tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/british-social-attitudes-7100/articlesBritish Social Attitudes – The Conversation2023-09-20T23:08:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2140192023-09-20T23:08:20Z2023-09-20T23:08:20ZWomen used to be more likely to vote Conservative than men but that all changed in 2017 – we wanted to find out why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549332/original/file-20230920-17-jymd2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=305%2C62%2C5686%2C3916&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/AJP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In many nations in the immediate post-war period, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pippa-Norris-2/publication/246291242_Gender_A_Gender-Generation_Gap/links/569153d408ae0f920dcb78af/Gender-A-Gender-Generation-Gap.pdf">women were more often supporters of rightwing parties than men</a>. This “traditional” gender gap was supposedly underpinned by women’s greater religiosity and lower exposure to the social institutions of the left, such as trade unions.</p>
<p>However, in many wealthy nations, a “modern” gender gap has emerged. Women in these nations are more likely to support leftwing parties than men. For example in the US, a greater proportion of women than men have voted for the Democratic presidential candidate in <a href="https://cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/resources/ggpresvote.pdf">every election since 1980</a>.</p>
<p>When seeking to explain why women and men vote differently, research has long emphasised the role of gendered values change. This is the idea that generation by generation, our values shift and our political leanings also shift to fit those new values. </p>
<p>But in a chapter for this year’s <a href="https://natcen.ac.uk/british-social-attitudes">British Social Attitudes survey</a>, we’ve found that in the UK, the gender gap in voting seems more tied to changing events than changing values.</p>
<p>Political scientists <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0192512100214007">Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris</a> described women’s leftward shift as a generational process. In this model, younger cohorts of women, who have experienced higher labour force participation, higher education, and less traditional gender roles, become more economically left-leaning, socially liberal and supportive of gender equality. This pushes them to the left of men in their party choices.</p>
<p><strong>The British two-party gender gap, 1945–2019:</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A chart showing women were more likely to support the Conservatives than men until 2017 when the trend reversed." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549309/original/file-20230920-29-amebma.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549309/original/file-20230920-29-amebma.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549309/original/file-20230920-29-amebma.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549309/original/file-20230920-29-amebma.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549309/original/file-20230920-29-amebma.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549309/original/file-20230920-29-amebma.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549309/original/file-20230920-29-amebma.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The percentage point difference between men and women in party support, with numbers below zero showing women more likely to vote Conservative than men and numbers above zero showing the opposite.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gallup Polls, 1945–59; British Election Study (BES), 1964–2019Adapted from P. Norris, ‘Gender: a gender generation gap? (Norris 1999)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That shift has only happened in the UK very recently. Data from the British Election Study indicates that women were more likely to vote for the Conservative party than men right up until the 2017 general election, when they became more likely to vote Labour than men. And we have reason to believe that the shift is not because women’s values have changed over generations. </p>
<p><strong>Gender gap in partisan identification, by generation, 1983-2022:</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549331/original/file-20230920-17-npue1l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chart showing that the gender gap in party support varies depending on the generation being looked at." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549331/original/file-20230920-17-npue1l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549331/original/file-20230920-17-npue1l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549331/original/file-20230920-17-npue1l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549331/original/file-20230920-17-npue1l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549331/original/file-20230920-17-npue1l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549331/original/file-20230920-17-npue1l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549331/original/file-20230920-17-npue1l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">percentage point gender gap for different generations across the years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The British Social Attitudes survey contains a long-term measure of party identification that allows us to test underlying patterns of support for the two largest parties. This data provides some evidence that the emergence of the modern gender gap in recent years is the product of underlying generational differences. </p>
<p>In general, the gaps for the two youngest generations tend to be above zero, indicating higher support for Labour among women in these groups. And the gaps for these generations reach up to around 15 percentage points.</p>
<p>In contrast, the gaps for the two oldest generations are more often below zero, indicating higher support for the Conservatives among women of these generations. The generational divide in the gender gap is particularly evident from the mid-2000s onwards. Prior to this, there are fewer generational differences in the gender gap.</p>
<h2>Did we change – or did you?</h2>
<p>However, while there is a generational gap, it does not appear to be based on changing values. We find no evidence that economic or social attitudes exhibit similar gendered generational patterns. </p>
<p>For example, although women are slightly more likely than men to support higher taxation and spending on public services, this is true across the generations. The gender gap itself does not increase among younger cohorts.</p>
<p>Instead we find that gender differences in attitudes towards Britain’s membership of the EU are a potentially more powerful explanation. Overall, women more often reported wanting to stay in the EU with no change in its powers than men. But this difference between men and women is generally larger and more consistent for the younger (1960-79 and post-1980) generations than for the oldest. </p>
<p>So in the younger age cohorts, a greater proportion of women than men were committed to staying in the EU in 2017 and 2019. This may account for the emergence of the gender gap in party support. </p>
<p>There is a difference between men and women in the older generations on wanting to stay in the EU, but this gap tends to reduce from the mid-2000s. After 2019, there was more convergence between the sexes across generations (with differences between men and women reducing), perhaps reflecting the fact that Brexit has fallen in salience.</p>
<p><strong>Gender gaps in attitudes to the European Union, by generation, 1983-2022:</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549348/original/file-20230920-15-ohyouj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chart showing the gender difference for attitudes towards the EU." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549348/original/file-20230920-15-ohyouj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549348/original/file-20230920-15-ohyouj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549348/original/file-20230920-15-ohyouj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549348/original/file-20230920-15-ohyouj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549348/original/file-20230920-15-ohyouj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549348/original/file-20230920-15-ohyouj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549348/original/file-20230920-15-ohyouj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Percentage in support of the UK staying in the EU with no change in its powers .</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://natcen.ac.uk/events/british-social-attitudes-2023">British Social Attitudes</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The gender gap in party support that emerged in the 2017 and 2019 elections may therefore be the result of the interaction between electoral context, including party policy and pre-existing gender gaps in attitudes and values, such as the greater support for the EU evident among younger cohorts of women than men. Both campaigns were fought around Brexit, after all. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/what-women-want-why-women-will-decide-the-next-election">findings</a> are in keeping with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17457289.2021.1968412">recent research</a> that has shown that the salient political issues of the day, including attitudes towards Brexit and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1369148119864699">public services such as the NHS</a>, and financial and economic concerns are more powerful explanations of the gender gap in party support than long-term values change. </p>
<p>This suggests that Labour cannot afford to be complacent about women voters. Their switch is not necessarily a natural generational trajectory and their support in the next election is not guaranteed if they don’t like the party’s policy positions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214019/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rosie Campbell receives funding from the ESRC, the UKRI, The Leverhulme Trust. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rosalind Shorrocks receives funding from the ESRC and UKRI. </span></em></p>Research has long suggested that women shift left on a generational basis, but we think something else is happening here.Rosie Campbell, Director of the Global Institute for Women’s Leadership and Professor of Politics, King's College LondonRosalind Shorrocks, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1783282022-03-04T10:41:41Z2022-03-04T10:41:41ZDid the pandemic drive a desire for more generous welfare? New research suggests not<p>The COVID-19 pandemic has been the most serious public health crisis in a century. It resulted in governments taking unprecedented powers to regulate people’s social lives, and undertaking substantial fiscal interventions to cushion the impact on people’s finances and the broader economy. <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2020/05/09/margaret-macmillan-on-covid-19-as-a-turning-point-in-history">Some have suggested</a> that the experience would be so profound that the pandemic would prove a “turning point in history” that heralded a significant change in the way societies are organised and economies are run.</p>
<p>However, implementing a profound change in public policy is likely to be difficult unless it chimes with public opinion. So, has there been a significant change in public attitudes in the wake of the pandemic? We have pursued this question in Britain by analysing three surveys that were <a href="https://natcen.ac.uk/media/2166750/Social-and-Political-Attitudes-in-Britain-in-the-Wake-of-the-Pandemic.pdf">conducted between summer 2020 and summer 2021</a>, each of which replicated questions that had been administered before the pandemic on the <a href="https://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/">British Social Attitudes</a> (BSA) survey, a high quality random probability survey conducted annually since 1983.</p>
<p>One key question we address is whether the pandemic changed attitudes towards inequality, welfare and the role of the state. The disease particularly affected those living in deprived communities and stimulated debate about inequality in British society. The public health measures threatened the livelihoods of those in hitherto secure jobs, and thus may have changed their attitudes towards welfare provision. Meanwhile, the expansion of public spending may have led some to reassess how big the state should be in future.</p>
<p>In practice, there are only limited signs that any of this has happened. True, there has been a modest increase in an already relatively widespread level of concern about inequality. On average in our three surveys conducted during the pandemic, 64% agreed that “ordinary people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth” – up from 60% across the three surveys conducted between 2017 and 2019. At the same time, two-thirds (66%) agreed that “there is one law for the rich and one for the poor” – up from 58% between 2017 and 2019.</p>
<p>However, the experience of the pandemic did not necessarily stimulate a greater willingness to take action on inequality. At 43%, the proportion who agreed that the “government should redistribute income from the better off to the less well off” was little different from the 42% who expressed that view in the years before the pandemic.</p>
<p>There was certainly no dramatic change in attitudes towards welfare. For example, in our pandemic surveys 44% disagreed that “many people who get social security don’t really deserve any help”, little different from the 42% who did so beforehand. Similarly, 40% disagreed that “most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another” – much the same as the 39% who did so before the pandemic.</p>
<h2>Long-term shift</h2>
<p>However, although public attitudes towards welfare may not have shifted much during the pandemic, they are still very different now from those in evidence a decade earlier. Between 2002 and 2012, just 29% disagreed that many social security recipients are not deserving of help, while only 27% disagreed that most people on the dole are fiddling. After an era when most people had been relatively unsympathetic towards welfare benefits, the public mood had already become much more supportive well before the pandemic set in.</p>
<p>Much the same is true of attitudes towards taxation and spending. Following the financial crash of 2007-8, on average just 35% said that the government should “increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits”. However, the public had already reacted against the curbs in public spending initiated by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition of 2010-15. By 2017-19 the proportion who thought taxes and spending should increase had reached 57%.</p>
<p>That figure fell somewhat during the pandemic – to 51%. But the swing might be thought to be modest compared with the scale of public spending during the pandemic - and indeed is likely to be in place for some time yet. In any event, the marked increase in public spending that occurred during the pandemic was accompanied by a public mood that was already looking for some expansion in the role of the state.</p>
<p>The pandemic shows little sign of being a “turning point” in public opinion. Rather, it is better regarded as barometer of existing social and political attitudes in Britain. The inequality of the pandemic stimulated debate because many were already concerned about inequality. Increased welfare provision reflected a more sympathetic public mood that was already in place. Meanwhile, the public were already seeking more government spending on public services.</p>
<p>Rather than having to respond to a new public mood, the challenge facing policy makers in the post-pandemic era will be to identify how best to respond to a rather different public mood that has already been in place for some time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178328/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The cost of conducting two of the three pandemic surveys reported here was funded by the Economic and Social Research council as part of UK Research and Innovation’s COVID-19 initiative (grant no. ES/V009788/1). NatCen’s British Social Attitudes survey is funded each year on a modular basis by a mixture of UK government and grant funding.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Curtis Jessop receives funding for this research from the ESRC</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dominic Abrams receives funding for this research from the ESRC.</span></em></p>The pandemic has not proved a ‘turning point in history’ - attitudes towards austerity and welfare had changed significantly before the crisis.John Curtice, Senior Research Fellow, National Centre for Social Research, and Professor of Politics, University of Strathclyde Curtis Jessop, Research Director, National Centre for Social ResearchDominic Abrams, Professor of Social Psychology, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/396112015-04-02T15:37:41Z2015-04-02T15:37:41ZSupport for the death penalty drops to lowest recorded level in Britain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76656/original/image-20150331-1256-1od8r3l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Thing of the past.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Death penalty image via www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Public support for the death penalty has fallen below 50%, according to new findings from <a href="http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media-centre/latest-press-releases/bsa-32-support-for-death-penalty.aspx">NatCen’s British Social Attitudes survey</a>. At 48%, the proportion who agree that “for some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence” is the lowest ever recorded.</p>
<p>The last state execution in Britain took place in 1964. Capital punishment was ended for murder the following year – though it remained an unused option for treason and a range of other offences. The <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents">1998 Human Rights Act</a> abolished the death penalty altogether.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.bsa-data.natcen.ac.uk/">British Social Attitudes</a> began asking about attitudes to the death penalty in 1986 – 22 years after the last state-sponsored execution in Britain. At this point support for capital punishment remained strong: 74% agreed that the death penalty was the most appropriate punishment for some crimes. Over the course of the 1990s support began to tail off, falling to 57% by 1999. Despite this shift, a majority of the public continued to support capital punishment for some crimes even after it was formally abolished.</p>
<p>Levels of support remained fairly steady, at between 52% and 59%, throughout the 2000s. Even now, more people agree (48%) with the death penalty for some crimes than disagree (35% agree, and 16% “neither agree nor disagree”). But if the 2014 figure represents the start of a further trend towards more liberal attitudes, then at some point in the future these lines will cross over.</p>
<h2>Generational change</h2>
<p>Young people have always been less likely than older people to support capital punishment. For example, in 1986, 67% of 18-24s compared with 84% of those aged 65 or older agreed with the death penalty. </p>
<p>In 2014, 43% of 18-24s supported it, compared with 52% of those aged 65 and older. If young people retain their views on the death penalty through their lives then, as older generations are replaced, support for the death penalty should fall further.</p>
<p>However, a closer look at the data suggests that the last three decades have also seen changes in attitudes within generations. For example, 70% of those who were aged 35-44 in 1986 agreed with the death penalty. Members of this group will now be in their mid-60s to early 70s, yet only 52% of those aged 65 or older agree with the death penalty these days. So the change in attitudes has been driven not only by older generations being replaced by younger, more liberal, cohorts, but also by falling support for the death penalty across the generations.</p>
<p>Views have not only become more liberal across age groups, they have also become more liberal across the party political spectrum – with one notable exception. In 1986, a majority of Conservative (83%), Labour (67%), Liberal (73%) and SDP (73%) supporters agreed with the death penalty for some crimes. By 2014, support was below 50% for supporters of all parties except UKIP (75%, compared with 49% of Conservatives, 43% of Labour supporters and 27% of Liberal Democrats).</p>
<h2>Changing attitudes</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76895/original/image-20150402-32448-f8x7hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76895/original/image-20150402-32448-f8x7hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76895/original/image-20150402-32448-f8x7hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76895/original/image-20150402-32448-f8x7hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76895/original/image-20150402-32448-f8x7hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76895/original/image-20150402-32448-f8x7hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76895/original/image-20150402-32448-f8x7hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gwynne Evans and Peter Allen: the last men executed in Britain.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These findings raise the question of whether falling support for the death penalty is simply a reflection of attitudes becoming increasingly liberal across a range of issues. </p>
<p>British Social Attitudes does provide some support for this theory – for example, we know that attitudes to marriage and relationships have become much more liberal since the early 1990s. But on issues of law and order we have not necessarily seen such a shift. For example, in 1986, 72% agreed that “people who break the law should be given stiffer sentences”; in 2014 the figure was almost identical, at 73%. So our changing attitudes to the death penalty do not appear to be indicative of a general trend towards softer attitudes on issues of crime and punishment.</p>
<p>Perhaps instead it is a reflection of harrowing media coverage of use of the death penalty in other countries. In 2014, there were <a href="https://theconversation.com/ohio-execution-lethal-injections-are-based-on-guesswork-22062">numerous media stories about botched attempts to execute prisoners</a> in the USA using lethal injection.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39611/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachel Ormston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At 48%, the proportion who agree that “for some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence” is the lowest ever recorded.Rachel Ormston, Senior Research Director (Social Attitudes), ScotCen Social ResearchLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/280812014-06-17T05:12:10Z2014-06-17T05:12:10ZAttitudes to benefits are not as negative as they seem<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51227/original/8v38ztqc-1402940070.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Not as divided as they seem.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Year after year, when the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey is released, newspaper headlines tell us of how our attitudes to benefits have hardened, feeding this into their wider discussions about the unpopularity of welfare, how our attitudes to one another have changed, and how the major parties should respond. </p>
<p>Last year was an exception, with headlines instead telling us that our attitudes might now be softening, although in my chapter in this year’s report I show how this softening was probably illusory.</p>
<p>But all of this talk of hardening and softening can be misleading. The singular strength of British Social Attitudes is that it allows us to see changes over time – yet we often become so obsessed with the change in the latest data that we forget to actually look at what people are telling us. And when we look at this closely, we do not see the complete collapse of support for the benefits system that many people seem to believe. </p>
<p>Instead, despite real concerns, we see a continued support for many aspects of the benefits system, and in particular that many types of spending should not be cut, that most claimants are not fraudulent, and that benefit levels are not generous.</p>
<p>So for example, BSA asks people if they think spending on benefits for different groups of people should increase, stay the same or decrease, explicitly flagging that this means taxes would rise. Even in 2013 – with politicians of all major parties talking about deficit reduction – more people want increases in spending rather than cuts for each of benefits for pensioners, disabled people, carers, single parents, low-paid workers and welfare benefits for the poor in general. </p>
<p>Indeed, there are outright majorities who want increases in spending on disabled people, carers, and parents working on low incomes. Only for unemployed people do more people want cuts rather than increases, reflecting a long-term decline in support for unemployment benefits across multiple measures. </p>
<p>The British public also does not believe that most benefit claimants are fraudulent. Given how confused public debate has become, it is worth restating this: people are clearly concerned about benefit fraud, but they do not think that every claimant is fraudulent. In BSA, most people (77%) think that “large numbers … falsely claim benefits”. But by “large numbers”, they mean (on average) a large minority, not a majority, as confirmed in a <a href="http://inequalitiesblog.wordpress.com/2012/06/12/perceived-fraud-in-the-benefits-system/">separate analysis of earlier BSA data</a> (and <a href="http://www.turn2us.org.uk/PDF/Benefits%20Stigma%20in%20Britain.pdf">surveys elsewhere</a>). Hence only minorities in 2013 agreed that “many people who get social security don’t really deserve any help”, or that “most people on the dole are fiddling” (both 33%). People’s estimates of the level of fraud are an order of magnitude higher than the best estimates about the <a href="http://inequalitiesblog.wordpress.com/2011/11/23/the-deservingness-of-benefit-claimants-i/">real fraud rate</a>, but this does not mean most people think all claimants are fraudulent.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51228/original/q3qq84s6-1402940177.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51228/original/q3qq84s6-1402940177.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51228/original/q3qq84s6-1402940177.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51228/original/q3qq84s6-1402940177.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51228/original/q3qq84s6-1402940177.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51228/original/q3qq84s6-1402940177.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51228/original/q3qq84s6-1402940177.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51228/original/q3qq84s6-1402940177.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">NatCen</span></span>
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<p>A further question rarely seems to be noticed, yet is one of the most intriguing. It describes a hypothetical person who relies on benefits (last year a 25-year old unemployed woman living alone), and asks what living standards this level of income would provide. It then asks the same question, but tells respondents exactly how much they would actually get (£72 per week after housing costs). In 2013, only a few people (7%) thought that she would have “more than enough to live on”, while nearly half (44%) thought that she would be not have enough to live on. After finding out the true amount, even more people (54%) think she would not have enough to live on. </p>
<p>In other words, few people think unemployment benefit is generous, and when they hear how much it is worth, an outright majority think it is not enough to live on. At the same time, more people think unemployment benefits are “too high and discourage them from finding jobs” (57%), rather than “too low and cause hardship” (22%). These attitudes can be squared; most people don’t think that low-paid work provides enough to live on either. Still, people do not seem to think that benefits provide a lavish lifestyle.</p>
<p>This is not to claim that black is white. The survey clearly shows people’s concerns about false claims and work disincentives, and from qualitative research and everyday conversation, it is clear that this angers many people. The headlines over the past decade were also not wrong: attitudes have become much more negative, particularly around unemployment benefits, as the chapter itself catalogues. </p>
<p>Still, this should not blind us to the real attitudes that British people have about the benefits system: declining support, some strong concerns, but still a trust that most claimants are genuine, and a belief that spending on “deserving claimants” should increase. </p>
<p>Benefit attitudes are not simply “hard” or “soft”, but complex and uneven. Creating policies that respond to these conflicted attitudes is tricky – but at least a clearheaded view offers us a good place to start.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28081/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Baumberg has received funding from the Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC), Medical Research Council (MRC), Joseph Rowntree Foundation, and the charity Elizabeth Finn Care/turn2us, but is writing in a personal capacity. He is a member of the Labour Party, Compass, and the Fabian Society, but is likewise writing in a non-party political capacity. For his views on the relationship between ideology and social science (and for further details of publications and interests), see <a href="http://www.benbaumberg.com">www.benbaumberg.com</a>.</span></em></p>Year after year, when the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey is released, newspaper headlines tell us of how our attitudes to benefits have hardened, feeding this into their wider discussions about…Ben Baumberg Geiger, Lecturer in Sociology and Social Policy, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/249202014-03-27T15:14:31Z2014-03-27T15:14:31ZWhy young people are losing faith in the welfare state<p>Recent <a href="http://www.ippr.org/publications/55/7775/national-salary-insurance-reforming-the-welfare-state-to-provide-real-protection">proposals</a> for benefit reform have centred upon the argument that at present many people feel they get <a href="http://inequalitiesblog.wordpress.com/2012/05/15/the-nothing-for-something-benefits-system/">nothing for something</a> from the welfare state, while those on benefits reap the rewards.</p>
<p>The rationale behind these proposals is two-fold. The first is that the erosion of universal benefits and social insurance means many people feel they now get little welfare bang for their income tax buck. This is the argument for self-interest: people like welfare when they get something from it.</p>
<p>The second is that heavy means-testing has created a dependency culture in which many claimants do not want to work. This is the argument against solidarity: that the public are less willing to help benefit claimants because they perceive them as undeserving.</p>
<p>But what if there is another cause of attitude change? And thus, what if the solution might be much, much different?</p>
<h2>Welfare and young people</h2>
<p>The graph below shows the percentage change (1987-2011) for those who agree with three long-running questions from the <a href="http://bsa-30.natcen.ac.uk/read-the-report/spending-and-welfare/who-has-changed-their-mind.aspx">British Social Attitudes</a> series relating to the benefits system. Importantly, the graph is broken down by age-group.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/44923/original/5kcs444w-1395922975.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/44923/original/5kcs444w-1395922975.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/44923/original/5kcs444w-1395922975.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/44923/original/5kcs444w-1395922975.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/44923/original/5kcs444w-1395922975.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/44923/original/5kcs444w-1395922975.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/44923/original/5kcs444w-1395922975.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/44923/original/5kcs444w-1395922975.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">British Social Attitudes</span></span>
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<p>The first conclusion we can draw is that there has been a uniform shift against support for the welfare state.</p>
<p>However, by far the largest shift in negative attitudes was among 18-34 and 35-44 year-olds. Among 18-34 year olds for example, the belief that “unemployment benefits are too high” rose 52.5% between 1987 and 2011. For the over-65s, the corresponding change was just 21.6%.</p>
<p>Of course, age is not the only demographic factor associated with <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6038112/The_Changing_Determinants_of_Welfare_Attitudes_in_the_UK">changes in attitudes towards welfare</a>. Labour supporters, for example, have shifted their views much more rapidly than Conservative ones. Similarly, people in Northern England, Scotland and Wales have “caught up” with those in the traditionally more conservative South.</p>
<p>Conservative sympathisers and southerners are still significantly more likely to report negative attitudes than other groups in most instances. Yet being young, which was once a predictor of positive attitudes to the welfare state, is now a fairly strong predictor of negative attitudes. This is a remarkable transformation.</p>
<h2>Distinct values</h2>
<p>One reason for this change could be that the youngest generation of adults hold <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21578666-britains-youth-are-not-just-more-liberal-their-elders-they-are-also-more-liberal-any">culturally distinct values</a> on a whole range of issues: from the economy and civil liberties to welfare and social justice. Young people are supposedly <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21578660-young-britons-have-turned-liberal-both-socially-and-economically-politicians-need-get">much more individualist</a> than previous generations. So they are less swayed by arguments about the collective pooling of social and economic risks than, say, the baby boomers born after World War II.</p>
<p>Also, young people have been at the receiving end of some of the most high-profile reforms and cuts to the broader system of state provision. The Education Maintenance Allowance – <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/7646">a seemingly popular and effective programme</a> – was abolished, while tuition fees were trebled up to £9000 per year. Now the Conservatives have pledged to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/02/conservatives-housing-benefit-jobseekers-allowance-unemployed-under-25s">abolish Housing Benefit for under-25s</a> if they win the next general election.</p>
<p>These two forces have created a new dynamic where the liberal, more individualistic outlook of younger people is strengthened and reinforced by a weakened stake in welfare provision.</p>
<h2>Implications for the welfare state</h2>
<p>For people concerned for the legitimacy of the welfare state, changing youth attitudes raises question marks over how welfare can be defended. <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2012.752064#.Ux7RS-d_skI">Evidence</a> suggests that the idea of a contributory principle – where people get back what they put in – is favoured by older and more advantaged groups, so it might do little (if anything) to win over the young. Indeed, shifting even more resources towards established workers – as the contributory principle logically implies – may end up alienating young people even more.</p>
<p>Instead, new policy should ensure much greater protection, support and opportunities for young people. A good start would be to defend the rights of young people to social security benefits, as well as investing much more in supporting the often difficult and complex transition between full-time education and the labour market.</p>
<p>Social security should also resonate with the particular cultural values that young people have: if they are more wedded to notions of personal freedom and autonomy than solidarity, social policies should be designed accordingly. More support could be offered, for example, to young people who want to move to new areas in search of jobs or training opportunities.</p>
<p>The welfare state is not in the extreme state of crisis some politicians would have us believe – support for the broader principles of social security <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/28781">remains strong</a>. But the capacity of the welfare state to tackle poverty and protect against social risks is reliant upon a strong degree of social legitimacy.</p>
<p>Understanding which groups have shifted their support – and why – is essential. For those who want to defend the welfare state, new and relevant ways must be found to make it work for the 21st century.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>A version of this article was first published on <a href="http://societycentral.ac.uk/2014/03/25/welfare-who-cares/">Society Central</a>, the evidence-for-policymakers site run by the <a href="http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/">Institute for Social and Economic Research</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/24920/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Sage receives funding from ESRC.</span></em></p>Recent proposals for benefit reform have centred upon the argument that at present many people feel they get nothing for something from the welfare state, while those on benefits reap the rewards. The…Daniel Sage, Doctoral Researcher in Social Policy, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/220972014-01-17T06:28:51Z2014-01-17T06:28:51ZLook to LGBQ and older couples for good relationship advice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39227/original/4z8t7mcm-1389888209.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1024%2C680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Out and about.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guillaume Paumier</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Holding hands with someone you love in public may seem like a carefree display of affection, but for people in same sex relationships it is still a risky thing to do.</p>
<p>Despite progress in our attitudes to gay partnerships, the findings of <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/enduringlove/files/enduringlove/file/ecms/web-content/Final-Enduring-Love-Survey-Report.pdf">Enduring Love?</a>, our two-year study into how modern couples maintain relationships, suggest that some among the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Queer (LGBQ) community still fear reprisals that prevent them from giving this outward sign of affection. </p>
<p>The 2013 Natsal (National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles) and 2008 British Social Attitudes surveys show increasing social tolerance of lesbian and gay lifestyles in Britain and <a href="https://theconversation.com/britons-have-sex-sooner-older-but-less-often-20735">greater sexual experimentation</a> among women and young queer couples. Same sex marriage is being legalised this year. While homophobia is still a live issue, it may still come as a surprise that some gay couples are still disinclined or afraid to hold hands while walking among the wider public.</p>
<p>Despite this our study found that same sex couples and child-free couples reported being among the happiest in their relationship. Our study included a large survey of about 5000 people (around 12% of whom where LGBQ) and in depth interviews with 50 couples (70% heterosexual, 30% LGBQ), where we discussed relationships, hopes and fears.</p>
<p>Despite the concern some expressed at “going public” with their relationship in the interviews, LGBQ respondents to the survey revealed that in general they were more positive about the quality of their relationship than their heterosexual equivalents. Responding to questions on sex, intimacy, being together and sharing values they rated their relationships more highly. And it appears their commitment to making their relationship work and their appreciation of everyday practices is greater than heterosexual counterparts who are perhaps more inclined to take things for granted. </p>
<p>Of course, same sex couples weren’t the only ones who were happy. The face-to-face interviews revealed that the older heterosexual couples and those who were in a second long-term relationship were often more inclined to reflect on how their relationship was working. Rather than writing off past relationships as a mistake or failure, couples were able to draw on lessons learned to enrich their lives today. </p>
<h2>Mums and dads</h2>
<p>Being spontaneous and putting time into one’s relationship can be harder when children come along and the survey found parenthood shapes relationship quality more than any other factor. Among survey respondents, who came from all ages and backgrounds, we found it was more difficult for parents to carry out relationship “maintenance” than it was for child-free couples. </p>
<p>But again, LGBQ parents scored higher on this than heterosexual couples. This may mean that LGBQ parents prioritise their relationship more than heterosexual ones but relationship duration may also play a part here. It was found that 44% of heterosexual survey participants had been in their relationship for 20+ years, compared with LGBQ parents whose relationship was likely to be between six and 10 years long. What is clear is that tensions between parenting and partnering uniformly have an adverse impact on relationships.</p>
<p>Although having children does affect the amount of work today’s couples are able to put into the relationship, this doesn’t mean parents are miserable. In fact, mothers came out as the happiest in their lives overall. They cited their children as the most important people in their lives, over and above their partners, which suggests that having a child brings extra value and dimension to women’s lives. </p>
<p>Conversely, fathers were more likely to name their partner as the most important person in their lives and, overall men placed more emphasis on the importance of sex in the relationship, whereas mothers were extremely keen to receive a cup of tea in bed, with or without the sex.</p>
<p>In a society where much research has been conducted into the stresses on relationships and marriage breakdowns, these findings reveal some positive and affirming things about couples. They are concerned with the quality of their relationships, they value the seemingly mundane and small gestures (that cup of tea in bed, stacking the dishwasher, putting out the bins) and seem prepared to work through difficulties – some of which reinforce their relationship, rather than pulling it apart. </p>
<p>But if there’s one thing we learned from our study, it’s that there is no single notion of the happy couple.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/22097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacqui Gabb receives funding from ESRC</span></em></p>Holding hands with someone you love in public may seem like a carefree display of affection, but for people in same sex relationships it is still a risky thing to do. Despite progress in our attitudes…Jacqui Gabb, Senior Lecturer in Social Policy, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/179672013-09-09T23:15:07Z2013-09-09T23:15:07ZGrowing support for Scottish independence … in England<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31011/original/5h5fmv7y-1378729701.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Popular south of the Border?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> David Cheskin/PA Wire</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The introduction of devolution in Scotland and Wales and its re-introduction in Northern Ireland was one of the major achievements of the Labour government. Yet its aspirations for fostering devolution in England largely came to naught. </p>
<p>True, city-wide government for London, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/31/newsid_2530000/2530803.stm">controversially abolished</a> by Mrs Thatcher in 1986, was <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/4/newsid_2503000/2503809.stm">restored in 2000</a> - but when, in 2004, voters in the north-east of England <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3984387.stm">rejected the idea</a> of having their own elected regional assembly, any hopes of rolling out a programme of devolution across the length and breadth of England died an instant death.</p>
<p>So has England simply been unmoved by the sight and sound of devolution elsewhere? Is it largely content with the way it is governed at present? And as Scotland prepares to vote in a year’s time on whether or not it should leave the UK entirely, is England really willing to tolerate what might be thought to be the ever increasing demands of its near northern neighbour? These are some of the questions addressed by a study of long-term trends in identities and constitutional preferences to be found in the latest <a href="http://www.bsa-30.natcen.ac.uk/">British Social Attitudes</a> report published today.</p>
<h2>Status quo (for England)</h2>
<p>England does indeed continue to evince relatively little interest in devolution for itself. Well over half, 56%, say that England’s laws should continue to be made by the UK parliament at Westminster. Although the figure has fluctuated up and down since 2000, there is no sign of a consistent trend in either direction. Just over one in five (22%) would like to see an English parliament established, while just 15% now back Labour’s original idea of regional assemblies. With figures like these, there seems little prospect of any government securing public support for changing the way England is governed any time soon.</p>
<p>Not that voters in England are entirely sanguine about some of the consequences of the fact that the rest of the UK enjoys a measure of devolution while it does not. Two-thirds say that now that many of Scotland’s laws are made by its own devolved parliament Scottish MPs should no longer be able to vote on laws that will only apply to England. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31014/original/nkqc2df7-1378733147.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31014/original/nkqc2df7-1378733147.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31014/original/nkqc2df7-1378733147.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31014/original/nkqc2df7-1378733147.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31014/original/nkqc2df7-1378733147.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31014/original/nkqc2df7-1378733147.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31014/original/nkqc2df7-1378733147.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31014/original/nkqc2df7-1378733147.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>True, that sentiment has been present since the very early days of devolution, but it seems to have become more insistent with as many as 29% now saying that they strongly agree with this proposition, up from 18% in 2000.</p>
<p>In short, voters in England would appear to think that the proper response to some of the apparent anomalies thrown up by the introduction of devolution elsewhere is to amend the way in which Westminster works rather than imitate the changes that have been introduced elsewhere. However, it remains to be seen whether there will eventually be a positive response to the ideas for changing Commons procedure on English bills put forward earlier this year by the <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130403030652/http://tmc.independent.gov.uk/">MacKay Commission</a>.</p>
<h2>Pay own way</h2>
<p>England has also become less happy about the advantage in terms of public spending per head that Scotland continues to enjoy (albeit that is a state of affairs that long predates devolution). In the early years of devolution, only around one in five people in England felt that Scotland received more than its fair share of public spending, but since 2007 the figures have been consistently running at around twice that level.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31015/original/qxxtnxjv-1378733240.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31015/original/qxxtnxjv-1378733240.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31015/original/qxxtnxjv-1378733240.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31015/original/qxxtnxjv-1378733240.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31015/original/qxxtnxjv-1378733240.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31015/original/qxxtnxjv-1378733240.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31015/original/qxxtnxjv-1378733240.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31015/original/qxxtnxjv-1378733240.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>But if this discontent is not reflected in a demand that England should enjoy devolution itself, how is it expressing itself? The answer appears to be in a growing willingness to question whether Scotland should continue to have devolution for itself. In years immediately after the creation of the Scottish Parliament public opinion in England was remarkably sympathetic to the idea that its northern neighbour should enjoy a measure of autonomy, with up to 59% agreeing that devolution was the best way of governing Scotland. </p>
<h2>English backing independence</h2>
<p>Now, however, that figure has fallen to 43%. Meanwhile the proportion who think that perhaps Scotland should indeed leave the UK and become an independent country appears to have edged up from around a fifth to a quarter, while almost as many question whether there should be any kind of Scottish Parliament at all.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31013/original/sv4kbkvb-1378733107.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31013/original/sv4kbkvb-1378733107.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31013/original/sv4kbkvb-1378733107.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31013/original/sv4kbkvb-1378733107.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31013/original/sv4kbkvb-1378733107.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31013/original/sv4kbkvb-1378733107.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31013/original/sv4kbkvb-1378733107.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31013/original/sv4kbkvb-1378733107.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">table.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the moment most <a href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/should-scotland-be-an-independent-country-1#line">opinion polls</a> suggest that in fact Scotland will vote to stay in the UK. Yet, at the same time, not only does almost everyone in Scotland want to keep their parliament, but a majority say they would like their parliament to be even more powerful than it is already. </p>
<p>At first glance that would seem to be recipe for a potential clash with opinion in England. However, one consequence of such a move could well be that Scotland has to rely more on revenues raised by taxes in Scotland itself rather than on monies handed over by taxpayers from across the UK. Maybe such a step is now just as necessary to assuage English discontent as it is to meet Scottish aspirations?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/17967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Curtice is co-editor of the British Social Attitudes 30th report. Partial funding for the 2012 Scottish Social Attitudes data reported here was generously provided by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number ES/K006355/1) and the Electoral Reform Society. Funding for the 2012 Northern Ireland Life and Times data was provided by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, and by ARK. Funding for the 2012 British Social Attitudes data came from NatCen Social Research’s own resources. Responsibility for the views expressed lies solely with the authors. </span></em></p>The introduction of devolution in Scotland and Wales and its re-introduction in Northern Ireland was one of the major achievements of the Labour government. Yet its aspirations for fostering devolution…John Curtice, Professor in Politics, University of Strathclyde Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/180202013-09-09T23:10:20Z2013-09-09T23:10:20ZBritons say no to smaller state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31019/original/5gyc6ygn-1378737422.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Representing the 90%.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dave Thompson/PA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Britain is still a majority social-democratic country. That is, politically, the most significant finding of the latest <a href="http://www.bsa-30.natcen.ac.uk/">British Social Attitudes survey</a> published this week. Most people want a country which “gets and spends” about what we do now, or even more, rather than less. The BSA figures seem to contradict the often heard assertion that the British people want Scandinavian levels of public services for American levels of taxes.</p>
<p>How do we judge how “social” democrat, as opposed to “liberal” democrat, a country is? The most telling test is how much people are willing to have collected in taxes and spent on public services and welfare provision.</p>
<p>Britain, for the past 50 years or more, has lain somewhere in the mid-Atlantic in terms of actual tax and spend. Our average spend, as a percentage of GDP, has been just under 43% – roughly midway between American and continental European levels.</p>
<p>The supposedly radical, “rolling back the state”, government of 1979-97 managed to “roll back” public spending to an average of 43.5% - very slightly up on the long-term average.</p>
<p>The “high-spending” New Labour government of 1997-2010 was nothing of the sort, seen in this historical perspective, at least until the onset of the Global Financial Crisis and “Great Recession” in 2008. Gordon Brown actually managed to get public spending down to its lowest level in the past five decades – below 37% of GDP – in 1998. Labour’s average, even including the GFC impact, was only 40% of GDP, and had stabilised at about 41% of GDP, just below the long-term trend rate before the GFC hit.</p>
<p>The British Social Attitudes Survey data go a long way to explaining this trend. Since 1983 they have been asking the same question every year - given a choice between these three options, which would you choose:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Reduce taxes and spend less on health, education and social benefits</p></li>
<li><p>Keep taxes and spending on these services at the same level as now</p></li>
<li><p>Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Throughout this period the “smaller state” option has never risen above 10%, with around 90% preferring the state to remain the same size or even grow.</p>
<p>Some voices on the right of British politics have been calling for “American” levels of tax and spend (about a third of GDP) since the 1970s. Think tanks on the right, like the Adam Smith Institute, <a href="https://theconversation.com/quackademics-under-fire-as-critical-voices-targeted-17381">Institute for Economic Affairs</a> and more recently Reform have been banging on about this for years – and in more recent years they have been joined by the “Orange Book” Liberal Democrats.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31016/original/4fq2h9tn-1378734705.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31016/original/4fq2h9tn-1378734705.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31016/original/4fq2h9tn-1378734705.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31016/original/4fq2h9tn-1378734705.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31016/original/4fq2h9tn-1378734705.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31016/original/4fq2h9tn-1378734705.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31016/original/4fq2h9tn-1378734705.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Attitudes to tax and spend, 1983–2012.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">British Social Attitudes Survey 2013</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The BSA figures help to explain why advocates of this radical right, “liberal democratic state”, position have failed to get anywhere near achieving their goal: the political obstacles are enormous. And in any case, public spending at these sorts of levels is now so embedded in the economic fabric that any radical reduction would have very disruptive effects on both public and private sectors.</p>
<p>The real fluctuation – as the BSA figures show – has been between the state should stay about the “same” size, or that it should get bigger (the “more” option).</p>
<p>The BSA analysts suggest that this fluctuation is “thermostatically” linked to changes in fiscal trends; when the state was perceived as getting “too small” in the late 80s and early 1990s, the tax and spend more group grew.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31003/original/kxjskpx8-1378719651.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31003/original/kxjskpx8-1378719651.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31003/original/kxjskpx8-1378719651.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=272&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31003/original/kxjskpx8-1378719651.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=272&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31003/original/kxjskpx8-1378719651.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=272&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31003/original/kxjskpx8-1378719651.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31003/original/kxjskpx8-1378719651.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31003/original/kxjskpx8-1378719651.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Long-term Public Spending Trends (% GDP)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">HMT</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By the mid-2000s, after New Labour’s rapid rise in public spending between 2000 and 2005, the “same” and “more” scores reversed. Now over 50% wanted tax and spend stabilised, and that is in fact what happened in the 2004 Spending Review.</p>
<p>Of course there have also been important other shifts in public opinion suggest. Welfare, and especially unemployment, benefits have become markedly less popular when people are asked specifically about them. But overall there has clearly been no dramatic shift to a “smaller state” attitude amongst the British public, however much the current coalition government might wish it otherwise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/18020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colin Talbot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Britain is still a majority social-democratic country. That is, politically, the most significant finding of the latest British Social Attitudes survey published this week. Most people want a country which…Colin Talbot, Professor of Government, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.