tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/apec-1881/articlesAPEC – The Conversation2024-01-10T18:30:35Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2204502024-01-10T18:30:35Z2024-01-10T18:30:35ZWhy domestic politics will prevent a thaw in China-Canada tensions in 2024<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/why-domestic-politics-will-prevent-a-thaw-in-china-canada-tensions-in-2024" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>China-Canada relations appear caught in a well-charted downward spiral in recent years amid tensions on various fronts that encompass human rights concerns, cybersecurity issues and, of course, disputes related to the arrests of Meng Wanzhou and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/11/21/from-friends-to-foes-the-canadian-tale-of-two-michaels-accused-of-spying-in-china_6275957_4.html">the “two Michaels.”</a> </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/meng-for-the-two-michaels-lessons-for-the-world-from-the-china-canada-prisoner-swap-168737">Meng for the two Michaels: Lessons for the world from the China-Canada prisoner swap</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-expels-chinese-diplomat-accused-targeting-lawmaker-2023-05-08/">Expelling each other’s diplomats in May 2023</a> further strained already deteriorating relations. </p>
<p>As both countries faced numerous challenges in domestic and international affairs, Beijing and Ottawa, coincidentally, sent signals of <a href="https://english.news.cn/20230527/aa62e479292646fc9f95916d2dbc3958/c.html">what’s known as “de-risking”</a> their foreign policy later in 2023.</p>
<p>China was apparently intent to ease tensions with its key trading partners. This was evident in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/07/anthony-albanese-china-trip-is-historic-but-for-canberra-not-for-beijing">Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Beijing</a>, and President Xi Jinping’s meeting with United States President Joe Biden and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/japan-pm-kishida-hold-talks-with-chinas-xi-nov-16-nikkei-2023-11-16/">Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida</a> during the APEC Summit in San Francisco.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-joe-bidens-meeting-with-xi-jinping-means-for-geopolitical-tensions-217754">What Joe Biden's meeting with Xi Jinping means for geopolitical tensions</a>
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<h2>Chinese, Canadian woes</h2>
<p>Domestic socioeconomic issues have largely fuelled China’s recent diplomatic activism. A lack of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/11/business/china-consumer-spending.html">consumer and capital market confidence</a> in China’s <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/09/china-investors-will-be-asking-these-3-questions-in-2024.html">economic outlook</a> has slowed its economy, causing <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/root-chinas-growing-youth-unemployment-crisis">high unemployment</a> as well as a series of social problems that have put pressure on the government.</p>
<p>For Canada, meantime, diplomatic achievements in 2023 were few and far between. Apart from increasingly tumultuous relations with China, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/25/india-canada-rift-trudeau-modi-sikh-separatists-diplomats/">Canada and India</a> are also embroiled in a significant diplomatic crisis. It’s not ideal for Ottawa to find itself at odds with Asia’s two great powers.</p>
<p>That’s likely why Ottawa is also attempting to chart a new path for Canada’s international engagement. In October 2023, Foreign Affairs Minister <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/11/address-by-minister-joly-on-canadian-diplomacy-amidst-geopolitical-uncertainty.html">Mélanie Joly</a> provided details about Canada’s goal to practise “pragmatic diplomacy, to engage countries of different perspectives in order to prevent an international conflict.” </p>
<p>But even though both countries are now embracing more pro-active foreign policy, it’s unlikely there will be a noticeable détente between China and Canada in 2024. </p>
<h2>Canada isn’t Beijing’s priority</h2>
<p>In a recent article in <em>Ottawa Life</em> magazine, Chinese Ambassador <a href="https://www.ottawalife.com/article/jointly-build-a-community-with-a-shared-future-for-mankind/">Cong Peiwu</a> wrote:</p>
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<p>“For the road ahead, it is hoped that Canada will work in the same direction with China, uphold the principle of mutual respect, seeking common ground while shelving differences, and win-win co-operation, to bring our bilateral relationship back on track at an early date.” </p>
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<p>However, Beijing’s aspirations may prove challenging.</p>
<p>Canada’s insubstantial position on China’s strategic chessboard means Beijing isn’t likely to either prioritize the Canadian-Chinese relationship or have a dedicated strategy to achieve a bilateral détente. </p>
<p>China classifies the major targets of its diplomacy into <a href="http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0912/c40531-31350174.html">four categories</a>: great powers, neighbouring states, developing countries and multilateral platforms. However, as a traditional western middle power, Canada doesn’t fit into any of these categories. </p>
<p>China <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/fundamental-misunderstandings-in-the-australia-china-relationship/">has developed partnerships</a> with other nations that range from friendly and co-operative to comprehensive strategic ties at a higher level, depending on the level of importance Beijing attaches to that specific state. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-and-china-sign-strategic-partnership-discuss-human-rights-1.546781">China and Canada established a strategic partnership in 2005</a>, a relationship that ranks lower than the “comprehensive strategic partnerships” China has with western countries like the United Kingdom, Australia, France and Germany.</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/china-canada-2020-commerce-chine.aspx?lang=eng">Canada is also ranked only 18th on China’s list of top trade partners</a>, which also stops Beijing from expending more diplomatic resources to solve its dispute with Ottawa. </p>
<p>That means that even though China may talk about repairing relations with Canada, it’s unlikely to have a dedicated plan to do so. Instead, China’s policies on Canada will likely depend on Canada’s attitude towards Chinese priorities. In particular, Canada’s approach to Indo-Pacific regional affairs in 2024 could significantly influence the Canada-China relationship.</p>
<h2>On the horizon</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/taiwan-prepares-for-contentious-presidential-election/7430650.html">A victory in Taiwan by its ruling party, DPP, in the country’s upcoming presidential election</a> will undoubtedly heighten tensions with China, potentially leading to an increase in economic and military pressure against the Taiwanese.</p>
<p><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/navigating-south-china-sea-security-in-2024/">The South China Sea</a> remains a significant flashpoint in the region and will probably be the site of sustained tensions between China and other countries, including the U.S. and its allies. </p>
<p>Since Canada regards itself as a <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng">stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific region</a>, its support of the liberal rules-based regional order inevitably puts it at odds with China’s claims in the region, which could deepen Chinese distrust of Canada in 2024.</p>
<p>While Canada’s lack of engagement with China makes it an outlier among western nations, Canadian domestic politics provides little incentive for the government to improve its relations with China. </p>
<p>Canadians currently have a negative view of China, with a <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/chinas-approach-to-foreign-policy-gets-largely-negative-reviews-in-24-country-survey/">Pew Research poll</a> conducted last summer indicating only 14 per cent have a favourable opinion of China. Much of this negativity is the result of <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/real-concerns-around-foreign-interference-impeding-improvement-of-canada-china-relations-trudeau-1.6551196">several foreign interference scandals involving China</a>.</p>
<p>The Liberal Party and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau have had a difficult time on the China file. Accusations of <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-china-foreign-interference-canada-guide/">ignored intelligence reports</a> and concerns over <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-foundation-donation-fournier-1.6825761">financial connections</a> to China have led the government to continually backtrack on engagement with the Chinese. <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cbc-ca-news-politics-appeals-rejected-hogue-1.7068082">Public hearings into election interference are beginning soon</a>.</p>
<p>In 2024, the Liberals face an unstable supply-and-confidence agreement with the NDP and the opposition Conservatives are polling well ahead of them. The Conservatives <a href="https://www.conservative.ca/minister-guilbeaults-baffling-trip-to-beijing/">even criticized the Liberals</a> for sending the federal environment minister to China last year.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-the-supply-and-confidence-deal-between-the-liberals-and-ndp-survive-in-2024-219478">Will the supply-and-confidence deal between the Liberals and NDP survive in 2024?</a>
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<h2>Trade numbers remain strong</h2>
<p>Poor relations have yet to significantly impact recent trade between Canada and China. There were record bilateral trade numbers <a href="https://www.ualberta.ca/china-institute/research/analysis-briefs/2023/2022-yearinreview.html">in 2022</a>, and while data for 2023 indicates a <a href="https://www.ualberta.ca/china-institute/research/analysis-briefs/2023/2023-q2.html">reduction in imports</a>, exports are up. </p>
<p>As long as exports to China continue unimpeded, the Liberals have minimal incentive to re-engage with the Chinese. A lack of engagement won’t improve the relationship, but it also avoids the chance of another diplomatic spat that could put key export industries at risk. </p>
<p>While China is Canada’s second-largest trading partner, it only represents 3.9 per cent of exports and 11.9 per cent of imports, according to the most <a href="https://www.ic.gc.ca/app/scr/tdst/tdo/crtr.html?grouped=GROUPED&searchType=All&areaCodes=553&naArea=9999&countryList=specific&toFromCountry=CDN&reportType=TB&timePeriod=2%7CYear+To+Date&currency=CDN&productType=NAICS&runReport=true">recent data</a>. That means outside of key export industries, concerns about China likely outweigh the trade benefits in the eyes of many Canadians.</p>
<p>Even Canadians who buy Chinese imports, like cellphones and computers, are probably willing to get them from somewhere else. China is therefore low on the federal government’s priority list. </p>
<p>A shift in Canadian public opinion about China is likely a prerequisite for re-engagement by both current and future governments. This shift in opinion can’t happen overnight and must be genuine; otherwise the government will look soft on China to wary Canadian citizens. </p>
<p>With the foreign interference inquiry soon to begin featuring public testimony in the weeks ahead, China may feature prominently in the Canadian news cycle in 2024 — meaning a genuine thaw in Canada-China relations isn’t yet in the cards.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With a public inquiry into Chinese interference about to begin, China may feature prominently in the Canadian news cycle in 2024 — meaning a genuine thaw in Canada-China relations isn’t in the cards.Ye Xue, Research Fellow, International Relations, China Institute, University of AlbertaKarel Brandenbarg, Policy Researcher, Political Science, China Institute, University of AlbertaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2203482024-01-08T14:49:26Z2024-01-08T14:49:26ZIs China preparing for a war over Taiwan, or has the west got it wrong? Here are the indicators<p>At a time when Russia has been making gains in <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/what-russia-gains-from-marinka-capture/ar-AA1m6YpE">Ukraine</a> and the Middle East appears to be on the brink of further regional conflict, a China-US military stand off is the last thing the world needs.</p>
<p>At first glance however, it might appear that China is preparing for a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/united-states-big-one-krepinevich?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20231222">long-term conflict</a> with the US over Taiwan, the self-governing island of 24 million people, which the mainland claims.</p>
<p>In his New Year’s address China’s president, Xi Jinping, stated that Taiwan would “surely be reunited” with China. This is particularly significant as it comes days ahead of Taiwan’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-67855477">national election</a> on January 13. The <a href="https://www.economist.com/interactive/2024-taiwan-election?utm_campaign=a.the-economist-today&utm_medium=email.internal-newsletter.np&utm_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm_term=1/3/2024&utm_id=1841170">result</a> which may deliver a more pro-Beijing government opting for closer ties, or what is currently looking more likely a Taiwanese leader who wants to keep Beijing at arms length. </p>
<p>The election will see the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) face off against the conservative Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP’s candidate, Lai Ching-te, who has been <a href="https://www.economist.com/interactive/2024-taiwan-election?utm_campaign=a.the-economist-today&utm_medium=email.internal-newsletter.np&utm_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm_term=1/3/2024&utm_id=1841170">leading in the polls</a>, has often been <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3246039/frontrunner-william-lai-challenged-renounce-independence-first-taiwan-election-debate">described</a> as a more outspoken advocate of Taiwanese independence than his predecessor, the outgoing Tsai Yingwen, who took a more diplomatic approach, believing there was no need to state her support for independence as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/24/taiwans-choice-who-will-replace-tsai-ing-wen-as-president-amid-china-tensions">island was a sovereign nation</a>. </p>
<p>Any shift or <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3246039/frontrunner-william-lai-challenged-renounce-independence-first-taiwan-election-debate">pro-independence statement</a> is likely to be seen by Beijing as a prompt for <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-elections-military-threats-ea68fa11a0b172c31162c0ff128cabf7">military action</a>, since a formal declaration of independence is a red line for Beijing. In contrast, the KMT is seen <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/why-taiwans-main-opposition-party-cant-shake-its-pro-china-stance/">as closer to Beijing</a>. The US has traditionally supported Taiwan’s semi-independent status and sees it as a convenient regional ally. Coupled with the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/18/world/asia/china-taiwan-military-planes.html">intensification</a> of Chinese military flights around Taiwan’s airspace, all of these elements point to Taiwan as a potential trigger for a conventional US-China conflict.</p>
<h2>Other key indicators</h2>
<p>There are other key indicators to watch out for. The Chinese <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/why-is-china-strengthening-its-military-its-not-all.html">military</a> has expanded and modernised over the past five years, and its advances in <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-hypersonic-missiles-threaten-us-power-in-the-pacific-an-aerospace-engineer-explains-how-the-weapons-work-and-the-unique-threats-they-pose-206271">hypersonic missile technology</a> puts Beijing at an advantage, as the US hasn’t yet deployed an equivalent.</p>
<p>Also significant is the growing <a href="https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/15/1/27/6548121?searchresult=1">perception</a> of the US as an enemy among the Chinese public, part of a government narrative, especially since 2017. This is also a common theme among Chinese netizens as well, many of whom tend to be more <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10511065/#:%7E:text=They%20demonstrate%20greater%20confidence%20in,incident%20%5B43%2C44%5D.">nationalistic</a> than the government is. </p>
<h2>Technical battles</h2>
<p>The US and China are already engaged in an economic and technological competition. This has continued despite the apparent <a href="https://globaleurope.eu/globalization/xi-biden-at-apec-a-reset-in-relations-but-for-how-long/">thaw</a> in relations at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in 2023, with the US and Chinese presidents sitting down for a four-hour chat, and agreeing to resume military-to-military communications which can avoid accidental military escalation. </p>
<p>In doing so Biden signalled he may be prepared to appeared to edge away slightly from his hardline policies <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/ikebrannon/2023/08/11/chinas-resilient-chip-sector-reinforces-the-need-for-stronger-us-policy-action/?sh=a0f9e00721b2">to reduce dependence on</a> China’s <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/26/china-trade-tech-00072232">technology</a>. His administration <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-11-17/trade-war-joe-biden-s-devotion-to-donald-trump-s-tariffs-is-a-mistake">has not allowed</a> US chip manufacturers to sell to China as well encouraging <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/jan/02/asml-halts-hi-tech-chip-making-exports-to-china-reportedly-after-us-request">its allies </a> to block the sale of hi-tech chip making exports. Dutch manufacturer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/jan/02/asml-halts-hi-tech-chip-making-exports-to-china-reportedly-after-us-request">ASML’s</a> cancellation of its shipments of chip-making machinery to China, was <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-01/us-pushed-asml-to-block-chinese-sales-before-january-deadline">attributed </a> to pressure from Washington. A competition for economic and technological supremacy is already well under way.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-american-technological-war-against-china-could-backfire-219158">Why the American technological war against China could backfire</a>
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<p>This China-US competition is akin to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20043377">US-Japan tension</a> of the 1980s and early 1990s, where Japan’s economic development and technological prowess caused notable <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1991-09-01/coming-war-japan">concern</a> among US policymakers to the extent that by the late 1980s, Japan was seen as a bigger challenge than the USSR.</p>
<p>But, while Beijing has adjusted to the new reality of an increasingly confrontational China-US relationship, this does not mean that China is definitely keen to start a long-term conflict. China is adjusting to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/economic-indicators/article/3241354/china-gdp-economic-growth-expected-slip-2025-after-1-trillion-yuan-bond-bonanza-wears">massive challenges</a> within its struggling economy, which makes Beijing somewhat reluctant to move to a war footing, despite its confrontational rhetoric. </p>
<h2>Both sides have reservations</h2>
<p>China’s significant <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/12/china-industry-manufacturing-cold-war/">industrial capacity</a> and the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/04/europe/uk-nato-ukraine-war-ammunition-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">reduction</a> of western military stockpiles caused by the war in Ukraine, mean a conflict with China is something that the US can ill afford.</p>
<p>This was further underlined by <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/us-military-changing-strategy-after-losing-simulated-war-with-china-b1894062.html">several simulation exercises</a> of a Taiwan conflict by the US military in 2020. They discovered that nine out of ten of the possible outcomes ended in a US defeat. So, a potential conflict with China poses a notable challenge for American power.</p>
<p>It’s clear that the present crises have provided an opportunity for China to gain understanding of current military challenges, as well as delivering some benefits. The conflict in Ukraine has <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/china-stands-to-gain-from-a-weakened-russia-the-west-should-prepare-now/#:%7E:text=Today%2C%20it's%20a%20different%20story,favor%20for%20years%20to%20come.">provided</a> China with several economic benefits, most notably in the form of greater <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/2/24/how-china-and-indias-appetite-for-oil-and-gas-kept-russia-afloat">access</a> to Russian oil and gas, that had been the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7095e5d7-7a72-483f-9464-52d36bac03f7">lifeblood</a> of many European industries which Chinese firms have competed against. Equally, the tensions in the Middle East have served as a <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4333687-how-foreign-wars-distracting-us-china-threat/">distraction</a> for the US, which has had to focus more on the Middle East and Ukraine rather than fully committing to a confrontation with China. These crises have bought China time to prepare for what might come next.</p>
<p>These events show what knowledge China has accumulated. In the case of Ukraine, this is the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/04/arsenal-of-democracy-integrating-ukraine-into-west-s-defense-industrial-base-pub-91150">importance</a> of industrial production to warfare, with Russia’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ramps-up-output-some-military-hardware-by-more-than-tenfold-state-company-2023-09-19/">industrial base</a> enabling Moscow to continue with the conflict. It also highlights the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66984944">limitations</a> of Nato’s capabilities in supplying Ukraine. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/11/14/aircraft-carriers-are-big-expensive-vulnerable-and-popular">vulnerabilities</a> of maritime power have been illustrated by the Houthi <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/the-red-sea-crisis-explained-houthis-austin-israel-gaza-iran-shipping-suez-drones-yemen-task-forse-153-red-sea/">blockade</a> of the Red Sea. This has demonstrated the possibilities of <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/24010092/houthis-red-sea-shipping-yemen-israel-gaza">using</a> missile and drone technologies to challenge stronger powers. In the case of China, this could take the <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/RB9700/RB9709/RAND_RB9709.pdf">form</a> of Beijing using its anti-ship and hypersonic missile capabilities to challenge Washington’s naval strength. </p>
<p>What is becoming clear is that Beijing is increasingly preparing for a possible conflict, just in case. This preparation could help determine the outcome in Beijing’s favour.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220348/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Harper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China has learned a lot from the Ukraine war that could help it prepare for a conflict with the west over Taiwan.Tom Harper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2183032023-12-06T18:31:45Z2023-12-06T18:31:45ZThe Sunnylands Statement sets a positive signal: World leaders gathered for COP28 must build off of it<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/the-sunnylands-statement-sets-a-positive-signal-world-leaders-gathered-for-cop28-must-build-off-of-it" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>In a politically turbulent world, it is rare to witness major global actors set aside their disagreements to address the existential threats posed by climate change. On Nov. 14, the United States and China did just this by issuing the <a href="https://www.state.gov/sunnylands-statement-on-enhancing-cooperation-to-address-the-climate-crisis/">Sunnylands Statement on Enhancing Cooperation to Address the Climate Crisis.</a> </p>
<p>Issued prior to the pivotal Biden-Xi meeting on Nov. 15 at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in San Francisco, the statement not only establishes a spirit of co-operation but also sustains the progress made in recent climate dialogues between <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/271748/the-largest-emitters-of-co2-in-the-world/">the world’s two largest greenhouse gases (GHG) emitters</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-renewed-china-us-cooperation-bodes-well-for-climate-action-218394">Why renewed China-US cooperation bodes well for climate action</a>
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<p>Climate organizations and analysts <a href="https://www.csis.org/podcasts/audio-briefs/what-sunnylands-statement-means-us-china-climate-cooperation-audio-brief">have welcomed the statement</a>. <em>China Dialogue</em> stated that it shows that even with <a href="https://chinadialogue.net/en/climate/wind-in-the-sails-us-china-climate-agreement-can-boost-global-action/">their complex relationship, both nations are committed to prioritizing climate issues</a>. While the Asia Society Policy Institute characterized <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/analysis-us-china-sunnylands-statement">the bilateral alignment of the statement as an “insurance” to the ongoing 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference</a> (COP28).</p>
<p>As a scholar closely monitoring <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-chinas-plans-to-decarbonize-its-economy-mean-for-canadas-energy-exports-172349">the global implications of China’s climate policy</a>, the statement is particularly intriguing for how it describes China’s approach to energy transition. China’s determination to “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/14/climate/us-china-climate-agreement.html">ramp up renewable energy with the goal of displacing fossil fuels</a>” should be taken seriously by Canadian, and global, policymakers when planning energy futures.</p>
<h2>Accelerating renewable energy transition</h2>
<p>There are <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/analysis-us-china-sunnylands-statement">two significant developments within the statement which are worth highlighting</a>. The first is China’s commitment to setting comprehensive climate targets by 2035 that encompass all greenhouse gases (GHG) and the second is its unprecedented consideration of absolute emission reductions in its (<a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/02/1160441919/china-is-building-six-times-more-new-coal-plants-than-other-countries-report-fin">primarily coal-fuelled</a>) power sector within this decade. </p>
<p>Such policy language is crucial for figuring out <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-16-november-sunnylands-statement-china-methane-plan-coal-capacity-payments/">China’s future energy import prospects</a>.</p>
<p>The Sunnylands Statement indicates that the U.S. and China recognize climate change mitigation as one of the limited domains in which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/14/climate/us-china-climate-agreement.html">they appear willing to cultivate stability in their bilateral relations</a>. This isn’t entirely surprising, given <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/china-invests-546-billion-in-clean-energy-far-surpassing-the-u-s/">the rapid transition towards renewable energy sources</a> that both countries have undertaken. This trend gained momentum during the pandemic and is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2021.118205">anticipated to continue as their economic activities recover, and become more dependent upon renewable energy</a>.</p>
<p>This has been confirmed by BloombergNEF’s <a href="https://about.bnef.com/blog/new-study-clean-energy-transition-now-hard-wired-into-the-u-s-economy/">2023 Sustainable Energy in America Factbook</a>, which reported that in 2022, U.S. energy transition investments rose 11 per cent year-on-year to $141 billion — a clear indication that clean energy is now an integral part of the American economy. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, despite the present obstacles, estimations for China’s greenhouse gas emissions indicate <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-07283-4">a probability exceeding 80 per cent that the country will reach its carbon peak between 2021 and 2026</a>.</p>
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<p>The journey towards decarbonization is not without obstacles. As highlighted in a recent review paper published by <em>Applied Energy</em>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2021.118205">about half of the announced economic stimulus plans worldwide continue to be dominated by fossil fuel investments</a>. In countries like Canada, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-01515-2">the allocation of subsidies to the oil and gas industry has generated public controversy</a>.</p>
<p>Beyond investments, fundamental changes in how people travel and work — borne of the pandemic — may lead to enduring long-term reductions in the use of fossil fuels for transportation. As evidenced by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2304099120">a recent study published by <em>PNAS</em></a>, the growth in remote and hybrid work alone could reduce individual carbon footprints by as much as 58 per cent.</p>
<h2>All eyes on COP28</h2>
<p>The Sunnylands Statement, signifying the world’s two largest economies’ pledge to “<a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-16-november-sunnylands-statement-china-methane-plan-coal-capacity-payments/">pursue efforts to triple renewable energy capacity globally by 2030</a>,” can thus steer discussions at COP28 towards meaningful fossil fuel phase-out strategies. Yet, concerns emerge when we consider Canada’s lack of determination in phasing out its oil and gas industry.</p>
<p>Reports on <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/oilsands-executives-cop-28-carbon-capture-1.7044163">Canada’s fossil fuel industry’s role at COP28</a> have stoked fears of “greenwashing” over carbon capture proposals in Alberta. These proposals are intended to tackle GHG emissions during oil sands production but do not address the emissions from the consumption of fossil fuels.</p>
<p>This brings us to a crucial question looming over COP28: what does “net zero” actually entail? In her book <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/en-ca/products/2735-ending-fossil-fuels"><em>Ending Fossil Fuels</em></a>, environmental scholar Holly Jean Buck warns against a potentially perilous narrative that envisions a “cleaner fossil world” in which carbon storage and other forms of carbon capture continue to obscure the dominance of fossil fuels, thereby failing to address systemic problems caused by contemporary society’s addiction to carbon-intensive modes of economic growth. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/05/record-number-of-fossil-fuel-lobbyists-get-access-to-cop28-climate-talks">If the unprecedented numbers of lobbyists</a> — <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/04/cop28-president-says-no-science-for-fossil-fuel-phase-out-claim-was-misinterpreted">and perhaps even the COP28 president</a> — have their say in preventing firm policy language concerning the end of the expansion of fossil fuels then a <em>cleaner fossil-fuel world</em> is likely to become our future. A future we should all be wary of.</p>
<h2>Charting a new course</h2>
<p>Although the Sunnylands Statement is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, it must be accompanied by a focused dialogue on the true meaning of <em>net zero</em>. Will a country lean towards net zero achieved primarily by renewables, or one achieved by carbon capture and storage? </p>
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<p>How major economies (the U.S., China, Canada, etc.) approach these issues carries significant national and international consequences. The Sunnylands Statement paved the way for energy talks at COP28, and the world is eagerly watching such talks’ outcomes. </p>
<p>As said by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres, “<a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2023-06-15/secretary-generals-press-conference-climate">The world is watching, and the planet can’t wait</a>.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218303/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sibo Chen receives funding from Toronto Metropolitan University and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. He is affiliated with the International Environmental Communication Association.</span></em></p>The Sunnylands Statement has set a powerful signal for COP28, however, it also highlights that more must be done in Dubai to define what it means to achieve ‘net zero.’Sibo Chen, Assistant Professor, School of Professional Communication, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179122023-11-16T10:02:28Z2023-11-16T10:02:28ZGrattan on Friday: A government in a big hurry gives opposition some wins on ex-detainees<p>It’s not very often we see a bill marched through parliament at such a pace as this week. </p>
<p>After being caught on the hop by the High Court, the government has brought in emergency legislation to strengthen its powers to control more than 80 people, some of them serious criminals, it has been forced to release from immigration detention. The bill was introduced in the lower house on Thursday morning and passed the parliament Thursday night. </p>
<p>Those of an irreverent turn of mind might recall Scott Morrison’s Great Strawberry Crisis of September 2018, when a bill was also raced through in a day. </p>
<p>Both the strawberry bill and this one were enacted in the name of “keeping the community safe”. </p>
<p>The strawberry exercise, following the discovery of needles in some fruit, was an obvious political stunt. This week’s legislation goes to a serious matter, although there’s dispute about the threat to community safety, given the risks posed by these people aren’t greater than those presented by local criminals who leave jail. The difference is these are non-citizens.</p>
<p>The High Court isn’t usually front and centre in politics. But when it is, it can land sharp punches that throw governments off balance. </p>
<p>The Albanese government always knew the court might rule, as it did last week, that people can’t be held indefinitely in immigration detention. But on the basis of its past record, the odds seemed against it doing so. </p>
<p>The Coalition says the government failed to take into account a hint months ago from one judge. Certainly the government wasn’t as prepared as it should have been when the decision came. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-latest-citizenship-stripping-plan-risks-statelessness-indefinite-detention-and-constitutional-challenge-107439">The latest citizenship-stripping plan risks statelessness, indefinite detention and constitutional challenge</a>
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<p>It initially concentrated on putting conditions into people’s visas and making sure security and law enforcement authorities were prepared. </p>
<p>It was quickly obvious, however, that a robust response would be required. Regardless of the logic, the argument that these people pose no more danger than do post-sentence Australians wouldn’t wash. This was especially obvious <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/14/sonya-was-told-her-rapist-would-never-be-free-then-a-high-court-decision-saw-him-released-into-the-brisbane-community">when media stories appeared about frightened victims</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-james-paterson-on-the-high-courts-decision-on-detention-and-rising-anti-semitism-217808">Politics with Michelle Grattan: James Paterson on the High Court's decision on detention and rising anti-Semitism</a>
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<p>The government’s situation was complicated by the court’s delay in providing reasons for its decision (on which, incidentally, we don’t know whether the judges were unanimous or split). </p>
<p>The explanation of the court’s action is that this was a habeas corpus case, so the court’s first duty was to the individual at the centre of it. That meant when it decided the man should be released, it had an obligation to say so immediately. </p>
<p>Immigration Minister Andrew Giles, a junior minister, visibly struggled under the Coalition’s attack in parliament. The optics weren’t helped by the departure of Anthony Albanese late Wednesday for the APEC meeting in the United States. It’s been reported this was a trip the PM would have preferred to miss, but felt obliged to make because Joe Biden expected him to be there.</p>
<p>The High Court decision affected immediately more than 90 people, a number of whom had been convicted of major crimes including murder and rape. More than 80 have been released. The total number potentially involved could run into the hundreds.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-high-court-has-decided-indefinite-detention-is-unlawful-what-happens-now-217438">The High Court has decided indefinite detention is unlawful. What happens now?</a>
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<p>The government kept repeating it had no choice but to let the detainees out at once. Minister for Home Affairs Clare O'Neil said, “If I had any legal power to do it, I would keep every one of those people in detention. Some of those people have committed deplorable, disgusting crimes. I am raising three children in this country, and I want a safe Australia.”</p>
<p>The emergency legislation, ticked off by a special caucus meeting, meant the Commonwealth could deploy ankle monitoring bracelets and impose curfews. </p>
<p>There was a catch-22 in the powers the government previously had. If a person breached their visa obligations, they could be sent to immigration detention – but after the court judgement, that penalty was no longer available. This made legislation necessary, so people could be jailed.</p>
<p>The government rushed the bill through the House of Representatives on Thursday morning in about an hour. The opposition was not allowed to move amendments. </p>
<p>The Coalition prepared several amendments, substantially broadening the restrictions, to pursue in the Senate. But, anxious to lower the temperature, speed the bill’s passage, and get the issue off the table, acting Prime Minister Richard Marles approached Opposition leader Peter Dutton. Marles and other ministers met Dutton in Marles’ office, and the government agreed to all the opposition amendments. They included mandatory minimum sentencing for visa breaches – which is inconsistent with Labor’s platform. It’s understood Albanese was kept abreast of things.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/i-have-no-rights-what-happens-to-stateless-people-in-australia-after-the-high-courts-ruling-217363">'I have no rights': what happens to stateless people in Australia after the High Court's ruling?</a>
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<p>The legislation may be stopgap because, without the court’s reasons the government is working, to a degree, in the dark. More legislation could be needed next year. </p>
<p>The Greens have denounced the extra controls. The Greens’ Nick McKim told the Senate. “Make no mistake, this is Prime Minister Albanese’s Tampa moment and history will condemn him for this, just as it condemned Mr Howard and Mr Beazley over 20 years ago”. This was a reference to Coalition legislation for a drastic response to the asylum seekers on the Tampa.</p>
<p>McKim accused Labor of “an abject craven capitulation by a party that has forgotten where it came from, and forgotten what it used to stand for.” He predicted a High Court challenge to the legislation.</p>
<p>David Manne, executive director of Refugee Legal, says a challenge is “absolutely” possible. He says the new law confers “extraordinary powers” that are beyond necessity and proportionality. </p>
<p>Manne says the controls imposed could involve another deprivation of a person’s liberty, when the High Court has just ruled against the deprivation of their liberty.</p>
<p>In crude political terms, Labor knows it is always potentially vulnerable on issues involving asylum seekers and refugees. That vulnerability is on two flanks. The Coalition will exploit any situation to paint Labor as weak. The Greens will cast Labor as heartless. </p>
<p>The government hopes the legislation provides the necessary belt and braces to send the community the message that, despite initial fumbling, it is in control of this unexpected situation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217912/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The High Court isn’t usually front and centre in politics. But when it is, it can land unexpected punches that throw governments off balance.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2173732023-11-16T02:22:26Z2023-11-16T02:22:26ZBiden-Xi meeting at APEC a reminder of the importance of global summits in dangerous times<p>For three decades, the leaders of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum have met to advance their shared interests in improving trade and investment across the region. </p>
<p>This year’s meeting in San Francisco has a particular prominence. US President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping have met for the first time since last year’s G20 summit in Bali, amid efforts by the two great powers to improve their fraught relationship. APEC is normally held alongside the annual ASEAN and East Asia summits, but those jamborees were held a little earlier this year, giving the trans-Pacific grouping some much-needed clear air.</p>
<p>Established in 1989, APEC was intended to drive trade liberalisation in the Asia-Pacific at a time when global efforts had stalled. US President Bill Clinton was the inaugural host of the leaders’ meeting in 1993. In the 1990s, the grouping launched ambitious goals about free trade and took on what now seems like a curious mix of members. </p>
<p>APEC is one of the few international bodies in which Taiwan participates, alongside Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China. The grouping manages this by having member economies, rather than states. It also includes Canada, Mexico, Peru and Chile, but not India. While many countries use the “Indo-Pacific” label to describe the region, APEC is a reminder that not so long ago the region’s future was imagined in rather different terms.</p>
<p>By the early 2000s, political interest in advancing free trade had ebbed and APEC’s influence began to wane. This was exacerbated by ASEAN’s offshoots, such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, appearing better placed to advance a cooperative agenda. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-xi-meeting-6-essential-reads-on-what-to-look-out-for-as-us-chinese-leaders-hold-face-to-face-talks-217611">Biden-Xi meeting: 6 essential reads on what to look out for as US, Chinese leaders hold face-to-face talks</a>
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<p>But the grouping remained valuable to its members less for the specific policy benefits it could provide, and more for the annual opportunity to gather and occasionally manage crises. </p>
<p>In 2001, the APEC summit in Shanghai allowed then US President George Bush and Chinese leader Jiang Zemin to meet and reset their relations following <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/gall/0,8542,468363,00.html">an incident in April that year</a> in which a US EP3 reconnaissance aircraft was forced to crash land on Hainan Island. China held 24 crew members and the craft for ten days. </p>
<p>US-China relations were badly damaged, and APEC created the space for a high-level reset. Then, as now, the forum provides a useful pretext for the leaders to meet without either side feeling they were signalling weakness by travelling to the other’s territory.</p>
<p>Two decades later, and US-China relations have been in their most difficult phase since the normalisation of relations in the 1970s. The much-anticipated meeting between Xi and Biden appears to have been a success. </p>
<p>In the lead-up, both sides sought to manage expectations, making clear that neither anticipated any major breakthrough in relations. However, the four-hour discussion seems to have produced several important achievements. Perhaps the most important, at least in terms of managing risk, is the reopening of communication channels between the countries’ militaries, which had been shut down by Beijing in response to the then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August last year. </p>
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<p>China has also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/14/biden-china-fentanyl-deal">agreed to crack down</a> on exporters who manufacture chemicals used in fentanyl production, and have agreed to establish a forum to maintain separation between AI and nuclear weapons systems. </p>
<p>Reportedly, the two leaders also discussed the <a href="https://apnews.com/live/apec-summit-live-updates">question of Taiwan</a>. The island has long been a regional flashpoint, but in recent years it has become a lighting rod for hawks on both sides of the Pacific. Both would benefit from a less heated environment. </p>
<p>More broadly, Biden and Xi appear to have succeeded in putting a floor under the relationship, and while they’re still some way from an agreed set of “rules of the road” in managing their regional competition, Asia can take some comfort that communication between the two is now better and the trajectory of the relationship is more positive than it has been.</p>
<p>Beijing and Washington have incentives for improving their relations. China’s economy is its worst shape since the reform era began. Biden faces wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and has surprisingly poor domestic political stocks less than a year out from the presidential election. </p>
<p>While the summit has improved things, the expectation bar was set low. The contest between the world’s two biggest economies remains heated, largely without guardrails and of immense risk.</p>
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<p>APEC is more than just the US and China bilateral meeting. The group is about economic cooperation, and in the coming days the US will also try to deliver more on the so-far meagre offerings of its “<a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/wto-g20-oecd-apec/indo-pacific-economic-framework">Indo-Pacific Economic Framework</a>”. </p>
<p>While its efforts to advance things like infrastructure standards and supply chain resilience will be appreciated, the real prize – improved access to the US market – remains politically off the table. This will limit what Washington can achieve.</p>
<p>The members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> (CPTPP), a trade agreement established after the US withdrew from its predecessor the TPP, will also gather to consider new applicants. Taiwan and China are prominent among these, but it is unlikely either will be allowed to join in the short term.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-drums-of-war-are-receding-but-anthony-albanese-still-faces-many-uncertainties-on-his-trip-to-china-216727">The 'drums of war' are receding, but Anthony Albanese still faces many uncertainties on his trip to China</a>
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<p>APEC 2023 is a reminder of how important multilateral gatherings are in times of geopolitical crisis. Without the excuse that the summit provided, there can be no doubt Xi and Biden would have found it much harder to meet and achieve what are, in the context of their parlous relations, some important positive steps to stabilise regional geopolitics. </p>
<p>Yet it is also a salutary reminder of the real limits of multilateralism in the region. The summit normally concludes with an agreed joint statement, but differences in views about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Gaza conflict and myriad other issues mean that even the veneer of concord is unlikely. The old expansive institutions seem not to be well suited to the current period of heightened geopolitical tension.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217373/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley has received funding from the Commonwealth government for research on regional multilateralism.</span></em></p>Despite a positive meeting, the contest between the world’s two biggest economies remains heated, largely without guardrails and of immense risk.Nick Bisley, Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University., La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1071782018-11-19T19:17:06Z2018-11-19T19:17:06ZAs tensions ratchet up between China and the US, Australia risks being caught in the crossfire<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246151/original/file-20181119-27767-1g4rqmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The APEC forum in Port Moresby may come to be seen as a pivotal moment when the US reasserted itself in the Pacific region.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/Mast Irham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Port Moresby may not be Yalta, nor, it might be said, is it Potsdam. But for a moment at the weekend the steamy out-of-the-way Papua New Guinea capital found itself at the intersection of <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-apec-us-china-tensions-leave-cooperation-in-the-cold-106448">great power combustibility</a>.</p>
<p>When this latest chapter in America’s relationship with China is written, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Port Moresby in November 2018 may well come to be regarded as a moment when Washington exposed its determination to reassert itself in the region.</p>
<p>The failure of APEC leaders for the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-18/apec-leaders-fail-to-agree-on-communique-wording/10508974">first time in the organisation’s history since 1993 to agree on a final communique</a>, due to a standoff on trade between the United States and China, points to more trouble ahead.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/after-apec-us-china-tensions-leave-cooperation-in-the-cold-106448">After APEC, US-China tensions leave 'cooperation' in the cold</a>
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<p>Unless frictions on trade and other issues are eased over the coming months, Washington and Beijing will have embarked on a course that threatens to destabilise the whole region.</p>
<p>These are significant moments in the evolution of a fractious relationship between an established and a rising power.</p>
<p>The US has long wrestled with a workable approach to an ascendant China. It has oscillated between a hedging strategy, elements of containment, and a process of engagement.</p>
<p>None of these approaches has gelled.</p>
<p>Now, it appears to be moving towards a policy of strategic competition and economic confrontation. This is a combustible formula.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/world/australia/apec-china-trade-xi-jinping-mike-pence.html">Competing worldviews were on show in Port Moresby</a> as leaders of the two countries put aside diplomatic niceties.</p>
<p>US Vice President Mike Pence’s <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/us-china-trade-barbs-at-apec-summit">declaration that</a> the US would not “change course” in its trade dispute with China until that country “changes its ways” could hardly have been more provocative.</p>
<p>China’s leader, Xi Jinping, took <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/protectionism-doomed-to-failure-xi-says-in-swipe-at-us">a swipe at the US</a> when he said countries that embraced protectionism were “doomed to failure”.</p>
<p>Failure to secure American and Chinese signatures to a leaders’ communique arose from differences over the need to reform the World Trade Organisation.</p>
<p>China dug its heels in on language that might have posed challenges to the role of state-owned enterprises, and also on the question of differential treatment of developed and developing countries.</p>
<p>China has long benefited under WTO rules from being regarded as a developing country.</p>
<p>Both Pence and Australian Prime Minister <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/apec-2018-don-t-leave-pacific-with-huge-debt-says-pm">Scott Morrison warned</a> loans to Pacific countries were being used as a “debt trap” to assert Chinese influence. Xi strongly rejected these assertions.</p>
<p>Whatever the upshot of these skirmishes, America’s posture in the Asia-Pacific has shifted to one in which it seems to be spoiling for a fight. Canberra should be wary.</p>
<p>The Barack Obama <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/17/obama-asia-pacific-address-australia-parliament">pivot to the Asia-Pacific</a> ended up lacking substance and has been superseded by a combative Trump administration. Its approach has less to do with engagement than with confronting China’s regional ambitions.</p>
<p>The pressure point for regional competition lies in the South China Sea, where China is developing base facilities on disputed features. That strategic competition now extends to the southwest Pacific.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-17/us-to-partner-with-australia-and-png-on-manus-island-naval-base/10507658">Pence’s announcement</a> that the US would partner Australia and Papua New Guinea in the development of a naval base on Manus Island overlooking the Bismarck Sea is, arguably, the most significant American security initiative in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Vietnam War. Pence said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We will work with these nations to protect sovereignty and maritime rights of the Pacific Islands as well.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Thus, Beijing was put on notice that America would adopt a more forward-leaning posture in the Asia-Pacific. Where this leads is hard to predict, but what is certain is that trade and other tensions will have a security overlay.</p>
<p>American bases on the Korean Peninsula and in the Japanese archipelago will now stretch into the southwest Pacific. The Manus base will overlook maritime routes on Australia’s northern approaches.</p>
<p>From an Australian strategic perspective, this is a hugely significant development, and one that will test Canberra’s ability to balance its security relationship with the US and its commercial partnership with China.</p>
<p>Beijing will correctly view the Manus facility as a joint endeavour to neutralise China’s thrust into the southwest Pacific, where it has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/response-to-rumours-of-a-chinese-military-base-in-vanuatu-speaks-volumes-about-australian-foreign-policy-94813">cultivating micro-states</a> as part of attempts to spread its power and influence across the region.</p>
<p>Belatedly, Canberra is responding to this Chinese assertiveness in its backyard by ramping up its diplomatic engagement, expanding its aid programs, and now partnering Papua New Guinea and the US in the development of a joint naval facility.</p>
<p>In the period ahead, Australian diplomacy towards China will need to be more nimble and subtle than it has been in the recent past.</p>
<p>Beijing will be watching.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/dont-load-up-pacific-with-debt-morrison-urges/news-story/a5ca50c848e55a11631a628ac9ef8f8e">Morrison was not understating the case</a> when he said US involvement in the Lombrun base on Manus would elevate Australia’s relations with its ANZUS alliance partnership to a “new level”.</p>
<p>How this “new level” plays out will depend on careful management of relations with China by whatever government is in power.</p>
<p>A joint naval facility will inevitably make it more difficult to avoid being caught in an American slipstream in any confrontation with China.</p>
<p>Finally, in the lead-up to what is shaping as one of more important encounters between world leaders in years – the meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump at the G20 in Buenos Aires this month – Australian policymakers would be advised to read <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/">Pence’s October 4 address to the Hudson Institute in Washington</a>.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-and-china-push-the-reset-button-on-an-important-relationship-106428">Australia and China push the 'reset' button on an important relationship</a>
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<p>Assuming Pence’s speech represents an administration view, this should be regarded as a deeply antagonistic statement verging on a declaration of hostilities.</p>
<p>Pence accused China of: seeking to influence America’s mid-term congressional elections; engaging in cyber attacks against American institutions; stealing American property rights; and adopting ruinous trade practices:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When it comes to Beijing’s malign influence and interference in American politics and policy, we will continue to expose it, no matter the form it takes.</p>
<p>We will work with leaders at every level of society to defend our national interest and most cherished goals.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Some viewed the Pence speech as the forerunner of a new cold war. That probably overstates the case, but it is also true that relations between Washington and Beijing have taken a turn for the worse.</p>
<p>Watch this space.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107178/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As relations between Washington and Beijing take a turn for the worse, the announcement of a new naval base on Manus Island carries great strategic significance.Tony Walker, Adjunct Professor, School of Communications, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1071892018-11-19T05:23:01Z2018-11-19T05:23:01ZPolitics with Michelle Grattan: Lowy Institute’s Jonathan Pryke on APEC 2018<p>The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) ended with no agreed communique and unresolved tensions between the United States and China on open display. </p>
<p>Lowy Institute’s Pacific Islands program director, Jonathan Pryke, who observed the forum in Port Moresby, said: “it is distressing for all parties that they weren’t able to find common ground. There is a fear that we’re losing the middle here.” </p>
<p>Pryke told The Conversation “the desire for a convergence of China into the international liberal order seems like a bit of a fantasy now.”</p>
<p>But he says “whilst the summit has left everyone on a pretty sour note” because of the state of the communique “it is still important for all the middle powers to find more ways in which they can communicate and work together to maintain this liberal order.” </p>
<p>On Australia partnering with America to develop a naval base on Manus, he said “the devil will be in the details … but it does send a strong symbolic message to China.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107189/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pryke told The Conversation "the desire for a convergence of China into the international liberal order seems like a bit of a fantasy now.”Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1066062018-11-13T19:02:55Z2018-11-13T19:02:55ZIn his first major foreign policy test, Morrison needs to stick to the script<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/245209/original/file-20181113-194500-179zyor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">After a positive start, Morrison's relations with his Indonesian counterpart, Joko Widodo, cooled off after he suggested moving the Australian embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Attending a global leaders summit might look easy – all interesting shirts, family-style photos and unusual handshakes – but these occasions can prove extremely difficult for leaders who focus solely on domestic politics or brand new leaders with uncertain electoral prospects. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Scott Morrison is both. </p>
<p>Morrison faces a busy week of foreign policy tests in his first big moment on the global stage. He first travels to <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/scott-morrison-is-about-to-meet-the-neighbours">Singapore</a> for the ASEAN and <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/eas/Documents/eas-factsheet.pdf">East Asia Summit</a>, then hosts Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-22/japanese-pm-shinzo-abe-to-make-historic-visit-to-darwin/10291338">historic visit</a> to Darwin before jetting off for the <a href="https://www.apec2018png.org/">APEC Summit</a> in Papua New Guinea on the weekend. This power week will be followed by the <a href="https://www.g20.org/en">G20 Leaders Summit</a> in Buenos Aires at the end of month. </p>
<p>This week, Morrison will have his first meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, US Vice President Mike Pence and Russian President Vladimir Putin, in addition to new (but not so new) Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohamad and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-bishop-gone-morrison-and-payne-face-significant-challenges-on-foreign-policy-102110">With Bishop gone, Morrison and Payne face significant challenges on foreign policy</a>
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<p>So what can we expect from Morrison’s debut summit season and in particular his meetings with Xi? </p>
<p>Pundits have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-and-china-push-the-reset-button-on-an-important-relationship-106428">speculating</a> whether Morrison might try to use the August leadership spill and appointment of new Foreign Minister Marise Payne as a way of pressing the reset button on relations with China. </p>
<p>Payne’s recent visit to Beijing was viewed by both parties as a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/australia-a-partner-not-a-rival-says-china-as-relations-warm-up-20181108-p50evi.html?ref=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_source=rss_feed">success</a>, so Morrison should have a more pleasant meeting with Xi than former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull might have. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/245212/original/file-20181113-194485-m89x5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/245212/original/file-20181113-194485-m89x5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/245212/original/file-20181113-194485-m89x5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/245212/original/file-20181113-194485-m89x5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/245212/original/file-20181113-194485-m89x5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/245212/original/file-20181113-194485-m89x5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/245212/original/file-20181113-194485-m89x5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Payne’s visit to China was the first by an Australian foreign minister since Julie Bishop’s trip in 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thomas Peter/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But Morrison’s first months in office show a leader who speaks without due care to the reactions of foreign governments – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/oct/16/australian-embassy-in-israel-may-be-moved-to-jerusalem">floating the idea</a> of shifting the Australian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem is the most glaring example – and a leader with little political capital to spare. </p>
<p>He needs to stick to the script this week. </p>
<h2>Danger signs</h2>
<p>Morrison has already courted controversy on foreign policy in a short period of time. He skipped the UN General Assembly in September. He also missed the Pacific Islands Forum in Nauru, forcing Payne to <a href="https://thenewdaily.com.au/news/national/2018/09/03/pacific-islands-forum-nauru/">reassure Pacific neighbours</a> that he wasn’t “snubbing” them. </p>
<p>Morrison did go straight to Jakarta in his first overseas trip as leader to <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-31/australia-and-indonesia-pledge-closer-ties/10189458">meet</a> with President Joko Widodo and sign the <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/iacepa/Pages/indonesia-australia-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement.aspx">Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement </a> with Indonesia.</p>
<p>But he was then <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/morrison-switches-back-to-normal-foreign-policy-20181101-p50de2.html">accused</a> of playing “straight from Trump’s songbook” when he mused about moving Australia’s embassy in Israel to Jerusalem without consulting diplomats or generals beforehand. It was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/oct/16/morrisons-desperate-embassy-stunt-is-a-silly-idea-designed-for-him-to-cling-to-power">widely seen</a> as a crude attempt to win the Jewish vote in the Wentworth by-election. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1057046316654592000"}"></div></p>
<p>One downfall of Australian leaders is they can sometimes look parochial and small-town while on the big stage. For example, then-Prime Minister Tony Abbott made a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/australia-suffers-another-cringeworthy-moment-during-g20-summit-20141117-11nxg9.html">cringeworthy speech</a> to G20 leaders in Brisbane in 2014 about GP co-payments and stopping the boats. Opposition leader Bill Shorten described it as “weird and graceless”. </p>
<p>In his case, Morrison failed to realise the negative reception his embassy musings would receive in Indonesia. Now, his meetings with Widodo are likely to be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/nov/12/morrison-plays-down-israel-embassy-spat-ahead-of-indonesia-trade-talks">frosty</a>, with no plans to sign the free-trade agreement by the end of the year. </p>
<h2>Morrison’s meetings with Xi, Putin and Modi</h2>
<p>In his recent <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/keynote-address-asia-briefing-live-beliefs-guide-us">headland speech</a>, Morrison seemed to adopt a Malcolm Turnbull-style line on taking a middle path with the US and China, noting that a confrontation between the two powers: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>risks unimagined damage to economic growth and the global order. Damage where no-one benefits. Lose-lose.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nevertheless, the speech was strong on <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/scott-morrison-has-staked-foreign-policy-on-values-beijing-abhors-20181105-p50e2a.html">values</a>, many of which China does not share.</p>
<p>It is also not clear how Xi will view the <a href="https://theconversation.com/morrison-to-unveil-broad-suite-of-measures-to-boost-australias-influence-in-the-pacific-106557">recent Pacific push</a> from Morrison, though he seemed to offer the possibility for partnership in the region. </p>
<p>Morrison’s meeting with Putin at the East Asia Summit will likewise be interesting to watch. This is Putin’s first time at the summit, but by no means his first rodeo. His presence is perhaps indicative of <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-is-a-rising-military-power-in-the-asia-pacific-and-australia-needs-to-take-it-seriously-105390">Russia’s intention to pivot</a> more attention towards the Indo-Pacific region, taking advantage of Trump’s absence. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-is-a-rising-military-power-in-the-asia-pacific-and-australia-needs-to-take-it-seriously-105390">Russia is a rising military power in the Asia-Pacific, and Australia needs to take it seriously</a>
</strong>
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<p>In yet another foreign policy stumble, Abbott once famously vowed to “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/tony-abbott-vows-to-shirtfront-vladimir-putin-over-mh17-tragedy-20141013-115cm3.html">shirtfront</a>” Putin over the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17. Putin enjoys such displays of toxic masculinity; hopefully, Morrison can restrain himself. </p>
<p>Australia wants to enhance its partnership with India, so we should see Morrison make a beeline for Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the ASEAN meeting, hoping for one of Modi’s signature <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Modi-hugs">hugs</a>.</p>
<p>Before meeting Modi, Morrison will hopefully have carefully read the <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/geo/india/ies/index.html">India Economic Strategy to 2035</a>, authored by the former high commissioner to India and head of DFAT, Peter Varghese. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/245214/original/file-20181113-194494-vchzed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/245214/original/file-20181113-194494-vchzed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/245214/original/file-20181113-194494-vchzed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/245214/original/file-20181113-194494-vchzed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/245214/original/file-20181113-194494-vchzed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/245214/original/file-20181113-194494-vchzed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/245214/original/file-20181113-194494-vchzed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Modi got a hug of his own from Abbott during his high-profile visit to Australia in 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tracey Nearmy/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Our Pacific family</h2>
<p>Last week, Morrison made perhaps his most important foreign policy speech – a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-08/scott-morrison-announces-pacific-infrastructure-bank/10475452">major strategic announcement</a> on the Pacific. He said Australia would open five new embassies and launch an infrastructure bank in the region to the tune of A$2 billion, and declared the Pacific “our patch”: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is our part of the world. This is where we have special responsibilities. We always have, we always will. We have their back, and they have ours. We are more than partners by choice. We are connected as members of a Pacific family.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The announcement came after he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/nov/01/scott-morrison-and-papua-new-guineas-pm-agree-to-joint-naval-base-on-manus-island">signed a deal</a> for a joint naval base in Papua New Guinea. Both this and the infrastructure bank were <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/drive/federal-politics:-the-pms-pacific-strategy-and-payne-in-china/10479292">seen</a> as ways of countering Chinese influence in the Pacific, but Morrison did refrain from using any anti-China rhetoric. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/for-pacific-island-nations-rising-sea-levels-are-a-bigger-security-concern-than-rising-chinese-influence-102403">For Pacific Island nations, rising sea levels are a bigger security concern than rising Chinese influence</a>
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<p>This is noteworthy. Tess Newton Cain has <a href="https://researchonline.jcu.edu.au/55672/1/Walking_the_Talk.pdf">pointed out</a> that Australia often misses the right tone of respect and partnership in its announcements to the region.</p>
<p>But despite this new push for Pacific engagement, Australia is still seen as weak on <a href="https://theconversation.com/lack-of-climate-policy-threatens-to-trip-up-australian-diplomacy-this-summit-season-102845">climate policy</a> – a hugely important issue to Pacific leaders. This could result in difficult conversations for Morrison at APEC, as PNG has invited many Pacific nations to attend for the first time. </p>
<h2>Sit down, be humble</h2>
<p>Even if Morrison puts his best foot forward to overcome his poor start on foreign policy, he will still have difficulty standing out in the crowd. </p>
<p>Even leaders require some political capital to stand out in those big rooms. </p>
<p>The churn in Australian prime ministers means that some foreign leaders may not consider it worth the time or energy to build a relationship of personal trust with Morrison if they view him more like a caretaker. Former Foreign Minister Julie Bishop had spent 10 years building up this <a href="https://www.afr.com/news/policy/foreign-affairs/julie-bishop-the-only-steady-hand-as-leadership-ills-risk-credibility-overseas-20180821-h14adn">diplomatic trust and stability</a> in her various roles, but that was severed abruptly. </p>
<p>My advice to Morrison? Stay humble and listen. Read the briefs, listen to the diplomats and do everything Payne and DFAT Secretary Frances Adamson say to do, to the letter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106606/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Harris Rimmer receives funding from the Australian Research Council. She is affiliated with IWDA as a national board member. </span></em></p>Prime Minister Scott Morrison has a busy summit season ahead of him. After early foreign policy stumbles, it’s important he reads his briefs, listens to the diplomats and stays humble.Susan Harris Rimmer, Australian Research Council Future Fellow, Griffith Law School, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1028452018-09-09T20:03:43Z2018-09-09T20:03:43ZLack of climate policy threatens to trip up Australian diplomacy this summit season<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/235348/original/file-20180907-190656-1qu49hy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2310%2C0%2C3153%2C3645&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Australia's climate stance risks its standing on the world stage.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia has navigated a somewhat stormy passage through the <a href="http://www.naurugov.nr/government-information-office/pif-(pacific-islands-forum).aspx">Pacific Islands Forum</a> in Nauru. Scott Morrison’s new-look government faced renewed accusations at the summit about the strength of Australia’s resolve on climate policy.</p>
<p>Australia is neither a small nation nor one of the most powerful, but for many years it has been a trusted nation. Historically, Australia has been seen as a good international citizen, a country that stands by its international commitments and works with others to improve the international system, not undermine it.</p>
<p>But in recent years climate change has threatened this reputation. This is
especially so among our allies and neighbours in the Pacific region, who attended this week’s Nauru summit.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/for-pacific-island-nations-rising-sea-levels-are-a-bigger-security-concern-than-rising-chinese-influence-102403">For Pacific Island nations, rising sea levels are a bigger security concern than rising Chinese influence</a>
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<p>With Australia’s new foreign minister, Marise Payne, attending instead of
the prime minister – not a good look, albeit understandable in the circumstances –
the government came under yet more international pressure to state plainly its commitment to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-paris-climate-agreement-at-a-glance-50465">Paris climate agreement</a>.</p>
<p>Pacific nations may be divided on many issues, but climate change is rarely one of them.</p>
<p>Before the meeting, Pacific leaders <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-31/samoan-prime-minister-hits-out-at-climate-change-sceptics/10185142">urged Australia</a> to sign a pledge of support for the agreement and to declare climate change “the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing” of the region.</p>
<p>Australia ultimately <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-05/australia-and-pacific-nations-sign-climate-security-declaration/10204422">signed the pledge</a>, but also reportedly resisted a push for the summit’s communique to include stronger calls for the world to pursue the Paris Agreement’s more ambitious goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pacific-pariah-how-australias-love-of-coal-has-left-it-out-in-the-diplomatic-cold-64963">Pacific pariah: how Australia’s love of coal has left it out in the diplomatic cold</a>
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<p>The government now has a chance to catch its breath before international summit season begins in earnest in November with the <a href="https://www.asean2018.sg/">East Asia Summit</a> in Singapore, followed quickly by <a href="https://www.apec2018png.org/">APEC</a> in Papua New Guinea and then the <a href="https://www.g20.org/en">G20 summit</a> in Buenos Aires on November 30 and December 1, not to mention the <a href="http://cop24.katowice.eu/">next round of UN climate negotiations</a> in Poland in December.</p>
<p>The G20 is arguably the most important summit, bringing together the leaders of the 20 most powerful nations in the world. It is a forum at which Australia’s
position on the climate issue has already suffered significant diplomatic damage under the Coalition government.</p>
<p>When Australia hosted the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/g20-brisbane-9429">G20 Brisbane talks in 2014</a>, the then prime minister, Tony Abbott, <a href="https://theconversation.com/abbotts-g20-agenda-climate-still-the-elephant-in-the-room-32810">worked to keep climate change off the formal agenda</a>. Stiff opposition from several of Australia’s allies forced him to back down.</p>
<p>Other nations will be wary of Australia’s stance at the G20 this time around,
especially following the leadership turmoil in Canberra.</p>
<p>Indeed, with climate policy continuing to divide the Coalition, there is a
significant risk that further missteps on climate change will undermine Australia’s international standing.</p>
<h2>A better option</h2>
<p>It doesn’t have to be this way. Australia could easily meet its Paris target of cutting emissions to <a href="http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/publications/factsheet-australias-2030-climate-change-target">26-28% below 2005 levels by 2030</a> with a national climate and energy strategy. But right now Australia is without one, and with Malcolm Turnbull’s passing as prime minister and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/malcolm-turnbull-shelves-emissions-reduction-target-as-leadership-speculation-mounts-101811">demise of the National Energy Guarantee</a>, it looks unlikely to have a strategy in place by the time the G20 rolls around in November.</p>
<p>Australia’s overall greenhouse emissions have been rising for several years now, and many <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-is-not-on-track-to-reach-2030-paris-target-but-the-potential-is-there-102725">independent projections</a> have Australia overshooting what is in reality a <a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-2030-climate-target-puts-us-in-the-race-but-at-the-back-45931">modest target</a>.</p>
<p>But, rather than rectifying the situation, Morrison and his new cabinet have yet to make it completely clear whether Australia will stand by the Paris Agreement at all.</p>
<p>Even if the scenario of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/time-for-china-and-europe-to-lead-as-trump-dumps-the-paris-climate-deal-78709">US-style pullout</a> is avoided, Morrison will face mounting pressure from the vocal band of conservatives in his party room not to commit to anything on climate change, be it symbolic or tangible.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-too-hard-basket-a-short-history-of-australias-aborted-climate-policies-101812">The too hard basket: a short history of Australia's aborted climate policies</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>What the government chooses to do next could have reputational repercussions for years to come.</p>
<p>Australia may not have the might of other nations, but what it has had at times is a reputation as a constructive international partner. This needs to be restored if Australian diplomats are to successfully navigate a disruptive international landscape.</p>
<p>Climate policy is clearly a threat to our domestic politics and to the job security of Australian prime ministers. With further missteps it could upend our diplomacy as well. Summit season will go a long way towards determining how much of a threat it really is.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102845/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian Downie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Climate policy is clearly a threat to the job security of Australian prime ministers, but it could upend our international diplomacy as well, with a string of key summits looming in coming months.Christian Downie, Australian Research Council DECRA Fellow, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1014102018-08-15T23:03:01Z2018-08-15T23:03:01ZWhen Canada did – and didn’t – stand up for human rights<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232096/original/file-20180815-2924-1fl15tf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The leaders of the 18 Asia-Pacific economies pose for a family photo in Vancouver in 1997. Indonesia's Suharto is sixth from the left. Protests against human rights violations were kept hidden from Suharto during the summit. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Frank Gunn</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Justin Trudeau’s government is under fire not only from Saudi government officials, but also from some Canadians who have <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/saudi-arabia-tweet-sanctions-canada-twitter-1.4777825">implictly criticized</a> Global Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland for being too aggressive in advocating for the release of Saudi human rights activists. </p>
<p>A tweet from the minister expressed her support for the activists, while her department followed up the next day with another seeking the “immediate release” of Samar Badawi and Nassima al-Sadah. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1025030172624515072"}"></div></p>
<p>None of it was anything unusual: Western diplomats call for the “immediate release” of political prisoners all the time. </p>
<p>Canada’s <a href="https://montrealgazette.com/news/national/opinion-canadian-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-human-rights-and-raif-badawi">Parliament unanimously called for the “immediate release” of jailed Saudi blogger Raif Badawi</a> (Samar’s brother) in 2015. That followed a similar <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/quebec-stands-firm-on-support-for-saudi-blogger-raif-badawi/article23755574/">unanimous motion for Badawi’s “immediate release” by the Quebec National Assembly</a>. </p>
<p>The same U.S. State Department official who <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-us-sidesteps-getting-involved-in-escalating-saudi-canada-dispute/">now asks Canada and Saudi Arabia to sort out their dispute</a> called on Russia earlier this year to <a href="https://twitter.com/statedeptspox/status/1004124328731045888">“immediately release” Ukrainian prisoners</a>. Navi Pillai, then-United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/07/472742-saudi-arabia-un-concerned-harsh-sentences-against-human-rights-defenders">urged Saudi authorities in 2014</a> “to immediately release all human rights defenders.” Saudi Arabia imposed no sanctions on the U.N. – instead it stayed in, and soon afterwards sought and won a seat on U.N. Human Rights Council.</p>
<p>“Saudi Arabia must immediately free women human rights defenders held in crackdown,” <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23270&LangID=E">nine U.N. experts added</a> in June 2018 — again prompting no Saudi attack on the UN or its Human Rights Council (of which the Saudi kingdom remains a member). </p>
<h2>Nothing remarkable</h2>
<p>So there’s little remarkable in Freeland’s anodyne call on Twitter for the “immediate release” of two Saudi activists. It is typical diplomatic language, and actually falls short of what the United Nations human rights system has said on several occasions. </p>
<p>What is remarkable is that <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-saudi-arabias-bold-move-has-nothing-to-do-with-canada/">Saudi government reaction</a> has allowed Canada to be portrayed as a human rights champion even as it continues to <a href="https://www.opencanada.org/features/latest-saudi-behaviour-another-reason-cancel-arms-deal/">arm Saudi Arabia</a> and thus implicitly accepts Saudi human rights violations. </p>
<p>The incident recalls other times when authoritarian regimes have reacted with anger to Canadian words on human rights. Some lessons might be drawn from these past incidents. </p>
<p>There were similar clashes between Canada and Indonesia back in the 1990s, a time when Indonesia’s military regime was a lightning rod for human rights concerns in ways similar to Saudi Arabia today. </p>
<p>In 1991, Indonesian soldiers opened fire on unarmed protesters in East Timor, now Timor-Leste. They had invaded the former Portuguese colony in 1975 and had occupied it ever since, at the cost of more than 100,000 dead. The <a href="https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/school-of-humanities-and-social-sciences/timor-companion/santa-cruz">massacre at the Santa Cruz cemetery</a> in the Timorese capital, Dili, prompted a wave of protest in Canada. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231749/original/file-20180813-2909-1nsqvmo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231749/original/file-20180813-2909-1nsqvmo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231749/original/file-20180813-2909-1nsqvmo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231749/original/file-20180813-2909-1nsqvmo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231749/original/file-20180813-2909-1nsqvmo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231749/original/file-20180813-2909-1nsqvmo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231749/original/file-20180813-2909-1nsqvmo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children hold photos of the victims of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre during the 19th commemoration in Dili, East Timor, in November 2010.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Jordao Henrique)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Barbara McDougall, foreign minister in Brian Mulroney’s Conservative government, <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?id=yWkWnQRy7WsC&pg=PA174&lpg=PA174&dq=mcdougall+freezes+aid+indonesia&source=bl&ots=7CnQEze3hy&sig=ptVgYUO7Qg9vcIU2cmnamkCKCp4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwib7MLvmuPcAhXnxlkKHfm7COYQ6AEwAHoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q=mcdougall%20freezes%20aid%20indonesia&f=false">froze three planned aid projects to Indonesia</a> and stopped permitting Canadian arms sales to the Suharto regime. </p>
<p>When the Netherlands also froze its aid, Indonesia responded with fury. It <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/12686/">rejected any future Dutch aid</a> and forced the dissolution of the Dutch-led consortium that co-ordinated foreign aid to Indonesia in favour of a more compliant Consultative Group on Indonesia. </p>
<p>Indonesian anger also targeted Canada, as Canadian foreign affairs files reveal. Ottawa was “treating us like a child,” complained one Indonesian cabinet minister. Another accused Canada of a “colonial mentality.” The Canadian Business Association in Jakarta warned against “meddling in the internal affairs” of Indonesia. </p>
<h2>McDougall stood firm</h2>
<p>Yet <a href="http://etanaction.blogspot.com/2016/11/25-years-after-santa-cruz-massacre-did.html">despite lobbying by Canadian businesses</a> and by Trade Minister Michael Wilson, McDougall declined to grant new aid or permit arms sales to Indonesia. Canadian diplomats worked quietly to maintain open channels with Indonesian counterparts, and McDougall stood firm. Opposition parties agreed and even called on her to go further. Canada maintained its position and bilateral relations continued relatively smoothly. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231751/original/file-20180813-2903-1pei01e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231751/original/file-20180813-2903-1pei01e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=782&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231751/original/file-20180813-2903-1pei01e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=782&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231751/original/file-20180813-2903-1pei01e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=782&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231751/original/file-20180813-2903-1pei01e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=983&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231751/original/file-20180813-2903-1pei01e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=983&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231751/original/file-20180813-2903-1pei01e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=983&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gov. Gen. Adrienne Clarkson (right) shares a laugh with Barbara McDougall after presenting her with the Order of Canada during a investiture ceremony at Rideau Hall in October 2001.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(CP PHOTO/Jonathan Hayward)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Public protests in Canada, however, continued to spark Indonesian government rage. In 1994, Guelph University held an arms-length review of its regional development project in Indonesia. When the review handed down a critical comment on human rights in Indonesia, <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?id=JMfP-kb7QiAC&pg=PA196&lpg=PA196&dq=guelph+university+indonesia+sulawesi+timor&source=bl&ots=FqcJOt8UZ-&sig=V_Skj13vq66KgmVfdSkAZq4aiYQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj54OH4nePcAhXLslkKHSYZC_EQ6AEwAnoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false">the Indonesian government immediately pulled the plug</a>, giving project staff six weeks to get out of the country.</p>
<p>When a Timorese refugee in Canada, <a href="https://greenvillage-timor.org/about-bella/">Bella Galhos</a>, started to campaign for Timorese human rights from her new home in Ottawa, Indonesian diplomats tried to pressure her through her family. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231755/original/file-20180813-2906-1cx0of0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231755/original/file-20180813-2906-1cx0of0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231755/original/file-20180813-2906-1cx0of0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231755/original/file-20180813-2906-1cx0of0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231755/original/file-20180813-2906-1cx0of0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231755/original/file-20180813-2906-1cx0of0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231755/original/file-20180813-2906-1cx0of0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bella Galhos at a news conference in Ottawa in September 1999.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(CP PHOTO/Fred Chartrand)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Benjamin Parwoto, Indonesia’s ambassador to Canada, <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?id=fMJADwAAQBAJ&pg=PA215&lpg=PA215&dq=bella+galhos+parwoto&source=bl&ots=QcXuaX4ulX&sig=AVp3mF0mFLZMvhSS3-IkMEqPlGY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwio--2snuPcAhWjzlkKHQxXCHMQ6AEwDXoECAYQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false">visited Galhos’s mother in Dili</a> accompanied by a military escort, making what appeared to be threats. </p>
<p>Galhos went public and Parwoto was raked over the coals in the Canadian media and summoned for a tongue-lashing by Lloyd Axworthy, foreign minister in Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government. </p>
<p>Through this diplomatic clash, Canadian diplomats remained firm that they would advocate for the safety of a Canadian resident’s family. Galhos’s family was a valid topic of Canadian concern, not an Indonesian internal affair. The parallel to current events is clear: Canada spoke out for Samar Badawi in part due to previous advocacy for her brother Raif, whose wife, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/ensaf-haidar-raif-badawi-saudi-canada-relations-1.4775315">Ensaf Haidar, lives in Quebec</a> with their children. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231752/original/file-20180813-2921-1q9aagu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231752/original/file-20180813-2921-1q9aagu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231752/original/file-20180813-2921-1q9aagu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231752/original/file-20180813-2921-1q9aagu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231752/original/file-20180813-2921-1q9aagu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231752/original/file-20180813-2921-1q9aagu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231752/original/file-20180813-2921-1q9aagu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ensaf Haidar is seen in this photo standing in front of a poster of her husband, Raif Badawi, in June 2015 in Montreal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Paul Chiasson</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In these early 1990s cases, Canada’s government stated concerns on human rights grounds and did not back down when Indonesian officials responded with anger and threats. It did not use tweets, a form of communication that did not yet exist, but it did use the 1990s equivalent — written statements made available to the media and the public. </p>
<p>Canada emerged with less credit in 1997, when it was scheduled to host the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit at the University of British Columbia. </p>
<h2>The APEC protests</h2>
<p>Chrétien and Axworthy were keen to make sure the summit succeeded, and pressed hard for Gen. Suharto to attend. Yet <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/we-were-at-this-tipping-point-apec-protests-at-ubc-continue-to-shape-politics-20-years-later-1.4417358">activists in Canada</a> continued to make Indonesia’s human rights record a public controversy. They plastered the streets of Vancouver and other cities with posters of Suharto’s face and the slogan “Wanted: for crimes against humanity.” </p>
<p>This enraged Indonesian diplomats, who called the posters “soft terrorist tactics” and threatened a boycott of APEC and other damage to Canada-Indonesia relations. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/5CWNKp0Uyyw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">CBC News.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The cost to obtain Suharto’s presence included a promise to spare the Indonesian president the sight of protesters. When activists armed with arrest warrants tried to carry out a citizens’ arrest of Suharto, they were promptly arrested by RCMP officers. </p>
<p>The RCMP later used pepper spray to stop protesters from scaling a fence that marked off the APEC meeting zone, and forcibly cleared the roads leading out of the meeting area at summit’s end, using force to keep Ottawa’s promises that Suharto would not witness any protesters.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231754/original/file-20180813-2900-swzpjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231754/original/file-20180813-2900-swzpjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231754/original/file-20180813-2900-swzpjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231754/original/file-20180813-2900-swzpjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231754/original/file-20180813-2900-swzpjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231754/original/file-20180813-2900-swzpjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231754/original/file-20180813-2900-swzpjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A demonstrator is assisted after getting pepper spray in her eyes when police used the spray to break up a demonstration at the APEC Summit in Vancouver in November 1997.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Dan Loh)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/police-behaviour-at-apec-97-poses-fundamental-questions-that-go-far-beyond-who-got-pepper-sprayed-and-why/article767820/">police crackdown on protests at APEC</a> saw Canada’s government painted as an enemy rather than a defender of free speech. </p>
<p>Faced with Indonesian anger and threats, Canada had surrendered to Indonesian demands. It emerged looking weak and won no favours from Indonesia in return. </p>
<p>When Axworthy considered offering Canadian “good offices” to mediate the East Timor dispute, the Indonesian foreign minister refused on the grounds that “Canadian NGOs are the most ferociously anti-Indonesian in the world and he is skeptical, therefore, of the Canadian government’s ability to resist domestic political pressure and maintain its neutrality.” </p>
<h2>Public pressure advances human rights</h2>
<p>The comparison of these 1990s cases suggests that when confronted with threats, Canada best serves its interests by standing firm. It also suggests that public expressions of diplomatic concern, rather than “quiet diplomacy” alone, are a useful tool for rights advocacy. </p>
<p>Indonesia felt the growing pressure so much so that, by 1998, it allowed a <a href="https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/school-of-humanities-and-social-sciences/timor-companion/countdown">referendum in East Timor</a> to resolve the issue one way or the other — a Timorese demand that Indonesia’s government had refused for many years. In that referendum, the Timorese opted massively for independence. </p>
<p>The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is now southeast Asia’s most democratic state and makes <a href="https://www.asiapacific.ca/canada-asia-agenda/15-years-after-independence-whatever-happened-east-timor">useful and creative diplomatic contributions </a> to this day. Public debate in Canada and other countries over human rights in Timor and Indonesia helped make this possible. </p>
<p>If there is a lesson from Canada-Indonesia clashes, it is that Canadian rights advocacy, both private and public, can be useful — and that Canada should not surrender to threats from authoritarian states to abandon advocacy. </p>
<p>Ironically, Canada’s words on human rights in Timor and Indonesia were stronger than those offered recently by Freeland on Saudi Arabia — and unlike Freeland’s words, were sometimes backed by concrete actions. </p>
<p>The Saudi incident, in fact, has displayed a stark gap between Canada’s strong words on human rights, in the Badawi case and others, and the lack of teeth behind those words — shown best by Canada lecturing others on human rights while trying to sell arms arms that in turn will be used to violate these very human rights.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/canadas-checkered-history-of-arms-sales-to-human-rights-violators-91559">Canada’s checkered history of arms sales to human rights violators</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101410/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Webster receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>Canada’s clashes with Indonesia in the 1990s over human rights abuses contain lessons for the current Canadian-Saudi Arabian diplomatic dispute.David Webster, Associate Professor of History, Bishop's UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/873462017-11-14T03:43:16Z2017-11-14T03:43:16ZAustralia’s tenuous place in the new global economy<p>The Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) has released a report titled <a href="https://ceda.com.au/CEDA/media/General/PDF/CEDA-Australia-s-Place-in-the-World-Nov-2017-FINAL.pdf">Australia’s Place in the World</a>, which considered how Australia should respond to changing attitudes to globalisation.</p>
<p>At home and around the world, there is a backlash against free trade and globalisation. The report asks what course Australia should navigate through these choppy economic and political waters.</p>
<p>The backdrop, of course, is the UK Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump as US President. </p>
<p>If that’s not motivation enough, one could easily add to CEDA’s list: the performance of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/french-election-latest-marine-le-pen-second-round-first-results-suggest-a7698191.html">Marine Le Pen in France’s recent presidential election</a>, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/22/germany-faces-first-far-right-party-in-parliament-since-second-world-war">election of the far-right AfD</a> to the German parliament, and the looming role of <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/pauline-hansons-one-nation-poised-to-be-kingmaker-in-queensland-election-20171109-gzhvql.html">Pauline Hanson’s One Nation in the Queensland election</a>.</p>
<h2>Tariffs and trade</h2>
<p>The report is broken into three sections: Global Economy, Global Security, and Global Governance, but it is the first and third that speak directly to Australia’s economic fortunes in the age of Trump.</p>
<p>One obvious, but correct and important observation the report makes is that Australia has been a huge beneficiary of free trade over the past 30 years. Not only have our exporters gained access to major overseas markets, but consumers in Australia have also benefited from reduced tariffs. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-a-free-trade-deal-australia-can-win-chinas-dairy-market-31681">With a free trade deal Australia can win China's dairy market</a>
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<p>For example, the price of a typical sedan has basically halved in real terms due to the removal of a 100% car tariff. But while trade and globalisation have made the economic pie bigger, the sharing of those benefits has been much more uneven. Just ask manufacturing workers. </p>
<p>What is missing from the report’s recommendations is how to deal with and compensate the losers from globalisation in Australia. That is important, both economically and politically. </p>
<h2>Global rise of populism</h2>
<p>The rise of populist parties around the world has been associated with this failure to compensate globalisation’s losers.</p>
<p>Part of what it takes to address this issue is so-called “place-based policies” which Rosalind Dixon and I have <a href="http://www.afr.com/opinion/oldstyle-industry-policy-has-been-an-abject-failure-20170601-gwii5s">previously discussed</a>. Broadly, this refers to the people who are affected when industries move away from particular areas and employment opportunities dry up.</p>
<p>The CEDA report argues, however, that: </p>
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<p>Policies such as moving from transaction taxes on property to broad-based land tax to address housing affordability and labour mobility need to be designed along with transition pathways. GST reform with a broader base to remove the need for stamp duty could be another option.</p>
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<p>The report also points out that Australia’s company tax rate is uncompetitive, and that the proposed shift to a 25% rate under the Coalitition’s “Enterprise Tax Plan” would only happen by 2026-27, if it happens at all. These are all good points, and would make for good policy. Yet the only one that looks vaguely likely to happen is replacing stamp duty with land tax - and that would be done at a state government level.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-brexit-the-fruits-of-globalisation-must-be-shared-with-low-and-middle-income-groups-61663">Lessons from Brexit: the fruits of globalisation must be shared with low- and middle-income groups</a>
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<p>The federal government floated the idea of GST reform and retreated almost immediately after the opposition predictably attacked it viciously and effectively as being “regressive”. The Enterprise Tax plan also looks to be in danger, as several crossbench MPs seem likely to side with Labor and want tax cuts only for small businesses. That’s utterly stupid economics, but apparently good politics.</p>
<h2>Middle power leadership?</h2>
<p>As the report notes: “Global cooperation is growing increasingly important in a world that faces a number of crises that require cross-border solutions.”</p>
<p>This is surely true, although the report paints a rosy picture of Australia’s potential role as a “middle power”, claiming that we were important in the establishment of the United Nations.</p>
<p>True, Australia played a relatively important role in establishing APEC and the G20. But that involved leadership from figures like Hawke, Keating and Rudd. I, for one, don’t see anyone on the present political landscape with those leadership and persuasion skills.</p>
<p>Perhaps the bigger challenge is that President Trump seems determined to radically undermine international institutions. Even Canadian Prime Minister <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/canadas-pm-justin-trudeau-sabotages-transpacific-partnership-shocking-leaders-20171110-gzj866.html">Justin Trudeau</a> was unhelpful in the Trans Pacific Partnership rebound effort that Malcolm Turnbull and others were trying to arrange.</p>
<p>What can Australia do in the face of orchestrated attacks on global institutions by the biggest and most important nations? Very little, I fear. The age of Trump is a difficult time for Australia and its leaders. Many things are out of our control.</p>
<p>What we can do, however, is resist the tide of populism at home, and provide stable and functional government. Both major parties have a patchy recent record in that regard, and the federal opposition has made some populist-type moves on trade and protectionism.</p>
<p>Let’s hope they don’t really believe it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87346/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Holden is an ARC Future Fellow.</span></em></p>The latest report from the Committee for Economic Development of Australia points to shifting global winds on globalisation and free trade. What can Australia do to continue to weather the storm?Richard Holden, Professor of Economics and PLuS Alliance Fellow, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/873682017-11-13T09:05:54Z2017-11-13T09:05:54ZAt APEC, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping revealed different ideas of Asia’s economic future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194308/original/file-20171113-27595-1kmzjur.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull (front left) joins other world leaders for the APEC summit in Danang, Vietnam.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Donald Trump has just attended his first APEC leaders’ summit following bilateral state visits to Japan, South Korea, China and Vietnam. After the NATO summit and G20 earlier in the year, in which he displayed his inexperience and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-09/did-trumps-g20-performance-indicate-us-decline-as-world-power/8691538">lack of affinity for multilateralism</a>, many feared the worst. </p>
<p>But the comfortable rapport he established with leaders like Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, as well as the less formal structures of APEC, meant there was no repeat of the northern hemisphere summer. </p>
<p>APEC was established in 1989 with the leaders’ summit added in 1994, with an ambition to drive economic co-operation and in particular trade liberalisation across the region. While it has been modestly successful in the unglamorous area of trade facilitation – involving largely regulatory streamlining to make the business of international trade smooth – as a co-operative framework it has not achieved any major outcomes. </p>
<p>So when looking at APEC, the real interest is not on the grouping’s economic policy process, but what occurs on the platform that the leaders’ summit provides, as its convening power remains impressive. What did we see in 2017?</p>
<p>Once again, APEC was a forum for discussing a non-APEC trade agreement. The TPP had regularly figured in previous meetings, and this time the 11 remaining members met to try to craft an agreement without the US. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau failed to attend one of the meetings, but it does appear that the 11 have <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/11/11/trans-pacific-partnership-deal-saved-despite-trudeau-no-show">salvaged some kind of a deal</a>.</p>
<p>A string of meetings occurred on the sidelines. Of greatest interest was <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41954436">Trump’s conclave with Russian President Vladimir Putin</a>, mostly focused on relationship-building, particularly important given the slate of new leaders in the club. New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, Moon, Hong Kong’s chief executive Carrie Lam and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen were all making their debut. </p>
<p>Despite the evidently warm personal relationship that Trump has developed with Xi, the smiles and <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2118954/xi-jinping-and-donald-trump-get-personal-state-visit">diplomatic tourism in Beijing</a> are the pleasant facade of what has become a more overt competition for influence in the region. At the 2017 iteration of the meeting Gareth Evans famously described as “four adjectives in search of meaning”, this was plainly in sight. </p>
<p>At keynote speeches to the APEC CEO summit, Xi and Trump laid out their views on the region’s future. Trump’s speech was the second setpiece, following <a href="https://www.csis.org/events/defining-our-relationship-india-next-century-address-us-secretary-state-rex-tillerson">Rex Tillerson’s speech at CSIS</a> in October, which outlined a belated US strategy to the region. The US aims to sustain a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, and Trump’s focus at APEC was on <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/11/10/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam">the economic dimension</a>. </p>
<p>Continuing the themes raised in his <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-20/donald-trump-speech-to-un-full-transcript/8962616">UN General Assembly speech</a> of September in which Trump declared he expected all countries to pursue their own interests first, he continued his walk away from core principles of its economic engagement of the region. In the past it had pursued large scale multilateral agreements, initially chasing a big free-trade agreement of the Asia Pacific, and more recently the TPP. </p>
<p>Trump said very plainly that there would be no more big agreements, and only bilateral deals based on strict and fairly narrow ideas of reciprocity. The other notable element was a direct statement that the US would no longer put up with predatory practices of other countries, such as IP theft, subsidies and not-enforced trade rules. While he did not name China as his main concern, he didn’t need to. </p>
<p>Trump’s effort to reconcile US rhetorical commitment to an open economic order in the region with his mercantilism stood in contrast to Xi’s approach. <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/11/c_136743492.htm">Xi painted a picture</a> that seemed much more in keeping with the longer-run trends in Asia’s economic order. </p>
<p>Xi repeated the <a href="https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum">promise made at Davos</a> that China was committed to economic openness. More specifically, he said China would seek to make economic globalisation more open, inclusive and balanced. </p>
<p>Interestingly, he said China would uphold regional multilateralism as the best means to advance the region’s common interests that were “interlocked”. He also presented the “Belt and Road Initiative” as an open mechanism that would help advance regional connectivity and even, somewhat surprisingly, described it in fairly economically liberal terms. </p>
<p>To be clear, Xi’s speech was a declaration of what China would do – whether it actually follows through is an open question. Nonetheless, Xi presented a China that would lead an open and inclusive economic order, in some ways as a defender of the status quo. Trump, in contrast, seemed to break with that tradition. Trump’s economic nationalism was on display, and he encouraged others to follow his lead. </p>
<p>Quite where this leaves the region is unclear. We still have to wait to see whether the two speeches of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” becomes an actual strategy. US policy remains hindered by a lack of resourcing in key branches of government.</p>
<p>Equally, we have to wait to see what China will actually do. But make no mistake, at APEC 2017, the region’s two biggest powers presented clearly different visions of the region’s economic future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87368/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<h4 class="border">Disclosure</h4><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley is Executive Director of La Trobe Asia, a member of the Australian Institute for International Affairs' National Executive and a Board member of China Matters. All of these entities have received funding from Australia's federal government.</span></em></p>At APEC 2017, the region’s two biggest powers presented clearly different visions of the region’s economic future.Nick Bisley, Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/867722017-11-02T07:37:41Z2017-11-02T07:37:41ZTrump’s tour of Asia-Pacific is vital for the stability of the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192980/original/file-20171102-26456-1aglqyh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">From an Australian perspective, Donald's Trump Asian tour could hardly be more important.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Yuri Gripas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Not for several presidential cycles, and perhaps not since Richard Nixon’s visit to China to initial the Shanghai Communique in 1972, has a visit to Asia assumed such significance – and one that is potentially fraught.</p>
<p>US President Donald Trump leaves Washington late this week for a 13-day tour of Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam for APEC, and the Philippines before returning home via Hawaii.</p>
<p>In these two weeks, Trump will be exposed to an Asia-Pacific – or Indo-Pacific – that is undergoing a wrenching transformation against a background of risks to a “long peace”. It is one that has survived more or less intact since the end of Korean War, leaving aside Vietnam.</p>
<p>From an Australian perspective, the Trump Asian tour could hardly be more important, given Canberra’s challenge of balancing its security and economic interests.</p>
<p>An American wrecking ball in the region is the last thing Australia needs, especially one that risks mishandling a North Korean nuclear threat to regional security.</p>
<p>In this regard, Trump’s every utterance, including his contributions to social media, will be scrutinised over the next two weeks by a nervous region.</p>
<p>What is striking about this latest period is the velocity of a geoeconomic shift that is challenging long-held assumptions about US authority in the regional power balance.</p>
<p>Seemingly, the Asia-Pacific region can no longer take for granted a US stabilising role.</p>
<p>As China’s power rises, so does US leverage ebb. This is not a zero-sum game.</p>
<p>The question is how pieces of a kaleidoscope will settle, if indeed they do.</p>
<p>Trump’s Asia tour will enable an assessment of the extent to which the US will remain a reliable regional security partner and a participant in various regional forums.</p>
<p>Former president Barack Obama talked about a “Pacific Century”, involving as it did a US “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific. Trump has not used such terminology.</p>
<p>Indeed, one of his first executive acts was to undo work that had been put into US participation in a region-wide trade initiative – the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) – aimed partly at countering China’s geoeconomic dominance.</p>
<p>This was a hasty, ill-considered decision that sent all the wrong signals about US commitment to building an Asia-Pacific trading and security architecture.</p>
<p>The other 11 TPP signatories, including Australia, are pressing on with attempts to finalise the trade liberalising protocol, but US absence significantly lessens its weight.</p>
<p>It may be unrealistic – given Trump’s bellicose “America First” pronouncements on trade – but Washington would do its regional credibility no harm if it reversed itself on TPP.</p>
<p>On a visit to Australia last month to launch the first volume of his memoir – Not For The Faint-Hearted – former prime minister Kevin Rudd warned of the risks of the end of a period of relative stability.</p>
<p>His warnings were based on a paper produced by the Asia Society Policy Institute – <a href="http://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/preserving-long-peace-asia">Preserving the Long Peace in Asia</a> – of which he is president.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/10/19/can-we-preserve-asias-long-peace/">In a contribution to the East Asia Forum</a>, Rudd asked the question: how can we save Asia’s “long peace” in light of North Korea’s attempts to develop a ballistic missile nuclear capability?</p>
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<p>This has been a crisis long in the making, beginning with the Soviet training of North Korean nuclear scientists and engineers after the second world war, the north’s expulsion of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors in 2002, and the subsequent series of ballistic and nuclear weapons tests.</p>
<p>The uncomfortable truth is that for the last quarter of a century, the international community has simply been kicking the can down the road. And now, at one minute to midnight, everyone is scrambling on what to do about it.</p>
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<p>In Rudd’s view, the Asia-Pacific needs to develop a security understanding – like the Helsinki Accords in Europe – to deal with security challenges, including North Korea and, more broadly, territorial disputes that threaten regional stability.</p>
<p>His preferred option is to bolster the East Asia Summit (EAS) as a regional forum to promote peace and stability. He makes the valid point the EAS has, potentially, the regional heft to undertake such a stabilising role.</p>
<p>Disappointingly, Trump is not planning to stay in the Philippines an extra day for this year’s EAS gathering. It might have been time well spent.</p>
<p>Membership, including the ten nations of the Association of South East Asian Nations, plus China, South Korea, Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia and the US, means all the main Indo-Pacific players are participants.</p>
<p>This is how Rudd puts it:</p>
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<p>The EAS has the mandate to expand its activities in the security domain. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 2005 is clear about this. Furthermore, members of the EAS have all signed the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, which commits partners to peaceful dispute resolution. Moreover, the EAS uniquely has all necessary players around the table.</p>
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<p>What is required in all of this is American leadership, but as things stand there is little sign of Washington possessing an overarching vision of where it might take the region in the next stage as China continues to expand its power and influence.</p>
<p>In this regard it is hard to disagree with a Lowy Institute paper – <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/autopilot-east-asia-policy-under-trump">East Asia Policy under Trump</a>. It identified a serious case of drift in American engagement with the region under a president whose knowledge of – and interest in – the Asia-Pacific appears limited at best.</p>
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<p>US policy on East Asia is thus on autopilot, which presents two distinct risks. First that of a crisis, whether created by the president or events. </p>
<p>The US faces challenges to its economic leadership from Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, a program of massive infrastructure investment that will enmesh the economies of China and its Asian neighbours, challenges from Chinese attempts to shape regional institutions to its advantage, and to shape a narrative of the region’s future that puts Beijing at its centre. </p>
<p>It also faces challenges from an increasingly capable Chinese military. All this in a region that is becoming increasingly illiberal – and doubtful of US staying power.</p>
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<p>This is a fairly bleak assessment of a US ability to engage the Asia-Pacific constructively in this latest period. In fairness to Trump, he remains on a steep learning curve. How all this will play out is anyone’s guess.</p>
<p>What is the case is there is no more important stop of Trump’s itinerary than his visit this coming week to China to engage the newly reinforced ruler Xi Jinping.</p>
<p>The China talks, in the lead-up to APEC in Vietnam, are the linchpin of Trump’s Asian foray. The two leaders exchanged a visit in April this year when Xi visited Trump in Mar-a-Lago.</p>
<p>On that occasion, a novice American president was feeling out his main rival for global leadership. This was a getting-to-know-you opportunity.</p>
<p>However, on this occasion more will be expected of a Trump-Xi encounter on issues like North Korea, concerns over China’s mercantilist behaviour, and its assertiveness in the South China and East China Seas.</p>
<p>While it would be unrealistic to expect a “grand bargain” to emerge between the leaders of a new bipolar world, what is needed is some clear guidance about US priorities amid the confusion that has accompanied Trump’s nine months in the White House.</p>
<p>Laying out some sort of vision for US engagement in the region should be a minimum requirement at a time of considerable uncertainty.</p>
<p>Elizabeth Economy of the Council on Foreign Relations put it this way in a <a href="https://www.google.com.au/search?q=cfr+donald+trump%27s+sia+adventure+show+me+love&oq=cfr+donald+trump%27s+sia+adventure+show+me+love&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i64.19333j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">CFR blogpost</a>:</p>
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<p>The president can allay regional fears that the United States is commitment-phobic, by reinforcing at each step Washington’s allies and partners are the cornerstone of US engagement in the region. Reiterating the US commitment to freedom of navigation, free trade, and political freedoms will also reassure regional actors that it still makes sense to buy into a regional order underpinned by a US alliance system. Of course, this trip is only the first step in putting the United States on firmer ground in Asia, after many months of confusing signaling and disruptive initiatives.</p>
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<p>Expectations for Trump’s engagement with the region may be low, but the same could not be said for the stakes at a time of considerable uncertainty and risk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86772/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Expectations for Trump’s engagement with the region may be low, but the same could not be said for the stakes at a time of considerable uncertainty and risk.Tony Walker, Adjunct Professor, School of Communications, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/738532017-04-06T19:19:47Z2017-04-06T19:19:47ZMaking sense of the global infrastructure turn<p><em>This is the final article in our series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/making-cities-work-37182">Making Cities Work</a>. It considers the problems of providing critical infrastructure and how we might produce the innovations and reforms needed to meet 21st-century needs and challenges.</em></p>
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<p>The global focus on US President Donald Trump has largely been on his inflammatory rhetoric and relative inexperience. A less substantive body of commentary has considered his policy platform, including his economic policies. </p>
<p>Among the most prominent of these policies is <a href="http://donaldtrumppolicies.com/donald-trump-policies/infrastructure/">a commitment</a> to:</p>
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<p>… [r]efocus government spending on American infrastructure and away from the Obama-Clinton globalisation agenda. </p>
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<p>Trump is not the first to identify increased infrastructure as a strategic economic imperative. Across the globe governments are turning to infrastructure as an instrument of economic policy.</p>
<p>Australia has since 2007 operated an infrastructure agency to prioritise and plan infrastructure provision at the national scale. The UK, New Zealand and Canada have also established national infrastructure planning agencies. </p>
<p>In Australia, this “<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563470903021100">infrastructure turn</a>” has eclipsed metropolitan planning as a means of intervening in cities. </p>
<p>Among global political and economic institutions, infrastructure has risen to prominence as a priority for national intervention and trans-national co-operation. Many agencies have called for increased spending on infrastructure. </p>
<p>The World Economic Forum, for example, <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/how-can-we-bridge-the-1-trillion-infrastructure-gap/">has lamented</a> that while estimated global demand for infrastructure exceeds US$3.7 trillion in investment value, only US$2.7 trillion is being provided. This leaves a US$1 trillion “<a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21599358-how-get-more-worlds-savings-pay-new-roads-airports-and-electricity">infrastructure gap</a>”.</p>
<p>The APEC Forum in 2013 <a href="http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2013/2013_aelm/2013_aelm_annexB.aspx">established a multi-year plan</a> on infrastructure development and investment. The G20 has established the <a href="http://globalinfrastructurehub.org/">Global Infrastructure Hub</a> and the <a href="http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/global-infrastructure-connectivity-alliance.pdf">Global Infrastructure Connectivity Alliance</a> to help with infrastructure investment. The World Bank helped set up the <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/global-Infrastructure-facility">Global Infrastructure Facility</a> in 2015.</p>
<h2>What is driving this shift?</h2>
<p>The reasons for the new focus on infrastructure are debatable. Four explanations offer possible insight.</p>
<p>First, at a simple material level, the focus on infrastructure reflects rapid urbanisation at the global scale. Millions more urban residents need water, energy, transport and telecommunications. But urbanisation does not in itself demand infrastructure.</p>
<p>A more systemic explanation is the use of infrastructure as a “spatial fix” for the contradictions of urban capitalism. At its most basic level, the agglomeration of economic activity in cities creates resource and congestion problems, which impede economic growth.</p>
<p>Capitalist economies seek to “fix” these problems with infrastructure investment that overcomes spatial frictions on flows of people, water, waste, energy and information. Under conditions of increasing urban complexity, infrastructure megaprojects appear more comprehensible and immediate “solutions” to urban problems than previous fixes using metropolitan spatial planning. </p>
<p>A further explanation is that infrastructure is being used as a sink for excess low-cost capital within the global economy. Such capital is otherwise unable to find sufficient destinations for productive investment. </p>
<p>Under such conditions, capital “switches” from productive investment into investment in the built environment. Infrastructure is the major component of this.</p>
<p>Finally, sustained weakness in the global economy has reduced the attractiveness of productive investment as a source of profit in favour of rents. We can thus observe the systematic emergence of “infrastructure rents” in the global economy – rentiers capture monopolies on particular infrastructure types. </p>
<p>Of these four explanations, the first is the most commonly presented. Yet it has perhaps the weakest explanatory power.</p>
<h2>Critiquing the global infrastructure push</h2>
<p>For critical urban social scientists, the global infrastructure turn poses a number of conceptual and methodological issues.</p>
<p>The first question is to test whether it’s specifically different from other forms of urban investment. </p>
<p>Cities have long been sites of physical building, including major developments and facilities. Yet the practices of global infrastructure involve mobilising capital, governments, information and production at a massive new scale via major international institutions and may be viewed as a distinctive urban phenomenon.</p>
<p>A second question is to understand how infrastructure has become a discourse in global policy. Global agencies almost universally view infrastructure as a beneficial phenomenon to be promoted. How this began and has been promulgated deserves greater investigation.</p>
<p>A third question is how infrastructure has become a field of specialist knowledge in its own right. And what implications does this have for understanding the role of infrastructure? </p>
<p>Infrastructure projects have developed their own language of financial appraisal, technical design and social and environmental impact. This then hampers democratic scrutiny of these projects.</p>
<h2>The democratic problem</h2>
<p>Finally, the politics of infrastructure demand attention. Infrastructure is often a site of political contestation, yet many infrastructure decision-making processes attenuate or repress democratic participation. The role of the state is often placed in tension, especially when private motivations drive infrastructure development.</p>
<p>There is a lack of transparency of interests – in terms of who benefits, both legally and surreptitiously, and who is affected or disadvantaged by infrastructure development. This is a clear problem that deserves greater investigation. </p>
<p>Large infrastructure projects have long fascinated politicians, governments and publics. Trump demonstrates the persistence of this fascination. Many view the need for infrastructure as an inevitable consequence of an increasingly urban world. </p>
<p>Yet the global turn towards infrastructure needs to be critically appraised beyond the utopian engineering rhetoric. We need to understand its causes and motivations, especially within the structural crisis of global capitalism and the efforts to resolve it. </p>
<p>We must also be attentive to the problematic aspects of the global infrastructure turn. The deployment of trillions of dollars in infrastructure investment necessarily demands clear democratic transparency and accountability. This applies not only to the money spent but to the effects on cities, societies, polities and the environment. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article draws on <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08111146.2017.1284036">a paper</a> by the author in a new <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cupr20/35/1">special issue</a> of the international journal, Urban Policy and Research, on critical urban infrastructure. You can read other published articles in our series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/making-cities-work-37182">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73853/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jago Dodson receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Housing and Research Institute and the Department of Environment.</span></em></p>The trillions of dollars spent on infrastructure demands democratic transparency and accountability. This applies to both the investment and to the effects on cities, societies and the environment.Jago Dodson, Professor of Urban Policy and Director, Centre for Urban Research, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/513942015-11-27T03:25:59Z2015-11-27T03:25:59ZThe limits of multilateralism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103410/original/image-20151127-28303-ivlivb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Alexander Astafyev</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the distinctive features of the contemporary international order is the role played by multilateral organisations. Ever since the US became the dominant force in international affairs in the aftermath of the second world war, institutionalised patterns of co-operation have been an increasingly important part of the way the world works.</p>
<p>Despite criticisms that some of these institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are either instruments of American hegemony and/or lacking in legitimacy, there is general agreement that they have been closely associated with the remarkable period of economic liberalisation and development that has taken place over the last 50 or 60 years.</p>
<p>Now, however, there are growing doubts about how effective such institutions are in actually dealing with the recurrent economic crises that plague the international system and which seem so resistant to remedy. </p>
<p>Even the creation of new institutions that are either designed to respond to crises, like the G20, or to promote future economic liberalisation, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, seem incapable of dealing effectively with economic disorder or overseeing the establishment of broad-based trade agreements.</p>
<p>The possible limits of both the G20 and APEC have been on display over the last few weeks. One problem is that these institutions have become hostage to events. Although they were originally created to deal with economic issues, when world leaders get together in the aftermath of shocking events such as the attacks in Paris, the agenda inevitably reflects this. It would be odd and possibly a dereliction of duty if things were otherwise, perhaps.</p>
<p>But the consequence for these organisations is that their original purpose may be overshadowed. In APEC’s case, that it was already competing for influence with a growing number of institutions and initiatives – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the venerable World Trade Organisation – has meant that questions have inevitably been raised about its very purpose and continuing relevance.</p>
<p>The effectiveness or otherwise of such institutions has been thrown into sharp relief by the deteriorating security environment in the Asia-Pacific. The so-called “rise of China” and its increasingly assertive – even aggressive – foreign policy in the South China Sea has heightened tensions between the region’s most powerful countries and highlighted the limited ability such institutions have in resolving differences.</p>
<p>At one level this is unsurprising. Organisations such as the G20 and APEC were never intended to deal with security issues of this sort. That they have become so is testimony to both the growing tensions in the region and that alternative institutions that were intended to deal with security issues have generally proved woefully ineffective.</p>
<p>The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the quintessential case in point in this regard. Originally established in the 1990s in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, it ought to be an organisation whose time has unambiguously arrived. On the one hand, security issues are top of everyone’s agenda in the Asia-Pacific. On the other, it contains all of the region’s most important security actors. Even North Korea is a member.</p>
<p>And yet the ARF has been conspicuous by its absence. This is entirely unsurprising and a function of the way this organisation was designed and operates. Its modus operandi reflects the so-called “ASEAN Way” of consensus, voluntarism and non-binding agreements that were the hallmark of the ASEAN grouping upon which it is based. Unfortunately this means that “difficult” issues that might make members feel uncomfortable are scrupulously avoided.</p>
<p>In practice this means that not only are contentious topics such as the region’s unresolved territorial disputes and China’s foreign policy not addressed, but expectations about the “socialisation” of regional powers into Western ways of diplomacy and multilateral mediation are unlikely to be realised. </p>
<p>On the contrary, China has begun to establish its own rival multilateral institutions such as the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation and the recently inaugurated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. As a result, this has led to the emergence of a different sort of institution that embodies potentially different ideas about the sort of role such institutions should play and the sorts of values and practices they should promote.</p>
<p>The great paradox of the Asia-Pacific region is that it suffers from a surfeit of overlapping initiatives and institutions that compete for influence and authority over various issue areas. The all-too-predictable result is that none of them are especially effective. From China’s perspective this is potentially not a bad outcome. </p>
<p>Diluting the coherence of potentially effective organisations such as the East Asia Summit, for example, by expanding the membership and range of issues it is expected to address, is one way of ensuring that it will not be able to achieve very much at all. </p>
<p>What regional powers ought to do is eliminate some of the redundant, overlapping institutions that currently add little value, and concentrate on one or two that actually have the power and authority to make a difference. Australian policymakers could provide a useful service by helping to bring this about.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>An earlier version of this piece appeared in Policy Forum.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51394/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
One of the distinctive features of the contemporary international order is the role played by multilateral organisations. Ever since the US became the dominant force in international affairs in the aftermath…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/509792015-11-20T05:44:31Z2015-11-20T05:44:31ZAs Asia embraces the Trans-Pacific Partnership, ISDS opposition fluctuates<p>Alongside this week’s APEC leaders’ summit in Manila, US President Obama met counterparts and trade ministers from 11 other Asia-Pacific states that agreed in October to the expanded <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/Pages/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-tpp.aspx">Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)</a>.</p>
<p>These states, covering around 40% of world GDP, cannot sign the free trade deal before February 3, when the US Congress finishes its 90-day review. But Obama and others in Manila <a href="http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2015/11/18/tpp-may-be-sealed-in-nz-in-february-says-najib/">reiterated</a> the importance of the TPP for regional and global economic integration.</p>
<p>There are, however, ongoing concerns in <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/australia-could-be-sued-for-billions-by-foreign-companies-for-new-laws-under-tpp-20151106-gksbjx.html">Australia</a> and <a href="http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2015/11/18/the-tpps-investment-chapter-entrenching-rather-than-reforming-a-flawed-system/">the US</a> about the TPP’s investment chapter, including its investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions. </p>
<p>The ISDS provisions grant foreign investors the right to use dispute settlement proceedings against a foreign government when they are unable to persuade their home country to do so. If the host state discriminates, seizes a foreign investment or renders it largely worthless without paying adequate compensation, or denies justice in local courts, the investor can use ISDS to bring a direct claim. ISDS helps depoliticise disputes and encourages a rules-based framework for investment, especially in <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2401504">developing countries</a>. </p>
<p>Yet ISDS has become a lightning rod for those in Australia who are unhappy about entering into free trade agreements aimed at promoting cross-border trade and investment beyond the WTO system. Polarised media coverage <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2685941">has escalated</a> particularly since 2011.</p>
<p>Part of the criticism comes from <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/tpp-will-the-transpacific-partnership-really-benefit-australia-20151006-gk24so.html">some economists</a>, including the <a href="http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/trade-agreements/report">Productivity Commission</a> in 2010. It favoured greater economic liberalisation, but prefered unilateral moves, or at least multilateral treaties. Although accompanied by a vigorous dissent, the commission’s main report also adopts a laissez-faire approach to investment: firms should make their own decisions about whether to invest locally or abroad, and do not need treaties to set baseline legal standards of protection.</p>
<p>However, most criticism of ISDS in Australia comes from the political left, which is generally opposed to economic liberalisation. Treaty-based protections for investors are seen as <a href="http://aftinet.org.au/cms/node/962">undermining national sovereignty</a>, altough others <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2033167">point out</a> this is inherent whenever one state commits to an international agreement. </p>
<p>Critics are also very concerned about <a href="http://theconversation.com/leaked-tpp-investment-chapter-shows-risks-to-australias-health-39799">“regulatory chill”</a>. They often <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041680">highlight</a> the first (and only) arbitration brought against Australia by Philip Morris Asia, regarding tobacco plain packaging. Yet a careful <a href="http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/897/">empirical study</a> recently found no significant extra regulatory chill even in a country like Canada, which has lost a few ISDS claims under the North American FTA in effect since 1994.</p>
<p>These two lines of critique came together in the Trade Policy Statement the <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1860505">Gillard government issued</a> in 2011. <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2152752">Controversially</a>, Australia declared it would never agree to any form of ISDS in future investment treaties. The stance complicated negotiations for major bilateral FTAs as well as the TPP.</p>
<p>In 2013, the Abbott government <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/chafta/fact-sheets/Pages/fact-sheet-investor-state-dispute-settlement.aspx">reverted</a> to including ISDS on a case-by-case assessment. This helped Australia to reach agreement on major FTAs, but the political left continues its opposition through <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2561147">multiple parliamentary inquiries</a>, especially in the Senate.</p>
<p>The Greens began by proposing an <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2483610">“Anti-ISDS Bill”</a>, which would have legislated the 2011 Trade Policy Statement stance. Even the Labor members on that Senate committee disagreed, mindful of setting a dangerous precedent that might constrain a future Labor government from negotiating and signing treaties in other fields. </p>
<p>However, Labor parliamentarians did <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2643926">initially side with Greens members</a> on inquiries into the Korea and then China FTAs, objecting in part to their ISDS provisions. Yet these are very limited regarding <a href="http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2015/06/compromised_isds_china.html">China</a>, and eventually Labor voted with the Coalition parliamentarians to allow tariff implementation legislation and therefore ratification to bring both FTAs into force.</p>
<p>The big question now is what approach Labor will take to the TPP, given its inclusion of ISDS (albeit with <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/official-documents/Documents/australia-new-zealand-investor-state-dispute-settlement-trade-remedies-and-transport-services.PDF">side letters</a> proposing a carve-out between Australia and New Zealand), with Australia’s general election scheduled for 2016. </p>
<p>Labor may well fudge its stance. After all, if elected but again only in coalition with Greens, a new Labor government may want to revive the Gillard government Trade Policy Statement to eschew ISDS provisions. If elected outright, Labor may instead be willing to accept them at least for the TPP. It may negotiate some further side letters or take the lead on a code of conduct already envisaged for ISDS arbitrators. </p>
<p>Overall, the TPP’s ISDS-backed commitments are quite similar to those in Australia’s FTAs since 2003. These, in turn, are largely modelled on <a href="http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2015/11/tpp_investment.html">treaties between third parties and the US</a>, which has never been subject to a successful ISDS claim.</p>
<p>Labor will also have to bear in mind that other TPP partners are generally comfortable with ISDS (as are large economies like <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2643926">Korea</a> and <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2244634">China</a> that may <a href="http://m.lowyinstitute.org/node/46209">accede later</a>). These include capital exporters like <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1724999">Japan</a>, but also foreign direct investment (FDI) hosts like <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2643926">New Zealand</a> and <a href="http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2041">Vietnam</a> – after subjecting ISDS to closer scrutiny recently.</p>
<p>Ironically, apart from Australia, it is mainly therefore the US – typically a strong proponent of ISDS – where some recent opposition <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/29/the-tpp-isnt-a-done-deal-yet/">may complicate TPP ratification</a>, especially in light of its own elections next year.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Nottage receives funding from the Australian Research Council for a project on international investment dispute management (DP140102526) and Canada's Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) for a research project comparing investor-state arbitration policy and practice particularly in advanced democratic economies (<a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/investor-state-arbitration">https://www.cigionline.org/articles/investor-state-arbitration</a>).
He has or had executive functions on the International Law Association's committee for the International Committee of Consumers, the Law Council of Australia's international law section and ADR committee, ACICA's rules drafting committee, and the Asia-Pacific Forum for International Arbitration.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leon Trakman receives funding from the Australian Research Council for a project on international investment dispute management (DP140102526).</span></em></p>Opposition against Investor-State Dispute Settlement clauses seems likely to fall away as Asian economies flock to the TPP.Luke Nottage, Professor, Sydney Law School, University of SydneyLeon Trakman, Professor, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/374262015-02-12T07:56:35Z2015-02-12T07:56:35ZAfghan overtures show China getting comfortable with life as a US deputy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/71748/original/image-20150211-25700-adcj6c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A show of force. Will China assert itself?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/stage88/4550658574/in/photolist-7W8jfA-qbTHU-g5Vsxo-7viaEx-4rzRVA-dpvXQx-qbU6f-658bGh-658bDb-apfxYW-g5W1MH-aWNYhP-qbTZT-qbTPm-qbUdr-gvFaB-fBt32u-qbU3a-91FDoA-qbUa9-5WF9BM-fBdH8D-aAebNU-qbTV2-K3Nat-8LPubh-9susLh-4UCtba-bSy7r4-joEtS6-4Qi71r-9P6ypk-4v1xGP-4AGC3t-8wifc2-2mWPU-aAbpHT-4QniR5-aAe4dw-762C8d-75XJnB-4Qi8Lp-4Qi892-4Qi9qF-653UwD-aAbKzc-joFZC4-3oZQ1m-3oVfLr-aAejid">Sam Ilić</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Whether you fear or welcome a challenge to the world’s existing power structure, the main focus of attention is on when China will begin to translate its increasing influence into genuine global leadership. And after a period when China has widely been seen as wanting to have power without leadership or responsibility, there are some signs that things are beginning to change. </p>
<p>To be sure, we need to retain a sense of proportion. When China does something new it can often garner much greater attention than the ongoing continued activities of others. For example, while China has been identified as <a href="http://www.herald.co.zw/china-supports-africa-in-battle-against-ebola/">being on the “frontline”</a> in the battle against Ebola, its actual contribution has been relatively modest compared to that of what the Guardian called the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/17/un-ebola-ban-ki-moon-international-community">“usual suspects” of development assistance</a>. </p>
<p>Furthermore, much of the new(ish) proactive Chinese international strategy has Chinese national and commercial interests very much front and centre; the promotion of <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/silkroad/">a new maritime silk road</a> seems to be a rather apt example here. But with these caveats in mind, something interesting seems to be happening in terms of <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/02/10/as-u-s-exits-china-takes-on-afghanistan-role/">China’s growing involvement in Afghanistan</a>.</p>
<h2>Taking Kabul by the horns</h2>
<p>In October 2014, China for the first time hosted a meeting of the Istanbul Ministerial Process established to promote peace and co-operation between Afghanistan and its neighbours. In the <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1203950.shtml">words of a foreign ministry spokeswoman</a>, the simple act of holding the event was an opportunity for China to promote its leadership credentials and allowed China to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Showcase the world’s support to the peaceful reconstruction in Afghanistan, and build consensus of regional countries on strengthening co-operation on Afghanistan and jointly safeguarding security and stability in Afghanistan and the region.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/71770/original/image-20150211-25676-14babt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/71770/original/image-20150211-25676-14babt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/71770/original/image-20150211-25676-14babt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/71770/original/image-20150211-25676-14babt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/71770/original/image-20150211-25676-14babt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/71770/original/image-20150211-25676-14babt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/71770/original/image-20150211-25676-14babt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/71770/original/image-20150211-25676-14babt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">New dawn? Sunrise in Kabul.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/defenceimages/11967967256/in/photolist-jeyXH3-fEnTNd-fEnTgs-fEnTpU-fE6hD8-fE6hN2-3bGmkB-3bGCeK-9NHbdf-aB7J3-doodo5-v77jX-gfTP7n-c5adv-c5ae6-c5agj-5TU76k-5TYrUE-6Bm9HU-bFUmf8-4AAtN2-9gdbm2-9gggzY-aCLy5A-6eEPRM">UK Ministry of Defence</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>China’s leaders also used the opportunity to increase its financial aid to Kabul, pledging extra funding, training, and technical assistance. So far so normal – China has established a track record in using high-profile meetings such as APEC, the Forum on Africa-China Co-operation and so on to make announcements of new funding and aid initiatives. </p>
<h2>Hey Mr Taliban..</h2>
<p>But then something different happened as China began to provide some sort of mediating role and directly involved itself in Afghani politics by holding talks with both the Afghan government <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/21/why-is-china-talking-to-the-taliban/">and the Taliban</a>. As the US prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan, China seems increasingly willing to step in to fill the void and – for some analysts – to increase its <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-u-s-exits-china-takes-on-afghanistan-role-1423539002?mod=e2tw">international standing as a putative global leader</a> in the process. </p>
<p>Perhaps it might even have more success than the other great powers that have tried, and failed, to pacify Afghanistan over the years. At the very least, it does not carry the same historical baggage as others in Afghanistan (or indeed, in the Middle East in general). </p>
<p>Of course, there are very good reasons for China to act. In the past, China claims that Afghanistan and al-Qaeda provided a safe haven for Muslim military separatists committed to “splitting” China and creating an <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-24757974">independent Islamic East Turkestan state</a>. </p>
<p>This might explain why China was prepared to accept US-led military action in Afghanistan in the first place, notwithstanding China’s usual commitment to defending state sovereignty. Contributing to peace and stability in Afghanistan, then, is not just an act of altruistic leadership, but one that has a clear national interest dimension for China as well. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/71771/original/image-20150211-25693-1p1vla3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/71771/original/image-20150211-25693-1p1vla3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/71771/original/image-20150211-25693-1p1vla3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/71771/original/image-20150211-25693-1p1vla3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/71771/original/image-20150211-25693-1p1vla3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/71771/original/image-20150211-25693-1p1vla3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/71771/original/image-20150211-25693-1p1vla3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/71771/original/image-20150211-25693-1p1vla3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Campaigners for East Turkestan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/kathmandu/14858456974/in/photolist-oCZtAE-oBsFXJ-oEY3Yn-oDd9Fv-omHLh7-oEY5SH-oDda7R-omHQbu-oBbspd-oDd2WD-omHCWW-omJbNR-oBbjTm-oBbj5h-omHGq9-oBbmTy-omHj85-omHZgH-omJazi-omZWNX-oBbmi5-oBbkFU-oDdcqZ-omHKDy-oBbgB1-oBbnq5-omHAoa-oCWuF8-omHQdU-oEXZkv-oCWodZ-oDbktU-oDd9iB-oEY8Wi-oDbiRL-omHFUF-oCZyBG-oDcZbZ-omHEWi-omJfor-oDd9zD-oBboiC-oCZtrS-oBbqM5-omHy6e-omHDS4-oEY24R-oCZsBL-omJ4A4-omJ8CH">S Pakhrin</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That said, other global leaders have often acted out of self interest as well; the <a href="http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6869.pdf">global financial order built at Bretton Woods</a> at the end of World War II was not exactly free from the influence of US economic considerations. </p>
<p>So how should we judge China’s emerging role as a provider of some form of global public goods?</p>
<h2>Overtaking manoeuvre</h2>
<p>Chinese strategists refer to the current era as one of strategic opportunity. Not least because of the consequences of the global financial crisis, a global power change has been accelerated, that has seen China rise while existing powers (most notably in Europe) decline. This has created a great opportunity for China to push to change the global order to one that is more reflective of Chinese power and Chinese interests. </p>
<p>But this opportunity is constrained by the residual power of the US which will remain, in Chinese eyes, the predominant global power for some time to come. Indeed, <a href="http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/event/us-china-shared-vision-global-economic-partnership">vice premier, Wang Yang, said as much in Chicago in December</a> when he reaffirmed China’s commitment to a US-led rule based world order which China has “neither the ability nor the intent” to overturn. </p>
<p>The challenge for China is not (yet) how to replace the US, but how to act as its No.2. In the case of Afghanistan, the No.1 seems relatively comfortable with a greater Chinese role. But it’s not always the case that the No.1 seems amenable to accommodating China’s further rise. Where it isn’t, China has begun to take action to build its own alternatives. </p>
<p>So if the US won’t ratify changes to voting power at the IMF that would give China a greater say – and the power structure at the ADB continues to favour others – then China is prepared to launch its own organ of financial governance <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-6">in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</a>. Here we see China competing for some form of leadership by replicating existing ways of doing things, rather than trying to fundamentally challenge the very nature or essence of global governance and the global order.</p>
<p>China as No.2, then, seems increasingly prepared to take on some degree of leadership – as long as that leadership simultaneously serves other domestic ends. China’s leaders have also become skilled at using major international events to put over a preferred national image of what China is and what it stands for to an international audience. </p>
<p>Given the renewed focus on environmental issues <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-state-and-citizens-must-battle-airpocalypse-together-23940">in light of China’s airpocalypse</a>, the Paris climate change conference at the end of the year might be very interesting indeed for students of China’s changing global role.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37426/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Breslin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whether you fear or welcome a challenge to the world’s existing power structure, the main focus of attention is on when China will begin to translate its increasing influence into genuine global leadership…Shaun Breslin, Professor of Politics and International Studies, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/341072014-11-11T20:18:16Z2014-11-11T20:18:16ZAmerica’s great gamble on China<p>President Obama arrived in Beijing Monday to participate in this week’s meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. He will have talks with China’s president Xi Jinping on the fringes of that forum this week. </p>
<p>It has been almost 18 months since the two men last met, a quite tumultuous period for both at home and a somewhat fractious one in terms of US-Sino relations. </p>
<h2>18 months is a long time</h2>
<p>President Xi has been at the forefront of efforts to institute far-reaching reforms at home, the latest of which was a carefully timed <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/wall-street-journal/foreign-investors-line-up-as-china-opens-stockmarket-door/story-fnay3ubk-1227119760955?nk=fe22730c6d26a62a41c2ba5c7a39b72d">announcement</a> of a landmark deal to coincide with the APEC meeting that will give global investors easier access to China’s $3.9 trillion stock market. </p>
<p>But while domestic criticism of Xi’s reforms has been as modulated as ever, the now new-ish regime has had to avoid upsetting the People Republic of China’s (PRC) delicate balancing act between its need for growth and endemic fear of the social dislocation that such growth may engender. China, we are often told, values stability above all else. </p>
<p>Nowhere has this tension been more evident than in the protests in <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-hong-kong-chinas-future-33966">Hong Kong</a>. However polite and violence free, the PRC’s leadership is inevitably concerned that any disruptive influences could spread to the mainland and inspire a resurgence of demands for greater political representation. </p>
<p>President Obama, of course, has faced a challenging set of domestic issues and a cacophony of criticism, both from the newly resurgent Republicans and many Democrats who shy away from being associated with him.</p>
<p>Even the improving American jobs situation, steady growth figures and a buoyant stock market have failed to stem a poor assessment of the president, with his performance ratings mired in the low 40s. And the Middle East once again dominates the President’s foreign policy agenda, as the rumblings over “the Russian question” and fears about Ebola continue. </p>
<h2>Charming the neighbors</h2>
<p>Both countries are in the midst of a “charm offensive”. </p>
<p>China has been seeking to reassure its Asian neighbors about its regional goals. Efforts at rapprochement with Japan over the disputed <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139">Diaoyu/Senkaku islands</a> seem to have resulted in a negotiated truce, even if there has been no resolution. Likewise, China’s signing of a liberalizing trade pact with South Korea, bringing sweeping cuts to tariffs, has been widely applauded. The APEC announcement of its support for a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/11/apec-summit-beijing-roadmap-asia-pacific-free-trade-area">Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)</a> suggests Xi is winning this offensive. All three deals indicate that moderate heads are prevailing in a heavily armed region often seen as the most likely candidate for a catastrophic interstate war. </p>
<p>President Obama, of course, has spent the last 18 months engaged in his own charm offensive. He has attempted to assuage America’s European allies in the aftermath of the damaging NSA revelations, and to ensure that key partners in the Middle East align with the US in the conflict with the Islamic State. In Asia, the US is currently negotiating a separate <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/what-trans-pacific-partnership-why-does-it-matter-1721344">Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) </a>– a rival to the FTAAP that excludes China.</p>
<p>Yet many of these issues will be put aside for a short while as the two leaders meet. </p>
<h2>US-China: a special relationship</h2>
<p>Certainly, our historic trade and military ties to Europe have led to many describing the US as “a European nation”. </p>
<p>But if Martians were to land on earth and objectively study America’s foreign policy interests, our alien visitors might soon conclude that Asia, and China in particular, is America’s most important bilateral relationship. They might scoff at America’s obsession with developments in the Middle East, all the more so as our dependence on that region’s oil declines. Indeed, events in the new century have tilted America’s perspective westward – and with it what President Obama eventually termed the American “rebalancing towards Asia” that officially commenced in 2011.</p>
<p>America and China share much in common. They have never been more economically intertwined, and arguably in many ways never before more vulnerable to each other. Their global current account balances – critical to the health of the global economy – have narrowed. But America’s bilateral trade imbalance with China remains stubbornly large and continues to grow. </p>
<p>The world’s two largest national economies also have the world’s two largest military budgets. And although the US official military budget dwarfs China’s there are still plenty of factors to keep American generals up at night. The PRC is continually seeking ways to offset America’s superior military technology. And it remains unclear just how big its military expenditure actually is. </p>
<p>Noteworthy in the expansion of China’s power, of course, is the massive growth in its economy over the last two decades. After all, this is a country where analysts consider a slowdown to a possible 7% growth rate next year as worrisome. But this concern was emphatically reinforced by the effective way that most Asian nations avoided the worst effects of the Great Recession, while the economies of the US and Europe struggled. </p>
<p>There has also, however, been increased friction with the PRC concerning its territorial claims over large tracts of the South China Sea, its unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea and Beijing’s disconcerting tendency to stick to the principle of sovereignty in coalescing with Russia, and against the US, at the United Nations.</p>
<p>All told then, America has a sticky and complicated relationship with China. We badly need each other but cannot find a way to exist in a state of domestic bliss.</p>
<h2>Contradictory views on the American side</h2>
<p>This is by no means entirely the fault of the Chinese. The fundamental American problem is that there are at least two contending views of China among America’s policy makers, academics and military. The US tends to pursue each track simultaneously: the Chinese must be either confounded or amused by the inherent contradictions in US policy.</p>
<p>The first and often most prominent is the American view of the Chinese as predators who seek territorial expansion and economic domination. According to this view the Chinese are “rising competitors” who make strenuous efforts to sign aid, trade and finance deals in Africa and Latin America – deals that supply China with much needed natural resources. </p>
<p>Chinese sponsorship of <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-development-bank-plans-test-rising-powers-strategic-shift-33436">a new development bank </a>to rival the World Bank is just the kind of evidence that proponents of this view regard as evidence that supports their views. The Chinese will stand on the sidelines, so this argument goes, watching the US fight wars that drain America’s resources until the Chinese feel comfortable mounting a challenge to the US’s position as the world’s dominant power.</p>
<p>This alarmist position does find its way – in moderated form - into such policy measures as a series of American bilateral military agreements with partners such as Indonesia and Australia. The American navy’s aircraft carriers, for example, patrol the Western Pacific as a reminder to the Chinese of America’s presence.</p>
<p>If that were our only strategy towards the Chinese, things would be simple. But people in Beijing must be confounded by the fact that we combine what the Chinese portray as an encirclement military strategy with a second economic one of engagement. </p>
<p>According to this more optimistic view, US military superiority will last for decades. So we buy China’s goods. We accept their purchases of our government bonds. We allow – even encourage – American firms to invest in their economy. We purchase shares in their companies such as <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/business-29999289">Alibaba</a> when they let us. And we even let them buy our most desirable real estate and send their children to elite US universities in record numbers. Yes, we do occasionally rebuff their attempts to buy firms that produce key national security assets and we “name and shame” them over their efforts at cyber-espionage and human rights abuses. </p>
<p>But when all is said and done, current US policy and its two - sometimes contradictory - prongs is still a pretty ambivalent way to treat a country that minimally obstructs the US in the pursuit of its goals and is a potentially major adversary.</p>
<h2>The American wager on China</h2>
<p>So is the US confused? Is it a case of the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing? Or is there some greater logic afoot in this game of sticks and carrots, of push and pull, one that predates the Obama administration? </p>
<p>Since Richard Nixon went to China in the 1970s, the United States has sought the opening of the Chinese economy to the West. President Clinton reinforced that effort with his support for China’s entry to the World Trade Organization and his signing of a major trade bill with China in 1999. </p>
<p>Clinton made a big bet. It is one deeply embedded in American theories of political development dating back over five decades: that capitalism, and with it economic development, will create a middle class who will demand democratic political representation. This was the way that democracy evolved in the UK and the US, and the American presidents of the last five decades – from Reagan to Obama – have believed it is true of China. Give China the means to develop economically and, eventually, and it will join the list of democratic, peaceful nations.</p>
<p>To date, the leadership of the PRC has proven stubbornly resistant to that pattern. China’s preference for authoritarian capitalism has been effective and remained peaceful. There is no evidence to support the alarmist view that China wants to change the economic rules or military balance of a system from which, at this point, it is the world’s greatest beneficiary. But there is equally no doubt that America’s leadership – Democrat and Republican – are doing their most to create a vibrant and wealthy Chinese middle class to foment change. They can only hope that this new middle class will enhance the prospects for political reform. This week’s meeting is just the latest episode in one of the unfolding, formative developments of the twenty-first century.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
President Obama arrived in Beijing Monday to participate in this week’s meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. He will have talks with China’s president Xi Jinping on the fringes…Simon Reich, Professor in The Division of Global Affairs and The Department of Political Science, Rutgers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/340962014-11-11T14:31:44Z2014-11-11T14:31:44ZAPEC summit shows how hard it is to define the Asian ‘region’<p>With considerable pomp and circumstance – and at considerable expense – it fell to China to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-29983537">host the annual APEC summit this year</a>. If it lives long in the memory at all, the meeting will probably be remembered for a handshake between Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe; a greeting that seemed to take place in an emotional vacuum stripped of the warmth that sometimes accompanies human interactions. Outside of diplomatic niceties though, there was a telling reminder of how hard it remains to build anything approaching a viable consensus in the region.</p>
<p>Given the recent state of Sino-Japanese relations, that rather cool handshake is probably the best that could have been hoped for and does at least illustrate the value of meetings like this that force leaders (and their officials) to have some form of regular contact. Progress towards resolving bilateral trade issues <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/11/10/apec-beijing-obama/18786007/">between China and the US</a> at the Beijing summit is another example of how what can appear to be just a talking shop can actually produce more than just hot air.</p>
<h2>Dreams of integration</h2>
<p>Xi Jinping also used the opportunity to establish what he called an <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-11-10/xis-dream-calls-for-love-not-money">“Asia Pacific Dream”</a> of closer regional integration built on a new free trade area for the entire Asia Pacific. But in what might seem to be a potential spark for the creation of more effective regional governance, we instead see one of the main obstacles. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/64271/original/hdy9t3gt-1415712673.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/64271/original/hdy9t3gt-1415712673.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/64271/original/hdy9t3gt-1415712673.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64271/original/hdy9t3gt-1415712673.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64271/original/hdy9t3gt-1415712673.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64271/original/hdy9t3gt-1415712673.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64271/original/hdy9t3gt-1415712673.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64271/original/hdy9t3gt-1415712673.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">John Kerry at a meeting of the Trans Pacific Partnership.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/statephotos/10151813153/in/photolist-gt5Gng-oZsb7p-nfn1kp-kV4ULa-nSwB5a-odby2R-oMZ2uo-oKsLFZ-pkMG8Q-o8ciyK-oS8qq1-o9Gi8e-oLcVST-o8b77b-ojddKN-otHu1N-gsmGcy-kdWDNX-kXYyav-m2K2dy-nY4Gdc-otey9F-o7fvDb-oqDef1-oarW7R-pkxd9k-ojJcpv-k624Yb-ovrGu2-nwbsEC-p8eMEv-ngrb5u-ngr3cB-ngrdEG-ngrb61-ngqW7Z-oyyTeF-mwLUkX-d9omBY-kXPFsz-jYTJJv-ntarV9-n2emm5-nuNNsh-nuNNEw-nfnbad-nfmUKM-nfn1YQ-nfmQ52-nfmNTK">US Department of State</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Chinese initiative might contain within it an economic logic, but it is also driven by geostrategic concerns. What started out as free trade negotiations between Chile, New Zealand and Singapore in 2002 (and later Brunei) became something else for China when the US joined the discussions in 2008. In keeping with the idea of a US “pivot” to Asia, there are now concerns that what has become the Trans Pacific Partnership agenda represents a deliberate political attempt to weaken China, by keeping it outside a new trade framework that will make it easier and cheaper for members to deal with each other. Hence the need to promote an alternative that has China not just included, but front and centre, rather than isolated on the outside. </p>
<p>And these two are not the only free trade initiatives under negotiation. There is a third version in the form of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership proposal which includes the ten ASEAN members and the countries with whom ASEAN already has individual free trade agreements. These are Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. But notably not the US. </p>
<h2>Existential questions</h2>
<p>What we see in Asia is not just competing ideas over how the region should best be governed. Nor just competition over who should take the lead in the promotion of regional governance of whatever kind. We see an even more basic competition over the very idea of what the region actually is, could be and should be. </p>
<p>And the definition of region that is favoured often reflects perceptions of who would wield what level of power in any given configuration. There is a case for arguing, for example, that the idea of region as Asia Pacific (and APEC as an institution) is built around a desire to obstruct the emergence of an “Asian-Asia” without the US (and perhaps without neo-liberal economic preferences). </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/64270/original/4hx545n8-1415712366.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/64270/original/4hx545n8-1415712366.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/64270/original/4hx545n8-1415712366.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64270/original/4hx545n8-1415712366.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64270/original/4hx545n8-1415712366.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64270/original/4hx545n8-1415712366.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64270/original/4hx545n8-1415712366.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64270/original/4hx545n8-1415712366.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mapping out Asia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/centralasian/3241904459/in/photolist-8gwNNt-8WTpfd-9mMJow-5WtBft-fYEYRB-5WxSW3-9mJFA8-9mJFti-5mRPC8-fuNZK1-9mMJwf-7jARNz-8N6VWt-bovaPk-9mJFDk-dUhCLq-6Db1vf-VvEiJ-9B9MAu-9B9MDN-8YzaR-9h7rcc-5he5AA-RFSaD-3TxF53-pc73p3-4ouj15-69NgqZ-9B9Msh-8gA5Z7-8gwAqR-8Gpy34-9B6U3t-9jfLmx-9gKm8R-iMsFNT-4KeAhR-87xHjD-9jfJUg-pboQHZ-xw3Xm-u1FP6-xvZ56-5go9Qz-9sXM3s-9AaeUr-eH7mg-P9rTt-89bPcy-5SgW5V">Playing Futures: Applied Nomadology</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If you can’t get the region that you want, the next best is to stop others getting the region they want instead. For example, a Chinese preference for a region that it can dominate defined <a href="http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/asean-3/item/asean-plus-three-cooperation">as ASEAN plus three</a> (China, Japan and South Korea) might be diluted by adding India and Australia and New Zealand. </p>
<p>And region defined in this way (ASEAN plus six, as it were) is exactly what happened in the form of the East Asia Summit. The subsequent addition of Russia and the US redrew the regional boundaries once more and arguably resulted in what started out as a potential basis for regional governance becoming an “APEC-lite” institution. Perhaps we can even call it an “anti-region” – an institution that has evolved as a result of attempts to stop other forms of regional governance from emerging. </p>
<p>So, do geostrategic concerns mean that we will continue to see largely ineffective efforts to establish preferred grand regional projects by the region’s major powers? Probably. But these grand strategies should not be assumed to be the only regional game in town. </p>
<p>At the end of World War II, <a href="http://bit.ly/YYOsAK">David Mitrany provided a vision of a “Working Peace System”</a> that saw the search for binding forms of a single comprehensive organisation as the problem rather than the solution. Such bodies could never work, he argued, as they are by their nature inflexible; they have a fixed membership, rigid practices, and formally defined understandings of what issues fall within (and outside) of the organisation’s scope. </p>
<p>The key for Mitrany was to let the issue at hand drive the nature of the cooperation; to build numerous organisations with incommensurate memberships, agendas and modus operandi depending on what was necessary to succeed. And if politicians with nationalist inclinations were given less power to resolve shared problems than technical specialists, then all the better. </p>
<h2>Targetted action</h2>
<p>At a functional level, Asia is already replete with smaller-scale initiatives that have lead to actual working regional cooperation. In finance, the combined effects of the Asian and global financial crises have led to a recognition of the need for deeper financial cooperation between regional governments. ASEAN also promotes an extensive range of cooperation under the broad umbrella of its <a href="http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community">ASEAN Economic Community initiative</a>. Rather than trying to find holistic regional level solutions to all the region’s problems, these initiatives instead focus on functionally discrete policy areas on issues as diverse as agriculture, telecommunications, energy, transport, finance, and tourism. </p>
<p>So the major powers will carry on trying to build understandings of region that fit their self-defined interests. And leaders will continue to meet at a range of institutional settings; and will manage to get some things done along the way. </p>
<p>At the same time, we are likely to see the ongoing evolution of multiple forms of “functional” regional collaboration focused on specific issue areas; often generated by the need to respond to crises. While we cannot ignore the former, it is the latter that provides the real basis for effective regional governance. This suggests the search for a once and for all single definition of the Asian region, and a corresponding regional organisation embodying this definition, is not only misguided but counterproductive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34096/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Breslin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With considerable pomp and circumstance – and at considerable expense – it fell to China to host the annual APEC summit this year. If it lives long in the memory at all, the meeting will probably be remembered…Shaun Breslin, Professor of Politics and International Studies, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/340842014-11-11T09:44:50Z2014-11-11T09:44:50ZChina and the new regional order<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/64235/original/9wbn9hj7-1415697657.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Kyung-Hoon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The region’s diplomats and leaders have been earning their money over the last few weeks. Or they have, at least, if their preferred key performance indicators are meetings attended, photos posed for, and hands shaken. Even Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe managed a tepid clasp, albeit one accompanied by gritted teeth.</p>
<p>Despite the cost and doubts about the significance and lasting impact of the various ‘deliverables’ such meetings generate, they do matter – even if there’s an excess of such get-togethers and institutional initiatives at present. That the leaders of Japan and China met at all was potentially the most important thing that’s happened in the region on which Australia’s strategic and economic welfare depends for quite a while.</p>
<p>What is most significant about the emerging regional order, perhaps, is that everything of significance that has happened of late is either being directly driven by China, or occurring in response to something China has done. When China shortly becomes the world’s biggest economy it will unambiguously confirm its material importance to the region and enhance its own growing diplomatic and strategic influence.</p>
<p>There is still much that could go wrong in China – the most obvious being a real estate bubble that looks overdue to pop – but if we extrapolate even a little from here, it is clear that whatever form the future takes in this part of the world, for better or worse, China’s economy is going to be its principal driver.</p>
<p>This is why some of the most significant moves of recent days have been about trade rather than security. Welcome as this may be, we should not forget that trade and security issues are more deeply interconnected than many recognise. Ironically, this is something the Abbott government <em>does</em> seem to realise, even if it invariably draws the wrong policy conclusions – the <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-consensus-about-beijings-new-bank-33587">recent failure</a> to join China’s proposed investment bank being a key case in point.</p>
<p>Some other nations have even less room for manoeuvre in such matters. The Philippines has been hung out to dry by its ASEAN colleagues as it confronts China’s territorial ambitions virtually single-handed: something that demonstrates, once again, the compromised and ineffective nature of the region’s most venerable institution.</p>
<p>ASEAN’s shortcomings are one reason why there is such a surprising surfeit of regional initiatives of one sort or another. Trade policy may be somewhat eye-glazing at times, but even the causal observer of the region cannot help but notice that the US and China are on opposite sides of a struggle to define its trade architecture. </p>
<p>It is not clear if either America’s much-anticipated but still unrealised Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) or China’s alternative Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) will ultimately triumph. More importantly, it is not obvious that they will actually influence trade outcomes even if there is agreement. </p>
<p>What is clear, however, is that first, many of China’s neighbours feel compelled to at least look as if they’re taking the FTAAP seriously. And second, many in China still see the TPP as a form of neo-containment.</p>
<p>In reality, bilateral deals of the sort that Australia has been successfully pursuing look likely to be more significant than their more ambitious regional alternatives. That’s not to say that they will necessarily be unambiguously beneficial, of course. Australian policymakers have a habit of signing up to duff bilateral deals for strategic rather than economic reasons. The US free trade deal was a noteworthy example of the genre. The deal with China could be another.</p>
<p>While the devil, as they say, is in the detail, Australia may have little choice. Not only has much political capital already been invested in doing a deal, but China is also adroitly putting pressure on trade partners to sign up to such agreements. The recently concluded deal with South Korea is arguably even more important symbolically than materially. A key American ally has signed up to a deal that highlights China’s growing economic importance and bargaining power.</p>
<p>It’s not necessary to be an unreconstructed ‘declinist’ to recognise that America’s influence in the region is unambiguously shrinking as China’s expands. In this regard, at least, realists have a point: power and influence are zero sum commodities. The US is still important and powerful, but the direction of travel is already clear. It is hard to imagine that what looks like an emerging trend today, won’t have become a commonplace reality in ten or twenty years. </p>
<p>At least Barack Obama has turned up for the region’s diplomatic shindigs on this occasion. His much anticipated speech on American leadership in the Asia-Pacific will undoubtedly seek to strike a reassuring tone – and will undoubtedly be well-delivered. Whether it actually produces any more of substance than the famous pivot/rebalance did remains to be seen.</p>
<p>In contrast to America’s lofty rhetoric, China is actually using its growing material power to redefine the region before our eyes. Australian policymakers may not like it much, but they may have little choice other than to adjust to a regional order in which China rather than the US is increasingly the key player.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34084/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The region’s diplomats and leaders have been earning their money over the last few weeks. Or they have, at least, if their preferred key performance indicators are meetings attended, photos posed for…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/338852014-11-06T19:23:17Z2014-11-06T19:23:17ZGrattan on Friday: Game of cat-and-bear as Abbott pursues Putin<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63865/original/92s3y7sx-1415274264.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Prime Minister of The Netherlands Mark Rutte reacts as he listens to Australian Prime Minster Tony Abbott, in Canberra.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP Image/Reuters POOL, David Gray</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Russians have started coming. On Thursday, an aircraft with about 80-90 Russians arrived in preparation for the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Brisbane. There will be four more official planes, including President Vladimir Putin’s, a back-up, and one for cargo.</p>
<p>As Team Russia assembles, Tony Abbott and Putin are playing cat-and-bear. Alexander Odoevskiy, second secretary at the Russian embassy, says that last week Australia put a formal request to Moscow for the Prime Minister to have a bilateral with the President at APEC in Beijing next week. Odoevskiy does not know the answer.</p>
<p>Abbott originally <a href="https://theconversation.com/abbott-vows-to-shirt-front-putin-as-russian-diplomat-recalls-better-times-32889">threatened to “shirt-front”</a> Putin in Brisbane, which never seemed a good idea. More sensibly, he is now aiming to bring forward the conversation about the MH17 investigation.</p>
<p>As Abbott <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/vladimir-putin-cant-duck-tony-abbotts-mh17-message/story-fn59nm2j-1227114014390">said to The Australian</a> this week: “What I won’t be doing is disrupting the sessions of the G20 with a private argument between Australia and Russia.”</p>
<p>After his Thursday talks with visiting Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, focusing on MH17, Abbott told a joint news conference: “One way or another, I will take the chance to speak to the Russian President sometime over the next week or so. I’ll be in Beijing with him at the APEC conference, then of course we’re expecting him at the G20 conference in Brisbane.</p>
<p>"What I’ll be saying to him is that Australia expects full Russian co-operation with the [MH17]investigation. We don’t want the investigation ridiculed, we don’t want the investigation compromised or sabotaged…</p>
<p>"Russia as a member of the international community owes it to the world, owes it to humanity, to ensure that justice is done and wherever possible the perpetrators of this crime are brought to justice.”</p>
<p>Rutte has already delivered that message face-to-face to Putin, as has Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. Abbott will get the same answer as Putin gave to Bishop: that MH17 was downed over Ukraine, but he’ll use what influence he has.</p>
<p>But the PM wants to personally have the conversation, not least for domestic political reasons, including that he’s built up expectations of what he’ll say. Opposition Leader Bill Shorten has also put Abbott under pressure with his hard line on Putin.</p>
<p>International stages, abroad and at home, will dominate the Prime Minister’s attention over the next couple of weeks. He’s won marks earlier in this area, but every performance poses new tests, of which one is being seen to deliver a tough message to Putin without having the G20 meeting overshadowed.</p>
<p>Abbott leaves on Sunday for APEC, which will be followed by the East Asia summit in Myanmar, before he returns to host the G20 on the weekend of November 15-16. </p>
<p>In Beijing next week, Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to formally launch China’s new regional bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, on which Australia has been caught awkwardly between the United States and China.</p>
<p>Ministers were split on whether Australia should join, with Treasurer Joe Hockey and Trade Minister Andrew Robb in favour and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop opposing – and carrying the day.</p>
<p>The deadline for the initial sign-up has passed. For the time being Australia is staying out. There is concern over governance issues but also the United States, which strongly lobbied Australia, is worried the bank will be used to extend China’s strategic influence in the region.</p>
<p>Abbott, with an eye to being in Beijing, is stressing there is no final decision against joining the bank - Australia wants further discussions about governance and transparency. He said this week: “We haven’t decided not to join. We would like to join but we want to join a multilateral institution, but not one that is basically owned and operated by China.”</p>
<p>Those in official circles who want Australia to join believe that’s Abbott’s inclination too.</p>
<p>The China bank fracas has seen detailed leaking from both sides about the internal row. The failure to sign up at the first stage represented another defeat for Hockey.</p>
<p>Now that the deadline has gone, the bank issue becomes less urgent. What is urgent over the next few days is landing the Australia-China free trade agreement.</p>
<p>Robb is in Beijing working on finalising the deal, where some thorny matters about agriculture needed to be ironed out.</p>
<p>Xi addresses federal parliament on November 17, straight after the G20. The agreement must be tied up before then. Abbott is confident. The details of the deal will be scrutinised by experts later to see what compromises were made in the quest to deliver on time.</p>
<p>As Abbott prepares to meet other leaders at both APEC and the G20, the government has finally moved this week to provide a more comprehensive response on Ebola.</p>
<p>Its reluctance had been obvious. The path it has taken, using a private medical provider, Aspen Medical, to run a British-constructed hospital in Sierra Leone, fitted its desire to be as hands-off as possible and – perhaps – its general philosophic preference to “go private” in health areas.</p>
<p>Cabinet’s national security committee has done the heavy lifting on the Ebola issue - holding multiple discussions – rather than the full cabinet. That is despite Abbott saying: “This is a public health emergency. It’s not a security emergency. It’s certainly not an economic emergency.”</p>
<p>The NSC’s brief has become very wide since national security issues came to the fore. Soon, the wits around the government will be comparing it with Kevin Rudd’s gang of four.</p>
<p>Ebola, including its potential economic impact (some experts are considerably more pessimistic than Abbott), is expected to be canvassed at the G20, though not as an agenda item.</p>
<p>After having been pressed hard by the US and Britain to put resources on the ground, Abbott had to make a credible commitment before he met Barack Obama and David Cameron. Not that they would have shirt-fronted him or anything. </p>
<p><strong>Listen to the latest Politics with Michelle Grattan podcast, with Transparency International’s Maggie Murphy, <a href="http://michellegrattan.podbean.com/e/maggie-murphy/">here</a>.</strong></p>
<iframe src="https://www.podbean.com/media/player/audio/postId/5359487/url/http%253A%252F%252Fmichellegrattan.podbean.com%252Fe%252Fmaggie-murphy%252F/initByJs/1/auto/1" width="100%" height="100" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"></iframe><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33885/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Russians have started coming. On Thursday, an aircraft with about 80-90 Russians arrived in preparation for the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Brisbane. There will be four more official planes, including President…Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/337962014-11-05T01:56:10Z2014-11-05T01:56:10ZDoes multilateralism still matter?
<p>For those of us who believe that international institutions are a good idea in principle, these ought to be quite exciting times. After all, we’re about to host the G20 and there will be an even bigger shindig next week in Beijing when the leaders of APEC gather for their annual gab fest. What’s not to like, as they say? </p>
<p>Actually, quite a lot. It’s not simply the eye-watering expense and the all-too-evident gap between the global elites and the hoi polloi whose lives are disrupted by their presence that’s rather troubling. It’s the fact that no matter how many or how grand the participants may be, they don’t actually seem to achieve much.</p>
<p>APEC is undoubtedly the principal exhibit in support of this thesis. It is difficult to think of a single significant outcome that can be attributed to APEC – other than alleviating Beijing’s smog for a couple of days – or one area in which its absence would have made a decisive difference to the course of international affairs. More importantly perhaps, it appears to have made no difference to the lives of those who ultimately fund it.</p>
<p>At least people have generally heard of the G20 now. It can even claim to have saved the world – or the bit of the world that operates out of Wall Street and the City of London, at least. For better or worse it needed saving. If there’s one idea we’ve all taken on board it is that some parts of the global financial architecture are not only too big to fail, but they’ll take us all down with them if they do.</p>
<p>In such perilous circumstances, some might think what we need is a set of effective institutions to regulate a potentially dangerous economic system that has been directly associated with all of the world’s great financial catastrophes. Dream on. The reality is that competing national perspectives, fuelled by powerful vested interests, make agreement and effective international cooperation all but impossible – except at moments of existential crisis, of course.</p>
<p>Part of the problem is scale: size matters. The UN is the quintessential example of an institution with too many members and too little capacity to act – always supposing its members could agree on what they wanted it to do. Even the much smaller Security Council only rarely agrees on any common agenda; even less often on effective action.</p>
<p>As one of the world’s few remaining admirers of the European Union, it pains me to have to admit that an over-burdened and unfulfilled agenda is a problem for the EU, too. The EU expanded too rapidly. Its political ambitions drove its economic agenda with disastrous results – not least in undermining its authority as an effective democratic institution.</p>
<p>It is questionable whether any international institution can address the pivotal problems of our era. Few people understand the byzantine, murderous politics of Middle East, for example, much less have a plan for sorting them out and encouraging or even imposing stability. The chances of ever reaching a meaningful agreement on climate change mitigation look equally remote, especially in the truncated timeframe available. </p>
<p>Wake-up calls don’t get much louder or more unambiguous than the latest IPCC report, but it is unlikely to change much if recent history is anything to go by. One part of society didn’t need reminding; another didn’t care, didn’t believe, or didn’t want to comprise a business model that continues to deliver short-term profitability. </p>
<p>An interesting question now is not simply whether international institutions can actually be effective, but what is driving them. The basic idea is that institutions are established to answer some need or address some unmet collective action problem. Plainly this is not happening at present in all the key areas of international life, be it economic, political or environmental. </p>
<p>The danger now is that policymakers will increasingly recognise this and use international institutions not to try and solve collective problems, but to appease powerful domestic audiences. Democracies are especially prone to this, of course. </p>
<p>The lack of leadership from the US on key economic and environmental issues is testimony to the constraints facing policymakers there. But we are hardly immune, as the Abbott government’s climate change policies remind us. Not only are its policies framed within an exclusively national policy calculus, but the government is keen to see that the environment doesn’t make it on to the G20’s agenda.</p>
<p>This is actually not such a bad idea, albeit for all the wrong reasons. The G20 is already looking over-burdened. It might be better advised to stick to Plan A and actually do something about fragile global finance, rather than being distracted by the passing policy preferences of its most powerful members. This is not to say there isn’t a desperate need for an effective institution to promote cooperation on climate change, but a dedicated organisation with an exclusive focus looks essential. </p>
<p>Perhaps the best hope, therefore, is fewer institutions with more modest, targeted and achievable agendas. For better or worse, there is little hope of solving big international problems without them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33796/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
For those of us who believe that international institutions are a good idea in principle, these ought to be quite exciting times. After all, we’re about to host the G20 and there will be an even bigger…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/189902013-10-08T19:27:59Z2013-10-08T19:27:59ZMore form than substance at APEC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/32646/original/m2txzcst-1381210145.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4096%2C2789&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Good for a holiday, but other institutions are overtaking APEC as a useful diplomatic forum for Australian trade interests.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Mast Irham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum concluded last night as leaders, foreign ministers and trade delegations wrapped up a week in Bali. You’d be forgiven for not noticing.</p>
<p>There are two types of people in the world: those that are aware of – even interested in – APEC, and the vast majority of the world’s inhabitants who have either never heard of it or have only the vaguest idea what it actually does. </p>
<p>Public awareness may not be the definitive measure of potential importance, but it does suggest that for an organisation that recently celebrated its twentieth birthday, it has a remarkable record of under-achievement.</p>
<p>It shouldn’t be this way. APEC is, after all, an organisation that claims to represent 40% of the world’s population in economies that generate more than half the world’s GDP. </p>
<p>And yet if the general public knows anything about APEC it is that world leaders are invariably photographed looking uncomfortable in some ethnically-themed outfit or other. All mildly amusing and good for relationship-building, no doubt, but hardly what APEC’s architects had in mind.</p>
<p>It’s worth remembering that when Bob Hawke originally argued in the late 1980s that the region needed a new organisation to promote trade liberalisation, APEC looked like an idea whose time had truly come. </p>
<p>At the time, Australia was concerned about being frozen out of increasingly important regional markets by countries with little history of, or enthusiasm for, economic liberalisation. Much has changed in the interim, but APEC’s agenda hasn’t.</p>
<p>Current APEC host Susilo Bambang Yuhoyono’s speech rehearsed a well-worn theme: APEC members must work to prevent protectionism and improve infrastructure to facilitate trade and investment. As motherhood statements go it was predictable enough, perhaps. It was also in implicit acknowledgement of the failure of APEC to drive a regional free trade agenda.</p>
<p>The key development during the twenty odd years of APEC’s existence has been the remarkable growth in bilateral trade agreements, rather than the sort of all-encompassing multilateral agreements APEC has championed to little effect. </p>
<p>Tony Abbott’s determination to secure bilateral free trade deals with China, Japan and Korea is indicative of this trend. It also chimes with a long-standing Coalition preference for two-way ties and an abiding suspicion of multilateral forums.</p>
<p>Given that there are other, potentially more powerful multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organisation seeking to do a similar sort of job, you’d be forgiven for asking what APEC’s current role actually is.</p>
<p>Significantly, for a part of the world that is supposedly unenthusiastic about transnational institutions and their potential impact on national sovereignty, there are no shortage of regional initiatives on offer. </p>
<p>As far as Australia’s trade relations are concerned, the key development is the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Risen from obscurity, it’s become a potentially pivotal part of the region’s burgeoning institutional architecture.</p>
<p>The TPP is another implicit acknowledgement of APEC’s failure and growing irrelevance. If APEC was working, no one would be looking to establish yet another major institution dedicated to promoting free trade. </p>
<p>More troubling from an Australian perspective, the TPP threatens to complicate further relations with China, which sees the TPP as part of an American strategy designed to marginalise it. </p>
<p>It is testimony to the potential of the TPP that it is engendering a good deal of debate – not a problem that has ever troubled APEC.</p>
<p>One of the primary justifications for APEC’s existence was that it actually brought the leaders of the key regional states together for a summit that offered real prospects for addressing key collective problems. Even this role has been diminished.</p>
<p>The decision to run APEC back-to-back with the East Asia Summit provides another reminder that there is now another organisation with a potentially wider, open-ended agenda that can perform this function.</p>
<p>The fact that Barrack Obama has failed to turn up for this APEC meeting is also a reminder that APEC – even the entire so-called ‘pivot’ to the region – takes second place to America’s domestic politics. </p>
<p>The US has always been lukewarm about APEC, and the decision to develop the TPP shows their priorities aren’t necessarily in accordance with Australia’s. </p>
<p>But perhaps we should take a lesson from our American allies and invest our limited diplomatic resources where they may have most impact. For a middle power like Australia, rule-based multilateral forums and agreements are unambiguously a good thing. </p>
<p>The question is, which ones can influence the behaviour of more powerful states in ways that serve Australia’s distinctive position and national interests? It probably won’t be APEC, an organisation whose time looks like it’s passed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/18990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Beeson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum concluded last night as leaders, foreign ministers and trade delegations wrapped up a week in Bali. You’d be forgiven for not noticing. There are two…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/43012011-11-16T04:04:04Z2011-11-16T04:04:04ZA ‘zhengyou’ to China? Signing with Obama on trade puts this friendship to the test<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/5567/original/apecportrait.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=213%2C139%2C3755%2C2361&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Strategic friendships: will Australia's decision to sign up to Obama's Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement impact on our relationship with China?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The task of simultaneously negotiating our traditional security and cultural ties with the US, and our burgeoning economic relationship with China, can justifiably be described as the “great foreign policy challenge of our time”. </p>
<p>US President Barack Obama’s announcement of a reinvigorated <a href="http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/">Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement</a>, made on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Hawaii on Saturday, has brought this challenge to the fore once again.</p>
<p>The US sees the TPP as an initiative through which it can demonstrate its economic leadership in the Asia-Pacific region, a region that will remain the world economy’s most dynamic into the foreseeable future. The Australian government’s enthusiasm in signing up to the TPP therefore sends a clear signal to other countries in the region that it embraces US leadership, as well as its strategic priorities.</p>
<h2>Unique and ambitious </h2>
<p>The TPP is unique among free trade arrangements (FTAs) in that it aims to not only reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers, but also liberalise investment flows, and promote regulatory convergence around matters as diverse as labour and environmental standards and intellectual property right protection.</p>
<p>It is also unique in the ambitious 12-month timetable set for its completion. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) already describes it as the “government’s highest regional trade priority”. Keep in mind that Australia is also in the midst of negotiating FTAs with <a href="http://203.6.168.90/fta/acfta/">China</a> and <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/fta/ajfta/index.html">Japan</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/transcript-joint-press-conference-honolulu">sales pitch</a> from Prime Minister Julia Gillard and Trade Minister Craig Emerson regarding the TPP has been firmly economic in nature. The liberalisation of international trade and investment creates jobs, but the <a href="http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm">Doha round</a> of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) sponsored multilateral negotiations has stalled, and so other avenues must be pursued. </p>
<h2>Not convincing </h2>
<p>However, the economic case for the TPP is far from convincing. </p>
<p>Gillard has made the point that the nine countries that have signed up to the TPP account for around one quarter of world GDP. The fact is that the US share of world GDP in 2010 was 23.1%. The share of the other eight countries combined, including Australia, was just 3.7%. </p>
<p>Moreover, Australia already has an <a href="http://203.6.168.65/fta/ausfta/final-text/">FTA with the US</a>. Likewise, it already has an FTA with Singapore, the third largest economy in the TPP after the US and Australia, as well as with other TPP members, New Zealand and Chile. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/5565/original/jintao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/5565/original/jintao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=783&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5565/original/jintao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=783&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5565/original/jintao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=783&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5565/original/jintao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=984&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5565/original/jintao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=984&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5565/original/jintao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=984&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China believes the Obama’s APEC Trans-Pacific Partnership is about containment.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>China and Japan, by far the most important destinations for our exports, are not part of the TPP. Consider this – in 2010-11, Australia’s merchandise exports to China amounted to $A64.8 billion, up 39.4% on a year earlier. Merchandise exports to the other eight TPP countries combined amounted to $A28.6 billion, up 3.9%. </p>
<p>Thus, where the marginal gains will come from is not clear. </p>
<p>Might the timely completion of the TPP encourage China and Japan into the fold? Japan’s government has <a href="http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111115005959.htm">indicated an interest</a> in joining, but faces a massive job in overcoming a domestic farming lobby firmly opposed to the deal and that has largely successfully resisted previous attempts at liberalisation. </p>
<h2>Damage to our relationship </h2>
<p>However, the main economic risk associated with the TPP for Australia is the damage it might do to our relationship with China. </p>
<p>The TPP feeds directly into the already strong fear in China that the US seeks to contain their economic emergence, despite what US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton might say to the contrary. China had, after all, already outlined its own preferred modes of deepening regional engagement, notably the <a href="http://www.aseansec.org/4918.htm">ASEAN plus 3</a> and ASEAN plus 6 groupings. </p>
<p>The official media in China has begun espousing this <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-03/02/c_13194503.htm">containment line</a>, as well as expressing annoyance that China was not invited to participate in the TPP. <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-11-14/pm-expect-more-countries-to-join-free-trade-zone/3664158">Prime Minister Gillard’s comment</a> that any country, including China, can join the TPP is disingenuous. If the TPP does include elements such as regulatory convergence then China has little realistic hope of joining and the Australian Government must have known this. </p>
<p>It is worth noting that if Japan did in fact join the TPP it would only add to China’s fears of being boxed in. Likewise, the announcement by Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou that it too is <a href="http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=180354&ctNode=445">interested in joining</a>, albeit over a longer time frame, has the potential to create enormous tensions in China.</p>
<h2>Biggest danger </h2>
<p>Perhaps the biggest danger for Australia is that the TPP will go nowhere or achieve little and China will have been alienated in the process. For example, how Vietnam intends to achieve regulatory convergence with countries like the US and Australia on matters such as labour and environmental standards is far from clear. Indeed, how the US plans to wean its own domestic agricultural sector off farm subsidies is also uncertain. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/5564/original/zhengyou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/5564/original/zhengyou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5564/original/zhengyou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5564/original/zhengyou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5564/original/zhengyou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5564/original/zhengyou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5564/original/zhengyou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd depicted Australia as a “zhengyou” - a true friend - to China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To be sure, China will continue to buy our iron ore even in the event of a TPP. Negative consequences for Chinese investment in Australia are potentially greater, particularly given that most of China’s investment abroad is conducted by state-owned enterprises. </p>
<p>And any fantasy that Australia is viewed in China as a “zhengyou” - a true friend - will have taken a sharp beating: in 2008, former Prime Minister Rudd remarked in a speech at Beijing University that: “A true friend is one who can be a zhengyou, that is a partner who sees beyond immediate benefit to the broader and firm basis for continuing, profound and sincere friendship.” </p>
<p>All of the above suggests that there is little to like in the TPP from an economic perspective. However, even this academic is happy to concede that economic considerations alone cannot and should not dictate our foreign policy. For example, many Australians would be pleased that labour and environmental standards are now assuming a place in trade negotiations. But in doing so, let’s at least be clear about the likely benefits of the deal, along with its potential risks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/4301/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Laurenceson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The task of simultaneously negotiating our traditional security and cultural ties with the US, and our burgeoning economic relationship with China, can justifiably be described as the “great foreign policy…James Laurenceson, Senior Lecturer, School of Economics, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.