tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/african-union-commission-31415/articlesAfrican Union Commission – The Conversation2024-03-05T13:14:17Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2241912024-03-05T13:14:17Z2024-03-05T13:14:17ZThe African Union is weak because its members want it that way – experts call for action on its powers<p>The <a href="https://au.int/">African Union (AU)</a> comes in for a lot of criticism. Most recently this is from within its own ranks. The AU Commission chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240217/speech-he-moussa-faki-mahamat-chairperson-african-union-commission-thirty">set out his frustrations after an AU summit</a> in February 2024. The commission is the executive organ which runs the AU’s daily activities. Mahamat accused member states of getting in the way of the commission doing its work, and failing to match rhetoric with action:</p>
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<p>Over the last three years, 2021, 2022 and 2023, 93% of African Union decisions have not been implemented.</p>
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<p>We think many of the criticisms of the AU are justified. This is based on more than 15 years of researching its <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adad026/7333637">political</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-12451-8">legal</a> development.</p>
<p>The AU was formed <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">in 2002</a> to replace the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau">Organisation of African Unity</a> (OAU). Its institutions include the <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">AU Commission</a>, the <a href="https://au.int/en/pap">Pan-African Parliament</a> and the <a href="https://www.african-court.org/wpafc/">African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights</a>, but the real power lies in the hands of its assembly, composed of heads of state and government. </p>
<p>The assembly has refused to transfer meaningful powers to any of the AU organs. For example, the Pan-African Parliament does not exercise any binding legislative powers. And the AU Commission cannot compel member states to comply with AU rules. Most member states <a href="https://theconversation.com/successes-of-african-human-rights-court-undermined-by-resistance-from-states-166454">refuse to comply</a> with the decisions of the human rights court. </p>
<p>The AU differs in this regard from the European Union (EU), where supranational, binding powers are exercised by organs such as the European Commission and the European Parliament. </p>
<p>The AU’s aim of deepening continental integration in Africa is not matched by the powers of its organs. As various AU-mandated reports have shown, the organisation is <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20Audit%20of%20the%20AU.pdf">dysfunctional</a> and not <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34915-file-report-20institutional20reform20of20the20au-2.pdf">fit for purpose</a>. </p>
<p>We have previously argued that the <a href="https://unisapressjournals.co.za/index.php/SAPL/article/view/11284">AU has come a long way in its first 20 years</a>. But we believe its <a href="https://theconversation.com/pan-african-integration-has-made-progress-but-needs-a-change-of-mindset-183541">long-standing weakness</a> lies with member states, not its executive, the AU Commission. </p>
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<p>Fixing the problem requires political willingness by member states to gradually sacrifice their sovereignty for the greater good of continental integration. Also, more innovative and creative ways are needed to see how powers can be transferred to weak AU organs. </p>
<h2>Structural weaknesses</h2>
<p>Member states have little trust in the AU. Since its creation in 2002, there has been more talk about what is needed to make it effective than actually fixing its many problems. The <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">AU Constitutive Act</a> allows the assembly to transfer some of its functions to organs such as Pan-African Parliament and AU Commission. Very little has been done about this, though. </p>
<p>Rather than granting the parliament the ability to make binding laws, the amended <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7806-treaty-0047_-_protocol_to_the_constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">PAP Protocol</a> only gave it the powers to make “model laws”. These are no more than recommendations. The same applies to the AU Commission. It can’t compel member states to comply with its decisions. So the AU has no way to exercise supranational powers (binding over its member states). </p>
<p>The AU is only as strong as member states allow it to be. African leaders have a worrying track record of putting narrow domestic gains ahead of transferring higher powers to the AU. </p>
<p>This is unfortunate because African regional integration does not, as is often assumed, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800540">come at the cost of national sovereignty</a>. </p>
<p>In 2016, African leaders mandated Rwandan president Paul Kagame to provide a report on how to reform the AU. The report was submitted to the AU Assembly <a href="https://au.int/en/documents/20170129/report-proposed-recommendations-institutional-reform-african-union">in 2017</a>. It called for better coordination between AU organs and the regional economic communities, and enhancing the capacity of AU organs to achieve continental integration. After eight years, Kagame is <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/337642/frustrated-kagame-hands-au-reform-over-to-ruto/">frustrated with the lack of results</a>. </p>
<p>Though proponents of ambitious AU reforms are disappointed, the reforms suggested by Kagame have produced some tangible progress. They have prompted a welcome rethink of the institutional structures. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/not-yet-uhuru-the-african-union-has-had-a-few-successes-but-remains-weak-187705">Not yet uhuru: the African Union has had a few successes but remains weak</a>
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<p>One example is the decision on self-funding, which has revialised the <a href="https://au.int/es/node/43455">AU Peace Fund</a> and the <a href="https://au.int/es/node/43455">UN peacekeeping budget available</a> for requests to support AU peace support operations. However, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/43077-EX_CL_Dec_1217-1232_XLIII_E.pdf">61% of the overall AU budget</a> is still financed by the AU’s <a href="https://ecdpm.org/application/files/7216/6074/7083/DP240-Financing-the-African-Union-on-mindsets-and-money.pdf">external partners</a> – including the EU, the US, China, India, Turkey and South Korea. Member states still pay <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/43203-doc-2022_AU_Consolidated_Final_Audit_Report_and_financial_statements_E_Signed-merged-1.pdf">on average only 80%-90%</a> of the contributions they owe. </p>
<h2>Poor leadership and weak empowerment</h2>
<p>The AU’s situation is not helped by some aspects of its leadership. Mahamat’s stewardship of a number of key projects and issues has been controversial. Notably, he largely remained silent about <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/2/14/addis-summit-raises-questions-about-ethiopias-many-conflicts">atrocities</a> committed by Ethiopian forces in Tigray during the two-year Ethiopia war which broke out in November 2020.</p>
<p>More hands-on, principled leadership would have been desirable. At the same time, member states haven’t created an environment in which the chairperson could operate as an effective change-maker. </p>
<p>AU member states and international partners have become <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/exclusive-audit-finds-nepotism-corruption-and-worse-at-the-african-union-commission-99181">frustrated</a> with the AU Commission’s performance, often attributing the AU’s problems to Mahamat’s personal leadership. </p>
<p>But blaming the chairperson is to ignore the deep-rooted structural deficiencies of the organisation. Without addressing these structural problems, whoever is <a href="https://assodesire.com/2024/02/19/outcomes-of-the-african-union-summit-in-7-points/">elected when Mahamat’s term ends in February 2025</a> will fall into the same inefficiency trap.</p>
<h2>Pathways to supranationalism</h2>
<p>The AU’s exercise of binding powers over its member states will require separating personal from institutional politics, ratifying existing legal instruments, and showcasing instances of good pan-African governance.</p>
<p>AU member states should commit to coming up with a feasible plan that shows how, in the short to medium term, they intend to transfer meaningful powers to the AU Commission and the Pan-African Parliament.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-african-union-at-20-a-lot-has-been-achieved-despite-many-flaws-175932">The African Union at 20: a lot has been achieved despite many flaws</a>
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<p>For example, member states that are willing and able to move ahead with endowing the parliament with supranational legislative powers should be encouraged. The amended <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7806-treaty-0047_-_protocol_to_the_constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">PAP Protocol</a> does not prevent this as it encourages member states to experiment with direct elections of membership to the parliament. </p>
<p>Also, the AU <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">Protocol on Free Movement</a> encourages willing member states and regional economic communities to take action. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-african-unions-panel-of-the-wise-an-unfulfilled-promise-184488">The African Union's Panel of the Wise: an unfulfilled promise?</a>
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<p>Nothing prevents such member states from getting into an arrangement with the Pan-African Parliament and AU Commission to provide guidelines and even monitor the way they implement these objectives. Along the example of the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/agreement-establishing-african-continental-free-trade-area">African Continental Free Trade Area</a>, national ratifications of AU instruments should be public and transparent to speed up action on agreed decisions. </p>
<p>Member states should encourage the inclusion of wider civil society in framing the terms and conditions of moving forward with the AU supranational project. In this way, the sense of popular ownership and legitimacy of the organisation will be guaranteed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224191/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ueli Staeger has received funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Babatunde Fagbayibo receives funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa. </span></em></p>African leaders have a worrying track record of prioritising narrow domestic gains over transferring supranational, binding powers to the AU.Ueli Staeger, Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of AmsterdamBabatunde Fagbayibo, Professor of International Law, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2137372023-09-20T08:43:58Z2023-09-20T08:43:58ZAU and G20: membership will give Africa more say on global issues – if it speaks with one voice<p>After seven years of advocating for full membership, the African Union (AU) <a href="https://apnews.com/article/g20-membership-africa-economy-india-ae58459261bc2722b54da422debc5b83">will join</a> the Group of 20 “<a href="https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/about_g20/G20_Background_Brief.pdf#page=2">most important industrialised and developing economies</a>”. It becomes the second regional bloc to join the group after the <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-g20_en">27-member European Union (EU)</a>.</p>
<p>The G20 was <a href="https://www.g20.org/en/about-g20/#overview">established</a> after the 1999 Asian financial crisis as an informal grouping of ministers of finance and central bank governors. It grew out of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-g7-who-are-its-members-what-does-it-do-2022-10-11/">G7</a>, which was formed in 1975 to deal with another complex global financial and economic crisis. </p>
<p>Since 2008, the G20 has met at the level of heads of state and government. Its agenda has been broadened beyond finance and economics to include, among other issues, climate change, disaster risk reduction and health.</p>
<p>The G20 is currently made up of 19 member states (including South Africa) plus the <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles_en">EU</a>. <a href="https://www.g20.org/en/about-g20/">These members</a> collectively account for about 85% of global economic output, more than 75% of global trade and about two-thirds of the world population. The AU’s 55 member states, on the other hand, bring only about <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/02/africa-global-growth-economics-worldwide-gdp/">3%</a> of global economic output, <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/09/african-union-g20-world-leaders/">but a population of 1.4 billion</a>.</p>
<p>Based on my <a href="https://uni-leipzig.academia.edu/UlfEngel/">research</a> on the <a href="https://brill.com/display/serial/YBAU">AU</a>, and my experience as an adviser to the <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">African Union Commission</a> (the AU’s secretariat) for 18 years, my view is that membership of the G20 is an important complement to the union’s existing multilateral and bilateral strategic partnerships.</p>
<p>The AU hopes to use its G20 membership to give member states <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/g20-admit-african-union-permanent-member-new-delhi-summit-draft-declaration-2023-09-09/">a greater voice</a> on key global issues and to make a stronger contribution to the ongoing renegotiation of the global order. But a major challenge will be to find a structured way to arrive at common African positions and speak on behalf of member states.</p>
<h2>Strategic partnership</h2>
<p>The AU has developed its external relations primarily through <a href="https://au.int/en/partnerships">multilateral and bilateral strategic partnerships</a>. </p>
<p>Multilaterally, strategic partnerships with the United Nations and the EU are of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/11/african-union-eu-un-partnership-project-launched-support-au-peace-support">key importance</a> (the League of Arab States plays less of a role). Bilaterally, China, India, Japan, South Korea and Turkey are currently considered key strategic partners. And last year, the African Union Commission participated in the <a href="https://www.state.gov/africasummit/#:%7E:text=Delegations%20from%20all%2049%20invited,private%20sector%20attended%20the%20summit.">United States-Africa Leaders summit</a>. </p>
<p>There is no routine process through which states are categorised as strategic partners. And to date the AU has struggled to develop a coherent policy for managing these partnerships. However, being a full member of the G20 now opens up the possibility to take <a href="https://x.com/AUC_MoussaFaki/status/1700423181104816554?s=20">collective African positions</a> on strategic questions to the global table. </p>
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<p>The continental concerns it can raise include debt relief, trade integration, financing the management of climate change and public health management.</p>
<h2>The African Union and the global order</h2>
<p>However, in the major global policymaking forums, member states of the AU don’t speak with one voice. This holds true for the UN General Assembly (as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-with-ukraine-five-reasons-why-many-african-countries-choose-to-be-neutral-180135">African vote on Russia’s war against Ukraine</a> demonstrates). And often also for the so-called A3 – the three African non-permanent members of the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members">UN Security Council</a> (Gabon, Ghana and Mozambique).</p>
<p>Yet, in a limited number of policy fields, the AU has managed to come up with what it refers to as “common positions”. These have been created and legitimised in different ways, and have a mostly diffuse legal binding effect on member states.</p>
<p>The most prominent of these common positions is the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/africas-quest-for-reform-of-the-united-nations-security-council/#:%7E:text=In%202005%2C%20the%20AU%20adopted,have%20strong%20representation%20in%201963.">2005 Ezulwini consensus on reform of the UN Security Council</a> to increase African representation in the council and provide the continent with two permanent seats with veto rights. But there are also common positions on other important global questions. These include <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/africa-report/common-african-positions-on-global-issues">mining, the post-2015 development agenda and asset recovery from illicit financial flows</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pan-africanism-remains-a-dream-four-key-issues-the-african-union-must-tackle-199791">Pan-Africanism remains a dream: four key issues the African Union must tackle</a>
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<p>The African Union Commission needs a clear definition of what “common positions” are, and how they can be achieved politically and domesticated legally by member states. </p>
<p>To develop more common positions, the 55 AU member states would have to delegate more state sovereignty to the union. There are some lessons from the EU’s experience. The EU has developed more than 300 common positions. These have been adopted by the EU Council and approved by the EU Parliament. In these cases, the union’s member states have ceded real sovereignty to the EU Commission.</p>
<p>It will be interesting to see how the AU will prepare African positions to be tabled to the G20. They will likely be prepared by the continental body’s <a href="https://au.int/en/pages/specialised-technical-committees-stcs-0">ministerial specialised technical committees</a>. In the G20 realm, I expect the committee on finance, monetary affairs, economic planning and integration to play a strong role. This will likely be in cooperation with the technical committee on economic development, tourism, trade, industry and mining.</p>
<p>However, the legal way in which member states can express their agreement or disagreement with common positions needs to be defined. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>Membership in the G20 represents a great opportunity. But Africa’s attempts to speak with one voice must be strengthened. And coordination processes must be created at the level of finance ministers and central bank governors, among others. These will ensure that the AU makes use of its membership in a global negotiating and decision-making platform.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213737/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ulf Engel receives research funding from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research for a project on African non-military conflict intervention practices (ANCIP, 2022-2026), and the German Research Council for a research project on inter-regionalism between ECOWAS, the AU and the EU on peace and security in the Sahel region (2020-2023).</span></em></p>The African Union’s membership in the G20 is an important complement to existing strategic partnerships.Ulf Engel, Professor, Institute of African Studies, University of LeipzigLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1924202022-10-18T15:31:30Z2022-10-18T15:31:30ZTigray war: two years on, the AU has failed to broker peace and silence the guns<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490024/original/file-20221017-18-h1y70o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A damaged tank on the road north of Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, in February 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union pledged in 2016 to “<a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/au-retreat-to-elaborate-a-roadmap-on-practical-steps-to-silence-the-guns-in-africa-by-2020-concludes-in-lusaka-zambia">silence the guns</a>” by the end of 2020, an ambitious agenda of ending armed conflicts on the continent. Just two months before that deadline, the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-22/ethiopia-s-war-toll-grows-as-the-world-looks-away">deadliest war</a> in years erupted in Ethiopia. On 3 November 2020, the armies of the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea <a href="https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2020/11/ethiopia-military-operations-reported-in-tigray-region-november-3">attacked</a> the region of Tigray. Since then, the guns have not been silent. Instead, it is the African Union that has been silent.</p>
<p>That war is now two years old. Crimes against humanity and war crimes have been committed during this time. Some <a href="https://martinplaut.com/2022/03/13/breaking-tigray-war-mortality-half-a-million-people-ghent-university/">estimates</a> show that over 500,000 civilians have been killed. Rape, displacement and starvation have been prevalent. Tigray has been under a complete siege with no access to land and air transport, telephone and internet access, banks and all kinds of humanitarian supplies. </p>
<p>The AU has shown itself to be of no use or consequence since the conflict started. During the first year of conflict, it failed to even acknowledge that there was a war. Instead, it adopted the Ethiopian government’s narrative of a “<a href="https://twitter.com/abiyahmedali/status/1326069599994056705?lang=en">law enforcement operation</a>” by a legitimate government against a rebellious entity. It was not until August 2021 that the AU took the first steps at mediating. </p>
<p>The chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki, <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">appointed</a> the former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, as his “high representative” to <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">promote</a> peace, security, stability and political dialogue all over the Horn of Africa region. This was a welcome development. But it soon became evident that the AU was not impartial. And the peace initiative was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-unions-mediation-effort-in-tigray-is-a-non-starter-169293">non-starter</a>. </p>
<p>One year on from Obasanjo’s appointment, the AU’s failures are as evident as they’ve been from the start. The AU Peace and Security Council – which is <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">charged</a> with prevention, management and resolution of conflicts – has never had any substantive agenda on Tigray. The two times it sat to discuss the war on Tigray were only to hear the briefings of Obasanjo as envoy. </p>
<p>The war has intensified to alarming levels. And another <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/au-led-ethiopia-peace-talks-delayed-over-logistics-diplomats">attempt</a> by the AU to convene peace talks in South Africa has met delays. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-unions-mediation-effort-in-tigray-is-a-non-starter-169293">Why the African Union's mediation effort in Tigray is a non-starter</a>
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<p>The AU has failed in applying its norms and principles to the conflict in Ethiopia. Its institutions were not activated and best practices were not utilised. The AU chairperson and his special envoy have put themselves at the service of the Ethiopian government. </p>
<p>The AU needs to launch a credible and robust peace process with mediators mutually agreed by the conflicting parties. The guns can only be silenced by engaging genuine peace processes guided by the norms and principles of the AU.</p>
<h2>AU’s failed diplomacy</h2>
<p>Despite their reservations, the authorities in Tigray gave Obasanjo the benefit of the doubt, and cooperated with him for the whole year. </p>
<p>Obasanjo shuttled between Addis Ababa and Mekelle, the Tigrayan regional capital, six times. Tigray received him as an elderly statesperson and engaged with him constructively. They accepted his advice to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/20/ethiopias-tigray-forces-announce-release-of-4000-prisoners">release</a> 4,500 prisoners of war as a confidence-building measure. Tigray was told that this would be reciprocated by Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed releasing an equal number of Tigrayan civilian prisoners. But when Abiy failed to deliver his end of the bargain, Obasanjo did nothing. </p>
<p>Before long, the Tigray leadership realised that Obasanjo was not capable of handling a complex problem that has a politico-military, historical and regional dimension. He never produced an organised agenda with measurable outputs. In three of his trips, his main agenda was to ask the authorities to release prisoners of war. </p>
<p>In March 2022, a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-truce.html">humanitarian truce</a>” was brokered by the Americans. Obasanjo is not known to have contributed anything towards it. In August 2022, Obasanjo <a href="https://twitter.com/rabdianalyst/status/1556028070716481538?lang=en">proposed</a> inviting Eritrea to the negotiating table, despite knowing that this crossed a red line for Tigray.</p>
<p>The AU failed in other ways, too. It lost its credibility in relation to the current war when it failed to condemn the atrocities. It has never demanded that Eritrea pull out troops from the Tigray war. It was very careful to call Obasanjo’s position “<a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">high representative</a>” and not “mediator”. Also his brief is the Horn and not Ethiopia-Tigray conflict, a clear nod to Abiy’s preference not to be seen to negotiate.</p>
<p>The AU was also behind the three African states represented at the United Nations Security Council. The so-called “A3” – Ghana, Gambia and Kenya – have continuously blocked any security council action, <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/09/ethiopia-informal-interactive-dialogue.php">most recently</a> in September 2022. </p>
<h2>Litany of errors</h2>
<p>The war in Tigray has intensified. Ethiopian and Eritrean armies have encircled Tigray in an attempt to break the resistance. Up to 60% of Ethiopian federal troops are deployed to Eritrea to fight under the command of the Eritreans. The Ethiopian Air Force has moved its operational base into Asmara. So far, several towns have been decimated by indiscriminate air raids and artillery shelling of the joint forces. </p>
<p>Most international actors, such as the UN, US, EU and the UK, have condemned the resumption of hostilities and the involvement of Eritrea in the war. But the AU has not. </p>
<p>In the middle of this, the AU chairperson <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ethiopias-tigray-leader-invited-peace-talks-africa-91023467">invited</a> the president of Tigray for talks in South Africa. The letter fell below the standards of the AU Commission. It did not say who else was invited. It misstated the date for the talks and didn’t say anything about logistical arrangements for the Tigrayan delegates living under a complete siege. </p>
<p>These mistakes are unusual from a bureaucracy that routinely organises such talks.</p>
<p>The letter claimed that there were continuous consultations with the parties on the issues. But the authorities in Tigray <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/au-led-ethiopia-peace-talks-delayed-over-logistics-diplomats">denied</a> this. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyatta-to-skip-ethiopia-peace-talks-3977112">strongly worded letter</a>, former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta – a would-be co-mediator in South Africa – confirmed this lack of consultation by the AU Commission. There were also reports that the second co-mediator, former South African deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, and the South African government were not consulted on the event. </p>
<p>The AU’s listed agenda did not include an immediate <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202210060051.html">cessation of hostilities</a>.</p>
<h2>AU principles</h2>
<p>The chairperson of the AU and his high representative have failed Africa and the norms, principles and institutions of the African Union. The AU needs to launch a credible, robust mediation process with mutually accepted mediators. This is what the Tigrayan authorities demanded at the outset. </p>
<p>The AU peace and security council should also be active enough to hold the chairperson in check and hold him to the norms and principles of the union.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192420/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mulugeta G Berhe (PhD) is affiliated to the Tigraian resistance and now lives in Mekelle. Does everything he can to support the resistance. </span></em></p>The African Union needs to launch a credible, robust mediation process with mutually accepted mediators.Mulugeta G Berhe, Senior Fellow, World Peace Foundation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1680132021-09-16T14:20:26Z2021-09-16T14:20:26ZWhy the push led by South Africa to revoke Israel’s AU observer status is misguided<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421535/original/file-20210916-21-popyo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Chairperson of the African Union, Moussa Faki Mahamat, speaks during a briefing in Addis Ababa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The announcement in July that Israel had been formally granted observer status at the African Union drew a sharp reaction from some countries on the continent. These included Algeria and Djibouti as well as South Africa, which said it was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/28/shocking-south-africa-slams-israels-au-observer-status">“appalled”</a>. </p>
<p>Pretoria moved quickly to lobby other Southern African Development Community states <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/sa-appalled-by-israels-african-union-observer-status-20210728">against the decision</a>. </p>
<p>At a meeting of Heads of State and Government in Lilongwe, Malawi, the regional body <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202108200204.html">issued a statement</a> objecting to the decision. It said it had been taken unilaterally by the AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat. It also expressed its solidarity with the Palestinian people.</p>
<p>Let us consider the regional body’s main objection – unilateralism on the part of Moussa Faki Mahamat. Did Commissioner Faki act outside his mandate in granting Israel observer status? The AU Commission <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/africa/2021-08-07-moussa-faki-defends-move-to-admit-israel-as-au-observer-state/">argues</a> that it acted within its “full sphere of competence”
reading of the <a href="https://portal.africa-union.org/DVD/Documents/DOC-AU-DEC/EX%20CL%20DEC%20230%20(VII)%20_E.pdf">AU document</a> setting out the criteria for granting observer status and the system of accreditation. It certainly grants the AU Commission discretion in making such decisions. </p>
<p>It should also be noted that Moussa Faki Mahamat’s decision <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-advantages-israels-observer-status-in-the-african-union-165773">was supported</a> by the current chairperson of the African Union, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Félix Tshisekedi. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/africa/2021-08-07-moussa-faki-defends-move-to-admit-israel-as-au-observer-state/">Faki noted in August 2021</a>, out of the AU’s 55 member states, 46 already enjoy diplomatic relations with Israel. Logically, then, Israel’s entry into the pan-African organisation, is merely an extension of what is happening at bilateral level between member states and Israel.</p>
<p>I have been involved in the subject of Israel’s relationship with the continent from an academic perspective for three decades. Based on this experience I believe that South Africa, and the regional body, are wrong in their approach. A more mature and sophisticated foreign policy that embraces engagement and dialogue is needed. </p>
<p>This is because Israel is becoming more integrated in the international community. The unprecedented close political, economic, trade and security ties between Israel and its Arab neighbours as well as African countries like Morocco, Chad, Guinea and Sudan <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/uae-targets-1-trillion-in-economic-relations-with-israel/2365173">speaks to this</a>. This is also the case in <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-advantages-israels-observer-status-in-the-african-union-165773">East Africa</a>. </p>
<p>In my view, South Africa is out of sync with the views of most African heads of state</p>
<p>In addition, isolating Israel will not work in promoting the well-being of Palestinians. This was tried for decades by Arab countries and has failed.</p>
<p>What is needed is a critical engagement with Israel and concerted efforts to strengthen the pro-peace constitutuency in Israel itself. </p>
<h2>The human rights question</h2>
<p>South Africa, as well as the Southern African Development Community, raised the issue of human rights in relation to Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. </p>
<p>I believe the organisation is using this selectively. </p>
<p>The leadership of the regional body did not raise the issue of human rights during the bad behaviour on the part of a number of country leaders. These included the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/life/mugabe-zimbabwe-s-liberator-turned-authoritarian-leader/1575001">worst excesses</a> of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe and the <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/subverting-democracy-in-tanzania-and-zambia/">authoritarianism</a> of Edgar Lungu Zambia. It has also been silent about the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17762749">corrupt despotism</a> of Africa’s last feudal monarch King Mswati III. </p>
<p>Neither did human rights considerations feature when Pretoria <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/africa/icc-south-africa-sudan-bashir.html">attempted to shield </a> Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir from the International Criminal Court to answer for atrocities in Darfur. </p>
<p>A second objection to the position taken by the Southern African Development Community is that, in my view, granting Israel observer status does not undermine previous AU resolutions expressing solidarity with the Palestinian cause.</p>
<p>Commissioner Faki said as much when he stated that Israel’s formal accreditation did not weaken the </p>
<blockquote>
<p>unflinching commitment of the Pan-African Organisation to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish an independent National State, with East Jerusalem as its capital, within the framework of a global, fair and definitive peace between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine.</p>
</blockquote>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-advantages-israels-observer-status-in-the-african-union-165773">In search of advantages: Israel’s observer status in the African Union</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>South Africa, Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have formally requested that the decision to accredit Israel should be rescinded at the October 2021 meeting of the AU Executive Council. </p>
<p>Most other countries on the continent, however, have sought closer ties with Isreal. Many, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda have secured Israeli investments and expertise in a wide variety of areas from agriculture to tech start ups. </p>
<p>Such a pragmatic approach follows a more pragmatic Arab approach. This was set in train by the signing of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/us/politics/trump-israel-united-arab-emirates-uae.html">Abraham Accords</a> between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 2020. </p>
<p>Just as Algeria and South Africa could not stop Morocco’s entry into the AU, neither can they stop Israeli accreditation. </p>
<p>In addition, 46 AU Member States already have relations with Israel. And Egypt, which also opposed Israel’s observer status, has since agreed to strengthen bilateral relations following a meeting between President Al-Sisi and Prime Minister Bennett. </p>
<p>In my view South Africa, and those of the same view on the continent, won’t be able to get the accreditation decision reversed. This echoes the failed attempts by Algeria and South Africa to stop Morocco’s entry into the AU.</p>
<p>Malawi, the country where the 41st SADC Summit took place, is seeking to open an embassy in Jerusalem. Harare is also seeking to improve its bilateral ties with Israel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hussein Solomon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Just as Algeria and South Africa could not stop Morocco’s entry into the AU, neither can they stop Israeli accreditation.Hussein Solomon, Senior Professor and Academic Head of Department: Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1543992021-02-06T06:43:00Z2021-02-06T06:43:00ZWhy the African Union’s decision on a top post is being seen as a litmus test<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382679/original/file-20210205-18-4w0dt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The reform of the operations of the African Union is key to its future</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Department of State/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This story was updated to reflect the recent appointments made by the African Union.</em></p>
<p>The recently concluded 34th summit of the African Union (AU) had a particularly significant job to do: it elected six commissioners to the AU’s secretariat, which is a vital cog in the organisation. The <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">AU Commission</a> works with various organs of the union to promote and advance its objectives. It reports to the <a href="https://au.int/en/executivecouncil">executive council</a>, which develops policy and oversees implementation of the decisions of the <a href="https://au.int/en/pages/assembly-heads-state-and-government">Assembly of Heads of State and Government</a>.</p>
<p>The election of the six commissioners signalled two things about the union. The first is how serious the AU is about putting in place a strong team to drive institutional reforms. The second is how strong its commitment is to implementing <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38956-doc-assembly_au_decl_12_iii_e.pdf">gender parity</a>.</p>
<p>As part of the appointment process the AU also decided on the chair and deputy chair positions. The incumbent chair, <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-tricky-business-of-electing-an-au-commission-chairperson">H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat</a>, was the only candidate for the position and was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/6/au-leader-faki-re-elected-for-second-four-year-term-at-summit">re-elected</a>. The deputy position – an important role because it is effectively the commission’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/announcements/38834-annc-deputy_chairperson_e.pdf">chief operating officer</a> – went to Rwanda’s <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/rwanda-beats-uganda-to-au-commission-chair-3283728">Dr Monique Nsanzabaganwa</a>.</p>
<p>The appointment piqued interest because of the commitment by African leaders to push for gender equality and parity. The fact that a woman was chosen was viewed as a positive development.</p>
<p>The deputy chair is responsible for the implementation and management of reform at the organisation. This is a massive and ongoing project. The current AU’s reform journey began in July 2016 when the assembly appointed Rwandan president Paul Kagame to do a study on its institutional reform. The <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/35998-doc-20170117_draft_technical_au_reform_report_v23.pdf">assessment</a> by the panel led by Kagame was unequivicol; the union was not fit for purpose.</p>
<p>A number of reforms were approved and <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/speeches/38087-sp-au_reform_overview_-_pres_kagame_-_feb_2020.pdf">significant progress</a> has been made in implementing these, in particular <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/35286-doc-ext-assembly-2xiannex_-_administrative_reform_roadmap_e.pdf">administrative reforms</a>. But there is still a significant amount of work to be done to overcome the dysfunctionalities identified in the Kagame-led review.</p>
<p>The new commission will need political dexterity, competence and experience to manage the complexities of the reform processes. This is because reform is an ongoing process. So, the new commission will have to continually work to ensure that the primary objectives of the reform are met.</p>
<h2>The deputy post</h2>
<p>The deputy chairperson is the commission’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/announcements/38834-annc-deputy_chairperson_e.pdf">chief operating officer</a>. They are responsible for the financial and administrative management of the commission. The deputy chairperson must therefore have a combination of substantive technical knowledge and political acumen.</p>
<p>Extensive knowledge and experience in organisational management, financial administration and a demonstrable understanding of the need for gender equality are also important.</p>
<p>Nsanzabaganwa, the first woman to be elected to the position, is the current <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/rwanda-beats-uganda-to-au-commission-chair-3283728">deputy governor</a> of the Bank of Rwanda.</p>
<p>She will need to deepen her knowledge and understanding of multilateral organisations. She must develop a vast network both continentally and internationally that she can draw on for consensus building and influence, especially in furtherance of the reform agenda. </p>
<p>Nsanzabaganwa will continue the ongoing work of addressing the challenges identified in the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34915-file-report-20institutional20reform20of20the20au-2.pdf">report on the proposed recommendations for institutional reform</a>. These include the challenges of low leadership by commissioners, accountability, inadequate supervision of commission employees and coordination of commission activities. </p>
<p>The report also pointed to inadequate supervision and coordination as well as weak staff recruitment and performance management systems. <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/35286-doc-ext-assembly-2xiannex_-_administrative_reform_roadmap_e.pdf">Considerable progress</a> has been made in fixing these, but gaps remain.</p>
<p>One major gap relates to the creation of a safe working environment for women. The commission has been bedevilled by accusations of <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20181122/outcome-investigation-allegations-harassment-against-women-and-other">sex and gender-based discrimination</a>. It falls on Nsanzabaganwa to drive changes that will create a safe environment for women and to ensure that the commission lives up to its gender policies.</p>
<h2>Financial autonomy</h2>
<p>The quest for <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31953-file-assembly_au_dec_605_financing_the_au.pdf">financial autonomy</a> in managing the union’s affairs has gained traction on the continent. The AU has made <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38739-doc-report_on_financing_of_the_union_jun_2020_002.pdf">significant strides</a> on this front, minimising its overdependence on external partners. </p>
<p>But to sustain the gains, the commission must have strategies for effective engagement with member states, encouraging them to pay their AU membership fees on time. Most of the progress on financial autonomy has been on generating its own resources for <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38739-doc-report_on_financing_of_the_union_jun_2020_002.pdf">the AU’s operational management</a>. The <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/286-price-peace-securing-un-financing-au-peace-operations">financing of peace operations</a> remains unresolved. The main stumbling block <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/286-price-peace-securing-un-financing-au-peace-operations">here</a> is agreement between the AU and the United Nations. </p>
<p>To resolve this impasse, Nsanzabaganwa must develop a deep understanding and knowledge of the United Nations’ financial and budgeting systems. This will be critical to ensuring that Africa is allotted its due share of resources to maintain peace and security.</p>
<p>Finally, as the chief operating officer, Nsanzabaganwa will have to work very closely with member states and the commission staff.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154399/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Linda Darkwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The election of commissioners is a key step in the reform process of the African Union Commission.Linda Darkwa, Senior Research Fellow, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of GhanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1218222019-08-21T12:16:29Z2019-08-21T12:16:29ZThe AU’s role in brokering Sudan deal offers lessons for the future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288691/original/file-20190820-170918-hlkxpy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Chairman of Sudan's transitional council, Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan, speaks during the power sharing agreement ceremony.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Morwan Ali/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) came into existence after a restructuring of its predecessor – the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It was created to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful continent. </p>
<p>While the AU has a clear mandate to deepen the process of economic and political integration on the continent, its predecessor was run on the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/78/311/197/16165?redirectedFrom=PDF">principle of non-interference</a> in the internal affairs of member states. This lessened its ability to resolve member states’ internal disputes. </p>
<p>However, the OAU did originate some of the standards that are at the foundation of the AU’s conflict resolution approach. One such standard is contained in the Lome Declaration which criminalises <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">unconstitutional changes of government</a>. </p>
<p>The AU now has a wider legal mandate for internal conflict resolution than its predecessor. This mandate is set out in its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">Constitutive Act</a> and in its Peace and Security Council <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7781-treaty-0024_-_protocol_relating_to_the_establishment_of_the_peace_and_security_council_of_the_african_union_e.pdf">Protocol</a>. But, the implementation of this mandate is still a work in progress. </p>
<p>But the AU has in recent days been <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/african-union-au-sudan-power-sharing-agreement-mediation-by-paul-mulindwa-2019-07">rightly praised</a> for using its regional laws to <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/new-sudan-thousands-celebrate-as-protesters-army-sign-deal-20190818">broker an agreement</a> between the Sudanese military and the country’s civilian movement. The agreement comes after months of conflict that followed <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47892742">the ouster</a> of Sudan’s despotic ruler Omar al-Bashir.</p>
<p>After al-Bashir was deposed, the military attempted to assume leadership of the country. It attacked protesters who were demanding that authority be transferred to a civilian administration. The attacks led to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/sudan-school-children-shot-dead-el-obeid-massacre-190729184528614.html">deaths and injuries</a>.</p>
<p>The agreement, which was brokered with the help of Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian Prime minister, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/sudan-constitutional-declaration-190804182241137.html">set out key conditions</a>, including the following:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The establishment of a joint military and civilian sovereign council, which will govern the country for three years before elections are held. </p>
<p>Shared leadership of the council. A military leader will lead for 21 months followed by a civilian leader for 18 months.</p>
<p>A bill of rights and freedoms for all Sudanese citizens.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The AU’s involvement has proven the usefulness of its regional laws in <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-african-union-law-shape-a-new-legal-order-for-the-continent-99245">resolving internal disputes</a> in member States. So how did it reach this point, and what lessons have been learned from its work in Sudan?</p>
<h2>AU intervention</h2>
<p>The military takeover that followed al-Bashir’s removal from power amounted to an “unconstitutional change of government” which is prohibited by Article 4 of the AU’s Constitutive Act. </p>
<p>This breach of regional law empowered Moussa Faki Mahamat, the chairperson of the AU Commission, to <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190411/statement-chairperson-commission-situation-sudan">denounce the military’s actions</a>. </p>
<p>Following the official denouncement, the AU’s Peace and Security Council adopted a decision stating that the actions of the Sudanese military amounted to an <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-840th-meeting-of-the-psc-on-the-situation-in-sudan">unconstitutional change of government</a>. The Council is central to the AU’s legal framework. It was set up to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. Its April 2019 decision also reiterated the need for a civilian-led and consensual transition and demanded that the military hand over power within 15 days. </p>
<p>Failure to hand over power should have led to the automatic suspension of Sudan from the activities of the AU as provided by the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf">Council’s protocol</a>. However, an <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5N2253AZ">extension of three months</a> was subsequently agreed to allow for further negotiations. </p>
<p>In my view, the decision to grant the extension was problematic because it undermined the “automatic” nature of the suspension and allowed the military to continue attacks on civilians without repercussions. Due to lack of progress and escalating violence, the Council <a href="https://twitter.com/AU_PSD/status/1136596052088373248">eventually suspended</a> Sudan in June.</p>
<p>During the three-month notice period, the AU continued to engage with the key parties in the conflict. This happened even as the military continued attacks on protesters. Finally in July, the AU/Ethiopia mediation team convinced both parties to <a href="https://www.apnews.com/d691c59bdf3f407885803bd97cece7a3">resume talks</a>. This led to the signing of a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-49213901">constitutional declaration</a>. </p>
<p>In the end, the AU’s mediation was successful. But during the drawn out negotiations over a hundred people <a href="https://www.apnews.com/6b47b66b2b68455b9c7047a78a73c048">were killed and hundreds more injured.</a> This begs the question: what could the AU have done differently?</p>
<h2>Lessons learned</h2>
<p>While it is laudable that the AU’s intervention in the Sudanese political crisis resulted in an agreement, there are lessons that should be learnt.</p>
<p>The most important lesson is regarding the implementation of the provision for suspension. The 15-day ultimatum that was originally given for the restoration of civilian rule is <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2019/04/29/the-quest-for-a-civilian-led-transition-in-sudan-is-african-unions-role-still-relevant/">consistent with previous practice</a> by the AU’s Peace and Security Council. </p>
<p>The threat of imminent suspension could have incentivised the military to act more speedily towards a resolution within a shorter time frame. It could have prevented or reduced the violence that ensued in the following months. </p>
<p>In addition, the AU and its Council need to develop a concrete strategy for dealing with continuing violence in the course of negotiations. The Constitutive Act gives these bodies the power to directly intervene in member states where there is serious threat to legitimate order and a need to restore peace and stability. The means and method of implementation of this power is left to the AU under the law, but could include the deployment of peacekeeping forces. </p>
<p>I would argue that the Sudan crisis warranted direct intervention. </p>
<p>This is not to downplay the crucial role that the AU and the Council played in helping to resolve the Sudan political crisis. Indeed, the role played by the regional body underscores the importance of its legal order and institutions in conflict resolution in Africa. </p>
<p>Its success in this respect will instil confidence among member states. It will also bolster the AU’s image as an effective and efficient organisation on the international stage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121822/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Femi Amao receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), UK . </span></em></p>The African Union’s role in Sudan’s political crisis proves that it’s legal framework is strong enough to resolve regional disputesFemi Amao, Senior Lecturer, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1181352019-06-05T12:39:01Z2019-06-05T12:39:01ZMore work lies ahead to make Africa’s new free trade area succeed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277925/original/file-20190604-69059-1afywat.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The port of Mombasa in Kenya, which was the first country, with Ghana, to ratify the African Continental Free Trade Agreement in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At a time when the global trade regime is under attack, the African Union (AU) is celebrating the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which came into effect <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190429/afcfta-agreement-secures-minimum-threshold-22-ratification-sierra-leone-and">on 30 May</a>. </p>
<p>After being ratified by the required minimum 22 nations, all the member states of the AU are now legally bound to allow African goods to be traded without restraint throughout the continent. </p>
<p>This is an impressive achievement. AfCFTA not only covers the entire continent, but has proceeded at a record pace. It was <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/34055-ext_assembly_dec_1x_e26_march.pdf">signed on 21 March 2018</a>. Its entry into force underlines African leaders’ commitment to pan-African economic integration – a <a href="https://archive.org/details/africamustunite00nkru/">goal as old as African independence</a> in the 1960s. </p>
<p>Intra-regional trade has long been minimal in Africa, standing at <a href="https://www.tralac.org/news/article/13489-african-trade-statistics-yearbook-2017.html">13% for intra-imports and 17% for intra-exports</a> over the last seven years. Earlier continental trade initiatives, such as the <a href="http://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/14129">1980 Lagos Plan of Action</a> and the <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/aec.htm">1991 African Economic Community</a>, have lagged far behind their ambitions. </p>
<p>However, the practical implications of the continental free trade area are <a href="https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/will-free-trade-be-africas-economic-game-changer">not immediate</a>. Significant work is required to deliver tangible results. Negotiations on tariffs, time lines and the seat of the AfCFTA Secretariat are still ongoing. And without effective public policies, liberalising trade risks having negative implications for many people on the continent.</p>
<h2>African trade to date</h2>
<p>Establishing regional economic communities across the continent has produced a complex pattern of overlapping but inconsequential <a href="https://ecdpm.org/publications/political-economy-africas-regional-spaghetti-bowl-synthesis-report/?utm_source=ECDPM+Newsletters+List&utm_campaign=bb4d47f899-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_05_27_01_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_f93a3dae14-bb4d47f899-388797801">trade regimes</a>. The only functioning <a href="https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/customs-union/">customs union</a> on the continent remains the 109 year-old <a href="https://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=394">Southern African Customs Union</a>, an imperial relic that is dominated by South Africa.</p>
<p>The last large-scale attempt to liberalise trade in Africa - the <a href="https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html">Tripartite agreement</a> covering most of eastern and southern Africa - was launched in 2015. Only four out of 27 countries ratified it, and the agreement was yet another hyped but ultimately stillborn initiative.</p>
<p>After a disappointing track record of African trade agreements, the AU is convinced that AfCFTA is finally the silver bullet. Indeed, there are some encouraging signs that the stars are aligning favourably.</p>
<p>At a time when the World Trade Organisation has proclaimed the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46395379">worst crisis in global trade since 1947</a>, and in a context of China and the US waging <a href="https://www.ft.com/us-china-trade-dispute">trade disputes</a>, African governments are collectively swimming against the stream.</p>
<p>The AU leadership has been eager to push a <a href="https://au.int/agenda2063/overview">long-term integration agenda</a> and an <a href="http://ipss-addis.org/research/policy_periodicals/the_au_reform_agenda-_what_areas_of_reform_are_mos.php">institutional reform agenda</a>. But it has struggled with what Rwandan President Paul Kagame, in his role as AU chairperson in 2018, <a href="http://www.rci.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/78/News/FInal%20AU%20Reform%20Combined%20report_28012017.pdf">called</a> a “crisis of implementation”.</p>
<p>The reform process aims to focus the AU on fewer priorities and to make the <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">AU Commission</a> more efficient in steering integration. It also seeks to make the AU central budget financially independent from international partners. This plan has struck a chord with many member states and the AU Commission. Creating a continental free trade area fits well into the strategy.</p>
<h2>Why AfCFTA is different</h2>
<p>Adherence to AfCFTA has become a competition for the title of “who is the best pan-Africanist”. This peer pressure to jump on the train <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Nigeria-now-close-to-signing-African-trade-pact/2560-5133532-a9cs0m/index.html">before it leaves the station</a> is behind the agreement’s rapid ratification.</p>
<p>The free trade area aspires to a membership of 55 highly diverse countries. This seems arbitrary from an economic point of view. However, it corresponds to and will likely benefit from an increasingly recognised and institutionalised “continentalist” interpretation of Africa. </p>
<p>AfCFTA is also vague enough to appeal to advocates of both trade liberalisation and economic protectionism. At this stage it is still possible for it to become either a stepping stone towards global integration, or a barrier against businesses from outside the continent.</p>
<h2>Obstacles to overcome</h2>
<p>In practice, trade in Africa did not change overnight on 30 May. Three key obstacles must still be overcome. If they’re not, the deal may follow the same path as the ill-fated agreements that have gone before it.</p>
<p>Firstly, AfCFTA has put the cart before the horse. Although it is now in force, many of the actual rules <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Keys_to_success_for_AfCFTA.pdf">still need to be agreed upon</a>. The process of negotiating rules of origin, tariff schedules, and service sector concessions will be long and cumbersome.</p>
<p>African states often lack the expertise or capacity to conduct such negotiations. International partners like the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/africa-europe-alliance-eu-supports-african-continental-free-trade-area-eu50-million_en">European Union</a> and <a href="https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/AfCFTA%20Factsheet%20%20EN%2002112019.pdf">Germany</a> have flocked to the AU Commission in large numbers to support AfCFTA.</p>
<p>Their support will likely be fragmented through the deployment of consultants and technical assistance. This does not bode well for the ownership of AfCFTA by AU member states and the AU Commission.</p>
<p>Secondly, AfCFTA is facing challenges regarding its governance. The details of its secretariat are yet to be thrashed out. What we do know is that the secretariat will be a <a href="https://www.tralac.org/documents/events/tralac/2800-tralac-annual-conference-presentation-the-afcfta-secretariat-beatrice-chaytor-auc-march-2019/file.html">semi-autonomous organ of the AU</a>, and that six countries are <a href="https://www.viportal.co/kenya-leads-quest-to-host-acfta-secretariat/">competing to host it</a>.</p>
<p>The likely geographical distance from AU headquarters in Ethiopia will complicate coordination with the continental body’s policy agenda. Budget cuts to the AU’s Department of Trade and Industry further hamper the transitory facilitation of AfCFTA.</p>
<p>Finally, the free trade area will invariably pose economic challenges in AU member states. The promise of free trade agreements is to create wealth through increased competition, the equalisation of wages and the substitution of domestic labour with imported goods. </p>
<p>International experience shows that the gains tend to be <a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/firms-trade/integrated-and-unequal-effects-trade-inequality-developing-countries">unequally distributed</a>, especially if a free trade area involves a large amount of diverse economies. Entire economic sectors and communities can be heavily affected by the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/448862/REA_FreeTradeAgreements.pdf">downsides</a>: wage cuts, unemployment and environmental degradation.</p>
<p>Questions abound. How will governments manage AfCFTA’s winners and losers when existing social protections are weak, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-voice-of-africas-informal-economy-should-be-heard-52766">informal markets dominate</a> many sectors? Will governments still respect the agreement even if it hurts some of their businesses and state companies? And how will they deal with the loss of customs revenue? Nigeria’s <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2019/05/27/settle-problem-home-dont-bring-african-union-obasanjo-tells-nigeria/">internal disputes</a> and <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/05/30/muhammadu-buhari-has-big-ambitions-for-nigerian-manufacturing">protectionism</a> are a case in point</p>
<p>The road ahead to an effective free trade agreement that delivers results to Africans is still long.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118135/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa’s new continental free trade area, the AfCFTA, is a remarkable achievement. However, decisive diplomatic, technical and social action is needed for it to succeed.Frank Mattheis, Senior research fellow, University of PretoriaUeli Staeger, PhD researcher, International Relations/Political Science, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/789462017-06-11T08:39:31Z2017-06-11T08:39:31ZWith an African running the WHO, it’s time for the continent to get hands on<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172901/original/file-20170608-32301-1fwbyg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Africa is home to many disease outbreaks yet is ill-prepared to deal with them. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">UNMEER/Martine Perret</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>New World Health Organisation (WHO) <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-whos-new-african-leader-could-be-a-shot-in-the-arm-for-poorer-countries-78277">Director-General</a> Dr Tedros Ghebreyesus has already drawn up a list of <a href="http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(16)31847-5/fulltext">things to do</a>. </p>
<p>The former Ethiopian Health Minister wants the organisation to work with governments to build their national capacity for universal health coverage through strong and resilient health systems. Secondly, he wants to strengthen the WHO’s response to threats such as disease outbreaks. And finally he wants to see the WHO harmonise emergency responses across partners while bolstering frontline defences at national and local levels.</p>
<p>The priorities make sense because the African continent is notorious for being ill-prepared to deal with disease outbreaks, yet it’s home to many emerging and re-emerging diseases such as Ebola, Yellow Fever, meningitis and Lassa Fever. </p>
<p>African leaders have a role to play in helping the new Director-General achieve these objectives. And the best way for them to contribute is by dusting off the 2001 <a href="http://www.who.int/healthsystems/publications/abuja_declaration/en/">Abuja Declaration</a> in which AU member states resolved to increase their health budgets to at least 15% of the state’s annual budget.</p>
<p>Over the last 16 years governments have indeed improved their spending on health. For example, Rwanda currently spends <a href="http://www.africanstrategies4health.org/resources/health-care-financing">22.3%</a> and Togo <a href="http://www.africanstrategies4health.org/resources/health-care-financing">15.4%</a> of their annual budgets on health. Nigeria spends<a href="http://www.africanstrategies4health.org/resources/health-care-financing"> 6.7%</a> and Uganda <a href="http://www.africanstrategies4health.org/resources/health-care-financing">10.2%</a>. South Africa’s <a href="https://www.healthpolicyproject.com/pubs/7887/SouthAfrica_HFP.pdf">health expenditure</a> is 14% of its general expenditure. </p>
<p>But most countries still have a long way to go to ensure that allocations to health are consistent and that the money is spent in ways that bolster the chances of Ghebreyesus meeting the objectives he’s mapped out for the WHO. </p>
<h2>No clear consensus</h2>
<p>Countries signed the declaration because they believed that special efforts and increased funding were needed to prevent and control epidemics and improve the general health of its citizens. But 16 years later there’s still no clarity on who has fulfilled the 15% pledge. Different assessments have come up with different results.</p>
<p>For example, in 2010 the African Union Commission tallied each country’s progress, finding that only <a href="http://www.ppdafrica.org/docs/policy/abuja-e.pdf">six of the 55 member states</a> had met the 15% benchmark. These were Botswana, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda and Zambia.</p>
<p>But a more comprehensive <a href="http://www.who.int/healthsystems/publications/Abuja10.pdf">report</a> by the WHO in the same year found that only one African country – Tanzania – had reached the target although 26 had increased their spending on health. The report also showed that 11 countries had actually reduced spending on health and nine had neither a noticeable negative or positive trend. </p>
<p>In another report in 2011, <a href="http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/JC2524_Abuja_report_en_0.pdf">UNAIDS</a> put the number of African countries who had met the target at nine: Ethiopia, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Swaziland and Togo.</p>
<p>What seems to be generally accepted – and confirmed by the <a href="http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/249527/1/WHO-HIS-HGF-Tech.Report-16.2-eng.pdf?ua=1">WHO’s 2016 assessment</a> – is that since the turn of the century most African governments have increased the proportion of total public expenditure allocated to health. </p>
<p>The average level of per capita public spending on health nearly doubled from about <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PCAP">US$70 in the early 2000s</a> to more than <a href="http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/249527/1/WHO-HIS-HGF-Tech.Report-16.2-eng.pdf">US$160 in 2014</a> </p>
<p>There’s no clear agreement on what the per capita spend should be. Between 1995 and 2014, the per capita expenditure on health across the world rose from<a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PCAP"> US$461 to US$1060</a>. Countries in the European Union spend up to US$3612 per capita while North America spends US$ 8990. </p>
<h2>Challenges ahead</h2>
<p>Health financing faces several challenges which can reverse gains made on the continent over the last 16 years. These include governments deciding to reduce spending on health, the wrong allocation of funds, unpredictable and the inconsistent funding as well as bad financial management. </p>
<p>Research shows that out of every US$100 that governments’ budget, only US$16 is allocated to health. And less than US$4 goes to the<a href="http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/249527/1/WHO-HIS-HGF-Tech.Report-16.2-eng.pdf?ua=1"> correct health services</a>. </p>
<p>In many instances, there are weak links between health and public financial management. This leads to under spending, which is a serious impediment for health care workers to access the allocated funds.</p>
<p>These challenges have several knock-on effects. They compromise government’s capacity to sustain long-term progress, they hamper effective planning and undermine efforts to provide the same service throughout a country.</p>
<p>The reality is that each African country must provide adequate domestic resources to create environments where health workers can get the job done. This would need leaders on the continent to use these resources in an accountable and transparent way with less dependence on external aid and global support. </p>
<p>This is because donor funding presents its own set of challenges. External aid makes up <a href="http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/249527/1/WHO-HIS-HGF-Tech.Report-16.2-eng.pdf">24% of the health spend </a>of governments on the continent. But funding can be unpredictable and subject to the interest of the donor which may not tally with pressing health problems faced by countries. On top of this donor funds can get sucked into the vortex of corruption and misapplication of domestic funds unless there are proper frameworks for accountability and transparency. </p>
<p>The bottom line is that extra spending by African governments needs to be channelled to the three areas outlined by the Director-General. Without this, his ambitious plans for improving health care on the continent won’t be realised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78946/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oyewale Tomori does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African leaders need to up their health allocations to help the new World Health Organisation Director-General meet his health care targets for the continent.Oyewale Tomori, Fellow, Nigerian Academy of ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/751402017-03-30T14:29:26Z2017-03-30T14:29:26ZSchool feeding schemes can fill children’s tummies and farmers’ pockets<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163267/original/image-20170330-15603-ops1k3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">School feeding schemes play a major role across Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomson Reuters Foundation</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every day, about <a href="http://reliefweb.int/report/world/school-meals-vital-ingredient-ending-hunger-and-promoting-healthy-diets">370 million children</a> worldwide benefit from national school feeding programmes. Sometimes it’s breakfast; sometimes it’s lunch and sometimes it’s both. But whatever the meal, school feeding schemes are a nutritional lifeline for these children.</p>
<p>It’s been proved <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21294742">repeatedly</a> that being fed at school improves children’s attendance and their academic performance. In Kenya, a breakfast programme increased school participation by 8.5% in a <a href="http://hgsf-global.org/en/bank/downloads/doc_details/334-hgsf-working-paper-4-food-provision-in-schools-in-low-and-middl">randomised control trial</a> of 25 pre-schools. School feeding schemes are also helping to greatly improve girls’ access to <a href="http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/innovfair2011/docs/wfp.pdf">primary education</a>. During a recent research trip to Banu, a rural farming community in Ghana’s Sissala East District, I saw first hand how that country’s school feeding scheme is helping children.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.au.int/en/commission">African Union Commission</a> has recognised how important school meals are. In recent years, it’s added another leg to this: pushing the idea that the schemes should be “home grown”. This means that the food for these meals should be sourced from local farmers. </p>
<p>Celebrating the <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/second-africa-day-school-feeding-celebrated-brazzaville-republic-congo">second Africa School Meals Day</a> in Congo Brazzaville on March 1 2017, the commission called on African governments to embrace homegrown school feeding. This involves local governments and education authorities buying food from farmers within beneficiary schools’ catchment areas. Getting local farmers involved in school feeding schemes has the potential to boost individuals’ livelihoods and revitalise rural economies in Africa.</p>
<p>A number of African countries – among them Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria – have already made a head start. But there are huge obstacles in the way of looping farmers in as part of the food chain. </p>
<h2>Small-scale farmers’ struggles</h2>
<p>Small-scale farmers – those who cultivate five or fewer acres of land – in Africa struggle to make ends meet. On their small plots they produce about<a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-06-19-smallholder-farming-the-surest-route-to-african-growth"> 80%</a> of the food that’s consumed in Africa. Yet, most live in <a href="http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/food-and-the-transformation-of-africa-getting-smallholders-connected-kofi-annan-and-sam-dryden-write-in-foreign-affairs/">poverty</a>. </p>
<p>One of the biggest problems they face is getting their produce to <a href="https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8376.pdf">market</a>. They are largely constrained by geography. Main market centres tend to be far away from rural areas and transport is not even, given the poor state of infrastructure.</p>
<p>As such, small-scale farmers have no choice but to rely on middlemen who tend to buy from them at lower prices than they’d earn at the markets themselves.</p>
<p>It’s this reality – the struggle of small-scale farmers to lift themselves and their families out of poverty – that’s prompted the AU and others to call for governments to stock their school feeding programmes with locally grown produce.</p>
<p>Such initiatives make sense on a number of levels. Governments save money since the food doesn’t have to be transported for long distances. School children benefit from familiar, locally grown nutritious food. And the farmers themselves can use their earnings to support their families or even reinvest into their farming businesses.</p>
<p>Brazil’s experience over the past few years suggests that homegrown school feeding programmes work. The South American nation has created strong linkages between school feeding schemes and small-scale farmers thanks to two initiatives: the <a href="http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp207419.pdf?_ga=1.248060999.1955371633.1486168309">National School Feeding Programme</a> and the <a href="http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCTechnicalPaper7.pdf">Food Acquisition Programme</a>. As of 2012 – the most recently collated data – some 67% of it <a href="http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCTechnicalPaper7.pdf">states and municipalities</a> were buying food produce from smallholder farmers for school feeding. </p>
<p>Inspired by the Brazilian experience, several African governments are integrating this pro-smallholder procurement model into their school feeding schemes. For instance, the <a href="http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4291e.pdf">Purchase from Africans for Africa</a> initiative is being piloted in five countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal. Results from the first phase of implementation revealed that about 37% of participating farmers’ <a href="http://paa-africa.org/2015/01/paa-africa-launches-report-on-the-first-phase-of-implementation/">produce</a> was bought to support school meals. </p>
<p>And in 2016 the Nigerian government launched a similar <a href="http://www.schoolsandhealth.org/News/Pages/Nigerian-Vice-President-launches-National-School-Feeding-Programme.aspx">campaign</a>.</p>
<p>But the continent has a long way to go to entrench a culture of homegrown school feeding schemes.</p>
<h2>Policy and governance</h2>
<p>So far, small-scale farmers’ participation in such schemes has been <a href="https://agriknowledge.org/downloads/5x21tf46t">low</a>. This is because the people running school feeding schemes are only being “encouraged” to buy from local farmers. There’s no contractual arrangement that outlines how much of a caterer’s food procurement budget ought to be spent on local purchases.</p>
<p>Another setback is the irregular disbursement of funds to caterers or schools for meal preparation. For example, in Ghana, caterers contracted to prepare school meals go for months without receiving payments for their <a href="https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2015/12/16/government-urged-to-address-delays-in-paying-school-feeding-caterers/">services</a>. This affects the quality of meals available to pupils. It can also be a disincentive for caterers to buy from small-scale farmers, who usually demand cash up front – which the caterers simply don’t have.</p>
<p>These concerns can be traced to the fact that most school feeding programmes don’t operate within set policy frameworks and aren’t governed by clear legislation. </p>
<p>The first step would be for national governments to formalise linkages between small-scale farmers and school feeding schemes. This would require governments to develop clear policy guidelines. </p>
<p>The recent launch of the <a href="http://reliefweb.int/report/world/home-grown-school-feeding-resource-framework-synopsis-march-2017">Home Grown School Feeding Resource Framework</a> by the UN World Food Programme and collaborating agencies is encouraging. Beyond this, platforms for facilitating country peer-learning and sharing best practice both regionally and globally are crucial. Research also has a role to play so that governments can learn from what works and what doesn’t. </p>
<p>All of this work can inform national governments and development partners to work towards more effective, homegrown school feeding schemes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75140/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clement Mensah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Getting local farmers involved in school feeding schemes has the potential to boost livelihoods and revitalise rural economies in Africa.Clement Mensah, PhD Candidate in Development Studies, Institute for Social Development, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/655782016-09-27T16:06:56Z2016-09-27T16:06:56ZHow Kenyan and Tanzanian medicine producers deserve a shot in the arm<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138058/original/image-20160916-6319-bg2ok2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite major improvement in access to HIV/Aids and TB treatment most people living in Africa still lack access to reliable and appropriate medicines. They continue to struggle with the worst health status in the world. Why is this happening? What can be done?</p>
<p>Unexpectedly, part of the explanation can be found in the state of Africa’s own pharmaceutical industry. Far too little is heard about the industry in debates about access to medicines. And it’s often said that <a href="http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137546470">Africa has no pharmaceutical industry</a>. But this simply isn’t true. </p>
<p>We set out to discover what was happening to local pharmaceutical production in Kenya and Tanzania. We also wanted to explore the extent to which more local production of medicines could improve access for those countries’ populations. </p>
<p>It’s a timely question. Both countries have an established pharmaceutical industry with scope for expansion into a huge and expanding regional market that is largely served by imports. </p>
<p>The two year research project surveyed those who buy medicines for facilities and shops, public and private, and included interviews with local manufacturers. We found that in both countries, but especially in Tanzania, the industries are vital to meeting their populations’ health needs, but <a href="http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137546470">struggled against external competition</a>.</p>
<p>But, more optimistically, our findings also showed that this situation can be turned around.</p>
<p>The domestic market for medicines is large. In 2013, we estimated that local firms in Tanzania were supplying 15% of a US$333 million market for pharmaceuticals (down from a third in 2009). Kenya-based firms were supplying a third of a US$577 million market. Access to reliable essential medicines is poor in both countries. It depends heavily on out-of-pocket payment by low income populations.</p>
<h2>Long history of production</h2>
<p>Medicines have been made in African countries since the 1930s, and after independence many governments supported the development of pharmaceutical manufacturing. There were two particular bursts of investment: in the 1970s – as part of early efforts to promote industrialisation – and from the 1990s onwards as industrialisation efforts revived.</p>
<p>In addition to this firms in Africa, most of which are owned by African capital, have a record of <a href="http://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-8603-10-12">promoting inclusive access</a> to medicines. Research in Tanzania, for example, showed that the local producers distributed essential medicines effectively in both rural and urban areas. Imports, on the other hand, were much less likely to move beyond the towns in which they arrived. </p>
<p>Several local firms had a good reputation: their products were widely regarded as reliable and indeed were preferred to Indian products of uncertain origin in the private market. In Kenya too, up-country facilities rely heavily on low cost locally produced medicines. </p>
<p>Tanzania’s firms mainly produce basic essential medicines in the form of tablets and capsules along with syrups for children. Kenya’s industry is by far the largest in East Africa. It also produces more complex items such as creams, intravenous drips and injectables. </p>
<h2>Importers have the upper hand</h2>
<p>External competition is skewed against local producers by a context of increasingly free trade in medicines, together with tax and import regimes that favoured importers, and aid funding that bypassed and undermined local producers. </p>
<p>In 2009, for example, the East African Community agreed to a zero tariff rate on imports of finished medicines with the rationale of meeting essential health needs. But local producers frequently have to pay duties on their imports of inputs for production.</p>
<p>In addition, the large aid funders bypass local African producers almost entirely, buying in bulk from overseas. This means that when Tanzania and Kenya switched to the new, and much more expensive, combination anti-malaria therapies, local firms that had been supplying most of the anti-malarials until then lost the business. One Tanzanian firm lost a third of its turnover. Rural populations used to reliable access to cheap locally produced anti-malarials, through facilities and private shops, became reliant on sometimes erratic imports of medicines. </p>
<p>Our research makes clear that the current pattern of globalisation of access to medicines simply isn’t working and isn’t sustainable. Rather than strengthening the domestic economic and political links – between population needs for medicines, government health policy and industrial development – it weakens them. </p>
<h2>Situation can be turned around</h2>
<p>With the right government policies, supported by a rethink by donors, the demand for medicines can be directed more towards local firms. This in turn can help them improve their products and become more competitive, generating much needed industrial employment and productivity. </p>
<p>Industrialisation in pharmaceuticals also brings with it the growth of technological, industrial, intellectual, organisational and research-related capabilities. Without these, quality medicines can’t be produced and health systems can’t be improved. Firms whose business focus is the domestic and regional market have an incentive to distribute and market their medicines effectively. Access improves and everyone gains.</p>
<p>There is real optimism that this turnaround can happen. African policy makers are already increasingly aware of the importance of this agenda. The Tanzanian government has made pharmaceuticals a priority industry in its <a href="http://www.mof.go.tz/mofdocs/msemaji/Five%202016_17_2020_21.pdf">new five-year development plan</a>. </p>
<p>Pan-African bodies are focusing on the issue too. The African Union Commission has developed a <a href="http://sa.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Pharmaceutical%20manufacturing%20plan%20for%20Africa-English.pdf">pharmaceutical manufacturing plan</a> for Africa. NEPAD has been working on bringing together cross-country regulation of medicines. Meanwhile, international bodies such as the WHO and European and Japanese donors are supporting manufacturing improvement in pharmaceuticals. This East African research is <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/ikd/sites/www.open.ac.uk.ikd/files/files/projects/Submission%20to%20UN%20Secretary-General%E2%80%99s%20High-Level%20Panel%20on%20Access%20to%20Medicines.pdf">widely cited internationally</a>. </p>
<p>A number of other African countries are showing what can be done. Ghana, Ethiopia and South Africa have all successfully supported the growth and technological improvement of medicines manufacturing in their countries. </p>
<p>But health and industrial policymakers have to work together – something of a revolution in itself – if these efforts are to succeed. The route to improved, more inclusive access to medicines needs to be based on an active African industrial policy that supports manufacturing. This should be coupled with a health policy geared towards the purchase and use of local medicines.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maureen Mackintosh has received funding, as an Open University, UK, academic, from the Department of International Development , UK, and the Economic and Social Research Council, UK, for research underpinning this article. The content of the article is the sole responsibility of the authors and does not represent the views of the DFID or ESRC. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof Samuel Wangwe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Firms with a focus on the domestic and regional market have an incentive to distribute their medicines effectively. Local production can create a win-win situation for health and employment.Prof Samuel Wangwe, Executive Director, Policy Research for Development Maureen Mackintosh, Professor of Economics, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.