tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/african-national-congress-2017-34617/articlesAfrican National Congress 2017 – The Conversation2017-12-20T12:59:23Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/894562017-12-20T12:59:23Z2017-12-20T12:59:23ZWho is Cyril Ramaphosa? A profile of the new leader of South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200161/original/file-20171220-4997-jb39at.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa moments before winning.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Cornell Tukiri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has a new president – <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/cyril-ramaphosa-to-shake-up-cabinet-13315934">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. But who is he?</p>
<p><a href="http://www.jacana.co.za/book-categories/biography-a-memoir/cyril-ramaphosa-revised-detail">Ramaphosa</a> cuts a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/ramaphosas-first-address-as-anc-president-read-the-full-speech-20171221">fitting figure</a> to take over government, stabilise the economy, and secure the constitutional architecture that he helped create at the end of apartheid. </p>
<p>But to expect more would be expecting too much. He is unlikely to veer far from the traditional economic path chosen by the ANC. </p>
<p>There are some important features we can draw on to make some conjectures about the man.</p>
<h2>The early days</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa was born in Johannesburg, the industrial heartland of South Africa, on <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">November 17, 1952</a>. The second of three children, his father was a policeman. He grew up in Soweto where he attended primary and high school. He later went to Mphaphuli High School in Sibasa, Limpopo, were he was elected <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201712040357.html">head of the Student Christian Movement</a> soon after his arrival, attesting to his Christian beliefs. </p>
<p>He studied law at the then University of the North (Turfloop), where he became active in the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/south-african-student-organisation-saso">South African Students Organisation</a>, which was aligned to <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/definition-black-consciousness-bantu-stephen-biko-december-1971-south-africa">black consciousness ideology</a> espoused by Steve Biko. He became active in the University Student Christian Movement, which was steeped in the <a href="http://www.hts.org.za/index.php/HTS/article/view/3176/html">liberation black theology</a> of the black consciousness movement.</p>
<p>After graduating with a degree in law, Ramaphosa continued his political activism through the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/black-people%E2%80%99s-convention-bpc">Black People’s Convention</a>, for which he was jailed for six months. He went on to serve articles and joined the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/council-unions-south-africa-cusa-formed">Council of Trade Unions of South Africa</a> which was to form the <a href="http://num.org.za/">National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)</a> with Ramaphosa as its first secretary general. He helped built the NUM into the largest trade union in the country, serving as its secretary general for just over 10 years.</p>
<h2>Business and politics</h2>
<p>His prominence and public stature grew even more when he was elected secretary general of the ANC in 1991. He went on to play a key role during South Africa’s transition, becoming one of the key architects of the country’s constitutional democracy.</p>
<p>Under the auspices of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">(Codesa)</a>, he became the ANC’s lead negotiator during negotiations on a post-apartheid arrangement. </p>
<p>Following this, <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/news/entry/conversation-on-the-constitution">he</a> led the ANC team in drawing up a new constitution for the country. It is now considered one of the most progressive constitutions in the <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/cape-times/20170320/281870118256239">world</a>. </p>
<p>In 1994 Ramaphosa lost the contest to become <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-11-11-how-ramaphosa-nearly-became-nelson-mandelas-deputy/">President Nelson Mandela’s deputy</a>. Having Thabo Mbeki appointed instead was a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/20/cyril-ramaphosa-return-nelson-mandela">blow</a>, but persuaded by Mandela, Ramaphosa went into business. </p>
<p>For the next two decades Ramaphosa put his energies into building a large investment holding company <a href="http://www.phembani.com/index.php/history-of-shanduka/">Shanduka</a> with interests in sectors ranging from mining to fast foods. The success of the group confirmed his reputation as a skilled dealmaker and negotiator. </p>
<p>During this 20-year period in business, Ramaphosa established deep links in the private sector in South Africa. </p>
<p>This set him at odds with sections of the ANC which believe that the post-apartheid arrangements delivered political power, but not economic freedom. These voices have become louder under President Jacob Zuma’s presidency with called for <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/251821/so-what-exactly-is-radical-economic-transformation">radical economic transformation</a> and action to tackle <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-good-politics-bad-sociology-worse-economics-77338">white monopoly capital</a>.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa will have his work cut out for him as he tries to accommodate these demands by driving a more inclusive social compact in the country while simultaneously trying to manage rampant corruption in the private and public sectors.</p>
<h2>Road to presidency</h2>
<p>Even during his years in business Ramaphosa remained close to the ANC, serving as a member of the national disciplinary committee. </p>
<p>But he made his major comeback onto the political scene at the ANC’s 2012 elective conference in Mangaung, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/ramaphosa-new-anc-deputy-president-1442300">Bloemfontein</a> where he was elected deputy president of the ANC, and later of the country. </p>
<p>Two years prior to this Ramaphosa became deputy chairman of the state-run <a href="https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/governance/developmentnews/ramaphosa-unpacks-the-ndp">National Planning Commission</a>. He presided over its <a href="http://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/Pages/Diagnostic-Report.aspx">diagnostic report,</a> which set out the problems facing the country in clear terms. A plan was drawn up to provide answers to the challenges identified in report. Known as the <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030">National Development Plan</a>, it was tabled as a blue print for the type of society South Africa could become. </p>
<p>The plan showed Ramaphosa’s strengths as an architect of social compacts. </p>
<p>Since its tabling the plan has been left to gather dust. But it remains a point of reference, and serves as a counterpoint to calls for radical economic transformation.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa is likely to emphasise stability – in government and the ANC. Given his history he is likely to want to stabilise the economy rather than to pursue radical interventions.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa has a personal interest to secure a stabilising social compact akin to the one he negotiated in 1994 given developments that have left the country economically and socially weaker. These have included allegations that parts of the state have been taken over by corrupt civil servants and some private sector interests, high levels of unemployment and increasingly fractious public debates. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly during his campaign trail he moulded his image on the sanctity of the rule of law and on the dictum that social stability hinges on respect of the rule of law. </p>
<p>The big question mark over Ramaphosa is how effective he will be. Although he’s been the deputy president of the ANC and of the country for five years, some believe that his influence has been minimal and that he has not been able to imprint his leadership on the party – or the country. </p>
<p>Will he be able to impose his will on those he now leads? Ramaphosa will be presiding over officials who have big personalities and have enjoyed long periods of political power. They are used to leading, not following.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89456/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thapelo Tselapedi received funding from the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the University of Johannesburg. </span></em></p>Cyril Ramaphosa is likely to emphasise stability - in government and the ANC. Given his history he is likely to want to stabilise the economy rather than pursue radical interventions.Thapelo Tselapedi, Politics lecturer, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/894022017-12-19T14:56:54Z2017-12-19T14:56:54ZWhy Ramaphosa won’t be able to deliver the three urgent fixes South Africa needs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199948/original/file-20171219-4995-1l53lra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa, centre, with fellow top leaders elected at the party's 54th national conference.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Cornell Tukiri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The competition for the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/anc-conference-2017/2017-12-18-cyril-ramaphosa-wins-anc-presidential-race/">top six leadership positions</a> in South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), was no carefully choreographed script such as the one-candidate-per-election of Chinese Communist Party congresses. It was a rip-roaring, full-throated democratic contestation – as raucous as US primary elections. Even more so, with delegates’ repeated singing and dancing. </p>
<p>This point bears emphasising. As recently as 2016, one hardline ANC critic published a book-length argument that ANC political practice and culture is shaped by an exile culture of avoiding or <a href="http://scholar.ufs.ac.za:8080/xmlui/handle/11660/3717">rigging elections</a>. The ANC’s 2017 national elective conference proves him wrong.</p>
<p>At a cost of <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-12-16-the-anc-conference-hotel-bill-mints-on-6000-plus-pillows-as-delegates-check-in/">tens of millions of rand</a> to host <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/breaking-anc-meeting-over-68-missing-votes-20171219">4 776 delegates</a> – and 1 200 <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-12-17-00-media-turnout-at-conference-is-biggest-the-party-has-ever-seen">accredited journalists</a> – for a five day conference, the ANC achieved the closest possible thing to internal democracy. By contrast, the UK Prime Minister has, on occasion, been chosen by less than four hundred MPs in a <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/heres-how-the-process-to-pick-a-new-uk-prime-minister-works-post-referendum-brexit-2016-6">party parliamentary caucus</a>.</p>
<p>This refutes those who predicted <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Labour/News/nasrec-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-anc-says-vavi-20171218">“the end of the ANC”</a>.</p>
<p>In the end <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> won the tightly contested race. He was the favourite candidate of that rarest of all alliances - business, labour and the South African Communist Party. His election was preceded by high expectations that, if elected, he would displace Zuma as state president before his term ends in 2019; stop corruption in loss making state owned enterprises; and make credible appointments to replace discredited ones in state institutions.</p>
<p>On the one hand, Ramaphosa’s narrow victory over Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma means that there will be no breakaway from the ANC, unlike the Economic Freedom Front and COPE after previous pivotal moments in the party.</p>
<p>On the other, Ramaphosa wins a poisoned chalice, raising big question marks over whether he will be able to deliver on the three big expectations.</p>
<h2>Poisoned chalice</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa faces a number of constraints. The biggest one is <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/meet-the-ancs-new-top-6-20171218">the composition of the other four men and a woman</a> who constitute the ANC’s “top six”. The team effectively runs the organisation.</p>
<p>The election results for the top six were a neck-and-neck mix of the two rival slates behind Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma. Winning candidates were separated from their rivals by only a few hundred votes.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=977&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=977&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=977&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa with Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. He narrowly defeated her to become ANC president.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludrook</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The rest of the team that will work with Ramaphosa are: David Mabuza as deputy president, Gwede Mantashe as national chairman, Ace Magashule as secretary-general, Paul Mashatile as treasurer-general and Jessie Duarte remains deputy secretary-general.</p>
<p>It makes for strange bedfellows given that Mabuza, Magashule and Duarte are widely viewed as Jacob Zuma supporters. This means that Ramaphosa won’t be as free to act as he might want to.</p>
<p>For example, it’s unlikely that a majority of the six would back a motion to ask Zuma to retire as state president before the end of his term of office in 2019. </p>
<p>It also remains to be seen to what extent this mixed slate leadership will support action against the <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1334530/who-are-the-guptas-details-according-to-madonsela/">Guptas</a>, Zuma’s friends at the heart of <a href="https://cdn.24.co.za/files/Cms/General/d/4666/3f63a8b78d2b495d88f10ed060997f76.pdf">state capture</a> allegations, and <a href="https://www.gov.za/tenderpreneurship-stuff-crooked-cadres-fighters">tenderpreneurs </a> - business people who get rich through government tenders, usually using dubious means - and the whole system of <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">patronage and clientelism</a> that has gotten out of hand. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-12-19-cyril-ramaphosa-wins-a-poisoned-chalice/">make-up of the team</a> that Ramaphosa will lead might also baulk at pressing the ANC led Parliament to take decisive action against the decline in the country’s large state owned enterprises such as South African Airways and power utility Eskom.</p>
<h2>Implications for the opposition</h2>
<p>The best results from a partisan viewpoint for the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) would be had Dlamini-Zuma won. This would have alienated more ANC voters in the 2019 elections. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s victory means the DA has no option but to knuckle down to the hard slog of building branches in townships, ensuring a rising proportion of black people are represented as members, and promoting a rising proportion of black representatives in its parliamentary and provincial legislature caucuses.</p>
<p>Anticipating a Ramaphosa win, DA leader Mmusi Maimane set the tone for his party’s 2019 campaign in a recent round of full page newspaper ads with the message: whoever wins at the ANC conference is irrelevant – only a DA government can turn the country around. For DA election canvassers, every month that Zuma continues in office as state president is the gift that keeps on giving.</p>
<p>But whether Ramaphosa can tempt disillusioned, abstaining ANC voters back to the polls remains a moot point. Will the DA now win the Gauteng Province in the 2019 elections? Will the ANC retain its shrinking Northern Cape Provincial majority? Can the DA get an absolute majority, or at least hold onto its three metro prize catches of Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Nelson Mandela Bay during the 2021 municipal elections?</p>
<p>All these questions are now part of the roller coaster ride that is normal in functioning democracies.</p>
<p>The EFF will probably continue its taunting of Ramaphosa as “buffalo man”, – a reference to the fact that <a href="https://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Ramaphosa-sorry-about-R18m-buffalo-20150429">he bought</a> a buffalo cow and her calf for nearly R20 million rand – but the party seems to have hit its ceiling of attracting alienated ANC voters. It will struggle to build its share of the vote any higher.</p>
<p>This ANC elective conference marks the start of a watershed for the party, which will continue until the end of Zuma’s term as president of the country in 2019.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>Cyril Ramaphosa has secured the leadership of South Africa’s governing ANC. But he may not be able to clean up the mess left by Jacob Zuma given the other members of the party’s leadership team.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/892482017-12-18T17:03:17Z2017-12-18T17:03:17ZThe ANC has a new leader: but South Africa remains on a political precipice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199756/original/file-20171218-27554-19f1lki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa, the new president of South Africa's governing party, the ANC, and potentially the country's future president. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rumours that President Jacob Zuma has instructed the South African National Defence Force to draw up plans for implementing a <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1756940/sa-presidency-rejects-reports-of-state-of-emergency-regulations-draft/">state of emergency</a> may or may not be true. Nonetheless they are evidence of South Africa’s febrile political atmosphere.</p>
<p>But any assumption that <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/anc-conference/anc54-breaking-ramaphosa-elected-anc-president-12453127">the election</a> of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> as the new leader of the African National Congress (ANC), after winning the race against Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, will place South Africa on an even keel are misplaced. Indeed, the drama may only be beginning.</p>
<p>It’s useful to look back to 2007 when President Thabo Mbeki unwisely ran for a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/i-asked-mbeki-to-stand-for-a-third-term-to-stop-zuma-kasrils-20171108">third term as ANC leader</a>. His unpopularity among large segments of the party provided the platform for his <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Zuma-sweeps-to-resounding-victory-20071218">defeat by Zuma</a> at Polokwane. Within a few months the National Executive Committee of the ANC latched onto an <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAKZHC/2008/71.html">excuse</a> to ask Mbeki to <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/thabo-mbeki-resigns-south-africa%E2%80%99s-second-democratic-president">stand down as president of the country</a> before the end of his term of office. Being committed to the traditions of party loyalty he complied, resigning as president some eight months before the Constitution required him to do so.</p>
<p>The question this raises is whether South Africa should now expect a repeat performance following the election of a new leader of the ANC. Will this lead to a party instruction to Zuma to stand down as president of the country? And if it does, will he do what Mbeki did and meekly resign?</p>
<p>There’s a big difference between the two scenarios: Mbeki had no reason to fear the consequences of leaving office. Zuma, on the other hand, has numerous reasons to cling to power. This is what makes him, and the immediate future, dangerous for South Africa, and suggests the country faces instability.</p>
<h2>Why Zuma won’t go</h2>
<p>It is not out of the question that Zuma may say to himself, and to South Africa, that he is not going anywhere. He is losing <a href="https://theconversation.com/dramatic-night-in-south-africa-leaves-president-hanging-on-by-a-thread-57180">court case</a> after <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21732538-judges-keep-finding-against-south-africas-embattled-president-jacob-zuma-loses-two">court case</a>, and judicial decisions are increasingly narrowing his legal capacity to block official and independent investigations into the extent of <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/State-Capture">state capture</a> by business interests close to him.</p>
<p>With every passing day, the prospects of his finding himself in the dock, <a href="https://theconversation.com/president-zuma-loses-bid-to-dodge-783-charges-but-will-he-have-the-last-laugh-85703">facing 783 charges</a>, including of corruption and racketeering, also increase. </p>
<p>Zuma will have every constitutional right to defy an ANC instruction to stand down as state president until his term expires following the next <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/newsmaker-2019-elections-results-will-be-credible-20171015-2">general election in 2019</a>, and the new parliament’s election of a new president. In terms of the <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/bills/2002/b16.pdf">South African Constitution</a>, his term of office will be brought to an early end only if parliament passes a vote of no confidence in his presidency, or votes that, for one reason or another, he is unfit for office.</p>
<p>But today’s ANC is so divided that it cannot be assumed that a majority of ANC MPs would <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-happening-inside-the-anc-not-parliament-is-key-to-why-zuma-prevails-82399">back a motion of no confidence</a>, even following the election of <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201712040357.html">Ramaphosa</a> as the party’s new leader. </p>
<p>In other words, there is a very real prospect that South Africa will see itself ruled for at least another 18 months or so by what is termed <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-06-27-anc-debates-two-centres-of-power">“two centres of power”</a>, with the authority and the legitimacy of the party (formally backing Ramaphosa) vying against that of the state (headed by Zuma).</p>
<h2>Throwing caution to the wind</h2>
<p>As if that is not a sufficient condition for political instability, we may expect that Zuma will continue to use his executive power to erect defences against his future prosecution. He will reckon to leave office only with guarantees of immunity. Until he gets them, Zuma will defy all blandishments to go. And if he does not get what he wants, he may throw caution to the wind and go for broke.</p>
<p>Hence, perhaps, the possibility that he is prepared to invoke a state of emergency.</p>
<p>The grounds for Zuma imposing a state of emergency would be specious, summoned up to defend his interests and those backing him. They would be likely to infer <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-pressure-mounts-on-south-africas-jacob-zuma-he-blames-an-old-enemy-western-intelligence-agencies-69599">foreign interference</a> in affairs of state, alongside suggestions that <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/zuma-again-denounces-the-monopoly-of-white-economic-power-11988619">white monopoly capital</a>, whites as a whole as well as nefarious others were conspiring to prevent much needed <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-12-15-know-your-candidate-dlamini-zuma-beats-the-ret-drum/">radical economic transformation</a>. Present constitutional arrangements would be declared <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africans-should-be-worried-by-anc-talk-of-a-colour-revolution-87019">counter-revolutionary</a> and those defending them doing so only to protect their material interests. </p>
<p>After a matter of time, such justifications would probably be declared unconstitutional by the judiciary. It is then that there would be a confrontation between raw power and the Constitution. If such a situation should arise, we cannot be sure which would be the winner.</p>
<h2>South Africa’s army</h2>
<p>It is remarkable how little the searchlight that has focused on state capture has rested on the Defence Force. Much attention has been given to how the executive has effectively co-opted the <a href="https://theconversation.com/leaked-emails-ramaphosas-hypocrisy-on-spying-by-the-south-african-state-83605">intelligence</a> and <a href="http://www.ngopulse.org/article/2016/09/29/political-interference-weakening-rule-law-sa">prosecutorial service</a>, as well has how the top ranks of the police have been selected for political rather than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/world/africa/south-africa-police-commissioner-under-investigation-is-suspended.html">operational reasons</a>. </p>
<p>It seems to have been assumed that South Africa’s military is simply sitting in the background, observing political events from afar. But is it? Where would its loyalties lie in the event of a major constitutional crisis? </p>
<p>The danger of the present situation is that South Africa might be about to find out.</p>
<p>Were the military to throw its weight behind Zuma the country would be in no-man’s land. Of course, there would be a massive popular reaction, with the further danger that the president himself would summon his popular cohorts to <a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-military-veterans-and-the-threat-to-south-africas-democracy-76118">“defend the revolution”</a>. </p>
<p>And South Africans should not assume that Zuma would be politically isolated. Those who backed Dlamini-Zuma did so to defend their present positions and capacity to use office for personal gain. If they were to rise up, the army would then be elevated to the status of defender of civil order.</p>
<p>What is certain is that in such a wholly uncertain situation the economy would spiral downwards quickly. Capital would take flight at a faster rate than ever before, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10658">employment</a> would collapse even further, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10334">poverty</a> would become even further entrenched. </p>
<h2>Reasons to be hopeful</h2>
<p>Is all this too extreme a scenario? Hopefully yes. There are numerous good reasons why such a fate will be averted. </p>
<p>Zuma’s control over the ANC is waning, as is his control over various state institutions, notably the National Prosecuting Authority. And the country has a checks and balances in place: there is a vigorous civil society, the judiciary has proved the Constitution’s main defence and trade unions and business remain influential. </p>
<p>Even so, it remains the case that what transpires now that the ANC’s national conference is over will determine the fate and future of our democracy. South Africa is approaching rough waters, and a Jacob Zuma facing an inglorious and humiliating end to his presidency will be a Jacob Zuma at his most dangerous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89248/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>South Africa’s ruling ANC has a new leader - Cyril Ramaphosa. But this doesn’t mean that the country is out of the woods. Political instability remains a real possibility.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/893172017-12-18T13:15:42Z2017-12-18T13:15:42ZVintage Zuma delivers a vengeful swansong, devoid of any responsibility<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199689/original/file-20171218-27607-1xxomej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Jacob Zuma sings before his opening address at the 54th National Conference of the governing ANC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The hope was that in <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/anc-conference-2017/2017-12-16-in-full--president-jacob-zumas-final-speech-as-anc-president/">opening</a> the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/54th-national-conference">54th National Conference</a> of the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma would rise to the occasion, seize the moment of his last address as party president with honesty and leave something worthy of history. For posterity to cherish.</p>
<p>It sounded as though he was taking the bull by the horns when he referred to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/jackson-mthembu-ending-slate-politics-cant-happen-like-instant-coffee-20151108">slate politics</a> as the function of ANC factionalism, which he acknowledged had fractured the governing party, including corrupting its systems and processes. Slate politics are the reason for internecine contests for leadership positions in the ANC, which, as he correctly pointed out, rob the ANC of good leadership.</p>
<p>But, in the end, his narcissistic streak shaped his swansong. It was largely couched in aspirational rather than diagnostic terms. For a political report of a leader whose 10-year tenure was coming to an end, it left much to be desired. </p>
<p>He claimed that he was leaving behind a stronger ANC, a statement he could only make if he’s suffering from delusions of grandeur, or because he’s indulging in self-gratification. Which ever it was, it exposed the dishonesty of the <a href="http://www.thenewage.co.za/anc-political-report-by-outgoing-president-jacob-zuma/">political report</a> he subsequently delivered, which was cluttered with rhetorical ploys and lacked a coherent theme for the august event. In truth, the divisions in the ANC are at their worst under him. So is its governing <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">Tripartite Alliance</a> - with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-communist-party-strips-the-anc-of-its-multi-class-ruling-party-status-88647">South African Communist Party</a> and labour federation <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/zuma-banned-from-speaking-at-cosatu-events-9300206">Cosatu</a> - that it leads.</p>
<h2>An attack on democracy</h2>
<p>Zuma missed the purpose of a valedictory address – to guide the future in the wake of leadership changes. Instead, he became vengeful, taking issue with what he termed ill-discipline in the organisation. Here he was referring to members who <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/just-in-anc-free-state-pec-several-branches-barred-from-attending-elective-conference-20171215">take the ANC to court</a> for violating its own constitution and processes. He suggested that they should be dismissed from the organisation immediately. </p>
<p>This is a strange way of dealing with issues, particularly for a president in a constitutional democracy who spent <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">half of his life</a> selflessly fighting for a more just system of organising society. The idea that someone’s membership of an organisation be immediately terminated when they take it to court to protect their rights is at variance with the principle of the supremacy of the constitution. </p>
<p>Zuma’s suggestion violates the right to external recourse for those aggrieved by internal organisational processes. That it’s even entertained by some in the leadership of the ANC demonstrates the extent of the crisis under Zuma. This is because ideas such as these pose a danger to the party’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/what-anc">foundational values</a> - of unity, non-racialism, non-sexism and democracy - as well as to the future of democracy in the country. That is because the ANC, despite its waning electoral performance, remains <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-has-remained-dominant-despite-shifts-in-support-base-63285">politically dominant</a>. Thus, what happens inside it ultimately affects the running of the country, hence it’s imperative <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-countrys-constitutional-court-can-consolidate-and-deepen-democracy-54184">internal party democracy</a> be entrenched in the ANC.</p>
<p>Had Zuma looked objectively and honestly into what led some members to take the ANC to court, his report would have perhaps managed to get to the core of the morass.</p>
<h2>Factional till the end</h2>
<p>Zuma also squandered the last opportunity he had to remove himself from petty factional politics of the ANC and assert himself as a unifier and a statesman. This was his chance to echo the voice of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/oliver-reginald-kaizana-tambo">Oliver Tambo</a>, the revered leader of the ANC who is attributed with holding the organisation together during its turbulent years as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">banned organisation</a>. </p>
<p>But he blew it by making a point of graciously thanking three senior members of the ANC who are leaders of the factions behind <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-03-anc-leadership-race-dlamini-zuma-supporters-in-battle-to-secure-the-final-prize-the-eastern-cape/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s presidential campaign</a>. These were the ANC Women’s League President <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/the-judiciary-carries-itself-as-if-its-being-lobbied-ancwl-president-20171209">Bathabile Dlamini</a>, ANC Youth’s League <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/anc-conference-2017/2017-12-16-maine-accuses-judges-of-seeking-to-influence-outcome-of-anc-conference/">Collen Maine</a>, and ANC military veterans leader <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-12-16-mkmva-boss-launches-scathing-attack-on-judiciary">Kebby Maphatsoe</a>.</p>
<p>On top of this, his political report lacked the valedictory message of hope for the future. It tinkered at the edges, and largely misrepresented the reality about the state of the ANC. Instead, he fanned the flames of revenge, particularly against those who have consistently tried to hold him accountable. </p>
<p>He made references to corruption, but deflected attention from his alleged implication in it. He set out to create the impression that South Africans are outraged only about corruption in the public sector, not what’s happening in the private sector. A veiled retort to those who have questioned his moral credentials and ethical leadership was that: if you don’t talk about corruption in the private sector, you shouldn’t talk about it in the public sector.</p>
<p>And rather than denouncing slate politics and factionalism, he stuck to lamenting their existence. I believe that the only reason he mentioned them at all was because they have led to splinter groups that have affected the ANC <a href="https://www.power987.co.za/news/read-its-been-an-honor-zumas-full-speech">“quantitatively and qualitatively”</a> . If slate politics hadn’t led to the current malaise, I doubt he would have made any reference to organisational maladies, which have in fact been spawned and sustained by his leadership over the past 10 years.</p>
<p>Zuma has bequeathed the ANC (and the country) a highly divided party, one that is factionalised and a threat to its own existence. Even when history gave him the opportunity to apologise for the mess his leadership has left the country in, the vintage Zuma didn’t want to take responsibility. </p>
<p>It is now left to those picking up the baton to take on the challenging task of returning the ANC to its foundational values of selflessness and service and its stature as a leader of society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding from the National Research Foundation(NRF) for his post-graduate studies. He is a member of the South African Association of Public Administration and Management(SAAPAM). He is the Chief Editor of the Journal of Public Administration.</span></em></p>Zuma’s last address to South Africa’s governing party, the ANC, as its president, betrayed his strange way of dealing with issues. He came across as delusional and self-indulgent.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/888202017-12-14T08:09:58Z2017-12-14T08:09:58ZSouth Africa needs electoral reform, but president’s powers need watching<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198518/original/file-20171211-27693-1jk3w15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jacob Zuma, president of South Africa. There are renewed calls for citizens to directly elect their president and other representatives. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Sumaya Hisham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Within a short time, the 4000 odd delegates to South Africa’s governing African National Congress’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/54th-national-conference">54th National Conference</a> will elect a new party leader. In turn – save death, disaster or unlikely electoral defeat – a parliament stuffed with an ANC majority will at some point elect that leader as the new <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-anc-presidential-elections-trump-south-africas-constitution-78553">President of South Africa</a>. The expectation is that this will be <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nkosazana-clarice-dlamini-zuma">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a> or <a href="http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00057409.html">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. But, if the ANC elects a pig, the ANC parliamentary majority will vote for the pig.</p>
<p>Although it is by no means unusual for parliaments to elect countries’ political leaders, there is widespread complaint in South Africa that it is the small ANC elite which attends the conference that effectively selects the next president of the country. This, it is said by many, is undemocratic. </p>
<p>Two main reasons are cited. First, ANC electoral procedures are deeply corrupted by money <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mantashe-warns-anc-delegates-against-selling-their-votes-20171126">changing hands</a>, personal ambition and <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/armed-guards-for-anc-factions-20171107">factionalism</a>. Second, it should be the people, not the party, which should be charged with electing the country’s leader.</p>
<p>It is therefore of considerable interest that, rather than emanating from civil society or another political party, the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/12/04/anc-gauteng-proposes-expansion-of-party-leadership">proposal</a> has been made by the ANC’s Gauteng provincial conference that consideration should be given to ordinary voters voting directly for presidents, premiers and mayors. This is of particular interest given that Gauteng is one of the ANC’s most powerful provinces, and at the same time, one which is often at odds with the party’s current leadership.</p>
<p>The proposal that the state president, provincial premiers and mayors be directly elected is a most welcome one, as there is much need to consider the quality of South Africa’s democracy, and to encourage public participation in decision-making. However, direct election of such offices simultaneously holds its risks.</p>
<h2>The electoral reform debate</h2>
<p>The debate about electoral reform in post-1994 South Africa has largely focused on the system used to elect MPs and their counterparts in the country’s nine provinces. The standard argument for a change was captured succinctly by ANC dissident and Umkhonto we Sizwe veteran <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-13-when-will-we-wake-up-and-reform-our-crooked-electoral-system/">Omry Makgoale</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When will we wake up and reform our crooked electoral system? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The argument is that the list proportional representation system results in the election of MPs who are <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-04-20-sas-electoral-system-fails-the-people">accountable to party bosses</a> rather than voters. Such an outcome is rendered more certain by the fact that <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996">South Africa’s constitution</a> lays down that MPs or provincial legislature representatives who leave or are ejected from their parties lose their seat in the relevant legislature, plus the handy salary that goes with it. To continue with the animalistic referencing, parties’ elected representatives become sheep, devoid of any capacity for independence.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Presidential hopeful Nkosazana Dlamini-ZumaChairperson.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Francois Lenoir</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Such critiques often suggest (very sensibly) that the electoral system should become a mixed one which combines proportionality of outcomes with the direct election of representatives from constituencies. This was recommended in 2002 by the <a href="http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/Van-Zyl-Slabbert-Commission-on-Electoral-Reform-Report-2003.pdf">Van Zyl Slabbert Commission</a> on electoral reform. But there has been relatively little debate about whether the President and premiers should be directly elected.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/Van-Zyl-Slabbert-Commission-on-Electoral-Reform-Report-2003.pdf">survey</a> conducted on behalf of the Van Zyl Slabbert Commission indicated that 63% of respondents would have liked to vote for the president directly. This level of preference was pretty much the same across all racial groups. Given the disastrous nature of the Zuma presidency, it is very possible that the preference for direct election would be considerably higher if the issue was put to survey respondents today.</p>
<h2>Virtue of direction election</h2>
<p>The virtue of the direct election of key political leaders is said to be that it renders them directly accountable to voters rather than to their political parties. On the face of it, it is an attractive argument, and it is one which could usefully introduce more diversity into the South African political system.</p>
<p>If they wanted to maximise their vote, parties would have to look at the qualities of their candidates, and ask themselves whether they would appeal to the electorate as a whole. (On this reckoning, it is a dead cert that Cyril Ramaphosa would streak home and dry, rather than, as under the ANC’s present system, running neck and neck with his chief rival, whose popular appeal is that of a wet fish). This would mean that candidates would end up openly campaigning for the leadership, dispensing with the ANC’s absurd pretence that individuals should not demonstrate political ambition. </p>
<p>There is also the possibility that voters would elect a president from a party other than the one which enjoys a majority in the National Assembly. </p>
<p>Would direct election of the president, premiers and mayors be a good idea? And, if so, what system should be adopted?</p>
<p>The second question is easily answered. To avoid the election of a president who gains less than 50% of a popular vote but more than any other candidate, provision would wisely be made for a second round of a presidential election in which the top two candidates engage in a run off.</p>
<h2>A good idea?</h2>
<p>So would direction elections be a good idea? </p>
<p>Parliamentary systems work well because they devolve the election of prime ministers to the legislature. On the continent, countries that inherited a parliamentary system from Britain subsequently opted for elective presidencies. </p>
<p>The results are not unambiguously encouraging. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1000&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1000&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1000&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Kenya and Zambia, for instance, the direct election of presidents may have weakened the link between legislatures and executives. This has allowed executives to trample over legislatures, and for leaders to claim a legitimacy separate from that of their party. Presidents from <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2161868.stm">Daniel Arap Moi</a> through to <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2014/0210/Kenya-slides-toward-authoritarianism">Uhuru Kenyatta</a> in Kenya and from <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/africa/20chiluba.html">Frederick Chiluba</a> through to <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-talk-about-zambia-as-it-falls-from-grace-under-president-lungu-77520">Edgar Lungu</a> in Zambia have all proved exceedingly authoritarian.</p>
<p>It follows that changing the South African system to allow for direct election would require the country to look carefully at how a directly elected president should be rendered accountable to parliament. Would the change enhance the accountability of the government by empowering MPs, or would it render them increasingly irrelevant?</p>
<h2>Dangers of an all-powerful president</h2>
<p>It is also worth recalling that there is now much greater awareness about how much power is concentrated in the Presidency, in a way, it would seem, that the makers of the country’s constitution did not intend. Under Zuma, the presidency has a direct say in far too much, such as the right to appoint the head of a National Prosecuting Authority which might have the responsibility of calling him to legal account. </p>
<p>South Africans need to be wary of any change in the system which ends up making the President less – rather than more – accountable.</p>
<p>In any case, while there can be very good reasons for reforming an electoral system, this will not automatically result in better governance. Form can rarely trump substance. Robert Mugabe only “won” the Zimbabwean presidency in 2008 through his army and police terrorising the opposition and effectively forcing his rival, Morgan Tsvangirai, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2175377/Zimbabwe-Morgan-Tsvangirai-withdraws-from-poll-citing-Robert-Mugabes-reign-of-terror.html">to withdraw</a>.</p>
<p>It will take more than a piecemeal change to South Africa’s constitution to improve it’s democracy. South Africans should be careful what they wish for, as they can never be quite sure what they will get.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88820/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>Changing the South African system to allow for direct election would require the country to look carefully at how a directly elected president should be held accountable to parliament.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/884042017-12-05T08:54:13Z2017-12-05T08:54:13ZSnags that could cast doubt on ANC’s choice of new leaders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197139/original/file-20171130-30919-kk4cjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's governing African National Congress has begun the process of choosing its leaders.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludrick</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) holds its highly contested national elective conference for its top six leaders, between <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/splash/index">December 16 – 20</a>. The conference will, among other things, mark the end of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">Jacob Zuma’s</a> <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ancs-nec-must-quit-20161023-2">controversial decade-long tenure</a> as party president. It will also bring to an end a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-11-18-its-gloves-off-in-the-anc-leadership-race-after-ndz-snubs-cyrils-overture/">bruising contest</a> to replace him. The top two contenders are <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-03-00-ramaphosa-takes-an-early-lead-as-anc-branches-cast-their-vote">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2017-11-29-dlamini-zuma-endorsed-by-free-state-in-anc-leadership-race/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>. The Conversation Africa’s Politics and Society Editor, Thabo Leshilo, asked Keith Gottschalk about the process.</em> </p>
<p><strong>Why does the conference matter?</strong></p>
<p>The elective conference is important for the party as well as the country. This is because the person chosen to lead the party has, since 1994, gone on to become president of the country – an outcome dictated by the fact that the parliament elects the next president and the ANC has a large majority in parliament. The outcome is therefore watched very closely by both South Africans who support the ANC and those who don’t.</p>
<p><strong>How does the ANC choose its top leaders?</strong></p>
<p>The ANC’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/docs/NEC-Nomination-Process.pdf">election process</a> is full of extraordinary contradictions. It has built into it some of the most stringent checks and balances of any party in the world. On paper, the process could not be more fair. In practice either incompetence or manipulation causes much anger.</p>
<p>The party holds an elective conference every five years. According to the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/constitution-anc">ANC rules</a>, 90% of the delegates to the conference must be from party branches. Each branch in good standing is entitled to send one delegate, and if a branch has more than 250 delegates it is allowed to send one extra delegate per 250 extra members.</p>
<p>The additional 10% of delegates is made up of representatives from each provincial executive, delegates representing the women, youth and veterans leagues as well as members of the party’s National Executive Committee who attend in an ex officio capacity. </p>
<p>Before the conference ANC members are required to take part in a specially convened annual general meeting of their branch. There are over 2 000 branches in good standing. To be able to vote at this special AGM members have to have their ANC membership card as well as their South African national identity document.</p>
<p><strong>What checks and balances are in place to make sure the process is fair?</strong></p>
<p>Voting at the branch AGMs is monitored by trusted veterans chosen by the Provincial Executive Committee who are deployed to monitor the process. </p>
<p>Voting usually takes place by show of hands, but may be done by secret ballot. The team monitoring the process must take a picture of results of voting recorded on paper using their cellphones and send the image to the party’s national headquarters at <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/contacts">Luthuli House</a>, in Johannesburg. This is to prevent ballot results being tampered with.</p>
<p><strong>What are the flaws in the system?</strong></p>
<p>I believe the process is fair. But it would be fairer if there was a direct one-member-one-vote system instead of branch totals. </p>
<p>The flaws in the system relate to the extent to which rigging can take place. This can happen by wealthy politicians setting up ghost branches. Provincial executive committees also sometimes try to manipulate the outcome of the branch AGMs. This can happen through manipulating who <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/kzn-anc-rebels-lash-out-at-leaders-20171106">gets chosen to represent the branch</a> as a delegate to the national conference.</p>
<p>But the biggest opening to possible fraud is through using the issuing of ANC membership cards to “gatekeep” – stopping people from being able to vote in branches, or even from attending the conference. Membership cards, and being included on the membership list compiled by Luthuli House, national HQ (as opposed to lists kept by one’s own branch and provincial office) matter because they give individuals the right to vote at their branches, as well as at the conference if they’re chosen to go as a delegate.</p>
<p>During the last few conferences there were accusations that the Zuma faction of the ANC deliberately used the fact that renewals and new cards can take a very long time to issue to keep certain people from attending (and voting). </p>
<p>The issuing of cards is a mess. New members complain bitterly about waiting inordinately long periods - sometimes up to 21 months - to get their membership cards. Renewals can also take forever. The renewal of the late ANC former cabinet minister Kader Asmal’s membership card reached his widow five years after he died.</p>
<p>Sometimes, some members in good standing suddenly discover that their names have been removed from the membership register. The most high profile of these cases was <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/zweli-mkhizes-name-not-on-branch-voters-roll-11891535">Zweli Mkhize</a>, the party’s treasurer and one of its top six leaders. </p>
<p>Five years ago an example of gatekeeping hit one branch’s delegate when he arrived at the national conference at Mangaung. He was told he was not a member in good standing. He was in fact an ANC Member of the Provincial Legislature. Only after votes were cast which saw Jacob Zuma re-emerge as party president was it conceded that he was actually a member in good standing.</p>
<p>Another potential flaw is that delegates who are mandated by their branch to vote for one particular candidate are persuaded – for example by being bribed when they get to the conference – to vote for someone else. </p>
<p>Voting at the conference is by secret ballot. The assumption is that branch delegates will behave with integrity and vote for the person their branch mandated them to vote for. </p>
<p>But even if they do accept a bribe, those reportedly offering <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-23-cyril-ramaphosa-leads-but-foul-play-may-snatch-victory">the bribe</a> have no way of knowing if the delegate actually did change his or her vote.</p>
<p>South Africans, especially ANC voters, will be watching closely for any signs of rigging, bribing branch delegates to switch their votes, and other manipulations. If all is free and fair the process certainly equals, for example, the degree of democracy in UK and US parties choosing their leaders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88404/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>The ANC’s elective conference is important for the party and South Africa. This is because the person chosen to lead the governing party since 1994, has gone on to become president.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/836472017-09-11T19:58:26Z2017-09-11T19:58:26ZExposés about South Africa’s deputy president point to ulterior motives<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185266/original/file-20170908-25998-112bc66.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa says his emails were hacked. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent media <a href="https://www.wmcleaks.com/cyril-ramaphosa-cheater-womanizer-corrupt-politician/?gclid=Cj0KCQjwub7NBRDJARIsAP7wlT8WBGbg2yYwikFuIE7uho6gW7105SyUJOck27c08sfQg3fKRMVDkHsaAoRZEALw_wcB">“revelations”</a> about South Africa’s Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa’s several alleged extramarital affairs are the classic approach to creating doubt about a prominent person’s integrity. </p>
<p>They also call into question his claim to be a <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-launches-campaign-with-attack-on-zuma-guptas-20170423">suitable moral or ethical alternative</a> to President Jacob Zuma’s corrupt administration. The latest accusations are meant to attack the very foundation of his campaign to lead both the ANC and the country. Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-09-02-ramaphosa-speaks-out-im-not-a-blesser-but-i-did-have-an-affair/">admitted</a> to having had an affair a decade ago.</p>
<p>This is not the first time that prominent ANC personalities have been placed in a situation similar to Ramaphosa’s. In the past accusations were made against <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/motlanthes-affairs-a-secret-432345">Kgalema Motlanthe</a>, a former ANC secretary-general and deputy president, and against <a href="https://citizen.co.za/lifestyle/your-life-technology/1312181/picture-naked-nzimande-with-his-student-girlfriend-on-a-bed/">Blade Nzimande</a>, general-secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Minister of Higher Education. The SACP is in a governing <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/kids/tripartite-alliance">tri-partite alliance</a> with the ANC and labour federation Cosatu.</p>
<p>More specific reports of alleged infidelity have appeared against Police Minister <a href="http://www.sundayworld.co.za/shwashwi/2016/11/16/fikile-mbalula-on-sex-scandal-this-thing-was-a-one-night-stand">Fikile Mbalula</a> and <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/2017/05/22/radebe-apologises-sex-text-saga/">Jeff Radebe</a>, minister in the Presidency. <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/anc-suspends-marius-fransman-for-5-years-20161110">Marius Fransman</a>, the ANC’s Western Cape leader, has been suspended for five years for sexual misconduct.</p>
<p>It would be inappropriate to generalise about all of them. And, with the available information, the Ramaphosa case appears to be an example of the tried-and-tested trick of spreading rumours about or exposing infidelity. </p>
<p>It is noteworthy that Ramaphosa’s defence mentions this directly, and that state institutions are being used (by the pro-Zuma group) to <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/latest-episode-an-escalation-of-a-dirty-war-ramaphosa-responds-to-smear-campaign-20170902">neutralise his election campaign</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It represents an escalation of a dirty war against those who are working to restore the values, principles and integrity of the African National Congress and society.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ramaphosa is considered a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-07-22-poll-has-ramaphosa-beating-dlamini-zuma/">frontrunner</a> among the contenders to replace Zuma - ahead of the president’s preferred successor, <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/dlamini-zuma-indicates-she-is-ready-for-presidency">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>. </p>
<h2>Gunning for Ramaphosa</h2>
<p>The campaign to discredit Ramaphosa has gone through several stages: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>first, an attempt was made to compromise him by placing blame for the <a href="https://citizen.co.za/opinion/opinion-columns/1613696/marikana-continues-to-haunt-ramaphosa/">Marikana massacre</a> on him. </p></li>
<li><p>Then he was discredited as a puppet of business who is being manipulated by <a href="http://www.whitemonopolycapital.com/tag/cyril-ramaphosa/">“white monopoly capital”</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>These were followed by the claim that he was being manipulated by a “white clique” that manage his election campaign and that he was, therefore, not <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-08-02-cr17-team-claims-that-the-campaign-is-run-by-whites-are-inherently-racist">genuinely “black”</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>He was also accused of having beaten his ex-wife. But, she <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/malema">refuted</a> the allegation.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The latest line of attack seeks to advance the view that his moral outrage against Zuma’s corruption and unethical leadership is compromised by his own immoral extramarital relations. Importantly, he admitted to having <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-09-02-ramaphosa-speaks-out-im-not-a-blesser-but-i-did-have-an-affair/">had an affair</a> a decade ago. </p>
<p>But, the campaign to discredit Ramaphosa appears to not be getting the desired effect. The general sentiment among <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-09-04-were-not-electing-a-pope-cosatu-anc-chief-whip-back-ramaphosa/">ANC spokespersons</a> and those of <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosas-alleged-extramarital-affairs-is-a-silly-non-scandal-cosatu-20170904">Cosatu</a> is one of dismay. <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1637687/i-support-and-love-him-says-ramaphosas-wife-tshepo-motsepe-following-cheating-scandal/">Ramaphosa’s family</a> and acquaintances have also dismissed the latest accusations against him. </p>
<p>The fact that some refers to events about eight years ago, and the fact that they openly challenge Ramaphosa’s character, point to possible ulterior motives. </p>
<h2>Message to detractors</h2>
<p>An important aspect of the current Ramaphosa case is that it is an indirect message to Zuma’s opponents. Zuma is making it clear that he still has sufficient access to intelligence agencies to expose the skeletons in their cupboards. It will likely dampen the emerging rebellion in the ANC. An example of such rebellion was seen during the recent <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-08-08-no-confidence-vote-the-people-versus-jacob-zuma">motion of no confidence</a> against him in Parliament. It saw 35 ANC MPs defy orders to toe the party line in the motion brought by the opposition.</p>
<p>If it’s seen in the same light as the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/31/hawks-subpoenas-trevor-manuel-and-his-former-deputy-over-sars-probe">Hawks’ investigations</a> into former finance minister Trevor Manuel and his deputy Jabu Moleketi; and then former South African Revenue Service Commissioner <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-08-31-hawks-vs-gordhan-reboot-former-finance-minister-once-more-in-special-units-sights/#.Wa__6rIjGpo">Pravin Gordhan</a>, about SARS intelligence and Treasury management; it sends a message to Ramaphosa supporters: to tread carefully in the future.</p>
<p>The fact that the ANC leadership nomination process <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/anc-officially-opens-nomination-of-leadership-contest-20170905">has commenced</a>, and that intense contestation can be expected ahead of the party’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/officials/current">national elective conference</a> in December, the possibility of serious incidents shouldn’t be excluded. </p>
<p>Political assassinations already underway in KwaZulu-Natal <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/political-killings-could-plunge-kzn-municipalities-into-state-of-ungovernability-cogta-mec-20170905">might increase</a>.</p>
<h2>Serious setbacks</h2>
<p>Another important symptom of the motive behind the Ramaphosa case is the fact that Zuma has experienced a set of serious setbacks lately. These include that:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the Guptas, the business family and his friends at the centre of state capture, are <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-07/backlash-over-south-africa-graft-claims-threatens-gupta-empire">suffering a meltdown</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>there are new parliamentary investigations into <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/ideas/2017-07-26-parliament-is-turning-up-the-heat-in-the-state-capture-kitchen/">state capture</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>the demise of his key supporters in government agencies (like <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/brianmolefe-fired-again-9448206">Brian Molefe</a>, <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/eskom-board-chair-resigns-20170612">Ben Ngubane</a>, <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2017/06/12/hlaudi-motsoeneng-is-out---former-sabc-coo-has-been-fired">Hlaudi Motsoeneng</a>, <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/18/berning-ntlemeza-s-bid-to-return-to-work-as-hawks-head-doused">Berning Ntlemeza</a>); </p></li>
<li><p>the South African Broadcasting Corporation is increasingly exhibiting <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-12-sabc-interim-board-confirms-dismissal-of-hlaudi-motsoeneng">independence</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>the ANC’s parliamentary caucus is rebelling <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-03-16-ancs-voting-cattle-in-parliament-show-signs-of-anti-zuma-revolt/">against him</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>he has suffered several negative <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/spytapes-case-court-rules-that-zuma-charges-be-reviewed-2015740">court judgments</a>; and </p></li>
<li><p>the UK public relations company <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-pr-giant-bell-pottinger-made-itself-look-bad-83529">Bell Pottinger’s woes</a> have also discredited Zuma’s mantra of “white monopoly capital”. The British public relations company employed by the Gupta business empire got embroiled in ANC internal politics. It has since been sanctioned for its role in promoting the racially divisive “white monopoly capital” narrative sponsored by the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-24-00-the-gupta-owned-state-enterprises">Guptas</a>, Zuma’s friends at the core of <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1525127/read-damning-new-academic-state-capture-report/">state capture</a> allegations.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Warning to the media</h2>
<p>The months leading towards the ANC’s December conference will be a trying period for the South African mainstream media. They are a lucrative target for abuse by the two main ANC election campaigns. </p>
<p>Leaks, planted information, fake news and attempts to lure journalists to support either faction are all very likely possibilities. The Ramaphosa case has been the first major test for the media. Clear editorial policies, uncompromised ethical practices and exceptional professionalism are what will see the media through. It cannot afford mistakes or miscalculations in the next four months.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Accusations against South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa appear to be an example of the tried-and-tested trick to discredit him and his political campaign to become the next president.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/823992017-08-13T09:17:59Z2017-08-13T09:17:59ZWhat’s happening inside the ANC, not parliament, is key to why Zuma prevails<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181812/original/file-20170811-13511-8ns7li.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of President Jacob Zuma reacting to the vote of no confidence proceedings in parliament.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Rogan Ward</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What matters inside the African National Congress, the party that governs South Africa, is not necessarily what matters outside it. This obvious point is missed by much of the commentary on the latest unsuccessful <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/08/zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote">motion of no confidence </a> in President Jacob Zuma – and in much discussion of South African politics.</p>
<p>One result of ignoring this reality is the claim that the vote seriously <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-08-09-analysis-even-as-he-wins-his-8th-no-confidence-vote-zuma-appears-weak/">weakened Zuma</a> because several dozen ANC members of parliament supported the motion or abstained.</p>
<p>This was the first time some ANC MPs supported a motion of no confidence in an ANC president. But, while Zuma came <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/08/zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote">within 21 votes of losing</a> in parliament, he was probably backed by 80% or more of the ANC caucus. Most of the votes against him were cast by opposition MPs, who do not have a say in who is ANC president, not ANC members, who do. </p>
<p>Unless parliament passes a motion of no confidence in him, which is not on the cards any time soon, his future depends on whether he was weakened in the ANC, not parliament.</p>
<p>Within the ANC, Zuma’s future is not the absorbing fixation it is outside it.</p>
<h2>Loyalty amid factionalism</h2>
<p>For many outside the ANC, politicians are defined by whether they want Zuma to go. Inside it, the key reality is a battle between two factions: Zuma’s is accused by its opponents, whose likeliest presidential candidate is deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa, of using public office to advance private interests. While Zuma is supported by one and opposed by the other, both know he does not shape what the ANC and government do on his own – he acts as part of a faction. If he goes and the faction wins, nothing changes and so for both sides, winning the factional battle is far more important than Zuma’s fate.</p>
<p>The contest is centred on winning the leadership elections at the ANC’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">December national elective conference</a>. What both sides do, they do with that in mind – Zuma’s fate is a product of this battle.</p>
<p>Key figures in the factions also want to run an ANC in good shape to win the next election and so they worry about splitting or damaging the organisation. If doing what matters to people outside the ANC risks harming it, they will not do it.</p>
<p>There is no evidence yet that the vote weakened Zuma’s faction. Because the vote was secret, we don’t know which MPs voted for him to go. But common sense suggests that they are not pro-Zuma faction members who changed sides but staunch members of the group which wants him gone. So the anti-Zuma group has not grown because some of its members expressed themselves more forcefully.</p>
<p>Nor does it show that the tide within the ANC is moving against Zuma. What matters inside the ANC, but not outside it, is loyalty to the organisation. For many years it was banned and under constant attack – this produced a culture in which the default position is to close ranks in the face of what it sees as outside attack. This made the dissent by ANC MPs a huge step for them. But there is no reason why their view should be shared by others – given the premium on loyalty, their decision could help the pro-Zuma faction by discrediting its opposition.</p>
<p>This misfit between the logic of ANC politics and that outside it explains other aspects of the no confidence vote which have caused confusion. One is that figures such as secretary-general Gwede Mantashe and chief whip Jackson Mthembu <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/no-confidence-vote-not-about-zuma-but-about-anc-mantashe-20170808">worked to get ANC MPs to defeat the motion</a> although they oppose Zuma’s faction; the SA Communist Party, which has <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-must-go-sacp-20170331">called on Zuma to go</a>, did not ask its members to support the motion.</p>
<p>They did this not because they have switched sides but because they believed Zuma’s defeat in a no confidence vote was unlikely – and would not help them if it happened. The opposing faction would still be there, as strong as before. They might be strong enough to replace Zuma with another member of the faction, changing nothing. Or, more likely, the deadlock between the factions would tear the ANC apart and might allow the opposition to elect a president by default. So they preferred to feign loyalty and to work to take over the ANC in December.</p>
<h2>Balance of power</h2>
<p>This means that the overwhelming ANC caucus vote against the motion does not tell us that the faction to which Zuma belongs is winning and will control the ANC after December. Many MPs who voted against the anti-Zuma motion may be part of the faction which wants him gone: they may have voted as they did because the leaders of their faction told them that strategy made this necessary. So the balance of power in the ANC, which decided who will lead it next year, may not have been affected either way by the no confidence vote.</p>
<p>What is happening inside the ANC may not be morally uplifting. But nor is it about foolishness or hypocrisy. It stems from decisions which are entirely logical if what matters inside the ANC matters to you. If everyone outside the ANC wants to grasp what is happening and where it might lead, they need to understand what matters inside the ANC.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82399/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Unless parliament passes a motion of no confidence in him, which is not on the cards any time soon, Zuma’s future depends on whether he’s weakened in the African National Congress, not parliament.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/820922017-08-04T12:32:20Z2017-08-04T12:32:20ZZuma no confidence vote: the ANC is the loser, whatever happens<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181020/original/file-20170804-2386-1p04e9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Jacob Zuma with Parliament's Speaker Baleka Mbete.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s governing African National Congress has got itself into one hell of a pickle. The National Assembly is due to debate an opposition motion of <a href="http://www.biznews.com/leadership/2017/07/05/zuma-no-confidence-motion/">no confidence </a> in President Jacob Zuma. </p>
<p>Were the motion to succeed, Zuma and his entire cabinet would be forced under the constitution to <a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-critics-within-the-anc-are-vocal-but-will-they-act-75587">resign</a>. The Speaker of the House would then become Acting President for up to 30 days while it goes about the business of electing a replacement, who would then serve as state president until the expiry of the present term of parliament in early 2019. </p>
<p>Yet the reality is that, save a political tsunami, the motion won’t succeed even though it’s common currency that Zuma is irredeemably corrupt and that he has <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">sold his country out</a> to the Gupta family. He has also alienated many of the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/05/24/sacp-stands-with-cosatu-on-its-zuma-banning_a_22106553/">ANC’s traditional allies</a>, and the performances of the government and the economy under his rule have become <a href="https://mybroadband.co.za/news/business/205458-three-graphs-which-show-how-zuma-wrecked-south-africas-economy.html">increasingly shambolic</a>.</p>
<p>Key figures in the ANC have indicated that their party’s MPs should vote with the opposition. These include former President Thabo Mbeki who has proclaimed that ANC MPs should vote in the national rather than the <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/mbeki-anc-mps-must-put-voters-first-8610759">party interest</a>. Similarly, the recently dismissed finance minister, Pravin Gordhan, has urged MPs to allow their consciences to dictate their votes.</p>
<p>Despite such calls, only two ANC MPs, <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-07-19-zuma-is-disgraceful-dishonourable-khoza/">Makhosi Khoza</a> and <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1589063/mondli-gungubele-refuses-to-toe-the-party-line-on-vote-of-no-confidence/">Mondli Gungubele</a>, have openly declared that they will vote with the opposition. The ANC has indicated it will subject Khoza to <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/makhosi-khoza-unfazed-and-unshaken-as-she-fights-anc-disciplinary-charges-20170801">disciplinary proceedings</a>. Gungubele may well face a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-31-mthembu-anc-must-act-against-defiant-mp-mondli-gungubele">similar fate</a>. If the ANC follows through on its threats, both may lose their jobs (for if a party expels an MP from party membership, the MP concerned can no longer sit in parliament).</p>
<p>There are certainly other MPs sitting on the ANC benches who recognise the damage that Zuma has done. But it appears they have been held back from speaking out because of the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/02/support-no-confidence-motion-in-zuma-at-own-risk-mbalula">threat of dismissal</a> from parliament and the loss of salary and status that would involve. </p>
<p>It’s for this reason that the opposition has set such store on securing a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-16-no-confidence-motion-secret-ballot-gains-ground-in-concourt/#.WYMg_YSGM9c">secret ballot</a> – reckoning that this will allow ANC MPs to vote in favour of the motion while circumventing the risk of party discipline.</p>
<h2>ANC’s conundrum</h2>
<p>When faced by the request of the opposition parties that she allow a secret ballot on the no confidence motion, Baleka Mbete, the Speaker of the House (and a member of the ANC’s National Executive Committee) declared that she did not have the power to grant the request under the rules of the Assembly. However, after being approached by opposition parties, the Constitutional Court subsequently ruled that a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-06-22-read-in-full-concourt-ruling-on-secret-ballot/">secret ballot was permissible</a>, throwing the decision back into her lap. Mbete has yet to make public her decision.</p>
<p>In the end she sought to deflect criticism by announcing <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-08-07-mbete-allows-secret-ballot/">in favour</a> of a secret ballot – but only at the last minute. </p>
<p>But even if enough ANC MPs were to align themselves with the opposition to unseat Zuma, the ANC would remain in control of the immediate situation because it would retain its majority in the House, and it would be another ANC MP who would be elected to serve as president. </p>
<p>Yet win or lose the vote, the consequences for the ANC are dire. </p>
<h2>Options for the ANC</h2>
<p>The party faces three possible options:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The ANC wins the vote by a substantial majority, with only a handful of ANC MPs voting with the opposition. Supposedly this would be a massive victory for the ruling party, yet it will fly in the face of not just the parliamentary opposition, but a massive body of popular opinion throughout the country. The ANC would have voted to keep a deeply corrupt president in power, with probable long term disastrous electoral consequences. Any internal ANC “reform” project will be more likely to fail.</p></li>
<li><p>The ANC just scrapes home by a small majority, indicating that a substantial body of the party’s MPs have voted for Zuma to go. Cue internal party turmoil. Will the dissident MPs own up? If they do, will they face party discipline? What would happen if the dissidents were known to include party heavyweights (and potential candidates for the party leadership at the party’s national congress in December 2017) such as <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/04/24/ramaphosa-readies-for-his-anc-presidency-campaign-by-attacking-z_a_22052547/">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> and <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/lindiwe-sisulu-launches-presidential-campaign-to-cleanse-and-save-anc-20170722">Lindiwe Sisulu</a>? Subjecting them to party discipline would risk not just massive intra-party division, but a split within the party – and the further danger that they might team up with the opposition.</p></li>
</ul>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181022/original/file-20170804-27415-n72zdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181022/original/file-20170804-27415-n72zdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181022/original/file-20170804-27415-n72zdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181022/original/file-20170804-27415-n72zdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181022/original/file-20170804-27415-n72zdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1026&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181022/original/file-20170804-27415-n72zdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1026&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181022/original/file-20170804-27415-n72zdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1026&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa, Deputy president of South Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr/GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<ul>
<li>The ANC loses the vote, and Zuma is forced to stand down as state president. In this case, the ANC is openly divided, and all hell would break out within the party ahead of its <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">conference in December</a>. An ANC MP, probably Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, would be elected as state president, but Zuma would remain as party president. </li>
</ul>
<p>The ANC would be at war with itself, with little or no prospect of it facing the electorate in 2019 in one piece. Were the ANC to offer Zuma an amnesty from prosecution, they would face a massive public backlash. If they didn’t, they would face the very real prospect of his having to face trial, with the party’s extraordinarily dirty linen being washed in public for the foreseeable future.</p>
<p>Whatever happens, Zuma will work ceaselessly and ruthlessly after the debate to secure the party presidency for his former wife, (and favoured candidate) <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/president-publicly-endorses-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-for-anc-leader">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>, reckoning that in so doing, he will retain the power to shape events (and not least, to keep himself out of jail). </p>
<p>Meanwhile, those opposing Zuma will need to rapidly group behind one leader (presumably the new state president) if they are to stand a decent chance of securing enough control over the party organisation to defeat Dlamini-Zuma in December. Rivalry between the prospective anti-Zuma candidates for the party leadership (notably Ramaphosa, Lindiwe Sisulu and Mathews Phosa), would only weaken their chances of victory.</p>
<h2>Ominous future</h2>
<p>Tim Cohen, editor of Business Day, has indicated, sagely, that the Zuma presidency has begun to wind down as the <a href="http://amabhungane.co.za/article/2017-07-22-gupta-leakscom-everything-you-ever-need-to-know-about-guptaleaks-in-one-place">#Gupta Leaks</a> – the series of emails detailing the extent of the Gupta family’s control of the state – reveal more and more dirt. More and more ANC rats will desert the sinking ship and seek safety on a new (anti-Zuma) ANC vessel.</p>
<p>Yet even if the anti-Zuma campaign was to gain enough momentum for victory in December, it will come at massive cost. Not the least of these dangers is that the already alarmingly high rate of <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/shooting-of-anc-councillors-in-kzn-could-plunge-municipality-into-chaos-mec-20170714">intra-party killing of rivals</a> will increase.</p>
<p>It’s difficult to imagine that the ANC will be in any reasonable shape to face the electorate in 2019. Although ostensibly it may yet put on a decent show, it seems inevitable that it will lose numerous votes and a large swathe of MPs.</p>
<p>The looming danger is that in facing the risk of defeat, the party will be tempted to subvert a contrary result in the 2019 election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation </span></em></p>Even if President Zuma wins the no confidence vote, the consequences for the ruling ANC are dire. A loss would see it further divided and weakened ahead of the 2019 elections.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/811122017-07-27T03:03:36Z2017-07-27T03:03:36ZPolitical irrationality is ruining South Africa, but can still be stopped<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179020/original/file-20170720-23992-83iazg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma was slammed as being irrational for the recent cabinet reshuffle.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In popular conceptions of what it means to be human is the universal notion that our species - <em>homo sapiens</em> - is essentially rational. It’s commonly believed that as rational beings, our thoughts and actions are informed by reason and logic that precludes the influence of emotions. On the other hand, irrationality is associated with defective reasoning, perverse thinking, being excessively emotional, or at worst, crazy.</p>
<p>Democracy, and by extension good governance, presupposes the capacity of political leadership to engage in reasoned debate, informed decision making and measured judgements. In the South African context, it’s assumed that this will all happen within the framework of the <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996">Constitution</a>.</p>
<p>In this way democratic governance is premised on rationality. It appears to be unthinkable without it. But is this true?</p>
<p>No. And certainly not in South Africa now. Irrationality is the term frequently used to describe the country’s political landscape. This is clear from the coverage of the embattled government of President Jacob Zuma, and its leadership. </p>
<p>The growing anxiety and uncertainty in the country is aptly articulated by the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-04-02-power-and-principle-has-zuma-checked-reason-and-rationality-at-the-door/">news headline</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Has Zuma checked reason and rationality at the door? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the unfolding drama of the far-reaching political scandal that threatens South Africa’s nascent democracy, known as “<a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/anc-calls-on-government-to-probe-gupta-email-allegations">Guptagate</a>”, political leadership has been repeatedly called out for its irrational behaviour. In response to Zuma’s most <a href="https://theconversation.com/stakes-for-south-africas-democracy-are-high-as-zuma-plunges-the-knife-75550">recent cabinet reshuffle</a> where he replaced finance minister Pravin Gordhan, Bonang Mohale, deputy chairperson of Business Leadership South Africa, <a href="http://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/251139/zuma-responsible-for-turmoil-recklessness-and-irrationality-blsa">said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have the President [Zuma] to thank for all this turmoil, irrationality and absolute recklessness… </p>
</blockquote>
<p>For its part, the opposition Democratic Alliance went to court to have the president’s decision set aside on the grounds that it was <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/02/zuma-granted-leave-to-appeal-ruling-to-hand-over-cabinet-reshuffle-records">irrational and unconstitutional</a>. </p>
<p>More recently the South African Reserve Bank, known for its conservative stance, openly accused the Public Protector of being reckless and irrational in her attempts to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-06-27-reserve-bank-challenges-public-protector-report-in-court/">amend the Constitution</a>. Her recommendations in a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-07-06-hands-off-sarb-public-protector-meddling-a-great-threat-to-an-economy-crippled-by-serious-problems/">report</a> on a bank bailout, has been widely viewed as beyond the mandate of her office and a threat to the stability of the economy.</p>
<p>The use of the word “irrational” in South Africa’s political debates begs interrogation. Increasing accounts of political irrationality naturally raise concerns about the effectiveness of democratic governance – and its legitimacy.</p>
<h2>Dispelling the ‘myth’ of rationality</h2>
<p>Irrationality as a ubiquitous descriptor of political machinations is not peculiar to South Africa. It is well documented across climes and cultures. US President Donald Trump immediately comes to mind. As a world leader he has elicited both censure and derision as grossly irresponsible and fundamentally <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-donald-trump-hate-media-immigrants-20170501-story.html">irrational</a>.</p>
<p>The fact is humans are not rational by default. The <a href="http://danariely.com/2009/04/20/irrationality-is-the-real-invisible-hand/">“invisible hand”</a> that drives human behaviour is in fact, irrationality. Nobel laureate, psychologist <a href="http://bigthink.com/videos/daniel-kahneman-on-controling-irrational-tendencies">Daniel Kahneman</a> together with Amos Tversky and others have pioneered research in this field. </p>
<p>Wired by evolution, cognitive limits restrict how we select, compute, store and adapt to information. Research shows that we employ a range of heuristics (mental shortcuts) that lead to cognitive biases and distorted perceptions. Most of these we’re not even aware of. As behavioural economist <a href="https://www.amazon.de/Predictably-Irrational-Hidden-Forces-Decisions-ebook/dp/B002RI9QJE">Dan Ariely</a>, author of “Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions” asserts:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our irrational behaviours are neither random nor senseless – they are systematic.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For example, humans have the tendency to select information (selection bias) that confirms preexisting beliefs (confirmation bias) while avoiding contradictory information that disturbs their preferred worldview. This <a href="https://theconversation.com/confirmation-bias-a-psychological-phenomenon-that-helps-explain-why-pundits-got-it-wrong-68781">well-researched bias</a> is at work when politicians choose to present skewed, biased evidence that makes them look credible with the public to achieve desired outcomes.</p>
<p>There’s also a self-interested bias where people are prone to distorted thinking because it benefits them in some way. <a href="http://rintintin.colorado.edu/%7Evancecd/phil3600/Huemer1.pdf">Rational irrationality</a> explains how:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(people) choose - rationally - to adopt irrational beliefs because the costs of rational beliefs exceed their benefit. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This goes some way in explaining the reckless actions of politicians like Zuma and Trump who devise irresponsible strategies in the interests of their “rational” endgame.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.cep.ucsb.edu/McDermott/papers/rationality2004.pdf">Neuroscience</a> shows that when it comes to decision making, humans are wired to favour emotions over intellect. This means emotions have an impact on our decisions in various ways. For example, in the face of deep uncertainty – a persistent feature of our age – unconscious emotions and perceptions render us prone to cognitive biases and errors.</p>
<p>This refutes the ideal of the stoic “rational man”, a description that persistently devalues women and castes them as the “weaker” sex. This stereotype – of women as emotionally volatile and incapable of rational thought – has served to exclude them from the corridors of power. </p>
<h2>Political irrationality has dire consequences</h2>
<p>Because irrationality is inherently human, it’s been a persistent part of politics throughout history. There’s substantial evidence that entrenched and unchecked irrationality has devastating consequences. This has happened when political leaders eschew reason and logic. In South Africa’s case this is clear from the country’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/04/south-africa-credit-rating-junk-status-sends-rand-tumbling">crippled economy</a> and rising <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-23-op-ed-the-descent-of-jacob-zuma-in-31-steps-and-counting/">discontent</a>. </p>
<p>But this doesn’t mean that irrationality has to prevail. South African civil society and democratic institutions have come to the party. They are increasingly challenging the irrational, unconstitutional actions of the ANC-led government and its leadership. What’s patently evident is that a free, independent press, the rule of law as enshrined in the Constitution and an independent judiciary are the bulwarks of a democracy under assault.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81112/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lyn Snodgrass does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Democracy and good governance require politicians to engage in reasoned debate, informed decision making and measured judgements. This presupposes rationality. Is this always true?Lyn Snodgrass, Associate Professor and Head of Department of Political and Conflict Studies, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/807802017-07-17T14:49:29Z2017-07-17T14:49:29ZThe best way South Africans can honour Mandela is by being active citizens<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178432/original/file-20170717-23045-1qxlxnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As one of the iconic leaders of the 20th century, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">Nelson Mandela</a> fought for democracy, justice, peace and reconciliation. He showed the world what it meant to live a life in the <a href="https://www.mandeladay.com/">service of others</a>.</p>
<p>In his own unique way, Mandela helped to restore the world’s trust and confidence in South Africa after apartheid. To honour his legacy the United Nations in 2009, decided that July 18, his birthday, would be <a href="https://www.mandeladay.com/">Mandela Day</a>.</p>
<p>People in 149 countries mark the day by taking time out to help others. As <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2013/12/06/nelson-mandela-madiba-meaning/3889469/">Madiba</a> – his clan name derived from his Xhosa ancestry – has shown, everyone has the ability and responsibility to help change the world for the better. </p>
<p>This year the <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/">Nelson Mandela Foundation</a> is encouraging people to specifically take action <a href="http://www.krepublishers.com/02-Journals/JSS/JSS-34-0-000-13-Web/JSS-34-2-000-13-Abst-PDF/JSS-34-2-145-13-1393-Sekhampu-T-J/JSS-34-2-145-13-1393-Sekhampu-T-J-Tx%5B6%5D.pmd.pdf">against poverty</a>. More than 63% of South African children live in poverty; one in five - 12 million - South Africans live in <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/63-of-young-sa-children-live-in-poverty-study-20160513">extreme poverty</a>.</p>
<p>Despite the positive impact of <a href="http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/6653">social grants</a>, poverty continues to halt progress in South Africa. Only through sustained development can it be eradicated to ensure a <a href="https://www.mandeladay.com/">dignified life</a> for all.</p>
<p>South Africa could do with its citizens becoming more active. In Brazil popular movements have worked with business elites to redistribute wealth and opportunity in a society that’s as unequal as South Africa. Without exception, development - particularly efforts to tackle poverty and inequality - is best achieved through a combination of <a href="https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/From_Poverty_to_Power_2nd_Edition.pdf">active citizenship and effective states</a>.</p>
<p>South Africa needs a brave and moral leadership to redirect its citizens (and politicians) to fight the scourge of poverty through development. Moral leadership has the ability to educate and activate communities to restore human dignity. </p>
<h2>Positive publicity and effective governance</h2>
<p>The country’s <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work.pdf">National Development Plan</a> aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. South Africa can realise these goals by drawing on the energies of its people. The country also needs to grow an inclusive economy, build capabilities, enhance the capacity of the state, and promote leadership and partnerships throughout society. </p>
<p>The plan makes it clear that to accelerate development, all South Africans must come on board. Leadership in all sectors must also put the country’s collective interests ahead of narrow, short-term goals. </p>
<p>This will require policy changes, the implementation of government programmes and holding people - especially political leaders - accountable for their actions. Also sorely needed are innovative solutions to complex challenges like <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-current-measures-underestimate-the-level-of-poverty-in-south-africa-46704?sa=pg2&sq=poverty&sr=3">poverty</a>, <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-unemployment-statistics-in-south-africa-explained/">unemployment</a> an <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-01-16-sas-rich-poor-gap-is-far-worse-than-feared-says-oxfam-inequality-report/">inequality</a>.</p>
<p>South Africa urgently needs to recover from the damage caused by <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/how-zumafication-happened">“Zumafication”</a> – where its president is accused of running the country through personal networks of favouritism and cronyism. John Wallis, the founder of <a href="http://peoplecapital.yolasite.com/resources/D-Open%20Letters.Vol-1.pp.67-76-D-.pdf">The People Capital Project SA</a> says some members of President Jacob Zuma’s executive have become tainted as corrupt and untrustworthy kleptocrats. </p>
<p>Many promises, scenario plans and forecasts have not been translated into homegrown and concrete development proposals, backed by a robust development curriculum, to help South Africa turn the socio-economic corner. The country has yet to be characterised by high levels of innovation, equality, opportunities, economic justice and human rights.</p>
<p>As such, the hopes and expectations of the poor have collapsed, leaving them even poorer (and less productive) than they previously were.</p>
<p>Zuma has become a prisoner of his own making - both the tool and agent of a self-serving political elite, amid growing <a href="http://panmacmillan.bookslive.co.za/blog/2009/05/28/moeletsi-mbekis-architects-of-poverty-why-africas-capitalism-needs-changing/">poverty and hunger</a>. </p>
<p>How long can this go on before the country’s economy – already <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-04-00-godongwana-anc-is-clueless-about-sas-economic-challenges/%E2%80%8B">in the doldrums</a> – implodes, and a deep rooted entitlement inspired complacency turns into social upheaval? </p>
<h2>Honouring Mandela’s legacy</h2>
<p>This state of affairs often leads to secrecy, deep political factions, <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">state capture, looting and corruption</a>, as already seen. The growing dispossession of citizens amid growing accumulation by a few elites results in growing economic injustice, leaving more people on the fringes of society.</p>
<p>Where the state and corporate bosses are only driven by financial growth and gain, without coupling it with productive development projects, they hold the down-trodden to ransom.</p>
<p>South Africans can no longer standby and watch their “house” burn. To truly honour Mandela’s legacy, they should espouse the values of active citizenship and help restore the world’s confidence in their country. Otherwise, they’ll continue barking at the moon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80780/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To honour the legacy of Nelson Mandela, South Africa could do with its citizens becoming more active in driving development - particularly efforts to tackle poverty an inequality.Chris Jones, Academic project leader in the Department of Practical Theology and Missiology, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/807052017-07-09T10:59:47Z2017-07-09T10:59:47ZANC policy conference shows shifting balance of power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177427/original/file-20170708-29852-p06zyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Competing to be the next president of South Africa's ANC: Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The media <a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-policy-conference-deeper-polarisation-and-a-stalemate-for-south-africa-80515">reported</a> on the national policy conference of the African National Congress (ANC) through the perspective of power struggles. This wasn’t far off the mark. While the ANC’s internal election campaign for its <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/26/paul-mashatile-confident-anc-will-head-to-elective-conference-united">December conference</a> - at which it will elect a new party leader - has not yet officially opened, in reality its party election campaigns are similar to US primaries, which run for an entire year.</p>
<p>In fact power politics was underway long before the national policy conference <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-06-30-anc-policy-conference-reporters-notebook-a-frozen-start/#.WV-4CoSGPIU">started</a> just outside Johannesburg on June 30th. Before policy motions were submitted, ordinary members are supposed to seek approval from branches. They then purportedly go to regional and finally provincial policy conferences.</p>
<p>But the reality was much rougher. The <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/06/25/factional-battles-plague-the-anc-in-the-western-cape_a_22980590/">experience</a> in the Western Cape, one of the nine ANC provincial structures, provides a good example. Its provincial policy conference started two hours late, and then had an hour and a half of disguised electioneering <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-02-28-analysts-put-their-money-on-cyril-ramaphosa-winning-anc-leadership-battle/">for Cyril Ramaphosa</a> – the deputy president – complete with rival sing-alongs by some 60 supporters of Ramaphosa and 30 supporters for <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-05-19-00-what-lies-beneath-the-many-faces-of-dr-dlamini-zuma">rival contender</a> Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Next, branch after branch took the floor to complain that they had not been allowed to register for the provincial policy conference. </p>
<p>The Provincial Executive Committee, with observers deployed by the party’s National Executive Committee, explained that the province had only been allocated 155 delegates to the national policy conference. This was less than the number of branches in good standing. (To be in good standing, a branch must have at least 100 paid up members. Only branches in good standing are allowed to send voting delegates to any conference.) So they had selected branches to ensure representation by geography and demographics. After continuing protests, the conference was abandoned without any debate over branch policy motions.</p>
<p>Political contestation likewise preceded – and had an impact on – the national policy conference. The ad hoc action grouping of 101 ANC veterans and stalwarts <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-06-29-anc-stalwarts-reject-policy-conference-in-battle-for-heart-of-the-party/">turned down</a> an offer of interceding during the first two days of the conference, partly on the grounds that the delegates would not have been mandated by their branches on how to vote. The veterans had been <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-06-30-zuma-says-anc-veterans-calling-for-him-to-step-down-not-as-strong-as-they-think/">publically criticised</a> by President Jacob Zuma.</p>
<p>And the composition of the national policy conference was altered to allocate double the number of delegates originally designated for both the ANC Women’s League and Youth League. (Between 3 700 to 5 000 delegates <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-07-03-branch-members-make-up-two-thirds-of-anc-policy-conference-delegates/">reportedly</a> attended the conference). Since both had publically endorsed Dlamini-Zuma over Ramaphosa, this move tilted the voting power of the rival blocs.</p>
<p>A combination of the pre-conference politicking, plus the machinations just before it met meant heightened tensions between rival factions. Plus eagerness for report-backs to branches.</p>
<h2>Efforts to stop the party splitting</h2>
<p>The media highlighted decisions that were symptomatic of the struggle between the Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma blocs. After debate, Zuma <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/don-t-discard-losing-candidates-at-anc-conferences-zuma">proposed</a> that in the December election for party president, whichever candidate came second should automatically become ANC deputy president. This was proposed as a mechanism to prevent splits in the party as happened in 2008 when <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/its-not-over-for-cope--willie-madisha">COPE was formed</a>, and then again in 2013 when the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/economic-freedom-fighters-eff">EFF was set up</a>. </p>
<p>That Zuma and Dlamini-Zuma support this motion indicates that they are uncertain they will win in December.</p>
<p>The media also flagged four motions as examples of the Ramaphosa faction outvoting the Dlamini-Zuma faction: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the defeat of the motion for land expropriation without compensation;</p></li>
<li><p>the Reserve Bank will retain its autonomy entrenched in the Constitution; only its mandate may be revised, and private shareholders nationalised;</p></li>
<li><p>the choice of the slogan “monopoly capital”, not White Monopoly Capital;</p></li>
<li><p>the latest Mining Charter is not endorsed, but needs to be revised.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>This outcome is interesting because it indicates that while Zuma has a voting majority at the national executive committee, he does not have one at the level of the branches. It appears that the cumulative impact of the steady drip, drip of front page <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/longer-walk-corruption">corruption scandals</a>, the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/full-text-constitutional-court-rules-on-nkandla-public-protector-20160331">Nkandla judgment </a>of the Constitutional Court, and the Gupta email leaks, have alienated branches one by one.</p>
<h2>Policy motions</h2>
<p>What are the chances of any of the policy motions agreed at the policy conference being implemented? Common sense is a good guide. Where the relevant cabinet minister strongly opposes any motion, it will not usually survive. On top of this, when the ANC-as-party recommends them to the ANC-as-government, Treasury will speak up on the cost implications. </p>
<p>An example from earlier conferences serves to make the point. More than a decade ago, a conference policy motion urged that school feeding be extended from primary schools to high schools, for a full cooked meal per day. When the motion was finally accepted by the ANC-as-government it had been amended by removing the reference to a cooked meal, and the insertion of the phrase “the progressive realisation of”. And that is what happened.</p>
<p>Now it’s over to the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). When will they hold regular periodic policy conferences to give their grassroots members in branches the opportunity to revise and update party policies?</p>
<p>Where this leaves the country is that there are no major changes in ANC policies. We can expect escalating campaigning by rival ANC factions all the way until the ANC national conference in December. The race is now wide open between Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma, with the margin between them both constantly shifting and too close to call.</p>
<p>This in turn could have a major impact on abstentions by voters who previously supported the ANC – or lack of them – in the 2019 general elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>A combination of politicking ahead of the ANC policy conference, plus the machinations just before it met meant heightened tensions between rival factions.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/806932017-07-09T10:59:36Z2017-07-09T10:59:36ZANC policy anarchy – its leaders are too weak to lead, or too weak to take over<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177340/original/file-20170707-23720-v9d03h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters expressing their view of President Jacob Zuma's government ahead of the ANC National Policy Conference.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Siphiwe Sibeko/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Disputed resolutions, deferred decisions and policy uncertainty were the prime bequests of the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/5th-national-policy-conference-2017">policy conference</a> of South Africa’s governing African National Congress to the troubled organisation. Hot on the heels of these incongruities were opaque proposals on how the ANC will act on wobbly state institutions that need to implement policy, and porous pitches on improved ethics and integrity.</p>
<p>Even more, the proceedings confirmed that the ANC leadership is in stalemate. Leadership is in transition and factional leaders lack the authority to steer policy in directions that will address the country’s massive delivery backlog.</p>
<p>To the question: is President Jacob Zuma leading the ANC onto <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-anc-may-be-stumbling-closer-to-its-most-serious-split-yet-80282">a path of implosion</a>, the verdict is a sad but unambiguous “yes”. The conference confirmed that the president and his faction are not letting go – neither of their ambitions to determine Zuma’s successor, nor of their efforts to make <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/radical-economic-transformation-zuma-vs-ramaphosa-20170502">“radical economic transformation”</a> their platform. </p>
<p>The conference confirmed that the ANC recognises that the cancer of corruption and capture afflicts it badly. Yet the organisation remains stunted in finding ways to deal with it. </p>
<p>While the conference opted for unity, it’s a unity that precludes cutting out the cancer because it’s embedded in a faction that’s not budging. It will do everything in its power to retain power. That includes gambling with the conference’s policy outcomes.</p>
<p>The policy conference was, in effect, a <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/05/zuma-outlines-remedy-to-kill-anc-factions">six-day war over policy</a>. Factional forces manoeuvred relentlessly to secure influence and power. The epitome of this deep factionalism was that Zuma in his closing address put forward a <a href="https://spiritofcontradiction.eu/dara/2013/02/13/war-of-positionwar-of-manoeuvre">“power-sharing” proposal</a>. His intervention tried to influence delegates to campaign for sharing the top ANC leadership positions. But the president’s factional interests meant that his proposal carried little weight.</p>
<p>Affected by the succession campaign, the overall outcome was approximate policy anarchy. It was directed by leaders who were either too weak to lead or too weak to take over. </p>
<h2>Stalemate state of the ANC</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/splash/index">national policy conference </a>, held every five years, is the ANC’s precursor to the December <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">national elective conference</a> that also adopts the final policy resolutions to supplement or substitute previous policy.</p>
<p>The character of the conference itself revealed a great deal about the indecisive and stalemate state of the current ANC. Unlike previous ones, there was no reliable stream of reports containing draft resolutions. And it failed to deliver consensual recommendations on crucial matters. </p>
<p>Several of the media briefings were delayed or rushed due to ongoing contests – some rhetorical, some ideological – between <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2B1377MXGug">factions in commissions</a>. The Secretary General’s <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/own-up-mantashe-warns-those-implicated-in-guptaleaks-20170630">report</a>, which mentioned the problem of how Zuma has allowed the Indian-born Gupta family to wield undue and corrupting influence, was tabled. But it was immediately <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-03-00-pushback-against-sg-report">discredited</a> by the pro-Zuma faction.</p>
<p>Some media briefings, like the pivotal report and proposed resolutions on legislature and governance – which presumably put the spotlight on issues of corruption, capture, and lack of cadre capacity – never happened. The briefing on organisational renewal was largely made up of a shopping list of issues that had been discussed. Very little else. </p>
<p>Policy certainty was a mirage. The best indicators of future policy were to be found in the subtly changing balance of forces in the succession contest for national ANC leadership. This was the price that the ANC and its factions paid for its short-term goal of unity.</p>
<p>The factional struggle was clearest around the battle over the terminology of “radical economic transformation”. Under this umbrella lay issues such as land expropriation, the mining charter and the role of the <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/183925/the-anc-policy-conference-was-never-really-about-the-policy-anaylst/">Reserve Bank</a>. Where resolutions on these matters materialised, such as “monopoly capitalism” winning vis-à-vis “white monopoly capitalism”, the battle was merely deferred. The reported losers proclaimed that party branches, and thereafter the December conference, would be the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Premier-league-coined-by-those-with-political-agenda-Mahumapelo-20151011">next battleground</a>.</p>
<h2>Share of contested positions</h2>
<p>Previous ANC policy conferences have also had their fair share of contested positions. Five years ago the fight between whether South Africa finds itself in a “second transition” or in the “second phase of the transition to a democratic society” was resolved. </p>
<p>Ten years ago the divisive question was whether then president Thabo Mbeki could contest for a third term as ANC president. Opposing factions compromised, deciding that the ANC president should “preferably” only run for <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/53rd-national-conference-resolutions">two terms</a>. This was followed by the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/docs/res/2013/resolutions53r.pdf">Polokwane</a> national conference at which Mbeki lost to Zuma as party leader.</p>
<p>If the ANC still has the power to <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/227503/the-centre-is-holding-gwede-mantashe">self-correct</a> – or ensure that its centre holds – it certainly didn’t show at this recent policy conference. The need to be radical and ensure equity and justice were conflated with the opportunistic appropriation of “radical economic transformation” for factional succession and continued capturist control of the South African state. </p>
<p>A compromise position of “radical socioeconomic transformation” – a long-standing and considered to be sufficient pivot of the ANC’s ideological stance – was announced but rejected by those supporting the president, including some of the so-called <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/news-national/1280539/the-ancs-cr17-and-premier-league-factions-explained/">Premier League</a> members (a group of provincial party leaders) and the party’s youth and women’s leagues.</p>
<p>This policy conference will be remembered for an ANC in disarray, plagued with internal dissent. It was a policy conference with ambiguous, unresolved policy stances. It ended without a definitive positioning on reconnecting the party with South African citizens and voters. This was the price the ANC paid to keep two powerful factions in the same broad church. </p>
<p>Chances are that the conference exacerbated rather than ameliorated the credibility of the ANC in the eyes of voters. The best hope for this haplessly acting ANC at this stage is not self-correction, but that opposition parties will make mistakes that surpass its own.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80693/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Booysen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The policy conference of South Africa’s governing ANC will be remembered for a party in disarray, plagued with internal dissent.Susan Booysen, Professor in the Wits School of Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/805152017-07-05T10:43:15Z2017-07-05T10:43:15ZANC policy conference: deeper polarisation and a stalemate for South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176871/original/file-20170705-30015-10jr6nb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma at the opening of the ANC's 5th national policy conference in Johannesburg. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s governing African National Congress’s previous four policy conferences have given a very good indication of what the policy resolutions will be at the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/2002-national-policy-conference">national conferences</a> that follow. As a result it was possible to anticipate whether changes in policies or continuity would characterise the next five years, several months before the final conference. </p>
<p>Can the same be expected of the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/5th-national-policy-conference-2017">ANC’s 5th policy conference</a>? </p>
<p>The ANC’s National Conference, held every five years, is its highest decision-making body in terms of electing its leaders and adopting policies. A policy conference is held a few months before the national conference to prepare draft policy resolutions after extensive debates.</p>
<p>Traditionally, ANC policy conferences have been dominated by economic policy matters. More recently the issue of organisational renewal has also taken <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/national-general-council-2015">centre stage</a>. At the last two National Conferences (2007, 2012) two sets of candidates (“slates”) dominated the proceedings. The result is that policy matters have increasingly become shorthand – or soundbites – for support for different candidates. </p>
<p>In 2007 then president Thabo Mbeki was regarded as neo-liberal and Jacob Zuma as <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president">pro-poor</a> and pro-workers. The same applies this year: <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/news-national/1504015/radical-economic-transformation-path-inclusive-growth-says-zuma/">radical economic transformation</a> – or <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-07-04-concept-of-white-monopoly-capital-rejected-by-majority-at-anc-policy-conference/">white monopoly capital</a> – is a code for Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, who President Zuma prefers to succeed him. The code for supporters of Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa is state capture, an inclusive economy and radical socio-economic transformation.</p>
<p>What this means as one analyses the essence of the 2017 policy conference is that focus is no longer primarily on policy. Rather it’s on policy as a means towards a political end – succession.</p>
<h2>Challenges facing ANC and South Africa</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-06-29-anc-veterans-will-boycott-part-of-policy-meeting-focused-on-partys-health/">boycott</a> by the ANC stalwarts and veterans and the Umkhonto we Sizwe Council overshadowed the first conference days. President Zuma’s <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/deshnee-subramany/president-jacob-zumas-opening-address-at-ancs-5th-national-pol_a_23009668/">opening speech</a> defiantly delegitimised their call for a consultative conference. (The ANC held national consultative conferences only three times in its history, in 1962, 1969 and 1985 while it was banned and mainly in exile at critical stages in its history to resolve important issues). Zuma also challenged his opponents in the ANC and accused them of being responsible for factionalism in the party and its organisational malaise. </p>
<p>ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe, on the other hand, tabled a controversial <a href="https://www.power987.co.za/news/ancs-full-diagnostic-report/">diagnostic organisational report</a> which could not be suppressed by Zuma’s supporters. The first part of the proceedings was therefore at best a quasi-consultative conference with no tangible results but rather posturing by the two main blocs in the ANC.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176872/original/file-20170705-30023-1abfo4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176872/original/file-20170705-30023-1abfo4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176872/original/file-20170705-30023-1abfo4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176872/original/file-20170705-30023-1abfo4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176872/original/file-20170705-30023-1abfo4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176872/original/file-20170705-30023-1abfo4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176872/original/file-20170705-30023-1abfo4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ANC and South African presidential hopefuls Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/5th-national-policy-conference-2017">Nine discussion documents</a> have been published as the basis of the policy discussions. Do they present an accurate picture of the state of the nation and the policy remedies South Africans expect? </p>
<p>The issues that the ANC as government has to address are well-known but often clouded in managerial jargon. One can reduce them to three overarching challenges.</p>
<p>The ANC is, firstly, engulfed in a crisis of credibility and integrity – even one of legitimacy despite its electoral majority. Unethical governance, egoistic tendencies and a decline in the ethos of service provision are all contributing factors. The policy conference’s organisation renewal mandate is therefore of paramount importance.</p>
<p>Secondly, the ANC has to engage directly with the economic downward spiral – the current recession, credit downgrading and low foreign direct investment. South Africa is also increasingly in competition with new African and other emerging markets. The domestic economy relies on mining as its primary source of foreign currency earnings while its contribution to the GDP continues a long pattern of decline. Agriculture too has been a major source of job creation. But that too is in decline. South Africa’s economy is changing while government policies aren’t keeping abreast.</p>
<p>Thirdly, a social crisis characterised by inequality, unemployment, family dysfunctionality, crime and drug abuse appears to have entered a vicious circle without effective government counter strategies. The gap between rural and urban life experiences is widening while the ANC’s panacea for it – namely land ownership – has not yet produced tangible results.</p>
<p>What do South Africans expect of the ANC and has the conference engaged with these ideals? In a generalised and simplified form, South Africans want to trust the public domain and want to see moral leadership. They want to have hope for the future and are willing to work together even under difficult circumstances. The Mandela era galvanised national pride and South Africans want to return to that. They also want to see a society based on fairness and with democracy that delivers positive results for them.</p>
<p>The ANC’s slogan of “a better life for all” does reflect some of these ideals. The <a href="https://nationalplanningcommission.wordpress.com/the-work-of-the-commission-2/">National Development Plan (NDP)</a> in principle also endorsed them. But the devil is in the detail. Both the NDP and the ANC’s strategy and tactics document tabled at the conference depend on a “developmental state” for implementation. The <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2008/06/15/the-developmental-state-and-economic-development/">developmental state</a> (as represented by post-war Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and others) is therefore the cornerstone of the ANC’s approach. </p>
<p>But it’s premised on a public sector with strong human and governance capacity as well as widespread consensus on how private-public partnerships can be used to stimulate and coordinate the economy. It also requires consensus on national priorities. </p>
<p>These premises are weak in South Africa and a policy conference is meant to address them.</p>
<h2>Shortcomings</h2>
<p>The main shortcomings in the ANC’s approach to policy are twofold. The first is that it concentrates almost exclusively on policy objectives but very little on policy strategies: how to achieve them; how to manage and coordinate policies. Government officials are often without a policy roadmap.</p>
<p>The second is that the ANC’s historical legacy places on limits its policy imagination. “Colonialism of a special type” is still the point of departure of the latest <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/National%20Policy%20Conference%202017%20Stratey%20and%20Tactics.pdf">strategy and tactics document</a>. A neo-colonial form of it is contemplated but even this makes exploration of options beyond its confines very difficult. At the same time socio-economic conditions in South Africa are changing radically. This includes urbanisation and the growth of the black middle class.</p>
<p>The National Policy Conference hasn’t recommended significant policy changes. The leadership changes in December 2017 might herald new policies. But this policy conference doesn’t provide South Africans with any basis of what might be possible. It has been too preoccupied with leadership succession. </p>
<p>The outcome is probably a deeper polarisation within the ANC and a consolidation of “two ANCs” with no pivotal decision making centre. This effectively amounts to a stalemate. This will be experienced in both the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/29/watch-anc-outlines-nec-meeting-outcomes">NEC</a> and the national cabinet. </p>
<p>The National Conference is the only remaining constitutional mechanism that can make a difference. But the 18 months after December and before the 2019 general election might be too short to rescue the ANC.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80515/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Policy conferences of South Africa’s governing ANC have been about economic policy matters. But more recently organisational renewal has also dominated, as the party loses support.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/804742017-07-04T14:18:31Z2017-07-04T14:18:31ZSouth Africa’s problems lie in political negligence, not its Constitution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176764/original/file-20170704-32624-4jke48.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many are questioning South Africa's constitutional democracy amid high poverty and unemployment.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa is witnessing another wave of disillusionment with the constitutional arrangement that followed the end of apartheid in 1994. As the country advances towards the third decade of democracy the sentiment is that the constitution is an obstacle to meaningful <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/152627/scrap-the-constitution-and-let-the-majority-decide-manyi/">economic transformation</a>. It’s roundly criticised for putting a brake on much needed wealth redistribution, following centuries of colonialism and apartheid oppression of the black majority.</p>
<p>President Jacob Zuma has even alluded to the need to <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/zuma-calls-on-black-parties-to-unite-on-land-20170303">amend the constitution</a> to enable accelerated radical land reform.</p>
<p>Why, indeed, has the country not made the kinds of social and economic advances that were promised in the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/timeline-20-years-democracy-1994-2014">negotiated settlement</a> and incorporated in the <a href="http://www.gov.za/DOCUMENTS/CONSTITUTION/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1">1996 constitution</a>?</p>
<p>South Africa’s <a href="http://www.gov.za/DOCUMENTS/CONSTITUTION/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1">constitution</a> is admired globally. It incorporates hard fought for political and civil rights, and a generous range of social and economic rights that can be enforced by courts. Why then do so many South Africans, mostly black, still live amid widespread poverty? Why do they continue to live in segregated spaces that reinforce <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-urgently-needs-to-rethink-its-approach-to-housing-78628">apartheid geography</a>? </p>
<p>With a constitution locating equality and dignity as its preeminent principle, why do so many women and children still suffer from such disturbing levels of violence? Why is unemployment so <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-06-01-sas-unemployment-rate-hits-a-13-year-high/">alarmingly high </a> in the face of vivid affluence and consumerism? </p>
<p>These questions go to the heart of the South African dilemma, namely, persistent economic inequalities and poverty. Some even perceive this as the failure of the South African constitutional project.</p>
<p>But has the constitutional project failed? And is the country’s constitution the problem? I believe not. The provisions in the constitution, if properly implemented and enforced, have the capacity to change the lives of the majority of South Africans.</p>
<h2>What’s failed</h2>
<p>There are many reasons for the country’s inability to realise the rights set out on the constitution. They include a lack of political will on the part of all spheres of government (national, provincial, and local), bureaucratic <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-06-21-who-knows-how-huge-irregular-expenditure-is-in--municipalities-auditor-general/">indifference or incompetence</a>, <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">corruption</a> and mismanagement. </p>
<p>Other problems concern either ineptitude of the so-called <a href="http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/constitution/english-web/ch9.html">Chapter 9 institutions</a>, established to strengthen the country’s constitutional democracy, including the Human Rights Commission and the Gender Commission. And the failure of government to implement their recommendations. </p>
<p>The reasons also relate to the failure of government to implement court decisions. </p>
<p>But a narrow focus on only law and the courts will yield only limited results and constrict the transformative possibilities of the constitution.</p>
<p>The ability of the constitution to change the lives of the majority of South Africans is particularly true if enforcement involves a broad spectrum of societal actors. This includes government, the corporate community and civil society, the media and the various professions, the trade union movement and religious bodies. </p>
<p>The range of social and economic rights in the constitution include the right of access to education, health care, food, water, social security, a clean environment and housing. Many have been litigated, often with judgments in favour of the applicants. But often the judgements haven’t been properly been implemented and enforced. </p>
<p>The most successful cases have been those where the plaintiffs have worked closely with civil society advocates to ensure that the court’s decision is implemented. A good example is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africans-can-use-their-constitution-to-fight-for-social-justice-54927">Treatment Action Campaign case</a> that forced government to roll out anti-retroviral medication to HIV positive pregnant women in public hospitals. </p>
<h2>The property hot potato</h2>
<p>Arguably the land question is the most pertinent in South Africa. Not surprisingly the section of the constitution that’s viewed as the greatest impediment to “radical” economic transformation is Section 25 – the so-called property section. </p>
<p>The right to property ownership is often seen as protecting the interests of white property owners over poor black South Africans. Is this fair? </p>
<p>I don’t believe so.</p>
<p>The protection of the right to property should protect everyone in a market economy. And most people want their property protected. But these protections don’t preclude the possibility of addressing the colonial and apartheid legacy of land theft from black South Africans.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176774/original/file-20170704-23217-1e8hw2e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176774/original/file-20170704-23217-1e8hw2e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176774/original/file-20170704-23217-1e8hw2e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176774/original/file-20170704-23217-1e8hw2e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176774/original/file-20170704-23217-1e8hw2e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176774/original/file-20170704-23217-1e8hw2e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176774/original/file-20170704-23217-1e8hw2e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Grinding poverty is forcing many young South Africans into scavenging.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Section 25 allows for land to be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public interest. The definition of public interest includes “the nation’s commitment to land reform and to bring about equitable access to all SA’s natural resources”. The clause sets out the terms (“just and equitable”) for compensating owners of land earmarked for expropriation. Most significantly, Section 25 provides that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>property is not limited to land.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Section 25 also provides for land reform through restitution and redistribution. It does this by enabling “a person or community whose tenure of land is insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices” to tenure that is legally secure, or of comparable redress, as provided for in legislation. </p>
<p>In addition, government is mandated to take affirmative action, within its available resources, to</p>
<blockquote>
<p>foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>These provisions create great possibility for addressing land shortage, security of tenure and other deprivations as a result of South Africa’s colonial and apartheid history. </p>
<h2>Failure to act</h2>
<p>That successive African National Congress governments have clearly not implemented the provisions of section 25 shows political negligence, a betrayal of its own policies and a failure of governance. </p>
<p>Section 25 provides government with a clear directive that must be matched with a solid commitment to act. Section 237 of the constitution directs that “all constitutional obligations must be performed diligently and without delay”. </p>
<p>The government clearly has not satisfied its constitutional obligations – and must do so with substantive thought and with urgency. </p>
<p>The Constitutional Court has on several occasions called on the government to take action. For example, in the <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2010/10.pdf">Tongoane case in 2010</a> Justice Ngcobo noted the priority that land restitution and security of tenure must be given. He noted:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are mindful that Parliament’s legislative plate is overflowing. These matters, have, however now become pressing and should be treated with the urgency that they deserve. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In light of government’s failure to fulfil its side of the bargain, it would be foolhardy to consider amending the constitution without considering the findings of the <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/motlanthe-appointed-to-chair-legislative-review-panel-2016-01-19">Motlanthe Commission</a>. Set up by the National Assembly, the commission will investigate the impact of key laws passed by the South African parliament since 1994 with a special focus on eradicating economic inequality. It could provide a blueprint for government action if, as expected, it sets out recommendations on social and economic rights, including land. </p>
<p>While the untold misery and deep humiliation that people endured under colonialism and apartheid cannot be fully compensated, they may have their rights to dignity and equality restored through government laws and other actions. If government doesn’t act, then civil society actors and key institutions should consider interventions that may force its hand. </p>
<p>It’s not the constitution’s failure to deliver “radical economic” transformation, but a lacklustre government that has forgotten its promises – first adopted in the <a href="http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/doc/HIST/freedomchart/freedomch.html">Freedom Charter</a> and then again in the constitution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80474/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Penelope Andrews does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Has South Africa’s constitutional project failed? Is the country’s constitution an obstacle to meaningful redistribution and land reform?Penelope Andrews, Dean of Law and Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/802822017-06-29T15:01:46Z2017-06-29T15:01:46ZWhy the ANC may be stumbling closer to its most serious split yet<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176248/original/file-20170629-11015-gdd4x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) enters its <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/splash/index">2017 policy conference</a> riven and weakened. The five-yearly national event is the precursor to the national elective conference where its policy proposals will be adopted formally.</p>
<p>The party is operating under the weight of concurrent crises. It acknowledges these fleetingly, vaguely and indirectly in <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/documents/discussion-documents/any-author/2017">nine policy discussion documents</a> that have been prepared for the conference, giving little indication of the unprecedented organisational mess it is in.</p>
<p>The full drama of the party’s capture, collapse or continuation will play out in debates at the conference. But it remains unclear whether or not the various factions will be able to find solutions and compromises that define the party 23 years after it <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/timeline-20-years-democracy-1994-2014">came to power</a>. It is also unclear whether the party can differentiate between the need for far-reaching change or whether it will simply stick to slogans like <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/radical-economic-transformation-zuma-vs-ramaphosa-20170502">“radical economic transformation”</a>.</p>
<p>The elephant in the room is whether economic transformation is a policy essential or simply a lifebuoy to protect the party’s embattled president, Jacob Zuma, and his faction. The truth is that the ANC doesn’t have much time to find answers to its <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-01-08-factionalism-and-corruption--the-twin-dangers-facing-anc-says-nzimande/">organisational battles</a> before its <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">December conference</a> when a new leader will be elected.</p>
<p>The main, interrelated crises that the ANC policy discussion documents relate, in some way or another, are the:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>leadership battles that are expressed along deep factional lines, amid suspicions that the president has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-zuma-has-used-the-capture-of-south-africas-state-institutions-to-stay-in-power-68175">gone rogue</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>electoral decline in which the ANC has been governing itself <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-has-remained-dominant-despite-shifts-in-support-base-63285">out of popular favour</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>communities that have become alienated, and a party that’s reverted to out-of-context liberation and revolution rhetoric to attract “masses” back into its fold;</p></li>
<li><p>the predicament created by the fusion of the party with state institutions, and the party infecting the state with its problems, to the point of paralysis, and</p></li>
<li><p>a loss of credibility. This is shown by its reaction to allegations of state capture involving undue influence on Zuma, along with the poverty of ideas on how to extricate itself from the crises.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>There are some early indications as to how the ANC will emerge from this cauldron. Will it be muddling through, veiled in compromises, or can a “new” ANC emerge?</p>
<p>Dissecting a few aspects of the crises in the context of the policy conference sheds some light.</p>
<h2>Irreconcilable factions?</h2>
<p>The ANC is at its weakest point ever. <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/anc-factions-could-abuse-policy-conference-20170624">Factional fallout</a> is pushing the party to the verge of implosion. The two <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/04/27/ndz-vs-cr17-battle-for-the-anc-underway_a_22058354/">major factions</a> are allied to President Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the one camp, and Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa in the other.</p>
<p>Rightly or wrongly they have become identified with diverging ideological-policy voices. Zuma’s camp is supposed to be more radical, while Cyril’s is viewed, in the phraseology of the Zuma camp, as being more sympathetic to <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-good-politics-bad-sociology-worse-economics-77338">“white monopoly capital”</a>. Ramaphosa’s game comes across as more erudite, playing on policy stability and inclusive growth. </p>
<p>Reading the policy documents raises the question of whether formulations can be found to bridge the factional divides, or whether the losers will simply choose to break away from the party.</p>
<p>This wouldn’t be the first split from the ANC. The first resulted in the breakaway <a href="http://www.congressofthepeople.org.za/content/page/History-of-cope">Congress of the People</a> after the ANC’s 2007 conference. Another followed after the 2012 conference and culminated in the formation of the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/founding-economic-freedom-fighters-eff">Economic Freedom Fighters</a>. </p>
<p>The difference this time is that there’s no clear centre of power that would remain to carry forward the remaining faction.</p>
<p>A spin-off party – at this stage an anti-Zuma ANC looks most likely – could link up with the growing political opposition to defeat the Zuma ANC in the 2019 elections. This would take the cost of another split far beyond anything the ANC had seen before. Hence, the latest thrust for <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/anc-unity-not-a-pipe-dream-mantashe-20170105">organisational unity</a>.</p>
<p>But even if it could achieve unity, there would still be the issue of how this was translated into policy consensus. Or the tricky issue of what to do about Zuma, state capture, abuse of state corporations and organs for private-factional gain. </p>
<p>The possibility that the ANC could lose power in 2019 runs like a tragic thread through the documents on <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/National%20Policy%20Conference%202017%20Stratey%20and%20Tactics.pdf">Strategy and Tactics</a>, and <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/National%20Policy%20Conference%202017%20Legislature%20and%20Governance.pdf">Legislatures and Governance</a>. The ANC acknowledges that its actions have repelled many of its previous supporters. It argues nevertheless that it has retained its liberation movement reputation, that voters believe it has performed, and can be trusted more than other parties.</p>
<p>Possible future electoral losses are noted. The party says it must “prepare itself for the complicated relationships involved in <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/anc-prepares-for-future-coalitions-20170312">coalition government”</a>. </p>
<p>But the documents concede only superficially that corruption, especially at the top, has tarnished the ANC’s credibility.</p>
<p>The crisis of the ANC’s <a href="http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/dominance-and-decline/">fusion into state power</a> leaps from the pages that deal with the public institutional landscape and the ANC’s proposals on how to address institutions gone wrong. But the documents simply regurgitate what’s gone before. There is no explicit mention of the problems of the presidency’s powers, or the deep problems of an unprofessional executive that is largely beyond accountability. These are alluded to in vague and abstract terms and are so carefully stated that they might as well be off the radar.</p>
<p>Zuma’s closeness to the <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/gupta-family">Guptas</a>, his friends who are the the centre of state capture claims, is inseparable from these elusive statements. </p>
<h2>Is Zuma trying to engineer a collapse of the ANC?</h2>
<p>So what happens next? One possibility is that Zuma is preparing simply to collapse the ANC, driving it into the ground on the premise that there can be no ANC without him. This scenario was put to me by an ANC functionary from a so-called <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Premier-league-coined-by-those-with-political-agenda-Mahumapelo-20151011">“Premier League”</a> – a pro-Zuma faction of leaders of four provinces.</p>
<p>It is perfectly feasible that the outgoing president could tear the ANC apart by letting it split while retaining power, for now, over a faction that cannot win elections and will not find credible coalition partners.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Booysen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The possibility that South Africa’s ruling ANC could lose power in 2019 runs like a tragic thread through its policy conference documents. It agrees that its actions have repelled many supporters.Susan Booysen, Professor in the Wits School of Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/802062017-06-28T14:55:28Z2017-06-28T14:55:28ZANC policy papers point to a party in a panic about losing power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176035/original/file-20170628-7303-1nn0cgh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The documents released ahead of the policy conference of South Africa’s governing African National Congress <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/5th-national-policy-conference-2017">(ANC)</a> expose a panicking party that sees enemies everywhere. While previous policy conferences addressed real policy issues, all energies are now focused on retaining state power as the leadership faces damning claims of <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">capture by a kleptocratic elite</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/documents/discussion-documents/any-author/2017">discussion documents</a> show a party that professes a desire for self-correction and renewal. But, it seems to have neither the guts, nor the necessary internal balance of forces to do so.</p>
<p>At the same time the documents point to deepening paranoia and an increasingly authoritarian tendency. In combination, they seem to emanate from a parallel universe where the party’s interests have become elevated above those of the South African society at large. </p>
<p>Some of the text show a party that’s going through the motions. There’s trotting out of lofty ideals left over from when it still occupied the <a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-take-heed-even-big-brands-die-if-they-abandon-their-founding-values-79506">moral high ground</a>. It’s a rhetoric that used to be meaningful and powerful. But it’s been emptied out by the ANC’s increasing failure to harness the state’s resources for the good of all. </p>
<p>For example, one of the documents <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/National%20Policy%20Conference%202017%20Organisational%20Renewal.pdf">“Organisational Renewal and Organisational Design”</a> claims:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[the ANC’s vision] is informed by the morality of caring and human solidarity, [and its mission] is to serve the people of South Africa.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Beyond this nostalgia for what it used to be, the ANC documents display little sense of the depth and severity of the political, constitutional, economic and governance crisis facing South Africa. What does come across strongly, however, is a party that feels beleaguered and panicky about possible loss of state power.</p>
<h2>Party and state are conflated</h2>
<p>The “Organisational Renewal…” document issues the following admonition:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>it is in the interests of the movement to… undergo a brutally frank process of introspecting and self-correction.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This sentiment is overtaken by disappointment over the party’s poor performance in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sharp-tongued-south-african-voters-give-ruling-anc-a-stiff-rebuke-63606">2016 local government elections</a>. Several pages are dedicated to investigating how other liberation movements became defunct. It transpires that the primary emergency is “to ensure that the ANC remains at the helm” of government. </p>
<p>Of course political parties are about getting and holding on to power. But because of the ANC’s habit of conflating party and state, there seems to be no understanding that its feeling of destiny – that it should rule “until Jesus comes” as President Jacob Zuma <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-07-05-zuma-repeats-that-anc-will-rule-until-jesus-comes">put it</a> – won’t dictate the will of the people.</p>
<p>Parties get reelected because they demonstrably govern in service of the will of the people. If the ANC should demonstrate that, it will be returned to power <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/04/21/anc-could-lose-power-in-2019-if-zuma-stays-or-dlamini-zuma-takes_a_22048928/">in 2019 </a>. If not, it won’t.</p>
<p>There is an admission that the,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>moral suasion that the ANC has wielded to lead society is waning; and the electorate is starting more effectively to assert its negative judgement.</p>
<p>Significant sections of the motive forces seem to have lost confidence in the capacity and will of the ANC to carry out the agenda of social transformation [due to] subjective weaknesses [in the party]. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>These weaknesses are identified but in a way that skirts around the extent and depth of <a href="http://47zhcvti0ul2ftip9rxo9fj9.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Betrayl-of-a-promise.pdf">state capture</a>. More and more evidence, including hundreds of thousands of leaked <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-05-28-here-they-are-the-emails-that-prove-the-guptas-run-south-africa/">emails</a>, have emerged that an Indian family of business people, the Guptas, has over the past numbers of years gained a hold over Zuma and a network of ANC leaders. This grip stretches from national to local level, and from government departments to state-owned enterprises. </p>
<p>But in the ANC documents black capitalists are blamed for “corrupt practices including attempts to capture institutions of political and state authority…” <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/gupta-family">The Guptas</a> only get an opaque acknowledgement with reference to lobbying: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[T]he lobbying process engineered by clandestine factionalism destabilises the organisation… Factionalism’s clandestine nature makes it a parallel activity…</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But it’s almost as though the document’s authors don’t believe their own diagnosis, or the implications of the party’s “subjective weaknesses”. The document becomes contradictory. Even as it admits that the “motive forces” … “still desire such change and are prepared to work for it”, it starts to cast suspicion:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the mass of the people can, by commission or omission, precipitate an electoral outcome that places into positions of authority, forces that can stealthily and deceitfully chip away at the progressive realisation of a National Democratic Society.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The people are the problem, not the party</h2>
<p>That “the people”, rather than a party that’s lost its way, are in fact the problem becomes more ominously clear in the document on <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/National%20Policy%20Conference%202017%20Peace%20and%20Stability.pdf">“Peace and Stability”</a>. Leninist vanguardism makes the party still feel it knows best, and that the people are useful fools. </p>
<p>It’s worth quoting the whole section to see the extent of the paranoia in the ANC and the array of enemies it creates to avoid confronting the enemy within. </p>
<p>According to the document, the main strategy used by foreign intelligence services is to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>mobilise the unsuspecting masses of this country to reject legally constituted structures and institutions in order to advance unconstitutional regime change. The alignment of the agendas of foreign intelligence services and negative domestic forces threatens to undermine the authority and security of the state. </p>
<p>Their general strategy makes use of a range of role players to promote their agenda and these include, but are not limited to: mass media; non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations; foreign and multinational companies; funding of opposition activities; judiciary, religious and student organisations; infiltration and recruitment in key government departments; placement of non-South Africans in key positions in departments; prominent influential persons…</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A small clique vs South Africa</h2>
<p>The proposed organisational renewal is to bolster the ANC secretary-general’s powers. Even this belated and lacklustre attempt to reduce the ANC president’s control over the party is compromised, as the clarion call of the discussion documents is “Let us deepen unity!”.</p>
<p>That’s why the actual enemies cannot be confronted, those that have insidiously corrupted the very life and soul of the party. Instead, a worrying paranoid and authoritarian tendency emerges. Its targets are journalists, judges, church and business leaders, activists, opposition parties, foreigners and intellectuals. </p>
<p>Nowhere is the fact confronted that Zuma, president of the ANC and the country, has ceded South Africa’s sovereignty to a foreign family, or that state-owned entities and government departments are being repurposed to enrich a small clique at the expense of <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">South Africa’s people</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80206/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christi van der Westhuizen is an associate of the Democracy Works Foundation.</span></em></p>Documents released ahead of the policy conference of South Africa’s embattled governing ANC show it hasn’t the guts or internal balance of forces, for self-correction and renewal.Christi van der Westhuizen, Associate Professor, Sociology, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/785532017-05-31T14:48:58Z2017-05-31T14:48:58ZHow ANC presidential elections trump South Africa’s constitution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171489/original/file-20170530-30121-nrtck4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ANC leaders greet party supporters at a recent rally. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/bills/2002/b16.pdf">Constitution</a> is clear on a number of issues related to the relationship between the country’s parliament and its executive. It lays down that if the National Assembly passes a vote of No Confidence in the cabinet, the cabinet must resign and the president must appoint another one. Or, if it passes a vote of no confidence in the president then the president and the entire government must resign.</p>
<p>In a presidential system the president is directly elected by the voters, normally has a fixed term, and can only be removed through processes of impeachment. This usually require passage of votes of no confidence, or their equivalent, in the responsible legislature or congress. </p>
<p>In contrast, in a parliamentary system, a president or prime minister assumes office by virtue of his or her capacity to command a majority in the legislature. </p>
<p>Despite various hybrid features, the South African Constitution is more of a parliamentary system than a presidential one. The party enjoying a majority presents its candidate to the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/parliamentary-democracy">National Assembly for election</a> – as required by the Constitution. In practice, that person has been chosen by the governing African National Congress (ANC) outside the legislature.</p>
<p>That’s not to say that the ANC is acting inconsistently with parliamentary practice. By selecting its leader outside the legislature, and getting the National Assembly to rubber stamp its choice, it’s acting in a manner fully consistent with parliamentary practice. But where it’s departed substantially from that script is by making a sharp distinction between the party and state presidencies. </p>
<p>The terms of office of the two presidencies are not in sync with one another, resulting in a “dual power” structure operating. This is because there’s a long gap between the ANC’s election of its president and the general elections which determine which party will have the majority in parliament, and consequently who will become president of the country. This gap is a recurrent source of potential instability so long as the ANC remains the majority party.</p>
<h2>Party president v state president</h2>
<p>The ANC elects its presidents at its <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/officials/President">five yearly National Congresses</a>. Notionally, the process of election is a grass roots one. Branches vote for their preference as leader. Their preferences are funnelled upwards through regions and provinces, with provincial delegations casting their vote for one of the candidates.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Other ANC-linked organisations, such as the <a href="http://www.ancyl.org.za/">Youth League</a> and <a href="http://womensleague.anc.org.za/">Womens’ leagues</a>, can also cast their votes at the congresses. But they contribute just 10% of the delegates to the National Congresses. This means that the person elected to the presidency can notionally claim to be elected by the mass of the party’s membership.</p>
<p>All well and good – except that in practice the ANC electoral process is distorted by money, patronage, factionalism, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2012-12-20-elective-processes-something-is-rotten-in-the-kingdom-of-the-anc/">vote-rigging</a>. and, quite often, <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/kzn-anc-wants-inquiry-into-political-killings-20160719">violence </a>. It can be argued, with good reason, that ANC practices negates the democratic legitimacy that it claims. Nevertheless the way in which it chooses its own presidents remains its own business, and is in no way in violation of the constitution.</p>
<p>What’s more problematic is first, that the ANC insists that it “deploys” its party president to the state presidency. In practice, this means that if he or she wants to remain secure in office, a president needs to command a majority in the party’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/officials/national-executive-committee-0">National Executive Committee</a>. A second issue is that there is a substantial period – usually between 16 and 17 months – between the election of a party president by a National Congress and the election of a state president by the National Assembly. </p>
<p>When there’s consensus between the party and state presidents there is no problem. This happened after Mbeki’s election as <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/anc-national-conference-1991-2013">party leader in December 1997</a> to succeed Mandela, who stayed on as state president until the April 1999 election. </p>
<p>Yet when there’s tension, the constitutional authority of the National Assembly is directly undermined. This occurred after <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president">Zuma’s victory at Polokwane in 2007</a>, with Mbeki remaining as state president until he was told to resign the office by the party in September 2008.</p>
<p>It was probably more by accident than design that the elections of ANC presidents and state presidents are so badly misaligned. The ANC’s negotiators during the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/book-6-negotiation-transition-and-freedom-chapter-1-transition-context-christopher-saunders">transition to democracy</a> probably simply failed to identify this as a potential problem. Yet the “dual power” situation which can arise, with a state president not knowing whether or not his or her actions might be countermanded by the party, is inherently destabilising, and a recipe for intra-party factional struggle. </p>
<p>It’s a situation South Africa can ill afford.</p>
<h2>The next round</h2>
<p>The ANC’s recent <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-national-executive-committee-following-meeting-held-26th-28th-may-2017">National Executive Committee meeting</a> made it clear that any MP voting for an opposition party sponsored motion of No Confidence in the president will be disciplined. This means that the motion will be defeated, even if there is a secret ballot. True, there may be a handful of dissidents on the government’s benches prepared to speak and act openly against the president. But they will do so in full knowledge that it may cost them their seats in parliament.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1003&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1003&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1003&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ANC secretary general warns party MPs not to support to oust President Zuma.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (the president’s former wife and <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/05/20/Dlamini-Zumas-campaign-to-become-next-ANC-leader-struggles-to-find-feet-outside-KZN">favoured candidate</a>) is elected party president at the next party congress in December 2017, it’s possible that Jacob Zuma may ostensibly bow to popular pressure and resign as state president. This would enable the ANC majority in the Assembly to elect her as state president. </p>
<p>Alternatively, Zuma may opt to remain as state president, allowing his former wife to mobilise support for the ANC around the country prior to the 2019 general election. Even if Zuma does stand down, allowing the two offices to be combined, we may assume that he will continue to be the power behind the throne, and that Dlamini-Zuma will be kept on a tight leash – at least until the election.</p>
<p>A victory for the Zuma faction in December 2019 could provoke the breakaway of the defeated faction, which would probably be headed by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa. This could herald the reshaping of the South African party system and the formation of a coalition government following the 2019 election. Many would say “Bring it on!” to the idea of a split within the ANC, although a triumphant Zuma faction is likely to make major efforts to prevent that happening. </p>
<p>Alternatively, if the anti-Zuma faction was to win, and Ramaphosa was to be elected party president, he would likely face a massive backlash from Zuma loyalists, who would fear the loss of patronage positions and gravy. A divided ANC in which the present factional battles continued to openly wage is an ANC which could well go down to defeat.</p>
<p>Whatever the outcome of the present battles within the ANC, the party would do the country a favour by bringing the two presidencies into alignment. The person elected to the party leadership should be immediately presented to parliament for election as state president.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78553/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>The internal processes of South Africa’s ruling ANC for electing the president is distorted by money, patronage, factionalism and vote-rigging. It negates the democratic legitimacy the party claims.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/778872017-05-25T13:35:51Z2017-05-25T13:35:51ZPopulism on the rise as South Africa and Namibia gear up to elect new presidents<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169984/original/file-20170518-12254-1siixom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma, left, gets a courtesy visit from President of Namibia Hage Geingob in 2015 in Cape Town. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Both South Africa and Namibia’s governing parties are set to hold elective congresses before the end of this year. Those who win the leadership contests will each lead their respective parties into a general election in 2019 as their presidential candidate. How this happens will be crucial for both countries’ political futures.</p>
<p>There are interesting similarities and differences between the two cases. As in many other countries, both states have a strong executive Head of State. There are term limits for the president of the country, if not for the president of the party. Both countries have constitutions that provide for a democratic governance structure, guided by the rule of law. </p>
<p>But in both cases the state presidency has so far been decided by the parties in power. Both governing parties came to power after armed <a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-africas-former-liberators-offer-rich-lessons-in-political-populism-70490">liberation struggles</a> in which a culture of secrecy and suspicion was widespread. Both had to negotiate a <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/collapse-apartheid-grade-12">regulated transition</a> from a minority regime to a <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/namibian-struggle-independence-1966-1990-historical-background">legitimately elected government</a>. </p>
<p>In both, returned exiles played key roles once their parties were voted into government. The African National Congress <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/">(ANC)</a> and the South West Africa People’s Organisation <a href="http://www.swapoparty.org/">(SWAPO)</a> had to adapt to a <a href="https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/liberal_democracy">liberal democratic order</a> that included transparency and accountability as part of civic demands and expectations. In both cases the constitutions provided for strong executive presidents with far-reaching <a href="http://www.gov.za/DOCUMENTS/CONSTITUTION/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1">influence and power</a>, along with the <a href="http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/constitutions/namibia_constitution.pdf">rule of law and multi-partyism</a>.</p>
<p>But the two countries have adjusted in different ways. SWAPO has entrenched its political dominance in all spheres of society since independence. The ANC is in decline and faces massive public protest and political opposition. In both cases the state presidents have resorted to populism to pursue their agendas. </p>
<h2>How South Africa and Namibia compare</h2>
<p>South Africa is a complex multi-layered class society with a long history of political and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/liberation-struggle-south-africa">ideological contestation</a>. It has a strong and multi-faceted <a href="http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/mckinleyconf50.pdf">civil society</a>. </p>
<p>The ANC’s political dominance has weakened. It got only 54% of the vote in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sharp-tongued-south-african-voters-give-ruling-anc-a-stiff-rebuke-63606">2016 local government election</a>. There is speculation that it may not even get 50% in the <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/251032/anc-stands-to-lose-majority-in-2019-research">2019 general election</a>. </p>
<p>Under President Jacob Zuma, the ANC has been plunged into a crisis of legitimacy. The party so far has not showed loyalty towards the principles of the <a href="http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/doc/HIST/freedomchart/freedomch.html">Freedom Charter</a>, its pre-liberation blueprint for a free and democratic South Africa. Instead it has been seen to support state capture by a <a href="http://blog.transparency.org/2017/02/14/state-capture-in-south-africa/">governing clique</a>. While the ANC fails, a still vibrant civil society is doing what it can to <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/05/civil-society-organisations-join-forces-in-call-for-zuma-to-resign">keep Zuma in check</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169988/original/file-20170518-12260-ti1us7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169988/original/file-20170518-12260-ti1us7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=740&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169988/original/file-20170518-12260-ti1us7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=740&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169988/original/file-20170518-12260-ti1us7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=740&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169988/original/file-20170518-12260-ti1us7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=930&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169988/original/file-20170518-12260-ti1us7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=930&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169988/original/file-20170518-12260-ti1us7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=930&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Namibia, on the other hand, with a <a href="http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/namibia-population/">total population</a> of less than a twentieth of South Africa’s, has very different social, political and class structures and a much weaker <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201601291383.html">civil society</a>. The old slogan from the struggle days, that <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/swapo-heads-for-victory-in-namibian-elections/a-18091417">SWAPO is the nation and the nation is SWAPO </a> still has resonance. </p>
<p>SWAPO has been in government since March 1990. It has steadily consolidated its political power, securing <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-namibia-votes/">80%</a> of votes in the national parliamentary elections of 2014. Its directly elected president, Hage Geingob received an <a href="http://links.org.au/node/4190">astonishing 87%</a>. Given the party’s overwhelming dominance its presidential candidate will, as a matter of formality, become Head of State for the next five years, with no meaningful opposition in Parliament. </p>
<p>In South Africa, though the Head of State is <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Govern_Political/SouthAf_Const_6.html">elected by Parliament</a>, he or she is nominated by the largest party. </p>
<p>In both cases the former liberation movements select the country’s next president. There is also a two-term limit for the president of the country, if not for the president of the party.</p>
<h2>Succession politics</h2>
<p>Towards the end of the year, some 400 SWAPO delegates will attend the party’s conference to decide leadership positions and so elect the presidential candidate. Until then a lot of campaigning and even more speculation about party-internal rivalling factions can be expected.</p>
<p>Geingob is in his first term in office. He is, in contrast to Zuma, eligible to be re-elected as Head of State provided he is confirmed as party president. His predecessor as Head of State and party president, Hifikepunye Pohamba, in a hitherto unprecedented move <a href="http://www.lelamobile.com/content/50386/Pohamba-resigns-as-Swapo-Party-president/">resigned as party president</a> when Geingob assumed office as Head of State. Party vice president Geingob then also became party president.</p>
<p>The SWAPO constitution makes no provision for such a transfer, so it’s a matter of controversy whether Geingob is – as his team claims – the official party president or the <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/54660/read/Geingob-Mbumba-and-Swapo-Constitution">acting president</a>. Though no other candidates have yet publicly declared their intention to compete for the party presidency this year (and by implication nomination as presidential candidate for the country in 2019), there is no doubt th
at <a href="http://www.observer.com.na/index.php/national/item/8083-2017-swapo-congress">internal power struggles exist</a>. </p>
<p>As Geingob qualifies for a second term as Head of State, he may be elected unopposed and unanimously as party leader, unless internal factions put up another candidate. He has recently shown increased eagerness to ensure that his relative comparative advantage as office holder is consolidated. To further anchor a loyal network he has enlarged Parliament and his cabinet and <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2016/03/18/namibias-president-geingob-one-year-on-a-for-effort-d-for-performance/">appointed special advisers</a>. </p>
<p>The upper echelons of SWAPO are still largely dominated by first and second generation struggle stalwarts who returned from exile just prior to independence. There is growing resentment about this among a much <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/116/463/284/2760214/Changing-of-the-guard-An-anatomy-of-power-within?redirectedFrom=PDF">younger generation of activists</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169990/original/file-20170518-12217-qfvf0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169990/original/file-20170518-12217-qfvf0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=869&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169990/original/file-20170518-12217-qfvf0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=869&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169990/original/file-20170518-12217-qfvf0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=869&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169990/original/file-20170518-12217-qfvf0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1092&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169990/original/file-20170518-12217-qfvf0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1092&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169990/original/file-20170518-12217-qfvf0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1092&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In South Africa, the ANC will elect new leaders at its national conference in December. The official ANC line is that campaigning for the party presidency has not begun. But Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Cyril Ramaphosa and others have already <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-04-26-who-wants-to-be-a-president-a-dummys-guide-to-the-2017-anc-leadership-race/#.WR1sFeuGM9c">started their campaigns</a> to succeed the scandal-ridden and now widely discredited Zuma.</p>
<p>Zuma has a strong personal interest in ensuring that his successor is loyal to him and will keep him out of jail if the charges against him – including fraud, racketeering and corruption – are <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/04/20/Zuma-and-NPA-appeal-hearings-against-reinstatement-of-783-criminal-charges-to-be-consolidated">reinstated</a>. He has now come out in support of his former wife, Dlamini-Zuma.</p>
<h2>Slide into populism</h2>
<p>Both Zuma and Geingob have recently adopted a more <a href="https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/populism-common-southern-africa-where-former-liberation-movements-have-become-dominant">populist rhetoric</a> in response to pressures within their parties and in the face of declining economies. Growth has come to a virtual standstill in both <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21710824-business-and-government-are-pulling-opposite-directions-growth-how">South Africa</a> and <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/162219/archive-read/Economic-growth-slows-in-2016">Namibia</a>. </p>
<p>In the wake of this, Zuma has called for <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/radical-economic-transformation-not-in-good-hands-9118623">radical economic transformation</a>. Along with others loyal to him, he has said that the constitution should be changed to allow for land to be taken without compensation, in the interests of <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/land-reform-zuma-moves-for-expropriation-with-no-compensation-20170331">land reform</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, under pressure within SWAPO, Geingob has paid tribute to Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe and said that Namibia should learn from how Zimbabwe <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/namibian-leader-praises-mugabe-applauds-controversial-land-reform-20170429">dealt with the land issue</a>. A land conference will be held in September, the second since independence. </p>
<p>By year’s end, the decisions taken at both parties’ congresses will indicate which policies associated with the election of the future presidents, both at party and state level, will shape the next few years. In both cases, the challenges are big and the stakes are high.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77887/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber is a member of SWAPO since 1974. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Saunders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s ANC and Namibia’s SWAPO, governing parties, enter crucial leadership elections this year, with presidents Zuma and Geingob both facing challenges.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaChris Saunders, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/780472017-05-22T14:14:29Z2017-05-22T14:14:29ZHow President Zuma blew the chance to steal a march on his opponents<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170164/original/file-20170519-12217-1dt4nxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Jacob Zuma is appealing a High Court ruling that he give reasons for his controversial cabinet reshuffle.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the dust was starting to settle on South African President Jacob Zuma’s recent controversial reshuffle of his cabinet, a new storm erupted. The country’s High Court ordered him to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-09-judge-vally-explains-why-he-requested-zumas-reshuffle-records/">give the reasons for his decision</a>.</p>
<p>The governing African National Congress (ANC) is <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/news-national/1508697/anc-hits-judge-vally/">infuriated</a>. The ANC in KwaZulu-Natal organised a march against what the party regards as <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/05/10/ANC-in-KZN-to-march-against-judiciary-on-May-15">judicial overreach</a>. </p>
<p>The president is appealing. The main point of his lawyers argument is that the court erred in the way in which it interpreted a Rule 53 of the <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/293446804116f9be990adf73d4bd4b4a/Zuma-files-application-for-leave-to-apeal-Gauteng-High-Court-decision-20171005">Uniform Rules of Court</a>. The rules came into effect in 1965 (predating the end of apartheid) to optimise the administration of justice, specifically in relation to the review of administrative or <a href="https://africacheck.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/sca-judgment-march-2012-on-reviewability-of-prosecution.pdf">quasi-judicial decisions with pernicious consequences</a>. </p>
<p>The premise of the judge’s ruling seems to be that accountability in the exercise of executive authority is sacrosanct in a constitutional democracy. </p>
<p>Its application in the past has been limited to administrative functions, never <a href="http://www.judiciary.org.za/doc/Court-Case-09-May-2017%20DA-v-President-RSA-pdf">an executive function</a>. It’s on this basis that Zuma’s lawyers are arguing that Rule 53 cannot be used to review and set aside an executive decision. </p>
<h2>Surreal interpretation of the law</h2>
<p>The judge’s interpretation attempts to sync the meaning of the Rule 53 with South Africa’s constitutional democracy. For his part, Zuma’s literal interpretation draws from the apartheid logic where executive sovereignty reigned supreme. In the past, the power of the president was akin to royal prerogative. </p>
<p>The judge argued that this <a href="https://africacheck.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/sca-judgment-march-2012-on-reviewability-of-prosecution.pdf">“is a relic of an age past”</a> and not part of the foundational logic of the post-apartheid state.</p>
<p>The president’s grounds for appeal appear surreal. How can the meaning of a rule – determined by a context that the president ferociously fought against as a freedom fighter – be invoked to justify his executive action in a democracy? </p>
<p>This is not a question of law, but of exemplary leadership in a society where the rule of law lies in the constitution. </p>
<p>In taking an oath as the president, Zuma committed himself to, in the <a href="http://faculty.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/afgjp/PADM601%20Fall%202009/FPA-Ethics-Article.pdf">words</a> of eminent scholar of government Louis Gawthrop, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the service of democracy, (which) requires, at least, a conscious and mature awareness of the ethical impulses of democracy, the transcendent values of democracy, and the moral vision of democracy. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indeed, Zuma’s executive authority includes the power to appoint and fire the deputy president, ministers and deputy ministers. </p>
<p>In other words, at issue is not the executive authority of the president, but how this authority is exercised. </p>
<p>The ruling – right or wrong – compels the nation to ask the question: Is Zuma’s exercise of his authority in sync with the objectives of the country’s hard-won democracy, as formalised in the constitution? </p>
<p>In a constitutional democracy, a concomitant of executive authority is accountability – a function of rationality. In other words, the president’s executive powers are not absolute, despite the fact that they are wide-ranging. </p>
<h2>Beyond the legalese of a cabinet reshuffle</h2>
<p>In a desperate attempt to extricate himself from a sticky situation Zuma has dug in his heels, clinging to the interpretation of law that belongs to the apartheid era. </p>
<p>Lest we forget, the Zuma presidency institutionalised <a href="http://www.dpme.gov.za/about/Pages/Outcomes-Monitoring-and-Evaluation.aspx">monitoring and evaluation systems</a> to keep in check the performance of state bureaucracy as well as ministers. For, as the former City of Los Angeles Board of Efficiency director Jesse D Burks <a href="http://www.temple.edu/tempress/titles/404_reg.html">aptly put it</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>most men cannot hold themselves to their highest standard of efficiency unless they are constantly stimulated by the prospect of a rigid and impartial appraisal of their work.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zuma thought, correctly, that a means to achieve this with his ministers was through performance agreements. These are important to check achievements against outcomes, and to detect misdirection of effort and waste. </p>
<p>They are also important because they give effect to outcomes-based governance where the focus is on the impact of state action. Of critical importance is positive change in the well-being of citizens. </p>
<p>A big part of outcomes-based governance are performance agreements between the president and ministers. These are linked to key outcomes, indicators and targets in the <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/medium-term-strategic-framework-2014-2019">Medium Term Strategic Framework</a> relating to the legislative mandates of respective government departments. The framework focuses attention on government issues that are critically important. These, in turn, are based on the manifesto of the governing ANC, and linked to a five-year electoral mandate. </p>
<p>Outcomes-based governance is an excellent model to optimise the state. Monitoring and evaluation systems generate performance data for the president to determine who in his cabinet performs, or does not. </p>
<p>With all these in place, why have the reasons for the cabinet reshuffle not been forthcoming? Why has it taken the intervention of the judiciary to compel the president to furnish them? </p>
<p>Wittingly or unwittingly, by introducing performance agreements Zuma promised that his decisions to reshuffle the cabinet could be based on rationality. Why is he now acting against the logic of the architecture of his administration which promises accountability in the exercise of executive authority? </p>
<h2>Missed opportunity to be the best</h2>
<p>Had Zuma followed through the logic of his administration he would have turned out to be the best president who, in the words of influential Baltimorean journalist H.L. Mencken, understands that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>as democracy is perfected, the office of the president represents, more and more closely, <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/27042-as-democracy-is-perfected-the-office-of-president-represents-more">the inner soul of the people</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He would have outsmarted the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), which brought the case to court. After all, he’s in a position to account to the nation about the performance of cabinet members, using performance data generated from their performance agreements.</p>
<p>By making this part of the culture of accountability, alternative narratives – beyond the score cards published annually by the DA assessing the performance of government – would have emerged. These would have provided an informed understanding of the state of the State. </p>
<p>The court case underscores the confluence of accountability and rationality in the exercise of authority in a constitutional democracy. Why is this difficult to understand?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78047/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding from the National Research Foundation for his post-graduate studies. He is affiliated with the South African Association of Public Administration and Management(SAAPAM), where he serves as the Chief-Editor Of the Journal of Public Administration.</span></em></p>President Jacob Zuma’s grounds for appeal are surreal. He invokes the meaning of a rule set by the apartheid context he ferociously fought against, to justify his executive action in a democracy.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/774852017-05-11T16:24:21Z2017-05-11T16:24:21ZCyril Ramaphosa’s Marikana massacre “apology” is disingenuous and dishonest<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168729/original/file-20170510-28095-4zq63h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa's apology for Marikana has ignited controversy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EWN/Dr Jack</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s Deputy President, <a href="http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/resourcecentre/profiles/profile/987">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>, has <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2017/05/08/Cyril-to-make-amends-Ramaphosa-takes-up-Madikizela-Mandela%E2%80%99s-offer-over-Marikana-apology">“apologised”</a> for his actions in the run up the <a href="https://theconversation.com/marikana-shining-the-light-on-police-militarisation-and-brutality-in-south-africa-44162">Marikana massacre</a> when police killed 34 striking mineworkers on August 16, 2012. His supposed apology during a speech at Rhodes University on May 7, 2017 – reportedly followed advice by struggle stalwart Winnie Madikizela-Mandela that he make amends and visit Marikana. </p>
<p>But, was it a proper apology?</p>
<p>Ramaphosa only referred to “language” he used in emails to fellow Lonmin directors, which he said “may have been unfortunate” and <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/07/ramaphosa-apologises-for-inappropriate-language-during-marikana-strike">“not appropriate”</a>.</p>
<p>But, to the best of my knowledge, no one has ever requested an apology for “language”. The concern is about his <em>actions</em> and their relationship to the killings. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa added that it was never his intention to have 34 mineworkers killed, but this again skirts the issue. Nobody suggested he was responsible for the 34 deaths, which followed after police opened fire on protesting miners and employees of Lonmin Mine in Marikana. </p>
<p>The argument is that his intervention made bloodshed more likely and that he could probably have stopped the killings had he acted differently. His critics (me included) are very clear that his failure to insist on negotiations led to the deaths. </p>
<p>Some fact checking is in order. </p>
<h2>What the Marikana Commission found</h2>
<p>The evidence in the <a href="http://www.marikanacomm.org.za/">Marikana Commission of Inquiry</a> showed that Ramaphosa interceded at two specific moments. We need to separate these if his culpability is to be accurately assessed. Of course he may have been involved on other occasions, but we don’t know about these.</p>
<ul>
<li>The first intervention was on August 12 2012, when he contacted then minister of police, Nathi Mthethwa, successfully lobbying him to send more police officers to Marikana. </li>
</ul>
<p>In his recent weekend apology, Ramaphosa claimed: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Ten workers had been killed and my role was to stop further deaths. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In fact, at the time he spoke with Mthethwa, only two workers, both security guards, had been killed. The commission felt that, in contacting the police minister, Ramaphosa had acted responsibly, and this is not an unreasonable conclusion.</p>
<ul>
<li>The second intervention was on August 15, the day before the massacre. We know about this through the flurry of emails that Ramaphosa authored and received. These don’t contain any evidence that he was acting benevolently.</li>
</ul>
<p>By now there were about 800 police on the ground at Marikana, so no need to lobby for more. The focus of his new role was to persuade Susan Shabangu, then minister of mineral resources, that the Marikana miners were not engaging in a labour dispute but <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2012/10/24/marikana-inquiry-shown-ramaphosa-emails">“a dastardly criminal act”</a>.</p>
<p>The significance of this is that if the conflict could be redefined, decisive police action could be justified. Ramaphosa was opposed to negotiations, which could have prevented further loss of blood. Instead, he supported the position of Lonmin and the South African Police Service, which would inevitably lead to deaths. Nobody planned for exactly 34 deaths, but deaths were anticipated, and Ramaphosa’s supposed apology is silent on this.</p>
<h2>The case against Ramaphosa</h2>
<p>We don’t know the full extent of Ramaphosa’s knowledge about the operation planned for August 16. But, given his position as a director of Lonmin and willingness to act in its interests, it’s unlikely he was unaware of “the plan” (which included use of lethal force). </p>
<p>Certainly two of Lonmin’s vice presidents, Barnard Mokwena and Mark Munroe, were in the loop before the operation got underway. Thus, in my view there’s a <a href="http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/prima+facie">prima facie</a> case for charging them with being accessories to murder. </p>
<p>Would they really have kept Ramaphosa in the dark? One reason we don’t know the answer is that Lonmin’s role was inadequately investigated by the commission. The company’s representatives, including Ramaphosa, also only spent short periods at the commission’s witness desk.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168731/original/file-20170510-28075-1hnuhoo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168731/original/file-20170510-28075-1hnuhoo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168731/original/file-20170510-28075-1hnuhoo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168731/original/file-20170510-28075-1hnuhoo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168731/original/file-20170510-28075-1hnuhoo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168731/original/file-20170510-28075-1hnuhoo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168731/original/file-20170510-28075-1hnuhoo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa at the Farlam Commission, in 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In my opinion, there’s enough evidence to charge Ramaphosa under the <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/prevention-and-combating-corrupt-activities-act-0">Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act</a>, a possibility flagged at the inquiry by counsel for injured and arrested persons, <a href="http://www.incwajana.com/dali-mpofu/">Dali Mpofu</a>.</p>
<p>It’s possible that because he was pushing for a murder charge against Ramaphosa, Mpofu lacked the time to pursue this lesser crime. In one of his emails, Ramaphosa tells his Lonmin colleagues: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[d]iscussion with Minister Susan Shabangu –- I called her and told her that her silence and inaction about what is happening at Lonmin was bad for her and the government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Given that, as acknowledged by the commission, Ramaphosa was a senior member of the governing ANC with enough weight to place pressure on the minister of police, the final words in the statement could be considered a threat. Whether or not Shabangu was influenced by Ramaphosa is not critical in terms of the law -– making the threat (just like offering a bribe) is illegal.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, Ramaphosa seeks to convey that he was a friend of the workers. But, as chairperson of Lonmin’s transformation committee he was responsible for the company’s failure to abide by its commitment to build 5,500 houses for employees, instead completing only three dwellings. Moreover, he benefited materially from the low wages that were the main grievance raised by the striking workers</p>
<p><a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">Ramaphosa</a> had been general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers and, later, as secretary general of the African National Congress he had led his party in talks that brought an end to apartheid. He was a skilled negotiator perfectly positioned to bring a peaceful settlement to the dispute, but instead he aligned himself with Lonmin and the police in their attempt to crush the strike using lethal force.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>For an apology from Ramaphosa to have credibility, there should be full disclosure of everything he knows. This has not yet happened.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the following should happen:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Full compensation to be paid, without further delay, to miners who were injured or wrongfully arrested and to the families of workers who were killed; </p></li>
<li><p>Adequate funding for investigations by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate into which police officers should be prosecuted for the Marikana massacre deaths;</p></li>
<li><p>Charging the police whose case files are now with the National Prosecuting Authority; and </p></li>
<li><p>The immediate dismissal of Police Commissioner General Riah Phiyega, who was suspended after the commission found she lied during her testimony. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The Claassen Inquiry, appointed by President Jacob Zuma, <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-02-22-zumas-failure-to-fire-phiyega-for-role-in-marikana-beggars-belief/">recommended her sacking</a> over six months ago, yet she continues to collect a large salary more than four years after a massacre in which she played a pivotal part.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s “apology” makes one wonder whether he’s in denial or just a desperate politician with <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/businesstimes/2017/05/10/Ramaphosas-presidential-bid-buoyed-by-Zuma-missteps">presidential ambitions</a>. But his expressed regret was dishonest and disingenuous, and will not remove the stain that Marikana placed on his reputation.</p>
<p><em>Peter Alexander is the author of various publications on Marikana, most recently an assessment of the Farlam Commission of Inquiry published <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2016.1223477">in the Journal of Southern African Studies</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77485/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor Peter Alexander holds the South African Research Chair in Social Change, which is hosted by the University of Johannesburg and funded by the Department of Science and Technology. He was a founder of the Marikana Support Campaign.</span></em></p>South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa’s apology for his role in the 2012 Marikana massacre has no credibility, as there wasn’t full disclosure.Peter Alexander, Centre for Social Change, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/766092017-04-25T19:41:21Z2017-04-25T19:41:21ZSouth Africa has a new trade union federation. Can it break the mould?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166582/original/file-20170425-12468-17hcapr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Delegates at the launch of the South African Federation of Trade Unions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Star/Nokuthula Mbatha</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The newly launched trade union grouping in South Africa – the South African Federation of Trade Unions <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/21/saftu-launch-marks-end-of-long-journey-since-numsa-left-cosatu">(Saftu)</a> – promises to be a voice for the growing numbers of unorganised and marginalised workers in the country. But, as the secretary of the South African Informal Traders Alliance warned delegates, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Don’t break our hearts with false promises.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Historically, trade unions in South Africa have played a significant role in shaping the political landscape, especially during the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43157717">struggle against apartheid</a>. But the union movement has declined globally in influence as the growing informalistion of work has eroded its power and unions are seen as protecting the special interests of those in regular employment.</p>
<p>With increasing numbers of people outside the formal employment net, unions have had a tough time defining their role. Yet the rights won by South African workers in the struggle for democracy continues to give them a degree of influence unsurpassed in post-colonial Africa.</p>
<p>The new federation was conceived over two years ago in the wake of the <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Labour/News/Cosatu-to-lose-millions-over-Numsa-split-20141112">expulsion</a> of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa from trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). The expulsion signified growing political realignment in the country given that Cosatu is in an alliance with the governing African National Congress. The union’s expulsion <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-03-30-cosatu-fires-zwelinzima-vavi">was followed by</a> that of the Cosatu general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi. </p>
<p>So what difference is the new federation likely to make to the lives of workers in South Africa, as well as the very large number of unemployed people and those in the informal economy?</p>
<p>Significantly, the new federation is not the outcome of a surge in worker militancy. Instead, it’s a response to the perceived failure of existing unions to provide an adequate voice and service to their members. The new federation is in fact the product of the crisis facing traditional trade unions across the globe.</p>
<p>A strength of the federation will be its ability to combine the experiences of long standing union leaders with a new generation of unionists disillusioned with the governing party and its two <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">alliance partners</a> – Cosatu and the South African Communist Party. </p>
<p>With nearly 700 000 members, it’s the second largest federation in South Africa after Cosatu. But the challenges facing an attempt to “cross the divide” between organised workers and the growing <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/11/precariat-global-class-rise-of-populism/">precariat</a> – those in casual, outsourced and informal jobs – will require strategic leadership willing to move out of the comfort zone of traditional unionism, recruit unfamiliar constituencies and experiment with new ways of organising.</p>
<h2>Challenges facing the new federation</h2>
<p>The first challenge will be to break with the bureaucratic practices that have seen many union leaders gradually distanced from their members. If the practices of “business unionism” – where unions come to mirror the values and practices of business – are to be challenged, two big issues will need to be revisited. These are union investment companies and the gap between the salaries of some union leaders and their members. </p>
<p>The new federation could make its mark within the labour movement by taking lifestyle issues seriously and, in particular, the wage gap within its own ranks.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zwelinzima Vavi, secretary general of the new trade union federation Saftu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/John Hrusa</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second challenge is around political diversity. What was striking at the launch was the wide range of political and ideological views. An illustration was the lively debate over the <a href="http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2017/04/24/new-union-federation-anti-politics-pro-workers/">relationship</a> between pan-Africanism and Marxist-Leninism. </p>
<p>But there was consensus that there should be no party political affiliation. Saftu, it was agreed, should be politically independent. The challenge will be for the new federation to be a genuine forum for political debate, respecting different views, and even allowing different ideological factions to be institutionalised.</p>
<p>The most difficult challenge arises from the shift from industrial unions to general unions. The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa led the way when it extended its scope to include a variety of economic activities beyond metalworkers. This included, for example, university cleaners and bus drivers. Furthermore, many of the Saftu affiliates are general unions. </p>
<p>How to deal with the danger of internal “poaching” of members was extensively discussed at the launch. Will the protocols proposed in the report of the steering committee prevent divisive conflict in the future? </p>
<p>Another major challenge facing Saftu is the need for innovative strategies on new ways of organising. It’s not clear how the federation intends to recruit the new constituencies of women, immigrants, low paid service workers, outsourced workers and the growing numbers of workers in the informal economy. Experiments in organising precarious workers, such as the <a href="http://www.cwao.org.za/contact.asp">Casual Workers Advice Office</a> in Germiston, need to be examined as they could provide ways of crossing the divide between the old and the new.</p>
<p>Another difficult challenge will be defining the federation’s position on economic policy. Harsh criticisms were made of the proposed national minimum wage of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-search-for-a-national-minimum-wage-laid-bare-south-africas-faultlines-69382">R20 an hour</a>. But maybe it is time to confront the dilemma that for many workers a bad job is better than no job. Has the time not arrived to go beyond the demand for decent work to explore what kind of role trade unions have in a developing country such as South Africa, in the context of a uni-polar world, dominated by neo-liberal capitalism? </p>
<h2>New ways of organising</h2>
<p>The leaders of the new federation are confident that a number of Cosatu affiliated unions will join, or if the unions don’t, their member will come across. But will the federation be able to break out of the old organising straight jacket? </p>
<p>To organise the low paid and the precarious is an ambitious task. There’s growing evidence that innovative strategies to bridge the informal-formal “divide” are emerging in the Global South with successful attempts emerging in <a href="http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:291569/FULLTEXT01.pdf">other parts of Africa </a>. For example, in Ghana an alliance of informal port workers with national trade unions has been formed and is proving to be effective.</p>
<p>Labour scholar, <a href="http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3755&context=jssw">Rina Agarwala</a>, has challenged the conventional view that informalisation is the “final nail in the labour movement’s coffin”. Informal workers in India, she demonstrates, are creating new institutions and forging a new social contract between the state and labour. New informal worker organisations are not attached to a particular party, nor do they espouse a specific political or economic ideology.</p>
<p>It’s too soon to pronounce on the future of the new federation. But it’s clear that workers are increasingly rejecting traditional trade unions and forming new types of organisations that bring workers together to promote their rights and interests. The future lies with unions that are forward looking and see the global economy as an opportunity for a new kind of unionism. </p>
<p>Saftu needs to draw on these experiences if it’s to fulfil the promise of its launch.</p>
<p><em>Edward Webster will soon be launching a collection of research based essays on precarious work in India, Ghana and South Africa. <a href="http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=518">Crossing the Divide: Precarious Work and the Future of Labour</a>, together with Akua O. Britwum and the late Sharit Bhowmik.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76609/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Webster does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s newest trade union federation, Saftu, comes at a time of declining political influence by unions, compared to during the struggle against apartheid. They are also seen as elitist.Edward Webster, Professor Emeritus, Society, Work and Development Institute, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/762712017-04-20T15:49:34Z2017-04-20T15:49:34ZSurvey sheds light on who marched against President Zuma and why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165843/original/file-20170419-2431-11i2r71.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The face and character of protests in South Africa seems to be changing. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Marius Bosch</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has long been described as the <a href="http://www.news24.com/MyNews24/IS-SA-the-protest-capital-of-the-world-20151029">“protest capital of the world”</a>. But the protests have largely been confined to black townships and informal settlements. </p>
<p>The student protests of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-10-29-student-protests-are-about-much-more-than-just-feesmustfall">2015-2016</a> suggested that this was beginning to change, with students of all races marching to places such as the African National Congress’s (ANC’s) headquarters Luthuli House, Parliament and Union Buildings. But the most recent marches were the first time in post-apartheid South Africa that such a united force was seen against a president and the governing party - <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/">the ANC</a>. </p>
<p>This followed growing discontent towards President Jacob Zuma and the ANC that was reflected in the loss of support in the 2016 <a href="http://www.news24.com/elections/results/lge">local government elections</a>. The outcry following Zuma’s recent cabinet <a href="https://theconversation.com/stakes-for-south-africas-democracy-are-high-as-zuma-plunges-the-knife-75550">reshuffle</a>, widely seen as being influenced by the interests of the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/11/03/gupta-family-played-key-role-in-cabinet-appointments">Gupta family</a>, culminated in nationwide protests on <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-04-07-south-africans-march-in-protest-against-zuma/">7 April 2017</a>. </p>
<p>Thousands of people marched across the country, notably in Pretoria, Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town, demanding that Zuma resign. These were followed by a march of the <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/in-pictures-tens-of-thousands-of-people-march-against-zuma-on-the-nationaldayofaction/">combined main opposition parties</a> on Wednesday 12 April to the seat of government in Pretoria that attracted tens of thousands of protesters, making it possibly the largest march in post-apartheid history. </p>
<p>What might these marches tell us about the future direction of South Africa’s political landscape? </p>
<p>The 7 April march was largely organised under the banner of the <a href="http://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/251465/save-sa-calls-on-all-south-africans-to-join-march-against-zuma">Save South Africa campaign</a>, which is made up of a variety of civil society organisations and business leaders. The predominately middle class makeup of the campaign was widely debated <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/whitefriday?lang=en">online</a>. But who did attend and why? Was this a rebellion of the white middle class?</p>
<p>A research team from the University of Johannesburg decided to find out by conducting a short survey with 185 marchers. While a small sample, the research team felt that provided a fairly accurate sample and an indicative sense of who was involved and why.</p>
<p>Our findings were that the majority of those who marched were middle-class and mostly black. Most said they were there to protest against Zuma.</p>
<h2>Who marched?</h2>
<p>Of the 185 people surveyed, 56% were black African and 30% were white. The marchers were predominately middle class. Of those surveyed, 58% held what could be considered middle class occupations – either professional or managerial, technician and associated professions or clerks. Only 10% could be regarded as holding traditionally working class occupations – either skilled manual labour or trades work, domestic work or elementary. 13% were self-employed.</p>
<p>The middle class nature of the protest is reinforced when looking at the marchers’ place of residence and mode of transport to the march. Most of the marchers surveyed lived in a suburb (74%) and nearly half (42%) used a private car to travel to the march. The average age of the marcher surveyed was 41, again suggesting that the marchers were likely to be people somewhat established in their careers. Just under two thirds (61%) were men. </p>
<h2>Why did people march?</h2>
<p>The reasons that people gave for marching can be categorised into one of five themes: anti-Zuma, change, social justice, the economy and/or corruption and other. The anti-Zuma theme was the most popular, with 41% of marchers surveyed providing this as their reason for attending. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165850/original/file-20170419-2418-5rh0lo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165850/original/file-20170419-2418-5rh0lo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165850/original/file-20170419-2418-5rh0lo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165850/original/file-20170419-2418-5rh0lo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165850/original/file-20170419-2418-5rh0lo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165850/original/file-20170419-2418-5rh0lo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165850/original/file-20170419-2418-5rh0lo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters in Cape Town call on President Zuma to step down.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Sumaya Hisham</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But identifying as anti-Zuma should not be equated with being anti-ANC. A number of respondents made clear that their opposition was to Zuma and not to the ANC. For instance, a retired 58 year old white man from Centurion said that he was at the march</p>
<blockquote>
<p>to support all South Africans to get rid of the Zuptas (Zuma and the Guptas), not the ANC.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While a black African self-employed 42-year old women from Benoni said</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zuma must go! Leadership is not for the people… I’m an ANC person but we want our old ANC back.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nearly half (48%) of black Africans responded with anti-Zuma sentiments. For white respondents, this was the second most common response, 26%. The second most common theme overall, and the most common theme for white respondents, was social justice. This encompassed a broad range of perspectives. For instance, one white 48-year-old housewife from Centurion said</p>
<blockquote>
<p>tax money … is not being used to help the poor. Zuma misuses our money, the poor get poorer. Struggle people didn’t die for this!</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Other respondents displayed their concern for social justice around a rights-based discourse. One 22-year-old black African student from the Pretoria suburb of Faerie Glen said he was at the march “in defence of the constitution”. While others framed their reason for being at the march around the future of their children. </p>
<p>The third most common theme was concerns for the economy and or corruption. For instance, a black 33-year-old operations manager from Randburg said, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>My mom is a government employee – her pension fund will be looted and it’s not their money. Zero leadership in this country. State is corrupt. Junk status.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Women were slightly more likely than men to raise issues of the economy and or corruption. Lastly, need for change accounted for 11% of respondents. No significant difference in the reasons for marching by class could be determined, partly because the sample of working class people was too small to draw any conclusions. </p>
<h2>Future prospects</h2>
<p>Most of the respondents surveyed were not part of any political grouping, with most (57%) reporting that they had attended the march with family or friends, and nearly a quarter (23%) saying they had come alone. Time will tell whether this loose network of people will be able to build and sustain a collective movement. As other commentators have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/05/getting-rid-jacob-zuma-not-panacea-south-africa-problems">highlighted</a>, a movement that centres on removing Zuma alone is unlikely to bring the socio-economic change demanded by poor and working class protesters almost daily in the country’s mainly black townships and <a href="http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2017/04/07/commuters-stranded-as-residents-protest-over-service-delivery/">informal settlements</a>. Can concerns for the pensions of government employees be united with demands for service delivery from those very same government employees? It remains to be seen.</p>
<p><em>Molefe Pilane, an independent researcher, contributed to the survey.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76271/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Protests in South Africa have largely been confined to black working class townships and informal settlements. Is this beginning to change?Carin Runciman, Senior Reseacher, Centre for Social Change, University of JohannesburgLinah Nkuna, Lecturer at the Department of Communication Science, University of South AfricaPier Paolo Frassinelli, Associate Professor, Communication Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/760262017-04-19T15:16:15Z2017-04-19T15:16:15ZSouth Africa’s ANC can stay a liberation movement and govern well<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165115/original/image-20170412-25898-1979v02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s governing party, is <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/cloneofsouth-africa-anc-awaits-key-municipal-ele-160804084046975.html">weakening</a>. It has recently committed some <a href="https://theconversation.com/firing-of-south-africas-finance-minister-puts-the-public-purse-in-zumas-hands-75525">terrible mistakes</a> in government. </p>
<p>High on the list of errors is its decision to close ranks in defence of President Jacob Zuma during the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/09/15/Joel-Netshitenzhe-Nkandla-state-capture-evoke-indignation">Nkandla debacle</a> where public money was used on upgrades to his private homestead. Then there’s the deployment of incompetent “cadres” to critical positions in government as well as Zuma’s ill-timed <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2017-01-24-aubrey-matshiqi-zuma-move-will-show-who-insiders-are/">cabinet reshuffle</a>. </p>
<p>Critics argue that these problems stem from the ANC’s insistence on being a <a href="https://v1.sahistory.org.za/pages/pdf/raymond-suttner/ANC-attainment-power.pdf">liberation movement</a> which they say is incompatible with a constitutional democracy. </p>
<p>This has raised the question about the party’s very nature: Is it not time for the ANC to stop seeing itself as a liberation movement but rather a modern, professional political party?</p>
<p>But that argument is hard to sustain. There’s nothing particular about political parties that makes them compatible with constitutional democracy.</p>
<h2>Liberation movement vs political party</h2>
<p>Those opposed to the ANC’s holding place as a liberation movement argue that a movement – liberation or social – is the old way of doing politics. This, they claim, was suitable during the struggles against colonialism and apartheid. But that struggle is now over and the post-apartheid era presents a new set of challenges.</p>
<p>The idea of a liberation movement keeps archaic and obsolete traditions alive. These include the leadership collective, consensus choice of leadership, revolution, comradeship, cadre deployment and patriarchal leadership patterns.</p>
<p>The role and character of liberation movements in power is informed by the democracy theory (coming out of <a href="https://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/POLSC2312.1.4.pdf">liberalism ideology</a>) and the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/party_dominance.pdf">theory of party dominance</a>. These theories suggest that for democracy to be effective, there should be vibrant political party competition because it strengthens deliberative aspects of a liberal democracy. It also engenders internal dynamism and change of groups of elites in power. </p>
<p>The party dominance theory leads to the view that the ANC dominates South Africa’s politics because of its liberation movement legacy. This dominance is seen as inimical to democratic competition. </p>
<p>But when liberation movements become political parties they enhance their efficiency and effectiveness. They also deepen their internal democracy and their ability to connect with the wider public.</p>
<p>Internal democracy within the ANC is seen as <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-countrys-constitutional-court-can-consolidate-and-deepen-democracy-54184">particularly important</a> given its political dominance. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ANC military veterans guard the party’s headquarters ahead of a march by the opposition DA.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Political parties shed the tendency towards <a href="https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-7/basoc/ch-5.htm">democratic centralism</a>, and its opaque internal political systems which insist on toeing the party line and brooks no dissent. </p>
<p>Political parties are assumed to operate like professional associations. They value accountability and transparency embracing modern systems of management and leadership. This enables them to become dynamic platforms for advancing refined political ends. </p>
<p>The conduct of Zuma and his cohort of leaders has been blamed on the ANC’s choice to remain steeped in the traditions of a <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/iservice/the-marginalisation-of-parliament">liberation movement</a>. The form determines the content: it produces tendencies that cause all manner of problems. </p>
<p>The ANC has made some catastrophic mistakes. It sometimes displayed arrogance in power and has allowed corrupt leaders to go <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-at-an-inflection-point-will-it-resist-or-succumb-to-state-capture-66523">unpunished</a>. </p>
<p>There has also been a vacillation of policy stances on the economy, land and other crucial policy areas. Largely sound policies have been poorly implemented. </p>
<p>And there have been cases where the party and the state’s affairs have been <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/anc-urges-government-to-review-madonselas-party-state-separation-findings">conflated</a>.</p>
<p>Some have argued that these problems stem from the ANC remaining essentially a liberation movement. To move with the times, they argue, it needs to assume a new, modern professional political party posture. </p>
<h2>Lessons from elsewhere</h2>
<p>The challenge in the ANC is, however, not unique to South Africa.
Liberal democrats in Japan, Christian democrats in Italy, the <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21711925-new-law-has-allowed-government-freeze-its-assets-leaving-it-unable-pay-staff-taiwans">Kuomintang</a> in Taiwan and nationalist democrats in Kenya all experienced similar challenges. </p>
<p>Although they were not liberation movements, they share a number of features with the ANC. This includes arrogance of power, personalisation of power, elitism and the preponderance of sectional interests over the common good. So, it seems these are tendencies that need to be overcome.</p>
<p>It’s hard to sustain the argument that liberation movements are not right for democratic consolidation merely because they are movements or that political parties are by nature good for competitive politics. Political parties can dominate, distort, corrupt, abuse, and complicate democratic systems just as liberation movements deepen democracy by strengthening its social basis. </p>
<h2>What the ANC needs to do</h2>
<p>The ANC doesn’t need to transition into a political party, whatever that means in practice. But, it needs to develop a leadership that’s competent to use the state to change the economy fundamentally in order to serve the majority and bring about qualitatively positive changes to the people, especially the poor.</p>
<p>The party needs to put a stop to the self-inflicted damage to its image through endless scandals, public displays of arrogance, factionalism and internal conflict. </p>
<p>The ANC also needs to end its practice of deploying poor quality cadres to critical state structures, and start heeding the counsel of its friends and foes that it must place the country’s interests before sectional interests of whatever faction of its leadership is in power. </p>
<p>It can look to the <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Editorial/What-we-can-learn-from-Tanzania-s-Chama-Cha-Mapinduzi/689360-2787692-1173726z/index.html">Chama Cha Mapinduzi</a> movement that’s been in power in Tanzania since the 1960s for example.</p>
<p>The party has ensured an open contest for leadership positions. The elected leaders are then expected to root out corruption, crime, tribalism and so forth.</p>
<p>There’s a constant change of national leadership and a level of dynamism that enables the movement to adapt to changing society. It has produced leaders like <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/former-tanzanian-president-julius-nyerere-dies">Julius Nyerere</a> and <a href="http://zikoko.com/list/8-reasons-tanzanias-john-magufuli-africas-beloved-president/">John Magafuli </a>who commands respect across party lines. </p>
<p>If liberation movements were formed to achieve total decolonisation and freedom, then for as a long the process is incomplete, they will have a good reason to exist. Like orthodox political parties, they constantly have to adapt to change.</p>
<p>Ultimately, democracy is meaningless if it doesn’t improve the material circumstances for the people. To do this, political formations must be occupied by conscientious, competent, compassionate and interested political elite.</p>
<p>This is what the ANC has shown it lacks as it attempts to “deal” with every scandal and crisis it causes. The problem isn’t its commitment to being a liberation movement, but rather that it wants to be a callous one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76026/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siphamandla Zondi works for Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, which sometimes receives funding from research funding foundations like the Mellon Foundation and NRF. </span></em></p>Democracy in South Africa is meaningless if it doesn’t improve the lives of the people. To do this, the governing ANC must be led by conscientious, competent and interested leaders.Siphamandla Zondi, Professor and head of department of Political Sciences and acting head of the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/761182017-04-12T16:56:03Z2017-04-12T16:56:03ZANC military veterans and the threat to South Africa’s democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165248/original/image-20170413-25898-1lzqft3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ANC military veterans guard the party’s headquarters.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>We may look back on the days in April 2017 when tens of thousands of South Africans marched demanding that President Jacob Zuma <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/06/anti-zuma-protest-gains-momentum-outside-parliament">should fall</a> as the beginning of something bigger.</p>
<p>There’s been a wistful glint in the eyes of ageing activists as they gear up for action again, predicting a return to the 1980s. Many have embraced the idea of the reconstitution of a <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/united-democratic-front-udf">United Democratic Front-style</a> multi-class, non-racial and popular anti-apartheid alliance of NGOs, community movements and religious groups to <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/08/south-africans-strengthen-calls-for-president-zuma-to-step-down">“Save South Africa”</a> from the capriciousness and corruption of the Zuma government.</p>
<p>We are told that Friday April 7, the day of the nationwide marches against Zuma, was the day when ordinary people stood up and said to the ANC: “Enough is Enough”! It was followed by another large demonstration of opposition political parties marching on the government’s seat of power in Pretoria, the Union Buildings, on April 12, which was also the president’s <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/04/12/Zuma-reveals-his-birthday-wishes-amid-protests1">75th birthday</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, while we should in no way underestimate this democratic stirring, we may look back and say that its greater significance was that it was this moment when it became manifest that Zuma’s faction of the ANC would be prepared to resort to violence to entrench its domination.</p>
<h2>Signs of intolerance of dissent</h2>
<p>Once the first marchers had marched, the ANC government sought to save face by proclaiming the day a <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/07/ayanda-dlodlo-thanks-anti-zuma-protesters-for-their-conduct">triumph for democracy </a> – which, of course, it was. Yet during the build-up to the march, the ANC had filled the air with threats of violence. </p>
<p>The most explicit warning was delivered by the newly installed Minister of Police, Fikile Mbalula. He did <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/04/mbalula-issues-stern-warning-to-violent-protesters">not want another Marikana</a>, he said, but implied the repeat of such an event, when police killed 34 striking miners, if protesters damaged property.</p>
<p>Other ANC officials, notably eThekwini mayor Zondile Gumede, issued <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/04/06/Durban-mayor-says-anti-Zuma-march-is-treason1">not-so-veiled threats </a> against those marching. Others sought to tie up the marchers’ right to march by <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/07/phahlane-insists-save-sa-march-is-illegal-despite-court-permission">denying permission</a>; others referred to marchers as <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2017/04/06/War-talk-from-MK-vets">“counter-revolutionary”</a>. </p>
<p>The most chilling threat was represented by the MK Veterans Association <a href="http://mkmva.anc.org.za/">(MKMVA)</a>, supposedly former members of the ANC’s armed wing uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Its press briefing before the marches took place stated that it was “mobilising” its members, who would be <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2017/04/06/War-talk-from-MK-vets">“combat ready”</a> to defend Luthuli House, the headquarters of the ANC. It was backed up by statements by the ANC Youth League that it was ready to defend the premises with <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zuma/watch-ancyl-backs-zuma-amid-calls-for-his-head-8497214">all the weapons at its disposal</a>.</p>
<p>Given that the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) had changed its initial plans to march upon Luthuli House, there was little or no need to “defend” the ANC’s headquarters from anyone. Even so, on the day, <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/04/07/MK-vets-gather-outside-Luthuli-House">some 700 MK “veterans”</a> assembled outside Luthuli House. </p>
<h2>Threat to democracy</h2>
<p>Dressed in military fatigues, the MK “veterans” explicitly presented themselves as the ANC’s armed wing ready to go into battle to counter the party’s enemies. In the event, they <a href="https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/toyi-toyi">toyi-toyied</a> and demonstrated – and were fortunately denied the opportunity by the police to prove their metal in clashes with the DA or anyone else. Yet the threat of violence was immanent.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supposed veterans of the ANC’s military wing perform the toyi-toyi protest dance outside the party’s headquarters in Johannesburg.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The real issue is how MK, as it’s presently constituted, views itself and is viewed by key elements amongst the ANC’s leadership as a militia ready to be deployed against its political opponents – internal as well as external. How many of those who presented themselves outside Luthuli House were genuinely former MK veterans we do not know. But, we can be pretty sure that many if not most - too young to have fought against apartheid – have been more recent recruits, with no genuine claim to membership.</p>
<p>We also know that under the national leadership of <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/kebby-maphatsoe">Kebby Maphatsoe</a>, the deputy defence minister, the Veteran’s Association has been deeply corrupted. Major questions posed about its internal finances are the subject of a <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mk-veteran-head-in-court-this-week-over-alleged-fraud-20160531">court case</a>. It’s been used to intervene violently in party <a href="https://theconversation.com/comrades-in-arms-against-apartheid-are-now-at-one-anothers-throats-64643">factional battles</a> on behalf of Zuma. Yet it has reserved its main animus for parties of opposition, regularly referred to by Maphatsoe as “the enemy”, “agents provocateurs”, and <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/south-africa-first-an-organ-of-the-counterrevoluti">“counter-revolutionaries”</a>.</p>
<p>It would be a mistake to dismiss all this as harmless political theatre. Rather, it constitutes a very real and present danger. It’s worth recalling that Siphiwe Nyanda, a former leading member of MK who became chief of the South African National Defence Force, has already referred to the veterans under Maphatsoe as a <a href="http://www.sundayworld.co.za/news/2012/09/03/mkmva-is-divisive---nyanda-slams-anc-s-army-veterans">“private army”</a>. If he’s worried, then so should we be. Armed militias aligned to a political party, or a faction within it, have no place in a constitutional democracy.</p>
<h2>Shades of Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>We have no need to look further than Zimbabwe to recognise the threats to democracy posed by armed militias. Formed in 2000, the <a href="http://dev.icicp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Country-Profile_Zimbabwe.pdf">National Youth Service</a> was subsequently responsible for the military style training of some 80 000 youths. Many of them went on to join the ruling Zanu-PF’s affiliated militias the <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/45f147ce2f.html">“Green Bombers”</a>which wreaked havoc upon supporters of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change in the 2008 general election. </p>
<p>Subsequently, many were to be incorporated into security structures such as the military, police and prison service. They remain a major reservoir of violent support for Zanu-PF, which doesn’t hesitate to use to intimidate and liquidate its opponents. As we know, Zimbabwean elections have now become a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">farce</a>.</p>
<p>Following the ousting of Pravin Gordhan as South Africa’s finance minister in the recent <a href="http://www.gov.za/speeches/president-jacob-zuma-appoints-new-ministers-and-deputy-ministers-31-mar-2017-0000">cabinet reshuffle </a>, and the <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/breaking-fitch-downgrades-sa-to-junk-status-20170407">downgrade by ratings agencies</a>, fears that South Africa under Zuma has embarked down a road which leads to Zimbabwe-style authoritarian kleptocracy have gained considerable ground. For the moment at least, such fears are probably exaggerated. </p>
<p>Although Zuma may be dominant within ANC structures for now, and although he will probably survive the forthcoming vote of <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/11/mbeki-calls-on-anc-mps-to-put-sa-first-in-vote-of-no-confidence-1">no-confidence</a> in the House of Assembly, his reshuffle has alienated many within the party. It has threatened his ability to secure the party presidency for his former wife, <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/news-national/1394103/1394103/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>, at the party’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">elective conference</a> in December.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Zuma’s supporters from the ANC Youth League disrupt a memorial service for anti-apartheid and ANC hero Ahmed Kathrada in Durban.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Rogan Ward</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Furthermore, the recent marches may have given backbone to some ANC MPs who fear the electoral consequences of the party continuing to cling to Zuma’s coattails. Yet the more desperate Zuma and his supporters become, the more the risk that they will turn to the MK Vets to help them. If, in turn, the Zuma faction was to prove triumphant in the leadership battle, it’s unlikely to hesitate to deploy MK vets (alongside its Youth League) against opponents during the lead up to the 2019 election.</p>
<p>Although the DA would go running to the courts, the militant <a href="http://www.effonline.org/">Economic Freedom Fighters</a> would be likely to respond to violence in kind, rendering the 2019 election campaign the most violent we will have seen since 1994. We are not there yet, and hopefully we never will be. </p>
<p>But, an economy which is about to hit the skids and which offers a massive pool of <a href="https://www.saldru.uct.ac.za/images/pdf/PresentationIZA.1-31.pdf">unemployed youths</a> available for political recruitment, is highly combustible. In such a context, were MKMVA to receive the covert (or not-so-covert) backing of the ANC, the prospect of a Zimbabwean scenario would loom ever larger.</p>
<p>If the white right wing was to reconstitute and parade in public in military uniforms, the ANC and all democrats would be rightly outraged. Equally, there should be no place in our democracy for MKMVA to play the role of soldier: that should be left to the South African National Defence Force.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76118/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation </span></em></p>The militant talk and antics by the ANC’s ex-soldiers may seem like theatrics, but they are a chilling reminder of how Zimbabwe used armed militia to crash opponents and democracy.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.