tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/akp-9706/articlesAKP – The Conversation2023-05-08T01:42:27Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2035632023-05-08T01:42:27Z2023-05-08T01:42:27ZTurkey’s Erdogan is facing re-election to hold onto power – can a divided opposition oust the strongman?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524803/original/file-20230508-195023-5mctet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sedat Suna/ AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Turkish voters head to polls for the presidential and parliamentary elections on May 14, the biggest question is whether President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-erdogan-key-dates-elections-82af9b0c0c5d09a9a9bdb1e2bf1b5b08">two-decade-long grip on power</a> can be challenged. </p>
<p>Turkey’s main opposition parties have made a range of promises that include boosting the economy, democratising the political system, separating religion from state affairs and improving the country’s ties with the West. </p>
<p>However, it is increasingly clear there are significant differences in the positions of each party in the opposition coalition. Serious questions remain as to how much change one can expect to see, even if Erdogan is defeated.</p>
<p>Many Turkish citizens would like to see new policies to lift Turkey out of one of the most severe economic crises it has experienced in the last two decades. But the political issues are even more complex. Any issues related to the political system, secularism and foreign relations have become more polarised as Erdogan has consolidated his power in recent years.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Kemal Kilicdaroglu is the presidential candidate representing the Nation Alliance, an election coalition made up of six opposition parties.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Erdem Sahin/ EPA</span></span>
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<h2>A divided opposition</h2>
<p>Turkey’s largest opposition party is the Republican People’s Party (the Turkish acronym for which is CHP). Formed by the founder of Turkey’s secular republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, this party remains loyal to the ideology of Turkish nationalism and is considered to be in the centre-left of politics.</p>
<p>CHP has aligned itself with <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/turkish-elections-alliances-and-challenges-for-akp.aspx">other nationalist and conservative forces</a> in a coalition called the Nation Alliance, whose combined shares of the vote might be enough to defeat Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (also known as the AK Party).</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-the-turkish-earthquakes-affect-how-the-country-is-governed-199946">Will the Turkish earthquakes affect how the country is governed?</a>
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<p>While there is widespread scepticism about polling in Turkey, the most recent surveys have showed that <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/03/14/turkey-opinion-poll-tracker-erdogan-vs-kilicdaroglu">CHP’s position is relatively strong</a> in the presidential race. In the parliamentary elections, however, Erdogan’s conservative policies seem to be serving the AK Party well.</p>
<p>This is a problem for the opposition, which has not done enough to counter the conservative politics of the ruling alliance. </p>
<p>The leader of the opposition is Kemal Kilicdaroglu, whom the Nation Alliance has nominated as its presidential candidate. This is despite Kilicdaroglu’s relatively low credibility with the public, as compared to other CHP figures.</p>
<p>Kilicdaroglu has pledged to deport the large number of refugees who have sought shelter in Turkey since 2011 when the war began in Syria. The opposition has argued this is a primary reason why Turkey is suffering economically, despite the widely acknowledged role of <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/01/27/is-recep-tayyip-erdogans-monetary-policy-as-mad-as-it-seems">Erdogan’s disastrous monetary policy</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-currency-crisis-is-a-textbook-example-of-what-not-to-do-with-interest-rates-172709">Turkey's currency crisis is a textbook example of what not to do with interest rates</a>
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<p>However, other nationalist and left-leaning forces with significant public support have decided to stay outside the Nation Alliance. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1647597966465572866"}"></div></p>
<p>On the nationalist side, the opposition candidate for the 2018 presidential elections (Muharrem Ince) is running on behalf of his new Homeland Party. Ultra-nationalists are also being represented by the Ancestral Alliance coalition, led by Sinan Ogan.</p>
<p>Parties on the left, on the other hand, have <a href="https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/goodbye-erdogan">only been able to run in the parliamentary elections</a>. Potential candidates from Turkey’s large Kurdish minority have faced particular difficulty in nominating themselves for the presidential race. Many of them have been <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/01/19/turkey-could-be-on-the-brink-of-dictatorship">imprisoned</a> on charges of being linked to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Their only option is to back Kilicdaroglu, which some have done.</p>
<p>Erdogan is, of course, the AK Party’s candidate for president. The party has been in power since 2002 when it won a majority of seats in the parliamentary elections for the first time. Erdogan became prime minister in 2003, and then won the presidential election in 2014 before being reelected in 2018. If he is elected, this would be his final term.</p>
<p>The AK Party is a conservative party with Islamist origins, currently in a coalition with the far-right Nationalist Movement that has become fragmented and unpopular. Despite this unpopular coalition, Erdogan himself has managed to maintain somewhat favourable ratings with the public.</p>
<h2>No checks on the president</h2>
<p>One of the biggest pledges the Nation Alliance has made is to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/28/turkish-opposition-join-powers-to-return-to-parliamentary-system">return Turkey’s presidential political system back to a parliamentary system</a>. Since Erdogan pushed through a referendum in 2017 to abolish the prime minister’s office, the president has been able to exercise an unprecedented level of power. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is believed to have forged strong ties with his Russian counterpart, President Vladimir Putin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexander Zemlianichenko/ AP</span></span>
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<p>Many observers blame the referendum for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/dec/18/the-observer-view-on-the-fall-of-recep-tayyip-erdogan-cant-come-soon-enough?utm_term=Autofeed&CMP=twt_gu&utm_medium&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1671345535">removing crucial checks on presidential power</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, the opposition has also assured voters it will <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-anti-recep-tayyip-erdogan-opposition-reset-eu-nato/">mend fences with Europe</a> after ties deteriorated sharply under Erdogan’s rule. It would try to unfreeze Turkey’s European Union accession talks, which have been stalled since 2018 due to the country’s democratic backsliding. Turkey’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/06/turkey-elections-russia-erdogan-putin-nato/">economic and political partnerships with Russia</a> have also been an issue for the EU.</p>
<p>Perhaps more importantly, in terms of foreign policy, the opposition is promising to foster better relations with countries in the Middle East. These ties have frayed because of Turkey’s aggressive foreign policy and incidents like the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/07/turkish-court-sends-case-of-26-accused-over-khashoggi-killing-to-saudi-arabia">murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi</a> at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018, which caused a rift between Turkey and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The opposition is also pledging to expedite the country’s rapprochement with Israel, the Gulf states, Egypt and Syria. </p>
<p>Erdogan has yet to fully normalise relations with these states, as they are still wary of Turkey’s regional influence under the AK Party’s rule. Erdogan has positioned Turkey as a middle power with strategic influence in the Middle East and the wider region, particularly after the Arab Spring. This influence is unlikely to fade soon, regardless of the elections. </p>
<p>So, will a change in Turkish leadership transform Turkey and the region? </p>
<p>The answer is not simple. But it’s likely much will stay the same. Many key institutions in Turkey like the parliament, judicial system and press have lost their independence during the Erdogan era. </p>
<p>Erodgan’s party has become very influential in both domestic and foreign policy, which means his footprint will not disappear immediately, even if he is not re-elected. Rather, Erdogan will have a lasting social, economic and political legacy for both Turkey and its neighbours.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203563/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Khalid Al Bostanji does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Even if Erdogan loses the upcoming presidential election, serious questions remain about how much the country would change.Khalid Al Bostanji, PhD candidate, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1999432023-02-16T11:38:02Z2023-02-16T11:38:02ZTurkey: Erdoğan worries about implications for his support ahead of May election<p>In the wake of Turkey’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/337edef6-05c9-498c-a3f0-13776082f218">worst earthquake since 1939</a>, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is clearly concerned about how the government’s response will affect the result in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-earthquake-threw-turkeys-election-plan-into-turmoil-2023-02-14/">May elections</a>. </p>
<p>Erdoğan is striving to show he is at the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/recep-tayyip-erdogan-prevent-political-fallout-earthquake-turkey/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=Twitter">forefront of relief efforts</a> in those areas where an estimated <a href="https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/erdogan-her-turlu-cirkefligi-sergileyenleri-biz-de-not-ediyoruz-haber-1603648">35,418</a> people have died. </p>
<p>But the response and the devastation of the earthquake highlights some of the government’s weaknesses.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220104-turkish-inflation-hits-36-nearing-20-year-high-as-lira-crisis-continues">failing economy</a> has made Erdoğan and his Justice and Development party (AKP) <a href="https://twitter.com/metropoll/status/1608405050941906945">unpopular</a>, according to some polls, but its stranglehold over the state means the result of the elections, scheduled for May 14, is very difficult to predict. </p>
<h2>Earthquake response</h2>
<p>Other countries have weathered far worse quakes with much less physical damage and many fewer casualties, even taking into account government error in the way it is handling the situation. </p>
<p>Larger quakes in <a href="https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/items/18300">Chile in 2010</a> and <a href="https://ascelibrary.org/doi/full/10.1061/(ASCE)LM.1943-5630.0000179">Japan in 2011</a> - while not without significant consequences - hit populated areas with many fewer deaths. Reports have <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/turkeys-lax-policing-building-codes-flagged-quake-97027265">suggested</a> that much of the destruction is caused by lack of investment in building work by the AKP, who they claim have collected the equivalent of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64594349">£3.8 billion</a> over the past 20 years in earthquake preparation funds – funds to make buildings earthquake resistant – and not accounted for how it has been spent. </p>
<p>They say the regime has allowed the mass construction of buildings with looser and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-2023-turkey-syria-earthquake-government-istanbul-fbd6af578a6056569879b5ef6c55d322">looser regulations on construction</a> and given <a href="https://theconversation.com/drafts/199692/edit">amnesties for contractors</a> who have not met building codes. Reports suggest that the Chamber of Geological Engineers of Turkey <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-2023-turkey-syria-earthquake-government-istanbul-fbd6af578a6056569879b5ef6c55d322">has been raising concerns</a> about existing buildings and new construction taking place in areas hit by these earthquakes for two years, including Kahramanmaras, Hatay and Osmaniye. The AKP government is now promising investigations into contractors and building standards.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">President Erdogan faces criticism over his handling of the Turkish earthquake.</span></figcaption>
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<p>This apparent corner-cutting in building standards has been <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-2023-turkey-syria-earthquake-government-istanbul-fbd6af578a6056569879b5ef6c55d322">noted over the years</a>, but never fully addressed. At the same time, Erdoğan promised fast economic growth and development. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-syria-earthquakes-a-seismologist-explains-what-has-happened-199340">Turkey-Syria earthquakes: a seismologist explains what has happened</a>
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<p>Erdoğan’s gutting of civil society organisations has also made housing and feeding the homeless after the earthquakes much harder than needed, and relief efforts overall <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/a-crane-gods-sake-inside-struggles-turkeys-earthquake-response-2023-02-13/">have been sluggish</a>. </p>
<p>Those in the provinces where thousands have died have made clear their <a href="https://tr.euronews.com/2023/02/10/afp-erdogan-deprem-bolgesinde-secmenlerin-ofkesiyle-karsi-karsiya">dissatisfaction</a> with the delays in aid, coordination issues and the decision not to supply troops to assist with search-and-rescue efforts. Particular criticism has been made against the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), the country’s <a href="https://time.com/6255634/earthquake-turkey-syria-erdogan-rescue/">disaster management agency</a>.</p>
<p>The government has reacted harshly to criticisms of its response to the disaster. Erdoğan <a href="https://www.youtube.com/shorts/9b72ZJg7Qt4">accused critics</a> of fomenting “social chaos” and ominously declared that he was making notes. </p>
<p>He later referred to his critics as “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64566296">provocateurs</a>”. With criticism coming from Twitter, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/musk-says-turkey-re-enable-full-twitter-access-shortly-2023-02-09/">restricted</a> access to the site in Turkey, despite the fact victims were using it to share their status and location. </p>
<p>In a further attempt to defend himself, the president has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-condemns-criticism-turkeys-quake-response-2023-02-08/">denounced criticisms</a> of his response as political opportunism. “In a period like this,” he said, “I cannot stomach people conducting negative campaigns for political interest.” </p>
<p>To try to rebuild popularity, the government has offered <a href="https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/erdogan-her-turlu-cirkefligi-sergileyenleri-biz-de-not-ediyoruz-haber-1603648">100,000 lira</a> (£4,399) in cash aid to the relatives of people who lost their lives and pledged to rebuild all damaged homes. In a search for someone to blame, widespread <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-64615349">arrests of contractors</a> have already begun.</p>
<h2>Lessons from 1999</h2>
<p>In light of all of this, Erdoğan is keenly aware that he must be seen to be involved and leading the disaster response, especially as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/aug/25/turkeyquakes.turkey2">earthquake of 1999</a> contributed to the discrediting of the government of the time and aided Erdoğan’s rise to power.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-syria-earthquake-the-scandal-of-not-being-prepared-199692">Turkey-Syria earthquake: the scandal of not being prepared</a>
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<p>In 1999, Turkey was hit by an earthquake that killed an estimated 17,000 people, and the reaction from the government was roundly criticised as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/aug/25/turkeyquakes.turkey2">disorganised</a>. When the next elections was called, the coalition of ruling parties were voted out. That, at least, was the situation 24 years ago, when the prime minister, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B%C3%BClent_Ecevit">Bülent Ecevit</a>, fumbled the crisis and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/recep-tayyip-erdogan-prevent-political-fallout-earthquake-turkey/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=Twitter">paid the price</a>. But this could also be the case this time. </p>
<p>Aware of growing public anger, and that the disaster will severely harm the country’s already weak economy, Erdoğan is looking for any advantage he can in the elections. AKP MP Bülent Arınç has already <a href="https://m.bianet.org/english/politics/274246-bulent-arinc-calls-for-scheduled-elections-to-be-postponed">called</a> for the elections to be delayed far beyond the June 18 deadline the constitution sets. </p>
<p>The move would be constitutionally dubious at best, with extensions only allowed during wartime. Opposition parties have vigorously condemned the suggestion, fearing that Erdoğan will use the time to crack down further on his opponents. In an election year that already promised to either seal <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/opinion/turkish-elections-a-final-referendum-on-erdogans-republic/">Turkey’s fate</a> by moving it closer to one-man rule or opening the possibility of dramatic change, the stakes have just got even higher.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Balki Begumhan Bayhan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Politicians will be wondering if the lessons from Turkey’s 1999 earthquake have been learned.Balki Begumhan Bayhan, PhD Candidate in Politics, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1076462019-01-02T23:55:05Z2019-01-02T23:55:05ZThe elusive quest for peace between the Turks and the Kurds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252026/original/file-20181227-47298-gqxlv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this December 2009 file photo, a member of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, trains on a weapon at their camp in the Qandil mountains near the Turkish border with northern Iraq. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Yahya Ahmed)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Donald Trump’s unilateral decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria is likely to help ISIS adopt a new strategy and expand its territorial control while at the same time continuing its execution of unarmed civilians. The move also means Trump has stabbed in the back his most successful military partner, the Kurds.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, all is not lost for the Kurds — they have already emerged as prominent actors who are capable of developing serious diplomatic and political ties.</p>
<p>A decade ago, the AKP government in Turkey launched a set of reforms called <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/fruitless-attempts-the-kurdish-initiative-and-containment-of-the-kurdish-movement-in-turkey/A1FB3871767CCB2DB107877EBE50F348">the Kurdish Opening</a> and started official conversations with the leaders of the Kurdistan Workers Party, known as the PKK. This was not the first time that the Turkish state was in contact with the PKK, but it was the first period for launching a multi-layered process which made the negotiations legitimate. </p>
<p>Yet Turkey’s 40-year internal conflict did not end and, in the summer of 2015, the dialogue between both sides gave way to aggravated state repression.</p>
<p>Less than two years after the collapse of the Turkish-Kurdish negotiations, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights announced that half a million Kurdish people left their homes due to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/world/europe/un-turkey-kurds-human-rights-abuses.html">ongoing military operations by the Turkish army from July 2015 to December 2016.</a> </p>
<p>Turkish troops entered the <a href="https://www.merip.org/mer/mer287/sur">peripheral, politicized neighbourhoods of Kurdish cities after the PKK declared democratic autonomy</a>, and kept those districts <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/03/turkish-police-kurd-actvists-clash-diyarbakir-curfew">under curfew, sometimes for up to 90 days</a>. </p>
<p>These developments beg the question: Why did the dialogue between the Turkish state and the PKK, aimed at mitigating ethnic conflict and bringing about peace, fail in Turkey? </p>
<p>Here’s why. </p>
<h2>Maintaining a control regime</h2>
<p>Even though the Turkish-Kurdish negotiations were highly publicized, the Turkish state’s reliance on violence has been underestimated. </p>
<p>Nation-states are expected to maintain control over certain territories that are under their jurisdiction. But what happens when a specific state enforces territorial control and violence over minority-populated areas in its attempts at democratization and dialogue during a negotiated peace process?</p>
<p>And how does the existing territorial agenda of the Turkish state affect its desire to resolve the protracted conflict with Kurds? </p>
<p>There is substantial research offering rich insights into territory, state and authority in parts of the world ranging from <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/096262989500003S">Israel and Palestine</a> to <a href="http://www.crossborder.ie/pubs/odowd_coakley.pdf">Ireland</a>, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1026546030554">the Balkans</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-asian-studies/article/lines-of-inconvenience-sovereignty-and-bordermaking-in-postcolonial-south-asia-19471965/F73D9923936444B81C02B6DD310BAF33">Asia</a> and <a href="http://people.unica.it/biancamariacarcangiu/files/2016/05/5.Korf-Raeymaeker-2013-Violence-on-the-Margins-Chs-1-2.pdf">Africa</a>. </p>
<p>But the relevance of the territorial aspects of conflicts has been largely neglected when it’s come to examining the Kurdish-populated borderlands of Turkey. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2015/06/local-peacebuilding-turkeys-kurdish-borderlands/">research I conducted</a> in Turkey’s Kurdish borderlands between 2013 and 2014 shows the territorial agenda of the Turkish state can be best seen when conducting ethnographic field work in those regions.</p>
<p>Kurdish borderlands are war-torn areas with their own dynamics. Opposing sides are more likely to confront and interact with each other here. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Borderlands between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. Summer 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In these volatile conditions, people became more willing to share their stories once I got to know them better. My interviews revealed that the policies introduced by the Turkish state to bring about peace failed because the state pursued what I call a “dual strategy” during the same process of democratic reforms. </p>
<p>That is, the state’s territorial agenda coexisted with its emphasis on negotiating the Kurdish-Turkish conflict through democratic channels.</p>
<h2>How Kurds regarded reforms</h2>
<p>Drawing on the 12 months of field work, my study’s focus on territorial control involved two aggregate factors, each of which also have various components.</p>
<p>At the state level, I examined democratic reforms and showed the mechanisms of territorial control. </p>
<p>At the Kurdish level, I looked at the responses of Kurdish political actors and Kurdish people to understand how the Kurds regarded the reform process. I presented the stories of Kurds from the 1990s and 2000s to show their experiences living under territorial control on the borderlands. </p>
<p>Both of these aggregate factors are the two main components of the typology of territorial control. </p>
<p>At the macro level, the state enacts policies and Kurdish political actors respond.</p>
<p>At the micro level, the state employs various mechanisms, including securitization, expulsion, demographic and administrative control, nationalizing the landscape and control of movement across borders. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Kurds speak of these processes — displacement and loss of property; militarization; disruption of minority culture; disenfranchisement; and denial and loss of minority cultural heritage — from their own perspective. </p>
<p>By focusing on territorial control, my research explains the limitations of democratic reforms that only focus on cultural rights but exclude territorial rights. </p>
<p>The processes of ethnic control continued to operate <a href="http://www.publicseminar.org/2018/04/vicious-infrastructure/">in certain Kurdish-populated sites, such as Hakkari, Sirnak, Van,</a> more than others during the Turkish-Kurdish peace process. These control tactics negated the impact of the so-called Kurdish Opening.</p>
<p>Why did the Turkish state continue to maintain territorial control in certain areas more than others? Because these are border zones in rough terrains that are more likely to foster insurgency.</p>
<h2>More control over certain border zones</h2>
<p>Border zones do not only cover the lines between Turkey, Iraq and Iran, which were not even properly fenced, but also some villages and towns in the hinterland/interior territories, which I also call ‘the zone of conflict’.</p>
<p>Control mechanisms used by the Turkish state seemed to be on hold in certain destinations, while they were strikingly visible in some other locations during my 12 months in the region. In these interior territories, displacement and loss of property became the primary tool of control while militarization and demographic control was more pervasive in towns right on the borders.</p>
<p>The Turkish state does not manage every border in the same way. Despite the common narratives of loss and displacement, there were some strategic locations where the state preferred to have civilians around rather than keeping the area vacated. </p>
<p>One of the villagers who also served as a village guard for more than a decade told me how they were compelled to stay in the village and became shields between the soldiers and guerrillas.</p>
<p>The majority of people, regardless of their political ideology, agree that everyone from these areas lost a property at least once. On top of that, most of them also complained about the lack of sufficient and fair compensation. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One of the houses that was demolished in the 1990s. The owners still have no access to this area.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Another common narrative, independent of political ideology, was that those who received some amount of compensation complained about the corrupt system because, according to these participants, the legal system created certain beneficiary groups who have been taking advantage of the Kurdish villagers’ fragile conditions. </p>
<h2>Ideology important</h2>
<p>Unsurprisingly, party affiliation and political ideology still matter.</p>
<p>Those who were openly associated with the People’s Democracy Party (HDP), a pro-minority party that has MPs in the Turkish parliament, were more critical about the processes of control and violence as well as their durability, partly because the HDP voters have witnessed and experienced the deep, dark side of these control practices — but also because every aspect of their lives was politicized.</p>
<p>In accordance with their political stance, the majority of the participants from the Kurdish-populated borderlands were sceptical but also optimistic about <a href="https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB111.pdf">the peace process</a>, because, for them, the process could be manipulated but the idea must have been appreciated because it was proposed by the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan.</p>
<p>Surprisingly, most of these people also had to serve as <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/kurds-who-became-village-guards-and-fought-pkk-rebels-in-turkey-to-be-disbanded-but-they-fear-a-9131095.html">village guards</a>, paramilitary groups armed and paid by the state in their war against the PKK. </p>
<p>The stories of village guards show the complexities and contradictions of this protracted conflict.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://dealingwiththepast.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Disa-Paramilitary.pdf">village guard system</a> has become a primary component of the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/mechanisms-co-optation-palestinian-territories-neutralizing-independent-civil-society">co-optation</a> and dependency measures taken by the state to neutralize independent actors and maintain <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227663216_Understanding_processes_of_ethnic_control_Segmentation_dependency_and_co-optation_in_post-communist_Estonia">territorial control</a> in these highly militarized areas adjacent to Iraq and Iran.</p>
<p>Democratization is a long path requiring courage, fairness and commitment. At the heart of democratization lies the elusive Turkish-Kurdish negotiations. </p>
<p>Understanding the Turkish-Kurdish negotiations and its limitations requires understanding the mechanisms and experiences of territorial control. Omitting territorial rights from the bundle of policies designed for minority accommodation in such divided settings means that a Turkish-Kurdish peace accord is a long way off.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107646/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dilan Okcuoglu received funding from MITACS CANADA and IDRC during her research.
She is currently affiliated with the Canada Research Chair in Quebec and Canadian Studies (CREQC), UQAM as well as the Centre for the Study of Democracy and Diversity, Queen's University. </span></em></p>Why did negotiations between the Turkish state and the Kurds, aimed at mitigating ethnic conflict and bringing about peace, fail in Turkey?Dilan Okcuoglu, PhD Candidate and Teaching Fellow in Political Studies, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1015562018-08-20T17:44:44Z2018-08-20T17:44:44ZTurkey’s currency collapse shows just how vulnerable its economy is to a crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232761/original/file-20180820-30584-1v3kc0c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sometimes you have to look back to move forward. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Economy/44969517b1c74254b4725e3d05699850/42/0">AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>If you happen to be a tourist in Turkey right now, consider yourself lucky. Otherwise, things look grim. </p>
<p>The Turkish lira <a href="https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=TRY&to=USD&view=1Y">has lost as much as a third of its value</a> relative to the U.S. dollar in less than a month and recently hit a record low. As a result, all imported goods became more expensive practically overnight. And because Turkey <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-industrial-sector-highly-dependent-on-raw-material-imports---78393">is heavily dependent</a> on foreign goods, most everything was affected, including gasoline, food, furniture and clothing. Turks are worried that more price hikes and <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2018/08/20/turkey-qatar-central-banks-sign-currency-swap-deal">possible shortages</a> of imported medicine are on the way. </p>
<p>The catalyst for the current crisis was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2018/aug/17/turkish-lira-volatile-as-us-warns-of-more-sanctions-business-live">U.S. sanctions</a>, which the Trump administration imposed on August 1 after Turkey’s government refused to hand over an American pastor it has detained for almost two years. Turkey responded by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-currency-usa/white-house-condemns-turkeys-tariffs-on-u-s-imports-idUSKBN1L020G">doubling tariffs</a> on U.S. cars, alcohol and other goods. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/19/politics/white-house-rejects-turkey-offer-andrew-brunson/index.html">More U.S. sanctions</a> may be on the way. </p>
<p>Turkey’s real economic troubles, however, go much deeper than the current spat with the U.S. and extend back many years. And while Qatar <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1004025/Turkey-crisis-US-sanctions-Trump-Erdogan-row-lira-plummets-Qatar-15BILLION-investment">has pledged</a> to invest US$15 billion to help Turkey and <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1005604/Turkey-lira-crisis-Qatar-investment-currency-swap-Erdogan-Donald-Trump-US-sanctions">offered other aid</a>, it does nothing to fix its actual problems. </p>
<p>We’ve been studying Turkey’s economy – the <a href="https://knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2017-gdp-by-country-data-and-charts">world’s 17th largest</a> – for three decades and recently visited the country, talking to Turks affected by the crisis, from small business owners and CEOs to blue-collar workers and taxi drivers. To understand how it went from <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/behlal-azkan/turkey-islamic-world-west_b_6474746.html">the envy</a> of the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/02/16/martin.egypt.turkey/index.html">Muslim world</a> to the verge of collapse, one must first look into Turkey’s recent history. </p>
<h2>An opportunity lost</h2>
<p>At the end of 2000, Turkey <a href="http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/04bc7b8d-4c66-4f64-af66-d1cc85acf251/sep13-2.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE-04bc7b8d-4c66-4f64-af66-d1cc85acf251-m3fB6-2">suffered</a> a banking crisis that resulted in a significant flight of capital and a severe <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/turkey?year=2001">economic recession</a>. </p>
<p>The International Monetary Fund agreed to lend Turkey <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr0123">$19 billion</a> on the condition that it overhaul and restructure its financial system, as well as open up its economy to the rest of the world. As its coalition government began to implement the structural changes, the crisis created an opening for Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist Justice and Development Party, known by the acronym AKP, which had long been in the shadows of Turkey’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/02/16/in-long-secular-turkey-sharia-is-gradually-taking-over/">stridently secular republic</a>. </p>
<p>Erdogan offered an “honest” alternative to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27749598">decades of high inflation</a> and economic and political instability, and voters were eager for a change. Amid doubts both at home and abroad, his party promised to <a href="http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2008/06/art-561814/">adhere to the IMF program</a> and also said it remained committed to the secular founding principles of the Turkish Republic. </p>
<p>The AKP kept to its pledge and fulfilled the conditions of the IMF “stand-by” agreement. This was helped by its application to join the European Union as a full member, which began in 1999. The process of accession acted as an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-economy-eu-idUSKCN0WR0KD">important anchor</a> and signal of modern Turkey’s economic and social path.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2016/02/06/erdoganomics">economy boomed</a> as a result, buoyed in part by strong global growth. Inflation fell to single digits for the first time in about 30 years, the economy expanded an average of 6.8 percent a year from 2002 to 2007 and exports more than tripled by 2012.</p>
<p>There was a dark side to this rosy picture, however. The Turkish economy was becoming increasingly dependent on imports and foreign cash to support much of this growth. When a country imports more goods and services than it exports, it finances the difference by borrowing abroad, creating a current account deficit. This made Turkey vulnerable to the whims of international investors in the event of a crisis. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Erdogan claims the U.S. is waging ‘economic war’ against Turkey.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Economy/f4730d550ef444bd93bbc185c47ab57a/9/0">AP Photo/Burhan Ozbilici</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The costs of ‘endless growth’</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/turkeys-economy-is-entering-a-slow-burning-crisis-analysts-warn.html">Those</a> <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/imf-warns-about-overheating-in-turkeys-economy-127608">who warned</a> of the problems lurking below the surface were swept aside as Turkey survived the 2008 global financial crisis with minimal damage and bounced back very quickly, mainly thanks to its restructured financial system after 2001. </p>
<p>While the U.S. and Europe <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/11/non-bank-leverage-surpasses-pre-financial-crisis-high-imf-warns.html">were wallowing in red ink</a>, Turkey’s low levels of household and corporate debt made it a very desirable <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e29f6794-1eb0-11e3-b80b-00144feab7de">destination for foreign capital</a> looking for a relatively safe home that offered stable returns. As a result, Turkey’s banking system was awash in low-cost credit, which <a href="http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1417011882-9.Turkeys_Distressing_Dance_with_Capital_Flows.pdf">financed a spending spree</a> by households and corporations. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the IMF stand-by agreement expired in 2008, and negotiations for a new agreement dragged on until talks <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/turkey-refusing-imf-funds">were suspended</a> two years later as Erdogan announced Turkey’s “graduation” from the program. Instead, he believed he could propel his economy toward “endless growth” and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-erdogans-push-for-endless-growth-brought-turkey-to-the-brink-1534526348">made it easier</a> for Turkish companies to access loans denominated in foreign currencies. This made them even more vulnerable to a drop in the value of the lira. </p>
<p>Erdogan also began to pour more government funds into huge <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/04/26/turkeys-president-hopes-to-turn-huge-building-projects-into-votes">public infrastructure projects</a> like expansive highway systems, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/airplane-mode/erdogan-flexes-political-muscle-new-11b-airport-istanbul-n840886">airports</a> and city hospitals via public-private partnerships. </p>
<p>This, coupled with the favorable credit conditions, caused the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-economy-construction/rpt-turkish-conglomerates-race-into-construction-hunting-quick-profits-idUSL5N17U67V">construction sector to boom</a> – particularly among companies closely associated with the government. The <a href="https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/index.php?/evds/portlet/jHQqZSuUssg%3D/en">central bank’s housing price index</a> doubled from the start of 2010 to the end of 2016.</p>
<p>The vibrant economy that resulted in turn helped <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/world/europe/turkey-election-erdogan.html">Erdogan keep winning elections</a>, allowing him to amass more power.</p>
<p>But all that spending worsened the current account deficit even further. As one illustration of the problem, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/private-sector-foreign-debt-on-the-rise-in-turkey-131948">private sector external debt surged</a> from just 16 percent of GDP in 2003 to almost 40 percent at the end of last year.</p>
<p>But even as we watched these events with growing alarm, Erdogan’s popularity and authoritarianism only grew, and in June, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/world/europe/turkey-election-erdogan.html">he became president</a> with significantly boosted powers to run the government as he sees fit.</p>
<p>One of the biggest fears now is that the currency crisis will lead to the kind of severe capital flight that crashed the economy in 2001. A recent central bank survey <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-inflation/turkish-inflation-spike-central-bank-survey-says">forecasts inflation</a> to reach more than 16 percent by the end of the year.</p>
<p>Making matters worse, Erdogan has been increasing his attacks on the independence of the central bank, historically <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-23/turkey-s-central-bank-steps-aside-in-erdogan-inflicted-crisis">one of the most trusted</a> institutions in the country. He has already eroded the relative independence of Turkey’s regulators by recently installing <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/11a52014-83b1-11e8-96dd-fa565ec55929">his son-in-law as the minister of treasury and finance</a>, one month before the current crisis hit. </p>
<p>This has hurt Turkey’s credibility in the eyes of foreign investors.</p>
<h2>Where Turkey goes from here</h2>
<p>Back in the 1980 and 1990s, Turkey’s main problem was political instability. Today, the problem is the opposite, too much authority invested in the hands of a single politician, whose popularity and political power have made him unable or unwilling to see Turkey’s crisis for what it is. </p>
<p>Rather than address any weaknesses in the economy, Erdogan has doubled down on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-economic-crisis-lira-trump.html">blaming</a> the West, particular the U.S., for <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-president-recep-erdogan-us-economic-currency-a8497391.html">waging</a> an “economic coup” on Turkey. </p>
<p>So where does Turkey go from here? As we see it, it has four options. </p>
<p>The least likely is a return to the long-abandoned IMF plan, which would put constraints on the easy credit Erdogan sees as essential to economic growth. Since Erdogan denies even the existence of a structural problem in the Turkish economy, this is presumably a nonstarter. </p>
<p>Another possibility is Turkey could implement its own stabilization program, perhaps with some support from the EU, mainly by alleviating Turkey’s short-term problems. However, for a variety of reasons, including past tensions and a lack of financial ties, this seems little more likely than a return to the IMF. </p>
<p>A third option is for Turkey to get more aid or loans from non-Western countries with cash to spare – such as China, Russia or Qatar – to solve its short-term financing problems. As we noted earlier, this will not be enough to resolve Turkey’s severe structural problems. And the high costs would be further estrangement from NATO – of which it is a key member – and more strain on its relations with the U.S.</p>
<p>Of course Turkey’s government could simply continue to deny there’s a problem at all, blame outsiders for everything and use the crisis to further entrench its political authority on the business community. In that sad scenario, the current trends will continue to play out, and Turkey will likely experience even higher inflation, bankruptcies, soaring borrowing costs, more debt and lower growth.</p>
<p>Turkey is entering a Muslim holiday period known as Feast of the Sacrifice. Some Turks may be wondering whether it’s their economy that will be the offering this year.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101556/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Can Erbil is affiliated with Capital Turkish Connections, a Washington DC-based think tank with over 60 non-resident Fellows and Ambassadors. CTC is a private, apolitical, nonprofit organization that facilitates projects and evidence-based dialogue among professionals and policy-makers on developments in Turkey and her evolving relationship with neighboring regions and transatlantic partners.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Umit Ozlale does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US sanctions announced earlier this month may have triggered the plunge in the lira, but the government has been mismanaging Turkey’s economy for years, creating severe vulnerabilities.Can Erbil, Professor of the Practice of Economics, Boston CollegeUmit Ozlale, Professor of Economics, Özyeğin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/988652018-06-25T12:11:56Z2018-06-25T12:11:56ZTurkey’s snap election yields surprises on all sides – what next?<p>It was another surreal night in Turkish politics. That <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/25/turkey-elections-result-erdogan-amnesty-was-vote-free-and-fair">the elections</a> were suddenly brought forward by more than a year was a surprise in itself – but the standout surprise of the campaign was the sudden rise of opposition candidate Muharrem Ince.</p>
<p>To everybody’s amazement, during a campaign lasting only 50 days, Ince transformed himself from an also-ran into a <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/muharrem-ince-the-man-who-could-topple-erdogan-xcshhzznm">serious contender</a>. He managed to pull support from all sections of society to his large rallies with an election slogan of “we will make peace, we will grow and we will share”.</p>
<p>While his supporters never thought a second round presidential vote would be anything but a foregone conclusion, they hoped Ince could capture enough of the vote to force one to happen – or even win the first round. But they were sorely disappointed. Instead, the sitting president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, pulled off a surprise of his own: he captured nearly 53% of the presidential vote, heading off a second round, while Ince garnered only 31%. While he accepted his defeat, he looks set to remain a significant opponent to Erdoğan, especially if he becomes the leader of his party, the CHP.</p>
<p>There were many other surprises besides. The HDP, the main pro-Kurdish party, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-passes-electoral-threshold-keeps-seats-in-parliament-133738">managed to enter parliament</a> even though its leader spent the campaign in prison. The nationalist MHP, the AKP’s election ally, managed to get <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/mhp-secures-seats-in-parliament-beating-forecasts-133745">more than 11%</a> even though its leader didn’t organise a single rally. This will deprive the AKP of its outright parliamentary majority, meaning it will be more dependent than ever on the MHP.</p>
<p>At the same time, these results usher in a dramatic realignment of the political system. Turkey’s president will now hold <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-election-factbox/turkeys-powerful-new-executive-presidency-idUSKBN1JI1O1">extensive executive powers</a>, and parliament will be much less significant. There will be no prime ministry, and all ministers will be appointed from outside the parliament by the president.</p>
<p>For those who have been worrying about Erdoğan’s increasingly autocratic rule until now, it seems their nightmare is about to enter a new phase. But Erdoğan isn’t out of the woods either.</p>
<h2>Hard times</h2>
<p>The country is facing one of its most serious economic crises of recent times, with the Turkish Lira <a href="http://money.cnn.com/video/news/2018/05/24/turkish-economy-lira.cnnmoney/index.html">worryingly weak</a> and interest rates <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/001fac1c-4872-11e8-8ee8-cae73aab7ccb">climbing</a>. Turkey is hosting <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/23/what-turkeys-local-leaders-have-to-say-about-the-syrian-refugee-crisis/">at least 3.5m Syrian refugees</a> with no prospect of a peace settlement in the hellish conflict across the border. Erdoğan has only a few friends in the international arena besides Russia’s Vladimir Putin. The prospect of EU membership has evaporated, and the US is now far from a dependable ally.</p>
<p>The Kurdish crisis, too, is still waiting for a political settlement, but the AKP’s increased dependency on the staunchly nationalist MHP will make a political resolution on that front even harder.</p>
<p>More importantly, these elections leave Turkish society all the more polarised and divided. For the 50% that voted for parties other than the AKP in the parliamentary polls, Turkey is a country of fear, mistrust and uncertainty. Erdoğan will need to work hard to win their hearts and minds, though in recent years he has seemed mainly interested in catering to his own 50% of the population.</p>
<p>With the promises made by opposition candidates during the election campaign, Erdoğan has also promised a prosperous new Turkey, a high-quality democracy where the rule of law would be the norm. He promised to lift the state of emergency shortly after the elections, to build his controversial <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2fce38da-4317-11e8-97ce-ea0c2bf34a0b">Istanbul Canal</a>, to open public parks throughout the country, and give every neighbourhood its own state-run cafe where <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/erdogan-promises-free-tea-and-cake-to-salvage-election-gamble-wj2br907f">tea and cake would be free</a>.</p>
<p>Given the state of the economy, these promises sound like a tall order. But having run the country for 16 years, one thing Erdoğan has on his side is experience. Indeed, that’s why many of his supporters voted for him. But promises are all very well; the question now is whether Erdoğan will make good on them – and what will happen if he doesn’t.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpaslan Ozerdem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has headed off a political humiliation, but making good on his extravagant promises won’t be easy.Alpaslan Ozerdem, Professor of Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/770642017-06-07T13:01:36Z2017-06-07T13:01:36ZModi and Erdoğan: strong leaders putting their democracies in peril<p>At the beginning of May, Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s first post-referendum <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/tayyip-erdogan-narendra-modi-bilateral-meet-live-updates-turkey-president-visit-trade-nsg-islamic-state/">foreign visit</a> was to meet India’s prime minister Narendra Modi. Despite Erdoğan’s controversial <a href="https://qz.com/972508/turkeys-erdogan-speaks-of-dear-friend-nawaz-sharif-and-resolving-kashmir-just-before-meeting-narendra-modi/">pro-Pakistan statement</a> just before the trip, the pair were pictured sharing friendly hugs as they vowed to tackle terrorism and extend <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/modi-and-erdogan-condemn-terror-pitch-expanded-trade-ties/story-02gyYBs5PeVsHqySC96LmO.html">economic relations</a>. </p>
<p>As they did so, it was hard not to notice the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/04/13/erdogan-and-modi-arent-the-trumps-of-the-east/?utm_term=.ed2ba252b951">similarities</a> between the political journeys of these two strongmen – and what is happening to their countries. Both have been using religion to cling to power, and pushing back the secular fabric of Indian and Turkish politics.</p>
<p>Both are right wingers who employ nationalist rhetoric, and both became politically stronger as they sought to polarise the multicultural societies they govern. Modi and Erdoğan also claim to be reforming the stagnating economies of their respective countries, turning them into <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/sadik_unay/2017/04/29/turkey-and-india-tale-of-two-rising-powers">“rising global powers”</a>. </p>
<p>The two leaders come from modest economic and educational backgrounds, but have successfully adopted “strong man” images which are extremely appealing to their respective constituencies. They brand the long established political workings of their countries as elitist, and promote populist policies. The strong resemblance of the two leaders has not gone <a href="https://www.amazon.com/dp/0997126426/?tag=slatmaga-20">unnoticed</a>. </p>
<p>Erdoğan is a product of political Islam in Turkey, which was pushed back under the earlier <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-the-new-model/">secular regimes</a> for decades. He came to power with the ambitious ideal of changing the very character of the nation. And he has slowly but surely achieved his goal. </p>
<p>His party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) gained sweeping victories in elections, and in 2014 he was elected as president in a referendum. Since then, Turkey has gone into democratic reverse, becoming an increasingly <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2015.1135732">authoritarian country</a>. Civil rights have been undermined and the country is more polarised than ever. Increasing <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/thousands-across-turkey-protests-against-pkk-666574588">communal violence</a> during election periods is just one example. </p>
<p>The Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) also came to power in 2014, motivated by the <a href="http://www.dailyo.in/politics/modi-erdogan-indian-democracy-image-abroad-secularism-cow-urine/story/1/16780.html">agenda of “Hindutva”</a>, the notion that India is the homeland of Hindus only. Since Modi became prime minister, minority groups, particularly Muslims and Christians, have been regularly attacked and are living in a very <a href="http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/muslims-dalits-religious-attacks-grew-in-india-narendra-modi-us-report/1/879370.html">hostile environment</a>. Modi supporters have stepped up their campaign against inter-religious marriages and the eating of beef. Mass conversions to Hinduism <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/29/india-mass-reconversion-christians-hinduism">are enforced</a> by his party activists. </p>
<p>Both in India and Turkey, the authoritarian tendencies of these two leaders have brought serious danger to democracy and human rights. </p>
<p>Modi’s dominant style of leadership has reduced the scope of dissent. Activists are also <a href="http://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/the-future-of-india-as-a-democratic-country-is-at-risk/295251">voicing concerns</a> over the intensifying climate of religious intolerance and political interference in academic and cultural institutions. In response, the state is <a href="http://thepoliticalfunda.com/Politics/Detail/With_series_of_undemocratic_episodes_Is_India_moving_towards_dictatorship20850">using coercive powers</a> to suppress opposition on the pretext of national security and Indian identity.</p>
<p>In Turkey, ever since the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/turkey-failed-coup-attempt-161217032345594.html">attempted coup</a> in July 2016, <a href="https://turkeypurge.com/">human rights violations </a> have became ever more visible. As soon as the putsch was quashed, a state of emergency was declared (it has been almost a year now). Emergency decrees have been used to purge thousands of members of any kind of opposition. Academics, journalists and politicians have been <a href="https://turkeypurge.com/">dismissed</a> from their positions, arrested or silenced. </p>
<p>As in India, these purges have been conducted under the pretext of national security. Many civil society organisations have been banned from receiving foreign funding and forced to close down. The media is under constant pressure to be subservient to the regime. The referendum which gave Erdoğan even more executive powers as president changed the regime of Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential one. </p>
<h2>Two of a kind</h2>
<p>Erdoğan is not prepared to let go of power, nor is he shy about letting the world know that he does not care about what the “West” thinks. He is more interested in forming alliances in the East, and happy to ignore Western criticisms about human rights and democracy.</p>
<p>Despite the similarities between the two leaders and the changes they are making, India is better placed than Turkey in terms of freedom and democracy. Democracy watchdog Freedom House defines Turkey as a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey">“partly free”</a> country where there is no press freedom, while it defines India as a free country with a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/india">partly free press</a>. According to the <a href="http://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index">World Democracy Index</a>, Turkey is a hybrid regime while India is defined as a flawed democracy. </p>
<p>Compared to Turkey, then, India has a better democratic framework – but it is under constant threat. Modi is continuing to win key state-level elections. His party is on the verge of gaining a majority in the upper house of the parliament and having one of its <a href="http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/president-list-of-probable-candidates-of-bjp-opposition-rashtrapati-bhavan/1/956492.html">members elected president</a>. A lack of effective opposition and a subservient national media are helping Modi on his way. The future of the country’s democracy is seen by many as <a href="http://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/the-future-of-india-as-a-democratic-country-is-at-risk/295251">high risk </a>.</p>
<p>Erdoğan and Modi have seriously damaged the secular character of their countries and managed to centralise power in their own hands. Both countries have previously been examples of modern states with secular values. But the rapid deterioration of democracy in Turkey and India now poses serious challenges for peace and stability in their respective regions. No doubt the two men will meet again soon – they have plenty in common, and much to discuss.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77064/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The leaders of Turkey and India have plenty in common.Ashok Swain, Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityBahar Baser, Research Fellow, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/763932017-04-21T06:45:59Z2017-04-21T06:45:59ZWhy the result of Turkey’s referendum is broadly unacceptable to so many<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-constitutional-referendum-experts-express-fear-for-a-divided-country-76289">result of Turkey’s April 16 referendum</a> handed President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the right to expand his power practically without checks and balances. It granted him authority to control the parliament and judiciary and the power to rule Turkey by decree. </p>
<p>But the razor-thin victory of the “yes” campaign has been strongly objected to by a range of groups. </p>
<p>Opposition parties have accepted all of Erdoğan’s electoral victories since 2002. But this time they are saying that he rigged the referendum. International observers agree with them. And, for days, hundreds of thousands of people have been <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/19/turkish-activists-arrested-protesting-referendum-opposition/">peacefully protesting in the streets</a>.</p>
<p>For decades, the <a href="http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/home">Council of Europe</a> (CoE) and the <a href="http://www.osce.org/">Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</a> (OSCE) have been sending electoral observer mission groups to monitor elections in the country at Turkey’s invitation. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.dw.com/en/osce-turkey-referendum-contested-on-an-unlevel-playing-field/a-38453816">A preliminary report on the referendum</a> from the joint mission by CoE and OSCE said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>our monitoring showed the ‘Yes’ campaign dominated the media coverage and this, along with restrictions on the media, the arrests of journalists and the closure of media outlets, reduced voters’ access to a plurality of views. Provincial governors used state-of-emergency powers to further restrict the freedom of assembly and expression. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In some cases, CoE and OSCE observers either had <a href="http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/311726">limited or no access</a> to the opening up of polling stations and during voting. And police presence was widely reported both in and outside polling stations. </p>
<h2>Last minute change</h2>
<p>Irregularities weren’t just detected on the ground.</p>
<p>A 2010 law disallows unstamped ballots in unstamped envelopes to be counted as valid. But, at the request of Erdogan’s ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party), the Supreme Board of Elections (YSK) made a <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/17/turkish-referendum-opposition-plans-appeal-against-last-minute/">last-minute decision to allow this illegal practice.</a></p>
<p>Oddly, the YSK followed the law for votes from the Turkish diaspora, not accepting unstamped ballots and envelopes as valid. </p>
<p>In the 2014 local elections, <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/turkey-politics-idINKBN17K1E5">the YSK cancelled and re-held elections in two towns because of unstamped votes</a> as a result of the application by the ruling AKP. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/311726">CoE and OSCE observers noted</a> that the last-minute decision by the YSK was illegal and lifted an important safeguard against fraud. </p>
<p>An Austrian member of the CoE observer mission stated that <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/osce-turkey-referendum-contested-on-an-unlevel-playing-field/a-38453816">up to 2.5 million votes</a> (about 6% of total votes) could have been manipulated in the referendum. CoE and OSCE monitors also said that <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-politics-referendum-observers-idUSKBN17K0JW">Turkish authorities were not cooperating</a> with efforts to investigate claims of possible electoral fraud. </p>
<p><a href="https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/world/europe/turkey-referendum-is-haunted-by-allegations-of-voter-fraud.html">The New York Times reported</a> that over 170 members of the opposition were banned from participating as observers in the election. And that some international election observers were temporarily detained, preventing them from fully observing vote counts. It was also alleged that “no” votes were removed from ballot boxes and deposited in a building site in the same area of southern Turkey. </p>
<h2>Opposition objections</h2>
<p>The pro-Kurdish opposition Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) has said it presented complaints about unstamped ballots affecting three million voters, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkish-referendum-million-votes-manipulated-recep-tayyip-erdogan-council-of-europe-observer-a7690181.html">more than twice the margin of Erdogan’s victory</a>, to no avail. </p>
<p>And the party’s deputy chairman said the electoral board’s last-minute decision to allow unstamped ballots meant that <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-politics-kurds-idUSKBN17L0VH?il=0">it’s now impossible to determine</a> how many invalid or fake votes may have been counted. He also said that some voters had been unable to cast their ballots in private. </p>
<p><a href="http://washingtonhatti.com/2017/04/18/hdps-provincial-co-chair-of-van-claims-that-20-percent-of-ballots-in-van-were-unsealed/">Other HDP officials stated</a> that some electors were given unsealed “yes” voted ballots by AKP members, asked to cast them and then return sealed ballots in exchange for money.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hayirveotesi.org/duyurular">Election monitoring NGO No and Beyond found</a> that in 961 ballot boxes, 100% of the ballots were “yes”. And in a third of these 961 boxes, 100% of eligible voters had cast votes. Both these occurrences are extremely unusual. </p>
<p>The NGO also said that in the town of Viranşehir, in the province Urfa, all the signatures of the voters were the same, suggesting that the same person signed them. </p>
<p>The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) has <a href="https://bianet.org/english/politics/185650-chp-seeking-annulment-of-referendum-applies-to-election-board">asked the YSK to annul the referendum</a> on the basis of fraudulent activities and its extralegal decision to allow unstamped ballots. Unsurprisingly, the YSK swiftly rejected the request. </p>
<p>The CHP will now <a href="https://bianet.org/english/politics/185700-chp-spokesperson-boke-we-might-withdraw-from-parliament">take its case to the Turkish Constitutional Court</a>. But it’s unlikely that the petition will see much success there either.</p>
<p>The court has been under Erdoğan’s control since he and his fellow Islamist colleague, former president Abdullah Gul, appointed AKP loyalists to the bench. Now it simply rubber stamps Erdoğan’s wishes. </p>
<h2>Echoes from history</h2>
<p>Electoral fraud is not new in Turkey. </p>
<p>The country had its first elections more than 170 years ago when the absolutist Sultan allowed local councils to hold elections to address local administrative issues in 1840. </p>
<p>The first Ottoman parliament was opened in 1876 but Sultan Abdulhamid the Second closed it down the following year until a coup in 1908 that brought secularist-nationalists to power. </p>
<p>They also did not like losing electoral power and, in the 1912 general elections, voters who tried to vote for the opposition candidates were beaten by supporters of the secularist-nationalists. In fact, the 1912 election is infamously called the “election with sticks”. </p>
<p>Even though the republic was established by the secularist nationalists in 1923, the one party-regime did not allow elections until 1946. When the second world war was over, Turkey – under threat of Soviet occupation – wanted to join the Western democratic pact, and so had to allow multi-party elections. But they were not ready to lose the elections. </p>
<p>Thus, there appeared to be a “open vote, hidden counting” rule in 1946, for starters. Under conditions of a party-state, the governor, head of district, mayor and provincial head of the ruling secularist-nationalist party – who were the same person – forced people to vote for the ruling party with the help of the security forces.</p>
<p>When the Republican Turkey had its first free elections in 1950, the ruling secularist-nationalist CHP lost power to the liberal secular Democrat Party (DP). Since then – and despite minor problems – none of the election results have been declared unacceptable by any of the contesting political parties. </p>
<p>The April 16 referendum was rather similar to the 1912 and 1946 general elections. This referendum is the first time in the democratic history of Turkey, which is a member of NATO, Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), that an election has been seen as illegitimate by not only domestic contenders, but by international observers as well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ihsan Yilmaz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This referendum is the first time in the democratic history of Turkey that an election has been seen as illegitimate by not only domestic contenders, but by international observers as well.Ihsan Yilmaz, Professor Ihsan Yilmaz is Research Chair in Islamic Studies and Intercultural Dialogue, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/762892017-04-17T01:43:31Z2017-04-17T01:43:31ZTurkey’s constitutional referendum: experts express fear for a divided country<p><em>Unofficial results from Turkey’s April 16 constitutional referendum show that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/apr/16/turkey-referendum-recep-tayyip-erdogan-votes-presidential-powers?utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=Australia+Morning+mail+new+030615&utm_term=222026&subid=2689150&CMP=ema_1731">won the right to expand presidential power</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The “yes” campaign has won <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39617700?ocid=global_bbccom_email_16042017_top+news+stories">51.37% of the votes while “no” has secured 48.63%</a>, with 99.45% of ballots counted. The electoral board has declared a victory for the former but the country’s two main opposition parties are challenging the results, demanding a recount of 60% of the votes. Official results are expected in 11 to 12 days.</em></p>
<p><em>Erdoğan can now create an executive presidency that will make him the head of state and head of government, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/world/europe/turkey-referendum-polls-erdogan.html?emc=edit_na_20170416&nl=breaking-news&nlid=64524812&ref=cta&_r=0">ending the country’s current parliamentary political system</a>. The changes could mean that Erdoğan retains power until 2029 in the highly divisive country that has been further polarised in the run-up to the referendum.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation Global asked scholars what they made of the results and what lies ahead for Turkey.</em></p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Ihsan Yilmaz, Professor & Research Chair in Islamic Studies and Intercultural Dialogue at Deakin University</strong></p>
<p>Despite controlling 90% of media coverage, using all sorts of stick-and-carrot mechanisms via the state, imprisoning the leaders and parliamentarians of Turkey’s third-largest party and more than 200 hundred journalists, Erdoğan could not get a clear win. </p>
<p>He has reached the limits of his electoral power and, in the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections, he may lose all power. But, as this referendum has shown once more, he is not prepared to lose and electoral fraud will likely take place in 2019. </p>
<p>Despite the clearly-worded law that was enacted in 2010 upon the request of the ruling <em>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</em> (AKP), which Erdoğan co-founded, the <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/turkey-referendum-opposition-slams-poll-board-over-last-minute-changes-demands-recount/story-g0AqNnAvq0sA9dLfe48g9N.html">High Electoral Board made a last-minute change</a> that validated 1.5 million unstamped ballots. The margin between the “yes” and “no” votes is less than this figure. </p>
<p>The opposition is contesting the result and Erdoğan’s first speech shows he is concerned that the international community may not accept the results as legitimate.</p>
<p>Instead of bringing stability, the referendum has divided the already polarised country further. Secularist and Westernised sections of society (about 30% of the population) hate the AKP. Around 15% of the country’s non-Sunni Muslims (Alevis), who have a hybrid faith of Shia Islam, Turcoman Shamanism and Anatolian Sufism, are afraid that a Salafised, increasingly Sunni-ist AKP will crush them. And the majority of Turkey’s Kurds (around 20% of the population) who voted “no” will never vote in favour of Erdoğan and AKP. </p>
<p>Turkey’s fault lines have deepened and the now undemocratic country, without EU membership aspirations, is no longer unified – if it ever was. </p>
<p>Erdoğan is left with around 45% to 50% of a coalition of conservative, Turkish nationalist and practicing Muslim voters. Even many of those who voted for him for economic reasons may prefer a potential centre-right party if it can be established. </p>
<p>Erdoğan cannot blame the country’s forthcoming economic troubles on the “no” vote as he won. So he is likely to do two things. </p>
<p>First, he may continue to suppress Kurdish dissidents and start seriously crushing the secularist sections (White Turks) in addition to Alevis. The anti-Gulenist witch hunt and leftist purges will continue. </p>
<p>The AKP will be Erdoğanised further and party heavy weights, such as Abdullah Gul (former foreign minister, prime minister and president and AKP co-founder); Bulent Arinc (former deputy prime minister and speaker of the parliament, and AKP co-founder); Ahmet Davutoglu (former foreign minister and prime minister) and their affiliates now face the prospect being purged and even imprisonment. Potential rivals, all were sidelined by Erdoğan and did not vote for the “yes” campaign.</p>
<p>Second, in order to entice Nationalist Movement Party (<em>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</em>) and Islamist Saadet Party voters who did not vote in his favour, Erdoğan could increase the volume of his anti-Western and pro-Islamist rhetoric, coupled with some actions along the lines of opening the Hagia Sophia museum as a mosque, declaring his caliphate, bringing back the death penalty, giving up Council of Europe membership and ending the EU membership process once and for all. </p>
<p>He is likely to continue to demonise European countries and will try to get full US support for his undemocratic regime. To secure that, he may well try to deepen his relations with Russia. Buying Russian missiles is one of the options.</p>
<p>Turkey was never a fully democratic country but there were hopes that it could become one. The April 16 referendum showed decisively that Erdoğan will not allow free and democratic elections, independent media and judiciary. </p>
<p><strong>Simon. P. Watmough, postdoctoral researcher in international relations and comparative politics at European University Institute:</strong></p>
<p>Despite a threatened challenge to results from Turkey’s opposition groups, it is clear that President Erdoğan has eked out a narrow victory in the April 16 constitutional referendum. </p>
<p>Make no mistake: this win marks a turning point in Turkey’s political development. Turks have narrowly voted to end their own democratic system and Turkey’s slide into “electoral authoritarianism” has been cemented. </p>
<p>The result will see all executive power centralised in the hands of one man, an unprecedented degree of control not seen since Turkey’s period of military rule in the early 1980s.</p>
<p>In the short run, it is clear that Erdoğan will use this opportunity to strengthen his grip on the state and attempt to advance his vision of a New Turkey. But in the longer term, things may not be nearly as bleak for dissent and political pluralism as they appear at present. </p>
<p>Despite his victory, there are distinct chinks in Erdoğan’s armour. </p>
<p>For one thing, there is a deep tradition of political pluralism and competitive partisanship in Turkey that will not simply evaporate now that Erdoğan is an executive president. The extremely narrow win for “yes” shows that Turkey is deeply polarised and that there is only the slenderest majority in support of this transition. Half the country is ready to oppose Erdoğan. </p>
<p>These factors are likely to underpin a galvanising of political opposition parties in Turkey, particularly the <em>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</em> (Nationalist Movement Party) but also the <em>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</em> (People’s Republican Party). They will regroup and organise for dissent, prepared to take advantage of any weakness that presents in the president’s standing.</p>
<p>Turkey’s electorate has shown remarkable support for Erdoğan and the AKP (Justice and Development Party), which he co-founded, during the long period of economic growth between 2002 and 2015. But economic storm clouds are gathering on the horizon. </p>
<p>With the economic tide turning, the chances of the country experiencing an economic crisis – as has so often been the case in the past – has increased. A debt crisis and economic collapse could be the trigger for widespread social and political mobilisation against Erdoğan’s New Turkey project.</p>
<p><strong>Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, research assistant in the Faculty of Law, Social Science and History at the University of Strasbourg:</strong> </p>
<p>It is fair to say that Turkey is divided in regard to the results of the referendum. Even though we don’t have the official results yet, it is obvious that the “yes” votes are narrowly leading despite the “no” vote being ahead in the country’s biggest cities – İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. </p>
<p>It should be noted though that, despite allegations of serious vote rigging, blunders by the High Election Council and strong evidence of undemocratic practices in the run up, the race was very tight. </p>
<p>The main opposition party has objected and this means that even if the result remains “yes” after official results are declared, this will be one of the most debated elections of Turkey. Erdoğan has been controlling the state apparatus for a long time now and would have disallowed any result other than “yes”. </p>
<p>While Erdoğan supporters may see the results as the official kick-off of the “New Turkey” era, their enthusiasm may be premature.</p>
<p>First of all, the results show that polarisation in Turkey has reached its peak. While half of the population is willing to deliver power to Erdoğan, the rest are strongly standing against him and his authoritarian and pro-Islamic policies. </p>
<p>Second, with the results, Erdoğan has indeed constitutionalised the one-man rule, but it is also crystal clear that the educated classes and young generations will still fight him in the months to come. And it might not be as easy for him to run the country with his previous authoritarian habits. </p>
<p>In this regard and against general belief, the result of the referendum is not an end; it is the start of a new era of struggle between pro-Erdoğanists and the rest for the country. </p>
<p><strong>David Tittensor, Lecturer in Studies of Religion at Deakin University</strong></p>
<p>Turkey has, unsurprisingly, voted yes in the referendum to grant President Erdoğan sweeping new powers that includes issuing decrees and the appointment of judges and officials who will scrutinise his decisions. It’s unsurprising because the vote took place in a state of emergency following mass purges that began even before the July 15 2016 failed coup attempt. </p>
<p>Erdoğan and his party waged an aggressive campaign that involved intimidating the opposition. Erdoğan regularly stated that those who vote “no” are terrorist supporters, and limiting the airtime for opponents. And, of course, there are allegations of vote tampering. </p>
<p>But in spite of all these tactics the outcome has been far from resounding, with the “yes” vote reportedly only narrowly carrying the day. </p>
<p>This indicates that there is still staunch opposition to Erodğan’s “one-man rule” and that the further repression that is likely to follow more centralised government will not lead to promised stability. </p>
<p>A more likely outcome is the stoking of further disunity in an already highly polarised society, which will be amplified by the serious challenges that Turkey currently faces. These include the Syrian refugee crisis, two terrorism campaigns waged by Kurdish insurgents and ISIS, and the Syrian war. </p>
<p>While Erdoğan has achieved his aim of using democracy, which he once famously described as a bus one eventually disembarks from when the desired stop is reached, the road ahead looks far from smooth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76289/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Experts agree that Turkey is even further polarised after contested unofficial results show President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has won the right to expand his powers.Simon P. Watmough, Postdoctoral research associate, European University InstituteAhmet Erdi Öztürk, Research Asistant, Université de StrasbourgDavid Tittensor, Lecturer in Studies of Religion, Deakin UniversityIhsan Yilmaz, Professor & Research Chair in Islamic Studies and Intercultural Dialogue, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/694412017-01-06T12:33:09Z2017-01-06T12:33:09ZWhy Istanbul is struggling to become an international financial centre<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151931/original/image-20170106-18656-1gum2dy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The prospect of Brexit has many wondering whether or not London <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-london-wont-lose-its-crown-as-europes-financial-capital-63362">will remain Europe’s main financial centre</a>. Yet, for all the talk of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-soft-brexit-is-in-the-interest-of-both-london-and-brussels-67722">Zurich or Frankfurt</a> stealing London’s crown, Istanbul is a city that’s doing its utmost to move up the food chain of financial rankings. </p>
<p>It may be an outsider in the contest – and is currently reeling from recent terrorist attacks – but the Turkish government is intent on boosting the city’s potential as a financial centre.</p>
<p>In an era of worldwide financial liberalisation and integration, international financial centres have significantly increased in number and geographical span since the late 1970s. These centres can be seen as the key points in the global financial system, mediating credit and debt for public and private actors across borders. </p>
<p>With numbers come rankings. The biannual Global Financial Centres Index (<a href="http://www.zyen.com/research/gfci.html">GFCI</a>) is arguably the most famous. It ranks 87 cities according to a large number of criteria within regulatory standards, business environment, human capital, infrastructure, and reputational factors. In doing so, it actually relies on numerous global indices related to these domains, and on international finance professionals’ opinions. London has consistently topped the GFCI in recent years.</p>
<p>London’s performance as a financial centre makes it clear why politicians and businesses take these indices seriously and want their business capitals to be highly ranked. London makes a significant contribution to the UK’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/london-three-reasons-why-calls-for-more-autonomy-should-be-taken-seriously-61621">economic growth, employment, and government revenues</a>. It is therefore not surprising that there have been various state-led initiatives to increase the status of world cities such as <a href="http://www.islamicfinance.com.my/index.php">Jakarta</a>, <a href="http://www.qfc.qa/en/news-and-events/Pages/the-New-Financial-City.aspx">Doha</a>, <a href="http://www.casablancafinancecity.com/en/content/about-us-0">Casablanca</a>, and <a href="http://en.sjr.sh.gov.cn/financial-centre/basic-situation/201.shtml">Shanghai</a> in the global financial system. </p>
<p>Istanbul is among them. Since 2007, the Turkish state has had the vision of making Istanbul first <a href="http://www.ifm.gov.tr/Shared%20Documents/Strategy%20and%20Action%20Plan%20for%20IFC%20Istanbul.pdf">a regional, and then a global financial centre</a>. For this, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has put in place a range of initiatives to hoist Istanbul into the <a href="http://www.ifm.gov.tr/Shared%20Documents/IFC-Istanbul%20Program%20Action%20Plan%20(2015-2018).pdf">GFCI’s top 25</a> by 2018. But careful examination of its policies indicates that they are more about securing political power than achieving real economic success.</p>
<h2>State control</h2>
<p>The AKP seems to have prioritised two initiatives for Istanbul as a prospective global financial centre: rebuilding parts of an already functioning infrastructure, and shifting Istanbul’s financial services to focus on Islamic finance. </p>
<p>The first priority has been to relocate the state-owned banks and market regulators from the political and administrative capital Ankara to a <a href="http://www.e-architect.co.uk/istanbul/atasehir-district">more upmarket area</a> of Istanbul. The second focuses on Islamic finance to <a href="https://www.islamicfinance.com/2015/04/istanbul-positioned-global-islamic-finance-gateway/">attract pious savers and investors</a> to the Turkish financial system.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Istanbul’s financial district.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yavuz Sariyildiz/shutterstock.com</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Neither policy will help Istanbul climb up the ranks in the GFCI any time soon. In an age of instant communication and decreasing importance of physical proximity, the relocation to Istanbul will not necessarily increase Istanbul’s score in the GFCI’s <a href="http://www.longfinance.net/images/gfci/20/GFCI20_26Sep2016.pdf">16 instrumental infrastructure factors</a>. And Turkey will be hard pressed to compete with existing Islamic finance centres such as London, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-finance-goes-global-but-malaysia-still-leads-the-way-27347">already offer comprehensive services</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, these policies can be better understood as part of the AKP’s policies of helping sustain economic growth by grand infrastructure and building projects, while shifting the Turkish economy to a more Islamic-oriented one. They sit in a context of <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview">sluggish economic growth</a> and the ascendancy of <a href="https://theconversation.com/secular-turks-may-be-in-the-minority-but-they-are-vital-to-turkeys-future-63979">Islamic conservatism</a> in Turkey in recent years.</p>
<h2>Improving in the rankings</h2>
<p>Istanbul is the business and finance capital of Turkey. It generates almost a quarter of the Turkish GDP and accommodates almost a fifth of Turkey’s population of 79m people. In September 2015, Istanbul was <a href="http://www.longfinance.net/images/GFCI18_23Sep2015.pdf">profiled by the GFCI</a> and marked as an “established transnational” financial centre alongside the likes of Chicago, Munich and Tokyo. It has earned this profile in the GFCI thanks to the speciality, diversity and connectivity of its financial services and markets. </p>
<p>But, despite being associated with such developed cities, Istanbul’s overall ranking in the GFCI dropped <a href="http://www.longfinance.net/images/gfci/20/GFCI20_26Sep2016.pdf">12 places to 57th in September 2016</a>. This was put down to political uncertainty, terrorism and armed conflict in and around Turkey. The GFCI’s rankings methodology is sensitive to such adverse events (so expect a drop in London’s top ranking in 2017 thanks to <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-is-on-britain-votes-to-leave-the-eu-experts-respond-61576">Brexit</a>).</p>
<p>If Istanbul is to reach the top 25 in the rankings any time soon, Turkey also needs to improve its financial regulatory standards, business environment and labour quality. It is not clear how the AKP’s immediate focus on building work – which is estimated to cost several billion dollars in an already densely populated and built-up Istanbul – can help. Instead, it might actually worsen <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/istanbul-revealed-as-the-most-congested-city-in-the-world-10149543.html">Istanbul’s infamous traffic congestion</a> and undermine the quality of life – another measure in the GFCI rankings. </p>
<p>The new focus on Islamic finance will surely help Istanbul by broadening the city’s financial offering. Yet, Islamic finance should not be promoted as a replacement for <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/borsa-istanbul-chair-says-all-stocks-exchanges-should-be-run-in-islamic-way.aspx?pageID=238&nID=88282&NewsCatID=346">secular financial services</a> that are already provided in the city. </p>
<p>After all, Turkey has for a long time cultivated business, trade and financial relationships with the rest of the world on the basis of its secular principles. It would profit from continuing in this tradition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69441/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emre Tarim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Does the Turkish government have ulterior motives in its attempt to make Istanbul a global financial centre?Emre Tarim, Lecturer in Behavioural Sciences, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/708562017-01-04T23:21:24Z2017-01-04T23:21:24ZErdoğan could be losing his grip on a dangerous, divided Turkey<p>Turkey’s New Year was marred by a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-38487509">terrorist attack</a>, claimed by the so-called Islamic State (IS), that killed 39 people and injured many more at a famous nightclub in Istanbul. After nearly two years of deadly incidents and alarming political instability, Turks were once again left counting the dead – and wondering how much more their country can take.</p>
<p>In the last 18 months, Turkey has seen 33 bomb attacks that have claimed 446 lives, <a href="http://www.diken.com.tr/bir-bucuk-yilda-33-bombali-saldirida-446-kisi-hayatini-kaybetti-363u-sivil/">363 of them civilians</a>. Some <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/istanbul-new-year-shooting-nightclub-isis-bosphorus-president-erdogan-troubled-turkey-peace-a7504801.html">commentators</a> even claim that low-level terror is now almost the norm in Turkey.</p>
<p>To make things more complicated still, the latest attack comes only six months after a bizarre <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-struggles-to-make-sense-of-a-surreal-failed-coup-detat-62596">failed coup</a>, undoubtedly one of the most significant events in Turkey’s modern history.</p>
<p>The coup’s planners had little public support, and <a href="http://www.itv.com/news/update/2016-07-16/turkey-opposition-denounces-coup-attempt/">opposition leaders</a> have also constantly underlined that it would have been a tragedy if it had succeeded. So, the aftermath was a huge opportunity for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish president, and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to correct the country’s disturbing course: to restore trust between various ethnic and religious communities, to start a new peace process with the Kurds after the last one <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/how-did-turkeys-peace-process-unravel-so-fast-382609585">failed</a> in 2015, and to bring greater democracy to the country. </p>
<p>But instead of trying to put Turkey back on the right track, the AKP government has done quite the opposite. </p>
<h2>Divide and rule</h2>
<p>The post-putsch period has brought chaos and enmity as well as a total crackdown on groups and individuals, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/purge-of-teachers-and-academics-bulldozes-through-turkish-education-62839">academics</a>, journalists, teachers, lawyers and judges. Some of them were supposedly linked to the followers of exiled religious leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/fethullah-gulen-public-intellectual-or-public-enemy-62887">Fethullah Gülen</a>, while others support different opposition groups.</p>
<p>This sort of authoritarianism has been brewing in Turkey for some time, especially since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-general-election-upset-the-rise-of-the-akp-interrupted-42942">elections of June 2015</a> failed to hand the AKP a ruling parliamentary majority. There followed an increased level of political violence and terrorism for a period of four months, enough to convince Turkish voters that without an AKP majority, there would be no end to the bloodshed the country was witnessing. After campaigning on that basis for a re-run of the June elections, Erdoğan <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-election-erdogan-and-the-akp-get-majority-back-amid-climate-of-violence-and-fear-49963">won the majority</a> he so badly wanted – but the result did nothing for peace and security.</p>
<p>The coup attempt was the next critical turning point. Erdoğan himself called it “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-17/coup-was-a-gift-from-god-says-erdogan-who-plans-a-new-turkey">a gift from God</a>” that enabled the rulers of “New Turkey” to shore up their power with ever harsher policies. Only five days after the attempted coup, the AKP government <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36852080">declared a state of emergency</a>; it was originally scheduled to last three months, but was then extended until mid-April 2017. It has become a useful tool for the government, which is still using the failed putsch as an pretext to crack down on opposition.</p>
<p>Rather than downplaying the divisions among different ethnic and religious groups in Turkey in the post-putsch period, the ruling party and the president are deepening the country’s many divisions, all the while assisted by the mainstream <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/monitoring/turkish-media-reflect-social-divisions">media</a>. They are creating a fractured political environment which will enable them to promote constitutional <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/ahmet-erdi-ozturk-tar-g-zayd-n/turkey-s-draft-constitutional-amendments-harking-back-to-1876">amendments</a>, in the long run presenting Erdoğan’s long-held dream of an <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-10/turkey-s-akp-proposes-amendment-extending-presidential-powers-iwjekh71">executive presidential system</a> as the only thing that can bring Turkey back from the brink. </p>
<p>But the strategy may yet backfire. </p>
<h2>On the brink</h2>
<p>In the broadest sense, the country’s social and political order has proven remarkably resilient in the face of terrorism, disasters and civil unrest, but it is now under more pressure than ever. Despite the strictures of the state of emergency, Turkey clearly remains vulnerable to terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>The violence of the last few years has so far boosted Erdoğan’s already strong public support, with many Turks trusting him to keep them safe – but with fear and uncertainty is on the rise.</p>
<p>Erdoğan is feeling pressure on various fronts. For example, IS recently <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/isil-burns-turkish-soldiers-alive-shocking-video-161223035619947.html">released</a> a video in December purporting to show two Turkish soldiers being burned alive in Syria; the authorities could not give a satisfactory answer on whether the claim was actually true. Then the Russian ambassador was <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-and-russias-relationship-is-strong-enough-to-survive-ambassadors-murder-70681">assassinated</a> by a Turkish policeman in the capital city, sending a message that no-one in Turkey is really safe. The continuing insecurity is already devouring the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2016/oct/05/turkey-tourism-industry-reels-year-to-forget-istanbul-antalya">tourism sector</a>, tanking the <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/emerging-markets-idUKL5N1ET1EH">Lira</a>, and undercutting the economy in general (with <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-exports-decreased-to-1426-bln-in-2016-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=108103&NewsCatID=344">exports</a> in particular on the wane). </p>
<p>All this will make it increasingly hard for the AKP to consolidate its voter base. The government seems incapable of safeguarding the basic conditions of security and stability, and if IS and other groups mount further attacks like the one on New Year’s Eve, indecisive voters might actually start to move towards other political parties. The very insecurity that helped Erdoğan strengthen his power base could yet be his downfall.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70856/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The divisive tactics that put Turkey’s president in control could yet be his undoing.Alpaslan Ozerdem, Chair in Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityBahar Baser, Research Fellow, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/628872016-08-08T00:03:36Z2016-08-08T00:03:36ZFethullah Gülen: public intellectual or public enemy?<p>On July 15, 2016, the Turkish Republic survived an attempted military coup d’état that killed nearly 300 people and cost more than an estimated <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/08/02/The-cost-of-Turkeys-failed-coup-100-billion/1211470140887/">US$100 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Immediately following the coup, Turkey’s government began a massive purge of state, military, business and civil society institutions in an attempt to remove alleged plotters from the ranks of social power. To date, approximately <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/02/world/europe/turkey-purge-erdogan-scale.html">75,000 people</a> have been detained or forced to resign.</p>
<p>Human rights groups <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/turkey-independent-monitors-must-be-allowed-to-access-detainees-amid-torture-allegations/">allege</a> that arbitrary arrest and torture are becoming routine. Turkey’s leaders strongly refute such claims. They argue that security forces are doing what is necessary to protect the nation from <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/turkey-slams-amnesty-over-report-alleging-torture/2016/08/02/cbcbe49a-58bc-11e6-8b48-0cb344221131_story.html">a clearly defined enemy</a>. The <a href="http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/2016/07/after-turkish-coup-democracy.html">implications</a> of the failed coup are deeply concerning for Turkey, the region and the world.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-survey-idUSKCN1060P1">What unites the purged</a> are alleged connections to Turkey’s most famous religious personality, Fethullah Gülen. </p>
<p>Presented by his followers as a learned scholar and orator, Gülen leads a transnational social and economic network that participants call Hizmet, from the Turkish word for “service,” and outsiders call the Gülen movement. The Turkish government insists Fethullah Gülen orchestrated the coup, and are demanding both <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/state-of-emergency-enables-turkish-govt-to-rule-by-decree-without-control-mechanisms.aspx?pageID=238&nID=102029&NewsCatID=341">domestic</a> and <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-warns-kyrgyzstan-over-possible-gulenist-coup-attempt-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=102091&NewsCatID=510">international</a> <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/4f8d6d3e-55a3-11e6-befd-2fc0c26b3c60">cooperation</a> to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/live/turkey-coup-erdogan/erdogan-calls-on-u-s-to-arrest-or-extradite-fethullah-gulen">bring him</a> and his alleged co-conspirators to justice.</p>
<p>What do we know about this man and his movement?</p>
<h2>The Gülen movement</h2>
<p>Anchored in private education, the GM began in the late 1960s. That’s when Gülen established a following of mostly young men attracted to his emotional call for religious Turks to participate in secular education and the market economy.</p>
<p>Gülen discouraged participation in Turkey’s primary Islamic political movement. Instead, he encouraged a patient and calculated accumulation of economic and institutional influence. As a form of “<a href="http://nyupress.org/books/9780814770986/">market Islam</a>,” members of the GM moved beyond education to succeed in news and entertainment media, information technologies, manufacturing, finance and other sectors. By the early 2000s, the GM operated schools and businesses in well over 100 countries.</p>
<p>I first met associates of the Gülen movement in 2005 in the United States. At the time, I was aware that Gülen lived in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania, and I knew of several <a href="http://pacificainstitute.org/#">interfaith institutions</a> that <a href="http://www.turkishculturalcenter.org">designated Gülen</a> as their <a href="http://rumiforum.org">honorary president</a>. I chose to do my dissertation research on the GM. I was intrigued by his brand of Islamic activist thinking, and by his followers’ focus on participation over confrontation, and on market competition over political insurrection. </p>
<p>In Turkey and most of the world, GM schools are private, for-profit institutions that required startup capital to be secured from within the GM community. Access to charter funding in the U.S., however, provided GM affiliates with an opportunity to secure public dollars for their education ventures. My research revealed that GM affiliates operated approximately <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/gulen-movements-charter-schools-may-be-caught-up-in-turkey-u-s-standoff-1468967536">150 publicly funded</a>, privately managed, charter schools throughout the United States – more GM institutions than anywhere outside Turkey. </p>
<p>As public schools, the GM’s school’s curriculum adhered to state-defined standards. Despite criticism that they were laboratories of “<a href="http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/12/18/book-release-the-gulen-movement-turkeys-islamic-supremacist-cult-and-its-contributions-to-the-civilization-jihad/">education jihad</a>,” GM schools were <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2010/09/27/what-drives-high-achievement-at-harmony-charters-/">widely lauded</a> for offering a <a href="http://gacharters.org/press-releases/fulton-science-academy-middle-school-going-from-great-to-greater/">high-quality</a> <a href="http://mycsp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Charter_Schools_2011_Annual_Report.pdf">science- and math-based education. </a></p>
<p>Parallel to moving into U.S. education was a widespread effort to promote Fethullah Gülen as an antidote to global jihadism. Followers presented his teachings as exemplifying what non-Muslims term “liberal” or “moderate” Islam. To this end, loyalists organized <a href="http://gulenconferences.com/category/conferences/">conferences</a>, <a href="http://rumiforum.org/ambassadors-speaking/">lobbied</a> political officials and sponsored thousands of <a href="http://toronto.interculturaldialog.com/upload/Essays/Essay04.pdf">trips to Turkey</a> for <a href="https://prieststurkey.wordpress.com/testimonials-and-reflections/">American academics</a>, activists, journalists, politicians and religious leaders. The GM was presented as a collective advocate for peace and democracy. </p>
<p>Time and again, GM activists denied any and all political aspirations. In interviews I conducted in the U.S., directors of these activities insisted that their aim was simply to cultivate dialogue with different social groups. When I pointed out that they were clearly targeting people of influence to support GM initiatives, I was told that I was not taking into account the religious sincerity of those involved. </p>
<p>I spent more than a year in Turkey conducting field research. From dozens of interviews, I learned that the GM network provided social mobility for thousands of Turks in a variety of sectors. A quality education, gainful employment, social rank and prestige, and world travel were all rewards of participation. I frequently asked why Gülen was a subject of distrust and conspiracy in Turkey. GM followers dismissed such suspicions as fear-mongering. They explained that so-called secularists in Turkey were fearful of pious Muslims. Organizational opaqueness, they argued, was necessary to protect themselves from secular state repression. </p>
<p>As I argued in <a href="http://nyupress.org/books/9781479800469/">my book</a>, when and where an organization labeled itself as “inspired” by Fethullah Gülen, and when and where affiliation was denied, depended upon context. Despite such ambiguity, GM loyalists insisted their aims were solely focused on creating the conditions for <a href="https://www.fgulen.com/en/">peace and prosperity</a>.</p>
<p>A high point in this effort was reached in 2008 when GM affiliates managed to <a href="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/howglentriumphed">manipulate the results</a> of a popular online poll conducted by Prospect and Foreign Policy magazines to name Gülen <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/07/the-worlds-top-20-public-intellectuals/">the world’s most influential public intellectual</a>. </p>
<h2>The new Turkey</h2>
<p>The GM’s maturation coincided with the 2002 rise of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, to single-party power. Gülen had long avoided participation in Turkish political Islam, but the AKP’s effort to rebrand Turkish Islamism in favor of market liberalization and global cooperation led the two social forces toward cooperation. </p>
<p>As partners, the GM and the AKP led a period of extensive political and economic reform in Turkey, and oversaw a massive, albeit <a href="http://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/plot-against-the-generals.pdf">fraudulent</a>, legal effort to dismantle entrenched state and military elites. It was thus under the AKP’s authority that the GM accumulated influence in Turkey’s police forces, the judiciary, the military and in the Ministries of Education, Foreign Affairs, Trade and elsewhere.</p>
<p>In 2011, the AKP returned to power for a third term. Shortly thereafter, the AKP and the GM each attempted to consolidate power, leading to a period of increasing enmity. A GM-linked prosecutor subpoenaed the AKP-appointed head of Turkey’s National Intelligence to account for alleged illegal government negotiations with Kurdish insurrectionists. This, together with a surveillance effort targeting the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/contents/articles/originals/2014/06/kutahyali-espionage-bodyguards-erdogan-gulenists-bugs.html">highest levels of government</a>, was viewed by the AKP as overreach. </p>
<p>For its part, the AKP moved to <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/gulen-akp-conflict-prep-schools.html">close down</a> GM-affiliated schools, media outlets and companies. In so doing, however, the AKP earned infamy for curbing press freedoms and for seizing private businesses. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s international reputation shifted from that of a reformer to an <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/29/turkey-authoritarian-drift-undermines-rights">authoritarian</a> trying to silence <a href="https://cpj.org/blog/2015/07/erdogan-vs-the-press-president-uses-insult-law-to-.php">critics</a>. Between <a href="http://www.wrldrels.org/profiles/FethullahGulen.htm">2012 and 2016</a>, a behind-the-scenes struggle for power devolved from squabble to nonviolent <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/clash-former-allies-akp-versus-gulen-movement">warfare</a>. </p>
<h2>Peace island or civil war monger?</h2>
<p>So what happens now? Should the U.S. extradite Fethullah Gülen? Should schools, businesses and interfaith organizations operated by GM affiliates in the U.S. be investigated to see if they played a part in an attempt to overthrow a foreign government? What about the thousands of recruited sympathizers in the U.S. and elsewhere who have previously supported, promoted or defended the GM and its leader? How will they respond to the accumulation of <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-coup-attempt-indeed-seems-gulen.html">evidence</a> pointing to the GM’s culpability on July 15? </p>
<p>Like me, most are likely waiting for a transparent investigation that can withstand legal scrutiny. Considering Gülen’s rights as a permanent resident in the U.S., Turkey must provide such evidence in accordance with <a href="https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-958.pdf">international extradition law</a>. This slow process will inevitably stir tensions between the two allies. </p>
<p>Turkish intellectuals claim the West is reluctant to accept Gülen’s <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/turkey-coup-attempt-who-difficult-to-decipher-gulenists.html">true colors</a>. <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/thinking-gulen-is-a-peaceful-scholar-is-a-huge-mischaracterization.aspx?pageID=449&nID=102173&NewsCatID=548">Many</a> <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-western-response-to-the-coup-attempt-is-scary-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=102311&NewsCatID=406">are incensed</a>. <a href="http://observer.com/2016/07/erdogans-self-serving-purge-has-gone-too-far/">Skeptical</a> U.S. opinion-makers, however, point to alleged <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/03/erdogans-purge-is-a-sectarian-war-turkey-gulen/">human rights atrocities</a> following the coup, and to Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies before the coup as cause for <a href="http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkey-update-erdogans-outlook-consequences-failed-coup/p38145">pause</a>. </p>
<p>Regardless of this debate, Gülen has not been able to deny the mass of circumstantial evidence linking his affiliates to the coup plot. His argument, however, is that this should <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/26/opinion/fethullah-gulen-i-condemn-all-threats-to-turkeys-democracy.html?_r=0">implicate neither himself</a>, nor the GM as a whole. </p>
<p>Sincere or not, it must be underscored that the GM is organizationally defined both by obfuscation and hierarchy. That is, it is entirely plausible that if “Gülenists” in Turkey’s military played a leading role in the events of July 15, “Gülenists” in other sectors could have had no knowledge of it, or of any aspect of the GM’s alleged “<a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-coup-attempt-indeed-seems-gulen.html">dark side</a>.” As the world observes the collapse of “the new Turkey,” confusion should be expected. </p>
<p>If it can be proven that the events of July 15 were orchestrated by GM, however, longtime critics will be vindicated and longtime sympathizers will be at an impasse. These actions killed hundreds and propelled Turkey into a state of chaos. They are completely antithetical to what the GM has collectively claimed to stand for – peace and democracy.</p>
<p>If Gülen helped orchestrate the coup, tens of thousands of affiliates and sympathizers, as well as those of us who have tried to more objectively study this man and his movement, will need to come to terms with one of the most fantastic frauds in modern history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62887/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua D. Hendrick has previously received research funding from the US Fulbright program, the Institute for Turkish Studies, The American Research Institute in Turkey, Loyola University Maryland, and the University of California, Santa Cruz. All observations and analyses are entirely his own. </span></em></p>It may sound farfetched that a scholar living in Pennsylvania planned the overthrow of the Turkish government. But Turkey is demanding the U.S. extradite the Hizmet leader.Joshua D. Hendrick, Assistant Professor of Sociology and Global Studies, Loyola University MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/626782016-07-26T19:49:19Z2016-07-26T19:49:19ZThe tragedy of Turkish democracy in five acts<p>The <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/15/world/turkey-military-coup-what-we-know/">failed July 15 military coup</a> in Turkey <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/16/how-erdogans-anti-democratic-government-made-turkey-ripe-for-unrest/">was a long time in the making.</a> Its aftermath is the final act in what may be viewed as the devolution of Turkish democracy into an authoritarian state.</p>
<h2>Prelude: Turkish appetite for democracy</h2>
<p>Turkey is a country where citizens’ demand for democracy has steadily grown over the last 15 years. A long period of competitive parliamentary elections and political liberalization created hope that democracy had become enshrined in Turkey’s political culture.</p>
<p>Everyday citizens <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01627.x/abstract">embracing democratic governance as the only legitimate form of government</a> are required for any democracy to be successful. When citizens do not demand democracy, <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/05/23/russians-back-protests-political-freedoms-and-putin-too/">preferring a strong authoritarian leader as in Russia</a>, there is little hope for democracy to flourish.</p>
<p>As part of the <a href="https://u.osu.edu/cnep/">Comparative National Election Project (CNEP)</a> at Ohio State University, we surveyed nearly 1,200 Turkish citizens about their views on democracy in early 2015.</p>
<p>Respondents expressed a large demand for democratic governance. Three-quarters of respondents consistently rejected each of the four types of authoritarian rule (one-party, strong man, military, religious) about which we asked. About four out of five (78 percent) respondents stated that democracy was preferable over any other form of government.</p>
<h2>Act One: a failure of supply to meet demand</h2>
<p>Yet, public demand for democracy is only part of the equation. Democratic values must also be adopted by elites and the country’s most important institutions. The “institutional supply” of democratic governance <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/pippanorris3/publications/books/democratic-phoenix">must satisfy the public demand.</a> Otherwise <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/16/how-erdogans-anti-democratic-government-made-turkey-ripe-for-unrest/">political instability may occur</a>.</p>
<p>Though Turkey had been making steady progress toward becoming a fully fledged democracy, it has <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/turkey">backslid in recent years.</a> Turkey may be best described as an <a href="http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/elections-without-democracy-thinking-about-hybrid-regimes">hybrid regime</a> that is a mix of democracy and authoritarianism. </p>
<p>The governing <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Justice-and-Development-Party-political-party-Turkey">Justice & Development (AKP) Party</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679">President Erdogan</a> have been at the center of this democratic backslide. With control of both parliament and the presidency, they have worked to reshape Turkey’s political and societal institutions to permanently preserve their power. </p>
<p>In recent years they have moved Turkey increasingly toward authoritarianism. They have cracked down on <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/turkey">press freedom</a> and <a href="http://globalnetpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Benchmarking-DemandTurkey_final.pdf">attacked online dissent.</a> Erdogan manipulated the last parliamentary election by <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/31/opinion/turkeys-war-of-distraction-on-kurds.html">reigniting the conflict with Kurdish separatists.</a> As a conservative religious party, the AKP has <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/world/europe/recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey.html">actively worked to Islamize Turkish society.</a> </p>
<p>President Erdogan has disregarded the constitution by <a href="http://origins.osu.edu/article/erdo-s-presidential-dreams-turkey-s-constitutional-politics">taking on extra-constitutional powers for the largely ceremonial presidency</a>. Those in parliament who oppose his autocratic dreams have been <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-05-08/turkeys-king">purged from his own party</a> or <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-politics-immunity-idUSKCN0YB0VC">targeted for prosecution.</a> </p>
<h2>Act Two: divided we fall</h2>
<p>This democratic backslide by President Erdogan and the AKP has created increased political dissatisfaction and polarization inside Turkey. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/31/istanbul-protesters-violent-clashes-police">2013 antigovernment Gezi Park protests</a> were a warning shot that was ignored. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://u.osu.edu/cnep/">survey</a> found that a majority of Turks described Turkey as not a democracy (22 percent) or a democracy with major problems (34 percent). Nearly half of Turks were either not at all satisfied (19 percent) or not very satisfied (26 percent) with how democracy worked in Turkey.</p>
<p>But these numbers overlook the deep political polarization about Turkish democracy. On one hand, there is a huge consensus that democracy is preferred to any other form of government. Yet, <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/10/15/deep-divisions-in-turkey-as-election-nears/">there is a great deal of polarization</a> between AKP supporters and supporters of the three main opposition parties on how much democracy Turkey actually enjoys.</p>
<p>Amongst AKP voters, our 2015 survey found that nearly three-fourths (72 percent) described Turkey as a full democracy or a democracy with minor problems. In contrast, about one-quarter (26 percent) of opposition voters felt the same. Likewise, 81 percent of AKP voters were somewhat or very satisfied with how democracy works in Turkey. By comparison 32 percent of opposition voters were similarly satisfied.</p>
<p>Beyond this opinion gap on democracy in Turkey, <a href="http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/content/76/3/405.short">affective polarization</a> between supporters of different parties has become very high. A recent German Marshall Fund survey found that three-quarters of Turks <a href="http://www.gmfus.org/publications/turkey-divided-we-stand">do not want their children playing</a> with the children of those who support a different political party. This high level of political polarization <a href="http://www.insightturkey.com/election-storm-in-turkey-what-do-the-results-of-june-and-november-2015-elections-tell-us/articles/7490">undermines the ability of the public</a> to collectively pressure the government to supply more democracy.</p>
<h2>Act Three: turning a blind eye</h2>
<p>The third act of this Turkish tragedy takes place outside of Turkey. The <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/world/europe/obama-erdogan-turkey-coup-attempt.html?_r=0">United States</a> and the <a href="http://www.salon.com/2016/05/18/germany_sides_with_turkeys_increasingly_authoritarian_president_erdogan_over_its_own_citizens_free_speech/">European Union</a> have <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/29/opinions/erdogan-crackdown-ghitis/">largely ignored</a> Turkey’s democratic backslide.</p>
<p>President Erdogan’s government is viewed as necessary for <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/world/europe/turkeys-fight-against-isis-explained.html">fighting ISIS.</a> He has also helped <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/07/europe/europe-migrant-crisis-summit/">deal with the European migrant crisis.</a> As a result, President Erdogan has enjoyed a free pass as he steadily erodes civil and political liberties. </p>
<h2>Act Four: die by the sword</h2>
<p>Historically, the Turkish <a href="http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2421&context=ilj">military has viewed itself</a> as the guarantor of Turkey’s secular and democratic character. It has <a href="http://time.com/4408850/turkey-coup-history/">intervened previously</a> when it viewed Turkish democracy as threatened. Yet, globally, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/22/are-coups-good-for-democracy/">the track record</a> for military coups saving democracy is very poor. </p>
<p>Ironically, before the July 15 coup attempt, the military was one of the most trusted institutions in Turkey. Nearly 40 percent of respondents to our survey said they trusted the military a fair amount or a great deal. This number rises to 58 percent among AKP voters. Likewise, a 2015 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that the Turkish military was the only institution <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/10/15/deep-divisions-in-turkey-as-election-nears/">with a net positive rating</a> of 52 percent by the Turkish public.</p>
<p>Yet, the attempt by a sizable faction of the military to stage a coup to depose Erdogan with the <a href="https://twitter.com/bramvermeul/status/754049979711381506">stated goal of restoring Turkish democracy</a> failed. Paradoxically, a key contributor to its failure was the high public demand for democratic governance in Turkey. Turks who flooded the streets <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/anti-military-protests-against-coup-in-turkey-2016-7">in resistance to the coup</a> were not only supporters of Erdogan, but also <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/turkish-political-parties-unite-coup-attempt-160717170830139.html">opposition supporters.</a></p>
<p>Demand for democracy is so strong in Turkey, despite polarized views on whether President Erdogan and the AKP were providing it, that most Turks were <a href="http://nyti.ms/29I5A3n">willing to accept</a> a deeply flawed “democracy” rather than a military dictatorship. And now, in the wake of the coup, the military <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/turkey-jails-generals-as-post-coup-purge-widens/2016/07/19/db076c84-4d1f-11e6-bf27-405106836f96_story.html">has been fully neutered.</a></p>
<h2>Act Five: the purge</h2>
<p>And thus the final act in this tragedy is that by rejecting a military dictatorship, the Turkish people may have simply substituted one form of autocratic governance for another: <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887111000281">electoral authoritarianism.</a> Electoral authoritarianism is the <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/05/28/electoral-authoritarianism-pub-19176">illusion of multiparty democracy</a> with severely restricted civil and political liberties. The <a href="https://www.gwu.edu/%7Eieresgwu/assets/docs/503-522_Gelman.pdf">poster child</a> for electoral authoritarianism is the Russian Federation.</p>
<p>This is the vision that President Erdogan apparently has for Turkey. Erdogan’s ultimate goal is to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-politics-presidency-idUSKCN0ST0Y120151104">rewrite the Turkish constitution</a> to create a strong, centralized presidency with a subservient parliament and judiciary. His personal role model is arguably his <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/putin-and-erdogan-too-alike-get-along-436100">“frenemy”</a> President Putin. He no doubt envies <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/russia">Russia’s authoritarian regime</a> that dominates every aspect of Russian political life.</p>
<p>In what some are calling President Erdogan’s <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2016/07/17/turkey-convulsed-by-failed-coup-turkish-voters-not-soldiers-should-toss-erdogan/#581f6f1e76d1">“Reichstag Fire” moment</a> the failed coup provides him the opportunity to further purge political dissent. This purge <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36835340">reaches deep</a> into the military, political, legal, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-idUSKCN1051B0?">media</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/purge-of-teachers-and-academics-bulldozes-through-turkish-education-62839">educational segments</a> of Turkish society. It will help him complete his project of <a href="http://observer.com/2016/07/erdogans-self-serving-purge-has-gone-too-far/">reshaping Turkey’s political system.</a></p>
<h2>Epilogue: resistance is not futile</h2>
<p>The future for Turkey democracy may look bleak. Erdogan’s quest for complete political control appears unstoppable. But there is hope. His authoritarian project will not be complete until the Turkish constitution is changed to formally redefine the role of the presidency. </p>
<p>Turkey is better positioned to stave off full electoral authoritarianism than Russia, for example, due to its high public demand for democracy. However, several factors will need, in my view, to come together for this demand for democracy to successfully stop Erdogan. </p>
<p>First, democracy and human rights advocates outside Turkey will need to make a major push on the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/kerry-warns-turkey-nato-membership-potentially-at-stake-in-crackdown/2016/07/18/f427ba8a-4850-11e6-8dac-0c6e4accc5b1_story.html">U.S. and the EU to exert influence</a> upon President Erdogan to temper his autocratic ambitions. </p>
<p>Second, the Turkish political opposition on the left and right needs to work together to dampen political polarization across party lines. Dampening polarization increases the potential for collective action on democracy’s behalf. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-idUSKCN1040K7">Unity rallies in defense of democracy</a> need to become more common. </p>
<p>Third, Turks need to be made aware that the constitutional changes sought by Erdogan will leave them hungry for democracy, if not starving. The political opposition and civil society should coordinate a massive strategic communication campaign together. If these combined efforts are successful, Turkey’s march toward authoritarianism, and ultimate democratic tragedy, may just be averted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62678/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erik C. Nisbet does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A professor at Ohio State surveyed Turkish citizens about their views on democracy. What he learned helps explain the current crisis in the EU wannabe.Erik C. Nisbet, Associate Professor of Communication, Political Science, and Environmental Policy and Faculty Associate with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/502662015-11-15T10:19:43Z2015-11-15T10:19:43ZG20 meets in the shadow of Paris attacks – and with Turkey on the brink<p>Even before the horror of the November 13 attacks in Paris, the stakes for the 2015 G20 summit were high for all concerned. Now, the timing of this particular gathering could scarcely be more sensitive. </p>
<p>While the French president, François Hollande, will be <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/hollande-cancels-trip-turkey-g20-attacks-presidency-003825521.html">staying in Paris</a> to preside over a state of emergency, the other attendees are meeting with the Paris attacks at the top of the agenda – and in a country that itself faces deadly challenges.</p>
<p>Turkey has been in a state of dire political instability and violence since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-votes-for-change-but-dont-expect-the-erdogan-power-drive-to-end-42950">inconclusive June 7 elections</a>, after which the governing AKP failed to form a coalition government. When the country <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-election-erdogan-and-the-akp-get-majority-back-amid-climate-of-violence-and-fear-49963">went to the polls again</a> on November 1, the AKP won 49% of the vote and enough seats in parliament to form a government – but not before a dramatic uptick in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-opens-up-old-wounds-with-a-new-campaign-against-the-pkk-45397">campaign against the Kurdish PKK</a> and a terrible bombing in Ankara, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ankara-bombs-turkey-is-being-torn-apart-by-bad-leaders-and-bad-neighbours-48944">worst terrorist attack in the country’s history</a>.</p>
<p>The November result came as a total surprise to many Turks, including the leaders of the AKP. All the polls predicted that the makeup of parliament would stay more and less the same, but in the end, the Turkish and Kurdish nationalist parties alike lost a significant chunk of their parliamentary seats, and all the possible post-election scenarios discussed before the elections were rendered moot. </p>
<p>It seems that after a period of intensive insecurity, the public opted for a shot at stability. And in theory, a return to stable single-party government offers a great chance to restore Turkey’s international clout. In particular, president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan clearly hopes a smoothly run summit can help repair his own tainted international image, which has never recovered since the crackdown on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-urban-uprising-has-smashed-national-wall-of-fear-14916">Gezi Park protests</a> of 2013.</p>
<p>This slow restoration is already underway. The Syrian refugee crisis has already made Turkey and its leaders a critical player for Europe. There is now an overall realisation that unless Turkey decides to stop the flow of refugees, this will be a non-stop process in the foreseeable future and the European Union countries are already in a total disarray with each other in coming up with a joined up response to this humanitarian crisis. </p>
<p>The situation has become so critical for Europe that German chancellor Angela Merkel decided to convene <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-is-buying-its-way-into-the-eu-with-a-deal-that-wont-solve-the-refugee-crisis-49331">emergency meetings</a> with Turkey’s leaders just before the November elections. </p>
<p>In return for Turkey sealing its European borders and re-accepting some of those Syrian refugees who have fled across them, Merkel has promised to speed up Turkey’s long-stalled EU membership talks, to allow visa-free EU entry for Turkish citizens much sooner than expected, and to bundle a significant financial aid package to help look after Syrian refugees in Turkey. </p>
<p>Similarly, the crisis has already been greatly exacerbated by <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-powerbrokers-gather-at-last-russia-races-against-time-to-save-assad-49910">Russia’s Syrian intervention</a>, and the precarious dynamics of the region are such that Turkey’s vital importance for Western interests can no longer be overlooked. That in turn means that the US and EU cannot afford to upset the AKP government.</p>
<h2>Shaky ground</h2>
<p>Still, Turkey doesn’t hold all the aces. If it wants to restore its international profile and once again become more than a partner of necessity, it will need to show signs of returning to its pre-2013 levels of stability and security. </p>
<p>However, in recent months the fighting between the security forces and PKK has intensified so much so that nobody now talks about the peace process that seemed so promising only a year ago. </p>
<p>If the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-02/erdogan-s-decisive-win-what-does-it-mean-for-turkey-s-economy-">already shaky economy</a> really starts to falter, then Turkey will have to deal with yet more social unrest. And to make matters worse, years of cynical and divisive politics have laid the ground for a devastating Balkan-style disintegration along sectarian and ethnic lines.</p>
<p>Still, nothing is guaranteed, and we can still hope that the 2015 G20 Summit will be remembered for the right reasons. It could be a stirring demonstration of global co-operation after the worst violence in France since World War II. </p>
<p>Equally, Turkey may yet use it to turn over a new leaf both domestically and internationally and become the reliable partner against extremism that the world needs it to be. </p>
<p>But these things will only be possible if its hosts and participants manage to hold their breath in an extraordinarily febrile and dangerous atmosphere.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50266/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpaslan Ozerdem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At an incredibly sensitive moment, the world’s leaders are gathering in an incredibly sensitive country.Alpaslan Ozerdem, Chair in Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/499632015-11-01T22:03:43Z2015-11-01T22:03:43ZTurkey election: Erdoğan and the AKP get majority back amid climate of violence and fear<p>Turkey’s president, Recep Tayip Erdoğan, appears to have strengthened his grip on the country after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won an outright majority in a snap election just five months after an inconclusive poll. It is a result that will shock and frighten many in the country.</p>
<p>Unofficial preliminary <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/reelection/results">results</a>, appeared to give the AKP 49.3%, followed by the centre-left Republican People’s Party (CHP) on 25.7%, the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) on 12.1% and the pro-Kurdish left-wing Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) on 10.5%. The AKP is predicted to take 312 seats in the 550-seat parliament, the CHP 135 seats, the HDP 60 and the MHP 43.</p>
<p>This result is a big surprise, since pre-election polls forecast a result <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/11/01/uk-turkey-election-idUKKCN0SP17S20151101">not much different from that of the June election</a> – and it undoubtedly owes a lot to the toxic atmosphere in which the election was held. </p>
<p>As reported widely <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-election-could-bitterly-divided-nation-be-only-a-few-steps-away-from-a-dictatorship-a6711106.html">around the world</a>, the campaign was anything but fair. The AKP not only controls the army, but also holds sway over the judiciary and much of the media. The party and President Erdoğan effectively dominated pre-election airtime on the country’s public broadcaster, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), which once again displayed <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_erdogan-ak-party-dominate-pre-election-airtime-on-public-broadcaster_402618.html">blatant favouritism</a> toward the government and Erdoğan. </p>
<p>More worryingly still, <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_abundant-claims-of-vote-rigging-on-election-day_403100.html">reports are circulating</a> of vote-rigging. The news agencies announced the results very rapidly. The election was called for the AKP within only a few hours, despite the fact that many votes were not even delivered to the <a href="http://anfenglish.com/news/45-votes-come-out-of-a-ballot-box-for-29-voters-in-mutki">counting boots</a>. Social media was abuzz with allegations of election fraud, as angry Turks documented their claims with <a href="http://umutgazetesi.org/antepte-kameralara-yansiyan-oy-hirsizligi/">photographs</a> and <a href="http://hayattv.net/secim-ihlalleri-01-kasim-2015-secimleri/">videos</a>. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://anfenglish.com/news/international-observers-detained-in-istanbul">delegation</a> from Greece that was watching the elections was detained in Istanbul on the day of the vote, heightening the general atmosphere of tension. And people who live in Kurdish majority areas had to vote amid a heavy police presence. </p>
<h2>Presidential system</h2>
<p>Many observers are convinced that one of the fundamental reasons Erdoğan <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkeys-president-calls-snap-election-1440445939.">called this snap election</a> in the first place was to restore the AKP as the single ruling party, which will enable him to change the regime to a presidential system and strengthen his position. </p>
<p>Turkey has been through turbulent times in between the two elections. According to official records, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/why-the-surge-in-terrorism.aspx?PageID=238&NID=88524&NewsCatID=425">more than 700 people have lost their lives</a> in political violence since June. The Kurdish peace process has collapsed, and the clashes between the PKK and the Turkish Army have restarted. </p>
<p>There have also been two suicide attacks. The first, in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33619043">Suruç</a>, near the Syrian border, killed at least 24 people and wounded nearly 100 more. Then there was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ankara-bombing-kills-dozens-calling-for-peace-in-turkey-48942">bombing of Ankara’s central railway station</a> on October 10, which killed 102 people and injured more than 400 – the deadliest terrorist attack in <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/11/turkey-bomb-blasts-ankara-mourning-scores-killed">Turkey’s history</a>. The bombs appeared to have targeted a “Labour, Peace and Democracy” rally organised by opposition parties and leftist groups. </p>
<p>No organisation has yet claimed responsibility for either attack, but the AKP government has tried to associate both with the PKK and other anti-government organisations, albeit with no evidence or proof. </p>
<p>Besides the Kurds and the leftists, the AKP has targeted other groups. Its relationship with the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13503361">Hizmet Movement</a>, a global faith-based civic network, fell apart in late 2013 after the Erdoğan government began raising disturbing concerns about its involvement in a “<a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_conceptual-contradictions-when-it-comes-to-rhetoric-about-parallel-state-by-ahmet-erdi-ozturk-_337284.html">parallel state</a>”, a supposed shadow “<a href="http://hizmetnews.com/16145/turkeys-akp-planning-to-blame-hizmet-movement-for-deep-states-crimes/#.VjaAkq7hBhA">fifth column</a>” controlled by the movement. Since then, the AKP government has been clamping down on Hizmet-connected media groups and businesses.</p>
<p>Ominously, that crackdown has begun to extend to the wider media. After the June elections, several newspapers were taken over by government-appointed trustee boards. These events have drastically eroded Erdoğan’s international support – the Economist went so far as to publish an article explaining why Erdoğan should leave, calling him “<a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21677201-turks-should-vote-against-ruling-justice-and-development-party-november-1st-sultan-bay">the sultan at bay</a>”.</p>
<h2>The devil they know</h2>
<p>Turkey may no longer be saddled with an uneasy coalition government, but the intense polarisation the AKP has caused will not be resolved any time soon. During the last few months, the AKP was skating on thin ice, working hard to poach votes from the MHP by creating a paranoid atmosphere of violence and authoritarian crackdowns. It has been brazenly trying to turn Turkey into a police state, one where the opposition has no room to breathe and where religious and ethnic tensions deepen every day. </p>
<p>It seems this strategy has worked. People turned to the devil they know; even with an ever-quickening slide towards dictatorship underway, most voters probably just wanted to end the uncertainty that’s gripped the country for so long.</p>
<p>Now there are big questions to answer. It remains to be seen how well the AKP and Erdoğan can actually govern a society as deeply divided as Turkey is now, and just how harshly they are prepared to treat opposition in the name of stability.</p>
<p>On the other hand, now Erdoğan and the AKP have what they wanted, perhaps they’ll finally see sense, tone down their rhetoric and pick up the Kurdish peace process once again. </p>
<p>That may be a futile hope – but at least Kurdish voices have not been completely shut out of politics. Even with the AKP riding high, the relatively young HDP is still going to have an opposition presence in parliament, and it’s now the third-largest party in terms of MPs. That gives it a great chance to and grow its voter base to gradually become the strongest opposition party by the next elections. </p>
<p>As things stand, the HDP is now the biggest challenge to Erdoğan’s authoritarianism – a crucial role. Selahattin Demirtaş, the party’s co-leader, sent a strong message to the country during his <a href="http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/hdp-den-secim-sonrasi-ilk-aciklama-94008.html">election night speech</a>: “No need to be afraid. We are here and we will keep resisting together.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49963/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After being humiliated at a summer election, Turkey’s ruling party set about winning over the population with fear. It seems to have worked.Bahar Baser, Research Fellow, Coventry UniversityAhmet Erdi Öztürk, PhD Candidate/Research Asistant, University of LjubljanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/496192015-10-30T05:30:26Z2015-10-30T05:30:26ZAs another election looms, can Turkey be saved from itself?<p>Turkey is about to hold its second general election in a year, after the first failed to produce a government. Since the vote in June, the country has been hit by violent unrest. </p>
<p>Whatever the outcome of the impending vote, urgent reform is needed to reinvigorate the progress towards democracy that appeared to have been made with the EU accession process of the early 2000s and the Peace Process (2009-2011; 2013-June 2015) with the Kurdish political movement.</p>
<p>The level of ideological polarisation on display in Turkey in the past few years has been deeply worrying. It has even been <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/umut-ozkirimli/ankara-bombing-and-end-of-turkish-republic">argued</a> that Turkey no longer constitutes a sustainable nation state. It has become a state of several nations, divided into vengeful communities who no longer have the will to live side-by-side in peace. </p>
<p>This troublesome political climate is largely the result of the demise of the peaceful negotiations between the incumbent AKP (Justice and Development Party) administration and the two major representatives of the Kurdish political movement – the HDP (Peoples’ Democracy Party) and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). </p>
<p>As the Peace Process failed, the armed struggle between the PKK and the Turkish security forces resumed, with tragic consequences for the social fabric of the country. The ensuing violence has robbed Turkey of a historic opportunity to resolve the decades-long dispute between the Turkish state and Kurdish citizens. </p>
<p>During the now collapsed negotiations, the HDP consistently argued that peace in Turkey is only possible if everyone has equal legal status and that the rights of all communities are recognised in the constitution.</p>
<p>This vision does not appear to be shared by the AKP or the mainstream media though. Both <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/09/erdogan-turkey-hdp-akp-pkk-kurdistan-statement/">continue to argue</a> that the Kurdish rights issue can be resolved through military action against the PKK.</p>
<h2>Peace interrupted</h2>
<p>Despite having taken a liberal, reformist attitude in the 2000s, the AKP has become increasingly nationalist, conservative/Islamist and uncompromising in its stance on the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/ruwayda-mustafah-rabar/what-is-kurdish-question">Kurdish question</a>. Where the party once pioneered attempts to integrate Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslims in Turkey and contributed to a democratic model that included these marginalised groups, it now seems to prioritise the rights of the Sunni majority. It is seen as promoting a conservative Turkish identity and letting national security define its approach to government. </p>
<p>Today, the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683849.2014.954747">Turkish democratic model</a> appears to have completely lost its validity. NATO, the US and the EU have <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30484729">raised concerns</a> about press freedom and the way <a href="https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/eur440222013en.pdf">protesters</a> have been treated by the government.</p>
<p>Then there is the government’s apparent desire to reignite its war with the PKK and its reluctance to take action against Islamic State. Turkey’s international image has certainly been severely tarnished in the last few years. </p>
<p>The archaic political order, based on one nation, one language and a narrow vision of society, is based on the link between Turkey and its conservative interpretation of Islamic principles. It cannot therefore accommodate the democratic demands of those who reject top-down social engineering such as Kurds, Alevis, seculars, liberals, LGBT people and various strands of the socialist left. </p>
<p>This fundamental question has not been addressed in the pompous speeches made by government spokespeople in the run up to this election. </p>
<p>Turkey desperately needs to establish a democratic consensus to mend the wounds in the psyches of its increasingly divergent populations. A new political order is needed to prevent these groups from splintering into separate nations. This must be based on multiculturalism and human security. Only through a broad coalition of social forces can the country end the intense polarisation that plagues it and progress towards conflict resolution and peace building.</p>
<h2>Beyond election politics</h2>
<p>Most <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/turkey-kurds-pkk-elections-erdogan-war-backfiring.html">independent surveys</a> indicate that the November 1 election will produce a result similar to those seen in June. Back then, the AKP took the most votes but not enough to form a government alone.</p>
<p>This time, there are two possibilities: either the AKP will form a coalition government with one of its opponents and get used to political compromise after almost 13 years of uninterrupted one-party rule, or president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will call for another election within a few months. That would further deepen the current crisis. </p>
<p>All scenarios for Turkey’s future, including the possibility of the AKP winning a parliamentary majority, demand that a plural and democratic centre ground be found. People need to be able to find peaceful solutions to their problems via the parliament rather than seeking potentially violent outlets for their frustrations. Otherwise, can Turkey even call itself a democracy at all?</p>
<p>Even an AKP administration can no longer afford to unilaterally impose its will on matters such as the Kurdish rights issue – at least not if it wants to keep Turkey from falling apart.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49619/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Only radical change can prevent civil war in a country fractured by the actions of its own government.Omer Tekdemir, Visiting Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of WestminsterOğuzhan Göksel, Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations, İstanbul 29 Mayıs UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/490672015-10-14T11:57:28Z2015-10-14T11:57:28ZAnger over Ankara response is a product of Turkish government’s past record<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98257/original/image-20151013-31141-1v2ds22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters hold placards reading 'we know who the killer is'.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Murad Sezer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkish voters will go to the polls on November 1, still reeling from the horrific bombings at a peace demonstration in Ankara on October 10. </p>
<p>The labour, peace and democracy rally in Ankara was planned as an intervention into the cycle of conflict that has engulfed the country since the parliamentary elections in June. Those who gathered did not get the chance to shout their calls for peace. A dual explosion went off, leaving <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/12/turkey-blames-ankara-bombings-on-islamic-state">at least 97 dead</a> and <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_isil-emerges-as-prime-suspect-in-ankara-blasts-as-court-orders-confidentiality-order_401339.html">more than 500 wounded</a>.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of the attack, there have been <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police-intervene-into-protest-against-ankara-bombing-in-istanbul-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=89830&NewsCatID=341">mass protests</a> against the government. The public anger, it seems, is being directed not at the perpetrators of the attack but at the people in charge of the country.</p>
<p>This is because the Ankara attack was not an isolated event. It is the latest link in a long chain of assaults against democratic forces in Turkey. Outrage is directed against the government precisely because the culprits of the previous attacks have not been held to account.</p>
<p>Turkish authorities are reportedly focusing on <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/12/turkey-blames-ankara-bombings-on-islamic-state">Islamic State</a> militants as the main suspects in the bombing. Prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has already <a href="http://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2015/10/12/turkey-close-to-identifying-one-of-ankara-suicide-bombers-says-pm-davutoglu">stated</a>, though, that the government is also considering the “usual suspects”. That means the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C). </p>
<p>If these swift official statements were intended to reassure the public that the government is determined to identify the culprits and bring them to justice, they failed spectacularly.</p>
<p>Since the Ankara attack, dozens of protest meetings and rallies have <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ankara-explosions-mourners-chant-anti-government-slogans-as-death-toll-rises-to-128-a6689501.html">taken place</a> across the country. These have been aimed squarely at criticising the interim AKP (Justice and Development Party) government and president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.</p>
<p>At first glance, this collective burst of anger could be interpreted as a condemnation of the initial official response from the government. Interior minister Selami Altınok had angered many by initially <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/11/turkey-ankara-terror-bombings-80-killed">rejecting</a> any suggestion that there had been failures in security preparations for the rally on October 10 – a view <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/not-taking-safety-precautions-is-not-a-security-gap-deputy-pm.aspx?pageID=238&nID89739&NewsCatID=338">echoed</a> by deputy prime minister Tuğrul Türkeş. Eyewitnesses and amateur video footage provided a damning account of the security forces’ questionable but all-too-familiar response. It has even been <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_questions-raised-as-death-toll-reaches-97-in-turkeys-deadliest-terror-attack_401231.html">reported</a> that the police <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ankara-explosions-turkish-police-fire-tear-gas-at-mourners-laying-flowers-a6689726.html">fired tear gas</a> at people trying to lay flowers at the scene a few hours after the attack.</p>
<p>Yet this customary shirking of responsibility and the abuses of police power are not the main reasons that thousands are chanting <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/world/europe/thousands-in-turkey-rally-against-government-after-ankara-bombings.html?_r=0">“murderer Erdoğan!”</a> or carrying banners that <a href="ewn.co.za/2015/10/11/Protesters-gather-at-scene-of-Ankara-bombings">blame the state</a> for the deaths of those gathered in Ankara.</p>
<h2>A turbulent year</h2>
<p>It is important to contextualise the Ankara bombings within the cycle of violence that has gripped Turkey since the June election. This vote marked the end of an era. The AKP saw its vote share drop 10% and <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-votes-for-change-but-dont-expect-the-erdogan-power-drive-to-end-42950">lost its parliamentary majority</a> for the first time since 2002. The HDP won an impressive 13% of the vote, securing 80 seats in the national parliament.</p>
<p>This new parliamentary dynamic prevented the AKP from introducing a controversial presidential system designed to radically extend Erdoğan’s powers. Incapable of accepting this electoral mandate, the party blocked the formation of a coalition government and forced a new election.</p>
<p>Ever since, a climate of insecurity has pervaded. In July, 32 youth activists were killed in an Islamic State-linked attack in Suruç. <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/turkey-syria-isis-bombings-need-new-security-concept.html#">Many people</a> believe <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_no-justice-in-sight-for-attacks-in-suruc-diyarbakir_401229.html">no serious investigation has been conducted</a> into the attack.</p>
<p>After an alleged PKK cell attacked police officers in the aftermath of Suruç the AKP duly shelved the peace process that has been underway since 2012. By joining the US-coordinated strikes against Islamic State, the government gained <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-08-03/turkeys-cover">a convenient pretext</a> to launch strikes against the PKK and unleashed an intense <a href="http://www.apple.com">crackdown</a> on Kurdish activists. This triggered further retaliatory PKK attacks against Turkish security forces.</p>
<p>As the conflict intensified, the AKP’s hostile rhetoric against the HDP and other opposition forces assumed a fully undemocratic character. <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/in-turkey-its-all-about-the-palace-erdogan-arrests-corruption-election/">Senior party figures</a> blamed the election results and the ensuing hung parliament for the country’s rapid descent into violence.</p>
<h2>A mandate in tatters</h2>
<p>As a result of all this, the public has little faith in the government’s willingness to conduct a transparent investigation into what has happened in Ankara. This suspicion is mirrored by an almost equally forceful assumption that the AKP is <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-turkish-deep-state-and-why-is-it-in-the-frame-for-the-ankara-bombings-49038">complicit</a> in the attacks against the Kurds, left-wing movements and other opposition forces. It has failed to prevent attacks against HDP offices all across the country and remained ineffective against Islamic State intrusions into Turkish territory.</p>
<p>This sentiment has been explicitly voiced by the HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş. He has <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-co-leader-slams-erdogan-govt-for-attack-that-claimed-86-lives.aspx?pageID=238&nID=89681&NewsCatID=341">openly wondered</a> why the state has been unable (or unwilling) to properly investigate previous attacks and blamed the government for turning a <a href="edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/10/12/turkey-intv-amanpour-pleitgen-selahattin-demirtas.cnn/video/playlists/intl-latest-world-videos/">blind eye</a> to the people behind them. If the government’s past record is any indication, it is no surprise that the public is not optimistic about the prospect of a comprehensive and transparent investigation. </p>
<p>The June election was the first stage of a wholesale rejection of the AKP regime which has been defined by a continual erosion of democracy and an intensified <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/cemal-burak-tansel/gezi-park-occupation-confronting-authoritarian-neoliberalism">authoritarian neoliberalism</a>.</p>
<p>For a party that has always highlighted its electoral victories as the proof of its own legitimacy, the AKP has shown a remarkable disregard for the popular will. It has endorsed a reckless politics of exclusion.</p>
<p>The public outrage at the Ankara bombings demonstrates that it is the same politics of exclusion and violence that will be the party’s undoing. Barring a highly unlikely AKP victory (i.e. parliamentary majority) in the upcoming elections, the AKP’s authoritarian ambitions will continue to confront both a growing grassroots mobilisation and a parliamentary opposition spearheaded by the HDP.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cemal Burak Tansel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beleaguered president may about to receive an unequivical message from voters.Cemal Burak Tansel, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Politics, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/465672015-08-25T15:32:21Z2015-08-25T15:32:21ZTurkey: Erdoğan is forcing his people to take sides<p>Ever since the June 2015 elections, which thwarted the <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-erdogan-aims-to-expand-presidential-power/a-17885582">proposed presidential system</a> that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has long craved, Turkey has been hurtling into one of its most turbulent periods in decades. And with a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/21/turkey-to-form-interim-government-before-snap-election-on-november-1">snap election</a> called for November 2015, the country’s political factions are facing off in an ever more violent and bitter fashion.</p>
<p>Polarisation has been a problem for Turkey for a long time: right versus left, Kurd versus Turk, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/turkey-alevi-sunni-clash-erdogan-secular-media.html">Alevi</a> versus Sunni, secular versus non-secular. But now, the division between supporters of the AKP – Erdoğan’s party – and their rivals has become one of the country’s biggest fissures.</p>
<h2>All against all</h2>
<p>As the country grapples with the threat of Islamic State <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33641315">just across the Syrian border</a>, Turkey’s low-intensity civil war has been <a href="http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ezgi_basaran/pkk_hem_kendisini_hem_de_hdpyi_kapatiyor-1420432">ramped up again</a> with the Kurdish PKK <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-kurdish-workers-party-trade-blame-over-failed-peace-process/2931329.html">mounting attacks on security personnel</a> and the state responding with violence of its own. Recent fighting has <a href="http://www.rt.com/news/311332-turkey-attack-village-kurds/">claimed the lives</a> of more than 60 military personnel, 400 PKK fighters and a considerable number of civilians, who are treated as casualties of war. </p>
<p>The so-called peace process has entirely stalled, although it’s debatable whether it was really going anywhere in the first place. <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/turkey-pkk-emergency-rule-kurds-resent-security-measures.html">Restrictions on movement</a> in eight provinces have been introduced, raising fears that the state will enact “emergency laws” to allow a heavy crackdown. A district of Diyarbakir called Silvan was <a href="http://anfenglish.com/kurdistan/attacks-by-turkish-forces-leave-silvan-devastated">attacked</a> by the Turkish military in mid-August; it was seriously damaged, and many residents had to flee to survive. Kurdish people are forced to live in an environment of insecurity as if they are being punished for not voting for the AKP, which also meant Erdogan’s way to the presidential system. </p>
<p>On the Kurdish side, the leader of the pro-Kurdish HDP party, Selahattin Demirtaş, has <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-co-chair-demirtas-calls-on-pkk-to-halt-violence-without-ifs-or-buts-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=87365&NewsCatID=338">called on the PKK to end its violence</a>, but everyday funerals are being held for Turkish soldiers killed during clashes with the PKK. These funerals have become a way for Turkish voters to <a href="http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/349325/Ofke_AKP_ye_dondu.html">show their rage</a> not only at the PKK for its attacks, but also at the AKP and its MPs for putting their countrymen in harm’s way. </p>
<p>At the <a href="http://www.afp.com/en/news/turkish-soldier-slams-government-slain-brothers-funeral">funeral</a> for his brother, who was killed in a PKK attack, Lieutenant Colonel Mehmet Alkan demanded: “Who is his murderer? Who is responsible for this? Why are those who were saying ‘peace process’ before now demanding ‘war till the end’ right now?”</p>
<p>Alkan was a lieutenant colonel in the Turkish army, and spent a good part of his life protecting Turkey’s territorial integrity against the PKK. His anger was directed at the government, and at its representatives at the funeral who were trying to make election propaganda of his brother’s death. </p>
<p>The cynicism around the civil war has reached the point where no side can even mourn its dead without being exploited for political ends.</p>
<p>Alkan soon found out the hard way what happens to those who speak out. Immediately after his tirade was reported, pro-AKP Twitter users began smearing him as a member of one or all of the groups designated as enemies of the Turkish state: the Alevists, the pro-Kurdish HDP, and the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13503361">Hizmet Movement</a> – a huge transnational Islamic movement some regard as a <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_conceptual-contradictions-when-it-comes-to-rhetoric-about-parallel-state-by-ahmet-erdi-ozturk-_337284.html">parallel state</a>.</p>
<h2>More chaos, more votes?</h2>
<p>This sorry state of affairs is not just an unfortunate collision of circumstances. It has been nourished by the current AKP government, which was put in a corner by the HDP’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-the-kurds-after-turkish-election-success-of-hdp-42979">biggest-ever electoral haul</a> and entry into parliament. </p>
<p>It is now trying desperately to gather the nationalist and conservative votes it needs to win its longed-for parliamentary majority. The AKP’s calculation appears to be that <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-turkeys-president-profiting-from-escalating-violence-45921">more chaos will mean more votes</a>, with people turning to the devil they know in hope of stability. </p>
<p>On the face of it, the latest PKK-Turkish army clashes have driven many groups on both sides back into their traditional corners. But things are changing as well – and it is <a href="http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/23/turkeys-erdogan-fights-for-his-throne-by-battling-kurds/">clear</a> that many Turkish voters are anything but won over by this new strategy. And the public’s reaction to the deliberately contrived chaos has so far defied the AKP’s expectations. </p>
<p>People all over Turkey are now questioning what intentions lie behind the resurgent violence. Kurds have always been suspicious, but this is new to the Turkish population at large. While polarisation and unrest are in themselves hardly new to Turkey, the current division of Turkish political and social life is more intense than it has been for decades. </p>
<p>As HDP MP Gülten Kışanak recently <a href="http://t24.com.tr/haber/gultan-kisanak-kardesim-canimiz-korunmuyor-oluyoruz-oluyoruz,307243?utm_medium=social&utm_content=sharebutton">mentioned</a>, this is a very different era. In the 1990s political killings were executed in secret, and violence was covert; nowadays, they are carried out without any shame or pretence. </p>
<p>In this deeply polarised climate, the obvious reaction is to take sides. That’s exactly what the AKP wants Turks to do, and it’s highly dangerous. It not only harshens the tone of political discourse; it exacerbates all the deeper, long-existing divisions that undermine Turkish civil society. </p>
<p>The run-up to the snap election will be a very dangerous time not only for the HDP, but for all opposition groups, who must now mount election campaigns in a deliberately cultivated environment of violence and fear. To be sure, this began a long time ago – the HDP’s party buildings were <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/bombs-hit-two-hdp-buildings-in-southern-turkey-injuring-at-least-three.aspx?PageID=238&NID=82569&NewsCatID=509">constantly coming under attack</a> even before the June elections – but it is getting substantially worse.</p>
<p>As things stand, Turkey offers no promise of a better future to any of its warring groups. And with the campaign for the newly declared elections already sinking into a factional brawl, the signs are ominous indeed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46567/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey’s political factions, hardly friends at the best of times, are more divided and mutually suspicious than ever.Bahar Baser, Research Fellow, Coventry UniversityAhmet Erdi Öztürk, PhD Candidate/Research Asistant, University of LjubljanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/453972015-07-29T13:34:29Z2015-07-29T13:34:29ZTurkey opens up old wounds with a new campaign against the PKK<p>The recent surge of violence in Turkey following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-bombing-risks-further-unrest-in-a-country-already-living-on-the-edge-45020">massacre of socialist activists in Suruc</a> has brought Turkey perilously close to an all-out conflict with the Kurds.</p>
<p>Turkey has begun regular air strikes targeting the bases of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) guerrillas as part of its broader “war on terror”, which has also included action against Islamic State (IS) and the left-wing Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKPC). So far, <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20150727-turkey-1000-detained-militants-islamic-state-pkk-arrests">more than 1,000 people</a> have been detained in Turkey. That number includes many trade unionists – and there are growing fears that non-violent dissidents will be targeted.</p>
<p>Turkey’s effort to tie its campaign against the PKK to the international campaign against IS is widely seen as a ploy to make its actions against the Kurds more internationally legitimate. Turkey seems to have convinced the US of the need to create a de-facto <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33698659">safe zone</a> on the border with Syria, a long-held Turkish plan <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/27/syrian-safe-zone-us-relents-to-turkish-demands-border-crisis-kurd-uk-military">to prevent Kurdish autonomous regions from joining one to another</a>. The Kurds view that plan with deep suspicion, seeing it as a push to undermine their achievements in Syria.</p>
<p>While the trigger points of Turkey’s conflict with the PKK in the past year have all been connected to the developments in Syria, it’s worth remembering that the conflict has a much deeper history. </p>
<h2>Long road to peace</h2>
<p>Since the early 1980s, the PKK has been the main force in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. It began its insurgency against Turkey in 1984, mounting guerrilla attacks against the security forces between 1984 and 1999. Ever since the capture and imprisonment of PKK leader <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no1/fiasco-in-nairobi.html">Abdullah Öcalan</a> in 1999, Turkish governments have introduced some minor reforms to broaden Kurdish rights in Turkey. </p>
<p>The violence has simmered down, with the PKK abandoning armed conflict in favour of political struggle for long periods. That said, during the past decade, the PKK has resorted to violence on a number of occasions – but this has always been followed by periods of inactivity. </p>
<p>Overall, the PKK maintains its commitment to peaceful political resolution of the conflict, but retains its estimated 5,000 strong guerrilla force, some of which is positioned inside Turkey.</p>
<p>The total number of casualties in the conflict is thought to be <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=tYORNy901oYC&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=45,000+casualties+turkey+pkk&source=bl&ots=VLR48CsOAj&sig=tFMlKytVFym4MVetmoIf3V1cCRc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAWoVChMItv_78ZaAxwIVQsAUCh0pQQHh#v=onepage&q=45%2C000%20casualties%20turkey%20pkk&f=false">more than 45,000</a>. The state has carried out many large-scale operations against the PKK, but without much success. The PKK has proved to be an extremely resilient organisation able to exploit general regional developments to its advantage.</p>
<p>The dialogue between Ankara and the PKK has continued over the past two and a half years and has produced positive outcomes. A <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21874427">ceasefire</a> was declared on March 21 2013, and an agreement on the <a href="http://politics.bgnnews.com/pro-kurdish-party-co-chair-discloses-10-item-peace-negotiation-framework-haberi/3829">plan for future negotiations</a> was made public in February 2015.</p>
<p>The PKK’s capacity to use violence and its occasional attacks have been cited by the Turkish government as reasons why a military approach is needed. Ankara has set withdrawal of the PKK guerrillas from Turkey and the conclusion of the armed struggle against Turkey as the basic conditions for restarting the peace process.</p>
<h2>Kurds versus the AKP</h2>
<p>As things stand, Kurdish demands cannot be accommodated within Turkey. A form of self-rule for the Kurds – which can be achieved through decentralisation of state structure in Turkey and devolution of power to regional level, the recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights (such as Kurdish-language education) and reforms to strengthen democracy and pluralism – would go a long way in satisfying Kurdish demands.</p>
<p>The escalation came after the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) performed strongly in the recent elections winning sufficient support to send 80 MPs to Turkish parliament and <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-the-kurds-after-turkish-election-success-of-hdp-42979">raising hopes</a> that the peace process would finally take a step forward.</p>
<p>All round, the HDP has dented the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)‘s hopes of consolidating its hegemony, which has been challenged on a number of fronts since the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/29/gezi-park-year-after-protests-seeds-new-turkey">Gezi Park protests</a> broke out in May 2013. Most importantly, the HDP’s success kept the AKP from winning the parliamentary majority it needed to introduce the presidential form of government for which it had been campaigning. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Syria, Kurdish forces have managed to repel IS attacks and consolidate their three autonomous regions, collectively known as the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/evangelos-aretaios/rojava-revolution">Cantons of Rojava</a>. Their success reduces the likelihood of moulding post-conflict Syria into a state shaped by Turkey’s vision of the region.</p>
<p>The Rojava project is achieved under the guidance and leadership of the <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/impact-syrian-war-kurdish-politics-across-middle-east">Democratic Union Party</a>. This party has an ideological affiliation with the PKK but is a separate entity, and the international powers treat it as such – but Turkey <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-says-pyd-no-different-than-pkk-for-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nID=73172&NewsCatID=338">treats it as a terror organisation</a>, worried as it is that Rojava’s success will increase the PKK’s power as a regional actor and permanently change the game in the Kurds’ favour.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The recent developments in Turkey and Syria make the Kurds the main barrier to the goverment’s ambitions for both Turkey and the wider region. Present indications are that actions against the PKK will be extended to include the HDP and that pro-Kurdish representation in the parliament will be eliminated. The debate in Turkey’s mainstream media following the attacks against the PKK has already begun to marginalise the HDP and implicate them in the latest violence, and the Supreme Court has begun an investigation into the HDP that could result in its closure and the possible imprisonment of senior MPs.</p>
<p>In Syria, the Kurdish forces have complained that Turkey has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33675760?post_id=10153405714147028_10153534257147028">attacked their defence positions</a> and it is possible that Turkey’s actions will be expanded to include the Rojava Cantons. </p>
<p>Starting a large-scale campaign against the Kurds could have unpredictable consequences and further increase the instability in the region. For that reason Turkey will face domestic and international opposition. However, without a workable plan to put the peace process on track, the ongoing tensions will further escalate the conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45397/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cengiz Gunes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whatever the pretext, Turkey’s latest push against the Kurds will do nobody any favours.Cengiz Gunes, Associate Lecturer, Faculty of Social Science, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/429422015-06-08T20:46:29Z2015-06-08T20:46:29ZTurkey’s general election upset: the rise of the AKP interrupted<p>The general election that took place on June 7 was no doubt one of the most critical in modern Turkish history. </p>
<p>For a significant part of the electorate, the election represented a chance to put a stop to the increasingly authoritarian, religiously conservative, and unabashedly <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Hi8tBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135&lpg=PA135&dq=neo+liberal+policies+AKP&source=bl&ots=P3tIQxn8Og&sig=8G-FTsfOhKPuzEhlj4Ps8KZtb7A&hl=en&sa=X&ei=9L11VaiPNs3YggT2yILQCw&ved=0CF0Q6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=neo%20liberal%20policies%20AKP&f=false">neo-liberal grip</a> of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) over the country. </p>
<p>At stake was the future of Turkey as a liberal democracy.</p>
<p>Of particular concern was the prospect of the AKP securing enough seats in the parliament to be able to push for a constitutional change that would bestow President Tayyip Erdoğan with a more powerful executive presidency.</p>
<p>The results are not good news for the AKP. They may have received the largest share of the votes — <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33047047">40.85%</a> — but they failed to secure enough seats to have a majority and to make the constitutional amendment for a more powerful presidency.</p>
<p>So how can the results be explained and why do they matter? What do they mean for the future of AKP in Turkish politics and, more generally, what do they say about the future of democracy in Turkey?</p>
<h2>A winning streak between 2002 and 2014</h2>
<p>In 2002, in the first-ever general election it participated in, the AKP got 34% of the popular vote and became the first party to govern Turkey without a coalition since 1991. </p>
<p>This was a huge success for a party that had been <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1018363/Justice-and-Development-Party">founded</a> just over a year before as a democratic, conservative but non-confessional challenge to establishment Turkish politics. </p>
<p>The party’s electoral success <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608746.2014.920571">continued</a> in the 2007 general election (46.6% of the popular vote) and in 2011 (almost 50%). In August 2014, in the first-ever direct election of the Turkish president, Erdogan, the leader of the AKP, won with almost 52%.</p>
<p>The electoral popularity of the AKP was unprecedented but not all that surprising to those who follow Turkish politics closely. </p>
<p>The 1990s in Turkey — often referred to as the “lost decade” — were defined by poor economic performance and unstable coalition governments.</p>
<p>Into this dispiriting situation, the AKP emerged not as an Islamist but a center-right party eager to carry on a reformist, democratic, pro-growth policy agenda. </p>
<p>In a relatively short amount of time, the party managed to build a wide<a href="http://turkishstudies.org/documents/pdf/publications/RepublicanPeoplesPartyAndThe2007GeneralElections.pdf"> coalition of supporters</a> from citizens who had grown estranged from the inward-looking, pro-military and nationalist policies that had dominated Turkish politics for so long. </p>
<p>Political and economic developments of the years following the AKP’s coming to power only enhanced their popularity.</p>
<p>The real gross domestic product (GDP) of Turkey (or GDP at constant prices) <a href="http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2013/06/how-well-did-the-turkish-economy-do-over-the-last-decade.html">rose</a> by 64% between 2002 and 2012, and real GDP per capita by 43%. </p>
<p>During the first few years of its government, the party seemed to be enthusiastically promoting Turkey’s bid for EU accession. Turkey had applied for a membership in the European Community back in 1987 and – after many years of lobbying – was finally granted candidacy in 1999. Ever since its foundation, Turkish political elites had wanted to position <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.464.9517&rep=rep1&type=pdf">Turkey as a part of Europe</a>: the AKP’s dynamic involvement in this process was widely welcome. </p>
<p>The political power of the military, whose intervention in parliamentary and executive affairs had been a mainstay of Turkish politics (there were three <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/04/20124472814687973.html">military coups</a> between 1960 and 1980), was being curtailed. </p>
<p>And although it later proved to be a rather inept plan lacking specificity and real effort, talks of a <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/12/01/kurdish-opening-in-turkey-origins-and-future/2ndb">“Kurdish opening” </a>gave hope to Kurdish citizens and liberal segments of the electorate that the long-festering sore of Kurdish insurgency in the east of the country would finally be addressed. </p>
<p>The AKP also rolled out a set of popular <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608746.2014.979031">social policies</a>. It extended the level of <a href="http://turkey.angloinfo.com/healthcare/health-system/health-insurance/">free medical services</a> for the poor. It also provided <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2597/476030PUB0Cond101Official0Use0Only1.pdf?sequence=1">cash transfers</a> for the poor, single women, and the disabled.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Happier days for Tayyip Erdogan in Davos.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8a/Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan-WEF_Davos_2009.jpg/1024px-Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan-WEF_Davos_2009.jpg">World Economic Forum, swiss-image.ch/Photo by Andy Mettler</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Abroad, Prime Minister and then President Tayyip Erdogan was <a href="http://www.worldleaders.columbia.edu/participants/recep-tayyip-erdo%C4%9F">embraced</a> as the architect of a new Turkey that set an example for the larger Middle East with its success in combining Islam, democracy and a thriving free-market economy.</p>
<h2>The authoritarian turn</h2>
<p>In the past few years especially, however, the AKP and its captain Erdogan – now the president of Turkey, residing in a 1,100-room <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29912398">presidential palace</a> which cost over US$600 million to build – openly embraced a more narrow view of democracy. </p>
<p>Erdogan appeared to think that having the support of 50% of the electorate gave him and his party the mandate to push ahead with an increasingly conservative agenda. </p>
<p>Moreover, this electoral authoritarianism has taken on a noticeably Islamic character. </p>
<p>From launching education reforms meant to raise “pious generations” to the active promotion of traditional family-based lifestyles, from placing restrictions on alcohol consumption to advocating for a ban on abortions, AKP and Erdogan made it clear that they meant business when it came to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13608746.2014.920571">legislating their religious values</a>.</p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20in%20the%20World%202014%20Booklet.pdf">Freedom House report</a>, as of 2014 Turkey had already become a case of “modern authoritarianism.” </p>
<p>If the rulers in a traditional authoritarian system openly and violently suppress freedoms, the rulers of the modern authoritarianism, the report notes, use more subtle, but ultimately more effective techniques: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Central to modern authoritarian strategy is the capture of institutions that undergird political pluralism. The goal is to dominate not only the executive and legislative branches, but also the media, the judiciary, civil society, the economy, and the security force.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indeed, as the report notes, under the AKP government, the past few years saw a notable intensification of these techniques, including:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“jailing reporters (Turkey leads the world in the number of imprisoned journalists), pressuring independent publishers to sell their holdings to government cronies, and threatening media owners with reprisals if critical journalists are not silenced.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The city park that proved a lightening rod</h2>
<p>In June 2013, the government cracked down on what started as a peaceful protest by mostly well-educated, non-political, middle-class youth against plans to erect yet another shopping mall in one of the few remaining green areas in Istanbul. </p>
<p>The attempt to protect Gezi Park was initially a popular reaction to the juggernaut of a construction boom that rarely consulted local residents. </p>
<p>Once the police used disproportionate force to clear out the protestors, opposition spread. If people had initially gone to Taksim Square to protect the people’s park against privatization, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22753752">they stayed</a> to show the government what a people’s democracy looks like. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">And this wasn’t the only protest in June 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a1/2013_Taksim_Gezi_Park_protests_%2815th_June%29.jpg/640px-2013_Taksim_Gezi_Park_protests_%2815th_June%29.jpg">Fleshstorm</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The government <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/erdogan-gezi-conspiracy-taksim-governance-authoritarian-akp.html">dismissed the protests</a> as the work of an international and national conspiracy backed by the financial lobby, the US and Israel. An <a href="http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/gezi_eylemlerinin_bilancosu_aciklandi-1138770">estimated 2.5 million citizens</a> participated in the protests. </p>
<p>The Gezi protests tarnished the legitimacy of Erdogan’s government, and things were only made worse for the AKP by the corruption scandal involving <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/turkish-ministers-sons-arrested-corruption-investigation">the sons of three cabinet ministers</a> and several businessmen, as well as Erdogan himself and his son. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, the results of the recent election should not come as a big surprise. But the vote was not just a negative verdict on the AKP; it was also a positive boost for the opposition parties.</p>
<h2>The success of the opposition parties</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Not as much orange as the AKP would have liked.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Basak Kus</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The 2015 general election has ended the single party rule of the AKP and put the opposition parties at the center of the Turkish politics.</p>
<p>Most significantly, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP - founded in 2012), representing a coalition of Kurdish voters and left-wing liberals, entered parliament for the first time with 13% of the votes and 80 seats. Their campaign emphasized pluralism and the rights of minorities and oppressed groups. Erdogan’s <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-03/atheists-gays-and-boozers-erdogan-tars-rivals-as-polls-narrow">attempts</a> to denigrate the HDP by calling it a party of gays and atheists failed. </p>
<p>The country’s oldest party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), won 25% and 132 seats. More importantly, perhaps, the CHP played a skillful role in the campaign by respectfully engaging with the HDP during the campaign and signaled its support for HDP’s passing the electoral threshold. </p>
<p>By all signs, the CHP is undergoing a significant transformation. The battle between the more pro-military, exclusively secular, and nationalistic wing of the party and the more liberal and pluralist side seems to have tilted in favor of the latter. During its campaign, the party highlighted social justice issues such as poverty and debt and quit its dogmatic stance on a variety of religious and ethnic issues. It also began to show interest in <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2011/08/03/10178/meet-the-new-republican-party-in-turkey/">engaging Washington</a> in policy conversations. </p>
<h2>What lies ahead?</h2>
<p>Turkey may still be AKP land, with the party having won the largest share of votes in 59 Turkish cities, but if one looks at the parliament, it is a different, much more variegated picture.</p>
<p>There are many challenges ahead. What would a coalition government look like? Opposition leaders have not shown a willingness to enter a coalition with the AKP. Indeed, the leader of the MHP has already called for holding early elections.</p>
<p>Yet, there is so much to be hopeful about. The election results ended one-party rule and put an end to Erdogan’s bid for absolute power. The HDP’s entering parliament is particularly meaningful. During the campaign, the HDP gave voice not only to Kurds, but also to gays and women:<a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/more-turkish-female-mps-enter-parliament-ever-1030929946"> 40%</a> of the new HDP members of parliament are women. </p>
<p>The results are also important for the future of Turkey’s foreign relations. </p>
<p>A politically stable Turkey is critical to regional stability. </p>
<p>Over the past few years, observers from the US and EU have raised concerns regarding the increasing tide of authoritarianism and threat to civil liberties. The actions of the Turkish government at home undermined its democratic credentials abroad. </p>
<p>Indeed, the Turkish government’s religious agenda was believed to have spilled over to its foreign policy. This view solidified particularly after the Syrian crisis, leading to questions about the “Sunnification” of Turkish foreign policy. </p>
<p>A more democratic rule, and a political leader who is open to dialogue and committed to a secular foreign policy, will benefit not only the citizens of Turkey, but also allies of the country in building coalitions to tackle the ever more challenging situation in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basak Kus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The June 7 elections were no doubt one of the most critical in modern Turkish history.Basak Kus, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/250992014-04-02T16:19:04Z2014-04-02T16:19:04ZErdogan’s local election triumph papers over cracks in ailing Turkish democracy<p>The Turkish people <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/31/turkey-election-blow-democracy-ironic-erdogan">went to the polls at the weekend</a> against a backdrop of some of the most serious unrest the country has seen in living memory. The local elections, in which the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2014/03/turkey-elections-test-erdogans-rule-2014331161154603492.html">achieved an impressive 45% of the vote</a>, is the first of three polls, to be followed in August by the country’s first direct presidential election. A general election will follow next year.</p>
<p>This is a convincing electoral victory for any government that has been in power for nearly 12 years but more so in the case of Turkey where the government has had to deal with serious unrest in the form of mass demonstrations in June that turned into a nationwide protest movement.</p>
<p>More recently, there has been a series of corruption allegations surrounding the inner circle of the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which has embroiled three cabinet members and their sons as well as members of the prime minister’s own family. There have been some <a href="https://theconversation.com/rift-with-party-fuels-crisis-at-heart-of-turkeys-government-21665">extraordinary developments</a> – not least when incriminating conversations involving high-ranking political figures and business and media personalities (including an alleged conversation between the prime minister himself and his son about getting rid of stashes of cash) were being leaked through social media on a daily basis. </p>
<p>For its part, the government responded by adopting increasingly authoritative measures, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/twitter-ban-erdogan-bringing-down-democracy-in-turkey-24643">placing bans on the use of Twitter and YouTube</a>, which were widely condemned both inside and outside Turkey.</p>
<h2>Behind the polls</h2>
<p>The exit poll results published by Turkish daily Radikal yesterday, presents some interesting clues as to how AKP achieved such a strong result. Among those who voted for the AKP, 75% indicated that corruption and sleaze allegations played no role in their vote, and more interestingly, 20.1% stated that their preferences were strengthened as a result. Similarly, 79.4% disclosed that the leakages of recorded tapes had no impact on their choice while 14.6% indicating that the leakages had reinforced their preference for the ruling party. Meanwhile, when it comes to the Twitter and YouTube bans, 82.3% of AKP voters said the ban had been irrelevant, while 11.9% said it had actually confirmed their preference for the governing party.</p>
<p>These results were achieved on the back of an election campaign that had been almost single-handedly run by Erdogan himself. The prime minister billed the campaign as a “new war of independence” in which “the nation was under attack”. Local issues were conspicuous by their absence.</p>
<p>Erdogan’s line was that the corruption allegations were the work of a “parallel state” and he sought the support of his followers to “wipe them out”. Parallel state refers to a network of devotees of the Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen who had been close allies of the AKP until a recent falling-out commonly thought to be the result of an internal power struggle between the two.</p>
<p>It’s interesting that these serious allegations of graft, any one of which bring down a government in many democracies, actually helped the pro-Islamic AKP consolidate its support. Two important characteristics of the AKP power base played a key role in this. This is partly down to economic factors – the effective welfare system that the party put in place, which has been made possible by Turkey’s steady economic growth since 2002, allowed millions of low income earners to have access to healthcare, schools and transport. </p>
<p>Another factor worth noting is that AKP’s ten-year administration has given the conservative masses – mostly politically powerless before 2002 a voice and a sense of somehow being part of the ruling class. The most visible measure of this has been the lifting of the headscarves ban for university students and public sector employees. Being such a dominant figurehead in the government, Erdogan is personally credited with these gains and the AKP voters associate their own prospects with those of the prime minister and his political future. </p>
<h2>What next for Turkey?</h2>
<p>Although the election victory is clear, the government’s fight for control prior to the election was achieved at the expense of democracy. New laws giving increased powers to the justice minister in appointing and dismissing judges and prosecutors call into question the separation of powers while the new internet law gives excessive powers to the government in control of digital media. Some of these worrying changes may be reversible, there have been indications that the Twitter and YouTube bans may be lifted. But there is no expectation that the repressive atmosphere will disappear any time soon.</p>
<p>Turkey today is deeply polarised: with 45% of the electorate are fiercely loyal to the prime minister while a substantial part of the remaining 55% feel just as strongly the other way and it is not clear how consensus might be reached. The prime minister’s victory speech, mostly conciliatory in the past, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/us-turkey-election-idUSBREA2R12X20140331">has already pointed in the direction of worsening of tensions</a> by referring to his determination to “pay back” and “wipe out the traitors”.</p>
<p>The stakes are very high. After years of enjoying favourable conditions in international financial markets, the Turkish economy is now <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/jessecolombo/2014/03/05/why-the-worst-is-still-ahead-for-turkeys-bubble-economy/">facing an uncertain future</a>. Turkey is currently seen as one of the fragile five: the group of countries that are identified as vulnerable due to their high current account deficits. Economic uncertainty has intensified following the US Fed’s reversal of its easy money policy that was put in place in response to the global financial crisis. Although the fiscal indicators may appear sound, inflation is already on the up while growth forecasts for 2014 and 2015 are in the modest 2%-3% range.</p>
<p>Turkey continues to face serious challenges both economically and politically, in spite of the decisive electoral results on Sunday. How the government chooses to deal with its renewed mandate will determine how the rest of the election marathon will pan out. The polarising “divide and rule” policy which has so often been on display may have helped towards the electoral victory but will do no good for Turkey’s prospects.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25099/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gulcin Ozkan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Turkish people went to the polls at the weekend against a backdrop of some of the most serious unrest the country has seen in living memory. The local elections, in which the ruling AKP (Justice and…Gulcin Ozkan, Professor of Economics, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.