tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/aleppo-22582/articlesAleppo – The Conversation2022-03-16T14:17:36Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1779522022-03-16T14:17:36Z2022-03-16T14:17:36ZRussia’s actions in post-Soviet wars provide clues to its brutal Ukraine invasion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451414/original/file-20220310-27-z06ijc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2396%2C1512&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this August 2012 photo, Russian soldiers ride atop an armoured vehicle through a street in Tskhinvali, capital of the Georgian breakaway enclave of South Ossetia, with a destroyed tank in the foreground. The Russian military quickly routed the Georgian army during the war.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Musa Sadulayev)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the midst of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it’s worth examining the evolution of Russia’s official rhetoric and military actions in former Soviet states since <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/the-collapse-of-the-Soviet-Union">the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991</a>.</p>
<p>In the 1990s, soon after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s military became involved in the first generation of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220222-moldova-then-georgia-now-ukraine-how-russia-built-bridgeheads-into-post-soviet-space">separatist wars in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Moldova (Transdniestria)</a> in former Soviet territory.</p>
<p>My research showed <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203716229">the initial involvement in those separatist wars was taken independently by the Russian military</a>. Later, Russia became officially involved.</p>
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<img alt="A man in battle fatigues in a wheelchair with a missing left foot." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451395/original/file-20220310-21-11lt8n1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451395/original/file-20220310-21-11lt8n1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451395/original/file-20220310-21-11lt8n1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451395/original/file-20220310-21-11lt8n1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451395/original/file-20220310-21-11lt8n1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451395/original/file-20220310-21-11lt8n1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451395/original/file-20220310-21-11lt8n1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A wounded volunteer from Moldova attends a veteran rally in front of the Presidential Office in Kyiv in June 2019. Volunteers from various countries who fought in Ukraine’s east against Russia-backed separatists have sought Ukrainian citizenship.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)</span></span>
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<p>Mercenaries across the former Soviet Union joined the fighting. Eventually, Russia was able to bring opposing sides to ceasefires and the negotiating table. The political status quo was enforced by mostly <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/500204?ln=en">Russian “peacekeepers,”</a> soldiers who had fought in the war.</p>
<p>The Russian government portrayed its response to these mostly local grievances as successfully bringing stability to volatile situations. Its official rhetoric, similar to its justifications for involvement in the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/long-echo-of-tajikistan-s-civil-war/">Tajikistani civil war</a> from 1992 to 1997, was that it was pursuing pragmatic economic and security interests and protecting its Russian diaspora, even it if was very small. </p>
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<p>The Russian state also portrayed Russia as the only country that could bring peace to the chaos that existed in the security vacuum that emerged with the breakup of the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>In the end, through its support of Abkhazian and Transdniestrian separatists and then its endorsement of the Georgian and Moldovan central governments, Russia ensured the legitimacy of the newly independent states while bringing them to heel. Friendship agreements were struck, military bases retained and the hesitation of countries to join <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Commonwealth-of-Independent-States">the Commonwealth of Independent States</a>, formed by Russia in 1991, disappeared.</p>
<h2>Open debates about military action</h2>
<p>I was in Moscow in the mid to late 1990s, interviewing Russian politicians and military elite and writing my <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Russian-Foreign-Policy-and-the-CIS/Jackson/p/book/9780415305778">PhD on Russian debates about military involvement in the former Soviet space</a>. What struck me then was the openness of the debate over foreign policy options. </p>
<p>One could discern different options, pursued by different government departments — including the Ministry of Defence versus the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — and within the political elite. The public, the media and the parliament also participated in a vigorous debate over a range of possible actions. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2586001">Diverse foreign policy ideas</a> were expressed based upon different interpretations of Russia’s identity.</p>
<p>These ranged from idealistic liberal westernist ideas — for example, Russia should develop closer relations to the West, or adopt western economic or political models — to what scholars then termed pragmatic nationalist ideas that argued Russia should carefully redevelop some ties with former Soviet states and abandon others.</p>
<p>There were also more extreme fundamentalist nationalist ideas that included xenophobic isolationism and imperialist arguments for recreating parts of the Soviet Union or the czarist Russian Empire.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-antagonism-toward-ukraine-was-never-just-about-nato-its-about-creating-a-new-russian-empire-177687">Putin's antagonism toward Ukraine was never just about NATO – it's about creating a new Russian empire</a>
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<p>Today, Russia has launched what may be termed its third wave of military involvement in the former Soviet region. This is an inhumane and planned military assault against most of Ukraine and all Ukrainians. </p>
<p>In many ways, it’s more like <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/russian-federation/endless-brutality-ongoing-human-rights-violations-chechnya">Russia’s brutal and indiscriminate actions inside its official borders in Chechnya</a> in the late 1990s, and outside its borders <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-02-27/putin-s-assault-on-ukraine-echoes-russia-s-brutal-battering-of-syria">in Syria after 2015</a>. No one can legitimately argue the invasion of Ukraine is designed to bring stability to former Soviet territory.</p>
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<img alt="Russian soldiers sit at a table with a white table cloth amid bombed ruins." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451399/original/file-20220310-13-estfaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451399/original/file-20220310-13-estfaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451399/original/file-20220310-13-estfaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451399/original/file-20220310-13-estfaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451399/original/file-20220310-13-estfaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451399/original/file-20220310-13-estfaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451399/original/file-20220310-13-estfaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">In this 2000 photo, Russian soldiers rest at Minutka square, in Grozny, Chechnya, Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Dmitry Belyakov)</span></span>
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<h2>A move towards more extreme ideas</h2>
<p>Since the 1990s, Russia’s official rhetoric and justifications have also evolved. In a much more tightly controlled and authoritarian regime under Vladimir Putin, the official language is less based on pragmatic or realist ideas (such as how develop closer ties to some neighbouring states) and incorporates more extreme nationalist and imperialist ideas.</p>
<p>During the second generation of Russian wars, in Georgia in 2008 and in Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk in 2014, the regime’s narrative addressed increasingly manufactured <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/russia-the-west-and-military-intervention-9780199590636">historical and ethnic injustices</a>. Added to this were perceived geopolitical grievances, including NATO and European Union expansion and American and western involvement in <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/18/why-the-color-revolutions-failed/">“colour revolutions”</a> on its borders. </p>
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<img alt="A dark-haired woman and two children walk past a tank" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451402/original/file-20220310-23-im5i42.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=125%2C0%2C2968%2C2334&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451402/original/file-20220310-23-im5i42.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451402/original/file-20220310-23-im5i42.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451402/original/file-20220310-23-im5i42.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451402/original/file-20220310-23-im5i42.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451402/original/file-20220310-23-im5i42.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451402/original/file-20220310-23-im5i42.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">In this 2008 photo, Georgian refugees are seen walking past a Russian armoured vehicle in the village of Igoeti after the Russian military quickly routed the Georgian army during the August 2008 war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Sergei Grits)</span></span>
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<p>More recently, culminating in <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843">Putin’s speeches in February 2022</a>, the president has presented an angrier and more delusional version of these narratives. He infamously spoke of <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/unpacking-putins-denazification-ukraine-and-my-forecasting-failure">genocide in the Donbas and the need to remove the fascist regime and “denazify” Ukraine</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/vladimir-putin-points-to-history-to-justify-his-ukraine-invasion-regardless-of-reality-177882">Vladimir Putin points to history to justify his Ukraine invasion, regardless of reality</a>
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<p>Putin now portrays Ukraine as an illegitimate nation, and a west-leaning Ukrainian government (with ties to NATO) as an illegitimate regime. </p>
<p>Compared to the 1990s, there is almost no foreign policy debate in Russia’s traditional media or parliament. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/world/europe/russia-ukraine-putin-media.html">Russians are being silenced</a>, and opposing views about Russia’s military involvement portrayed by the state are deemed unacceptable. Many <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/russia-kremlin-censors-media-and-disperses-protesters-opposed-to-ukraine-invasion/">social media platforms are shut down, and on the streets, protesters are being arrested</a>.</p>
<p>There is real danger in presenting simplistic analyses of complex wars, especially in the middle of them. But the world would be wise in examining and taking seriously the evolving role of ideas, perceptions and domestic politics alongside geopolitics in wars like the one ongoing in Ukraine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177952/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole Jackson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the midst of the Ukraine-Russia war, we should pay more attention to the evolution of Russia’s official rhetoric and military actions in former Soviet states.Nicole Jackson, Associate Professor of International Studies, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1568542021-03-24T00:56:32Z2021-03-24T00:56:32ZTen years on from the Syrian uprising, what has prevented an end to the tragedy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390990/original/file-20210322-17-gxdsah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C0%2C6698%2C3530&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">East Aleppo after Syrian forces, backed by Russia and Iran, recaptured the city in 2016.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ten years ago this month, Syrians took to the streets to call for political reform and social dignity.</p>
<p>The success with which earlier protest movements in Tunisia and Egypt had toppled dictators Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, as well as NATO’s air campaign against Muammar Gaddafi’s forces in Libya, seemed outwardly to present an opportunity for change in Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. </p>
<p>Instead, the Syrian uprising turned into an insurgency and then a bloody civil war. </p>
<p>By December of 2011, 133 countries in the United Nations General Assembly (including Aotearoa New Zealand) were strongly condemning the Syrian authorities’ “<a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/469/38/PDF/N1146938.pdf?OpenElement">grave and systematic human rights violations</a>” in its response to the uprising. </p>
<p>Alas, this was to no avail. In the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/10-years-10-facts-explain-syria-s-conflict">past decade</a>, 7 million Syrians (from a pre-conflict population of 22 million) have been internally displaced, and 5.6 million have fled to neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>More than 500,000 have been killed, including 55,000 children. According to the UN <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=26811&LangID=E">Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic</a>, thousands of civilians have been subject to torture, sexual violence or death in detention, or have disappeared.</p>
<p>The dire circumstances of more than 64,000 mostly women and children being held in the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Al%20Hol%20Snapshot_26Jul2020.pdf">Al-Hol and Al-Roj detention camps</a> in north-eastern Syria have become the most recent statistic in the Syrian tragedy.</p>
<p>How did this ongoing disaster happen? While the Syrian conflict is complex, it is possible to identify three things that facilitated the militarisation of the uprising and al-Assad’s political survival.</p>
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<img alt="Aerial view of rows of tents at refugee camp" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Aerial view of the Atma refugee camp on the Turkish-Syrian border, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span>
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<h2>First resort to violence</h2>
<p>Like their counterparts in neighbouring countries, Syrians faced a pervasive <em>mukhabarat</em> (security establishment), poverty and the absence of basic freedoms. </p>
<p>Their desire for change found early expression when a group of schoolboys painted a slogan, first seen in Tunisia and then in Tahrir square in Cairo, onto a wall in the southern Syrian city of Daraa: الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام (as-shab yurid isqat an-nizam), translated as “the people want the fall of the regime”. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/arab-spring-after-a-decade-of-conflict-the-same-old-problems-remain-154314">Arab Spring: after a decade of conflict, the same old problems remain</a>
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<p>But the al-Assad government did not fall. It violently cracked down on the protest movement. In Daraa, the schoolboys were detained and tortured. When the <em>mukhabarat</em> dismissed the tribal elders who intervened on their behalf, it sparked demonstrations in the city. </p>
<p>The demonstrators were met with <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/03/369772-un-human-rights-office-voices-concern-recent-events-yemen-bahrain-and-syria">live ammunition</a> and later tanks. Whole neighbourhoods and villages were put under siege. This <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2011/4/28/deraa-a-city-under-a-dark-siege">excessive use of violence</a> against demonstrators in Daraa and elsewhere militarised the Syrian uprising and undermined the protest movement. </p>
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<img alt="Bashar as-Assad and Vladimir Putin seated and talking" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Syrian president Bashar al-Assad meets his key ally, Russian president Vladimir Putin, in Damascus, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span>
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<h2>Failure of the UN Security Council</h2>
<p>The UN Security Council, initially slow to react, became no more than a witness to the violence in Syria. </p>
<p>Seven months after the protests in Daraa began, a resolution tabled by France, the UK, Germany and Portugal condemned Syria’s human rights violations, and raised the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2011%20612.pdf">potential use of force</a> under Article 41 (Chapter VII) of the UN Charter. </p>
<p>Russia and China vetoed the resolution, and non-permanent members India, Brazil, South Africa and Lebanon abstained. No punitive action occurred.</p>
<p>Opposition to the draft resolution was motivated by what had happened in Libya. On March 17 2011, UN Security Council <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement">Resolution 1973</a> had authorised “necessary measures” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect Libyan civilians against Gaddafi’s military. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/every-day-is-war-a-decade-of-slow-suffering-and-destruction-in-syria-154595">'Every day is war' – a decade of slow suffering and destruction in Syria</a>
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<p>The UN-sanctioned, NATO-led military campaign began two days later, but did not cease after the feared attack against civilians in Benghazi was foiled. It continued for seven months until Gaddafi was captured and killed. </p>
<p>Russia’s veto of the first Syrian UN Security Council resolution was based on a suspicion that regime change, as had occurred in Libya, was also planned for Syria. </p>
<p>But Russia has <a href="https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto">gone on to veto</a> a further 15 resolutions, rendering the security council largely impotent in the face of a war that has seen thousands of Syrian civilians killed, maimed, detained, tortured and forcibly displaced.</p>
<h2>The pretext of terrorism</h2>
<p>In late 2016, Syrian forces, backed by Russia and Iran, recaptured eastern <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/13/fall-of-aleppo-pub-66469">Aleppo</a>. The battle for the city had been a prolonged, bloody and strategically important standoff between government forces and anti-government armed groups that had taken a terrible toll on civilians.</p>
<p>For ten years, al-Assad’s permanent representative to the security council had used the threat of terrorism to justify sieges on whole cities and neighbourhoods, the use of barrel bombs on civilians, and attacks on medical personnel and facilities. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ten-years-after-the-arab-spring-libya-has-another-chance-for-peace-157041">Ten years after the Arab Spring, Libya has another chance for peace</a>
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<p>However, in the first six months of the Syrian uprising, al-Assad decreed an amnesty for “political prisoners”. At least four <a href="http://s.telegraph.co.uk/graphics/projects/isis-jihad-syria-assad-islamic/index.html">radical Islamists</a> who later joined or formed militias were among those pardoned. </p>
<p>When Aleppo fell, Aotearoa New Zealand was serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Then-Prime Minister John Key told the security council that although terrorism was a major consequence of the Syrian war, “<a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/statement-united-nations-security-council-syria">it did not cause it</a>”.</p>
<p>Later, as Aotearoa New Zealand’s term came to an end in December 2016, its permanent representative <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/briefing-the-situation-in-the-middle-east-aleppo-syria/?">stated</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I choose to believe the Secretary-General and the people working for him when they say the issue is not terrorism, but it is barbarism.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Without denying the legacy of UN-designated terrorist groups Islamic State (ISIS) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (former Jabhat al-Nusra) in the Syria conflict, Aotearoa New Zealand was right to reject the Syrian state’s justification for its actions.</p>
<p>One minor irony in all this is that the same Syrian permanent representative to the UN was also, in his capacity as rapporteur for the <a href="https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/c24/about">UN Decolonisation Committee</a>, charged with monitoring Aotearoa New Zealand’s administration of Tokelau. </p>
<p>However, this authoritarian absurdity pales in comparison to an ongoing tragedy in Syria. What Key said to the UN in 2016 remains true: a political solution is the only way out of this conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156854/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hanlie Booysen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Three crucial factors have determined the fate of Syria, including the failure of the United Nations to stop the carnage.Hanlie Booysen, Research fellow, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of WellingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1545952021-03-15T12:31:24Z2021-03-15T12:31:24Z‘Every day is war’ – a decade of slow suffering and destruction in Syria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388068/original/file-20210305-17-1cy3igf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C0%2C1049%2C759&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The city of Homs has been ravaged by war, leaving millions of people homeless and displaced. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abduljalil Achraf</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Abduljalil sent me a photo of his ruined home in Homs, Syria. “It is the third floor”, he told me over WhatsApp. The building still stands but it looks like an empty skeleton. Most of its facade has been destroyed, while piles of debris surround it. Residents have not been able to return, as they fear it could collapse at any time.</p>
<p>For a decade now, conflict, violence and destruction have reshaped the lives of millions of Syrians since the start of the Syrian Revolution in March 2011. Abduljalil is just one of more than <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html">12 million</a> people who have had to flee their homes. While 5.6 million people have fled Syria to find refuge in countries such as Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan, 6.6 million people have been internally displaced.</p>
<p>Over the past five years, I have been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/xT6AE8RNPymQ9PCNpge2/full?target=10.1080/13604813.2019.1575605">researching</a> the relationship between urban violence and the impact it has on cities. My research has been mainly focused on my home city of Homs where I conducted a series of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13604813.2020.1833536">interviews</a> with local people and examined the way Homs has been transformed in the past decade. The conflict has created a disorientating experience for many Homsis. People have lost some of their most cherished places, as well as many of their loved ones. </p>
<p>I want my research to help people understand how it feels to be forcibly uprooted. What does it mean to see your own country getting destroyed, to see your home – the place that gave you a sense of safety, security, belonging and identity – in ruins? </p>
<p>These questions are personal to me. I too was forced to leave my home in Homs when fighting broke out and tanks entered my city. I have not been able to return since 2011. From afar, I have seen my country crumble into ruins. I have watched the people I love struggle daily, losing their homes, their dreams, their friends and their future. I have lost people – people I coudn’t even say goodbye to.</p>
<p>As a displaced person, my life moves in parallels. Walking in London where I now live, the images of destroyed homes and shattered lives are always at the forefront of my mind. I left Syria, but Syria didn’t leave me. My life, like the lives of millions of us, has been terribly damaged – just like our cities. The past decade has been a story of loss and suffering, a landscape of grief and sorrow.</p>
<h2>Homs as it was</h2>
<p>Before the conflict started, Homs was known as a city of diversity where different communities from different religious and sectarian backgrounds lived together. It had a population of 800,000 people, but yet there was a strong sense of community – it felt as if everyone knew everyone else. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The busy city centre of Homs before the fighting began." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A bustling Homs before the conflict started in 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.city-analysis.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/8.-Homs-before-2011-Source-Ammar-Azzouz.jpg">Ammar Azzouz</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many neighbourhoods were divided along sectarian lines. Some were mostly inhabited by Alawites or Sunnis while others were mixed with Alawites, Sunnis and Christians living together. </p>
<p>It was a city of peace, quiet and simplicity. Its people famous for their sense of humour and generosity. The memory of this thriving and cosmopolitan city, makes the present reality even more difficult to swallow.</p>
<p>Abduljalil said the memories of old times haunt his former home like a ghost. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I remember the stars I put on the roof in my bedroom … but even the stars fell.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Abduljalil and his family had no choice but to flee their home in 2013 fearing, for their lives. Their neighbourhood, Jouret al-Shayah, at the heart of Homs, was <a href="https://unhabitat.org/city-profile-homs-multi-sector-assessment">heavily targeted</a>.</p>
<p>Other cities including Mosul, Beirut, Aleppo and Raqqa have suffered too. Cities have turned into battlefields. Wars are no longer fought outside densely populated areas, but in neighbourhoods. The urbanisation of the military has made <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0267303032000087766?journalCode=chos20">everyday life</a> a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5yEOdutixw&t=18s">target</a>. </p>
<p>Even cultural heritage sites have been targeted. The shelling of places such as the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hyQdng7qsCI&t=37s">Khaled Ibn al Walid Mosque</a> in Homs, the destruction of monuments, cultural artefacts and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34036644">temples</a> in Palmyra and in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/38303230">Ancient City</a> of Aleppo shocked the world. </p>
<p>But this interest in the ancient monuments has overshadowed the loss people have endured to their way of living that has collapsed in the past decade – the slow suffering. Homes, bakeries, schools and hospitals have been destroyed too. But these “ordinary” spaces have rarely been brought into the conversation.</p>
<p>Everyday life is a battle for survival, even though the fighting in Homs has ended. For many families, food – including sugar and bread – are becoming hard to obtain. Some of the people I spoke to reported long hours waiting to get rice, while many struggle to afford food due to the country’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f3ccc3a7-c697-412a-9b99-18944de5c108">economic collapse</a>. The UN has <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/02/1085722">reported</a> that around 60% of Syrians (12.4 million people) do not have regular access to safe and nutritious food.</p>
<p>One woman I spoke to, who asked not to be identified, lives in Mashta Al Hilu, a town between Homs and Tartus. After finishing her degree in architecture in Homs, she struggled to find a job. She told me how she felt when walking in the ruined streets. In Baba Amr she said she felt as if a “monster” had destroyed it.</p>
<p>Her dream is to improve her violin skills, but these dreams are on hold. She said she felt isolated, as many of her friends had left Syria or had been killed. She asked me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Is life after war more difficult than the life at the time of war? … Every day is war.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There were hopes for change in 2011. People imagined that the future would be different. Nobody expected that Homs would be destroyed, that entire neighbourhoods would be razed to the ground, that another day could mean yet another loss. </p>
<p>Abduljalil and his family couldn’t rebuild their home. No charity or organisation helped them. They eventually decided to sell the ruins and rent outside the heart of the city. Abduljalil still visits his past life, his lost home. He told me: “I feel as a flower uprooted from its roots and planted in another place”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ammar Azzouz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After ten years of conflict and destruction, what is left of Syria and what hope is there for its people?Ammar Azzouz, Short-term Research Associate, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1160322019-04-29T19:37:48Z2019-04-29T19:37:48ZArt and activism at the Lebanese-Syrian border<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271031/original/file-20190425-121220-qu00g1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C50%2C1198%2C957&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Refugee camp in the Bekaa Valley.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anaïs Ortega</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>January 2019. It’s 7:30 am and the air is freezing here in the refugee settlements in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. We are five educators on site this morning. Muzaffar, one of our students, is not wearing shoes and he is swinging his purple feet over the bus seat. The student activity is called “the bus project” and is part of an education program for Syrian refugees coordinated by SALAM, the organisation I work for near the Syrian border. It is here that most of the Syrians who have fled the war live or survive day after day. </p>
<p>Lebanon is currently one of the countries hosting the most refugees in the world (1.5 million refugees according to official numbers, but some NGOs suggest that up to 2 millions). SALAM, which means peace in Arabic, set up its headquarters here in 2016 and works with a team of international volunteers. Their main projects are both educational and cultural: tutoring classes for children and adults in the camps, music and sports activities organised in a community centre and a mobile cinema. Other major international NGOs provide medical aid or food distribution. </p>
<p>If the daily lives of the displaced are an ongoing struggle for survival, it is also a constant battle against boredom and emptiness. Unemployed for the most part, people are waiting for the war to even though their situation often appears irreversible.</p>
<h2>Photo portraits of Aleppo’s inhabitants</h2>
<p>Around us there are only tarp tents and mud. In the distance, I can see olive groves, vineyards, and the mountains that constitute the geographical border with Syria. I think of images relayed by the media of the country and its devastated cities. Removing myself from the relentlessness of the imagery is not an easy, but I try to superimpose the work of Issa Touma in my mind.</p>
<p>Issa is a Syrian photographer and curator from Aleppo. We met in 2017 in Madrid where he presented his short film <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=THdMj0-LmRw">“9 Days: From My Window in Aleppo”</a>. In 2012, from his window in Aleppo, he filmed the conflict between the so-called free army and the troops of Bashar Al-Assad. Nine days during which time stopped behind the shutters of his apartment, from where he recorded the conflict raging in his street. In the documentary, Issa, who has good reasons to fear for his life, seems to accept the hopelessness of his situation. Yet, he is not a passive spectator, and he films this war testimony <a href="https://vimeo.com/280351401">day after day</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263168/original/file-20190311-86690-k5hzee.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263168/original/file-20190311-86690-k5hzee.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263168/original/file-20190311-86690-k5hzee.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263168/original/file-20190311-86690-k5hzee.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263168/original/file-20190311-86690-k5hzee.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263168/original/file-20190311-86690-k5hzee.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263168/original/file-20190311-86690-k5hzee.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A photo by Issa Touma.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is an experience that draws another timeframe where the present seems to play the leading role. Issa managed to escape. He fled to Europe, but he returned home as soon as he could. In <a href="https://notesfromaleppo.today/"><em>Notes from Aleppo</em></a>, his most recent work, through a series of videos he describes life in a city rising from its ashes. He portrays people who stayed in Aleppo or chose to return to the city in ruins.</p>
<p>Since 2017, 500,000 men and women have returned to Aleppo, a city that counted 2.1 million inhabitants before the war. Among those who remained in Lebanon by fear of being associated to “the rebels”, rightfully or wrongfully so, or afraid that their children could be enrolled in the regular army, are the people who live in this refugee camp. Here, stuck in the middle of this valley at the bottom of the mountains, so close and yet so far from their country, their little huts are buzzing before my eyes and the thick smoke of the <em>sobias</em> (iron stove used to heat the tents) is forever engraved in my retina.</p>
<h2>Music and social cohesion</h2>
<p>These territories can stimulate intercultural exchanges, but are also conflictual spaces where inequalities between populations are important. For Syrians who recently settled here, the Bekaa Valley has become, a place of constant transit and segregation, a space where they do not belong to but cannot leave either. We are far from an idealised land that promotes mobility, gatherings, and exchanges. Everything suggests that creativity does not belong here, in circumstances where the practice of artistic activities is a luxury. Yet, imagination becomes crucial, individually and collectively, not in an attempt to escape reality through a purely aesthetic project but rather in a quest for collaborative experiences. However, to do so, one must find the physical and mental space to stimulate sensory exploration in such a difficult environment.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271030/original/file-20190425-121241-pc9xfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271030/original/file-20190425-121241-pc9xfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271030/original/file-20190425-121241-pc9xfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271030/original/file-20190425-121241-pc9xfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271030/original/file-20190425-121241-pc9xfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271030/original/file-20190425-121241-pc9xfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271030/original/file-20190425-121241-pc9xfx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Sounds of Change project.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.soundsofchange.org/">soundsofchange.org</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Lucas Dols possessed the infinite energy needed to organize sustainable participatory artistic projects in the hotbed of the Middle East. He has created <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4B0jLc-Sdw">Sounds of Change</a>, a pedagogical project and utopian experimentation that is both a local and a transnational experience. The organisation is established in Lebanon but also in Jordan, Palestine, Holland, Turkey, Greece, Canada, India, and Ukraine. Sounds of Change uses music as a vehicle for change, to create bridges and simulate social inclusion, empathy, collaboration, and creativity. Their music workshops are dialogues between sounds and movements. No one needs to be a musician, it is about exploring one’s musical self and listening to others.</p>
<p>I saw Lucas for the first time in Tanayel after a long day of work. He immediately attracts attention and transmits energy. I remember participating with some apprehension to one of his workshops. We were about ten adults led by an improvised conductor, a participative and co-productive audience. Little by little, the strange cacophony became music, a surprising exercise infused with complex and intoxicating emotional dynamics, a form of participative art that transcends purely aesthetics and becomes a social and symbolic exercise. Later on, I saw the work of Ahmed, another member of the organisation with the children of the camps. Several times a week, he organises a choir at a community centre in the valley. Music allows wounds to resurface, war traumas are revealed, and what was invisible suddenly becomes visible.</p>
<h2>Knitting the days</h2>
<p>Here like in Syria, waiting is part of the everyday life. So there is time for these types of projects. Too often, We forget this aspect of war when we live in peace: perpetual expectancy and hope for a better tomorrow without any clear vision of the future. What can we do when there is nothing to do, nothing but daily survival in an existence that is not really ours? It is hard to grasp the pervasive emptiness filling everything.</p>
<p>The Syrian artist Diana Jubi came up with the idea of a textile calendar. Day after day and since the beginning of the war, She knits a scarf that serves as a calendar. This long piece of wool has no other function than to be a witness of the time passing. It is an activity that is familiar to us, concrete. For those who have never experienced war or never lived in forced exile, being able to feel this expectation is to perceive another reality.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/_4B0jLc-Sdw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Sounds of Change project.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Artistic practices feeding on reality attempt to provoke debate or social change. They refute both traditional activism and purely mercantile, formal, and narcissistic forms of contemporary art. Like the artist Tania Burguera, these artistic manifestations reject the Western assumption that art has no function. These artistic approaches incorporate an emotional dimension; it is a double-edged sword. <a href="https://scholar.google.fr/scholar?q=The+Cultural+Politics+of+Emotion&hl=fr&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart">According to researcher Sara Ahmed</a>, who works on gender issues and postcolonialism, emotions have political implications. They have an emotional power that can generate social change and can be used or misused. </p>
<p>“Artivists” also advocate for the use of emotion as a tactic (short-term) or as a strategy (long-term) for political action. For them, affecting has effect. The link between art and activism seems more topical than ever. Just consider the curatorial choices of cultural institutions and organisations, major art competitions, biennials, prizes, calls for projects, or academic publications. Reclaiming art and adopting inclusive and democratic aesthetic strategies to stimulate social and political change is not a utopia, it is a rapidly developing reality that takes the most unexpected forms.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in the Bekaa, families are waiting without knowing if or how long the situation will take to evolve, at the mercy of a political context they cannot control. It is about fighting against indifference and creating sensorial spaces through the work of artists to give these people a voice and therefore a place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116032/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anaïs Ortega ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>In this difficult context, through different mechanisms, the artists engage with the consequences of war to restore social cohesion, stimulate imagination and revive hope.Anaïs Ortega, PhD researcher art, activism and migration, Université de LausanneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1131592019-03-08T11:43:32Z2019-03-08T11:43:32ZRefugees forced to return to Syria face imprisonment, death at the hands of Assad<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262723/original/file-20190307-82669-1e1ka1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Aid from UNICEF being distributed to Syrian refugees at a flooded camp in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, Jan. 10, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Lebanon-Syrian-Refugees/766b4b7cab6444b29c09f1c2833d65ac/63/0">AP/Bilal Hussein</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>I worked on the Syrian-Turkish border from 2012-16, leading the <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/bureau/194564.htm">U.S. government team</a> that was pushing hundreds of millions of dollars in humanitarian and other aid into northwest Syria. We were helping communities that had been cut off by the Syrian government.</p>
<p>Maybe no American official heard more about the suffering inside Syria at the hands of the Syrian regime than I did. </p>
<p>More than 3.5 million Syrian refugees <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-time-to-dispel-some-myths-80996">fled violence and persecution</a> in Syria for Turkey. Some faced <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/for-syrian-refugees-fear-of-conscription-prevents-return-home/">forced conscription into the army</a> to fight their fellow Syrians. Some <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/pay-a-hefty-bribe-or-risk-being-felled-by-assads-snipers/">paid huge bribes</a> to escape torture for demonstrating peacefully against the regime. </p>
<p>Most couldn’t take another day of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/06/middleeast/syria-weapons-against-civilians/index.html">indiscriminate bombing of innocent civilians</a> in schools, hospitals and markets.</p>
<p>I left Turkey in 2016, retired from the U.S. government in 2017 and follow Syria as a private American citizen. I also teach about foreign aid at the University of Washington.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Syrian government shelled its own people during the civil war. Here, a victim in a hospital bed in 2014, Aleppo, Syria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mideast-Syria-Brutal-War/94fe34aed47f43e48115b0d19af918f4/6/0">AP/Muhammed Muheisen</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Last month I was in Berlin for two days, coaching a group of Syrian civil society organizations about how to make themselves heard at an upcoming meeting of European Union nations <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/57556/brussels-host-third-conference-supporting-future-syria-and-region_en">in Brussels on the future of Syria</a>. </p>
<p>These Syrian activists know the civil war is lost, that Bashar al-Assad will remain in power for the foreseeable future (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/world/middleeast/syria-future.html">thanks to his Russian and Iranian backers</a>) and that the West did very little when it came to backing real change in Syria. </p>
<p>But they know there is one battle left to fight: the battle to stop Syrian refugees from being forced to return to Syria against their will.</p>
<h2>Millions fled</h2>
<p>The burden the refugees put on Syria’s neighbors is clear. </p>
<p>There are half a million Syrian refugees <a href="http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Jordan%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20June%202018.pdf">living in towns and cities across Jordan</a>, a country already hosting tens of thousands of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. In Lebanon, there are <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71">nearly a million Syrian refugees</a> – that’s one-sixth of the population. More than 3 million are living in Turkey.</p>
<p>A small percentage live in camps in Jordan and Turkey; there are no refugee camps in Lebanon. Most refugees are living in Jordanian, Lebanese and Turkish communities, sharing services with local populations. </p>
<p>The governments and people of these countries deserve the world’s thanks for the hospitality they’ve shown. </p>
<p>Some other countries have tried to help. The U.S. Agency for International Development, for example, <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/addressing-impact-syria-crisis-jordan">spent hundreds of millions in Jordan</a> to help communities near the Syrian border cope with increased demands for education and medical care. </p>
<p>I saw the <a href="https://www.zakat.org/en/">Zakat Foundation</a>, a private American charity from Chicago, running “second-shift schools” for Syrian children in Turkey, after the Turkish children had left their schools for the day. </p>
<p>But this work pales in comparison with the generosity extended by the neighboring countries themselves.</p>
<h2>Danger in returning</h2>
<p>As grateful as they are for the welcome in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, the refugees want to go home and try to put their lives back together. Their homes, their property, their cemeteries and loved ones are inside Syria. </p>
<p>But as a longtime humanitarian aid official, I believe that now is not the time. </p>
<p>Syria’s security services were always strong. They suspect nearly everyone who left the country of loyalty to the opposition. No one should trust a regime that bombed innocent civilians for years, probably <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/jul/04/families-syria-disappeared-demand-answers-un">detained more than 200,000</a> without trial and is <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity">reported to have killed its own civilians</a> with chemical weapons. </p>
<p>Without strong international oversight, I foresee that premature refugee returns will mean many thousands more in prison, tortured, conscripted and missing.</p>
<p>What’s the alternative to forcing refugees to return too soon? </p>
<p>Providing more support to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon to expand services for the refugees and the communities that host them is one way to help these refugees during this period. </p>
<p>Europe can expand the European Union’s <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trustfund-syria-region/content/home_en">Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syria Crisis</a>, or MADAD (Arabic for expand), project. MADAD supports countries hosting refugees by investing in health and education, economic development and job creation.</p>
<p>All countries can help Syria’s neighbors through multilateral programs like the <a href="http://www.srtfund.org/">Syria Recovery Trust Fund</a>. The fund assists Syrian communities in opposition-controlled areas by paying for basic services like water and power. </p>
<p>Refugees will not return <a href="https://theconversation.com/garbage-collection-in-syria-is-crucial-to-fighting-the-islamic-state-109396">before these services are restored</a>. With a mandate to work in Syria’s neighboring countries too, and with greater resources, the SRTF could also help Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan cope with the refugee numbers.</p>
<p>Helping Syria’s refugees where they are won’t be cheap, but it will be cheaper than rebuilding Syria. Until there is a realistic political settlement of the conflict, with enforceable legal rights for returning refugees, rebuilding Syria should be left to the Syrian government. </p>
<h2>‘Not yet’</h2>
<p>At the conference in Brussels next week, attendees could focus on the usual response to Syria’s problems by providing more short-term fixes, like safe zones inside Syria – safe from Syrian government attack – to which refugees could return safely. But these would not come with a long-term commitment to protect the refugees who return there. </p>
<p>And that approach will just kick the problem down the road. It may turn parts of Syria into a “no-man’s land” someday and <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282849.htm">a haven for terrorists</a>.</p>
<p>I had dinner with some Syrian friends on my last night in Berlin, seven brave young people who are trying to help communities cut off by the regime. They love their country, want to go back and help rebuild it. </p>
<p>I asked them if they would go back now, when the bombing has mostly stopped and countries are beginning to resume diplomatic relations with Damascus. </p>
<p>They smiled sadly, shook their heads and said, “Not yet.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113159/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Ward does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Syrian civil war has ended, but there are millions of Syrian refugees living in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. With danger from a hostile regime back in Syria, what will happen to them now?Mark Ward, Lecturer, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1043622018-10-18T09:25:30Z2018-10-18T09:25:30ZHow Syrian architects can start to rebuild – even in the devastation of war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240431/original/file-20181012-109219-1yoag4i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Destruction in Homs.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Majd Murad</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-whos-involved-and-what-do-they-want-95002">war in Syria</a> has turned many of its cities into battlegrounds. Places like Aleppo, Homs and Raqqa have been reshaped beyond recognition by the destruction of architecture and the mass displacement of citizens.</p>
<p>Residents are trapped in a war zone, struggling to cope with everyday activities. Their daily routines involve checkpoints, security zones and besieged neighbourhoods. They live between ruins and are disoriented within their own homeland. Amid mass destruction, they have lost a sense of belonging in the cities they used to know.</p>
<p>In Syria, where the war has entered its eighth year, architects and urban planners can no longer wait for “post-war reconstruction” plans or “peace resolution”. Instead they are already working to save their heritage, preserve their identity, and protect their history from being erased by extreme violence.</p>
<p>This is happening in a variety of ways. Some are hiding cultural artefacts in secret graveyards to protect them from demolition and looting. Some are trying to rebuild destroyed houses and souks, and provide shelter for internally displaced populations. Some are travelling to other countries – Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey – to receive training on the best ways to save their cities and heritage. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A destroyed neighbourhood in Homs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Majd Murad</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The war has made it vital for architects to shift their thinking in an attempt to respond to the changing dynamics of war. As part of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.architecture.com/awards-and-competitions-landing-page/awards/riba-presidents-awards-for-research/2018/architects-at-the-time-of-war&ust=1539441900000000&usg=AFQjCNHJkKN44xj9PfCj8JeTTCBb5ODGSw&hl=en&source=gmail">my own research</a>, I have spoken to Syrian architects based inside and outside the country about how work to rebuild these cities can be supported from afar. Several ideas have emerged, including the creation of mentoring programmes, research collaborations with academics, and providing online learning materials on architecture, construction and project management.</p>
<p>One of the most common themes was the need for resources – on rebuilding, on bringing communities back together – to be published in Arabic. I am now working on a translation project of ten briefing papers from the “<a href="https://www.urbanconflicts.arct.cam.ac.uk/publications/copy_of_briefing-papers">Conflict in Cities</a>” project of the Urban Conflicts Research Centre (UCR) at the University of Cambridge with <a href="https://www.urbanconflicts.arct.cam.ac.uk/people/dr-wendy-pullan">Professor Wendy Pullan</a>.</p>
<p>The Arabic materials will be openly shared in early 2019 with audiences in the Middle East to share knowledge about topics such as urban regeneration, politics of heritage and the role of cities in reducing conflicts. </p>
<p>But we must also remember what any future reconstruction is for. Architects, academics, politicians, economists and developers each have their own agenda and interests. For some, the reconstruction is a financial opportunity to invest and make money. For others it is a place for foreign designers to experiment with new ideas.</p>
<p>There are already fears that the last to participate in these emerging plans and conversations will be the Syrians themselves – and that such plans might not put the Syrians at the heart of the reconstruction. </p>
<p>After all, many of those interested in the “reconstruction” of Syria have little knowledge about the country, the way of life, and its social and cultural landscapes. We must remember that any construction that does take place will be upon land that is soaked with the blood of Syrian men, women and children.</p>
<p>We must also be wary of a lack of balance in the plans for reconstruction and the building of urban resilience – the capacity of the city, its systems and its inhabitants to adapt to different shocks and stresses. </p>
<h2>The power of building</h2>
<p>In some cities, reconstruction and resilience are only focused on a few spots of the city, and benefit only particular communities. Some disadvantaged communities are overlooked. As the urban design expert Lawrence J Vale <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Resilient-City-Modern-Recover-Disaster/dp/0195175832/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1539765275&sr=1-4&keywords=Lawrence+J.Vale">notes</a>, uneven resilience threatens the ability of cities as a whole to function economically, socially and politically.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A ruined residential area in Homs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anon</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>But there is also hope. Architecture could bring huge positives to a devastated Syrian society. It can be symbolic and powerful when architects have the opportunity to face history, instead of whitewashing it – when architecture can contribute to creating spaces and places for everyone, and not only for the elite.</p>
<p>In his book, <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Building-Post-War-Textbook-Nicholas-Bullock/dp/041522179X">Building the Post-War World</a>, Professor Nick Bullock explains how after World War II, rebuilding created an opportunity for the spirit of innovation and experimentation linked to the hopes of a new and better world and architecture.</p>
<p>In Syria, with such huge loss of the fabric of cities and countryside, architects are searching for the “Syrianess” of Syrian architecture. Many of the architects I spoke with emphasised the need to build a new Syria, for Syrians, by Syrians. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Julia Domna Palace rebuilt in the Old City of Homs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yvonne M. Al-Abdi</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They do not want to apply an international architectural language in their cities, or a Beirut-like reconstruction plan that does not reflect the identity of the country. Instead, they are looking towards a Syrian identity through architecture – architecture that can bring a sense of social justice and cohesion to all Syrians. To the displaced, to the poor, and to the disadvantaged – rebuilding a Syria for everyone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104362/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ammar Azzouz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Work to preserve the country’s heritage is already happening.Ammar Azzouz, Visiting Scholar, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/938512018-03-27T04:58:37Z2018-03-27T04:58:37ZWhy schools become battlegrounds during conflict<p>Last week, more than 100 girls who had been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/boko-haram-returns-some-of-the-girls-it-kidnapped-last-month">abducted by the Islamic militant group Boko Haram</a> from a Nigerian school in Dapchi in February were released to their families. But the community was also threatened that if the group returned and found any girls in school, they would be abducted again – and not returned.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Syria, <a href="http://undocs.org/S/2014/295">conservative estimates</a> are that at least 4,072 schools have been forced to close, used as shelters, or destroyed due to the conflict. And there have been at least 1,292 <a href="http://www.savesyrianschools.org/context.php">attacks on schools</a> in the Hama, Daraa, Homs, and Idlib provinces. </p>
<p>While a coalition of NGOs were presenting the findings of their #SaveSyrianSchools project in a public hearing in Geneva last week, another school was <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/syria-strike-kills-15-children-at-school">bombed in Syria</a>, killing at least 15 children.</p>
<p>These examples reflect broader trends of targeting education across conflict-affected parts of the world. It is estimated that <a href="https://www.unicef.org/media/files/Education_Uprooted_DIGITAL.pdf">one in four school-aged children</a> in conflict-affected nations are not in school. This is a total of around 27 million children. And girls are 2.5 times more likely to be denied an education. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aleppos-dying-children-and-shattered-health-system-is-there-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-63995">Aleppo's dying children and shattered health system: is there light at the end of the tunnel?</a>
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<h2>Why use schools as battlegrounds</h2>
<p>There are many reasons why schools and students, despite being protected by <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/children">international law</a>, are targeted during times of armed conflict and unrest. Students collected together in a school, or isolated travelling to and from school, are prime targets for abduction by armed groups. </p>
<p>Children are often taken to be recruited as <a href="http://childsoldiersworldindex.org/">child soldiers, or used as human shields or human bombs</a>. Schools are soft targets, and the targeting of children is very effective in campaigns of terror, having a <a href="https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/report/2011/hidden-crisis-armed-conflict-and-education">destabilising effect on communities</a>.</p>
<p>Schools and universities are also <a href="http://www.protectingeducation.org/restricting-military-use-and-occupation">ideal locations for military headquarters</a> and facilities, and can become central to war efforts. This makes them key military targets for opposing sides.</p>
<p>Schools can be seen by armed groups to represent state authority, and are therefore key targets in campaigns against the government. This is especially true when the groups disagree with the form of education being provided. This reality is perhaps best illustrated by <a href="https://undocs.org/en/S/2017/304">Boko Haram</a>, which in 2015 committed to the cause of Islamic State and renamed itself the Islamic State of West Africa. </p>
<p>Despite the change, the group remains best known as “Boko Haram”, which in the local Hausa dialect roughly translates as “Western education is forbidden”. Targeting schools and abducting children is <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/04/11/they-set-classrooms-fire/attacks-education-northeast-nigeria">a core strategy of the group</a>, whose extremist beliefs oppose such education as sinful, and particularly object to the education of girls.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/countering-boko-haram-can-a-regional-approach-help-nigeria-36910">Countering Boko Haram: can a regional approach help Nigeria?</a>
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<p>Boko Haram’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32299943">infamous 2014 abduction of 276 girls in Chibok</a> sparked the #BringBackOurGirls social media campaign. According to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/tag/boko-haram">Human Rights Watch</a>, more than 910 schools have been destroyed by Boko Haram in Nigeria; 600 teachers have been murdered, and thousands have been more forced to flee. </p>
<h2>What the rest of the world can do</h2>
<p>All children have the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Language.aspx?LangID=eng">right to an education</a>, and that can only be secured when schools are safe places to study. While the world watches and encourages American children rallying to make their schools safer, it’s a salient time to remember that <a href="https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10497.pdf">75 million children</a> worldwide experience significant disruption to their education in regions of conflict and insecurity. </p>
<p>Despite the United Nations declaring attacks on schools as one of the <a href="https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/six-grave-violations/">six grave violations</a> that most impact on children during armed conflict, much remains to be done to safeguard education during conflict – particularly for girls. </p>
<p>This is largely because education is not seen as a priority in crisis situations. Its loss is not immediately life-threatening, so it often takes a back seat to other concerns. This forms part of what is sometimes referred to as “<a href="http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/WHS-background-paper.pdf">the humanitarian-development divide</a>” – the disconnect between priorities during protracted crises. Education is often <a href="https://www.unicef.org/media/files/Education_Uprooted_DIGITAL.pdf">one of the first services to be lost</a> during a crisis, despite its importance to communities.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"977859578309300224"}"></div></p>
<p>Education attracts <a href="http://www.educationcannotwait.org/the-situation/">less than 2% of global humanitarian aid</a>. Many affected countries invest far more on their military spending <a href="https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/report/2011/hidden-crisis-armed-conflict-and-education">than they do on education</a>. </p>
<p>While many initiatives and funds exist, there is still a need for greater coordination between government bodies and NGOs to effectively mount a response. And with countries slashing their aid budgets, this will become increasingly difficult. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/savage-budget-cuts-pull-australia-down-in-foreign-aid-rankings-58854">Savage budget cuts pull Australia down in foreign aid rankings</a>
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<hr>
<p>There may also be a lack of political will to confront this problem by countries not directly affected. In Australia, this is reflected by the government’s current <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/the-other-safe-schools-campaign-that-australia-is-ignoring-20160404-gnxmst.html">failure to endorse</a> the <a href="http://www.protectingeducation.org/draft-lucens-guidelines-protecting-schools-and-universities-military-use-during-armed-conflict">Safe Schools Declaration</a> – an international commitment supporting clear guidelines and reporting mechanisms to protect schools and education during armed conflict. These include the commitment not to use schools or universities for military purposes and to support measures to monitor and report on attacks on schools. </p>
<p>Education is a right, not a luxury to be indulged in better times. To rise out of conflict and create truly stable communities, education is a necessary investment in the future, and the international community shares a collective responsibility to protect it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93851/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shireen Daft does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Schools and students are often targeted during times of armed conflict. Abducted children can be recruited as soldiers and schools are ideal locations for military headquarters.Shireen Daft, Lecturer in Law, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/882842018-01-30T11:32:50Z2018-01-30T11:32:50ZWhy ignoring mental health needs of young Syrian refugees could harm us all<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196974/original/file-20171129-12032-1p9nqp2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Syrian child drew a picture of helicopters dropping bombs and children dying as a result. The surviving children are crying, while the deceased ones have smiles on their faces. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zaher Sahloud</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When a seven-year-old student in eastern Aleppo was asked at the peak of the bombardment campaign by the Assad regime in 2015 to draw a picture, he did not draw children playing, nor did he draw a blue sky or a smiling sun. </p>
<p>Instead, Ahmad drew helicopters dropping barrel bombs, houses blazing in fire and mutilated dead children in blood. In his drawing, the dead children had smiles on their faces, while those alive were in tears. </p>
<p>For this little boy, a pen and a paper were the only tools that enabled him to express his traumatic recollections of a childhood lost. </p>
<p>In Syria, its neighboring countries and all the way to Europe, there are millions of Syrian refugees and displaced individuals like Ahmad who have cried and will continue to cry without any opportunity to express their trauma, let alone receive any support and therapy to overcome the nightmares of war, loss and forced displacement. </p>
<p>The near-disappearance of Syria from the news does not mean that the war has ended. In just the first few months of 2017, more than <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/number-syrian-refugees-passes-million-170330132040023.html">250,000 Syrians</a> registered as refugees, bringing the number of Syrian refugees to more than 5.1 million. <a href="http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/15-syrian-refugees-frozen-death-lebanon">Fifteen Syrian refugees</a>, including three children, have been found frozen to death in northern Lebanon. They lost their lives as they attempted to cross into Lebanon from neighboring Syria. All countries bordering on Syria have <a href="https://qz.com/635110/these-are-the-routes-being-closed-off-to-refugees-fleeing-into-europe/">limited immigration</a>, essentially closing their borders to refugees. </p>
<p>Now, seven years into the brutal Syrian crisis, the exact scale and impact of psychological trauma, mental health challenges and PTSD on both children and adults are not well-known, nor are they prioritized by local and international aid agencies, relief organizations and governments. But we know the psychological toll of the conflict is significant. </p>
<p>According to Ana Moughrabieh, a Syrian-American critical care specialist who continues to help fellow colleagues in Syria’s Idlib province via telemedicine, a new trend has emerged among women and teenagers. Every few days, one or two women and teens are admitted to the local hospital after a suicide attempt by ingesting insecticides. The insecticide is known locally as “gas pill” and leads to multiple organ failures, causing a painful and slow death. </p>
<p>As a doctor who spent the last six years providing medical relief in <a href="http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/December-2016/Chicagoans-of-the-Year-2016-John-Kahler-Zaher-Sahloul-and-Samer-Attar/">Syria</a>, I believe that the world should pay attention to the future of Syria by lending a healing hand to its traumatized children. If we don’t, we will have to face the ugly and unpredictable consequences in the years ahead.</p>
<h2>Mental health not a priority</h2>
<p>In the north, more than 220,000 civilians have became displaced in <a href="https://www.afad.gov.tr/ar/24446/AFAD-Head-Gulluoglu-visits-Idlib">Idlib</a> province in the past few weeks after an orchestrated campaign by Assad troops and Russian jets. There are <a href="https://www.thesun.ie/news/2091195/idlib-in-syria-used-to-be-a-refugee-haven-now-we-live-each-day-in-fear-with-scores-killed-by-bombs-and-many-more-injured/">2.5 million people in Idlib</a>, half of them internally displaced from other cities. </p>
<p>In the south, 17 patients, children among them, died while awaiting evacuation from besieged <a href="http://time.com/5080005/syria-eastern-ghouta-medical-evacuations-icrc/">Ghouta</a>. More than 400,000 civilians are still under siege by their own government for the sixth consecutive year. The regime continued to bomb civilian areas with conventional and sometimes chlorine bombs. Every day there is a new list of dead civilians and children that no one pays attention to except for the local activists. To many Syrians, there is a sense that the world has deserted Syrians.</p>
<p>The resulting depression, PTSD, suicidal tendencies, severe aggression and other <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-and-lebanon-psychological-distress-common-among-iraqi-refugees-iom-study-finds">mental illnesses that result from these horrors</a> are invisible wounds that are not being detected early enough, let alone treated efficiently, in Syria and beyond. The longer they go untreated, the more amplified are the impacts.</p>
<p>Mental illness remains a taboo across the world, especially in Syria and the Middle East where patients and their families are afraid to seek treatment fearing that they will be labeled as crazy, or “Majnoon” in Arabic. </p>
<p>Often these people are shunned by their communities and spend their lives struggling with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/04/25/syrias-mental-health-crisis/">minimal support</a>. There is <a href="http://www.emro.who.int/syr/syria-news/mental-health-care-in-syria-another-casualty-of-war.html">only one operating mental health hospital</a> in Syria where people with acute psychiatric conditions are treated. </p>
<p>Even before the crisis, mental hospitals were more like prisons than real hospitals. There were only two public psychiatric hospitals. One is located in a rural area outside Damascus but now operates with limited capacity because of security concerns. The second one, in Aleppo, has closed.</p>
<p>In the neighboring countries of Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon that are host to over <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-emergency.html">five million Syrian refugees</a>, psychosocial support and psychiatric care are predominantly <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A0E119713D1F7CC6C125740200389E30-Full_Report.pdf">privatized</a>. The situation is compounded by a severe shortage of psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers.</p>
<p>M.K. Hamza, a Syrian-American psychiatrist who volunteered in multiple medical missions to Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Greece, described a <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com.au/experts-say-pain-syrian-children-beyond-ptsd-1546040">new syndrome</a> to illustrate the extreme psychological trauma that affects Syrian children. In 2016, he called this <a href="http://metro.co.uk/2017/02/28/doctors-create-term-for-pain-syrian-children-experience-because-its-far-worse-than-ptsd-6477911/">human devastation syndrome</a>. According to the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com.au/experts-say-pain-syrian-children-beyond-ptsd-1546040">same report</a>, more than 45 percent of Syrian children refugees suffer from PTSD, and many suffer from other mental health problems like depression and anxiety.</p>
<h2>Other aspects of psychological trauma</h2>
<p>Many of these young people are at high risk of becoming drug addicts, prostitutes and extremists themselves. There are even reports of <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-04/syrian-refugees-selling-their-organs-on-the-black-market/8160496">criminal organ trafficking</a> and illegal adoptions run by international gangs preying on vulnerable Syrian children. </p>
<p>In Lebanon, a small country of five million that’s now home to over 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 16-year-old Abed is among the very few Syrians who receive therapy and counseling from a local nongovernmental organization called <a href="http://www.artofhopeglobal.org">Art of Hope</a> that helps alleviate PTSD and trauma through art therapy and vocational training. Art of Hope tries to bring some level of normalcy, dignity and belonging to Syrian children by engaging them in activities like art and craft workshops and addressing their emotional trauma. </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/tara-kangarlou/im-a-journalist-and-this-_b_9324252.html">Tara Kangarlou</a>, the founder of the organization, the teenager was forced to witness beheadings in his hometown of Raqqa, where ISIS also amputated his hand. Abed currently suffers from depression, guilt and aggressive tendencies. During one of the therapy sessions, Abed told his counselor that it may be better if he returns home to join ISIS – expressing remorse that perhaps it was his fault that ISIS amputated his hand.</p>
<h2>Addressing mental health in age of IS</h2>
<p>As the number of out-of-school children looms both inside Syria and in host countries, these invisible wounds won’t be healed unless large humanitarian groups and U.N. agencies team up with local and grassroots organizations inside Syria and out. They need to address the mental health and public health challenges in parallel with educational programming. </p>
<p>In the absence of adequate leadership and security, I believe <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/world/middleeast/isis-syria-militants-kurds.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news">terrorist groups will fill gaps</a> and prey on vulnerable recruits. They do so by providing these children and teens with basic necessities, but most importantly a sense of dignity, belonging and purpose. </p>
<p>I believe that treating these wounds would be an investment that will pay in the form of counterextremism and reduction of conflict and hostility. An absence of treatment is damaging to the children and also to society.</p>
<p>Nations could also develop telemedicine counseling to fill the gap. On a grassroots level, host countries should engage in training of local trainers and empowering Syrians to detect early signs of depression, anxiety and suicidal tendencies.</p>
<p>In spite of the overwhelming trauma, Syrian children are so resilient. They smile, play and adapt quickly in the refugee camps and even under siege. The same child who drew a picture of death and bombs will be drawing flowers, rivers, butterflies and happy faces after a few sessions of art therapy. He can grow up to become a doctor, a teacher, an engineer or even a president. It is incumbent on us to provide him with that chance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88284/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>M. Zaher Sahloul is a senior adviser and past president of the Syrian American Medical Association.</span></em></p>Syrian refugee children are not getting the care they need in the wake of the trauma they have endured. Here’s why that’s bad for them and bad for the rest of the world.M. Zaher Sahloul, Associate Clinical Professor, University of Illinois ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812812017-08-01T13:52:11Z2017-08-01T13:52:11ZWhy Russia needs troops from the Caucasus in Syria – and how they bolster Moscow’s ‘eastern’ image<p>During the early years of the Cold War, the Soviet Union made a great push to reach out to the developing world, and particularly to the Middle East and Asia. It established particularly close ties with Nasser’s Egypt and later with Syria, but didn’t do so well with others; the Chinese leadership in particular <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682745.2010.481426">doubted</a> whether the USSR really empathised with the Global South and its anti-colonial struggle. Russia, it argued, was essentially a former colonial power, or at the very least a white European country incapable of understanding the developing world’s problems.</p>
<p>Moscow duly tried to prove the opposite by cultivating its own “eastern” identity. It sent its “easterners” on conspicuous missions abroad: Armenians and Azerbaijanis worked in solidarity committees and friendship societies, while Uzbeks and Tajiks served as ambassadors in the Middle East or played a key role as soldiers during the invasion of Afghanistan. </p>
<p>These plans to win over Middle Eastern and Asian allies were rendered moot when the USSR crumbled. But today, Russia’s push to claim an eastern identity seems to be underway once again – and nowhere more so than in Syria.</p>
<p>As media attention has shifted to efforts to oust the so-called Islamic State from its Syrian stronghold, Raqqa, the Syrian regime is struggling to govern the areas of Syria it has recaptured with the help of Russia and other backers. Particularly troublesome is Aleppo, the country’s largest city and former business hub, which was brought back under Damascus’s full control in December 2016. Enter Russia, whose help has already turned the tide in the Syrian regimes’s favour. </p>
<p>Russian military police are now helping to beef up security in Aleppo and other areas. They are drawn in part from the Russian Northern Caucasus, in particular from the predominantly Muslim republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia. In December 2016, a Chechen battalion was <a href="https://youtu.be/oEpYOAo0LCQ">dispatched</a> to Aleppo, returning from its tour in March 2017; in February 2017, <a href="https://ria.ru/syria/20170213/1487860594.html">Ingushetia</a> sent a group of soldiers to provide security to Russian military facilities. Finally, in April, another detachment of Chechen troops boarded a plane to Syria, deemed to stay there <a href="http://polit.ru/news/2017/04/19/chechen_army">until August</a>.</p>
<p>To listen to the state-backed media, this would seem like proof that Russia’s “eastern” identity is as self-assured as ever. Outlets such as RT stress that these military policemen are particularly welcomed in Syria, where they are supposedly greeted as fellow Sunni Muslims, while <a href="https://www.rt.com/news/375551-chechen-soldiers-patrolling-aleppo/">Russian experts</a> claim that they can more easily empathise and communicate with the local community. </p>
<p>While there might be some truth to these claims, there are rather “harder” interests behind Russia’s Syrian strategy – both on the side of the federal government in Moscow and on the side of the Caucasian republics involved. </p>
<h2>Quid pro quo</h2>
<p>The Syrian conflict is not overly popular in Russia. Ever since Russian troops directly intervened, <a href="http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD175.pdf">media coverage</a> at home has been huge, with every effort made to portray the intervention as a humanitarian and anti-terrorist mission. But at best, the Russian public is largely uninterested – and apathy could quickly sour into outright opposition if a significant number of Russian lives were lost on the ground. </p>
<p>Sending military forces from the peripheral republics minimises this risk. Most Russians see the republics and their populations as a huge social, political, and economic burden; if Chechen or Ingush lives were lost, this would hardly have an effect on public opinion in Moscow or St. Petersburg. </p>
<p>The republics also have something special to offer: experienced troops who have operated before in theatres characterised by terrorist threats and are particularly well prepared for the Syrian arena. On top of this, as political scientist Aleksey Makarkin told Russian business channel <a href="http://www.rbc.ru/politics/13/02/2017/58a1c09e9a79475806d0095d">RBK</a>, both Chechnya and Ingushetia are desperate to attract and keep Russia’s attention. Being among the poorest republics, they badly need central government support, especially since the Kremlin has increasingly <a href="http://afpc.org/publication_listings/viewArticle/3561">diverted funds to Crimea</a>.</p>
<p>But there’s something else going on, too – and Chechnya in particular has specific interests in mind. </p>
<h2>Playing it safe</h2>
<p>As Russian newspaper <a href="https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2016/12/20/127616-v-chechne-formiruyut-dva-batalona-dlya-otpravki-v-siriyu">Novaya Gazeta</a> reported, it seems the Chechen government’s military strategy includes an element of retribution: the soldiers it’s sending to the Middle East to join the pro-regime effort are drawn from families who have already seen a member leave to fight on the other side. </p>
<p>One military commander seemed to back this up in an ambiguous TV interview: while highlighting the <a href="https://youtu.be/DM7POPWmYn8?t=1m55s">all-Russian</a> and multi-faith identity of his troops, he also stressed that they were sent to Syria to <a href="https://youtu.be/DM7POPWmYn8?t=15m30s">redeem the Chechens’ reputation</a>.</p>
<p>In effect, the republic has its own small foreign policy, and so long as it sticks mostly to Moscow’s line, both parties have something to gain: Russia can use Chechnya’s semi-independent operations to open a second <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2014/01/chechnya-mideast-diplomacy-muslim-outreach-ramzan-kadyrov.html">diplomatic channel</a> to the wider Middle East, while Chechnya can strengthen its position vis-a-vis the central government and Middle Eastern countries, and <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2017/05/31/16053/">improve</a> its status among disdainful Russians. In one recent PR stunt, Chechen diplomacy helped to <a href="https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2913468">free</a> a Russian girl held by Turkish authorities after she attempted to cross into Syria.</p>
<p>Whether all this will pay off for Russia, its republics, and Syria remains to be seen. While Russian military police might have strengthened security for now, Aleppo is still under the sway of various militias and paramilitaries, who’ve filled the void left by regular armed forces when they moved on to Syria’s other front lines. The Damascus government is <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/06/22/aleppo-militias-become-major-test-assad">stepping up its efforts</a> to crack down on these groups, but they remain a problem.</p>
<p>The Russian discourse around these police missions bears a remarkable resemblance to the Soviet Union’s approach to the Middle East, including its exploitation of Soviet Muslims to pursue its goals there. As in the past, rather than an exuberant embrace of an eastern identity, this is a political manoeuvre. </p>
<p>In contrast to Soviet times, however, the republics are pursuing their own agendas much more openly, especially Chechnya, which genuinely fosters a Muslim identity under the leadership of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/23/putins-closest-ally-and-his-biggest-liability">Ramzan Kadyrov</a>. Still, for Russia as a whole and for Chechnya in particular, what looks like a geopolitical play for other countries’ sympathies or mere identity politics is in fact a matter of dicey domestic considerations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philipp Casula receives funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation. </span></em></p>By sending troops from the North Caucasus to Syria, Russia is returning to its old habits.Philipp Casula, Visiting scholar in Russian Studies, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/733752017-04-26T06:30:40Z2017-04-26T06:30:40ZBack for our future: lessons from the Crusades about peace in Syria today<p>The latest phase of the multifaceted conflict in Syria bears every sign of escalating further. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38308883">The fall of Aleppo</a> was meant to signal the beginning of the end for the rebels, but new offensives in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39401326">Raqqa</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/world/middleeast/syria-rebels-damascus.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170322&nl=morning-briefing-europe&nlid=64524812&src=twr&te=1&_r=0">the country’s capital Damascus</a> again changed the balance. </p>
<p>Bashar al-Assad allegedly responded with <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idlib-idUSKBN1760IB">chemical weapons</a>, leading to a United States missile strike and to Russian President <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKBN1782S0">Vladimir Putin’s warning</a> of serious consequences in response. </p>
<p>At the same time – and in a clear show of force – the US <a href="http://www.reuters.com/video/2017/04/13/us-drops-mega-bomb-on-isis-caves-in-afgh?videoId=371488686">dropped its largest non-atomic bomb</a> in Afghanistan to target forces from the so-called Islamic State (IS), who, though pressed in Iraq, are <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul-usa-idUSKBN17E26E">still fighting hard</a>, and <a href="https://isis.liveuamap.com/">spreading</a> to wider fronts.</p>
<p>Only peace in Syria will allow IS to be defeated. But when peace efforts are put into geopolitical and historical context, commentators often <a href="http://www.vox.com/2016/2/4/10910360/syria-peace-talks-geneva-doomed">dismiss the possibility</a>. Instead, they tend to see the rise of the Islamic State as another example of a so-called clash of civilisations that has ostensibly been a relentless force since the bloody history of Jihadis, Crusaders and inter-sect violence that began in the Middle Ages. </p>
<p>The response to such rhetoric has often been to differentiate both mainstream modern Islam and the West from such parallels, suggesting that the Islamic State is a “medieval” throwback and the rest of us have moved on. </p>
<p>But there is a less well-rehearsed – and perhaps more historically pertinent – argument: that our medieval forebears were not just mindless fanatics. More specifically, that medieval Christians and Muslims were also merely seeking stability in a troubled world. </p>
<p>Indeed, the idea that we are doomed to be haunted by sectarian differences is remarkably similar to the wholly discredited “<a href="http://www.hoover.org/research/beyond-ancient-hatreds">ancient hatreds</a>” explanation that was used to explain the break up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. </p>
<p>A case study from the height of the Crusades in the 12th and 13th centuries illustrates that even the most brutal leaders can choose to compromise for stability. And that perhaps we should accept that such stability is worth compromising for today, as Syria’s unproductive peace talks allow the war to rage on.</p>
<h2>A 12th-century role model for IS?</h2>
<p>Meet <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Zangi-Iraqi-ruler">Imad ad-din Zengi</a>, a 12-century Jihadi <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/25016279-the-isis-apocalypse">held up</a> by the architects of Islamic State as a model ruler for their Caliphate. </p>
<p>Zengi is known to have been a major influence on the late <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2006/jun/09/guardianobituaries.alqaida">Abu Musab al-Zarqawi</a>, one-time al-Qaeda number three and head of operations in Iraq. Zarqawi’s <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12096/abstract">actions provoked</a> the decisive split between al-Qaeda and the group we now know as Islamic State. </p>
<p>Even a cursory biography of Zengi reveals why he would become al-Zarqawi’s personal hero. </p>
<p>Zengi began as the <em>atabeg</em> (governor) of Mosul, Islamic State’s current besieged “capital”. He went on to seize Aleppo and Hama in modern Syria, contending with the rival Islamic power of Damascus, before turning on the Crusaders at Edessa, one of the four Crusader states. </p>
<p>Similarly, just as Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda had always viewed the US as the primary enemy of Islam, <a href="http://www.cfr.org/iraq/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9866">al-Zarqawi’s organisation</a> (at that point known as al-Qaeda in Iraq) focused on the establishment of a Caliphate. This emphasis led him not only into conflict with the West, but also – and fatally in terms of the group’s relationship with al-Qaeda – with those Middle Eastern states ruled by leaders <a href="http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1">he believed</a> were more interested in promoting idolatry than Islam. </p>
<p>As Zengi conquered the Middle East before turning to the Crusaders, so al-Zarqawi planned to conquer the region before turning on the infidels of the West. Indeed, <a href="http://islamiccoins.ancients.info/Zangids/ZangidState.JPG">Zengi’s territories</a> bear an eerie similarity to <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034">Islamic State’s own territories last year</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166772/original/file-20170426-13391-1npkb7q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166772/original/file-20170426-13391-1npkb7q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166772/original/file-20170426-13391-1npkb7q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166772/original/file-20170426-13391-1npkb7q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166772/original/file-20170426-13391-1npkb7q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166772/original/file-20170426-13391-1npkb7q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166772/original/file-20170426-13391-1npkb7q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zengi’s possessions, with the Byzantine Empire in purple and Crusaders states in pink.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But his career as a model for the group goes further. </p>
<p>First, his conquests compelled the emir of Damascus to ally with the Crusaders against him, neatly mirroring how Islamic State sees Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.</p>
<p>And just like Islamic State, Zengi was renowned for his brutal rule. When he took the city of Baalbek, just north of Damascus, for instance, he swore on the Koran and all his wives that he would treat the defenders well if they surrendered. He flayed the governor and hanged the rest. </p>
<h2>Zengi vs John</h2>
<p>So far, so “medieval” – and it would seem that both the Islamic State and its analysts are correct in likening the Caliphate as a return to the barbarous horrors of the Middle Ages. Except that this story of Islamic Jihadis against Christian Crusaders was never as clear-cut as historians – Christian and Islamic, medieval and modern – recorded. </p>
<p>A major player is often left out of this story: <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/2166088.Byzantium">the surviving Roman Empire</a>, labeled “Byzantium” during the Enlightenment. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166773/original/file-20170426-13411-of67dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166773/original/file-20170426-13411-of67dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166773/original/file-20170426-13411-of67dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166773/original/file-20170426-13411-of67dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166773/original/file-20170426-13411-of67dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1060&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166773/original/file-20170426-13411-of67dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1060&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166773/original/file-20170426-13411-of67dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1060&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Alexios I Komnenos called on Pope Urban II for mercenaries to aid his fight against the Turks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAlexios_I_Komnenos.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Returning the Byzantine Empire to the narrative reveals that it was in fact Emperor Alexios I Komnenos who <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/12907736-the-first-crusade?ac=1&from_search=true">called on Pope Urban II for mercenaries to aid his fight against the Turks</a>, an appeal that took on a life of its own as western knights carved out their own principalities in the east rather than yield their conquests to the emperor. Thus, the founding of the Crusader states. </p>
<p>Disputes continued until Alexios’ son, John II Komnenos, launched a major eastern campaign in 1137 with the aim of forcing at least the Crusader states of Antioch and Edessa to submit to his rule. But, as both a Christian and a politician who had no desire to ruin relations with the Pope and the west by attacking the Crusaders, John II Komnenos instead made a deal. </p>
<p>He and Prince Raymond of Antioch would conquer Aleppo and other Muslim-ruled towns together. Raymond would then hand over Antioch to John II Komnenos in exchange for these new conquests. This strategy would provide a useful buffer state for the Empire, give rich lands to Raymond and halt Zengi’s rise. </p>
<p>It also set the stage for the ultimate clash of civilisations, as the Christian Roman Emperor John II Komnenos, squared off against the great Jihadi Zengi. His campaign includes sieges and battles with names strikingly familiar to anyone following today’s news broadcasts: Manbij, Al-Bab, Aleppo, Damascus. </p>
<p>As arguably the most powerful Christian statesman of the period, John’s intervention can also be seen as the regional superpower intervening, in another clear parallel for us. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166774/original/file-20170426-13425-15a1jrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166774/original/file-20170426-13425-15a1jrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166774/original/file-20170426-13425-15a1jrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166774/original/file-20170426-13425-15a1jrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166774/original/file-20170426-13425-15a1jrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1269&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166774/original/file-20170426-13425-15a1jrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1269&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166774/original/file-20170426-13425-15a1jrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1269&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">John II Komnenos squared off against the great Jihadi Zengi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AJohn_II_Komnenos.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As John marshalled his forces against Aleppo and the cities of northern Syria, Zengi was in the field, laying siege to Damascus-ruled Hama and then Baalbek, only a few days away. Though some cities were ruled by independent emirs, many, and particularly Aleppo itself, had been conquered by Zengi in the previous few years. But he did not turn his army to confront John. </p>
<p>Medieval authors, just as modern commentators, used the rhetoric of the clash of civilisations, and both Christian and Muslim accounts were always setting up champions against each other. So the question is why was there no Zengi versus John showdown outside Aleppo. And how did medieval historians and commentators, which modern day Jihadis use for inspiration, explain it?</p>
<h2>The other side of the story</h2>
<p>The two major sources on Zengi are <a href="https://global.britannica.com/biography/Ibn-al-Athir">Ibn al-Athir</a> and <a href="http://www.sunnah.org/history/Scholars/ibn_asakir.htm">Ibn Asakir</a>, both of whom were commissioned to write histories of the Zengid dynasty and, as such, were unsurprisingly quite flattering in their portrayal. </p>
<p>In their view, this was the moment when Zengi united Islam against Christianity. His first duty was to seize Hama and Baalbek, so that he could later bring forth the united armies of Islam against the Crusaders. </p>
<p>This message was preached to contemporary readers, as they argued for all Muslims to unite to finish what Zengi had started. The same argument was used by Archbishop <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1889303.William_Of_Tyre_Historian_Of_The_Latin_East?ac=1&from_search=true">William of Tyre</a>, a prominent western chronicler of the Crusades, when attempting to convince his contemporaries to launch another Crusade. </p>
<p>Only Christians united could defeat the Muslims, and vice versa. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166775/original/file-20170426-13401-p5omyd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166775/original/file-20170426-13401-p5omyd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=759&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166775/original/file-20170426-13401-p5omyd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=759&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166775/original/file-20170426-13401-p5omyd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=759&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166775/original/file-20170426-13401-p5omyd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=954&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166775/original/file-20170426-13401-p5omyd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=954&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166775/original/file-20170426-13401-p5omyd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=954&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">William of Tyre writing his history of the Crusades.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AWilliam_of_tyre.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The argument was necessary because John’s campaign failed and he was obliged to return west. Though he returned a few years later to try and finish the task, John died in a hunting accident in 1143. </p>
<p>Zengi meanwhile seized Edessa from the Crusaders and renewed his designs on Damascus. But in 1146, he was assassinated by a Christian slave, making him a martyr for the cause. </p>
<p>He left his son Nur ad-Din to confront the armies of the Second Crusade. And from here, the cycle of Crusade and Jihad continued, such that it seems that it was always meant to be that way.</p>
<p>But this interpretation of history, related by later medieval authors and parroted by modern commentators, is not the full story. There is another explanation for Zengi’s reluctance to attack found in less well-known sources. </p>
<p>Other Muslim voices come from <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/19732072-the-book-of-contemplation?from_search=true">Ibn Munquidh</a>, a poet, scholar and diplomat who served many Islamic dynasties, and famously talked of both friends and enemies among the Christians. And <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/771260.The_Damascus_Chronicle_of_the_Crusades?ac=1&from_search=true">Ibn al-Qalanisi</a>, a scholar of Damascus and thus a supporter of the major Islamic power opposed to Zengi. </p>
<p>Both these authors, and <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/10453503-chronique-de-michel-le-grand?ac=1&from_search=true">lesser-known</a> eastern <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/5103145-armenia-and-the-crusades?ac=1&from_search=true">Christian writers</a>, mention that John and Zengi exchanged numerous ambassadors and gifts, even including hunting birds for their shared hobby. These embassies are said to have continued even after John returned to Antioch for the winter. </p>
<h2>Seeking stability and order</h2>
<p>Thus we have the picture of the respective champions of Christianity and Islam – the progenitors of the “clash of civilisations” that still echoes today – negotiating and exchanging gifts with one another, even as their armies were barely a few days apart. </p>
<p>Exactly what they talked about is not recorded. But by examining the situation before the chaos of the First Crusade an explanation presents itself. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166776/original/file-20170426-13422-11eeokb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166776/original/file-20170426-13422-11eeokb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166776/original/file-20170426-13422-11eeokb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166776/original/file-20170426-13422-11eeokb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166776/original/file-20170426-13422-11eeokb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166776/original/file-20170426-13422-11eeokb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166776/original/file-20170426-13422-11eeokb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Byzantine Asia Minor (Anatolia) and the Byzantine-Arab frontier region in 780 AD, with provinces, roads and major settlements.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAsia_Minor_ca_780_AD.svg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The map above shows the rough borders of the region in the late 8th and mid-11th centuries, the latter being before internal crises and Turkish incursions weakened both the Roman Empire in the north, and the Fatimid Caliphate in the south.</p>
<p>The political order of the Christian Romans in the north, and Islam in the south and east, had been relatively stable for the previous few hundred years despite occasional border wars. We have accounts of well-treated Muslim prisoners in Constantinople having a mosque built for their use, while the Caliph allowed the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem to be under the protection of the Roman Emperor. What’s more, Christians often served in the Fatimid civil service. </p>
<p>Many women were captured and then married by a member of the other religion, so that Christians had Muslim mothers and vice versa. The most famous example of this is the legendary tale of <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/86749.Digenis_Akritas?ac=1&from_search=true">Digenes Akrites</a>, a Robin Hood figure of the eastern frontier. His very name symbolises his origins, with <em>Di-genes</em> referring to his dual ancestry, and <em>Akrites</em> referring to his role as a border warrior. </p>
<p>The Digenes Akrites story, and others, were however written in the 12th century. That’s after civil wars, and Turkish and Crusader invasions had swept away this political order forever – or perhaps not. In the summer of 1138, it appears that John and Zengi were negotiating a return to the Roman north and Islamic south in the Middle East, bringing stability back to the war-torn region. </p>
<p>Now, Zengi was hardly a humanitarian or a figure to be admired by modern standards. Though better by comparison – and renowned in his own day for supposedly never putting anyone to death – neither was Emperor John.</p>
<p>Ibn Munquidh uses the expression “sacking a city like the Romans” whenever a general of any religion let his soldiers loose on a civilian population. But these medieval figures used as role models by Islamic State and others were not fanatics. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166777/original/file-20170426-13383-apc8aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166777/original/file-20170426-13383-apc8aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166777/original/file-20170426-13383-apc8aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166777/original/file-20170426-13383-apc8aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166777/original/file-20170426-13383-apc8aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166777/original/file-20170426-13383-apc8aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166777/original/file-20170426-13383-apc8aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Caliph allowed the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem to be under the protection of the Roman Emperor.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Church_of_the_Holy_Sepulchre#/media/File:Kuppel_der_Grabeskirche.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They were happy to divide the Levant between them for the sake of stability and order, if for no other reason than that was best for their own personal glory and regimes. </p>
<h2>Peace in Syria</h2>
<p>Considerably more controversially, the same may be said of Islamic State. They <a href="https://www.academia.edu/27199875/Islamic_Caliphate_A_Quasi-State_A_Global_Security_Threat">see themselves</a> as a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-not-terrorist-group">quasi-state</a> looking <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/08/01/the-islamic-state-threat-to-the-middle-east/">to impose</a> their <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-a-year-of-the-caliphate-what-is-it-that-the-so-called-islamic-state-really-wants-10352950.html">own version</a> of stability and order in the Middle East.</p>
<p>If we look closely at the group’s infamous propaganda machine, the most striking narratives in the West are ones of <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3539802/Grisly-ISIS-propaganda-video-shows-brutal-executions-victims-including-Iraqi-soldier-crawls-hands-knees-begs-mercy.html">brutality</a>. But the <a href="https://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf">vast majority</a> revolve around constructing an image of a brotherhood with the aim of an inclusive and stable Caliphate at its centre. </p>
<p>The reason Western commentators so often overlook this is that the latter is aimed specifically at Muslims. Whereas those pieces of propaganda with a narrative of brutality at their heart are focused on the West. And they are used as a method to warn Western leaders against interfering with the group’s objectives.</p>
<p>The Islamic State then, may indeed be a “medieval throwback”, but not in the sense that many western commentators suggest. And the parallels between the 12th and 21st centuries are not only due to the wanton brutality of those involved. </p>
<p>Rather, it’s because they share an ambition for stability in the Middle East, starting with the unification of the region <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/">under the flag of Islam</a>. Unlike many, IS do have a clear plan for an ordered region - but that plan consists of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-a-year-of-the-caliphate-day-to-day-life-in-the-islamic-state-where-any-breach-of-restrictive-10348151.html">total authoritarian brutality in every aspect of everyday life,</a> with the slightest infractions of any of their prohibitions punished with the <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/reports-of-everyday-life-under-the-islamic-state-a-1041317.html">lash, amputation, crucifixion and worse</a>.</p>
<p>Zengi’s own inhumane methods may have added to al-Zarqawi’s glorification of him as an individual. But the root of al-Zarqawi’s and Islamic State’s adoration <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/25016279-the-isis-apocalypse">come from Zengi’s geopolitical aims</a>. Indeed, the so-called Caliphate was originally <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/culture/books/2017/01/west-can-never-hope-understand-islamic-state">proclaimed</a> from the mosque built by Zengi in Mosul.</p>
<p>The bottom line is that those fighting in the Middle East – however brutal or seemingly blinded by religion they may appear – are in fact seeking a <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2015/10/05/a-fight-for-statehood-isis-and-its-quest-for-political-domination/#_ftn30">return to a vision of political order</a>. Until this is found, they will continue fighting. </p>
<p>Thus, even as Zengi and John considered civil compromise, so we can hope that Russia and the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia and all other powers involved can do the same, so that the instability that allows IS to exist can be eliminated, and with it, IS itself.</p>
<p>The alternative is to let the Islamic State and those like them impose their own vision of order, which will likely follow Tacitus in “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/2936846.Tacitus">making a desert and calling it peace</a>”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A case study from the height of the Crusades in the 12th and 13th centuries illustrates that even the most brutal leaders can choose to compromise for stability.Maximilian Lau, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Byzantine History, Hitotsubashi UniversityEmily Jarratt, MA Student Conflict, Security and Development, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/720122017-03-07T07:33:58Z2017-03-07T07:33:58ZNo end in sight for Syrian refugees banned under Trump’s new travel order<p>US President Donald Trump has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-executive-order-bans-travelers-from-six-muslim-majority-countries-applying-for-visas/2017/03/06/3012a42a-0277-11e7-ad5b-d22680e18d10_story.html?utm_term=.821236da9e10">issued a new version of his travel ban</a>, which will prevent citizens of six Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States for a period of 90 days.</p>
<p>The original order banned citizens of Syria, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Libya and Yemen from entering the US, halted any refugees admissions for 120 days and banned Syrian refugees indefinitely. Iraq has been left off the new list, and Syrian refugees will <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/06/politics/trump-travel-ban-iraq/">be banned for the same 120 days as other refugees</a>.</p>
<p>The new order follows a month of confusion after the initial ban – signed on January 27 with immediate effect – caused chaos and uncertainty in the US and around the world. </p>
<p>While Syrians may get some relief from the fact that they are no longer banned indefinitely, their situation remains desperate. And confused US policy in the Middle East only makes things worse for those fleeing Syria’s pulverising war of competing international players.</p>
<h2>Refugees as security threats</h2>
<p>Since the first decree was issued, scholars have warned that any such measure will be ineffective for <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-02-01/wrong-way-stop-terrorism">preventing terrorism</a> and is blind to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/30/i-interviewed-300-syrian-refugees-they-are-far-from-a-security-threat/?utm_term=.be2061671c1b">humanitarian plight</a> of Syrians fleeing war. Prominent Syrian intellectuals <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/opinion/how-isis-benefits-from-trumps-ban-on-syrians.html?_r=1">expressed personal indignation</a> at the way the ban supports the “war on terror” approach, which targets already vulnerable populations. </p>
<p>Certainly, refugees and internally displaced people who are escaping economic hardship, conflict and political persecution have been <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Politics-Insecurity-Migration-International-Relations-ebook/dp/B000OI0GZ2/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&qid=1486606235&sr=8-7&keywords=politics+of+insecurity">portrayed as a security threat</a> in much of Western political discourse.</p>
<p>Even when not specifically and directly singled out as a threat to homeland security, the migration issue has become embedded in security debates worldwide, which has stoked hyper-politicised public concern with <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2017/266447.htm">vetting and screening</a> potential refugees. </p>
<p>In this way, the international refugee regime is yet another example of <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100671550">power asymmetry</a> between rich and poor countries. Southern states, which are closest to conflict zones, bear the brunt of the refugee-hosting burden, while Northern states must be convinced that taking in refugees will serve their security, immigration and trade interests. </p>
<p>Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt and other North African countries currently host <a href="data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php">4.9 million Syrian refugees</a> of a total of 11 million people displaced.</p>
<h2>The legacy of the Arab Spring</h2>
<p>In a <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/01/arab-fractures-citizens-states-and-social-contracts-pub-66612">fractured region</a> of dissolving social contracts and collapsing states in the wake of the Arab Spring, the political refugees and economic migrants who escape to neighbouring countries, European shores, or even the US, are symptomatic of a wider upheaval.</p>
<p>The latest <a href="http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/11/29/arab-human-development-report-2016-enabling-youth-to-shape-their-own-future-key-to-progress-on-development-and-stability-in-arab-region-.html">Arab Human Development Report from the UN Development Programme</a> notes that forced migration is among the most serious challenges facing the Middle East and North African region. </p>
<p>The consequences of this long-term affliction will magnify in the years to come. Children without schooling and separated families are afflictions that impede advancement and self-empowerment among populations already fleeing war zones or impending conflict. </p>
<p>The dire long-term prognosis for Syria’s refugees is evident in the report’s emphasis on the multi-dimensional nature of the refugee crisis. </p>
<p>Syrians forcibly displaced by the war do not appear poised to go back to Syria. For them, schooling, employment, community support, and productive interactions with NGOs and local governments of countries such as Turkey and Jordan are the best bet for now. </p>
<h2>Displacement as a weapon of war</h2>
<p>Certainly, Syria’s uprising did not begin as a war. Indeed, the Syrian revolution was part of the regional wave of popular uprisings that began in Tunisia. In the city of Dar’aa in 2011, activists mobilised, intending to <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Burning-Country-Syrians-Revolution-War/dp/0745336221/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1486624428&sr=8-1&keywords=burning+country">seize their “freedom and dignity”</a> from the ruling Assad dynasty. </p>
<p><em>Silmiyyah</em> (peaceful) was the catchword of these protests. The digital mobilisation of Syria’s <a href="http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1841">diaspora activists</a> in particular traversed cultures to bring the revolution to Western audiences. </p>
<p>Of course, the years since the early phase of the uprising have seen intense militarisation and internationalisation in the face of brutal repression from President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The bloody morass has expanded to include Arab and non-Arab regional powers and militias including Russia, ISIS, and the US-led anti-ISIS coalition. </p>
<p>The magnitude of Syria’s refugee problem can be understood as a feature of what scholars such as <a href="https://www.amazon.com/New-Old-Wars-Organized-Violence/dp/080478549X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1486624543&sr=8-1&keywords=kaldor+new+wars">Mary Kaldor</a> and <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Global-Governance-New-Wars-Development-ebook/dp/B00I6ISZ2S/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1486624572&sr=8-1&keywords=mark+duffield+new+wars">Mark Duffield</a> consider the “new” warfare of the globalised, post-Cold War era. </p>
<p>Forced displacement has become a strategy of war, not a mere side effect, in conflicts that span legitimate states as well as non-state actors (such as ISIS), government forces, and private militias. In this context, standard international humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts may reinforce, rather than solve, these massive human catastrophes, as we have seen in <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/07/bosnia-srebenica-united-nations-peacekeeping/398078/">Bosnia and elsewhere</a>. </p>
<p>Enter Assad’s “<a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21706225-dr-assad-turns-syrias-hospitals-death-traps-part-kneel-or-starve">starve or kneel</a>” strategy, bolstered by Russian aerial bombardment and Iranian and Hezbollah militia action on the ground. </p>
<p>The result has been significant opposition losses and evacuations in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37197933">Darayya</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrias-war-of-extermination-signals-the-end-of-the-international-community-66708">eastern Aleppo</a>, and most recently, <a href="https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/community/2017/02/14/after-battle-for-wadi-barada-the-damascus-water-war-isnt-over">Wadi Barada</a>. </p>
<p>Forced displacement, particularly along sectarian lines, has become a <a href="http://en.etilaf.org/press/syrian-coalition-mass-forced-displacement-of-wadi-barada-residents-violates-truce-part-of-systematic-policy.html">paramount concern</a> for Syrians, as expressed by political bodies such as the National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. </p>
<p>In addition to violating international law, these forced evacuations threaten the potential for restoring any semblance of national unity, in a failed state whose territorial control is already divided among the Assad regime, the Kurds, ISIS, and various opposition fighting groups.</p>
<h2>The US and Syria’s uprising</h2>
<p>Forced displacement doles out not just politicised humanitarian strife but also lengthens the odds of maintaining Syria’s territorial integrity and any remnants of cohesion or harmony — let alone any institutionalised “freedom and dignity”. </p>
<p>In this conflict, it is unclear whether the US is facilitating or harming a just political solution. The political negotiating game, after Russian aerial bombardment allowed Assad to <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/12/13/fall-aleppo">regain territorial footing in the country</a> and in which Syrians themselves have little say, is now in full swing. There can be no doubt that Moscow has <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-pax-russica-in-the-middle-east-putin-will-have-to-do-more-to-make-it-stick-73244">taken the lead</a> on the international diplomacy of Syria’s war. </p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/22/russia-syria-talks-astana-kazakhstan-">negotiates</a> alongside Turkey and Iran, seeks to reconfigure the opposition, and has even <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-25/syria-opposition-rejects-russian-draft-of-new-constitution">attempted a draft constitution</a> — strongly opposed by the opposition, and encroaching on the “Syrian-led” designation stipulated by the <a href="http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2254.pdf">UN Security Council</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://idraksy.net/aljolany-plan/">In-fighting</a> among factions of the armed opposition further exacerbates the opposition’s relative weakness. The <a href="http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/67829">ambiguous “safe zone”</a> avoided by Obama and now bandied about by Trump may never see the light of day.</p>
<p>Whether or not the US decides to re-open the door to refugees from Middle East and North African region, their numbers will continue to swell as wars rage on.</p>
<p>Wherever refugees struggle to make their home – probably not the US – they appear unlikely to return to Syria any time soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72012/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Layla Saleh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Syrian refugees have been banned from the US for the next 120 days. Whatever happens next, the country they are fleeing will never be the same again.Layla Saleh, Assistant Professor of International Affairs, Qatar UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/721662017-01-31T02:23:51Z2017-01-31T02:23:51ZWhat’s gone wrong in the seven countries Trump included in his ban? Essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155002/original/image-20170131-3265-8cfnjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Syrian children remove rubble Aleppo, Syria.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Hassan Ammar</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: The following is a roundup of archival stories related to Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Libya and Somalia.</em></p>
<p>Last week, President Trump signed an executive order temporarily banning citizens from seven countries from entering the U.S. and indefinitely banning Syrian refugees.</p>
<p>The stated aim of <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/29/protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states">the order</a> is to ensure the U.S. doesn’t allow terrorists into the country. </p>
<p>Why did the Trump administration single out these seven countries? As many commentators have pointed out, they are all majority Muslim. Another commonality is war.</p>
<h2>Iraq and Syria</h2>
<p>The destabilizing force of the militant organization Islamic State (IS or ISIS) has been especially strong in Iraq and Syria. In June 2014, IS shook the world by overrunning the Iraqi city of Mosul. Taking advantage of political weaknesses and ethic division in Iraq and neighboring Syria, IS grew rapidly to the point where 10 million people lived under its power, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034">according to the BBC</a>.</p>
<p>The Syrian government and Russia and – acting separately – a U.S.-led coalition pushed back against IS. They dropped tens of thousands of airstrikes that weakened IS and leveled Syrian cities. By late October 2016, IS had been diminished to the point that University of California professor James L. Gelvin considered <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-islamic-state-finished-five-possible-scenarios-67676">five possible scenerios</a> for its demise.</p>
<p>But the violence displaced more than three million Iraqis in the span of 18 months prior to the U.S. presidential election. This left humanitarian aid agencies struggling to meet the demand for assistance, wrote Thomas Acaro of Elon University in November. His <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-iraq-and-syria-humanitarian-aid-workers-struggle-within-a-strained-system-67604">survey of international aid workers</a> revealed stress in the system:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“A lack of safety is an increasingly palpable fact of life. They report seeing friends and colleagues get raped, kidnapped and, yes, even beheaded.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Airstrikes in November 2016 also destroyed the two largest hospitals in the Syrian city of Aleppo. M. Zaher Sahloul, a physician and professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago, traveled there as a volunteer and wrote about <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-aleppos-medical-nightmare-and-why-we-must-act-67434">the medical nightmare affecting thousands of civilians</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>"Physicians for Human Rights has recorded 382 attacks on medical facilities, of which 344 were carried out by the regime and Russia; they were also responsible for the deaths of 703 of the 757 medical personnel killed in the war so far. Most of Aleppo’s doctors have left.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Libya</h2>
<p>After Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi was overthrown by a militia-led uprising in 2011, the U.S. and other Western countries supported efforts to elect a new, democratic government. By February of 2015, the U.S. was bombing parts of Libya in an effort to extinguish IS strongholds in the North African country. <a href="https://theconversation.com/libya-and-isis-what-happened-37801">What went wrong</a>? Mieczyslaw Boduszynski,
a former U.S. diplomat who worked in Libya during the post-Gadhafi transition, explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Over time, the vast unguarded borders and lawlessness of post-Gadhafi Libya provided the ideal environment for jihadists of various stripes to set up bases. For IS, Libya provide[d] an opportunity not only to extend the caliphate, but to do so far away from coalition airstrikes in Syria and Iraq.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Iran</h2>
<p>While threatened by the spread of IS in neighboring Iraq, Iran’s government celebrated a victory in 2015 when the the Obama administration and five other countries agreed to lift sanctions against Iran in return for the country’s voluntary curbing of its nuclear ability. </p>
<p>Scholars at Indiana University, Bloomington <a href="https://theconversation.com/money-trumps-fear-in-reactions-to-wests-nuclear-accord-with-iran-44749">wrote</a>: “As sanctions fall away, Iran should rise swiftly back into the major leagues, propelled by larger energy exports that could top $100 billion a year, the release of hitherto frozen funds and a highly educated and motivated workforce.”</p>
<p>But the deal may have been short-lived. As David Mednicoff of University of Massachusetts Amherst <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-and-tillerson-face-the-middle-east-68695">observed</a>, “Trump has … promised to renegotiate the multilateral treaty that stopped Iran’s move toward nuclear weapons.”</p>
<p>Mednicoff also noted another potential source of instability: Iran’s relationships in the region.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Arab Gulf states frequently express anxiety around Iran’s power. They see Iran as a threat to their countries’ autonomy and to the majority Sunni Islam that differs from the assertive minority Shi’ism central to Iran’s political ideology.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Yemen</h2>
<p>Civil war has been raging for nearly two years in Yemen. The U.N. has called the conflict a “major calamity.” </p>
<p>Vincent Durac of the University College Dublin <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemen-a-calamity-at-the-end-of-the-arabian-peninsula-67954">traces the origins of the war</a> to 2011 when a rebellion unseated the country’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose party had dominated the country’s political life since Yemeni unification in 1990. But what really triggered the conflict was the years of failed transitional negotiations that followed Saleh’s ousting.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“More than 10,000 people have lost their lives, while more than 20 million (of a total population of some 27 million) are in need of humanitarian assistance. More than 3 million people are internally displaced, while hundreds of thousands have fled the country altogether. There are reports of looming famine as the conflict destroys food production in the country.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Somalia and Sudan</h2>
<p>Robert Rotberg of Harvard’s Kennedy School suggested another reason why IS may have asserted control in northern African countries. “Terrorists are in it as much for the loot as for the ideology,” <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-little-understood-connection-between-islamic-terror-and-drug-profits-53602">he wrote</a>. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“ISIS- and al-Qaida-linked groups in Africa prosper by trafficking drugs across the Sahara and by offering "protection” to smugglers who have long been trading illicit goods throughout the continent. Although Westerners tend to think of these groups as driven by ideology, new recruits may be more attracted by opportunities to make money.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Simon Reich of Rutgers, Newark <a href="https://theconversation.com/has-world-war-three-begun-55201">cautions that</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“we may have been entering a new form of global war for the last three decades – in slow motion. This war is similar in some respects to prior incarnations, and significantly different in others. First, all wars have a geographic fulcrum. This one is in the Middle East and North Africa. Its epicenter spreads from Libya and Egypt to the Persian Gulf and Turkey.”</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72166/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
This roundup from our archives explains some of the major conflicts unfolding in the seven countries singled out by Trump’s executive order.Emily Costello, Director of Collaborations + Local News, The Conversation USDanielle Douez, Associate Editor, Politics + SocietyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/707472017-01-03T13:38:24Z2017-01-03T13:38:24ZSyrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon face an uncertain 2017<p>As 2016 drew to a bloody close in Syria and the government took back control over eastern Aleppo, over <a href="http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php">4.8m Syrian refugees</a> continued to seek safety and a means of living a dignified life across the Middle East. There are 2.8m Syrians currently registered in Turkey, over a million in Lebanon, and around 656,000 in Jordan. To put this figure into context, in the so-called European “refugee crisis” a total of <a href="http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php">884,461 Syrian refugees</a> applied for asylum in Europe between April 2011 and October 2016. </p>
<p>Media focus on international forced migration continues to leave internal displacement largely invisible to international audiences. It also hides the realities of involuntary immobility – people who are “internally stuck” – and those who are physically prevented from crossing Syria’s borders to its neighbouring countries. What will 2017 bring for those people who have been displaced by the ongoing Syrian conflict?</p>
<h2>Continually seeking safety</h2>
<p>In December 2016, over <a href="http://www.unocha.org/syria">6.3m people</a> remained displaced inside Syria’s borders. Syria’s internally displaced people (IDPs) remain at risk both within the towns and cities they once called home, and also when attempting to escape. These IDPs include Syrian citizens, but also over <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/syria-palestine-refugees-humanitarian-snapshot-october-2016">430,000 Palestinian refugees</a>, an estimated <a href="http://www.institutesi.org/WP2016_02.pdf">5,000 stateless Kurds</a>, and thousands of Iraqi refugees. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-aleppo-what-is-happening-villages-buses-attacked-and-burned-a7482736.html">Evacuation buses</a> – including those from eastern Aleppo and villages in Idlib province in December 2016 – were attacked and torched. IDPs, stayees, and evacuees alike both fear, and often face, a similar fate.</p>
<p>In June 2016, Jordan effectively closed its border with Syria, citing security concerns. As a result, more than 75,000 Syrian refugees have spent more than six months <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ruqban-unknown-refugee-camp-along-jordanian-syrian-border-280134972">stranded</a> on the Syrian-Jordanian border, including in the Ruqban and Hadalat camps.</p>
<p>As early as 2012, Jordan had already <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/12/jordan-risk-of-humanitarian-disaster-as-12000-refugees-from-syria-stranded-in-no-mans-land/">barred</a> the entry of certain groups of refugees fleeing Syria: all <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/05/lebanon-palestinians-barred-sent-syria">Palestinian refugees who had been living in Syria</a>; unaccompanied men without family ties in Jordan; and people without valid identity documents. </p>
<p>At the Ruqban border crossing, in the far north-east of Jordan, the number of people in the border camps has been increasing dramatically. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/12/jordan-risk-of-humanitarian-disaster-as-12000-refugees-from-syria-stranded-in-no-mans-land/">Satellite images</a> published by Amnesty International showed that 90 shelters were present in July 2014. By the end of July 2016, this had increased to 6,563, and by September <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/09/syria-jordan-border-75000-refugees-trapped-in-desert-no-mans-land-in-dire-conditions/">8,295</a>. </p>
<p>With only <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/09/syria-jordan-border-75000-refugees-trapped-in-desert-no-mans-land-in-dire-conditions/">one delivery</a> of humanitarian aid allowed between June and August 2016, satellite images have also documented <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/09/syria-jordan-border-75000-refugees-trapped-in-desert-no-mans-land-in-dire-conditions/">graves and burial sites</a> there. Desperately needed aid deliveries resumed in <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/10/jordan-aid-deliveries-to-refugees-trapped-in-the-berm/">October</a>. However, such deliveries remain under threat, as do the lives of the camps’ residents – the camp was reportedly struck by a <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/10/16/car-bomb-strikes-syrian-refugee-camp-on-jordan-border">car bombing</a> in October and an <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/12/18/deadly-bombing-hits-syrian-refugee-camp-on-jordan-border">IED explosion</a> in mid-December. </p>
<p>The recent history of the region is scarred with barriers to entry and border camps that violate the international principle of non-refoulement – which prohibits refugees from being pushed back over a border into a territory where their lives or freedoms are at risk. Between 2006 and 2010, thousands of Iraqi Palestinians were left stranded at the al-Tanf and al-Waleed camps on the Syrian-Iraqi border after the end of the 2003 Iraq War. The Libyan War also left thousands of Libyan and non-Libyan migrants and refugees, including Iraqis and Palestinians, <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/4eb945c39.pdf">stranded at a camp on the Salloum border crossing</a> between Libya and Egypt in 2011. </p>
<p>Even after a conflict is officially declared to be “over”, thousands of people can remain stranded in border camps for years.</p>
<h2>Borders will become tougher to cross</h2>
<p>As in Jordan, Lebanon’s border controls have been increasing over the past year, with border closures and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/05/lebanon-palestinians-barred-sent-syria">push-backs</a> to Syria occurring on and off since at least 2013. Michel Aoun’s election as Lebanese president at the end of October 2016 is expected to lead to even greater restrictions on Syrian refugees. Aoun’s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/middleeast/michel-aoun-lebanon-president.html?_r=0">inaugural speech</a> called directly for Syrian refugees to return to their country of origin, irrespective of the conflict. </p>
<p>Aoun, along with <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/lebanon-politics-refugees_us_582798d7e4b02d21bbc91ae2">other political leaders</a> in Lebanon, have proposed the creation of “safe zones” within Syria, in the expectation that refugees in neighbouring countries could be moved back. The international community has not yet supported such a proposal, which – history clearly tells us – would likely result in the creation of hyper-militarised zones that are far from “safe” for those people corralled there.</p>
<p>Even Turkey – which has been heralded as having the most accessible border policy out of these three countries – started building a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-idUSKCN11Y1MB">concrete wall</a> along its 900km border with Syria in 2014. It is due to be completed by spring 2017. In addition to <a href="http://www.ecre.org/extension-of-the-border-wall-and-ongoing-violence-at-the-turkish-syrian-border/">closing 17 of its 19 border crossings</a>, Turkey has also used physical force <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/10/turkey-border-guards-kill-and-injure-asylum-seekers">on a regular basis throughout 2016</a> to prevent Syrian refugees from entering its territory. </p>
<p>This year will invariably witness new and ongoing border closures and push-backs over the Turkish-Syrian border in light of both the ongoing unrest across Turkey and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-europes-refugee-deal-with-turkey-is-it-legal-and-can-it-work-56054">EU-Turkey deal</a> that allows European states to return those refugees who have crossed the Mediterranean to Turkey. This deal has helped to provide an air of legitimacy for Turkey to close its border with Syria in the name of protecting the EU, while sacrificing refugees from Syria in the process.</p>
<h2>Lives and livelihoods</h2>
<p>Despite the Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps in Jordan featuring heavily in media and political accounts of Syrian refugees, fewer than 10% of all refugees from Syria across the Middle East live in camps. Instead, more than 4.3m – in addition to hundreds of thousands of <a href="https://theconversation.com/refugees-helping-refugees-how-a-palestinian-camp-in-lebanon-is-welcoming-syrians-48056">new and established Palestinian and Iraqi refugees</a> – live alongside <a href="https://refugeehosts.org">host communities</a> in cities, towns and rural areas across Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151604/original/image-20170103-18644-cxziih.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151604/original/image-20170103-18644-cxziih.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151604/original/image-20170103-18644-cxziih.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151604/original/image-20170103-18644-cxziih.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151604/original/image-20170103-18644-cxziih.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151604/original/image-20170103-18644-cxziih.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151604/original/image-20170103-18644-cxziih.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Syrian street venders working in the alleyways of Baddawi refugee camp, North Lebanon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Turkey, <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/595328/IPOL_STU(2016)595328_EN.pdf">38% of all Syrian refugees</a> are in the poor regions of the south-east and 29% in the south of the country. In one city, Killis, they make up 49% of the population. Employment opportunities in these poor towns and cities, even in the informal market, remain low, and large proportions of both refugees and host communities continue to live in acute poverty. In Jordan, an estimated <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/02/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/">93% of Syrian refugees in urban areas</a> are living under the poverty line. </p>
<p>In Lebanon, over a million refugees from Syria are obliged to pay a prohibitive fee every year to renew their residence permits to remain in the country legally, and face numerous restrictions on formal employment. This has meant that increasing numbers of refugees from Syria are <a href="http://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon-2016">forced to live in hiding</a>. Syrian men are particularly vulnerable to arrest at the many checkpoints across Lebanon and can find themselves at risk of immediate deportation. As a result, hundreds of thousands of women and children continue to engage in <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrian-refugees-in-lebanon-are-falling-into-slavery-and-exploitation-57521">unsafe and exploitative forms of labour</a> to survive. </p>
<p>Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon have for over 60 years been prohibited from employment in over 20 professions, including medicine, law and engineering. Newcomers can only enter formal employment if they are sponsored by a Lebanese employer through a system which effectively leads to exploitative labour. A similar sponsorship system exists in Jordan and Turkey.</p>
<p>The international community is encouraging host states to grant Syrian refugees legal access to the labour market in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey to overcome these vulnerabilities. But given high unemployment and impoverishment levels among each country’s own citizens this is unlikely.</p>
<p>Turkey has been heralded for accepting such a large number of Syrians and also for officially developing policies to grant Syrians the right to work legally in the country. But between <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/595328/IPOL_STU(2016)595328_EN.pdf">January and April 2016, only 2,000</a> Syrians applied for permission to work in Turkey and the actual number of permits issued remains undisclosed.</p>
<p>As states continue to develop increasingly restrictive policies, and as the international community continues to fail to deliver its promises to meaningfully support Syrian refugees, <a href="https://refugeehosts.org/2016/12/14/refugee-refugee-relationality-hospitality-and-being-with-refugees/">local communities</a> will continue to be the most important sources of support, even when they themselves are highly vulnerable. This is the focus of the ongoing <a href="https://refugeehosts.org">Refugee Hosts project</a>, that I am leading through research with nine local communities across Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Regional and international leaders alike have a great deal to learn from the humanity and hospitality of these communities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70747/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh receives funding from The Leverhulme Trust, the AHRC, the ESRC and the European Research Council.</span></em></p>With the many interconnected conflicts within Syria continuing, and with routes to safety increasingly blocked, what can Syria’s 4.8m refugees expect in this ‘new’ year?Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Reader in Human Geography and Co-Director of the Migration Research Unit, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/707332016-12-22T07:50:51Z2016-12-22T07:50:51ZTurkey turns closer to Russia after ambassador assassination<p>The assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, Andrey G Karlov, by an <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38377419">off-duty Turkish police officer</a> in the Turkish capital Ankara appeared, at first glance, to be a game changer in the ongoing Syrian war. </p>
<p>When Karlov was gunned down at a public event by Mevlut Mert Altintas, the war had already entered a new phase with the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38335418">fall of Aleppo</a> through the support of Russia and Iran. But far from bringing about the beginning of World War III, the assassination has shed light on a new power axis dominating the Middle East.</p>
<p>This new phase centres around three main regional actors on the ground, Turkey, Iran and Russia, each with diverging calculi and interests. </p>
<h2>No immediate crisis</h2>
<p>Contrary to <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/19/five-things-to-worry-about-after-the-assassination-of-russias-ambassador-to-turkey/">early commentary</a> and as seen in the statements from the leaders of <a href="http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/66432/buyukelci-karlova-duzenlenen-saldiri-turk-rus-iliskilerine-yonelik-acik-bir-provokasyon.html">Turkey</a> and <a href="https://www.rt.com/news/370831-putin-russian-ambassador-ankara/">Russia</a>, the Russian ambassador’s assassination did not lead to an immediate crisis. </p>
<p>Relations between the two countries had recently normalised following the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581">downing of a Russian SU-24 fighter jet by Turkish air forces</a> in November 2015 after it violated Turkish air space. </p>
<p>Comments by Russian President Vladimir Putin that the assassination is being cautiously viewed in his country as <a href="https://themoscowtimes.com/news/putin-says-assassination-of-russian-ambassador-in-turkey-was-a-provocation-56584">an attempt to sabotage the countries’ improved relations</a> and <a href="https://www.rt.com/news/370893-turkish-officials-condemn-assassination/">Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s</a> expression of a strong wish to continue close Turkish-Russian ties, have highlighted the decisiveness of the two nations to keep cooperating – despite significant cleavages – on the slippery path towards the end of the Syrian civil war. </p>
<h2>Critical timing</h2>
<p>The recent incident came at a time when <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-4050752/Last-remaining-rebels-civilians-await-Aleppo-evacuation.html">Turkey and Russia have been collaborating</a> on the evacuation of civilians in Aleppo. Its timing is critical for three main reasons. </p>
<p>First, the past ten days have seen <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/blast-hits-bus-turkey-central-province-kayseri-161217063957100.html">a new wave of terror</a> in Turkey attributed to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-blast-kurds-tak-idUSKBN13O21C">TAK</a>, the urban affiliate of the Kurdish separatist organisation known as the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100">PKK</a>. The attacks have increased calls for <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/three-party-leaders-vow-joint-fight-against-terror.aspx?pageID=238&nID=107279&NewsCatID=338">national unity</a> against terror. </p>
<p>Second, Turkey has felt <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-14/russia-and-turkey-pushed-the-west-out-of-syria">abandoned by its Western allies</a> in its efforts to protect itself from spillover effects of the Syrian civil war since 2015. Turkey has recently diverged from the US in its the handling of the Syrian crisis, as well as over how best to fight Islamic State. The recently triggered crisis with the EU over the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/08/eu-turkey-refugee-deal-qa">refugee deal</a>”, has also led the Turkish government to search for alternatives and ad-hoc coalitions for solving the Syruan crisis, in the form of Russia and Iran. </p>
<p>Third, the incident came the day before the planned <a href="http://aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-russia-iran-to-meet-in-moscow-over-syria/709559">trilateral meeting</a> of the three regional actors involved militarily in the crisis. That meeting was the first face-to-face gathering organised independently of UN diplomatic initiatives and without the participation of the US and other regional actors, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar.</p>
<p>The meeting affirmed a strong <a href="http://www.byegm.gov.tr/english/haber/russia-turkey-pledge-need-for-more-efforts-to-fight-terrorism/103517">commitment</a> to cooperation in the fight against terrorism.</p>
<h2>Reshaping the regional calculus?</h2>
<p>Regionally, Turkey appears to be the country most affected by the Syrian civil war. It has been a direct target for violent groups based in Syria, such as Islamic State and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), along with its military wing, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36773195">YPG</a>. The PKK has also resumed violence against the Turkish state after a <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/08/turkey-pkk-erdogan-akp-kurdistan/">three-year peace process</a>. </p>
<p>On top of all this, Turkey carries the heaviest financial and social burden as host to nearly <a href="http://aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/eu-minister-proud-of-turkey-hosting-3-mn-refugees/695851">three million Syrian refugees</a>. </p>
<p>Since Turkey’s Assad-centric approach to the conflict has not been supported by its Western allies, its gradual isolation in the Middle East has prevented it from pursuing a flexible and independent Syrian agenda. </p>
<p>The entrance of Russia into the Syrian quagmire in <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/30/politics/russia-syria-airstrikes-isis/">September 2015</a> together with an increasing Iranian presence on the ground have served to make Turkey more vulnerable to the diffusion of the civil war. </p>
<p>Together, these factors appear to have pushed Turkey to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/whats-turkey-doing-in-syria/511148/">revise its Syria policy</a>, taking into consideration the changing regional balance and the strategies of newcomers, such as Russia. </p>
<p>Despite this <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2016.1142367?journalCode=ctwq20">revision of its regional calculus</a>, Turkey as a long-time ally of the West and as a NATO member, has not yet changed sides in Syria. And its main reservations about the future of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remain.</p>
<h2>The new Turkish-Russian-Iranian coalition</h2>
<p>Worsening spillover effects from the Syrian war, combined with the Western strategy of non-engagement, <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683849.2012.685257">does appear to have forced Ankara</a> to return to its traditional strategy of diversifying foreign policy options and partners. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/investigators-seek-answers-in-russian-ambassadors-assassination-in-turkey/2016/12/20/e63b5950-c63a-11e6-acda-59924caa2450_story.html?utm_term=.03e2a5fa2f4c">statements</a> of the three countries’ foreign ministers in the aftermath of the Russian-Turkish-Iranian meeting reflect their shared interests in finding a peaceful political solution to the ongoing gridlock. And the ongoing evacuation of civilians from Aleppo has offered hope for the efficiency and the functionality of the trilateral regional conflict resolution mechanism. </p>
<p>The reactions to the assassination can also be seen as a good indicator of the increasing interdependence between Turkey and Russia regarding Syria and other regional security problems. </p>
<p>In fact, America’s unwillingness to act as a peace broker in Syria <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/20/russia-iran-turkey-meet-without-us-syria-agree-broker-peace/">allowed Russia to take on a leading role</a> in the crisis and reinforced its capacity to manoeuver on the ground. </p>
<p>Given the ambiguities of US president-elect Donald Trump’s possible <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-11-28/syria-policy-trump">Syria policy</a>, it seems likely that regional actors will have room to more easily assume extra roles in dealing with the crisis in the coming months.</p>
<p>The assassination shows that prolonging the crisis would not serve anyone’s interests. The conflict has now become unsustainable for all parties concerned. </p>
<p>There’s now a greater need for all involved in Syria to take more responsible action with the aim of restoring security order. The assassination has proven that Russia needs Turkey – together with Iran – to shape the post-Syrian war environment in the Middle East. </p>
<p>Turkey’s presence in this ad-hoc coalition signifies the total failure of Western actors in Syria, and provides clues as to how the new Middle Eastern order will be designed in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70733/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emel Parlar is editor in chief of a peer-reviewed online journal Rising Powers Quarterly. (<a href="http://risingpowersproject.com/rising-powers-quarterly/editorial-board/">http://risingpowersproject.com/rising-powers-quarterly/editorial-board/</a>)</span></em></p>Despite the assassination of the Russian ambassador in Turkey, Ankara is part of a new ad-hoc coalition with Moscow and Tehran in the MiddleEast.Emel Parlar Dal, Associate Professor of International Relations, Marmara UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/706972016-12-22T07:47:33Z2016-12-22T07:47:33ZHow heartbreaking images from Aleppo could actually change international norms<p>The siege of Aleppo is a mass atrocity with unprecedented levels of visibility. Confronted with the horrific images of a destroyed city, and the testimonies of wounded survivors using social media to <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/13/middleeast/syria-aleppo-goodbye-messages/">reach out to the world</a>, many have argued that a <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/aleppo-civilians-killed-complete-meltdown-humanity-u-n-n695286">complete meltdown of humanity</a> is unfolding. </p>
<p>Some have lamented that the post-Holocaust cry of “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/12/14/europes-aleppo-continues-to-haunt-the-continent/?utm_term=.f1e3d0b7fe75">never again</a>” proved meaningless and that UN tenet of the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml">responsibility to protect</a> is based on <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/14/opinions/aleppo-the-right-to-protect-opinion/">empty words</a> at best. </p>
<p>I dare to disagree. Yes, over the past five years, the responsibility to protect doctrine has failed to shape political interests and mobilise effective action to prevent tragedy in Aleppo. But it is important to understand that the best we can do for Syria or any other war-torn country is to improve and strengthen international norms for the protection of civilians. </p>
<p>The problem is not that norms such as the responsibility to protect are empty but that they evolve not just through <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601361?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">consensus</a>, but also through <a href="http://www.springer.com/la/book/9783642552342">contestation</a>; not just with the excitement of success but also with the emotional responses to failures to protect. </p>
<p>In the case of Aleppo, the images we have seen have had an impact on the political debate and international perception of the humanitarian situation. They also might have an important role in future discourses about the responsibility to protect.</p>
<h2>The politics of images in Aleppo</h2>
<p>Samantha Power, author of the 2002 bestseller, <a href="https://books.google.dk/books/about/A_Problem_from_Hell.html?id=lJraAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide</a> and currently US ambassador to the UN, highlighted the videos sent by Aleppo survivors in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vfyzcD8GE5k">her speech to the Security Council on December 13</a>. </p>
<p>She <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/15/world/samantha-power-aleppo-srebrenica/">warned</a> that Aleppo “will join the ranks of those events in world history that define modern evil, that stain our conscience decades later”. These events were Halabja (the 1988 massacre of Kurdish people by the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein), Rwanda, Srebrenica, and “now Aleppo”. </p>
<p>She concluded her speech asking Syria, Russia and Iran if they were “truly incapable of shame”, if there was nothing they would not “lie about or justify”. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vfyzcD8GE5k">The Russian ambassador replied</a> by first questioning the authenticity of those videos, then providing other facts, and finally refusing to take moral lessons from the United States, which has its own doubtful track record.</p>
<p>Politics is a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/narrative-politics-9780199324460?cc=dk&lang=en&">competition over narratives</a> and meaning. But images produce meaning not only on the basis of their informative character, they can also trigger <a href="http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo3683962.html">empathy</a> in a way no other testimony can. </p>
<p>This does not mean that images from war zones, such as Syria, are not contested. A recent video of Canadian activist Eva Bartlett casting aspersions on the veracity of images of children being rescued from the rubble in Aleppo went viral, prompting a detailed <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-eva-bartletts-claims-about-syrian-children">fact check</a> of her claims from the UK’s Channel 4. In exactly this way, the ground war in Syria is translated into an online information war worldwide. </p>
<p>But in the longer term, the images of atrocities and the emotional responses they provoke may have more radical political consequences. </p>
<h2>Visibility and atrocities</h2>
<p>Our failure to protect in the past has triggered the development of humanitarian norms such as responsibility to protect. This experience has been closely related to the visibility of some atrocities and the invisibility of others. </p>
<p>Images of the Holocaust were key to establishing it as <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137415103">a paradigm of injustice</a>. And it was after the first fully fledged televised war in Vietnam that American scholars resurrected <a href="http://www.basicbooks.com/full-details?isbn=9780465052714">ethical discussions about “just wars”</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137009746">My research shows</a> that in the months leading to the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, most of the leaders of NATO’s members gave speeches about the necessity of avoiding another Bosnia and formulated this imperative by explicitly linking it to the visibility of mass atrocities in both places. </p>
<p>On March 11 1998, <a href="https://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19980311-14335.html">Bill Clinton said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We do not want the Balkans to have more pictures like we’ve seen in the past few days, so reminiscent of what Bosnia endured. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A few days later, graphic pictures of the Bosnia conflict were projected during a <a href="http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa49268.000/hfa49268_0f.htm">US Congress hearing to remember the massacre in Srebrenica</a>. </p>
<p>Expressions such as “to watch” or “to see” were associated with other terms such as “to wait,” or “stand by”, or “stay still”, while intervention and action were typically expressed by combining “to do” and “not watch anymore”. There are echoes of this in <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/14/can-still-save-500-aleppos-children-avert-christmas-massacre/">statements about Aleppo today</a>. </p>
<p>But visibility does not necessarily lead to “good” international norms or “good” politics. </p>
<p>In Kosovo, a less-than-ideal military intervention led by NATO without a UN mandate broke the political deadlock. But the weaknesses and ambiguities of that intervention made a critical assessment of the humanitarianism necessary and led to the development of the responsibility to protect principle.</p>
<p>Eleven years after its inception and five after its implementation in the Libya crisis, the idea of the responsibility to protect is clearly in trouble. </p>
<p>It has been increasingly contested (mainly, but not exclusively, by Russia) and seen as part of <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Critical-Perspectives-on-Human-Security-Rethinking-Emancipation-and-Power/Chandler-Hynek/p/book/9780415532518">neocolonial understandings of the international order</a>. </p>
<h2>What comes next</h2>
<p>In a political climate characterised by the rise of <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21710249-his-call-put-america-first-donald-trump-latest-recruit-dangerous">a new nationalism</a> in Europe, the US and beyond, and increasing public indifference or even hostility to the dispossessed and the vulnerable, it should not be taken for granted that hearts around the world would “break” at the sight of Aleppo. </p>
<p>But still, <a href="http://www.news24.com/World/News/heartbreak-over-aleppo-shared-across-social-media-20161214-2">they do</a>, seemingly including those of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-aleppo-7-december-2016">some politicians</a>. This might create political momentum for further development of international norms for the protection of civilians.</p>
<p>This is not an easy task, and it requires a genuine international dialogue. But it is not an impossible task either. As the <a href="https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/ERC%2520USG%2520Stephen%2520OBrien%2520on%2520Syria_19December2016.pdf">UN Security Council resolution on the safe evacuation of Aleppo</a> demonstrates, common ground still exists. </p>
<p>Possible ways forward include <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=1316371700">focusing on protection</a> and distinguishing more clearly between conflict prevention, humanitarian intervention and the prevention, mitigation or halting of mass atrocities. <a href="http://journals.rienner.com/doi/abs/10.5555/1075-2846.22.4.473?code=lrpi-site">Structural prevention</a>, which combines different strategies to address the root causes of atrocities, also needs to be rethought – by reallocating its ownership to local communities. </p>
<p>Last but not least, Western leaders should stop talking from a position of moral superiority like Samantha Power did. European leaders have had their own meltdown of humanity with the refugee crisis, but have <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/map/competing-understandings-protection-european-%25E2%2580%2598migrant-crisis%25E2%2580%2599">never evoked the responsibility to protect in that context</a>.</p>
<p>If some of the politicians moved by the images of Aleppo today are not equally moved by the images of refugees’ dangerous journeys to Greece or Italy, that is also because most Western politicians still understand responsibility to protect as norm of foreign policy that stops at their borders. </p>
<p>The outrage provoked by the images of Aleppo has changed the political debate. Will it change the way we think about our responsibility to protect? Potentially. The international community must use these images to change the narrative, otherwise it will only be left with discredited norms.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70697/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chiara De Franco receives funding from the Danish Research Council for a project investigating how the European Union practices prevention of civilians. </span></em></p>The images we have seen of Aleppo could play an important role in future discourses about the responsibility to protect.Chiara De Franco, Associate Professor in International Relations, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/705772016-12-20T00:53:50Z2016-12-20T00:53:50ZAfter Aleppo, vows that ‘this can never happen again’ must actually mean something<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150622/original/image-20161218-26116-1olow1n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A child sleeps while waiting to be evacuated from war-torn eastern Aleppo.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Abdalrhman Ismail</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When it comes to mass atrocities – genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity – we often express disbelief and outrage after we have spectacularly failed to prevent them. </p>
<p>Last week we were inundated with accounts of the deepening humanitarian crisis in Aleppo and belated cries that “something must be done”. Yet we have known of the threat to civilians in eastern Aleppo for months. Crucially, members of the international community could have done something despite a situation that frequently seemed intractable. How do we ensure that our all-too-common refrain of “never again” has some meaning?</p>
<p>The political situation in Syria is, of course, unique and complex. Reports of what has been happening in eastern Aleppo are often conflicting. Were neighbourhoods “brutally assaulted” and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-12-16/obama-pins-blame-for-atrocities-in-aleppo-on-assad-and-russia">recaptured</a>, or “<a href="https://www.rt.com/news/370510-aleppo-women-children-evacuated/">liberated</a>” by Syrian state forces, Iranian-backed militias and Russian airstrikes?</p>
<p>Have the victorious militias <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/syrian-army-iraqi-militia-reportedly-killing-aleppo-civilians--un-20161213-gtaia2.html">engaged in summary executions</a>, or have they been assisting safe evacuations? Are <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/aleppo-falls-to-syrian-regime-bashar-al-assad-rebels-uk-government-more-than-one-story-robert-fisk-a7471576.html">some accounts</a> naively overlooking or even “wilfully ignoring” war crimes and nefarious affiliations of the rebel fighters?</p>
<p>What has been clear for some time is that throughout the siege and bombardment of eastern Aleppo, civilians were killed in large numbers. As 2016 has drawn to a close, we have seen once again how mass atrocity announces its approach to those who are listening, lingers in the doorway for a while contemplating an entrance, and then bursts in when it is clear that its advance won’t be impeded.</p>
<p>At the emergency meeting of the UN Security Council on December 13, US Ambassador <a href="https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7607">Samantha Power blamed</a> Syria, Russia and Iran for atrocities committed against civilians in Aleppo.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>To the Assad regime, Russia and Iran, your forces and proxies are carrying out these crimes …Three member states of the UN contributing to a noose around civilians. It should shame you.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>“Who is to blame?” angrily retorted Russia’s ambassador, Vitaly Churkin. “I think that God will ultimately tell us.” Perhaps – <a href="http://www.unmultimedia.org/avlibrary/asset/1795/1795997/">but not all judgements</a> need be deferred to quite that extent.</p>
<p>Apportioning blame can serve a number of purposes. One is to try to identify what went wrong, to ensure it is not repeated. </p>
<p>For that purpose, our net must be cast more widely. There is more than enough blame to go around. In addition to condemning Syria, Russia, Iran and the rebel forces in eastern Aleppo (that were their ostensible targets) for the siege and slaughter of civilians, we might consider what other members of the international community, including Australia, did <em>not</em> do.</p>
<p>All United Nations member states endorsed the “responsibility to protect” at the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/worldsummit_2005.shtml">2005 World Summit</a>. It was made explicit that this responsibility, borne by the international community, must be discharged exclusively through the UN. In other words, members of the international community have acknowledged a duty to act in cases of mass atrocity and have even designated the UN as an “agent of protection” when states manifestly fail to protect their own populations.</p>
<p>Yet this designated agent is plagued by both internal and external constraints, including inadequacies in the decision-making structure of the Security Council (specifically, the veto provision). The UN is also hampered by relying on resources from its member states, which are often not forthcoming. </p>
<p>In late October, in relation to the Aleppo crisis, UN humanitarian chief Stephen O’Brien <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/26/aleppo-bombings-syria-un-stephen-obrien-vitaly-churkin">lamented</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>People’s lives [have been] destroyed and Syria itself destroyed. And it is under our collective watch.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The UN Security Council members have failed to act in exactly the way O'Brien warned would render the crisis “this council’s legacy”.</p>
<p>But if there is a responsibility to protect vulnerable populations from mass atrocity, surely this doesn’t simply disappear when the agent designated to discharge it can’t act. Which alternative body, or bodies, should take over this responsibility?</p>
<p>I want to propose so-called “coalitions of the willing”, or temporary, purpose-driven collections of states (and sometimes non-state and intergovernmental actors) as one, likely provocative, answer to this question – but I do so with caution. “Coalitions of the willing” are often associated with states that engage in military action without UN Security Council authorisation or any moral imperative to act. One need only think of the infamous “coalition of the willing” <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm">that invaded Iraq</a> in 2003.</p>
<p>I want to propose “coalitions of the willing” in a different context. </p>
<p>Sometimes members of the international community have what we understand to be a moral responsibility to respond to a crisis, but are unable to act independently. They may also lack an overarching organisation willing or able to act on their behalf. As actors can achieve things by working together (even in informal associations) that they can’t achieve alone, we might argue that, in the absence of a viable alternative, individual states (and possibly other actors) have an <em>obligation</em> to establish an informal, temporary association in order to respond effectively and robustly to a crisis in time to mitigate disaster. And we might rename this group a “coalition of the obligated”.</p>
<p>If we are calling on a “coalition of the obligated” to engage in military intervention for human protection purposes without Security Council authorisation, this is a controversial proposal. But it is also perhaps a necessary one if the context is Rwanda in 1994, Srebrenica in 1995, or Aleppo today. Having said that, a couple of caveats are essential.</p>
<p>First, a “coalition of the obligated” need not be formed solely for the purpose of military intervention. It might instead take on the task of negotiating effective action to reduce the risk of mass atrocity, to ensure the delivery of food and medical supplies to civilians, to arrange safe passage out of a war zone, to broker peace, or to collectively provide asylum to those fleeing persecution.</p>
<p>Second, our obligations are not exhausted when such an ad hoc group is formed to respond to a crisis. Ongoing responsibilities include creating an environment in which future crises are prevented, and establishing or reforming formal organisations, like the UN, with the will, procedures and resources in place to act. If this is done, informal, imperfect and more controversial alternatives are not required.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70577/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Toni Erskine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The United Nations has failed to protect the Syrian people from the conflict that has torn their lives apart – so now is the time for a “coalition of the obligated” to step in.Toni Erskine, Professor of International Politics, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/704092016-12-14T23:04:45Z2016-12-14T23:04:45ZAleppo’s fall marks a turning point, not the end of the Syrian war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150073/original/image-20161214-32170-vow5ba.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Before regime forces reclaimed east Aleppo, it was the last major civilian centre still controlled by the insurgency.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/George Ourfalian</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Saturday night, Bashar al-Assad’s regime <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/12/syria-assad-forces-close-to-capturing-east-aleppo">launched a major offensive</a> to retake control of eastern Aleppo, which various armed factions of the Syrian rebellion have held since 2012. </p>
<p>Aleppo is Syria’s second-largest city, and east Aleppo was the last major civilian centre that the insurgency still controlled. Its takeover is a major strategic and psychological blow for the Syrian opposition.</p>
<p>But while the Assad regime may have <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/aleppo-civilians-have-nowhere-safe-to-run-red-cross-says-1481628920">captured</a> eastern Aleppo, and will no doubt consolidate control over the rest of Syria’s major population centres, the conflict and its ramifications are far from over.</p>
<h2>Won the battle, not yet the war</h2>
<p>One reason Assad and his allies may have won the battle for Aleppo but not yet the war is because the neighbouring <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-14/syria-rebels-lose-aleppo-idlib-provice-becomes-final-stronghold/8117594">Idlib governorate</a> remains, relatively firmly, in rebel-controlled hands. </p>
<p>Over the past year or so the two main armed groups operating in the area, Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (previously Jabhat al-Nusra), have been consolidating their control of the province. </p>
<p>The groups have done this through the <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/keeping-lights-rebel-idlib/">development and delivery</a> of various governance and infrastructure projects. These include maintaining water and electricity supply, sanitation, the sale of subsidised bread, as well as other types of relief provision for an <a href="https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/Syria%20governorate%20profiles%206%20August%202014.pdf">estimated population</a> of more than 1.5 million people. </p>
<p>This is in addition to the many civilian-led local councils that support service and aid delivery in different Idlibi communities. </p>
<p>Even if the regime was to recapture Idlib governorate in what would need to be a brutal military offensive, the people living in many of its towns and cities have experienced, at the very least, an experiment in participatory government after decades of authoritarian control.</p>
<p>Despite the hardship, and many of the failings of the rebels’ attempts at governance, the memory of some level of freedom – unheard of in Syria before the uprising – will be difficult for the regime to erase.</p>
<p>Additionally, after nearly six years of war, Syria’s economy and physical infrastructure lie devastated. The World Bank <a href="https://www.rt.com/business/339703-world-bank-syria-costs/">recently estimated</a> the cost of rebuilding the country may reach US$180 billion. </p>
<p>Many of Syria’s great historic cities – like Aleppo, Hama and Old Homs – are shadows of their former selves as a result of the conflict. </p>
<p>To make matters worse, the Syrian pound has <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/society/2016/5/9/syrian-pound-hits-lowest-value-since-start-of-war">depreciated</a> more than 92% since the start of the war. Its value has fallen from 48 pounds to the US dollar to 625 pounds to the dollar on the black market in May 2016. </p>
<p>The regime’s primary international backers, Iran and Russia, may be willing to assist financially with rebuilding Syria’s physical infrastructure. But it seems unlikely even their coffers will stretch as far as the World Bank’s estimate.</p>
<p>Finally, as the civil war has ground on, the regime has become increasingly reliant on external support. This has come from Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, Russia and various other notionally pro-regime militia groups. The growing death toll of regime forces and the sheer cost of waging the war has meant the Assad regime has effectively outsourced much of its previous military and security capabilities. </p>
<p>Arguably, even if it eventually “wins” the war against the insurgency, the regime will find it difficult to provide a “legitimate monopoly on violence”. <a href="http://english.aawsat.com/2016/07/article55353990/syrian-crisis-faces-turning-point-disputes-among-allies">Growing tensions</a> between Iranian and Syrian military personnel have already been reported.</p>
<p>Likewise, the Assad regime exercises very little control <a href="http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/the-decay-of-the-syrian-regime-is-much-worse-than-you-think/">over many militias</a>. The armed forces are being eaten away by local militias involved in criminal enterprises and smuggling. The regime’s oft-cited war-cry – “Assad or we burn the country” – may have come to pass in a potentially unexpected way.</p>
<h2>So, what now?</h2>
<p>Assad <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/bashar-al-assad-aleppo-victory-huge-step-161207191853890.html">recently said</a> that taking Aleppo:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… won’t mean the end of the war in Syria. But it will be a huge step towards this end. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He was right in both regards. The fall of rebel-held Aleppo marks a turning point in the war but it is not yet the end-game. The regime will now attempt to consolidate its rule over the area and population of Syria it controls. </p>
<p>Leaving aside Islamic State, which Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/9/1/syrian-foreign-minister-fighting-is-not-our-prime-concern">recently claimed</a> was not the government’s “prime concern”, it is only a matter of time before Assad and his allies defeat the vestiges of the Syrian rebellion, now corralled in Idlib. However, economic ruin and the fracturing of the once-almighty security apparatus is the price the regime will pay for its victory. </p>
<p>The legacy of some level of freedom will also be difficult to erase from the minds of millions of Syrians who supported the rebellion. </p>
<p>So, while Aleppo has fallen and Assad may be able to defeat the remaining insurgents militarily in the short-to-medium term, the ramifications of the war are far from over.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70409/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marika Sosnowski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Assad regime’s takeover of Aleppo is a major strategic and psychological blow for the Syrian opposition.Marika Sosnowski, PhD Candidate, School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/703642016-12-14T14:22:15Z2016-12-14T14:22:15ZWhat’s in store for Syria after Aleppo falls? Russia and Iran will decide<p>Let us be clear. The imminent victory in Syria’s largest city of Bashar al-Assad’s government – and of its essential supporters, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah – is built on <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-38320647">war crimes</a>. </p>
<p>For months, hundreds of thousands of people in opposition-held areas of Syria’s largest city have been besieged and bombed. Thousands have been killed. Men of fighting age seized in recent days by pro-Assad forces face conscription into the Syrian military or detention and torture. Scores of residents reportedly <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/12/middleeast/aleppo-syria-government-gains/index.html">executed</a> in the 24 hours before a ceasefire was announced on December 13.</p>
<p>Rebels and civilians will get some respite, if yesterday’s agreement for their removal from Aleppo to other areas in north-west Syria is implemented. But this is only the end of one chapter: the war goes on, as it has since the uprising against Assad in March 2011.</p>
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<p>Opposition forces are still holding out in some areas near Damascus and in southern Syria; more importantly, they control much of Syria’s north-west, including almost all of Idlib Province and parts of Hama, Aleppo, and Homs provinces. A joint <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/12/syria-kurds-islamic-state.html">Turkish-rebel offensive</a> has captured a significant part of northern Syria. The so-called Islamic State (IS) is far from gone: only days before Aleppo really began to give way, it recaptured large parts of the historic city of <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrian-army-with-russia-beats-back-islamic-state-advance-on-palmyra-1481451208">Palmyra</a> from the Assad regime. Syria’s Kurds have their own areas, especially in the north-east of the country.</p>
<p>In this multi-sided conflict, will there be more Aleppos? Or will there finally be a period without quite as many war crimes and bloodshed?</p>
<p>Assad doesn’t have the answer, however much he claims control of his “Syrian nation”. The US has little more to contribute, now effectively sidelined after years of indecision and a misguided decision to follow Moscow’s lead. As things stand, much of the future of Syria is at the mercy of Russia and Iran.</p>
<h2>Assad’s bluster</h2>
<p>In a recent <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/bashar-al-assad-aleppo-victory-huge-step-161207191853890.html">interview</a> with the regime-friendly Syrian newspaper, al-Watan, Assad was clear that he still aims for a total victory, with Aleppo as “a huge step towards this end”. But while he’d never admit as much, he simply doesn’t have the resources to achieve such a thing. </p>
<p>The sudden fall of Palmyra to IS made clear once again that Assad’s depleted military is now little more than a figurehead for the real forces propping him up: <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-russian-air-force-back-stealth-su-35s-syria-17059">Russian air power</a>, Iranian <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/iranian-commanders-killed-syria-151013192529038.html">commanders</a> and <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/iran-army-brigade-65-green-berets-syria-deployment.html">troops</a>, <a href="http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/06/hezbollah-syria-gains-losses-160601093443171.html">Hezbollah</a> fighters, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/tags/quds-brigade">Palestinian brigades</a>, Iranian-trained <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqi-militias-complicate-aleppo-battle-1475687051">Iraqi</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/30/iran-covertly-recruits-afghan-soldiers-to-fight-in-syria">Afghan</a> militia, and <a href="http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/07/201472494759578879.html">Syrian paramilitary units</a>.</p>
<p>Even if he conscripts men captured in Aleppo, Assad will remain a military dependent rather than a force to be reckoned with. And with the Syrian <a href="http://qz.com/741432/the-collapse-of-the-syrian-economy-is-worse-than-germany-after-world-war-ii/">economy only kept from total collapse</a> by international sponsors, it is unclear whether the president’s supposedly loyal public will keep supporting him post-conquest.</p>
<p>So what Assad can’t or won’t acknowledge is that the future of his regime depends on others in Syria. As has been the political and military reality for months, Russia is in the driving seat.</p>
<h2>Leading them on</h2>
<p>Having <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-behind-russias-military-build-up-in-syria-47787">saved Assad</a> with aerial intervention in September 2015, Vladimir Putin and his inner circle decided to go further and erode the opposition and rebels with thousands of airstrikes, advanced weapons, and special forces – all helped along by Iran and Hezbollah. </p>
<p>Despite a seriously tense relationship with Turkey, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-downing-of-russian-jet-over-turkey-really-lead-to-a-wider-war-51207">shot down a Russian fighter plane</a> at the end of 2015 – Putin recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/27/kremlin-says-erdogan-apologises-russian-jet-turkish">achieved a political breakthrough</a> in talks with the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, defusing tension over the downed jet and apparently agreeing to pursue their Syrian aims on different fronts.</p>
<p>Russia played for time by leading the US on a snipe-hunt for a “political resolution” that would never occur. By early December 2016, Moscow even <a href="http://www.dailysabah.com/syrian-crisis/2016/10/08/russia-backs-un-call-to-allow-opposition-to-exit-aleppo">agreed</a> to a US-Russian proposal to evacuate those in opposition-held Aleppo districts – but then pulled back when the pro-Assad forces advanced further into the areas concerned.</p>
<p>With Aleppo effectively crushed, Moscow’s focus turns to opposition-held Idlib Province. Does it back Assad’s fervent desire to wipe out the rebels, with the prospects of weeks and possibly months of bombing, killing of civilians, and further displacement? Or does it settle for what has been achieved, allowing the opposition an enclave in Syria just as the Kurds are (at least for now) allowed theirs?</p>
<p>That decision probably hasn’t been made yet – and what’s more, not even Russia is in full control. </p>
<p>Russia may hold sway in the air, but Iran remains the key military player on the ground. It began training Syria’s militias back in 2012, and then put in its own forces and Iranian-led foreign units. It’s invested far more than Russia since the Syrian uprising began in 2011, sinking billions into preserving the regime. It has lost more than a dozen commanders and many hundreds of troops, not to mention the large uncounted casualties among the Iraqis and Afghans whom it leads. </p>
<p>Iran also consistently goes further than Russia in its private and public support for Assad. In autumn 2015, when it appeared Moscow might accept a settlement in which the regime remained but the president went, senior Iranian officials <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11973660/Russia-stance-on-Assad-suggests-divergence-with-Iran.html">made clear</a> that Assad’s departure was a red line which could not be crossed. And when the prospect of conquering Aleppo finally arose in 2016, <a href="http://english.aawsat.com/2016/11/article55362782/talks-russia-syrian-factions-aleppo-opposition-iran-seeks-foil-deal">Iran pressed Moscow</a> not to settle for a deal which would leave the opposition in any part of the city.</p>
<p>This will go on. Because of its huge investment so far and its stake in Syria as a secure corridor to Lebanon and Hezbollah, Iran may not be willing to tolerate any opposition area in Syria whatsoever. And that means it will almost certainly insist on pushing into Idlib, despite the inevitable financial, military and human cost.</p>
<p>To complicate things further, another major player is waiting to see what comes next: Turkey. </p>
<h2>Balancing acts</h2>
<p>Beyond the drama over Aleppo city, Turkey has gained more ground than anyone in Syria in the last few months. Having <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-mends-fences-with-israel-and-russia-thawing-two-of-its-frostiest-relationships-62128">reconciled with Putin</a>, an emboldened Erdoğan duly intervened. </p>
<p>Along with Syrian rebel groups, his forces of territory – and, far from incidentally, a “<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-rebel-idUSKCN11C1FJ">safe zone</a>” for civilians – along the Turkish-Syrian border and into Aleppo Province. That offensive is now trying to drive IS from its last major position in the area, the town of <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/12/syria-kurds-islamic-state.html">al-Bab</a>.</p>
<p>A longtime backer of the opposition and rebels, Turkey has traded in its unqualified support for the anti-regime forces for a balancing with Moscow and Tehran. In exchange for accepting their advances, Erdoğan now has his area to push back his main foe – <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/turkey-attacks-backed-kurdish-fighters-syria-161022184745848.html">Syria’s Kurds</a> – and to exercise leverage over the future of the country.</p>
<p>All the while, conspicuous by their near-total absence are the Americans. Once the ultimate power throughout the Middle East, they are sidelined. Secretary of State John Kerry, desperate to claim success before the Obama administration humiliatingly gives way to Trump’s, continues his quixotic pursuit of a resolution. </p>
<p>Even after months of Russian manipulation ended in the carnage of Aleppo rather than that outcome, Kerry may well try once more. Meanwhile, President Obama’s UN Ambassador, Samantha Power, continues her rhetorical offensive against Moscow and the Assad regime.</p>
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<p>This is all little more than a performance. The US’s marginality was evident in the December 13 ceasefire announcement. Kerry was nowhere to be seen; instead, it was Turkish intelligence services and the Russian military that reached agreement. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov <a href="http://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2016/12/14/fm-cavusoglu-discusses-aleppo-with-russian-iranian-counterparts">summed it up</a>: “It is easier for Moscow to reach deal with Turkey on Aleppo than with the US.”</p>
<p>The US has been reduced to a policy of trying to exert influence by supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in an offensive against IS in northern Syria. That offers some traction in a corner of the Syrian conflict, satisfying Washington’s rhetoric that IS – rather than the Assad regime – is the primary concern. But it is only a corner: the US is now on the bench. </p>
<p>Although Aleppo may be important, that stage is far bigger. With Russia, Iran, and Turkey as well as Assad all invested in the outcome, the catastrophe is all set to continue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70364/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the rebels on the back foot and the US sidelined, other major players hold the keys to Syria’s future.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/676042016-11-21T01:21:19Z2016-11-21T01:21:19ZIn Iraq and Syria, humanitarian aid workers struggle within a strained system<p>More than ever before, the humanitarian aid system as we know it is being stretched, questioned and tested. Among those bearing this strain are the individual aid workers.</p>
<p>Humanitarian aid workers around the world provide vital material and medical support to millions of people displaced by violent conflict. These women and men are the link between donor organizations and people in need.</p>
<p>But in places like Iraq, for example, there is a major strain on the humanitarian aid system. The number of internally displaced persons who stand to benefit from humanitarian support is <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/iraq-emergency.html">growing</a> as an Iraqi-led military coalition attempts to retake the city of Mosul from the Islamic State. Nearly <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/101584/briefing-how-29-million-iraqis-were-displaced-18-months">3 million Iraqis</a> were displaced in the past 18 months.</p>
<p>According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/20/global-refugee-figure-passes-50-million-unhcr-report">over 50 million war refugees</a> worldwide, the most since WWII. This number is likely to swell in the coming weeks as combined forces continue moving into northern Iraq and the humanitarian crisis in the Middle East gets worse. More funding is needed so that aid workers can do their job safely, efficiently and effectively, according to an official from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs now on the ground in Iraq. In July, <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=2880">the U.N. requested</a> US$284 million, and as of Nov. 19, only 65 percent of this total had been secured. Preparing to care for the displaced as the onset of colder weather approaches has <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2016/11/582ecace4/unhcr-sustained-support-still-needed-mosul-aid-operations.html">become a high priority</a>.</p>
<p>The need for humanitarian support globally is rising at a much higher rate than can be met by currently available material and human resources. In our imperfect world there will always be a need for humanitarian efforts, and those tasked with directly addressing these needs feel both a personal and professional responsibility to deliver. </p>
<p><a href="http://blogs.elon.edu/aidworkervoices/">My research</a> and book, “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Aid-Worker-Voices-Tom-Arcaro/dp/1530476127">Aid Worker Voices,</a>” focus on aid workers. I’ve surveyed and interviewed more than 1,000 worldwide, many with multiple years of service and numerous long-term deployments across the globe. Their responses provide insights on the challenges of their day-to-day work to save and restore people’s lives.</p>
<p>Here’s some of what they shared with me.</p>
<h2>Shifting sands</h2>
<p>Many veteran aid workers observed that the core aspects of the work have slowly become more complex in the last several decades. A lack of safety is an increasingly palpable fact of life. They report seeing friends and colleagues get <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2016/08/23/491057541/gang-rape-of-aid-workers-in-south-sudan-is-a-turning-point">raped</a>, <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/11/06/australian-ngo-volunteer-kidnapped-kabul-reports-say/93386468/">kidnapped</a> and, yes, even <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/11/isil-beheads-syrians-us-aid-worker-2014111683932604856.html">beheaded</a>.</p>
<p>Here’s what one respondent said about the difficulties inherent in her profession:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“There are issues facing workers in this job that are so serious and so important that it needs the whole industry to stand up and shout about it.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>She went on to say that she just wants to “get back to the work that I am fiercely proud of,” instead of fearing for her safety.</p>
<p>But that walk forward tends to happen on shifting sands.</p>
<p>Humanitarian principles like neutrality and impartiality that once seemed so self-evident have been drawn into question, especially on the politically and ethnically complex battlefields of Iraq and Syria. Humanitarian safety protocol that seemed straightforward in places like <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/23/2004-tsunami-five-years-on">Aceh, Malaysia</a> or even <a href="http://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/ha/earthquake/index.htm">Port-au-Prince</a>, Haiti appear almost quaint now on the battlefields in the Middle East where even <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/world/middleeast/syria-aid-john-kerry.html">aid convoys</a> have become targets.</p>
<p>On the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, delivering aid and support has deep political implications. The idea that “the friend of my enemy is also my enemy” takes on dizzying levels of complexity here, as everyone tries to make sense of the scorecard listing who is supporting or fighting whom in these theaters.</p>
<p>Tufts University researcher Antonio Donini put it <a href="http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/eyes-others-how-people-crises-perceive-humanitarian-aid">this way</a>: “Humanitarianism started off as a powerful discourse; now it is a discourse of power, both at the international and at the community level.” Aid workers are caught in power squabbles as they try to deliver needed supplies, medical care and support for those in need.</p>
<p>Aid workers know the world differently than most others from less cosmopolitan professions. Doing their job effectively <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Mahmood-Mamdani/e/B001IYZ4V2">demands they understand</a> cultural and political dynamics.</p>
<h2>Tough, complicated jobs</h2>
<p>One survey respondent observed, “Humanitarian aid work is more and more like firefighting. We are not the ones in charge of pursuing those causing the fires to stop them, we just jump from one emergency to the other, and that will not change things for good.”</p>
<p>Though an overwhelming majority - 90 percent - of survey respondents were at least moderately optimistic about the positive impact of humanitarian aid work, many had sobering thoughts. </p>
<p>A female worker currently working in an African nation said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Humanitarian aid work operates within a system that is built on inequality – we won’t see large-scale change happen in the lives of people, in terms of long term development, until we start to challenge the structures and systems that result in this inequity in the first place. And the heart of those institutions is within North America and Europe – until we recognize how dependent we are on the oppression and marginalization of others for our own betterment and benefit … humanitarian aid work is just another cog in this bullshit machinery.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The confines of the system within which aid workers struggle to work includes the humanitarian aid industry, and the larger economic and political forces that shape our world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67604/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Arcaro does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The humanitarian crisis in the Middle East is getting worse by the day. A survey of aid workers provides a glimpse into life on the ground, and clues to why the humanitarian sector is ailing.Thomas Arcaro, Professor of Sociology, Elon UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/674342016-11-08T11:09:32Z2016-11-08T11:09:32ZInside Aleppo’s medical nightmare, and why we must act<p>There are only <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/28/aleppo-two-hospitals-bombed-out-of-service-syria-airstrikes">30 remaining doctors</a> in Aleppo, and they have been describing an unimaginable situation, some of which I have seen firsthand. They have to perform amputations on children on the floor of their rudimentary emergency rooms without anesthesia or proper sterilization. They are running short on blood products, intravenous fluid, antibiotics and pain medications. </p>
<p>The doctors have been struggling to provide health care for a traumatized population of 300,000, while their hospitals are bombed daily and their medical supplies and medications are depleted. </p>
<p>They have been working nonstop for the past three months, dealing with the influx of a large number of polytrauma and crush patients suffering from horrible injuries, pulled from under the rubble. </p>
<p>Hospitals are targeted frequently in Syria, especially in Aleppo, mostly by the Syrian government and lately by Russian jets. Physicians for Human Rights has recorded 382 attacks on medical facilities, of which 344 were carried out by the regime and Russia; they were also responsible for the deaths of 703 of the 757 medical personnel <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_syria_map/web/index.html">killed in the war so far</a>. Most of Aleppo’s doctors have left. </p>
<p>My organization, the<a href="https://www.sams-usa.net/foundation/"> Syrian American Medical Society</a>, reported that July was the worst month for attacks on health care since the beginning of the conflict. There were 43 attacks on health facilities in the month – more than one a day. By comparison, this number of attacks occurred over six months in 2015, with<a href="https://www.sams-usa.net/foundation/"> 47 attacks from January to May</a>.</p>
<p>A few months ago, two of my colleagues and I made the dangerous trip from Chicago to Aleppo in order to volunteer in a <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-aleppo-road-pictures-photogallery.html">medical mission with the Syrian American Medical Society</a>. We worked in a hospital that was built 20 meters underground because it was targeted a dozen times in the past four years. </p>
<p>We worked, lived and slept in the hospital, while hearing the sounds of earth-shaking explosions nearby. The hospital was operated by a diesel-run generator and connected to the world through satellite internet and a tele-medicine unit. </p>
<h2>Using sewing thread for medical sutures</h2>
<p>It was so surreal for me, a critical care specialist from Chicago, to witness nurses and doctors in an underground hospital in a besieged Mideast city. M10 was the largest trauma hospital in Aleppo, performing 4,000 life-saving surgeries every year. In its intensive care unit, I treated innocent victims of the Russian and Syrian airstrikes. I still remember vividly Ahmad Hijazi, who was pulled from under the rubble of his destroyed house after a barrel bomb thrown by a regime helicopter exploded while he was asleep.</p>
<p>Ahmad sustained a spinal cord injury and lung contusion. Doctors struggled to manage his case with very limited resources. We were unable to evacuate him to Turkey for lifesaving surgery because the only road leading from the city was bombed every day by regime forces trying to encircle the city. A few days later, Ahmad gave up. He suffered cardiac arrest and was pronounced dead. </p>
<p>He is only one of thousands of innocent civilians who could have been saved in any other conflict or disaster area with simple means. His death and those of tens of thousands of civilians occurred because they lacked access to proper medical care constitute a war crime. </p>
<p>Since we left, the situation became more dire because of the ensuing siege. The only female obstetrician in the city told me that she has been using sewing threads to suture her patients after C-sections because of a shortage of surgical sutures. </p>
<p>She has been delivering mostly children with very low birth weight as pregnant women have no access to fruits, vegetables, milk, meat or vitamins. Food and baby milk are becoming scarce, so predictably, and for the first time in its modern history, Aleppo is witnessing <a href="http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/malnutrition/en/">children with severe malnutrition</a>.</p>
<h2>We can do more than cry</h2>
<p>Shedding tears about the pictures of the injured children of Syria is not enough. Hugging your children is not enough. The expected human response when seeing someone in distress is to exert our utmost effort to relieve their distress. Syrian children are not dolls to cry over and then move on.</p>
<p>We are accountable, as are our political leaders, if we don’t act when we watch videos of Syrian children crying in agony because war criminals are bombing them or snipers shooting at them. Tweeting and Facebooking about them, although necessary to spread the word, does not absolve us from doing what matters most – which is saving their lives and building a better future for them!</p>
<p>Every person can do several things right now to help Syrian children like Omran Daqneesh, the five-year-old boy from besieged Aleppo – whose photo showing his dust- and blood-covered face after being rescued following an airstrike <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/world/middleeast/omran-daqneesh-syria-aleppo.html?_r=0">captured the world’s attention</a> – and millions of other Syrian children affected by the conflict in Syria.</p>
<p>Advocate now and call your political leaders and president demanding that your country must exert its moral leadership to stop the genocide and save Aleppo now. In the U.S., we should not wait for the next president to take office. By that time, it will be too late. We should place ending the genocide at the top of the national agenda. </p>
<p>This would mean specific plans for stopping the genocide and bringing peace, not merely applying band-aids. What is happening in Aleppo is affecting all of us, wherever we live. The refugee crisis, the rise of Xenophobia, Islamophobia, anti-refugee sentiment and terrorism are all consequences of the crisis in Syria. Our national leaders should muster the political will to end it.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Organize with faith and civic groups in your city to form a broader coalition that can force our political leaders to act. This is the American way and this how democracy works. If we said “Never Again,” we should mean it, and we should have political leaders responsible if they failed the genocide test.</p></li>
<li><p>Speak up in medical societies and meetings. Invite speakers to your hospitals to address the attacks on medical neutrality and health care. The medical community should not tolerate a new normal where 150 years of Geneva conventions and International Humanitarian norms are thrown under the bus and undermined every day. The medical community can play a major role in forcing political leaders to listen to the pleas of Aleppo nurses struggling to save lives while being bombed by the most advanced war machine.</p></li>
<li><p>Volunteer in medical missions to help refugees. There are many NGOs, including <a href="https://www.sams-usa.net/foundation/index.php/press-releases/2-uncategorised/263-sams-global-response-april-medical-mission#!April_2016_free_doctor_sign">SAMS Global Response,</a> that provide medical relief to Syrian refugees in neighboring countries and in Europe. Join a life-changing experience when you extend a hand of healing to a desperate refugee living in a tent thinking that the world has forgotten about her. </p></li>
<li><p>Form a chapter to help resettling Syrian refugees in your city following the steps of the Syrian Community Network. More than <a href="http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/13210-syrian-refugees-admitted-year-through-october-675-99-">13,210 Syrian refugees have been resettled</a> in the U.S. so far, and more are expected to arrive in the next few years.</p></li>
<li><p>Give generously. We are a country of giving, so let us do what we do best by donating to charities and NGOs that are touching the lives of thousands of refugees or Syrians in distress in places including Aleppo.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The bombing of besieged Aleppo has become perhaps the most critical event, besides the Ghouta chemical attack, in Syria’s genocide, which has killed more than 450,000 people since 2011. UN Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura warned that “between now and December, <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55317#.WCD3KjbSfq0">if we cannot find a solution, Aleppo will not be there anymore.</a>” When the dust settles and facts are fully established, the bombing of Aleppo will be viewed as one of the worst war crimes since World War II.</p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/opinion/columnists/2016/09/08/genocide-syria-lives-dies-cares/90094352/">Charles C. Haynes</a>, the director of the Religious Freedom Center, put it recently, “What future generations will long remember about this moment in history is not bombastic rhetoric about border walls or deleted emails. Future generations will remember us – and judge us – by what we did or did not do to stop the genocide.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67434/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>M. Zaher Sahloul does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Warfare and bombing are typical in Aleppo, where hospitals are targeted and even children are wounded and killed. Read how we can do more than cry, from a doctor who has served in the city.M. Zaher Sahloul, Associate Clinical Professor, University of Illinois ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/670712016-10-18T14:33:30Z2016-10-18T14:33:30ZThe ICC’s Al-Mahdi ruling protects cultural heritage, but didn’t go far enough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141959/original/image-20161017-4735-vbd8m3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A burnt ancient manuscript at the Ahmed Baba Centre for Documentation and Research, in Timbuktu. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Benoit Tessier/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the first of its kind, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has delivered an important <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr1242">judgment</a> on the destruction of World Heritage.</p>
<p>International law clearly protects cultural heritage from attack, including during <a href="http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html">armed conflict</a>. But such crimes are seldom prosecuted and tend to be viewed as secondary to crimes against people. The ICC has partly changed this in the case against Ahmad Al Faqi Al-Mahdi, a local leader in Timbuktu who was appointed as head of the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi">morality police</a> when power changed hands in the city. The case exclusively concerned attacks against <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi">cultural heritage</a>. </p>
<p>This is the first ICC case to examine attacks against cultural heritage. It is also the first to consider the actions of terrorist movements linked to Al-Qaeda. Its findings are likely to affect how the international community responds to attacks on cultural heritage – for example, <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/23">the destruction of Palmyra in Syria</a> by Islamic State.</p>
<p>The judgment sends the message that the international community will not tolerate destruction of cultural heritage sites. That is to be welcomed. But in our view the judgment did not go far enough. This is because it also sends the message that the court values the culture that binds a community together less than the toll on human lives. While understandable, we suggest that the court’s reasoning is shortsighted and that it missed a valuable opportunity.</p>
<p>We would argue that protecting cultural heritage sites is equally important and connected to the protection of civilian populations. After all, as the ICC recognised in its judgment, the heritage site was a large part of the social glue that made the individuals living in Timbuktu a community. </p>
<p>Without culture, people are but an assembly of organisms in the same species. Culture makes us a people, a civilisation.</p>
<h2>Cultural heritage in times of war</h2>
<p>The rise of the so-called Islamic State (Isis) in recent years has seen a spike in attacks on and destruction of globally significant sites of cultural heritage. Some of these have included <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/23">Palmyra</a> and <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/21">Aleppo</a> in Syria, the <a href="https://gatesofnineveh.wordpress.com/2014/07/24/and-now-its-gone-shrine-of-jonah-destroyed-by-isis/">Shrine of Jonah</a> in Iraq and <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/119">Timbuktu</a> in Mali, which date back centuries and were internationally recognised as protected sites. </p>
<p>Increasingly, such sites are targeted precisely because of their religious and cultural significance and their value to the international community.</p>
<p>The ancient city of Timbuktu holds a special place in Islamic and world history. It played an essential role in the spread of Islam in Africa during the religion’s early period. Its mosques also made it a commercial, spiritual and cultural centre in the <a href="http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/gold/hd_gold.htm">trans-Saharan trading route</a>.</p>
<p>Following the collapse of government in Mali in <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-calls-for-elections.html?_r=0">2012</a>, terror groups occupied the power vacuum. These groups include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mujwa.htm">MUJWA</a>, an offshoot of Maghred Al-Qaeda;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/national-movement-liberation-azawad-mnla">MNLA</a>, Tuareg nationalists; </p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/ansar-dine">Ansar Dine</a>, Muslim fundamentalists who ordered the destruction of Timbuktu escalating the activities of the morality police led by Al-Mahdi; and </p></li>
<li><p>Al-Qaeda in the <a href="https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html">Islamic Maghreb</a>, a franchise of Al-Qaeda that runs separately from the Saudi Al Qaeda. It was responsible for the 9/11 attacks in the US. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Al-Mahdi was an educated and respected member of the local community in Timbuktu. From April 2012 he was the head of the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi">Hesbah</a>, the morality brigade responsible for enforcing the religious and political edicts of the two terrorist groups, Asnar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The two groups had gained control of Timbuktu. These organisations decided that the mausoleums to the saints and the mosques in Timbuktu were to be destroyed.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141958/original/image-20161017-4752-1xjcphj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi on trial at the ICC for destroying historic mausoleums in Timbuktu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Patrick Post/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Al-Mahdi initially advised against their destruction, recognising that the sites were an important part of the community’s religious and cultural life.</p>
<p>But the ICC found that in organising and providing the means for the destruction and participating in the destruction of five sites, Al-Mahdi was criminally responsible for total or partial destruction of 10 of the most significant sites in Timbuktu. These included several parts of the World Heritage Site.</p>
<h2>Heritage versus human lives</h2>
<p>The ICC sentenced Al-Mahdi to nine years imprisonment, which was within the range of nine to 11 years agreed by the prosecution and defence. The sentence recognised the gravity of the crime, the significance of the cultural heritage destroyed and the religious motivation for its destruction. </p>
<p>But the judges also highlighted that the destruction of “property” – no matter how culturally significant – is less grave than crimes committed against individuals. In other words, cultural heritage has been relegated to a subset of property offences. </p>
<p>In doing so, the ICC suggests that destroying a cultural heritage site that has stood for centuries, and is an important part of a group’s social glue, is about as bad as destroying a modern hospital. While both buildings play important roles, one is much harder to replace than the other. The ICC does not seem to have taken that fully into account.</p>
<p>This will have repercussions for the future protection of cultural heritage in armed conflict. </p>
<p>The judgment also ignored the connection between acts against cultural heritage and violence against the civilian population, which are often both justified by the same discriminatory religious ideals. This therefore weakens its potential to send a strong signal that intentional destruction of cultural heritage will not be tolerated.</p>
<p>The international community has always been reluctant to acknowledge this reality and turn it into law. There are other historical examples. </p>
<p>During World War II, and in many conflicts since, this realisation was always in the mind of the major war criminals, as witnessed in the <a href="http://www.rapeofeuropa.com/">Nazi policy</a> of destroying Jewish art; the <a href="http://www.icty.org/en/press/full-contents-dubrovnik-indictment-made-public">bombing of Dubrovnik</a> during the Yugoslav wars; and the destruction of the <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/208">Buddhas of Bamiyan</a>.</p>
<p>The ICC had the chance to change the world’s approach to these acts. But it fell short.</p>
<h2>Identifying victims of cultural loss</h2>
<p>Al-Mahdi accepted responsibility and demonstrated remorse for his actions. He pleaded guilty at an early stage and cooperated with the prosecution. Other possible defendants may have taken note of the court’s recognition of this in his sentence. </p>
<p>His guilty plea certainly saved valuable time and resources. And the case has been the most efficient and speedy <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi">ICC trial to date</a>. This is an important win for an institution that has struggled to deliver timely justice and faces serious challenges to its credibility due to the collapse of key trials.</p>
<p>The conviction also opens the door for the ICC to consider suitable reparations to victims for the destruction of the sites. This will be the first time an international court has had to consider how one compensates for the loss of the irreplaceable.</p>
<p>Eight victims participated in the trial process. But the court will have to explore who the victims of destruction of cultural heritage are: individuals, local communities, the state of Mali or the international community? </p>
<p>The ICC prosecutor, and the court itself, recognised that at some level all are victims. Indeed, while the suffering of the local community in Timbuktu is deepest of all, we are all affected by the loss of the treasures that bind us as humankind. </p>
<p>If only the ICC could fully see that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67071/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucas Lixinski is affiliated with the Association of Critical Heritage Studies.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ICC sentence against Al-Mahdi for destroying ancient artifacts at Timbuktu sends the right message that the international community will not tolerate the destruction of heritage sites.Lucas Lixinski, Senior lecturer, UNSW SydneySarah Williams, Associate professor, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/650682016-09-07T16:47:47Z2016-09-07T16:47:47ZSyria chlorine attack claims: what this chemical is and how it became a weapon<p>New claims that the Syrian government have dropped barrel bombs full of chlorine <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-37291182">on a suburb of Aleppo</a> are the latest in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/chlorine-attacks-continue-in-syria-with-no-prospect-of-assad-being-brought-to-account-39209">series of allegations</a> of chemical weapon use. Although the Syrian government denies using chemical weapons, a recent UN-led enquiry found it had used chlorine on <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-37184856">at least two occasions</a>.</p>
<p>Here’s what you need to know about chlorine and its use as a chemical weapon.</p>
<h2>Greenish-yellow gas</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136937/original/image-20160907-25272-pd45d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136937/original/image-20160907-25272-pd45d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136937/original/image-20160907-25272-pd45d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136937/original/image-20160907-25272-pd45d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136937/original/image-20160907-25272-pd45d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1006&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136937/original/image-20160907-25272-pd45d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1006&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136937/original/image-20160907-25272-pd45d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1006&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chlorine gas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Chlorine_in_bottle.jpg">W Oelen/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The chemical element chlorine is too reactive to exist on its own in nature, but some of the compounds that contain it are essential to life. We use hydrochloric acid (HCl) in our stomachs to break down food and destroy bacteria, while sodium chloride (NaCl) – the common salt we add to food – is so important that it was once used as a currency.</p>
<p>Pure chlorine was first isolated from hydrochloric acid by Carl Wilhelm Scheele in 1774. Within a few years, its bleaching properties were discovered and in 1810 Humphry Davy announced that it was a chemical element. At room temperature, it is a greenish-yellow gas with a choking smell, which is denser than air.</p>
<p>Dry chlorine gas won’t bleach, but in water it forms hypochlorite, responsible for the bleaching action, and also responsible for its disinfectant action. It was first used to <a href="http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-does-chlorine-added-t/">disinfect tap water</a> at the time of a typhoid outbreak in Maidstone in 1897. Since then the process has been generally adopted.</p>
<p>Forty million tons of chlorine is manufactured a year, among other things for use in making many pharmaceuticals. Thousands of organic chlorine compounds occur naturally including vancomycin, which for many years was the antibiotic of last resort and is <a href="https://www.iupac.org/publications/pac/1996/pdf/6809x1699.pdf">made in nature</a> by a bacterium in the soil.</p>
<h2>Health dangers</h2>
<p>But chlorine itself is <a href="http://www.lenntech.com/periodic/elements/cl.htm">very reactive with the human body and very toxic</a>. It irritates the eyes and skin and, even at quite low levels, can causes permanent lung damage even if it does not kill you. Breathing high levels of chlorine causes pulmonary oedema – fluid buildup in the lungs.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/chlorine-accidents-take-big-human-toll/">Accidents with chlorine</a> do happen. In Graniteville, South Carolina, on January 6 2005, a railroad tanker full of liquefied chlorine gas was punctured <a href="http://www.southcarolinaradionetwork.com/2015/01/06/we-couldnt-breathe-the-graniteville-train-derailment-a-decade-later/">killing eight people</a> that day, with another fatality three months later attributed to inhaling the gas. More than 5,000 people were evacuated from its immediate vicinity and some have health problems more than ten years later.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136927/original/image-20160907-25249-kmyl5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136927/original/image-20160907-25249-kmyl5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136927/original/image-20160907-25249-kmyl5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136927/original/image-20160907-25249-kmyl5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136927/original/image-20160907-25249-kmyl5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136927/original/image-20160907-25249-kmyl5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136927/original/image-20160907-25249-kmyl5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.compoundchem.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Chemical-Warfare-World-War-1-Poison-Gases1.png">Compound interest.</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Use as a weapon</h2>
<p><a href="http://chemicalweapons.cenmag.org/who-was-the-father-of-chemical-weapons/">Fritz Haber</a> (1868-1934) knew about the toxicity of chlorine when he chose it as his agent of warfare in 1915. He had already come up with the <a href="http://chemgeneration.com/milestones/the-haber-bosch-process.html">Haber-Bosch process</a>, patented in 1910, for the fixation of nitrogen as ammonia, which won him the 1918 Nobel Prize in chemistry. This made the manufacture of artificial fertilisers possible and the survival of millions of people today depends on it.</p>
<p>But it also enabled the mass production of nitric acid, source of the explosives that Germany used in World War I. Haber was an intensely patriotic German Jew. He was head of the chemistry section in the Ministry of War, coordinating the production of ammonia needed to fight the war. He was also in charge of chemical warfare, choosing chlorine gas as the agent. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136933/original/image-20160907-25231-iisusu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136933/original/image-20160907-25231-iisusu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136933/original/image-20160907-25231-iisusu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136933/original/image-20160907-25231-iisusu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136933/original/image-20160907-25231-iisusu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136933/original/image-20160907-25231-iisusu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136933/original/image-20160907-25231-iisusu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">British chlorine gas casualties April 1915.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_weapons_in_World_War_I#/media/File:British_55th_Division_gas_casualties_10_April_1918.jpg">Thomas Keith Aitken/Imperial War Museum</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Haber supervised the installation of the <a href="http://chemicalweapons.cenmag.org/when-chemicals-became-weapons-of-war/">first chlorine gas cylinders</a> in the trenches on the Western front, near Ypres. He and the specialist troops waited for the wind to blow from the east towards the Allied trenches and launched the first gas attack on April 22 1915. As clouds of chlorine drifted towards the Allies, <a href="http://chemicalweapons.cenmag.org/first-hand-accounts-of-the-first-chlorine-gas-attack/">panic set in</a>. It was no good diving into a trench, as the dense chlorine was heavier than air and poured in. Of the 15,000 or more casualties, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/100-years-on-the-day-the-first-poison-gas-attack-changed-the-face-of-warfare-forever-10193976.html">5,000 soldiers were killed</a>.</p>
<p>Haber’s story ended tragically in several ways. He returned home to a celebration of the success of the attack on May 1 but that night his wife Clara committed suicide after an argument – possibly over the morality of what he was doing. A few years later he developed a system for getting rid of insect pests, using hydrogen cyanide. It became known as the Zyklon system. A derivative pesticide, Zyklon B, was used to exterminate millions in Nazi concentration camps, where many of Haber’s close relatives died.</p>
<p>Gas masks were developed to protect against chlorine attacks and other chemical warfare agents were developed. But chlorine remains the simplest chemical weapon and reappeared on the battlefield <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/world/middleeast/21cnd-baghdad.html?_r=0">during the Iraq War</a> and allegedly now in Syria. In World War II, both sides of the conflict knew that the other side had weaponised chlorine and refrained from using it. Today in Syria, it sadly appears this may not have been the case.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Cotton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Assad government is accused of using chlorine gas as a weapon against its own people.Simon Cotton, Senior Lecturer in Chemistry, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/639952016-08-23T03:52:14Z2016-08-23T03:52:14ZAleppo’s dying children and shattered health system: is there light at the end of the tunnel?<p>Being a doctor can be risky business, some times more than others. </p>
<p>During my dozen medical missions to Syria, I had to crawl under a border fence, jump over walls, walk in the mountains at night for hours without any light, pass through the sniper alley in Aleppo, negotiate with smugglers and work in bombed, underground hospitals.</p>
<p>The Syrian crisis is now in its fifth year. The country’s health services are under <a href="http://www.atsjournals.org/doi/10.1513/AnnalsATS.201510-661PS#.V7pvW5MrKYU">unprecedented strain</a> due to the protracted war, deliberate targeting of health staff and infrastructure by the Syrian regime and Russian forces, the exodus of physicians and nurses, shortages of medical supplies and medications and the disruption of medical education and training. </p>
<p>Syria’s largest city, Aleppo, has 85,000 children, including around 20,000 below the age of two. Dozens are injured every week, just like five-year-old Omran Daqneesh whose pictures have shocked the world. Many have far worse injuries and will not survive.</p>
<p>I took care of some of these unlucky children, such as Ahmad Hijazi, also five years old. He was hit by one of Assad’s barrel bombs. These are containers the size of barrels, stuffed with TNT and metal shrapnel, which the Syrian regime throws from helicopters onto urban areas such as hospitals, civilian neighbourhoods, fruit markets and schools. </p>
<p>Hijazi had shrapnel lodged in his spinal cord and was paralysed from his neck down. When I saw him, he was breathing with great difficulty, so we put a breathing tube in his mouth and put him on life support. The day after I left, he had a cardiac arrest and died.</p>
<p>Around <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/world/middleeast/death-toll-from-war-in-syria-now-470000-group-finds.html?_r=0">half-a-million people have been killed</a> in the conflict. Half of the population has been displaced. There seems to be no light at the end of the tunnel.</p>
<p>Medical neutrality is a principle under <a href="http://www.redcross.org.au/ihl-geneva-conventions.aspx?gclid=CKmAgvS81s4CFYKavAodnHkMlA#Geneva">international humanitarian law</a> that <a href="http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/issues/persecution-of-health-workers/medical-neutrality/?referrer=https://www.google.com.au/">ensures protection of medical personnel</a>, patients, facilities and transport from attack or interference. It also underpins unhindered access to medical care and treatment; humane treatment of all civilians; and non-discriminatory treatment of the injured and sick. </p>
<p>Systematic attacks on health care, mostly by the Syrian government and recently Russia, are violations of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medical_neutrality">medical neutrality and therefore war crimes</a> under the Geneva Conventions.</p>
<h2>A health system in ruins</h2>
<p>Before the onset of fighting, Syria’s health care system was comparable with that of other middle-income countries, such as Iran. By 2015, all sectors of the country’s health infrastructure had disintegrated. </p>
<p>Within only a few years, the life expectancy of resident Syrians has <a href="http://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/alienation-and-violence-impact-syria-crisis-2014">declined by 20 years</a>; from 76 in 2010 to 56 by the end of 2014. This isn’t all due to the direct effects of war. </p>
<p>Many more Syrians have <a href="http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/09/30/syrias-other-crisis/">died prematurely from infections</a> and chronic disease than from the fighting – this includes diseases such as pneumonia, hepatitis, tuberculosis and diarrhoeal infections, as well as heart disease, kidney disease, diabetes, cancer and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.</p>
<p>Hospitals and clinics have been destroyed. Eight out of the ten hospitals in Eastern Aleppo are <a href="http://www.emro.who.int/eha/news/health-care-increasingly-out-of-reach-for-syrians-in-eastern-aleppo-city.html">partially functional or out of service</a> as a result of targeted attacks. From March 2011 to the end of May 2016, at least 738 Syrian <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_syria_map/findings.pdf">doctors, nurses and medical aides died</a> in 373 attacks on medical facilities.</p>
<p>The working conditions of Aleppo’s remaining doctors are unsustainable. An estimated 35 doctors are left in Eastern Aleppo which, with a population of approximately 300,000, means there is one doctor for every 8,570 people. There is not a single critical-care doctor – my own speciality – despite the abundance of critically ill patients. </p>
<p>Doctors, local administrators and NGOs are struggling in <a href="http://www.atsjournals.org/doi/10.1513/AnnalsATS.201510-661PS#.V7unN5N96jh">substandard conditions and often use unorthodox methods</a> to do their work. They work in underground makeshift hospitals, hospitals dug into mountains or in natural caves for protection. They perform surgeries without light, proper anaesthesia or sterilisation, transfuse blood without proper matching and have medical students or dentists perform life-saving procedures due to the shortage of specialists.</p>
<p>Much-needed medical supplies are channelled through dangerous routes across the borders of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. As physicians, we can’t wait for politicians to fix the crisis.</p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Fifteen Aleppo doctors recently penned an <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/11/middleeast/aleppo-syria-doctors-letter-obama/index.html">open letter to US President Obama</a>, in which they wrote that “there is an attack on a medical facility every 17 hours” by the Russian-backed Syrian air force.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the charity Syrian American Medical Society reported that July has been <a href="http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/43-attacks-marks-july-worst-month-attacks-healthcare-syria">the worst month for attacks</a> on health care since the beginning of the conflict. There were 43 attacks on health facilities in the month – more than one a day. By comparison, this number of attacks occurred over six months in 2015, with 47 attacks from January to May. </p>
<p>Charities and other organisations, such as the Syrian American Medical Society, have <a href="http://www.atsjournals.org/doi/10.1513/AnnalsATS.201510-661PS#.V7upSJN96jh">pioneered solutions to some of the resource gaps</a>. These include portable ultrasounds and other point-of-care diagnostic tools, as well as virtual wards connecting nurses and doctors in besieged areas with specialists in the United States.</p>
<p>Doctors in the US and other Western nations have helped Syrian counterparts make the best of the situation by providing training and helping with technology and treatment. But more needs to be done to support remaining health workers. </p>
<p>International medical organisations should advocate on behalf of their Syrian colleagues and champion an end to violations of international humanitarian law.</p>
<p>Educational opportunities to support Syrian health professionals, including scholarships for medical students, would help with ensuring there are enough staff to rebuild the Syrian health system. More resources should be directed to research the impact of conflicts on health care and the use of technology and other innovative solutions to mitigate harms.</p>
<p>Consensus should be achieved and acted on by the international community on the urgent need to protect civilians from airstrikes and chemical attacks. This is needed to apply pressure on the Syrian government to stop targeting the remaining health care staff and hospitals.</p>
<p>We should share knowledge, skills and technology with all patients, across the world. Although our local patients are a priority, we can also benefit the global community.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63995/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zaher Sahloul is a member of the Syrian American Medical Society and founder of American Relief Coalition for Syria.</span></em></p>Aleppo has 85,000 children. Dozens are injured every week, just like five-year old Omran Daqneesh whose pictures have shocked the world. Many have far worse injuries and will not survive.M. Zaher Sahloul, Associate Clinical Professor, University of Illinois ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/634862016-08-09T14:58:36Z2016-08-09T14:58:36ZPutin, Obama and the battle for Aleppo<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/03/syrian-rebels-advance-on-assad-forces-aleppo-siege">battle for Aleppo</a> has the Arab world, Middle East observers and Western policymakers on edge. </p>
<p>In what is likely a turning point in the long Syrian civil war, a coalition of opposition fighters is attempting to break Bashar al-Assad regime’s siege of the country’s commercial capital. Meanwhile, the Syrian government – with Russian support – is bombing rebel strongholds in the city which is still home to <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37006859">250,000 people</a>, according to the BBC.</p>
<p>Thanks to recent U.S. diplomatic overtures to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/obamas-syria-plan-teams-up-american-and-russian-forces/2016/07/13/8d7777cc-4935-11e6-acbc-4d4870a079da_story.html">deepen cooperation</a> with Russia against the Islamic State, or IS, and al-Qaida affiliate Al-Nusra Front, the U.S. could be considered a partner in those airstrikes. The U.S. overtures have been criticized as <a href="http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/opinion/the-case-for-finally-bombing-assad.html?">strategically inconsistent</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/obamas-syria-plan-teams-up-american-and-russian-forces/2016/07/13/8d7777cc-4935-11e6-acbc-4d4870a079da_story.html">Putin-pleasing.</a></p>
<p>As a student of American policy in the Middle East, I’d argue that American efforts are key to the tumultuous trajectory of Syria’s uprising-turned-war. What’s less clear to me is how much U.S. President Barack Obama’s approach prioritizes either the immediate needs of Syrians suffering from war and terrorism or their aspirations for self-liberation from authoritarian rule.</p>
<h2>IS overshadows Syrians</h2>
<p>Cynics might consider U.S. policy in Syria apathetic to the plight and aspirations of the Syrian people. </p>
<p>Even worse, we may be witnessing a microcosm of a teetering world order in Syria. Longstanding international dynamics have been upended as the freedom- and dignity-seeking popular uprisings of the Arab Spring have gone bloodily awry. </p>
<p>What there is now, in the words of democratization specialists Thomas Carothers and Oren Samet-Marram, is a new “<a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/new-global-marketplace-of-political-change-pub-59808">global marketplace of political change</a>” that is contested by an array of international actors rather than just influenced by Western democratic powers. In addition to the U.S., Russia, China, Qatar, Iran, IS and Hezbollah are all vying to shape the politics of transitional countries in the Middle East. Sometimes their tools are diplomacy; more often, military force or terrorism.</p>
<p>So whose political interests are winning out in Syria? </p>
<h2>More losers than winners</h2>
<p>It’s complicated, because <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-syrian-war-in-one-short-easy-read-50866">so many interests</a> are at play.</p>
<p>Ever since late 2011, months after Assad began <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/09/syria-protest-troops-attack-democracy-demonstrators">violent attacks on his own people</a>, Obama has pledged to work toward <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/president-obama-future-syria-must-be-determined-its-people-president-bashar-al-assad">his ouster</a>. </p>
<p>However, Russian’s President Vladimir Putin has long ties to Assad and has remained loyal to him.</p>
<p>The U.S. and Russia first overcame this difference and agreed to a “political solution” in Syria after meeting in Geneva in June 2012. In August of that year, Obama declared that any use of chemical weapons by Assad would be a “<a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">red line</a>” that the Americans would not tolerate. </p>
<p>Then, in August 2013, Assad unleashed a chemical weapons massacre in the suburbs of Damascus, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/2013-eyewitness-accounts-syria-chemical-attack">killing as many as 1,400</a> of his own citizens. Obama threatened airstrikes but <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/middleeast/syria-talks.html?_r=0">reversed himself</a> after Russia mediated a deal that stayed Obama’s hand in return for a promise that Assad would turn over Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal to be destroyed.</p>
<p>Obama’s vacillating Syria policy has spurred ongoing debate, especially with regard to fighting IS. The counterterrorism turn, starting with the anti-IS “<a href="http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve">Inherent Resolve</a>” campaign in September 2014, is one way to explain the dissonance in U.S. policy. </p>
<p>The fact is that since fall 2015, Russian military intervention has bolstered Assad positions on the ground. And Assad’s strength has strengthened Moscow’s position in negotiations with the U.S.</p>
<p>In parallel, in December of last year, the U.N. moved its focus from the Geneva mandate to seek a “Syrian-led political transition” to one focused on stamping out terrorism in the region through <a href="http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2254.pdf">Security Council Resolution 2254</a>.</p>
<p>But Syrians living under aerial bombardment in a half-emptied-out country don’t have the luxury of the UN and Obama’s extended time horizon. The president may be able to exercise <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf">“strategic patience”</a> through January 2017, when a new president will occupy the Oval Office, to further test Russian promises. But each passing day means starvation and bloodshed for Syrians. Besieged populations suffer in Aleppo as well as areas such as Damascus suburb Darayya.</p>
<p>The banalization of death intensifies as “international norms” of warfare are disregarded. The latest testament of ongoing horror has been Assad regime targeting of <a href="http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/press/press-releases/aleppo-region-suffers-worst-week-of-hospital-attacks-since-syrian-conflict-began.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/">six hospitals in Aleppo</a> last week.</p>
<p>The U.S. goal to “degrade and ultimately destroy” IS has taken precedence over any other imperative. U.S.-Russian bargaining within the International Syria Support Group, the working group they cosponsor that seeks diplomatic solution to Syria’s conflict, centers around the identification of targeted terrorists as a means to end the war. The new proposal from the White House, in which the U.S. and Russia will cooperate in specifically pursuing al-Nusra, is just one more sign of this new focus.</p>
<h2>Uncertain political transition</h2>
<p>But a stronger U.S.-Russian partnership is unlikely to achieve the elusive political solution. </p>
<p>Russia’s unabashed flouting of the February 2016 internationally agreed <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/25/middleeast/syria-civil-war-q-and-a/">“cessation of hostilities”</a> demonstrates these long odds. And the path toward a ceasefire is made more difficult by the agreement’s exclusion of ambiguously defined terrorist groups and territory. </p>
<p>Russian bombing, combined with Assad strikes, are responsible for most of more than <a href="http://sn4hr.org/blog/2016/07/29/24984/">5,000 civilian deaths</a> since the cessation of hostilities began, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights. The new Washington-Moscow cooperation is intended, in theory, to clearly mark out Russian and U.S. targets and therefore avoid civilians and U.S.-backed “moderate” opposition fighters. In exchange, Putin is to pressure Assad to abide by U.N. provisions against bombing civilians. </p>
<p>In the meantime, Al-Nusra has announced that it is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syrias-jabhat-al-nusra-splits-from-al-qaeda-and-changes-its-name/2016/07/28/5b89ad22-54e6-11e6-b652-315ae5d4d4dd_stTohe%20effry.html">splitting from al-Qaida.</a> The effects of this move are as yet unclear, but the fallout will likely impact both armed opposition dynamics and U.S. policy.</p>
<p>Ultimately, in my view, the U.S. has made itself complicit in Russia’s support for Assad. Washington is effectively buttressing a regime whose repressive crackdown on peaceful protests in 2011 pushed the country into its downward spiral of proxy and regional warfare. </p>
<p>Obama <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/obama-adresses-fight-against-iran-payments-and-russian-involvement-syria-1584039564">chides</a> Putin in speeches: “It is time for Russia to show it is serious” about “reduc[ing] the violence.” A military counterterrorism strategy is the key, he said. But in the same breath, he declared a commitment to working with Russia on those very goals. Such remarks put nobody at ease except perhaps Assad and his Russian and Iranian backers. </p>
<p>The apparent skepticism with which Syrians approached peace talks earlier this year is vindicated. The Syrian High Negotiations Committee stuck to its minimalist humanitarian conditions. These included a suspension of barrel bombing, the freeing of political prisoners and an end to siege-and-starvation tactics. These calls echoed those by <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1_oO9QrlL_CIshuHQ3N0mIkzG4_R4O4GVc-EbmKE0doQ/edit?pref=2&pli=1">Syrian civil society activists</a> on the eve of the talks in late January. </p>
<p>Yet these appeals have been repeatedly trampled upon in a U.S.-blessed process. John Kerry has not, in my view, made a serious effort to meet the U.N.-sanctioned opposition demands, based in the <a href="http://www.un.org/undpa/en/Speeches-statements/14112015/syria">“confidence-building measures”</a> agreed upon in Vienna in the lead-up to Resolution 2254. These attempts to mitigate Assad’s so-called <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/assads-starve-or-kneel-policy">“starve or kneel”</a> strategy, in which Putin has become a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/putins-model-of-success/2015/10/11/4cb3a592-6dcd-11e5-aa5b-f78a98956699_story.html">credentialed associate</a>, are basic requirements unmet thus far in the ISSG process.</p>
<p>The dramatic <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-opposition-idUSKCN0XK0KU">suspension</a> of the opposition’s participation in the peace talks in April was thus no surprise. The latest U.S.-Russian agreement will not help U.N. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura’s attempts to resume negotiations later this month.</p>
<p>An important question must be clearly enunciated. Where is this U.S.-Russian orchestrated process, claiming to seek an end to Syria’s war and a political transition, headed? </p>
<p>When the running cost of diplomatic road maps with open-ended timetables is buckets of blood, the acrobatics of international statecraft appear unsuited for an explosive region and a post-colonial order whose unraveling began with cries of “al sha’b yureed,” or “the people want.” </p>
<p>In my opinion, the U.S.-Russian process promises neither to substantively address the dire humanitarian situation nor seriously pursue an end to the war. That a political transition hammered out among Syria’s “people” can emerge from this diplomatic deadlock is even less likely. The battle for Aleppo confirms the primacy of violence over politics in Syria today. No solutions, diplomatic or otherwise, are in sight. The war rages on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63486/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Layla Saleh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The survival of civilians seem forgotten in a new U.S. and Russian agreement to root out IS and other terrorists in Syria.Layla Saleh, Assistant Professor of International Affairs, Qatar University, Qatar UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/586622016-05-04T11:04:58Z2016-05-04T11:04:58ZSyria peace talks languish in the doldrums as fighting engulfs Aleppo<p>The latest round of talks in Geneva have failed to curb a dramatic spiral of violence and the tragedy in Syria is deepening rapidly. A hard-won and admittedly imperfect ceasefire has been broken, resulting in hundreds of deaths, particularly in Syria’s second city, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0XR0CT">Aleppo</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2016/05/01/despite-the-alleged-truce-and-the-data-of-de-mistura-3116-were-killed-during-the-second-month-of-it/">Syrian Observatory for Human Rights</a> documented the deaths of 3,116 people during April 2016. In recent days, US Secretary of State John Kerry has sought to revive the process, yet a number of structural problems remain. The sheer number of actors involved in the talks, all arriving with competing visions of what a post-conflict Syria would look like, have caused serious problems. </p>
<p>Kerry himself <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-36183569">said</a> the conflict is “in many ways out of control” and the fact that strikes continued across Syria, even during the peace talks, badly undermined the trust-building work that is crucial to any successful peace deal. The breakdown resulted in a barrage of attacks as the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, sought to wrestle Aleppo back from rebel control. In February, Assad vowed to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/12154848/Assad-vows-to-retake-total-control-of-Syria.html">regain control</a> of all of Syria, seemingly with tacit approval from Russia. </p>
<p>In response to the breakdown of the ceasefire, rebel groups <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/01/syrian-rebel-groups-reject-new-ceasefire-in-revenge-on-assad-for/">vowed revenge</a> and suggested that any “attack against any liberated area where one of our factions is present will be considered an assault against all faction … and we will have a right to respond”. </p>
<p>The situation in Aleppo in particular, and across Syria in general, is increasingly precarious. As the conflict enters its sixth year, the death toll has passed 400,000, and 11m have been displaced from their homes. While 4m have left Syria, 7m remain. Daily life is far removed from what it was before the war started: infrastructure is crumbling, everyday Syrians struggle to meet their basic needs, and it remains extremely difficult to get humanitarian aid into certain parts of the country.</p>
<p>One citizen of Aleppo described life in the city as like “an apocalypse” and since the conflict began, the population has plummeted from 2.4m to around 400,000. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/destruction-in-syria/">Basic infrastructure</a> across the state has been destroyed, posing serious challenges to the provision of education and welfare. Medical personnel are increasingly in the firing line, and Joanne Liu, president of Médecins Sans Frontières, noted the rising violence against <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/18/msf-will-not-share-syria-gps-locations-after-deliberate-attacks">civilian infrastructure</a>, including hospitals. Aleppo’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-36169170">last paediatrician</a> was killed in April.</p>
<p>Since February Médecins Sans Frontières has <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/18/msf-will-not-share-syria-gps-locations-after-deliberate-attacks">refused to share details</a> of where its hospitals are because it says providing GPS co-ordinates to Assad and Russian forces does not protect them, but increases the chances of attacks on its facilities. Three hospitals have been hit since the ceasefire broke down, amid suggestions that Assad is seeking to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35561845">retake all of Syria</a>. </p>
<h2>Responsibility to protect</h2>
<p>According to the white helmets, the main emergency response force in Syria, the last week alone has seen <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/01/syrian-rebel-groups-reject-new-ceasefire-in-revenge-on-assad-for/">260 air strikes and 110 artillery bombardments</a>, killing 189 and injuring 394. While violations have been documented on all sides of the conflict, the Saudi foreign minister, Adel Jubeir, highlighted the <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/kerry-seeks-path-calm-syria-38808342">power imbalance</a> that underpins the air war: “There is only one side that is flying airplanes, and that is Bashar al-Assad and his allies, so they are responsible for the massacre of women, children, and the elderly.”</p>
<p>This is by no means a consensus view. A <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2016/04/syria-army-gearing-aleppo-assault-160429191355747.html">number of voices</a> still refer to Assad as the legitimate ruler of Syria, and explicitly or by implication suggest that violence against his rule is unlawful and illegitimate. Others argue that to defeat IS and prevent the spread of groups such as <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2016/01/syria-war-aleppo-jabhat-al-nusra-return.html">Jabat al-Nusra</a>, the West must support the Assad regime. Of course, this argument ignores the way Assad has treated the Syrian people. </p>
<p>While “legitimacy” is a malleable concept in international law, it’s obvious that when a government commits grave violations of sacrosanct international norms then that government should forfeit its legitimacy. As international relations scholar Jason Ralph has pointed out, the Syrian state has manifestly <a href="http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian_outlook/are-the-us-air-strikes-in-syria-and-iraq-legal-and-why-is-this-question-important/">failed to exercise its sovereignty responsibly</a>, and has therefore surrendered its right to non-intervention. Ralph made this point in the context of the fight against IS, but it can – and should – also be applied to the way Assad has treated his population.</p>
<p>The norm of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/responsibility-to-protect">Responsibility to Protect</a> exists as a means of preventing such atrocities from being committed, yet requires the approval of the UN Security Council and it is here that the international community has once again failed the people of Syria. The ability to wield a veto has ensured that other countries’ geopolitical interests have left Syria burning while the world watches. </p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>What’s immediately clear is there cannot be diplomatic progress so long as the ceasefire agreement is being flagrantly violated. The extension of a truce into Aleppo is paramount, but the forces who could wrangle it are stuck discussing how to get to discussions about how to achieve it.</p>
<p>One possible solution would be to provide rebels with <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-la-fg-syria-downed-planes-20160501-story.html">anti-aircraft weapons</a>, but that comes with concern about such weapons falling into the wrong hands. Debates about whether to arm rebel groups have been underway ever since the Syrian conflict began, but debates are shaped by the concern that these weapons would fall into the hands of IS or Jabat al-Nusra.</p>
<p>The anger and despair of those across Syria was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/01/syrian-rebel-groups-reject-new-ceasefire-in-revenge-on-assad-for/">summed up</a> in these words from a civilian in Aleppo: “For six years now we have been dying while these men talk in conference rooms […] We are totally alone.”</p>
<p>The people Syria should not be left alone. The international community has a responsibility to protect people who cannot protect themselves – and it’s high time that responsibility was taken seriously.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58662/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The world has singularly failed to find a path forward for Syria – or to stop the Assad government flagrantly violating all efforts to stop the conflict.Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.