tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/conflict-1275/articlesConflict – The Conversation2024-03-06T17:15:09Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250202024-03-06T17:15:09Z2024-03-06T17:15:09ZA US with fewer allies threatens global security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579834/original/file-20240305-30-n3u2sq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C0%2C6657%2C4652&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/american-soldiers-us-flag-troops-1170998920">Bumble Dee/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>At a recent election rally in South Carolina, Donald Trump <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-68268817">said</a> he would “encourage” aggressors such as Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to Nato allies he considers to have not met their financial obligations. </p>
<p>Trump’s comments, however offensive, may merely be an electoral strategy. Why should, say, a South Carolinian citizen see their taxes go towards defending faraway lands, especially if they believe these partners are not willing to pay equally? </p>
<p>But there’s also a logic to his remarks that Europe should recognise, especially in light of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Many European nations need to build up their <a href="https://www.econpol.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/EconPol-PolicyReport_45_0.pdf">own security capacities</a> again after years of lax spending on defence.</p>
<p>Regardless, such public comments from a presidential candidate have long been unthinkable. Since the second world war, America has sought out allies. What would it mean for the nation’s security, as well as that of the wider world, should they forego them?</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Trump says he ‘would encourage’ Russia to attack non-paying Nato allies.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>British precedent</h2>
<p>The modern US-led global order is in many ways a modern iteration of something developed by Great Britain at the beginning of the 19th century. Britain used the peace negotiations that followed the Napoleonic wars (1803–1815) to try and limit the power of expansive land empires like that of defeated France. </p>
<p>The 19th century is sometimes referred to as “Pax Britannica” (British peace) because of the relative absence of conflict between major European powers, with the notable exception of the Crimean War (1853–1856). It lasted until a unified German state emerged as a land power in continental Europe in 1871, upending the security presumptions of the post-Napoleonic peace.</p>
<p>One of Britain’s key reasons for fighting two world wars against Germany was to maintain its version of a global order. But, in winning, Britain depleted its finances – and <a href="https://www.antiquesage.com/world-war-ii-bankruptcy-of-the-british-empire/">capacity to maintain an empire</a> – through borrowing from the US. </p>
<p>The US had become the new economic heavyweight, with a military built up and spread by wartime necessity. Its adherence to basic principles meant the British did not resist America’s newfound global primacy. </p>
<p>Free trade was to remain sacrosanct. Sea trade routes were defended as these were (<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-airstrikes-on-houthi-rebels-are-the-us-and-uk-playing-fast-and-loose-with-international-law-222906">and still are</a>) vital for US economic superiority. The US would also maintain the kind of alliances that the British tended to turn to during times of war, where coalitions of allies share the costs and persevere towards victory. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-airstrikes-on-houthi-rebels-are-the-us-and-uk-playing-fast-and-loose-with-international-law-222906">With airstrikes on Houthi rebels, are the US and UK playing fast and loose with international law?</a>
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<h2>Lonely at the top?</h2>
<p>The US would actively shape the world to its own liking in the post-war period. After the hyper-nationalistic conquests that were characteristic of its enemies in the first and second world wars, the US wanted no more empires.</p>
<p>It set up institutions dedicated to spurring free trade and global stability like the UN, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. And it formed alliances, most notably Nato, which included befriending wartime enemies like Germany and committing themselves to a long-term global role.</p>
<p>These alliances allowed the US to station troops overseas in strategic positions without having to administer a costly and potentially discontented empire, like the British and basically every world power had done before them.</p>
<p>Much of this was motivated by the Cold War. The Soviets had exchanged Nazi occupation of eastern Europe for their own. And it was widely believed that in the absence of US security guarantees, western Europe would also be invaded and made communist – an ideology that the US considered incompatible with its own. </p>
<p>The great power competition soon led to US involvement in other zones of communist activity, such as Asia. This was a period in which the US intervened in foreign governments and carried out or supported ethically questionable conflicts. For US politicians, however, it was generally bipartisan to believe that US intervention was justified by a bigger conflict between democracy and authoritarianism.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and white image of paratroopers jumping out of a plane." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=682&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=682&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=682&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">US paratroopers carrying out a strike in the Tay Ninh province of south Vietnam in 1963.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/vietnam-war-march-1963-840-south-245961343">Everett Collection/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>US power was also different to, say, the heyday of the Spanish empire in the 16th century. This empire did an excellent job of antagonising other powers and depleting its own vast resources in endless wars over honour and Catholicism.</p>
<p>Although certainly not universally loved, US power is not completely resented. This has much to do with America’s <a href="https://news.illinoisstate.edu/2018/07/book-examines-american-cultures-influence-on-the-world/">globally exported culture</a>, from Hollywood to hip-hop. But also in how its power can be articulated as mutually beneficial to other nations, both in terms of trade and security. </p>
<p>We do not live in a peaceful world. But it is widely acknowledged that the world would <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/12/11/if-the-united-states-pulls-back-the-world-will-become-more-dangerous">become more dangerous</a> if the US were to suddenly disengage. US security guarantees, for instance, disincentivise allies like Germany and Japan from developing nuclear weapons for their own safety.</p>
<h2>Global security is American security</h2>
<p>Supporting US allies, which was once a bipartisan issue in American politics, is becoming a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/can-republicans-find-consensus-foreign-policy">zero-sum game</a> – even though it is just about the most dangerous issue to do this with. </p>
<p>Bringing global security guarantees into question is exactly what states hostile to the US want. They know it weakens a world order that protects democracies, global trade, and weaker states that could otherwise be imposed upon militarily. </p>
<p>The US protects these not merely as an act of charity, but also because they are in the vital interests of America’s own safety, even if it can seem indirect to some American voters or the politicians who recently <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-senate-passes-us-95-billion-aid-package-for-ukraine-what-this-tells-us-about-republican-support-for-trump-223502">held up aid</a> for Ukraine.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-senate-passes-us-95-billion-aid-package-for-ukraine-what-this-tells-us-about-republican-support-for-trump-223502">US Senate passes US$95 billion aid package for Ukraine – what this tells us about Republican support for Trump</a>
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<p>Ironically, a worldview that sees raw, almost <a href="https://www.britannica.com/money/mercantilism">mercantilist</a>, selfishness as the entirety of foreign policy is exactly the thing that the US’s global order of free trade and respecting national sovereignty has discouraged for almost a century. </p>
<p>If America First becomes America Only, it might be a world view that certain regimes wish to emulate. But morally, it will not do what the nation managed in the past. To convert souls to an American future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Rees receives funding from The University of Exeter and The Royal Historical Society.</span></em></p>A world where the US has fewer allies would be an even more dangerous place.William Rees, PhD Candidate in Modern American History, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247072024-03-05T16:30:30Z2024-03-05T16:30:30ZHow countries in conflict zones can recover from floods – lessons from Pakistan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578963/original/file-20240229-20-88ie0x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A family crosses the flooded streets of Pakistan in 2010. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://climatevisuals.org/search/?searchQuery=flood%20pakistan">Gerhard JˆrÈn/Climate Visuals</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than 6,000 people died and at least 11,000 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/18/libya-floods-conflicting-death-tolls-greek-aid-workers-die-in-crash#:%7E:text=Confusion%20has%20emerged%20over%20the,killed%20elsewhere%20in%20eastern%20Libya">reportedly disappeared</a> in the aftermath of the destructive flood that hit Libya on <a href="https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/devastating-flooding-libya">September 10 2023</a>. </p>
<p>Infrastructure in north-eastern Libya has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/libya-floods-the-drowning-of-derna-was-a-man-made-disaster-decades-in-the-making-213797">seriously damaged</a>. The economy continues to suffer and companies that are crucial partners for reconstruction and development have been forced to close due to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/90695">flood damage</a>. With more than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/unhcr-update-libya-september-2023-enar">40,000 people</a> still displaced, labour shortages continue and essential services, including healthcare, remain disrupted. </p>
<p>This severe flooding highlighted the vulnerability of Libya – a country already grappling with political instability, <a href="https://www.rulac.org/publications/libya-a-short-guide-to-the-conflict">ongoing conflict</a> and a deteriorating economy – to climate-related threats. </p>
<p>Libya and other flood-hit countries, especially in conflict zones, could learn a lot from Pakistan, where the plans for recovery from similar floods in 2022 differ in some significant ways. </p>
<p>Pakistan’s response to its floods included a comprehensive <a href="https://www.undp.org/pakistan/publications/pakistan-floods-2022-post-disaster-needs-assessment-pdna">post-disaster needs assessment</a>, a strategy that outlines clear priorities for rebuilding livelihoods, agriculture and public infrastructure over the coming five years. </p>
<p>Libya’s approach lacks this forward planning. Without conducting a comprehensive assessment of what a country needs, meaningful recovery efforts cannot be effectively carried out.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.undrr.org/implementing-sendai-framework/what-sendai-framework">United Nations Sendai framework</a>, a global agreement that guides countries in reducing the risks of natural disasters, emphasises the importance of “building back better” in recovery to reduce vulnerabilities of a place and its people. </p>
<p>However, most disaster management doesn’t focus on long-term recovery. My research in disaster recovery and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=c5aWJIsAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">climate change adaptation</a> indicates that the best route for the development of comprehensive and sustainable plans is for the government and relevant organisations to rebuild affected communities, repair damaged infrastructure and provide ongoing social, economic and health support. </p>
<p>Now that initial response and relief efforts have been rolled out across Libya’s affected regions, the focus needs to shift to consider the long-term recovery of these communities. </p>
<h2>The damage of debt</h2>
<p>The country also needs to consider how it funds its recovery. Developing countries tend to rely heavily on loans to <a href="https://floodresilience.net/resources/item/2020-floods-in-tabasco-lessons-learned-for-strengthening-social-capital/">fund recovery programmes</a>. Countries, including Pakistan, are often forced to continue paying existing loans in the aftermath of disasters instead of spending new funds on recovery. </p>
<p>Pakistan’s journey towards recovery from the major floods of <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/news/pakistan-flooding-one-year-later">2010 and 2011</a> is a stark example of the challenges countries face when burdened with heavy debt. In order to rebuild and rehabilitate, Pakistan borrowed a staggering estimated <a href="https://devinit.org/resources/filling-the-gap-addressing-climate-driven-crises-pakistan/">US$20 billion to US$40 billion</a>. This came at a significant cost.</p>
<p>In 2021, the burden of repaying debts amounted to <a href="https://devinit.org/resources/filling-the-gap-addressing-climate-driven-crises-pakistan/">US$11.9 billion annually</a> accounting for 32% of the Pakistan government’s revenue. Consequently, Pakistan’s capacity to effectively respond to the 2022 floods was severely restricted. Ironically, the country accumulated more debt in addressing the aftermath of these floods than it received in humanitarian support in 2022.</p>
<p>Countries like Libya need to carefully manage their borrowing to avoid long-term economic challenges and debt burdens. Pakistan’s experience showed that <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/pakistan-floods/">private donations</a> from within the country can be a significant source of funds, alongside the international giving that is more common.</p>
<p>Libya could explore alternative funding sources such as international grants, loans from international financial institutions, redirecting existing budget allocations and generating additional revenue domestically through stimulating economic growth.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Close up shot of boy drinking clean fresh water from outside tap" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">In 2010 Pakistan was hit by one of the largest natural disasters the world has ever seen. Ten years’ worth of rain falling in just two weeks resulted in extreme flooding across much of the country. Access to clean drinking water became a huge issue.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://climatevisuals.org/search/?searchQuery=flood%20pakistan">Vicki Francis/DFID/Climate Visuals</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<h2>Road to recovery</h2>
<p>There is also a more literal question of how to rebuild. In Pakistan, the reconstruction of damaged roads, bridges, power stations, schools, hospitals and homes involved a collaborative approach. Inspired by the self-resilience housing model developed by Yasmeen Lari, <a href="https://www.arct.cam.ac.uk/staff/professor-yasmeen-lari">Pakistan’s first female architect</a>, local community involvement was key. </p>
<p>This model also promotes sustainability and generates local employment by using locally sourced materials, such as mud bricks. Instead of relying on conventional and expensive building materials like cement blocks, local people make mud bricks using locally sourced clay and other natural materials that are easily replaceable in the future. </p>
<p>Pakistan’s self-resilience housing approach taps into the benefits of short supply chains and creates local jobs in the process. Libya needs to draw lessons from this strategy for rebuilding infrastructure. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Looking down over sandy ground, brown mud bricks drying in vast rows on the ground, a few trees in background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Mud bricks are made by local communities in Pakistan as part of efforts to improve resilience.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/bricks-made-mud-putting-row-2404684131">nadeemshahzad/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Recovery efforts should not only focus on rebuilding physical infrastructure. Strengthening economic, social and environmental resilience must be prioritised too. As seen in Pakistan, millions of people are <a href="https://www.preventionweb.net/news/pakistan-flood-victims-crises-collide-fuel-growing-hunger">still struggling</a> to find a sustainable means of livelihood and <a href="https://www.redcross.org.uk/stories/disasters-and-emergencies/world/climate-change-and-pakistan-flooding-affecting-millions">clean water</a> remains a pressing issue in many affected areas. </p>
<p>Social and psychological support is just as important. That includes counselling services and mental health systems to address trauma, grief and loss. </p>
<p>A 2022 <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyt.2022.890671">study</a> by Iranian researchers revealed that post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms were particularly prevalent after extreme flood events. Another <a href="https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disasters/2022-pakistan-floods/">2022 report</a> showed that Pakistan flood survivors who were given professional psychological support recovered more rapidly and completely.</p>
<p>To pave the way for recovery in Libya, additional support will be needed, particularly in terms of temporary shelters, medicine and access to health facilities and sanitation services. </p>
<p>Coordinated local action and stable governance will help fragile regions like Libya and Pakistan to strengthen communities and prepare for more inevitable climate shocks. Peace building needs to be an integral part of climate crisis recovery, prevention and readiness.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola is a Visiting Scientist at the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security. He is grateful to have received grants supporting his research on climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction.</span></em></p>Our expert in disaster recovery and climate change adaptation calls for a longer-term response to conflict zones affected by severe flooding, such as Libya and Pakistan.Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola, Visiting Scientist, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244092024-03-05T12:12:14Z2024-03-05T12:12:14ZCrisis in Abyei: South Sudan must act and stop violence between Dinka groups<p>Abyei – a territory roughly the size of Jamaica – is being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/oct/26/oil-rich-and-extremely-poor-inside-the-forgotten-abyei-box-a-photo-essay">contested</a> by two countries, Sudan and South Sudan. Abyei, which covers just over 10,000km², is under <a href="https://unmis.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/UNMIS/Fact%20Sheets/FS-abyeiprotocol.pdf#page=1">special administrative status</a> following the terms of a 2005 peace agreement between the two countries.</p>
<p>The disagreement has led to increasingly violent inter-communal tensions. Although the roots of these stretch back decades, they present a complex challenge, particularly in a context where the state lacks the capacity to enforce the rule of law impartially. But, in my view, the South Sudanese national government has the tools to help alleviate these tensions in the near term.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://pureportal.coventry.ac.uk/en/persons/jan-pospisil/publications/">researched</a> the political and security situation in Sudan and South Sudan for more than two decades and, as representatives from all sides confirm, the heart of the current conflict lies in overlapping territorial claims. </p>
<h2>Important region</h2>
<p>Abyei is both geographically and culturally significant.</p>
<p>It’s strategically positioned in a resource-rich and fertile area between Sudan and South Sudan that is also important for its transport links. Abyei is a bustling regional trading hub. Although there is only one producing oilfield in Abyei and <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2010/1102/Oil-rich-Abyei-Time-to-update-the-shorthand-for-Sudan-s-flashpoint-border-town">production is declining</a>, the region is thought to have vast untapped resources. </p>
<p>Abyei is deeply embedded in the history of the Ngok Dinka community, who are among the northernmost Dinka populations. The Dinka represent the predominant ethnolinguistic group in South Sudan, a country that emerged as the world’s newest nation in 2011. </p>
<p>Abyei’s ownership is also contested by the Arabic Misseriya from the north, indigenous to the current Sudanese territory.</p>
<p>These contestations have resulted in the region being plagued by <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/clashes-in-disputed-african-region-of-abyei/7460780.html">recurrent conflicts</a>, marking a history of turmoil in Abyei dating back more than a century. </p>
<h2>Efforts at resolution</h2>
<p>In an effort to resolve the dispute over <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_040526_Protocol%20between%20GoS%20and%20SPLM%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20Abyei%20Conflict.pdf">Abyei’s sovereignty</a>, negotiations held between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement that began in 2002 proposed a referendum to decide if Abyei should become part of Sudan or South Sudan. Such a referendum would have been held in parallel with the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12317927">South Sudanese independence referendum in 2011</a>. </p>
<p>The referendum on Abyei, however, has yet to happen. This is largely due to <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-referendum-in-abyei-is-an-ongoing-challenge-for-the-african-union">disagreements</a> over voter eligibility. The nomadic lifestyle of the Misseriya groups has also complicated matters.</p>
<p>To address recurrent tensions, the <a href="https://unisfa.unmissions.org/mandate">United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei</a> was established in 2011. It was tasked with maintaining peace in the contested region. Over a decade later, however, little has changed.</p>
<p>Since <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/response-people-impacted-violence-agok-and-aneet-situation-report-no-1-22-april">2022</a>, contestations over Abyei have been complicated by <a href="https://acleddata.com/2024/02/09/acled-brief-violence-rises-across-south-sudans-disputed-abyei-state/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=acled-brief-violence-rises-across-south-sudans-disputed-abyei-state">renewed clashes</a> between the Ngok and another Dinka sub-group, the Twic Dinka, from the south. </p>
<p><strong>Map of Abyei</strong></p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-UD8WK" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/UD8WK/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>The Ngok Dinka assert their rights to the whole territory of what is known as the “Abyei Box”. This is the current internationally recognised form of Abyei, which was established based on the findings of the <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/boundary-demarcation-sudan-comprehensive-peace-agreement">Abyei Boundary Commission</a>. The commission was formed from the North-South peace talks of the mid-2000s. </p>
<p>Conversely, the Twic Dinka argue that their ancestral lands extend further north to the River Kiir, suggesting a natural demarcation line between their territory and that of the Ngok Dinka. The Twic contend that the Ngok Dinka’s presence south of the river had been a result of displacement caused by historic hostilities with the Misseriya during <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05430.6?seq=1">Sudan’s civil war in the 1980s and 1990s</a>.</p>
<h2>The drivers of conflict</h2>
<p>Following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/9/12/south-sudan-president-signs-peace-deal-with-rebel-leader">conclusion of the South Sudanese civil war in 2018</a> and the formation of a power-sharing government, tensions escalated in the Abyei region. This was partly due to grievances from Twic politicians who felt overlooked for significant roles in the national government and also in the state government of Warrap, where Twic county falls. Income from the bustling Aneek market in south Abyei was seen as a potential remedy for these grievances. </p>
<p>However, when the Abyei administration began land demarcation efforts in February 2022, conflict erupted. This resulted in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/response-people-impacted-violence-agok-and-aneet-situation-report-no-1-22-april">several deaths and the destruction of Aneek market</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, the area has remained tense, with outbreaks of violence involving organised assaults or clashes between armed youth factions.</p>
<p>This situation has been further exacerbated by the involvement of Bul Nuer militias. </p>
<p>One faction of militias was displaced from their native Mayom county in Unity State, in South Sudan’s north, by intense flooding. They eventually settled in Twic county, in Warrap state, in areas close to the Abyei border. </p>
<p>Concurrently, political disputes between other factions of Bul Nuer militias with the local government of Mayom county escalated to violent clashes. This forced the militias to flee Unity State. They, too, settled in Twic county.</p>
<p>This complicated an <a href="https://www.sudanspost.com/gai-machiek-i-am-not-a-rebel-and-not-involved-in-abyei-attacks/#google_vignette">already tense situation</a>.</p>
<p>To address the escalating violence in Twic county and Abyei, South Sudan President Salva Kiir <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/kiir-orders-expulsion-of-nuer-spiritual-leader-from-warrap">ordered the expulsion</a> of Bul Nuer militia members from Warrap state, and their resettlement in other states outside Warrap and Abyei. However, the implementation of this decree has faced significant challenges. </p>
<p>Since settling in Twic county in 2022, many Bul Nuer families have formed marital alliances with Twic families, integrating them into the community. This integration led to widespread protests from the Twic against Kiir’s decree. As a result, the Bul Nuer militias have remained in the area. </p>
<p>The presence of these militias has fuelled distrust among the Ngok community. </p>
<p>This tension boiled over in early February 2024 when minor altercations involving Ngok, Twic and Bul Nuer youths escalated into a larger conflict, resulting in the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1146007">loss of more than 50 lives</a>.</p>
<p>Addressing these deep-seated inter-communal tensions, with roots stretching back decades, presents a complex challenge particularly in a context where the state lacks capacity to enforce laws impartially. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Despite these difficulties, the South Sudandese national government has the tools to help alleviate these tensions in the near term. </p>
<p>One significant area of ambiguity that has contributed to ongoing disputes is the undefined border status between Twic and Abyei. </p>
<p>The government’s strategy has been to avoid making definitive statements regarding this border. This is in an effort to prevent alienating any community and to curb conflict escalation. </p>
<p>However, considering the intensification of tensions over the past two years, it may be prudent to reconsider this approach and seek a more definitive resolution to the border issue. Clarifying the border between Twic county and Abyei could significantly undermine the influence of political myths and propaganda used to raise ethnic distrust.</p>
<p>Initiating political dialogue that involves both Ngok and Twic leaders, as well as engaging with the youth who have been both instigators and casualties of the conflict, could facilitate this process of demystification. </p>
<p>While achieving a long-term resolution to the conflict around Abyei amid <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/oct/26/oil-rich-and-extremely-poor-inside-the-forgotten-abyei-box-a-photo-essay">socio-economic challenges</a> remains an elusive goal, adopting pragmatic approaches to manage the current conflict is essential for maintaining peace in the region. Such efforts would help lay the groundwork for long-term stability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224409/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Pospisil receives funding from the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, a programme funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. He is Associate Professor at Coventry University's Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations.</span></em></p>Overlapping territorial claims continue to fuel conflict in Abyei, which is claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan.Jan Pospisil, Associate Professor, Research, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2124162024-02-05T13:31:18Z2024-02-05T13:31:18ZEnemy collaboration in occupied Ukraine evokes painful memories in Europe – and the response risks a rush to vigilante justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573141/original/file-20240202-21-8rxp75.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C389%2C5000%2C2926&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A suspected Russian collaborator arrested in Kharkiv, Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineCollaborationArrests/5c55957802d04749be3bc74030956441/photo?Query=collaboration%20ukraine&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=25&currentItemNo=11">AP Photo/Felipe Dana</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Collaboration with the enemy is a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198788898.003.0002">common and often painful</a> part of armed conflict. It is also an issue in which I have both a professional and personal interest. </p>
<p>The war in Ukraine is, in many ways, <a href="https://twitter.com/amanpour/status/1696576647552496122">a transparent conflict</a>, with cellphone images, drone cameras and satellite imagery feeding a flow of data to social media platforms and news outlets.</p>
<p>But in Ukraine’s occupied territories, there are actions and decisions that many people – ordinary residents and officials alike – will want to remain hidden, not just for now but for years to come.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://ronaldniezen.ca/">scholar of international human rights</a> who has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/narratives-of-mass-atrocity/1B0560BEB271D364CF43345C02856527">studied the aftermath of mass atrocities</a>. I have also written a novel, “<a href="https://www.blackrosewriting.com/mystery/thememoryseeker?rq=Niezen">The Memory Seeker</a>,” inspired by my family’s experience with the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands in World War II.</p>
<p>When my father died several years ago at age 96, he left behind unanswered questions about his sympathies and activities during the war. Had he supplied the Nazis with information? Had he, for example, denounced people of age to be forced to work in German factories? This doubt has led me to explore wartime complicity and how it is dealt with. </p>
<h2>Liberating powers</h2>
<p>There can be no doubt that there <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/01/magazine/ukraine-kherson-collaboration-russia.html">has been collaboration</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jun/26/ukraine-russia-collaborators-revenge">in the areas Russia has occupied</a> since invading Ukraine in February 2022.</p>
<p>In June 2022, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-updates-bucha-commemorates-one-year-since-liberation/a-65190611">Bucha was the first liberated city</a> from which <a href="https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2022/06/21/civilian-collaboration-and-reprisals-behind-ukraines-front-lines/.">collaboration with Russians was reported</a>. The mayor of Bucha, Anatoliy Fedoruk, <a href="https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2022/06/21/civilian-collaboration-and-reprisals-behind-ukraines-front-lines/">claimed that some local residents</a> provided Russians with information about local people so that the invading army “knew in advance” whom to kill and where to find them.</p>
<p>As the Ukrainian counteroffensive advanced after the initial Russian invasion, collaboration was also reported in other liberated <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/19/europe/kupiansk-ukraine-liberated-russia-intl-cmd/index.html">cities like Kharkiv</a>, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/02/06/the-hunt-for-russian-collaborators-in-ukraine">Izium</a> and villages in the southern front. </p>
<p>Now, with retaken territories long under Ukrainian control, the former occupiers, collaborators and sympathizers are <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/02/06/the-hunt-for-russian-collaborators-in-ukraine">the ones being hunted</a>, rooted out and, in some cases, brought to justice.</p>
<p>The problem of collaboration is especially thorny in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-the-donbas-so-important-for-russia/a-61547512">Ukraine’s Donbass region</a>, with its long history of Russian-Ukrainian cultural and linguistic interaction. </p>
<p>The industrialization of the area in the 19th and 20th centuries brought in a large number of Russian-speaking workers, and the region still has a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/06/02/1101712731/russia-invasion-ukraine-russian-language-culture-identity">significant Russian-speaking population</a>. Since the summer of 2022, the front has stalemated, with a little more than half the region under Russian control. Divided loyalties are especially common in these circumstances and sometimes <a href="https://bihus.info/zamgolovy-naczpolu-pidzhyvaye-u-partnera-rosijskogo-kryminalnogo-avtoryteta-i-maye-druzhynu-z-rosijskym-pasportom/">reach the upper echelons of Ukraine’s administrative power</a>.</p>
<h2>What to do with collaborators</h2>
<p>The problem of collaboration was a concern for Ukrainian authorities from the first days of Russia’s February 2022 invasion. On March 3, 2022, the Ukrainian parliament amended the country’s criminal code with two new laws criminalizing any type of <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2022-04-04/ukraine-new-laws-criminalize-collaboration-with-an-aggressor-state">cooperation with an aggressor state</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://zmina.ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/12/zvit_zmina_eng-1.pdf">Criminal Liability for Collaboration Law</a> prohibits the expression of certain opinions, such as dissemination of the aggressor state’s propaganda in educational institutions, denial of Russia’s armed occupation of Ukraine and refusal to recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over the temporarily occupied territories.</p>
<p>It also prohibits cooperation with an aggressor state, its occupation administrations and its armed forces or paramilitary forces. </p>
<p>Punishment for violations may include a ban on holding positions in government and house arrest for up to 15 years, with or without confiscation of property. </p>
<p>The changes to Ukraine’s criminal code reflected concern among Ukraine’s leaders that collaboration with Russia would give the invading forces both ideological and military advantages.</p>
<p>Yet in the near-daily <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/speeches">speeches made since then by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy</a>, I was unable to find any reference to the need to root out collaborators. The reason may be that merely drawing attention to the problem of collaboration is bad for morale, even if the number of active sympathizers in a given location is very small. It also interrupts narratives of collective heroism and national unity and implies divided loyalties.</p>
<p>But that doesn’t mean it hasn’t been happening.</p>
<p>Among the more than <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/11/19/ukraine-gives-swift-justice-to-suspected-collaborators-in-recently-liberated-areas_6267879_4.html">7,000 criminal collaboration cases</a> opened by Ukrainian prosecutors are clear-cut violations involving collaborators who helped Russians <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/in-ukraine-collaboration-cases-arent-always-clear-cut/">identify military targets</a> and others who identified neighbors who were Ukrainian loyalists and possible partisans.</p>
<p>In other cases, however, matters are less clear. What is one to do, for example, with those who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jun/26/ukraine-russia-collaborators-revenge">continued their jobs under Russian occupation</a> and provided basic services in local government offices or in education? Or the garbage collectors who <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-kherson-wartime-collaboration-law-problems-amendments/">continued to work</a> while the Russians occupied their town? These kinds of cases, too, are being prosecuted.</p>
<p>There are risks of overreach inherent in prosecuting people like sanitation workers and school teachers. Still, this legal approach to collaboration is <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.32_GC-III-EN.pdf">consistent with the fourth Geneva Convention</a> regarding the treatment of civilians in conditions of war. The convention <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0173.pdf">calls for judgments to be</a> “pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”</p>
<h2>The rush to (in)justice</h2>
<p>Sometimes the sheer number of offenses overwhelms the capacity for a state to prosecute them.</p>
<p>What is to be done, for example, about those who are accused of collaboration by, say, giving directions when asked by an enemy soldier or <a href="https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/live-oekraine-roept-burgers-in-bezet-gebied-op-om-door-rusland-georganiseerde-verkiezingen-te-mijden%7Eb14c7f5d/">participating in a sham election</a>? Were they acting out of a survival instinct or did they really sympathize with the Russians? Their motives may be known only to them. </p>
<p>Then there is the unofficial response by liberated populations against collaborators. Liberation brings tremendous release, not only of newfound freedom but of temptations toward revenge against those who once supported the occupier.</p>
<p>This could be one reason why societies that experience occupation followed by liberation are prone to vengeance-seeking and lawlessness.</p>
<p>It may be for that reason that my father decided to keep his wartime experience cloaked in secrecy.</p>
<p>The Netherlands, even with its global reputation for upholding human rights and democratic values, was no exception to the rush to judgment of suspected collaborators after World War II. Officially, there were trials and executions of <a href="https://www.annefrank.org/en/timeline/119/arrest-of-nsb-leader-anton-mussert/">prominent Nazis like Anton Mussert</a>, head of the Dutch fascists, and scores of other high-ranking party members. Thousands more served prison time.</p>
<p>Informal tribunals were held to punish those deemed to have been sympathetic to the Nazis, including <a href="https://www.dbnl.org/tekst/_han001200001_01/_han001200001_01_0015.php">women who had illicit relationships</a> with occupying German soldiers – who had their hair violently sheared and were publicly humiliated.</p>
<p>Vigilante violence was common across post-war Europe. In Italy between 1943 and 1947, vengeful partisans began a “cleansing” of police and civil servants associated with the fascist regime and went on to <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20181122/italian-film-red-land-rossa-istria-wwii-massacres">execute thousands of German sympathizers</a>.</p>
<p>Across Europe in the aftermath of World War II, the will to revenge, for a while at least, was expressed in the justice of the mob. </p>
<h2>The post-occupation challenge</h2>
<p>A similar rush to justice appears to be playing out in parts of liberated Ukraine.</p>
<p>Journalist <a href="https://www.joshuayaffa.com/">Joshua Yaffa</a>, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/02/06/the-hunt-for-russian-collaborators-in-ukraine">writing from liberated Izyum</a> for The New Yorker, found a town in which hundreds had been questioned or detained on suspicion of collaboration with occupying Russians. “Every case will be looked into,” an investigator assured him. “No one should sleep too comfortably.”</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Ukraine watchers like Emily Channell-Justice, director of Harvard University’s Temerty Contemporary Ukraine Program, have <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukrainian-vigilantes-may-seek-revenge-for-russian-war-crimes-expert-2022-4">expressed concern</a> that Ukrainian vigilante groups may seek extra-judicial revenge.</p>
<h2>Families divided</h2>
<p>As the war enters its third year, the issue of collaboration will continue to gnaw away in occupied parts of Ukraine. And the longer the Russian occupation goes on, the more those in the occupied areas will be pressured into everyday complicity.</p>
<p>Liberation, when and where it comes, brings with it difficult conversations both in official and family settings. As with the Netherlands at the end of Nazi occupation, the search for collaborators in Ukraine will not only be made by police and partisans; it will happen within families coming to terms with the past.</p>
<p>And if my family’s experience of World War II is anything to go by, stories of the occupation will be parsed for loyalties, and silence will nurture suspicion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212416/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald Niezen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Liberated cities are prone to vigilante justice against those accused of conspiring with the enemy.Ronald Niezen, Professor of Practice in Sociology and Political Science/International Relations, University of San DiegoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227182024-02-03T17:28:29Z2024-02-03T17:28:29ZUS raids in Iraq and Syria: How retaliatory airstrikes affect network of Iran-backed militias<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573194/original/file-20240203-29-7pf0p7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C126%2C1594%2C1069&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The headquarters of an Iranian-linked group in Anbar, Iraq was among the sites targeted by U.S. bombers.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-destruction-after-the-us-warplanes-carried-out-an-news-photo/1974225653?adppopup=true">Hashd al-Shaabi Media Office/Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>U.S. bombers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-starts-retaliatory-strikes-iraq-syria-officials-2024-02-02/">struck dozens of sites</a> across Iraq and Syria on Feb. 2, 2024, to avenge a drone attack that killed three American service members just days earlier.</em></p>
<p><em>The retaliatory strikes were the first following a deadly assault on a U.S. base in Jordan that U.S. officials blamed on Iranian-backed militias. Sites associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were among those hit by American bombs.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. turned to American University’s <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">Sara Harmouch</a> and <a href="https://www.westpoint.edu/social-sciences/profile/nakissa_jahanbani">Nakissa Jahanbani</a> at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center – both experts on Iran’s relationship with its network of proxies – to explain what the U.S. strikes hoped to achieve and what could happen next.</em></p>
<h2>Who was targeted in the U.S. retaliatory strikes?</h2>
<p>The U.S. response extended beyond targeting Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq, or <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a>, the entity <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/29/us-troops-jordan-iraq-militias/">claiming responsibility</a> for the drone attack on Jan. 28. </p>
<p>This term, Islamic Resistance in Iraq, does not refer to a single group per se. Rather, it encompasses an umbrella organization that has, since around 2020, integrated various Iran-backed militias in the region. </p>
<p>Iran <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68126137#">officially denied</a> any involvement in the Jan. 28 drone strike. But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is known to be part of the networks of militia groups that Tehran supports with money, weapons and training through the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force</a>.</p>
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<p>In recent months, parts of this network of Iran-backed militias have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/">claimed responsibility</a> for more than 150 attacks on bases housing U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>As such, the U.S. <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">retaliatory strikes</a> targeted over 85 sites across Iraq and Syria, all associated with Iranian-supported groups and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.</p>
<p>The U.S. operation’s stated aim is to deter further Iranian-backed aggression. Specifically, in Syria, the U.S. executed several airstrikes, reportedly resulting in the death of at least <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/03/world/middleeast/at-least-18-members-of-iran-backed-groups-were-killed-in-syria-monitoring-group-says.html#:%7E:text=The%20aftermath%20of%20the%20U.S.,16%20people%20had%20been%20killed%2C">18 militia group members</a> and the destruction of dozens of locations in <a href="https://www.syriahr.com/en/324467/">Al-Mayadeen and Deir el-Zour</a>, a key stronghold of Iranian-backed forces.</p>
<p>In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces, a state security apparatus comprising groups backed by Iran, reported that U.S. strikes resulted in the deaths of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-launches-retaliatory-strikes-iraq-syria-nearly-40-reported-killed-2024-02-03/">16 of its members</a>, including both fighters and medics. </p>
<p>The U.S. response was notably more robust than other recent actions against such groups, reflecting an escalation in efforts to counter the threats posed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliates.</p>
<h2>What do we know about the network targeted in the strike?</h2>
<p>Initially, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq emerged as a response to foreign military presence and political interventions, especially after <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">the 2003 U.S.-led invasion</a> of Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq acted as a collective term for pro-Tehran Iraqi militias, allowing them to launch attacks under a single banner. Over time, it evolved to become a front for Iran-backed militias operating beyond Iraq, including those in Syria and Lebanon.</p>
<p>Today, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> operates as a cohesive force rather than as a singular entity. That is to say, as a network its objectives often align with Iran’s goal of preserving its influence across the region, but on a national level – in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon – the groups have their distinct agendas.</p>
<p>Operating under this one banner of Islamic Resistance, these militias effectively conceal the identities of the actual perpetrators in their operations. This was seen in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">deadly Jan. 28, 2024, attack on Tower 22</a>, a U.S. military base in Jordan. Although it is evident that an Iranian-supported militia orchestrated the drone assault, pinpointing the specific faction within this broad coalition is difficult.</p>
<p>This deliberate strategy of obscuring the particular source of attacks hinders direct attribution and poses challenges for countries attempting to identify and retaliate against the precise culprits. </p>
<h2>What are the strikes expected to accomplish?</h2>
<p>U.S. Central Command <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">said on Feb. 2</a> that the operation’s aim is to significantly impair the operational capabilities, weaponry and supply networks of the IRGC and its Iranian-backed proxies.</p>
<p>The strikes targeted key assets such as command and control centers, intelligence facilities, storage locations for rockets, missiles, drones and logistics and munitions facilities. The goal is not only to degrade their current operational infrastructure but also to deter future attacks. </p>
<p>The action followed the discovery of an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-believes-drone-that-killed-soldiers-was-iranian-made-sources-2024-02-01/">Iranian-made drone</a> used in an attack on Jordan. </p>
<p>In a broader strategy to counter these groups, the U.S. has also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/us/politics/us-iran-sanctions-charges.html">implemented new sanctions</a> against IRGC officers and officials, unsealed criminal charges against individuals involved in selling oil to benefit Hamas and Hezbollah, and conducted <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/us/politics/us-iran-sanctions-charges.html">cyberattacks</a> against Iran.</p>
<h2>How will this affect Iran’s strategy in the region?</h2>
<p>Prior to the U.S. response on Feb. 2, Kataib Hezbollah, a group linked to Iran, announced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqs-kataib-hezbollah-suspends-military-operations-us-forces-statement-2024-01-30/">a halt</a> in attacks on American targets – a move seen as recognizing the serious implications of the Jordan drone incident. </p>
<p>It is possible that the cessation was the result of pressure from Tehran, though this has been <a href="https://thehill.com/newsletters/morning-report/4443950-us-plan-retaliate-against-iran-takes-shape/">met with skepticism</a> in Washington.</p>
<p>But the development nonetheless speaks to the interplay of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">influence and autonomy</a> among the so-called Axis of Resistance groups, which oppose U.S. presence in the Middle East and are supported by Iran <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">to varying</a> degrees.</p>
<p>The U.S. airstrikes – <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">combined with sanctions and charges</a> – serve as a multifaceted strategy to deter further aggression from Iran and its proxies. By targeting critical infrastructure such as command and control centers, intelligence operations and weapons storage facilities, the approach aims to undermine Iran’s ability to project power in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">comprehensive and broad nature</a> of the U.S. response signals a robust stance against threats to regional stability and U.S. interests.</p>
<p>The aim is to isolate Iran diplomatically and economically, while squeezing its support for regional proxies. This underscores a commitment by the U.S. to counter Iranian influence that could potentially weaken Tehran’s regional engagement strategies, negotiation positions and capacity to form alliances.</p>
<p>However, the effectiveness of airstrikes and sanctions in deterring Iranian-backed aggression remains uncertain. Historical <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">trends suggest</a> that similar U.S. actions since the Oct. 7 Hamas assault in Israel, and as far back as 2017, have not completely halted attacks from Iranian-backed groups.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s approach seeks to navigate this landscape without <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/02/politics/us-strikes-iraq-syria/index.html">escalating the conflict</a>, focusing on <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2024-01-31/iran-hamas-gaza-israel-war-terrorism">targeting</a> the financial mechanisms that <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">support Iranian proxies</a>. Yet the impact and repercussions of such sanctions on Iran and the broader regional dynamics is complex.</p>
<p>In the short term, any direct U.S. retaliation against Iranian interests could heighten regional tensions and exacerbate the cycle of <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-uk-airstrikes-risk-strengthening-houthi-rebels-position-in-yemen-and-the-region-221006">tit-for-tat strikes</a> between the U.S. and Iranian-backed forces, increasing the risk of a broader regional conflict. And given that the attack’s pretext involves the Israel-Hamas war, any U.S. response could indirectly affect the course of that conflict, impacting future diplomatic efforts and the regional balance of power. </p>
<p>Iran’s “<a href="https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/whither-irgc-2020s/">forward defense” strategy</a> – focused on addressing threats externally before they become ones within its borders – would suggest that Iran will continue to support proxies through weaponry, funding and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/how-iran-and-its-allies-hope-to-save-hamas/">tactical knowledge</a> to reduce the influence and legitimacy of the U.S. and its allies in the region.</p>
<p>This underscores the delicate balance required in responding to Iranian-backed aggression – aiming to safeguard U.S. interests while preventing an escalation into a wider regional confrontation.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: Parts of this story were included in <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">an article</a> published on Jan. 29, 2024.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views, conclusions, and recommendations in this article are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More than 85 locations linked to militias were hit in a robust response by Washington to an earlier deadly drone attack on a US base in Jordan.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityNakissa Jahanbani, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207862024-01-31T13:35:44Z2024-01-31T13:35:44ZThis course examines how conflicts arise over borders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571637/original/file-20240126-19-g1hl2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C1718%2C1144&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Border conflicts, spanning different time periods and places, are behind many of the big international disputes today</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/december-2023-israel-an-israeli-tank-driving-along-the-news-photo/1878801578?adppopup=true">picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Text saying: Uncommon Courses, from The Conversation" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/uncommon-courses-130908">Uncommon Courses</a> is an occasional series from The Conversation U.S. highlighting unconventional approaches to teaching.</em> </p>
<h2>Title of course:</h2>
<p>Borders and Battles: The Historical Roots of Geopolitical Conflict</p>
<h2>What prompted the idea for the course?</h2>
<p>I got the idea for the course when I noticed that all of the other history courses I taught – on India, the Middle East and the British Empire – featured major border conflicts. These conflicts arose from a variety of issues, whether the borders were historically <a href="https://www.history.ox.ac.uk/changing-times-and-irish-border">ill-conceived</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/kashmir-the-roads-ahead/">politically disputed</a> or cut across <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/explainer/report-dna-explainer-what-is-the-water-dispute-between-india-and-bangladesh-know-purpose-of-kushiyara-river-pact-2983049">contested resources</a>.</p>
<p>As all of these <a href="https://www.thequint.com/news/world/britain-7-present-day-conflicts-world-communalism-israel-palestine-rohingyas-cyprus-shashi-tharoor-era-of-darkness">borders were drawn by the British</a> in the closing days of the empire, they reflect a critical aspect of decolonization. So I decided to abandon the conventional geographical focus of the history course and instead design a course that examines the theme of embattled borders, across different time periods and places. </p>
<h2>What does the course explore?</h2>
<p>The course encourages students to look at how borders impact people’s everyday lives.</p>
<p>For instance, we discuss how, along the U.S. southern border, the U.S. uses <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/c/view?docid=721845">death as a deterrent</a> to migrant border crossing. In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Border Patrol began <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/RL33659.pdf">systematically funneling migrants away from urban areas</a> and into the Sonoran Desert in southern Arizona. There, many <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-770.pdf">succumb to the harsh elements</a>, including <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/magazine/border-crossing.html#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%20Border%20Patrol,of%20the%20last%2022%20years.">temperatures</a> that routinely hit 120 degrees Fahrenheit (49 degrees Celsius), a scarcity of water, and predatory wildlife. </p>
<p>In Israel-Palestine, we examine how the borders between Israel and the occupied territories evolved, why they are contested or enforced and whether they should be redrawn.</p>
<p>The course also explores the <a href="https://exhibits.stanford.edu/1947-partition/about/1947-partition-of-india-pakistan">1947 Partition of India</a>, which led to the creation of Pakistan. We talk about the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan">many wars</a> fought between these two nuclear-armed nations, as well as the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/the-great-divide-books-dalrymple">interpersonal violence and animosity</a> fueled by Partition. </p>
<p>Finally, students investigate the <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9105/#:%7E:text=The%20Northern%20Ireland%20border%20came,Government%20of%20Ireland%20Act%201920.">1921 separation of Northern Ireland from Ireland</a> and how it led to a cycle of violence. </p>
<p>We discuss both <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/ira-irish-republican-army-and-changing-tactics-terrorism">IRA terrorism</a> against British civilians and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-foyle-west-47433319">atrocities committed by the British army</a> in Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>For each border conflict, we pay close attention to the imperial and expansionist policies that fueled the formation of borders. Students consider how borders represent historical and imperial legacies. </p>
<h2>Why is this course relevant now?</h2>
<p>Borders and Battles was first offered during the height of the <a href="https://www.americanoversight.org/a-timeline-of-the-trump-administrations-family-separation-policy">Trump administration’s family separation policy</a>. This policy separated families trying to enter at the U.S. southern border. Parents were held in federal prisons or deported, while children were placed under the care of the Department of Health and Human Services.</p>
<p>I am now teaching the course against the backdrop of war in Israel-Palestine. Students come to understand how and why border disputes like these developed, how they were aggravated or resolved, and how they affect both individuals and wider society.</p>
<p>I find that students are eager to discuss these issues; they do not need to be sold on their relevance. Many students actually tell me how the course helped them make sense of contemporary conflicts.</p>
<h2>What’s a critical lesson from the course?</h2>
<p>The most critical takeaway from the course is the dehumanization of the “enemy,” each side by the other. It’s common to all border disputes, no matter where, or when, or why they occur. </p>
<p>This process often involves the politicization of religious, racial and class-based differences. Government officials cast those who defy borders as subhuman, and state policy consistently reflects this bias. Israel’s defense minister, for example, explained that it was necessary to cut off all supplies to Gaza because <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/10/358170/israel-defense-minister-calls-palestinians-human-animals-amid-israeli-aggression">Palestinians are “human animals</a>.”</p>
<h2>What materials does the course feature?</h2>
<p>The course material purposefully draws on a variety of formats.</p>
<p>We begin with a book, Jason De Leon’s “<a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/1368216769">The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail</a>.” De Leon chronicles the journeys of migrants across the U.S. southern border.</p>
<p>We also play an interactive game, <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/1304814039">Defining a Nation: India on the Eve of Independence, 1945</a>. This game requires students to reenact the partition of the subcontinent. The outcome can be – and usually is – different than the actual historical outcome.</p>
<p>The course ends with a film, “<a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/945634441">In the Name of the Father</a>,” which looks at the IRA bombing of army pubs in Guildford, England, and the wrongful conviction of the “Guildford Four.” </p>
<h2>What will the course prepare students to do?</h2>
<p>Many former students have stated that the course better enabled them to understand news broadcasts and keep up with current events.</p>
<p>The course also prepares students for international travel. Some students took the course before traveling to Israel or the Palestinian territories.</p>
<p>The course material has even inspired students to become involved in causes related to border disputes. As a direct result of knowledge gained from the course, a handful of students have joined organizations assisting refugees at the U.S. southern border.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220786/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nita Prasad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Religious, racial and class-based differences often get politicized.Nita Prasad, Professor of History, Quinnipiac UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216162024-01-23T13:29:43Z2024-01-23T13:29:43ZEducation has a huge role to play in peace and development: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570556/original/file-20240122-20-g5icoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children's education is frequently disrupted in conflict-fraught areas.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Beloumou Olomo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nelson Mandela was a famous advocate for the value of education. In 1990, the man who would become South Africa’s first democratically president four years later <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/24/us/the-mandela-visit-education-is-mighty-force-boston-teen-agers-are-told.html">told a high school in Boston</a>: “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.”</p>
<p>The United Nations agrees. In 2018 its General Assembly adopted a resolution that proclaimed 24 January as the <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/days/education">International Day of Education</a>. It’s an annual opportunity to shine a spotlight on the role that education can and should play in promoting peace and development. This year the theme is “learning for lasting peace” – a critical focus in a world that, the UN points out, is “seeing a surge of violent conflicts paralleled by an alarming rise of discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and hate speech”.</p>
<p>To mark the occasion, we’re sharing some of the many articles our authors have contributed since we launched in 2015 that examine the intersection of education and conflict – and how to wield this powerful “weapon” for positive change.</p>
<h2>Education under attack</h2>
<p>Education systems in a number of African countries <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/GCPEA_NSAG_ScopingPaper.pdf">have been identified</a> by international advocacy groups as “very heavily affected” by conflict. These include Sudan, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Central Sahel, which includes Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, is another region of high concern. In 2020 alone (and before COVID lockdowns), 4,000 schools in the Central Sahel <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/Central-Sahel-Paper-English.pdf">closed because of insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>Craig Bailie <a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">explains</a> what drives armed groups to attack schools in the Central Sahel, leaving hundreds of thousands of students high and dry.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">Education is both the victim and the best weapon in Central Sahel conflict</a>
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<h2>Long-term effects</h2>
<p>Education systems, of course, do not exist in a vacuum. Where conflict meets long-term governance failures, poor resourcing and other societal issues, schooling comes under even more pressure. Ethiopia, for instance, has not only had to reckon with <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">internal conflict since 2020</a>; it’s also grappling with deeply rooted systemic crises.</p>
<p>Tebeje Molla and Dawit Tibebu Tiruneh <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">unpack</a> how these crises are colliding to leave Ethiopian children and teenagers floundering.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">Ethiopia’s education system is in crisis – now’s the time to fix it</a>
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<h2>Rebuilding is possible</h2>
<p>That’s not to say education systems can’t bounce back after conflict. During Somalia’s civil war in the late 1980s more than 90% of schools were destroyed. In the wake of the war the north of the country declared itself as the Republic of Somaliland. </p>
<p>Tobias Gandrup and Kristof Titeca <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">examine how</a>, together, the state, NGOs and the diaspora have succeeded in rebuilding the education system.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">How schools are kept afloat in Somaliland</a>
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<h2>Solutions exist</h2>
<p>Researchers also have a role to play in strengthening education systems. All over the continent, projects that aim to keep children learning even amid devastating conflicts are being developed, rolled out and tested.</p>
<p>One example comes from north-eastern Nigeria, which has been beset by Boko Haram attacks. Margee Ensign and Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob <a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">used</a> a combination of radio and tablet computers to improve the literacy and numeracy skills of 22,000 children forced out of school.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">Disasters interrupt schooling regularly in parts of Africa: here's a solution</a>
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<h2>In the classroom</h2>
<p>Conflicts seem inevitable in a world racked by many “wicked problems” like climate change, inequality and poverty. But what’s taught in Africa’s classrooms could play a role in solving them. The ability to think critically, and to engage with facts rather than fiction, is key. </p>
<p>To this end, Ayodeji Olukoju <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">explains</a> why it was so important that Nigeria reintroduced history as a school subject in 2019, a decade after scrapping it from the curriculum. Understanding history, he argues, helps to explode myths and stereotypes, leading to a more cohesive society.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">What studying history at school can do for Nigerians</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221616/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Education can spur peace and development. Here are five essential reads on the topic.Natasha Joseph, Commissioning EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2192642024-01-03T09:38:27Z2024-01-03T09:38:27ZSouth Africa to lead new military force in the DRC: an expert on what it’s up against<p><em>The United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Monusco, is ending after 20 years. It will be replaced by troops from the Southern African Development Community (<a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/operationalisation-sadc-standby-force-mechanism-intervention-crises-situations-remain">SADC</a>), led by the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/">South African military</a>. Thomas Mandrup, an expert in African security governance and South African military and foreign policy, recently wrote a <a href="https://www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/milscience/sigla/Documents/Briefs/Briefs%202023/SIGLA%20Brief%2012%2023%20Mandrup.pdf">paper</a> on the subject. We asked him about the new mission and what awaits it.</em></p>
<h2>What prompted the deployment?</h2>
<p>The security situation in the eastern DRC has deteriorated <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1143937">in recent months</a>, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/21/dr-congo-president-says-un-peacekeepers-to-begin-withdrawal-this-year">criticism</a> has been raised against the UN force, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">Monusco</a>, which was due to start its <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/pr-government-democratic-republic-congo-and-monusco-sign-disengagement-plan-withdrawal-mission">drawdown</a> shortly after the national elections <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-elections-three-factors-that-have-shaped-tshisekedis-bumpy-first-term-as-president-217018">on 20 December</a>.</p>
<p>There was also <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/11/fog-of-eastern-drc-fighting-clouds-eacrf-effectiveness/">increased frustration</a> with the <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-regional-force">East African Community Regional Force</a> because of its lack of positive impact on the security situation in the eastern DRC. In addition, there was competition between the East African Community and SADC member states for future influence in the DRC. </p>
<p>The DRC became a member of the East Africa Community in 2022 and has historical trade relations with east Africa.</p>
<h2>What challenges await the SADC mission?</h2>
<p>The SADC mission in the DRC – which carries the acronym (<a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/president-ramaphosa-to-participate-in-virtual-extraordinary-sadc-summit/">SAMIDRC</a>) – is expected to replace the East African Community Regional Force and help the national security forces in fighting especially the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868">M23 rebels</a>, a group allegedly <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">supported by Rwanda</a>.</p>
<p>The SADC force is expected to attempt, in cooperation with the local security forces, to neutralise the main rebel groups operating in the eastern DRC. This is something that Monusco and the East African Community Regional Force have not been able to do for the last 20 years.</p>
<p>The rebel groups have operated in that area for many years, know the terrain, and are integrated with the local population.</p>
<p>The lessons learned from the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/asking-the-right-questions-about-the-force-intervention-brigade">SADC/Monusco Force Intervention Brigade</a> show that the new intervention force must be sizeable, and have proper air cover as well as transport and air elements. It must also have special forces capabilities, and mobility in very difficult terrain. Also required are tactical and operational intelligence and enough fire-power. </p>
<p>In addition, a SADC internal document is instructive: it says the regional force found it difficult to fulfil <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/samim-shifting-scenario-six-scenario-five">its mandate</a> of disarming the Al-Sunnah insurgents in Mozambique because of a lack of a clear mandate and the necessary capabilities.</p>
<h2>What role will the South African National Defence Force play? What resources does it have?</h2>
<p>Post-apartheid South Africa has played a central role as a mediator and peacemaker in Africa. The DRC has been at the centre of these efforts. The South African National Defence Force will lead the SADC intervention force. </p>
<p>However, the South African National Defence Force is <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-thandi-modise-defence-dept-budget-vote-202223-24-may-2022">overstretched and underfunded</a> and has been for <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-army-is-in-steady-decline-and-nothings-being-done-to-fix-it-74712">a long time</a>.</p>
<p>There is a discrepancy between what the politicians want it to do and the <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-thandi-modise-defence-dept-budget-vote-202223-24-may-2022">resources available</a> for this. In addition, the South African government has increasingly used the military for <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-not-a-magic-bullet-south-africa-needs-to-do-more-for-long-term-peace-164717">domestic security and policing tasks</a> while also <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/money-recovered-from-crime-will-go-to-fight-crime/">deploying soldiers</a> and equipment in complex international peace missions, including combat missions in the DRC and Mozambique and <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/extension-of-sandf-deployments-in-mozambique-and-drc-to-cost-r2-billion/">ad hoc shorter international deployments</a>.</p>
<p>The South African National Defence Force faces a host of challenges. The politicians are seemingly unwilling to prioritise its tasks. Instead of releasing forces by closing one operation, the force is expected to handle an ever increasing number of tasks and deployments at the same time. Many of these are of a more civilian nature, such as sending out army engineers to stop the pollution of the Vaal River or <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/extension-of-sandf-deployments-in-mozambique-and-drc-to-cost-r2-billion/">protecting installations of Eskom</a>, the power utility, without additional funding. </p>
<p>The defence force has problems keeping its equipment operational and has, for instance, only one operational C-130 transport aircraft. It has only a few helicopters available for all domestic and international missions – <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/saaf-in-crisis-as-aircraft-serviceability-drops-to-less-than-20/">five Oryx</a>, out of an initial 39, and three Rooivalk, out of 11.</p>
<p>Hence it will not be able to provide the much-needed air transport and air cover for offensive operations. The soldiers will have to use road transport in the DRC. But the country has very limited functional roads, making it especially difficult to operate and move around <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/saaf-in-crisis-as-aircraft-serviceability-drops-to-less-than-20/">during the rainy season</a>.</p>
<p>The specialised elements and mobile elements, like the paratroops, the reconaissance units and the <a href="https://www.recce.co.za/the-hq/">Special Forces</a>, which can be effective against groups like the M23, are overstretched to such an extent that it negatively affects their operational readiness.</p>
<p>The reserve force, in principle numbering 19,000, constitutes an important augmenting tool for the permanent force. Due to personnel shortages, the reserve force has increasingly been used for both <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-holds-second-defence-reserves-indaba/">domestic and international deployments</a>.</p>
<p>However, it is ageing and only at half its supposed strength. The average age of the personnel is 46 years old, which is a big operational challenge. Active soldiers <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/media-statement-defence-department-must-urgently-consider-appointment-chief-defence-reserves-and-chairperson-reserve-force-council">should be young and fit</a>. Ideally the majority of the force (private-level) should be 25 or younger. Officers and non-commissioned officers will have a higher average age. </p>
<p>The South African National Defence Force has reached a stage where it can no longer continue to deploy without significant additional funding and intake of recruits. The force will also have to take a critical look at its institutional structure and set-up. It has <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-mulls-future-of-its-military-to-make-it-fit-for-purpose-146423">too many expensive senior officers</a>, and too few young deployable soldiers. </p>
<h2>What are the risks?</h2>
<p>The risks are multifaceted. If the needed funding is not secured, the troop contributing countries will have to fund the missions from their own budgets. The <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/sadc-mission-mozambique-samim-brief">SADC mission in Mozambique</a>, for instance, <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/36712/">has struggled</a> with funding, which has hampered its operational capabilities. </p>
<p>The next challenge is whether the SADC member states will make the needed capabilities and equipment available to the new force, allowing it to successfully fulfil its mandate. The discrepancy between what a mission needs and what is provided has been seen in Mozambique, negatively affecting the mission’s ability to achieve its operational objectives. </p>
<p>In the operational area the new force will face an adversary allegedly supported by Rwanda. If the SADC force comes under-equipped or wrongly equipped, it increases the risk to the soldiers. The lessons learned from the strategic failure of the South African National Defence Force <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1322">in 2013 in Central African Republic</a> is a clear warning. Then a small bilateral South African training mission, augmented by a few hundred lightly armed special operation forces and paratrooper elements, fought a rebel force of 7,000 for two days. A small airborne element was left stranded, facing an overwhelming enemy without air cover, logistical support, heavy equipment or extraction possibilities.</p>
<p>It was only the bravery and skills of the deployed force that limited the number of casualties to 17. However, the mission was a strategic failure, which illustrated the limitation of the South African National Defence Force in logistically and practically supporting a force deployed several thousand kilometres away. Notably, the South African National Defence Force is in a worse shape than it was in 2013.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219264/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Mandrup receives funding from The Carlsberg Foundation. </span></em></p>The new intervention force must be sizeable, and have proper air cover as well as transport and air elements. None are guaranteed.Thomas Mandrup, Associate Professor, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership In Africa (SIGLA), Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2196822023-12-14T23:53:02Z2023-12-14T23:53:02ZThe Israeli-Palestinian conflict is putting Canadian multiculturalism to the test<p>In popular thinking, and according to its general image, Canada is considered to be open and welcoming to ethnocultural and religious diversity. </p>
<p>Immigration is perceived as an <a href="https://journals.library.ualberta.ca/af/index.php/af/article/view/29376">asset for Canada</a>, and over the decades, multiculturalism has come to be considered a value to be protected and cherished. This can be seen in <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/221026/dq221026b-eng.htm">the 2020 General Social Survey</a>, where 92 per cent of the population endorsed multiculturalism. <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-18.7/page-1.html">The Canadian Multiculturalism Act</a> states that multiculturalism is a “fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity and that it provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada’s future.” </p>
<p>However, since the Hamas attacks on Israel on Oct. 7 and the Israeli bombardment of Gaza, the demonstrations that have followed — both in favour of, and against Israel or in support of Palestine — have revealed many tensions linked to immigration. Hate crimes are also on the rise; in Toronto alone, there are reports of a <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/hate-crime-rise-israel-gaza-1.7001288">132 per cent increase since the start of the conflict</a>.</p>
<p>So it is imperative to consider the potential for conflict within Canada’s various communities. The issue is particularly concerning for those who are simultaneously facing racism and the repercussions of ongoing conflicts in their countries of origin. For example, the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/sikh-separtist-movement-punjab-1.6981041">historical conflict between Hindus and Sikhs</a> is raising concern among Sikhs in Canada, particularly since one of their leaders was murdered in British Columbia.</p>
<p>As a sociologist who specializes in inclusive education, I quickly observed that racism and discrimination are significant issues in our society. I recently wrote an article entitled <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/trema/6042#:%7E:text=L'%C3%A9ducation%20inclusive%20englobe%20et,n%C3%A9gliger%20for%20all%20the%20worst">“Thinking about inclusive education in a context of discrimination and diversity in Canada,”</a> which explains, among other things, the limits of Canadian multiculturalism in the fight against discrimination. In line with the perspective <a href="https://www.ehess.fr/fr/personne/serge-paugam">of French sociologist Serge Paugam</a>, who maintains that the sociologist’s role includes speaking out <a href="https://www.puf.com/content/La_pratique_de_la_sociologie">“against all forms of domination,”</a> I will analyze how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is undermining this multiculturalism.</p>
<h2>Increase in hate crimes</h2>
<p>Statistics on hate crimes show that tensions do exist, in spite of the results of the 2020 survey. For example, from <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/230322/cg-a004-eng.htm">2019 to 2021</a>, the Jewish community was the group most frequently targeted by hate crimes, and there was a significant increase in reports made to the police. In 2019, 306 antisemitic crimes were reported nationally. A year later this figure rose to 331 and by 2021, it had risen significantly to 492. <a href="https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/victim/rd16-rr16/p1.html">A further rise was recorded in 2022, with 502 incidents reported</a>. </p>
<p>Muslim communities have also been heavily affected by hate crime: in 2019, 182 incidents were reported. In 2020, this number fell to 84, but increased to 144 in 2021. Finally, Catholics have also been the target of hate crimes, with a significant increase in reports: in 2019, 51 cases were recorded compared with 43 in 2020 and 155 in 2021.</p>
<p>Ontario, the province with the highest number of immigrants in Canada, seems to have the highest percentage of hate crimes per capita. According to Statistics Canada data for 2021, Ottawa is the city with the highest rate of hate crime. <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510019101">Among the top 10 Canadian cities most affected by the phenomenon, there are more than eight Ontario cities</a>.</p>
<h2>A switch in public opinion</h2>
<p>To put it bluntly, not all Canadians see multiculturalism as an asset, and this change is exacerbated by the ongoing conflict between two of the country’s most discriminated communities. All this is taking place in a context where Canada’s capacity to welcome immigrant populations is being questioned.</p>
<p>According to an <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/there-s-going-to-be-friction-two-thirds-of-canadians-say-immigration-target-is-too/article_7740ecbd-0aed-5d36-b5da-b67bda4a13c5.html">Abacus poll published on Nov. 29</a>, more than 67 per cent of the population believes that there will be tensions between communities, principally because of the federal government’s immigration threshold, which is considered excessive. The government is still aiming to welcome <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-immigration-500000-2025-1.6636661">more than 500,000 immigrants a year over the next few years</a>. On the other hand, Ottawa rejected the Century Initiative, led by a former McKinsey executive, which aimed to <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canada-immigration-public-opinion/">increase Canada’s population to 100 million by 2100</a>. </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canada-diversity-poll">another poll</a>, by Leger-Postmedia, more than 78 per cent of Canadians express concern about the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the country. With respect to pro-Palestine demonstrations, more than three-quarters of those polled believe that the government should expel non-citizens who are guilty of hate speech or who have demonstrated support for Hamas from the country. </p>
<p>These figures show a major shift in public opinion about the value of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is no longer seen simply as making citizens aware of the richness of the country’s ethnocultural and religious diversity. It is also seen as supporting the various communities that live in, or want to immigrate to Canada. <a href="https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canada-diversity-poll">According to the same survey</a>, more than half say that the Canadian government should do more to ensure that newcomers accept Canadian values, and more than 55 per cent think that Canada’s immigration policy should encourage newcomers to adopt these values, in particular by abandoning any beliefs that are incompatible with Canada.</p>
<h2>An increasingly complex world</h2>
<p>The Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems to have shaken the foundations of multiculturalism. </p>
<p>It is striking to note how a value once considered fundamental — one that in 2020 was supported by more than 92 per cent of the population — can be questioned to this extent just three years later. On the other hand, it is important to remember that hate crimes existed before this conflict and that indicated multiculturalism was not as much of a “Canadian value” as it was believed to be. </p>
<p>Sociologist Edgar Morin maintains that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/095715589700802401?download=true&journalCode=frca">“diversity creates complexity and complexity creates richness</a>.” Of course, Canadian multiculturalism rightly relies upon the richness of diversity, but it’s now being called upon to renew itself in an increasingly complex society and world. </p>
<p>At times, Canadian multiculturalism gives the impression that communities are living side by side, tolerant of ‘the Other,’ without actually co-constructing a society in which everyone belongs. The social situation must not be allowed to deteriorate, because we do not want to live in a state of confrontation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219682/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian J. Y. Bergeron ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The recent conflict between Israel and Hamas has exacerbated hate crimes in Canada and put Canadian multiculturalism to the test.Christian J. Y. Bergeron, Professeur en sociologie de l’éducation, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2173422023-12-10T14:30:49Z2023-12-10T14:30:49ZTechnologies like artificial intelligence are changing our understanding of war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560980/original/file-20231122-23-u5geo5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=76%2C12%2C8410%2C3970&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Technology is changing how wars are fought, but not the reasons for them.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/technologies-like-artificial-intelligence-are-changing-our-understanding-of-war" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Artificial intelligence (AI) is widely regarded as a disruptive technology because it has the potential to fundamentally alter social relationships. AI has affected <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/widm.1385">how people understand the world</a>, <a href="https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs.pdf">the jobs available in the workforce</a> and judgments of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0008125619867910">who merits employment</a> or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2019.1575664">threatens society</a>.</p>
<p>Nowhere is this more apparent than in warfare, which is defined by social and technological processes. Technologies such as <a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/Army-of-None/">autonomous weapon systems (AWS)</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/ca/this-is-how-they-tell-me-the-world-ends-9781635578492/">cyberweapons</a> have the potential to change conflicts and combat forever.</p>
<h2>Justifying warfare</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316104668">Acts of violence committed in war are often framed in virtuous terms</a>, with <a href="https://www.harpercollins.com/products/moral-combat-michael-burleigh">justice and other morality motivations</a> used to legitimate armed conflict.</p>
<p>Yet “<a href="https://iep.utm.edu/justwar/">just wars</a>” require both clear definitions of who is a combatant and clear distinctions between war and peace. When such distinctions are eroded, this leads to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19574-9">total wars</a> — all against all. Boundaries between civilians and soldiers and military and domestic infrastructure are blurred, making everyone and everything a legitimate target. We might believe that total wars are a thing of the past, involving <a href="https://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/The-Mongol-Art-of-War-Kindle/p/5046">Mongolian hordes</a> or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139052528">trench warfare</a>, but <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/MTS.2023.3299315">recent discussions</a> of technology’s impact on warfare have breathed new life into the concept.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/B21mUKbH8K3","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<h2>New battlefields, old conflicts</h2>
<p>Information has always been key to the successful development and implementation of military strategy and battlefield tactics, with <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA367662">information warfare</a> predating the information age. Knowing the position and temperament of adversaries plays a decisive role in <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.ca/books/600221/the-art-of-war-by-sun-tzu-translated-and-introduced-by-peter-harris/9781101908006">predicting and manipulating their attitudes and behaviour</a>.</p>
<p>In our information age, we might assume that technological superiority in collecting and aggregating data will translate into significant changes in the balance of power. This hasn’t always been realized. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-4571(199305)44:4%3C204::AID-ASI3%3E3.0.CO;2-4">To be useful, data must be informative</a>. Patterns might remain obscured in noisy data, might be too novel to be recognized or might be misidentified.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561145/original/file-20231122-15-cg8dn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="an unmanned drone looking like a slim small airplane among clouds" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561145/original/file-20231122-15-cg8dn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561145/original/file-20231122-15-cg8dn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561145/original/file-20231122-15-cg8dn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561145/original/file-20231122-15-cg8dn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561145/original/file-20231122-15-cg8dn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561145/original/file-20231122-15-cg8dn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561145/original/file-20231122-15-cg8dn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A concept futuristic design of an unmanned military reconnaissance drone.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The ongoing Israel-Hamas war provides a clear example. <a href="https://politicstoday.org/israels-mass-surveillance-of-palestinians-is-more-than-an-obsession/">Palestinians are some of the most surveilled people in the world</a>, with Israel pioneering and using <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/israel-opt-israeli-authorities-are-using-facial-recognition-technology-to-entrench-apartheid/">facial recognition technology</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010620956796">drone surveillance</a>. This surveillance was justified on the grounds that more military intelligence would reduce the possibility of an attack. </p>
<p>Hamas’s ability to inflict such a vicious, widespread co-ordinated attack on Oct. 7, 2023 cannot be attributed to superior technology. The Israeli army had more resources. Instead, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199341733.001.0001">failures of human intelligence</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/10/analysis-is-hamas-a-more-sophisticated-force-than-israel-imagined">successful concealment</a> provide the best explanation. </p>
<p>Hamas’s use of drone technology also provided a decisive advantage. Despite Israel’s earlier <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-says-it-knocked-out-hamas-drone-program/">destruction of the Hamas drone program</a>, <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2023/11/how-hamas-innovated-with-drones-to-operate-like-an-army/">the militant group’s use of drones in the October attack</a> was a critical determinant of its success. This demonstrates the resiliency of armed forces that use relatively inexpensive technologies.</p>
<h2>War without fighters</h2>
<p>Cyberattacks are another emerging tool in the arsenal. As non-lethal weapons, <a href="https://www.google.ca/books/edition/Behold_a_Pale_Farce/SwcCBAAAQBAJ">their threat and role in combat</a> continues to be a matter of debate: cyberattacks lead to disrupted or defaced websites, financial loss and compromised information. They rarely directly affect the physical world.</p>
<p>One notable exception is an attack <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html">attributed to the U.S. and Israel</a> known as <a href="https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/">the Stuxnet virus</a>. It successfully damaged Iran’s nuclear centrifuge equipment, setting the program back for years.</p>
<p>In contrast to traditional weapons, cyberweapons might best be seen as <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26481911">force multipliers</a>. Battlefields have always relied on communication between commanders and units. Disrupting communication during a critical military operation can reduce the offensive and defensive capabilities of an adversary. However, as more automated weapons systems are adopted, these weapons could be turned against their own armies using cyberattacks.</p>
<p>The most significant concern is that these weapons will be used to attack <a href="https://www.resecurity.com/blog/article/ransomware-attacks-against-the-energy-sector-on-the-rise-nuclear-and-oil-gas-are-major-targets-2024">critical infrastructure</a>, the way <a href="https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sandworm-disrupts-power-ukraine-operational-technology">Russia disrupted the power grid in winter during its war on Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Cyberspace itself is difficult for many to understand. The indirect relationship between action and consequences and the limited realism of data often results in organizations discounting the frequency and severity of these attacks. By <a href="https://www.skyboxsecurity.com/resources/report/cybersecurity-risk-underestimated-operational-technology-organizations/">overestimating their ability to effectively cope with such attacks</a>, they create vulnerabilities for themselves and the societies that they supply with their goods and services.</p>
<p>Like traditional weapons, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyx001">the precision of cyberweapons is key</a>. In the case of Stuxnet, <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/stuxnet-infections-spread-to-115-countries/">the virus was not contained and it infected other computers</a>. Other malware can similarly have a widespread effect. </p>
<p>The 2009 Conficker virus <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/opinion/sunday/conficker-worm-ukraine.html">nearly consumed the internet</a> with its ability to autonomously adapt and replicate within systems. If such an approach were weaponized, such a virus could disrupt commerce, power grids and transportation systems. </p>
<h2>Wars of words</h2>
<p>Alone, AI-based weapons will <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00431">not change the nature of warfare</a>. They might nevertheless change how we <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/MTS.2023.3299315">perceive and describe conflicts</a>.</p>
<p>In the U.S., cyber operations have been described as “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/NewsStories/Article/Article/1847823/persistent-engagement-partnerships-top-cybercoms-priorities/">persistent engagements</a>,” framing attacks as an unrelenting conflict. In China, “<a href="https://www.iwp.edu/books/unrestricted-warfare/">unrestricted warfare</a>” suggests that all methods and targets are permissible. </p>
<p>Both <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/cash-strapped-north-korea-believed-to-be-stepping-up-cyberthefts-against-the-south">North Korea’s estimated 1.5 million cyberattacks on South Korea</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-government-faces-5-million-cyber-attacks-daily-official">attacks on Taiwan attributed to China</a>, fit this pattern. </p>
<p>The limited capabilities of cyberattacks are less concerning than physical attacks. China’s increased use of drones has <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3147997/regional-stability-risk-chinas-growing-use-military-drones">stoked tensions with neighbours, including Japan</a>. Previous drone incursions have been referred to as “<a href="https://dronecenter.bard.edu/act-war-drones-testing-china-japan-relations/">acts of war</a>,” with Taiwan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-shoots-down-unidentified-drone-kinmen-2022-09-01/">shooting one down last year</a>. A rogue drone — or swarm — could unintentionally act as a catalyst for conflict in unstable geopolitical regions.</p>
<p>Yet, while state and non-state entities might act in belligerent manner or even <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/china-us-canada-taiwan-strait-1.6865130">take aggressive postures</a>, these actions are often simply gambits. Despite the widely publicized <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65169855">Chinese surveillance balloon that flew over Canada and the U.S.</a> last year, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-17/biden-and-xi-have-far-to-go-if-they-want-to-lift-cold-war-clouds">the recent meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and China’s Xi Jinping</a> illustrates that words don’t always translate into actions. And despite its threatening posturing, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/10/china-taiwan-invasion-reunification-risk/">China doesn’t yet have the capacity to invade Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>Wars conducted solely or primarily with AI-enabled technologies will not likely happen in the near future. Humans will remain the primary combatants — and victims — of armed conflict.</p>
<p>While the rationales for wars will remain the same, we must consider how autonomous weapons and cyberweapons will change how conflicts will be perceived and fought. If they’re fought beyond the abilities of meaningful human control, we are placing our fates in the hands of machines.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217342/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jordan Richard Schoenherr received funding from Army Research Laboratories during his time as a Visiting Scholar at the Army Cyber Institute / Behavioral Science and Leadership Department at the US Military Academy (West Point). He has worked as a consultant for the DGMPRA, Department of National Defence on the impact of stress on ethical decision-making.</span></em></p>Advances in technology are deployed in war, changing the ways that wars are both fought and communicated.Jordan Richard Schoenherr, Assistant Professor, Psychology, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162052023-11-27T14:01:41Z2023-11-27T14:01:41ZRwanda’s troops in Mozambique have done well to protect civilians – the factors at play<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Rwanda">Rwanda</a>’s involvement in <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ipi-pub-ppp-rwanda.pdf#page=1">peacekeeping operations</a> for the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) has increased since 2004. </p>
<p>The relatively small east African nation is Africa’s most active troop-contributing country and the fourth most active worldwide. It has <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors">nearly 6,000 soldiers and police</a> committed to UN peacekeeping missions.</p>
<p>In recent years, however, Rwanda has deployed its army independently of the UN or AU. In 2020, it sent 1,000 troops to fight anti-government rebels in the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic-rwanda/b191-rwandas-growing-role-central-african-republic">Central African Republic</a>. A year later, it sent soldiers to deal with jihadist militants in northern Mozambique, and now has <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/03/08/military-intervention-has-not-stopped-mozambique-jihadist-conflict">2,500 troops</a> there. </p>
<p>These two missions aim to confront and eliminate armed enemies of the host state. The operations – which aren’t under the UN and AU protocols – raise questions about the conduct of Rwanda’s army and its counterinsurgency doctrine. Specifically when it comes to avoiding civilian casualties. </p>
<p>Traditional peacekeeping missions have a <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/improving-peacekeeping-and-civilian-protection/">disappointing record</a> on protecting innocent bystanders. UN and AU forces have been <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/united-nations-peacekeeping-forces-expelled-mali-drc-somalia-africa-by-adekeye-adebajo-2023-10">criticised</a> for being risk averse and under-resourced in preventing crimes and violence against civilians. </p>
<p>In 2015, Rwanda was one of several countries arguing that the UN should do more to defend civilians in conflict. It sponsored a set of recommendations eventually codified as the <a href="https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/2942/2018_kigali_principles.pdf">Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians</a>. They identified various shortfalls that handicap many peacekeeping missions. </p>
<p>I’m a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=ncVlZRkAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">conflict researcher</a> who has examined Rwanda’s military intervention in Mozambique. In a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400?src=">paper</a>, I used the deployment to evaluate the Rwandan army’s commitment to protecting civilians.</p>
<p>The Mozambique mission is independent of the UN and AU. Therefore, the Rwandan military is less subject to the monitoring that guards against excessive force and abusive practices. As an offensive counterterrorism operation, the mission is also potentially more aggressive and violent than peacekeeping. </p>
<p>Conventional wisdom would predict that an <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/death-solves-all-problems-the-authoritarian-counterinsurgency-toolkit/">authoritarian government</a> like Rwanda’s would be heavy-handed in putting down an insurrection. But my findings suggest that’s not so in Mozambique.</p>
<p>The Mozambique campaign is unlike the disaster across Rwanda’s border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There, Rwanda’s army stands <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/rwanda-backing-m23-rebels-in-drc-un-experts">accused</a> of backing the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23 rebels</a> who have committed war crimes and accelerated a humanitarian crisis.</p>
<h2>The Mozambique mission</h2>
<p>The province of Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique had been struggling with a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection-mozambiques-cabo-delgado">vicious jihadist insurgency</a> since <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271">2017</a>. Efforts by Mozambique’s security forces and foreign mercenaries failed to stop decapitations, village burnings and attacks on government forces and infrastructure. </p>
<p>When militants threatened <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tGB6c-gn5Fw&themeRefresh=1">oil and gas development projects</a> that once promised to lift Mozambique out of poverty, President <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_mozambique-rwanda-armies-retake-key-jihadist-held-town/6209325.html">Felipe Nyusi turned to Rwanda for help in 2021</a>. The Rwandan Defence Forces began to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2022.2132046">attack</a> Islamic State-aligned militants. </p>
<p>Yet, the Rwandan army has balanced the pursuit of insurgents and the protection of the population. Operations to annihilate insurgents often kill and injure civilians as well. Strategies that focus narrowly on protecting civilians, on the other hand, tend to make <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698249.2022.1995680">counterinsurgent forces gun shy</a>. </p>
<h2>What worked</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400?src=">My study</a> suggests how Rwanda has been able to hold down civilian casualties while battling insurgents. The Rwandan army was in Mozambique nearly a year before inflicting its first recorded <a href="https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-27-june-3-july-2022">civilian fatality</a> – a single curfew breaker in a tense recovered town.</p>
<p>First, Rwandan troops actively patrol and interact with the community to collect information about the local people and the insurgents who threaten them. Rwandan soldiers benefit from their knowledge of Swahili, which enables them to communicate directly with the locals. It helps them tell friend from foe.</p>
<p>The second factor is restraint: a more disciplined use of firepower. As the experience of western armies in Iraq and <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/146/1/44/27133/Limiting-Civilian-Casualties-as-Part-of-a-Winning">Afghanistan</a> has shown, maintaining restraint under the persistent threat of ambush isn’t easy. It comes with some risk too. </p>
<p>Other conditions likely contributed to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/rwandas-military-intervention-in-mozambique-raises-eyebrows/a-58957275">Rwanda’s early success</a> in Mozambique. The insurgents don’t use suicide tactics, for instance. And at least <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/08/insurgents-strike-cabo-delgado-with-remote-controlled-ieds/">until recently</a> they have lacked sophisticated explosives. </p>
<p>Also, portions of the affected area in Cabo Delgado were largely abandoned when the Rwandans arrived. This helped in sorting insurgents from innocents. </p>
<p>Still, these considerations shouldn’t discount the Rwandan army’s achievements. Its record in the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic-rwanda/b191-rwandas-growing-role-central-african-republic">Central African Republic</a> is also consistent with its conduct in Mozambique. There as well, Rwandan forces have attained impressive battlefield results without inflicting substantial civilian harm. </p>
<h2>Rwanda in DRC</h2>
<p>The story is different in the DRC. <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/central-africa%E2%80%99s-strategic-balance-crumbling-206022">A case has been made</a> that Rwanda’s destabilising activities there are motivated by <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">strategic interests</a> that don’t apply in Mozambique or the Central African Republic. </p>
<p>This doesn’t explain the mentality of rank-and-file soldiers, though. The army’s record in Mozambique and the DRC suggests instead that Rwandan battlefield behaviour may be conditioned by cognitive framing and service culture. </p>
<p>Studies of the way foreign armies approach missions in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon have found that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306393">culture and framing</a> often shape how troops perceive their environment, interpret threats and understand their role.</p>
<p>Fighting in eastern DRC may be perceived differently by Rwandan soldiers because it’s so intimately tied to the traumas of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994">1994 genocide</a>. They may worry about spillover violence affecting stability in Rwanda, or about ethnic discord tearing the army itself apart. </p>
<p><a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/46/4/48/111176/Soldiers-Dilemma-Foreign-Military-Training-and">Armed forces elsewhere</a> have demonstrated a tendency to prize their own cohesion above human rights concerns in high-stress scenarios.</p>
<h2>The civilian factor</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400?src=">My research</a> suggests the Rwandan army’s actions in Mozambique have been consistent with the core promises of the Kigali Principles. </p>
<p>In response to <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/winning-peace-mozambiques-embattled-north">persistent militant raids</a>, Rwandan troops in Cabo Delgado have conducted pursuits across district boundaries. Troops have gone further afield at Maputo’s request. </p>
<p>The presence of Rwanda’s soldiers has also helped to curb the mistreatment of local inhabitants by Mozambique’s police and armed forces. These forces have a history of <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad687-amid-increasing-insecurity-mozambicans-fault-police-for-corruption-lack-of-professionalism/">corruption</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/04/mozambique-security-forces-abusing-suspected-insurgents">abuse</a>. </p>
<p>The Islamist insurgency in Mozambique, however, has yet to be defeated. A long-term solution will require more fundamental political and social measures, as well as reform of Mozambique’s security services. </p>
<p>Rwandan army operations have demonstrated what a competent African force can do when properly resourced and committed to the mission. It also suggests that soldiers are more effective when empowered to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDsIPgJGKQU">exercise discretion</a> in applying force.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ralph Shield does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rwandan forces have been able to keep civilian casualties low in Cabo Delgado despite carrying out a counterterrorism operation.Ralph Shield, Conflict researcher, US Naval War CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2170672023-11-26T08:40:39Z2023-11-26T08:40:39ZClimate adaptation funds are not reaching frontline communities: what needs to be done about it<p>Communities around the world face <a href="https://public.wmo.int/en/our-mandate/climate/wmo-statement-state-of-global-climate/Africa-2022">increasingly severe</a> and <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/facts-about-climate-change-in-africa/">frequent impacts</a> from climate change. They are on the “frontlines” of droughts, flooding, desertification and sea level rise. </p>
<p>International climate finance is supposed to help. In the 2015 Paris Agreement, the world’s wealthiest countries pledged <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-glasgow-climate-pact/cop26-outcomes-finance-for-climate-adaptation#Developed-countries-have-pledged-USD-100-billion-a">US$50 billion annually</a> to support climate adaptation among those “particularly vulnerable” to climate change. Climate adaptation is the adjustments humans make to reduce exposure to climate risk. </p>
<p>Eight years later, it is clear that this money is failing to reach vulnerable “frontline communities”, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Recently, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, South Sudan and Niger have been among the <a href="https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/2021-01/cri-2021_table_10_most_affected_countries_in_2019.jpg">top ten most affected countries</a>.</p>
<p>The host country of the upcoming annual United Nations climate negotiations (COP28), the United Arab Emirates, has announced it is focused on “<a href="https://www.cop28.com/en/news/2023/10/cop28-presidency-co-hosts-global-dialogue-in-abu-dhabi-to-focus-on-accelerating-the-energy">fixing climate finance</a>”. </p>
<p>I am a researcher who has studied international climate finance for seven years, both at the annual COPs and through research in <a href="https://www.sei.org/about-sei/press-room/finance-for-climate-adaptation-fails-reach-most-vulnerable/">Madagascar</a>, Mauritius and <a href="https://www.sei.org/projects/equity-in-adaptation-finance/">Namibia</a>. My work explores how to make climate finance more equitable and accessible for vulnerable communities.</p>
<p>It’s my view that the countries that contribute the bulk of the funding for climate adaptation can ensure more money reaches those who need it most. To do that they must first understand why financing isn’t reaching frontline communities. Otherwise money will continue to fall well short of need.</p>
<h2>Why funding isn’t reaching vulnerable communities</h2>
<p>The clearest reason why adaptation finance does not reach these communities is that there is simply not enough of it. Wealthy countries have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/sep/20/rich-countries-not-providing-poor-with-pledged-climate-finance-analysis-says">consistently failed</a> to deliver on the US$50 billion commitment. Every year the gap between needs and support grows. The latest <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2023">Adaptation Gap Report</a> estimates that international adaptation finance is 10-18 times below need.</p>
<p>Beyond this shortfall, the current structure of climate finance prevents frontline communities from accessing support. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378022000139">Studies show</a> that the poorest and most vulnerable countries receive less than their fair share of adaptation finance. Support for sub-Saharan African countries is <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-ways-in-which-finance-for-climate-adaptation-in-africa-falls-short-169280">as little as US$5 per person</a> per year. </p>
<p>Two key barriers explain this disconnect. The first is the overlap of climate vulnerability with conflict and political instability. <a href="https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/rain_turns_to_dust_climate_change_conflict.pdf#page=12">Twelve of the 20 countries</a> most vulnerable to climate change are also affected by conflict. Vulnerable countries are also prone to political turmoil, frequent changes in government, and high levels of government corruption.</p>
<p>UN climate funds and other major funders like the World Bank see these countries as less “ready” for adaptation projects. <a href="https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/169654">My research</a> has also found that wealthy countries worry their taxpayers’ money will be lost to corruption.</p>
<p>The second barrier is the finance application process. Proposals for UN climate funds, such as the <a href="https://www.wri.org/research/improving-access-green-climate-fund-how-fund-can-better-support-developing-country">Green Climate Fund</a>, can number hundreds of pages. Application requirements differ from fund to fund. It can take years to develop a proposal and to receive the money.</p>
<h2>Reaching frontline communities</h2>
<p>Even when vulnerable countries receive international support, further barriers can prevent it from reaching frontline communities. Currently, only <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-three-major-gaps-in-climate-adaptation-finance-for-developing-countries/">17% of adaptation finance has reached local levels</a>. My research in <a href="https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/169654">Madagascar and Mauritius</a> found both administrative and political barriers.</p>
<p>National governments consume resources administering grants, often hiring expensive foreign consultants to plan, implement and monitor projects. These costs eat into the money intended for local communities. The focus on large, individual projects tends to concentrate funding in one area, limiting how far benefits can reach.</p>
<p>Funds also require clear evidence of success. Governments might invest in projects they know will succeed rather than take innovative approaches or choose riskier areas. </p>
<p>National governments also make decisions for political reasons. They tend to distribute resources – including money for adaptation – based on what will help them stay in power. They are more likely to fund political supporters than opponents. Communities are often vulnerable precisely because they are politically marginalised.</p>
<p>Finally, studies show that adaptation finance, like development funding, can be lost to corruption and mismanagement. Wealthy and powerful elites can <a href="https://theecologist.org/2021/jan/22/adaptation-funds-increase-climate-vulnerability">“capture” the benefits</a> of internationally financed projects, such as a <a href="https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000050">disproportionate share of rice seeds</a> for a project to build the resilience of agriculture in Madagascar.</p>
<h2>How to fix it</h2>
<p>It is not too late to change how adaptation finance flows to ensure more of it reaches vulnerable communities. The first step is to increase funding for adaptation. Support for adaptation <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2023">actually declined in 2021</a>, the most recent year for which we have data. Wealthy countries must meet the commitments they made in the Paris Agreement.</p>
<p>The second step is for UN funds, the World Bank and wealthy countries to dedicate a greater proportion of funding to the most vulnerable countries. They must do so regardless of whether these countries are affected by conflict, instability and corruption.</p>
<p>For UN funds this can be accomplished by simplifying and standardising application procedures. Funds can also dedicate more resources to help countries prepare proposals. They should focus less on demanding clear results and more on supporting adaptation that aligns with national and local priorities.</p>
<p>Wealthy countries that contribute to climate funds need to give up some power over the money. They will have to accept imperfect governance and that some funding will be lost to mismanagement and corruption. They have tolerated such trade-offs before, such as during the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/07/corruption-covid-19-how-to-fight-back/">COVID pandemic</a>, when urgency outweighed concerns over waste and fraud.</p>
<p>But funders should also push for increased transparency around projects. They can encourage scrutiny by local civil society groups, for example, by publishing project information in local languages.</p>
<p>The third step is to experiment. For example, the Green Climate Fund is currently experimenting with <a href="https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp024">“decentralised” adaptation finance</a> in Namibia. Rather than a single large project, the Namibian government broke the funds into 31 small grants for community-based organisations. Together with the University of Namibia, we are <a href="https://www.sei.org/projects/equity-in-adaptation-finance/">examining whether and how</a> this approach helps more funding reach frontline communities. Early results are encouraging.</p>
<p>Fixing climate finance is not simple, but it is urgent. Failing to do so means leaving the most vulnerable alone to face the increasing threats of climate change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katherine Browne has received funding from the US Department of Education (Fulbright-Hayes Doctoral Dissertation Abroad fellowship), US State Department (Fulbright Fellowship), the University of Michigan, and Swedish Research Council for Sustainable Development (FORMAS).</span></em></p>Getting climate funds to frontline communities may require rich countries and the UN easing control over how the money is spent.Katherine Browne, Research Fellow, Stockholm Environment InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2173212023-11-09T13:49:51Z2023-11-09T13:49:51ZWhat is the rule of proportionality, and is it being observed in the Israeli siege of Gaza?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558445/original/file-20231108-19-qs1pf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C50%2C4224%2C2771&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">When does bombing become disproportionate? </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-kid-walks-amid-debris-of-destroyed-buildings-news-photo/452897524?adppopup=true">Onur Coban/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>More than <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-hamas-war-palestinians-photo-gallery-0d3960dc03ddd8b4fe3d81111cf177a0">a month after</a> Hamas fighters killed 1,400 Israelis in a shock assault, bombs continue to fall on the Gaza Strip in reprisal Israeli attacks.</em></p>
<p><em>The aerial campaign has left a heavy death toll – the health authority in the Hamas-run enclave has put the total number of Palestinians killed <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/06/middleeast/gaza-10k-deaths-intl/index.html">in excess of 10,000</a> – leading to questions over whether the <a href="https://verdict.justia.com/2023/10/31/proportionality-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict">response by Israel has been proportionate</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>“Proportionality” has a place in what is described as the “laws of war.” The Conversation turned to <a href="https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/goldman/bio">Robert Goldman</a>, an expert on international humanitarian law at American University Washington College of Law, for guidance on some of the issues.</em></p>
<h2>What are the ‘laws of war’?</h2>
<p>The laws of war, also known as international humanitarian law (IHL), consist of the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm">four 1949 Geneva Conventions</a>, their two Additional Protocols of 1977, the <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/hague-conventions">Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907</a>, as well as certain weapons conventions. It also includes what is known as “<a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law">customary law</a>” – rules that are accepted by states are legally binding, but are not necessarily part of any formal treaty.</p>
<p>Simply put, these instruments seek to spare civilians and others who are no longer active combatants from the effects of hostilities by placing restrictions and prohibitions on the conduct of warfare.</p>
<p>It is important to understand that modern IHL is not concerned with the reasons for, or the legality of, going to war. Rather, that is governed by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text">United Nations Charter</a> and member states’ own practice.</p>
<p>It is also important to note that violations of the laws of war are <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/03/22/russia-putin-war-crimes-icc-ukraine">notoriously hard to prosecute</a> and can be frustrated by lack of cooperation by the parties involved. </p>
<h2>Can civilian structures ever be lawfully attacked?</h2>
<p>Under IHL, civilian objects – such as homes, apartment blocks, hospitals and schools – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/when-are-attacks-civilian-infrastructure-war-crimes-2022-12-16/">cannot be directly attacked</a>. This is because they, unlike munitions factories and command and control centers, do not effectively contribute to military action.</p>
<p>There is a caveat, however. If enemy forces take up positions in these civilian structures, then they become military objectives and can be lawfully bombed if the raid would yield the attacking party a definite military advantage.</p>
<p>That said, the stipulation does not allow unlimited license to attack such structures. The civilians located in those buildings are not lawful targets. As such, they retain the benefits of what is known as “<a href="https://lieber.westpoint.edu/proportionality-international-humanitarian-law-principle-rule/">the rule of proportionality</a>” as it relates to collateral civilian casualties – that is, deaths that are not intended by the attacking party but nonetheless result from their actions.</p>
<h2>What exactly is the rule of proportionality?</h2>
<p>The rule of proportionality applies to all armed conflicts as part of <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law">customary IHL</a>.</p>
<p>The proportionality rule operates as a general restraint on the conduct of parties engaged in hostilities and applies to attacks against lawful military targets located in the vicinity of civilians and civilian structures. It prohibits an attack that may be expected to cause incidental death or injury to civilians or the destruction of civilian objects that would be excessive – or disproportionate – in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.</p>
<p>As such, the rule does not apply to enemy combatants or civilians who are directly participating in hostilities.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man kneels by a row of candles. He is behind a blue and white Israeli flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558490/original/file-20231108-25-muyric.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558490/original/file-20231108-25-muyric.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558490/original/file-20231108-25-muyric.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558490/original/file-20231108-25-muyric.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558490/original/file-20231108-25-muyric.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558490/original/file-20231108-25-muyric.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558490/original/file-20231108-25-muyric.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Hamas attack of Oct. 7 left Israelis mourning 1,400 dead.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protesters-led-by-bereaved-families-and-families-of-news-photo/1780911637?adppopup=true">Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images.</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The proportionality rule requires those who plan a military operation to undertake in good faith a pre-attack analysis to determine the effects of the attack on civilians and civilian objects. </p>
<p>Such a determination requires a balancing of probabilities that take in foreseeable collateral civilian casualties and the relative importance of a particular military target. This is a relational concept – in other words, it can’t be quantified by stating any fixed number of civilians dead or injured for any one attack.</p>
<p>Given the uncertainties of warfare, the actual number of civilian casualties may be greater or less than what the pre-attack analysis predicted. So too might the military advantage gained.</p>
<p>As such, the lawfulness of such an attack must be based on an honest appreciation of the facts and circumstances known to military planners at the time, and not in hindsight.</p>
<p>In addition, planners of a particular attack must choose a weapon that ideally will avoid or minimize likely civilian collateral damage. </p>
<p>Importantly, planners of any attack must suspend or cancel the operation if it becomes apparent that the target selected is not a military objective, or if the attack will result in disproportionate collateral damage.</p>
<p>As such, the rule or proportionality requires the attacking party to place high priority on the timely collection and evaluation of target intelligence.</p>
<h2>Is the rule of proportionality being observed in Gaza?</h2>
<p>In concrete terms, the rule of proportionality – and its associated precautionary measures – require that the Israeli military undertake, in good faith, a pre-attack analysis of likely civilian casualties ensuing from each and every aerial attack in Gaza. That analysis should be based on timely, reliable and constantly updated target intelligence.</p>
<p>Israeli military spokesmen <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XUR73tsck9E">have stated</a> repeatedly that they are <a href="https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-news-hamas-war-10-13-23/h_d5b0c4f36adfd60ae650ee9f9caf1b7b">taking all feasible measures</a> to avoid excessive collateral damage in their bombing campaign.</p>
<p>But given the alarming civilian death toll in Gaza, I would submit that the burden has now shifted to the Israeli military to be more forthcoming in explaining to the public its target selection criteria. This is especially needed in those attacks that have caused <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/least-500-victims-israeli-air-strike-hospital-gaza-health-ministry-2023-10-17">extensive civilian deaths</a>.</p>
<p>For the same reason, I believe the onus is now on the Israeli military to explain what precautionary measures it has taken to avoid or minimize collateral damage, particularly given recent reports that it has <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israeli-air-force-photos-fighter-aircraft-armed-unguided-weapons-2023-10">used so-called “dumb bombs</a>” instead of precision-guided munitions in its campaign.</p>
<p><em>Part of this article appeared in an <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-laws-of-war-apply-to-the-conflict-between-israel-and-hamas-215493">earlier article</a> published by The Conversation on Oct. 15, 2023.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217321/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Goldman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An expert on the laws of war argues that the burden is now on Israel to show that the heavy death toll in Gaza is proportionate to the military advantage gained.Robert Goldman, Professor of Law, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163212023-10-27T14:27:50Z2023-10-27T14:27:50ZHow to redesign social media algorithms to bridge divides<p>Social media platforms have been implicated in conflicts of all scales, from <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2023/09/jarell-jackson-shahjahan-mccaskill-killed-philadelphia-social-media/674760/">urban gun violence</a> to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/01/17/jan6-committee-report-social-media/">storming of the US Capitol building</a> on January 6 and <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/350/68/PDF/N1635068.pdf?OpenElement">civil war in South Sudan</a>. Scientifically, it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/misinformation-why-it-may-not-necessarily-lead-to-bad-behaviour-199123">difficult to tell</a> how much social media can be blamed for one-off incidents. </p>
<p>But in much the way that climate change increases the risk of extreme weather, evidence suggests that current algorithms (which mostly <a href="https://medium.com/understanding-recommenders/how-platform-recommenders-work-15e260d9a15a">optimise for engagement</a>) raise the political “temperature” by disproportionately surfacing inflammatory content. This <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.16941">may make people angrier</a>, increasing the risk that social differences <a href="https://knightcolumbia.org/content/the-algorithmic-management-of-polarization-and-violence-on-social-media">escalate to violence</a>.</p>
<p>But what if we redesigned social media to bridge divides? “<a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/bridging-based-ranking">Bridging-based ranking</a>” is an alternative kind of algorithm for ranking content in social media feeds that explicitly aims to build mutual understanding and trust across differing perspectives.</p>
<p>The core logic of bridging-based ranking has already been used on <a href="https://bridging.systems/facebook-papers/">Facebook</a> and <a href="https://communitynotes.twitter.com/guide/en/about/introduction">X</a> (formerly known as Twitter), albeit not in the main feed. It is also used in <a href="https://pol.is/home">Polis</a>, an online platform for collecting public input, used by several governments to inform policymaking on polarised topics. </p>
<p>There are many open questions, but evidence from existing uses of bridging-based ranking suggests that changes to algorithms may <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.13912">reduce partisan animosity</a> and <a href="https://bridging.systems/facebook-papers/">improve the quality and inclusiveness</a> of online interactions.</p>
<p>People are increasingly looking for alternative algorithms. Regulators <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/25/quiet-qutting-ai/">in the EU</a> and new platforms <a href="https://blueskyweb.xyz/blog/3-30-2023-algorithmic-choice">such as Bluesky</a> are giving users choice regarding which algorithm determines what they see, and recent <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/does-social-media-polarize-voters-unprecedented-experiments-facebook-users-reveal">large-scale experiments on Facebook</a> have tested different options.</p>
<p>If we care about social cohesion, then during this period of “shopping around” we need to seriously consider alternatives such as bridging.</p>
<h2>How it works</h2>
<p>Current <a href="https://medium.com/understanding-recommenders/how-platform-recommenders-work-15e260d9a15a">engagement-based algorithms</a> make predictions about which posts are most likely to generate clicks, likes, shares or views – and use these predictions to rank the most engaging content at the top of your feed. This tends to amplify the most polarising voices, because divisive perspectives are very engaging.</p>
<p><a href="https://bridging.systems/">Bridging-based ranking</a> uses a different set of signals to determine which content gets ranked highly. One approach is to increase the rank of content that receives positive feedback from people who normally disagree. This creates an incentive for content producers to be mindful of how their content will land with “the other side”.</p>
<p>Among the <a href="https://bridging.systems/facebook-papers/">internal Facebook documents</a> leaked by whistleblower Frances Haugen in 2021, there is evidence that Facebook tested this approach for ranking comments. </p>
<p>Comments with positive engagement from diverse audiences were found to be of higher quality, and “much less likely” to be reported for bullying, hate or inciting violence. A similar strategy is used in <a href="https://communitynotes.twitter.com/guide/en/about/introduction">Community Notes</a>, a crowd-sourced fact checking feature on X, to identify notes that are helpful to people on both sides of politics.</p>
<p>This pattern of “diverse positive feedback” is the most widely implemented approach to bridging. Others include <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.13912">lowering the ranking</a> of content that promotes partisan violence, or using surveys to shape algorithms so that they increase the ranking of content according to <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/platforms-engagement-research-meta/">how it makes users feel in the long term</a>, rather than the short term.</p>
<p>Conflict is an important part of society, and in many cases, a key driver of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/586859">political and social change</a>. The goal of bridging is not to eliminate conflict or disagreement, but to promote constructive forms of conflict.</p>
<p>This is known as <a href="https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation">conflict transformation</a>. Professional mediators, facilitators and “peacebuilders”, who work with opposing groups, have a detailed understanding of <a href="https://knightcolumbia.org/content/the-algorithmic-management-of-polarization-and-violence-on-social-media">how conflicts escalate</a>. They also know how to structure communication between opposing groups in ways that build mutual understanding and trust.</p>
<p>Research on bridging-based ranking can draw on this, taking insights from conflict management in the physical world and <a href="https://scripties.uba.uva.nl/search?id=record_24357">translating</a> them <a href="https://howtobuildup.medium.com/archetypes-of-polarization-on-social-media-d56d4374fb25">into digital systems</a>. </p>
<p>For example, facilitating contact between people from rival groups in “opt in”, non-threatening settings <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2011.03.001">can reduce prejudice</a>, and we <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2311627120">can</a> <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-023-01655-0">design</a> social platforms to create these conditions online.</p>
<h2>Why should big tech adopt this?</h2>
<p>Firms such as Meta have built their fortune on the “attention economy” and content which promotes short-term engagement, and hence revenue.</p>
<p>We simply don’t yet know the extent to which the goals of bridging and engagement are in tension. If you talk to people who work at social media platforms, they will tell you that when well-intended changes to the algorithm are tested, user engagement sometimes drops initially, but then slowly rebounds over time, ultimately ending up with more engagement.</p>
<p>The problem is, platforms normally get cold feet and cancel experiments before they can observe such long-term benefits. Evidence we <em>do</em> have from <a href="https://bridging.systems/facebook-papers/">leaked Facebook papers</a> suggests that incorporating bridging <a href="https://youtu.be/ePh_DVi3dMM">improves the user experience</a>.</p>
<p>Bridging-based ranking might also have benefits beyond engagement. By reducing <a href="https://lukethorburn.com/files/BridgingBasedRanking-PluralitySpringSymposium.pdf#page=13">toxicity</a> and content that <a href="https://bridging.systems/facebook-papers/">violates community guidelines</a>, it would likely reduce the need for costly content moderation.</p>
<p>Demonstrating a willingness to make their algorithms less divisive would also build goodwill among regulators, reducing the risk of reputational and legal damage. For example, Facebook has been heavily criticised for allegedly facilitating incitements to violence in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-46105934">Myanmar</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/07/sri-lanka-blocks-social-media-as-deadly-violence-continues-buddhist-temple-anti-muslim-riots-kandy">Sri Lanka</a>, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/dec/14/meta-faces-lawsuit-over-facebook-posts-inciting-violence-in-tigray-war">Ethiopia</a>. </p>
<p>It has subsequently faced lawsuits from victims and communities, who have sought <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/dec/06/rohingya-sue-facebook-myanmar-genocide-us-uk-legal-action-social-media-violence">up to £150 billion</a> in damages.</p>
<h2>Questions and challenges</h2>
<p>Important questions around bridging-based ranking remain, and we set out many of these in a <a href="https://knightcolumbia.org/content/bridging-systems">recent paper</a> published with the Knight First Amendment Institute, which publishes original scholarship and policy papers relating to the defence of freedoms of speech and the press in the digital age. </p>
<p>Which divides should be bridged? Are there unintended consequences – for example, amplifying mainstream views at the expense of minority viewpoints? How can decisions about the design of mass communication technologies be made democratically?</p>
<p>Bridging is not a panacea. There is only so much algorithmic changes can do to address societal conflict, which is a result of complex factors such as inequality. But by recognising that digital platforms are reshaping society, we have an obligation to guide that process in an ethical, humanistic direction that brings out the best in us.</p>
<p>It falls to both the tech companies that built these systems and an engaged public to create technologies designed for social cohesion. With care, wisdom and democratic oversight, we can foster online communities that reflect our better sides. But we have to make that choice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216321/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aviv Ovadya is affiliated with the the Berkman Klein Center at Harvard, the AI & Democracy Foundation, the newDemocracy Foundation, and the Centre for Governance of AI. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Thorburn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Algorithms have been blamed for dividing society. What if they could support social cohesion instead?Luke Thorburn, PhD Candidate in Safe and Trusted AI, King's College LondonAviv Ovadya, Affiliate at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society, Harvard UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2158622023-10-25T20:26:39Z2023-10-25T20:26:39ZWorkplace tensions: How and when bystanders can make a difference<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554617/original/file-20231018-17-tq49jv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C43%2C5806%2C3835&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The modern workplace is no stranger to political tensions, differing viewpoints and interpersonal conflicts.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In today’s climate of global political tensions and polarization, workplaces are filled with conflicting viewpoints. When employees hold political identities and perspectives that do not align with their co-workers, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/smi.2856">they perceive greater incivility from them</a>, which can result in greater stress and burnout.</p>
<p>Amid all this, bystander intervention has emerged as a key strategy for handling interpersonal conflicts. A <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2017.07.006">substantial body of research</a> advocates for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3692-2">bystander interventions</a> as a means to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206317702219">support targets and curb aggressive workplace behaviours</a> ranging in severity from rudeness to confrontation, threats and, rarely, violence. </p>
<p>However, the effectiveness of bystander intervention remains largely uncertain. This is where our research comes in. <a href="https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2020.0396">Our recent paper</a> dives into this crucial topic by constructing a theoretical model outlining how perpetrators respond to bystander intervention during incidents of interpersonal workplace aggression.</p>
<h2>The bystander’s dilemma</h2>
<p>There are complex emotional dynamics at play when individuals witness workplace aggression. Bystanders often <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000249">experience moral anger toward those who they perceive as perpetrators</a> and empathy for those they perceive as targets. These emotions, in turn, drive bystanders to support targets and penalize perpetrators. </p>
<p>However, there are several things that can reduce the likelihood of bystander action. One problem is that bystanders often lack the courage or skills to act on their convictions, failing to get involved in workplace tensions. </p>
<p>Another reason bystanders avoid intervening is fear of backlash from the perpetrator. And this fear is not without merit; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8998.8.4.247">research has found</a> that perpetrators often retaliate when individuals voice concerns about mistreatment. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of people having a conversation in a conference room" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555670/original/file-20231024-24-mwuadj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555670/original/file-20231024-24-mwuadj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555670/original/file-20231024-24-mwuadj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555670/original/file-20231024-24-mwuadj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555670/original/file-20231024-24-mwuadj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555670/original/file-20231024-24-mwuadj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555670/original/file-20231024-24-mwuadj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">There are complex emotional dynamics at play when individuals witness workplace aggression.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even when bystanders do intervene, their actions can be ineffective, and, in some cases, counterproductive. In our paper, we argue this is because an intervention questions a perpetrator’s sense of goodness, causing a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12378">moral identity threat</a> and making them feel like a “bad person.” </p>
<p>At the same time, it also threatens the perpetrator’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20159278">relational identity</a> by conveying that standard norms for acceptable co-worker behaviour have been violated. This suggests that the perpetrator is also acting as a “bad colleague”. Threatening messages are likely to be met with resistance from the perpetrator, who is then inclined towards self-protective action. </p>
<h2>The perpetrator’s perspective</h2>
<p>Our paper theorizes that, in most cases, a perpetrator’s initial response to an intervention will be defensive and resistant to feedback. This is especially the case when emotions are running high, making it difficult for individuals to consider alternative viewpoints. In such instances, perpetrators are likely to condemn intervening bystanders and may even react to them punitively.</p>
<p>But there is some encouraging news. Specific aspects of the bystander intervention — like who intervenes and how — can help perpetrators see the intervention as an opportunity for growth. For instance, when an intervention offers the perpetrator a chance to feel morally and relationally accepted by the bystander, they are more open to feedback. </p>
<p>In other words, interventions that criticize behaviour without attacking the person allow perpetrators to maintain their belief in their moral character and keep seeing themselves as a good colleague. Under these conditions, they are more likely to adopt a <a href="https://hbr.org/2016/01/what-having-a-growth-mindset-actually-means">growth-oriented mindset</a>. This ability to save face can lead them to consider the intervention as an opportunity to change their behaviour.</p>
<p>The identity of the person intervening also plays a crucial role. People are more willing to accept feedback from those they like and trust. Talking to people in a safe setting and listening to different viewpoints can help perpetrators consider other perspectives. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two women having a serious conversation at a table. One of the women has her back to the camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554616/original/file-20231018-28-8f4jb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554616/original/file-20231018-28-8f4jb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554616/original/file-20231018-28-8f4jb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554616/original/file-20231018-28-8f4jb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554616/original/file-20231018-28-8f4jb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554616/original/file-20231018-28-8f4jb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554616/original/file-20231018-28-8f4jb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Interventions that criticize behaviour without attacking the person allow perpetrators to maintain their belief in their moral character.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Power dynamics at work have a considerable impact on intervention effectiveness. Powerful perpetrators tend to be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/a0012633">less concerned about the social implications of their actions</a> and are more likely to become defensive. In contrast, those with less power tend to be more dependent on others and, as a result, are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01824.x">more attuned to the expectations of their peers</a>. To ensure perpetrators are more receptive to an intervention, bystanders with more power than the perpetrator may need to step in.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, not everyone is equally susceptible to influence from others. While most people want to behave in a morally and socially acceptable manner, a minority of individuals are not concerned by such considerations. It can be hard to convince such individuals to change their mind, unless the bystander has the power to impose change. </p>
<h2>Strategies for effective intervention</h2>
<p>Our research offers several practical recommendations for effective bystander intervention in the workplace:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Carefully consider the best time to intervene. Unless there is a clear risk to the target (and a safe way to meaningfully intervene), it is best to wait until emotions have cooled.</p></li>
<li><p>Intervene in ways that allow the other person to maintain their sense of being a good person and colleague. Focus on addressing their behaviour, not their personal attributes, values or beliefs.</p></li>
<li><p>Recognize that powerful bystanders and those trusted by the other person are more effective in eliciting constructive responses than those with relatively less power.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>Bystanders can play a pivotal role in resolving workplace tensions, with the power to shift the narrative from conflict to resolution. As workplace tensions mirror global and social turmoil, the ability to step in, intervene and shape outcomes becomes ever more valuable, especially for vulnerable populations. </p>
<p>The essence of bystander intervention is not just about stopping a negative act, but also about fostering an environment where respect, growth and collaboration thrive. Every time a bystander is able to intervene effectively, we move a step closer to a workplace where everyone feels valued and heard. We should not underestimate <a href="https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/fixing-a-toxic-work-culture-how-to-encourage-active-bystanders">the ripple effect that one thoughtful, constructive action</a> can have.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215862/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sandy Hershcovis receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brianna Barker Caza, Ivana Vranjes, and Zhanna Lyubykh do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The essence of bystander intervention is not just about stopping a negative act, but also about fostering an environment where respect, growth and collaboration thrive.Sandy Hershcovis, Associate Dean and Future Fund Professor in Equity, Diversity and Inclusion, University of CalgaryBrianna Barker Caza, Associate Professor of Management, University of North Carolina – GreensboroIvana Vranjes, Assistant Professor of Social Psychology, Tilburg UniversityZhanna Lyubykh, Assistant Professor, Beedie School of Business, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2156372023-10-13T23:27:04Z2023-10-13T23:27:04ZWhere does international law fit into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?<p>Thinking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is never easy. Yet the growing number of declarations being made highlights how important it is to consider the factors involved in making an assessment of the situation under the applicable law.</p>
<p>While the solution to any conflict is political, the fact remains that any armed conflict is covered by a specific branch of international law, the law of armed conflict, also known as international humanitarian law. </p>
<p>Although international humanitarian law is sometimes thought to lack effectiveness, we must not lose sight of the fact <a href="https://aoc.media/analyse/2022/03/10/les-conflits-armes-une-zone-de-non-droit/">that its application, however minimal</a>, ensures that civilian lives are spared.</p>
<p>As a professor at Laval University’s Faculty of Law and Scientific Director of the <a href="https://www.irsem.fr/en/index.html">Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École militaire</a> (an interdisciplinary research centre for conflict and peace studies based in Paris), I specialize in international humanitarian law and am a member of the <a href="https://www.crdh.fr/en/">Paris Human Rights Centre</a> (Research Centre for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law).</p>
<h2>Classifying the conflict</h2>
<p>The first step to be taken before making any legal analysis in international humanitarian law is to classify the situation. In the present case, this qualification is open to <a href="https://lieber.westpoint.edu/legal-context-operations-al-aqsa-flood-swords-of-iron/">debate</a>. </p>
<p>There are two possible ways to characterize it. It is either a non-international armed conflict between an armed group, Hamas, and a State, Israel, or it is an international armed conflict, owing to the situation of occupation that has prevailed in the Palestinian territories since the Six-Day War of 1967. </p>
<p>In 2012, <a href="https://access.archive-ouverte.unige.ch/access/metadata/3819f7ae-9778-49d4-8415-0563efb64f10/download">I argued that despite the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli troops, the territory of the Gaza Strip remained under Israeli occupation</a>. Indeed, when in 2004 the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00-FR.pdf">International Court of Justice</a> stated that Israel was obliged to apply international humanitarian law and international human rights law by virtue of its status as occupying power in this territory, Israel unilaterally withdrew its troops from Gaza in 2005, claiming to be free of its obligations. </p>
<p>I believe that for a situation in a territory to be characterized as an occupation, and, therefore, for a power to establish its authority over it, that power needs to deploy its armed forces in the territory. However, the withdrawal of these forces does not ipso facto mean there is no more occupation, as long as the State continues to control the land, sea and air borders, to issue passports to its population and to have its currency in circulation. The fact that Israel can decide to <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israel-cuts-electricity-supply-to-gaza/">completely cut off the electrical power supply</a> in Gaza only confirms this. </p>
<p>Since 2005, clashes and confrontations between Hamas and Israel have taken place on a regular basis. The fact that they have reached the scale demonstrated by the events of Oct. 7 is not likely to change this assessment. </p>
<h2>So, what difference does this make?</h2>
<p>None at all.</p>
<p>Whichever way one characterizes the conflict, it goes without saying that the acts of <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule1">deliberately targeting civilians</a> and taking <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule96">hostages</a> are strictly forbidden. This is even more the case when these acts are part of a pattern of violence whose principle aim is to <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule2">spread terror among the civilian population</a>.</p>
<p>In the same vein, no matter how the conflict is qualified, it is difficult to see how <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/total-siege-of-gaza-prohibited-under-international-law-un-1abc1549">declaring a “total siege” of the Gaza Strip</a> could be consistent with international humanitarian law. The “siege” is not a notion that is expressed, in extenso, in international humanitarian law. The term siege refers to restricting the movement of people and goods in a specific area with the aim of forcing enemy forces to stop fighting. </p>
<p>While a siege, as such, is not prohibited, its effects inevitably lead to violations of international humanitarian law. For example, preventing the delivery of food or the supply of water can lead to the starvation of the population living in the territory. Using famine as a method of warfare is <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule53">prohibited</a>. Similarly, restricting or preventing the movement of people means that humanitarian personnel cannot carry out their relief work in the besieged zone. But humanitarian organizations must be allowed to deliver aid to the civilian population and, according to international humanitarian law, the parties in the conflict must even <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule55">“facilitate their passage”</a>.</p>
<p>The unleashing of violence that we are seeing, including the initial acts and the response to them, is inevitably leading to massive violations of international humanitarian law and therefore to <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule156">war crimes</a>. </p>
<p>The situation raises the legitimate question of how effective international humanitarian law is. However, if, as <a href="https://msf-crash.org/en/rony-brauman">Rony Brauman</a> of Médecins sans frontières once said, “to promote international humanitarian law is to promote war” (the comment, in itself, merits conversation), promoting respect for this law in a situation such as the one in Israel and Gaza — which, whatever its nature, is undoubtedly an armed conflict — can do no harm. On the contrary, abandoning the pursuit of respect for international humanitarian law, even when it is being abused, will only lead to more chaos.</p>
<p>In this respect, it is worth remembering that third States, i.e. States which are not parties to this armed conflict, have an obligation to <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gci-1949/article-1?activeTab=1949GCs-APs-and-commentaries">“ensure respect for international humanitarian law.”</a> This means that in all its interactions with the parties to the conflict, Canada, like every other state in the world, has a duty to remind them of their obligations under international humanitarian law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215637/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julia Grignon is a member of the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme (France), President of the Sous-commission droit international humanitaire et action humanitaire. She is also Development Director of the Osons le DIH! partnership for the promotion and development of international humanitarian law, funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.</span></em></p>This unleashing of violence, including the initial acts and the response to them, inevitably leads to war crimes.Julia Grignon, Professeure en droit international humanitaire, Université LavalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126562023-10-11T15:43:16Z2023-10-11T15:43:16ZHow collective memories fuel conflicts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553231/original/file-20231011-23-6jaxvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=47%2C53%2C3874%2C1940&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/create/editor/CiQwYTkwYWExOS1lMDI5LTQwYWItODJjYS0zNTRkNDk3YTM1N2E">Pictrider/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When a group of youths <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40972055">attacked shops and buildings</a> in Tallinn, Estonia, on the evening of April 26, 2007, it sparked two days of civil unrest. This resulted in the death of a young man, injuries to 100 people, including 13 police officers, and the arrest of over 1,000 people. </p>
<p>The unrest was due to a disagreement between two communities – ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians – <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40972055">over how they should remember the events</a> of the second world war and the Soviet period. These disagreements stemmed from contentious “collective memories” of events and narratives. </p>
<p>Such <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/3377910">shared recollections</a> of past events can arise among a group or nation – whether factual or fabricated. As I have shown in a paper, <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2313-5778/7/3/45">published in Genealogy</a>, collective memories among individuals in a community, passed down through generations, are often at the heart of conflicts.</p>
<p><a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fpac0000144">Collective memory</a> is a social representation of the past. It ultimately explains how people’s shared recollections are formed within the social groups they belong to. But it <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fpac0000144">also explains</a> how they are formed against the social groups of people they do not consider themselves members of.</p>
<p>This creates a shared, collective past among each group that can be <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-018-9463-5">reignited in the present</a> to retain the memory of the past.</p>
<p>This may seem to be just another word for history. But memory <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1750698017720256?casa_token=uTleRWim814AAAAA%3Adyt_CubxQv-oUf9WxiJPaFjduyUgszMJ9YfUW8fzHFARNFx-rBOfJf8Y0uEBvKh0bdPWEvWyAUgB">is not history</a>. Ultimately, history views events with depth and from multiple perspectives. </p>
<p>Collective memory, on the other hand, <a href="https://openlibrary.org/works/OL12600W/The_Holocaust_in_American_Life?edition=holocaustinameri00novi">simplifies the events</a> – viewing them from a single perspective and reducing them to myths. </p>
<p>This is much like how our individual memories work. They are often faulty and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-real-you-is-a-myth-we-constantly-create-false-memories-to-achieve-the-identity-we-want-103253">driven by</a> how we want to view ourselves. As such, collective memory <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/SEMI.2009.009/html">is fundamentally tied to identity</a> in ways that history aspires not to be, even though the latter may drive the former.</p>
<p><a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-62621-5">Collective memories</a> can be shared in many ways. This includes family tales, folklore, institutionalised education, social media, sanctioned narratives, propaganda and education.</p>
<h2>A glimpse into Nigeria</h2>
<p>In my paper, I argue that contentious historical accounts shape collective memories as well as collective behaviour. The research is based on case studies conducted in April 2018 and May 2022 in Benue State, Nigeria, aiming to understand the persistence of conflicts there over time.</p>
<p>The paper explores how historical events in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Nigeria resonate today. This has reignited collective memories, influencing collective behaviour towards violence. That’s because people seek to redress current grievances through the lens of past events.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2313-5778/7/3/45">history</a> is marked by persistent violence, through the eras of European imperialism, independence, the Nigeria-Biafra war (1967–70), military dictatorships and multi-party politics. </p>
<p>One problem is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2022.2129015">eco-violence</a> – conflict over water and other agricultural resources between contending groups: nomadic herders and farmers. These conflicts have persisted for decades, from colonial times to independence and the present day. </p>
<p>Collective memories influence people’s collective behaviour in several ways. First, they provide <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ejsp.2420180303">historical contexts to contemporary issues</a>. Second, they link a known and collectively <a href="https://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/37454">shared past emotion to a current event</a>. And third, they associate <a href="https://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/37454">current issues with societal contradictions</a> of previous events, such as colonial efforts to divide and conquer.</p>
<p>The convergence of these three factors is shaping the persistence of conflicts between the nomadic herders and farmers. There are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344527">conflicting narratives</a> between the two groups regarding the ownership of communal land. There are also differing opinions on who should have access to it – and how. </p>
<p>Among the farmers in the region, the conflicts <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2016.1200314">are perceived</a> as a resurgence of the 1804 jihad, a military and religious attack by an Islamic army, aimed at claiming their land. They now feel attacked again.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Fulani herdsman in Togo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553232/original/file-20231011-17-wdtv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553232/original/file-20231011-17-wdtv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553232/original/file-20231011-17-wdtv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553232/original/file-20231011-17-wdtv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553232/original/file-20231011-17-wdtv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553232/original/file-20231011-17-wdtv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553232/original/file-20231011-17-wdtv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fulani herdsman in Togo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">wikipedia</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The nomadic Fulani herders, on the other hand, assert their rights to access agricultural resources <a href="https://asq.africa.ufl.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/168/Ochonu-Vol10Issue23.pdf">by citing their lineage to the Sokoto Caliphate</a>, which was created as a result of the jihad and once governed parts of the north-central region.</p>
<p>These contentious collective memories between the two groups shape people’s perceptions and their collective actions. And this transfer of emotions from past events to new ones complicates the peaceful resolution of conflicts. It ultimately leads to persistent violent disputes.</p>
<p>The ongoing violent conflicts between farmers and nomadic Fulani herders in Nigeria, similar to the 2007 unrest in Tallinn, Estonia, are shaped by differing narratives of the past. The effect of collective memories in intensifying these violent confrontations is undeniable. </p>
<h2>Conflict resolution</h2>
<p>Embedding collective memory within conflict resolution strategies is crucial for realising sustained peace. One way to so this is by using “cognitive reappraisal techniques”. Such techniques involve <a href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=1488dbc63973d268e9918fc16844f468221d42fd">exposing individuals</a> to emotionally charged situations to change their emotional reactions.</p>
<p><a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10902-016-9779-0">Temporal distancing</a>, for example, is a cognitive reappraisal technique that occurs when you imagine a stressful event from your future self’s perspective rather than your current self’s. </p>
<p>Another technique, self-distancing, entails stepping back from your immediate reactions to see emotionally charged events from a broader perspective. The <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0956797612452572">cognitive reappraisal technique</a>, when applied to a conflict situation, aims to lessen group hostility, encourage peaceful responses to past violent incidents, and reduce aggressive behaviour in group interactions.</p>
<p>It <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002713492636">could therefore</a> reduce disagreements between two communities. Although adapting this approach to fit the Nigerian context may require additional studies, it holds potential.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212656/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We need to embed collective memory in conflict resolution strategies.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2128152023-10-03T19:35:52Z2023-10-03T19:35:52ZBook review: African thinkers analyse some of the big issues of our time - race, belonging and identity<p>The subjects of race, identity and belonging are often fraught with contention and uneasiness. Who are you? Who belongs? Who is native, or indigenous to a place? These perennial questions arise around the world.</p>
<p>They are the subject of the book <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/9783031387968">The Paradox(es) of Diasporic Identity, Race and Belonging</a>, edited by <a href="https://scholar.google.co.jp/citations?user=EEyB8sMAAAAJ&hl=en">Benjamin Maiangwa</a>, a political scientist at Lakehead University in Canada. </p>
<p>The contributors are academics, mostly early career scholars and doctoral candidates in African and North American universities. They study genocide, peace and conflict, gender, decolonial practices, identity, race and war. </p>
<p>Unavoidably, questions that defy convenient answers pervade the reflections and analyses in the book. </p>
<p>In my own work as <a href="https://www.mtroyal.ca/ProgramsCourses/FacultiesSchoolsCentres/Arts/Departments/EnglishLanguagesCultures/FacultyStaff/Ademola-Adesola.htm">a scholar</a> of African literature with an interest in the subjects of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344526">conflict</a>, childhood and identity, I underscore the relevance of these questions. </p>
<p>The Paradox(es) of Diasporic Identity, Race and Belonging assembles voices that urge us to think more critically about how the politics of race and identity hampers healthy interrelations among people.</p>
<p>In a world increasingly divided by supremacist ideologies, the insights in this collection of essays are highly relevant. </p>
<h2>What the book’s about</h2>
<p>The contributors to the book use a variety of forms of writing. Some of the essays are autobiograpical; some are literary criticism; others scholarly analyses. They re-examine familiar but controversial concepts. </p>
<p>Among them are ideas about naming, indigeneity, land, citizenship, identitarian disparity, diasporic (un)being, immigration and migration, and the political economy of (un)belonging. These are topical ideas that predominate in discourses on nationalism, ethnicity and nation states. Their engagement in this collection helps us to further appreciate how unfixed and complex they are; they are never amenable to any easy analysis. </p>
<p>The volume is structured into three parts: Identity, Coloniality, and Home; Diaspora, Race, and Immigration; and Belonging: Cross-Cutting Issues. Each section has an introduction, a conversation among four of the contributors, an epilogue and an afterword.</p>
<p>This layout attests to the careful editing of the whole. There is an organic flow of engagement with ideas from one chapter to the next. Yet no chapter’s unique argument is overshadowed by another’s. </p>
<h2>Critical probing and analysis</h2>
<p>The chapters inspired by personal experiences do as much critical probing as those framed by hardcore analyses. </p>
<p>The contributions don’t sound jointly rehearsed, but represent a form of dialogue. Readers will find a kaleidoscope of interrelated but distinct compelling arguments on matters of race, identity and belonging, and the violent and paradoxical patterns they take in the <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520204355/on-the-postcolony">postcolony</a>. This is a notion that is concerned with a particular historical course involving societies that have latterly experienced colonialism, as theorised by the Cameroonian historian and political theorist <a href="https://wiser.wits.ac.za/people/achille-mbembe">Achille Mbembe</a>. </p>
<p>As is customary in volumes of this kind, the opening chapter comes from the editor. He welcomes readers with questions that invite them to ruminate on place and identity construction and the way it determines relations. </p>
<p>Such questions, which reverberate throughout the volume, are “What is home? What creates the feeling of belonging or (dis)connection to a place/space or other people? Is home a place, a feeling, other people, or an idea? Is it a destination or a spiritual entity or experience? Who am I in this political space?” </p>
<p>For the reader who has taken their identity for granted thus far, such questions can be jarring and unnerving. They can also provoke deep thoughts. </p>
<h2>The construction of race</h2>
<p>The chapter underlines the fact that identity is constructed and is fluid. It stresses racial signifiers – indigenous, native, white, black – as markers which mask, confuse, distress and misrepresent. </p>
<p>In some people they produce false triumphalism and superiority and in others they activate demeaning nervousness. As the chapter maintains, cultural essentialism, the product of these markers, distorts cultural facts. It also abjures a cultivation of interest in history and critical mindedness. And it is this matter of invented racial/cultural identity that the conversation in chapter 12 of the book foregrounds. </p>
<p>In that conversation, such constructs as “Black”, “African”, “White” and “immigrant” ricochet from one discussant to another. The conversation makes it clear that there is a kind of under-appreciation of the violence that minoritised people within national boundaries and diasporic spaces experience when designated in certain senses. </p>
<h2>Interconnected humanity</h2>
<p>With its other chapters, the volume broadens the frontiers of research in the intersecting areas of race, ethnicity, peace, home(lessness), gender and other forms of identity and diasporic formations. It calls for a spiritual reawakening of our identities. </p>
<p>This volume is a force in the promotion and celebration of the dignity of human differences. One can hear again and again the refrain in Maya Angelou’s timeless poem, Human Family:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://allpoetry.com/Human-Family">We are more alike, my friends,/than we are unalike</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The humanistic ring in this book results from a conviction that the human or spiritual identity trumps all other ones, including institutionalised discriminatory ways of being and exclusionary policies and regulations, all of which enable the questioning of other people’s humanity. </p>
<p>The contributors’ insistence is on interconnected human relations and, to borrow from the Canadian novelist and essayist, Dionne Brand, on life – </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Map-Door-No-Return-Belonging/dp/0385258925">It is life you must insist on</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Scholars, students and general readers interested in migration studies, peace and conflict studies, political science, literary studies, African studies, international relations, gender studies, sociology and history will find this work an enlightening resource.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212815/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ademola Adesola does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The book makes invaluable contributions to subjects of race, identity and belonging and how they shape human interrelations.Ademola Adesola, Assistant Professor, Mount Royal UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2146992023-10-03T15:57:00Z2023-10-03T15:57:00ZDeath of the Armenian dream in Nagorno-Karabakh was predictable but not inevitable<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551558/original/file-20231002-16-n1pj07.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C8192%2C5464&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kornidzor-armenia-refugees-from-nagorno-karabakh-passing-news-photo/1696781430?adppopup=true">Middle East Images /AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Thirty-five years ago, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/06/14/strike-protest-by-100000-are-reported-in-armenia/e7e480e9-e7e0-41fb-ae2b-666b7596349d/">more than 100,000 Armenian protesters</a> took to the streets to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/29/world/armenian-protests-reportedly-subside.html">convince Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev</a> that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18270325">Nagorno-Karabakh</a> – an ethnically Armenian enclave stuck geographically in the neighboring republic of Soviet Azerbaijan – ought to be joined to Armenia.</p>
<p>In recent days, more than 100,000 people have taken to the streets again. But this time it is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-separatist-4c5983327329e01c8647dffaddc486b6">Karabakh Armenians fleeing their homes</a> to find refuge in Armenia. They have been decisively defeated by the Azerbaijanis in a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66851975">short and brutal military operation</a> in the enclave. Their dream of independence appears over; what is left is the fallout. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/history/people/emeritus/rgsuny.html">longtime analyst</a> of the history and politics of the South Caucasus, I see the chain of recent events in Nagorno-Karabakh as depressingly predictable. But that is not to say they weren’t avoidable. Rather, greater flexibility from both sides – and less demonization of the other – could have prevented the catastrophic collapse of Artsakh, as Armenians called their autonomous republic, and with it the effective ethnic cleansing of people from lands they had lived in for millennia. </p>
<h2>A legacy of Lenin</h2>
<p>What began as a struggle to fulfill the promise of Soviet Union founder Vladimir Lenin, that <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/oct/16.htm">all nations would enjoy the right to self-determination</a> within the USSR, turned into a war between two independent, sovereign states that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-happening-between-armenia-azerbaijan-over-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-19/">saw more than 30,000 people killed</a> in six years of fighting.</p>
<p><iframe id="piBFX" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/piBFX/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The 1988 demonstrations were met by <a href="https://www.nkr.am/en/armenian-pogroms">violent pogroms by Azerbaijanis</a> against Armenian minorities in Sumgait and Baku. Gorbachev, wary that a shift in territory would foster similar demands throughout the Soviet Union and potentially enrage the USSR’s millions of Muslim citizens, promised economic aid to and protection of the Armenians, but he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/20/world/gorbachev-joins-the-hard-liners-and-bars-armenian-annexation.html">refused to change the borders</a>.</p>
<p>The dispute became a matter of international law, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of recognized states, in 1991 – with Azerbaijan declaring independence from the Soviet Union and rejecting <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/27/nagorno-karabakh-votes-to-secede-from-soviet-azerbaijan-1988">Nagorno-Karabakh’s autonomy vote</a>. The <a href="https://www.csce.gov/issue/territorial-integrity#:%7E:text=Respect%20for%20territorial%20integrity%20%2D%20the,among%20OSCE%20participating%20States%20under">legal principle of territorial integrity</a> took precedence over the ethical principle of national self-determination. </p>
<p>This meant that under international law, state boundaries could not be changed without the mutual agreement of both sides – a position that favored Azerbaijan. All countries in the world <a href="https://theconversation.com/nagorno-karabakh-blockade-crisis-choking-of-disputed-region-is-a-consequence-of-war-and-geopolitics-211717">recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan</a>, even, eventually, Armenia.</p>
<h2>An unsolved diplomatic problem</h2>
<p>But that didn’t mean the status of Nagorno-Karabakh was ever settled. And for all their efforts, outside powers – Russia, France and the United States most importantly – failed to find a lasting diplomatic solution.</p>
<p>The First Karabakh War, which grew out of the pogroms of 1988 and 1990, ended in 1994 with an <a href="http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/cease_fire.shtml">armistice brokered by Russia</a> and the Armenians victorious. </p>
<p>Moscow was Armenia’s principal protector in a hostile neighborhood with two unfriendly states, Azerbaijan and Turkey, on its borders. In turn, Armenia was usually Russia’s most loyal and dependable – and dependent – ally. Yet, post-Soviet Russia had its own national interests that did not always favor Armenia. At times, to the dismay of the Armenians, Moscow leaned toward Azerbaijian, occasionally <a href="https://apnews.com/21dd4e22cf944d95867c6102dfe783a7/russia-defends-selling-arms-both-azerbaijan-and-armenia">selling them weapons</a>. </p>
<p>Only Iran, treated as a pariah by much of the international community, provided <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/01/iran-armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-russia-nagorno-karabakh-syunik/">some additional support</a>, sporadically, to Armenia. </p>
<p>The United States, though sympathetic to Armenia’s plight and often pressured by its <a href="https://anca.org/">American-Armenian lobby</a>, was far away and concerned with more pressing problems in the Middle East, Europe and the Far East.</p>
<h2>What might have been</h2>
<p>The disaster that has befallen Nagorno-Karabakh was not inevitable. Alternatives and contingencies always exist in history and, if heeded by statespeople, can result in different outcomes. Analysts <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.1999.tb00348.x">including myself</a>, advisers and even the first president of independent Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, <a href="https://armenianweekly.com/2017/03/22/ter-petrosyan-reiterates-call-for-compromise-on-artsakh/">proposed compromise solutions</a> that might have led to an imperfect but violence-free solution to the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.</p>
<p>Yet the triumphant Armenian victors of the 1990s had few immediate incentives to compromise. Instead, after the First Karabakh War, they expanded their holdings beyond the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/11/9/azerbaijani-idps-hope-to-return">driving an estimated one million Azerbaijanis out of their homes</a> and making them hostile to Armenians.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman cries out while supported by fellow mourners at a freshly dug grave" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551597/original/file-20231003-17-dwe71c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551597/original/file-20231003-17-dwe71c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551597/original/file-20231003-17-dwe71c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551597/original/file-20231003-17-dwe71c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551597/original/file-20231003-17-dwe71c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551597/original/file-20231003-17-dwe71c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551597/original/file-20231003-17-dwe71c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mourner at the gravesite of a 1992 massacre of Azerbaijanis fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/three-azeri-women-mourn-04-march-1992-between-fresh-graves-news-photo/52017898?adppopup=true">David Brauchli/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The greatest error of the Armenian leaders, I believe, was to give in to a fatal hubris of thinking they could<a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/255-digging-out-deadlock-nagorno-karabak"> create a “Greater Armenia</a>” on territory emptied of the people who had lived there. After all, wasn’t this how other <a href="https://globalsocialtheory.org/concepts/settler-colonialism/">settler colonial states</a>, such as the United States, Australia, <a href="https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=10153&lang=EN">Turkey</a>, <a href="https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/israels-illegal-occupation-of-palestinian-territory-tantamount-to-settler-colonialism-un-expert">Israel</a> and so many others had been founded? Ethnic cleansing and genocide, along with forced assimilation, have historically been effective tools in the arsenal of nation-makers.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Azerbaijani nationalism smoldered and intensified around the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. Many decision-makers in Azerbaijan viewed Armenians as <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-karabakh-theme-park-armenia-ethnic-hatred-aliyev/31217971.html">arrogant, expansionist, existential enemies</a> of their country. Each side considered the contested enclave a piece of their ancient homeland, an indivisible good, and compromise proved impossible.</p>
<p>Armenian leaders also failed to fully comprehend the advantages that Azerbaijan held. Azerbaijan is a state <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/azerbaijan/">three times the size of Armenia with a population larger</a> by more than 7 million people. It also has <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/azerbaijan-energy-profile/energy-security">vast sources of oil and gas</a> that it has used to increase its wealth, build up a 21st-century military and finesse into greater ties with regional allies and European countries thirsty for oil and gas.</p>
<p>Armenia had a diaspora that intermittently aided the republic; but it did not have the material resources or the allies close at hand that its larger neighbor enjoyed. Turks and Azerbaijanis referred to their relationship as “<a href="https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Turkey-Azerbaijan-Armenia.pdf">one nation, two states</a>.” Sophisticated weapons flowed to Azerbaijan from Turkey – <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2023-03-06/ty-article-magazine/.premium/92-flights-from-israeli-base-reveal-arms-exports-to-azerbaijan/00000185-fd3d-d96e-adef-ff3dc38e0000">as they did from an Israel</a> encouraged by a shared hostility with Iran, Armenia’s ally – tipping the scales of the conflict.</p>
<h2>Democracy versus autocracy</h2>
<p>Armenians carried out a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/07/armenias-democratic-dreams/">popular democratic revolution in 2018</a> and brought a former journalist, Nikol Pashinyan, to power. A novice in governance, Pashinyan made serious errors. For example, he boldly, publicly declared that “<a href="https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-calls-for-unification-between-armenia-and-karabakh">Artsakh” was part of Armenia</a>, which infuriated Azerbaijan. While Pashinyan tried to assure Russia that his movement was not a “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/18/why-the-color-revolutions-failed/">color revolution</a>” – like those in Georgia and Ukraine – Vladimir Putin, no fan of popular democratic manifestations, grew hostile to Pashinyan’s attempts to turn to the West. </p>
<p>While Azerbaijan had grown economically – with the capital city of <a href="https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-baku-basks-in-architectural-attention">Baku glittering with new construction</a> – politically, it stagnated under the rule of Ilham Aliyev, son of former Communist Party boss Heydar Aliyev.</p>
<p>The autocratic Ilham Aliyev needed a victory over Armenia and Ngorno-Karabakh to quiet rumbling discontent with the corruption of the family-run state. Without warning, he launched a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer">brutal war against Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2020</a> – and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan-clashes.html">won it in just 44 days</a> thanks to drones and weapons supplied by his allies.</p>
<p>The goal of the victors then was equally hubristic as that of the Armenians a generation earlier. Azerbaijan’s troops surrounded Nagorno-Karabakh and in December 2022 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nagorno-karabakh-residents-say-disastrous-blockade-choking-supplies-2023-08-16/">cut off all access</a> to what was left of the self-declared Republic of Artsakh, starving its people for 10 months. On Sept. 19, 2023, Baku <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-violent-end-of-nagorno-karabakhs-fight-for-independence">unleashed a brutal blitzkrieg</a> on the rump republic, killing hundreds and forcing a mass exodus. </p>
<p>This ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh – first through hunger, then by force of arms – completed the Azerbaijani victory. The defeated government of Artsakh declared it would officially dissolve the republic by the end of 2023.</p>
<h2>Learning from defeat and victory</h2>
<p>War sobers a people. They are forced to face hard facts. </p>
<p>At the same time, victory can lead to prideful triumphalism that in its own way can distort what lies ahead.</p>
<p>Aliyev appears to have tightened his grip on power, and Azerbaijanis today speak of other goals: a land corridor through southern Armenia to link Azerbaijan proper with its <a href="https://mirrorspectator.com/2023/06/08/azerbaijan-preparing-nakhichevan-for-zangezur-corridor-opening/">exclave Nakhichevan</a>, separated from the rest of the country by southern Armenia. Voices have also been raised in Baku calling for a “<a href="https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-augmented-azerbaijan-the-return-of-azerbaijani-irredentism">Greater Azerbaijan</a>” that would incorporate what they call “Western Azerbaijan” – that is, the current Republic of Armenia.</p>
<p>Armenians might hope that Azerbaijan – and the international community – take seriously the principle of territorial integrity and protect Armenia from incursions by the Azerbaijani army or any more forceful move across its borders. </p>
<p>They might also hope that the U.S. and NATO, which proclaim that they are <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/26/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-united-efforts-of-the-free-world-to-support-the-people-of-ukraine/">protecting democracy</a> against autocracy in Ukraine, will adopt a similar approach to the conflict between democratic Armenia and autocratic Azerbaijan.</p>
<p>But with Russia occupied with its devastating war in Ukraine and stepping back from its support of Armenia, a power vacuum has been formed in the Southern Caucasus that Turkey may be eager to fill, to Azerbaijan’s advantage.</p>
<h2>A chance for democratic renewal?</h2>
<p>The immediate tasks facing Armenia are enormous, beginning with the housing and feeding of 100,000 refugees.</p>
<p>But this might also be a moment of opportunity. Freed of the burden of defending Nagorno-Karabakh, which they did valiantly for more than three decades, Armenians are no longer as captive to the moves and whims of Russia and Azerbaijan.</p>
<p>They can use this time to consolidate and further develop their democracy, and by their example become what they had been in the years just after the collapse of the Soviet Union: a harbinger of democratic renewal, an example of not just what might have been but of what conceivably will be in the near future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214699/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald Suny does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The collapse of the self-proclaimed republic ushers in a new reality in the South Caucasus. For Armenia, the first concern is how to accommodate the needs of 100,000-plus refugees.Ronald Suny, Professor of History and Political Science, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2139142023-09-29T15:41:08Z2023-09-29T15:41:08ZUkraine war: Russian shelling is taking a deadly toll on urban bats<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550598/original/file-20230927-27-i3qjxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C0%2C5439%2C3645&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many of the buildings in Kharkiv that bats roost in have been destroyed or damaged by shelling.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/demolition-demolished-apartment-buildings-city-caused-2289208005">DarSzach/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has given rise to a humanitarian crisis. <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/">More than 6.2 million people</a> have fled Ukraine as a result of heavy shelling and fighting, and an additional 5.1 million people have been internally displaced. </p>
<p>But wars do not only inflict suffering on humans – animals suffer too. <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jaae/5/1/article-p27_4.xml">Research</a> by the <a href="https://batsukraine.org/en/bats-species-en/">Ukrainian Bat Rehabilitation Center</a> (the largest project for bat conservation, research and outreach in eastern Europe) has brought into focus the plight of bats in the war-damaged city of Kharkiv. Situated only 30km from the Russian border, Kharkiv has suffered severe damage from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-russia-accuse-each-other-shelling-civilians-zaporizhzhia-2023-07-15/">relentless shelling</a> throughout the conflict.</p>
<p>In 2022, shelling may have led directly to the killing of approximately 7,000 <a href="https://www.woodlandtrust.org.uk/trees-woods-and-wildlife/animals/mammals/noctule-bat/">noctule bats</a> (<em>Nyctalus noctula</em>) – a species common throughout Europe. Nearly 3,000 more bats then became trapped inside damaged buildings, where many subsequently died. More trapped bats were found in Kharkiv in 2022 than in the preceding four years combined.</p>
<p>Despite the challenges posed by the invasion, scientists at the Ukrainian Bat Rehabilitation Center have valiantly continued their bat conservation efforts, providing care and rehabilitation for injured bats. These efforts have also given scientists the opportunity to gather data on how the invasion has affected bats and their roosting locations. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The common noctule bat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550596/original/file-20230927-19-2pbu8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550596/original/file-20230927-19-2pbu8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550596/original/file-20230927-19-2pbu8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550596/original/file-20230927-19-2pbu8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550596/original/file-20230927-19-2pbu8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550596/original/file-20230927-19-2pbu8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550596/original/file-20230927-19-2pbu8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shelling may have led to the killing of 7,000 noctule bats in Kharkiv alone in 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/common-noctule-nyctalus-noctula-netopyr-rezavy-150484784">Denisa Mikesova/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Bats in trouble?</h2>
<p>Bats inhabit parts of urban areas that are particularly susceptible to attacks. Noctule bats, for instance, spend most of the winter hibernating <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-25220-9_14">within multistorey buildings</a>, such as in cavities between concrete blocks.</p>
<p>The damage to the city began at the end of the bat hibernation season (November to April). Consequently, some of the buildings were sheltering thousands of hibernating bats when the first strikes occurred. The researchers estimate that as many as 45% of the buildings in Kharkiv that bats roost in have been completely or partially destroyed by shelling. </p>
<p>During this hibernation period, bats enter a <a href="https://thelandmarkpractice.com/bats-and-hibernation/">state of inactivity</a> where they reduce their heart rate and metabolic state. Once they have entered this state, they can take <a href="https://dnr.wisconsin.gov/newsroom/release/55886">upwards of 20 minutes</a> to wake up, so cannot respond to danger quickly.</p>
<p>From August to October, bats again gather in these buildings to mate, during a period known as “autumn swarming”. Windows left open by people as they were evacuating, or that were broken during the war, made it easy for bats to fly inside these buildings, where they subsequently became trapped. </p>
<p>During the autumn swarming period in 2022, three times as many bats were found trapped in buildings than the average in non-war years, with a death rate of around 30%.</p>
<h2>Lured into a trap</h2>
<p>In 2022, Kharkiv might also have been experiencing a higher bat population than is usual for autumn. Typically, researchers observe only a few bats in the weeks directly following the autumn swarming, a period they term the “autumn silence”. Between 2016 and 2019, they recorded sightings of fewer than 10 bats every few days during this silence.</p>
<p>However, during the same period in 2022, they reported sightings of over 100 bats on three occasions. This suggests that the usual autumn silence period may not have occurred.</p>
<p>This surge in bat numbers could have been brought about for several reasons. In the early days of the war, streetlights in Kharkiv were switched off and there was minimal lighting from houses, so the level of artificial light pollution was reduced. Artificial light pollution can disrupt bats, making them more <a href="https://www.lbp.org.uk/downloads/Publications/Management/lighting_and_bats.pdf">vulnerable to predators</a> and causing them to <a href="https://www.bats.org.uk/about-bats/threats-to-bats/lighting#:%7E:text=Artificial%20light%20falling%20on%20or,abundance%20(just%20after%20dusk).">emerge from their roosts</a> later at night.</p>
<p>The increase in bat sightings could also be explained by the growth of unmown grass and vegetation in the city during the conflict. This may have offered an <a href="https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/12/191219074744.htm">increased supply of insects</a> for the bats to feed on.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A destroyed residential building after a missile rocket attack." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550613/original/file-20230927-19-wgneed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550613/original/file-20230927-19-wgneed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550613/original/file-20230927-19-wgneed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550613/original/file-20230927-19-wgneed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550613/original/file-20230927-19-wgneed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550613/original/file-20230927-19-wgneed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550613/original/file-20230927-19-wgneed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">War-damaged windows became gateways for bats to enter buildings.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/destroyed-residential-building-after-russian-missle-2319354047">Tatyana Vyc/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Protecting animals in conflict zones</h2>
<p>Hundreds of thousands of bats are estimated to hibernate in Kharkiv each year. The proportion of bats that have been killed or trapped in the city’s war-damaged environment is therefore still relatively low.</p>
<p>But this same story is probably happening throughout all of Ukraine’s war-damaged cities, resulting in many more bat fatalities. So the impact the war is having on their population is still worrying.</p>
<p>Bats play an <a href="https://www.bathealthfoundation.org/html/general_public.html">important role in the ecosystem</a>, particularly because they prey on insects. A substantial decline in bat populations has the potential to result in an <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8530310/">uptick in the population</a> of insect pests. </p>
<p>Invasive insect pests carry a substantial economic burden, imposing a yearly cost of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/worlds-first-international-plant-health-conference-to-set-global-agenda-on-biosecurity-and-address-challenges-in-plant-health#:%7E:text=economy%20and%20environment.-,The%20Food%20and%20Agriculture%20Organization%20(FAO)%20of%20the%20United%20Nations,at%20least%20USD%2070%20billion.">at least US$70 billion</a> (£57 billion) to the global economy. According to <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1201366">research</a>, the economic value of bats to the US agricultural sector alone is estimated at nearly US$23 billion annually.</p>
<p>The Ukrainian Bat Rehabilitation Center’s research has highlighted the ecological impact war can have on urban bats. However, this may apply to <a href="https://www.ifaw.org/international/press-releases/war-ukraine-biodiversity">many other key species</a> too.</p>
<p>When the time comes to repair Ukraine’s damaged cities, the significance of urban wildlife must not be overlooked. These animals are an important part of the urban environment. As people rebuild their lives, they must ensure a home is rebuilt for nature too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213914/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eleanor Harrison does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Shelling may have led to the killing of 7,000 noctule bats in the city of Kharkiv aloneEleanor Harrison, Lecturer in Ecology, Keele UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2144402023-09-27T12:28:32Z2023-09-27T12:28:32ZAzerbaijan’s use of force in Nagorno-Karabakh risks undermining key international norms, signaling to dictators that might makes right<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550458/original/file-20230926-15-w7zafc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=46%2C38%2C5172%2C3352&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Samantha Power, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, speaks to journalists in Armenia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ArmeniaUS/ec180132168b4272a8b0f6dc25ab3d2a/photo?Query=samantha%20power&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1098&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Vasily Krestyaninov</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United States’ top humanitarian aid representative, Samantha Power, was <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/joe-biden-samantha-power-nagorno-karabakh-violence-against-civilians-humanitarian-aid-armenia-azerbaijan/">dispatched on a fact-finding mission</a> on Sept. 26, 2023, to a registration point on the border with Armenia for those fleeing the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nagorno-karabakh-blockade-crisis-choking-of-disputed-region-is-a-consequence-of-war-and-geopolitics-211717">Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh</a>. What she found was frustration: “Sanction Azerbaijan or go back to your country! We don’t care. Stop the lies!” someone shouted in <a href="https://youtu.be/7MEE0z_r-VQ?si=aazSHggdD4fT9E-H&t=783">a mid-press conference interruption</a>.</p>
<p>Underscoring the gravity of the situation, Power’s visit coincided with a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/26/world/europe/azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-explosion.html">fuel depot explosion</a> across the border in the disputed territory that killed at least 68 people, with 105 reported missing.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://spia.vt.edu/people/students/seferian.html">Armenian scholar of international affairs</a>, I see the anger directed at Power reflecting two realities: the worsening plight of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and the perceived inaction of the international community. Should the authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan be allowed to act with impunity in Nagorno-Karabakh, then I fear it will only further erode the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/purposes-and-principles-un-chapter-i-un-charter">international principle of nonuse of force</a>.</p>
<p>The violence the people of Nagorno-Karabakh are trying to leave behind ramped up on Sept. 19, when Azerbaijani forces launched <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66851975">“anti-terror” operations</a> on the enclave – populated by Armenians but within Azerbaijan’s recognized borders – claiming that some of its servicemen were killed by land mines placed by the Armenian side. </p>
<p>The flare-up of violence is only the latest episode in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9xlQKCx5iXg">a long-standing conflict</a>. And it was not entirely unexpected; troops had been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-its-working-with-both-armenia-azerbaijan-tensions-rise-2023-09-07/">building up</a> for weeks prior to the assault. </p>
<p>A Russian-brokered truce was announced the following day, on Sept. 20. It saw <a href="https://www.nkr.am/">the self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh Republic</a> – or, in Armenian, Artsakh – acquiesce to disarming and disbanding. The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic had been in de facto existence since 1991, though never formally recognized by any nation or international body.</p>
<p>There are now <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/09/22/nagorno-karabakh-genocide-armenia/">deep concerns that the world is essentially witnessing a genocide in real time</a> – despite the reticence of the U.S. and other actors to use that term.</p>
<h2>‘Reintegrating’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’</h2>
<p>Azerbaijan has pushed its rhetoric on “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-seeks-reintegration-karabakh-armenians/32605005.html">reintegrating</a>” the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh for some time now. The Azerbaijani government in the capital Baku presents its country as <a href="https://migration.gov.az/en/press_detail/273">a multiethnic, cosmopolitan society</a> in which the Armenian population can fully participate, with all of its cultural rights guaranteed. But the regime in Baku has <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/azerbaijan">a well-founded reputation for authoritarianism</a>, <a href="https://oc-media.org/azerbaijan-arrests-anti-war-figures/">suppression of dissent</a> and repression of the Armenian population in particular.</p>
<p>Before the latest violence, Nagorno-Karabakh had been under a nine-month <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/06/europe/nagorno-karabakh-blockade-azerbaijan-armenia-intl-cmd/index.html">partial or whole blockade</a> of the one highway connecting the territory with Armenia. </p>
<p>That road was opened after the fighting ended last week and has led to a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20230926-our-nation-has-been-sold-armenia-faces-refugee-exodus-from-nagorno-karabakh">mass exodus</a> of people fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenia. If most of the population leaves, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ethnic-armenians-will-leave-nagorno-karabakh-adviser-their-leader-2023-09-24/">as expected by a senior Nagorno-Karabakh official</a>, that could amount to about 120,000 people. And that will pose a significant challenge for Armenia, with its population of less than 3 million.</p>
<p>The government of Armenia characterizes the developments as “<a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ethnic-cleansing-nagorno-karabakh-armenia-azerbaijan-nikol-pashinyan/">ethnic cleansing</a>.” Others, including <a href="https://luismorenoocampo.com/lmo_en/report-armenia/">Luis Moreno Ocampo</a>, the former prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and the <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/sos-alerts-1/sos-alert---artsakh-">Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention</a>, have gone further, accusing the Azerbaijani government of knowingly pursuing a policy of genocide.</p>
<h2>Washington and Moscow weigh in</h2>
<p>Power, a former genocide scholar who serves as head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, has refrained from using that word. But <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/joe-biden-samantha-power-nagorno-karabakh-violence-against-civilians-humanitarian-aid-armenia-azerbaijan/">she did attest</a> to the “violence, deprivation and … fear” of Armenians living under the government of Azerbaijan.</p>
<p>During her visit, Power reiterated the <a href="https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-september-25-2023/#post-484287-ARMAZER">position previously expressed</a> by the State Department over the need for an independent, international mission and access for humanitarian organizations to the area. Power also mentioned the commitment by Washington to allocate US$11.5 million in relief. </p>
<p>In responding to questions about imposing sanctions on Azerbaijan, Power added: “There are a range of options under active consideration.”</p>
<p>The United States, maintaining a policy of <a href="https://www.state.gov/call-for-end-of-hostilities-in-nagorno-karabakh/">pursuing a peaceful resolution</a> to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, has been among the most important actors engaged in resolving the dispute. For 25 years after the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict">First Karabakh War</a> ended in 1994 with a cease-fire, Washington co-chaired negotiation efforts with Paris and Moscow to find a resolution through what was known as as the Minsk Group. It functioned under the aegis of the <a href="https://www.osce.org/">Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</a>, a body that has met since the end of the Cold War as a forum for all the countries of Europe, the former Soviet Union and North America.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer">Second Karabakh War</a> took place over 44 days in the autumn of 2020. It ended with a cease-fire negotiated by the Kremlin. Among <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384">the provisions of that agreement</a> was the placement of about 2,000 Russian peacekeepers in the areas still held by Nagorno-Karabakh forces. </p>
<p>Those peacekeepers have proven to be ineffective. There have been <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenia%E2%80%93Azerbaijan_border_crisis">numerous flare-ups</a> ever since, with Azerbaijani forces attacking both Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper.</p>
<h2>Larger geopolitical picture</h2>
<p>Yet, if anything, events since the end of the Second Karabakh War have conspired to make concerted intervention over the enclave even less likely.</p>
<p>Resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute was one of the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/09/briefing-on-the-situation-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-region-2.php">few areas of agreement and collaboration between Washington and Moscow</a>. Tensions over the war in Ukraine have dented that collaboration. Western powers now have to face a new reality with Baku as well. The close alliance between Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as with Israel, and the <a href="https://amwaj.media/article/will-azerbaijan-iran-tensions-reach-point-of-no-return">regional interests of Iran</a> further complicate matters.</p>
<p>Moscow – Armenia’s long-standing ally – has in the meantime been preoccupied with events in Ukraine. Moreover, Russia’s relations with Armenia have recently taken a <a href="https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/749325/a-new-low-in-armenia-russia-relations/">sharp downturn</a>. The current Armenian administration led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power following mass protests in 2018, has <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/09/the-eagle-in-the-south-caucasus-armenia-tests-alternative-geopolitical-waters/">not always toed the line</a> with the Kremlin. With Moscow’s attention diverted, Azerbaijan has felt emboldened to tighten its chokehold on Nagorno-Karabakh – seemingly unencumbered by any obligation to refrain from using force.</p>
<h2>Challenging international norms</h2>
<p>Since the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020, the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments have pursued multiple tracks of diplomacy, with Russia, the European Union and the United States each hosting negotiations. It was emphasized time and again that <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/azerbaijan-address-high-representative-josep-borrell-un-security-council-nagorno-karabakh_en">resorting to the use of force would not be acceptable</a>, and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20221031-armenia-and-azerbaijan-pledge-not-to-use-force-over-nagorno-karabakh-region">all the parties committed</a> to pursuing a peaceful resolution.</p>
<p>As German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock <a href="https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2618034">told the United Nations Security Council</a> on Sept 21, 2023: “Just at the moment when a glimpse of hope was emerging [regarding the blockade], when humanitarian supplies were allowed into Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku broke its repeated assurances to refrain from the use of force.”</p>
<p>Such conduct could have consequences that go far beyond Nagorno-Karabakh itself. In line with similar foreign policy decisions made by Moscow in regards to Ukraine or <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/90625">the Syrian government against its own people</a>, international observers are pointing to a resurgence in the use of force as a norm in international affairs.</p>
<p>Ever since the end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations, the governments of the world have – in principle at least – agreed to abstain from using force as a foreign policy tool. Of course, the world has seen many conflicts since 1945, but the principle of nonuse of force has continued to be recognized as the only legitimate basis to settle disputes. If Azerbaijan carries on with impunity in Nagorno-Karabakh, it will send a signal to authoritarian leaders around the world that might makes right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214440/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Being of Armenian background may be perceived as a bias. The research I have conducted on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been consistent with academic standards and best practices.</span></em></p>Violence has caused thousands to flee the Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh amid anger over perceived lack of action from Washington or the international community.Nareg Seferian, Ph.D. Candidate, School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia TechLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2115392023-08-28T14:43:12Z2023-08-28T14:43:12ZDRC: rising Twirwaneho rebel group highlights the unending volatility of the country’s east<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543291/original/file-20230817-43619-bs2zp0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier guards a camp in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in January 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guerchom Ndebo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">three-decade conflict in the eastern region</a> of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has led to the proliferation of <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/04/18/actualite/securite/est-de-la-rdc-266-groupes-armes-locaux-et-etrangers-recenses-par-le-p">hundreds of armed groups</a>. With the violence appearing to take an <a href="https://blog.kivusecurity.org/why-violence-in-the-south-kivu-highlands-is-not-ethnic-and-other-misconceptions-about-the-crisis/">ethnic slant</a>, several groups have emerged claiming to be protecting their communities from attacks. One such group is the Twirwaneho, which has <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf#page=13">become more active</a> since 2019. Christopher P. Davey, who has <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=TYPO3qoAAAAJ&hl=en">extensively studied</a> the drivers of conflict in eastern DRC, explains how the Twirwaneho’s claim of communal self-defence highlights the fractured nature of Congolese politics.</em></p>
<h2>What is the conflict in the DRC all about?</h2>
<p>The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been a theatre of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">increasingly violent conflict</a> since the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994">Rwandan genocide of 1994</a> pushed over a million refugees across the common border. Rwanda’s efforts to capture those responsible for the genocide sparked two wars in <a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">two wars</a>. Violence, driven by armed groups, has been persistent since. </p>
<p>Central to Congo’s politics is a broken relationship between the seat of government in Kinshasa, the underrepresented social and economic groups in the eastern region, and external parties. Added to this mix are transnational armed groups, foreign militaries, the <a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/blog/monuscos-2022-mandate-streamlined-but-missing-key-protection-language/">UN peacekeeping mission</a> and Congolese state actors like the military. </p>
<p>This has resulted in the world’s <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/news/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-refugee-crisis-explained/">longest-standing refugee crisis</a>. It has also led to the proliferation and fragmentation of <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CRG-Armed-Groups-in-the-Congo.pdf#page=5">dozens of armed groups</a> in the eastern region. </p>
<p>One of these groups is the Twirwaneho, a <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf#page=6">Banyamulenge</a> – or South Kivu-based Congolese Tutsi – self-defence/armed group. </p>
<p>This group is important to understand because its rising profile demonstrates the <a href="https://newbooksnetwork.com/jason-k-stearns-the-war-that-doesnt-say-its-name-the-unending-conflict-in-the-congo-princeton-up-2022">unending nature of Congo’s war</a>.</p>
<h2>Who are the Twirwaneho?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">Banyamulenge</a> are a minority group in South Kivu, eastern DRC, who have faced <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2022/un-special-adviser-prevention-genocide-condemns-escalation-fighting-drc">attacks based on their ethnicity</a>. Formed in the early 2010s, Twirwaneho (meaning “let’s defend ourselves” in the Banyamulenge language) is a contemporary response by mutinying national army officers to continued conflict and local self-defence needs within the Banyamulenge community. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">The Banyamulenge: how a minority ethnic group in the DRC became the target of rebels – and its own government</a>
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<p>The overlap between <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/self-defence">self-defence and armed groups</a> is not unique to the DRC. <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jamh/aop/article-10.1163-24680966-bja10012/article-10.1163-24680966-bja10012.xml">My research</a> on the history of Banyamulenge soldiers shows that the <a href="https://kivusecurity.org/about/armedGroups">gumino</a> (“let’s stay here”) self-defence tradition was part the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s international campaign in the late 1980s. It was used to raise funds and recruit for the <a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/conflict/52/Rwandan+Civil+War+%281990+-+1994%29">Rwandan civil war</a> (1990-1994). </p>
<p>This led to a generation of fighters <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0886260519900281">trained by the Rwandan Patriotic Front</a> who got into the ranks of various armed groups across both Congo wars. </p>
<p>These groups include Twirwaneho. Its leader is Michel “<a href="https://blog.kivusecurity.org/tag/makanika-2/">Makanika</a>” Rukunda, who was once in the Congolese national army before he mutinied in 2019. He transformed Twirwaneho militias into a militarily coordinated, and internationally represented and funded, fighting force. But he is also accused of human rights violations that have placed him on the European Union <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.LI.2023.190.01.0028.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2023%3A190I%3ATOC">sanctions list</a>. </p>
<p>The Twirwaneho’s direct role in national politics is minimal. However, the group has become a symbol of defiance for both the community it claims to defend and those who <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">see Tutsis as foreign invaders</a>. Also, a <a href="https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/review?uri=urn%3Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A7ae8352e-191d-39b0-858d-496fa13a25b2">report</a> from the UN group of experts on the DRC hints towards collaboration between Twirwaneho and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">Rwanda-supported M23</a>.</p>
<h2>Is the group keeping the peace or fuelling conflict?</h2>
<p>The Twirwaneho <a href="https://twitter.com/twirwaneho/status/1664342022675746817/photo/1">claim</a> that neighbouring armed groups and the national army make up a coalition launching counterattacks on Banyamulenge villages. This is in reprisal for Twirwaneho operations against the military and <a href="https://chimpreports.com/burundi-army-fights-red-tabara-rebels-in-drc/">other armed groups</a> and connected populations. </p>
<p><a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jamh/6/2/article-p107_2.xml">My research</a> shows that the Twirwaneho are related to, but distinct within, an array of armed groups in DRC engaged in a complex political, economic and at times existential struggle. </p>
<p>During Nairobi fieldwork, to understand more about the international side of the movement I met three young former rebels who had fled the Twirwaneho. They joined the group after their schools closed following increased local conflict. Graduating from students to soldiers, they fought this anti-Twirwaneho coalition. Echoing his community’s sentiment, one former Twirwaneho officer told me they are “not an armed group”. He emphasised this point: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… I was seeing myself as a civilian who decided to come and protect my community.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Inherent in the Twirwaneho’s fight are claims of stopping a Tutsi genocide in the DRC, also made by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23</a>. However, increased fighting across North and South Kivu has <a href="https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/review?uri=urn%3Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A7ae8352e-191d-39b0-858d-496fa13a25b2">exacerbated violence against all civilians</a>. </p>
<h2>What’s behind the group’s rising profile?</h2>
<p>Makanika as the emerging leader of the group has instilled discipline and “patriotism”. In my fieldwork I heard consistent claims of insufficient promotion and pay for Banyamulenge soldiers in the national army and persecution of their people. These claims became reasons for joining, along with a narrowing of options for traditional <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jamh/6/2/article-p107_2.xml">livelihoods</a>. </p>
<p>As command centred under Makanika, his diaspora reputation grew. Many Banyamulenge in the US and African Great Lakes region credit him with preserving the community. Young Banyamulenge men have left families and careers to join the Twirwaneho. The group recruits school children, pressures community members to join and draws on existing self-defence groups. </p>
<p>Coordinated by the <a href="https://twitter.com/MahoroMpa">Mahoro Peace Association</a>, the Banyamulenge diaspora has contributed <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/1238442/accusations-of-funding-militias-in-south-kivu.html">hundreds of thousands</a> of US dollars to displaced families in <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/the-banyamulenge-genocide-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-on-the-interplay-of-minority-groups-discrimination-and-humanitarian-assistance-failure/">South Kivu</a>. This is not an <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/57e92e4d4.pdf">uncommon practice</a> across other groups in the country. </p>
<p>The peace association <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/1238442/accusations-of-funding-militias-in-south-kivu.html">asserts</a> it does not actively raise money for Twirwaneho, but its leadership advocates for fighting to reclaim the homeland. This implicitly encourages support. </p>
<p>Many Banyamulenge do not consider any funds sent as support for an armed group. Rather, it is seen as mobilisation for the survival of the community. </p>
<h2>What’s the end game?</h2>
<p>What the Twirwaneho want is a complex question. Their <a href="https://twitter.com/twirwaneho">social media</a> posts broadcast goals of Banyamulenge peace and security in Congo. Yet, violence in the DRC is <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-violence-has-many-causes-the-uns-narrow-focus-on-ethnicity-wont-help-end-conflict-208774">not a simple ethnic conflict</a>. Although many Banyamulenge support the group, they are divided on how its goals are to be accomplished.</p>
<p>It is easy to see how a diaspora is willing to support the survival of their community. However, armed groups typically result in continued violence and military competition: rebels fight for material gains that do not translate into increased security for civilians.</p>
<p><em>This piece was written in collaboration with researchers at the <a href="https://gecshceruki.org/">Conflict and Human Security Research Group</a> (GEC-SH/CERUKI).</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher P. Davey is affiliated with Clark University and Education for Global Peace, and works for Binghamton University SUNY.</span></em></p>Central to the DRC’s politics is a broken relationship between the seat of government in Kinshasa and underrepresented groups in the eastern region.Christopher P. Davey, Visiting Assistant Professor, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116332023-08-20T09:27:25Z2023-08-20T09:27:25ZZimbabwe’s president was security minister when genocidal rape was state policy in 1983-4. Now he seeks another term<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543031/original/file-20230816-17-eic0p6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tafadzwa Ufumeli/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Trigger warning: this article contains accounts of sexual violence.</em></p>
<p>Zimbabwe will hold its elections on 23 August. The current president of Zimbabwe, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, is running for re-election. This is despite his having oversight in the execution of the genocide of a minority group of Zimbabweans in the south-west region, as evidenced in my <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">newly published study</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hazel-Cameron-2">genocide scholar</a>, I have studied the nature, causes and consequences of genocide and mass atrocities, as well as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41917771?seq=6">role of external institutional bystanders</a>. Since 2011, I have researched the crimes of the powerful of Zimbabwe. Much of this has involved an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">analysis of official British and US government communications</a>. This has shed new light on what knowledge was available to the British and US governments about <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325887696_State-Organized_Starvation_A_Weapon_of_Extreme_Mass_Violence_in_Matabeleland_South_1984">atrocity crimes targeting the Ndebele</a> in the early post-independence years of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">latest study</a> explores a military operation, known as Gukurahundi, between 1983 and 1984 in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands in Zimbabwe. Drawing on 36 in-depth interviews with survivors, my study provides new insights into <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7388214.stm">Operation Gukurahundi</a>. It identifies systematic patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the operation. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">British policy towards Zimbabwe during Matabeleland massacre: licence to kill</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The study concludes that these patterns indicate a state policy of systematic genocidal rape in 1983 and 1984. This policy was deployed with the intent to destroy, in part, a specific ethnic group: the minority Ndebele of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>My study acknowledges the immense suffering of the victims of the genocide and their descendants. It also illustrates that genocide creates victims across generations. Time cannot eliminate the trauma inflicted or the need for justice. </p>
<h2>The genocide</h2>
<p>In January 1983, the Zanu-PF government of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27519044">Robert Mugabe</a>, in the newly
independent Zimbabwe, launched a massive security clampdown on the Ndebele. This was <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">both politically and ethnically motivated</a>. At the heart of the operation was a strategy of state-ordered terror. It was perpetrated by a 4,000-strong all-Shona Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean National Army led by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-minister-idUSKCN24U0MK">Perrance Shiri</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">Mnangagwa</a> had oversight over both the army’s Fifth Brigade and the Central Intelligence Organisation in his role as minister of internal security and chairman of Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/17/could-mnangagwa-be-zimbabwes-comeback-crocodile">Joint High Command</a>. He <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-27-op-ed-mnangagwa-and-the-gukurahundi-fact-and-fiction/">reported directly to Mugabe</a>. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa, however, has <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-24-00-gukurahundi-ghosts-haunt-mnangagwa/">denied accusations</a> he played an active role in Operation Gukurahundi.</p>
<p>The stated objective of the campaign was to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jocelyn-Alexander/publication/250225505_Dissident_Perspectives_on_Zimbabwe%27s_Post-Independence_War/links/566858c308ae193b5fa0379f/Dissident-Perspectives-on-Zimbabwes-Post-Independence-War.pdf">rid the country of “dissidents”</a>. However, the overwhelming majority of those targeted by security forces were non-combatant Ndebele civilians. The government viewed them as supporters, or potential supporters, of the political opposition.</p>
<p>In 1983, the Fifth Brigade moved from village to village in Matabeleland North and some areas of the Midlands. Their presence led to <a href="https://www.pearl-insights.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/The-Matabeleland-Massacres-Britains-wilful-blindness.pdf">extreme violence</a>. The operation shifted to Matabeleland South in February 1984, where state-led atrocities and violence
continued. This included the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325887696_State-Organized_Starvation_A_Weapon_of_Extreme_Mass_Violence_in_Matabeleland_South_1984">orchestrated starvation of the Ndebele</a>. </p>
<p>Estimates vary on the number of non-combatant civilians massacred during Operation Gukurahundi. One conservative estimate is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/df5722c221bf4c5ca894e5e481413ca3">between 10,000 and 20,000</a>. However, Dan Stannard, the director internal of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation during Operation Gukurahundi, believed that between <a href="http://researchdata.uwe.ac.uk/104/240/roh-oh-sta-da1-appr.pdf">30,000 and 50,000</a> Ndebele may have been killed. </p>
<p>Although the peak of the violence occurred between 1983 and 1984, the operation didn’t end until December 1987 with the signing of a <a href="https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/explandict/unity-accord-of-1987/">national unity accord</a>. </p>
<h2>Rape and sexual violence</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">My research</a> reveals what has, until now, been omitted from criminological scrutiny: a state policy of rape and sexual violence that targeted the Ndebele people during Operation Gukurahundi. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a> made a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTR,40278fbb4.html">historic judgment</a> which established that rape and other forms of sexual violence could be acts of genocide as defined by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">United Nations Convention on Genocide Article II</a>. The tribunal recognised how rape and sexual violence functioned to destroy the minority Tutsi group of Rwanda in 1994.</p>
<p>I gathered data for my <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">study</a> from 36 in-depth interviews with male and female survivors in a representative sample of geographical locations across Matabeleland. While small in comparison to the sheer scale of the violence and the numbers who were victimised, this study nonetheless establishes reliable conclusions about the nature of events. </p>
<p>The patterns I identified include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>public spectacles of multiple perpetrator rape targeting children and adults</p></li>
<li><p>people forced to witness the rape of female and male family members</p></li>
<li><p>rape and sexual violence followed by mass killing</p></li>
<li><p>forced intrafamilial rape</p></li>
<li><p>forced bestiality</p></li>
<li><p>forced nudity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These are acts that can be interpreted as “deliberately inflicting on the (Ndebele) group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, a contravention of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">Article II (c) of the UN Genocide Convention</a>.</p>
<p>The systematic dehumanisation and degradation of the Ndebele through forced intrafamilial rape was a recurring pattern of state harm. It was pervasive in both Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South.</p>
<p>One of the people I interviewed, Bukhosi, who was 19 in 1984 and living in Matabeleland South, <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">shared the cruelty</a> of knowing that the Fifth Brigade might force him to attempt to have sex with his relatives. They would threaten to shoot him if he refused. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There were times we were afraid even to be in the company of our sister, even to go to the shop. Because I know when these guys come and see us together, they say ‘sleep with your sister’. Then you are afraid to go with your mother because something terrible would happen, they will say ‘do this to your mother’. You are afraid even to be with your brother at home, because they … these guys (Fifth Brigade), when they find the two of you. It is terrible … So we were all separated ….</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm">rituals of degradation</a> are found wherever a policy of genocidal rape is adopted. They cause shame and humiliation. They leave communities and individual families destroyed, their bonds crushed through the annihilation of social norms. </p>
<p>Forty years later, the intergenerational impacts of Operation Gukurahundi on the Ndebele group are profound. My interviewees widely reported mental health issues. Children born of survivors are angry and struggle to understand their family’s brutal history when questions about these painful experiences are met with silence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Mnangagwa
with Senior Royal Prince William in November 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kingston Royal</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I also identified patterns of reproductive violence targeting males and females. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>killing the foetuses of pregnant women</p></li>
<li><p>internment in concentration camps for sexual servitude (rape camps)</p></li>
<li><p>forced pregnancies </p></li>
<li><p>genital mutilation. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Fifth Brigade officers targeted the wombs of pregnant women with knives, bayonets or through stamping.</p>
<p>These acts can be interpreted as “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the (Ndebele) group”, a contravention of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">Article II (d) of the Genocide Convention</a>. </p>
<p>Every participant in my study reported the presence of a military rank structure – and complicity of senior officers in mass rapes and sexual violence. There was no evidence of sexual predation by army personnel for personal satisfaction. </p>
<p>Another study participant, Phindile, was 37 and lived in Matabeleland South in 1984. There were 21 homesteads in her village. She told me there were three commanders in her area. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Those were the ones who were giving the instructions. Rape was done (by) daylight and darkness but most were done in the evening. The commanders would be there eating. The chief commander would be sitting at a distance and giving instructions on what to do. They used to do the raping according to their rank.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>My <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">research</a> establishes that the policy of rape and other forms of sexual violence was systematic and predicated on the government’s intent to destroy the Ndebele in part. The policy reflects the ideology and strategic goals of those in high office. The fundamental human rights of many survivors remain affected <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/gukurahundi-the-election-dilemma-for-undocumented-victims/">to this day</a>. </p>
<h2>Swept under the carpet</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Prosecution for genocide</a> extends to those who plan, instigate, order, commit or aid and abet in its <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/genocide">planning, preparation or execution</a>.</p>
<p>In the early 1990s, reports of state-organised rape, the detention of women in rape camps, enforced pregnancy and other sexual atrocities trickled out of Bosnia and Croatia. Securing indictments became an <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/war-crimes-brutality-genocide-terror-and-the-struggle-for-justice-by-aryeh-neier-new-york-times-books-1998-pp-xiv-274-index-25-can35-between-vengeance-and-forgiveness-facing-history-after-genocide-and-mass-violence-by-martha-minow-boston-beacon-press-1998-pp-xiii-202-index-23/47336631C6CF464C84E5226AB62AD274">international political priority</a>. </p>
<p>Similar <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/uk/revealed-british-diplomats-pressured-bbcs-jeremy-paxman-understand-true-perspective-massacres-zimbabwe-61535">reports had trickled out</a> of Zimbabwe a decade earlier but were <a href="https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/16176/Cameron_2017_TIHR_BritainsWilfulBlindness_AAM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">swept under the carpet</a>. </p>
<p>Intelligence on genocidal rape and other atrocities was <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">minimised by British representatives</a> in Zimbabwe. This was clearly politically influenced, as expressed in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">numerous diplomatic cables</a> between Harare and London.</p>
<p>The crimes of genocide committed by the Third Reich in Nazi Germany, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or the Hutu government of Rwanda were subjected to investigation, prosecution and judgment in international courts. </p>
<p>Yet, 40 years after the mass atrocities of Operation Gukurahundi, there has been no official investigation, prosecution or judgment. The most senior surviving person accused of overseeing the genocide and other crimes against humanity, the incumbent president of Zimbabwe, enjoys impunity. He is endorsed and flattered – for example, he was <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202304190012.html#:%7E:text=Emmerson%20Mnangagwa%2C%20President%20of%20Zimbabwe%20.&text=President%20Emmerson%20Mnangagwa%20has%20been,ceremonial%20home%20of%20Britain's%20monarchy.">invited</a> to the May 2023 coronation of King Charles III of the UK.</p>
<p>Rather than being subjected to a process of international justice before a court with the jurisdiction to try the mass crimes of Gukurahundi, Mnangagwa will stand for re-election on 23 August. The survivors will continue their <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/memory-and-erasure">search for justice and accountability</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hazel Cameron received funding for this research project from Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, the British Academy and a Principal’s Special Award, University of St Andrews. </span></em></p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa has not faced official investigation or prosecution over his role in Operation Gukurahundi – 40 years on.Hazel Cameron, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854482023-08-20T09:27:05Z2023-08-20T09:27:05ZCivilian support for military coups is rising in parts of Africa: why the reasons matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543212/original/file-20230817-25-4iakmh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The clamour for coups among citizens is rising</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the night of <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/142678/togo-who-killed-sylvanus-olympio-the-father-of-togolese-independence/">13 January 1963</a>, Togo’s President Sylvanus Olympio was shot dead by rebels in the first military coup staged in Africa. A long list, as shown below, was to come. From the 1960s to the end of the millennium, there were an average of four military coups a year on the continent. By the end of the 1990s this phenomenon seemed to have faded away. </p>
<p>But since August 2020 six African nations have suffered seven coups or attempted coups. </p>
<p>First came <a href="https://theconversation.com/malis-predictable-coup-leaves-an-unclear-path-to-civilian-rule-144774">Mali</a>, in August 2020. The military took advantage of social unrest and insecurity caused by the activities of violent extremists. Mali had two coups or attempts in a nine-month span. </p>
<p>In April 2021, <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-signs-of-a-true-transition-in-chad-a-year-after-idriss-debys-death-181203">Chad</a> followed the same path. In March 2021, there was a coup attempt in Niger, and in September 2021 it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-coup-highlights-the-weaknesses-of-west-africas-regional-body-167650">Guinea’s</a> turn. A month later, it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan</a>. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-military-takeovers-in-west-africa-burkina-faso-coup-highlights-the-links-193972">Burkina Faso</a>, an attack in November 2021 led to the coup in January 2022. </p>
<p>More recently, a coup was <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">launched in Niger</a>, deposing President Mohamed Bazoum. Two days later, General Abdourahamane Tchiani declared himself the leader of Niger. </p>
<p>All together, that’s more than <a href="https://defishumanitaires.com/en/2019/11/27/the-sahel-is-a-demographic-bomb/">100 million people</a> being ruled by the military after power was seized violently. All are in the Sahel. This has alerted governments in the region.</p>
<p>Researchers, analysts and journalists have pointed to mismanagement, incompetence, corruption, economic crisis and state weakness as the main factors propelling military coups all over the world and, of course, in Africa. State weakness is a factor in the recent instances in Africa. They have happened partly because of governments’ failure to stem the spread of groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State all over the Sahel. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">Niger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely</a>
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<p>But there are two intertwined characteristics that differentiate Africa from the rest of the world. One is the public support of many citizens on the streets when there is a coup. The other is the society’s rising support for military rule as a form of government. Popular support for military rule has grown in the last 20 years.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589346.2022.2072582">research</a> explored the reasons for this. I used survey data to examine whether support for nondemocratic rule was mainly due to poor institutional and economic performance or to an existing so-called authoritarian personality and culture in the region. This type of personality refers to values existing in certain societies that make them more prone to embrace authoritarian forms of government. </p>
<p>This distinction is relevant because if the reason for military rule support is cultural, then societies will continue to endorse authoritarian regimes. If the reason is institutional performance, then as long as incumbent governments perform efficiently, both politically and economically, democratic support will overcome authoritarian support.</p>
<h2>Citizen discontent</h2>
<p>I carried out a quantitative analysis using <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> survey data gathered from 37 African countries, both from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis looked for underlying factors propelling the rise in support for military rule. </p>
<p>Respondents were asked about the extent of their support for military rule as a form of government plus a number of other potential explanatory questions such as perception of corruption, governing and opposition parties performance, economy evaluation and socio-demographic issues like their level of education.</p>
<p>The data shows that from 2000 to the present, the level of support for military rule as a form of government has doubled, from 11.6% of people supporting “much” or “very much” military rule as a form of government to 22.3%. Of the 37 countries <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">analysed</a>, there were 11 where support for military dictatorship was decreasing and 26 where this figure was on the rise. The latest <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/young-africans-show-tolerance-for-military-intervention-a-wake-up-call-afrobarometer-ceo-tells-german-leaders/#:%7E:text=Afrobarometer%20findings%20from%2028%20African,if%20elected%20leaders%20abuse%20power.">Afrobarometer data</a> shows that support for democracy has fallen in the last year. Out of 38 countries, only four show decreasing support for military rule since 2000, whereas 34 show higher support for higher military rule than in 2000.</p>
<p><a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">Support</a> for military rule was higher in “partly free” and “not free” countries than in “free” countries. (They were categorised according to the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world">Freedom House</a> index.) </p>
<p>But there were some exceptions. In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">South Africa</a>, which is a constitutional democracy with regular elections, one in three South Africans supported military rule as a form of government. In democratic Namibia the level of support showed that one in four Namibians supported military rule.</p>
<h2>Reasons to support military rule</h2>
<p>The analysis points to three conclusions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>In sub-Saharan Africa, the legitimacy of military rule is mainly based on institutional performance and economic management. These are weakened by jihadist organisations rapidly expanding throughout the region. State institutions are not able to tackle their expansion throughout the region.</p></li>
<li><p>In North Africa, institutional performance plays a role but authoritarian personality plays a larger role in the support for military rule.</p></li>
<li><p>Education seems to be an antidote against authoritarianism. Those with higher level of education, according to survey data, show higher level of democratic endorsement.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The study’s findings suggest that people in sub-Saharan Africa are fed up with their governments for many reasons, including security threats, humanitarian disasters and lack of prospects. Waiting for the next elections to take place to change government does not seem to them to be a good option. Opposition parties do not seem to enjoy a better image. For the survey respondents, the solution appears to be to welcome the military to intervene.</p>
<p>If citizens perceive that politicians don’t care about them, this will invite the military to continue overthrowing civil governments, with society publicly legitimising their intervention in politics. </p>
<p>If military, political and economic solutions are not found, military coups in the region will increase and people will continue gathering on the streets to welcome them. Niger’s recent coup may not be the last one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185448/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlos García Rivero is Research Fellow at the Centre for International and Comparative Politics, at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. </span></em></p>Citizen expectations of governments are not being met by most elected leaders.Carlos García Rivero, Associate Professor, Universitat de ValènciaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113552023-08-15T14:08:27Z2023-08-15T14:08:27ZSouth Sudan is gearing up for its first election – 3 things it must get right<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542338/original/file-20230811-21-9migfb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudan President Salva Kiir (left) and Vice President Riek Machar.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Louis/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The people of South Sudan have not exercised the right to choose their leaders since the referendum that secured <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/new-nation-born">independence from Sudan in 2011</a>. Instead, they have suffered through cycles of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/south-sudans-12-years-of-independence-triumphs-and-challenges/a-66151967">violent conflict</a> that have prevented the democratic transfer of power. </p>
<p>South Sudan descended into violent conflict less than three years after independence. It signed its first <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Agreement%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20the%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Republic%20of%20South%20Sudan.pdf">peace agreement in 2015</a>. This collapsed in less than a year and was followed by another wave of violence. The 2015 peace agreement was resuscitated in <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">2018</a> with hope it would lead to a newly elected government in February 2023. </p>
<p>After failing to fully implement the 2018 revitalised peace agreement, the signatories <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15219.doc.htm">extended its term for 24 months</a> to allow for better preparation for elections in December 2024. The elections, however, may be extended again. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Luka-Kuol-2">studied</a> constitution-making, security governance and post-conflict transitions. I also served as a minister in the Government of Southern Sudan and the Sudan National Government of Unity in 2005. In my view, postponing polls has become a currency in South Sudan, making a democratic transition through elections an elusive quest. However, it’s possible to hold elections if there is political will. </p>
<p>A recent public opinion survey showed that the majority of South Sudanese <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/South-Sudan-Policy-Report-Elections.pdf#page=11">are opposed to any further delays</a> to elections. Church leaders and civil society organisations have also <a href="https://cityreviewss.com/no-more-extension-the-church-adds-voice-in-call-for-general-election/">called</a> for elections. These sentiments indicate that the South Sudanese are tired of a status quo where the ruling elite clings to political power through endless power-sharing arrangements rather than through the ballot. </p>
<p>Three key things are needed for a credible poll: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>electoral laws to guide the process</p></li>
<li><p>voter registration and constituency boundaries</p></li>
<li><p>a safe environment to vote in.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Providing what’s needed</h2>
<p>There are <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf">major political and logistical challenges</a> in the way of an election in South Sudan. Resolving them will require hard choices and difficult trade-offs. </p>
<p><strong>Electoral laws:</strong> one of the big issues in the political reforms process is whether the elections will be conducted under a permanent constitution – which is <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudans-constitution-making-process-is-on-shaky-ground-how-to-firm-it-up-177107">still being drafted</a> – or the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2011">current constitution</a>. A permanent constitution is one of the prerequisites for the conduct of election under the 2018 peace deal. However, tying a permanent constitution to the conduct of elections was unrealistic. Permanent constitution-making takes time. It requires the effective participation of citizens, and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their home areas. </p>
<p>Also, the permanent constitution should be ratified by an elected parliament. Not the current handpicked 650 members of the national legislature who are part of South Sudan’s elite power-sharing arrangements. </p>
<p>The amended <a href="https://www.fd.uc.pt/g7+/pdfs/South_Sudan.pdf">2011 transitional constitution</a>, the <a href="https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/SS/south-sudan-the-national-elections-act-no.-39-of/view">2012 elections Act</a> and the <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">2018 revitalised peace agreement</a> can provide the basis for laws to guide the 2024 elections. </p>
<p><strong>Voter registration:</strong> another necessary condition for the conduct of elections is a population census. This is important for voter registration and the drawing of constituency boundaries. However, it would be ideal to conduct such a census when there is relative stability, and displaced persons and refugees can return to their homelands. </p>
<p>A population census will take time, though. So how can South Sudan register voters and draw boundaries without one? Political elites need to make the <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf">strategic decision</a> to either use the 2010 constituency boundaries, population estimates or voter registration data. Given rapid demographic shifts – <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/record-36-million-africans-forcibly-displaced-is-44-percent-of-global-total-refugees-asylum/">40%</a> of the country’s population has been forcefully displaced – projections based on the <a href="http://ssnbs.microdatahub.com/index.php/catalog/6/study-description">2008 census</a> could be used to reflect these changes. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ssnbss.org/">National Bureau of Statistics</a> and other research centres, such as the public policy think-tank <a href="https://www.suddinstitute.org/">Sudd Institute</a>, could objectively make population projections. Combined, these data sets can provide reasonable estimates for voter registration and drawing boundaries for constituencies.</p>
<p><strong>Security, and political and civic space:</strong> violent conflict still plagues South Sudan. Should elections be held when there is greater security? Or be organised under the current conditions in the hope that they will produce a legitimate government that promotes peace? A <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/South-Sudan-Policy-Report-Elections.pdf">public perceptions survey</a> found that despite the fear of violence, the majority of South Sudanese want elections. Creating a minimum safe and secure environment, which includes political and civic space for elections, is within the reach of political elites. Especially with the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/south-sudan-begins-unifying-ex-rebels-and-army-3932544#:%7E:text=South%20Sudan's%20unity%20government%20has,to%20transition%20to%20professional%20soldiers.">unification and deployment of security forces</a>. </p>
<h2>What’s going right</h2>
<p>South Sudan has put in motion two major laws that could help conduct elections.</p>
<p>The first is the progressive <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/elections-act-2012-amendment-bill-tabled-before-parliament">National Elections Bill</a>. It proposes a mixed system that allows geographical representation, as well as special <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf#page=14">parliamentary quota seats</a> for political parties and marginalised groups, such as women, persons with disabilities and the youth. This is aimed at ensuring inclusivity. It also reduces the risk of a single party holding a monopoly of power.</p>
<p>The elections bill has the potential to achieve political stability that rests on the distribution of power and resources to constituencies, as in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-illustrates-both-the-promise-as-well-as-the-pitfalls-of-devolution-96729">case of Kenya</a>. </p>
<p>The second law is the newly amended <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/parliament-passes-political-parties-act-2012-amendment-bill-2022">Political Parties Act</a>. Elections are only as credible as the parties that contest them. The amended law provides mechanisms for regulating political parties. It aims to ensure internal democratic governance and accountability in party constitutions. However, its implementation remains a challenge. For instance, the Political Parties Council hasn’t been formed, affecting the registration of political parties. </p>
<p>Most of South Sudan’s political parties are at the embryonic stage with limited or no political experience and resources. Investing in building their institutional capacities and governance will be as urgent as funding the elections. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>South Sudan is at a crossroad. Its ruling elites have to decide between continuing on the <a href="https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/new-blog-3/2022/12/13/elite-capture-and-popular-participation-in-south-sudans-constitution-making">endless power-sharing path</a> or heed to the demands of the people and embrace elections for state legitimacy and democratic transition.</p>
<p>The latter provides citizens with hope of a better South Sudan governed by elected leaders. Yet, political elites are <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf#page=23">becoming increasingly calculating and transactional</a> in meeting the minimum conditions for holding elections. </p>
<p>Providing funding for the elections, and related institutions and activities will test political commitment to the poll. The <a href="https://mofp.gov.ss/doc/MinisterofFinancandPlanning-BudgetSpeechFY2023_2024.pdf">2023-2024 budget</a> – expected to be an elections budget – failed to allocate resources for the poll. </p>
<p>The challenges facing the 2024 elections can be surmounted by collective political will. This is currently in short supply.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luka Kuol is affiliated with the Abyei Community Action for Development and the Rift Vally Institute.</span></em></p>The political elite have held on to power through power-sharing arrangements rather than the ballot. How will that change?Luka Kuol, Adjunct Professor, University of JubaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.