tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/asian-ageing-population-6028/articlesAsian ageing population – The Conversation2018-10-25T10:02:17Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1038892018-10-25T10:02:17Z2018-10-25T10:02:17ZThe fear making Chinese women reluctant to have more children<p>I was waiting in a fashionable café for Tang Xiaohe* in the Dongzhimen district in Beijing. Every bit of the décor in the café signalled the prosperity of China’s capital city. So did the price of a cup of cappuccino. </p>
<p>Xiaohe is a 35-year-old mother-of-one who works in a large tourism company. She contacted me when I put a call out via WeChat seeking women born under China’s one-child policy in the 1980s who were willing to talk about their transitions to employment and parenthood for my ongoing research. Xiaohe chose this café, which is two miles away from her office, to avoid any lunchtime haunts frequented by her colleagues. </p>
<p>So far, I’ve interviewed 82 women, and I always ask them how many children they have – and if they want another one. Xiaohe gave a resounding no. But this was hardly a surprise. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, there was an increase of <a href="http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2017/indexeh.htm">0.88 births per thousand</a> women of child-bearing age between 2015 and 2016, after the end of the one-child policy in late 2015. Although there was a <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/30/WS5a700ec1a3106e7dcc1379b7.html">rise in second births</a> in 2017, there is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/opinion/china-women-birthrate-rights.html">little prospect</a> of a new baby boom now couples are allowed two children. Urban Chinese families no longer want more children.</p>
<p>In recent months the Chinese government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/28/china-could-scrap-two-child-policy-ending-nearly-40-years-of-limits">has even hinted</a> that it may relax the current two-child policy even further as way to solve problems caused by an ageing population.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-looks-to-relax-two-child-policy-but-it-wont-solve-demographic-problems-102518">China looks to relax two-child policy – but it won't solve demographic problems</a>
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<h2>Hemmed in</h2>
<p>Women born under the one-child policy between 1980 and 1987 are the first generation of Chinese women in many years to be given an opportunity to have more than one child. Yet this is a generation sandwiched between the responsibilities of child rearing and looming old-age care for elderly family members.</p>
<p>Xiaohe was born and raised in a small county in Hebei, northern China. Like many girls of her generation, she passed <a href="https://www.springer.com/gb/book/9789811015861">China’s <em>gaokao</em></a> university entrance exam with flying colours, went to university and subsequently worked in Beijing, which she now calls home. Like many generations before her, she manages the childcare for her six-year-old daughter with help from her parents and in-laws and is committed to looking after them in old age. Looking after her daughter and a mother in a wheelchair, on top of a senior management role, is challenging but manageable.</p>
<p>But these are not the main reasons she gave me for not having another child. It was her fear. </p>
<p>Her fear of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/yanzhonghuang/2014/07/16/the-2008-milk-scandal-revisited/#32a5d2774105">poisoned milk powder</a> and of lead-covered toys. Her fear of dermatologically untested nappies, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/30/world/asia/china-protest-faulty-vaccines.html">unsafe vaccines</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/24/china-horrified-allegations-child-abuse-at-kindergarten">child abuse in nurseries</a>, followed by cover-ups. Under the glossy metropolitan lifestyle and outward appearance of having made it in the big city, Xiaohe confessed her anxiety and the worries which sometimes keep her awake at night.</p>
<p>It’s the urban middle class who have been the main beneficiaries of China’s economic growth. It has led to increasing personal income, ever-rising property value, the urban <em>hukou</em> or residency permit, and the associated benefits such as access to good-quality schools and healthcare. These so-called <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0097700416672419">“pocketbook” factors</a> keep them loyal to the state. The middle class tend to resist social reforms that would bring down the barriers between urban and rural citizens, between wealthy eastern and poorer western regions, or would introduce changes to the education system that might undermine their privileges. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/hukou-and-what-birthplace-can-still-mean-for-marriage-in-china-75032">'Hukou', and what birthplace can still mean for marriage in China</a>
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<h2>Broken chain of trust</h2>
<p>Underneath unquestioning support of the state, there is a pathological distrust in the ethics of businesses and manufacturers and the power of local institutions to regulate them after a string of scandals related to children’s welfare. This <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ssqu.12049">trust deficit</a> is best captured by a Chinese saying: “事不关己高高挂起” which translates as: “Don’t get involved in anything not relating to my own interests and stay aloof like a lamppost from trouble.”</p>
<p>Instead, people often mobilise their own resources or networks to solve any problems. Xiaohe turned to a university friend who was studying in the UK and asked her to ship milk powder regularly from the UK. She also begged her relatives or friends to buy foreign-made nappies when they travelled abroad. She paid much higher premium for all these products and also owed people for their help, known as “returning favours” or 还人情. Xiaohe explained that this was a common strategy taken by members of the middle class – to solve problems by dipping into their own pockets.</p>
<p>She thought money could make any problem disappear – until a recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/30/world/asia/china-protest-faulty-vaccines.html">vaccine scandal</a>. Her daughter was given the standard vaccines for children against diphtheria, tetanus, polio and hepatitis B made by the pharmaceutical company Changchun Changsheng. But in July 2018 it emerged <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/16/asia/china-vaccine-scandal-doses-intl/index.html">hundreds of thousands</a> of the vaccines were faulty. </p>
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<p>My daughter was vaccinated by this product. I was so angry but I am helpless. I thought I could avoid this. I avoided the nursery and the milk power. But there is no escape no matter how much money you have. </p>
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<p>She added: “Why do I want to bring another child in the world like this? You just cannot trust anyone or anything.” </p>
<p>The Chinese state has engineered one of the most successful economic transformations in the 20th century, keeping much of the population on-side in the process. Yet, it might have difficulty in mending the broken chain of trust between people and business, local institutions and society. The state can use every trick in the book to encourage Chinese citizens to have more children, either for the sake of the nation or for the nation’s economy. But if couples are worried that their children’s welfare will be at risk, they won’t see any point in having more children. </p>
<p><em>* Names have been changed to protect anonymity.</em> </p>
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<p><em>Correction: This article was updated on October 29 to clarify that there was an increase of 0.88 births per thousand women of child-bearing age between 2015 and 2016, not that the overall birth rate in China had increased by 0.9%.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103889/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ye Liu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China wants its citizens to have more children. But they are reluctant to.Ye Liu, Lecturer in International Development, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1025182018-09-05T09:24:08Z2018-09-05T09:24:08ZChina looks to relax two-child policy – but it won’t solve demographic problems<p>There are signs that China’s infamous birth control restrictions – relaxed from a one-child to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-scrapping-the-one-child-policy-will-do-little-to-change-chinas-population-49982">two-child policy in 2015</a> – could be relaxed even further, if not removed altogether. </p>
<p>The first sign came from postage stamps. In 1980, just after the one-child policy was implemented, the postal service introduced a <a href="https://www.weibo.com/1502367562/GtGb6mXuA?type=comment#_rnd1535681554645">stamp</a> showing a single (rather sad-looking) baby monkey to celebrate the zodiac cycle. In 2016, meanwhile, after the two-child policy was introduced, a <a href="https://www.weibo.com/1502367562/GtGb6mXuA?type=comment#_rnd1535681554645">stamp</a> with two (much happier) monkeys was issued. In August, ahead of the year of the pig in 2019, another <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-45124502">stamp</a> was issued showing a very happy pig with three very happy piglets.</p>
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<p>Of course, this is just a pig on a stamp. Back in 2007, a Chinese <a href="http://thinkdifferentlyaboutsheep.weebly.com/farm-animal-factspigs.html">stamp</a> was issued with five pigs playing with their mother – and, of course, a five-child policy did not follow in 2008. </p>
<p>Many have identified another possible signal which came in late August, with the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-population/china-paves-way-to-end-family-planning-policy-state-media-idUSKCN1LD077">publication</a> of a Draft Civil Code which omits any commitments to family planning. It will be deliberated upon in September before its implementation. However, family planning is actually covered in the Population and Planning Law and, as such, <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/28/WS5b8511a7a310add14f3883c3.html">does not need</a> to be duplicated in the marriage section of the civil code. </p>
<p>However, in March 2018, in a much less noticed piece of administrative news, the National Health and Family Planning Commission was <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130313112946/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/10/c_132221724.htm">dissolved</a> and folded into the new National Health Commission, possibly signalling a shift in resources away from policing family planning policy. </p>
<h2>Demographic travails</h2>
<p>All this is linked to the fact that China is one of the most rapidly ageing countries in the world. It’s also seeing a steady decline in its working age population which, in turn, is linked to wage inflation. I have <a href="http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2017-06/19/content_29792479.htm">argued elsewhere</a> that a major motive for the “Belt and Road” initiative of Chinese infrastructure investment around the world is to take advantage of more favourable demographic circumstances in other parts of Asia and Africa.</p>
<p>But would relaxing the two-child policy even more actually achieve China’s goals to offset population ageing and stagnation by increasing fertility?</p>
<p>This is where years of studies of fertility preferences in China can come into play. A <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02529203.2015.1001482">recent meta review</a> of studies of fertility preferences in China between 2000 and 2011 found an average of only 4% of respondents wished to have more than two children. Even in rural areas, the mean ideal number of children was under two. The same study also found a significant negative relationship between education levels of women and their ideal number of children. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.701.5432&rep=rep1&type=pdf">a meta review</a> I worked on of fertility studies between 1980 and 2009, my colleague Baochang Gu and I found that in most cases precisely nobody stated a preference for three children. Where they did, these respondents accounted for less than 5% of the total.</p>
<p>Of course, studies of fertility preferences in a country which tightly controls fertility – and which are often performed by family planning commissions themselves – need to be approached with caution. A 1990 <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1971594">study showed</a> that when respondents were guaranteed anonymity in a fertility preference survey, they reported a higher desired number of children than those who were not.</p>
<h2>Weak appetite for three children</h2>
<p>From the direct costs of having children to the impact upon female career progression and structural issues relating to the cost of living, work culture, and the challenge of finding decent employment, there has arguably rarely been a worse time to expect Chinese people to have more <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2067770/why-chinas-two-child-policy-failing-reality-test">children</a>. As marriage is being postponed, couples are also having their first child later, which my ongoing research suggests is also lowering the overall fertility rate. And at this very moment, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/166af97e-a6c6-11e8-8ecf-a7ae1beff35b">consumer confidence</a> is also on the decline, not least as a consequence of uncertainty about global trade.</p>
<p>And it’s worth remembering that the response to China’s 2015 reforms to its birth control policies was <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-in-shock-why-no-baby-boom">relatively muted</a>. There wasn’t a “baby boom” – making another one now seem unlikely.</p>
<p>These contextual issues are increasingly similar to other parts of East Asia which are grappling with low fertility. Take Taiwan, for example – a territory never subject to any birth control restrictions. In a 2010 <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0135105">national survey</a> of married women, just 1.24% of women stated an intention to have three or more children. </p>
<h2>Hopes pinned on more babies</h2>
<p>But despite this weight of scientific, empirical and observational evidence, there is still a real anticipation among many observers, including Chinese officials, that further relaxation will bring about an end to China’s demographic woes. Part of the reason for this misplaced optimism is a false view that China’s birth control policies were a kind of “pressure valve” that held back a massive unmet desire for children. This comes from <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-017-0595-x">a view that it was birth control policies</a> which were the predominant driver of fertility decline in the 1980s and 1990s. But put in context beside <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-018-0658-7">the nature of fertility declines</a> elsewhere, as well as the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13524-018-0662-y">revolutionary changes in economic and social conditions</a> in China over the past two decades, then the idea of a “pressure valve” loses steam.</p>
<p>The reality is that relaxing birth control policies – or scrapping them altogether – is not going to be a magic solution to China’s demographic problems. A multi-dimensional approach to population policy which tackles the institutions associated with ageing, such as pensions and social care, is a first step. </p>
<p>Still, people in China currently do want more children than they have – even if it not three. Policies which seek to bridge this gap between aspirations and reality, not least through looking at circumstances in neighbouring territories as well better understanding why bringing up children seems so tough in China, will stand a much better chance of success. They would also have the added benefit of allowing citizens to meet some of their aspirations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102518/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stuart Gietel-Basten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are signs China could drop its two-child policy in an attempt to boost population growth.Stuart Gietel-Basten, Associate Professor of Social Science and Public Policy, Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1020562018-08-28T16:12:59Z2018-08-28T16:12:59ZThe longevity dividend: how ageing populations could boost economic productivity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233434/original/file-20180824-149493-rtx8em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Armed with a lifetime of skills. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/elderly-businesswoman-working-her-desk-office-189270530?src=aLeSh5zxfG937bWKPGbWgA-1-79">Shutterstock.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>People are generally living longer than previous generations across most parts of the world. Rising life expectancy is a result of advances in medicine as well as improving living standards and healthier lifestyles. But while this should be celebrated for social reasons, is it beneficial in economic terms? Does the increase in the older population create an economic burden on society or can older people be mobilised to enhance the productivity of communities in which they work and live?</p>
<p>New analysis of international <a href="http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/index.php/publications/publication_details/towards_a_longevity_dividend">data</a> from 35 countries, published by the International Longevity Centre, provides more evidence in favour of a “longevity dividend”. The authors found that as life expectancy increases, so does “output per hour worked, per worker and per capita”. </p>
<p>Yet, much of the public debate on ageing has been framed in terms of a “burden”. As populations age, governments have worried about how a swelling population of retired people will put increasing stress on pension systems and the social care sector. Policies to raise state pension ages, reduce entitlements and move towards defined contribution pension schemes aren’t aimed so much at reducing the burden of increased longevity but rather shifting the cost of it from the state and employers to the individual. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233290/original/file-20180823-149475-vrr38k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233290/original/file-20180823-149475-vrr38k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233290/original/file-20180823-149475-vrr38k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=310&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233290/original/file-20180823-149475-vrr38k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=310&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233290/original/file-20180823-149475-vrr38k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=310&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233290/original/file-20180823-149475-vrr38k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233290/original/file-20180823-149475-vrr38k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233290/original/file-20180823-149475-vrr38k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Scatterplot of life expectancy and GDP per hour 1970-2015 (35 countries).</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/index.php/publications/publication_details/towards_a_longevity_dividend">Toward a longevity dividend, International Longevity Centre</a></span>
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<p>Employers worry about the burden of managing an expanding number of older workers who cannot afford to retire when they want to, are less physically capable to take on certain tasks than younger colleagues, and are perceived as less adaptable to changes in work. Many people <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/pension-poverty-retirement-research-state-savings-joseph-rowntree-foundation-prudential-a8275626.html">are afraid</a> that the burden of longer lives may make retirement unaffordable. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-question-employers-are-wary-to-ask-when-are-you-going-to-retire-70971">The question employers are wary to ask: when are you going to retire?</a>
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<p>In the UK, a third of retired people have the state pension as their only source of income. Given that the new full state pension (currently <a href="https://www.gov.uk/new-state-pension/what-youll-get">£164.35</a> per week for a single person) would need to be increased dramatically in order to reach the absolute poverty threshold of <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/691917/households-below-average-income-1994-1995-2016-2017.pdf">£296 per week per household</a> – the point at which one struggles to meet basic needs – the affordability of retirement is a significant concern for many. </p>
<p>Even young people <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/membership/2017/jan/23/saving-retirement-pension-generation-old-age">have concerns</a> about the cost of ageing. If retirement ages stay where they are, future generations will be responsible for supporting an increasing number of retirees through rising taxes and pension contributions. If older people delay retirement (as they are across the EU where for men it <a href="http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/average-effective-age-of-retirement.htm">was aged 63.4 years in 2016</a> compared with 62 ten years previously), young people worry about being crowded out of the job market.</p>
<p>But there’s an alternative perspective which frames an ageing population as a phenomenon which can enhance productivity and therefore pay a societal dividend. Older workers have formal, technical and tacit skills which they’ve accumulated through long service. Employers in sectors which are facing labour shortages are seeking to acquire such skills through programmes such as mid-career apprenticeships. Older workers can also help younger ones find pathways into secure and well-paid work through mentoring and job sharing. Many older people are also contributing to social welfare by taking on caring roles such as looking after grandchildren and elderly parents.</p>
<h2>Get them when they’re older</h2>
<p>Whether increased longevity is a burden or a dividend depends on the extent to which societies prepare for the challenges of ageing populations and plan for making use of the benefits. One of the most tangible benefits of living and working longer is the retention of skills and knowledge. However, employers do not always know how to use such assets, especially when they come from outside their workplaces. </p>
<p>For example, I am working on a project with the Officers’ Association on the experiences of older military officers in transitioning to civilian work. Employers speak positively of officers but are often unsure how to use skills acquired through military service. But officers have skills in leadership, work organisation and decision-making which can be applied to a broad range of jobs.</p>
<p>Economies which are experiencing a longevity dividend are those in which governments, employers and labour unions are working in a coordinated way to make use of the older workforce as a resource. In Japan, for example, the government has invested in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/careers/careers-blog/retirement-ageing-workforce-japan-jobs">Silver Human Resource Centers</a> to help older people gain employment in sectors facing skills shortages. Training and intergenerational learning is being facilitated in places like Hong Kong through <a href="https://www.elderacademy.org.hk/en/institution/index.html">Elderly Academies</a> which encourage older people to take part in education while normalising older people’s place in the classroom for young students. Across Europe, employers and unions <a href="http://www.adapt.it/aspire/">are collaborating</a>, with help from EU funding, to develop, pilot and embed new approaches to managing age by redesigning work. </p>
<p>The longevity dividend, like most economic benefits, is attainable but needs to be worked for. Mobilising older workers’ skills, expanding labour forces and fostering intergenerational solidarity will mean that rising life expectancy can be both socially and economically good.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102056/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matt Flynn receives funding from the European Commission, British Academy and European Social Fund for research on workplace active ageing. He is also carrying out research for the Officers' Association and Forces in Mind Trust on the transition of older military officers into civilian work.</span></em></p>An ageing population doesn’t have to be an economic burden.Matt Flynn, Professor in Organisational Behaviour & Human Resources, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/649182016-09-13T09:25:46Z2016-09-13T09:25:46ZWhy national fertility campaigns are unlikely to make people have more children<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137088/original/image-20160908-25237-1vitthr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kiselev Andrey Valerevich/www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Italy, September 22 will be “<a href="http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/news/p3_2_2_1_1.jsp?lingua=italiano&menu=eventi&p=daeventi&id=431">fertility day</a>”. But official government <a href="https://extranewsfeed.com/the-fertility-day-fiasco-113991d48870#.5ywge75ok">posters</a> initially launched to promote the campaign, saying “Hurry up! Don’t wait for the stork” and “Beauty knows no age … Fertility does”, sparked an <a href="http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/bisogna-fare-pi-figli-e-reta-massacra-ministro-lorenzin-1301217.html">outcry</a> and were taken down. </p>
<p>The campaign <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/05/italys-fertility-day-posters-sexist-echoes-of-fascist-past">has been called</a> “sexist, ageist, and anachronistic”. It also led to comparisons of pronatalism – the promotion of human reproduction – that happened during Italy’s <a href="https://extranewsfeed.com/the-fertility-day-fiasco-113991d48870#.5ywge75ok">Fascist history</a>. Even the Italian prime minister <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37254831">criticised</a> the marketing campaign, and it was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/02/italian-government-pulls-controversial-campaign-encouraging-wome/">pulled</a> – although the day will go ahead as planned.</p>
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<p>The Italian government is not the world’s first to encourage reproduction through rather blunt means. In Denmark, citizens are told by both the state and advertisers to “<a href="https://www.rt.com/news/345499-denmark-baby-boom-sex/">Screw for Denmark</a>”, “<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/denmark-s-bizarre-series-of-sex-campaigns-lead-to-baby-boom-a7062466.html">Do it for Mom</a>” and “<a href="http://www.thelocal.dk/20151006/copenhageners-encouraged-to-have-babies-earlier">Count their eggs</a>”. </p>
<p>In some countries, parents have been cajoled into thinking that limiting their fertility is bad for their children. In South Korea, an advertising campaign showed a sad plant with one leaf wilting under a grey sky juxtaposed next to a healthy growing one with two leaves under bright sunshine, both underneath the phrase: “One is not enough”. In 2010, the country’s Ministry of Health also <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8469532.stm">switched off the lights</a> at 4pm to encourage its civil servants to go home and procreate. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137091/original/image-20160908-25231-93evk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137091/original/image-20160908-25231-93evk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137091/original/image-20160908-25231-93evk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137091/original/image-20160908-25231-93evk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137091/original/image-20160908-25231-93evk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137091/original/image-20160908-25231-93evk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137091/original/image-20160908-25231-93evk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘One is not enough’: award-winning poster produced by the Korea Productivity Centre.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan <a href="http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/05/30/468192/Turkey-Erdogan-contraception-birth-control">told citizens</a> that: “One (child) means loneliness, two means rivalry, three means balance and four means abundance.” Women have been offered a wide range of incentives to have more children and marry earlier, including gold coins. And in 2015, they <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/turkey-government-early-marriages.html#ixzz4JNap1ZTG">were told</a> that they “should not focus on any career other than the career of motherhood”. </p>
<p>Elsewhere, a “call to arms” in terms of national pride is used. In Taiwan, both the low birth rate and high number of unmarried men and women have been referred to as a “[<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/23/taiwan-low-birth-rate">national security”</a> threat. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/sep/12/russia.matthewweaver">one Russian city</a>, the “Give Birth to a Patriot” scheme gave couples a day off – the Day of Conception – with prizes offered for parents who had children on Russia Day, around nine months later. A fridge for a baby, if you will. </p>
<p>Of course, the reason for these campaigns is that most of these countries have very low fertility rates that have led to rapid population ageing and, in some cases, the prospect of population decline. Even <a href="http://weekspopulation.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/government-matchmaking-in-iran-not.html">Iran</a> and Turkey, which have fertility rates of around replacement rate, are engaged in very active, blunt pronatalist policies in a bid to boost their populations. </p>
<h2>Why people put off having children</h2>
<p>In order to get a better idea of the prospects for success of these types of campaigns, we need to look beyond mere slogans. Some countries have brought in hugely expensive and comprehensive sets of policies to spur the fertility rate. In Singapore, for example, couples are given assistance in meeting prospective partners, preferential access to public housing, <a href="http://www.babybonus.msf.gov.sg/parent/web/about">huge baby bonuses</a>, support for child and healthcare, assistance in child’s savings, and tax rebates. In total, the state hands over more than <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baby_bonus#Singapore">£90,000</a> in subsidies before a child reaches the age of 13. Yet, Singapore continues to have one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, and <a href="http://www.tandfebooks.com/isbn/9780203890066">there is little evidence</a> that this will change anytime soon. </p>
<p>The reason for pessimism about the prospects for these policies – and that of fertility day in Italy – is that they do not address the fundamental reasons behind low fertility and why men and women are postponing childbearing, or eschewing it altogether. </p>
<p>It’s because finding decent, secure employment is ever more difficult, <a href="http://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol29/4/">especially since the onset of the Great Recession</a>. Because <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/95429">buying a house is becoming</a> out of reach. Because <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2010.00347.x/abstract">combining work and family is still not practical in many countries</a> – seen most dramatically in <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/pregnancy-discrimination-work-has-surged-shocking-rate-uk-mps-warn-1578868">discrimination against pregnant women</a>. In Italy and <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/your_rights/discrimination__pregnancy_maternity_parenthood_final_en.pdf">elsewhere</a> it has been a common practice for women to sign <em>dimissioni in bianco</em>, or blank resignation letters to be activated upon pregnancy. </p>
<p>Women also often have to bear a <a href="http://heapro.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/1/17.short">“double burden”</a> of work and care. Adding all this up, <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15544770802206077">investing in the success of one child</a> into the next generation can be preferable to “diluting” limited resources between two. </p>
<h2>A two-child norm</h2>
<p>As well as being a “sexist mess”, as Roberto Saviano (the author of <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Gomorrah.html?id=0IkZuTYQCj0C">Gomorrah</a>) <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/05/italys-fertility-day-posters-sexist-echoes-of-fascist-past">puts it</a>, fertility day offends “all the people who don’t have children and those who would like to have some but can’t because there is no work in Italy”. Against this backdrop, governments should be grateful citizens are having any children at all. </p>
<p>Crucially, though, evidence suggests that the majority of women and men have not “given up” on either building a partnership or having children. There is a very strong <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2014.00691.x/pdf">“two-child norm”</a> around much of the world – including Italy. What we see, then, is not the “selfish” eschewing of parenthood, often caught up in a general vein of bashing the way Millenials live their lives. </p>
<p>Rather, we are seeing a frustrated, unrealised potential. But getting governments – and companies, and parents-in-law – to swing behind and support parents and families raises other issues, particularly relating to fairness for those who do not want to bear children at all and risks imposing new, anti-feminist norms.</p>
<p>My solution to this is to see very low fertility as being a consequence of other problems in society, of the kind described above. If these problems are tackled, low fertility may well sort itself out. Whether or not it does, however, society may well be a better place anyway.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64918/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stuart Gietel-Basten currently receives funding from the OUP John Fell Research Fund, and previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, the KONE Foundation and the Hong Kong Research Grants Council. </span></em></p>Italy is the latest in a line of countries with ageing populations trying to boost proceation through a ‘fertility day’.Stuart Gietel-Basten, Associate Professor of Social Policy, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/572992016-04-07T07:44:00Z2016-04-07T07:44:00ZHow China is rolling out the red carpet for couples who have more than one child<p>A rather remarkable turnaround has occurred in China. For a country famous for having the most comprehensive sets of policies designed to <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25469931">limit births</a>, it is now introducing new policies to support parents who have a second child. </p>
<p>In November 2015, China <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1873987/china-abandon-three-decade-old-one-child-policy-driving">announced</a> it would abandon its one-child policy and switch to a national two-child policy. The change came into force on January 1, 2016, with the immediate rationale being to tackle China’s <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjmsJbsnvfLAhUCXBQKHQ56AuMQFgg_MAc&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.prb.org%2Fpdf10%2Ftodaysresearchaging20.pdf&usg=AFQjCNF5qfVDLhBQFXA2vX9uKQ-Af91iEg&sig2=exT5OHkbdMRAVKUnJU_WWw">rapidly ageing</a> (and projected declining) population. </p>
<p>Some predicted a <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/china-braces-baby-boom-under-new-two-child-rule-n489641">huge baby boom</a>. Others – <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00324728.2014.982898#.VwON_OIrJhE">including me</a> – suggested that the reforms were “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-11-12/two-little-too-late">too little, too late</a>”, and that “<a href="http://www.economist.com/news/china/21677416-simply-allowing-people-have-more-children-does-not-mean-they-will-chinas-two-child-policy-will">simply allowing people to have more children does not mean they will</a>.”</p>
<p>In early March, incentives for parents to have more children were explicitly mentioned <a href="http://english.caixin.com/2016-03-15/100920476.html">in a speech</a> by Premier Li Keqiang. <a href="http://gbtimes.com/china/two-child-policy-highlighted-chinas-parliament">Li noted</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We will improve the supporting policies to complement the decision to allow all couples to have two kids … We will encourage the development of kindergartens open to all children. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The theme was seen <a href="http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2016-03/09/content_23797321.htm">across the March meeting</a> of the National People’s Congress (NPC). Xu Ma, an NPC deputy and director of the National Research Institute of Family Planning, stated that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>A lack of childcare and fewer job opportunities are major obstacles to Chinese women having a second baby … To help working mothers, community nurseries should be opened to care for children younger than three-years-old. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Meanwhile, NPC deputy Zhu Lieyu suggested that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The government should offer mothers of two children a living allowance for three years, and the sum should be 70-80% of the average per capita income in their specific part of the country. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>More concretely, the Chinese minister of finance, Lou Jiwei, <a href="http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2016-03/09/content_23797321.htm">was quoted</a> in state media to have submitted a set of proposals to reform individual income tax to support couples to have a second child. </p>
<p>While mortgage relief for couples who have two children appears not to have made it into the latest round of tax reforms, there <a href="http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2016-03/02/content_23711774.htm">is evidence that education costs</a> may be added to the list of costs deductible for tax relief. </p>
<h2>Local incentives coming thick and fast</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/117505/original/image-20160405-28940-19j2lzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/117505/original/image-20160405-28940-19j2lzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/117505/original/image-20160405-28940-19j2lzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/117505/original/image-20160405-28940-19j2lzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/117505/original/image-20160405-28940-19j2lzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/117505/original/image-20160405-28940-19j2lzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/117505/original/image-20160405-28940-19j2lzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China needs more young people.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/editorial?cr=00&pl=edit-00%22>Shutterstock.com">TonyV3112/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At a local level, other policies to support childbearing are already being introduced. In late March 2016, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-family-idUSKCN0WR0ML">it was announced</a> that mothers in Beijing would be entitled to an extra month’s maternity leave, while new fathers would be entitled to 15 days paternity leave. </p>
<p>For some time now, <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25469931">studies have observed</a> family planning officials in some large cities actively encouraging couples to take advantage of their rights to have a second child. In this way, local governments could become ever more proactive in designing policies to support couples to have a second child.</p>
<h2>Not worked elsewhere in Asia</h2>
<p>Governments across Pacific Asia have been introducing <a href="https://www.routledge.com/products/9780415468848">increasingly far-reaching policies</a> in recent years to support and encourage childbearing in an attempt to <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eap/brief/rapid-aging-in-east-asia-and-pacific-will-shrink-workforce-increase-public-spending">stem extremely rapid ageing</a> resulting from <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2010.00347.x/abstract">very low fertility rates</a>. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most expansive and famous <a href="https://www.routledge.com/products/9780415670685">is in Singapore</a>. As well as <a href="http://www.sdn.sg/">government sponsored dating events</a> and wide-ranging maternity benefits, parents are effectively handed <a href="http://www.heybaby.sg/havingchildren/baby_bonus.html">“baby bonuses” and tax rebates</a> of tens of thousands of pounds per child. </p>
<p>Elsewhere, policies to support childbearing both financially and in terms of childcare and parental leave have been introduced in <a href="http://www.ipss.go.jp/s-info/e/ssj2014/007.html">Japan</a>, <a href="http://www.ipss.go.jp/webj-ad/webjournal.files/population/2012_Vol.10/Web%20Journal_Vol.10_04.pdf">Taiwan</a>, <a href="http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-21482-5_6">South Korea</a>, and <a href="http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-21482-5_4">Hong Kong</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, in each of these settings fertility has stayed resolutely low; <a href="http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-21482-5_3">not least in Singapore</a> which has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world. </p>
<p>This is because the financial subsidies simply do not come close to offsetting the high costs of childbearing in these countries. Costs are further exaggerated by expectations of huge investment in education and other activities, sometimes called <a href="http://www.uhpress.hawaii.edu/p-2626-9780824825348.aspx">“education fever”</a>. These policies are also not able to adequately address some of the more fundamental reasons for limiting family sizes, such as fragile employment and the “triple burden” placed on women to work and take primary responsibility for both children and elderly parents. </p>
<h2>A helping hand</h2>
<p>There is now a broad agreement that it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-scrapping-the-one-child-policy-will-do-little-to-change-chinas-population-49982">not just the family planning policies which pushed</a> – and kept – fertility down in China. As such, just changing the policy is likely to have only a limited impact. </p>
<p>Assuming, though, that many of the other reasons for low fertility are common to both China and elsewhere in Asia, and given the limited success elsewhere in turning birth rates around, we <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00324728.2014.982898">might question</a> how effective policies to support childbearing will be at increasing the Chinese fertility rate. </p>
<p>But I think that this misses the point. If the new policies set out to encourage childbearing in order to achieve certain key population “goals”, then they may well not succeed. But the language of the new policy announcement does not appear to suggest this. In a break from the “old” way of talking about family planning, this “new” language is much more about “supporting” than “encouraging”. This is not just semantics. If the new policies are designed to support citizens to be able to meet their aspirations in terms of family, work and life, then their success should be judged on this rather than the birth rate in years to come. </p>
<p>Switching from the world’s most restrictive family planning regime to offering incentives for childbirth is a remarkable turnaround. But it may well be that the truly revolutionary aspect of this policy change is the switch from “controlling and shaping” citizen’s actions to meet the needs of the nation, towards “supporting and enabling” them to meet their own personal aspirations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57299/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stuart Gietel-Basten receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p>Incentives to encourage childbearing haven’t worked elsewhere in Asia – can they in China?Stuart Gietel-Basten, Associate Professor of Social Policy, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/561062016-03-29T15:02:21Z2016-03-29T15:02:21ZJapan is not the only country worrying about population decline – get used to a two-speed world<p>The past century has been one of unprecedented global population growth. While the number of people in the world doubled from <a href="https://www.templateroller.com/template/1895962/the-world-at-six-billion-the-united-nations.html#docpage-4">0.8 to 1.6 billion between 1750 and 1900</a>, the 20th century saw a near quadrupling to 6.1 billion. In the past 15 years alone, more than <a href="http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp">1.2 billion</a> have been added to that. Worries about “<a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-Population-Bomb-Paul-Ehrlich/dp/1568495870">overpopulation</a>” can be seen everywhere <a href="http://www.populationmatters.org/">from the UK</a> to <a href="http://www.popline.org/node/412004">Sub-Saharan Africa</a>. </p>
<p>So it may have been a surprise to some to see Japan, the <a href="http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/022415/worlds-top-10-economies.asp">world’s third largest economy</a>, posting <a href="http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Economy/Japan-population-at-127.11-mil.-in-2015-down-for-1st-time-since-1920">the first population decline since 1920</a>, falling 0.7% from five years earlier. A <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/06/21/editorials/fertility-rate-dips/">persistently low birth rate</a> is the main reason. </p>
<p>Japan has been worrying for a while now about whether its population may one day become extinct. In 2006, the Japanese National Institute of Population and Social Security Research predicted that by the end of the present century, population would decline to around 50m, falling further to 10m by the end of the next.</p>
<p>By 2350 just 1m would be left and by the year 3000 just 62 people would be rattling around the Land of the Rising Sun. (Perhaps by then <a href="http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/busted/year3000.html">we would be living underwater</a>).</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/116294/original/image-20160323-28212-54qb7n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/116294/original/image-20160323-28212-54qb7n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/116294/original/image-20160323-28212-54qb7n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116294/original/image-20160323-28212-54qb7n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116294/original/image-20160323-28212-54qb7n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116294/original/image-20160323-28212-54qb7n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116294/original/image-20160323-28212-54qb7n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116294/original/image-20160323-28212-54qb7n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Predicting Japan’s extinction: total population (millions).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Japanese National Institute of Population and Social Security Research</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Neither current nor projected population decline is unique to Japan. Many East Asian societies are forecast to encounter rapid decline over the coming centuries. A <a href="http://www.ysj.or.kr/bbs/board.php?bo_table=4_11&wr_id=853&sca=&sfl=wr_subject%7C%7Cwr_content&stx=%B8%EA%C1%BE&sop=and">similar exercise</a> to that of Japan was published in South Korea, with the rather more generous assumption of 10,000 Koreans left by 2503.</p>
<p>Neither is the narrative of population decline unique to Asia. Current population decline in some Eastern European countries, such as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-sight/wp/2014/11/10/the-steep-decline-of-bulgarias-population-in-the-post-soviet-era/">Bulgaria</a>, has resulted from both low fertility and high rates of emigration. And the projected demographic travails of Germany – which has one of Europes’ lowest fertility rates – have even been <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2016/jan/06/refugee-influx-helps-halt-decline-in-germanys-population">cited as a reason</a> for Chancellor Angela Merkel’s approach to the refugee crisis.</p>
<h2>Quality, not quantity</h2>
<p>So how worried should we be about this? <a href="http://www.springer.com/gb/book/9784431548300">Classical approaches to demography</a> and economics, which see population size as critical to GDP growth, would suggest we should be very concerned. This is multiplied by the link to population ageing. This is often referred to as a “<a href="https://www.rt.com/business/aging-population-elderly-double-2050-904/">timebomb</a>” in terms of its effects on both economic growth and the sustainability of social security and health and social care systems.</p>
<p>Recently, however, demographers have <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/jun/16/population-10-billion-dorling-review">tried to move the discussion</a> on from concern about over- or under-population. Instead, they have focused on the raw number of people as just one variable in either economic growth or sustainability, which is multiplied by lifestyle, education, savings and so on. </p>
<p>In this view, the total quantity of people is less important than their quality (defined by, for example, education or health). Not only can this mean that population decline can be weathered by increased labour (and capital) productivity, but the “timebomb” of population ageing can also, to a degree, be diffused.</p>
<h2>Political point scoring</h2>
<p>So, if this is the case, why are governments such as Japan’s and Korea’s so worried about population decline?</p>
<p>Population decline can, to a degree, be seen as a sense of national weakness: a lack of “vitality”. These <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/japan-seeking-renewal-in-the-face-of-decline/">nationalistic sentiments</a> can link into discussions not only of the strength of a culture, but can also have consequences for (the perception of) national defence. It is perhaps no surprise that the South Korean “extinction” forecasts were commissioned by a right-wing politician. In Taiwan, low birth rates were referred to by the previous president as a <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0135105">“national security concern”</a>. </p>
<p>It’s possible that these extinction forecasts do not represent a real concern at all, but are just another tool used by the state to urge citizens into reproducing. </p>
<p>On a much more local level of abstraction, however, we need to look at where depopulation is occurring the most. In Japan, the capital Tokyo is actually growing rapidly. Yet in Japan, as elsewhere in East Asia, <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/22/national/media-national/old-story-rural-depopulation/">rural depopulation</a> is occurring on a tremendous scale – driven by both low fertility and migration to towns and cities. A recent book called <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/16/national/social-issues/japan-becoming-extinct/#.VuCvO5N97EZ">Local Extinctions</a> on this became a bestseller in Japan. In <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-06/09/content_20945807.htm">China</a>, some villages are almost uniquely composed of the elderly.</p>
<p>The consequences of this for the economic and social prospects of rural areas are clear. To take one specific example, we can look at <a href="http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/02/16/2003639502">an article</a> which received far less press than the Japanese population decline story, but is just as apt. Over the last two years, two colleges in Pingtung County at the southern tip of Taiwan have closed down. While there may have been other reasons at play, the local media explicitly state that this is “due to the nation’s dwindling student population”, which in turn is ascribed to the low birth rate.</p>
<h2>Peak youth</h2>
<p>What we see here in Pingtung County is a reflection of the dramatic changes which are forecast to occur among youth populations around the world over the next 50 years. </p>
<p>As the chart below shows, which I presented at the recent <a href="http://www.international.ac.uk/media-centre/events-diary/2016/03/international-higher-education-forum-2016.aspx">UUK International Higher Education Forum)</a>, the world is roughly split into two – between countries where the population aged 15-19 will increase (almost threefold in the case of Niger) and where it will decrease. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/115881/original/image-20160321-30906-n4ofoj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/115881/original/image-20160321-30906-n4ofoj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/115881/original/image-20160321-30906-n4ofoj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115881/original/image-20160321-30906-n4ofoj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115881/original/image-20160321-30906-n4ofoj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115881/original/image-20160321-30906-n4ofoj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115881/original/image-20160321-30906-n4ofoj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115881/original/image-20160321-30906-n4ofoj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Boom and bust: population rise and fall around the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">UNPD 2015</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some examples of youth population decline from 2015 to 2050 include Taiwan (-46%), Thailand (-38%), Poland and South Korea (both -31%), Brazil (-22%) and China (-21%). As education systems are still growing in many of these countries, it would be wrong to translate these figures into inevitable school and college closures. But it might suggest that through the basic principles of supply and demand, quality in education – especially higher education – could potentially increase as students become more discerning. This would then have impacts on total numbers of institutions.</p>
<p>The countries which make up the present majority of the world’s population, therefore, have reached “peak youth”. Not only will younger people have to bear a greater burden of supporting an ageing population, but there are concerns that as they become demographically marginalised, so too might they become politically marginalised. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/8ox8V0_nRQ4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Protests swept Egypt in 2011 as part of the Arab Spring.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, the tremendous growth in the youth population elsewhere (primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East) has raised concerns well beyond those about “over-population”. These include worries over outward migration, exploitation of land and resources, and unrest due to a so-called “<a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/youth-bulge-a-demographic-dividend-or-a-demographic-bomb-in-developing-countries">youth bulge”</a>.</p>
<p>To me it is clear that <a href="http://ems.gtc.ox.ac.uk/content/young-people-and-future-emerging-markets">realising the potential</a> of both this dwindling and booming young population will be the key to truly determining whether rapid population decline or growth will have a negative effect on either local, national or global societies. Improved, relevant education and skills alongside access to decent employment and a strong political voice are the key priorities for this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/56106/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stuart Gietel-Basten receives funding from the Economic & Social Research Council. </span></em></p>Worries about overpopulation aren’t being felt everywhere.Stuart Gietel-Basten, Associate Professor of Social Science and Public Policy, Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/499752015-10-29T16:43:45Z2015-10-29T16:43:45ZAs China ends the one-child policy, what is its legacy?<p>China has <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-34665539">announced the end</a> to its infamous one-child policy, the restrictive rule that has limited many families to one child, and some to two children for the past 37 years. The changes will allow all couples to have two children. </p>
<p>China has a <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=F_zWHMFLQa4C&dq=wan,+xi,+shao+campaign&source=gbs_navlinks_s">long history of controlling its population</a>. Throughout the 1950s, family planning was encouraged under Mao Zedong to promote economic growth. But only in 1973 did it become a political priority, with the national <em>wan, xi, shao</em> – “late marriage, longer spacing, and fewer children” campaign encouraging two children per couple.</p>
<p>In June 1978, a policy of one child per couple <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Just_One_Child.html?id=MjLdqh9lMgcC&source=kp_cover&redir_esc=y">was rigorously pursued</a> as the government feared that China would not be able to modernise and support a large population at the same time. </p>
<p>Yet the law was difficult to enforce. Male children were prized and families who first gave birth to a daughter would lack a son to support them in old age. From 1984 onward, responding to societal unrest, rural couples whose first child was a girl were allowed to conceive a second child.</p>
<p>A series of changes took place from 2010, after it emerged <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/chinas-hidden-children/">13m children</a> were on record as being without proof of identity (<em>hukou</em>) because they were denied birth registration as a result of family planning policies. </p>
<p>The National Health Ministry and National Population and Family Planning Commission <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/10/c_132221724.htm">were merged</a> in 2013, which signalled a relaxation of birth control as a government priority. In November 2013 the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/15/china-one-child-policy-abolish-labour-camps">state decreed</a> that citizens were allowed to have two children if either member of the couple was an only child themselves. The new announcement marks the most radical change of all: two children allowed for all couples.</p>
<h2>Children with no identity</h2>
<p>From forced abortions, sterilisation and astronomical fines, the one-child policy led to a plethora of human rights abuses. </p>
<p>From the beginning there were questions about how best to enforce it. One way was to charge citizens who had more than one child “social compensation fees”, colloquially referred to as “fines”, from two to eight times the annual incomes in rural areas, or annual disposable income in urban areas. With the income derived from these fines, livelihoods and careers of government staff depended on charging fees for unauthorised children. For example, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/oct/25/china-one-child-policy-benefits-rules">in Henan Province</a> alone the Population and Family Planning Commission employed 17,000 administrators and 22,000 nursing and technical staff. </p>
<p>In the early days, mass sterilisations and abortions were particularly rife in the early 1980s. As time went on, great pressure was put on mothers with one child to accept an IUD coil, and mothers with two children to be sterilised. In many areas children could not have their birth recorded <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/chinas-hidden-children/">until this took place</a>. Mothers and families who <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/oct/25/china-one-child-policy-benefits-rules">could not afford fines</a> for giving birth to unauthorised children would see no choice but to undergo an abortion.</p>
<p>When births could not be prevented, then local government <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/chinas-hidden-children/">could deny legal identity documentation</a> to children born without permission. This was initially a way to hide unauthorised births. In this way, the child did not exist on government records or population statistics. Even the parents themselves might prefer to lose out on their child’s <em>hukou</em> than be punished for an unauthorised child. </p>
<p>Over time, as China’s birth rate decelerated and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19630110">the population aged</a>, local governments worried less about fulfilling birthing targets. Later on, denial of the <em>hukou</em> would be used as leverage to enforce payments of fines. Without it, parents would face their child being barred from obtaining an education and being unable to obtain an ID card, or paying the outstanding fines. Assets could be seized, bank accounts frozen, or a parent detained for 15 days at a time and taken to court when parents refused to pay up.</p>
<h2>The legacy of 4-2-1 families</h2>
<p>The driving factor behind the relaxations is that control over births is no longer necessary. China’s population is ageing rapidly. Longer life expectancy means that by 2050 it <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19630110">is expected</a> that for every 100 people aged 20-64, there will be 45 people aged over 65. This has lead to the “4-2-1” family where a child of working age could have to care for two parents and four grandparents in retirement. </p>
<p>Equally troubling it China’s skewed gender ratio. In 2014, China now has <a href="http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/gender-01222015125826.html">33m more men than women</a> – believed to be a consequence of selective abortion and female child abandonment exacerbated by family planning restrictions. Without radical changes, many men (usually referred to as “bare sticks”) will be unable to find wives. </p>
<p>Some will question if China’s abandonment of its one-child policy will really lead to more births, as the previous relaxation in 2013 <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/06/china-one-child-policy-problems-ageing-population">did little to boost</a> birth rates. Others will note that the policy is not really over: couples are still limited to two children. Meanwhile, with giving birth out of wedlock still effectively illegal, some will question if the relaxations go far enough.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49975/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>S G does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Enforcing the birth control policy left millions of children with no identity.S G, PhD Candidate, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/493202015-10-28T14:00:16Z2015-10-28T14:00:16ZHow a Confucian comeback is helping China manage its ageing population<p>Reports that a beauty salon in the Chinese city of Guangzhou deducts 5% to 10% of employees’ wages and <a href="http://news.dayoo.com/guangzhou/201510/13/139995_44364125.htm">deposits the money</a> into their parents’ bank accounts sparked much debate recently in China. The company also actively promotes the Confucian virtue of “filial piety”, or respect for one’s parents, among its employees.</p>
<p>The company’s policy exemplifies the coming together of two current phenomena in China: the pressures brought on by an <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/oct/01/china-elderly-population-pensions-rethink">ageing population</a>, and the renewed interest in Confucianism. After being denounced during Mao’s rule, the ideas of the ancient Chinese sage <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confucius/">Confucius</a>, who was born around 551BCE, are now gaining currency at both a social and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/29/us-china-politics-vacuum-idUSBRE98S0GS20130929">political level</a>.</p>
<p>China’s youth today face the pressure of not only finding a job, but also a home and raising a family. When young Chinese grow up, the importance of <a href="http://en.people.cn/90001/90782/7117246.html">supporting</a> their parents in their old age is firmly instilled in them, too. </p>
<p>This was illustrated by an online <a href="http://www.weibo.com/1699540307/CF3jcxwaY?type=comment#_rnd1445496611833">discussion</a> about the beauty salon’s “tax”: many commentators clearly believed that it was the moral responsibility of children to be filial towards their parents. While many supported the company’s motivations, there was some disagreement about the extent to which a private company should be involved. Others argued that true filiality requires sincerity and goes beyond money.</p>
<p>This concept of filiality is an example of a bottom-up, popular interpretation of Confucian virtues by citizens in contemporary China. But just as there was disagreement about the company’s tax online, Confucius’s journey back to political acceptability has not been without setbacks. </p>
<h2>A long road back</h2>
<p>When a statue of Confucius <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-01/12/c_13687988.htm">appeared</a> outside the National Museum, and next to Tiananmen Square in 2011 – before Xi Jinping took over as president – China-watchers wondered if something revolutionary had happened. After all, the square is one of modern China’s most symbolic spaces. It was where Mao proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, where demonstrations took place in 1976, and where the <a href="http://www.tsquare.tv/chronology/">pro-democracy protests of 1989</a> began. Soon afterwards, though, the statue had been removed – possibly the authorities had had a change of heart.</p>
<p>Similarly, when the film Avatar started generating massive box office returns in 2010, seemingly at the cost of the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/4999702/China-backs-10m-biopic-of-Confucius.html">state-backed biopic Confucius</a>, James Cameron’s picture was temporarily <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/8469672.stm">removed</a> from 2D screens. At the time, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/world/asia/20china.html%22%22">reports</a> suggested this was a deliberate measure to increase the revenue of Confucius. Despite this, Avatar still broke box-office records in China, while
Confucius, starring Chow Yun Fat in the title role, made <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=atZXKA4z47bU">less impressive</a> gains.</p>
<p>The recent reemergence of Confucius and his thinking, however, is a big step forward for the sage. It’s a far cry from the days of the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976 when he was denounced as a representative of the “Four Olds” (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits) – and the “<a href="http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=relfac">Criticise Lin, Criticise Confucius Campaign</a>” of 1974 to 1976. During that, he was critiqued alongside defence minister <a href="http://www.morningsun.org/stages/linbiao/linbiao.html">Lin Biao</a>, who was derided as a reactionary. </p>
<p>But those days are gone. While the statue of Confucius near Tiananmen was moved from its original prominent position, it did later <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/04/tiananmen-confucius-statue-relocated/">reappear</a> in the museum’s courtyard. That same year, a giant silicon bust of <a href="http://www.rockbundartmuseum.org/en/exhibition/overview/a6bfwv">Confucius</a> was put on display in the Rockbund Art Museum in Shanghai, too. </p>
<p>And the sage’s rise continues. The Ministry of Education is also examining the role of “traditional” values in <a href="http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/china-weighing-more-emphasis-on-traditional-culture-in-textbooks/">textbooks</a>. In 2013, a law <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-23124345">decreed</a> that children must visit their elderly parents. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://english.hanban.org/node_7719.htm">Hanban</a>, “a public institution affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education”, has <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/27/c_133677094.htm">opened</a> <a href="http://www.confucius.ucla.edu/about-us/confucius-institutes-worldwide">480 Confucius Institutes</a> around the world. And in Guiyang, the Confucian scholar Jiang Qing has opened a “<a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-china-is-turning-back-to-confucius-1442754000">Confucius Academy</a>”, which aims to spread the philosophy.</p>
<p>Even China’s president, Xi Jinping, has been positive about Confucianism. On the 2,565th anniversary of the sage’s birth in 2014, he <a href="http://library.chinausfocus.com/article-1534.html">remarked that</a>: “Confucianism and other schools of thought in Chinese history all adhered to the principle that theories must serve the management of state affairs and benefit real life.” He went on: “Chinese Communists are neither historical nihilists, nor cultural nihilists.” This stance creates a space for traditional philosophers to be discussed in the political arena, especially in support of top-down governance such as China’s.</p>
<h2>Keeping the social order</h2>
<p>At its most basic level, Confucianism teaches that civic order comes from individuals fulfilling their specific, socially defined roles. This is most explicitly stated in the canonical text <a href="http://www.acmuller.net/con-dao/greatlearning.html">The Great Learning</a>, which explains that political, social and familial order comes from regulation of the self. </p>
<p>In a political sense, Confucianism might have appeal as a philosophy that can promote stability at a time of change. This ideal of stability is reflected in former president Hu Jintao’s “<a href="http://en.people.cn/90002/92169/92211/6274603.html">Harmonious Society</a>” concept, which complements the Confucian emphasis on <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/can-sage-save-china-106183">harmony</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, China is also faced with an <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19630110">ageing</a> population. By 2040, 28.1% of the Chinese population will be over 60, compared to 12.4% in 2010, according <a href="http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/ageing/WorldPopulationAgeing2013.pdf">to the UN</a>. So, in light of Xi’s call for Confucianism to benefit society in concrete ways, private initiatives to support ageing parents might be welcomed.</p>
<p>Confucius isn’t gate-crashing the Party: the hosts have invited him in. But as the beauty salon in Guangzhou shows us, Confucian values are back at the social level, too. Parents send their children to Confucian <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/09/21/respect-your-elders-confucian-kindergartens-catch-on-in-china/">kindergartens</a>, and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/29/arts/29iht-melvin.1.7298367.html?pagewanted=all">Yu Dan’s</a> Confucian self-help book was a bestseller. </p>
<p>Confucius himself <a href="http://www.acmuller.net/con-dao/analects.html">said that:</a> “at 60 my ear was obedient; at 70 I could follow my heart’s desire without transgressing the norm.” If the “filial piety tax” catches on, perhaps ageing parents, like the government, will take some heart from this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49320/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Pacey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A Chinese company deducts 5-10% of employees wages’ and gives the money to their parents – it’s filial piety in action.Scott Pacey, Deputy Director of the China Policy Institute, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.