law Commission on the Review of Electoral Law in 2017. </p>
<p>Other challenges include financing yet another expensive round of elections and ensuring a successful election process without irregularities. This will be difficult to do at such short notice.</p>
<p>All these are reasons to be cautious. Experience elsewhere points to the fact that court judgments, however favourable, don’t deliver great democratic outcomes.</p>
<p>The lessons from the re-run of the presidential elections in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2019.1594072">Kenya in 2017</a> serve as an illustrative example. After the initial euphoria, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41773919">boycott</a> of the subsequent re-run by the opposition proved to be a huge disappointment. </p>
<h2>Democratic consolidation</h2>
<p>The process of consolidating democracy in Malawi has been fragile. </p>
<p>The capacity to organise successful elections is a key indicator of democracy consolidation. The country held its first democratic poll in 1994. The introduction of democracy resulted in numerous changes in electoral legislation, statutes allowing registration and competition of parties, frequency of national elections, and the freedom of the press. </p>
<p>But Malawi has underperformed in a number of areas. </p>
<p>For example, a survey conducted by Afrobarometer – a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts surveys on democracy, governance and economic conditions – shows that <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/ad341-malawians-see-declining-quality-elections-express-little-trust-electoral">trust in the electoral management body</a> fell from 49% in 1999 to 34% in 2019. Public support for elections as a means of choosing leaders has also significantly fallen, from 78% in 2003 to 55% in 2017. </p>
<h2>Reliance on courts</h2>
<p>The findings of a more recent <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad340-most-malawians-see-legal-challenge-election-results-justified-courts-impartial">survey</a> provide useful insights into how Malawians perceive their courts. A large majority of the respondents considered the courts as impartial and trustworthy. They were also of the view that the president must always obey court rulings, even when they believe these are incorrect. </p>
<p>But Malawians were split on whether the losing side in an election should always enjoy the right to challenge its defeat in court.</p>
<p>When the courts are conceived to be the ultimate defenders of democracy, the judicial system risks being burdened with an overload of expectations and trying to satisfy a large number of political interests. The regression of electoral governance over a long period requires constant observation, monitoring and commitment by all stakeholders. These include voters, political parties, media, civil society organisations and international agencies. </p>
<p>When key stakeholders slacken in their duties, they put additional pressure on the courts. Multiple actors – not just the judiciary – must step in to ensure that a young democracy matures and consolidates. </p>
<p>In Malawi, the need right now is to overhaul the model of electoral governance. Reforms should focus on a system that relies less on the judiciary and more on other national and local institutions that can function responsibly and effectively.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Banik receives funding from the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Happy Kayuni receives funding from the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad).</span></em></p>A new round of elections offers an opportunity to strengthen civil and political freedoms.Dan Banik, Professor of political science and Director of the Oslo SDG Initiative, University of OsloHappy Kayuni, Professor, University of MalawiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1282412019-12-04T08:55:54Z2019-12-04T08:55:54ZSwapo’s unassailable position shattered: what next for Namibia?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304896/original/file-20191203-67028-zkby3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The results of the Namibian election reflect growing discontent among voters with the way the country is being run. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The level of uncertainty that surrounded the sixth Namibian elections since the country’s independence in 1990 was unprecedented. Held late <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/incumbent-party-wins-namibian-election-amid-corruption-scandal-20191201">last month</a>, the poll combined voting for the country’s president and for the national assembly.</p>
<p>Two issues dominated the debate until right before election day. The first was that an independent candidate, Panduleni Itula, was expected to split the presidential vote for the ruling party, South West Africa People’s Organisation (Swapo). </p>
<p>The second was a major corruption scandal around the allocation of fishing quotas. This erupted two weeks before the poll, and involved the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/officials-namibia-corruption-scheme-remain-custody-191202140206392.html">arrest of two cabinet ministers</a>.</p>
<p>A further feature of the poll was the controversy around electronic voting machines. Questions around their efficacy highlighted an erosion of trust in the state apparatus. Even on election day, independent candidate Itula continued to express misgivings about this central feature of the <a href="https://neweralive.na/posts/apprehensive-of-evms-itula-casts-his-vote">electoral process</a>. </p>
<p>These issues shrouded further reasons for rising discontent in the country. These include staggering unemployment rates, particularly among young people, a persistent economic crisis and gross social inequality. Another conflict-ridden issue is the unresolved land question. These crises are compounded by rising constraints on the state budget. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.elections.na/PresidentialRace.aspx">election results</a> showed voters registering their demand for dramatic changes. This was most evident in the sharp drop in support for incumbent President Hage Geingob. Five years ago he <a href="https://theconversation.com/namibian-elections-the-sands-are-shifting-slowly-127656">garnered 87%</a>. This time he scraped through with just 56.3%, helped by voters in the preponderantly rural north, where he could rely on a loyal Swapo power base. </p>
<p>Itula insisted throughout the election campaign that he remained a Swapo member. Using a loophole in the party constitution, Itula and his supporters apparently hoped to tap Swapo support. His candidature reflected a persistent split in the ruling party, which seems to include ethnic resentment against “Damara” Geingob. Itula came in with just under 30%, after a strong showing particularly in urban areas and among youth, much less though in the populous north.</p>
<p>In the national assembly, opposition parties, including the newly formed <a href="https://www.politicalanalysis.co.za/listen-namibias-landless-peoples-movement-on-its-2019-priorities/">Landless People’s Movement</a>, saw their positions strengthened. The final result gave Swapo 65.5%, just short of a two-thirds majority needed to amend the constitution. This was a massive loss of some 15 percentage points against the resounding 80% of 2014. It is the first time that Swapo has dipped below the magic 66% since 1994.</p>
<p>Voter participation also fell, from over 70% in 2014 <a href="http://www.elections.na/RaceForVotes.aspx">to 60%</a> of registered voters. </p>
<p>Swapo’s seemingly unassailable position has been shattered. The outcome of these elections may well go further than a slight erosion of Swapo’s power position. It may lead to a situation where discontent by frustrated voters is channelled into directions other than formal politics. Thus, a latent crisis of legitimacy of the postcolonial state might break into the open.</p>
<h2>Trust in tatters</h2>
<p>But will the result mean that the government deals with the country’s massive challenges? Besides the long-term issues of persistent gross inequality and the worsening crisis of state finance as well as a bleak economic outlook, these also include the interrelated issues of corruption and transparency in government and politics.</p>
<p>A huge corruption scandal over the allocation of fishing quotas broke only weeks before the elections. <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/86051/read/Shanghala-dodges-N$4m-Fishrot-payment-questions">“Fishrot”</a> involves culprits from Namibia as well as Angola, Iceland and Norway. It revolves around kickbacks for the allocation of Namibian fishing quotas, which are given out by the responsible line ministry. Among those arrested are two former cabinet ministers.</p>
<p>Corruption in high places is well known. It’s common cause in the country that fishing rights are dished out to people who are not connected to fisheries in any way, only to pass them on for a hefty fee. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/namibian-elections-the-sands-are-shifting-slowly-127656">Namibian elections: the sands are shifting -- slowly</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The most recent case was unusually dramatic with the arrest of top politicians shortly before the elections. But it’s widely considered to be the tip of the iceberg. Both former ministers were due to be back in the national assembly after the elections, but have now been removed from the Swapo list.</p>
<p>The corruption cases may well add to the lack of trust in the institutional set-up, which appears severely shaken in the aftermath of the elections. </p>
<p>Prior to the polls expectations were running high for the independent presidential candidate and for opposition parties. This was particularly true among young urban people. </p>
<p>Publication of the official results engendered not just disappointment but chagrin. One cause was the delay of more than 72 hours in the announcement of the results. This was despite the use of new electronic voting machines which should have expedited the process. In the event, it increased suspicions about manipulation, adding significantly to these concerns.</p>
<p>The leader of the newly formed Landless People’s Movement, Bernardus Swartbooi, went as far as to call the election results <a href="https://neweralive.na/posts/opposition-question-poll-outcome">rigged</a>. He also bemoaned the fact that recourse to the justice system appeared to be meaningless, as the courts had in the past repeatedly sided with the electoral commission, as he stressed at a press conference on November 28 where the present author attended. </p>
<p>For the first time since independence, Namibia’s institutional set-up has been called into question. Within the system, there is seemingly no chance to appeal against shortcomings or intentional abuse. The unresponsive <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/86036/read/ECN-officials-refuse-to-take-media-questions">attitude taken by the electoral commission</a> added to the misgivings. A range of opposition parties have announced they will consider <a href="https://www.namibiansun.com/news/lpm-rdp-claim-daylight-robbery2019-12-03/">legal action against the election results</a>.</p>
<p>Swapo faces serious challenges. The perennial issue of gross social inequality is articulated in demands for land, not only for farming, but above all for <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?page=archive-read&id=144771">urban housing</a>; the Fishrot scandal has already rekindled <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/86105/read/Namibians-reel-over-Fishrot-revelations">workers’ resistance at the coast</a>. The break-up of Swapo’s two-thirds majority has been hailed by the leader of the official opposition, McHenry Venaani of the Popular Democratic Movement, as a chance to <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/86045/read/Reduced-victory--Swapo-Geingob-drop-votes">“sanitise the debate in the house”</a>. But formal politics also suffers from an inflated cabinet and attendant spoils system which permeates the state apparatus. Again, this is related to a budgetary crisis in the face of a persistent economic downswing. </p>
<p>Swapo’s clinging to power in this election may prove to be the opening of a much more dramatic period than has been seen over the three decades since the much-lauded transition to independence in 1990.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reinhart Kössler has used research funds of the NRF available through his position as a Visiting Professor and Research Associate at the Institute of Reconciliation and Social Justice, The University of the Free State</span></em></p>For the first time since independence, Namibia’s ruling party has suffered electoral setbacks in the midst of economic and political crisis.Reinhart Kössler, Professor in Political Science, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1277482019-12-03T16:18:55Z2019-12-03T16:18:55ZThe Sidama have voted for their own state. What follows is far less certain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304719/original/file-20191202-67017-1uf272k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The government must encourage demands for the creation of new states to be an outcome of negotiations</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>November 20, 2019 might go down in history as one of the turning points for federalism in Ethiopia. It was the day on which a clause of the Ethiopian <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et007en.pdf">constitution</a> that gives ethnic communities the right to establish their own state was <a href="https://theconversation.com/sidama-vote-first-step-in-long-process-of-change-in-ethiopia-127525">put into practice</a>. </p>
<p>Finally, after years of campaigning, the Sidama were allowed to have their day in a referendum. They’ve been <a href="http://theconversation.com/why-sidama-statehood-demand-threatens-to-unravel-ethiopias-federal-system-121701">demanding</a> their own state on the grounds that at <a href="http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ethiopia-population/">4%</a> of Ethiopia’s total population, they represent a bigger group than some other ethnic communities that have their own states. </p>
<p>According to the results announced by the National Electoral Board, <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/ethiopiaNews/idAFL8N2831M0">98.5% voted for the creation of the Sidama state</a>. </p>
<p>This represents the introduction of one more ethnically defined state, further strengthening the ethnic basis of Ethiopia’s federal system. It could be seen to be reinforcing the federal design that attaches importance to ethnicity as a primary political identity. This explains why other movements, such as those representing the Oromo, the largest ethnic group in the country, strongly supported the Sidama’s campaign. They see this vote as strengthening sub-national citizenship. </p>
<p>On the other hand, the Sidama vote could be a blow to those who have always considered the communities that make up the State of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, from which the Sidama have chosen to break away, as one of the strongholds of the idea of Ethiopian citizenship. The state is home to more than 56 ethnic groups.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The outcome of the Sidama vote paves the way for the inclusion of a 10th state in the Ethiopian federation. </p>
<p>But what happens next is unclear.</p>
<p>For example, will it lead to the Sidama state being added to Article 47 of the constitution, which lists the states that make up the Ethiopian federation? It’s not clear how the federal government intends to go about this.</p>
<p>Would this be accomplished by a simple act of parliament? Or will it require an amendment to the country’s constitution? As I’ve <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-why-the-sidama-secession-demand-needs-to-be-negotiated-120734">argued before</a>, it would be difficult to consider the inclusion of a new state to Article 47 of the constitution as anything less than a constitutional amendment. The difficulty with a constitutional amendment is that it requires the blessing of the two houses of the federal parliament and the support of the state parliaments. </p>
<p>This might seem impossible, except for the fact that Ethiopia is dominated by one party which controls the federal government and all state governments. It’s therefore a safe bet that the ruling party will be able to get the state governments behind a constitutional amendment aimed at the recognition of the new state. </p>
<p>This is true even though the overreaching hand of the ruling party is not as strong as it used to be. </p>
<p>There’s another possibility: that the federal government bypasses a constitutional amendment and simply acts as if the business of creating a new state is completed. But that wouldn’t look good for a government and a prime minister who professes to be overseeing a new era of constitutionalism and rule of law. </p>
<h2>The floodgates effect</h2>
<p>The Sidama vote could open the floodgates for other communities wanting the same. Other ethnic communities that have already demanded their own states include the Welayta ethnic group, the second largest in the Southern state. </p>
<p>But there are concerns. In a country where there are more than 80 ethnic groups, the territorial solution isn’t feasible. Not every ethnic group can have its own state. Clearly creating micro-subnational units that aren’t economically viable isn’t sustainable.</p>
<p>Providing a territorial solution in the form of a new state might also create a perverted incentive, given that territorial entities are the sites of resource – and patronage. Political elites might demand the creation of new states simply to benefit from the dividends of controlling a new one.</p>
<p>But these concerns need to be balanced against the legitimate demands of other groups which should not simply be dismissed. </p>
<p>Ethiopia will not be the first federation to see the breakup of existing states and the creation of new ones. Nigeria started as a federation of three states. It’s now composed of <a href="http://aboutnigerians.com/list-of-36-states-in-nigeria-with-their-capitals-current-governors-and-title-slogan/">36</a>. </p>
<p>In India 15 new states were carved out from 14 states between <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/special-features/revisiting-journey-29-states-701021.html">1956 and 2014</a>. </p>
<p>Both countries continue to entertain demands for the creation of new states. Yet neither of them is facing the imminent danger of disintegration. </p>
<p>It’s also important to remember that Ethiopia started the road to federalism with 14 states before the current constitution reduced it to nine states and two self governing cities. So, having more (and smaller) states isn’t necessarily a bad idea. It might even have the effect of strengthening the federal government, an important asset in the context of a divided society.</p>
<p>Importantly, what’s needed is a federal government that doesn’t believe that the fate of the country is at stake whenever it’s faced with a demand for new state. The government must be flexible enough to accommodate reasonable requests for the creation of new states while at the same time nudging the demands for the creation of new states to be an outcome of negotiations that increasingly look beyond ethnic homogeneity and also consider administrative convenience and economic viability.</p>
<p>As the case of Sidama has amply demonstrated – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49070762">more than two dozen</a> people died this year as people campaigned for a new state – simply ignoring the concerns of those who make similar calls might cost the country dearly. </p>
<p>The government’s decision to reject the unilateral declaration of the creation of new state – and forcing the actors to follow the constitutional path – was appropriate. But what happens next will have a profound and long-term effect on Ethiopia’s troubled federal system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127748/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yonatan Fessha receives funding from European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and
innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement 752098.</span></em></p>In a country where there are more than 80 ethnic groups, the territorial solution isn’t a feasible solution.Yonatan T. Fessha, Marie-Curie Fellow, EURAC Research and Associate Professor, Public Law and Jurisprudence, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1261502019-11-06T13:22:56Z2019-11-06T13:22:56ZHow Masisi outsmarted Khama to take the reins in Botswana<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300085/original/file-20191104-88428-77r7lj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mokgweetsi Masisi being sworn in as the elected President of Botswana by Chief Justice Terrence Rannowane. With him is his wife Neo. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mmegi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mokgweetsi Masisi’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/botswanas-masisi-wins-hotly-contested-election-20191025">decisive victory</a> in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/world/africa/botswana-election-mokgweetsi-masisi.html">recent Botswana elections</a> over a coalition backed by his former boss, Ian Khama, is the culmination of an astonishing 10 year political career. </p>
<p>Morphing from an obscure first-time MP in 2009 to a <a href="http://www.weekendpost.co.bw/wp-column-details.php?col_id=22">surprise </a> vice presidential appointment in 2014, and then <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/botswana-mokgweetsi-masisi-takes-over-presidency-amid-opposition-resurgence/a-43206610">president in 2018</a>, the man affectionately known as “Sisiboy” (a play on his surname) has wrested control of Botswana from the powerful Khama family. This he has achieved using tireless campaigning and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/TheGazettebw/posts/10156960929272620">“the rebirth of the Botswana Democratic Party”</a> (BDP).</p>
<p>The Khama lineage has dominated Botswana’s politics since the 1870s, right through the modern presidencies of Sir Seretse Khama (1966-1980) and Ian Khama (2008-2018). But they are now a discredited, spent force with <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/08/05/newly-formed-bpf-party-endorsed-by-khama-confident-of-electoral-victory">Ian Khama’s new party</a> having won only 5% of the vote.</p>
<p>The prosecution of Khama’s security chief, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-18-botswana-arrests-ex-spy-boss">Isaac Kgosi</a>, and presidential secretary, <a href="https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=82492&dir=2019/september/03">Carter Morupisi</a>, following his assumption of power in 2018, showed that Masisi was no longer willing to tolerate <a href="https://www.zambianobserver.com/former-president-ian-khama-linked-to-billions-of-dollars-found-in-offshore-accounts-belonging-to-dis-agent-maswabi/">the widespread corruption</a> that flourished under his predecessor. Investigators continue to uncover allegations of <a href="https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=82441&dir=2019/august/30">shocking malfeasance</a>.</p>
<p>Masisi, 58, is on a mission to restore Botswana’s reputation as a beacon of clean governance on the continent, and is pouring resources and energy into that effort.</p>
<p>His ascent and success have surprised everybody. Even Khama <a href="https://inkjournalism.org/1904/turmoil-in-africas-model-democracy/">admitted</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I have come to realise that I have maybe misjudged him. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The early days</h2>
<p>My own acquaintance with Masisi goes back to childhood, when we attended the same schools and played tennis at the same club. The last time I saw him was at a now defunct laundromat in northern Gaborone, in 1994. He was his usual friendly, well-mannered self, inquisitive and loquacious. Recently returned from completing his master’s degree in education at Florida State University, he was one of the co-owners of this faltering business. </p>
<p>Prior to going to Florida State, Masisi had worked on revamping Botswana’s social studies curriculum for its secondary schools, which he continued to do in the 1990s under the sponsorship of UNICEF. Knowing that the curriculum was a disaster (having no Botswana history at all and being full of outdated colonial and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/bantu-education-and-racist-compartmentalizing-education">Bantu Education</a> myths), I doubted he could make meaningful changes. Whether he ever did or not, his early career in pedagogy undoubtedly led him to confront government dysfunction head on.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/botswanas-governing-party-wins-tight-election-but-biggest-tests-are-yet-to-come-125666">Botswana’s governing party wins tight election. But biggest tests are yet to come</a>
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<p>Gaborone in the 1970s and 80s was a small, intimate place, and Masisi grew up there surrounded by the families of the Botswana bureaucratic and business elite. Despite this somewhat privileged milieu and education, nothing about him then suggested that he would go on to become such an influential national politician. </p>
<p>Although his father, <a href="http://www.dailynews.gov.bw/news-details.php?nid=25372">Edison</a>, was a senior cabinet member, Masisi did not display the charisma of a <a href="https://maps.prodafrica.com/places/botswana/south-east-district/gaborone/monument-1/sir-seretse-khama-statue-gaborone-botswana/">Sir Seretse Khama</a>, the first president of independent Botswana. Neither did he show the technocratic brilliance of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/18/ketumile-masire-obituary">Quett Masire</a>, who succeeded Seretse Khama as president in 1980; nor the emotional oratory of a <a href="http://www.sundaystandard.info/tribute-dk-kwelagobe-he-leaves-position-bdp-secretary-general-after-27-years">Daniel Kwelagobe</a>, the BDP chairman. Although Masisi today compares favourably to any of these political legends, none of this seemed evident in his youth.</p>
<p>He has always been easy to underestimate. Although a prefect at Gaborone’s <a href="https://www.thornhillprimary.ac.bw/">Thornhill</a> and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/maruapula/posts/">Maru A Pula</a> private schools, he was not a standout personality. Strong in humanities rather than the sciences, he was a middling student. Similar things could be said about his teenage sports career, during which he never showed the same tenacity and killer instinct on the tennis court that he has shown in politics. </p>
<h2>The ‘priest’</h2>
<p>Masisi’s greatest moment in his young life was when, at 20, he was cast as the <em>umfundisi</em> (priest) in a 1983 Gaborone theatrical adaptation of Alan Paton’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Cry-the-Beloved-Country-novel-by-Paton">“Cry the Beloved Country”</a>. Playing a much older man with grey hair, a shuffling gait, and a quavering voice, Masisi turned in a powerful performance that brought him a standing ovation from <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/alan-stewart-paton">Paton</a> himself and President Masire.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299983/original/file-20191103-88394-1acw3ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299983/original/file-20191103-88394-1acw3ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=806&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299983/original/file-20191103-88394-1acw3ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=806&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299983/original/file-20191103-88394-1acw3ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=806&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299983/original/file-20191103-88394-1acw3ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1013&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299983/original/file-20191103-88394-1acw3ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1013&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299983/original/file-20191103-88394-1acw3ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1013&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The young Mokgweetsi Masisi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/OfficialMasisi/photos/a.859647030770828/2432458980156284/?type=3&theater">Mokgweetsi Masisi FB page</a></span>
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<p>While his acting career ended after a role in a highly forgettable <a href="https://www.bfi.org.uk/films-tv-people/4ce2b88ceeb37">straight-to-video feature</a>, his portrayal of the priest nevertheless presaged key themes of his future political life.</p>
<p>After leaving UNICEF in 2003 Masisi entered politics, but failed to win his father’s old seat in Moshupa, the family home 41km northwest of Gaborone. He then endured a period of <a href="https://www.facebook.com/OfficialMasisi/">“failure, illness, unemployment, being seen as unfit for certain things, scorn and ridicule”</a>. He relied on his <a href="https://yourbotswana.com/2018/11/04/president-masisi-clarifies-first-ladys-role/">newly-wed wife Neo’s</a> salary for a time. He nevertheless persevered and built up a following, while also welcoming the birth of his daughter, Atsile.</p>
<p>Masisi managed to win the governing BDP’s primary and general election, <a href="http://www.sundaystandard.info/family-affairs-within-botswana-parliament">landing in parliament in 2009</a>. Within two years he was in the cabinet. In 2014, President Ian Khama, <a href="https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=82441&dir=2019/august/30">looking for an inexperienced and pliable deputy</a>, appointed him vice-president.</p>
<p>Like the priest in Paton’s story who went to Johannesburg seeking his sister and son only to find a degraded and desperate situation, so Masisi found the central government and cabinet unrecognisable from the institutions that his late father had served so well in the past. With the BDP having been taken over by a coalition of Khama lackeys and “tenderpreneurs” – business people who enrich themselves, often dubiously, through government tenders – even the party’s founder, former President Masire, disowned it for <a href="https://www.academia.edu/33661982/President_Masires_Final_Message_to_Botswana">lacking the values and discipline of the original</a>. </p>
<p>Masisi’s role as vice-president was to serve as a short-term stopgap for Ian Khama’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/08/13/how-fredo-tragic-godfather-character-became-an-insult-wielded-by-trump/">Fredo-like</a> brother, Tshekedi. His looming appointment as Khama’s successor was highly unpopular inside and outside the party.</p>
<p>Ever since 1998, the BDP has transferred power from the president to the vice-president a year before the next general election. Masire did this for Mogae in 1998, who then did the same thing for Ian Khama in 2008.</p>
<h2>Outmanoeuvring the Khamas</h2>
<p>It is clear that former President Khama (66), like many others, underestimated his young vice-president. Masisi took advice in secret late-night sessions with former presidents Masire and Mogae as well as other veterans who despised “the New BDP” that Khama led.</p>
<p>Using their counsel, he attended party meetings across the entire country to build up his own constituency. Masisi <a href="https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=82441&dir=2019/august/30">described</a> his years as vice-president] as “brutal hell”, <a href="https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=82441&dir=2019/august/30">adding that</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was the most abused vice-president.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Once Khama handed power to Masisi in April 2018, “Sisiboy” moved quickly onto the attack, arresting the despised Isaac Kgosi and installing his own supporters in key positions. Once the Khama brothers <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/06/01/botswana-ex-president-slams-successor-after-quitting-ruling-party//">defected to the opposition</a> ahead of the 2019 election, they and their supporters were thoroughly outworked by Masisi’s relentless campaign organisation. </p>
<p>The full story of how the underling Masisi prosecuted his silent war with Khama is one we must wait for. Ultimately, it is his energetic campaigning and <a href="http://www.sundaystandard.info/masiresque-masisi">his desire to bring back </a>the forgotten ethos and policies of the early BDP – of Seretse Khama and Masire – that won over the voters despite the defection of the Khamas.</p>
<p>Masisi now vows to reinvigorate Botswana’s stalled economy. In this regard his supporters expect him to show no less stamina than he did in the election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126150/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Barry Morton receives funding from Sir Ketumile Masire Foundation </span></em></p>The Khamas have dominated Botswana’s politics since the 1870s, but they are now a discredited, spent force.Barry Morton, Research Fellow, African Studies, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1261142019-10-31T14:47:50Z2019-10-31T14:47:50ZHow colonial rule predisposed Africa to fragile authoritarianism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299489/original/file-20191030-17914-1e5mcmn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zambian President Edgar Lungu's increasingly repressive government uses colonial-era laws to silence dissent.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/ EPA/Phillipe Wojazer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The impact of colonial rule on sub-Saharan Africa continues to be the subject of intense debate and controversy. Barely a year goes by in the UK without a public figure igniting a furore by arguing that colonialism <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/oct/19/end-myths-britains-imperial-past">somehow benefitted</a> the people it oppressed.</p>
<p>But our new <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Authoritarian-Africa-Repression-Resistance-Histories/dp/0190279656">book</a>, “Authoritarian Africa: Repression, Resistance, and the Power of Ideas”, paints a very different picture. We re-evaluate the political legacy of colonialism and find that it had a profound impact on African political systems. </p>
<p>The colonial era strengthened the power of <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6025327/The_Bigmanism_or_the_Big_Man_Syndrome_As_an_Optical_Lens_to_Understand_African_Democracies_-_A_Case_Study_in_Zimbabwe">“Big Men”</a> – powerful local leaders – over their communities. This undermined <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-chief-defied-apartheid-and-upheld-democracy-for-the-good-of-his-people-121771">pre-existing checks and balances</a>. In this way the colonial era helped institutionalise repressive forms of government. </p>
<p>At the same time colonial rule also ensured that post-colonial leaders would face a major struggle to assert their authority. It did this by creating states with limited capacity to provide services and police their own territories. </p>
<p>The unstable authoritarian pathway that so many states followed after colonial rule was no accident. It was facilitated by the ways in which European empires undermined democratic elements within African societies. </p>
<p>Understanding the deeper impact of colonial rule is, therefore, important. Not only to give us a better sense of history, but also because it helps to contextualise the development of African politics ever since.</p>
<h2>Big Man rule</h2>
<p>Prior to colonial rule, many – though not all – African societies lived in relatively small groupings that were much smaller than modern, centralised states. In some cases, these societies didn’t recognise a strong <a href="https://seunfakze.wordpress.com/2012/02/21/stateless-societies-the-igbo-the-fulani-the-somali-by-prof-g-n-ayittey/">central authority figure at all</a>. This put limits on the extent to which power could be abused. The low population density meant that communities might move to another area if a ruler was excessively exploitative.</p>
<p>These systems weren’t necessarily democracies. Power was often dominated by older, wealthier men. But, most were a long way from being centralised political systems capable of mass repression.</p>
<p>Colonial rule fundamentally changed this picture in two ways. </p>
<p>First, it created clearly demarcated national boundaries and a central authority structure, along with a more extensive bureaucracy and security forces. Thus, post-colonial presidents enjoyed the potential to wield power over a vast territory and diverse group of communities.</p>
<p>Second, colonial governments typically lacked enough officials to effectively run their territories. To maintain political stability they therefore collaborated with – or subordinated – existing leaders and power structures. In many cases, this involved funding and arming willing collaborators to enable them to exert greater control over their communities. These leaders were expected to manage their communities and prevent a rebellion against colonial rule.</p>
<p>It was more efficient for colonial governments to engage with fewer leaders who could deliver the support of a greater number of people. In addition, many colonial officials falsely assumed that Africans lived in tribal kingdoms. As a result, the process concentrated power in the hands of a relatively small number of “<a href="https://www.academia.edu/6025327/The_Bigmanism_or_the_Big_Man_Syndrome_As_an_Optical_Lens_to_Understand_African_Democracies_-_A_Case_Study_in_Zimbabwe">Big Men</a>” and entrenched ethnic identities.</p>
<p>Some African communities resisted the imposition of what they saw as illegitimate authority structures. In others, political entrepreneurs gave colonial regimes what they wanted in a bid to accumulate greater power. But, in both cases, the colonial era disempowered its <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2015/12/mahmood-mamdanis-citizen-and-subject-twenty-years-later">“subjects</a>. </p>
<p>It also laid the foundations for politics in many African states to become dominated by a struggle for power between the leaders of different communities.</p>
<h2>The birth of election rigging</h2>
<p>European powers also handed over a poisoned chalice at independence when it came to democratic institutions. Colonial governments had done little to create the conditions under which democratic politics could take hold and thrive. In some cases they even refused to hold elections until the eve of independence. Instead, they systematically sought to deny Africans their political and economic rights, and stymie the emergence of popular nationalist parties.</p>
<p>This typically involved highly repressive laws. These enabled governments to censor the media, ban public meetings, and detain political leaders on flimsy charges. When colonial regimes came under threat, their default response was invariably <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2005/feb/05/featuresreviews.guardianreview6">intimidation and violence</a>. </p>
<p>All of these policies were enacted by states that were extremely centralised and in which the colonial governor wielded vast power.</p>
<p>In a number of countries – including <a href="https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2007/08/377883.html">Kenya and Nigeria</a> – colonial governments even attempted to manipulate elections to ensure that their allies would emerge victorious. The first rigged elections held on the continent were those organised by Britain and France.</p>
<p>If colonial governments taught aspiring political elite anything, it was how to use co-option and coercion to demobilise popular movements. Indeed, many African governments have restricted the basic freedoms of their citizens by using colonial era legislation still on the statute books. </p>
<p>Just a few years ago, for example, five radio journalists were arrested in Zambia for allegedly calling a government politician "useless” under Section 179 of the penal code. The code was first introduced <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2019/03/colonial-era-laws-govern-african-journalism-190310080903941.html">under British colonial rule</a>.</p>
<h2>Rise of fragile authoritarianism</h2>
<p>This complex colonial inheritance gave rise to a set of governments characterised by fragile authoritarianism.</p>
<p>On the one hand, the authoritarian structures fostered under colonialism meant that democratic constitutions were quickly undermined after independence. On the other, the social and political impact of colonial rule made it more difficult for governments to assert control. </p>
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<span class="caption">Cameroonian President Paul Biya, one of Africa’s ‘Big Men’, has been in power since 1982.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span>
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<p>This tension led to the emergence of a set of political systems that typically struggled to establish a sustainable alternative to democratic rule.</p>
<p>The challenges that post-colonial leaders faced were particularly difficult because they were multifaceted. There was the threat posed to them by rival Big Men. And there was also the fact that these leaders had inherited states that <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qh05m">lacked an effective infrastructure or public services</a>. They also inherited economies that were designed to extract value rather than create mass employment.</p>
<p>Most African governments lacked the funds needed to make up for this deficit. This was made worse by the fact that the early 1970s saw a <a href="https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6668.pdf">period of economic decline</a>. As a result, building <em>effective</em> totalitarian regimes – in which the state uses repression and control over information to regulate all aspects of life – was often all but impossible.</p>
<p>In this sense, post-colonial states reproduced a core feature of colonial rule: in the absence of a strong state, maintaining political stability depended on a combination of coercion and co-option. Leaders who understood the importance of this balancing act could stay in power for decades. Those who did not could be toppled in weeks.</p>
<h2>The past of the present</h2>
<p>Of course there is much more to Africa than fragile authoritarianism. And the way in which these legacies played out was not uniform. It was shaped by variations in the colonial power and the different strategies that the Belgian, British, French, and Portuguese deployed.</p>
<p>The decisions of African leaders and the nature of the nationalist movement that fought for independence were also of great importance. For example, in two countries – Botswana and Mauritius – they enabled multiparty democracy to be built and maintained after independence.</p>
<p>But in many ways these exceptions prove the rule. On the whole, colonialism reinforced the authoritarian elements within African societies while undermining the elements of inclusion and accountability that had previously balanced them out. The cumulative impact of these changes made it more difficult for African countries to forge democratic futures.</p>
<p>When viewed in this light, it is clear that there is little reason for European nations to be proud of their empires.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126114/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Fisher receives funding from the Newton Fund/British Academy and WhatsApp. He has previously received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The unstable authoritarian pathway that many post-colonial African states followed was facilitated by the way in which European empires undermined democratic elements within African societies.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamJonathan Fisher, Reader in African Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1227262019-09-05T09:02:06Z2019-09-05T09:02:06ZZimbabwe’s deepening crisis: time for second government of national unity?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290911/original/file-20190904-175686-v3skdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Zimbabweans have turned to hawking to keep the wolf from the door as the economic crisis in the country deepens. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is going through its worst socio-economic and political crisis in two decades. Crippling daily power outages of <a href="https://www.biznews.com/africa/2019/08/05/zimbabwe-tipping-point-economic-crisis">up to 18 hours</a> and erratic supply of clean water are just some of the most obvious signs. Meanwhile, an inflation rate of over 500% has put the prices of basic goods beyond the reach of most people.</p>
<p>Hopes that the end of President Robert Mugabe’s ruinous rule in November 2017 would help put the country on a new path of peace and prosperity have long <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">dissipated</a>. Efforts by his successor President Emmerson Mnangagwa to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-says-mnangagwa-12913367">attract foreign investors</a>, who are critical in reviving Zimbabwe’s ailing economy, have also largely failed.</p>
<p>The situation has not been helped by the rejection of the 2018 presidential election results by the main opposition party. The Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) claims the governing Zanu-PF stole the elections even though the results were <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Regional-observers-Zimbabwe-election-free-and-fair/4552902-4692254-e75fje/index.html">endorsed</a> as free and fair by the African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC). Only the European Union observers were somewhat circumspect <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/eu-observers-say-zimbabwe-election-fell-short-on-fairness-20181010">in their assessment</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">Fantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed</a>
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<p>The opposition alliance has been calling for Mnangagwa’s government to relinquish power, and a <a href="https://www.openparly.co.zw/chamisa-calls-for-national-trasitional-authority/">national transitional authority</a> appointed to run the country for at least two years, or until the 2023 general elections.</p>
<p>How individuals who will sit on the national transitional authority will be chosen and by whom, is not clear. But the party and <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/03/01/towards-the-national-transitional-authority/">some academics</a> believe such a transitional authority would normalise Zimbabwe’s highly polarised political situation and help it revive its relations with the West.</p>
<p>The opposition may have a point on re-engagement with the West. This is key to helping end the investment drought that started in earnest <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.908.3003&rep=rep1&type=pdf">between 2000 and 2003</a> under sanctions imposed by Western countries for human rights violations linked to Zanu-PF’s violent land reform seizures and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/03/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum">election rigging</a>.</p>
<p>But the transitional authority idea is doomed to fail because of lack of buy-in by Zanu-PF. So, it’s time to consider a more viable alternative path to peace for Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>Clamping down</h2>
<p>For now, the government has dismissed talk of a transitional authority as unconstitutional. Instead, in May it launched its own platform, called the <a href="https://www.panafricanvisions.com/2019/zimbabwe-mnangagwa-launches-the-political-actors-dialogue-to-address-long-term-economic-challenges/">Political Actors Dialogue</a>. The forum comprises 17 small political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. </p>
<p>The main opposition party is boycotting the process on grounds that Mnangagwa is an illegitimate president. Recently, it attempted to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi-gdPunLfkAhXfSBUIHdWZCeIQFjAEegQIBBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-africa-49366224&usg=AOvVaw0fkr2f1y4BV0-4W2SlJHGY">embark on public protests</a> in the hope of bringing the government to its knees. The protests fell flat after being blocked by the courts and the police.</p>
<p>It boggles the mind why the MDC-A, led by Nelson Chamisa, insists on marches when previous attempts were crushed with brute force. These led to deaths in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=21&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwingbiQ87TkAhVsZhUIHWexAsIQFjAUegQICBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.news24.com%2FAfrica%2FZimbabwe%2Fzimbabwean-generals-deny-troops-shot-and-killed-6-protesters-20181113&usg=AOvVaw02nyk1uLwat64nJso2EImF">August 2018</a> and <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwicyIfl87TkAhV9SBUIHXzrAC4QFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmg.co.za%2Farticle%2F2019-01-30-zim-army-responsible-for-murders-rapes-report&usg=AOvVaw1fiTJ2kraC9xNiMyQ4TBM6">January 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The Zanu-PF regime has always clamped down heavily on perceived threats to its rule since 1980. Why then does the MDC-A continue to endanger people’s lives through this deadly route as a way of resolving Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political crises?</p>
<p>I firmly believe that the opposition needs to change tack and focus on entering into dialogue with the government. </p>
<h2>Dialogue and unity government</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis requires the two leading political protagonists - Mnangagwa and Chamisa - to enter into serious dialogue. Both leaders need to soften their hard-line stances towards each other and put the people of Zimbabwe first.</p>
<p>There’s a precedent for this. Ten years ago, then South African President Thabo Mbeki managed to bring then President Mugabe and Movement for Democratic Change opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiMheeVnrfkAhVXShUIHeBIDw04ChAWMAB6BAgAEAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.france24.com%2Fen%2F20080721-mbeki-harare-mediate-talks-zimbabwe-political-crisis&usg=AOvVaw2pLPeTVwBEVrH2TSAcW5e3">negotiation table</a>. </p>
<p>The talks culminated in the formation of the government of national unity that ran Zimbabwe from February 2009 to July 2013, with Mugabe as the President and Tsvangirai as the Prime Minister. The unity government was fairly successful and managed to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiv9PjanrfkAhUUTBUIHQR0D0cQFjAJegQIABAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theindependent.co.zw%2F2013%2F07%2F11%2Freflecting-on-positive-zimbabwe-gnu-moments%2F&usg=AOvVaw25plQQHFWt-5PTjI9_Fi6J">stabilise the economy</a>.</p>
<p>Two decades of suffering have shown that it is not the threat of protests or sanctions from the West that can move Zanu-PF to change, but neighbouring countries under the aegis of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwia1fucj7HkAhWnRhUIHcY8Dvc4ChAWMAB6BAgAEAI&url=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary.fes.de%2Fpdf-files%2Fbueros%2Fmosambik%2F07874.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2PSzn2eTrgI53Cnw2yrI2t">SADC</a>. South Africa is pivotal in this regard as the region’s strongest economic and military power. </p>
<p>It’s time to experiment with a second government of national unity for Zimbabwe. But for this to happen, SADC and South Africa must have the appetite to intervene in Zimbabwe. This is currently lacking. </p>
<h2>Dialogue in Zimbabwe’s history</h2>
<p>Historically, dialogue has moved Zimbabwe forward as a nation during its darkest hours. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>A year before independence in 1980, battle-hardened guerrilla commanders agreed to talk to the then Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, to end Zimbabwe’s liberation war even though they were convinced that they were winning. </p></li>
<li><p>In 1987 Joshua Nkomo, who was the leader of the main opposition party, the Zimbabwean African People’s Union, agreed to talk to his political nemesis, then Prime Minister Mugabe. Yet before this, he had been hounded out of the country by Mugabe in the mid-80s, and <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">thousands of his supporters killed</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>More recently in 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai agreed to enter into a unity government with Mugabe, despite winning the first round of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-10-00-zim-2008-election-taken-by-a-gun-not-a-pen">2008 elections</a>. The unity government briefly resuscitated and stabilised Zimbabwe’s fragile economy. Hyperinflation was tamed, basic commodities became available again and people regained purchasing power.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Given the MDC-A’s positive contribution during its brief stint in the 2009-2013 unity government, the party should be expending its energies on dialogue. The main opposition party can enter into a second government of national unity, but continue building and strengthening its own support.</p>
<p>In the same vein, Zanu-PF also needs to realise that without the involvement of the MDC-A, its attempts to revive the economy and end the strife in the country, on its own terms, are destined to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122726/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>It’s time for a new approach as it becomes increasingly clear that protests won’t topple the Zanu-PF government.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1217582019-08-14T13:43:52Z2019-08-14T13:43:52ZSouth Africa’s 2019 poll showed dangerous signs of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287992/original/file-20190814-136176-1y9wevw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Analysing South Africa's recent elections offers some useful insights into the country's democracy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/KIM LUDBROOK</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The general election in South Africa <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/App/dashboard.html">in May</a> conveyed mixed messages: one was that democracy is maturing, the other that it is failing. </p>
<p>The good news was that this was very clearly an outcome of a discerning electorate displaying a nuanced sense of realism. The contrary interpretation is that the results show democracy in the country is being hollowed out. There were worrying signals that voters feel the established political system is failing them. </p>
<p>Voter enthusiasm and trust in the governing African National Congress (ANC) continued to decline. It now stands at its lowest point since 1994. The main opposition Democratic Alliance’s (DA’s) vote <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/App/dashboard.html">fell back</a> rather than increasing for the first time. Both parties lost votes to the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), whose democratic and non-racial values are questionable.</p>
<p>Careful analysis by Collette Schulz-Herzenberg in a new published <a href="https://readinglist.click/sub/election-2019-change-and-stability-in-south-africas-democracy-in-depth-analysis-by-experts-on-south-african-politics/">book</a>, “Election 2019 South Africa: Change and Stability in South Africa”, shows that an estimated 9 million citizens were not registered to vote. Most worrying is that registration was lowest among younger citizens (in the 18-29 year old category), and that this recorded a sharp drop from 58% in 2014 to 49% in 2019. </p>
<p>Worse, the falling levels of voter registration (down from 78% in 2014 to 75% of the <a href="https://pari.org.za/book-launch-election-2019-change-and-stability-in-south-africas-democracy/">voting age population</a> show a decline in the capacity of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to perform its basic functions – to register voters and to administer the electoral process with efficiency, integrity and independence. More alarming than the <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2019-05-09-iec-glitches-a-man-made-disaster/">technical glitches</a> which occurred in some areas on polling day has been the failure of the registration process to keep pace with the expanding population. </p>
<p>The books shows turnout of registered voters on election day has fallen from a high of 89% in 1999 to just 66% in 2019. Although this does not compare badly with elections elsewhere globally, it suggests a growing sense of alienation from the political system.</p>
<p>This is especially so among the young and poorer citizens. In short, the election’s result endorses other evidence that trust in South Africa’s constitutional settlement and its political institutions <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad71-south-africa-perceptions-of-democracy">is steadily declining</a>.</p>
<h2>The optimistic view</h2>
<p>The optimistic perspective notes that these were the country’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/elections2019">sixth democratic elections</a>, and that they passed off remarkably smoothly given the <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2019/review/FullBR.pdf">languid state of the economy</a> and the extent of <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/fighting-crime">social ills</a>. Furthermore, they did so peacefully. </p>
<p>True, the IEC’s performance fell below its accustomed standards. But, the irregularities which occurred were the result of administrative shortcomings rather than any political motivation. There was little substantive evidence that the elections were anything but credible, free and fair. </p>
<p>Most importantly, in a world where political polarisation is proceeding apace, South Africans opted largely for the political centre rather than for parties which preached extremes. Even so, voters proved adept at sending strong messages to the political parties, large and small.</p>
<p>Although the ANC was returned to power, it was punished for its record over the previous five years. Its percentage of the total vote fell from 62% in 2014 to under 58%. Voters also showed their discontent with what many saw as the DA’s unconvincing performance. Although it was confirmed as the leading opposition party, its share of the vote was also reduced, down from just over 22% in 2014 to less than 21%. This is a poor outcome given the dismal performance of the economy under the ANC, along with the perpetual <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/05/11/anc-keeps-power-but-scandals-cost-it-votes">corruption scandals</a> that have rocked the governing party. </p>
<p>In short, the large majority of those who voted opted for parties of the centre and gave short shrift to the political extremes. </p>
<p>The radical-populist EFF managed to establish itself firmly as South Africa’s third major party, and increased its vote (from 6% to just over 10%). But its success fell far short of its hopes and expectations. This suggested that its policies and demeanour enjoyed only limited support. </p>
<p>Likewise, although there was a drift of white voters <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-who-why-and-what-of-south-africas-minority-afrikaner-party-116913">away from the DA to the Freedom Front Plus</a>, there was no undue cause for alarm. Its rise seemingly points more to a reassertion of Afrikaner discontents, rather than any ideological drift to the political right.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-who-why-and-what-of-south-africas-minority-afrikaner-party-116913">The who, why and what of South Africa's minority Afrikaner party</a>
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<p>Voters also <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-africas-2019-general-election-post-analysis">shunned the array of latecomers</a> that had made their appearance in the weeks and months prior to the elections. </p>
<p>This suggests that, despite myriad voter dissatisfactions, the established party system has relatively firm foundations and will not easily be undermined. </p>
<h2>Pessimistic view</h2>
<p>It’s possible to look at the election through a negative lens.</p>
<p>What will happen if these trends continue? Will declining enthusiasm for South Africa’s established party system result in declining enthusiasm for democracy? Are South Africans spurning the democratic electoral process and becoming indifferent to formal politics? Does this imply they are moving in a direction which could see them swinging behind populist-authoritarian parties and movements of doubtful democratic credentials, as is happening in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006">so many countries elsewhere</a>?</p>
<p>The easy answer to all of these questions is that we simply don’t know. It is tempting to regard the glass of South African democracy as half full. Equally, it is wise to regard the same glass as half empty. Yet how we interpret the election cannot be simply a matter of free choice: both optimistic and pessimistic interpretations tell us much about the present state of South African democracy.</p>
<p>One interpretation, which is consistent with this, is the recognition that South Africa continues to be a country of insiders and outsiders. Formal citizenship is accorded to all by birthright. But the substance of that citizenship depends upon individuals’ access to opportunity (“life chance”) – a decent upbringing, home, schooling, job and livelihood. </p>
<p>The hypothesis that forms is whether South Africa’s democracy is for insiders only, and that outsiders are increasingly regarding it as irrelevant to their concerns. If this is true, then South Africans need to be seriously worried: the quality of their democracy will ultimately depend upon the extent to which it manages to bring all within its tent. </p>
<p><em>Roger Southall is co-editor with Collette Schulz-Herzenberg of <a href="https://pari.org.za/book-launch-election-2019-change-and-stability-in-south-africas-democracy/">Election 2019 South Africa: Change and Stability in South Africa</a>, published by <a href="https://www.jacana.co.za/">Jacana Media</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121758/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>The election’s result endorses other evidence that trust in South Africa’s constitutional settlement and its political institutions is steadily declining.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.