tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/bashar-al-assad-13775/articlesBashar al-Assad – The Conversation2024-02-07T17:35:23Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215202024-02-07T17:35:23Z2024-02-07T17:35:23ZHow Iran controls a network of armed groups to pursue its regional strategy<p>It took the US several days <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">to respond</a> to the January 28 attack on its military base in Jordan that killed three of its service personnel. But when it did, it hit at least 85 targets across Iraq and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">Syria</a>. </p>
<p>The Pentagon was careful not to directly attack Iran itself, but it targeted Iranian-backed groups which have been conducting raids on US military assets in the region since before Hamas launched its attack on Israel on October 7.</p>
<p>The US strikes were carefully calibrated to avoid <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/austin-vows-all-necessary-actions-after-us-troop-deaths-2024-01-29/">escalation</a>. The five days between the attack on the Tower 22 US base in Jordan and the US airstrikes on February 2 gave Iran and its proxies time to move people and high-value assets. </p>
<p>This retaliation wasn’t about body counts, it was about US president Joe Biden showing Iran – and the American electorate – that it doesn’t do to mess with the US. It was a classic shot across the bows.</p>
<p>But who are these groups that Iran can rely on to act in its interests and how much of a threat do they pose to regional security?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graphic showing Middle East and the varioujs armed groups operating there on behalf of Iran" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s network of armed groups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Council for Foreign Relations</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iran’s foreign policy over nearly five decades since the 1979 revolution has had <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47321#">several key objectives</a>. It wants to remove the US from the Middle East and to replace it as the guarantor of regional security. </p>
<p>It has worked to boost the fortunes of Shia groups in the region, working directly against Saudi Arabia’s Sunni proxies, as seen in the conflict in Yemen. And it refuses to recognise the state of Israel, instead working with Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to pressure the Jewish state.</p>
<h2>Quds Force</h2>
<p>The Quds Force is part of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is the IRGC’s primary vehicle for foreign affairs. According to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Council on Foreign Relations</a>, Quds is largely responsible for providing training, weapons, money and military advice to a range of groups in the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">“Axis of Resistance”</a>. </p>
<p>Quds was led by General Qasem Soleimani, who had oversight of Shia armed groups in Iraq and Syria as well as wielding a significant amount of influence with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Soleimani was killed in a US drone strike in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, on January 3 2020. </p>
<p>He was succeeded by his longtime deputy <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-s-new-quds-force-leader-has-a-long-history-with-afghanistan/30379354.html">Ismail Qaani</a>, who had gained extensive experience in organising and supporting insurgent groups in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Syria</h2>
<p>In 2021, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/">estimated that</a> the IRGC had established 82 fighting units in Syria with up to 70,000 fighters. Many of these have been recruited since 2011 to help the Shia regime of Bashar al-Assad combat insurgents there.</p>
<p>Quds activities in Syria are reportedly overseen by <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/">Khalil Zahedi</a>, nicknamed Abu Mahdi al-Zahdi. Working through regional subordinates, he controls a number of armed groups, including Liwa al-Quds, Lebanese Hezbollah, Fatemiyoun Brigade, Zainebiyoun Brigade, Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Liwa al-Baqir and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali.</p>
<p>Iran’s principal aims in Syria are to keep the Assad regime in power, maximise Iranian influence, protect Shia minorities and reduce and – if possible – eliminate the US presence in Syria. It also aims to create the conditions for a possible encirclement of Israel by occupying strategic position around the Golan heights.</p>
<h2>Iraq</h2>
<p>In Iraq, since the US invasion, Iran-backed armed groups come under an <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/10/profiles-pro-iran-militias-iraq">umbrella organisation</a> called the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) or <em>Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī</em>. The PMF claims to have as many as 230,000 fighters, mainly Shia. The PMF was founded in 2014 when Iraq’s Shia religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/shiite_militias_iraq_english.pdf">issued a fatwa</a> calling on Iraqis to defend their country after the Iraqi army collapsed and Islamic State took the northern province of Mosul. </p>
<p>In 2018 the PMF was incorporated into Iraq’s armed forces as an auxiliary force. As a result its wages are paid by the Iraqi military, but the Iranian government lacks proper command and control over the PMF. The same year PMF’s political wing contested elections in Iraq, coming second in the poll. It also performed well in Iraq’s 2023 regional elections and is now believed to wield considerable control in both the Iraqi parliament and the country’s supreme court. </p>
<p>Its military forces are now believed to be <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-popular-mobilization-force-is-turning-iraq-into-an-iranian-client-state/">active in Kurdistan</a> as part of an overall strategy to force the US to withdraw from the region.</p>
<h2>Lebanon</h2>
<p>North of Israel’s border with Lebanon, Hezbollah has been conducting military operations against Israel for many years and since October 7 clashes between Hezbollah forces and the Israel Defence Forces have become <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-6-2024">almost daily occurences</a>.</p>
<p>Hezbollah (Party of God) was formed in 1982 to fight against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. It was trained and equipped by Iran, which continues to provide practically all of its <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-islamist-proxies">financial and military resources</a>. In its <a href="https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/The%20Hizballah%20Program%20-%20An%20Open%20Letter.pdf">1985 manifesto</a>, it vowed to expel western powers from Lebanon, called for the destruction of Israel state and pledged allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader.</p>
<p>In 2021 Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, claimed that the organisation has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-lebanon-beirut-civil-wars-hassan-nasrallah-a3c10d99cca2ef1c3d58dae135297025">100,000 trained fighters</a>, but estimates as to its actual strength vary considerably.</p>
<p>While heavily involved both politically and economically in Lebanon, Hezbollah is also active throughout the region, <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollahs-regional-activities-support-irans-proxy-networks">doing Iran’s business</a> rather than looking after Lebanese interests.</p>
<h2>Major headache for the west</h2>
<p>As can be seen with the recent attacks by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen on shipping in the Red Sea (the Houthis are armed and trained by Iran as part of a civil war against the Sunni national government backed by Saudi Arabia), dealing with Iran’s proxies throughout the Middle East is a serious challenge. </p>
<p>Many of these groups now wield significant political influence in the countries in which they are embedded, so confronting them is not simply a military exercise. And, as the dramatic rise in tensions in the region following the assault by Hamas on Israel (also planned with Iranian help) suggests, Iran is capable of fomenting trouble for the west almost at will across the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran funds a large network of armed groups across the Middle East as part of its ambition to replace the US as regional power.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2093102023-07-14T12:48:37Z2023-07-14T12:48:37ZIs the US being hypocritical in taking years to destroy its chemical weapons, while condemning other nations for their own chemical weapons programs? A political philosopher weighs in<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536842/original/file-20230711-25-mdhw2x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=92%2C25%2C5481%2C3699&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Technicians working to destroy the United States' chemical weapons stockpile at the U.S. Army Pueblo Chemical Depot on June 8, 2023, in Pueblo, Colo. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ChemicalWeapons/8d1fbfd1fe5141e3b9be5758135070c6/photo?Query=chemical%20weapons&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=2756&currentItemNo=2">AAP Photo/David Zalubowski</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United States has finished destroying the last of its stock of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoniopequenoiv/2023/07/07/us-destroys-last-of-chemical-weapons-a-mandated-act-decades-in-the-making/?sh=5f46dcba4839">chemical weapons</a>, marking the end of a 26-year period during which it frequently <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/03/24/us-decries-iraqi-use-of-chemical-weapons/4421ebe8-df59-477d-882b-7d381f3a1868/">condemned other states</a> for maintaining and using chemical weapons while continuing to keep a stockpile of such weapons for itself. </p>
<p>The use of chemical weapons on the battlefield has been <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Chemical-Weapons-Frequently-Asked-Questions#IV">illegal since 1925</a>, and the United States in 1997 ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, which committed it to destroying its <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcsig">existing chemical weapons</a>. </p>
<p>This delay reflects, in part, the sheer difficulty of destroying <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3453616/dod-destroys-last-chemical-weapons-in-arsenal/">chemical weapons safely</a>. Nonetheless, some commentators have also thought the U.S. displayed <a href="https://truthout.org/articles/history-shows-hypocrisy-of-us-outrage-over-chemical-weapons-in-syria/">hypocrisy</a> for loudly condemning other states for their chemical weapons programs while <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15276.doc.htm">maintaining supplies</a> of such weapons itself. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://phil.washington.edu/people/michael-blake">political philosopher</a>, I am interested in the ways in which moral ideas such as hypocrisy can be applied to international politics. The idea of hypocrisy is a complex one, and it is not easy to understand what exactly follows, morally speaking, when one is accused of being a hypocrite. </p>
<h2>Political hypocrisy</h2>
<p>The first thing to note here is that hypocrisy generally involves conflict between what someone does and what someone says. And as philosopher <a href="https://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/philosophy/people/_faculty/kittay.php">Eva Feder Kittay</a> notes, that does not generally mean that the hypocrite’s words <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24435495">are false</a>. Sometimes “do as I say and not as I do” is good moral advice. In other words, if a politician praises honesty while practicing deceit, honesty still constitutes the morally superior choice. </p>
<p>Political theorist <a href="https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1992/9/18/judith-shklar-professor-and-noted-theorist/">Judith Shklar</a> similarly noticed this truth about hypocrisy. She asserted that the disdain we feel for a hypocrite is not because her moral statements about others are wrong, but because the hypocrite is <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674641761">too weak to live up to what she may require of others</a>. </p>
<p>This may help us understand why we tend to think the hypocrite is morally inadequate. The one who condemns others without living up to the morality that grounds such condemnation seems not to be taking morality itself all that seriously. </p>
<p>That, in turn, suggests that the hypocrite does not offer moral condemnation as sincere moral advice. Like the deceitful politician praising honesty, the hypocrite instead uses moral language for the purpose of self-interest – to score political points, or to demonstrate dominance over someone else. </p>
<p>Critics of American foreign policy have often described the U.S. as hypocritical in just this way. Singaporean diplomat and author Kishore Mahbubani has argued that the <a href="https://mahbubani.net/can-asians-think/">U.S. is too often willing to condemn the human rights abuses of its adversaries</a> while ignoring those of its allies, and indeed its own practices – including decisions about when and how to use <a href="https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2016/10/12/how-us-violates-international-law-plain-sight">military force</a>, as in the invasion of Iraq – that seemingly contravene international law. This suggests, he argued, that the U.S. does not always care about human rights in themselves and too often uses them as a tool for self-interested politics. </p>
<p>And some Middle Eastern commentators have noted that the United States condemns the use of chemical weapons by hostile nations while ignoring, or assisting, the use of chemical weapons by allies. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Police officers and others stand in front of tall buildings that appear to be damaged." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Damaged buildings in the town of Douma, the site of a suspected chemical weapons attack, near Damascus, Syria, in April 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Syria/139a58728d5545d1a9683b02f12a8743/photo?Query=chemical%20weapons%20syria%20civilians&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=149&currentItemNo=2">AP Photo/Hassan Ammar</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iranian foreign minister <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chemical-weapons-and-claims-of-hypocrisy-irans-facebook-foreign-minister-tackles-syria/">Mohammad Javad Zarif</a>, for instance, noted in 2013 the irony that the U.S. condemned the use of chemical weapons by Syrian leader Bashar Assad against civilians while refusing to issue sanctions on the use of such weapons by Saddam Hussein to kill nearly 5,000 of his own citizens in the 1988 Halabja massacre. The reasoning for this silence was purely political, argued Zarif: At the time, Saddam was viewed as a staunch U.S. ally and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2003/jun/29/highereducation.news">necessary counter</a> to regional Iranian influence. </p>
<p>An investigation later revealed through CIA documents and interviews with former officials that the U.S. had provided Iraq with intelligence it knew would result in in a chemical weapons attack <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/">against its own citizens</a>. Those <a href="https://irp.fas.org/congress/2002_cr/s092002.html">weapons</a> were partly derived from thiodiglycol, a chemical manufactured in the U.S. and imported from <a href="https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/81ali.pdf">an American firm</a>. </p>
<p>After the relationship with Iraq soured, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged to Congress that he was seeking to find a legal way to permit the use of “<a href="https://www.military.com/defensetech/2003/02/06/rumsfeld-wants-ok-for-u-s-chemical-strikes">non-lethal” chemical weapons</a> as part of the invasion of Iraq.</p>
<p>These weapons are explicitly banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention as tools of war and are often more destructive than the term would imply: Russia’s use of nonlethal sleeping gas in response to a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20067384">hostage-taking in Chechnya</a> left 130 hostages dead in 2002. The willingness to use chemical weapons during that invasion sits uneasily with the fact that the invasion was justified, in part, on the basis that Iraq itself <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-justifying-war">maintained a stock of chemical weapons</a>.</p>
<h2>Maintaining moral authority</h2>
<p>Coming back to today, the destruction by the U.S. of its chemical weapons supplies will, at the very least, remove some of the perception that the United States has been hypocritical in its attitudes toward such weapons. </p>
<p>From my perspective, as regards those weapons, their destruction is not sufficient to fully ensure American moral authority. The U.S. might be rightly accused of hypocrisy until it consistently condemns their use by anyone – ally or adversary. </p>
<p>The accusation of hypocrisy doesn’t change the fact that countries shouldn’t use chemical weapons. The American condemnation, even if hypocritical, is still valuable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209310/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Blake receives funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities.</span></em></p>When it comes to chemical weapons, American condemnation, even if hypocritical, is still valuable.Michael Blake, Professor of Philosophy, Public Policy and Governance, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2009712023-03-13T12:28:30Z2023-03-13T12:28:30ZSyrian earthquake devastated an area that was already a disaster zone – and highlights the vital role of local aid groups<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514302/original/file-20230308-493-637toa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C38%2C1358%2C851&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The earthquake destroyed many houses and buildings in northwestern Syria.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bahar Organization</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Three weeks after the <a href="https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disasters/2023-turkey-syria-earthquake/">February 2023 earthquakes struck Turkey and Syria</a>, I stood amid the rubble in Jindires, a devastated Syrian village. An estimated <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/03/1134182">50,000 people had lost their lives</a> in the two countries by that point, with the number of casualties still climbing. </p>
<p>Around me, heaps of concrete and twisted metal mixed with bursts of color — fragments of furniture, children’s toys, clothing — that served as reminders of the lives that crumbled when homes crumbled, trapping people inside and underneath the wreckage. Many bodies remained buried beneath those concrete heaps.</p>
<p>In the absence of the heavy equipment needed to remove large hunks of debris, I saw people using brooms and wheelbarrows to make a clean patch of earth where they could pitch their tents, often in front of their collapsed homes. </p>
<p>There was almost a sense of normalcy, at least on the surface. Some shops were open for business. Men passed by on motorcycles and bicycles, women bought fruits and vegetables.</p>
<p>For <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=LO6JIHwAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">someone like me</a> who <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/good-rebel-governance/E2E58C592555044B01A8C51C5891262A">researches war and humanitarian crises</a>, there was also a glaring omission: I saw no international aid workers and no white SUVs with the logos of globally recognized institutions during the 48 hours I spent in the Afrin district of northern Syria.</p>
<p>As far as I could tell, there were no other foreigners there during my visit.</p>
<h2>One group making a difference</h2>
<p>Based on what I saw firsthand and have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/15/northwest-syria-aid-delays-deadly-quake-survivors">learned through my research</a>, the international humanitarian <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/02/syrian-rescue-efforts-slowed-bureaucracy-and-regime">response to the earthquake in war-torn northwest Syria</a> <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/02/16/slow-humanitarian-response-to-rebel-controlled-syria-after-earthquake-is-deadly-hwr">has been deplorable</a>. </p>
<p>With politics trumping humanitarian need, everyone <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/5/qatars-emir-criticises-aid-delay-to-syria-earthquake-victims">from heads of state</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/15/un-assad-syria-earthquake-aid-victims/">news outlets</a> <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/15/northwest-syria-aid-delays-deadly-quake-survivors">to human rights groups</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/14/white-helmets-criticise-un-over-assad-say-on-aid-deliveries">Syrian rescue groups</a> has lambasted the United Nations for doing too little. U.N. aid chief Martin Griffiths has even <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/02/13/un-aid-chief-apologizes-for-failure-to-deliver-in-northwest-syria/">apologized for his organization’s failures</a>.</p>
<p>But some humanitarian aid is being delivered, I observed, thanks to Syrian groups like the <a href="https://bahar.ngo/">Bahar Organization</a>, a grassroots Syrian organization I’ve been studying for 10 years.</p>
<h2>Aid delivery everywhere</h2>
<p>I first met Dr. Sharvan Ibesh, a co-founder of Bahar, in 2013, when I was researching how Syrian civil society was responding to the humanitarian needs of civilians. At the time, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-islamic-state-group-migration-bashar-assad-syria-c928ec068b59ea33d54018d796382969">war had been going on for two years</a>.</p>
<p>The staff members of many international aid groups and other foreign organizations had by then pulled out of opposition-controlled Syrian regions, citing problems with security as a result of ISIS and armed groups that were backed by the al-Qaida terrorist network.</p>
<p>International organizations were desperate to find partners to do the work they could <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12298">no longer do because of safety concerns</a>. But the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/12/14/pity-the-nation-assessing-a-half-century-of-assadist-rule/">brutal regime led first by Hafez Assad</a> and later by his son <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/01/13/assads-normalization-and-the-politics-of-erasure-in-syria/">Bashar Assad</a>, who took over in 2000, meant that civil society was both weak and fledgling, and there were few organizations with skills to deliver humanitarian relief. </p>
<p>Ibesh had been a surgical resident in the Syrian city of Aleppo when the bombs started falling there in February 2012, less than a year after the uprising began. He and his fellow residents set up emergency medical care stations throughout the city to treat those civilians badly injured by Syrian and <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/barrel-bombs-syria/story?id=46729495">Russian barrel bombs</a>. Back then, Bahar was operating with a makeshift mobile office and on a shoestring budget, and many members of its staff were volunteers. </p>
<p>Ibesh spoke little English and couldn’t communicate directly with North American and European donors or international and nongovernmental organizations. What Bahar excelled at was getting aid to people affected by the war throughout northwest Syria, no matter which armed group they were living under.</p>
<p>Bahar volunteers or staff could cross checkpoints – moving from territory controlled by one warring party to another – and they could deliver aid without being robbed or extorted, a feat unimaginable to any international organization.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514313/original/file-20230308-18-ab9ua0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Children play soccer on a dusty street with tents." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514313/original/file-20230308-18-ab9ua0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514313/original/file-20230308-18-ab9ua0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514313/original/file-20230308-18-ab9ua0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514313/original/file-20230308-18-ab9ua0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514313/original/file-20230308-18-ab9ua0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514313/original/file-20230308-18-ab9ua0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514313/original/file-20230308-18-ab9ua0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children play soccer in the Syrian city of Jindires on Feb. 28, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/children-play-soccer-in-the-city-of-jindires-on-february-28-news-photo/1247561533">Abdulmonam Eassa/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Still a war zone</h2>
<p>As the war has dragged on, Bahar has deepened its capacities and expanded its humanitarian programs with an annual budget that has averaged US$50 million for the past three years.</p>
<p>It still partners with international organizations, but I’ve learned through my research that it’s also one of the few Syrian organizations to receive direct funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development.</p>
<p>Northwest Syria remains a war zone. Syria’s Afrin district is under Turkey’s influence, having pushed out Kurdish forces and <a href="https://medyanews.net/hdp-calls-on-turkey-to-end-afrin-occupation-on-fifth-anniversary/">paved the way for armed militias</a> from all over the country to find a new home there. During my visit, Syrian and Russian warplanes bombed nearby areas of Idlib province that were also harmed by the earthquake.</p>
<p>When the earthquake hit the Afrin district, Bahar was already there and already engaged with people affected by the Syrian civil war. Many Bahar staff members lost their homes, family members died, and one staff member was killed, but they mobilized immediately. Thanks to its direct relationship with USAID, the group could reallocate funds almost instantaneously.</p>
<p>Bahar, according to several conversations I had during my visit and beforehand, was the only organization operating in Afrin in the earthquake’s aftermath. A second Syrian nonprofit organization, Takaful Al-Sham, has since joined them. </p>
<p>By the time I arrived, Bahar had set up a multiservice clinic in Jindires, with support from Doctors Without Borders, and distributed and helped set up 590 tents for families who had lost their homes. It was providing activities for children and psychological support for traumatized people, along with cash for many residents.</p>
<p>And its pre-earthquake work continues in the broader Afrin district – the group is running a hospital, a tuberculosis clinic and a malnutrition center for infants and children, among other endeavors.</p>
<p>Bahar continues to navigate this impossible web of politics, danger and extreme humanitarian need with a staff the group says now numbers 800. </p>
<p>I believe that they can do it because they are local – they’re embedded in the community, with a deep understanding of what their neighbors need. Bahar is directly funded by USAID, which means it can avoid going through an intermediary. It could also immediately redirect spending as needed following the earthquake.</p>
<h2>On the ground</h2>
<p>In 2016, under what was dubbed the <a href="https://agendaforhumanity.org/initiatives/3861">Grand Bargain</a> agreement, 61 donor countries and aid providers pledged to provide 25% of their humanitarian budgets directly to local groups, instead of large international organizations such as the United Nations and international nongovernmental organizations.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain">most recent independent audit</a> measuring progress toward these goals shows that this direct support for local organizations is “slow” and “stymied.” </p>
<p>If the international community is unclear about why and how supporting local organizations can save lives, the earthquake in Syria is a case in point.</p>
<p>I’m not suggesting that Bahar can single-handedly manage the earthquake response in Syria. But I do believe that Bahar, and organizations like it, are best positioned to respond because they are already there.</p>
<p>They know the communities. And, due to the funding they receive directly from donors, they are nimble. They are also <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/15/un-assad-syria-earthquake-aid-victims/">not mired in the geopolitical dimensions</a> of humanitarian aid that keeps U.N. assistance and personnel in Damascus, Syria’s capital, and on the Turkish side of the border. </p>
<p>Standing on the roof of a Bahar office in Jindires, Ibesh and I could see two collapsed apartment buildings across the street. Each was formerly four stories tall – about 100 residents were killed when the buildings crumbled to the ground in the earthquake.</p>
<p>Ibesh said he longs for additional support from foreign countries and aid groups to Jindires and the surrounding areas affected by the earthquake.</p>
<p>On top of the funds and materials they would bring, the presence of foreign aid workers might signal international solidarity and provide some hope for the Syrians who have been living through a dozen years of war and now this natural disaster.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200971/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kimberly Howe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar who visited Syria after the earthquake observes that as the war has dragged on, a humanitarian organization she’s researched for 10 years has branched out.Kimberly Howe, University of Virginia Humanitarian Collaborative Practitioner Fellow; Assistant Research Professor of International Relations, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2002212023-03-08T13:40:07Z2023-03-08T13:40:07ZSyria’s earthquake survivors struggle in a disaster made far worse by civil war, bombed-out hospitals and currency collapse<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513474/original/file-20230304-14-t2k1qb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=917%2C1040%2C4546%2C2596&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Temporary shelters have been set up near neighborhoods in the Idlib province demolished by the Syria-Turkey earthquake.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/magnitude-quake-struck-early-on-february-6-as-people-slept-news-photo/1247017652?phrase=syria%20earthquake%20Idlib%20province&adppopup=true">Omar Haj Kadour/ AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After a pair of devastating earthquakes struck southern Turkey and northwestern Syria, the number of confirmed deaths continues to rise, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/earthquake-death-toll-surpasses-50000-turkey-syria-2023-02-24/">surpassing 50,000</a> as of Feb. 24. </p>
<p>The United Nations estimates that millions of people on both sides of the border have been affected, including <a href="https://www.unocha.org/story/nearly-9-million-people-syria-affected-t%C3%BCrkiye-earthquake-un-launches-400-million-funding">9 million</a> in Syria alone. Many across northwest Syria are enduring winter conditions without adequate shelter or access to food, drinking water, electricity or heating fuel. </p>
<p>Indian economist Amartya Sen famously argued that famines must be understood as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/01/arts/does-democracy-avert-famine.html">problems with human origins</a> rather than merely as natural disasters. The consequences of this disaster must likewise be understood in the larger context of the region’s politics. </p>
<p>Just as the scope of the devastation in Turkey can be partly blamed <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-rages-at-shoddy-construction-after-earthquake-proof-homes-topple-/6968593.html">on shoddy construction</a> and the political apparatus that enabled it, the consequences of the earthquake in Syria can be explained in part by the country’s devastating civil war.</p>
<p>Since it began in 2011, the war there has cost more than <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-58664859">600,000 lives</a> and displaced more than half of Syria’s population. This includes <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html">more than 6 million Syrians</a> who fled abroad as refugees and 7 million more who were displaced within Syria. </p>
<p>Among these internally displaced Syrians, 3 million are now living in the last piece of Syria still controlled by opposition forces, the region surrounding the city of Idlib in Syria’s northwest. </p>
<p>This area was both badly affected by the earthquake and arguably the region of Syria least prepared to withstand it.</p>
<h2>Unable to meet basic needs</h2>
<p>Idlib’s buildings, already badly damaged by years of bombardment by regime and allied Russian forces, had little chance of withstanding the 7.8 magnitude earthquake that occurred on Feb. 6, 2023. </p>
<p>In the immediate aftermath, rescue operations were hampered by the lack of access to search and rescue equipment. Members of the Syrian civil defense organization known as <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/white-helmets-group-ordinary-syrians-extraordinary/story?id=96971864">the White Helmets</a> were able to rescue some of those under the rubble, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/11/1156305956/earthquake-survivors-in-northern-syria-already-ravaged-by-war-are-unable-to-rece">but Syrians interviewed</a> in the media have lamented that some of those who died could have been saved <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/13/middleeast/syria-idlib-earthquake-scenes-intl/index.html">with better equipment</a> and a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/09/world/middleeast/syria-earthquake-aid.html">faster international response</a>. </p>
<p>Worse, for the past several years, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/world/middleeast/russia-bombing-syrian-hospitals.html">Russian</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/21/syria-several-killed-in-govt-attack-on-hospital-in-idlib">Syrian government forces</a> have repeatedly bombed <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/hospitals-deliberately-targeted-in-syrias-idlib-province-11796872">the region’s medical facilities</a>, leaving them <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2019/03/syria-unlawful-attacks-by-government-forces-hit-civilians-and-medical-facilities-in-idlib/">stretched beyond capacity</a> even before the earthquake. </p>
<p>Now those facilities have been <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/13/middleeast/syria-idlib-earthquake-scenes-intl/index.html">overwhelmed by the sheer numbers</a> of injured requiring medical attention.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C37%2C4985%2C3285&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women walk through rubble near a demolished building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C37%2C4985%2C3285&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women walk among airstrike-ruined buildings in Idlib, Syria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Syria-Idlib-on-the-Brink/aef79c4ef57e4369a529d3870f3e1dd2/53/0">AP Photo/Felipe Dana</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The impact of war on delivering aid</h2>
<p>Further worsening the situation, the ongoing hostilities and political wrangling have hampered the distribution of aid to the survivors.</p>
<p>Syria today is divided among several <a href="https://theconversation.com/2-reasons-and-1-disease-that-make-peace-in-syria-so-difficult-133330">warring parties</a>, including President Bashar Assad’s regime, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, and the collection of armed groups that make up the opposition to Assad’s regime.</p>
<p>In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the Syrian government – which has a history of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/oct/21/assad-regime-siphons-millions-in-aid-by-manipulating-syrias-currency">diverting international aid</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/11/syria-surrender-or-starve-strategy-displacing-thousands-amounts-to-crimes-against-humanity/">using starvation</a> as a weapon of war –
insisted that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/07/world/europe/turkey-syria-quake-un-aid.html">all international earthquake aid</a> must come through government-held territory. </p>
<p>This position is rejected by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-quake-aid-held-up-by-hts-approval-issues-says-un-spokesperson-2023-02-12/">Hayat Tahrir al-Sham,</a> the authoritarian opposition faction that controls most of Idlib province, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/13/world/middleeast/earthquake-idlib-syria-aid.html">which has refused</a> to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/15/northwest-syria-aid-delays-deadly-quake-survivors">allow aid to enter the region</a> that’s sent from government-controlled areas.</p>
<p>After a week of international pressure, the Syrian government <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/15/northwest-syria-aid-delays-deadly-quake-survivors">authorized the opening</a> of two additional border crossings from Turkey into the affected areas for the distribution of aid by the United Nations.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Dozens of tents are scattered across red sand, with mountains in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Displacement camps in Syria’s Idlib province pack people closely together, with no running water.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/drone-image-taken-on-march-17-shows-a-displaced-camp-in-the-news-photo/1207507564">Omar Haj Kadour/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch, a nonprofit research and advocacy group, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/15/northwest-syria-aid-delays-deadly-quake-survivors">has reported that</a> aid being sent to earthquake-stricken territory held by the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/18/politics/us-helicopter-raid-isis-syria/index.html">Syrian Democratic Forces</a> has been blocked by both regime forces and the Turkish-backed armed group known as the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/topic/syrian-national-army">Syrian National Army</a>.</p>
<p>The Syrian regime’s forces reportedly insisted that aid could go through only if half of it were handed over to them.</p>
<p>Such obstacles are not present in government-held areas, where <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/syria/2023/02/09/turkey-earthquake-uae-aid-flights-land-in-syrias-damascus-to-help-survivors/">international aid </a>has been able to arrive directly. The United States and European Union have also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/05/world/middleeast/us-syria-assad-sanctions.html">adjusted their sanctions</a> against the Syrian government for the next six months to ensure the speedy delivery of humanitarian aid. </p>
<p>But the long-standing economic consequences of the war, including the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/war-hunger-scares-me-more-war-cannons-inflation-soars-syrias-economy-spirals-downward">collapse of Syria’s currency</a>, mean that all areas of Syria face a difficult recovery. </p>
<p>Syrians who have fled the country have been affected as well. Turkey hosts more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/15/world/middleeast/turkey-syria-refugees-earthquake.html">3.5 million Syrian refugees</a>, many of whom settled in the area hit by the earthquake.</p>
<p>Like the Turkish population of the region, they too have lost family and friends, homes and livelihoods. Now, some <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/12/world/middleeast/syria-turkey-earthquake-refugees.html">also face hostility</a> from those who oppose the provision of government aid to the refugees. </p>
<h2>The task of rebuilding Syria</h2>
<p>In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, it is understandable that the first impulse of the international community has been to dispatch search and rescue teams, food and medicine and other types of aid.</p>
<p>But in the longer term, the factors that made this earthquake so terribly devastating remain unresolved and stand to complicate any humanitarian response.
An effective response would need to take into account the human origins of the political, economic, and humanitarian conditions that resulted in civil war – not just the impact of a natural disaster. </p>
<p>One good first step would be to make permanent the two additional border crossings into the opposition-held areas, which at present have been authorized only temporarily by the Syrian government, although the regime will be reluctant to do so. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man dressed in dark clothes is surrounded by other men wearing helmets as they walk near a demolished building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513475/original/file-20230304-1853-vx3tix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513475/original/file-20230304-1853-vx3tix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513475/original/file-20230304-1853-vx3tix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513475/original/file-20230304-1853-vx3tix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513475/original/file-20230304-1853-vx3tix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513475/original/file-20230304-1853-vx3tix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513475/original/file-20230304-1853-vx3tix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Syrian President Bashar Assad, center, on Feb. 10, 2023, visits neighborhoods hit by an earthquake in Aleppo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/syrian-president-bashar-al-assad-visits-neighbourhoods-news-photo/1246979089?phrase=syria%20earthquake%20Bashar%20al-Assad&adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It will be especially important to rebuild medical facilities in Idlib, where Syrians are providing supplies as best they can. </p>
<p>Both Syria and Turkey are facing a painful reconstruction process. But for Syria, the process will be further complicated by a war that is not over and whose consequences will be with Syria for years to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ora Szekely does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The earthquake that struck Turkey and neighboring Syria on Feb. 6, 2023, was a natural disaster, but its consequences have been shaped by the human tragedy of the Syrian civil war.Ora Szekely, Associate Professor of Political Science, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1997782023-02-14T19:11:43Z2023-02-14T19:11:43ZAs Syrians were trapped beneath the rubble, a broken UN system was held hostage by the Assad regime<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509961/original/file-20230214-28-m2j5fv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3000%2C1998&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://photos-cdn.aap.com.au/Preview/20230210001761757958?assetType=IMAGE&path=/aap_dev19/device/imagearc/2023/02-10/fe/48/f3/aapimage-7ov0rgzupkwkvvz39gq_minihighres.jpg">Ghaith Alsayed/AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>While international teams poured into Turkey to mount a furious search and rescue effort following the massive earthquake on February 6, the response on the other side of the border in Syria was catastrophically slow.</p>
<p>For days, Syrians remained stuck under the rubble in sub-zero temperatures waiting for help. However, the only vehicles that crossed the border from Turkey were <a href="https://twitter.com/Tessa_Fox/status/1624325240712052737">trucks</a> ferrying the bodies of the dead home for burial. </p>
<p>When the United Nations finally delivered aid to rebel-controlled northwest Syria four days after the quake, incredulous rescuers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/09/world/middleeast/syria-earthquake-aid.html">lamented</a> that it appeared to have been packed for delivery before the earthquake. It contained less critically-needed supplies like nappies, instead of heavy machinery or disaster response supplies. </p>
<p>It took a full week for the Syrian government, which frequently blocks aid delivery to its opponents, to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/13/syrias-assad-agrees-to-open-two-more-entry-points-for-aid-to-earthquake-victims">finally agree</a> to open two additional border crossings from Turkey to allow more aid into northwestern Syria. But for many, this would come too late.</p>
<p>In the end, politics stood in the way of a humanitarian response that could have saved hundreds, if not thousands, of lives. The disaster unfolding before our eyes is almost entirely man-made. </p>
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<h2>An aid system mired in corruption and authoritarian politics</h2>
<p>The more than decade-long Syrian civil war has reached something of a stalemate, but Bashar al-Assad’s regime has never regained control of the entire country.</p>
<p>While regime-held territory, including the cities of Aleppo, Latakia and Hama, sustained significant damage and loss of life in the quake, the worst affected part of the country is the rebel-controlled northwest, home to 4.6 million people.</p>
<p><a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/northwest-syria-factsheet-20-january-2023">Two-thirds</a> of them have been displaced from other parts of Syria. And 4.1 million people were in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/northwest-syria-factsheet-20-january-2023">desperate need</a> of humanitarian assistance before the earthquake struck. </p>
<p>As of February 12, more than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/country/syr">4,400 people</a> had been killed and 7,600 injured in the region. Thousands more remain missing, presumed dead.</p>
<p>Getting supplies into this part of Syria is not a new problem. The international community has struggled to get aid in throughout the war, leaving people increasingly vulnerable to a tragedy like the recent earthquake. </p>
<p>Aid is normally delivered to people via a country’s central government. However, in 2014, the UN Security Council passed a resolution to allow humanitarian assistance to be delivered to Syrians via four international border crossings, in order to help those beyond the reach of the UN’s Damascus-based aid program.</p>
<p>The Security Council has had to renew the resolution every six to 12 months, but following veto threats by Russia, humanitarian assistance was reduced to just the Bab al-Hawa crossing between Turkey and northwest Syria in 2020. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509963/original/file-20230214-28-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509963/original/file-20230214-28-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509963/original/file-20230214-28-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509963/original/file-20230214-28-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509963/original/file-20230214-28-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509963/original/file-20230214-28-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509963/original/file-20230214-28-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trucks loaded with UN humanitarian aid for Syria at the Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey last week.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ghaith Alsayed/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russia maintains aid should be delivered via Damascus now that the war is mostly dormant. The regime, however, has been accused of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-assad-regime-systematically-diverts-tens-millions-aid">stealing</a> donations, manipulating foreign exchange rates to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-assad-regime-systematically-diverts-tens-millions-aid">siphon off</a> half of every aid dollar that’s donated, and <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/02/20/syrias-polio-epidemic-suppressed-truth/">withholding</a> childhood polio vaccines from opposition-held territory.</p>
<p>The regime approved just nine UN aid deliveries between Damascus and northwest Syria between August 2021 and November 2022, highlighting the region’s almost-total dependence on aid coming across the border from Turkey.</p>
<p>Although experts have long argued <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/28/no-legal-barrier-un-cross-border-syria">the UN could legally use other border crossings</a>, it has followed the Security Council resolutions to the letter. </p>
<p>The UN has also remained tight-lipped on the frustrations of its dealings with Damascus, apparently believing that preserving its relationship with Assad’s regime is essential to continuing the aid flows to the millions who need it inside government-controlled Syria and what little makes it to the rebel areas.</p>
<p>This has given the Assad regime obscene influence over aid delivery and made the UN complicit in one of the gravest failures of the international humanitarian system in recent history.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-syria-earthquake-the-challenge-of-delivering-aid-in-a-disaster-zone-199440">Turkey-Syria earthquake: the challenge of delivering aid in a disaster zone</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Wasting time on politics</h2>
<p>The earthquake damaged the road leading to the Bab al-Hawa crossing, delaying urgent shipments of equipment and aid for days. </p>
<p>Syria’s UN ambassador, meanwhile, wasted no time in predictably <a href="https://twitter.com/KSaloomey/status/1623399377027969024">declaring</a> that Syria welcomed all international aid, provided it was directed via Damascus. </p>
<p>Always looking for an opportunity to exploit the suffering of its own people, the regime then cynically called for sanctions relief on the government, even though many experts argued humanitarian aid was already exempt from sanctions.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-syria-earthquake-assad-blames-west-as-agencies-struggle-to-get-aid-to-his-desperate-people-199691">Turkey-Syria earthquake: Assad blames west as agencies struggle to get aid to his desperate people</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The US nevertheless announced a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/10/us-syria-sanctions-exemption-earthquake-relief">six-month</a> suspension of sanctions to speed up aid deliveries. And legal experts <a href="https://www.crossborderislegal.org/_files/ugd/166212_a14558496a1242d28fb13a5aea08f26c.pdf">renewed their calls</a> for the UN to use the other functioning Turkish border crossings not damaged by the quake. </p>
<p>True to form, though, the UN maintained the status quo. When the Assad regime begrudgingly approved the use of two more border crossings from Turkey for the next three months, UN Secretary-General António Guterres could do little more than “<a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/statement-secretary-general-opening-crossing-points">welcome</a>” the news. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509960/original/file-20230214-14-snnk84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509960/original/file-20230214-14-snnk84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509960/original/file-20230214-14-snnk84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509960/original/file-20230214-14-snnk84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509960/original/file-20230214-14-snnk84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509960/original/file-20230214-14-snnk84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509960/original/file-20230214-14-snnk84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Syrian President Bashar al-Assad meeting with Martin Griffiths, UN under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, in Damascus this week.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Syrian Presidency via Facebook/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the additional crossings will temporarily increase the drip-feed of aid across the border, there had been no UN aid deliveries at all from Damascus to the rebel-held northwest at the time of writing. </p>
<p>Time was ultimately a luxury that Syrians did not have. While the UN danced around politics and convention, Syrians died under the rubble. A heartbroken Raed Saleh, the head of the White Helmets, who undertook much of the search-and-rescue efforts, <a href="https://www.syriacivildefence.org/en/latest/media-releases/remarks-raed-al-saleh-white-helmets-press-conference-conference-latest-developments-nw-syria/">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I want to begin with my apologies and deep regret to all families in all parts of Syria whose relatives we could not reach alive; just thinking about it pains our hearts. We were fighting helplessness and time to reach people alive. </p>
<p>The lack of adequate equipment is a big reason for this helplessness, but we swear to you that we worked and did our best.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Aid should go to groups on the ground instead</h2>
<p>Correcting the UN’s failures is essential to preventing further loss of life.</p>
<p>First, the UN must find a way to protect its humanitarian mission from being held hostage by regimes that are indifferent to the plight of their own people. </p>
<p>While both Russia and Syria share much blame for weaponising aid, this crisis has been many years in the making and it is essential the UN takes responsibility for failing to challenge the status quo. It must now establish permanent humanitarian corridors to prevent further avoidable catastrophes.</p>
<p>Next, donor countries must reconsider their aid budgets given the UN system is failing to serve those most in need.</p>
<p>As the priorities in Syria now shift to recovery and reconstruction, wealthy states must funnel aid dollars to trusted partners on the ground in northwestern Syria, such as the <a href="https://www.whitehelmets.org/en/">White Helmets,</a> <a href="https://molhamteam.com/en/wecan">Molham Team</a> and <a href="https://srd.ngo/">Syrian Relief and Development</a>. Individual donors should do the same. </p>
<p>These groups have almost single-handedly carried out the earthquake response so far, and will continue to do the heavily lifting for the foreseeable future.</p>
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<p>Syria is on the brink of a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/09/middleeast/turkey-syria-earthquake-aid-bab-al-hawa-intl-hnk/index.html">secondary humanitarian disaster</a> as a result of the lack of safe housing, electricity, sanitation and drinking water during a freezing winter. Now is the time for the international community to make things right by investing in reconstruction that benefits the Syrian people, rather than lines the pockets of Assad and his cronies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199778/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dara Conduit receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>Politics stood in the way of a humanitarian response that could have saved hundreds, if not thousands, of lives.Dara Conduit, ARC DECRA Fellow, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1996182023-02-10T14:52:26Z2023-02-10T14:52:26ZTurkey-Syria earthquake: why it is so difficult to get rescue and relief to where it is most needed<p>The death toll from the earthquakes that struck Turkey and Syria on February 6 has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/09/turkey-syria-earthquake-death-count-updates/">climbed above 21,000</a> in four days, exceeding the World Health Organization’s estimate of 20,000. But it continues to rise by the hour as more grim discoveries are made under the rubble.</p>
<p>Search-and-rescue efforts are well under way in Turkey after an initially slow response, but have yet to really take off in northern Syria. Syrians in rebel-controlled areas were kept waiting for help due <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/2023/02/08/syria-earthquake-victims-icrc-idlib/">political tensions</a> and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/syria-turkey-earthquake-rebel-held-civil-war-survivors-cold-winter-rcna69463">shattered infrastructure</a> following the earthquake and more than ten years of conflict. </p>
<p>So far, nobody knows how many people are still stuck under the rubble. Ovgun Ahmet Ercan, a Turkish earthquake expert, <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/02/07/the-scale-of-the-disaster-in-turkey-and-syria-keeps-growing?">told The Economist</a> he had estimated that 180,000 people or more may be trapped under the rubble, nearly all of them dead.</p>
<p>A UN convoy <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/09/middleeast/turkey-syria-earthquake-aid-bab-al-hawa-intl-hnk/index.html">finally gained access</a> to northern Syria on Thursday morning – a day after what is considered to be the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/turkey-syria-earthquake-latest-updates-on-death-toll-and-rescue-operation-12804459?postid=5398592#liveblog-body">critical 72-hour window</a> for finding survivors. But hopes of a really effective rescue mission were dashed as there was <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/turkey-earthquake-latest-babies-rescued-alone-flown-to-ankara-as-erdogan-admits-quake-response-shortcomings-12804459?postid=5400363#liveblog-body">no heavy search-and-rescue equipment</a> provided. Now the survival rate of people trapped under the rubble stands at <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/turkey-syria-earthquake-latest-updates-on-death-toll-and-rescue-operation-12804459?postid=5398592#liveblog-body">less than 6%</a>.</p>
<p>To avoid losing more lives and reduce suffering, the international aid response will now be more critical than ever. Based on my <a href="https://research.rug.nl/nl/publications/mission-impossible-operations-management-in-complex-extreme-and-h">doctoral research</a> which focused on humanitarian aid in conflict and political crisis situations, here are the key priorities. </p>
<h2>Huge challenges</h2>
<p>This will be an extremely challenging aid operation. For a start, the weather is not on the responders’ side – both countries are experiencing a harsh wet winter. There are also regional political tensions and <a href="https://cccmcluster.org/operations/syria">millions of refugees in both countries</a> due to the conflict in Syria.</p>
<p>Syria faces a <a href="https://turkiye.un.org/en/218301-turkiye-syria-quake-latest-full-scale-disaster-still-unfolding-un-humanitarians-warn">convergence of disasters</a>. Conflict, a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/whole-syria-cholera-outbreak-situation-report-no-11-issued-15-january-2023#">cholera outbreak</a> and already <a href="https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/msf-responds-overwhelming-medical-needs-following-earthquakes-turkey-and-syria">dangerously overstretched</a> medical facilities are just some of the issues to deal with.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133177">crucial UN aid hub</a> for northern Syria, close to the epicentre of the initial earthquake in Turkey, was affected. This could have worsened the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/syria-turkey-earthquake-rebel-held-civil-war-survivors-cold-winter-rcna69463">shortages of key supplies</a> needed immediately after the earthquake struck. </p>
<h2>Political response</h2>
<p>One of the most important decisions a government makes in disasters is whether to <a href="https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/state-of-emergencystate-of-siege/">declare a state of emergency</a>. For humanitarian organisations, this means that they can freely work in the affected areas. Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has already <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64548985">declared a three-month state of emergency</a>. As a result, the response in Turkey has received significantly more resources and media attention. </p>
<p>The Syrian government has not declared a state of emergency. This means that it does not officially recognise or support any organisations that work in rebel-controlled areas. This is risky for aid workers. There are no official safety guarantees yet and the proliferation of armed groups increases security risks for rescue-and-relief missions. </p>
<p>The support available to Syria will only be effective if the Assad regime is willing to grant access to rebel-controlled areas. International aid organisations can only do so much when facing an <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272696316300468">uncompromising government</a>. Other governments should make earnest attempts to engage with Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad. The priority for Syria is to negotiate with the government and other armed groups for safe and unhindered access to ensure that more aid is delivered for as long as needed.</p>
<h2>Money is vital</h2>
<p>Cash donations from the public and from governments are important. Ideally, they should <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/earmarked-funding-four-reasons-why-we-shouldnt-dictate-where-our-charitable-donations-go/">not be earmarked</a> – meaning that donors should not dictate how the money should be spent. This allows aid organisations to quickly adapt their responses when needed. </p>
<p>Obviously, at present, the top priorities are food and water, access to medical assistance and clothing and shelter suitable for the current weather conditions. </p>
<p>It’s understandable that the public wants to see supplies sent as quickly as possible – but the state of infrastructure in the earthquake region will not support this and storing supplies in the area increases the risk of theft. Also the type of support needed is changing fast as focus shifts from search and rescue to keeping people alive. </p>
<p>The goal should be to ensure slow but steady supply of essential items. This means finding safe alternative access routes, for example using sea freight to build a continuous pipeline of international supplies and constantly delivering supplies to badly hit areas using small vehicles. Pack animals such as donkeys can also play an important role in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/1500-donkeys-trek-aid-darra-souf-afghanistan">delivering basic supplies</a> and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-donkey-ambulance-maternity-saddle/25120705.html">providing an ambulance service</a> for people in difficult to reach places. </p>
<p>Aid corridors to the northern Syria must be opened. In the recent past Russia and China have blocked UN efforts to reopen several routes from Turkey to Syria closed by the Assad regime. Meanwhile, Damascus refuses to allocate resources to rebel-controlled territory and is accusing responding international organisations of “funding terrorists”. This is going to require a major diplomatic effort so that aid flows from both sides.</p>
<p>Aid organisations must coordinate and collaborate efforts with local communities and political actors, especially important in northern Syria where international <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-aid-workers-were-forced-out-of-syria-the-same-thing-could-happen-in-this-war-179781">aid workers were forced out</a> several years ago because high security risks. </p>
<h2>Caring for the dead</h2>
<p>As already mentioned, there is also a cholera outbreak in the afflicted region. The <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/risks-posed-by-dead-bodies-after-disasters">World Health Organization</a> identifies cholera as one of the few diseases that can be transmitted from dead bodies, so this can pose a huge public health risk following a natural disaster.</p>
<p>To avoid repeating the same mistakes that were made in <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/cholera/haiti/index.html#">Haiti</a> where huge numbers of people ended up infected, disease control should be a priority. This will require specialist help to ensure proper sanitary conditions and burials. </p>
<p>The slow response does not need to be defining feature of this crisis. There is still time for coordination, collaboration and diplomacy to get things moving and save as many lives as possible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199618/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nonhlanhla Dube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A cholera outbreak, a harsh winter, ten years of civil war and obstruction from the Syrian government are some of the difficulties faced by aid agencies.Nonhlanhla Dube, Lecturer in Operations Management, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1996912023-02-10T13:39:43Z2023-02-10T13:39:43ZTurkey-Syria earthquake: Assad blames west as agencies struggle to get aid to his desperate people<p>It didn’t take long for Syria’s Assad regime to seek political and economic benefit from the devastation of an earthquake. As emergency services were reaching victims of the 7.8-magnitude tremor on February 6, <a href="https://sana.sy/en/?p=299415">regime-linked organisations demanded</a> governments “immediately end the siege and unilateral coercive economic sanctions imposed on Syria and its people for 12 years”.</p>
<p>Long-time supporters of the Assad line were just as prompt. Rania Khalek, a commentator on pro-Assad and Russian state-linked outlets, <a href="https://twitter.com/RaniaKhalek/status/1622579981044928514">tweeted</a>: “Syria has to deal with this horrific disaster while under US sanctions that have ruined its medical sector and capacity to respond, these sanctions are criminal.”</p>
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<p>Meanwhile, the regime threatened to block any assistance to opposition-held areas of northwest Syria, with its UN ambassador, Bassam Sabbagh insisting that <a href="https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/07/syria-earthquake-aftermath-aid-politics">Damascus must oversee</a> all deliveries into Syria.</p>
<p>The UN’s resident Syria coordinator, El-Mostafa Benlamlih, <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/world/syrian-crisis/un-appeals-for-access-to-deliver-earthquake-aid-to-nw-syria/amp">appealed</a>: “Put politics aside and let us do our humanitarian work. We can’t afford to wait and negotiate. By the time we negotiate, it’s done, it’s finished.”</p>
<h2>Assad’s sanctions manipulation</h2>
<p>The sanctions over the regime’s deadly 12-year repression of its citizens date to <a href="https://www.state.gov/syria-sanctions/">April 29 2011</a>, six weeks after authorities detained and abused teenage boys <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/graffiti-boys-who-sparked-syria-uprising-brace-for-regime-attack-1.740678">daubing graffiti in Daraa</a> in southern Syria, sparking a popular uprising. Then US president, Barack Obama, ordered a block on the property of those involved in human rights violations.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:121:0011:0014:EN:PDF">European Union</a> and <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2011/10/canada-expands-sanctions-against-syria.html">Canada</a> followed in May, with travel bans and asset freezes on individuals and prohibition of the export of goods and technology that could be used by the regime’s armed forces. In August, <a href="https://www.state.gov/syria-sanctions/#:%7E:text=Executive%20Order%2013582%2C%20signed%20on,U.S.%20persons%2C%20prohibits%20the%20importation">Washington expanded sanctions</a> to cover the oil sector and to prohibit any export of goods from the US to Syria.</p>
<p>The US <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-usa-idUSKBN14W28W">blacklisted regime figures</a> connected with Assad’s chemical weapons program after sarin and chlorine attacks that killed or wounded thousands of civilians. In 2019, Washington toughened the measures with the <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act/index.html">Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act</a>. Prompted by photographs of 6,785 detainees, most of them tortured to death in the regime’s prisons, the Act aimed at industries related to infrastructure, military maintenance, and energy production.</p>
<p>But the US, European, and international sanctions included exemptions for humanitarian aid. In November 2021, after <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/navigating-humanitarian-exceptions-in-syria-oct2020.pdf">reports from NGOs</a> about obstacles to their operations, the US Treasury <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0505">expanded its general license</a> to “facilitate legitimate humanitarian activity while continuing to deny support to malicious actors”. </p>
<p>As the European Union <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/31/syria-council-extends-sanctions-against-the-regime-for-another-year/">extended its measures in May 2022</a>, it reiterated that “the export of food, medicines or medical equipment are not subject to EU sanctions, and a number of specific exceptions are foreseen for humanitarian purposes”.</p>
<p>Aid has been delivered to Damascus throughout the uprising despite the ongoing repression, but much of it has wound up in the pockets <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2018/09/how-un-humanitarian-aid-propped-up-assad-regime/">of the Assad regime</a> and its cronies. A review of <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2022/01/assad-regime-100-million-un-aid/">779 UN procurement entries</a> for 2019-2020 found that, with manipulation of exchange rates, the regime diverted US$100 million (£83 million). Other funds were taken from NGOs operating in regime-controlled areas.</p>
<p>Human Rights Watch and the Syrian Legal Development Programme <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/27/syria-major-problems-un-procurement-practices">summarised</a> that the Syria case showed how UN agencies were exposed “to significant reputational and actual risk of financing abusive actors and/or actors that operate in high-risk sectors without sufficient safeguards”.</p>
<p>Despite this, the European Union accepted the request of the regime for assistance under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. An initial <a href="https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/earthquake-eu-mobilises-support-syria-and-further-aid-turkiye-2023-02-08_en">€3.5 million (£3.1 million) was allocated</a> for access to “shelter, water and sanitation, and health various items” as well as support of search-and-rescue operations.</p>
<p>Germany followed with the announcement of an additional €26 million in humanitarian assistance, and the UK with £3 million.</p>
<p>On Thursday, the US Treasury announced an <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1261">extension of the licence</a> for humanitarian aid “to make very clear that US sanctions in Syria will not stand in the way of lifesaving efforts for the Syrian people”.</p>
<h2>Cutting off opposition areas</h2>
<p>The most daunting barrier to international aid has long been erected around the opposition-controlled areas in northwest Syria. In 2014, the UN <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/12/486582">authorised four cross-border posts</a> for aid operations, two from Turkey into northwest Syria and two from Iraq into the northeast.</p>
<p>By 2022, Russia’s veto in the UN security council had reduced the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-syria-humanitarian-aid-veto-united-nations/31935855.html#:%7E:text=International%20humanitarian%20aid%20trucks%20cross,diplomats%20warned%20of%20potential%20catastrophe.">four posts to one</a>, the Bab al-Hawa crossing from Turkey into Idlib province. Had it not been for the politics around Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russians might have <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2023/01/un-extends-aid-nw-syria-6-months/">shut down that last post</a> in January, cutting off 4 million people from any access to assistance.</p>
<p>In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the route from Turkey to Bab al-Hawa was badly damaged. Turkish authorities had to grant permission but were “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/08/syria-earthquake-sanctions-idlib-aid/">completely overwhelmed with dealing and helping their own people</a>”. The UN hesitated to use other crossings amid the past objections of the Assad regime and Russia.</p>
<p>As a result, the first movement of aid – six trucks with tents and hygiene products – only reached northwest Syria on <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133317">Thursday morning</a>, more than 72 hours after the earthquake.</p>
<p>With rescuers relying on old cranes, pickaxes, and shovels, the head of the White Helmets civil defence organisation, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/first-un-aid-quake-convoy-reaches-syria-sources-say-2023-02-09/">Raed al-Saleh, said</a>: “The UN are not delivering the aid that we are in most need of to help us save lives, with time running out.”</p>
<p>Political economist <a href="https://www.mei.edu/profile/karam-shaar">Karam Shaar</a> of the Middle East Institute summarised on Twitter: “The groaning of the thousands trapped under the rubble has ceased over the past few hours. Why didn’t the UN drop aid? Because they need permission from Damascus: the same Damascus that has been bombing them day and night.”</p>
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<p>Meanwhile, as the death toll climbs in both Assad and opposition-controlled areas of Syria, the political drumbeat from Damascus goes on. The regime’s foreign minister, Feisal Mikdad, meeting a senior UN official on Thursday, <a href="https://sana.sy/en/?p=299774">proclaimed without any apparent irony</a>: “The western politicisation of the humanitarian assistance is unacceptable.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199691/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Damascus is putting politics above its people as it hinders the international aid response.Scott Lucas, Professor, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1962522022-12-08T18:11:23Z2022-12-08T18:11:23ZUkraine recap: prepare for a ‘long war’ says Putin – but most Russians beg to disagree<p>If nuclear weapons are used in Ukraine, it won’t be Russia that starts it, says Russian president Vladimir Putin – ostensibly seeking to reassure the world while also delivering an arch reminder that he does, after all, have the power to swing the world’s largest nuclear arsenal into action if he chooses. </p>
<p>Putin was speaking to what has been described as “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/07/vladimir-putin-says-russias-war-on-ukraine-could-be-long-term-process">his personal human rights council</a>”, skirting for the moment the convenience of having your own human rights council when the United Nations human rights council, the OHCHR, tends to insist on paying more than lip service to awkward things such as … human rights. </p>
<p>The Russian president also said he thought that the war in Ukraine was becoming a lengthier operation than he had initially thought, but reassured the public that he had no plans for further mobilisation. This last point is a key message for Putin, who will have been concerned at recent internal polling conducted for the Kremlin’s Federal Guard Service (FSO) and leaked to the exiled dissident news website Meduza, that support for the war has fallen to about <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-new-figures-show-only-one-in-four-russians-support-it-but-that-wont-be-enough-to-oust-putin-196163">one in four</a> of the population. </p>
<p>Natasha Lindstaedt of the University of Essex, one of whose research specialisms is the operation of authoritarian regimes, believes that while this collapse in support for the war will certainly give Putin much food for thought, the idea that his leadership is at risk – which many media outlets took as a cue for intense speculation – is, for the present at least, fanciful. Over more than two decades Putin has effectively “coup-proofed” his presidency and he has more or less complete control over Russia’s political and social elites. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-new-figures-suggest-only-one-in-four-russians-support-it-but-that-wont-be-enough-to-oust-putin-196163">Ukraine war: new figures suggest only one in four Russians support it, but that won't be enough to oust Putin</a>
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<p>But if Russia’s military continues its below-par performance on the battlefield, you can expect the level of dissatisfaction to continue to rise. Despite Russia’s attempts to destroy Ukraine’s power grids, the Ukrainian people continue to make do and mend, constantly repairing and patching up and conserving power through scheduled blackouts when needed. Scott Lucas, a professor of international affairs at the Clinton Institute, University College Dublin, explains this and various other factors which are likely to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/four-fronts-in-the-ukraine-russia-war-to-look-out-for-as-winter-bites-196230">hallmarks of the conflict</a> as winter sets in.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/four-fronts-in-the-ukraine-russia-war-to-look-out-for-as-winter-bites-196230">Four 'fronts' in the Ukraine-Russia war to look out for as winter bites</a>
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<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
<em>The Conversation, a not-for-profit newsgroup, works with a wide range of academics across its global network to produce evidence-based analysis. Get these recaps in your inbox every Thursday. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapTop">Subscribe here</a>.</em></p>
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<h2>Battlefields: Ukraine and Syria</h2>
<p>Among other things, Lucas gives us a brief snapshot of the various battlefronts, chiefly in the south and east of the country. But Frank Ledwidge, a specialist in military strategy at the University of Portsmouth, drills right down into the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-the-kinburn-spit-is-of-vital-military-significance-and-opens-up-the-recapture-of-crimea-195870?notice=Article+has+been+updated.">Kinburn spit</a>, a tiny headland at the mouth of the Dnipro river, which – he says – will be of “enormous strategic importance” over coming weeks.</p>
<p>A tiny strip of land about 40km long and between 4km and 12km wide, the spit’s position enable whoever controls it to command entry to the Dnipro river and also project influence south and east into the Black Sea. Its strategic importance, writes Ledwidge, explains the numerous battles that have been fought to control it over centuries.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-the-kinburn-spit-is-of-vital-military-significance-and-opens-up-the-recapture-of-crimea-195870">Ukraine war: why the Kinburn spit is of vital military significance and opens up the recapture of Crimea</a>
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<p>Ledwidge believes an operation to retake it is already underway. We’ll be watching carefully in the coming days and weeks. Meanwhile – despite the accepted wisdom that fighting slows down or stops in winter in inhospitable climates such as Russia and Ukraine, some military analysts believe that Ukraine will seek to capitalise on the Russian military’s low morale and shortages of munitions to press ahead with its counteroffensives in the south and east. </p>
<p>Liam Collins, a former US military intelligence officer and the founder of the Modern War Institute of the United States Military Academy West Point, <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-troops-poor-performance-and-low-morale-may-worsen-during-a-winter-of-more-discontent-195683">writes that Russia</a> “lacks the ability to conduct large-scale attacks, and it is left with little option but to continue … conducting missile strikes against targets that are either defenseless or offer little strategic value”. He adds that: “the cold will further lower – if that is possible – the already low morale of Russia’s poorly outfitted and undertrained soldiers”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-troops-poor-performance-and-low-morale-may-worsen-during-a-winter-of-more-discontent-195683">Russian troops' poor performance and low morale may worsen during a winter of more discontent</a>
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<p>It’s often overlooked that, thousands of miles from the battlefields of Ukraine, Russia is already embroiled in a conflict in Syria where it backs the regime of Bashar al-Assad against opposition groups variously supported by the US and its allies and others supported by the regional power, Turkey. Turkey recently launched airstrikes against Kurdish groups in the north of Syria and Iraq. </p>
<p>Stefan Wolff, an international security expert from the University of Birmingham, believes that reigniting the conflict in Syria could <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-forgotten-war-what-russia-could-win-from-the-reignited-conflict-in-syria-195869">benefit Russia</a> by bringing Ankara and Moscow closer together as it will inevitably pit Turkey and its proxies against groups that derive their support from the US. And Putin’s support for Assad will go down well with Iran, which may help in negotiations over fresh arms supplies. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-forgotten-war-what-russia-could-win-from-the-reignited-conflict-in-syria-195869">The forgotten war: what Russia could win from the reignited conflict in Syria</a>
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<h2>The diplomatic front</h2>
<p>We also have this fascinating piece about the way Turkey has often rather adroitly pivoted between supporting Russia and the west from Georgios Giannakopoulos, from the Centre for Hellenic Studies, King’s College London. Giannakopoulos <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-turkey-is-the-pivot-point-between-russia-and-the-us-history-shows-us-why-195406">charts the delicate diplomatic game</a> being played by the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as he tries to fulfil his country’s obligations as a Nato member while also maintaining a close relationship with Putin. This east-west divide is a dilemma that has exercised Turkish leaders for a century or more.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-turkey-is-the-pivot-point-between-russia-and-the-us-history-shows-us-why-195406">Ukraine war: Turkey is the pivot point between Russia and the US – history shows us why</a>
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<p>Since Putin sent his military into Ukraine at the end of February, around 1.5 million Ukrainians have settled in neighbouring Poland, which initially welcomed them with open arms. There were already about 1.3 million Ukrainians living in Poland – mostly young men of working age who have taken up residence there for mainly economic reasons but also to escape the turmoil after Russia’s intervention and annexation of Crimea in 2014.</p>
<p>Félix Krawatzek and Piotr Goldstein, of the University of Oxford and the Zentrum für Osteuropa und Internationale Studien (ZOiS) in Berlin, have <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-poland-welcomed-refugees-with-open-arms-at-first-but-survey-shows-relations-are-becoming-more-strained-196080">conducted a survey</a> in Poland of both young people and those older Poles who remember the turmoil of the early 1990s. It reveals that while most people believe Poland is doing the right thing by hosting so many desperate people, the sense of kinship with their neighbouring Ukrainians has come interesting nuances.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-poland-welcomed-refugees-with-open-arms-at-first-but-survey-shows-relations-are-becoming-more-strained-196080">Ukraine war: Poland welcomed refugees with open arms at first, but survey shows relations are becoming more strained</a>
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<p>Finally – and with a nod to the aforementioned survey which finds most Russians want negotiations to end the conflict, we have some pointers from the Northern Ireland peace agreement that all sides would do well to bear in mind. </p>
<p>Thomas Hadden, now professor emeritus with the school of law at Queen’s University Belfast, was involved over many years and in various capacities with the peace process. He <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-the-northern-ireland-peace-process-can-tell-us-about-ending-this-conflict-195757">believes that</a> “only compromise will make it possible to bring this conflict to an end” – and offers examples of his reasoning from Northern Ireland as well as Colombia and South Africa.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-the-northern-ireland-peace-process-can-tell-us-about-ending-this-conflict-195757">Ukraine war: what the Northern Ireland peace process can tell us about ending this conflict</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a weekly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Some of the key articles from our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past week.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1942452022-12-01T19:02:15Z2022-12-01T19:02:15ZFriday essay: how the West betrayed Syria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497552/original/file-20221128-19-9f5mq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=142%2C245%2C8484%2C5497&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Syrian refugees watch health workers visiting a refugee camp in Lebanon in October to help contain a cholera outbreak. More than half the country's population is still displaced.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bilal Hussein/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“Assad, or we burn the country,” Syrian government loyalists chanted in 2011. It was a statement of intent that proved to be prophetic.</p>
<p>In early 2011, the Arab Spring tore through Tunisia, then Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Oman, Yemen, and Jordan. Syria stood at the precipice as people rose up against the dictatorship of President Bashar al-Assad, who had ruled since 2000.</p>
<p>Assad had assumed power from his father who had himself taken power in a military coup and then ruthlessly cracked down on the opposition. Hopes that Assad junior would prove be a reformist soon dissipated as his regime too ruled with an iron fist: a security state that used terror and torture to keep control. </p>
<p>The regime responded to peaceful protests with force, gunning marchers down in the streets of cities like Daraa and Hama. The opposition – bolstered by mass defections from the army – turned to force. But the opposition was always fragmented, riven by internal dissent and a sharp divide between secularists, moderate Islamists, extremists, and the Kurds.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, they made significant gains. Assad responded brutally, gradually reclaiming control of much of the country through a campaign of indiscriminate bombing, siege and starvation, mass detention, torture, and killing.</p>
<p>As diplomats at the United Nations argued about what to do in Libya few seemed to understand that Syria was descending into a hell that would consume more than half a million lives, displace more than half the population, incubate the genocidal Islamic State, and draw in Iran, Hezbollah, Russia, the United States, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Britain, France and others – including Australia. </p>
<p>Except for the courageous <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Helmets_(Syrian_civil_war)">Syrian White Helmets</a> and a few humanitarian organisations, no-one made the protection of Syrians from atrocities their priority. As the UN’s envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, put it in 2015, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>everybody had their agenda and the interests of the Syrian people came second, third, or not at all.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497557/original/file-20221128-15-zeetej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497557/original/file-20221128-15-zeetej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497557/original/file-20221128-15-zeetej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497557/original/file-20221128-15-zeetej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497557/original/file-20221128-15-zeetej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497557/original/file-20221128-15-zeetej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497557/original/file-20221128-15-zeetej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497557/original/file-20221128-15-zeetej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">White Helmet workers and civilians carry an injured man after a government airstrike hit the town of Ariha in Syria, July, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Syrian Civil Defense White Helmets/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>It is difficult to convey the sheer extent of the brutality inflicted on Syrians since the hope-filled days of Spring 2011. Raw numbers have a numbing effect. Syrians were shot in the streets as they protested. (They protest still, in the streets of <a href="https://npasyria.com/en/86880/">Daraa this month</a>). Tens of thousands were hauled into prisons and tortured until dead. </p>
<p>Barrel bombs packed with high explosives, nails, and makeshift shrapnel were hurled indiscriminately by the dozen into civilian neighborhoods. Men, women, and children were gassed to death with sarin and chlorine. </p>
<p>Civilians were shot, knifed, beheaded, and even crucified. They were denied food, water, and medicine to the point of malnutrition. Children had their homes brought down on top of them, were raped, shot, tortured, and forcibly recruited into armed groups. Women and girls in their thousands were kidnapped, trafficked, and sold as sex slaves. Schools and hospitals were systematically targeted and destroyed.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497510/original/file-20221128-14-lz1nah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497510/original/file-20221128-14-lz1nah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497510/original/file-20221128-14-lz1nah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497510/original/file-20221128-14-lz1nah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497510/original/file-20221128-14-lz1nah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497510/original/file-20221128-14-lz1nah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497510/original/file-20221128-14-lz1nah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497510/original/file-20221128-14-lz1nah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Syrian child receives treatment after an alleged chemical attack at a field hospital in Saraqib, Idlib province, northern Syria, 04 April 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stringer/EPA</span></span>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-tadamon-massacre-two-researchers-secretly-investigate-mass-murders-in-syria-190165">The Tadamon Massacre: Two researchers secretly investigate mass murders in Syria</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Syrian government and its Iranian and Russian allies were not responsible for all Syria’s atrocities, but they were responsible for the vast majority.</p>
<p>Datasets compiled by groups such as the <a href="https://www.syriahr.com/en/152189/">Syrian Observatory for Human Rights</a> and <a href="https://www.statista.com/topics/4216/the-syrian-civil-war/#topicHeader__wrapper">private statistic companies</a> record the number of civilians killed by the government and its allies between 2011 and 2021 as being between 175,000 and 207,000. In comparison, those same datasets record that ISIS was responsible for the deaths of between 5,000 and 6,500 Syrian civilians. The number of civilians killed by other opposition groups ranges between 6,000 and 11,000. </p>
<p>Put another way, the Syrian government and its Russian and Iranian allies are likely responsible for between 86% and 94% of all civilian deaths directly caused by the war. There is no place for moral equivalency here.</p>
<h2>Failure of conscience</h2>
<p>Today, Assad’s government nominally controls about three quarters of the country. The region around <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idlib_Governorate">Idlib</a>, in the north-west, remains in opposition hands, principally those of radical Islamists though other groups operate there too and the area houses more than two million displaced Syrian civilians.</p>
<p>Turkey holds a pocket of land around the city of Afrin and along its border, and the Kurds continue to control most of the land they claimed during the war, a condition thus far tolerated by Damascus. Last week Istanbul launched missile attacks against Kurds in north-east Syria.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497554/original/file-20221128-22-9ljzak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497554/original/file-20221128-22-9ljzak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497554/original/file-20221128-22-9ljzak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497554/original/file-20221128-22-9ljzak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497554/original/file-20221128-22-9ljzak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497554/original/file-20221128-22-9ljzak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497554/original/file-20221128-22-9ljzak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497554/original/file-20221128-22-9ljzak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Workers clean up destruction in Yarmouk camp in Damascus, Syria, which saw heavy fighting.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Omar Sanadiki/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In government held areas, arbitrary detention, forced disappearance, and killing remain common. Torture is still <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G22/463/09/PDF/G2246309.pdf?OpenElement">employed systematically</a>. Collective punishments are commonly employed, and families thought associated with the opposition have had property seized. </p>
<p>More than half the country’s population is displaced either inside Syria or in neighboring countries, principally Turkey and Lebanon. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/generous-aid-to-ukraine-is-diverting-resources-away-from-other-refugee-crises-around-the-world-190961">Generous aid to Ukraine is diverting resources away from other refugee crises around the world</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497519/original/file-20221128-26-2u2bsv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497519/original/file-20221128-26-2u2bsv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497519/original/file-20221128-26-2u2bsv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497519/original/file-20221128-26-2u2bsv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497519/original/file-20221128-26-2u2bsv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497519/original/file-20221128-26-2u2bsv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497519/original/file-20221128-26-2u2bsv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497519/original/file-20221128-26-2u2bsv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An aerial view taken with a drone shows sewage water surrounding shelters of Syrian refugees at Kalbeet camp, north Idlib, 29 October 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yahya Nemah/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There were many points when world leaders could have taken different decisions from the ones they did. Different decisions could have saved lives. For Russia and Iran, protecting Assad was always more important than protecting ordinary Syrians. For their ally, China, solidarity with political friends and an instinctive preference for brutal yet orderly authoritarianism were paramount.</p>
<p>What concessions to humanity these nations made were wrung out of them through intense diplomatic pressure, fears of Western military unilateralism and calculations of self-interest. The disarming of Syria’s chemical weapons after 2013 was agreed to only to forestall US airstrikes. At the peak of the war, “humanitarian” evacuation agreements were accepted by Assad’s government because they facilitated surrenders and forced displacement.</p>
<p>Western governments exhibited genuine humanitarian concern. But it was shallow concern always tempered by fears of international jihadist terrorism, political instability, and refugees, and the US ambition to withdraw from the Middle East and avoid creeping military entanglements. </p>
<p>The result was a dangerously contradictory strategy that involved vocal backing for human rights and democracy without offering the material support needed for these values to prevail. </p>
<p>Concerns about getting drawn into new military commitments inhibited serious consideration of options such as safe zones, no-fly zones, or targeted strikes against government artillery and aircraft used to terrorise civilians – options that <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/publication/turkeys-interventions-its-near-abroad-case-idlib">Turkey proved in 2020</a> (when it used force to prevent the collapse of Idlib) could be utilised to good effect. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497517/original/file-20221128-20-fmn7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497517/original/file-20221128-20-fmn7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497517/original/file-20221128-20-fmn7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497517/original/file-20221128-20-fmn7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497517/original/file-20221128-20-fmn7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497517/original/file-20221128-20-fmn7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497517/original/file-20221128-20-fmn7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497517/original/file-20221128-20-fmn7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A displaced Syrian girl looks out from her tent at Abu Makki camp, on the outskirts of Idlib, Syria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sedat Suna/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Fateful decisions</h2>
<p>In 2011, the Obama administration stumbled on a strategy of trying to coerce Assad to share power by providing just enough support to keep the fight going but not enough to bring the opposition victory. </p>
<p>This strategy rested on an assumption no less flawed than the belief that Assad’s fall was inevitable: that Assad could be coerced into stepping down. It was a strategy that took no heed of the regime’s nature or its oft-stated intent to claim “every inch” of Syria by force. A flawed strategy always doomed to fail.</p>
<p>With the rise of ISIS in 2014, even this approach was pushed aside in favour of combating the caliphate and managing the refugee crisis. For the chaotic Trump administration, which came to power in late 2016, Syria – even with ISIS – was never more than a “strategic sideshow,” as one of several short-lived National Security Advisers, John Bolton, explained. </p>
<p>The inheritors of Bush Jnr’s “war on terror” were determined to avoid the mistakes of the past but in their determination to prevent resurgent jihadist terrorism, they contributed directly to the rise of first <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-nusra-front-syrias-top-islamist-militia">al-Nusra</a> and then ISIS, and to the fragmenting and marginalisation of Syria’s peaceful protestors and mainstream opposition. </p>
<p>The US and its allies did eventually intervene in 2014, first with air strikes and special forces and then with a more extensive ground campaign – but to counter ISIS, not protect Syrians. The US-led coalition’s intervention helped some Syrians – notably the Kurds – in the short-term, but while it saved some Kurds from ISIS, its hasty execution exposed others to Turkish encroachment on their territory.</p>
<p>Regional powers also had their own priorities. The protection of Syrian civilians was rarely near the top. Syria’s neighbours played out their geopolitical struggle through the lives of Syria’s people.</p>
<p>More than two-thirds of Syria’s population are Sunni Muslim. These formed the backbone of the protest movement. One of the greatest cruelties of all was that those states with vast resources and a proclaimed affinity with Syria’s Sunnis – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Turkey, and Jordan – privileged their own interests over the collective interests of the people they claimed they were helping. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498401/original/file-20221201-24-vgdi9d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498401/original/file-20221201-24-vgdi9d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498401/original/file-20221201-24-vgdi9d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498401/original/file-20221201-24-vgdi9d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498401/original/file-20221201-24-vgdi9d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498401/original/file-20221201-24-vgdi9d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498401/original/file-20221201-24-vgdi9d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498401/original/file-20221201-24-vgdi9d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Syrian Free Army soldiers praying during an offensive in 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aref Tammawi/AAP</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Rather than helping build a united opposition, they fermented and rewarded factionalism. Rather than encouraging a Syrian-led Free Syrian Army, a group initially <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-free-syrian-army-a-decentralized-insurgent-brand/">founded by ex army officers </a>, they tried to boost their own influence by arming and funding a panoply of small and fractious armed groups. </p>
<p>And rather than instilling in their clients the values of moderation and inclusiveness, they encouraged the lurch toward extremism. Regional powers created a competitive marketplace for arms, fighters, and funds that encouraged factionalism, rewarded extremism, and sowed the seeds of the opposition’s destruction.</p>
<h2>What about civilians?</h2>
<p>Everything else flowed from the key fact that the fate of Syria’s civilians was no one’s priority. There were critical junctures when things might have turned out differently had protection been prioritised. Yet at each turn there was always something else judged more important. The fate of <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/2016/03/un-mediation-syrian-crisis">Kofi Annan’s mediation mission</a> in 2012 – effectively abandoned by a UN Security Council that had endorsed it – was one such instance. </p>
<p>There were many more mis-steps. Obama’s decision not to authorise air strikes in 2013. The UN’s decision not to refer the torture and killing of thousands trapped by Syria’s detention system to the International Criminal Court. </p>
<p>Russia’s decision to <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3180.html">prop up Assad with military force</a>. The West’s decision to not back Sunni opposition groups battling ISIS. Decisions to allow Assad to <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/syria-stole-100m-un-aid-manipulated-currency-value-report-2021-10">manipulate humanitarian aid to his advantage</a>. The series of decisions by the UN Security Council to allow the cities of Hama, Homs, Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta, and Deraa to be toppled one-by-one.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497520/original/file-20221128-533-jy07b6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497520/original/file-20221128-533-jy07b6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497520/original/file-20221128-533-jy07b6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497520/original/file-20221128-533-jy07b6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497520/original/file-20221128-533-jy07b6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497520/original/file-20221128-533-jy07b6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497520/original/file-20221128-533-jy07b6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497520/original/file-20221128-533-jy07b6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Photos on porcelain decorated with images of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar Assad in a souvenir shop in Damascus, Syria, April 18, 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hassan Ammar/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Once the fleeting belief in the inevitability of Assad’s fall evaporated, Western fears about instability and entanglement fed a deeply flawed assumption that drove a political strategy doomed from the outset to fail. That assumption was that Syria’s president could be persuaded or coerced into negotiating a political settlement that would satisfy the opposition’s core demands. </p>
<p>But no paper agreement could end state terror while Assad held onto the levers of Syria’s security apparatus. </p>
<p>To think otherwise was to misunderstand the personalised, patrimonial, and intensely brutal nature of Assad’s regime. It was also to be wilfully deaf to what Assad said repeatedly: that he would not be coerced; that he would reclaim “every inch” of Syria. Those who talked to him usually came to the same conclusion, though it took some longer than others to reach it. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494549/original/file-20221109-11-j43zkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494549/original/file-20221109-11-j43zkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494549/original/file-20221109-11-j43zkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494549/original/file-20221109-11-j43zkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494549/original/file-20221109-11-j43zkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494549/original/file-20221109-11-j43zkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494549/original/file-20221109-11-j43zkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494549/original/file-20221109-11-j43zkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption"></span>
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<p>The UN’s first envoy, Kofi Annan, reported that Assad had no interest in serious negotiation. Its second envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, quickly reached the same conclusion. The third UN envoy, Staffan de Mistura, skirted around the issue for years propping up a zombified peace process that existed only in the minds of those paid to attend. But even he eventually reached the same conclusion. </p>
<p>No matter how often these flawed assumptions were exposed, governments persisted with a strategy dependent on the good graces of the very regimes they knew to be responsible for mass atrocities. We cannot be surprised that they failed.</p>
<p>Yet despite it all, Assad has still not retaken “every inch”. He likely never will. The Syrian economy has nosedived toward total collapse. Hyperinflation has brought home a new reality to Assad’s loyalist circle, a future with limited income, destroyed infrastructure, and little hope of reconstruction.</p>
<p>A future in which Syria’s governing elite will be dependent on Iran and Russia, two states with their own troubles that will likely diminish their ability and eagerness to prop up Assad, much less pay for reconstruction.</p>
<p>In much of the country, the government rules in name only. The security state on which Assad depends is no longer controlled exclusively by Syria’s government or the Assad family. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/children-are-being-used-as-human-shields-in-syria-what-is-the-world-doing-about-it-175655">Children are being used as 'human shields' in Syria – what is the world doing about it?</a>
</strong>
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</p>
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<p>Russia all but controls the remaining functional parts of Syria’s armed forces; Iranian proxies in their tens of thousands have established themselves across the country in militias, causing resentment even among loyalists. Elsewhere, government control depends on a loose network of militias, each with its own loyalties and interests. It is a brutal compact already fraying – the <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/protests-daraa-syria-undermine-assads-narrative-victory">daily protests in Daraa</a> are far from the only signals of this.</p>
<p>Of Assad’s foreign allies, only Iran comes out of the war the stronger – its militias, weapons factories and stores, and networks now positioned across Syria are not far from the Golan Heights. But even this apparent success came at a colossal cost. Iran’s Shi’ite militia and Hezbollah allies sustained heavy losses, and the Syrian meat grinder helped cripple Iran’s economy. Spending more than $1 billion per year on Assad’s defence, the Iranian economy spiralled downward in 2020, provoking anti-government protests.</p>
<p>Russia succeeded in reasserting its place on the global stage by helping prop up Assad. But even before it invaded Ukraine, the nation found itself politically isolated, backing a Syrian regime it knows cannot command the loyalty of most of its people – a collapsed state run like a loose network of mafia fiefdoms facing a huge reconstruction bill. </p>
<p>Looking back to its original goals, Moscow’s policy failed completely in its first purpose: containing extreme violent Islamism. Its strategy of backing Assad helped embolden ISIS, which was suppressed only with significant American and Kurdish help. </p>
<p>Even with ISIS seemingly defeated, it would be difficult to claim that Moscow faces less of a threat from jihadi terrorism in the 2020s than it did in 2011. Its disastrous invasion of Ukraine has forced Moscow to reduce its support to Assad, giving up ground in the great game of political influence to Iran. Russia’s imperial dreams reached their apogee for a while in Syria but were fraying even before they were crushed in the fields of Ukraine.</p>
<p>It is not just that Assad’s long-predicted victory remains incomplete. It is that by refusing to deal properly with a regime responsible for mass atrocities, the international community is storing up trouble for the future.</p>
<p>The ghosts of the recent past will haunt Syria’s future until there is, at last, a reckoning. The UN, an increasing number of governments, and even some human rights organisations believe an authoritarian peace is possible. That Assad victorious can be coaxed to reform, his terrorised people persuaded to meekly accept their fate. </p>
<p>They are wrong. The violence and the suffering will likely continue until there is a reckoning with Assad and his allies.</p>
<p><em>Alex Bellamy’s Syria Betrayed: Atrocities, War, and the Failure of International Diplomacy is published by Columbia University Press.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194245/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex Bellamy receives funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.</span></em></p>More than half a million people have died in Syria’s war with half the population displaced. The suffering will continue until there is a reckoning with Assad and his allies.Alex Bellamy, Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1939882022-11-21T09:33:46Z2022-11-21T09:33:46ZThe European Union in Syria: too complacent?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493529/original/file-20221104-10296-2qp6wd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C242%2C2044%2C1287&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dan Stoenescu, head of the EU delegation for Syria, during a visit to the territories controlled by the Damascus regime on 8 August 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=603503987803706&set=pcb.603504244470347">Dan Stoenescu/Facebook</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since 2011, Bashar Al-Assad has waged a brutal war that has taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of Syrians – estimates range between <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/06/un-human-rights-office-estimates-more-306000-civilians-were-killed-over-10">306,000</a> and <a href="https://www.syriahr.com/en/243125/">610,000 victims</a>. Overwhelming evidence ties Al-Assad to a range of <a href="https://onu.delegfrance.org/bashar-al-assad-is-guilty-of-war-crimes">war crimes and genocidal practices</a>, and the European Union has long advocated a firm stance against his regime.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/syria/who-we-are_en?s=209">EU Delegation for Syria</a>, which moved to Beirut in 2012, is designed to promote European values and supervise EU external relations and aid policy. In the name of pragmatism, it has recently tended to change its tone toward the Syrian government in place. What are the consequences?</p>
<h2>A firmness that only lasted so long</h2>
<p>Six months after the start of the Syrian revolution, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/the-right-honourable-catherine-ashton-baroness-upholland">Catherine Ashton</a>, then EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_11_504">demanded the departure of Bashar Al-Assad</a>. This was in line with the strategy adopted within the UN Security Council by the United States and a majority of European countries, including France and the United Kingdom.</p>
<p>In an August 2012 speech, US president Barack Obama defined a <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/obama-syria-foreign-policy-red-line-revisited-214059/">“red line”</a> that, if crossed, would lead to devastating consequences for the Damascus regime: the use of chemical weapons. Just a year later, Al-Assad did just that in <a href="https://www.state.gov/ninth-anniversary-of-the-ghouta-syria-chemical-weapons-attack/">Eastern Ghouta</a>, yet the attack remained without consequences. Washington’s reversal heralded the EU’s gradual shift.</p>
<p>Indeed, from 2015 onwards, the fear of a “refugee crisis”, coupled with the initial successes of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220228-russia-s-growing-ties-to-syria-amid-military-backing">Russian intervention</a> and the establishment of <a href="https://www.eurasian-research.org/publication/de-escalation-zones-in-syria-pro-et-contra/">“de-escalation zones”</a> in Syria, led the EU to focus on economic sanctions and humanitarian aid. It thus ruled out the possibility of trying to exert political influence to facilitate a resolution of the conflict.</p>
<p>At the time, researcher Dimitris Bouris and Anis Nacrour, former head of the EU delegation to Syria, <a href="https://www.iemed.org/publication/the-ins-and-outs-of-the-eus-shortcomings-in-syria/">asserted</a> that EU was “reducing its room for manoeuvre to the role of financial partner and provider of technical assistance to UN mediation initiatives.” With the West no longer calling for Al-Assad’s departure with the same vigour, Damascus’s allies began to assert that he had won the war – and this, despite the persistence of <a href="https://snhr.org/blog/2022/09/04/the-most-notable-human-rights-violations-in-syria-in-august-2022/">systematic</a> even <a href="https://aljumhuriya.net/en/2019/09/19/terror-genocide-and-the-genocratic-turn/">genocidal violence</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/9_L623CqWr0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Syria: EU humanitarian aid (2021).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The EU has gradually adopted the idea of an [“early rehabilitation plan”]plan (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/opportunities-strengthening-resilience-and-advancing-early-recovery-syria_en), is heavily involved in Syria alongside the UN, which has continued to call for a ceasefire combined with a Syrian-initiated political solution since the Security Council’s unanimous adoption of <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2015/sc12171.doc.htm">resolution 2254 in December 2015)</a>.</p>
<p>This cooperation is manifested in the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2022/05/10/">annual conference on aid for the future of Syria and the countries of the region</a>. In May 2022, 6.4 billion euros were mobilised.</p>
<h2>Recent EU diplomatic movements</h2>
<p>Until 2021, the EU delegation to Syria remained discreet about the composition of its team, its activities and its movements in Damascus. </p>
<p>That changed with the <a href="https://www.rri.ro/en_gb/april_17_2021-2635454">September 2021 appointment</a> of Romanian diplomat <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/410120_nl?s=209">Dan Stoenescu</a> to head the delegation. In his first official trip to Damascus, he met with Imran Raza, UN resident coordinator, as well as <a href="https://www.facebook.com/EUinSyria/posts/pfbid02fKLKchSbPkpxNxCyV2BhMGbAvoY6kPcjsRCjMZBFG2mSG1MHdiTKVZJcmXcUCAjgl">representatives of humanitarian aid agencies</a>, including the Red Cross, UNDP, WHO and the World Food Programme, as well as numerous diplomats.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dan Stoenescu, in blue suit in the centre, stands alongside the International Committee of the Red Cross president Christophe Martin and others, in Damascus, September 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=2985836848370514&set=pcb.2985841275036738">EU Delegation to Syria Facebook page</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With this first visit to the regime-controlled area, Stoenescu broke the European promise not to favour Al-Assad’s quest for legitimacy. The presence of European diplomats whose Syrian embassies had closed since 2012 (only the Czech Republic’s embassy remained open; currently, seven European embassies are open) also breaks the taboo of resuming a form of exchange.</p>
<p>The visits are described in full transparency on the delegation’s and Stoenescu’s Facebook pages. On 8 August 2022, Stoenescu goes on a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid031k9xXuqixD9QXhZSmbkGYjuRkZeMbSXD9N1zN8gnMLXME7aAnpvk5ewPbzkkvhocl">“four-day humanitarian mission”</a> together with <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/head-european-union-delegation-joint-field-visit-aleppo-homs-hama">Imran Raza</a>. Three cities under the control of the regime are visited for the first time: Homs, Hama and the <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Moyen-Orient/Alep-sous-controle-regime-syrien-2016-12-23-1200812506">martyred city of Aleppo</a>.</p>
<h2>Archetypes of humanitarian and reconstruction discourse</h2>
<p>The delegation’s communication is that of a diplomatic service addressing a European audience that used to observing <a href="https://ia800307.us.archive.org/22/items/OnRevolution/ArendtOn-revolution.pdf">“suffering at a distance”</a>, to use Hannah Arendt’s phrase. Through its role as mediator, it must inform the citizens of the member countries but also of the whole world and <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/208779/1/cbs-phd2011-12.pdf">convey its conception of a form of social responsibility</a>. No culprit is named: the delegation does not opt for what the sociologist Luc Bolstanski defines as the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/la-souffrance-a-distance--9782864241641-page-91.htm">“topic of denunciation”</a>, which “turns away from the depressing consideration of the unfortunate and his suffering to look for a persecutor”, only the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/la-souffrance-a-distance--9782864241641-page-117.htm">“topic of feeling”</a>, which directs attention toward a benefactor and the good actions he or she accomplishes.</p>
<p>The responsibility here is humanitarian: it mobilises the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1468-0424.00298">“iconography of help”</a>. Any case of suffering <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/208779/1/cbs-phd2011-12.pdf">requires a good action</a>, “regardless of what brought the suffering on or what the consequences of assisting might be”.</p>
<p>The European action is divided into two parts: early reconstruction in the territories under the control of the regime, and humanitarian aid for refugees and displaced persons. The political scope of this strategy is relegated to the background. Stoenescu’s <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid02S3J2LA5u8p5Xz883QkgVvJjFNiTQVVxxvTSS2jnuTEb6aAFy1HEWyeAFdu6CaqSZl">reaction</a> to the Security Council’s adoption of <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/security-council-renews-cross-border-aid-operations-syrias-north-west-six-months-adopting-resolution-2642-2022-compromise-amid-divisions">resolution 2642</a>, which limits cross-border aid operations in northwestern Syria to six months so as to prevent Russia from using its veto power, is an example:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The humanitarian needs of Syrians, the majority of whom are women and children, should not be politicised! […] Cross-border operations must be depoliticised and must increase.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Through <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid0BrwfHHq7wqyERtqftXxSeTRvt5AJrJXENfqPE6GCSxTzrJJVtkYsywGAzxYz51Rnl">passive forms</a> focusing on the plight of the victims, the names of those responsible for the abuses are carefully avoided, leading to a disempowering effect:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I am outraged by the recent attacks in northern Syria that are said to have killed more than 17 people […] Innocent people continue to be victims of this conflict!”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Syrians, on the other hand, are described here as a homogeneous group, thus erasing the existence of oppressors and oppressed. To quote the delegation’s <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/syria_en?s=209">official website </a>: “The EU and the Syrians have a common goal: a stable and peaceful Syria”; “our interest, as Europeans, is the same as what the Syrians want”.</p>
<p>To support its discourse, the delegation uses photographs to create the picture of a people “rebuilding” themselves through the reconstruction of <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid088VMS5E1bYnQQSJkyQjT2tD9o9TFzrVxMRwPD5W6TDhsLAkmn92azNoyaX5Kj5gSl">schools, medical facilities, an infrastructure</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dan Stoenescu at a school in al-Qusayr, 9 August 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=604297797724325&set=pcb.604299651057473">Dan Stoenescu/Facebook</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These emotionally powerful situations captivate the imagination of an often uninformed public, organise its <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674008014">“cultural knowledge”</a> of the region, and consolidate an idealised conception of the political situation in Syria. Thus, European readers discover “resilient” children <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid02rDsyh29SBjKTyYdZkm6JqGFRAyd9FYrkBFS49QXAmuLaFzjLrtLxApPw6FuwqyQ5l">colouring and singing together</a> in a youth centre in <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Moyen-Orient/Syrie-Damas-reconquete-dAlep-2016-09-23-1200791259">Aleppo</a>, or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid0PLoDgC684AMMWVrvbDhvZQbqG1eMJ8sATgKqQpTM86QCcvjCokjfAPC5mK4Wx2LWl">playing music</a> in <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/qusayr-rules-syrian-regimes-changing-way-war">al-Qusayr</a>.</p>
<p>Images from the <a href="https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/index_fr">Directorate General for Civil Protection and European Humanitarian Aid Operations</a> or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees sometimes counterbalance these idealised images. Refugee children, this time destitute, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/EUinSyria/posts/pfbid02ghGzhXBpdxGZ5xtLuWph7qfFZXsHKFjVAjDjHk2gZaz9ipMtiEa6ywhN81NPwjF8l">sitting on crates stamped “UNICEF”</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.facebook.com/EUinSyria/posts/pfbid02DnZ93CGdJhYz7339bRmnNQn3Szbk5jnGe3eu49JxJcVgmGULbLDGm243uLMNPrEql">mothers and infants</a> suffering from the cold of the camps in northeast Syria. These images <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1468-0424.00298">appeal to Western preconceptions</a> and emphasise the need to maintain international humanitarian assistance as it is.</p>
<h2>Early rehabilitation policy: what are the risks?</h2>
<p>The vision of the conflict conveyed by the EU and the UN has been denounced by politicians, activists, researchers and <a href="https://ifit-transitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Conclusions-and-Raecommendations-Toward-More-Principled-International-Support-A-Dialogue-between-Syrians-and-the-International-Community-31-March-2022-1.pdf">Syrian civil society organisations</a>, who warn that this policy must not be transformed into a political and financial support to Bashar Al-Assad.</p>
<p>At stake are the misappropriations of funds organised by the Syrian regime, which have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/oct/21/assad-regime-siphons-millions-in-aid-by-manipulating-syrias-currency">generated headlines</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/syria0619_web3.pdf">reports</a> alike. The <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-war-assad-millions-un-procurement-costs-companies">Syria Trust</a>, founded by Bashar Al-Assad’s wife, is an example of how international aid can enrich the president’s inner circle. The <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/09/04/paradox-of-syria-s-reconstruction-pub-79773">scandal affecting UN agencies</a> present in 2018 in Aleppo illustrates the risks of co-optation. The regime systematically bombed of the eastern part of the city, destroying schools, hospitals, homes, and infrastructure. Yet UN experts were forced by the regime to work only in the neighbourhoods of western Aleppo.</p>
<p>In such a context, Stoenescu’s recent trip to al-Qusayr – a city that was <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-battle-for-qusayr-how-the-syrian-regime-and-hizb-allah-tipped-the-balance/">violently recaptured by Hezbollah and Shiite militias in 2013</a> – raises questions. While described as apolitical and humanitarian, this official visit can’t help but endorse the regime’s strategy. In al-Qusayr, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-qusayr-idUSKCN1U20LP">2019 return of refugees</a> escorted by Hezbollah supported the regime’s official discourse that the country was now stabilised and safe.</p>
<p>Finally, the plan implemented by international agencies is not without dramatic consequences for Syrians seeking justice and accountability: reconstruction can lead to the erasure of war crimes, for example in the case of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/05/safe-no-more/students-and-schools-under-attack-syria">schools bombed by the regime</a>.</p>
<p>Consequently, the current UN and EU strategy needs to be challenged so that in the future it makes trusted local intermediaries a central part of conflict resolution. Such action will limit the leakage of European funds, corruption and co-option of humanitarian aid, and the process of normalisation of relations with the regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Élise Daniaud received a PhD contract from the LUISS Guido Carli University.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yahia Hakoum received a research grant.</span></em></p>In the name of contributing to the reconstruction of Syria, is the EU rehabilitating Bashar Al-Assad?Élise Daniaud, PhD candidate on Syria/Russia/Middle-East, LUISS Universita Guido CarliYahia Hakoum, Chercheur au Centre de Recherches Internationales (CERI), Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1927802022-10-18T18:38:33Z2022-10-18T18:38:33ZIranian drones used by Russia in Ukraine show that there’s already one victor in that war: Iran<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490397/original/file-20221018-22-a66uli.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C7%2C4985%2C3308&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ukrainian rescuers work at the site of a Kyiv residential building destroyed by a drone that local authorities consider to be Iranian-made. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-rescuers-work-at-the-site-of-a-residential-news-photo/1244045819?phrase=iranian%20drones&adppopup=true">Oleksii Chumachenko/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The war in Ukraine is helping one country achieve its foreign policy and national security objectives, but it’s neither Russia nor Ukraine.</p>
<p>It’s Iran.</p>
<p>That was starkly clear on the morning of Oct. 17, 2022, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/17/world/europe/russia-ukraine-iran-drones.html">as Iranian-made drones attacked civilian targets in Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv</a>. Russia used the Iranian drones to inflict damage on Ukraine’s national energy company headquarters, and the drones also killed four civilians.</p>
<p>Iran is among Russia’s most <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-iran-vladimir-putin-khamenei-nato-us/">vocal supporters</a> in the war. As <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/aaron-pilkington-1364407">a military analyst who specializes in Iranian national security strategy</a>, I see this having little to do with Ukraine and everything to do with Iran’s long-term strategy vis-à-vis the United States. </p>
<p>As Russia’s war on Ukraine passed six months and continued eroding Russia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62553629">manpower</a>, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-putin-admits-running-out-weapons-ukraine-war-invasion-state-duma-law-1720957">military stores</a>, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/russia-economy-sanctions-myths-ruble-business/?tpcc=recirc062921">economy</a> and <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russia-isolated-its-postimperial-phantasm">diplomatic connections</a>, leader Vladimir Putin opted for an unlikely but necessary <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/19/putin-russia-iran-ukraine-00046646">Iranian lifeline</a> to salvage victory in Ukraine and also in Syria where, since 2015, Russian soldiers have been fighting to keep Bashar al-Assad’s government in power. </p>
<p>And at a time when <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/10/17/iran-protests-gen-z-mahsa-amini-death">the Islamic Republic of Iran’s government is facing growing citizen protests</a> against its autocratic rule, Putin’s move has, in turn, helped Iran make progress in promoting its national interests, as defined by its leadership.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three men greet one another -- one in a black suit, the other two in black clerical robes with black headwraps" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, center, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, greet each other as Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stands at right during their meeting in Tehran, Iran, on July 19, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranRussia/f83bd4861f434cfa9da703a103a0be1b/photo?Query=Russia%20Iran&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=3751&currentItemNo=41">Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Opposing the US everywhere</h2>
<p>Since the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8w4Ku6l7OEI">Islamic Revolution of 1979</a>, Iran’s leaders have believed the United States is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-leader-death-to-america-means-policies-not-people/">constantly scheming</a> to <a href="https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/467788/%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%DA%98%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C">topple Iran’s government</a>. They view leaders in Washington as the greatest threat and obstacle to promoting Iranian national interests – achieving economic self-sufficiency, international legitimacy, regional security, power and influence. </p>
<p>The fears of Iran’s leaders are not irrational – the long history of U.S. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661">meddling</a> in Iranian affairs, continuous <a href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2009/09/08/the-axis-of-evil-and-the-great-satan/">open hostility</a> between the two countries and decades of U.S. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-10/guide-to-us-bases-surrounding-iran-in-the-middle-east/11855542">military buildup</a> in close proximity to Iran greatly concern leaders in Tehran. </p>
<p>The U.S. has <a href="https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/BSI/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY18.pdf#page=74">military forces in many</a> Middle Eastern countries, <a href="https://truthout.org/articles/bases-bases-everywhere-except-in-the-pentagons-report">with or without invitation</a>. To promote its national interests, Iran is working to force the U.S. military out of the region and reduce U.S. political influence there. </p>
<p>Iran has an even bigger aim: <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2012/aug/31/part-ii-khamenei-unworld-order">to overthrow</a> what it sees as the U.S.-dominated global political order. </p>
<p>Iran counters U.S. influence by maintaining partnerships with an assortment of nonstate militias and governments united by their fierce anti-U.S. hostility. The country <a href="https://nowlebanon.com/the-iranian-network/">nurtures a network</a> of militant partner and proxy groups, whose own political preferences and ambitions align with Iran’s objectives, by providing <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/05/09/new-mideast-task-force-can-counter-iranian-arms-smuggling-but-more-capabilities-are-needed/">weapons</a>, <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iran-lebanon-training-hezbollah">training</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/proxies-and-politics-why-iran-funds-foreign-militias">funds</a> – and, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/21/how-do-irans-proxies-actually-work/">in some cases</a>, direction. Among the recipients are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/">Hezbollah</a>, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad">Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad</a>, friendly <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/10/profiles-pro-iran-militias-iraq">Iraqi militias</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/09/16/why-iran-is-getting-blame-an-attack-saudi-arabia-claimed-by-yemens-houthis/">Ansar Allah</a> in Yemen, better known as the Houthis or the Houthi rebels. </p>
<p>Through these militias and their political arms, Iran extends its influence and works to shape an Iran-friendly government in states like Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/newsletters/2022/08/15/us-drone-attack-targets-us-base-in-syria-no-casualties/">It threatens</a> U.S. forces and antagonizes Western-allied governments in states such as Israel, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220714-jordans-position-towards-regional-issues-has-shifted-especially-on-iran/">Jordan</a>, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/bitter-rivals-iran-and-saudi-arabia/">Saudi Arabia</a>, <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/kuwait-and-iran-a-fluctuating-history-1.1341755">Kuwait</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2017/01/22/Iran-s-export-of-terrorism-poses-threat-to-Bahrain-as-well-as-the-Gulf">Bahrain</a> and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-de-facto-ruler-sees-iran-islamists-threat-ambitious-gulf-safe-haven-2022-05-13/">United Arab Emirates</a>. </p>
<p>At the national level, Iran maintains no permanent mutual defense treaties. Its closest strategic partners include Syria, <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-venezuela-relations-presidents-postures-and-pressures">Venezuela</a>, <a href="https://www.38north.org/2021/11/the-north-korea-iran-relationship-an-anti-american-alliance-or-transactional-partnership/">North Korea</a>, <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/research/china-iran-relations-limited-enduring-strategic-partnership">China</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/24/russia-iran-drones-sanctions/">Russia</a>. They cooperate <a href="https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/china-iran-create-parallel-global-chessboard/">politically</a>, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-china-sign-economic-security-agreement-challenging-u-s-pressure-11616866936">economically</a> and <a href="https://orinocotribune.com/iran-russia-china-to-carry-out-military-drills-in-venezuela/">militarily</a> to create an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-china-iran-russia-triangle-alternative-world-order/">alternative</a> to what their leaders perceive as the U.S.-led world political order. </p>
<p>That cooperation includes undermining <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/what-are-americas-national-interests">U.S. national interests</a> and helping ease or circumvent <a href="https://www.chairmont.com.au/post/russia-china-and-iran-circumventing-sanctions-trade-wars-us-dollar-and-blockchain">Western political pressure</a> and <a href="https://orinocotribune.com/venezuelan-deputy-julio-chavez-iran-russia-china-venezuela-alliance-can-circumvent-sanctions/">economic sanctions</a>. </p>
<h2>Tehran to the rescue</h2>
<p>Russia’s current war in Ukraine has <a href="https://www.nato-pa.int/content/finland-sweden-accession">left Moscow with only a handful of sympathetic friends</a>. </p>
<p>Few political leaders understand Putin’s newfound political isolation and related animosity toward the United States more than Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But Iran-Russia relations <a href="https://carnegiemoscow.org/2016/08/18/russia-and-iran-historic-mistrust-and-contemporary-partnership-pub-64365">are complicated</a>. </p>
<p>The two countries found common cause in helping Syrian strongman Assad defeat his country’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34710635">opposition forces</a>, but for different national interests. </p>
<p>Saving Assad helps Russia reassert itself as a <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/news/world/how-russia-used-the-war-in-syria-to-reassert-its-global-might/">major power</a> in the Middle East. For Iran, a friendly Syria is a <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/irans-unwavering-support-to-assads-syria/">critical link</a> in Iran’s anti-U.S., anti-Israel coalition. </p>
<p>As Russia and Iran fought to sustain Assad, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syria-war-russia-iran-influence/2021/05/19/7d26851e-a9d1-11eb-bca5-048b2759a489_story.html">they also competed</a> for lucrative postwar <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">reconstruction and infrastructure contracts</a> in that country, and to shape the post-civil war political environment to their advantage. </p>
<p>But neither country was bold enough to influence the way the other operated in Syria. Consequently, sometimes Iranian-backed and Russian <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Russia_and_Iran_in_Syria_a_Random_Partnership_or_an_Enduring_Alliance.pdf">forces cooperated</a>, and at other times <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220505-russia-iran-backed-militias-clash-in-syrias-palmyra/">they squabbled</a>. Mostly they <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">left each other alone</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, though, Russia’s plight in Ukraine compelled its leader to solicit Iran’s help in two ways. </p>
<p>First, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a branch of the Iranian military, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/24/russia-ukraine-syria-deployments-iran-israel-confilct/">provided supplementary manpower</a> to fill the void left when Russia reallocated troops from Syria to its Ukraine campaign. </p>
<p>Second, Russia has used Iran’s low-cost and battle-proven unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, to counter Kyiv’s Western-supported arsenal and buttress its own <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/five-reasons-why-russia-struggling-ukraine/362636/">struggling forces</a> and surprisingly <a href="https://cepa.org/russias-military-failure-on-an-awesome-scale/">inept warfighting capabilities</a>. </p>
<p>In July, Iran hosted numerous Russian officers and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/09/politics/russia-training-drones-iran/index.html">conducted training</a> on Iranian <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDJ8XzJjOeU">Shahed-129</a> and <a href="https://theaviationist.com/2020/08/02/iran-showcases-shahed-181-and-191-drones-during-great-prophet-14-exercise/">Shahed-191</a> drone operations. As of early August 2022, anonymous intelligence sources and Ukrainian officials <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5">indicated</a> that Russia <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-middle-east-iran-united-states-d7802180c7ecbdbe5cd06ee72c6d18f7">had obtained</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/24/russia-iran-drones-sanctions/">used</a> Iranian drones in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Since acquiring Iranian drones in early September, Russia has launched over 100 Iranian <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/18/world/europe/iran-attack-drones-ukraine.html">Shahed-136</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-posts-iranian-drone-official-denies-giving-vladimir-putin-russia-1748518">Mohajer-6</a> attack and reconnaissance drones in over a dozen attacks against a large range of targets: Ukrainian special forces, <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/russias-war/iranian-drones-create-new-dangers-for-ukrainians-forces.html">armor</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/26/iranian-drones-ukraine-russia-war-00058802">artillery</a> units, air defense and fuel storage <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/10/russias-use-iranian-drones-ukraine-hints-reliance-iran">facilities</a>, Ukrainian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-military-says-russian-drones-hit-military-objects-odesa-2022-09-26/">military</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2022/10/14/ukraine-infrastructure-damage/">energy</a> infrastructure, <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/ukraine-russia-iran-shahed-136-drones-lawnmowers-death-1895532">civilian targets</a> and a recent <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-social-media-0cc944fef471a425a862728b3dd0d8bc?utm_source=homepage&utm_medium=TopNews&utm_campaign=position_01">series</a> of drone and missile attacks against <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/missiles-exploding-drones-hit-ukraines-power-water-91663099">Kyiv</a>.</p>
<p>Russia is expected to soon rely on Iran further to supplant its <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2022/10/14/ukraine-infrastructure-damage/">dwindling</a> weapons supplies by acquiring <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/fateh-110/">two</a> <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/zolfaghar/">types</a> of Iranian-made short-range ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine, according to <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/17/iran-russia-missile-sales-00062075">U.S.</a> and allied security officials.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A drone flying in the air." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian drone flies over Kyiv during an attack on October 17, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/drone-flies-over-kyiv-during-an-attack-on-october-17-amid-news-photo/1244032825?phrase=iranian%20drones&adppopup=true">Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ukraine war promotes Iran’s interests</h2>
<p>This warming alliance may not help Russia defeat Ukraine. It will promote Iran’s national interests.</p>
<p>Russia’s Syria drawdown brought additional Iranian soldiers there to further prove their fighting abilities and <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/in-syria-iranian-forces-fill-gaps-left-by-ukraine-bound-russians-sources/">entrench themselves in Syria</a>. That then allows Iran to control territory threatened by <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-syrias-anti-assad-forces-48527">anti-Assad forces</a> and maintain an open corridor or “<a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/06/18/burning-bridge/#:%7E:text=Iran%20and%20its%20proxy%20forces%20are%20establishing%20an,southern%20Lebanon%20and%20the%20Golan%20front%20in%20Syria.">land bridge</a>” by which Iran extends support to its network of anti-America and anti-Israel <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/iran/#:%7E:text=Iran%20supported%20various%20Iraqi%20Shia,'ib%20Ahl%20al%2DHaq.">partners and proxies</a>.</p>
<p>Russia’s acquisition of Iranian arms <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/08/21/2761396/world-powers-eager-to-obtain-iran-s-military-achievements-top-general">will significantly boost</a> Iran’s weapons industry, whose primary clientele right now is its own militias. Iran’s recent efforts to expand drone manufacturing and exports yielded limited success in small, mostly peripheral markets of <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/ethiopia-acquires-iranian-uavs-for-tigray-war/#:%7E:text=In%20the%20latest%20effort%20to,unmanned%20aerial%20vehicles%20(UAVs).">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2132191/middle-east">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/02/31/2711791/%DA%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A2%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%BE%D9%87%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A2%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87">Tajikistan</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-s-apparent-supply-of-combat-drones-to-venezuela-highlights-terrorism-risks/6476585.html">Venezuela</a>. </p>
<p>Moscow is the <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/18417/global-weapons-exports/">second-largest global arms exporter</a>, and its surprising transformation to Iranian arms importer signals the seriousness of Russia’s problems. It also legitimizes and expands Tehran’s weapons industry <a href="https://www.irna.ir/news/83197978/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%AA">beyond arms production for the purpose of self-sufficiency</a>. This one alliance moves Iran toward a <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-695755">more prominent role</a> as a major arms exporter.</p>
<p>Lastly, Russia’s war in Ukraine extends a new avenue by which Iran might directly counter U.S.-provided weapons, as well as the opportunity to undermine U.S. and NATO influence in Eurasia. Iran’s drones could afford Moscow an effective and desperately needed response to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3095394/us-provided-himars-effective-in-ukraine/">U.S. weapons</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9CW6fYbT6Y">wreaking havoc</a> <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/watch-this-switchblade-suicide-drone-attack-a-russian-tank-in-ukraine">against Russian</a> <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/here-e2-80-99s-every-weapon-us-has-supplied-to-ukraine-with-2413-billion/ar-AA117AKN">forces in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Iranian weapons may force Ukraine’s Western benefactors to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3083102/fact-sheet-on-us-security-assistance-to-ukraine/">allocate additional billions</a> for counter-drone or air defense systems, or aid to replace assets that Iranian weapons potentially neutralize. </p>
<h2>Zero-sum game</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/10/16/iran-russia-missiles-ukraine/">introduction of Iranian ballistic missiles to Ukraine</a> would compound the limited tactical victories scored by Iranian drones. They will bring further unnecessary suffering and prolong and further destabilize the war in Ukraine, but I don’t believe they will tip the scales of conflict in Russia’s favor.</p>
<p>Their greater contribution is to Iran’s national interests: They allow Iran to directly check and undermine the U.S. and NATO outside of Iran’s usual regional area of operations. They boost Iran’s profile among countries that also wish to challenge the United States and NATO’s political, military and economic power. And they strengthen solidarity among those countries.</p>
<p>As Iran’s fighters, advisers and weapons proliferate to new areas and empower U.S. adversaries, Iran further promotes its national interests at the expense of U.S. national interests.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-winner-is-emerging-from-the-war-in-ukraine-but-its-not-who-you-think-189036">of a story</a> originally published Aug. 30, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192780/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aaron Pilkington is a U.S. Air Force analyst of Middle East affairs now studying at the University of Denver, conducting research on Iranian national security strategy. He will later join the Military & Strategic Studies department at the U.S. Air Force Academy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, the United States Air Force Academy, or any other organizational affiliation.</span></em></p>Iran has a growing role in the Ukraine war, helping Russia augment its dwindling weapons supplies. That may help Russia, but it also serves Iran’s national interests.Aaron Pilkington, US Air Force Analyst of Middle East Affairs, PhD Candidate at Korbel School of International Studies, University of DenverLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1901652022-09-19T18:43:04Z2022-09-19T18:43:04ZThe Tadamon Massacre: Two researchers secretly investigate mass murders in Syria<p><em>Addressing reporters on 17 August, the French National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor’s Office said that it had received “significant documentation relating to possible crimes committed by Syrian regime forces… during the Tadamon massacre in Damascus in 2013”. The French foreign affairs ministry continued, “the alleged facts are likely to constitute the most serious international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity and war crimes,” crimes for which French justice has universal jurisdiction. Last month’s development prompts us to recommend that you read this article/interview on the edifying investigation that brought the Tadamon massacre and the identity of some of its perpetrators to light.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>In early 2019, at an international academic conference in Paris, a Syrian political activist approached a scholar of mass violence affiliated with the <a href="https://www.niod.nl/en">NIOD Institute of War, Holocaust & Genocide Studies</a> (University of Amsterdam). Could they meet privately? A few hours later, the professor had in his possession 27 unedited videos documenting mass atrocities committed by members of Syria’s security forces. The videos had been copied from a computer located in the Damascus headquarters of Syria’s Office of Military Intelligence by a young soldier assumed to be loyal to Assad.</p>
<h2>Two academics’ quest for justice</h2>
<p>Three years later, on April 27, 2022, <em>The Guardian</em> published <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/27/massacre-in-tadamon-how-two-academics-hunted-down-a-syrian-war-criminal">shocking images</a> of the execution of 41 civilians that had taken place on April 16, 2013, in a neighbourhood on the south side of Damascus. The British newspaper named the two researchers from the University of Amsterdam who had provided the images and further evidence identifying the perpetrators of the massacre: on the one hand, <a href="https://www.niod.nl/en/staff/ugur-umit-ungor">Uğur Ümit Üngör</a>, the above-mentioned scholar, a German historian of Turkish origins, and on the other, Annsar Shahhoud, a PhD student born in Syria who was researching incidents of mass violence in her country during the current conflict.</p>
<p>The day after <em>The Guardian</em> released the images, <em>New Lines</em>, an US magazine specialising in the Middle East, published <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/how-a-massacre-of-nearly-300-in-syria-was-revealed/">an article</a> by the researchers in which the two described how they used covert tactics to communicate with the murderers themselves. The work took three years, during which time they spoke to almost nobody else about what they were doing, not even to members of their families.</p>
<p>The one video that has been released to the public so far tells only part of the story. According to the researchers, 288 civilians lost their lives during the Tadamon Massacre, including 7 women and 12 children. The remaining footage records many more scenes of murder, other forms of violence, and clandestine efforts to clean up the carnage to hide the evidence.</p>
<p>Once their research completed, Uğur and Annsar turned the 27 videos over to the appropriate government authorities in the Netherlands, France and other European countries. They do not know what further use will be made of them.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 80,000 readers look to The Conversation France’s newsletter for expert insights into the world’s most pressing issues</em>. <a href="https://theconversation.com/fr/newsletters/la-newsletter-quotidienne-5?utm_source=inline-70ksignup">Sign up now</a>]</p>
<p>Given my personal research interests and concern that the French-reading public know about the Tadamon Massacre, I asked Annsar and Uğur for an interview to hear about how they conducted their research. I reached them through a Syrian activist who had been a political prisoner. My own work examines the ways people have been describing the Syrian conflict by analysing the lexicon and narrative forms used by different factions.</p>
<p>Annsar and Uğur responded immediately to my request for an interview. What follows is a summary of our conversation via Zoom in which they described, step by step, how they went about conducting their secret investigation.</p>
<h2>The case against making the videos public immediately</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/audio/2022/apr/27/investigating-a-war-crime-part-1-searching-for-the-shadow-man-podcast">Today in Focus</a>, Uğur explained that from the moment he received the videos in 2019 until <em>The Guardian</em> published some of the images in April 2022, he and Annsar told nobody about them, with the exception of the Dutch police in compliance with the country’s “fiduciary obligations”, which required them to inform the authorities about the videos while they temporarily made private use of them.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Our goal was to find a way to speak to these ‘professionals,’ who specialised in committing acts of mass violence. They did not know we had video evidence of their crimes.” (Uğur Ümit Üngör)</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467029/original/file-20220604-12-wv5u00.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467029/original/file-20220604-12-wv5u00.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467029/original/file-20220604-12-wv5u00.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467029/original/file-20220604-12-wv5u00.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467029/original/file-20220604-12-wv5u00.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467029/original/file-20220604-12-wv5u00.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467029/original/file-20220604-12-wv5u00.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Tadamon neighbourhood in South Damascus, Syria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Guardian</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Uğur explained they had two options: go public with the videos immediately, via the media, or incorporate them into an ongoing project on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2021.1979907">mass violence in Syria</a> sponsored by their research institute.</p>
<p>Going public right away with the videos would have been a mistake, Uğur concluded. Had we done so, Syrian activists would have immediately identified and denounced the killers on social media, which would have made it very difficult to get more information about the massacre. Once the videos went viral, the culprits would have gone underground and the Syrian government would have denied the authenticity of the footage. Releasing the videos would have no doubt produced 5 sensational minutes of emotional overkill, without providing anything more substantial. What is more, Uğur added, “we couldn’t make the videos public until the young soldier who had risked his life copying them had left Syria, which he only succeeded in doing at the end of 2021”.</p>
<h2>How a fake Facebook profile gained a pro-Assad network’s trust</h2>
<p>When Uğur returned to Amsterdam with the videos, he contacted Annsar Shahhoud, who was doing her PhD thesis on the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623528.2021.1979908?needAccess=true&journalCode=cjgr20">role Syrian doctors had been playing since 2011 in government-sponsored campaigns of torture and murder</a>.</p>
<p>To gather information for her dissertation, she had created a Facebook page under the pseudonym “Anna Sh.”. Mixing fact with fiction, Anna Sh. identified herself as a Syrian researcher based in the Netherlands, who was an Alawite loyalist of Assad. She was doing research, she explained, on the “successes” of the Syrian army since the conflict began in 2011.</p>
<p>Under this alias, Annsar had already attracted a network of several dozen Facebook friends affiliated with the Syrian government, including soldiers in the regular army, military intelligence agents and members of Assad’s special militia (NDF).</p>
<p>The videos now opened new avenues of research. Together, Uğur and Annsar decided to focus on 3 out of 27, each 6 minutes long, during which soldiers took turns filming one another committing acts of violence. As they raise their rifles and take aim, they move slowly, almost lethargically, with bored expressions on their faces.</p>
<h2>The facts and the investigation</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r5wMtWrH2PE">only video released</a> to the public so far is not recommended for sensitive people:</p>
<p>Surrounded by other members of his unit and filmed in broad daylight, a soldier kills 41 people. The victims arrive in a minibus. As they are forced out of the vehicle, we see that they are blindfolded with their hands tied behind their backs. Someone orders them to run, one by one, to escape the gunfire of “a local sniper”. In a matter of seconds, each victim lunges forward and disappears into the ditch prepared for the corpses, hit by a bullet or two in the back. When night falls, the soldiers burn the bodies, a detail confirmed by the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_J1gqCp6C0s&t=35s">images published in <em>The Guardian</em></a>.</p>
<p>By examining the videos’ metadata, Uğur and Annsar were able to determine the date of the mass murders, as April 16, 2013, but neither the location, the killers’ identities, nor the office responsible for ordering the massacre. For a year, they believed that this horrific crime had taken place in Yelda, a suburb south of Damascus, until a few research assistants from Syria, who came from the southern part of Damascus, recognised a road from the Tadamon district of the city in a few isolated frames from the videos Uğur and Annsar had shared with them.</p>
<h2>Identifying Tadamon’s assassin</h2>
<p>In January 2021, after a year and a half of research, the two researchers got a big break: While combing through thousands of profiles linked to followers of Anna Sh.’s Facebook page, Annsar pinned down the profile of a man whose face she had seen in one of the videos. This was the very same person she had watched kill almost all of the victims in that particular six-minute sequence.</p>
<p>Annsar contacted the man immediately. For a while they quickly communicated back and forth, before he grew suspicious and pulled back. Six months later, he contacted her again and opened up, during which time Anna Sh. succeeded in recording two video conferences with him.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466373/original/file-20220531-26-q5hf4g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466373/original/file-20220531-26-q5hf4g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466373/original/file-20220531-26-q5hf4g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466373/original/file-20220531-26-q5hf4g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466373/original/file-20220531-26-q5hf4g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466373/original/file-20220531-26-q5hf4g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=828&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466373/original/file-20220531-26-q5hf4g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=828&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466373/original/file-20220531-26-q5hf4g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=828&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Amjad Youssef, a warrant officer from the Damascus Office of Military Intelligence (Branch 227), was filmed executing several dozens of people.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The man was a warrant officer from the Damascus headquarters of the Office of Military Intelligence. In their conversations, they did not talk about Tadamon, but he admitted he “could not even remember how many people he had killed; there had been so many”.</p>
<p>With this breakthrough, the investigation not only identified the alleged assassin, but connected him to Syria’s Office of Military Intelligence, <a href="https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/reports/militarybranch227#.Yqb6VsVBxph">Branch 227</a>. And in doing so, Annsar and Uğur produced the first piece of documented visual evidence of a mass murder that indisputably implicated the security apparatus of the Syrian government in crimes against humanity.</p>
<p>A few days after my conversation with Uğur and Annsar, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) <a href="https://snhr.org/blog/2022/05/30/the-syrian-regime-detains-the-criminal-amjad-yousef-who-killed-dozens-of-syrians-and-raped-dozens-of-women-in-al-tadamun-neighborhood-in-damascus/">announced</a> that Amjad Youssef had been placed “under arrest” by his superiors in Branch 227. The network did not yet know what would become of him.</p>
<p>As for the victims themselves, they went from being described in general terms among the tens of thousands of <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/tenth-annual-report-enforced-disappearance-syria-international-day">civilians forcibly disappeared</a> since 2013, to casualties of the “Tadamon Massacre,” murdered – and filmed – by members of Syria’s military intelligence.</p>
<h2>The details of mass violence</h2>
<p>As scholars of mass violence with special expertise in the Syrian case, Uğur and Annsar analyse the Tadamon Massacre through a theoretical lens that extends well beyond what they could see in the videos alone. But they also look at this specific case through what they call a ‘micro-space’, focusing on details that might elude those who only analyse mass violence at the macro, national level.</p>
<p>Uğur and Annsar show us that the Tadamon Massacre is only one “instantaneous sequence” of events, a single illustration of what Syria’s security forces have been doing since 2012 across the southern districts and suburbs of Damascus. Over time, they contend that the state policy went on to systematically exterminate and cleanse the region of people suspected, for one reason or another, as being in the opposition.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“In the Syrian case, it is important to distinguish between acts of mass violence, carried out by the secret police, which reflect the professional training of the killers, and acts of violence by amateur civilians, engaged in armed conflict.” (Uğur Ümit Üngör)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In order to effectively analyse how the Syrian government has resorted to violence to “cleanse” the nation, Uğur and Annsar use case studies. They divide the country up into “micro-spaces- by province, city, neighbourhood, or village – which yield more conclusive results”. Their goal is to establish, as completely as possible, the chain of command in each of the cases, all the way up the political hierarchy to the president of the country, with the aim of incriminating members of the security forces along the way.</p>
<p>Annsar Shahhoud clarifies what this means:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Our studies of micro-spaces in Syria make it possible to distinguish between the primary goal of the regime – mass violence – and the specific tactics the government uses to escalate local disputes until all chaos breaks out. Our methodology allows us to follow the way the regime manipulates tensions within each community, in different spatial environments. In Homs, for example, in 2011, before the demonstrations had reached that city, the regime found ways to exacerbate feuds between Sunni and Alawite neighbourhoods, leading people to kidnap one another, creating an atmosphere of civil war. What you see in the Tadamon video is characteristic of the kinds of political tactics used by the regime in various other Syrian micro-spaces. The social nature of a particular space, its ethnic and religious composition and other sociological factors, determines which strategies the regime will adopt in one place or another as it lays the groundwork for achieving its final goal.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In other words, in certain places such as Tadamon or the city of Homs, the regime would like us to see political factions lining up neatly along traditional ethnic and religious divisions (Alawites and Sunnis). And when that does not happen, seemingly on its own, with just a little encouragement from the outside, as it did not happen in Aleppo, then the regime immediately resorts to mass violence, against the entire civilian population, particularly when the area is controlled by anti-government forces.</p>
<h2>Is the Syrian conflict a revolution, a civil war, or genocidal war?</h2>
<p>Given Uğur and Annsar’s theoretical approach to the study of mass violence and their methodological innovations in the study of the Syrian case (micro-spatial methodology and Facebook interviews), their project makes an invaluable contribution to narratives about the Syrian conflict.</p>
<p>Thanks to their analysis, the confusing explanations routinely given for why civil war has broken out in Syria begin to evaporate.</p>
<p>In an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2021.1979907">article</a> on mass violence, Uğur stresses that in order to identify forms of violence in the context of a particular conflict, it helps to make a conceptual distinction between “the scale of fighting taking place among different military factions” and “the degree of mass violence committed against civilians.”</p>
<p>In Uğur’s opinion, the rapid outbreak of violence in Syria following the uprising in 2011, led to “a complex and lopsided civil war. Nevertheless, he added, the form and scale of the violence on the part of the Syrian regime can only be described as premeditated genocide directed in an indiscriminate way against the entire population in zones controlled by the rebels”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466375/original/file-20220531-18-h22f6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466375/original/file-20220531-18-h22f6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466375/original/file-20220531-18-h22f6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466375/original/file-20220531-18-h22f6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466375/original/file-20220531-18-h22f6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466375/original/file-20220531-18-h22f6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466375/original/file-20220531-18-h22f6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Uğur provided this diagram to help place their research in the wider context of the Syrian conflict. The largest frame represents the ‘conflict’, where the armed opposition is divided between two or more factions. Within the conflict there is a revolution in which some of the fighters are engaged in a civil conflict (ethnic and/or ideological). However, alongside this familiar kind of violence, typically seen in civil wars, there is another kind of violence in the Syrian case that is highly sophisticated, but rarely studied – ‘mass violence,’ state-sponsored violence, that targets the civilian population, pure and simple, without caring about where individual people stand politically.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466420/original/file-20220531-24-npsaet.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466420/original/file-20220531-24-npsaet.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466420/original/file-20220531-24-npsaet.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466420/original/file-20220531-24-npsaet.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466420/original/file-20220531-24-npsaet.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=799&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466420/original/file-20220531-24-npsaet.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=799&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466420/original/file-20220531-24-npsaet.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=799&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A comment identifies the ‘authors of the Tadamon massacre’ following an interview of Annsar and Uğur broadcast on the YouTube channel of Syria TV, an opposition media based in Turkey. ‘6 assassins, 5 Alawites and one Druze,’ it goes on. ‘Spread the word everywhere, brothers’.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In sum, Uğur claims that it is not exactly wrong to identify what is going on in Syria as a “civil war”. But in doing so, analysts obscure the well-documented fact that “from the very beginning of this revolution, the Syrian government has been organising and orchestrating mass violence”.</p>
<p>The video of the Tadamon Massacre further complicates the familiar narrative about the nature of Syria’s conflict. At first glance, for Syrians watching the video, the footage provides a simplistic and typical picture of a civil war: an Alawite soldier (recognised as such by his accent) methodically kills 41 civilians from a district in Damascus inhabited by Sunnis.</p>
<p>Uğur completed this observation:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Yes, one of the murders in the video is Alawite, while the other one, who is filming, is Druze. But their boss is Sunni and the boss of their boss is Alawite. These ethnic/religious identities have nothing to do with the Syrian conflict. I firmly believe that the one and only relevant sect in Syria is Mukhabarat.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since Hafez Al-Assad built his security state empire, the term <a href="https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/11815/12636">Mukhabarat</a> [i.e. the military intelligence service of the Syrian government] resonates in Syrian society like the eye of Big Brother. Its secret agents are everywhere. They tap telephone lines; they infiltrate places of work and, depending on the part of the country, they find their way into people’s homes.</p>
<p>According to Uğur, those who belong to the Mukhabarat take on imaginary or supernatural personalities and assume unidentifiable nicknames, like “Abu Ali,” “Abu Stef,” “Abu Saqr,” etc. Annsar adds, having learned this from her interviews with members of the secret service:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“While talking to people working for Mukhabarat, you must never pronounce the word ‘Mukhabarat’ itself, because they are frightened by the very idea of the agency! It’s a never-ending circle of fear, paranoia, and terror.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As for Amjad Youssef, the Syrian Network of Human Rights has confirmed that he never received a warrant or any other official document justifying his arrest.</p>
<p>Uğur had already made the same point:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The regime is intelligent and keeps its criminals under tight control. It spies on them, keeps them together, or disposes of them as needed. Syria is a sealed box, a state of killers.”</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p><em>This text was translated from French by Judith Friedlander, Professor Emerita of Anthropology at Hunter College (CUNY).</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamad Moustafa Alabsi ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Two academics have identified the perpetrators of a massacre committed in 2013 by Syrian loyalist forces. An episode that says a lot about the reality of Syria in the last 10 years.Mohamad Moustafa Alabsi, Chercheur postdoctoral au Mellon Fellowship Program, Columbia Global Centers, Amman, Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (FMSH)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1890362022-08-30T12:20:14Z2022-08-30T12:20:14ZA winner is emerging from the war in Ukraine, but it’s not who you think<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481597/original/file-20220829-8742-2t6sjg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1%2C1%2C1020%2C680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In July 2022, Iran provided the Russian military with training for using Iranian-produced weapons, including the Shahed-129 drone, displayed here at a 2019 military show in Tehran.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/file-photo-shows-visitors-look-on-the-shahed-129-an-iranian-news-photo/1231019247?adppopup=true">Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The war in Ukraine is helping one country achieve its foreign policy and national security objectives, but it’s neither Russia nor Ukraine.</p>
<p>It’s Iran.</p>
<p>Iran is among Russia’s most <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-iran-vladimir-putin-khamenei-nato-us/">vocal supporters</a> in the war. This has little to do with Ukraine and everything to do with Iran’s long-term strategy vis-à-vis the United States. </p>
<p>As Russia’s war on Ukraine drags on and continues eroding Russia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62553629">manpower</a>, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-putin-admits-running-out-weapons-ukraine-war-invasion-state-duma-law-1720957">military stores</a>, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/russia-economy-sanctions-myths-ruble-business/">economy</a> and <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russia-isolated-its-postimperial-phantasm">diplomatic connections</a>, leader Vladimir Putin has opted for an unlikely but necessary <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/19/putin-russia-iran-ukraine-00046646">Iranian lifeline</a> to salvage victory in Ukraine and also in Syria where, since 2015, Russian soldiers have been fighting to keep Bashar al-Assad’s government in power.</p>
<p>Putin’s move has, in turn, helped Iran make progress in promoting its national interests.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three men greet one another -- one in a black suit, the other two in black clerical robes with black headwraps" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, center, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, greet each other as Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stands at right during their meeting in Tehran, Iran, on July 19, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranRussia/f83bd4861f434cfa9da703a103a0be1b/photo?Query=Russia%20Iran&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=3751&currentItemNo=41">Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Opposing the US everywhere</h2>
<p>Since the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8w4Ku6l7OEI">Islamic Revolution of 1979</a>, Iran’s leaders have believed the United States is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-leader-death-to-america-means-policies-not-people/">constantly scheming</a> to <a href="https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/467788/%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%DA%98%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C">topple Iran’s government</a>. They view leaders in Washington as the greatest threat and obstacle to promoting Iranian national interests – achieving economic self-sufficiency, international legitimacy, regional security, power and influence. </p>
<p>The fears of Iran’s leaders are not irrational – the long history of U.S. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661">meddling</a> in Iranian affairs, continuous <a href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2009/09/08/the-axis-of-evil-and-the-great-satan/">open hostility</a> between the two countries and decades of U.S. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-10/guide-to-us-bases-surrounding-iran-in-the-middle-east/11855542">military buildup</a> in close proximity to Iran greatly concern leaders in Tehran. </p>
<p>The U.S. has <a href="https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/BSI/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY18.pdf#page=74">military forces in many</a> Middle Eastern countries, <a href="https://truthout.org/articles/bases-bases-everywhere-except-in-the-pentagons-report">with or without invitation</a>. To promote its national interests, Iran is working to force the U.S. military out of the region and reduce U.S. political influence there. </p>
<p>Iran has an even bigger aim: <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2012/aug/31/part-ii-khamenei-unworld-order">to overthrow</a> what it sees as the U.S.-dominated global political order. </p>
<p>Iran counters U.S. influence by maintaining partnerships with an assortment of nonstate militias and governments united by their fierce anti-U.S. hostility. The country <a href="https://nowlebanon.com/the-iranian-network/">nurtures a network</a> of militant partner and proxy groups, whose own political preferences and ambitions align with Iran’s objectives, by providing <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/05/09/new-mideast-task-force-can-counter-iranian-arms-smuggling-but-more-capabilities-are-needed/">weapons</a>, <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iran-lebanon-training-hezbollah">training</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/proxies-and-politics-why-iran-funds-foreign-militias">funds</a> – and, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/21/how-do-irans-proxies-actually-work/">in some cases</a>, direction. Among the recipients are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/">Hezbollah</a>, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad">Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad</a>, friendly <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/10/profiles-pro-iran-militias-iraq">Iraqi militias</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/09/16/why-iran-is-getting-blame-an-attack-saudi-arabia-claimed-by-yemens-houthis/">Ansar Allah</a> in Yemen, better known as the Houthis or the Houthi rebels. </p>
<p>Through these militias and their political arms, Iran extends its influence and works to shape an Iran-friendly government in states like Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/newsletters/2022/08/15/us-drone-attack-targets-us-base-in-syria-no-casualties/">It threatens</a> U.S. forces and antagonizes Western-allied governments in states such as Israel, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220714-jordans-position-towards-regional-issues-has-shifted-especially-on-iran/">Jordan</a>, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/bitter-rivals-iran-and-saudi-arabia/">Saudi Arabia</a>, <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/kuwait-and-iran-a-fluctuating-history-1.1341755">Kuwait</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2017/01/22/Iran-s-export-of-terrorism-poses-threat-to-Bahrain-as-well-as-the-Gulf">Bahrain</a> and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-de-facto-ruler-sees-iran-islamists-threat-ambitious-gulf-safe-haven-2022-05-13/">United Arab Emirates</a>. </p>
<p>At the national level, Iran maintains no permanent mutual defense treaties. Its closest strategic partners include Syria, <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-venezuela-relations-presidents-postures-and-pressures">Venezuela</a>, <a href="https://www.38north.org/2021/11/the-north-korea-iran-relationship-an-anti-american-alliance-or-transactional-partnership/">North Korea</a>, <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/research/china-iran-relations-limited-enduring-strategic-partnership">China</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/24/russia-iran-drones-sanctions/">Russia</a>. They cooperate <a href="https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/china-iran-create-parallel-global-chessboard/">politically</a>, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-china-sign-economic-security-agreement-challenging-u-s-pressure-11616866936">economically</a> and <a href="https://orinocotribune.com/iran-russia-china-to-carry-out-military-drills-in-venezuela/">militarily</a> to create an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-china-iran-russia-triangle-alternative-world-order/">alternative</a> to what their leaders perceive as the U.S.-led world political order. </p>
<p>That cooperation includes undermining <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/what-are-americas-national-interests">U.S. national interests</a> and helping ease or circumvent <a href="https://www.chairmont.com.au/post/russia-china-and-iran-circumventing-sanctions-trade-wars-us-dollar-and-blockchain">Western political pressure</a> and <a href="https://orinocotribune.com/venezuelan-deputy-julio-chavez-iran-russia-china-venezuela-alliance-can-circumvent-sanctions/">economic sanctions</a>. </p>
<h2>Tehran to the rescue</h2>
<p>Russia’s current war in Ukraine has <a href="https://www.nato-pa.int/content/finland-sweden-accession">left Moscow with only a handful of sympathetic friends</a>. </p>
<p>Few political leaders understand Putin’s newfound political isolation and related animosity toward the United States more than Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But Iran-Russia relations <a href="https://carnegiemoscow.org/2016/08/18/russia-and-iran-historic-mistrust-and-contemporary-partnership-pub-64365">are complicated</a>. </p>
<p>The two countries found common cause in helping Syrian strongman Assad defeat his country’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34710635">opposition forces</a>, but for different national interests. </p>
<p>Saving Assad helps Russia reassert itself as a <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/news/world/how-russia-used-the-war-in-syria-to-reassert-its-global-might/">major power</a> in the Middle East. For Iran, a friendly Syria is a <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/irans-unwavering-support-to-assads-syria/">critical link</a> in Iran’s anti-U.S., anti-Israel coalition. </p>
<p>As Russia and Iran fought to sustain Assad, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syria-war-russia-iran-influence/2021/05/19/7d26851e-a9d1-11eb-bca5-048b2759a489_story.html">they also competed</a> for lucrative postwar <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">reconstruction and infrastructure contracts</a> in that country, and to shape the post-civil war political environment to their advantage. </p>
<p>But neither country was bold enough to influence the way the other operated in Syria. Consequently, sometimes Iranian-backed and Russian <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Russia_and_Iran_in_Syria_a_Random_Partnership_or_an_Enduring_Alliance.pdf">forces cooperated</a>, and at other times <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220505-russia-iran-backed-militias-clash-in-syrias-palmyra/">they squabbled</a>. Mostly they <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">left each other alone</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, though, Russia’s plight in Ukraine compelled its leader to solicit Iran’s help in two ways. </p>
<p>First, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a branch of the Iranian military, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/24/russia-ukraine-syria-deployments-iran-israel-confilct/">provided supplementary manpower</a> to fill the void left when Russia reallocated troops from Syria to its Ukraine campaign. </p>
<p>Second, Russia will use Iran’s low-cost and battle-proven unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, to counter Kyiv’s Western-supported arsenal and buttress its own <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/five-reasons-why-russia-struggling-ukraine/362636/">struggling forces</a> and surprisingly <a href="https://cepa.org/russias-military-failure-on-an-awesome-scale/">inept warfighting capabilities</a>. </p>
<p>In July, Iran hosted numerous Russian officers and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/09/politics/russia-training-drones-iran/index.html">conducted training</a> on Iranian <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDJ8XzJjOeU">Shahed-129</a> and <a href="https://theaviationist.com/2020/08/02/iran-showcases-shahed-181-and-191-drones-during-great-prophet-14-exercise/">Shahed-191</a> drone operations. Anonymous intelligence sources and Ukrainian officials <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5">indicated</a> that Russia <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-middle-east-iran-united-states-d7802180c7ecbdbe5cd06ee72c6d18f7">already has obtained</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/24/russia-iran-drones-sanctions/">employed</a> Iranian drones in Ukraine. <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202208063214">Though unconfirmed</a>, this is consistent with a previous <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5023137/iran-provide-unmanned-aircraft-training-russia-ukraine-war-jake-sullivan">White House assessment</a> that Iran would provide Russia with “up to several hundred” drones for use in Ukraine. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/RwbuYhh0FSM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan tells reporters on July 11, 2022, that Iran planned to send ‘several hundred’ drones, including some equipped with weapons, to Russia.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ukraine war promotes Iran’s interests</h2>
<p>This warming alliance may not help Russia defeat Ukraine. It will promote Iran’s national interests.</p>
<p>Russia’s Syria drawdown brought additional Iranian soldiers there to further prove their fighting abilities and <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/in-syria-iranian-forces-fill-gaps-left-by-ukraine-bound-russians-sources/">entrench themselves in Syria</a>. That then allows Iran to control territory threatened by <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-syrias-anti-assad-forces-48527">anti-Assad forces</a> and maintain an open corridor or “<a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/06/18/burning-bridge/#:%7E:text=Iran%20and%20its%20proxy%20forces%20are%20establishing%20an,southern%20Lebanon%20and%20the%20Golan%20front%20in%20Syria.">land bridge</a>” by which Iran extends support to its network of anti-America and anti-Israel <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/iran/#:%7E:text=Iran%20supported%20various%20Iraqi%20Shia,'ib%20Ahl%20al%2DHaq.">partners and proxies</a>.</p>
<p>Second, Russia’s acquisition of Iranian arms <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/08/21/2761396/world-powers-eager-to-obtain-iran-s-military-achievements-top-general">will significantly boost</a> Iran’s weapons industry, whose primary clientele right now is its own militias. Iran’s recent efforts to expand drone manufacturing and exports yielded limited success in small, mostly peripheral markets of <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/ethiopia-acquires-iranian-uavs-for-tigray-war/#:%7E:text=In%20the%20latest%20effort%20to,unmanned%20aerial%20vehicles%20(UAVs).">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2132191/middle-east">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/02/31/2711791/%DA%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A2%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%BE%D9%87%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A2%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87">Tajikistan</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-s-apparent-supply-of-combat-drones-to-venezuela-highlights-terrorism-risks/6476585.html">Venezuela</a>. </p>
<p>Moscow is the <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/18417/global-weapons-exports/">second-largest global arms exporter</a>, and its surprising transformation to Iranian arms importer signals the seriousness of Russia’s problems. It also legitimizes and expands Tehran’s weapons industry <a href="https://www.irna.ir/news/83197978/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%AA">beyond arms production for the purpose of self-sufficiency</a>. This one alliance moves Iran toward a <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-695755">more prominent role</a> as a major arms exporter.</p>
<p>Lastly, Russia’s war in Ukraine extends a new avenue by which Iran might directly counter U.S.-provided weapons, as well as the opportunity to undermine U.S. and NATO influence in Eurasia. Iran’s drones could afford Moscow an effective and desperately needed response to U.S. weapons wreaking havoc against Russian forces in Ukraine – <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3095394/us-provided-himars-effective-in-ukraine/">the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System</a>, the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9CW6fYbT6Y">Javelin</a> anti-tank guided missile, the <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/watch-this-switchblade-suicide-drone-attack-a-russian-tank-in-ukraine">Switchblade</a> “kamikaze” or suicide drone <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/here-e2-80-99s-every-weapon-us-has-supplied-to-ukraine-with-2413-billion/ar-AA117AKN">and others</a>. </p>
<p>Iranian weapons may force Ukraine’s Western benefactors to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3083102/fact-sheet-on-us-security-assistance-to-ukraine/">allocate additional billions</a> for counter-drone or air defense systems, or aid to replace assets that Iranian weapons potentially neutralize. </p>
<p>This has already happened on the <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/sep/16/timeline-houthi-attacks-saudi-arabia">Arabian Peninsula</a>, where Iran-equipped Ansar Allah’s drone warfare against <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-arabia-drone-attack-oil-infrastructure-ras-tanura-dhahran-houthis-yemen-iran/">Saudi Arabia</a> and the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/11/attacks-on-uae-shows-its-strengths-more-than-vulnerabilities-analysts.html">UAE</a> compels Gulf states to expend <a href="https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/The-iranian-drone-threat#:%7E:text=Further%2C%20it%20is%20costlier%20to%20defend%20against%20drones,against%20a%20drone%20swarm%20an%20extremely%20expensive%20proposition.">disproportionate sums</a> on costly weapons systems and to <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/idex/2021/02/23/from-lasers-to-missiles-idex-exhibitors-are-determined-to-counter-drones/">develop other expensive solutions</a> to counter Iran’s low-cost drones.</p>
<h2>Zero-sum game</h2>
<p>Limited tactical victories scored by Iranian drones may prolong and further destabilize the war in Ukraine, but they will not tip the scales of conflict in Russia’s favor. </p>
<p>Their greater contribution is to Iran’s national interests: They allow Iran to directly check and undermine the U.S. and NATO outside of Iran’s usual regional area of operations. They boost Iran’s profile among countries that also wish to challenge the United States and NATO’s political, military and economic power. And they strengthen solidarity among those countries.</p>
<p>As Iran’s fighters, advisers and weapons proliferate to new areas and empower U.S. adversaries, Iran further promotes its national interests at the expense of U.S. national interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aaron Pilkington is a U.S. Air Force analyst of Middle East affairs now studying at the University of Denver, conducting research on Iranian national security strategy. He will later join the Military & Strategic Studies department at the U.S. Air Force Academy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, the United States Air Force Academy, or any other organizational affiliation.
</span></em></p>There’s an unexpected beneficiary of Russia’s war on Ukraine.Aaron Pilkington, US Air Force Analyst of Middle East Affairs, PhD Student at Korbel School of International Studies, University of DenverLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1788362022-03-15T12:16:05Z2022-03-15T12:16:05ZPutin puts international justice on trial – betting that the age of impunity will continue<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451997/original/file-20220314-101106-1r6jxz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C67%2C4985%2C3255&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A pregnant woman is carried away from a shelled maternity hospital. She later died.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWarMaternityHospital/0c824c429f0f4bfbb1c5cea372219a22/photo?Query=maternity%20ukraine&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=136&currentItemNo=5">AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Images of pregnant women <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-europe-2bed71c00916d44ea951c5809b446db3">fleeing a bombed maternity ward</a> in Mariupol, Ukraine, raised again the question of how far the Russian military will be willing to go to conquer the country – and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/3/10/is-russia-committing-war-crimes-by-bombing-hospitals-in-ukraine">whether war crimes are being committed</a>.</p>
<p>In just over two weeks of the invasion, <a href="https://extranet.who.int/ssa/LeftMenu/Index.aspx?utm_source=Stopping%20attacks%20on%20health%20care%20QandA&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=Link_who">the World Health Organization has verified</a> 39 attacks by Russians on health care facilities. Ukraine <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/mar/11/first-thing-russian-forces-have-killed-more-civilians-than-soldiers?utm_term=622b4edc7d657dbab80fe20b1e5cd689&utm_campaign=GuardianTodayUS&utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&CMP=GTUS_email">claims more civilians</a> than Ukrainian soldiers have already been killed. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf">International humanitarian law</a>, constituting agreements between countries on the laws of conduct in war, requires militaries to avoid the deliberate targeting of civilians and the use of weapons like cluster munitions that are indiscriminate – in other words, have a high chance of affecting civilians. </p>
<p>It also calls on warring nations to prevent extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, such as schools, residential buildings and hospitals. Simply stated, under these criteria, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-icc-is-investigating-war-crimes-in-ukraine-could-putin-be-indicted-178005">war crimes</a> take place when there is excessive destruction, suffering and civilian casualties. Rape, torture, forced displacement and other actions may also constitute war crimes.</p>
<p>There are other international crimes, including genocide and crimes against humanity. The latter consists of similar acts like rape and murder <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml">undertaken as part of widespread or systematic attack</a> directed against a civilian population.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://udayton.edu/directory/artssciences/hrc/inglis-shelley.php">scholar of human rights and the law</a>, I believe there is clear evidence that Russia has already engaged in violations of international law, including war crimes. Although the potential for holding Russian commanders, and even President Vladimir Putin, accountable and punishing them for international crimes is more likely than in the past, the path is likely long and difficult. Moreover, it is unknown what effect, if any, the specter of prosecution will have on the course of the war.</p>
<p>That’s because international justice has been unable to either prevent or prosecute many perpetrators of war crimes in the past decade.</p>
<h2>History repeating</h2>
<p>International law experts point to <a href="https://theweek.com/russo-ukrainian-war/1010764/putins-brutal-record-in-chechnya-and-syria-is-ominous-for-ukraine">the earlier ravages of Russian military actions in both Chechnya and Syria</a> as an indicator of the tactics Putin is willing to use in the invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>Russia fought two wars against the breakaway republic of Chechnya in the years following the fall of the Soviet Union. The second – in which Putin cut his teeth as a wartime leader – was seen as particularly brutal.</p>
<p>During that 1999-2000 conflict, advocacy group <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/press/2000/04/chech0421.htm">Human Rights Watch collected evidence</a> that Russia <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/29/war-crimes-chechnya-and-response-west#">carpet-bombed the capital Grozny and other towns</a>, causing heavy civilian casualties – estimates run into <a href="https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/5415049">the tens of thousands killed</a> – and leaving much of the capital destroyed. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman dragging a cart walks away from the edifice of buildings destroyed by missiles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The city of Grozny was destroyed by Russian shells.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-combination-of-photos-created-on-july-29-shows-a-news-photo/1158372463?adppopup=true">Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is also compelling evidence that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed during Russia’s occupation of <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=20220310-prosecutor-statement-georgia">South Ossetia in Georgia in 2008</a> and in relation to its annexation of <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=201211-otp-statement-ukraine">Crimea and engagement in eastern Donbas region</a> in Ukraine in 2014.</p>
<p>In 2015, Russia participated in Syria’s civil war on the side of President Bashar al-Assad by providing Russian air support to Syria’s army. According to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/01/russia/syria-war-crimes-month-bombing-aleppo">Human Rights Watch</a>, the aerial bombardment of Aleppo supported by the Russians in 2016 was “recklessly indiscriminate, deliberately targeted at least one medical facility, and included the use of indiscriminate weapons such as cluster munitions and incendiary weapons.” </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/02/russia-committed-war-crimes-in-syria-finds-un-report">United Nations concluded</a> that the Russian air force was <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=25638&LangID=E">responsible for war crimes in the Syrian province of Idlib in 2019</a>, having bombed indiscriminately a major marketplace and a displaced persons camp, killing and injuring scores of men, women and children. Russian denied any culpability. And no charges against Putin or Russian military commanders have ever been formally pursued internationally for alleged crimes in Chechnya or Syria. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/11/politics/joe-biden-warning-chemical-weapons/index.html">United States recently raised</a> the prospect of <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity">Russia’s deploying prohibited chemical weapons</a> in Ukraine. If it does so, it will be following the lead of Putin ally Assad, whose government <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity">is known for its use of prohibited chemical weapons</a> against civilians in Syria.</p>
<p>Either way, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/09/russian-ukraine-war-will-get-worse-before-it-gets-better-army-secretary-christine-wormuth-says.html">military experts</a> expect Russia’s tactics in Ukraine to only intensify in its brutality and disregard for the laws of war.</p>
<h2>In search of accountability</h2>
<p><a href="https://opiniojuris.org/2022/02/25/more-than-rhetoric-international-criminal-justice-crime-semantics-and-the-role-of-the-icc-in-the-ukraine-conflict/">Many scholars</a> pin their hopes for accountability on <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/">the International Criminal Court</a>, which was established under the Rome Statute in 1998 with 123 states parties. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-international-criminal-court">The aim of the court</a> is to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. </p>
<p>Although neither Russia nor Ukraine is a party to the Rome Statute, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/7/is-putin-likely-to-face-the-icc-over-russias-actions-in-ukraine">ICC has initiated an investigation</a> into alleged crimes based on <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1146">a special declaration by Ukraine</a>. This gives the ICC legal authority to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes committed in Ukraine since 2014. </p>
<p>But while this early action means that evidence might be collected in real time and speed up the usually slow process of international justice, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/icc-faces-myriad-challenges-prosecute-war-crimes-ukraine-2022-03-04/">there are still substantial problems in prosecuting these alleged crimes</a>. </p>
<p>The standards set for proving massive and complex international crimes are more daunting than for domestic crimes. It is even harder to <a href="https://theconversation.com/civilians-are-being-killed-in-ukraine-so-why-is-investigating-war-crimes-so-difficult-178155">prove command responsibility by a head of state</a>, such as Putin, particularly when there is no cooperation between the ICC and the country of the accused. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/prosecuting-heads-of-state/F6143E3825D0C7EACA922A0E9BF1C9A5">Successful cases are few</a> and have taken place only after a leader’s fall from power and only if the court has cooperation with the country. That’s how Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia was prosecuted by the <a href="https://www.icty.org/">International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</a>. Similarly, former President Charles Taylor of Liberia was prosecuted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. </p>
<p>Other options for criminal trials <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/03/russia-war-crimes-putin-prosecute.html">exist outside the ICC but also face major obstacles</a>. Advocates have harnessed <a href="https://lieber.westpoint.edu/water-finds-way-universal-jurisdiction-justice-syria/">the concept of universal jurisdiction</a> – inspired by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/chile98/index.htm">the efforts of Spain to bring former dictator Augusto Pinochet of Chile</a> to justice – to bring perpetrators of war crimes in Syria to trial in European courts. </p>
<p><a href="http://opiniojuris.org/2022/03/08/de-bunking-the-role-of-international-law-in-the-ukrainian-conflict/">Legal experts are also</a> looking at the prosecution of Putin and Russian leadership directly for <a href="https://crimeofaggression.info/role-of-the-icc/definition-of-the-crime-of-aggression/">the crime of aggression</a> in regards to Ukraine. </p>
<p>For this crime, the ICC does not have legal authority to prosecute Putin without a U.N. Security Council referral. Given that Russia has a seat on the Security Council, where it wields a veto, that won’t happen. Options include establishing a special tribunal by Ukraine <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80395/united-nations-response-options-to-russias-aggression-opportunities-and-rabbit-holes/">with U.N. General Assembly endorsement</a> or other international support. </p>
<p>But the ICC and special courts are “made from scratch” institutions, with limited capacity and without a police force. Practically, getting Putin or other Russian leaders into any court is an issue. For example, the ICC still struggles <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">to capture former Sudan President Omar al-Bashir, accused of genocide and other crimes in Darfur</a>, despite issuing arrest warrants for him in 2009 and 2010. </p>
<h2>Age of impunity</h2>
<p>Advocates point out <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-05-13/age-impunity">that impunity</a> – the ability to escape responsibility for violations of international law – has been on the rise for many years, along with authoritarianism.</p>
<p>That means the initiation of criminal investigations might have little impact on the calculations of Putin, senior Russian leadership or commanders and soldiers on the ground in Ukraine. Some <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Simmons_Paper.pdf">international law experts argue</a> that even where actual prosecution and punishment might not be immediate, actors who care about their legitimacy domestically or internationally are more likely to be deterred from committing more crimes by potential prosecutions. However, there are no <a href="https://internationallaw.blog/2017/04/06/the-approach-to-deterrence-in-the-practice-of-the-international-criminal-court/">firm conclusions</a> about the preventive or deterrent effect of international justice. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 150,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>The actions of Russia in Ukraine <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/14/vladimir-putin-war-crimes-icc-sajid-javid-hague">might spur investigations at an unprecedented</a> pace. And the ICC can issue <a href="https://iccforum.com/rome-statute#Article58">arrest warrants in order to prevent the further commission of crimes</a>. Such warrants would affect the accused’s ability to travel and officially represent the country.</p>
<p>When, or if, the formal label of accused “war criminal” gets attached to specific Russian names, it is possible that the prospect of accountability will become a more significant factor in the decision-making of those responsible for the ruthless war in Ukraine. But it will still be too late for the many victims already being identified.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178836/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shelley Inglis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin has a history of flattening cities in time of conflict. But alleged war crimes in Chechnya and Syria never resulted in charges, let alone prosecutions. Will Ukraine be any different?Shelley Inglis, Executive Director, University of Dayton Human Rights Center, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1653452021-07-30T11:43:02Z2021-07-30T11:43:02ZRussia and Syria: bound together in a mission that is far from accomplished<p>All the standard public relations ploys were in evidence for <a href="https://tass.com/world/1317951">the recent meeting</a> between Syria’s leader Bashar al-Assad and Russian envoy Alexander Lavrentiev in Damascus. More than 230 officials from 30 federal executive bodies, five Russian regions, and the Russian defence ministry had trekked to the Syrian capital. There were 15 agreements and memorandums on “<a href="https://tass.com/world/1317755">key areas of Russian-Syrian cooperation</a>”. The return of refugees from neighbouring countries was said to be a “<a href="http://sana.sy/en/?p=243524">national priority</a>”. The Assad regime and the Kremlin “affirmed the need for reconstruction and liquidation of terrorist hotbeds”.</p>
<p>But the press releases from Assad and Russian state outlets could not obscure the obvious questions. Why was Lavrentiev in Damascus for the second time in three weeks, if all was proceeding smoothly with the Assad regime? How could the bullish tone of the declarations be reconciled with the extent of the day-to-day crisis for most Syrians in regime areas, from shortages to blackouts to <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/syria/kneel-and-starve-under-the-watchful-eye-of-the-secret-police-syrians-go-hungry/">a 247% rise</a> in food prices in the past year?</p>
<p>Russia has invested heavily in the Syrian conflict. It has <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-decision-to-withdraw-from-syria-isnt-about-how-to-leave-but-how-to-stay-89095">backed the regime</a> since the March 2011 uprising. It prevented Assad’s fall in 2015 with a massive military intervention, enabling the regime to recapture of much of the country.</p>
<p>But the value of investments can go down as well as up. Moscow’s projection of influence, especially with its bombers and special forces, comes at a high cost. Part of that might be recouped by stripping Syria’s economic carcass, claiming control of resources and industries. In the medium term, however, Russia is handcuffed to expending scarce capital on an Assad regime offering little return.</p>
<p>Syria’s GDP has fallen by an <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/syria_2021_humanitarian_needs_overview.pdf">estimated 60%</a> since 2011. Its currency has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-financial-markets-poverty-bashar-assad-syria-ae6759bd97b4c406bff645b5184d9557">lost almost 90% of its value</a> on the black market. US sanctions, tightened in 2019 over the regime’s war crimes, are choking off vital supplies. The regime cannot fill tenders for wheat, rice and sugar, and its oil lifeline from Iran is under threat. A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-financial-meltdown-how-it-happened-2021-06-17/">banking crisis in Lebanon</a> has locked up the accounts of the regime, financiers, businesses and individual Syrians.</p>
<p>If the Assad elites maintain their grasp on what wealth remains, albeit purging some of their members – such as Assad’s billionaire cousin <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-52705469">Rami Makhlouf</a>, whose assets <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-tycoon-idUSKBN22V1IC">were seized in 2020</a> – they do so with 90% of their citizenry below the poverty line. About 13.4 million Syrians, more than 70% of people still in the country, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/syria_2021_humanitarian_needs_overview.pdf">struggle to meet daily needs</a> with the price of basic food items <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/world-food-programme-sounds-alarm-food-prices-rise-mideast#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%20WFP%2C%20the,million%20in%20the%20past%20year.">29 times higher</a> than in March 2011. Early in July, the regime <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2021/07/assad-regime-doubles-price-bread-triples-cost-home-heating/">further reduced subsidies</a>, doubling the price of bread and tripling the cost of home heating. </p>
<h2>Assad stripping</h2>
<p>Assad may nominally retain power, but Russia has pursued the option of grabbing economic spoils while keeping him there. Moscow has seized much of Syria’s <a href="https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/69882">phosphate production</a>. Through a partnership with a Syrian state firm, it runs the port at Tartous in western Syria, near the expanding Russian military base. The Russian engineering firm Stroytransgaz, controlled by Vladimir Putin’s friend Gennady Timchenko, is hoping to expand into other energy infrastructure, and Moscow is manoeuvring to get a foothold in the <a href="https://npasyria.com/en/62119/">Kurdish-controlled oilfields</a> in the north-east.</p>
<p>But, unless the Kremlin is willing to invest resources into long-term rebuilding, this is little more than the equivalent of a corporate raider stripping assets. There is little trade in non-energy goods and services, direct investment, or development assistance.</p>
<p>In contrast to Iran, which has given Syria billions of dollars in <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/irans-credit-line-to-syria-a-well-that-never-runs-dry/">lines of credit</a>, Russia’s support in terms of aid has turned out to be “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/five-years-of-russian-aid-in-syria-proves-moscow-is-an-unreliable-partner/">shallow and inconsistent</a>”. That tactic may preserve short-term profit, but it undermines Russia’s geopolitical manoeuvres. Far from “regaining every inch” of Syria, as it has pledged, the regime will struggle for a modicum of legitimacy as its people struggle more and more. Moscow may have acquired a dependent state (or a portion of the state, at least) – but it’s a state in a permanent situation of instability.</p>
<h2>Break it and buy it</h2>
<p>Moscow’s current playbook comprises propaganda, bargaining, and demands not only for the removal of US and European Union sanctions, but for the “west” to <a href="https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/russias-competing-policy-interests-syria-and-middle-east">put in the funds</a> for reconstruction of regime areas. Meanwhile, the rhetoric around the issue of the <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1312391">return of refugees</a> came with the implied message: Syrians should be in Syria, with Russia leading the effort. This would be managed with financial help from the west, said Lavrentiev, despite the “tough position of a number of European countries”.</p>
<p>So far Russia has had <a href="https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2021_06_EASO_Syria_Situation_returnees_from_abroad.pdf">little success</a>. Of more than 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, only 16,805 voluntarily returned in 2020 and 5,124 from January to March 2021. Of 658,000 in Jordan, just 3,466 returned in 2020 and 1,345 in the first quarter of 2021.</p>
<p>Earlier this month Moscow had to back down over the threat of a Security Council veto over a Russian plan effectively allowing the the Assad regime to control the provision of assistance to opposition areas. Instead, Russia conceded a <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2021/07/draft-un-resolution-ensures-syria-aid-through-2-crossings/">year’s extension</a> of the last humanitarian crossing into northern Syria, serving 1.4 million people in northwest Syria.</p>
<p>Nor did the Kremlin obtain an easing of US sanctions. On the contrary, the Biden Administration announced its first extension on July 28, with <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0292">measures against</a> eight regime prisons and five officials.</p>
<p>In the summer of 2002, the then US secretary of state, Colin Powell, famously invoked the so-called “Pottery Barn rule” with the then president, George W Bush, who was considering the invasion of Iraq: “You break it, you buy it.” Bush ignored that rule – invading and then leaving Iraq in chaos – and the fruits of his decision continue to be a problem for the US almost 20 years later.</p>
<p>Russia faces the aftermath of a mission far from accomplished. Soon after its 2015 military intervention, Russian officials considered whether to ease Assad out of power. Five years later – and only weeks after Assad’s staged re-election – the issue is still unresolved.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/syrian-election-bashar-al-assad-wins-with-95-of-votes-as-world-watches-in-disbelief-161704">Syrian election: Bashar al-Assad wins with 95% of votes as world watches in disbelief</a>
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<p>No deluge of PR about “strategic cooperation” can completely hide that reality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165345/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Like it or not, Russia is mired in Syria with no obvious exit strategy.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1617042021-05-28T11:47:58Z2021-05-28T11:47:58ZSyrian election: Bashar al-Assad wins with 95% of votes as world watches in disbelief<p>The least surprising news of the week from Syria is that Bashar al-Assad has won another <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-president-bashar-al-assad-wins-fourth-term-office-with-951-votes-live-2021-05-27/">seven-year term</a> with 95% of the votes – an increase on the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/04/bashar-al-assad-winds-reelection-in-landslide-victory">89% he won in 2014</a>.</p>
<p>Officials said 78.6% of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/syria-election-results-bashar-assad-wins-4th-term/a-57695135">eligible voters</a>, or more than 13.5 million people, cast their ballots in the election on May 26. But western critics have pointed out this is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/syria-elections-polls-open-as-western-countries-slam-illegitimate-vote/a-57663592">highly unlikely</a>, given that so much of the electorate lives in areas under the control of rebels or Kurdish-led troops, where the vote wasn’t held. </p>
<p>Syria’s minister of the interior, Mohammad Khaled al-Rahmoun, said before the election that more than 18 million people had been <a href="https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/14000305000609/Syrians-Head-Plls-Elec-Presiden">eligible to vote</a>, including citizens living abroad. But it has been estimated that 13 million <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/millions-of-syrians-excluded-as-election-takes-place-under-assad-regime-47009">of those eligible</a> would have been unable to cast their ballots, as they were either living outside regime-controlled areas or were barred from voting because they had fled the country illegally and were unable to show an exit stamp on their passports.</p>
<p>Syria is presently divided into four areas of control. The Assad regime controls Damascus, Latakia, Homs, Hama, Tartous, Sweida, and parts of Deraa, Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Azzor and Hasaka, comprising 12.5 million people. About 3.5 million people live in areas under the control of the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the east. </p>
<p>A further 3.2 million people live in Idlib in the north, under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – formerly Jabhat al-Nusra (an al-Qaeda affiliated group). Finally, 1.3 million people are in the north-west of the country under the control of the Syrian National Army (SNA), a plethora of opposition groups and remnants of the Free Syrian Army.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Syria showing areas of control" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=678&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=678&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=678&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Syria: who controls what in 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Etana Syria</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Syria in 2021 is tired and divided after more than ten years of civil war. More than 13.3 million people have been forced from their homes, of whom 6.6 million are registered as refugees by <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html">UNHCR</a>. More than 12 million of Syria’s resident population of <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/syria-population">just over 18 million</a> don’t have access to enough food, according to a <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/syrian-arab-republic#:%7E:text=WFP%20provides%20life%2Dsaving%20food,ownership%20of%20their%20food%20security.">report</a> from the World Food Programme.</p>
<p>Assad <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/23/civil-war-ruin-raging-poverty-but-assad-is-guaranteed-to-win-syrias-fake-election">was up against</a> two little-known challengers, Abdullah Salloum Abdullah, former state minister of parliamentary affairs, and Mahmoud Ahmad Marei, the head of the National Democratic Front, a small, state-endorsed opposition party. They were the only approved candidates of the 31 who applied for nomination. </p>
<h2>Contested legitimacy</h2>
<p>The election has been widely criticised, including by <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/syria-presidential-election-on-26-may-quint-statement">the “Quint”</a> – the group of governments comprising the UK, US, France, Germany and Italy. A statement from the Quint said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[We] wish to make clear that Syria’s May 26 presidential election will neither be free nor fair. We denounce the Assad regime’s decision to hold an election outside of the framework described in UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and we support the voices of all Syrians, including civil society organisations and the Syrian opposition, who have condemned the electoral process as illegitimate.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The statement went on to “urge the international community to unequivocally reject this attempt by the Assad regime to regain legitimacy”. </p>
<p>But legitimacy has a questionable factor of every Syrian election since the 1963 coup, in which the Ba'ath Party <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18582755">first took power</a> and excluded all rivals. After a split among separate wings of the party in November 1970, Hafez al-Assad – the father of the incumbent president – orchestrated a coup that became known as the “Corrective Movement”. Rival politicians were condemned to death in absentia and, in 1973, the Syrian constitution was amended to enshrine power in the Ba'ath Party as “leader of the state and society”. </p>
<h2>Hereditary dictatorship</h2>
<p>Syria became to all intents and purposes a hereditary dictatorship. After the death of Hafez al-Assad in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hafiz-al-Assad">June 2000</a>, his son Bashar al-Assad <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/bashar-al-assad-a-profile-of-a-mass-murderer/">succeeded</a> him as party leader and head of state.</p>
<p>Aged 34, and educated as an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/18/bashar-al-assad-trained-as-a-doctor-how-did-he-become-a-mass-murderer">ophthalmologist</a> at Moorfields Hospital in London, Assad junior – whose <a href="https://www.economist.com/1843/2021/03/10/banker-princess-warlord-the-many-lives-of-asma-assad">wife Asma</a> was born and brought up in London – was initially presented as a break from the past. But a brief “Damascus Spring” was followed by a gradual tightening of the reins of power as the president and his oligarchical allies moved to restrict freedom of speech and other <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14703912">political expression</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/every-day-is-war-a-decade-of-slow-suffering-and-destruction-in-syria-154595">'Every day is war' – a decade of slow suffering and destruction in Syria</a>
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<p>The ferocity of the regime’s response to Syria’s Arab Spring <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-syrian-uprising-began-and-why-it-matters-112801">protests</a> turned the initial calls for reform to a clamour for revolution. But Assad, with the backing of Russia and Iran, has held on to power and is now generally thought to be fairly secure once again. What is striking, though, is that the Assad regime has been called into question more for its use of violence and the perpetration of war crimes (including the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/10/attacks-ghouta/analysis-alleged-use-chemical-weapons-syria">use of chemical weapons</a>) rather than for its lack of democratic legitimacy.</p>
<p>This year’s elections <a href="https://npasyria.com/en/59023/">were held</a> according to Syria’s 2012 constitution, which stipulates that presidential candidates have to have been living in Syria for the past ten years, be Muslims and be endorsed by at least 35 of the 250 members of the parliament. At present 177 of the members are affiliated with the Ba'ath Party. This suggests that the prospect of anyone but the favoured Ba'athist candidate – on this case Assad himself – winning the election was always so remote as to be pretty much non-existent.</p>
<p>Assad chose to cast his vote in the Damascus suburb of Douma. The district had been a rebel stronghold before being recaptured in an offensive in 2018, that included an alleged <a href="https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2019/03/opcw-issues-fact-finding-mission-report-chemical-weapons-use-allegation">chemical weapons attack</a> which drew almost universal global revulsion at the time. He had a point to prove, as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-57252600">he told reporters while voting</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Syria is not what they were trying to market – one city against the other and sect against the other, or civil war. Today, we are proving from Douma that the Syrian people are one.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Of course, that all depends who is counting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161704/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Aljasem is a PhD candidate at the Center for Conflict Studies at Utrecht University. </span></em></p>Assad claims to have won more than 95% of the vote, but that’s highly unlikely.Ali Aljasem, PhD researcher, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1568542021-03-24T00:56:32Z2021-03-24T00:56:32ZTen years on from the Syrian uprising, what has prevented an end to the tragedy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390990/original/file-20210322-17-gxdsah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C0%2C6698%2C3530&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">East Aleppo after Syrian forces, backed by Russia and Iran, recaptured the city in 2016.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ten years ago this month, Syrians took to the streets to call for political reform and social dignity.</p>
<p>The success with which earlier protest movements in Tunisia and Egypt had toppled dictators Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, as well as NATO’s air campaign against Muammar Gaddafi’s forces in Libya, seemed outwardly to present an opportunity for change in Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. </p>
<p>Instead, the Syrian uprising turned into an insurgency and then a bloody civil war. </p>
<p>By December of 2011, 133 countries in the United Nations General Assembly (including Aotearoa New Zealand) were strongly condemning the Syrian authorities’ “<a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/469/38/PDF/N1146938.pdf?OpenElement">grave and systematic human rights violations</a>” in its response to the uprising. </p>
<p>Alas, this was to no avail. In the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/10-years-10-facts-explain-syria-s-conflict">past decade</a>, 7 million Syrians (from a pre-conflict population of 22 million) have been internally displaced, and 5.6 million have fled to neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>More than 500,000 have been killed, including 55,000 children. According to the UN <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=26811&LangID=E">Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic</a>, thousands of civilians have been subject to torture, sexual violence or death in detention, or have disappeared.</p>
<p>The dire circumstances of more than 64,000 mostly women and children being held in the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Al%20Hol%20Snapshot_26Jul2020.pdf">Al-Hol and Al-Roj detention camps</a> in north-eastern Syria have become the most recent statistic in the Syrian tragedy.</p>
<p>How did this ongoing disaster happen? While the Syrian conflict is complex, it is possible to identify three things that facilitated the militarisation of the uprising and al-Assad’s political survival.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Aerial view of rows of tents at refugee camp" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390993/original/file-20210322-19-1b51l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Aerial view of the Atma refugee camp on the Turkish-Syrian border, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>First resort to violence</h2>
<p>Like their counterparts in neighbouring countries, Syrians faced a pervasive <em>mukhabarat</em> (security establishment), poverty and the absence of basic freedoms. </p>
<p>Their desire for change found early expression when a group of schoolboys painted a slogan, first seen in Tunisia and then in Tahrir square in Cairo, onto a wall in the southern Syrian city of Daraa: الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام (as-shab yurid isqat an-nizam), translated as “the people want the fall of the regime”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/arab-spring-after-a-decade-of-conflict-the-same-old-problems-remain-154314">Arab Spring: after a decade of conflict, the same old problems remain</a>
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<p>But the al-Assad government did not fall. It violently cracked down on the protest movement. In Daraa, the schoolboys were detained and tortured. When the <em>mukhabarat</em> dismissed the tribal elders who intervened on their behalf, it sparked demonstrations in the city. </p>
<p>The demonstrators were met with <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/03/369772-un-human-rights-office-voices-concern-recent-events-yemen-bahrain-and-syria">live ammunition</a> and later tanks. Whole neighbourhoods and villages were put under siege. This <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2011/4/28/deraa-a-city-under-a-dark-siege">excessive use of violence</a> against demonstrators in Daraa and elsewhere militarised the Syrian uprising and undermined the protest movement. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Bashar as-Assad and Vladimir Putin seated and talking" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390991/original/file-20210322-17-4v6c6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Syrian president Bashar al-Assad meets his key ally, Russian president Vladimir Putin, in Damascus, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Failure of the UN Security Council</h2>
<p>The UN Security Council, initially slow to react, became no more than a witness to the violence in Syria. </p>
<p>Seven months after the protests in Daraa began, a resolution tabled by France, the UK, Germany and Portugal condemned Syria’s human rights violations, and raised the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2011%20612.pdf">potential use of force</a> under Article 41 (Chapter VII) of the UN Charter. </p>
<p>Russia and China vetoed the resolution, and non-permanent members India, Brazil, South Africa and Lebanon abstained. No punitive action occurred.</p>
<p>Opposition to the draft resolution was motivated by what had happened in Libya. On March 17 2011, UN Security Council <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement">Resolution 1973</a> had authorised “necessary measures” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect Libyan civilians against Gaddafi’s military. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/every-day-is-war-a-decade-of-slow-suffering-and-destruction-in-syria-154595">'Every day is war' – a decade of slow suffering and destruction in Syria</a>
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<p>The UN-sanctioned, NATO-led military campaign began two days later, but did not cease after the feared attack against civilians in Benghazi was foiled. It continued for seven months until Gaddafi was captured and killed. </p>
<p>Russia’s veto of the first Syrian UN Security Council resolution was based on a suspicion that regime change, as had occurred in Libya, was also planned for Syria. </p>
<p>But Russia has <a href="https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto">gone on to veto</a> a further 15 resolutions, rendering the security council largely impotent in the face of a war that has seen thousands of Syrian civilians killed, maimed, detained, tortured and forcibly displaced.</p>
<h2>The pretext of terrorism</h2>
<p>In late 2016, Syrian forces, backed by Russia and Iran, recaptured eastern <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/13/fall-of-aleppo-pub-66469">Aleppo</a>. The battle for the city had been a prolonged, bloody and strategically important standoff between government forces and anti-government armed groups that had taken a terrible toll on civilians.</p>
<p>For ten years, al-Assad’s permanent representative to the security council had used the threat of terrorism to justify sieges on whole cities and neighbourhoods, the use of barrel bombs on civilians, and attacks on medical personnel and facilities. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ten-years-after-the-arab-spring-libya-has-another-chance-for-peace-157041">Ten years after the Arab Spring, Libya has another chance for peace</a>
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<p>However, in the first six months of the Syrian uprising, al-Assad decreed an amnesty for “political prisoners”. At least four <a href="http://s.telegraph.co.uk/graphics/projects/isis-jihad-syria-assad-islamic/index.html">radical Islamists</a> who later joined or formed militias were among those pardoned. </p>
<p>When Aleppo fell, Aotearoa New Zealand was serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Then-Prime Minister John Key told the security council that although terrorism was a major consequence of the Syrian war, “<a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/statement-united-nations-security-council-syria">it did not cause it</a>”.</p>
<p>Later, as Aotearoa New Zealand’s term came to an end in December 2016, its permanent representative <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/briefing-the-situation-in-the-middle-east-aleppo-syria/?">stated</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I choose to believe the Secretary-General and the people working for him when they say the issue is not terrorism, but it is barbarism.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Without denying the legacy of UN-designated terrorist groups Islamic State (ISIS) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (former Jabhat al-Nusra) in the Syria conflict, Aotearoa New Zealand was right to reject the Syrian state’s justification for its actions.</p>
<p>One minor irony in all this is that the same Syrian permanent representative to the UN was also, in his capacity as rapporteur for the <a href="https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/c24/about">UN Decolonisation Committee</a>, charged with monitoring Aotearoa New Zealand’s administration of Tokelau. </p>
<p>However, this authoritarian absurdity pales in comparison to an ongoing tragedy in Syria. What Key said to the UN in 2016 remains true: a political solution is the only way out of this conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156854/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hanlie Booysen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Three crucial factors have determined the fate of Syria, including the failure of the United Nations to stop the carnage.Hanlie Booysen, Research fellow, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of WellingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1545952021-03-15T12:31:24Z2021-03-15T12:31:24Z‘Every day is war’ – a decade of slow suffering and destruction in Syria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388068/original/file-20210305-17-1cy3igf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C0%2C1049%2C759&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The city of Homs has been ravaged by war, leaving millions of people homeless and displaced. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abduljalil Achraf</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Abduljalil sent me a photo of his ruined home in Homs, Syria. “It is the third floor”, he told me over WhatsApp. The building still stands but it looks like an empty skeleton. Most of its facade has been destroyed, while piles of debris surround it. Residents have not been able to return, as they fear it could collapse at any time.</p>
<p>For a decade now, conflict, violence and destruction have reshaped the lives of millions of Syrians since the start of the Syrian Revolution in March 2011. Abduljalil is just one of more than <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html">12 million</a> people who have had to flee their homes. While 5.6 million people have fled Syria to find refuge in countries such as Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan, 6.6 million people have been internally displaced.</p>
<p>Over the past five years, I have been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/xT6AE8RNPymQ9PCNpge2/full?target=10.1080/13604813.2019.1575605">researching</a> the relationship between urban violence and the impact it has on cities. My research has been mainly focused on my home city of Homs where I conducted a series of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13604813.2020.1833536">interviews</a> with local people and examined the way Homs has been transformed in the past decade. The conflict has created a disorientating experience for many Homsis. People have lost some of their most cherished places, as well as many of their loved ones. </p>
<p>I want my research to help people understand how it feels to be forcibly uprooted. What does it mean to see your own country getting destroyed, to see your home – the place that gave you a sense of safety, security, belonging and identity – in ruins? </p>
<p>These questions are personal to me. I too was forced to leave my home in Homs when fighting broke out and tanks entered my city. I have not been able to return since 2011. From afar, I have seen my country crumble into ruins. I have watched the people I love struggle daily, losing their homes, their dreams, their friends and their future. I have lost people – people I coudn’t even say goodbye to.</p>
<p>As a displaced person, my life moves in parallels. Walking in London where I now live, the images of destroyed homes and shattered lives are always at the forefront of my mind. I left Syria, but Syria didn’t leave me. My life, like the lives of millions of us, has been terribly damaged – just like our cities. The past decade has been a story of loss and suffering, a landscape of grief and sorrow.</p>
<h2>Homs as it was</h2>
<p>Before the conflict started, Homs was known as a city of diversity where different communities from different religious and sectarian backgrounds lived together. It had a population of 800,000 people, but yet there was a strong sense of community – it felt as if everyone knew everyone else. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The busy city centre of Homs before the fighting began." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A bustling Homs before the conflict started in 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.city-analysis.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/8.-Homs-before-2011-Source-Ammar-Azzouz.jpg">Ammar Azzouz</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many neighbourhoods were divided along sectarian lines. Some were mostly inhabited by Alawites or Sunnis while others were mixed with Alawites, Sunnis and Christians living together. </p>
<p>It was a city of peace, quiet and simplicity. Its people famous for their sense of humour and generosity. The memory of this thriving and cosmopolitan city, makes the present reality even more difficult to swallow.</p>
<p>Abduljalil said the memories of old times haunt his former home like a ghost. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I remember the stars I put on the roof in my bedroom … but even the stars fell.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Abduljalil and his family had no choice but to flee their home in 2013 fearing, for their lives. Their neighbourhood, Jouret al-Shayah, at the heart of Homs, was <a href="https://unhabitat.org/city-profile-homs-multi-sector-assessment">heavily targeted</a>.</p>
<p>Other cities including Mosul, Beirut, Aleppo and Raqqa have suffered too. Cities have turned into battlefields. Wars are no longer fought outside densely populated areas, but in neighbourhoods. The urbanisation of the military has made <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0267303032000087766?journalCode=chos20">everyday life</a> a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5yEOdutixw&t=18s">target</a>. </p>
<p>Even cultural heritage sites have been targeted. The shelling of places such as the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hyQdng7qsCI&t=37s">Khaled Ibn al Walid Mosque</a> in Homs, the destruction of monuments, cultural artefacts and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34036644">temples</a> in Palmyra and in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/38303230">Ancient City</a> of Aleppo shocked the world. </p>
<p>But this interest in the ancient monuments has overshadowed the loss people have endured to their way of living that has collapsed in the past decade – the slow suffering. Homes, bakeries, schools and hospitals have been destroyed too. But these “ordinary” spaces have rarely been brought into the conversation.</p>
<p>Everyday life is a battle for survival, even though the fighting in Homs has ended. For many families, food – including sugar and bread – are becoming hard to obtain. Some of the people I spoke to reported long hours waiting to get rice, while many struggle to afford food due to the country’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f3ccc3a7-c697-412a-9b99-18944de5c108">economic collapse</a>. The UN has <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/02/1085722">reported</a> that around 60% of Syrians (12.4 million people) do not have regular access to safe and nutritious food.</p>
<p>One woman I spoke to, who asked not to be identified, lives in Mashta Al Hilu, a town between Homs and Tartus. After finishing her degree in architecture in Homs, she struggled to find a job. She told me how she felt when walking in the ruined streets. In Baba Amr she said she felt as if a “monster” had destroyed it.</p>
<p>Her dream is to improve her violin skills, but these dreams are on hold. She said she felt isolated, as many of her friends had left Syria or had been killed. She asked me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Is life after war more difficult than the life at the time of war? … Every day is war.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There were hopes for change in 2011. People imagined that the future would be different. Nobody expected that Homs would be destroyed, that entire neighbourhoods would be razed to the ground, that another day could mean yet another loss. </p>
<p>Abduljalil and his family couldn’t rebuild their home. No charity or organisation helped them. They eventually decided to sell the ruins and rent outside the heart of the city. Abduljalil still visits his past life, his lost home. He told me: “I feel as a flower uprooted from its roots and planted in another place”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ammar Azzouz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After ten years of conflict and destruction, what is left of Syria and what hope is there for its people?Ammar Azzouz, Short-term Research Associate, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1505662020-11-24T15:07:05Z2020-11-24T15:07:05ZSyria, masculinity and how the Assad regime’s priorities have changed during pandemic<p>When I picture Syria, the first thing I see in my mind’s eye are the statues of the late Syrian president, Hafez al-Assad, in military attire – there’s one in almost every square. But it’s not just statues in the urban spaces, this muscular image of the nation permeates popular culture – Syria is symbolically depicted in songs and stories as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/20581831.2018.1554233">nation of warriors</a>. And, since the uprising in 2011, this link between Syrian masculinity and warrior status has, if anything, intensified.</p>
<p>But the coronavirus has hit all sides very hard. The impact of COVID-19, combined by new sanctions in the shape of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/19/the-caesar-act-and-a-pathway-out-of-conflict-in-syria/">US Caesar Act</a>, which targets overseas sources of income for the Assad regime and its enablers, has brought hostilities <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-war-torn-syria-the-coronavirus-pandemic-has-brought-its-people-to-the-brink-of-starvation-144794">to a halt</a> for the time being. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop of economic and political turmoil, the current president, Bashar al-Assad, has had to resort to adopting new strategies to prop up his regime’s finances. This has included chasing his cousin <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/can-syrias-assad-regime-survive-new-wave-threats">Rami Makhlouf</a> – a regime loyalist – for hundreds of millions of dollars in unpaid back taxes. </p>
<p>Another revenue-raising exercise has been the recent <a href="https://nation.com.pk/09-Nov-2020/syraq-region-unprecedentedly-witnesses-new-election-military-service-laws">reform of the military service law</a>. This has set a new level of exemption fees – one category for Syrians living abroad and another for Syrians inside the country. So, for the first time, some male residents of Syria – including academics – can evade military service by paying a fee, without having to leave the country.</p>
<p>The new reform has also imposed a charge on people who, for medical reasons, were exempted from the military service – now they have to pay, despite being physically unable to bear arms (we have to say that ‘those who are assigned to service at offices’) This reinforces the link between being an able-bodied Syrian man and serving in the military, while at the same time bringing in more money for the regime’s coffers.</p>
<h2>Militarised manhood</h2>
<p>In the two Syrian constitutions <a href="https://syriauntold.com/2016/06/23/the-construction-of-a-patriarchal-militant-identity-in-the-syrian-constitutions-1973-2012/">(1973 and 2012)</a>, military service is mandatory for men. The sacred notion of fighting and dying for the nation has been part of the regime’s propaganda imposed on children through the compulsory conscription to Baʾath-affiliated organisations such as the Syrian National Organisation for Childhood (<em>talaʿeʾe</em>) during the primary stage and the Revolutionary Youth Union (<em>al-shabibah</em>) in high school.</p>
<p>In a <a href="http://mubasher.aljazeera.net/news/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%83%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%87">landmark speech</a> in July 2015, Assad emphasised the relationship between national “belonging” and military service, saying: “The fatherland is not for those who live in it or hold its nationality, but for those who defend and protect it.”</p>
<p>His wife Asma al-Assad reinforced this narrative of masculinity when she met a group of <a href="https://youtu.be/ZUNb2mhHJb8">voluntary female soldiers</a> on Mother’s Day in March 2018 and praised them in comparison with men who evaded conscription. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Your presence in the battlefield marks a new victory and a whole new age… When you are able to sacrifice your soul for the nation, this is the new age and this is the real equality between men and women… You have now proved to the whole world that you are a human being… a human being has strong determination that cannot be defeated.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Masculinity and post-war Syria</h2>
<p>For some men, this this perpetuation of the warrior male stereotype has contributed to an identity crisis. In a recent roundtable discussion with about 50 men who had fled conscription and were living in the UK, many of the men expressed a sense of anguish for failing to defend the nation. </p>
<p>Some concluded that they were not worthy of being Syrian without the honour of carrying arms for their country, while others expressed their desire to go back to die on their home soil. One of them told me: “I feel I have failed my mother… Syria is our mother.”</p>
<p>But the latest reform to Syria’s military service law reflects the regime’s new priorities in fighting COVID-19, which takes money, rather than fighting the regime’s enemies, which takes soldiers.</p>
<p>It’s important to note that the reform targets Syrian men in diaspora and those living in Syria who can afford to pay rather than join up (accepting that some men had always corruptly paid bribes to avoid military service). It’s a shame that the male body is still regarded as either cannon fodder or a source of cash for the country – and it won’t stop men feeling that the constitution, which stipulates that military service is “sacred duty” and pledges to building “physically” as less masculine if they don’t join the armed forces and sign up to protect the nation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150566/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rahaf Aldoughli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Changes to the conscription law in Syria aim to raise money, while still dismissing those men who don’t bear arms as second-class citizens.Rahaf Aldoughli, Lecturer in Middle Eastern Politics, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1447942020-09-17T19:50:58Z2020-09-17T19:50:58ZIn war-torn Syria, the coronavirus pandemic has brought its people to the brink of starvation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358502/original/file-20200917-18-8ik4q4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C0%2C5543%2C3692&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/SANA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Syrian President Bashar al-Assad may have successfully warded off a nine-year <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/10338256?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cg41ylwvggnt/syrian-civil-war&link_location=live-reporting-story">rebellion</a> against his government, but he is being tested with economic turmoil and civilian protests amid the coronavirus pandemic and looming conflict in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.</p>
<p>The civil war in Syria has been overshadowed as the world grapples with the COVID-19 pandemic and its grim economic and social ramifications.</p>
<p>In March 2020, before the pandemic’s first wave reached its peak, the war was in full swing. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51667717">Turkey and Russia locked horns</a> over the northwestern Syrian city of Idlib, the last stronghold of the Syrian opposition. There were fears Turkey would actively fight the Syrian government.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-and-russia-lock-horns-in-syria-as-fear-of-outright-war-escalates-131830">predicted</a>, a last-minute deal was struck when Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-51760973">visited his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Moscow</a> in March 2020.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51763926">The deal</a> established a security corridor 6 kilometres each side of Idlib’s M4 motorway. This is a key route linking Aleppo and Latakia, two major cities held by the Syrian government, which also retained its territorial gains during the crisis with Turkey. </p>
<h2>Civil war takes a break amid the pandemic</h2>
<p>Since March, there has not been any significant development in the Syrian conflict, which has been largely driven by the Syrian government’s offensive since it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/magazine/aleppo-after-the-fall.html">captured Aleppo</a> in 2016. Opposition has been largely eliminated, with those remaining in Idlib seemingly happy to be on the defensive rather than launch any offensive to the Russian-supplied Assad forces.</p>
<p>There are several reasons why the Assad government has just about halted its offensive. These include the coronavirus pandemic, the impact of the economic turmoil in Lebanon, and the economic and political crisis within Syria. Moreover, Turkey, a key player in Syria, has been busy in the eastern Mediterranean.</p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-and-russia-lock-horns-in-syria-as-fear-of-outright-war-escalates-131830">Turkey and Russia lock horns in Syria as fear of outright war escalates</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>On March 30, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-52100372?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cg41ylwvggnt/syrian-civil-war&link_location=live-reporting-story">first</a> coronavirus-related death was reported in Syria. There were fears the virus could spread rapidly through the highly vulnerable <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/#:%7E:text=More%20than%206.6%20million%20Syrians,remain%20trapped%20inside%20the%20country.">6.6 million people</a> displaced by the conflict, now living in overcrowded camps.</p>
<p>As the coronavirus spread deep into the country, the Syrian government introduced several <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2020%2004%20Syria%20Country%20Brief.pdf">measures</a> to halt its progress. Borders were closed, travel between rural and urban areas was restricted, schools and restaurants were shut, and a nationwide curfew was implemented between 7.30pm and 6am. The effectiveness of these measures was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/coronavirus-syria-cases-assad/2020/07/18/732573ec-c14a-11ea-8908-68a2b9eae9e0_story.html">highly uncertain</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Damascus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Official reports suggest Syria is doing well, with <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/">160 deaths and 3,614 cases</a> at the time of writing. But, as with many <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2319714520928884">authoritarian countries</a>, these figures seem too low, given the conditions in the country.</p>
<p>In April, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/coronavirus-disaster-making-war-torn-syria-200413072258750.html">testing</a> was as low as 100 a day, with half of those in the capital, Damascus. By August, that had risen to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/24/medic-syria-covid-19-crisis-health-pandemic">300 a day</a> in only five testing centres. Of the reported cases, a mere 500 are from government-controlled regions. Syria as a whole has reported far fewer cases than any other Middle Eastern country.</p>
<p>It is almost certain the numbers of coronavirus cases are grossly under-reported. The deputy director for health in Damascus <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/24/medic-syria-covid-19-crisis-health-pandemic">estimates</a> the real number is 112,500 cases in Damascus alone. Poorly equipped hospitals are running out of supplies and, unfortunately, body bags. </p>
<h2>Economic meltdown and civil unrest</h2>
<p>There is a reason for the under-reporting of coronavirus cases in Syria: the economic turmoil that is facing the country and threatening the Assad government far more than the years of armed rebellion.</p>
<p>In late April, the government began lifting some coronavirus restrictions, but these measures caused panic-buying and sharp increases in food prices. This was compounded by a rapid fall in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53006408">value of the Syrian pound</a>, which traded at 3,000 to the US dollar on the black market (as opposed to 47 to the dollar before the civil war).</p>
<p>Inevitably, coronavirus measures have had a major economic impact on the war-torn country. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53006408">cost of living in Syria</a> has increased by more than 100% year on year.</p>
<p>The economic crisis was deepened by the increasing <a href="https://www.state.gov/caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act/">US sanctions</a>. New sanctions introduced in June target any <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53006408">foreign person</a> who has knowingly provided significant financial, material, or technological support to the government of Syria.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A large refugee camp on the Syrian side of the border with Turkey, in Idlib province.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Ghaith Alsayed</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Further, the worst economic meltdown in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/06/protesters-flood-on-to-the-streets-of-beirut-demanding-basic-rights">Lebanon</a> since the 1975-90 civil war caused a further slump in the Syrian economy. </p>
<p>The compounding effect of these forces culminated in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/06/protesters-flood-on-to-the-streets-of-beirut-demanding-basic-rights">rare civilian protests</a> in the Syrian capital. The protests began with economic demands but quickly turned into clashes, with supporters of Iran-backed Hezbollah <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/12/syrian-protesters-call-for-assads-downfall-as-economic-crisis-deepens">calling for the downfall</a> of the Assad government. </p>
<p>The government was not the only target of public anger. More than 80% of Syrians <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/press/2019/3/5c88e57d4/united-nations-calls-sustained-support-syrians-region-ahead-brussels-conference.html#:%7E:text=An%20estimated%2083%20percent%20of,or%20lack%20of%20sustained%20livelihoods.">live below the poverty line</a>. The economic crisis hit the opposition-controlled city of Idlib, leading to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/12/syrian-protesters-call-for-assads-downfall-as-economic-crisis-deepens">demonstrations against the militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham</a>.</p>
<p>Many Syrians are in desperate circumstances. The pandemic has wiped out what meagre income they had, and they face <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53218788?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cg41ylwvggnt/syrian-civil-war&link_location=live-reporting-story">mass starvation</a>. The likely result is another mass exodus to Europe through Turkey.</p>
<h2>Repercussions of Syrian conflict in eastern Mediterranean</h2>
<p>The current crisis in the eastern Mediterranean is seemingly the result of <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-greece-conflict-in-eastern-mediterranean-is-less-about-gas-than-vaccuum-left-by-trump-144691">dispute</a> between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, over Turkey’s exploration of natural gas in waters claimed by Greece. There are three reasons why it has repercussions for the Syrian conflict.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-greece-conflict-in-eastern-mediterranean-is-less-about-gas-than-vaccuum-left-by-trump-144691">Turkey-Greece conflict in eastern Mediterranean is less about gas than vaccuum left by Trump</a>
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<p>First, Turkey is drifting away from the western and European bloc over its <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">assertive Syria policy</a> (and Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies within Turkey). Turkey was at odds with the US and European countries over its military operations and Syrian refugee policy, which allowed a flood of refugees to cross into Europe. In doing so, Turkey grew closer to Russia and, to some extent, Iran.</p>
<p>The second is the uncertainty of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/further-strikes-on-syria-unlikely-but-trump-is-always-the-wild-card-94814">US policy on Syria</a> and the US pulling out of Syria under the Trump administration. This resulted in Russia dominating the course of the Syrian civil war. Meanwhile, developments in the eastern Mediterranean forced European powers, particularly <a href="https://onu.delegfrance.org/Intervention-of-the-French-armed-forces-in-Syria">France</a>, to step in to fill the void.</p>
<p>The third is Greece’s attempt to bolster its own diplomatic and economic interests by leveraging against Turkey’s alienation from its western allies. This is aided by the conflict between Turkey and Egypt over Turkey’s <a href="https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/turkey-becomes-the-muslim-brotherhoods-base-to-take-over-the-world/">support of the Muslim Brotherhood</a>.</p>
<p>In early 2020, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-cyprus-israel-pipeline/greece-israel-cyprus-sign-eastmed-gas-pipeline-deal-idUSKBN1Z10R5">Greece signed</a> a major 1,900 kilometre undersea pipeline deal with Israel and Cyprus, followed by a bilateral <a href="https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/02/26/greece-to-sign-defence-deal-with-france/">defence deal with France</a>. Greece expanded its diplomatic push by signing an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-greece/egypt-and-greece-sign-agreement-on-exclusive-economic-zone-idUSKCN252216">agreement with Egypt</a> “designating an exclusive economic zone in the eastern Mediterranean between the two countries, an area containing promising oil and gas reserves”.</p>
<p>Unprepared, Turkey felt trapped, flexing its military muscles in <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/10/southern-eu-leaders-urge-turkey-to-end-unilateral-actions-in-mediterranean-sea-threaten-sa">unilateral moves</a> in the Mediterranean Sea. French President <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-calls-out-turkey-while-extending-dialogue-branch/">Emmanuel Macron responded</a> saying Turkey is “no longer a partner” in the region, further escalating tensions.</p>
<p>Russia has so far stayed quiet on the eastern Mediterranean crisis. But <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russia-in-the-mediterranean-strategies-and-aspirations">a dispute between Turkey, Greece and other NATO countries</a> will further alienate Turkey within NATO, resulting in a stronger position for Russia and its military and political base in Syria. </p>
<p>The coronavirus and its repercussions may have contributed to the slowing of civil war in Syria, but the humanitarian crisis facing its people may yet grow even worse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144794/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with Islamic Sciences and Research Academy of Australia. </span></em></p>After years of civil war, the Syrian people are now suffering from the coronavirus pandemic and a crashing economy. And there is no end in sight.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1325712020-03-02T19:19:40Z2020-03-02T19:19:40ZThe worst humanitarian crisis of the 21st century: 5 questions on Syria answered<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317870/original/file-20200228-24680-x2ap6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2889%2C1894&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Syrians board a dinghy bound for Greece.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Turkey-Syria-Migrants/d090fcc7924b46f8a8aeb54ca656c432/2/0">DHA via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Remember former President Barack Obama’s infamous <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=avQKLRGRhPU">red line speech in 2012</a>? In that speech, the president made it clear that the U.S. would not stand for the use of chemical or biological weapons by President Bashar al-Assad against opposition forces in Syria. </p>
<p>But, despite subsequent evidence of the use of these weapons by Assad’s forces, the U.S. declined to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LMePcKiEMFE">directly confront the regime</a>.</p>
<p>A complex, devastating conflict has continued ever since, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200104-syria-death-toll-tops-380-000-in-almost-nine-year-war-monitor">killing close to 400,000 Syrians</a> and <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/syria/">forcing millions from their homes</a>. It has involved a range of players over nine years: the Assad-controlled government regime, various rebel opposition groups, the Islamic State, Syria’s Kurdish minority and major international powers, including the United States, Iran, Turkey, Russia and the European Union. </p>
<p>Consequently, some confusion about current events and what they mean is understandable. So, here are some answers to key questions about why Syria is back in the news. </p>
<h2>1. What’s going on right now?</h2>
<p>The war in Syria has resulted in more <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/syria/">than 11 million people displaced</a>. Over half of these displaced people are <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/what-is-a-refugee/">refugees</a>, with the vast majority currently hosted in the regional states of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.</p>
<p>The war has now reached a crisis point. Since December, the Russian-backed Assad regime has significantly increased air and ground assaults on civilian sites in Idlib province, causing destruction and mass displacement. </p>
<p>Idlib is considered the remaining stronghold of the rebel opposition to Assad’s regime. Lying in the northeast of Syria bordering Turkey, it is home to approximately 3.5 million people. </p>
<p>The United Nations has repeatedly called for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/02/27/world/middleeast/27reuters-syria-security-guterres.html">an immediate cessation of hostilities</a>. Nonetheless, the assaults continued. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317872/original/file-20200228-24694-1ex33w4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317872/original/file-20200228-24694-1ex33w4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317872/original/file-20200228-24694-1ex33w4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317872/original/file-20200228-24694-1ex33w4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317872/original/file-20200228-24694-1ex33w4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317872/original/file-20200228-24694-1ex33w4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317872/original/file-20200228-24694-1ex33w4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317872/original/file-20200228-24694-1ex33w4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Turkish-backed rebel fighters fire a howitzer toward Syrian government forces positions near the village of Neirab in Idlib province.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ghaith Alsayed</span></span>
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<h2>2. How many people are fleeing?</h2>
<p>Since December, nearly 950,000 people, an estimated 80% of whom are women and children, have fled their homes because of ground and air assaults by the Russian-backed Assad forces <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/02/25/809273845/u-n-humanitarian-crisis-in-syria-reaches-horrifying-new-level">during an uncharacteristically cold winter</a>. </p>
<p>Many live in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/02/18/807150232/satellite-photos-show-rapid-growth-of-syrian-refugee-camps">makeshift displaced persons camps</a> in northern Syria. Reports show that women are burning plastic to keep warm, and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/02/1057551">babies and children are dying due to the cold</a>.</p>
<p>The U.N. estimates that close to 2 million Syrians are in need of <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/02/1058201">humanitarian assistance</a>. While aid is being delivered, it is insufficient to meet the needs of families for food, clean water and heating. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.iom.int/news/iom-reaffirms-un-call-cessation-hostilities-syria-wake-deaths-humanitarian-partners">Local aid workers</a> have also been killed. </p>
<h2>3. Why is this considered a humanitarian crisis?</h2>
<p>Until early January, humanitarian assistance was coming from international organizations into Syria <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1055181">through Iraq</a>. Aid is currently coming in through Turkey, as it affords the most feasible route for people to seek refuge and for humanitarian assistance to get through to Syria. </p>
<p>However, Turkey has effectively closed its borders to those fleeing from Idlib, noting it already <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-are-there-to-stay-at-least-for-now-125176">hosts over 3.6 million Syrian refugees</a>. </p>
<p>Some reports put the death toll around Idlib in the thousands. The U.N. has recorded <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25564&LangID=E">hundreds of deaths in Idlib and Aleppo</a> due to the recent attacks, which are backed militarily by Russia. Many medical facilities and schools have been targeted or impacted.</p>
<p>Experts claim that the attacks are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/syria-cites-deliberate-attacks-civilians-200218111516852.html">part of a strategy to explicitly target civilians</a>. Such targeting of civilians, schools and hospitals could be war crimes – grave violations of the law of war. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23226&LangID=E">U.N. Commission of Inquiry</a> and <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-syrian-war-crimes-are-being-investigated-in-europe/">European courts</a> are investigating crimes committed during <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-un-warcrimes-idUSKBN20P1IR">the Syrian conflict</a>. </p>
<h2>4. Who is involved in this fight?</h2>
<p>The conflict in Syria started with a peaceful uprising in 2011 <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war">against the four-decade authoritarian rule of the Assad family</a>. Since then, it has become increasingly complicated, involving a number of countries near and far.</p>
<p>Iran has remained a steadfast supporter of Assad throughout the conflict, although <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/irans-unwavering-support-to-assads-syria/">its exact military and financial support</a> is difficult to track. </p>
<p>In 2015, Russia, a historic ally of the Assad family, directly entered the conflict to support the government through airstrikes. It controls much of the airspace in northern Syria today. </p>
<p>The United States entered the war as part of a coalition in 2014. It has supported <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49963649">Syrian Kurdish militia</a>, known as the People’s Protection Units, in a joint fight against the Islamic State, which had gained power in parts of Syria. The United States’ support of the Syrian Kurds has consistently rattled Turkey, which links the group to its own <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100">Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)</a>, which is considered a terrorist group by neighboring Turkey, the European Union and the United States. </p>
<p>In October, President Donald Trump ordered the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/the-kurds-facts-history.html">removal of U.S. military personnel from northern Syria</a>, abandoning the traditional support by the U.S. for Syrian Kurds and opening up advantages for <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Russia-lands-forces-at-former-US-air-base-in-northern-Syria-607964">the Assad regime and Russia</a>. </p>
<p>In response, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkeys-syria-incursion-what-spurred-it-and-whats-next">Turkey intervened militarily</a> to undermine the Syrian Kurds and create a safe zone along its borders. These actions infuriated Turkey’s western allies because it <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/10/1049761">heightened the conflict</a> in parts of the north that had been peacefully governed by the Syrian Kurds. </p>
<p>While Turkey and Russia do not agree on Syria, they have been coming closer since 2015, even overcoming crises like the downing of a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-turkey-jet/kremlin-says-turkey-apologized-for-shooting-down-russian-jet-idUSKCN0ZD1PR">Russian aircraft by Turkish forces</a> near the Syrian border. </p>
<p>Turkey, the United States and European Union states are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, known as NATO. Deepening a divide between Turkey and NATO is considered by experts to be in the interest of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. </p>
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<span class="caption">Putin, left, shakes hands with Assad during a 2018 meeting in Sochi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Syria-Curtailing-Iran-Analysis/54e2e9e2f7e945d280e4f6edace6f9bd/45/0">Mikhail Klimentyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP</a></span>
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<h2>5. What now?</h2>
<p>The humanitarian crisis is grave, and the situation in flux. With the fighting around Idlib continuing, <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/turkey-warns-syria-halt-offensive-end-of-february.html">international tensions</a> are flaring. </p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/27/dozens-of-turkish-soldiers-killed-in-strike-in-idlib-in-syria-reports-say">33 Turkish soldiers died</a> in an attack by Russian-backed Syrian forces on Feb. 27, Turkey called for NATO to meet <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/02/28/810307205/nato-meets-after-turkey-says-russian-backed-force-killed-33-troops-in-syria">and has retaliated</a> in Syria. Russia has denied any involvement in the specific assault. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/turkey-syria-russia-deciphering-attack-on-turkish-troops.html">Neither Turkey nor Russia</a> appears to be decreasing <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/russia-turkey-idlib-putin-erdogan.html">their interventions in Syria</a>. </p>
<p>With Russia wielding a veto power on the United Nations Security Council, the institution responsible for addressing threats to international peace and security has been unable to effectively intervene to halt the conflict and <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/syria/">protect civilians</a>.</p>
<p>Many experts contend that the war could be in its final throes and <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2020-01-17/bashar-al-assads-hollow-victory">some victory for Assad</a> is no longer in question. For now, the Trump administration has indicated it has <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/pentagon-syria-reengagement-idlib-showdown-trump-esper.html">no intention of reengaging in Syria</a> to protect the people of Idlib. </p>
<p>However, in such a complex conflict, the delicate balance of interests can be disrupted. For example, Turkey has opened its borders for <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/turkey-will-no-longer-stop-syrian-migrant-flow-to-europe-official-says/news">Syrian refugees to flow into Europe</a>, creating a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51678462">potential renewed crisis</a> for the European Union. </p>
<p>Turkey has asked NATO for military support for a <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/02/28/will-an-attack-on-turkish-troops-in-syria-change-the-course-of-the-war">no-fly zone over Idlib</a>, but has gained no traction so far. <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2020-02-24/washington-must-protect-syrians-fleeing-idlib">Experts agree</a> that the best route to protect civilians would be such a zone and argue the United States must play a role. </p>
<p>Others are calling for an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/27/un-wont-protect-syrian-refugees-save-idlib-eu-nato-can/">EU-NATO intervention</a> to protect the people of Idlib. The <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/75344/Syria:%20Statement%20by%20the%20High%20Representative/Vice-President%20Josep%20Borrell">EU</a> is meeting to discuss the crisis.</p>
<p>For now, Turkey is taking on the <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/03/operation-spring-shield-clash-turkey-syrian-arab-army-idlib.html">Syrian forces alone</a> and claiming some success. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/turkey-erdogan-visit-russia-tensions-syria-idlib-200302085502839.html">Russia and Turkey</a> are set to meet to discuss the conflict on March 5.</p>
<p>[<em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132571/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shelley Inglis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The war in Syria has reached a crisis point, with close to 400,000 deaths and more than 11 million people displaced.Shelley Inglis, Executive Director, University of Dayton Human Rights Center, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1318302020-03-01T19:04:25Z2020-03-01T19:04:25ZTurkey and Russia lock horns in Syria as fear of outright war escalates<p>As the nine-year Syrian civil war enters its final turn, Turkey and Russia, long-time allies in Syria, are on the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/turkey-vows-drive-syrian-forces-idlib-200226104230214.html">brink of war</a> over the Syrian province of Idlib.</p>
<p>Both sides are sending stern messages of warning as diplomacy to end the conflict has so far failed to de-escalate the situation.</p>
<h2>What has led to the stand-off?</h2>
<p>In September 2018, Turkey, Russia and Iran signed an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-putin-erdogan-hope/russia-and-turkey-agree-to-create-buffer-zone-in-syrias-idlib-idUSKCN1LX1BU">agreement</a> (also called the Sochi accord) to create a de-escalation zone in Idlib, where violent hostilities were prohibited. </p>
<p>Under the agreement, opposition forces were classified as jihadist and mainstream. Mainstream forces were to pull heavy weapons out of the zone and jihadist groups to vacate it completely. All sides, including Turkey, set up military observation posts.</p>
<p>Claiming that jihadist groups did not leave the zone after more than a year, Syrian government forces launched an offensive in December 2019. The offensive displaced more than 900,000 civilians. </p>
<p>This was followed by the Syrian government forces attacking a Turkish observation post and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/03/turkish-soldiers-killed-battle-syria-idlib-assad">killing 13 Turkish soldiers</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ceasefire-in-syria-is-ending-heres-whats-likely-to-happen-now-125492">The 'ceasefire' in Syria is ending – here's what's likely to happen now</a>
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<p>Outraged, Turkey retaliated on February 2 with a counter-attack that killed Syrian soldiers and <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/02/03/4-russian-special-forces-officers-killed-in-syria-reports-a69139">four members of Russian special forces</a>. Turkey also intensified its <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-10/turkey-deploys-tanks-commandos-to-break-sieges-in-syria-s-idlib">military build-up</a> in Idlib’s north.</p>
<p>On February 3, Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan openly defied Russia with a visit to Ukraine, where he pledged <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200205-turkeys-erdogan-pledges-200m-to-ukraine-army/">US$200 million in military aid</a>. </p>
<p>On February 15, Erdogan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-erdogan/turkeys-erdogan-situation-in-idlib-wont-be-solved-until-syrian-forces-withdraw-idUSKBN2090QB">warned</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The solution in Idlib is the (Syrian) regime withdrawing to the borders in the agreements. Otherwise, we will handle this before the end of February.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Russia <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-12/russia-pins-blame-on-turkey-for-first-time-for-syria-escalation">blamed Turkey</a> for failing to meet its obligations and continued to allege Turkey was supplying weapons to what Russia considers terrorist groups. </p>
<p>Erdogan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-kremlin-turkey/russia-accuses-turkey-of-breaking-syria-deals-rejects-erdogan-claim-idUSKBN2061EL">countered</a> these claims by saying Russian and Syrian government forces were “constantly attacking the civilian people, carrying out massacres, spilling blood”. </p>
<p>The greatest fear is an all-out war in Idlib and the inevitable civilian suffering. With more than a million civilians trying to survive in makeshift camps, a United Nations representative has <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2020/02/24/syria-un-warns-bloodbath-idlib/">warned</a> of “a real bloodbath”.</p>
<h2>Why is Idlib so important?</h2>
<p>Capturing Idlib has immense strategic significance for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as it is the last opposition stronghold in Syria.</p>
<p>Backed by Russia, Assad has been conducting a successful military offensive against jihadist opposition forces throughout the country to regain and consolidate his power since 2015. He has allowed remnants of these groups to escape to Idlib as a deliberate strategy to gather all opposition forces in one location.</p>
<p>So far, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45403334">Idlib has been controlled</a> by a range of opposition groups. The most powerful is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which was formed by a large faction that split from the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda in 2017.</p>
<p>Capturing Idlib with the help of Russia and clearing the province of all armed opposition would allow Assad to declare victory and end the civil war. </p>
<h2>Turkish and Russian clash of interests in Syria</h2>
<p>Erdogan had three main goals in his Syrian involvement. First, prevent the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria. The Turkish fear such a development could inspire the large Kurdish-populated southeast regions of Turkey to pursue similar ambitions.</p>
<p>The second is to fight a proxy war in Syria through jihadist groups to topple the Assad regime and establish an Islamist government. Erdogan hoped this would extend his political influence in the Middle East and his ambitions to make political Islam dominant would be achieved.</p>
<p>A third aim is to do with maintaining his 18-year rule in Turkey amid political and economic problems. A war in Syria serves to silence critics. </p>
<p>Erdogan calculated he could achieve his goals if he was to have forces in Syria and collaborate with Russia and Iran. The cost was distancing Turkey from the Western block and increasing its international alienation.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">As Turkish troops move in to Syria, the risks are great – including for Turkey itself</a>
</strong>
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<p>Turkey, Russia, Iran and the Syrian government wanted to balance Western and particularly US power in Syria, and if possible to push US out of Syria. Even though their relationships were <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-russia-and-turkey-the-uneasy-alliance-reshaping-world-politics-71079">fragile</a> from the start, these four countries were extremely careful on the diplomatic table and presented a powerful bloc against US involvement in Syria.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ceasefire-in-syria-is-ending-heres-whats-likely-to-happen-now-125492">Russian strategy</a> in Syria has been clear from the start – support the Assad government until it regains control over all Syrian territory and defeats all opposition forces. Then Russia can control Turkey so it does not cause serious armed conflict with the Assad regime, while protecting Russian interests in Syria and the greater Middle East.</p>
<p>Russia has invested enormous funds in support of the Assad government. The only way to recoup its costs and have return on investment is if Assad achieves a full victory. Nothing short of capturing Idlib will suffice, even if it means open conflict with Turkey.</p>
<h2>What is likely to happen next?</h2>
<p>Erdogan is caught in a dilemma. He is unable to influence the Syrian opposition parties in Idlib, but he is also not prepared to forsake them. If he withdraws support, they may possibly retaliate with terrorist attacks in Turkey.</p>
<p>Another flood of Syrian refugees is a serious problem for Erdogan. He <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/erdogan-loses-istanbul-reasons-and-implications">lost local government elections</a> in 2019 largely due to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey. </p>
<p>It is hard to predict what Erdogan will do in Syria. He is either bluffing or is determined to stay the course, even if it means war. He has shown he is not afraid to make bold moves, as demonstrated with his October 2019 <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">military operation</a> in northern Syria and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51626743">recent military involvement</a> in the Libya conflict.</p>
<p>Bluffing or not, Putin is not backing down and will not hesitate to take on Turkey in Syria. In doing so, Putin will continue to support the Assad forces with equipment, military intelligence, air power and military expertise, rather than being involved in open military conflict. This strategy allows Russia to claim Syria is exercising its legitimate right to defend its sovereign territory against a foreign Turkish military presence. </p>
<p>It is likely Erdogan will avert the risk of war at the last moment. He has involved the US, which has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-19/trump-backs-erdogan-as-turkey-rejects-russia-s-proposal-on-syria">expressed its support</a> for Turkey and hopes to see Assad gone. He has used his <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/turkey-syria-united-states-ankara-change-of-heart-on-nato.html">NATO membership card</a> and the European fear of another Syrian refugee flood to bring European powers onside at the diplomatic table.</p>
<p>Erdogan will be happy and claim victory if he manages to enlarge the safety zone with a continued Turkish presence there. Russia would only accept this on the condition that all jihadist opposition groups leave Idlib. On these terms, both sides could claim a win from the present dangerous tension.</p>
<p>The likely <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/idlib-russia-rejects-truce-as-violence-mounts/a-52530985">Russian response</a> is to go all the way in Idlib, regardless of what Turkey does. Any Turkish military success in Syria is highly unlikely. Russia completely controls the airspace and could inflict serious damage on Turkish ground troops. </p>
<p>It is in Russia’s interests to finish this costly civil war once and for all. It is only a matter of time before the Assad government captures Idlib diplomatically or by force.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131830/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with Islamic Sciences and research Academy of Australia.</span></em></p>The contested province of Idlib has become a focus of the conflict, which has become increasingly violent and dangerous.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1255212019-11-26T13:35:47Z2019-11-26T13:35:47ZSyria military presence risks US credibility with world community<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300346/original/file-20191105-88378-2myyy0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=34%2C0%2C3885%2C2587&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Donald Trump has rapidly, and without warning to allies or even his own officials, shifted U.S. foreign policy in Syria.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Trump/138b7ee2945843d6bc5a6b921d511ac4/28/0">AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump’s decisions to withdraw U.S. troops from northern Syria – and then to send them back into action – has raised new concerns around the world about the reliability of U.S. promises.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of Trump’s presidency, <a href="https://time.com/4574466/donald-trump-international-order-stability/">I and other</a> foreign policy scholars have worried that Trump’s tendencies toward <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claims-database/">hyperbole, exaggeration and outright lying</a> could disrupt a relatively stable international community. </p>
<p>For the last several years, I was relieved to find that didn’t happen. Some of the president’s public statements about <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/11/politics/trump-nato-diplomats-reaction/index.html">NATO</a>, trade and nuclear weapons were concerning, but largely didn’t result in major shifts in U.S. policy or changing courses of American action.</p>
<p>However, by announcing that the U.S. military in northern Syria would leave positions they occupied between Turkish and Kurdish forces – two U.S. allies who viewed each other as enemies – and then <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/us/politics/us-syria-isis.html">apparently reversing that decision</a>, Trump has likely caused U.S. allies and rivals to view American commitments in a new, uncertain light.</p>
<p>Other countries have seen how quickly the U.S. can reverse longstanding commitments. They may now adjust their own diplomatic and military strategies to depend less on the U.S. That, in turn, may reduce the power and influence the U.S. has in the international community, increasing global instability.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, left, long a U.S. ally, has made a new agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Russia-Turkey-Syria/b8152e099cd14229805c8a2159f4da5e/10/0">Presidential Press Service via AP, Pool</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Slow-moving bureaucracy</h2>
<p>In the first several years of the Trump presidency, bureaucratic lack of action in the Pentagon and the State Department meant that statements from the president didn’t actually change what U.S. troops and diplomats did in other countries. </p>
<p>The message other nations took from that was that they couldn’t totally ignore the president’s words, but they <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-twitter-japan-us-foreign-policy-shinzo-abe-military-a8988211.html">did not need to worry</a> about their implications very much. Despite what Trump said, they felt they could continue to depend on the U.S. for assistance, aid and support.</p>
<p>For instance, a Japanese foreign ministry official told the Japan Times newspaper, “<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-twitter-japan-us-foreign-policy-shinzo-abe-military-a8988211.html">The Japanese government shouldn’t react to a tweet</a> by the president each time … If it’s their official position, we need to deal with it, but the president says various things.”</p>
<p>Put another way, Trump’s statements were hurting the reputation of the U.S., but not damaging the country’s credibility about its commitments.</p>
<p>To many scholars of foreign policy, this might be surprising. The <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691171609/resolve-in-international-politics">behavior of a country’s leader</a> is expected to <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501747717/reputation-for-resolve/">affect that country’s global reputation</a>, which is usually key to international credibility. Developing consistent positions deters <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300050615/extended-deterrence-and-prevention-war">would-be challengers</a> of U.S. allies or interests. </p>
<p>That’s why national officials in the U.S. and around the world are typically quite careful with <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/theatre-of-power-the-art-of-diplomatic-signalling/oclc/1119404991">what they say and how they say it</a>.</p>
<h2>Sticking with the message</h2>
<p>In general, the U.S. and other countries do best if they clearly state their positions and follow up on them. Saying one thing one day and doing something contradictory the next scrambles observers’ perceptions. The uncertainty could embolden rivals and make allies nervous.</p>
<p>For instance, in 2012, President Barack Obama declared that using chemical weapons would be a “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-issues-syria-red-line-warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-b811-09036bcb182b_story.html">red line</a>” Syrian leader Bashar Assad should not cross. When Assad did attack his own people with chemical weapons, Obama did not order a military response, and was <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-obamas-red-line-a-green-light/">widely</a> <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/robert-gates-syria-red-line-obama-2016-1">criticized</a> by politicians and foreign policy elites <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-obama-syria-requires-more-than-words/2013/09/09/3c98ec46-1724-11e3-804b-d3a1a3a18f2c_story.html">for not</a> matching his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/04/10/politicians-who-were-wrong-on-the-red-line-should-just-admit-it/">words with actions</a>. Obama’s vacillation was blamed for <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/how-obamas-chemical-weapons-deal-fell-apart/522549/">Assad’s subsequent use</a> of chemical weapons. </p>
<p>However, many observers exaggerate the importance of reputation. As political scientist <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/reputation-and-international-politics/oclc/32894358">Jonathan Mercer notes</a>, when one government tries to predict another’s behavior, it is more likely to consider the opposing leader’s immediate strategic circumstances rather than his or her past behavior. </p>
<p>For instance, rather than interpret Obama as weak and irresolute for not responding to Syria’s use of chemical weapons, Assad may have seen the excoriation that Obama suffered for failing to respond to their use, but also seen Congress’ reluctance to endorse military measures.</p>
<p>Thus, rather than become more emboldened by Obama’s irresolution, Assad may have recognized that Obama’s hesitation to strike Syria was due to other factors beyond his own character and reputation.</p>
<h2>A focus on credibility</h2>
<p>U.S. credibility may have survived well into Trump’s presidency because it’s not just simply based on reputation. </p>
<p>Rather, as scholar <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410591001474">Shiping Tang notes</a>, what the president says isn’t necessarily the only thing that determines a country’s credibility. Its interests and what it can actually do are also important factors.</p>
<p>While Trump’s erratic leadership style chipped away at the U.S.’s reputation, the other two pillars of its international credibility appeared solid. And even though Trump expressed skepticism about U.S. commitments to NATO, for instance, the steady behavior of institutions such as Pentagon and the State Department suggested U.S. capabilities and interests had not changed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces troops counted on U.S. support in the fight against the Islamic State group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Syria-Defying-Kurds/20d183920bde4037a3189ae3871fe5e3/171/0">AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, the president’s decision to abandon longtime Kurdish allies in Syria showed that U.S. strategic interests may seem predictable, but actually can change very suddenly. </p>
<p>Indeed, the fact that Trump’s move <a href="https://time.com/5521419/syria-withdrawal-donald-trump-joseph-votel/">surprised officials in the Pentagon and the State Department</a> – who had no warning of the decision – means that foreign allies cannot be sure what U.S. interests are. </p>
<p>These uncertainties are further compounded by the president’s refusal to share with Congress or the American public the details of his discussions with world leaders. Nor will he reveal whether he has any potential private conflicts of interest that might be influencing him. All that U.S. allies and rivals can ascertain from the Syria decision is that the country’s security interests shifted without warning.</p>
<p>Until this recent decision about Syria, when the world struggled to decode the president’s confusing statements, foreign leaders could still count on core U.S. interests remaining constant. However, the prospect that U.S. foreign policy could change significantly, without warning or explanation, means other countries can’t trust what the U.S. says – and they’ll act accordingly.</p>
<p>The Kurds, for instance, quickly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/world/middleeast/syria-turkey-invasion-isis.html">allied with the Assad regime</a> they had been fighting against. Allies like Afghanistan might feel pressure to negotiate settlements with potential U.S. enemies or rivals, to protect them if American support ends suddenly. Closer allies, like Japan and the European Union, may also feel the need to deepen ties with U.S. rivals to guard against the day America turns away from them, too.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125521/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Banks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In northern Syria, Trump has caused U.S. allies and rivals to view American commitments in a new, uncertain light. Other countries may now shift to depend less on the U.S., weakening national power.David Banks, Professorial Lecturer of International Politics, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1254922019-10-22T19:00:31Z2019-10-22T19:00:31ZThe ‘ceasefire’ in Syria is ending – here’s what’s likely to happen now<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298017/original/file-20191022-56238-1h5x1rz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Syrian troops deployed near Aleppo. The likely winner from the latest conflict in Syria is the Assad government.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/SANA handout</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The five-day <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/17/us-delegation-seeks-syria-ceasefire-after-trump-undercuts-mission-turkey-mike-pence">ceasefire</a> negotiated by US Vice President Mike Pence and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan ends today.</p>
<p>Despite the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/18/middleeast/syria-turkey-ceasefire-violations-intl/index.html">shaky</a> ceasefire, the risk of economic sanctions from the US and worldwide condemnation, Turkey is likely to stay in Syria for a long time.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">As Turkish troops move in to Syria, the risks are great – including for Turkey itself</a>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/14/syrian-troops-enter-kurdish-fight-against-turkish-forces">anticipated clash</a> between Turkey and Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian government is also unlikely to eventuate, for three three reasons:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Erdogan’s main aims require the army to stay in Syria for the long term</p></li>
<li><p>Assad’s and Erdogan’s goals in northeastern Syria strangely overlap</p></li>
<li><p>The coordinating role of Russia in Syria prevents the need for Erdogan and Assad to clash in open warfare. </p></li>
</ol>
<h2>Has Turkey achieved its objectives?</h2>
<p>Even though Turkey has been building its forces on the border for some time, the US-allied Kurdish YPG (which Turkey considers a terrorist group) was caught by surprise. They were busy fighting Islamic State and not expecting the US to allow Turkish forces across the border. Battle-weary YPG forces were no match for the powerful Turkish army. </p>
<p>As a result, Kurdish commanders begged the Trump administration to intervene. The ceasefire deal was struck to allow YPG forces to withdraw beyond what Turkey calls a “safe zone”. Trump declared the ceasefire to be a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqgVunYCTIk">validation</a> of his erratic Syrian policy.</p>
<p>Turkey’s immediate objective of establishing a 32-kilometre deep and 444-kilometre wide safe zone across its border with Syria will likely be achieved.</p>
<p>Yet establishing this zone is just the precursor to Erdogan’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">three primary objectives</a>. Those are to resettle millions of Syrian Arab refugees in northeastern Syria, as a result helping to prevent the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish administration and, finally, to ensure his political survival by maintaining his alliance with the Turkish nationalist party (MHP). </p>
<p>The June 2019 political loss of the important city of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/erdogan-loses-istanbul-reasons-and-implications">Istanbul</a> to the main Turkish opposition party, primarily due to Syrian refugee debates, has been an important trigger for Erdogan to act on his Syria plans.</p>
<p>These objectives require Turkey to remain in Syria at least until the end of the Syrian civil war. This would mean the status of northeastern Syria and its Kurdish population were clearly determined in line with Turkey’s goals. These outcomes could take many years to eventuate.</p>
<p>So, any withdrawal before the primary objectives are met will be seen as a defeat within Turkey. Erdogan wants to enter the 2023 presidential elections claiming victory in Syria. </p>
<h2>Erdogan’s and Assad’s goals overlap</h2>
<p>With the US no longer a serious contender in Syrian politics, Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin are the only leaders capable of stymieing Erdogan’s objectives. </p>
<p>Prior to Turkey’s military intervention, the relationship between the Kurdish leadership and Assad administration was one of mutual avoidance of conflict. Since the beginning of the civil war in 2011, they have never clashed militarily. </p>
<p>The expected outcome of this policy was that the Kurds would have an autonomous region in northeastern Syria and an important role in post-civil war negotiations. Assad had no choice but to agree to this in order to stay in power.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-syrian-war-is-not-over-its-just-on-a-new-trajectory-heres-what-you-need-to-know-110292">The Syrian war is not over, it's just on a new trajectory: here's what you need to know</a>
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<p>The Turkish intervention opens new possibilities for the Assad government. The speed of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/13/kurds-reach-deal-with-damascus-in-face-of-turkish-offensive">alliance between the YPG and Assad</a> indicates the Syrian government senses an opportunity.</p>
<p>The Kurdish-Assad alliance allows Assad’s forces and administration to enter areas they could not enter before. Assad wasted no time in wedging his forces in the safe zone by <a href="https://time.com/5703009/syrian-forces-border-town-turkish-plans/">seizing the major Kurdish town of Kobani</a> in the middle of the Syrian-Turkish border.</p>
<p>Despite the Kurdish-Assad alliance, resettling Syrian Arab refugees in Kurdish regions will weaken Kurdish claims to the region and suit Assad’s goal of a unified Syria that he totally controls.</p>
<p>There is another immediate benefit for Assad. Idlib is a strategic city in northwestern Syria and the last stronghold of the Syrian opposition to Assad. Resistance groups defeated elsewhere were allowed to gather in Idlib. Careful negotiations took place in the past few years to avoid an all-out bloodbath in Idlib.</p>
<p>Assad will almost certainly ask Turkey to abandon its patronage of Idlib and opposition forces l
ocated there. In return, Assad will allow a temporary Turkish presence in northern Syria.</p>
<p>So, although Kurdish forces signed a deal with Assad, it is highly unlikely this will evolve into active warfare between Turkey and Syria. Instead, the situation will be kept tense – by Assad forces remaining in Kobani – to allow Erdogan and Assad to get what they want.</p>
<h2>Russia will prevent a Turkey-Syria clash</h2>
<p>This is where Russia and Putin come in. Russia is an ally of both the Turkish and Syrian governments. To save face, Erdogan is unlikely to sit in open negotiations with Assad. Negotiations will be done through Putin.</p>
<p>When <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/turkey-erdogan-travel-russia-talks-putin-191016204628625.html">Putin and Erdogan meet</a> on October 22, the main negotiating points will be to prevent a war between Turkey and the Russian-armed Assad forces. Erdogan will ask the Russian and Assad governments to allow Turkey to stay in the zone it established. In return, Russia will request further concessions on Idlib and perhaps more arms deals similar to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48620087">S-400 missile deal</a>.</p>
<p>A deal between Erdogan and Assad suits Russia because it serves the its main objectives in Syria – keep Assad in power to ensure Russian access to the Mediterranean Sea and weaken NATO by moving Turkey away from the alliance.</p>
<p>If the Kurds realise Assad has no intention of fighting Turkey, they may decide to take matters into their own hands and engage in guerrilla warfare with Turkish forces in northern Syria. While this may deliver a blow to Turkish forces, Erdogan will use it to back his claim they are terrorists.</p>
<p>Regardless of what happens, Turkey will stay in northern Syria for the foreseeable future, no matter the cost to both countries.</p>
<p>The eventual winner in Syria is looking to be the Assad government, which is moving to control the entire country just as it did before the 2011 uprising.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125492/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with Islamic Sciences and Research Academy of Australia.</span></em></p>With so much politics at play, Turkey is likely to be in Syria for a long time to come – and the real winner from it all is likely to be the Assad government.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1253332019-10-16T13:54:45Z2019-10-16T13:54:45ZSyria: why the Kurds had little option but to do a deal with Bashar al-Assad<p>When the Syrian military withdrew from the Kurdish populated regions of Syria in July 2012, they left the Kurds in charge of their homeland, what they call Rojava. Without a backer and surrounded by many hostile states and militia, few people gave the Kurds any chance of survival. </p>
<p>Despite the odds stacked against them, the Kurdish forces managed to push back the attacks by Islamic State (IS) and other jihadist militias and emerged as the most effective ground force against IS in Syria. The support the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces received from the US and the anti-IS coalition allowed them to expand the areas under their control and build a coalition with other ethnic groups in northeast Syria. </p>
<p>That momentum was lost when US president Donald Trump abruptly declared his intention to withdraw American soldiers from Syria <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/20/syria-kurds-trump-troop-withdrawal-isis-turkey">in December 2018</a>. Although that withdrawal was delayed, since then, the long-term fate of the entity the Kurds call the Autonomous Administration of North-East Syria (NES) has been left in the balance, without a clear future strategy in sight. </p>
<p>Despite their battlefield sacrifices in the war against IS, the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50011468">ongoing Turkish military operation</a> in northeastern Syria has now pushed the Kurds into a corner. They have been left to choose between accepting the authority of Bashar al-Assad or facing a full-scale invasion by Turkey of the territory they control. They chose a deal with Assad. </p>
<h2>The ground battle</h2>
<p>The Turkish army, supported by its Syrian proxies, the Turkish-backed Free Syria Army (TFSA), started a large-scale air and ground military operation on October 9 against the NES. The green light for the operation had been secured a few days <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/chaos-syria-washington-after-trump-call-erdogan-unleashed-turkish-military-n1063516">earlier when Trump told his Turkish counterpart</a> Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that US troops would be withdrawn from the border. </p>
<p>So far, intensive air strikes and artillery fire followed by a ground invasion have <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-iran-kurds-invasion-war-cheap-how-erdogan-a9152396.html">targeted the border cities</a> of Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. Turkish troops and TFSA militias have managed to enter these cities but are yet to fully capture them. Their stated aim is to capture the area between the two cities and create a 30-kilometre “safe zone” along it.</p>
<p>Turkish <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/world/middleeast/turkey-attacks-syria.html">air strikes and artillery fire</a> have also targeted villages in the district of Kobani – which became the symbol of Kurdish resistance against IS at the end of 2014 – and the city of Qamishli. Turkish attacks have so far led to the displacement of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/syria-turkish-kurdish-clashes-cause-mass-displacement/a-50812352">more than 130,000 civilians</a>. Infrastructure critical to civilian survival, such as water stations and pumps, electricity networks and hospitals have been hit. </p>
<p>Civilian casualties have been mounting since the operation began and several civilians were reportedly executed on October 12 by the TFSA groups, including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/13/female-kurdish-politician-among-nine-civilians-killed-by-pro-turkey-forces-in-syria-observers-say">a Kurdish politician</a>, secretary-general of the Future Syria Party, Hevrin Khalaf. </p>
<h2>How the world sees the Kurds</h2>
<p>Turkey accuses the SDF of links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been fighting an insurgency against Turkey since 1984 for the recognition of Kurdish rights in Turkey. Turkey fears the consolidation of Kurdish-led autonomy as a threat to its interests and security. Preventing the Kurds from establishing themselves as an important actor in Syria has become a key objective of Turkey’s foreign policy. Erdoğan also hopes to displace the native Kurdish population of the region by settling the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/24/erdogan-proposes-plan-for-refugee-safe-zone-in-syria">2m Syrian refugees Turkey hosts</a> in their place. </p>
<p>Across the region, the Kurdish ascendancy in Syria had generated deep anxiety. Alongside Turkey, Iran also saw the Kurds as a barrier to its ambitions to extend its political influence in the region. The presence of US forces and the Kurds’ co-operation with the anti-IS coalition has also been a key concern for Iran. However, Iran has not been as vocal as Turkey in its opposition to the Kurds in Syria and and <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2019/10/14/2118497/iran-s-parliament-condemns-turkish-invasion-of-northern-syria">condemned the Turkish invasion</a>. </p>
<p>The international community overwhelmingly opposes the Turkish invasion and sees the military action as motivated by Turkey’s ulterior motive to dominate the region. Only a handful of states declared their support for Turkey, including Turkey’s close <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20191015-qatar-defends-turkey-s-northern-syria-operation">ally Qatar</a>, Azerbaijan and Somalia. </p>
<p>On October 14, the US announced a list of <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/10/14/donald-trump-authorises-sanctions-against-turkey-syria-offensive/">sanctions on Turkey</a> in retaliation for its operation against the Kurds. It is preparing to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/trump-impose-sanctions-turkey-191014195833562.html">send a high-level delegation</a> to Ankara, headed by US vice president Mike Pence, to broker a ceasefire – although Erdoğan <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50064546">rejected US calls for one</a>. </p>
<h2>Rapprochement with Assad</h2>
<p>With the Turkish invasion underway, the US decision to withdraw all its military forces from northeast Syria <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-orders-withdrawal-of-us-forces-from-northern-syria-days-after-pentagon-downplays-possibility/2019/10/13/83087baa-edbb-11e9-b2da-606ba1ef30e3_story.html">on October 13</a> prompted a military agreement between the Syrian regime and the SDF. </p>
<p>Syrian soldiers are <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-backed-syrian-forces-enter-key-city-manbij-in-northern-syria/a-50847542">now moving back into territory</a> controlled by the SDF and the US soldiers such as Manbij. Russia, a key ally of Assad which has forces on the ground in Syria, said it <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50058859">would try to prevent clashes</a> between Turkish and Syrian troops. </p>
<p>Kurdish sources <a href="https://anfenglishmobile.com/features/salih-muslim-talks-about-the-agreement-with-the-syrian-state-38404">said the agreement</a> with the Syrian government would see the Syrian military stationed along the border with Turkey to deter a wider Turkish invasion. According to officials of the Autonomous Administration, institutions such as the local councils, educational institutions and police force that the Kurds have built up since 2012, will continue to operate for the time being, but they are expected to be incorporated into Syrian state structures in the longer term. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-education-system-was-central-to-the-kurds-rojava-revolution-in-northern-syria-now-its-under-attack-125153">New education system was central to the Kurds' Rojava Revolution in northern Syria – now it's under attack</a>
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<p>The finer details of the agreement are yet to be worked out, but some level of Kurdish autonomy is expected to be retained as part of the post-conflict political settlement. Still, the core Kurdish demands for extensive autonomy within a decentralised federal state in Syria and the preservation of the SDF as an independent military force are unlikely to be realised. But the Kurds will feel a sense of success if their agreement with Syria prevents a wider Turkish invasion and displacement of the Kurdish population.</p>
<p>Despite the SDF’s success on the battlefields against IS, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration was not included in the international diplomatic efforts to end the Syrian conflict, such as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/14/golden-opportunity-lost-as-syrian-peace-talks-collapse">Geneva peace talks</a> organised by the UN in 2017. This continues today: the Syrian constitutional committee, was set up by <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1048162">the UN in September 2019</a> to rewrite the Syrian constitution, excluding Kurdish representatives. </p>
<p>The Kurdish position had already weakened after Trump’s decision in December 2018 to withdraw troops. His abrupt and impulsive decision signalled that the US was unlikely to lend its support for efforts to secure a legally recognised status for the Kurdish-led administration within Syria. This changed the dynamics on the ground for the Kurds and weakened their bargaining position. </p>
<p>Russia and the Assad government knew that rather than make a deal with the Kurdish-led administration, they could wait until favourable conditions forced it to settle for far less than it would if it had US support. </p>
<p>The US withdrawal from Syria leaves Russia as the main power broker. With a Turkish invasion in full swing, the Kurds were left with little choice but to accept the terms offered by Russia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125333/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cengiz Gunes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia left as the main power broker as the Turkish invasion of northeastern Syria continues.Cengiz Gunes, Associate Lecturer, Faculty of Social Science, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.