tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/dictatorship-1918/articlesDictatorship – The Conversation2024-03-27T13:26:41Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265342024-03-27T13:26:41Z2024-03-27T13:26:41ZArgentina: Javier Milei’s government poses an urgent threat to human rights<p>“Milei, you scumbag, you are the dictatorship.” This was among the defiant shouts that rang out across downtown Buenos Aires on Sunday March 24 as some 400,000 Argentinians <a href="https://buenosairesherald.com/society/hundreds-of-thousands-march-to-call-for-memory-truth-and-justice">filled</a> the Plaza de Mayo, the iconic square that has borne witness to pivotal moments in Argentina’s history. </p>
<p>People flock to Buenos Aires – and other cities across Argentina – on this date each year for an annual march to commemorate the victims of the country’s last military dictatorship. Between 1976 and 1983, an estimated <a href="https://jacobin.com/2020/06/argentina-dictatorship-dirty-war-military">30,000 people</a> were killed, imprisoned, tortured or forcibly disappeared in a state-led campaign that still haunts the country.</p>
<p>But this year the march felt a little different. Activists showed their palpable outrage at President Javier Milei’s administration for seeking to downplay the brutal legacy of the dictatorship.</p>
<p>And on March 21, Milei’s defence minister, Luis Petri, <a href="https://www.lacapital.com.ar/luis-petri-se-fotografio-cecilia-pando-y-esposas-condenados-lesa-humanidad-n10124703.html">reportedly</a> met with the wives of military officers convicted of crimes against humanity. The meeting occurred amid <a href="https://www.ambito.com/politica/la-respuesta-javier-milei-la-liberacion-genocidas-es-una-gran-mentira-n5969541">rumours of pardons</a> for human rights abuses that had been committed under the dictatorship.</p>
<p>Many human rights have been rolled back too. Activists have faced threats, funding for the country’s <a href="https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSefEd0YAyug3sNSnZPse43F2TvM34QDhhCtD6ur2GgdHzxlgg/viewform?pli=1">commemorative sites</a> has been withdrawn and their staff laid off, and workers in the Secretariat of Human Rights have been <a href="https://buenosairesherald.com/politics/nineteen-human-rights-secretariat-workers-laid-off-without-prior-notice">sacked</a>. Human rights, which have been hard won over decades in Argentina, are in danger.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A large crowd of people in a street holding banners and pictures aloft." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584410/original/file-20240326-22-bd6xlm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584410/original/file-20240326-22-bd6xlm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584410/original/file-20240326-22-bd6xlm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584410/original/file-20240326-22-bd6xlm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584410/original/file-20240326-22-bd6xlm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584410/original/file-20240326-22-bd6xlm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584410/original/file-20240326-22-bd6xlm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">People gather in cities across Argentina on March 24, the anniversary of a coup that installed a brutal military dictatorship in Argentina.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/buenos-aires-argentina-march-24-2017-611220890">AstridSinai/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<h2>Political violence</h2>
<p>Milei is a self-professed anarcho-capitalist. His policies are at best, nebulous, and at worst, dangerously chaotic. Since he was elected in November 2023, Milei has made <a href="https://theconversation.com/argentinas-anti-government-protests-offer-a-lesson-for-the-international-struggle-against-the-rise-of-the-far-right-222570">clear plans</a> for sweeping liberal economic reforms, cuts to funding for public services, and has opposed equal marriage and legal abortion.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/argentinas-anti-government-protests-offer-a-lesson-for-the-international-struggle-against-the-rise-of-the-far-right-222570">Argentina’s anti-government protests offer a lesson for the international struggle against the rise of the far right</a>
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<p>Milei’s human rights policy is <a href="https://medium.com/@observatorio/newsletter-03-2024-e78b73d578ce">worrying</a>. A number of active and retired military personnel have been appointed to various government positions, including chief of staff and to the Ministry of Defence. However, there would be worse to come in the run up to this year’s March 24 commemorations – an outright assault on human rights. </p>
<p>In early March, Sabrina Bölke, a member of <a href="https://hijos-capital.org.ar/">HIJOS</a> (Sons and Daughters for Identity and Justice against Oblivion and Silence), was <a href="https://buenosairesherald.com/human-rights/assaulted-argentine-rights-activist-speaks-out-i-thought-my-life-was-going-to-end">attacked</a> and sexually assaulted in her home. HIJOS is an Argentinian organisation founded in 1995 to represent the children of people who had been murdered, disappeared or imprisoned by the country’s military dictatorship</p>
<p>Before leaving, her attackers wrote “VVLC [viva la libertad, carajo] ñoqui” on one of the walls. This is <a href="https://buenosairesherald.com/politics/javier-milei-the-fringe-economist-pundit-turned-presidential-frontrunner">Milei’s catchphrase</a> and loosely translates as “Long live freedom, dammit”. Ñoqui (gnocchi) is a derogatory term for state workers, equivalent to “jobsworth” in English.</p>
<p>This is a lesson in what happens when radical “outsiders” like Milei (or Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Donald Trump in the US) come in from the shadows. They not only tolerate political violence, but actively encourage it. Lacking political experience, their leadership is founded on creating an “us v them” mentality which emboldens their supporters. </p>
<h2>Revising history</h2>
<p>The day of commemoration brought one more disturbing turn of events. The government released a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/23/javier-milei-argentina-dictatorship-remembrance">video</a> straight out of the denialist playbook, presenting a false, alternative portrayal of the military dictatorship’s crimes.</p>
<p>The video advocates for a “complete memory” that shifts the focus to those killed by armed left-wing organisations in the 1960s and 1970s and calls for the end of the pursuit of justice for military perpetrators. It stars Juan Bautista Yofre, the ex-chief of the Secretariat of Intelligence, and María Fernanda, the daughter of Captain Humberto Viola, who was killed in 1974 by the revolutionary left. </p>
<p>The video resurrects the “two demons” trope. This is a theory that equates systematic state terrorism with the violence committed by the revolutionary left. It justifies the disappearances as the result of a conflict between two warring factions.</p>
<p>It’s a viewpoint that had, in recent years, lost much credibility. In 2006, the prologue to the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons’ truth commission <a href="http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_001.htm">report</a>, which was originally published in 1983 to detail the extent of forced disappearance across Argentina, was <a href="https://jacobin.com/2020/06/argentina-dictatorship-dirty-war-military">rewritten</a> specifically to remove allusions to this myth.</p>
<p>Such rejection of historical facts is not surprising. During his presidential campaign debates, Milei <a href="https://elpais.com/argentina/2023-11-16/el-negacionismo-de-la-dictadura-que-propone-milei-no-cala-en-los-cuarteles-argentinos.html">disputed</a> the number that had disappeared at the hands of the dictatorship.</p>
<p>His vice president, Victoria Villarruel, the niece of a member of the armed forces under judicial investigation, has gone even further. She has <a href="https://elpais.com/argentina/2023-11-15/la-candidata-de-milei-a-la-vicepresidencia-propone-desarmar-el-museo-de-la-memoria-de-la-esma.html">called</a> for an end to human rights trials and has pushed for the closure of the memory museum on the grounds of what was once the notorious former Navy Mechanics School that became a clandestine detention centre during the dictatorship.</p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>Milei and Villarruel may struggle to block human rights trials completely, certainly not without a stand-off with the Argentine courts. The <a href="https://buenosairesherald.com/politics/traitors-milei-rails-against-deputies-who-rejected-omnibus-bill-articles">opposition</a> of congress to Milei’s “omnibus law” (the collective name for his package of liberal reforms) in February 2024 is a reminder that he will undoubtedly face legislative roadblocks. </p>
<p>The Argentine Court of Appeal, which is responsible for ruling on human rights cases, has also been clear that it will <a href="https://www.pagina12.com.ar/723302-la-camara-de-casacion-desbarato-un-intento-de-los-genocidas-">prevent perpetrators</a> of human rights abuses benefitting from house arrest. However, we will probably see a gradual undermining of judicial processes via the release of defendants and the replacement of judges, accompanied by an emboldening of those who deny state terrorism. </p>
<p>It is still early days in Milei’s tenure. But human rights activists and international observers should be concerned about the future of human rights in Argentina.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226534/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cara Levey has received funding from Irish Research Council </span></em></p>Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in Argentina to commemorate victims of the country’s military dictatorship amid renewed concerns for human rights.Cara Levey, Senior Lecturer in Latin American Studies, University College CorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255142024-03-12T15:26:35Z2024-03-12T15:26:35ZJimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier: the gangster behind the violence in Haiti who may have political aspirations of his own<p>A violent uprising in the Caribbean nation of Haiti has put the spotlight on the man leading the mayhem – a homicidal gang boss and former policeman called Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier.</p>
<p>Over the past two weeks, Haiti’s powerful gangs have plunged a country already on life support into a coma. More than <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-68462851">3,800 hardened criminals</a> were broken out of Haiti’s two biggest jails, the country’s international airport has been partially taken over, and gangs have <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-68531759">tried to seize</a> the political quarter of its capital, Port-au-Prince.</p>
<p>Following the recent wave of violence, the country’s acting president, Ariel Henry, has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-68541349">agreed to step down</a> once a transitional council has been created to run the country. Henry has become a pariah in Haitian politics. He is an unelected leader, taking power after Haiti’s president was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-57762246">assassinated</a> in 2021, and has presided over the country’s <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129537?utm_term=63bfaeecfacb1506e4d4474705eee640&utm_campaign=FirstEdition&utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&CMP=firstedition_email">economic freefall</a>.</p>
<p>It is unclear how the current political crisis will be solved. But Chérizier has emerged from the armed insurrection as the most formidable leader in Haiti, and some suspect he may have political aspirations of his own. </p>
<p>He has <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/haitis-notorious-gang-leader-plots-future-amid-rebellion/story?id=107994731">claimed</a> to be fighting a holy war of sorts for the soul of Haiti, delivering “it back into the hands of its chosen people, the everyday Haitian beat down by years of abuse, racism and corruption.” </p>
<p>However, there is one crucial question. Can Chérizier reinvent himself from a feared gangland boss to a legitimate political leader?</p>
<p>Haiti’s history is replete with political leaders with very dubious pasts, and the country’s citizens are used to their violent machinations. François “Papa Doc” Duvalier, a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Francois-Duvalier">ruthless dictator</a> who served as president of the country between 1957 and 1971, institutionalised gangs and made them a part of the everyday life of the Haitian people.</p>
<p>His personal militia, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1971/04/23/archives/papa-doc-a-ruthless-dictator-kept-the-haitians-in-illiteracy-and.html">Tonton Macoute</a>, were given the license to kidnap, torture and kill thousands of their fellow Haitians during his brutal reign. Despite this, Papa Doc enjoyed an abundance of admiration and affection from those he lorded over with an iron fist. This was, in large part, because of his politics of patronage and unique brand of “grassroots” black nationalism.</p>
<p>Going by that antecedent, Chérizier is not an uncommon outsider. He may be a homicidal criminal, but he also enjoys a cult status in Port-au-Prince. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/10/haiti-gang-boss-kingpin-barbecue-jimmy-cherizier">Murals</a> in the impoverished Haitian slums he rules as his private fiefdom liken him to the Argentine guerrilla leader, Ernesto “Che” Guevara. In a country with a short supply of tall leaders, Chérizier is an outsize figure. </p>
<p>His alias, <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1873542/haiti-gang-leader-barbecue">“Barbecue”</a>, which he has earned due to his penchant for burning his opponents alive, has helped him build a “tough guy” image – an essential character trait for any aspiring leader in this violent country. The last political leader of Haiti of any significance, Papa Doc Duvalier, had this in plenty. </p>
<p>But unlike other contemporary gang leaders in Haiti, Chérizier is a man with a brain. He is articulate, aware and thinks big. Far from your traditional gang boss that exists in the twilight, he actively seeks out the limelight. </p>
<p>He likes giving interviews and goes the extra mile to impress the audience with his revolutionary political zeal. Over the past year, he has welcomed a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qyGnxdDOGHo">succession of foreign reporters</a> to the gang-controlled neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince in attempt to justify the uprising. According to Chérizier, his brand of violent street politics is very much in tune with the need of the hour. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/qyGnxdDOGHo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Chérizier speaking to Al Jazeera about the crisis in Haiti.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Political acumen</h2>
<p>The current political instability in Haiti has largely been manufactured by Chérizier and the gangs he leads as a cleverly thought-out survival strategy. But it is also couched in an astute reading of the Haitian national sentiment and popular mood. </p>
<p>In 2023, the UN security council <a href="https://apnews.com/article/haiti-un-kenya-armed-force-resolution-3749ac5db9d6c5903e61dee7b4206e6c">approved</a> the deployment of a Kenyan-led multinational peacekeeping force to Haiti to reign in the gangs and their spiralling violence. The UN secretary-general, António Guterres, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66946156">stressed</a> that a “robust use of force” is needed to disarm the gangs and restore order. However, the mission has subsequently stalled. </p>
<p>Such an intervention would in all likelihood severely undermine the power of Haiti’s gangs. So, on the one hand, Chérizier’s decision to stir up a political uprising can be seen as a planned strategy to scare off any external forces seeking to impose order. </p>
<p>But Haitians have traditionally <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/11/04/1131254613/haiti-sanctions-foreign-intervention-protests-gangs-cholera">opposed</a> any foreign intervention in their domestic affairs, regardless of the state of disarray or chaos. As a fiercely independent people, they proudly stand as the first black republic to emerge following a successful <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Haitian-Revolution#ref343634">slave revolt</a> during the high noon of European colonialism. </p>
<p>Chérizier has used Henry’s unpopularity and controversial decision to deploy foreign police officers in the nation to drum up a nationwide violent fervour for political change. In a video call to <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/haitis-notorious-gang-leader-plots-future-amid-rebellion/story?id=107994731">ABC News</a> on March 11, he said: “The first step is to overthrow Ariel Henry and then we will start the real fight against the current system, the system of corrupt oligarchs and corrupt traditional politicians.” </p>
<p>In the past, Chérizier has floated his own <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/akeyz8/haiti-jimmy-cherizier-government">“peace plan”</a> for the country. He has demanded that gang members be given total amnesty and that the country is governed by a “council of sages”, implying leaders such as him would have a formal political role. </p>
<p>With Henry now out of the political scene, the chance that Haitians will be forced to embrace such an outcome may not be far-fetched after all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225514/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amalendu Misra has received funding from
British Academy /
Nuffield Foundation</span></em></p>Haiti is descending into anarchy, causing the gang leader behind the violence to emerge as the country’s most powerful leader.Amalendu Misra, Professor, Department: Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2237092024-02-21T11:44:17Z2024-02-21T11:44:17ZFascist propaganda on the big screen: the history of the NO-DO in Francoist Spain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576041/original/file-20240131-25-kv6g9l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C6%2C1019%2C676&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Francisco Franco at a sailing regatta in the bay of La Concha in San Sebastián. The even was later broadcast in NO-DO 1028A.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Francisco_Franco_durante_una_competici%C3%B3n_de_regatas_en_la_bah%C3%ADa_de_la_Concha_(5_de_8)_-_Fondo_Mar%C3%ADn-Kutxa_Fototeka.jpg">Fondo Marín-Kutxa Fototeka</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1EdyZtkGXo">first ever film</a> was shown at the Grand Café in Paris, on 28 December 1895. Interest in film and cinematic technology then quickly spread, captivating audiences and dominating much of 20th century culture. Spain’s first cinematic screenings took place in 1896, but from the 1930s onwards its cinematic output took on two significant peculiarities. </p>
<p>One of these was the unavoidable and entrenched practice of dubbing foreign films. This meant, in the long term, fewer opportunities for Spanish people to become familiar with other cultures and languages, and made it very easy to manipulate and censor a film’s content.</p>
<p>Another element, present throughout Francisco Franco’s dictatorial rule from 1939 to 1975, was the obligatory screening of a 10-minute cinematic newsreel before films. This was called the <em>Noticiario Español</em> (“Spanish News Broadcast”), but was more popularly known as the NO-DO, an abbreviated form of the state-owned “<em>Noticias y Documentales</em>” (News and Documentaries) company that created it.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572494/original/file-20240131-19-6oxoz2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The NO-DO masthead." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572494/original/file-20240131-19-6oxoz2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572494/original/file-20240131-19-6oxoz2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572494/original/file-20240131-19-6oxoz2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572494/original/file-20240131-19-6oxoz2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572494/original/file-20240131-19-6oxoz2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572494/original/file-20240131-19-6oxoz2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572494/original/file-20240131-19-6oxoz2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The NO-DO masthead.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.rtve.es/play/videos/nodo/not-231/1467367/">RTVE</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Features and impact of the NO-DO</h2>
<p>The dictatorship wanted to take advantage of a medium that sidestepped the limitations of illiteracy: around <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_education_in_Francoist_Spain#Literacy">25%</a> of Spain’s population could neither read nor write in 1930. They also had a captive audience: from 1943 onwards, the dictatorship ordered that in all cinemas, before any film, the NO-DO had to be shown. </p>
<p>It also benefited from a total lack of competition, as well as the technological, suggestive power of cinema. As a result, it was able to impose its singular, one-sided worldview upon a large part of the Spanish population.</p>
<p>These messages formed part of a wider media ecosystem that fell under the direct or indirect control of the regime: Franco’s political party – the Falange – and the Catholic Church both held sway. This control extended to both ownership and content.</p>
<h2>NO-DO and the dictatorship</h2>
<p>The NO-DO’s format was simple: black and white footage with a male voiceover. It was only in the transition to democracy following Franco’s death in 1975 that it started to reflect wider technological and social changes: its first colour instalment was broadcast in <a href="https://www.rtve.es/play/videos/noticiarios-nodo/not-1795/1467325/">June 1977</a>, and the first female voiceover did not come until <a href="https://www.rtve.es/play/videos/noticiarios-nodo/not-1919/1467327/">December 1979</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572782/original/file-20240201-23-ixwoou.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An image of a NO-DO camera operator at work." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572782/original/file-20240201-23-ixwoou.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572782/original/file-20240201-23-ixwoou.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572782/original/file-20240201-23-ixwoou.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572782/original/file-20240201-23-ixwoou.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572782/original/file-20240201-23-ixwoou.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572782/original/file-20240201-23-ixwoou.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572782/original/file-20240201-23-ixwoou.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A NO-DO camera operator at work.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.rtve.es/play/videos/nodo/not-1304-conmemorativo-25-anos/1486951/">RTVE</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Outside of this final period, the NO-DO’s content toed the Francoist party line with surgical precision.</p>
<p>It only addressed topics that were entertaining, politically convenient, and could be shown in a light-hearted way, without any obvious ideological spin. Its central mission, however, was to legitimise Franco’s cause or, at least, to sugarcoat events both within Spain and in the world at large. </p>
<p>This heavy bias is evident in how it handled topics such as <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anbI0kfi_rs">representation of women</a>, Spain’s various <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aBij2feJ9xQ">regional identities</a> (often reduced to tame folkloric dance performances for visiting dignitaries) or the proganda offensive celebrating the Franco regime’s so-called <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IjLIcaL74Lg">25 Years of Peace</a>. </p>
<p>Some were critical of, or perhaps even immune to, the propaganda, but it was an effective way to spread biased information, and to shape society’s thinking by indoctrinating or persuading a captive audience. Similar broadcasts were used by Spain’s totalitarian contemporaries, including <a href="https://www.archivioluce.com/archivio-cinematografico-2/#/">fascist Italy</a>, <a href="https://archive.org/details/diedeutschewochenschau567301941/Die+Deutsche+Wochenschau+(+585+-48-1941).mp4">Nazi Germany</a>, and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL3X_JIjPmlKwJ68_QAXJzKPl0v9EdkPVO">Soviet Russia</a>. </p>
<h2>News in the cinema</h2>
<p>Before and during the Spanish Civil War, there is actually <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/argonauta/1195">evidence</a> of each side having its own cinematic newsreels. There are examples of a <a href="https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noticiario_Espa%C3%B1ol"><em>Noticiario Español</em></a> and another broadcast called <a href="https://www.europeanfilmgateway.eu/search-efg/Laya%20Films/exact?page=0%2C0%2C0"><em>Espanya al dia</em></a> (Catalan for “Spain Up To Date”) in the eastern republican part of the country. The western rebel territory had its own newsreel – also called <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLgM8MmF1-E_NKu_w6O4W25wN3X57lqSFA"><em>Noticiario Español</em></a> – in 1938 and 1939. </p>
<p>The NO-DO came about after the Civil War thanks directly to the Francoist dictatorship’s power, which made it the sole production of this sort. <a href="https://www.rtve.es/play/videos/nodo/not-1-introduccion-primer-noticiario-espanol/1465256/">First screened on 4 January 1943</a>, it actually continued into the post-Franco era, <a href="https://www.rtve.es/play/videos/nodo/not-1966/1467587/">ending on 25 May 1981</a>.</p>
<p>However, its glory began to fade as early as the 1960s, when competition emerged in the form of television (Spain’s public broadcaster, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Televisi%C3%B3n_Espa%C3%B1ola">TVE</a>, was inaugurated in 1956). It entered an even steeper decline in the late 1970s when it stopped being mandatory in cinemas, by which point television had spread more widely into households, holding sway over people’s conversations, timetables, and even the layout of their homes.</p>
<h2>The legacy of the NO-DO</h2>
<p>The NO-DO ended well within living memory, and left a profound impression on the country’s collective consciousness. </p>
<p>To this day, numerous elements still resonate with much of Spain’s popular culture. Few can forget its <a href="https://parecequefueayer.espaciolatino.com/Nodo.mp3">iconic opening melody</a>, the pompous voiceovers, and the hackneyed speeches filled with platitudes like <a href="https://www.rtve.es/play/videos/noticiarios-nodo/not-1299/1487016/">“su excelencia el Jefe del Estado”</a> (“His Excellency, the Head of State”). Its <a href="https://www.rtve.es/play/videos/nodo/not-502/1469616/">repeated references to newly inaugurated marshes, reservoirs and wetlands</a> even led to the dictator being popularly known as “Paco el Rana” (“Frankie the Frog”).</p>
<p>It also left its mark on those who were not alive to see it first hand. One clear example of this is the long-running Catalan political satire programme <a href="https://www.ccma.cat/3cat/cercador/?cerca=Pol%25C3%25B2nia%2520NO-DO"><em>Polònia</em></a>, which riffs on the NO-DO’s format and has aired weekly since 2003.</p>
<p>It also has considerable value as a historical archive. Its extensive output – a total of 4,106 episodes – has been <a href="https://www.rtve.es/filmoteca/no-do/">digitised in its entirety</a> by RTVE and the Filmoteca Española. It provides a wealth of material for researchers interested not only in Francoism, but also in the country’s tumultuous transition to democracy. </p>
<p>All of these topics, and more, have been addressed in the recent monograph “<a href="https://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/filmhistoria/issue/view/2948">80º Aniversario del noticiario del NO-DO (1943-2023)</a>” (“The 80th Anniversary of the NO-DO Newsreel (1943-2023)”) published by the scientific journal <em>FILMHISTORIA Online</em>. </p>
<p>The NO-DO has to be viewed with a critical eye, since it is as biased and effective as it is fascinating. However, when handled carefully it provides a powerful tool to help us understand, study and scrutinise our country’s recent past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223709/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Las personas firmantes no son asalariadas, ni consultoras, ni poseen acciones, ni reciben financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y han declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado anteriormente.</span></em></p>During the Franco dictatorship, Spanish cinema goers were forced to watch the regime’s propaganda newsreels before every film.Jaume Claret, Historiador. Profesor agregado en los Estudios de Artes y Humanidades y director del Máster Universitario de Historia del Mundo Contemporáneo, UOC - Universitat Oberta de CatalunyaRicard Rosich Argelich, Historiador y profesor. Investigador Predoctoral FPU en Historia Contemporánea. Miembro del Centre d'Investigacions Film-Història y del Centre d'Estudis Històrics Internacionals, Universitat de BarcelonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099672023-07-24T02:12:21Z2023-07-24T02:12:21ZCambodian strongman Hun Sen wins another ‘landslide’ election. Will succession to his son be just as smooth?<p>On December 24, 2021, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, 70, chaired a meeting of the Cambodian People’s Party, which has ruled the Southeast Asian country since 1979. The meeting saw his eldest son, Hun Manet, 45, <a href="https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50994699/hun-manet-unanimously-elected-to-be-the-future-prime-minister/">unanimously selected</a> to be the future prime minister. </p>
<p>After years of speculation over the identity of the strongman’s political successor, it was both an unsurprising and uninspiring choice.</p>
<p>A similar lack of surprise and inspiration encapsulates Cambodia’s general election this past Sunday. Even by the low standards of Southeast Asia, it was one of the worst sham votes in living memory. Up against a mix of 17 emasculated, feeble and grovelling opposition parties, Hun Sen’s party quickly boasted it had won in a “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/un-pls-help-cambodia-pm-hun-sen-s-party-claims-landslide-election-win-in-unopposed-election-20230724-p5dqnl.html">landslide</a>”.</p>
<p>The entire event amounted to nothing more than a gigantic confidence trick designed to foist a political reality on repressed citizens – formulated without their consent and enforced without their approval. </p>
<p>Hun Sen’s transition of power to his son is now assured. The only question is when. The strongman said last week it could happen <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thousands-rally-cambodias-ruling-party-election-campaign-finale-2023-07-21/">in a matters of weeks</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538879/original/file-20230724-79526-6g4pyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538879/original/file-20230724-79526-6g4pyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538879/original/file-20230724-79526-6g4pyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538879/original/file-20230724-79526-6g4pyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538879/original/file-20230724-79526-6g4pyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538879/original/file-20230724-79526-6g4pyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538879/original/file-20230724-79526-6g4pyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hun Sen raises a ballot before voting at a polling station in Kandal province on Sunday.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Heng Sinith/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Preparing for a sham election</h2>
<p>The campaign period for this year’s election featured the usual dose of manipulation and misconduct – all of which was aimed at guaranteeing few, if any, surprises at the ballot box.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-05-16/cambodia-disqualifies-sole-opposition-party-ahead-of-election/102350226">In May</a>, the National Election Committee barred the leading opposition Candlelight Party from competing in the election because it had failed to provide the necessary documentation. This documentation, ironically, had been taken in a police raid years earlier.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ahead-election-cambodia-amends-law-bar-non-voters-contesting-future-2023-06-23/">In early June</a>, the National Assembly amended the election law to bar non-voters from ever running for office, as well as penalise anyone who calls for election boycotts. For the fledgling opposition, boycotts were a new and desperate tactic aimed at discrediting the electoral process.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1683050281410625537"}"></div></p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/30/world/asia/cambodia-hun-sen-meta-facebook.html">In late June</a>, Hun Sen also had a very public spat with Meta, Facebook’s parent company, after its oversight board recommended his account be suspended for threatening political opponents with violence. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/cambodian-government-blocks-news-sites-before-unopposed-election-/7185151.html">And last week</a>, the government blocked the websites of several news organisations, including Radio Free Asia. It was all just business as usual in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hun-Sens-Cambodia-Sebastian-Strangio/dp/0300190727">Hun Sen’s Cambodia</a>.</p>
<p>The uncomfortable truth is such elections have never been more than a means for Hun Sen to hold onto power with an ever-tightening grip, as opposed to an opportunity for his opponents to ever gain power. </p>
<p>Since the occupying Vietnamese forces <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/15/world/new-cambodian-premier-named.html">installed</a> him as leader in January 1985, the ageing strongman has slowly but methodologically bent the political system to his will. </p>
<h2>How do dictators stay in power?</h2>
<p>How has he accomplished this feat over the past 38 years? Based on my research in the field of authoritarian politics, two significant factors stand out. </p>
<p>The first thing Hun Sen did was <a href="https://www.leemorgenbesser.com/_files/ugd/ca20d0_672663d4d08646d6b7e9af89c9ef9517.pdf">personalise power</a> by following the “playbook” of other strongmen like Paul Biya in Cameroon, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Idi Amin in Uganda. Among his actions across four decades of authoritarianism: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>he acted as a gatekeeper of the process by which people are appointed to high office</p></li>
<li><p>appointed relatives to high-level posts in the party, military and government</p></li>
<li><p>took control of the state security apparatus and created his own paramilitary group outside the normal chain of military command </p></li>
<li><p>and monopolised the decision-making process within the ruling party, while also controlling who enters and exits its executive committee. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>By 2005, Hun Sen alone had discretion over personnel policy and the distribution of rewards throughout Cambodia’s political system.</p>
<p>The second thing Hun Sen did was entrench a harsher form of dictatorship in Cambodia, transforming the country in recent years into a genuine <a href="https://www.leemorgenbesser.com/_files/ugd/ca20d0_0abb970b8b59403f930d59464c23c31b.pdf">one-party state</a>. </p>
<p>In July 2015, the government rammed through a bill designed to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jul/13/ngo-alert-cambodia-legislation-gives-government-new-powers-to-monitor-fine-or-disband">suppress</a> civil society groups. The law used arcane compliance requirements related to funding, reporting, registration and political neutrality to limit their operations.</p>
<p>Then, in August 2017, the Finance Ministry <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/cambodia-daily-newspaper-closes-over-disputed-tax-bill-n799671">went after</a> the independent English-language newspaper, The Cambodia Daily, for a decade’s worth of alleged back taxes. It was merely the start of sustained campaign aimed at ridding the country of an independent media. </p>
<p>The Supreme Court then <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42006828">dissolved</a> the Cambodia National Rescue Party, the only serious challenger to the ruling party, on the fictitious grounds it was trying to topple the government in a “colour revolution.” Hun Sen has repeatedly rolled out this allegation against anyone who disagrees with him.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1681164601382010880"}"></div></p>
<h2>How does one dictator pass the reins to another?</h2>
<p>It was against this backdrop that Hun Sen spent Sunday going through the motions of sanctioning one last sham election, at least as prime minister. </p>
<p>Having used his personal power to banish political opponents, monopolise the media landscape, disempower civil society organisations, crush mass protests and arbitrarily rescind the political rights and civil liberties of citizens, the path is now clear for Hun Manet to succeed him. So, what will happen next?</p>
<p>Leadership succession can be the Achilles heel of dictatorships. The process can sometimes encourage infighting among political elites and potentially plunge a country into chaos. The evidence suggests strongmen are more likely to give up power when they satisfy four preconditions:</p>
<p>1) <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/7718896/Nursultan-Nazarbayev-Kazakh-leader-of-nation-hatches-succession-scheme.html"><strong>Immunity</strong></a>: they can ensure legal protection for any alleged crimes committed while in office.</p>
<p>2) <a href="https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=20958"><strong>Security</strong></a>: they have a paramilitary force or formal position at the apex of the security apparatus.</p>
<p>3) <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/31/financier-bill-browder-says-vladimir-putin-is-worth-200-billion.html."><strong>Wealth</strong></a>: they have a stash of cash and/or a portfolio of properties to fund their retirement.</p>
<p>4) <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/19/cuba"><strong>Trust</strong></a>: they appoint someone to take over who can protect their immunity, security and wealth.</p>
<p>Having so far satisfied all but the need for <a href="https://english.cambodiadaily.com/news/rainsy-claims-hun-sen-sought-immunity-law-54185/">immunity</a>, Hun Sen is now well-positioned to pass power onto his son. </p>
<p>Typically, when political succession occurs in dictatorships, the new strongman receives the benefit of the doubt from a slew of hopeful foreign states and optimistic foreign journalists. This comes from a place of exhaustion and exasperation: surely he can’t be worse? </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1681205325255577600"}"></div></p>
<p>Hun Manet, who was <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/02/cambodia-will-hun-manet-be-more-pro-us-than-his-father/">trained</a> at the United States Military Academy at West Point and received a PhD in Economics from the University of Bristol, will be yet another beneficiary of this mindset. </p>
<p>But like the sons of other strongmen, such as Ilham Aliyev (the son former Azerbaijani leader Heydar Aliyev), Bashar al-Assad (son of Hafez al-Assad in Syria), Joseph Kabila (son of Laurent Kabila in Congo) and Kim Jong Un (son of Kim Jong Il in North Korea), Hun Manet has been groomed in the image of his father. </p>
<p>There is nothing to suggest Cambodia’s next prime minister won’t also have a sham election up his sleeve.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lee Morgenbesser receives funding from the Australian Research Council</span></em></p>Leadership succession can be dangerous for dictatorships, encouraging infighting among political elites and potentially plunging a country into chaos.Lee Morgenbesser, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2083582023-06-23T01:30:03Z2023-06-23T01:30:03ZSorry prime minister, Joe Biden was right – Xi Jinping really is a ‘dictator’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533602/original/file-20230623-27572-1n45fx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C4000%2C1982&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Manuel Balce Ceneta /AP, Mark Mitchell /AP, Leah Millis /Pool Photo via AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s not every day that a New Zealand prime minister takes China’s side in a disagreement between Washington and Beijing over whether the leader of China is a dictator. </p>
<p>But these are extraordinary times.</p>
<p>At a fundraising event on Tuesday, US President Joe Biden found himself talking about the Chinese <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/apr/15/pentagon-leaks-us-officials-more-chinese-spy-balloons">espionage balloon incident</a> in February. The president was in full voice, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jun/21/joe-biden-calls-chinese-president-xi-jinping-dictator-antony-blinken-china-visit">claiming</a>, “The reason why Xi Jinping got very upset in terms of when I shot that balloon down with two box cars full of spy equipment in it was he didn’t know it was there.” </p>
<p>He then went on to say, “That’s a great embarrassment for dictators. When they didn’t know what happened. That wasn’t supposed to be going where it was. It was blown off course.”</p>
<p>At a press briefing in Beijing the next day, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/21/biden-likens-chinese-president-xi-to-dictators">called Biden’s comments</a> “irresponsible” and said they “go totally against facts and seriously violate diplomatic protocol, and severely infringe on China’s political dignity”.</p>
<p>But from a strictly factual point of view, Biden’s “dictator” comments were spot on. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a dictator as “an absolute ruler of a state”. Xi Jinping would seem to fit the bill.</p>
<p>He is general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the 2022 CCP constitution states that the party is committed “to uphold the people’s democratic dictatorship”. </p>
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<h2>‘Democratic dictatorship’ in theory and practice</h2>
<p>The people’s democratic dictatorship concept was formally advanced for the first time in a <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/mao-zedong-peoples-democratic-dictatorship-commemoration-twenty-eighth-anniversary">landmark speech</a> in 1949 by Mao Zedong, who led China from 1949 to 1976. </p>
<p>The concept is a cornerstone of the Chinese political system, and establishes the theoretical basis by which the CCP historically led the various “classes” of people in China – the working class, the peasant class, the petty bourgeoisie and the national capitalists:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>to maintain dictatorship over the lackeys of imperialism – the landlord class, the bureaucratic capitalist class and the Kuomintang reactionaries and their henchmen representing these classes – to oppress them, to enable them to behave properly and not permit them to talk and act wildly.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/to-understand-what-xi-jinpings-concentration-of-power-really-means-we-must-turn-to-history-193303">To understand what Xi Jinping's concentration of power really means, we must turn to history</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It also serves as one of the CCP’s “Four Cardinal Principles”. According to the CCP constitution: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Four Cardinal Principles – to keep to the path of socialism, to uphold the people’s democratic dictatorship, to uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and to uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought – form the foundation for building the country. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>So far, so theoretical. But how does the people’s democratic dictatorship concept operate in the real world? </p>
<p>In essence, it legitimises Xi’s rule over China (from 2012 to the present). Indeed, it is widely recognised both in and out of China that he is the country’s most powerful leader since Mao.</p>
<h2>Dictatorship by any other name</h2>
<p>This is where Prime Minister Chris Hipkins comes into the picture. On Thursday he was asked by a reporter in Lower Hutt if he agreed with Biden’s “dictator” comment.
<a href="https://www.1news.co.nz/2023/06/22/hipkins-disagrees-with-bidens-assessment-xi-jinping-a-dictator/">His response</a> was: “No, and the form of government that China has is a matter for the Chinese people.” </p>
<p>The obvious response is to observe that, as a matter of law in China, Xi is the leader of a political system where there are no competitive multiparty elections. The seven members of the standing committee of the CCP select the general secretary of the CCP, not the citizens.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-and-the-us-are-locked-in-struggle-and-the-visit-by-secretary-of-state-blinken-is-only-a-start-to-improving-relations-207981">China and the US are locked in struggle -- and the visit by Secretary of State Blinken is only a start to improving relations</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Careful planning by the CCP ensures there is zero uncertainty as to who will be selected as leader of China at every party congress, held every five years. If that is not a dictatorship, then what is? </p>
<p>We may debate whether the country has a benign or a malign dictatorship. But a dictatorship it is. </p>
<p>Hipkins was also asked how the Chinese people could actually change the way they are governed. He replied, “That would be a matter for them.” But precisely because China is run by the CCP through the mechanism of a “people’s democratic dictatorship”, the matter is not up to them. </p>
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<h2>‘Bourgeois liberalisation’</h2>
<p>One hopes the prime minister gives serious thought to these issues before his visit to China and <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/132361398/chris-hipkins-to-meet-xi-jinping-in-china-next-week">meeting with Xi</a> next week. After all, history clearly demonstrates that dictatorships have had an adversarial relationship with liberal democracies. </p>
<p>Former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping characterised liberal democracy as an example of “bourgeois liberalisation” and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0920203X9500900401">launched a campaign</a> in 1987 against such unwanted influences. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-zealand-has-just-joined-an-overtly-anti-china-alliance-are-the-economic-risks-worth-it-183716">New Zealand has just joined an overtly anti-China alliance – are the economic risks worth it?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>And the CCP constitution states that the party must not just “uphold the people’s democratic dictatorship” but “oppose bourgeois liberalisation”. </p>
<p>The tangle the prime minister got himself into in Lower Hutt underlines the complex realities of heightened ideological differences underpinned by great-power rivalry in the 21st century.</p>
<p>It also reinforces the point that, in the third decade of the century, New Zealand must have a foreign policy to match those challenges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208358/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Khoo has received funding from the Asia New Zealand Foundation, the Australian National University, Columbia University, the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, and the University of Otago.
</span></em></p>When is a dictatorship not a dictatorship? When you’re a New Zealand prime minister and you’re due to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping, that’s when.Nicholas Khoo, Associate Professor of International Politics, University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2048342023-06-21T14:58:31Z2023-06-21T14:58:31ZRwanda: Paul Kagame is a dictator who clings to power but it’s not just for his own gain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524433/original/file-20230504-25-9wocho.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Kagame at a commemoration of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in April 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mariam Kone/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz0zdet/rwanda">recently said</a> he was looking forward to his retirement after 23 years in power. Speaking to the press in April 2023, he claimed he “may join journalism in my old age” – a somewhat surprising choice, given the poor <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/rwanda">state of the freedom of the press</a> in Rwanda.</p>
<p>But the chances that Kagame will actually step down seem rather small. After a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-rwanda-politics-idUKKBN0U209D20151219">controversial referendum</a> in 2015, Rwandans voted to extend presidential term limits, allowing Kagame to rule potentially until 2034. More recently, Kagame was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230404-paul-kagame-re-elected-as-head-of-rpf">re-elected to head the ruling party</a> – the Rwandan Patriotic Front – for another five years. And last year he suggested that he might <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2OBIiz0PJgQ">run for president again</a> in Rwanda’s 2024 elections. He said:</p>
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<p>I would consider running for another 20 years. I have no problem with that. Elections are about people choosing.</p>
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<p>While the 65-year-old leader seems to be open to the idea of retirement, he continues to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz0zdet/rwanda">feel duty-bound</a> to serve his country, saying:</p>
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<p>We have been having this discussion within our (ruling) party since 2010 but circumstances, challenges and the history of Rwanda tend to dictate certain things.</p>
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<p>My <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">research</a> suggests Kagame is not only acting out of self-interest. For the past decade, I have studied dictators – broadly defined as leaders who <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26798255?casa_token=H1VtUP6OXN4AAAAA%3ACN4ZMpqRQLjTVWADVkXNAy7DkihYbR37keo8XMMpN6KUdqpLTa1nJyH40iUKhIp-ZKKCl_xcF_PWJnL83ej-Sf_QMuCsg95AIYSyk3X67O8ptoy1N_AH">cannot be removed through elections</a>, or where political opposition doesn’t operate on a level playing field. I have tried to <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/289/289">nuance the assumption</a> that all dictators are <a href="https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/the-rationality-of-dictators-towards-a-more-effective-implementat">power hungry</a>. Some dictators are. But often their motives to rule their countries are more complex.</p>
<p>In my view, this is the case with Kagame. While staying in power is necessary to attaining his vision for Rwanda, it isn’t a goal in itself. Kagame’s end goal seems to be a safe and prosperous Rwanda, but not one that’s meant to benefit all Rwandans equally. </p>
<p>Although it’s prohibited by law to differentiate among Hutu and Tutsi, ethnic differences <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">still matter in Rwanda</a> – <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/rhetorical-legacies-of-leadership-projections-of-benevolent-leadership-in-pre-and-postgenocide-rwanda/916F556DD2CFAB34AEF40A509E4D9229">favouring</a> <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/11/from-ethnic-amnesia-to-ethnocracy-80-of-rwanda-top-officials-are-tutsi/">Tutsi refugees</a> who were driven out of their country in pre-1994 episodes of genocidal violence. Former refugees like Kagame.</p>
<p>Kagame is indeed a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">dictator</a> who <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">restricts</a> serious political opposition, independent media and civil society. But he doesn’t rule only for the sake of being in power. I argue that he’s motivated by more than innate self-interest, which is likely to make him more <a href="https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/the-rationality-of-dictators-towards-a-more-effective-implementat">persevering</a> in the pursuit of his goals.</p>
<h2>Kagame’s Rwanda</h2>
<p>The circumstances, challenges and history of Rwanda are intertwined with Kagame’s own life story. Following a genocidal killing spree that began in 1959 and targeted his ethnic community, the Tutsi, Kagame and his family <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/56058176?queryString=waugh%20kagame&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false">were forced to flee to Uganda</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">Life as a refugee</a> was difficult. Kagame was confronted with discrimination and became politically conscious as he grew older. This culminated in his role as the leader of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rwandan-Patriotic-Front">Rwandan Patriotic Front</a>, which fought in Rwanda’s civil war in 1990, and eventually to end the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">1994 genocide</a>. </p>
<p>Throughout his ascent to Rwanda’s highest office in 2000, Kagame has been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">pragmatic and ruthless</a>. </p>
<p>The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/rwanda-progress-or-powder-keg/">invasion of Rwanda from Uganda</a> in 1990 sparked a civil war. Kagame was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Stephen-Kinzer-Thousand-Rwandas-5-2-2008/dp/B00HTKBBR0">realistic</a> about what his forces were able to do and was <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">more open to the eventual peace talks</a> than many others in his ranks were. </p>
<p>Yet, when mediation failed and the 1994 genocide needed to be ended, Kagame didn’t shy away from <a href="https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/gsi.12.2.03">perpetrating mass atrocities</a> to <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">attain this end</a>. After he got into power, his <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/4876.htm">ruthless tactics</a> targeted anyone he believed to be an enemy at home and abroad <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/586476/summary?casa_token=fIZfzS2BSB0AAAAA:e79DaDyhEhWY5BqB4gCoA-JyMoDKnyGaFnrdv2tyHkX-ugS8M9lCzRfu5M7CRfhKic3IeK3iU6k">in the Democratic Republic of Congo</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-kagame-could-be-president-of-rwanda-until-2035-whats-behind-his-staying-power-204051">Paul Kagame could be president of Rwanda until 2035 - what's behind his staying power</a>
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<p>Kagame is also idealistic. He has consistently worked towards the same goal, against all odds, for most of his adult life. He sees the end as justifying the means – whether this entails sacrificing innocent lives to save others during the genocide, or sacrificing freedom for prosperity in post-genocide Rwanda. But for Kagame, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">idealism</a> goes hand in hand with pragmatism: </p>
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<p>If you are driven by the ideal, but you are able to recognise and work with reality, then managing this reality will help you to embrace it and get there. So, the marathon is the long journey we take towards development, it is reality. But we are driven by an ideal, and this ideal allows us to sprint forward; it motivates us; it helps us to achieve our goals and manage reality.</p>
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<p>Kagame has <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/828735733?queryString=rwanda%20crisafulli%20redmond&stickyFacetsChecked=false&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false&format=Book&subformat=Book%3A%3Abook_printbook&subformat=Book%3A%3Abook_digital&changedFacet=format">received</a> credit for the manner in which Rwanda prospered after the genocide into a clean, modern country with a growing economy. </p>
<p>These achievements are <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview">impressive</a> in many respects. But as various <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">studies</a> have <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">shown</a>, this growth hasn’t benefited all Rwandans equally. </p>
<p>This is because the president’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23018900">allegiance</a> <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/11/from-ethnic-amnesia-to-ethnocracy-80-of-rwanda-top-officials-are-tutsi/">lies with</a> his fellow Tutsi.</p>
<h2>Kagame’s mission</h2>
<p>In my view, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter/149350840">Kagame’s goal</a> is to create a home for the Tutsi population that was chased out of Rwanda before the 1994 genocide. </p>
<p>The president launched a project of social engineering where, on the surface, ethnicity <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/714811956?lang=nl&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false&queryString=remaking%20rwanda&stickyFacetsChecked=false">no longer matters</a> and the economy is thriving due to extensive modernisation. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">ethnicity continues to matter</a>. An example of this is that, for nearly 10 years, the Tutsi have come to be recognised as the only genocide survivors in the country. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">2014</a>, Kagame officially renamed the genocide “the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">How Rwanda's annual genocide commemoration fans the flame of ethnicity</a>
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<p>The name change suggests that only the Tutsi are victimised. Consequently, the Hutu are perceived as either <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">culpable bystanders or perpetrators</a>. It obscures the fact that moderate Hutus were targeted as well in 1994. </p>
<p>In addition, some scholars have <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Chronicles-African-Region-French/dp/9057187574">questioned the extent of Rwanda’s economic progress</a>. An Ansoms, a professor in development studies, states that the country’s apparent modernisation hides “<a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">the true extent of poverty and inequality in the countryside</a>”. </p>
<p>For as long as Kagame believes he hasn’t <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter/149350840">fulfilled his goal</a> of creating a prosperous and stable Rwanda that can be home to former Tutsi refugees like himself, he will continue to seek power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204834/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maartje Weerdesteijn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The circumstances, challenges and history of Rwanda are intertwined with Paul Kagame’s own life story.Maartje Weerdesteijn, Assistant Professor, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2041832023-04-27T20:17:48Z2023-04-27T20:17:48ZFriday essay: Stan Grant on how tyrants use the language of germ warfare – and COVID has enabled them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522488/original/file-20230424-22-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C9%2C3020%2C2269&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Uighur woman protests before a group of paramilitary police in western China's Xinjiang region.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ng Han Guan/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is 2019. There is a virus lurking in China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is warning that if it is not contained, it could infect the entire country. It could turn the country upside down. Tear at the social fabric. The CCP’s dream of harmony cannot withstand this. So they tell their people: this must be wiped out. Memories are too fresh in China of what happens when things spiral out of control.</p>
<p>China is a nation that barely hangs together. Throughout time, empires have risen and fallen. Bloodshed beyond imagining – on a scale almost unseen in human history – marks each turn in China’s fate. </p>
<p>The hundred years between the mid-19th century and the Communist Revolution in 1949 were brutal. The Opium Wars with Britain, the fall of the Qing, the Taiping Rebellion, the Boxer Rebellion, the civil war between nationalists and communists, the Japanese occupation – tens of millions were slaughtered.</p>
<p>The CCP knows it should fear its own. It knows what happens when people rise up. The party seeks stability, but stability can only come with force and threats. Nothing can be tolerated that strays too far from the reach of the party.</p>
<p>Now, a virus is loose. In 2019, the world is not watching. Not really. Some warn of what is happening, what is to come. But who listens? It is too far away. We are trading with China and we grow rich as China grows rich.</p>
<p>So, the Communist Party goes to work in secret. It is rounding up people infected with the virus. It is locking them away in secret facilities. Prisons. Isolating them. Choking off the virus at its source. Nothing short of elimination will do.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-the-uyghurs-and-why-is-the-chinese-government-detaining-them-111843">Explainer: who are the Uyghurs and why is the Chinese government detaining them?</a>
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<h2>An ideological virus</h2>
<p>This virus has a name. Uighur. Many, if not most, in the West cannot spell it. Nor can they pronounce it. Uighurs. Muslims. A people in the outer western regions of this vast country. People who have been yearning to be free. Who speak their own language. Practise their culture. Pray to their god.</p>
<p>They are a virus. At least, that’s what the CCP calls them.</p>
<p>The Communist Party transmits “health warnings”. As reported by Sigal Samuel <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/%2008/china-pathologizing-uighur-muslims-mental-illness/568525/">in The Atlantic</a>, and <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/infected-08082018173807.html">translated</a> by Radio Free Asia, it aims them at Uighurs via WeChat, a popular social media platform in China:</p>
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<p>Members of the public who have been chosen for re-education have been infected by an ideological illness. They have been infected with religious extremism and violent terrorist ideology, and therefore they must seek treatment from a hospital as an inpatient […] The religious extremist ideology is a type of poisonous medicine, which confuses the mind of the people […] If we do not eradicate religious extremism at its roots, the violent terrorist incidents will grow and spread all over like an incurable malignant tumour. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2018, Human Rights Watch released a report, titled <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/10/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs">Eradicating Ideological Viruses</a>. The warnings are there. Even if the world is slow to wake to them. The report says:</p>
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<p>Perhaps the most innovative – and disturbing – of the repressive measures in Xinjiang is the government’s use of high-tech mass surveillance systems. Xinjiang authorities conduct compulsory mass collection of biometric data, such as voice samples and DNA, and use artificial intelligence and big data to identify, profile and track everyone in Xinjiang. <br></p>
<p>The authorities have envisioned these systems as a series of “filters”, picking out people with certain behaviour or characteristics that they believe indicate a threat to the Communist Party’s rule in Xinjiang. These systems have also enabled authorities to implement fine-grained control, subjecting people to differentiated restrictions depending on their perceived levels of “trustworthiness”. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Uighur Abudwaris Ablimit points to a photo of his brother during a gathering to raise awareness about loved ones who have disappeared in China’s far west.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Christina Larson/AP</span></span>
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<p>Note the language. Biometric data. Voice sampling. DNA. This is ideological and it is biological. People are treated as viruses that transmit illness. If not stopped, they will threaten us all, is the message.</p>
<p>Human Rights Watch says in the name of stability and security, authorities will “strike at” those deemed terrorists and extremists, to rid the country of the “problematic ideas” of Turkic Muslims. Not just Muslims, but anyone not expressing the majority ethnic Han identity. As Human Rights Watch says: “Authorities insist that such beliefs and affinities must be ‘corrected’ or ‘eradicated’.”</p>
<p>This is not new. What the CCP is doing is what other tyrannical regimes have done. They seek to create what’s been called a “harmony of souls”. They want nothing less than to produce the perfect, subdued, sublimated human. Compliant. Passive. </p>
<p>In the words of Joseph Stalin: “The production of souls is more important than the production of tanks.” Historian Timothy Snyder says the Nazi and Soviet regimes turned people into numbers. And tyrants everywhere have used the language of germ warfare. They define their enemies as diseases or infections and they seek to inoculate their own societies.</p>
<p>Authoritarian regimes seek to sterilise and “purify” society. Listen to them.</p>
<p>Stalin’s henchman <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vyacheslav-Molotov">Vyacheslav Molotov</a> spoke of purging or assassinating people who “had to be isolated” or, he said, they “would spread all kinds of complaints, and society would have been infected”.</p>
<p>The architect of Hitler’s Holocaust, Heinrich Himmler, in sending millions to the gas chambers, <a href="https://www.museumoftolerance.com/education/teacher-resources/holocaust-resources/what-is-holocaust-denial.html">said</a> he was exterminating “a bacterium because we do not want in the end to be infected by a bacterium and die of it”. He said: “I will not see so much as a small area of sepsis appear here or gain a hold. Wherever it may form, we will cauterise it.”</p>
<p>And then there is Adolf Hitler, who compared himself to the famed German microbiologist <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/1905/koch/biographical/">Robert Koch</a> who found the bacillus of tuberculosis. Hitler said, </p>
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<p>I discovered the Jews as the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/27387/chapter-abstract/197176732">bacillus and ferment</a> of all social decomposition. And I have proved one thing: that a state can live without Jews.</p>
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<p>To Hitler, Jewish people were “no longer human beings”. He described the Holocaust as a “surgical task”, “otherwise Europe will perish through the Jewish disease”.</p>
<p>It is no mistake these regimes use the language of virus, disease and contamination. Just as a virus is to be eradicated, so too people are to be removed, eliminated or exterminated. These attitudes do not belong to a time past. There are leaders today who exploit the same fears, who focus on difference and create division using the same language of disease.</p>
<p>Remember what Donald Trump <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/06/donald-trump-mexican-immigrants-tremendous-infectious-disease">said</a> of Mexican immigrants? That they are responsible for “tremendous infectious diseases pouring across the border”.</p>
<p>And in China, the Communist Party <a href="https://theconversation.com/leaked-documents-on-uighur-detention-camps-in-china-an-expert-explains-the-key-revelations-127221">has locked up</a> a million Uighur Muslims in “re-education camps”, where human rights groups say they are brainwashed with Communist Party ideology. A virus to be eradicated.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-report-on-chinas-abuse-of-uyghurs-is-stronger-than-expected-but-missing-a-vital-word-genocide-189917">UN report on China's abuse of Uyghurs is stronger than expected but missing a vital word: genocide</a>
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<h2>Virus of tyranny</h2>
<p>The virus of tyranny has haunted our world. Albert Camus warned us of this in his novel <a href="https://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-albert-camus-the-plague-134244">The Plague</a>: the story of a rat-borne disease that overruns an entire city. His was a bleak vision of death and fear, of a city sealed off and a people locked down, then shot when they tried to escape. </p>
<p>Written in 1947, just two years after World War II, when the West was still celebrating the victory of freedom, Camus’s plague is an allegory of authoritarianism.</p>
<p>Camus wanted to tell us of the courage that swells within us, that when the plague was at its worst, brave people fought against it. But he cautioned us, too, that the plague can return. It is “a bacillus that never dies or disappears for good”, but bides its time “slumbering in furniture and linen”. It waits patiently “in bedrooms, cellars; trunks, handkerchiefs, old papers”, until one day it will rouse again. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Engraving of a plague doctor in 17th-century Rome.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paul Furst/Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In coronavirus, tyranny may have found the perfect host: a fearful population and all-powerful government. French philosopher Michel Foucault long ago made the link between the plagues of the 17th century and authoritarian control. </p>
<p>Behind state-imposed discipline, <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/discipline-and-punish-9780241386019">he wrote</a>, “can be read the haunting memory of contagions”: not just the memory of a virus but of rebellion, crime, all forms of social disorder, where people “appear and disappear, live and die”. It is the state that brings order to the fear: “everyone locked up in his cage, everyone at his window, answering to his name and showing himself when asked”. </p>
<p>In the response to the plague, Foucault saw the forerunner of the modern prison: the panopticon; the all-seeing eye.</p>
<p>The plague-stricken village, <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/discipline-and-punish-9780241386019">wrote Foucault</a>, is </p>
<blockquote>
<p>traversed throughout with hierarchy, surveillance, observation, writing; the town immobilised by the functioning of an extensive power that bears in a distinct way over all individual bodies – this is the utopia of the perfectly governed city.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The coronavirus shutdowns remind us freedom is the province of the state. The crisis has centralised government control. Around the world, governments have used physical and biological surveillance to control the pandemic. To eradicate the virus.</p>
<p>We have all become, to varying degrees, a little bit like China.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-albert-camus-the-plague-134244">Guide to the Classics: Albert Camus' The Plague</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>A strange illness in Wuhan</h2>
<p>Coronavirus emerges out of China in the dying months of 2019. I remember reporting on it. A strange illness is being detected in the city of Wuhan. Dozens of people are being treated for pneumonia-like symptoms. In January 2020, there is the <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19">first reported death</a>. Then quickly, deaths in Europe, the United States, South Korea, Japan, Thailand.</p>
<p>We are still so blasé. It feels so far away. We have seen this before, haven’t we? SARS, swine flu, Ebola. They come and they go. Life goes on. We go to the beach. We get on planes. We have parties. And if we have a cough or feel a bit under the weather, we most likely still go to work.</p>
<p>We don’t realise what is happening. I am <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/qanda/2020-24-02/11983216">on ABC’s Q+A program</a> in February 2020. Footage is shown of lockdown in Wuhan. People are barricaded in their apartments while police forcibly remove and restrain. The audience is appalled.</p>
<p>It couldn’t happen here, could it? An epidemiologist on the panel says, actually, yes. We have laws to allow for just these extreme emergency measures. Surely though, we agree, it isn’t likely.</p>
<p>On the same program is China’s deputy ambassador to Australia, Wang Xining. Minister Wang, as he is known, is an old acquaintance. A sparring partner. When I was based in China for CNN, he was my minder. He was appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to watch everything that I did.</p>
<p>In China I was arrested and detained, taken to Chinese police cells for doing stories the authorities did not approve of. I was, on several occasions, physically attacked and beaten. My family was under constant surveillance. Now the man responsible was sitting next to me in an ABC studio.</p>
<p>In the audience, a Uighur man asks a question. He was separated from his wife and child. He had come to Australia ahead of them, hoping to settle and secure visas so they could follow. He didn’t know where they were. He had family in the Chinese “re-education” camps. He was clearly worried.</p>
<p>Minster Wang defends the China COVID lockdown. And he defends the lockdown – soon to be called the genocide – of the Uighurs.</p>
<p>In this moment were twinned the two crises – the two “viruses” – threatening our world. COVID-19 threatened our health. Soon, we would indeed follow China’s lead and introduce lockdowns. And the virus of tyranny was spreading.</p>
<p>In 2020, as COVID crossed borders, so, too, did tyranny. Liberal democracy was in retreat. Freedom House, which measures the health of democracy, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">now counted</a> 15 straight years of democratic decline. From the post–Cold War boom, freedom was now being crushed.</p>
<p>Within democracies, too, people were falling under the sway of autocrats and demagogues. This had been a slow burn. Growing inequality, war-fuelled refugee crises and a blowback against globalisation had eroded trust. The poor and left-behind felt abandoned.</p>
<p>The devil dances in empty pockets. From the early 2000s, anti-immigration attitudes grew. Racial division became even more stark. Far-right parties made a comeback in Europe as barbed wire went back up on borders. People wanted their countries back and they were primed for populists. Türkiye’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-20-year-rule-of-recep-tayyip-erdogan-has-transformed-turkey-188211">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a>, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, India’s
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-pressure-builds-on-indias-narendra-modi-is-his-government-trying-to-silence-its-critics-159799">Narendra Modi</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-philippines-is-set-for-a-fiery-election-even-without-any-dutertes-at-least-for-now-169535">Rodrigo Duterte</a> in the Philippines, Brazil’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-now-for-brazil-president-lula-strengthened-but-bolsonaro-supporters-wont-go-quietly-197530">Jair Bolsonaro</a> – all would come to power. Each spouted easy solutions to complex problems. Each divided to conquer.</p>
<p>Into the picture came a political circus act. A Manhattan real estate billionaire and reality television star. Donald Trump styled himself as the anti-politician. He promised to “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-drain-the-swamp/2020/10/24/52c7682c-0a5a-11eb-9be6-cf25fb429f1a_story.html">drain the swamp</a>” and “make America great again”. Eight years of the first Black president of the United States, Barack Obama, ended in 2016 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-victory-will-mean-the-end-of-us-soft-power-68654">with the election</a> of a man who exploited racism.</p>
<p>To populists, COVID-19 initially was a boon. They seized on it to strengthen their grip on their countries. This was the state of the world in 2020, when the virus took hold. This was a perfect storm. A virus that robbed us of our freedom just as democracy was imploding and freedom was in retreat. And China was proudly boasting that its authoritarianism was ascendant.</p>
<p>If the 20th century was a triumph of democracy, the 21st century, to China’s Xi Jinping, would crown the China dream.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kafkaesque-true-stories-of-ordinary-people-inside-the-first-days-of-covid-19-in-wuhan-china-180039">'Kafkaesque' true stories of ordinary people: inside the first days of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Plagues, political repression and violence</h2>
<p>Plagues have historically been a harbinger of political repression and violence. The Spanish flu after World War I <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/1918-flu-pandemic-boosted-support-for-the-nazis-fed-study-claims.html">contributed to</a> the rise of the extreme right in Germany. The Black Death in the 14th century <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-black-death">unleashed violence</a> against Jews.</p>
<p>Sydney University Professor of Jurisprudence Wojciech Sadurski, in his book <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/pandemic-of-populists/E75407A3309F868636BBA65F9F1ED783">A Pandemic of Populists</a>, says COVID has been a “powerful accelerator of many of the pre-existing trends, both negative and positive, in business, culture and politics”. </p>
<p>Populist leaders declared states of emergency and, as Sadurski writes, pushed them “well beyond the limits of the necessary”. Viktor Orbán <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-europe/how-viktor-orban-used-the-coronavirus-to-seize-more-power">set aside parliament</a>. He was a one-man government. People critical of him could be arrested. In <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_misinformation_in_the_Philippines">the Philippines</a>, as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/17/fake-news-real-arrests/">in India</a>, police were given powers to detain anyone “spreading misinformation” or inciting mistrust.</p>
<p>Sadurski points out that, in most cases, these authoritarian leaders used militaristic language. Fighting COVID was a war. The people were conscripted.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán set aside parliament and became a one-man government during COVID. He’s pictured here with medical supplies flown from China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tomas Kovacs/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Xi Jinping is not a populist leader. He doesn’t seek legitimacy at the ballot box. He is an authoritarian. And he believes his system is better. To Xi, the battle against coronavirus is <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/02/13/805760466/china-declares-peoples-war-on-covid-19-including-reporting-family-and-friends">also a war</a>: a “people’s war”.</p>
<p>It has been a war without end. Xi cannot allow the virus to win. Long after lockdowns passed elsewhere, Xi continued to keep a stranglehold on COVID flares. It has weakened the economy. It is straining nerves. People are angry. There have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-strict-covid-zero-policy-are-sweeping-china-its-anyones-guess-what-happens-now-195442">protests</a>. Some are even calling for Xi to go.</p>
<p>But Xi has strengthened his grip. By <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/26/asia/china-xi-jinping-president-intl/index.html">altering the constitution</a> and scrapping two-term presidential limits, he is now leader for life. Under cover of fighting COVID, he has used <a href="https://melbourneasiareview.edu.au/covid-19-and-the-rise-of-the-surveillance-state-in-china/">enhanced surveillance</a> and tracking technology to peer into every part of people’s lives. The COVID crackdown <a href="https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00829/">coincided</a> with crushing democracy in Hong Kong. He has arrested dissidents. Silenced rivals. He is <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/china-ready-fight-after-3-days-large-scale/story?id=98494152#:%7E:text=TAIPEI%2C%20Taiwan%20%2D%2D%20China's,McCarthy%20in%20the%20United%20States.">threatening</a> war on Taiwan.</p>
<p>And Uighurs remain a target. Still a “virus” to be eliminated.</p>
<h2>A hinge point of history</h2>
<p>We are at a hinge point of history. Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, there is <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/03/06/sliding-toward-a-new-cold-war">talk</a> of Cold War 2.0. The United States is staring down a new rival: China. We are witnessing a return of great power rivalry. It is a supercharged great power rivalry. </p>
<p>China is <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-soviet-union-containment-polarization-foreign-policy-11639526097">more powerful</a> today than the Soviet Union was then, and the United States is unquestionably diminished. America is politically fractured, it is deeply divided along racial and class lines; it has <a href="https://theconversation.com/american-exceptionalism-the-poison-that-cannot-protect-its-children-from-violent-death-184045">an epidemic</a> of gun violence and it has been devastated by coronavirus.</p>
<p>Donald Trump thought he was bigger than COVID. He was slow to act, he was dismissive and his populism was eventually revealed as reckless. Yes, he fast-tracked vaccine research and production. But he was a master of mixed messaging and so much damage was done. At the time of writing, in the United States there have been more than <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/28/us-records-100-million-covid-cases-but-more-than-200-million-americans-have-probably-had-it.html#:%7E:text=The%20U.S.%20has%20officially%20recorded,even%20more%20difficult%20to%20control.">100 million cases</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/15/1-million-us-covid-deaths-effects">one million deaths</a>. The only country to reach that number. Trump lost office.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Donald Trump thought he was bigger than COVID – and lost office.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">zz/Dennis Van Tine/STAR MAX/IPx/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By contrast, Xi Jinping is entrenched in power. The country where COVID first emerged is the world’s biggest engine of economic growth. It is on track <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereksaul/2022/12/06/china-and-india-will-overtake-us-economically-by-2075-goldman-sachs-economists-say/?sh=3f8d5a358ea9">to usurp the United States</a> as the single biggest economy in the world. It is extending its influence and economic reach via the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, the biggest investment and infrastructure program the world has ever seen.</p>
<p>Xi is building an army to match his economic might. And he is leading the way on artificial intelligence research. The numbers tell the story. In the 20 years between 1997 and 2017, China’s global share of research papers <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/china-rises-first-place-most-cited-papers">increased</a> from just over 4 per cent to nearly 28 per cent. And what is it focusing on? Speech and image recognition. The Chinese Communist Party can track anyone, anywhere, anytime.</p>
<p>Technology was meant to liberate us. Some saw the death knell for authoritarian regimes. How can you control the internet? But China has. Cyberspace has become a tool of tyranny. China has taken the digital age and put it in service of genocide.</p>
<p>There are lessons here for journalists. Our job is not to simply report events, it is to connect them. To join the dots. To reveal the big forces at play in our world. We missed this opportunity.</p>
<p>We cannot understand the COVID pandemic and its impact without understanding the currents shaping our world. COVID emerged out of China at a time when Xi Jinping had his eyes on global supremacy. He had shown how far he would be prepared to go to “harmonise” the nation. He had trialled his lockdown measures on what he callously called the “virus” of the Uighurs. </p>
<p>Around the world, democracy was in retreat and authoritarianism on the march. And now a virus was spreading that would attack the liberal democratic West where it believed it was strongest: its freedom.</p>
<p>Media can so easily be overwhelmed by events. One of the most common failings – particularly of television – is to report what we see, not what it means. Images can drive coverage. And images of people in white suits locking down entire cities obscured what was even more important. COVID was a 21st-century virus; a virus of a globalised world, of high-speed travel and borderless trade. It was also a virus of an increasingly authoritarian world.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic was a stress test. It revealed and accelerated fault lines already there. Populists were stripped bare. Their slogans, easy answers and arrogance meant they were slow to act. Millions died who might otherwise have lived. In strong democracies where there is trust in science and authority, countries emerged stronger. Yet they, too, walked a fine line between surrendering liberty and saving lives.</p>
<p>In China, Xi Jinping believes the People’s War is <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/china-declares-victory-over-both-the-coronavirus-and-critics-of-the-communist-party-at-the-biggest-political-event-of-the-year">a victory</a> for the Communist Party. The Party – the all-seeing eye – can control everything. It sits at the heart of everything. Xi believes he is the fulfilment of prophecy. The man who follows the great leaders, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. The one who delivers on China’s greatness.</p>
<p>Xi walks a tightrope, too. He has strained the nation to breaking point. The relentless, cruel lockdowns have slowed the economy and crushed the spirit of Chinese people. And they are angry and rising. China, like the rest of the world, is also reaching a tipping point.</p>
<p>In December 2022, Xi felt the pressure from the Chinese people, following mass demonstrations and unrest, and lifted the lockdowns abruptly. COVID quickly ran rampant. However, though the COVID lockdowns have ended, the Uighurs continue to suffer.</p>
<p>The virus of tyranny sleeps within democracy, too. It has always been in our bloodstream. China has edged us, the democracies, closer to what political scientist Vladimir Tismaneanu <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520282209/the-devil-in-history">has called</a> “the age of total administration and inescapable alienation”.</p>
<p>The COVID pandemic has passed, at least as a political crisis. Our minds are turned now to <a href="https://theconversation.com/essentialising-russia-wont-end-the-war-against-ukraine-might-real-and-credible-force-be-the-answer-195938">war in Ukraine</a> and economic strife. But journalists must remember that, as in contagions past, COVID will shape us. It leaves behind the trace of tyranny. And that is the true virus. The virus that will not die.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is an edited extract from <a href="https://publishing.monash.edu/product/pandemedia/">Panemedia: How Covid Changed Journalism</a> (Monash University Press).</em></p>
<p><em>This essay was originally written in November 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204183/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stan Grant does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s Xi Xinping had trialled his COVID lockdown measures on what he callously called the ‘virus’ of the Uighurs, writes Stan Grant. COVID lockdowns are now over, but the trace of tyranny remains.Stan Grant, Vice Chancellors Chair Australian/Indigenous Belonging, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1995642023-03-08T12:08:44Z2023-03-08T12:08:44Z70 years after his death, Stalin’s ghost still haunts Russia<p>Seventy years ago, on the night of March 5, 1953, a certain Joseph Vissarionovitch Djougachvili breathed his last. He was better known under his <em>nom de guerre</em>, Stalin, “The Man of Steel”.</p>
<p>An oppressed people; a reign of Terror in the name of government; real enemies, or imaginary ones, forced to confess under torture to the most absurd of crimes; mass graves; purges; deportations; famines, censorship and “total” propaganda; a war waged against Hitler for the unimaginable price of 27 million Soviet dead; a divided Europe; and a Cold War on the point of heating up: <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/2010/09/23/naimark-stalin-genocide-092310/">this was the inheritance left by the “Vodj”</a> (The Leader).</p>
<p>Three years after his death, in February 1956, his successor Nikita Khrushchev denounced “the excesses of his personality cult” <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2753/RSH1061-1983500301?journalCode=mrsh20">during the 20th Congress of the Communist Party</a>. In 1961, his body was finally withdrawn from Lenin’s Mausoleum, on the Red Square, in Moscow, to be placed in more modest surroundings in the necropolis near the Kremlin wall. During the Perestroika, archives were opened and the truth on the 30 years of his reign was revealed. </p>
<p>But this repudiation did not last long. If polls are to be believed, Russians <a href="https://khpg.org/en/1608809237">have become increasingly fond of him</a>. The explanations for this are multiple. They do have a lot to do of course with the personality and the historical vision of the man who has been sitting in the Kremlin since 2000 and who views his distant predecessor both as an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/09/09/how-putins-russia-is-erasing-the-memory-of-stalins-crimes/">“effective manager”</a> and also as the symbol of the victory of the Second World War. However, harking back to Stalin can also be inconvenient for Putin.</p>
<h2>A relatively recent return to grace</h2>
<p>The “Stalinist Revival”, it must be emphasised, is a more recent phenomenon than one might imagine. In 2008, at the end of Vladimir Putin’s second term, 60% of those surveyed by the Levada Center (one of the country’s main polling organisations) said that the crimes committed in Stalin’s era were unjustified. In 2012, at the end of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential mandate, <a href="https://meduza.io/news/2021/06/23/levada-tsentr-v-rosssii-56-oproshennyh-schitayut-stalina-velikim-vozhdem-v-ukraine-16">only 21% of those questioned saw Stalin as a “great leader”</a>, which was lower than the 29% recorded in 1992, less than a year after the end of the USSR.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512649/original/file-20230228-18-kzzwq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512649/original/file-20230228-18-kzzwq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512649/original/file-20230228-18-kzzwq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512649/original/file-20230228-18-kzzwq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512649/original/file-20230228-18-kzzwq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512649/original/file-20230228-18-kzzwq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512649/original/file-20230228-18-kzzwq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512649/original/file-20230228-18-kzzwq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Stalin’s tomb, in front of the Kremlin wall. Click to zoom.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tomasz Wozniak/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The dictator’s popularity took off again in 2015, the year after Crimea’s annexation. In 2019, 70% of those surveyed said that for them Stalin had played an either quite or very positive role. Only <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/politics/16/04/2019/5cb0bb979a794780a4592d0c">16% saw him in a negative light</a>. It was also from then on that young Russians, until then mostly indifferent to Stalin, started to express positive sentiments toward him. In 2021, months before the invasion of Ukraine, 56% of them considered him as a <em>veliki vojd</em> (a Great Leader); this was <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2021/06/23/otnoshenie-k-stalinu-rossiya-i-ukraina/">a new record</a>.</p>
<p>The primary reason for these favourable sentiments towards Stalin is historical: the “leader with an iron fist” is <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2012/05/russia-putin-elections-power/">a cliché deeply anchored in a political culture that is fundamentally conservative</a> and has never really experienced democracy.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Russians have not really turned the page on Stalinism. After the death of their Leader, the country experienced two small waves of “De-Stalinisation” under Khruschev (1953-1964) and Gorbachev (1985-1991), and then significantly a long period of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24468830">“Re-Stalinisation”</a> under Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko (1964-1985).</p>
<p>The Yeltsin years (1992-1999) were marked on the one hand by <a href="https://www.lexpress.fr/informations/le-lent-degel-de-la-memoire_613109.html">“an archival revolution”</a> that either revealed or confirmed the extent of Stalin’s crimes, and also on the other, by the absence of any real decommunization on a moral or legal level. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/08/world/russian-court-weighs-communist-party-s-legality.html">“trial of the Communist party”</a> in 1992, was a failure because of a difficulty in defining the Communist party, which had never been a political party in the traditional sense, but rather was an “instrument of power control”. Russia never knew its own version of the “Nuremberg Trials” with the PCSU in the dock; this could have educated younger generations. </p>
<h2>The nostalgia for “greatness”</h2>
<p>The absence of a communist “Nuremberg Trial” has played an important role in the failure for Russia to become a genuine democracy. </p>
<p>During the second half of the 1990s, on the back of the geopolitical and economic decline of the country, we were privy to the re-emergence of discourse and policies that harked back to the long tradition of a strong Russian state: (<a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/what-we-do/projects/jean-monnet-ii/perverting-power-vertical-politics-and-aesthetics-global-east">“the power vertical”</a>. This was a trend which was replayed and amplified during Putin’s two first terms, from 2000-2008. </p>
<p>Remember when in 2005, while expressing himself before the Russian Federal Assembly (the combined bicameral legislature of the Houses of Parliament), Putin called the dismantling of the USRR <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057">the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”</a>. That same Putin, during many years, kept banging on about this simple idea: it was Lenin, with his <a href="https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/su1922.htm">project for a federation of states, adopted in December 1922</a>, who was retrospectively responsible for the disintegration of the USSR. The subtext was that the “catastrophe” would never have happened, had it been <a href="https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2008/9/4/caa796f9-24f0-4e25-98da-4e98b20f18c8/publishable_fr.pdf">Stalin’s project for “autonomy”</a>, in the ascendant at that moment. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512650/original/file-20230228-24-cqr5t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512650/original/file-20230228-24-cqr5t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512650/original/file-20230228-24-cqr5t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512650/original/file-20230228-24-cqr5t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512650/original/file-20230228-24-cqr5t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512650/original/file-20230228-24-cqr5t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512650/original/file-20230228-24-cqr5t3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The portrait of Stalin is frequently held up on May 9 during the</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexey Borodin/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The war over memory</h2>
<p>Conspiracy theories form the core of Stalinophilia in Russia. Putin has frequently emphasised that even if he does not refute Stalinist crimes and the reality of the great purges of the 1930s, <a href="https://www.lexpress.fr/monde/europe/en-russie-le-retour-en-grace-de-staline_2135197.html">he is just as wary of criticisms of Stalinism</a>, which he sees as a means to weaken Russia today, in presenting it as a country that, in the end, had not changed much from its totalitarian past. From this perspective, Putin sees attacking Stalin as participating in a Western conspiracy theory, and an attempt to downgrade Russia to a second-rank country, or even a third-rank country, in contrast to its “rightful” position.</p>
<p>Criticism of Stalin becomes particularly suspect when it relates to its action during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) . The “cult” of this war <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/livres/article/2021/02/18/brejnev-l-antiheros-d-andrei-kozovoi-leonid-brejnev-yeux-grands-fermes_6070434_3260.html">finds its roots in the Brezhnev era</a>, when Putin was a young officer in the KGB. It’s through this cult that Stalin was rehabilitated in the eyes of millions of Russians, for whom he is closely associated with victory in 1945. The revisionist propaganda, alongside a legislative arsenal designed to fight any <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/2021-02-17/ty-article/.premium/russia-enacting-law-to-back-heroic-narrative-about-its-role-in-wwii/0000017f-f450-d223-a97f-fddd41b30000">“falsification of history”</a>, ended up being effective: the victor of 1945 eclipsed the tyrant of the Great Terror. </p>
<p>This policy of wilful amnesia has borne the results we now see. And so, in a 2005 survey, 40% of those questioned considered that the Red Army had been destroyed by the Stalinist purges compared to <a href="https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/06/22/levada-dolia-rossiian-vozlagaiushchikh-otvetstvennost-za-porazhenie-sssr-v-nachale-voiny-na-stalinskie-repressii-sokratilas-v-dva-raza">only 17% agreeing with this view in 2021</a>. Even the Gulag has ended up being relegated to the status of an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/29/russia-gulag-camps-putin-nationalism-soviet-history">“unfortunate side effect”</a>.</p>
<h2>Can Putin “catch up and surpass” Stalin?</h2>
<p>This being said, the “Stalinophilia” of the population nevertheless remains a double-edged sword, because it can also nourish resentment towards rulers. For Russians who express respect for Stalin, he represents in effect less of a historical character and more a <a href="https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/84991">symbol of a “Great Russia”</a>, a powerful and respected country, a Russia where justice and order reign. </p>
<p>The decision to invade Ukraine, in February 2023, must from this perspective be seen as a manifestation of Putin’s will to “catch up and surpass” Stalin, in a parody of a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1957/11/11/telle-est-la-prediction-faite-le-6-novembre-par-m-khrouchtchev_2322157_1819218.html">famous slogan of the Soviet era</a>. While speaking to the leaders of the counter-intelligence agency FSB on February 28, Putin asked his men to double their efforts to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-tells-fsb-security-service-up-its-game-against-western-spy-agencies-2023-02-28/">“eradicate the vermin who seek to divide Russians with the support of the West”</a>. </p>
<p>Is a witch hunt in the league of 1937 in the works? At least the Russians won’t be able to say they weren’t forewarned. They wanted Stalinism? They will get it! </p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article was translated from French by <a href="https://www.fleurmacdonald.co.uk/">Fleur Macdonald</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199564/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andreï Kozovoï ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Stalin, who died on March 5, 1953, was partially rehabilitated in the decades that followed. These days, he is in some respects a source of inspiration for Vladimir Putin.Andreï Kozovoï, Professeur des universités, Université de LilleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1939882022-11-21T09:33:46Z2022-11-21T09:33:46ZThe European Union in Syria: too complacent?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493529/original/file-20221104-10296-2qp6wd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C242%2C2044%2C1287&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dan Stoenescu, head of the EU delegation for Syria, during a visit to the territories controlled by the Damascus regime on 8 August 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=603503987803706&set=pcb.603504244470347">Dan Stoenescu/Facebook</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since 2011, Bashar Al-Assad has waged a brutal war that has taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of Syrians – estimates range between <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/06/un-human-rights-office-estimates-more-306000-civilians-were-killed-over-10">306,000</a> and <a href="https://www.syriahr.com/en/243125/">610,000 victims</a>. Overwhelming evidence ties Al-Assad to a range of <a href="https://onu.delegfrance.org/bashar-al-assad-is-guilty-of-war-crimes">war crimes and genocidal practices</a>, and the European Union has long advocated a firm stance against his regime.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/syria/who-we-are_en?s=209">EU Delegation for Syria</a>, which moved to Beirut in 2012, is designed to promote European values and supervise EU external relations and aid policy. In the name of pragmatism, it has recently tended to change its tone toward the Syrian government in place. What are the consequences?</p>
<h2>A firmness that only lasted so long</h2>
<p>Six months after the start of the Syrian revolution, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/the-right-honourable-catherine-ashton-baroness-upholland">Catherine Ashton</a>, then EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_11_504">demanded the departure of Bashar Al-Assad</a>. This was in line with the strategy adopted within the UN Security Council by the United States and a majority of European countries, including France and the United Kingdom.</p>
<p>In an August 2012 speech, US president Barack Obama defined a <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/obama-syria-foreign-policy-red-line-revisited-214059/">“red line”</a> that, if crossed, would lead to devastating consequences for the Damascus regime: the use of chemical weapons. Just a year later, Al-Assad did just that in <a href="https://www.state.gov/ninth-anniversary-of-the-ghouta-syria-chemical-weapons-attack/">Eastern Ghouta</a>, yet the attack remained without consequences. Washington’s reversal heralded the EU’s gradual shift.</p>
<p>Indeed, from 2015 onwards, the fear of a “refugee crisis”, coupled with the initial successes of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220228-russia-s-growing-ties-to-syria-amid-military-backing">Russian intervention</a> and the establishment of <a href="https://www.eurasian-research.org/publication/de-escalation-zones-in-syria-pro-et-contra/">“de-escalation zones”</a> in Syria, led the EU to focus on economic sanctions and humanitarian aid. It thus ruled out the possibility of trying to exert political influence to facilitate a resolution of the conflict.</p>
<p>At the time, researcher Dimitris Bouris and Anis Nacrour, former head of the EU delegation to Syria, <a href="https://www.iemed.org/publication/the-ins-and-outs-of-the-eus-shortcomings-in-syria/">asserted</a> that EU was “reducing its room for manoeuvre to the role of financial partner and provider of technical assistance to UN mediation initiatives.” With the West no longer calling for Al-Assad’s departure with the same vigour, Damascus’s allies began to assert that he had won the war – and this, despite the persistence of <a href="https://snhr.org/blog/2022/09/04/the-most-notable-human-rights-violations-in-syria-in-august-2022/">systematic</a> even <a href="https://aljumhuriya.net/en/2019/09/19/terror-genocide-and-the-genocratic-turn/">genocidal violence</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/9_L623CqWr0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Syria: EU humanitarian aid (2021).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The EU has gradually adopted the idea of an [“early rehabilitation plan”]plan (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/opportunities-strengthening-resilience-and-advancing-early-recovery-syria_en), is heavily involved in Syria alongside the UN, which has continued to call for a ceasefire combined with a Syrian-initiated political solution since the Security Council’s unanimous adoption of <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2015/sc12171.doc.htm">resolution 2254 in December 2015)</a>.</p>
<p>This cooperation is manifested in the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2022/05/10/">annual conference on aid for the future of Syria and the countries of the region</a>. In May 2022, 6.4 billion euros were mobilised.</p>
<h2>Recent EU diplomatic movements</h2>
<p>Until 2021, the EU delegation to Syria remained discreet about the composition of its team, its activities and its movements in Damascus. </p>
<p>That changed with the <a href="https://www.rri.ro/en_gb/april_17_2021-2635454">September 2021 appointment</a> of Romanian diplomat <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/410120_nl?s=209">Dan Stoenescu</a> to head the delegation. In his first official trip to Damascus, he met with Imran Raza, UN resident coordinator, as well as <a href="https://www.facebook.com/EUinSyria/posts/pfbid02fKLKchSbPkpxNxCyV2BhMGbAvoY6kPcjsRCjMZBFG2mSG1MHdiTKVZJcmXcUCAjgl">representatives of humanitarian aid agencies</a>, including the Red Cross, UNDP, WHO and the World Food Programme, as well as numerous diplomats.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dan Stoenescu, in blue suit in the centre, stands alongside the International Committee of the Red Cross president Christophe Martin and others, in Damascus, September 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=2985836848370514&set=pcb.2985841275036738">EU Delegation to Syria Facebook page</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With this first visit to the regime-controlled area, Stoenescu broke the European promise not to favour Al-Assad’s quest for legitimacy. The presence of European diplomats whose Syrian embassies had closed since 2012 (only the Czech Republic’s embassy remained open; currently, seven European embassies are open) also breaks the taboo of resuming a form of exchange.</p>
<p>The visits are described in full transparency on the delegation’s and Stoenescu’s Facebook pages. On 8 August 2022, Stoenescu goes on a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid031k9xXuqixD9QXhZSmbkGYjuRkZeMbSXD9N1zN8gnMLXME7aAnpvk5ewPbzkkvhocl">“four-day humanitarian mission”</a> together with <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/head-european-union-delegation-joint-field-visit-aleppo-homs-hama">Imran Raza</a>. Three cities under the control of the regime are visited for the first time: Homs, Hama and the <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Moyen-Orient/Alep-sous-controle-regime-syrien-2016-12-23-1200812506">martyred city of Aleppo</a>.</p>
<h2>Archetypes of humanitarian and reconstruction discourse</h2>
<p>The delegation’s communication is that of a diplomatic service addressing a European audience that used to observing <a href="https://ia800307.us.archive.org/22/items/OnRevolution/ArendtOn-revolution.pdf">“suffering at a distance”</a>, to use Hannah Arendt’s phrase. Through its role as mediator, it must inform the citizens of the member countries but also of the whole world and <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/208779/1/cbs-phd2011-12.pdf">convey its conception of a form of social responsibility</a>. No culprit is named: the delegation does not opt for what the sociologist Luc Bolstanski defines as the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/la-souffrance-a-distance--9782864241641-page-91.htm">“topic of denunciation”</a>, which “turns away from the depressing consideration of the unfortunate and his suffering to look for a persecutor”, only the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/la-souffrance-a-distance--9782864241641-page-117.htm">“topic of feeling”</a>, which directs attention toward a benefactor and the good actions he or she accomplishes.</p>
<p>The responsibility here is humanitarian: it mobilises the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1468-0424.00298">“iconography of help”</a>. Any case of suffering <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/208779/1/cbs-phd2011-12.pdf">requires a good action</a>, “regardless of what brought the suffering on or what the consequences of assisting might be”.</p>
<p>The European action is divided into two parts: early reconstruction in the territories under the control of the regime, and humanitarian aid for refugees and displaced persons. The political scope of this strategy is relegated to the background. Stoenescu’s <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid02S3J2LA5u8p5Xz883QkgVvJjFNiTQVVxxvTSS2jnuTEb6aAFy1HEWyeAFdu6CaqSZl">reaction</a> to the Security Council’s adoption of <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/security-council-renews-cross-border-aid-operations-syrias-north-west-six-months-adopting-resolution-2642-2022-compromise-amid-divisions">resolution 2642</a>, which limits cross-border aid operations in northwestern Syria to six months so as to prevent Russia from using its veto power, is an example:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The humanitarian needs of Syrians, the majority of whom are women and children, should not be politicised! […] Cross-border operations must be depoliticised and must increase.”</p>
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<p>Through <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid0BrwfHHq7wqyERtqftXxSeTRvt5AJrJXENfqPE6GCSxTzrJJVtkYsywGAzxYz51Rnl">passive forms</a> focusing on the plight of the victims, the names of those responsible for the abuses are carefully avoided, leading to a disempowering effect:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I am outraged by the recent attacks in northern Syria that are said to have killed more than 17 people […] Innocent people continue to be victims of this conflict!”</p>
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<p>Syrians, on the other hand, are described here as a homogeneous group, thus erasing the existence of oppressors and oppressed. To quote the delegation’s <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/syria_en?s=209">official website </a>: “The EU and the Syrians have a common goal: a stable and peaceful Syria”; “our interest, as Europeans, is the same as what the Syrians want”.</p>
<p>To support its discourse, the delegation uses photographs to create the picture of a people “rebuilding” themselves through the reconstruction of <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid088VMS5E1bYnQQSJkyQjT2tD9o9TFzrVxMRwPD5W6TDhsLAkmn92azNoyaX5Kj5gSl">schools, medical facilities, an infrastructure</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Dan Stoenescu at a school in al-Qusayr, 9 August 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=604297797724325&set=pcb.604299651057473">Dan Stoenescu/Facebook</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These emotionally powerful situations captivate the imagination of an often uninformed public, organise its <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674008014">“cultural knowledge”</a> of the region, and consolidate an idealised conception of the political situation in Syria. Thus, European readers discover “resilient” children <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid02rDsyh29SBjKTyYdZkm6JqGFRAyd9FYrkBFS49QXAmuLaFzjLrtLxApPw6FuwqyQ5l">colouring and singing together</a> in a youth centre in <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Moyen-Orient/Syrie-Damas-reconquete-dAlep-2016-09-23-1200791259">Aleppo</a>, or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid0PLoDgC684AMMWVrvbDhvZQbqG1eMJ8sATgKqQpTM86QCcvjCokjfAPC5mK4Wx2LWl">playing music</a> in <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/qusayr-rules-syrian-regimes-changing-way-war">al-Qusayr</a>.</p>
<p>Images from the <a href="https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/index_fr">Directorate General for Civil Protection and European Humanitarian Aid Operations</a> or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees sometimes counterbalance these idealised images. Refugee children, this time destitute, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/EUinSyria/posts/pfbid02ghGzhXBpdxGZ5xtLuWph7qfFZXsHKFjVAjDjHk2gZaz9ipMtiEa6ywhN81NPwjF8l">sitting on crates stamped “UNICEF”</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.facebook.com/EUinSyria/posts/pfbid02DnZ93CGdJhYz7339bRmnNQn3Szbk5jnGe3eu49JxJcVgmGULbLDGm243uLMNPrEql">mothers and infants</a> suffering from the cold of the camps in northeast Syria. These images <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1468-0424.00298">appeal to Western preconceptions</a> and emphasise the need to maintain international humanitarian assistance as it is.</p>
<h2>Early rehabilitation policy: what are the risks?</h2>
<p>The vision of the conflict conveyed by the EU and the UN has been denounced by politicians, activists, researchers and <a href="https://ifit-transitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Conclusions-and-Raecommendations-Toward-More-Principled-International-Support-A-Dialogue-between-Syrians-and-the-International-Community-31-March-2022-1.pdf">Syrian civil society organisations</a>, who warn that this policy must not be transformed into a political and financial support to Bashar Al-Assad.</p>
<p>At stake are the misappropriations of funds organised by the Syrian regime, which have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/oct/21/assad-regime-siphons-millions-in-aid-by-manipulating-syrias-currency">generated headlines</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/syria0619_web3.pdf">reports</a> alike. The <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-war-assad-millions-un-procurement-costs-companies">Syria Trust</a>, founded by Bashar Al-Assad’s wife, is an example of how international aid can enrich the president’s inner circle. The <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/09/04/paradox-of-syria-s-reconstruction-pub-79773">scandal affecting UN agencies</a> present in 2018 in Aleppo illustrates the risks of co-optation. The regime systematically bombed of the eastern part of the city, destroying schools, hospitals, homes, and infrastructure. Yet UN experts were forced by the regime to work only in the neighbourhoods of western Aleppo.</p>
<p>In such a context, Stoenescu’s recent trip to al-Qusayr – a city that was <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-battle-for-qusayr-how-the-syrian-regime-and-hizb-allah-tipped-the-balance/">violently recaptured by Hezbollah and Shiite militias in 2013</a> – raises questions. While described as apolitical and humanitarian, this official visit can’t help but endorse the regime’s strategy. In al-Qusayr, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-qusayr-idUSKCN1U20LP">2019 return of refugees</a> escorted by Hezbollah supported the regime’s official discourse that the country was now stabilised and safe.</p>
<p>Finally, the plan implemented by international agencies is not without dramatic consequences for Syrians seeking justice and accountability: reconstruction can lead to the erasure of war crimes, for example in the case of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/05/safe-no-more/students-and-schools-under-attack-syria">schools bombed by the regime</a>.</p>
<p>Consequently, the current UN and EU strategy needs to be challenged so that in the future it makes trusted local intermediaries a central part of conflict resolution. Such action will limit the leakage of European funds, corruption and co-option of humanitarian aid, and the process of normalisation of relations with the regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Élise Daniaud received a PhD contract from the LUISS Guido Carli University.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yahia Hakoum received a research grant.</span></em></p>In the name of contributing to the reconstruction of Syria, is the EU rehabilitating Bashar Al-Assad?Élise Daniaud, PhD candidate on Syria/Russia/Middle-East, LUISS Universita Guido CarliYahia Hakoum, Chercheur au Centre de Recherches Internationales (CERI), Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1934232022-10-27T18:04:19Z2022-10-27T18:04:19ZUkraine recap: the approach of ‘General Winter’ and what it means for the conflict<p>The next couple of weeks is likely to see Ukraine’s weather taking a turn for the worse, bringing first rain and then, as temperatures plummet, increasingly heavy snowfalls. “General Winter” has always had an important part to play in armed conflicts in this part of the world – something that Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolph Hitler both learned to their cost (Hitler was clearly an imperfect student of military history, given he appears not to have factored the catastrophic 1812 retreat from Moscow into his Operation Barbarossa invasion plans).</p>
<p>Once the snow sets in, it’s generally there until April. Frank Ledwidge, a military strategist at the University of Portsmouth, has spent a lot of time in these conditions and describes it as being like walking out of your well-heated apartment and into a freezer. Not that Russia’s troops will be bivouacked in apartments, of course. This time round, it’ll be Russians suffering the privations that Hitler and Napoloeon’s military experienced. Far from home and with uncertain supplies of food and cold weather equipment, morale will be difficult to maintain.</p>
<p>This, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-general-winter-is-about-to-arrive-this-time-its-not-good-news-for-the-russian-army-193247">writes Ledwidge</a>, is one reason for the attacks on Ukraine’s power plants. Vladimir Putin is only too aware of the onset of winter and wants the Ukrainian population to suffer as well. On the battlefield, the swift offensives of recent weeks are likely to move at a slower pace as first mud, then ice underfoot make rapid manoeuvring more difficult. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-general-winter-is-about-to-arrive-this-time-its-not-good-news-for-the-russian-army-193247">Ukraine war: 'General Winter' is about to arrive – this time it's not good news for the Russian army</a>
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<p>Meanwhile reports from the front continue to focus on Ukrainian advances in the south and east, particularly around the city of Kherson, where civilians have been ordered to evacuate to the eastern side of the Dnipro River in anticipation of bitter urban fighting. </p>
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<p>There is also continuing speculation about the prospect of a Putin escalation – and the form that escalation might take. Regular unsubtle hints about the possibility of resorting to the use of nuclear weapons continue to emerge from the Kremlin, but Stefan Wolff and David Dunn, experts in international security at the University of Birmingham, believe that Putin has several other non-nuclear options he can employ first. </p>
<p>They write that the recent targeting of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure – like the aforementioned power stations, is an <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-escalates-with-sabotage-and-false-flag-operations-leaving-the-west-struggling-to-find-a-response-193043">integral part of Putin’s war strategy</a>. And Kremlin claims (which Kyiv vehemently denies) that Ukraine has mined and is preparing to destroy the vast Kakhovka dam near Kherson would seem to indicate that this is something that Russia could well be contemplating with the warning simply a “false flag” to sow confusion. These sort of deniable attacks are an integral part of Russia’s military playbook. Meanwhile, the attack on the Nord Stream gas pipelines and more recent cyberattacks that have disrupted German rail systems and US airports are designed to get Kyiv’s western allies worrying about their own defences instead of just Ukraine’s.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-escalates-with-sabotage-and-false-flag-operations-leaving-the-west-struggling-to-find-a-response-193043">Ukraine war: Putin escalates with sabotage and 'false flag' operations leaving the west struggling to find a response</a>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
<em>The Conversation, a not-for-profit newsgroup, works with a wide range of academics across its global network to produce evidence-based analysis. Get these recaps in your inbox every Thursday. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapTop">Subscribe here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Another likely false flag was the round of calls from Russia’s minister of defence, Sergei Shoigu, to various of his opposite numbers warning that Ukraine was planning to detonate a “dirty bomb”, arguably less heinous as a weapon of mass destruction than a tactical nuclear warhead, but still something that would sow misery and confusion across a large area of Ukraine. The west has dismissed Shoigu’s warning, instead taking it as a hint that Russia is planning something similar. Christoph Bluth, an international security expert at the University of Bradford, walks us through what <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-are-dirty-bombs-and-why-is-russia-suddenly-talking-about-them-193250">dirty bombs are</a>, whether they’ve ever been used before and what their potential use might mean for this conflict.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-are-dirty-bombs-and-why-is-russia-suddenly-talking-about-them-193250">Ukraine war: what are 'dirty bombs' and why is Russia suddenly talking about them?</a>
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<h2>Putin futures</h2>
<p>All the while Kremlin watchers are anxiously looking for signs that Putin’s authority might be crumbling – something most observers believe is the best prospect for an expeditious end to the conflict. But Nick James, an expert in Russian politics at the University of Oxford, believes that Putin’s longevity will depend on the outcomes of the war, rather than the other way around. James gives us <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-if-any-are-the-chances-of-toppling-putin-and-who-might-take-over-193348">three possible scenarios</a> for the future of Putin’s leadership given different outcomes of his Ukraine conflict.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-if-any-are-the-chances-of-toppling-putin-and-who-might-take-over-193348">Ukraine war: what, if any, are the chances of toppling Putin and who might take over?</a>
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<p>We also have this fascinating parallel insight into the different between <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-difference-between-a-populist-and-a-dictator-the-ancient-greeks-have-answers-191719">populist leaders and tyrannical dictators</a>, with a bit of help from the philosophers and historians of Ancient Greece.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-difference-between-a-populist-and-a-dictator-the-ancient-greeks-have-answers-191719">What is the difference between a populist and a dictator? The ancient Greeks have answers</a>
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<p>Putin has attempted to justify this invasion in several ways and for different audiences. His appeal to Russians has been based on either the country’s imperial past and the idea that somehow Ukraine has no separate existence from Greater Russia, or the idea that this “special military operation” has always been about rescuing Ukraine’s pro-Russian populations from the “Nazi gang” in power in Kyiv. Russia has also run the line that this is all actually a defensive fight against aggression by an expansionist Nato. </p>
<p>But, as historian Ronald Suny of the University of Michigan writes, none of these justifications <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ukraine-conflict-is-a-war-of-narratives-and-putins-is-crumbling-192811">stand up to any serious scrutiny</a>. In the eyes of most of the world – and, given the growing anti-war protests in Russia itself – Putin’s narratives are crumbling in the face of reality.</p>
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<p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ukraine-conflict-is-a-war-of-narratives-and-putins-is-crumbling-192811">The Ukraine conflict is a war of narratives – and Putin's is crumbling</a>
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<h2>Bigotry of war</h2>
<p>In neighbouring Belarus, meanwhile, Alexander Lukashenko – one of Putin’s staunchest allies – clings to power despite his enduring unpopularity. Many people there look to reports that their country may be dragged into the conflict on Russia’s side, but there seems little or no public appetite for this eventuality. And many Belarusians feel as if their president’s friendship with Russia leaves them out in the cold. </p>
<p>As political scientists David Roger Marples of the University of Alberta and Katsiaryna Lozka of Ghent University report, Belarusians visiting other countries for work – or even those who have fled Lukashenko’s repressive regime – are <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarusians-are-facing-discrimination-and-blame-for-russias-war-in-ukraine-192828">encountering discrimination on all sides</a>. Even those who have aligned themselves with the exiled opposition leader, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, are being shunned or worse.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/belarusians-are-facing-discrimination-and-blame-for-russias-war-in-ukraine-192828">Belarusians are facing discrimination and blame for Russia's war in Ukraine</a>
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<p>While we’re on the subject of discrimination, the Russian state’s deep homophobia has been well known for many years. But since the war began, Russia’s exploitation of this bogus threat to justify its political aims has sunk to new lows. Announcing his invasion in February, Putin denounced the west’s “aggressively imposing … attitudes that are directly leading to degradation and degeneration, because they are contrary to human nature.”</p>
<p>Richard Foltz, a professor of religion and culture at Concordia University in Canada, presents some of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/homophobia-as-a-wartime-marketing-tool-some-russians-fear-the-west-will-make-them-gay-192826">more bizarre manifestations</a> of this extreme prejudice – including from Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill, whose contention is that the promotion of LGBTQ+ rights by many western countries is the “forcible imposition of a sin condemned by divine law” and that the invasion of Ukraine is a holy war against Nato turning Russian boys gay, something that would be almost laughable if it wasn’t so dangerously unpleasant.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/homophobia-as-a-wartime-marketing-tool-some-russians-fear-the-west-will-make-them-gay-192826">Homophobia as a wartime marketing tool: Some Russians fear the West will make them gay</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a weekly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Some of the key articles from our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past week.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1917192022-10-27T15:14:30Z2022-10-27T15:14:30ZWhat is the difference between a populist and a dictator? The ancient Greeks have answers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489615/original/file-20221013-9673-ammf7r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A statue of Plato.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Richard Panasevich/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Giorgia Meloni is Italy’s new <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/25/giorgia-meloni-sets-out-vision-for-italy-in-maiden-speech-as-pm">prime minister</a>. Her party, Fratelli d’Italia, received 26% of the vote and, as part of a far-right <a href="https://www.termometropolitico.it/1176989_tutti-i-partiti-centrodestra.html">coalition</a>, now controls a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2022/sep/25/italian-election-2022-live-official-results">majority</a> in both chambers of the legislature.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/wahlen-in-italien--ist-giorgia-meloni-die-gefaehrlichste-frau-europas--32742572.html">Stern</a> magazine, Meloni is the “most dangerous woman in Europe”. One <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2022/sep/24/giorgia-meloni-is-a-danger-to-italy-and-the-rest-of-europe-far-right">concern</a> is that her party are a “neo-fascist” organisation and so pose a danger to democracy in Europe. </p>
<p>Her victory poses an old question: how can we tell the difference between a democratic populist and an aspiring tyrant? </p>
<p>Twentieth-century experience suggests that highly ideological and totalitarian parties, such as Mussolini’s Fascists, represent the greatest threat to democracy. But <a href="https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/policy-and-engagement/documents/authoritarian-regimes-provocation-paper-v5-002.pdf">we can better identify</a> threats to democracy in the modern world using a wider range of historical examples. The 21st-century “<a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674660069">despots</a>” and “<a href="https://thecritic.co.uk/issues/august-september-2022/confusing-populism-with-tyranny/">strongmen</a>” resemble an older model of authoritarian rule: the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/03/23/the-rise-of-personalist-rule/">personalist dictator</a> or tyrant, in which power is vested more in an individual than a party or ideological group.</p>
<p>The first people to examine the puzzle of how to recognise a future dictator, and the first theorists of tyranny, were <a href="https://academic.oup.com/liverpool-scholarship-online/book/43261?login=false">the ancient Greeks</a>. Classical theorists, including Plato and Aristotle, identified two truths that have since been neglected by the western world.</p>
<p>First, tyranny is primarily <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/agpt/38/2/article-p208_3.xml">defined</a> not by ideology or behaviour but by the distribution of power within a state. Constitutions in the ancient world were categorised by who was sovereign (thus democracy is a state where the people, <em>demos</em>, have power, <em>kratos</em>). In a tyranny, one individual and his closest supporters have a monopoly of power and wealth. To identify a tyranny, the key question is not whether a politician is a demagogue but whether the state’s structures allow him or (much less frequently) her to consolidate power.</p>
<p>The second basic principle is that power corrupts and the distribution of power determines behaviour. If so, the tyrant – who possesses excessive power – will in time be corrupted morally. This observation is <a href="http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Hdt.+3.80&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0126">recorded</a> first by the Greek historian Herodotus (around 430BC). Herodotus claimed that certain Persian nobles debated what constitution they should adopt (in around 522BC). One of those nobles, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otanes">Otanes</a>, observed that the absence of effective legal checks led even good people to yield to the temptation of abusing power over time.</p>
<h2>Separation of powers</h2>
<p>Modern data goes some way towards confirming these observations. Authoritarian regimes tend to be associated with higher levels of corruption and worse governance than functioning democracies. At the most extreme end, “personalist” dictatorships (of which Vladimir Putin’s Russia is a current egregious example) are characterised by erratic decision-making, high levels of <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/706049?casa_token=ohirMfOf4cEAAAAA%3A1pn_g7qdZk5to4lydwTk72m-zdwpGieZhZrSUugavVSns36zjfTETc2rYujC1lKBI25gb9iakns">repression</a> internally and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/strongmen-and-straw-men-authoritarian-regimes-and-the-initiation-of-international-conflict/4352949B5F1550DD67076468BFB1BB8F">belligerence</a> externally.</p>
<p>The key is to examine the separation (or concentration) of power in particular countries. The overall health of democratic institutions, with or without nationalist politics, determines whether states are susceptible to democratic decay. An important factor (as demonstrated by data on <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm">regime transitions</a>) is how long these institutions last. Established democracies are far less likely to move towards authoritarianism than democracies in which constitutions are new or routinely altered.</p>
<p>Aspiring tyrants do not generally remove institutions: they prevent them from functioning properly. <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/2896">Populists</a> mistrust institutions, dictators use them. In the ancient world a tyrant such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pisistratus">Pisistratus of Athens</a> (ruled around 546-526BC) did not need to abolish the existing laws. One <a href="http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0046%3Achapter%3D16">anecdote</a> tells how Pisistratus attended a trial for murder as a defendant. The prosecutor, however, did not. He was intimidated into dropping the case. Tyrants can act this way, because they control who holds state offices. They also often possess a personal militia or means of coercion. One of Pisistratus’ first moves was to persuade the Athenians to grant him a bodyguard. Tyranny is thus a state where the law does not rule, but the tyrant rules by means of law.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-a-laureate-a-classicist-explains-the-words-roots-in-ancient-greek-victors-winning-crowns-of-laurel-leaves-191407">What's a laureate? A classicist explains the word's roots in Ancient Greek victors winning crowns of laurel leaves</a>
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<p>Modern analysts tend to focus less on the distribution of power and more on leaders’ ideologies, public pronouncements and leadership styles. In Meloni’s case, any resemblance to 1930s fascism in Italy sparks alarm. Many point to the origins of Meloni’s party in the <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/italy-election-meloni-far-right/">neo-fascist</a> Movimento Sociale Italiano. </p>
<p>Aspiring and established dictators come from all ideological backgrounds. Nationalist politics do not necessarily lead to authoritarianism. While xenophobia is often a tool of dictators, Fratelli d’Italia’s <a href="https://www.fratelli-italia.it/about-us/">promotion</a> of national sovereignty is also mainstream conservatism.</p>
<p>Victor Orban’s Hungary is an example of where a right-wing party (Fidesz) has not only won elections but has been able to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary">concentrate power</a> to a worrying degree. The government has increasing (though not universal) control over the media, there are widespread allegations of corruption. Judicial independence is now questionable and unlawful surveillance has been reported.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/italys-election-is-a-case-study-in-a-new-phase-for-the-radical-right-92198">Italy's election is a case study in a new phase for the radical right</a>
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<p>Criticism of Orban has focused on ideological elements of his programme, such as traditional Christian views on sexuality. This has helped Fidesz to rally support from the right. The EU, through its attempts at aggressive economic coercion, has also turned Orban into something of a <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1405479/Eu-news-viktor-orban-fidesz-epp-Matteo-salvini-afd-germany-weber">martyr</a> for those concerned by European federalism. For opponents of the European project, Orban and Putin are fighting a common enemy.</p>
<p>Based on these definitions, Meloni is not a dictator, and neither is Orban, although the second is edging closer as he seeks to control the major institutions of power.</p>
<h2>How to respond to populism</h2>
<p>Overreaction to nationalist populism in democracies can backfire. Orban has won four elections in 12 years. Meloni’s triumph shows that the politics of Europe remain unstable. A more conciliatory approach is needed to diffuse the toxic belief, held by many on the right, that the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/nov/26/democracy-rigged-trump-biden">system is rigged</a> against them. </p>
<p>It was possible to predict Putin’s monopolisation of power would lead to increasingly aggressive behaviour. Aristotle <a href="http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0058:book=5:section=1313b&highlight=war">noted</a> that “the tyrant is a stirrer-up of war, with the deliberate purpose of keeping the people constantly in need of a leader”. </p>
<p>Policymakers and the media need to distinguish between movements or individuals that legitimately challenge the political status quo in a democracy and those that are a genuine threat to democracy itself. </p>
<p>Democracy, demagogues and tyrants are all words used by the Greeks. Demagogues, or populists, are an inherent feature of democracy where all have equal rights. For <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520251687/whats-wrong-with-democracy">many theorists</a>, from Aristotle to the US Founding Fathers, this is a key weakness of democracy. But if western societies are to remain democracies, it is also an unavoidable part of politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191719/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edmund Stewart receives funding from UKRI Policy Fund. </span></em></p>The first people who studied tyranny were the ancient Greeks, an expert says.Edmund Stewart, Assistant Professor in Ancient Greek History, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1902222022-09-30T12:26:24Z2022-09-30T12:26:24ZNicaragua has kicked out hundreds of NGOs – even cracking down on Catholic groups like nuns from Mother Teresa’s order<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487153/original/file-20220928-24-dggq1k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=143%2C83%2C3850%2C2287&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nicaragua's lawmakers have closed NGOs in a string of decrees.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-of-nicaraguan-parliament-during-a-session-in-news-photo/1239277687">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/07/24/nature-of-democratic-backsliding-in-europe-pub-76868">countries around the world are becoming less democratic</a> as leaders in places such as <a href="https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/02/16/recent-downfall-of-democracy-in-nicaragua/">Nicaragua</a>, <a href="https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/03/07/what-happens-to-a-democracy-deferred-malis-delayed-democratic-elections/">Mali</a>, <a href="https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/04/20/viktor-orbans-hungary-a-democracy-backsliding/">Hungary</a> and <a href="https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/06/11/freedom-of-speech-and-media-in-bangladesh-the-exploitation-of-media-and-restriction-of-free-speech-as-a-tool-to-advance-electoral-autocracy-by-ezgi-nalci/">Bangladesh</a> seek to increase their power and diminish the ability of the courts, legislatures and independent institutions to constrain them.</p>
<p>It’s a process that scholars in political science refer to as “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abb2434">democratic backsliding</a>” or “<a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/719009">democratic erosion</a>.” We’ve been studying this situation in Nicaragua, and we see it as emblematic of the global trend.</p>
<p>Unlike <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/on-democratic-backsliding/">the regime changes of the 20th century</a>, in which dictatorships sprang up overnight after violent revolutions and military coups, today’s autocrats more subtly and gradually undermine the foundations of democracy. They rig the rules in their favor by weakening checks and balances in their nations and by engaging in manipulation that keeps them in power. </p>
<p>One method that today’s autocrats and the governments under their control are increasingly using to strengthen their grip on power is to crack down on nongovernmental organizations. They are branding these often foreign-funded groups, known as NGOs, as <a href="https://nonprofitrisk.org/resources/articles/foreign-agent-registration-funding-restrictions-for-ngos/">foreign agents</a>. Another tactic is to cast them – usually falsely – as <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf">money launderers and terrorists</a>.</p>
<p>All of these designations undermine the NGOs’ credibility and create a pretext for restricting their operations.</p>
<h2>Why NGOs are in the crosshairs</h2>
<p>It’s true that many powerful governments like the United States <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12041">fund NGOs</a>. Typically, this money pays for clearly beneficial work such as building roads, wells and schools or increasing access to health care.</p>
<p>Globally funded independent organizations, like the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/where-we-work/americas/nicaragua">Red Cross</a>, also fill these gaps and often rush in supplies and support after disasters strike. </p>
<p>However, many NGOs focus on assistance that buttresses democracy, by encouraging voting and other forms of civic engagement. And because of those efforts, they have <a href="https://nonprofitrisk.org/resources/articles/foreign-agent-registration-funding-restrictions-for-ngos/">become subjected to</a> tight government supervision and auditing. </p>
<p>This is especially happening in countries that are undergoing democratic backsliding, such as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/slavic-review/article/democratic-backsliding-in-poland-and-hungary/8B1C30919DC33C0BC2A66A26BFEE9553">Poland</a> and <a href="https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/62-special-issue/the-challenge-of-indias-democratic-backsliding/">India</a>.</p>
<p>Democratic backsliding is <a href="https://www.psa.ac.uk/psa/news/nicaragua%E2%80%99s-democratic-backsliding">well underway in Nicaragua</a> under President Daniel Ortega’s <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/nicaraguas-shift-towards-dictatorship-is-part-of-a-latin-american-backslide-11636476080">increasingly authoritarian leadership</a>. Especially in 2022, his government has been clamping down on NGOs and Catholic institutions.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman walks by a mural of a man holding his fist in the air" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Daniel Ortega, who led Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990, returned to power in 2007.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-walks-past-a-mural-with-the-image-of-daniel-ortega-news-photo/1236426762?adppopup=true">Orlando Valenzuela/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Stacking the deck in Nicaragua</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaragua-former-revolutionary-daniel-ortega-now-resembles-the-dictator-he-helped-overthrow-171235">Ortega first rose to power</a> in 1979. He stepped down from the presidency after losing a closely monitored election in 1990, only to become president again after a 2006 win. He has since been reelected three times, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/11/07/1053275827/nicaragua-may-be-holding-presidential-elections-but-it-is-edging-toward-dictator">most recently in 2021</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/11/07/1053275827/nicaragua-may-be-holding-presidential-elections-but-it-is-edging-toward-dictator">This phase of his leadership</a> has been rocked by waves of <a href="https://usoas.usmission.gov/oas-resolution-condemns-ortega-regime-in-nicaragua-2/">domestic turmoil and repression</a>.</p>
<p>One of the most troubling moments came in 2018, when the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/27/nicaragua-protests-leave-deadly-toll">authorities attacked</a> people who were taking part in <a href="https://apnews.com/article/e049398b9d9e495cb64eefe5134a4c62">widespread protests</a> over proposed safety-net reforms.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2021/302.asp">Estimates from outside observers</a> indicated that over 350 people were killed by the Nicaraguan police force, with thousands more imprisoned.</p>
<p>Nicaragua has since cracked down harshly on NGOs operating there, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/nicaragua-cancels-non-governmental-organizations-civil-society">prohibiting more than 1,600 of them</a> so far.</p>
<p><iframe id="YofuJ" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/YofuJ/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>More NGOs expelled</h2>
<p>A series of legislative decrees passed by the National Assembly, over which <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nicaragua/nicaragua-ortega-murillo-regimes-goal-obliterate-space-independent-civil-society">Ortega wields much influence</a>, have stripped these organizations’ rights to exist and operate in the Central American country. This status is known there as “legal personhood.”</p>
<p>The most far-reaching of these decrees were issued in 2022, sometimes with <a href="https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/nicaragua-strips-legal-status-from-another-100-ngos">100 NGOs or more</a> losing their rights at one time. For example, decrees number <a href="http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/Normaweb.nsf/xpNorma.xsp?documentId=8A1E857C6C19099606258893006829EE&action=openDocument">8823</a> through <a href="http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/Normaweb.nsf/xpNorma.xsp?documentId=EFC0DCAF996C6E53062588B00075B5F7&action=openDocument">8827</a>, passed between July and August, removed legal recognition from 100 organizations at a time, for a total of 500.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, lawmakers have issued a large number of decrees in 2018 and 2019 granting recognition to domestic NGOs. The largely religious and community-based organizations may have been encouraged to carry on the operations of NGOs that were being pushed out of Nicaragua. We have been unable to learn much about how these new groups are faring so far.</p>
<p>Throughout 2019 and 2020, <a href="https://www.ned.org/2021-democracy-award/colectivo-de-derechos-humanos-nicaragua-nunca-mas/">several outspoken NGOs</a> were forced to stop operating by legislative decrees, resulting in the seizure of their assets and often the imprisonment or expulsion of their leadership. This was accompanied by legislation that included the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/nicaragua-passes-controversial-foreign-agent-law/a-55291712">Foreign Agents Law passed in October 2020</a>, which mirrored word for word language <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/13/kremlins-repressive-decade">used by Russia</a> and other backsliding countries.</p>
<p>Nicaragua then picked up the pace of its <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/19/nicaragua-government-dismantles-civil-society">NGO closures</a>, including the expulsion of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/nicaragua">human rights groups and development agencies</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/nicaragua-expels-red-cross-representative-without-giving-reason-2022-03-25/">health care organizations</a>. Even <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-62076784">some Catholic institutions</a> have been sent packing, with nuns from the order founded by Mother Teresa leaving the country on foot.</p>
<p>Nicaragua has also <a href="https://www.catholicherald.com/article/global/nicaragua-expels-the-vatican-ambassador/">expelled the apostolic nuncio</a> – who serves essentially as an ambassador of the Catholic Church – in a move the Vatican called “incomprehensible.” </p>
<p>Among countries recently experiencing democratic backsliding, not all have such an adversarial relationship with major religious organizations. In Hungary, for example, Viktor Orbán has <a href="https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2022/april/orban-hungary-evangelical-election-voices-choice-conservati.html">considerable support from Evangelical Christians</a>. </p>
<p>However, in Nicaragua, Ortega has cast a wide net in clamping down on civil society, as demonstrated by the legislation used to restrict the ability of NGOs and other organizations to operate freely. This is part of a broader effort to weaken the electorate’s ability to prevent his further consolidation of power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190222/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>These crackdowns are occurring around the world in countries that are becoming less free because of what’s known as ‘democratic backsliding.’Kelsey Martin-Morales, Doctoral Student in Political Science, University of South CarolinaMatthew Wilson, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of South CarolinaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1867892022-08-16T16:13:53Z2022-08-16T16:13:53ZOperation Condor: why victims of the oppression that swept 1970s South America are still fighting for justice<p>Between 1976 and 1978, an extrajudicial <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/audio/2020/sep/18/operation-condor-the-cold-war-conspiracy-that-terrorised-south-america-podcast">campaign</a> of violent repression was waged by South American dictatorships against <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-4438-9709-9">political dissidents and exiles</a> who spoke out against domestic repression and military rule. </p>
<p>Operation Condor, as this campaign was known, has since inspired multiple <a href="https://www.penguinlibros.com/es/literatura-contemporanea/281637-libro-las-cenizas-del-condor-9788420461618">novels</a>, plays and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569325.2020.1801398">exhibitions</a>, not to mention a forthcoming <a href="https://www.mexicanist.com/l/the-ashes-of-the-condor/">HBO series</a>. The latter, based on The Ashes of the Condor, the 2014 novel by Uruguayan writer Fernando Butazzoni, tells the story of a young man whose parents fled Uruguay during the military dictatorship. </p>
<p>In 1992, a cache of about 700,000 documents were discovered in a police station in Asunción, Paraguay. Dubbed the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20774985">Archives of Terror</a>, these papers comprehensively recorded the activities of the Paraguayan secret police throughout the dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989). Ever since, <a href="https://discovered.ed.ac.uk/discovery/fulldisplay?vid=44UOE_INST:44UOE_VU2&tab=Everything&docid=alma9910784973502466&context=L&search_scope=UoE&lang=en">scholars</a> and <a href="https://thenewpress.com/books/condor-years">journalists</a>, in Chile, <a href="https://theconversation.com/truth-justice-and-declassification-secret-archives-show-us-helped-argentine-military-wage-dirty-war-that-killed-30-000-115611">Argentina</a> and <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780742536876/Predatory-States-Operation-Condor-and-Covert-War-in-Latin-America">the US</a> have investigated this <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3185071">transnational terror network</a>. </p>
<p>Between 2017 and 2020, I compiled the first <a href="https://sites.google.com/view/operationcondorjustice/database?authuser=0">database</a> on human rights violations in South America. I recorded at least 805 victims of abductions, torture, sexual violence, baby theft as well as extrajudicial executions and disappearances, taking place between 1969 and 1981. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Judges with official ribbons stand behind a wooden desk in a panelled court room." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A largely female cohort of judges presides over the 2019 Appeals verdict in the Condor trial in Rome.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Janaina Cesar</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How Operation Condor came about</h2>
<p>As I explain in my new book, <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/page/detail/?k=9780300254099">The Condor Trials</a>, a <a href="https://ladiaria.com.uy/justicia/articulo/2022/7/comenzaron-las-audiencias-por-el-segundo-juicio-contra-troccoli-en-italia/">new case</a> which has been brought against Italo-Uruguayan navy officer Jorge N Troccoli, constitutes the 48th criminal investigation into these years of terror, since the 1970s. The first hearing was held in Rome on July 14, 2022. Troccoli stands accused of the 1970s murders of two Italo-Argentinians and one Uruguayan national. </p>
<p>My research has shown that the <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300254099/the-condor-trials/">majority of Condor victims</a> (48%) were Uruguayan nationals. Argentina was the key theatre of operations with 69% of all victims being targeted there. Furthermore, the primary targets were political activists (40%), followed by members of guerrilla groups (36%).</p>
<p>Research normally places Condor’s beginnings in 1974-1975. My research, however, has shown that from as early as 1969, <a href="http://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/images/documentos/Capitulo6/Capitulo%206.pdf">Brazilian refugees</a> in Uruguay, Argentina and Chile were targeted and, in many cases, killed. </p>
<p>Within the geopolitical context of the cold war, the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414088021003004">national security doctrine</a> was formulated in the <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116191.pdf">United States</a>, founded on the idea that achieving national security trumped all other governmental concerns. Military leaderships in South America took inspiration from this doctrine to wrest control of their own civil governments.</p>
<p>The 1954 coup d'état in <a href="https://theconversation.com/paraguays-new-president-recalls-an-old-dictatorship-95993">Paraguay</a>, which saw President Federico Chávez’s government overthrown by the army, was the first. Putsches followed in <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-dilma-rousseff-stumbles-how-will-brazils-military-react-51088">Brazil</a> (1964), <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-zimbabwe-to-bolivia-what-makes-a-military-coup-127138">Bolivia</a> (1971), Uruguay, <a href="https://theconversation.com/general-pinochet-arrest-20-years-on-heres-how-it-changed-global-justice-104806">Chile</a> (1973) and Argentina (1976). </p>
<p>The military dictatorships thus installed <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781137527349">brutally repressed</a> all forms of political opposition. Thousands of illegal arrests were made. Torture and sexual violence was prevalent. Disappearances, baby thefts and extrajudicial executions were committed. The violence saw citizens throughout South America flee their home countries. </p>
<p>Brazilians sought safe haven in Uruguay and Chile from 1968, when domestic repression in Brazil intensified. They were the first to be targeted. </p>
<p>By early 1974, thousands of Brazilians, Bolivians, Chileans, Paraguayans, and Uruguayans were living in Argentina. Active in denouncing the <a href="https://sitiosdememoria.uy/sites/default/files/2021-07/libro_tribunal_russel.pdf">crimes against humanity</a> being committed across the region, they came under increasing fire from their <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/745598">respective dictatorships</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A wall of black and white headshots in a gallery setting." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 2010 exhibition on the people who were disappeared following the 1973 putsch in Chile.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Desaparecidos_Chile_1973.JPG">Marjorie Apel | Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On November 25, 1975, representatives of the security forces of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay were invited by the head of Chile’s secret police to a <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB239d/PDF/19751000%20%5binvitacion%5d.pdf">working meeting of national intelligence</a> in Santiago, Chile. Operation Condor was born. </p>
<p>The Condor system was composed of four elements. First, the secret <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/19870-national-security-archive-doc-4-dia-intelligence">Condortel</a> communications system allowed members to share intelligence. Second, <a href="https://www.penguinlibros.com/es/literatura-contemporanea/255015-ebook-los-anos-del-condor-9789566042501">Condoreje</a>, a forward command office, located in Buenos Aires, oversaw operations on the ground in Argentina in particular. Third, a databank in Santiago, Chile, centralised shared intelligence information. And four, the secret <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/18424-national-security-archive-doc-08-cia-report">Teseo</a> unit was tasked with carrying out attacks against leftist targets in Europe.</p>
<h2>How women have fought for justice</h2>
<p>A group of justice seekers – survivors, victims’ relatives, activists, legal professionals and journalists – have <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Left-in-Transformation-Uruguayan-Exiles-and-the-Latin-American-Human-Rights/Markarian/p/book/9780415541626">long been dedicated</a> to bringing these human rights violations to light. Many of these campaigners are women: the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3694051#metadata_info_tab_contents">mothers</a>, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/tla.12213">grandmothers</a>, wives, sisters and daughters whose lives have been directly impacted by Condor. As Argentinian prosecutors told me, <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/page/detail/the-condor-trials/?k=9780300254099">these justice seekers</a> “absolutely galvanised all investigations that occurred: without them, nothing would have happened”. </p>
<p>American journalist Jack Anderson first used the term “Condor” in <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/272795380/Anderson-Condor-South-American-Assassins">August 1979</a>, in an article in the Washington Post. However, as early as 1976, Uruguayan journalist <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03064227708532672">Enrique Rodriguez Larreta</a> and former trade union activist <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/amr130831977eng.pdf">Washington Perez</a> testified to Amnesty International and the <a href="http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/79.80eng/Argentina2155.htm">Inter-American Commission on Human Rights</a> about the ordeals suffered in Buenos Aires and Montevideo.</p>
<p>The Argentine general election of 1983 hailed the gradual return of democracy and constitutional rule to South America. Brazil and Uruguay followed suit in 1985, then Paraguay in 1989, and Chile in 1990. </p>
<p>In countries including <a href="https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=6849">Chile</a> and <a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l6683.htm">Brazil</a>, the outgoing regime sought to guarantee its own impunity with new amnesty laws. In others, including <a href="http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/20000-24999/21864/norma.htm">Argentina</a> and <a href="https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/15848-1986">Uruguay</a>, newly democratic parliaments aimed to prevent the return of military rule with similar laws. As a result, all criminal investigations into past atrocities were shelved. </p>
<p>Despite these setbacks, since the late 1970s, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/abs/operation-condor-on-trial-justice-for-transnational-human-rights-crimes-in-south-america/C2A765BAB0E45A1260053E1E8DC0AE82">multiple</a> criminal investigations into <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-research-review/article/remnants-of-truth-the-role-of-archives-in-human-rights-trials-for-operation-condor/2AF7021DD3F8050CB4FBED77487DFEBF">Condor atrocities</a> have gone ahead. Thirty of these cases have gone to <a href="https://global.ilmanifesto.it/in-a-historic-sentence-italian-court-orders-life-sentences-for-operation-condor-torturers/">sentencing</a>, four trials are currently ongoing, three have been shelved and 11 are in pre-trial. </p>
<p>To date, 112 South American military and civilian officials, including former dictators and government ministers, have been brought to justice. This most likely only represents a fraction of those guilty. While there is no official estimate of the total number of perpetrators, it is likely to be in the thousands. </p>
<p>This process is important for the victims, their families and the wider societies that suffered in the past. It is also crucial in preventing such atrocities from being perpetrated in the future. </p>
<p>Moreover, <a href="https://theconversation.com/khashoggi-murder-how-states-are-increasingly-repressing-dissidents-beyond-their-borders-106124">transnational repression</a> of <a href="https://theconversation.com/has-uzbekistans-repressive-government-helped-radicalise-its-emigrants-and-exiles-86887">exiles and dissidents</a> remains a pressing issue the world over. According to the US thinktank Freedom House, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/Complete_TransnationalRepressionReport2022_NEW_0.pdf">85 such incidents</a> occurred in 2021 alone. Justice for Operation Condor stands, therefore, as a clarion warning to authoritarian states today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francesca Lessa’s project on Operation Condor received funding from the University of Oxford John Fell Fund, The British Academy/Leverhulme Trust, the University of Oxford ESRC Impact Acceleration Account, the European Commission under Horizon 2020, and the Open Society Foundations. She has advised lawyers, activists, and prosecutors involved in the Condor Trial in Italy. She is the Honorary President of the Observatorio Luz Ibarburu, a network of human rights NGOs in Uruguay. </span></em></p>Instigated by multiple governments in South America, Operation Condor resulted in hundreds, potentially thousands, of human rights violations and extrajudicial killings.Francesca Lessa, Lecturer in Latin American Studies and Development, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1880262022-08-11T15:25:13Z2022-08-11T15:25:13ZBourguiba did a lot for Tunisian women. But was he their emancipator?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478707/original/file-20220811-14-y4negy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators gather in support of women's rights and equal justice in Tunis in June 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Yassine Mahjoub/NurPhoto via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tunisia’s <a href="https://publicholidays.africa/tunisia/womens-day/">National Women’s Day</a> is often associated with <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Habib-Bourguiba">Habib Bourguiba</a>, the country’s first president, who pursued the policy of state feminism. Bourguiba ruled the country for 30 years after its independence from France in 1957. In 1987 he was ousted in a coup d’etat by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Zine-al-Abidine-Ben-Ali">Zine El Abedine Ben Ali</a>. Bourguiba’s state feminist policies earned him the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-44617-8_10#:%7E:text=Habib%20Bourguiba%20made%20the%20best,%E2%80%9Cliberator%20of%20Tunisian%20woman%E2%80%9D.">moniker</a> of the emancipator and liberator of Tunisian women. </p>
<p>But was he really their emancipator? </p>
<p>Like most Tunisian women, I grew up thinking this idea was true because this was the message the Tunisian educational system and media had communicated. When I started researching the history of the Tunisian feminist movement, however, I discovered that the reality was much more complex.</p>
<h2>Bourguiba’s state feminism</h2>
<p>State feminism refers to the government’s adoption of policies that foster women’s rights and improve women’s lives. Bourguiba was the <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/27/state-feminism-and-the-islamist-secularist-binary-womens-rights-in-tunisia/">pioneer of state feminism</a> in Tunisia. He used his powers to pass reforms that vastly improved women’s legal status. </p>
<p>These reforms were imposed from the top down and promoted women’s rights in a number of areas. </p>
<p>A few months after the country’s independence from France, Bourguiba instated the Personal Status Code. This granted women unprecedented liberties and social autonomy. It eliminated men’s practice of immediate divorce and provided equal divorce rights for women and men. Women’s consent became required for marriage. The <a href="https://www.judicaelleirakoze.org/patreon-post-state-feminism-in-tunisia/">right of a guardian</a> to marry off a woman without her permission was abolished. Polygamy was also outlawed. </p>
<p>As a result of these changes, the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-44617-8_10#:%7E:text=Habib%20Bourguiba%20made%20the%20best,%E2%80%9Cliberator%20of%20Tunisian%20woman%E2%80%9D.">labels</a> “the father of feminism” and “Tunisian women’s liberator” were given to Bourguiba. The labels reflected the paternalistic and patriarchal aspect of the Bourguibist feminist policies. They also mirrored the state’s monopolisation of the feminist cause. </p>
<p>In reality, Bourguiba deliberately marginalised Tunisia’s autonomous feminism. Different women’s unions appeared in the pre-independence period. Yet, after independence, Bourguiba opposed, <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-nouvelles-questions-feministes-2014-2-page-4.htm">marginalised and dissolved</a> them. He outlawed their activities in the name of “national unity” and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2017.1391770">replaced</a> them with the National Union of Tunisian Women in 1958. </p>
<p>The result, according to Tunisian researcher Chouaib Elhajjaji, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/chouaib-el-hajjaji/feminism-in-tunisia-brutal-hijacking-elitism-and-exclusion">was that</a> he killed the grassroots movement and turned it into a government sponsored one.</p>
<p>Bourguiba co-opted women’s rights by linking the National Union of Tunisian Women to his <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Democratic-Constitutional-Rally">Socialist Destourian Party</a>. He transformed the Women’s Union into a tool for his state feminism. </p>
<p>The result was an ambiguous policy. It <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/clio/286?amp%3Bid=286&lang=en">presented</a> itself as freeing and modernising, while maintaining a level of conservatism. This is what <a href="https://journals.warwick.ac.uk/index.php/feministdissent/article/view/292">explains</a> Bourguiba’s reinforcement of women’s traditional roles as wives, mothers and guardians of Islamic tradition in his speeches, despite his revolutionary ideas.</p>
<p>Co-opting women’s rights served his nationalist agenda, but not the feminist cause. The women’s union could not criticise the state’s gender politics. </p>
<p>My reading at Tunisia’s National Archives allowed me to notice the constant praise of Bourguiba in the publications of the Tunisian Women’s Union, particularly its journal Femme (Woman). The journal refers to Bourguiba repeatedly as the emancipator of Tunisian women. Indeed, the fact that he appointed the union’s first president, <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/20200308-radhia-haddad-pr%C3%A9sidente-femmes">Radhia Haddad</a>, reflects his hegemony over this female organisation.</p>
<p>Haddad herself would later <a href="https://journals.warwick.ac.uk/index.php/feministdissent/article/view/292">criticise</a> the lack of freedom of expression and association. Other feminist activists, like Amal Ben Aba and <a href="https://nawaat.org/2013/04/24/zeineb-turki-du-parti-al-jomhouri-la-priorite-est-de-realiser-une-paix-sociale">Zeineb Cherni</a>, also joined in denouncing <a href="https://journals.warwick.ac.uk/index.php/feministdissent/article/view/292">the state’s hold on feminism</a>. The state cracked down on them.</p>
<p>This created a need for an independent form of activism capable of acting outside the state agenda. As a result, an <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-nouvelles-questions-feministes-2014-2-page-4.htm">autonomous feminist movement</a> emerged in Tunisia in the 1980s. </p>
<h2>Independent feminism</h2>
<p>The independent groups signalled their divergence from the government’s official “feminist” structures. They allied themselves with opposition parties because they saw a link between the fight against sexism and the fight against authoritarianism. </p>
<p>Tunisian feminists chose to qualify their activism as “autonomous” to <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-nouvelles-questions-feministes-2014-2-page-4.htm">differentiate</a> it from the state’s approach.</p>
<p>For instance, in 1987, the <a href="http://alraidajournal.com/index.php/ALRJ/article/view/1323">Tahar Haddad cultural club</a> was founded as part of the push for independent voices. Its growth was challenged by Bourguiba’s decision that only his women’s union could operate. This hindered the actual <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2017.1391770">political representation </a> of the autonomous women’s movement. </p>
<p>The Tunisian independent feminist movement wanted to end the patronage of Bourguiba over women’s rights. Activist Sana Ben Achour illustrates this in her <a href="https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/as/2018-v42-n1-as03619/1045124ar/">comment</a> on the determination of the independent feminists who founded the Tahar Haddad Club to achieve their goals in spite of Bourguiba:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our relationship {with the National Union of Tunisian Women} was conflictual because the Tunisian feminist movement was born out of the will to break with tutelage, more particularly with the father figure, the figure of Bourguiba … We no longer wanted to hear the discourse, which made Bourguiba know what was best for us, women.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ben Achour throws light on the important problem of Bourguiba’s appropriation of achievements made in the women’s rights arena. This centralises the father cult. It also erases the role that Tunisian women’s rights activists played in advancing women’s rights. The most notorious example of this erasure is the Personal Status Code, which was celebrated as Bourguiba’s achievement. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/chouaib-el-hajjaji/feminism-in-tunisia-brutal-hijacking-elitism-and-exclusion">Elhajjaji</a> explains, this has resulted in</p>
<blockquote>
<p>ignoring the female activists who fought for these laws. School history books rarely mention names such as <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-683">Bchira Ben Mrad</a>, Radhia Haddad and <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/feminism-in-tunisia-brutal-hijacking-elitism-and-exclusion/">Manoubia Ouertani</a>, but instead, it’s Bourguiba who is celebrated as the women’s ‘saviour’ and ‘liberator.’ </p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/state-feminism-in-tunisia-reading-between-lines/">Amira Mhadhbi</a>, who exposes the oppressive aspect of Bourguiba’s state feminism, illustrates this further:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>President Bourguiba was declared the ‘liberator of Tunisian women.’ … This initiated a culture of political patriarchy. By effectively outlawing other forms of political leadership, Bourguiba stalled the women’s movement in its broader fight for autonomy from male authority.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The evidence presented so far reflects the limitations of Bourguiba’s state feminism. It is undeniable that the state feminist policies he pursued have benefited Tunisian women and girls in multiple areas. But, if independent feminists were deliberately marginalised by this male figure, then can we continue to call him the emancipator of Tunisian women?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188026/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jyhene Kebsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Former president Bourguiba’s standing as father of Tunisian feminism has come under scrutiny.Jyhene Kebsi, Lecturer in Gender Studies, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1835762022-05-23T12:25:27Z2022-05-23T12:25:27ZPutin’s key mistake? Not understanding Ukraine’s blossoming national identity - even in the Russian-friendly southeast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464570/original/file-20220520-18-dedifa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=675%2C271%2C4501%2C3174&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladimir Putin has written and spoken about how Ukrainians and Russians are 'one people.'</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-seen-during-the-summit-of-news-photo/1240707725?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine in February 2022 has, thus far, produced the opposite of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-18/the-three-biggest-failures-for-russian-troops-in-ukraine/101071150">what he expected</a>.</p>
<p>Rather than deepening political <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin-west-eu-nato-f810a6d94524b804730a9704ad4f0a87">fissures in the West</a>, Putin’s invasion has <a href="https://morningconsult.com/2022/05/12/ukraine-war-european-union-bond/">united the leaders and populations</a> of the majority of countries across Europe <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/19/finland-sweden-nato-maps/">and encouraged further NATO expansion</a>. </p>
<p>Putin also seems to have believed <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/18/russia-putin-ukraine-war-three-weeks/">it would be relatively easy</a> to capture Ukraine’s capital and topple its government. Instead, the Russian military lost the battle for Kyiv and experienced <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/15/us/politics/russia-moskva-ship-sunk-ukraine.html">the humiliating sinking of its flagship Black Sea cruiser</a>, leaving Putin to oversee <a href="https://millercenter.org/putins-subdued-victory-day-speech">subdued Victory Day celebrations</a> on May 9, 2022. </p>
<p>These defeats, together with the deaths of <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3489148-uk-russia-has-likely-lost-one-third-of-ground-combat-forces-in-ukraine/">thousands of Russian soldiers</a>, have forced Putin’s generals in Ukraine to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frontlines-moving-battle-donbas-ukraine-mounts-counter-offensive-2022-05-15/">shift course</a> and focus their attacks on the east and southeast of the country - areas that are more linguistically and ethnically Russian. The <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-fighting-donbas-kharkiv/31851233.html">early results</a> of the campaign to gain control in eastern Ukraine were disappointing for Putin. Once again, the resentment of Ukrainian civilians <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-collects-russian-dead-war-rages-multiple-fronts-2022-05-14/">and effectiveness</a> of the Ukrainian military stood in sharp contrast to his expected outcome. </p>
<p>Most leaders’ decisions are based on a mix of rational calculations and preexisting mindsets. Putin is no exception. </p>
<p>One of his key convictions is that Russians and Ukrainians are the same people, an idea he <a href="https://apnews.com/article/entertainment-oliver-stone-europe-russia-ukraine-3fe3ff2299994fae97825381765b831c">has talked</a> and <a href="https://huri.harvard.edu/news/putin-historical-unity">written about</a> for years. It is an important part of why he proclaimed Russian soldiers would be welcomed in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Understanding Putin’s poor judgment requires a look at his failure to grasp shifts in how Ukrainian citizens have identified themselves since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. </p>
<h2>Drifting from Russia</h2>
<p>For much of the period since <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/12/24/1066861022/how-the-soviet-unions-collapse-explains-the-current-russia-ukraine-tension">the breakup of the Soviet Union</a>, Ukraine saw <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/01/is-this-new-era-ukrainian-politics/">notable regional differences</a> in levels of support for pro-Russian presidential candidates vs. pro-Western ones. This pattern reflected the reality that many residents of the far eastern and far southern parts of the country saw themselves as closely aligned, culturally and politically, with Russia. Those in the far west of Ukraine, meanwhile, tended to identify with Europe more than Russia. </p>
<p>The visible divides in presidential election voting masked an important set of changes, in which Ukraine was becoming increasingly more Ukrainian - linguistically, ethnically and nationally. Going as far back as <a href="https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Hrytsak_Yaroslav/National_Identities_in_Post-Soviet_Ukraine_The_Case_of_Lviv_and_Donetsk__en.pdf">the late 1990s</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4147368">early 2000s</a>, social science researchers <a href="https://www.marquette.edu/political-science/directory/lowell-barrington.php">like myself</a> have emphasized how Ukraine’s population, as a whole, was connecting less and less with Russia. At the same time, a discrete Ukrainian national identity was beginning to emerge. </p>
<p>This process sped up in 2013 and 2014, when the Russian-friendly President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, chose to sign an agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union rather than with the European Union. Yanukovych’s decision sparked massive protests, known as the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30131108">Maidan Revolution</a>, which forced Yanukovych to flee the country. Putin’s subsequent actions <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html">to seize Crimea</a> and aid separatist activities in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Donbas">Donbas</a> region of eastern Ukraine accelerated <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2022.2032606">the weakening of the country’s attachment to Russia</a> and the yearning among Ukrainians <a href="https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1083&page=1">to look westward to Europe</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://huri.harvard.edu/people/volodymyr-kulyk">Volodymyr Kulyk</a>, one of the most important scholars on Ukrainian identity and public attitudes about Russia, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1174980">argued in 2016</a> that the blurry line dividing those who identified with the West from those who supported close ties to Russia “shifted eastward” after 2014. </p>
<p>Political scientist <a href="https://harriman.columbia.edu/person/elise-giuliano/">Elise Giuliano</a>, a specialist on the politics of ethnic identity, provided evidence <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1447769">in a 2018 article</a> that the majority of ethnic Russians in the Donbas did not support the actions of the pro-Russian separatists seeking to secede from Ukraine. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Women and men hold yellow and blue banner and yellow and blue balloons." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464569/original/file-20220520-24-ig14ad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464569/original/file-20220520-24-ig14ad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464569/original/file-20220520-24-ig14ad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464569/original/file-20220520-24-ig14ad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464569/original/file-20220520-24-ig14ad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464569/original/file-20220520-24-ig14ad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464569/original/file-20220520-24-ig14ad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Activists in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine prepare to release balloons into separatist-held territories in February 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/group-of-activists-in-the-donbas-region-of-eastern-ukraine-news-photo/1238346953?adppopup=true">Ali Atmaca/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A national identity deepens</h2>
<p>Growing support after 2014 across Ukraine for an overarching, civic national identity - based on Ukrainian citizenship rather than ethnic identity - was the most crucial change. It offered a means to unite ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in Ukraine. </p>
<p>My latest research examines the strength of a citizenship-based, civic national identity in Ukraine and how it relates to ethnic identity and language. </p>
<p>Quantitative and qualitative survey data offers evidence of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2020.1851541">how weak Ukrainians’ attachment to Russia</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2020.1851541">how strong their attachment to Ukrainian citizenship</a> had already become before 2022, even among ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. </p>
<p>Most respondents viewed a civic national identity based on citizenship as an important part of their self-identity. More participants in the survey saw this kind of national identity as an important or very important part of who they are than those who felt that way about the region they live in, the language they speak or their ethnic identity. Comments from respondents about the importance of being a Ukrainian citizen included statements like “Because I love my country”; “I do not betray my country”; and “I am proud of Ukraine, and I am a patriot.”</p>
<p>The results also underscore that it is not contradictory for people to perceive this kind of national identity as an important part of their identity while also feeling the same way about their ethnic identity, spoken language or region. In Ukraine at least, ethnic identity and a multiethnic, civic national identity are not the incompatible rivals they’re sometimes thought to be.</p>
<p>And so I wasn’t surprised to read about <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/europe/russia-linked-ukraine-mayor-says-he-ll-die-fighting-putin-s-invaders-20220324-p5a7gm">Oleksandr Vilkul’s staunch defense</a> of Ukrainian sovereignty. A powerful politician in southeastern Ukraine, Vilkul had long espoused support for the rights of Russian speakers and closer ties with Russia. In early May 2022, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/07/world/europe/russia-putin-ukraine-politicians.html">The New York Times reported</a> that the Russians approached Vilkul with an offer to align with the invading Russian forces.</p>
<p>Vilkul’s response?</p>
<p>“Get lost.”</p>
<h2>Looking westward</h2>
<p>Putin’s aggressive actions in the years leading up to the 2022 invasion had convinced Russian-speakers like Vilkul in eastern and southern Ukraine to think of themselves, first and foremost, <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/europe/russia-linked-ukraine-mayor-says-he-ll-die-fighting-putin-s-invaders-20220324-p5a7gm">as Ukrainians</a>. </p>
<p>The horrific attacks Putin has unleashed this spring will only accelerate this process, I believe. The time and firepower needed to gain control of Mariupol, a <a href="https://voxukraine.org/en/the-elephant-in-mariupol/">heavily Russian-speaking city</a> in eastern Ukraine, is <a href="https://www.vox.com/2022/5/17/23037687/mariupol-evacuation-ukraine-russia">symbolic of Russia’s short-term struggles</a> and long-term problems.</p>
<p>Even if the Russian military were to gain and keep control of Ukraine’s east and southeast, it will come only after a long and terrible period of fighting and bombing. More homes, schools and hospitals in Ukraine’s most ethnically and linguistically Russian areas will be destroyed, and many more of the very people Putin claimed he <a href="https://twitter.com/mission_russian/status/1496874393485598725?s=20&t=glWDTkaqh_jSoy-bt179HA">sought to protect</a> will lose their lives. </p>
<p>To the extent Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine see themselves as one people, they increasingly do so as part of a multiethnic Ukrainian national identity anchored by shared citizenship and a shared love of the country Putin’s forces continue to assault. </p>
<p>In the long term, the ongoing attacks will further reinforce Ukraine’s civic national identity and solidify what Putin fears most from Ukraine: a broad desire to look westward, rather than eastward, for its future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lowell Barrington does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Studies on Ukraine going as far back as the late 1990s and early 2000s showed that the country’s population was connecting less and less with Russia.Lowell Barrington, Associate Professor of Political Science , Marquette UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1825032022-05-11T17:42:13Z2022-05-11T17:42:13ZA member of the Marcos family is returning to power – here’s what it means for democracy in the Philippines<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462327/original/file-20220510-18-1j774w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C341%2C5982%2C3646&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Politics is the Marcos family business.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ferdinand-bongbong-marcos-jr-and-his-family-take-part-in-news-photo/1395951494?adppopup=true">Ezra Acayan/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Some 36 years after the <a href="https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/people-power-philippines-world-bright-spot-1986/">People Power Revolution</a> restored democracy to the Philippines, a member of perhaps the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/08/why-late-philippine-dictator-was-no-hero#">most brutal</a> <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61212659">and corrupt</a> political dynasties in the nation’s memory is set to return to the Philippine presidency. </p>
<p>Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., the son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr., <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/10/philippines-presidential-election-result-ferdinand-bongbong-marcos/">has won the presidential election</a>, according to preliminary results. It will return him to the Malacañang Palace where he lived as a child and from which his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/26/world/marcos-flees-and-is-taken-to-guam-us-recognizes-aquino-as-president.html">parents fled in 1986</a>. His running mate, Sara Duterte, the daughter of current President Rodrigo Duterte, is also <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Philippine-elections/Philippine-presidential-election-How-the-night-unfolded">set to win the vice presidency</a> by a landslide.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Ferdinand Marcos, dressed in white traditional Philippine shirt, raises his hand and speaks into a microphone to supporters; beside him in a green jumpsuit is his son, Bongbong." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462323/original/file-20220510-26-r56oh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462323/original/file-20220510-26-r56oh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462323/original/file-20220510-26-r56oh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462323/original/file-20220510-26-r56oh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462323/original/file-20220510-26-r56oh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462323/original/file-20220510-26-r56oh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462323/original/file-20220510-26-r56oh0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Like father, like son?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/philippine-president-ferdinand-marcos-waves-goodbye-to-news-photo/1337631331?adppopup=true">Alex Bowie/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both candidates hail from political dynasties with long histories of abuses of power. The human rights offenses of the first Marcos regime, from 1965 to 1986, are well documented, involving an estimated <a href="https://www.manilatimes.net/2016/04/12/featured-columns/columnists/3257-fact-checking-the-marcos-killings-1975-1985/255735">3,257 deaths</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/04/five-things-to-know-about-martial-law-in-the-philippines/">over 50,000 victims who were tortured and detained</a> during the martial law period alone. Also well documented is the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/07/10bn-dollar-question-marcos-millions-nick-davies">estimated US$10 billion Marcos plundered</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the outgoing Duterte administration is notorious for its <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-brutal-personal-costs-of-the-philippines-human-rights-abuses-100694">so-called “war on drugs</a>,” during which his infamous death squads killed more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-duterte-says-will-never-apologise-drug-war-deaths-2022-01-04/">6,200 as of 2022</a>.</p>
<p>The election has been mired in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/04/02/1090474739/philippines-presidential-election-resurfaces-old-scandal">tax scandals</a>, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/25/philippines-election-corruption-bongbong-marcos/">bureaucratic corruption</a> and <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Philippine-elections/Philippine-activists-warn-of-voting-anomalies-ahead-of-election">voter suppression</a>.</p>
<p>But despite these scandals both past and present, dynastic families remain in full force in the Southeast Asian archipelago. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/cf/ase/faculty_display.cfm?person_id=1091464">scholar of Philippine history</a>, I know this “rule by dynasty” dates from the days of American colonial rule. But it has been enhanced by a more modern curse: media manipulation and disinformation.</p>
<h2>The political economy of dynasties</h2>
<p>The tenacity of political dynasties of all political orientations to outlast the Philippines’ halted revolutions – both <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-35526200">in 1986</a> and a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/05/world/people-power-ii-doesn-t-give-filipinos-the-same-glow.html">later uprising in 2001</a> – shows that popular mobilization did not lead to a more democratic government.</p>
<p>The late <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/world/asia/benedict-anderson-scholar-who-saw-nations-as-imagined-dies-at-79.html">political scientist Benedict Anderson</a> famously called the Philippines a “<a href="https://newleftreview.org/issues/i169/articles/benedict-anderson-cacique-democracy-and-the-philippines-origins-and-dreams">cacique democracy</a>” – a fusion of popular electoral power and feudal, dynastic rule.</p>
<p>While landowning elites existed during the 19th century, this “cacique democracy” – cacique referring to local political bosses in Latin American countries – developed during the American colonial rule of the Philippines <a href="https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/the-philippines-an-overview-of-the-colonial-era/">between 1898 and 1942</a>. The aim was to cultivate an Indigenous leadership that could collaborate with American colonial rule.</p>
<p>To establish loyal allies among the local population,<a href="https://newleftreview.org/issues/i169/articles/benedict-anderson-cacique-democracy-and-the-philippines-origins-and-dreams"> the U.S. expropriated 400,000 acres</a> owned by the Catholic Church between 1898 and 1941 and auctioned it to landowners and economic elites. These same leaders, bolstered by their consolidated agricultural economic base, formed a new political class in Manila, as they participated in the new legislature of the colony.</p>
<p>With their wealth and political influence strengthened under American occupation, these ruling families held disproportionate sway over the development of the fledgling nation <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/philippine-independence-declared">following independence in 1946</a>.</p>
<p>These “caciques,” or native feudal lords, went on to become the ruling class of today. The Marcos family is descended from regional landowners in Ilocos Norte, in the north of Luzon, the Philippines’ most populous island. But unlike his forebears, Ferdinand Marcos Sr. rose from regional leader to national prominence, first as the president of the Philippine Senate in 1959, then as national president in 1965. Through his own charisma – and the popularity of his wife, Imelda Romualdez Marcos – the family consolidated their political base.</p>
<p>At the opposite end of the political spectrum <a href="https://www.ranker.com/list/members-of-the-aquino-family/reference">are the Aquino family</a>, hailing from a clan of elite landowners in Central Luzon, whose patriarch was one of the original members of the republican government formed after the 1896 Philippine Revolution. Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., a senator and outspoken Marcos critic, was <a href="https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/143594-look-back-ninoy-aquino-assassination/">assassinated in 1983</a>. His wife, Corazon Aquino, was elected on the back of the mass fervor of the 1986 Revolution, and later their son reached the presidency.</p>
<p>Dynasties have long dominated Philippines politics. But the fact that the Marcos name not only survived the overthrow of its patriarch but managed to become rehabilitated in the following decades hints at the tenacity of dynastic politics in the Philippines.</p>
<h2>Media and disinformation</h2>
<p>Despotic power cannot be shored up by birthright claims alone. So it is no coincidence that the return of the Marcos family has coincided with large-scale attacks against journalism, <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/01/17/578610243/a-fraught-time-for-press-freedom-in-the-philippines">waged by the national executive and its allies</a>.</p>
<p>In 2022, the Philippines was <a href="https://rsf.org/en/index">ranked by Reporters Without Borders</a> 147th out of 180 countries for press freedom. This is a stark contrast to the period before the election of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. in 1965, when <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2005/08/neumann-sidebar/">the country’s press was considered the most free in Asia</a>.</p>
<p>During the six years of Duterte’s rule since 2016, the president developed a reputation as someone who used social media disinformation – especially via Facebook – to cultivate support for his brutal “war on drugs.” At the same time he frequently attacked the work of journalists and critics of his regime.</p>
<p>Duterte made a deliberate attempt to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/oct/09/rodrigo-dutertes-war-press-freedom-maria-ressa-truth">undermine the free press</a>. In December 2020, after months of systematic targeting by President Duterte, the Philippine Congress <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/10/world/asia/philippines-congress-media-duterte-abs-cbn.html">voted to shut down ABS-CBN</a> – the country’s largest broadcasting network. </p>
<p>The Philippines remains one of the most dangerous places for reporters. As recently as December 2021, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/10/killing-journalist-criminal-libel-philippines">journalist Jesus Malabanan was shot by gunmen in his own home</a>. Malabanan, a well-respected reporter who worked on Reuters’ coverage of the Philippine drug war, was the 22nd journalist murdered during the Duterte regime.</p>
<p>The weakening and intimidation of independent journalism and media paved the way for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/06/business/philippines-election-disinformation.html">disinformation to flourish</a>. </p>
<p>Bongbong Marcos’ presidential run has been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/06/business/philippines-election-disinformation.html">widely criticized for media manipulation</a>. And disinformation has been central to the shift in public opinion toward the family.</p>
<p>In 2019, Rappler, the independent news website founded by Nobel Peace Prize recipient Maria Ressa, ran <a href="https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/245290-marcos-networked-propaganda-social-media/">a three-part investigation</a> that revealed the extent to which Marcos deployed digital propaganda to propel himself into public favor through the use of disinformation spread on other social media platforms, and through various fan pages and other viral content. The first Marcos regime was recast in misleading propaganda that portrayed the era <a href="https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/245540-networked-propaganda-false-narratives-from-the-marcos-arsenal/">as a time of progress</a> while denying its human rights abuses.</p>
<p>And in 2020, <a href="https://www.rappler.com/nation/bongbong-marcos-cambridge-analytica-rebrand-family-image/">Cambridge Analytica whistleblower Barbara Kaiser alleged that Marcos had reached out to the firm</a> – known for its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html">harvesting of Facebook users’ data</a> for political campaigns – in an effort to further bolster his family’s image. The Marcos campaign denies this connection.</p>
<h2>Never again?</h2>
<p>The election of Bongbong Marcos comes close to 50 years after his father declared martial law, on Sept. 23, 1972.</p>
<p>That original Marcos era – with its extrajudicial killings and rampant corruption – has been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-05/bongbong-marcos-philippines-election-social-media/101035620">subjected to revisionism</a>, with many Filipinos looking back at the Marcos years as a time of stability and growth while ignoring the abuses. The $10 billion plundered by the Marcoses – which once dominated headlines – gets talked about less. Imelda Marcos, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/06/opinions/philippines-election-marcos-bongbong-imelda-andelman/index.html">herself a notorious kleptocrat</a>, has been transformed into an object of fascination.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Protesters gather holding signs saying 'Never Again to Martial Law.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462320/original/file-20220510-14-3sexqi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462320/original/file-20220510-14-3sexqi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462320/original/file-20220510-14-3sexqi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462320/original/file-20220510-14-3sexqi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462320/original/file-20220510-14-3sexqi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462320/original/file-20220510-14-3sexqi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462320/original/file-20220510-14-3sexqi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Anti-Marcos and -Duterte protesters hold a vigil in Manila, Philippines.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/anti-marcos-and-duterte-protesters-hold-a-vigil-in-liwasan-news-photo/1396462191?adppopup=true">Lauren DeCicca/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile the voices of survivors of the martial law era and the activists who oppose authoritarian rule have grown less effective in the face of President Duterte’s popularity. Their message of “never again” failed to disrupt the Marcos family return to power. </p>
<p>In 2018, on the 35th anniversary of the assassination of Ninoy Aquino, Imee Marcos – Bongbong’s sister – stated that “the millennials have moved on [from Ferdinand Marcos’ history], and I think people at my age should move on as well.” </p>
<p>The electoral victory of her brother seems to have have proved Imee Marcos correct.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182503/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian De Leon receives funding from the Fulbright Commission and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p>Bongbong Marcos is the projected winner of the Philippines election. That the son of a brutal dictator has won shows how wedded the country is to dynastic politics – and image manipulation.Adrian De Leon, Assistant Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1796242022-04-07T12:25:46Z2022-04-07T12:25:46ZWhy the best way to stop strongmen like Putin is to prevent their rise in the first place<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456402/original/file-20220405-18-m5oam5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=61%2C24%2C8181%2C5462&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are few ways for the West to deter the rise of another dictator like Russian President Vladimir Putin.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-speaks-during-a-joint-news-photo/1238504428">Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine presents foreign policymakers with few good options to punish Russian President Vladimir Putin, or to deter these types of aggressions in the future. The U.S. government, for example, continues to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/05/us-allies-to-impose-russia-sanctions-following-outrage-over-bucha.html">push for additional sanctions on Russia</a> in response to news of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/03/ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russia-controlled-areas">Russian military atrocities</a>, even though prior sanctions <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-sanctions-may-make-russians-lives-worse-without-stopping-putins-assault-on-ukraine-179623">did not deter those abuses</a> in the first place. So it is worth thinking about what policymakers might do to prevent future world leaders from following Putin’s example.</p>
<p>Putin is what political scientists <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=DV5ECYgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">like</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=1-C0q3IAAAAJ">us</a> call a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-26/new-dictators">personalist dictator</a>. The <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-new-kremlinology-9780192896193">center of power</a> in Russia is <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-dictatorships-work/8DC095F7A890035729BB0BB611738497">not a political party or the military</a>. It’s him, personally. Strongmen’s choices are relatively unconstrained by these institutions. All power is thus concentrated in his hands, including, most notably, personal discretion and control over decision-making and appointments to state offices.</p>
<p>This is the type of dictator who causes <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302735">much of modern global strife</a>.
They <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/strongmen-and-straw-men-authoritarian-regimes-and-the-initiation-of-international-conflict/4352949B5F1550DD67076468BFB1BB8F">start conflicts with other nations</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12080">invest in nuclear weapons</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/706049">repress their own citizens</a>. In addition to Putin, notable examples from recent history include Moammar Gadhafi, Saddam Hussein, Idi Amin and three generations of North Korean leaders.</p>
<p>Our research has found that once these type of leaders start repressing their own citizens at home or initiating conflicts abroad, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001">there are few good ways to stop them</a>. But that doesn’t mean their rise to power in the first place is inevitable.</p>
<h2>A source of international trouble</h2>
<p>There are several reasons personalist dictators initiate most international conflicts. They face <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801479823/dictators-at-war-and-peace/#bookTabs=1">relatively little domestic opposition</a>, so when trouble starts, nobody checks them by highlighting their faults or mistakes.</p>
<p>In addition, these leaders surround themselves with compliant staffers who retain their own power only if they say what the dictator wants to hear. So he or she gets <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/dictators-and-dictatorships-9781441173966/">less accurate intelligence</a>, because the people giving briefings are afraid to give bad news.</p>
<p>In addition, personalist leaders are the type most likely to be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738866">ousted violently</a>. Their fear of what might happen to them upon leaving power pushes them to use conflict as a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/es/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/international-relations-and-international-organisations/leaders-and-international-conflict?format=PB">diversionary tactic</a>. An international crisis can boost domestic support among the people and among the elites, who are key to the dictator’s success.</p>
<p>Indeed, Putin’s domestic popularity <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/vladimir-putins-crimea-effect-ebbs-away-5-years-on/a-47941002">soared</a> after he annexed Crimea in 2014; and he <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-public-approval-is-soaring-during-the-russia-ukraine-crisis-but-its-unlikely-to-last-177302">remained popular</a> at home as he prepared for war in 2022. The <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-poll-ratings-climb/31781913.html">latest polls</a> suggest Putin is even <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/">more popular in Russia today</a> than at the start of the war.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man strides toward the center of a stage with a crowd behind him waving Russian flags" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 remains popular in 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaCrimeaReunificationAnniversary/25189daa46304783ac1a46a68a2157d1/photo">Mikhail Klimentyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Stopping them before they start</h2>
<p>The most common international response to personalist dictators causing problems are economic sanctions – but our research finds these <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001">rarely work when dictators export oil or other natural resources</a>. In fact, they often lead to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001">increased repression and harm for ordinary citizens</a>, who suffer the brunt of the sanctions.</p>
<p>Direct military intervention is sometimes possible against these dictators’ regimes. But those rarely go well. U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which led to further <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/afghan">deadly</a> <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/">conflicts</a>, ended with a fragile state in <a href="https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Iraq/fragile_state_index/">Iraq</a> and the return of personalist-style Taliban rule in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2022/feb/17/inside-taliban-return-to-power-afghanistan-mazar-i-sherif">Afghanistan</a>. Even <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-usa-military-factbox/factbox-western-military-assault-on-libyas-gaddafi-idUSTRE72L7X720110322">U.S. military strikes</a> to stop Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi from slaughtering his own citizens resulted in a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/ten-years-ago-libyans-staged-a-revolution-heres-why-it-has-failed/">failed state</a> rife with <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya">civil war</a>.</p>
<p>In the present situation, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-and-where-are-they-180382">Russia has nuclear weapons</a>, and Putin has <a href="https://theconversation.com/would-putin-use-nuclear-weapons-an-arms-control-expert-explains-what-has-and-hasnt-changed-since-the-invasion-of-ukraine-178509">signaled he might use them</a> if he views the conflict as escalating. </p>
<p>That leaves practically <a href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0198746997/ref=olp_product_details?ie=UTF8&me=">no way for Western democracies</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-in-realpolitik-from-nixon-and-kissinger-ideals-go-only-so-far-in-ending-conflict-in-places-like-ukraine-179979">shut down Putin’s aggression</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Armed men stand on a dock next to a large yacht." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Spanish and U.S. police seized this yacht, owned by a Russian oligarch closely linked to Russian President Vladimir Putin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SpainUSOligarchsYachtSanctions/da2e3664c9ba46b5977ef167dec724c9/photo">AP Photo/Francisco Ubilla</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Shielding the money</h2>
<p>In recent decades, Western governments have aided – whether intentionally or by accident – the rise of personalist dictators in three ways.</p>
<p>First, Western governments enable dictators’ cronies to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/08/russian-oligarch-money-london-uk-economic-crime-bill/">launder the illicit gains</a> paid by the dictator in exchange for their loyalty. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/mar/06/how-london-became-the-place-to-be-for-putins-oligarchs">London</a> and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/business/real-estate/russian-money-flows-us-real-estate-rcna17723">Miami</a> have become havens for Russia’s oligarchs to <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/defending-the-united-states-against-russian-dark-money/">stash</a> their <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w23712">payouts</a> from Putin. </p>
<p>To protect these investments, Russian oligarchs have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/48c4bfa6-7ca2-11e9-81d2-f785092ab560">funded political campaigns</a> throughout <a href="https://euobserver.com/foreign/137631">Europe</a>, and especially in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/feb/23/oligarchs-funding-tories">U.K.</a>, with well-heeled London <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-02/london-lawyers-say-no-comment-on-links-to-rich-russian-clients">lawyers lobbying</a> Boris Johnson’s government on behalf of Russian clients in a bid to prevent too harsh a crackdown.</p>
<p>Some of this money <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/14/russian-oligarch-charged-illegal-political-donations-00017090">flows to political campaigns in the U.S.</a> as well.</p>
<h2>Buying oil and gas</h2>
<p>Second, rising commodity prices, especially a spike in oil or gas prices, provide a windfall for many personalist dictators, enabling them to consolidate domestic power by using the extra revenue to pay loyal supporters. In 2009, political commentator Thomas Friedman proclaimed the “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/16/the-first-law-of-petropolitics/">First Law of Petropolitics</a>,” which states that as oil prices rise, dictators undermine political freedoms. But recent research shows that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2019.14">increasing oil revenue</a> facilitates the rise of personalist dictators, who are the ones largely <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/706049">responsible for repressing their citizens</a>. </p>
<p>In the short term, Western governments are <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-war-drives-u-s-hunt-for-more-oil-to-help-tame-rising-prices-11646935216">scrambling</a> to find substitutes for Russian energy imports. One long-term solution may be to <a href="https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25932/accelerating-decarbonization-of-the-us-energy-system">decarbonize Western economies</a> so energy markets are not at the mercy of dictators in oil-rich countries such as Russia and Venezuela – and perhaps someday Saudi Arabia.</p>
<h2>Military support</h2>
<p>Third, foreign military support for dictators helps them to consolidate power. In general, dictators have trouble purging military elites who oppose them: The men with guns can oust the leader anytime. In most autocracies, therefore, the military acts as a limiting force on the leader’s power. But with <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/63/1/43/5290475">support from foreign allies</a>, a dictator can more easily install a cadre of personally loyal military and security leaders.</p>
<p>Sometimes this support comes in the form of an actual military occupation. Soviet occupation of North Korea in the late 1940s paved the way for Kim Il Sung to oust his generals, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2018.8">creating a personalist dictatorship</a> that still confounds policymakers decades later. Foreign powers often supply dictators with money to purchase military equipment, in the process making the dictator into a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000039">reliable customer</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/rwanda-paul-kagame-americas-darling-tyrant-103963/">U.S.</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38568629">U.K.</a> have been known to train dictators’ sons at their military schools. For example, leaders of personalist dictatorships in the <a href="https://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/perspective/2019/12/19/dominican-playboy-causes-stir-at-cgsc/">Dominican Republic</a> and <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/35854/rwanda_president_visits_west_point">Rwanda</a> sent children to be trained in the U.S., while <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200102020065.html">Uganda’s president sent his son to a British military school</a>.</p>
<p>And Belarussian strongman Alexander Lukashenko has apparently sent his youngest son, who frequently <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/10/12/europes-last-dictator-lukashenko-has-mini-me-young-son/73813498/">appears with his father</a> in military <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/06/belarus-nikolai-lukashenko">outfits</a>, to <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/09/17/protest-plagued-belarus-strongman-transfers-son-to-moscow-school-reports-a71474">study in Moscow</a>. When these relatives <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/6767/musevenis-speedy-promotion-of-son-and-a-new-african-trend/">ascend the ranks</a> of their nations’ military, they ensure the most loyal person possible is in charge of the weapons. </p>
<p>Or dictators may simply mount a countercoup to reinstall “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/mapped-the-7-governments-the-u-s-has-overthrown/">their man</a>” should the military bite back in the face of repeated purges. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1964/02/21/archives/gabon-president-resumes-office-mba-restored-by-french-vows-total.html">French paratroopers</a> saved the necks of multiple <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538120675/Historical-Dictionary-of-Modern-Coups-D%E2%80%99%C3%A9tat">West African leaders</a> when their militaries attempted coups in response to policy failures and purges in their ranks.</p>
<p>Foreign support also protects dictators from domestic insurgents. In 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama sent additional troops to Iraq and authorized <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA388-1.html">airstrikes</a> to save the U.S.-backed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/world/middleeast/echoes-of-a-strongman-in-baghdad-today.html">strongman</a> in Baghdad from an Islamic State group advance. And in <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3180.html">2015</a>, the Russian military helped <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-russia-20170406-story.html">save</a> Syrian president Bashar al-Assad from defeat at the hands of Syrian rebels.</p>
<h2>Is it too late to respond effectively?</h2>
<p>Putin’s regime joins personalist dictatorships – including those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Venezuela – that have confounded policymakers for decades. </p>
<p>Once a leader successfully <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/US/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/how-dictatorships-work-power-personalization-and-collapse">consolidates power and transforms his rule</a> into a personalist dictatorship, he is likely to keep causing trouble on the world stage. And once these rulers do bad things, it is often too late to stop them.</p>
<p>[<em>There’s plenty of opinion out there. We supply facts and analysis, based in research.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=politics&source=inline-politics-no-opinion">Get The Conversation’s Politics Weekly</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179624/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Wright has received funding from the U.S. National Science Foundation and the Minerva Research Initiative of the U.S. Department of Defense.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abel Escribà-Folch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In recent years, Western governments have, in effect, aided the rise of personalist dictators in Russia, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Venezuela.Joseph Wright, Professor of Political Science, Penn StateAbel Escribà-Folch, Associate Professor of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu FabraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1775622022-03-23T18:04:29Z2022-03-23T18:04:29ZBestia: Oscar-nominated film exposes how the powerful in Chile still don’t pay for human rights abuses<p><em>This article contains references to sexual assault and rape that some may find distressing.</em></p>
<p>Chilean stop-motion animation film <a href="https://vimeo.com/ondemand/bestia">Bestia</a>, up for an Oscar in the shorts category, has exposed wounds in a country still grappling with the demons of its past. Bestia, directed by Hugo Corruvias, tells the chilling story of <a href="https://oicanadian.com/the-nazi-beast-ingrid-olderock-the-cruel-chilean-torturer-known-as-the-woman-with-the-dogs/">Ingrid Olderock</a> a Chile-born German known as “The Dog Lady”. Olderok was an agent of the National Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), which was created by Augusto Pinochet after overthrowing Salvador Allende in 1973.</p>
<p>Accounts by her victims alleged that she had trained her German Shephard Volodia to rape female left-wing dissidents during the Pinochet regime. The film is inspired by Journalist Nancy Guzman’s <a href="https://www.montacerdos.cl/products/ingrid-olderock-la-mujer-de-los-perros">book</a> La Mujer de los Perros (The Dog Lady). Guzman interviewed the now-deceased torturer in 1996.</p>
<p>The film exposes the depths of torture and corruption in Chile through the troubled mind and everyday thoughts of Olderok. After Pinochet fell, those who had committed the worst atrocities were let off scot-free and allowed to reintegrate into society. </p>
<p>The same happened again in 2019 after Chileans rose against continuing inequality and injustice. While the dictatorship-era constitution was abolished, politicians used it once again not to pay for their crimes. Bestia exposes how the powerful in Chile then and now can avoid punishment for such human rights abuses. </p>
<h2>The Dog Lady</h2>
<p>Ingrid Felicitas Olderock Bernhardt was raised in the German Colony of Peñaflor in central Chile where her grandparents settled shortly after the second world war. She went to a German school and she and her siblings were forbidden to speak Spanish or mix with Chileans. She told Guzman:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was a Nazi from childhood. Germany had never been stronger than under the Nazis.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In her 20s, Olderock became a policewoman, quickly ascending the chain of command thanks to her diligence and work ethic. She was Chile’s first female parachutist to jump 1,000 feet and a skilled markswoman. </p>
<p>Shortly after the 1973 coup, she presented a project to her boss: to train an anti-Marxist female commando. A year later, she was in charge of 60 trainees at the School of Santo Domingo, equipping them to shoot, follow, detain and torture left-wing female dissidents.</p>
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<p>In 1975, Olderock was asked by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/08/manuel-contreras-head-of-chiles-spy-agency-under-pinochet-dies-aged-86">the head of the secret police</a> (DINA) to participate in the interrogation of prisoners. Volodia the German Shephard dog became Olderock’s most terrifying instrument of torture. </p>
<p>In the dank basement of an ordinary house in Santiago nicknamed <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/sale-of-venda-sexy-torture-centre-highlights-chiles-struggle-for-historical-memory-regarding-sexual-violence/">“<em>La Venda Sexy</em>”</a> (sexy blindfold), she is alleged to have directed the hound to sexually abuse and maul detainees, most of whom were killed and then disposed of. It wasn’t until 1981 when an attempt was made on her life by two members of the underground resistance, that Olderock’s name and heinous deeds became known to the public.</p>
<p>How was such a sinister character allowed to live in anonymity until she died in 2001? Put simply, Pinochet’s military <a href="https://apnews.com/article/7315b8a74254491786c02fa559b05fd6">pact of silence</a> and a culture of impunity that still thrives in Chile today.</p>
<h2>Urgent Reform</h2>
<p>Neither the military nor police force has been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/26/hrw-calls-for-urgent-police-reform-in-chile-to-address-abuses">reformed</a> since the start of Chile’s weak democracy. This period of transition began when Pinochet lost the 1988 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/10/06/chiles-pinochet-beaten-in-plebiscite-on-rule/cbc2e773-f1cc-4c37-bcb5-91b9de1e8084/">referendum</a> after which he was forced to concede power to a civilian government. </p>
<p>This transition toward democracy came with conditions attached. Pinochet demanded the silence of the survivors of torture, and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eur450311998en.pdf">immunity</a> from prosecution for those that committed human rights abuses during the regime. This forced victims to live alongside their former abusers, like Olderock. To date, the whereabouts of around 4,000 people disappeared by the regime is still <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/14/where-are-they-families-search-for-chile-disappeared-prisoners">unknown</a>.</p>
<p>With an unreformed military whose silence and crimes are <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/09/chile-years-pinochet-s-coup-impunity-must-end/">protected</a> by the current constitution, a new generation of torture victims are having to live in silence. </p>
<h2>A Democracy Bathed in Blood</h2>
<p>Modern political developments in Chile have all been rooted in political agreements that guarantee immunity for the military, exclude important social actors and ensure the model implemented by the regime remains untouched. In 1985, the <a href="https://elpais.com/diario/1985/12/22/internacional/504054014_850215.html">national agreement</a> seeking a path toward democracy was signed by the Catholic Church, the regime and a small number of opposition groups. Groups affected by the repression, left-wing politicians and nongovernmental organisations were excluded.</p>
<p>In 1991, the “<a href="https://cja.org/where-we-work/chile/">Rettig Report</a>” into human rights violations was published on the condition that retaliation violence from left-wing groups was included. Large sections of print were blacked out, protecting the identity of military personnel involved in human rights aberrations. </p>
<p>In 2004 torture victims were invited to give their testimonies to the “National Commission of Political Prison and Torture”. They were paid a paltry sum and the file closed for 50 years. </p>
<p>After the social uprisings over the cost of living in late 2019 dubbed “<em>El Estallido</em>” (social outbreak), Chile’s attorney general’s Office launched <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/chile">8,581 total cases of alleged police abuses</a>. This was in response to widespread military <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2020/10/eyes-on-chile-police-violence-at-protests/">repression</a> against protesters that resulted in over 500 ocular traumas, 35 deaths and tens of thousands of accusations of torture.</p>
<p>The 2019 “<em>Acuerdo por la Paz</em>” (<a href="https://chilereports.cl/en/news/2019/12/02/agreement-for-social-peace-and-a-new-constitution">peace agreement</a>) was a timely solution for the president Sebastián Piñera and his cronies. In exchange for a new constitution, he would get himself off the hook and create a mechanism to quell the uprising. As a result, many of the cases have been closed without prosecution.</p>
<p>Once again, the agreement was made by an elite group, mistrusted by the general public and <a href="https://radio.uchile.cl/2019/11/18/un-acuerdo-excluyente-sin-paz-ni-justicia/">excluding</a> important social actors. It also <a href="https://www.laizquierdadiario.cl/El-proceso-constituyente-nacio-como-un-pacto-de-impunidad-para-los-responsables-de-las-violaciones">side-stepped</a> the many human rights violations, adding yet another layer of impunity in Chile’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/02/09/a-new-low-for-global-democracy">imperfect</a> democracy.</p>
<p>During the dictatorship Chileans resisted impunity through <a href="https://www.forgingmemory.org/narrative/nueva-cancion-chile">song</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-23970034">murals</a> and <a href="https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/video/arpilleras-chile-marjorie-agosin">textile</a> art. In the digital age, a new generation of filmmakers and content producers continue the struggle against repression, cronyism and lingering injustices. In this context, Bestia serves as both testament and homage to Chile’s forgotten victims.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177562/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carole Concha Bell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A provocative short film about a woman and her dog, Bestia highlights the impunity enjoyed by Chile’s military and politiciansCarole Concha Bell, PhD Candidate, Department of Spanish, Portuguese & Latin American Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1796232022-03-22T19:33:13Z2022-03-22T19:33:13ZEconomic sanctions may make Russians’ lives worse – without stopping Putin’s assault on Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453424/original/file-20220321-14965-1dlejm2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=29%2C0%2C6481%2C4899&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Everyday Russians, like these people in Moscow, may shoulder much of the burden of the world's economic sanctions aimed at Vladimir Putin and his oligarchs.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/shop-assistant-speaks-to-customers-in-a-candy-store-in-news-photo/1239387719">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/russias-war-ukraine-sanctions-timeline">economic sanctions</a> levied upon Russia as a consequence of its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-military-operations-ukraine-demands-kyiv-forces-surrender-2022-02-24/">invasion of Ukraine</a> target the Russian economy and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s closest personal and business associates. </p>
<p>The goal is to alter domestic politics within Russia, ultimately <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/28/biden-administration-expands-russia-sanctions-cuts-off-us-transactions-with-central-bank.html">stopping Putin’s aggression</a>. Yet our research into <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001">how economic sanctions affect the behavior of dictators</a> indicates the sanctions are likely to increase political repression in Russia and hurt average Russians’ economic security – without stopping Putin from pulverizing Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Personal rule</h2>
<p>Putin rules Russia with what political scientists <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=DV5ECYgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">like</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=1-C0q3IAAAAJ">us</a> call a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-26/new-dictators">personalist dictatorship</a>. </p>
<p>This term means that the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-dictatorships-work/8DC095F7A890035729BB0BB611738497">leader has more power</a> than the political party that backs him, and more than the military and security forces. In Russia, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-new-kremlinology-9780192896193?cc=us&lang=en&">Putin controls</a> policy decisions and political appointments and thus <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/19/opinion/putin-zelensky-trump-heroism.html">faces few constraints</a> from Russian political institutions or organized elites. </p>
<p>Recent news indicates that Putin has surrounded himself with a small <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/putins-historic-miscalculation-may-make-him-a-war-criminal">group of hand-picked yes men</a> – that is exactly what a personalist dictatorship looks like.</p>
<h2>Will sanctions stop Putin?</h2>
<p>Economic sanctions are an <a href="https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2021/04/22/sanctions-are-now-a-central-tool-of-governments-foreign-policy">increasingly widespread</a> international response when personalist dictators start making trouble on the world stage, such as abusing human rights at home or investing in nuclear weapons programs. Though the sanctions are economic in nature, they also impose political costs on personalist leaders by affecting the people who support the leader’s tenure in office.</p>
<p>Our research finds that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00590.x">sanctions make it more likely</a> that personalist autocracies – but not other types of autocracies – lose power. </p>
<p>Personalist dictatorships rely on delivering immediate material benefits to their elite supporters. When sanctions cut off foreign revenue that funds regime backers’ fancy lifestyles, those backers tend to withdraw their support, or even leave the country, destabilizing the regime.</p>
<p>Sanctions are most destabilizing when the targeted country depends on exports of one or only a few goods to pay for the loyalty of the ruling elite. When Uganda’s <a href="http://www.international-economy.com/TIE_F03_Nurnberger.pdf">Idi Amin lost coffee export revenue because of sanctions in 1977</a>, he could no longer pay military elites. Many defected, weakening his power. A similar process unfolded when <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25612695?seq=1">U.S. sanctions restricted sugar imports</a> from the Dominican Republic in 1960 and 1961 during Rafael Trujillo’s rule.</p>
<p>There is, however, one important caveat to the rule that sanctions make it more likely that personalist autocracies lose power. Sanctions, historically, have not destabilized dictatorships of any stripe that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001">are substantial petroleum exporters</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453426/original/file-20220321-25-1wk9j0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An industrial plant has smokestacks steaming into the sky" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453426/original/file-20220321-25-1wk9j0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453426/original/file-20220321-25-1wk9j0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453426/original/file-20220321-25-1wk9j0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453426/original/file-20220321-25-1wk9j0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453426/original/file-20220321-25-1wk9j0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453426/original/file-20220321-25-1wk9j0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453426/original/file-20220321-25-1wk9j0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Germany, where this oil refinery is located, gets much of its petroleum from Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/shell-wesseling-oil-refinery-is-seen-in-wesseling-germany-news-photo/1239011371">NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Petroleum is different</h2>
<p>Although sanctions have <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/05/politics/sanctions-russian-oligarch-elites/index.html">caused much pain for Russian elites</a> and their banks, foreign currency is still flowing into Russia <a href="https://euobserver.com/world/154530">to pay for oil and gas</a>. </p>
<p>Petroleum exports – oil and natural gas – are different from other exports, because world demand for oil is <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040915/how-does-law-supply-and-demand-affect-oil-industry.asp">consistently strong</a>. With few substitutes for oil in the world economy, the Biden administration is scrambling to replace Russian petroleum exports with increased imports to the U.S. from <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/07/white-house-oil-deals-saudi-arabia-venezuela-iran-00014803">Saudi Arabia</a> and <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/09/house-gop-leader-kevin-mccarthy-warns-against-iran-venezuela-oil-to-offset-russia.html">Venezuela</a>.</p>
<p>The oil trade also involves many international players with distinct motivations – including democratic governments with varying degrees of energy independence, multinational firms, banks and investors. EU and U.S. sanctions so far have <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-sanctions-over-ukraine-largely-spare-energy-sector-vital-to-europe-11645970890">exempted Russian energy exports</a> to Europe.</p>
<p>To put it bluntly, while Germans have sent helmets and defensive weapons to Ukraine, they are still <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-rejects-calls-for-banning-russian-oil-and-gas/">sending euros to Putin</a> in exchange for his gas. </p>
<p>If sweeping international sanctions could somehow choke oil and gas export revenue for the Russian regime, that might destabilize Putin’s regime. But Western governments have yet to impose those kinds of sanctions. And even if they did, non-Western demand for Russia’s oil and gas could “<a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9780804794329/html">bust</a>” Western sanctions, with other countries and companies buying Russian exports at a cost below the world market price, effectively getting a good deal on oil for helping Russia evade the sanctions.</p>
<p>For example, the U.S. imposed oil-transaction sanctions on Venezuela <a href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/images/15301">in 2019</a>, but <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exclusive-under-us-sanctions-iran-venezuela-strike-oil-export-deal-sources-2021-09-25/">Iran still buys Venezuelan oil</a>, as does <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-10/china-buys-more-sanctioned-oil-from-iran-venezuela-at-a-bargain">China</a>, at a discount from standard world-market oil prices. </p>
<p>U.N. sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq led to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/02/iraq.oil.smuggle/index.html">massive oil smuggling</a> because the sanctioned oil could be bought at below-market prices, encouraging illicit sales. That revenue undercut the sanctions’ goal of weakening Saddam’s grip on power. Now <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-considers-buying-discounted-russian-oil-commodities-officials-say-2022-03-14/">India is contemplating buying Russian oil</a> for cheap.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Russians protest the war in Ukraine.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The story gets worse</h2>
<p>Sanctions destabilize target regimes by causing the elites to become discontent, leading to their defection – or by emboldening domestic opponents to mobilize against the sanctioned government, as may have been <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/12/opponents-of-sanctions-on-south-africa-were-wrong-but-that-doesn-t-mean-they-always-work.html">the case when sanctions targeted the South African apartheid regime</a>. Indeed, many <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/police-detain-more-than-900-people-anti-war-protests-across-russia-monitoring-2022-02-27/">Russian citizens have taken to the streets</a> to protest Putin’s war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>However, personalist regimes rely <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/706049">heavily on repression</a> carried out by loyal security forces, more so than other kinds of dictatorships. Fearful that protests could spiral out of control, Putin has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/10/vladimir-putin-regime-anti-war-protests-russia-russian">arrested thousands</a>. </p>
<p>Personalist dictators <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738866">rarely have peaceful ways of retreating</a> when backed into a corner. So they use every means at their disposal – including lethal violence against their own people – to stay in power. Indeed, personalist dictatorships are more likely than other types of dictatorships <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001">to increase domestic repression</a> when hit with sanctions.</p>
<p>The threat of mass protest has forced Putin to engage in a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-russia-disinformation-propaganda/">disinformation campaign</a> to control the domestic narrative. His government has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/world/europe/russia-ukraine-propaganda-censorship.html">shut down independent media</a> and threatened to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/russia-censoring-news-war-ukraine-foreign-media-are-trying-get-around">jail foreign journalists who report truthfully on the war</a>. If media repression fails to curb protests, Putin is likely to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/706049">meet large protests on the streets with violence or mass arrests</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, economic sanctions <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00136.x">hurt ordinary citizens</a> in personalist dictatorships because these leaders tend to shield elites from the economic pain of sanctions by pushing costs onto regular people. Our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001">research</a> demonstrates that sanctions targeting personalist dictatorships take more food out of citizens’ mouths those those targeting other types of regimes.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 150,000 readers get one of The Conversation’s informative newsletters.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140K">Join the list today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179623/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Wright has received funding from the U.S. National Science Foundation and the Minerva Research Initiative of the U.S. Department of Defense. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abel Escribà-Folch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Personalist dictators tend to shield the elites who support them from the economic pain of sanctions by pushing costs onto regular people.Joseph Wright, Professor of Political Science, Penn StateAbel Escribà-Folch, Associate Professor of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu FabraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1779842022-03-03T13:28:07Z2022-03-03T13:28:07Z3 reasons Belarus is helping Russia wage war against Ukraine<p>Russia is attacking Ukraine, but Belarus, a neighboring country, is “the other aggressor in this war,” European Union President Ursula von der Leyen <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_1441">said on Feb. 27,</a> 2022. </p>
<p>One politician, Alexander Lukashenko, has ruled Belarus with a draconian hand for the last 28 years, with no interruption in power. And now, Lukashenko is supporting Russia in the war, reciprocating Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent help in maintaining his own political power.</p>
<p>Putin is using Belarus as a staging ground for his war, which has resulted in at least <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113002">500 Ukrainian civilian deaths</a>, and caused <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/02/1084100763/1-million-refugees-fled-ukraine">more than 1 million people</a> to flee the country. Russian troops have crossed into Ukraine through <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-hybrid-war-report-belarus-joins-conflict-against-ukraine/">the Belarusian border</a> in the north.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tatsiana-Kulakevich-2">an expert on Eastern Europe</a>, I believe there are three key points to understand about Belarus’ involvement in the Ukraine war. </p>
<p><iframe id="tYySA" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/tYySA/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Russia unofficially controls Belarus</h2>
<p>Belarus is a former Soviet republic of <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/belarus/overview#1">9.4 million people</a> that borders both Russia and Ukraine as well as Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. It is also Europe’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/05/25/why-belarus-is-called-europes-last-dictatorship">last dictatorship</a>.</p>
<p>Lukashenko has spent nearly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/19/world/europe/lukashenko-belarus-russia-ukraine.html">three decades balancing his ties</a> to both Western powers and Putin. But the last presidential election marked a turning point that pushed Lukashenko closer toward Putin. </p>
<p>Lukashenko claimed victory after the Aug. 9, 2020, election, which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/world/europe/eu-belarus-election.html">international experts</a> widely consider fraudulent. Lukashenko <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/world/europe/belarus-election-lukashenko.html">received 80% of the popular vote</a>, an impossibly favorable result given public discontent with his regime. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://www.alamy.com/the-largest-protests-in-the-history-of-independent-belarus-demonstration-against-elections-of-president-lukashenko-peaceful-protestors-holding-big-w-image368847343.html">unprecedented public uprising</a> followed, as hundreds of thousands of Belarusians protested the election results. </p>
<p>Putin <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-vows-support-for-belarus-leader-alexander-lukashenko-11600105778">offered financial and military</a> support to help Lukashenko silence the protests — without any international response or pushback. Putin also warned foreign powers not to interfere in Belarus’ affairs. This promise boosted Lukashenko’s confidence and feelings of impunity.</p>
<p>Belarusian police subsequently attacked protesters with <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20201011-police-break-up-belarus-opposition-protest-with-water-cannon-stun-grenades">water cannons, tear gas and stun grenades</a>.</p>
<p>Since 2020, Belarus has faced a series of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-approves-new-sanctions-against-belarus-over-ukraine-invasion-source-2022-03-02/">international economic sanctions</a> that further alienated Lukashenko from the West. The European Union and the U.S. announced on March 2, 2022, <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/596560-biden-targets-belarus-russian-defense-sector-with-new-restrictions">a new set of sanctions</a> that restricts technology and potential war material exports to Belarus. </p>
<p>The lack of international reaction to Putin enabling Lukashenko’s behavior — alongside the economic pressure — pushed the Belarusian leader even closer to the Kremlin. This leaves Lukashenko with a limited ability to have an independent, or neutral, position on the war.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four people sit and stand around a table and dump out white ballots of paper from a large maroon envelope." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Election commission staff count votes on Feb. 27, 2022, after the Belarusian constitutional referendum that ended Belarus’ stance as a nuclear-free zone.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/election-commission-staff-count-votes-after-the-2022-belarusian-at-picture-id1238812001?s=2048x2048">Peter Kovalev/TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Belarusian people cannot easily speak against Lukashenko</h2>
<p>The human rights situation in Belarus has sharply deteriorated since the 2020 elections, prompting an estimated <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/belarus/news/article/situation-in-belarus-france-s-position">100,000 to 200,000 people</a> to leave Belarus for neighboring European Union countries and Ukraine.</p>
<p>People increasingly cannot freely express their opinions about any of the government’s decisions, for fear of persecution and arrest. </p>
<p>Since 2020, Belarus has <a href="https://prisoners.spring96.org/en">detained more than</a> 1,000 political prisoners, the U.S. State Department <a href="https://www.state.gov/political-prisoners-in-belarus/">reported in January 2022</a>.</p>
<p>And at least 497 journalists and media workers were detained by the government during the first eight months of 2021, according to <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/05/25/why-belarus-is-called-europes-last-dictatorship">United Nations human rights expert Michelle Bachelet</a>. An estimated 129 Belarusian nonprofit and human rights organizations also closed down during this time frame.</p>
<p>Despite threats of government fines and arrests, thousands of Belarusians again took <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-ukraine-protests/31726865.html">to the streets</a> on Feb. 27, 2022, to protest the referendum and to express solidarity with Ukraine. As a result, <a href="https://spring96.org/ru/news/106932">police arrested an estimated 800 protesters</a>. </p>
<p>The silencing of public opinion gives Putin more power to exploit Belarusian territory for his political and military interests. Belarusians cannot apply pressure to the government and stop Lukashenko from following Putin’s orders.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An aerial shot shows a large crowd of people marching across a bridge over a river on a grey day" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A large crowd of protesters march in Minsk, Belarus, after the disputed presidential election on Aug. 9, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/large-crowd-of-protesters-march-through-the-streets-on-september-29-picture-id1228786618?s=2048x2048">Artem Dubik/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Belarus is a strategic stage for Russia</h2>
<p>The border between Belarus and Ukraine stretches about 674 miles – roughly half the length of Ukraine’s border with Russia. This significantly expanded Russia’s base for attacking Ukraine. </p>
<p>Belarus and Russia conducted large-scale, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/10/1079888622/russia-military-exercise-belarus-ukraine">joint military exercises</a> ahead of the Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine. <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/02/16/belarus-says-not-a-single-russian-soldier-will-stay-after-joint-drills-a76408">Despite public assurances</a> from the Belarusian government that the Russian troops would go back to Russia, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60451955">some 30,000 Russian troops</a> extended their stay in Belarus, and many eventually crossed into Ukraine. </p>
<p>Lukashenko continues to follow Putin’s orders as the war escalates.</p>
<p>Putin put Russia’s <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-nuclear-forces-ukraine-fighting/">nuclear forces on high alert</a> on Feb. 27, raising international concern. That same day, Belarus <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/27/belarus-holds-referendum-to-renounce-non-nuclear-status">scrapped its commitment to remaining nuclear free</a> following a public referendum vote that was rigged, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/belarus-referendum-russia-ukraine-invasion-1.6367876">international experts say</a>. This change in Belarus’ constitution would allow Belarus to physically host Russian nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>Belarus’ military ties to Russia have strengthened since 2020.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/1/russia-to-send-arms-maybe-even-s-400s-to-belarus-lukashenko">Lukashenko announced in September 2021</a> that Russia would send military equipment, including helicopters and air defense systems, to the Belarusian-Ukraine border. </p>
<p>Two months later, Lukashenko broke his neutrality on Crimea, a Ukrainian peninsula that Russia forcibly annexed in 2014. The Belarusian leader publicly recognized that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/1/belarus-lukashenko-says-annexed-crimea-is-legally-russian">Crimea was Russian territory</a>. Lukashenko also offered to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-germany-migration-europe-ab1efae5e65bf01af3be2f6139ef6f4b">host Russian nuclear weapons</a> if NATO moves nuclear weapons from Germany to Eastern Europe, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-germany-migration-europe-ab1efae5e65bf01af3be2f6139ef6f4b">as had been reported</a>. </p>
<p>Lukashenko <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/launchpad-russias-assault-ukraine-belarus-holds-referendum-renounce-non-nuclear-2022-02-27/">repeated his plan to station Russian warheads</a> on Belarusian soil on Feb. 27, 2022, speaking at a polling station on the day of the referendum.</p>
<p>Russia’s ability to place nuclear weapons in Belarus has raised alarm for neighboring NATO countries, chiefly Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as the U.S. and other Western powers.</p>
<p>By hosting Russian troops and weapons, Lukashenko has shown that he is closely aligned with Putin — despite <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sviatlana-tsikhanouskaya-people-of-belarus-dont-want-to-fight-in-ukraine/a-60923917">the popular will</a> of the Belarusian people to maintain distance. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatsiana Kulakevich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Belarus’ alliance with Russia is a strategic factor in the Ukraine war. The country’s long-term dictator, Alexander Lukashenko, has indicated he will do as Russian President Vladimir Putin says.Tatsiana Kulakevich, Assistant Professor of instruction at School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, Affiliate Professor at the Institute on Russia, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1623772021-06-18T11:45:12Z2021-06-18T11:45:12ZBrazil: the road to Jair Bolsonaro’s militarised democracy<p>When former paratrooper captain Jair Bolsonaro was inaugurated as president of the Brazilian Republic on January 1, 2019, the heavy militarisation of his government attracted little attention from observers. Much more focus was put on the president’s <a href="https://www.letemps.ch/opinions/jair-bolsonaro-lappel-dictature">radical rhetoric</a>, his calls for violence, and the <a href="https://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/monde/bresil-les-principaux-ministres-du-gouvernement-bolsonaro_2055604.htm">ultraconservative profile</a> of some of his cabinet.</p>
<p>And yet at the beginning of 2019, 7 of 23 cabinet ministers were military officers. As the months went on, the militarisation of the government and of the entire administration only increased.</p>
<p>In early 2020, the government integrated two more members of the armed forces into the strategic positions of <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/02/14/bresil-un-general-nomme-chef-du-gouvernement_6029506_3210.html">chief of staff to the presidency</a> and <a href="https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/pandemie-le-ministere-de-la-sante-chasse-gardee-des-militaires-au-bresil">minister of health</a>. At the same time, the number of officers in the administration has increased at a dizzying rate and the management of major public enterprises has been entrusted to generals.</p>
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<p>Bolsonaro treats the officer corps as his political base, as a military party he can use to fill political positions. In return, he and his close circle expect unfailing support. This includes demonstrating public hostility toward institutions such as the Supreme Court and judiciary, which they feel are acting against their interests.</p>
<p>And yet the alliance between the Bolsonarist clan and military generals is fraught. The military often presents these tensions as a sign of autonomy and of the apolitical nature of the armed forces. It does this to preserve both its own popularity with the public – and leave the exit door open.</p>
<p>Until very recently, the overwhelming majority of top generals considered Bolsonaro to be the best defender of their interests and the policies they want to pursue. Many of these men are ultraconservative. They believe the left must be excluded from politics and that the west is in a culture war against ideologies hostile to their Christian traditions and to the social and domestic order. They believe communism did not die at the end of the Cold War, and that Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964-1985) was a golden age where the military fought courageously against it.</p>
<p>This collective imagination is the reason why military staff co-opted Bolsonaro as early on as 2014 and then contributed decisively to his accession to power.</p>
<h2>An army that never really gave up power</h2>
<p>The militarisation of Brazilian politics is the result of this pact sealed between the authoritarian outsider Bolsonaro and those ultraconservative generals eager to get closer to, or even return to, power. This phenomenon contradicts the idea that Brazil successfully <a href="http://www.revues.msh-paris.fr/vernumpub/01-furtado.pdf">transitioned to democracy</a> following the military dictatorship. To understand this power project in the mid-2010s, there are three sets of factors to consider.</p>
<p>The first is just how incomplete Brazil’s democratic transition actually was. It proceeded without justice, without the purging of those in charge, and without any real imposition of civilian authority on the military.</p>
<p>Since 1985, all Brazilian presidents have had to tread carefully around transitional justice, including when appointing defence ministers and considering reforms to military training. In 2004, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s first defence minister, the diplomat José Viegas, was <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2004/11/09/l-armee-bresilienne-impose-sa-loi-a-lula_498831/">forced to resign</a> because he dared to oppose the praise of the dictatorship by senior commanders.</p>
<p>The military’s institutional culture has remained hostile to the civilian political class, which it portrays as corrupt and incompetent. However, until 2018 commanders were careful not to intervene openly in politics, even during the elections of the former trade unionist Lula in 2002 and 2006 and the former guerrilla Dilma Rousseff in 2010 and 2014. The pressure was mainly behind the scenes and on issues concerning the institution of the military, or its actions during the dictatorship. But within the military, open nostalgia for authoritarian order was widespread.</p>
<p>The second factor is that retired military officers, many of them former members of the repressive apparatus, created activist groups in the 1990s, spurred on by right-wing ideologies imported from the United States. These groups imagined that communism’s new faces were progressive cultural struggles, including feminism, the rights of indigenous peoples and LGBTQ+ people and the defence of the environment. It seems that these theories, long perceived as anachronistic and delusional, have in fact been spreading since the mid-2000s within the active army.</p>
<p>A third set of factors relates to the role of the armed forces in Brazilian democracy. Defending Brazilian territory has moved to the periphery, side-lined by a focus on urban security operations such as the fight against drug trafficking and the pacification of the favelas.</p>
<p>The armed forces have shored up their public legitimacy by taking on a policing role, at times extremely violently, as in infrastructure projects such as building roads and bridges. They’ve also taken part in UN peacekeeping operations, notably the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, which was led by <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/fin-de-la-misson-minustah-pour-le-bresil-terre-d-accueil-des-haitiens-17-10-2017-2165118_24.php">Brazilian officers</a> between 2004 and 2017.</p>
<h2>Political distrust</h2>
<p>All this reinforced a distrust within the army of the political classes, and reinforced a conviction that it knows how to – and can – govern. All this came to a head during the Rousseff presidency. The military was particularly upset by the <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/ameriques/20150901-bresil-crimes-dictature-dilma-rousseff-ines-etienne-romeu-casa-da-morte">National Truth Commission</a> launched in 2012, which officially recounted and condemns the crimes committed during the dictatorship. Some members of the military high command saw this as retaliation from the communist left.</p>
<p>Officers positioned themselves everywhere: in the judiciary, on social media, in the administration, and stood as candidates by the hundreds in all the assemblies of the country <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2018/08/16/au-bresil-les-militaires-en-campagne-pour-les-elections_5343099_3222.html">in the 2018 election</a>. Some members of staff even applied strategies of “hybrid warfare” from western military manuals, designed to discreetly destabilise political systems while pretending to respect the rules.</p>
<p>In doing this, the armed forces played a central, albeit behind-the-scenes role in the <a href="https://www.letemps.ch/monde/comprendre-destitution-dilma-rousseff-bresil-trois-minutes">institutional coup against Rousseff</a> in 2016 which resulted in her successful impeachment – and the subsequent election of Bolsonaro two years later.</p>
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<h2>The end of the alliance?</h2>
<p>Their current positions within the government is their retribution for this role. And yet the ex-captain they felt would serve their interests is currently increasingly discredited by his <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/blog/le-bresil-au-coeur-dun-marasme-sanitaire-et-economique">catastrophic management</a> of the Covid-19 health crisis.</p>
<p>Some are beginning to leave the ship with great fanfare. In late March 2021, the three commanders of the armed forces resigned en masse after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/30/brazil-military-chiefs-resign-bolsonaro-fires-defense-minister">Bolsonaro sacked</a> the minister of defence. Others are distancing themselves from Bolsonaro more discreetly.</p>
<p>Bolsonaro, politically isolated, is only protected by the popularity he still has among a third of the population. By distancing themselves from the president, however, the military top brass do not intend to leave the structures of power for good. On the contrary, they wish to give themselves the political means to survive if Bolsonaro falls or is not re-elected. The consequences of this power project for the survival of Brazilian democracy in the years to come are difficult to anticipate.</p>
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<p><em>This article is based on several chapters of the book <a href="https://www.alamedaeditorial.com.br/historia/os-militares-e-a-crise-brasileira-de-joao-roberto-martins-filho">“Os militares e a crise brasileira”</a> (João Roberto Martins Filho org., Alameda, 2021), in particular those of Manoel Domingos Neto, Eduardo Costa Pinto, Adriana Marques, Piero Leirner and the author herself.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162377/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maud Chirio is founder and co-president of Réseau Européen pour la Démocratie au Brésil (Red.br).</span></em></p>Don’t be fooled by the recent resignation of three members of the military in Brazil – the country is heading down an increasingly militarised path.Maud Chirio, Maître de conférences en histoire contemporaine, Université Gustave EiffelLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1583712021-05-18T12:23:03Z2021-05-18T12:23:03ZMuslim women are using Sharia to push for gender equality<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396649/original/file-20210422-18-17aoklz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C17%2C2973%2C1926&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslim women in India protesting against the use of Sharia as a tool for oppression.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/indian-muslim-womens-hold-placards-and-take-part-in-a-news-photo/928329674?adppopup=true">anjay Purkait/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sharia is often portrayed as barbaric and particularly regressive in terms of women’s rights. Citing Sharia, lawmakers in some Muslim-majority countries have punished theft with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50179741">amputation</a>, and sex outside of marriage with <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/05/28/in-pakistan-honor-killings-claim-1000-womens-lives-annually-why-is-this-still-happening/">stoning</a>. Women have been also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/nyregion/muslim-abuse-womens-shelter.html">forced to stay in abusive marriages</a> and flogged for defying Sharia because they were <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/12/01/sudan-has-repealed-its-repressive-public-order-law-that-had-let-police-flog-women-wearing-pants/">wearing trousers</a>.</p>
<p>Commonly translated as Islamic law, Sharia is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-sharia-means-5-questions-answered-79325">broad set of ethical principles</a> found in the Quran, Islam’s holy book, and in the teachings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad. It is not a strict legal code, leaving it open to <a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-blame-sharia-for-islamic-extremism-blame-colonialism-109918">varying interpretations</a> by governments and religious leaders. </p>
<p>Public outcry over Sharia has led to more than 200 <a href="https://belonging.berkeley.edu/global-justice/islamophobia">anti-Sharia bills</a> being introduced across the United States. The European Court of Human Rights has twice ruled Sharia <a href="https://www.justiceinitiative.org/voices/case-watch-europes-broad-view-acceptable-limits-free-speech">incompatible</a> with <a href="https://www.icnl.org/resources/research/ijnl/refah-partisi-the-welfare-party-and-others-v-turkey">human rights</a>. Conservative analysts have called Sharia <a href="https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2020/03/11/beware-the-other-pandemic-sharia-supremacism/">the world’s “other pandemic,”</a> a comparison to COVID-19. </p>
<p>However, many Muslim women do not regard Sharia as being incompatible with their rights. My <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108965989">research</a> shows how women – typically small activist groups in many countries – are using Sharia to fight against oppressive practices. </p>
<h2>Sharia and women’s rights</h2>
<p>I interviewed nearly 150 women’s rights activists, religious leaders, officials and aid workers over the past decade in Somalia and Somaliland, where <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2016-report-on-international-religious-freedom/somalia/">more than 99%</a> of the population is Muslim.</p>
<p>The region has suffered cycles of <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/famine-somalia">famine and drought</a>, as well as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jols.12251">brutal dictatorship and civil war</a> that led to the collapse of Somalia’s government 30 years ago and the split between Somalia and Somaliland. </p>
<p>I wanted to learn why women were demanding Sharia and whether Sharia could help rebuild societies after war. My book, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108965989">“Shari‘a, Inshallah: Finding God in Somali Legal Politics,”</a> tells the story of peace builders and peacemakers oriented toward, rather than away from, Sharia. </p>
<p>Because Sharia <a href="https://theconversation.com/harsh-punishments-under-sharia-are-modern-interpretations-of-an-ancient-tradition-115211">encourages a diversity of interpretations</a>, there is no right or wrong way to interpret it.</p>
<p>Women activists I met saw an inherent feminism in Sharia. Muslims “can find support for almost everything” in Sharia, a Somali activist reminded me. It’s just that women “have to know their rights in the Quran,” she added.</p>
<p>These activists help their local communities understand women’s rights in Islam. For example, one activist fighting for girls’ education explained to local parents how Sharia demands that both “boys and girls have the right to education.” Billboards put up by human rights groups referred to the Islamic teaching that to educate a girl is to educate a nation. They emphasized that Prophet Muhammad himself <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780312213510#aboutBook">taught women and men</a> and encouraged his followers to do the same.</p>
<p>Another activist I talked with invoked Sharia to explain that girls should be allowed to play sports. She explained to parents that not allowing their daughters to play <a href="https://academicjournals.org/journal/JPESM/article-full-text-pdf/7772CB356230">goes against Sharia</a>, which “gives rights to human beings.”</p>
<p>Yet another called the Quran – one of the sources of Sharia – her guide to persuade women to <a href="http://exhibitions.globalfundforwomen.org/exhibitions/women-power-and-politics/elections/quran">run for public office</a>. Allowing women to stand for election, she publicly insisted, “is Islamic.” </p>
<h2>Patriarchy and interpretations</h2>
<p>Part of the problem with the often brutal interpretation of Sharia has been that men have been aligning it with their political views. “The custodians of law are men,” an aid worker told me.</p>
<p>Indeed, some religious leaders insist that Sharia allows <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/sep/03/a-race-against-time-the-new-law-putting-somalias-children-at-risk-of-marriage">child marriage</a> and <a href="https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnado630.pdf">female genital mutilation</a> to preserve women’s premarital virginity and prevent women from experiencing sexual pleasure.</p>
<p>Activists I met tried to put an end to these harmful practices by sharing harrowing stories in workshops with religious leaders. One activist told me that in one such workshop she had related the tragic story of a young girl whose pelvis shattered during childbirth. Another shared the story of a child who drank bleach to avoid a forced marriage. </p>
<p>These women wanted religious leaders to share these stories with others. They argued that Sharia could not be used to permit child marriage and female genital mutilation. <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Encountering-the-Transnational-Women-Islam-and-the-Politics-of-Interpretation/Sharify-Funk/p/book/9780367605667">Protecting women</a> “is so clearly written in the Quran,” said one activist who added that “Islam always promotes the person, health, and dignity.” </p>
<p>[<em>This Week in Religion, a global roundup email newsletter each Thursday.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/this-week-in-religion-76/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=religion-global-roundup">Sign up.</a>]</p>
<h2>Reclaiming women’s power</h2>
<p>Religious leaders in these countries have, however, been reluctant to speak publicly on these issues. But many of the Somali women I met were reviving a centuries-old tradition – of women <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/156920803322765155">teaching and interpreting Sharia</a>. In the seventh century, Aisha, the Prophet Muhammad’s surviving spouse, was among the first Muslim authorities to render decisions on sacred law <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/494271">that men had to follow</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A Muslim woman leads prayers inside the Qal'bu Maryam women's mosque in Berkeley, California." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Qal'bu Maryam women’s mosque in Berkeley, California.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/soraya-deen-leads-prayers-as-part-of-a-grand-opening-news-photo/1213336107?adppopup=true">Kristopher Skinner/MediaNews Group/East Bay Times via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Not just in Somalia and Somaliland, but in many parts of the world, Muslim women <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/islam-gender-and-social-change-9780195113570?cc=us&lang=en&#">are reclaiming</a> their rights by studying and sharing Quranic verses and prophetic teachings. In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/888E17F4ACC3739CE1AA443FD07C9BA8/9781108423946AR.pdf/Constituting_Religion.pdf">Malaysia</a>, for example, groups like <a href="https://rpl.hds.harvard.edu/religion-context/case-studies/gender/malaysias-sisters-islam">Sisters in Islam</a> and <a href="https://www.musawah.org/">Musawah</a> have been publicly putting forward feminist interpretations of Quranic verses to teach women about gender equality and inheritance rights. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/mwjhr-2016-0022">Egypt</a>, women have invoked Sharia to expand access to divorce.</p>
<p>In my research in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139199247">Sudan</a>, I saw women lawyers teach women displaced by civil war that their rights come from God. On the Day of Judgment, these women said to one another, God will judge those who tried to take away women’s God-given rights. </p>
<p>And in Los Angeles, California, a <a href="https://www.womensmosque.com/">women’s mosque</a> offers women-led sermons, classes and events.</p>
<p>By interpreting theological and legal texts in less patriarchal ways, these women, as I found, are shattering age-old sexist interpretations of Sharia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158371/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Fathi Massoud has held fellowships from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Andrew Mellon Foundation, Fulbright-Hays, and the University of California. Any views expressed here are the author's responsibility.</span></em></p>Sharia is often portrayed as being brutal and barbaric. However, in many parts of the world, women are using Sharia to stop oppressive practices.Mark Fathi Massoud, Professor of Politics and Legal Studies, University of California, Santa CruzLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1601542021-05-10T12:32:40Z2021-05-10T12:32:40ZHaitians protest their president in English as well as Creole, indicting US for its role in country’s political crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399480/original/file-20210507-19-12nvewv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protest signs on the ground before a march on March 28, 2021, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, to denounce President Jovenel Moïse's efforts to stay in office past his term.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/signs-are-seen-on-the-ground-before-haitians-demonstrated-news-photo/1231992427?adppopup=true">Valerie Baeriswyl/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Haitian protesters on the nation’s streets have a laundry list of reasons they believe President Jovenel Moïse should resign.</p>
<p>They blame Moïse for overstaying his term, which should have ended on <a href="https://nacla.org/news/2021/02/06/foreign-roots-haiti-constitutional-crisis-jovenel-moise">Feb. 7</a>, for fiscal austerity that has caused <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2021/02/25/can-haiti-rid-itself-of-jovenel-moise">rapid inflation and deteriorating living conditions</a> and for sponsoring <a href="http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Killing_With_Impunity-1.pdf">gang attacks that have killed at least 240 people</a> since 2018, according to human rights groups. </p>
<p>And though <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-languages-are-spoken-in-haiti.html">very few people in Haiti speak English</a>, Haitian protesters are using English to make their demands known, with viral <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23freehaiti&lang=en">Twitter protest hashtags</a> like <a href="https://haitiantimes.com/2021/03/16/online-trend-freehaiti-spurs-action-offline-with-protests-in-us-2/">#FreeHaiti</a> and protest signs reading “Jovenel is a dictator.”</p>
<p>My research on <a href="https://pir.fiu.edu/people/phd-grad-students/tamanisha-john/">imperialism and Caribbean politics</a> suggests Haitians are using English not only to <a href="https://www.coha.org/haitis-ongoing-struggle-for-uninterrupted-democracy-against-international-interventionism/">draw Western attention to the crisis there</a>, but also to indict the U.S. for its <a href="https://www.voanews.com/americas/haiti-presidents-term-will-end-2022-biden-administration-says">role in creating that crisis</a>. </p>
<h2>A scandal-plagued president</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/haiti-protests-summon-spirit-of-the-haitian-revolution-to-condemn-a-president-tainted-by-scandal-126315">Sustained protests</a> have been a hallmark of Moïse’s tenure since he was <a href="https://haitiliberte.com/the-record-low-voter-participation-in-haitis-2016-election/">elected in November 2016</a> in an election that fewer than 12% of Haitians voted in. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399496/original/file-20210507-19-crdlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Valerie Baeriswyl / AFP via Getty Images" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399496/original/file-20210507-19-crdlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399496/original/file-20210507-19-crdlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399496/original/file-20210507-19-crdlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399496/original/file-20210507-19-crdlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399496/original/file-20210507-19-crdlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399496/original/file-20210507-19-crdlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399496/original/file-20210507-19-crdlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Haitian President Jovenel Moïse speaks on Nov. 18, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/haitian-president-jovenel-moise-speaks-during-a-military-news-photo/1183269268?adppopup=true">Jovenel at a podium with men sitting behind him</a></span>
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<p>Moïse was the <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/haiti/politics-moise.htm">handpicked successor of Haiti’s unpopular last president, Michel Martelly</a>. His meager 2016 electoral success came after two years of delayed votes and <a href="http://worldpolicy.org/2016/03/22/haitis-unending-electoral-transition/">confirmed electoral fraud by Martelly’s government</a>. In 2017, his first year in office, <a href="https://haitiliberte.com/le-rapport-petrocaribe-de-la-commission-senatoriale-speciale-denquete-du-senateur-evalliere-beauplan/">the Haitian Senate issued a report accusing Moïse</a> of embezzling at least US$700,000 of public money from an infrastructure development fund called PetroCaribe <a href="https://time.com/5609054/haiti-protests-petrocaribe/">to his personal banana business</a>. </p>
<p>Protesters flooded into the streets crying “<a href="https://theweek.com/articles/840427/fight-transparency-haiti">Kot Kòb Petwo Karibe a</a>?” – “where is the PetroCaribe money?” </p>
<p>Lacking the trust of the Haitian people, Moïse has relied on hard power to remain in office. </p>
<p>He created a kind of police state in Haiti, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-military/haitian-army-set-to-make-controversial-return-after-two-decades-idUSKBN1DJ01M">reviving the national army</a> two decades after it was disbanded and <a href="https://cepr.net/whats-in-haitis-new-national-security-decrees-an-intelligence-agency-and-an-expanded-definition-of-terrorism/">creating a domestic intelligence agency</a> with surveillance powers. Since early last year, Moïse has also been ruling by decree. He effectively shuttered the Haitian legislature by refusing to <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2020/01/18/jovenel-moise-tries-to-govern-haiti-without-a-parliament">hold parliamentary elections scheduled for January 2020</a> and summarily <a href="https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article249251975.html">dismissed all of the country’s elected mayors in July 2020</a> when their terms expired.</p>
<p>Existing street protests exploded early this year after Moïse refused to hold a presidential election and <a href="http://www.haiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/CCI-CONSTITUTION-Note.pdf">step down when his term ended in Feburary 2021</a>. Instead, he claims his term ends in February 2022, because Haiti’s 2016 election was postponed. </p>
<p>In the coming months, Moïse says, he <a href="https://www.liberationnews.org/fierce-struggle-resists-u-s-backed-haitian-presidents-power-grab/">intends to change the Haitian Constitution</a> to strengthen the powers of the presidency and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-03/proposed-changes-to-haiti-s-constitution-may-keep-moise-in-power">prolong his administration</a>. </p>
<h2>Memories of a dictatorship</h2>
<p>For many Haitians, Moïse’s undemocratic power grabs recall the 30-year, U.S.-backed dictatorship of François Duvalier, aka “Papa Doc,” and his son Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399495/original/file-20210507-13-17wn3bx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black-and-white image of François Duvalier, in a suit, and his wife, in a dress, surrounded by watchful men" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399495/original/file-20210507-13-17wn3bx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399495/original/file-20210507-13-17wn3bx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399495/original/file-20210507-13-17wn3bx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399495/original/file-20210507-13-17wn3bx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399495/original/file-20210507-13-17wn3bx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=580&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399495/original/file-20210507-13-17wn3bx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=580&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399495/original/file-20210507-13-17wn3bx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=580&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">François Duvalier with bodyguards and his wife, Simone, after they voted in Haiti’s 1957 presidential election, in which Duvalier was a leading candidate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/francois-duvalier-is-shown-with-his-wife-simone-after-they-news-photo/101945949">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Both Papa Doc and Baby Doc relied on <a href="https://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/haiti.htm">murdering</a> and <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-02-03-mn-3859-story.html">brutalizing</a> Haitians to remain in power, in close collaboration with <a href="https://origins.osu.edu/article/pact-devil-united-states-and-fate-modern-haiti/page/0/1">Western corporate and political interests</a> in Haiti. The Duvaliers enriched themselves – along with <a href="https://theconversation.com/gas-shortages-paralyze-haiti-triggering-protests-against-failing-economy-and-dysfunctional-politics-116337">Haiti’s American financial investors and U.S. manufacturers based there</a> – while leaving the country in massive debt. </p>
<p>When mounting Haitian protests ended the regime in 1986, Baby Doc fled the country. Haiti was in <a href="https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1835&context=graddis">economic collapse and social ruin</a>.</p>
<p>The 1987 Haitian Constitution that Moïse now seeks to change was written soon after to ensure that Haiti would never slide back into dictatorship.</p>
<p>Beyond Moïse’s use of state violence to suppress opposition, Haitian protesters today see another similarity with the Duvalier era: the United States’ support. </p>
<p>In March, the U.S. State Department announced that it supports Moïse’s <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/03/09/the-biden-administration-is-greenlighting-haitis-descent-towards-dictatorship/">decision to remain in office until 2022</a>, to give the crisis-stricken country time to “elect their leaders and restore Haiti’s democratic institutions.”</p>
<p>That stance – which echoes that of Western-dominated international organizations that hold substantial sway in Haiti, <a href="https://dyalog.org/refleksyon/2019/2/11/the-core-group-as-a-parasite-on-haitian-sovereignty">such as the Organization of American States</a> – sustains what is left of Moïse’s legitimacy to remain president. </p>
<p>Haitians unhappy with continued American support for their embattled president have held <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/hundreds-haiti-protest-demand-leaders-resignation-75387503">numerous demonstrations outside the U.S. embassy</a> in <a href="https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/445921/haiti-activists-to-protest-outside-the-us-embassy-in-port-au-prince-feb-22-24">the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince</a>, while Haitian Americans in the U.S. have <a href="https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/solidarity-rallies-call-for-end-to-u-s-backed-dictatorship-in-haiti/">protested outside the Haitian embassy in Washington, D.C.</a> </p>
<p>Some Haitian demonstrators have also <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-31/haiti-leader-defies-protester-calls-to-cancel-election-and-quit">burned the American flag</a> at several <a href="https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article249213495.html">protests in Port-au-Prince</a>. The flag-burning, like the English-language protest slogans, aims to highlight the history of Western foreign intervention that created the disaster situation in Haiti.</p>
<p>From its invasion and military occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 to its support of the Duvalier regime, the U.S. has played a <a href="https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-14-the-united-states-and-latin-america/moments-in-u-s-latin-american-relations/a-history-of-united-states-policy-towards-haiti/">major role in destabilizing Haiti</a>. Ever since the devastating Haitian earthquake of 2010, international organizations like the United Nations and nonprofits like the American Red Cross have also had an <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-decade-after-the-earthquake-haiti-still-struggles-to-recover-129670">outsize presence in the country</a>.</p>
<p>Last year, protesters staged demonstrations outside the United Nations headquarters in Haiti as the U.N. Security Council met to discuss Moïse’s future and the country’s political crisis. Their message, <a href="https://www.struggle-la-lucha.org/2019/10/12/haiti-gripped-by-protests/">according to the publication Haïti Liberté</a>, “No more foreign meddling.” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399493/original/file-20210507-19-1yjhdms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Crowd in the street under smoky skies hold up a sign with U.S., Canadian and other foreign flags" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399493/original/file-20210507-19-1yjhdms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399493/original/file-20210507-19-1yjhdms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399493/original/file-20210507-19-1yjhdms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399493/original/file-20210507-19-1yjhdms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399493/original/file-20210507-19-1yjhdms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399493/original/file-20210507-19-1yjhdms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399493/original/file-20210507-19-1yjhdms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters in Port-au-Prince in 2019 highlight the role of foreign governments in supporting President Jovenel Moïse, who was accused of corruption.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-carry-a-cross-bearing-images-of-canada-us-and-news-photo/1149703953?adppopup=true">CHANDAN KHANNA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why English?</h2>
<p>Haitian protesters aren’t the only non-English-speaking protesters to use English to air their grievances. In Myanmar, where a Feb. 1 coup overthrew the country’s democratically elected government, <a href="https://www.elgazette.com/english-the-language-of-protest/">English-language protest signs, videos and hashtags abound</a>.</p>
<p>According to linguist Mary Lynne Gasaway Hill’s 2018 book, “<a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319774183">The Language of Protest</a>,” using a widely spoken, politically dominant language like English helps to get traditional news outlets to cover uprisings occurring abroad. And if the state cracks down on dissent, that means international audiences will see the violence, too – potentially protecting protesters and hurting the government’s credibility.</p>
<p>[<em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>English is a more likely protest tool, then, in a country where local people feel – or in fact are – powerless to effect change without outside alliances. Coupled with “social media and the rapidity of globalized communication,” Hill writes, English protest messages can raise some critical international solidarity.</p>
<p>I see another reason, too, for Haitian protesters’ recent adoption of English: It is the language of the United States, the world’s most powerful country and Moïse’s most influential international backer.</p>
<p>Haitians’ cries to “Free Haiti” ask Americans not only to pay attention to their struggle – but also to consider their country’s responsibility for it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160154/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tamanisha J. John does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Haitian president Jovenel Moïse is accused of overstaying his term, embezzling funds and dismantling parliament. Protests are a hallmark of his presidency – but the language of them has changed.Tamanisha J. John, Ph.D. Candidate of International Relations, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1550862021-03-03T13:25:55Z2021-03-03T13:25:55ZForcibly sterilized during Fujimori dictatorship, thousands of Peruvian women demand justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387344/original/file-20210302-13-i776sp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5588%2C3705&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Victims of forced sterilizations protest in Lima, Peru, in 2014. Public hearings to uncover this dark chapter of the Fujimori dictatorship began in January. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotografia-de-noticias/peruvian-andean-women-victims-of-forced-fotografia-de-noticias/469233773?adppopup=true">Erneseto Benavides/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The regime of Peruvian dictator Alberto Fujimori sterilized <a href="https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1740&context=gsp">272,028 people</a> between 1996 and 2001, the majority of them Indigenous women from poor, rural areas – and some without consent. </p>
<p>Now, in public hearings that began earlier this year, thousands of these women are demanding justice for what they say were forced sterilization procedures called tubal ligations. </p>
<p>Sterilization was a covert part of Fujimori’s “family planning” policy, which purported to give women “<a href="https://www.un.org/esa/gopher-data/conf/fwcw/conf/gov/950915131946.txt">the tools necessary [for them] to make decisions about their lives</a>.” But in fact, as <a href="https://1996pnsrpf2000.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/informe-69-2002-aqv.pdf">revealed in government documents</a> published by the Peru human rights ombudsman’s office in 2002, the regime saw controlling birth rates as a way to fight <a href="https://1996pnsrpf2000.wordpress.com/investigacion/financiamiento/">“resource depletion” and “economic downturn.”</a> </p>
<p>These were euphemisms for what Fujimori, and past leaders of Peru, referred to as the “<a href="https://www.erlacs.org/articles/abstract/10.18352/erlacs.9637/">Indian problem</a>” – higher birth rates among Indigenous people than Peruvians of European descent. And since Indigenous women of Quechua descent had the highest poverty rates in Peru, they were the government’s main target for “family planning.” </p>
<p>Rather than getting consultations on their reproductive rights, as other Peruvian women did when they visited public health clinics, Indigenous women were offered “family planning” methods, one of which was tubal ligation.</p>
<p>“Health officials took me to the hospital … and forced me to undergo surgery,” testified Dionicia Calderón in a <a href="http://onamiap.org/2017/06/estado-esta-obligado-a-garantizar-justicia-y-reparacion-en-los-casos-de-esterilizaciones-forzadas/">public testimony</a> organized by the National Organization of Andean and Amazonian Indigenous Women in Peru in 2017. </p>
<p>Indigenous Peruvians are widely recognized as particular <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=DT6SDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA71&ots=waxe97KsKn&sig=GrmYtX2ZxVGujgQ-kJbvmsPO9N4#v=onepage&q&f=false">victims of the Fujimori dictatorship</a>. But my research <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319917696#:%7E:text=This%20book%20examines%20human%20rights,and%20understanding%20of%20human%20rights">documenting Indigenous women’s stories</a> finds that the crime of forced sterilization has been <a href="https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol14/iss2/8/">underplayed in Peru’s post-Fujimori reckoning with the past</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387322/original/file-20210302-21-1251mv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=27%2C89%2C4573%2C3359&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women in black holding flower bouquets and signs stand solemnly in front of a wall" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387322/original/file-20210302-21-1251mv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=27%2C89%2C4573%2C3359&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387322/original/file-20210302-21-1251mv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387322/original/file-20210302-21-1251mv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387322/original/file-20210302-21-1251mv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387322/original/file-20210302-21-1251mv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387322/original/file-20210302-21-1251mv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387322/original/file-20210302-21-1251mv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Peruvian women in April 2017 demand reparations for forced sterilization.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotografia-de-noticias/urgent-comprehensive-reparations-policy-for-fotografia-de-noticias/665151452?adppopup=true">Fotoholica Press/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Truth and justice</h2>
<p>Victims and families of victims of forced sterilization began to seek legal recourse in 1998, two years before Fujimori’s downfall. </p>
<p>The family of María Mamérita Mestanza – who was coercively sterilized, suffered health complications and died on April 5, 1998 – filed charges with the <a href="https://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2003eng/peru.12191.htm">national prosecutor’s office against the chief of the health center that performed her tubal ligation</a>. But judges twice ruled that there were insufficient grounds to prosecute the doctor. </p>
<p>In 2004, official investigations by prosecutors began against Fujimori into his regime’s “<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/es/latest/news/2018/04/peru-order-to-indict-fujimori-is-a-milestone-in-search-for-justice-for-victims-of-forced-sterilization/">compulsive application of sterilizations</a>.” But after Fujimori was prosecuted and convicted by Peru’s Supreme Court for other human rights abuses, the <a href="https://1996pnsrpf2000.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/cladem-cronologia-denuncia-ef1.pdf">sterilizations case was closed</a> because it was not considered genocide or torture, and the crimes could not be charged within Peru’s existing penal code. </p>
<p>Investigations were reopened in 2011 after the <a href="https://tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2020/02064-2018-AA.pdf">Inter-American Commission on Human Rights</a>, an international legal body, pressured the state to investigate the case, citing the high number of victims. By January 2014, Peru’s Public Ministry was pursuing charges against doctors for <a href="https://cejil.org/en/caso-mamerita-mestanza-chavez">María Mamérita Mestanza’s death</a>. But it re-closed 2,000 other cases, saying there was insufficient evidence to hold Fujimori himself accountable. </p>
<p>For years, the roughly 2,000 forced sterilization cases continued to <a href="https://reproductiverights.org/centro-de-prensa/fiscal-landa-ordena-denunciar-a-fujimori-y-exministros-por-esterilizaciones-forzada">bounce around the Peruvian criminal justice system</a>. Every so often, authorities would open investigations into some <a href="https://idehpucp.pucp.edu.pe/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/An%C3%A1lisis-del-Dictamen-Fiscal-sobre-Esterilizaciones-Forzadas.pdf">low-level officials</a> accused of <a href="http://www.demus.org.pe/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/RESOLUCION-FISCAL-LANDA_ESTERILIZACIONES-FORZADAS.pdf">participating in the “family planning” program</a>, only to close them again because of “<a href="https://rpp.pe/peru/actualidad/fiscalia-archivo-caso-de-esterilizaciones-forzadas-noticia-982885">insufficient information</a>.” This was part of general impunity surrounding Fujimori, whose son and daughter are both politicians.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Indigenous groups were recording the testimonies <a href="https://interactive.quipu-project.com/#/en/quipu/intro">of these women</a> and creating an online archive in which Indigenous women recall their forced sterilization. Called “Quipu,” the database – along with pressure from international human rights groups like Amnesty International – helped pressure the government to holding public hearings on the topic. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387315/original/file-20210302-19-aoeiif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Older woman in green shirt and straw hat speaks into a microphone held by a younger woman" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387315/original/file-20210302-19-aoeiif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387315/original/file-20210302-19-aoeiif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387315/original/file-20210302-19-aoeiif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387315/original/file-20210302-19-aoeiif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387315/original/file-20210302-19-aoeiif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387315/original/file-20210302-19-aoeiif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387315/original/file-20210302-19-aoeiif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Esperanza Huayama testifies about her forced sterilization 18 years earlier under Alberto Fujimori’s government, at an Amnesty International press conference in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotografia-de-noticias/peruvian-andean-peasant-esperanza-huayama-a-fotografia-de-noticias/493637374?adppopup=true">Cris Bouroncle/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In January of this year, the <a href="https://rpp.pe/politica/judiciales/alberto-fujimori-caso-esterilizaciones-forzadas-poder-judicial-suspende-audiencia-por-falta-de-interpretes-de-quechua-noticia-1314439">first official government hearings</a> on coercive sterilizations began in Lima. But they were suspended after just one day, when Judge Rafael Martín Martínez determined the court needed more translators for the wide variety of Quechua dialects spoken by the victims. </p>
<p>Hearings resumed on March 1 in Lima, to “formalize the charges for mediated authorship on the crimes against life, body, and health; grievous bodily harm causing death,” according to <a href="https://www.pj.gob.pe/wps/wcm/connect/cortesuprema/s_cortes_suprema_home/as_inicio/as_enlaces_destacados/as_imagen_prensa/as_notas_noticias/2021/cs_n-sustentan-ante-juez-denuncia-penal-contra-fujimori-y-exministros-por-esterilizaciones-forzadas-01032021">prosecutor Pablo Espinoza Vázquez</a>. </p>
<p>In addition to wrenching testimonies from victims, the prosecution presented <a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=212939730516279">damning evidence</a> that Fujimori and his health ministers set an annual sterilization quota. For instance, in 1997, Fujimori’s government aimed to sterilize 150,000 people, the prosecutor alleged, regardless of their health condition or consent. </p>
<p>The majority of the victims of coercive sterilizations were of Indigenous descent. </p>
<h2>Difficult road ahead</h2>
<p>The hearings have given thousands of Indigenous women in Peru hope that their abusers may finally be held criminally accountable for violating their reproductive rights, depriving them of children and decimating the Indigenous population by <a href="https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol14/iss2/8/">preventing the births of future generations</a>. </p>
<p>And recent <a href="https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/ley-que-modifica-los-articulos-3-y-6-de-la-ley-28592-ley-qu-ley-n-31119-1926075-2/?_ga=2.253155339.38567553.1612794597-1840789389.1583242158&fbclid=IwAR0Rv82MPKdHROq8BNIeydLhqWRYWWtP5bn1_zv3CU1jwblrvIEZlYjqJXQ">legislative changes</a> now entitle victims of forced sterilizations to medical, financial and educational reparations, and potentially an official apology.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Peruvian protester holds a sign reading, 'Forced sterilizations are not myths or errors; they are crimes against humanity.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384195/original/file-20210215-19-1w24cfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384195/original/file-20210215-19-1w24cfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384195/original/file-20210215-19-1w24cfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384195/original/file-20210215-19-1w24cfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384195/original/file-20210215-19-1w24cfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384195/original/file-20210215-19-1w24cfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384195/original/file-20210215-19-1w24cfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Peruvian woman holds a sign reading, ‘Forced sterilizations are not myths or errors; they are crimes against humanity.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Televisa via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But former president Fujimori and his inner circle retain links with powerful people in politics. Despite efforts to punish them for the crimes of the dictatorship, they <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9789813349384">have largely escaped justice</a>.</p>
<p>Fujimori was <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2009/04/peru-conviction-fujimori-e28093-milestone-fight-justice-20090407/">convicted in 2009 and jailed for crimes against humanity</a>, but his conviction was overturned in 2017 on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-16097439">health-related grounds</a>. This so-called “humanitarian” pardon was annulled in 2017, and in 2018 a court-appointed team of medical experts concluded the former dictator was fit to serve the rest of his sentence. Fujimori was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-fujimori/perus-fujimori-pardon-annulled-forced-back-to-prison-idUSKCN1PI0BL">ordered back to jail</a>. </p>
<p>His daughter, Keiko Fujimori, a candidate in this year’s Peruvian presidential election, says she would consider <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-politics/perus-keiko-fujimori-says-would-pardon-father-if-elected-president-idUSKBN29N1HT?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews">pardoning her father if she won</a>.</p>
<p>So the road to actually convicting Fujimori for reproductive violence against Indigenous women is long. His victims, telling their stories publicly now, know how often their cases were previously dismissed due to “insufficient information” and how marginalized their voices have been in Peru’s transitional justice process. </p>
<p>Despite the odds, victims and their families maintain hope that this time things will be different. As the daughters of two women who died of coercive sterilization-related <a href="https://gestion.pe/peru/politica/manana-se-reanuda-audiencia-contra-alberto-fujimori-por-caso-de-esterilizaciones-forzadas-noticia/">medical complications declared</a>, “Without judicial investigations, there is no truth, and without truth, there will be no justice.”</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155086/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ñusta Carranza Ko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Forced sterilization of Indigenous women was a covert part of ‘family planning’ under Fujimori. Over 200,000 Peruvians underwent tubal ligations between 1996 and 2001 – many without their consent.Ñusta Carranza Ko, Assistant Professor, School of Public and International Affairs, University of BaltimoreLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1438852021-02-12T13:18:29Z2021-02-12T13:18:29ZUS-educated foreign soldiers learn ‘democratic values,’ study shows – though America also trains future dictators<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383898/original/file-20210211-16-4bu91t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C30%2C4103%2C2708&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Foreign military students from the U.S. Navy's Patrol Craft Officer course conduct a field training exercise at the Stennis Space Center in Mississippi in 2009. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.defense.gov/observe/photo-gallery/?igphoto=2001152339">Department of Defense</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The leadership of a U.S.-trained special operations officer, Col. Assimi Goita, in Mali’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/mali-coup-leader-was-trained-by-us-special-operations-forces/2020/08/21/33153fbe-e31c-11ea-82d8-5e55d47e90ca_story.html">August 2020 coup</a> has <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-military-assistance-programs-disappoint/">reignited an old American debate</a> about whether U.S. military education of foreigners is spreading respect for democracy or empowering future dictators.</p>
<p>Several notorious <a href="https://thegrayzone.com/2019/11/13/bolivian-coup-plotters-school-of-the-americas-fbi-police-programs/">coup plotters</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/nov/18/us-military-usa">human rights violators</a> – among them Argentina’s 1970s-era military junta leader Leopoldo Galtieri and Guatemalan dictator Efraín Ríos Montt – were trained by the United States military. So was the <a href="https://www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/ustrained-police-sniper-colonel-gulmurod-khalimov-made-isis-minister-of-war/news-story/5469ea35513f9c8a4eba5cf553d5171c">Islamic State group’s minister of war</a>, Gulmurod Khalimov. </p>
<p>Training foreign military personnel became part of the United States’ global military strategy to <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/lend-lease-act-1">achieve its foreign policy goals during World War II</a>, along with a robust program of weapons and equipment sales. Today, the U.S. Armed Forces run <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/FMT_Volume-II_FY2018-2019.pdf">14 programs</a> in over 150 countries, providing education and training for roughly <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/FMT_Volume-II_FY2018-2019.pdf">70,000 foreign military personnel</a> of all ranks each year, both in the U.S. and overseas.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/94/hr13680">International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act</a>, passed in 1976 and amended in 1978 and 1991, these programs aim to transmit the U.S. military’s professional values and norms – namely respect of democratic values, human rights and civilian control of the armed forces. They also seek to professionalize and strengthen the armed forces of recipient countries.</p>
<p>Is that what’s really happening?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Goita, a middle-aged Black man, stands at a lectern in fatigues with his hand raised, with a crowd in foreground" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Col. Assimi Goita is sworn in as Mali’s transitional vice president following a military mutiny, Sept. 25, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sept-25-2020-colonel-assimi-goita-is-sworn-in-as-malis-news-photo/1228741241?adppopup=true">Xinhua/Habib Kouyate via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What soldiers learn</h2>
<p>The U.S. military’s underlying assumption seems to be that foreign soldiers learn democratic values in class and further absorb them by living in the United States during training. Graduates are expected to train their peers upon returning home, thus spreading American military values throughout the armed forces of their country.</p>
<p>That’s the theory. </p>
<p>But little research has been done to examine whether this actually happens. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066109344659">Papers examining U.S. foreign military training</a> tend to be theoretical and <a href="http://www.allazimuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2-Atkinson-All-Azimuth-Jul-2015.pdf">limited in scope</a>. Neither the U.S. government nor scholars have demonstrated how, or even whether, this process works.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1209&context=etd2020">security studies research</a> attempts to fill that gap. I examined the centerpiece of U.S. military training initiatives: the U.S. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-international-military-education-and-training-program#:%7E:text=The%20International%20Military%20Education%20and%20Training%20%28IMET%29%20program%2C,to%20members%20of%20foreign%20militaries%20to%20take%20class%E2%80%A6">International Military Education and Training program</a>. Each year, this <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585950.pdf">US$900 million government program</a> offers 4,000 courses in the United States, from individual classes on specific skills like radio operation to degree programs at the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/education/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/us-war-colleges">United States’ four war colleges</a>. </p>
<p>To assess what foreign officers actually take away from this experience, I studied one participant country, Hungary, in depth. </p>
<p>I administered a survey to 350 military personnel, 140 of whom had completed a U.S. training program and 210 who had not. Survey respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of democratic values, civilian control of the armed forces and human rights on a <a href="https://www.simplypsychology.org/likert-scale.html">scale of 1 to 10</a>, with 1 meaning “not important at all” and 10 meaning “extremely important.”</p>
<p>The results show that U.S.-trained military officials displayed greater respect for democratic values, rating them an average of 7.8 in importance, compared with the control group’s average rating of 6.1. Human rights were similarly judged more important by U.S.-trained military officials, 7.5 to 6.6. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Photo of two soldiers in fatigues, one standing and the other lying in the bushes shooting a weapon" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. soldiers train with Hungarian armed forces on March 3, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.defense.gov/2020/Mar/04/2002258876/-1/-1/0/200303-Z-CC612-1079A.JPG">Army Staff Sgt. Noshoba Davis/Department of Defense</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When asked whether “the military should intervene in domestic policy making,” nearly all survey respondents roundly rejected the idea. But U.S.-trained military officials were less inclined, rating military intervention a 2.8 out of 10, compared with 3.5 in the control group.</p>
<p>To ensure the validity of my results, I employed several control measures to correct for potential biases, such as participants’ prior attitudes toward democracy.</p>
<h2>How armies change</h2>
<p>Having established that individual trainees learn the intended practices and values in U.S. military training, I then examined whether they share these lessons more widely within their military. </p>
<p>Statistical analysis of the same 350 surveys provides some initial evidence that they do. </p>
<p>I found military personnel who have served under a U.S.-trained commander to have higher respect for democratic values, human rights and civilian control than those who have never served under a U.S.-trained commander. </p>
<p>This knowledge transfer may explain my next finding, that U.S. military training helps countries keep the peace. </p>
<p>Here I zoomed out from modern-day Hungary to analyze <a href="https://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs/mids">3,558 international military disputes</a> between 1976 and 2007. </p>
<p>I found that countries that had received U.S. training were less likely to have initiated the conflict than other countries. In fact, for every soldier trained in the U.S., the probability of a country instigating an international conflict decreases by about three-quarters of a percent, on average. </p>
<h2>Battling insurgencies</h2>
<p>The benefits of U.S. military training on domestic rule of law are more mixed. </p>
<p>I examined 120 insurgencies between 1976 and 2003 and found that countries with U.S.-trained militaries were more likely to defeat the insurgents. Again, the probability of victory increased proportionally with the number of U.S.-trained soldiers.</p>
<p>This analysis controlled for other kinds of military assistance the U.S. provides to allies, like weapons and operational support. </p>
<p>But when U.S.-trained militaries fight domestic insurgents, I found, the conflicts are usually longer than those in other countries. Uganda’s civil conflict lasted from 1978 to 1991. India’s lasted from 1978 to 2003. Militaries in both countries were receiving substantial American military education and training throughout. </p>
<p>I hypothesize that such prolonged conflicts may result when insurgents recognize the higher capacity of the U.S.-trained government forces they are up against and resort to guerrilla tactics rather than open combat. </p>
<p>In some places, long conflicts have opened the door to decidedly undemocratic practices. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5400%2C3637&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Half a dozen young men in green military gear and helmets sit nervously and look straight at the camera" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5400%2C3637&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Salvadoran Army recruits await their turn during a parachute training exercise overseen by the U.S. in 1982, during the Salvadoran Civil War.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/group-of-salvadoran-army-recruits-await-their-turn-during-a-news-photo/595390475?adppopup=true">Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The El Salvador civil war is a good example. This fight between leftist insurgents and the U.S.-backed right-wing government was fought from 1979 to 1991. Salvadoran government forces committed major <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/03/el-salvador-no-justice-years-un-truth-commission/">human rights violations against civilians</a>, including kidnapping the children of suspected insurgents, burning villages and destroying crops, according to a postwar truth commission. </p>
<p>At least 75,000 people died in the conflict. </p>
<h2>Weighing the evidence</h2>
<p>My research establishes, possibly for the first time, that U.S. military training programs achieve their stated goals: They transmit democratic values to foreign soldiers, who spread them among national armed forces.</p>
<p>However, it does not conclude that American military education is an unmitigated good. Far from it. </p>
<p>U.S. foreign military training has produced more democratic commanders, better-trained warlords and everything in between. My next research project will try to determine which specific conditions create suboptimal, even deadly, results. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143885/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sandor Fabian served in the Hungarian armed forces.</span></em></p>The US Armed Forces run 14 programs in over 150 countries, providing education and training for roughly 70,000 foreign military personnel each year. What, if anything, are they learning?Sandor Fabian, Research Fellow, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.