tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/donetsk-9303/articlesDonetsk – The Conversation2023-08-08T13:43:26Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2097502023-08-08T13:43:26Z2023-08-08T13:43:26ZUkraine war: why a ceasefire based on partition of territory won’t work<p>Even as Ukraine’s counteroffensive pushes slowly forward, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/unwinnable-war-washington-endgame">some observers are calling</a> for the warring sides to negotiate a ceasefire. This would create a de facto demarcation line separating areas held by Ukrainian forces from those under Russian control at the moment the fighting stops. </p>
<p>Others argue, however, that a ceasefire is unlikely to <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/responses/should-america-push-ukraine-negotiate-russia-end-war?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=Should%20America%20Push%20Ukraine%20to%20Negotiate%20With%20Russia?&utm_content=20230713&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017">lead to a durable settlement</a>. For Ukraine, a truce would mean giving its adversary time to regain strength for renewed aggression, while abandoning its citizens to the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/russia-filtration-of-ukrainian-civilians-a-shocking-violation-of-people-forced-to-flee-war/">horrors of occupation</a> in Russian-controlled areas. </p>
<p>Establishing a provisional line of separation would break up long-established administrative and economic structures. This would indefinitely prevent the divided regions from rebuilding and restoring their inhabitants’ security and welfare.</p>
<p>To understand this, let’s look back at how Soviet leaders drew the border between Russia and Ukraine. It was this border that Ukraine inherited in 1991 after <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2021-12-21/end-soviet-union-1991">the dissolution of the Soviet Union </a>. </p>
<p>And it was this border that Russian president Vladimir <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828">Putin denounced</a> on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, declaring that modern Ukraine was a historical mistake arising from <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1407587">early Soviet border-making policy</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Map 1. Ukraine in 1991:</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.academia.edu/88907513/The_Territorial_Challenge_in_the_Early_Soviet_State">As research has shown</a>, Russian and Ukrainian communists who in 1919 mapped out the border between Ukraine and Russia took as their starting point the former Russian empire’s provincial boundaries. These had evolved haphazardly over centuries and reflected neither the geographical distribution of Ukrainian- and Russian-speakers nor economic considerations, such as transport links, the location of industries or flows of goods to markets.</p>
<p>Over the next decade, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546545.2018.1478771">Moscow repeatedly moved the border</a> with the aim of shaping a Ukrainian Soviet Republic that, while retaining a majority Ukrainian-speaking population, could also build a strong and sustainable economy. This meant drawing borders to facilitate rational planning and the integrated development of industry and agriculture. </p>
<p>In some cases, the Soviet authorities involved local officials and residents in border-making. Regional interests, however, were always subordinated to the needs of the Soviet economy and the imperative of maintaining central political control.</p>
<p><strong>Map 2: Ukrainian borders between 1917 and 1938</strong></p>
<p>For example, the districts of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Shakhty">Shakhty</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Taganrog">Taganrog</a> were initially incorporated in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as they had a majority of Ukrainian speakers. In 1924, however, they were transferred to the Russian Soviet Federative Republic (RSFSR) for economic reasons.</p>
<p>By contrast, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Putyvl">Putivl’ district</a> had been allocated in 1919 to the RSFSR, as most of its population was Russian-speaking. Despite this, in 1926 the district was integrated into Soviet Ukraine after Ukrainian officials and local residents made the case that its markets and transport links were within that republic.</p>
<p>In 1954 Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine. However, this was not a “gift”, <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/02/27/283481587/crimea-a-gift-to-ukraine-becomes-a-political-flash-point">as commonly reported</a>, and even less an “exceptionally remarkable act of fraternal aid” on the part of the Russian people, arising from its “generosity” and its “unlimited <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/meeting-presidium-supreme-soviet-union-soviet-socialist-republics">trust and love” of Ukrainians</a>, as Soviet politicians at the time declared. </p>
<p>Rather, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago">as recent analysis shows</a>, it was a strategic decision with multiple motives. Khrushchev aimed to reinforce central Soviet control over Ukraine by incorporating Crimea’s large ethnic Russian population, after a <a href="https://books.openedition.org/ceup/547?lang=en">decade of Ukrainian nationalist insurgency</a> in the newly annexed western regions. </p>
<p>At the same time, Khrushchev hoped the transfer would win him the support of Ukrainian communist elites, bolstering his bid for supreme power in the factional struggle that erupted after <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/topics/post-stalin-succession-struggle">Stalin’s death in 1953</a>.</p>
<p>Construction of a vast irrigation system unifying Crimea and southern Ukraine was already under way, to be fed with water from the <a href="https://www.downtoearth.org.in/blog/water/the-destroyed-kakhovka-dam-once-symbolised-russian-ukrainian-harmony-90172">Kakhovka reservoir on the Dnipro river</a> via the <a href="https://iwpr.net/global-voices/crimean-canal-key-its-liberation">North Crimean canal</a>. For the purposes of planning and carrying out this mega-project, only completed in the mid-1970s, the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine also made economic sense. </p>
<p>Border-making <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801442735/empire-of-nations/">across the Soviet Union</a> attempted similarly to balance <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5163409/Nature_nationalism_and_revolutionary_regionalism_constructing_Soviet_Karelia_1920_1923">many different, often competing, criteria</a>. Where these borders were drawn to a large extent determined <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2501300">the subsequent course of Soviet history</a> and, since 1991, has shaped the internal development and external relations of states and societies <a href="https://huri.harvard.edu/news/return-history-post-soviet-space-thirty-years-after-fall-ussr">across post-Soviet space</a>. </p>
<h2>Invasion and annexation</h2>
<p>In February 2022 Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, seeking to revise the post-1991 border settlement. By that summer its army had occupied large parts of the four eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. </p>
<p>In September, on the Kremlin’s orders, Russian-installed leaders of these regions organised a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/23/occupied-parts-of-ukraine-prepare-to-vote-on-joining-russia">series of plebiscites</a>. These asked residents in occupied areas if they wished their region to become <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/referendum-violence-and-humiliation-southeastern-ukraine">part of the Russian Federation</a>. </p>
<p>Voting took place watched by armed soldiers and counting was unmonitored. The polls – denounced by UN officials <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15039.doc.htm">as “illegal</a>” – unsurprisingly yielded vast majorities in favour of joining Russia.</p>
<p>On September 30 2022, Putin <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465">declared Russia’s annexation</a> of these regions. Four days later the Russian state Duma <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/69513">ratified this</a>.</p>
<p>However, even at the moment of annexation large parts of these territories remained under Ukrainian control or were threatened with imminent recapture. In November, the Ukrainian army <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/nov/18/liberated-kherson-ukrainians-victory-russia-occupation">liberated the city of Kherson</a>. Its 2023 counteroffensive is now slowly but steadily <a href="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/733fe90805894bfc8562d90b106aa895">taking back land</a> in several areas of the annexed regions. </p>
<h2>New state borders?</h2>
<p>Where, then, does Russia intend to draw its new state borders? In September 2022, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov refused to give any answer to this. </p>
<p>He reiterated only that Russia had recognised the independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics within the Ukrainian regional borders that had existed before the declaration of these <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/02/22/territorial-claims">Russian proxy administrations</a> in 2014. </p>
<p>This implied that Russia envisaged incorporating these regions in their entirety. He said nothing about Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1576063377595502594"}"></div></p>
<p>A ceasefire along a <a href="http://library.law.fsu.edu/Digital-Collections/LimitsinSeas/pdf/ibs022.pdf">Korea-style demarcation line</a> would fracture the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/10-maps-that-explain-ukraines-struggle-for-independence/">unified territory that Ukraine inherited in 1991</a>. Over and above the political, strategic, legal and moral objections to an armistice that entrenches territorial partition, this outcome would cause intractable economic problems. </p>
<p>Whether a truce held a few months or many years, it would continue to prevent <a href="https://cepr-org.nottingham.idm.oclc.org/voxeu/columns/reconstructing-ukraine-trade-and-foreign-direct-investment">external investment</a> in the divided regions, draining state resources and preventing <a href="https://gwu.app.box.com/s/o6lwf49ros52v31j9zpw2wkwkf96axqu">vital reconstruction</a>. A stopgap solution without a permanent settlement – a peace treaty – will only create conditions for <a href="https://www.startribune.com/the-dangers-of-ceding-territory-for-peace-in-ukraine/600288169/">further suffering</a> and future conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209750/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Baron has received funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council, Arts and Humanities Research Council, British Academy, Gerda Henkel Stiftung, and Leverhulme Trust.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephan Rindlisbacher has received funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation. </span></em></p>Russian and Ukrainian communists who in 1919 mapped out the border between Ukraine and Russia took as their starting point the former Russian empire’s provincial boundaries.Nick Baron, Associate Professor in History, University of NottinghamStephan Rindlisbacher, Academic Research Fellow at the Center for Interdisciplinary Polish Studies, European University ViadrinaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1914822022-09-29T12:32:09Z2022-09-29T12:32:09ZRussia plans to annex parts of Eastern Ukraine – an Eastern European expert explains 3 key things to know about the regions at stake<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487158/original/file-20220928-22-wck8q5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman votes in the controversial referendum in Donetsk, Ukraine on Sept. 27, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/people-cast-their-votes-in-controversial-referendums-in-donetsk-on-picture-id1243546788">Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia is set to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/entire-villages-empty-out-ukrainians-flee-russian-annexation-refugees-say-2022-09-28/">formally annex</a> four occupied territories in eastern Ukraine, claiming the region as its own more than six months after it first invaded its neighboring country. </p>
<p>Russia announced on Sept. 27, 2022, that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moscows-proxies-occupied-ukraine-regions-report-big-votes-join-russia-2022-09-27/">more than 85%</a> of people in the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic, as well as parts of two other occupied regions in Ukraine – Kherson and Zaporizhshia – voted to become part of Russia.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/so-called-referenda-during-armed-conflict-ukraine-illegal-not-expression-popular-will-united-nations-political-affairs-chief-tells-security-council">the United Nations</a>, the United States and <a href="https://english.nv.ua/nation/population-drain-in-occupied-zaporizhzhia-oblast-renders-sham-vote-even-more-fraudulent-ukraine-wa-50272302.html">Ukrainian officials</a> have all decried the process as a <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/09/28/russia-ukraine-referendum-sham-results-putin-un">“sham”</a> and illegal. </p>
<p>The Group of Seven, an international political coalition with Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the U.S. as members, also <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-09-23/g7-condemns-russias-scam-ukraine-referendums">condemned Russia’s referendums</a> as “illegitimate.” The G7 leaders have promised to impose sanctions on Russia if it proceeds with the annexation.</p>
<p>There <a href="https://twitter.com/sumlenny/status/1573473284884115456">are reports</a> that Russian and Chechen soldiers <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63013356">have pressured</a> people at their homes and at voting sites to align with Russia. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.usf.edu/arts-sciences/departments/school-of-interdisciplinary-global-studies/people/tkulakevich.aspx">a researcher</a> of Eastern Europe, I think it’s important to understand that people in these four regions are not a single political bloc, even though most of the people in these territories do not want to join Russia.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of older looking people sit on a train, looking distressed." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People board an evacuation train from the Donbas region heading to western Ukraine in August 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/people-board-on-an-evacuation-train-from-donbas-region-to-the-west-of-picture-id1242543446">Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The four Ukrainian regions have distinct relationships with Russia</h2>
<p>Russian forces first occupied parts of Kherson, a port city, and Zaporizhzhia, a city that’s home to the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/why-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-mattersfor-whole-world">largest nuclear facility</a> in Europe, earlier in 2022. </p>
<p>But even before Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it also controlled parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The Kremlin has supported and armed two <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/21/donetsk-and-lugansk-heres-what-we-know-about-rebel-regions">puppet separatist governments</a> in this region, known as Donbas, since 2014.</p>
<p>In May 2014, breakaway Ukrainian politicians <a href="https://theprint.in/world/why-donetsk-luhansk-ukraines-rebel-territories-recognised-by-russia-matter/842664/">proclaimed</a> that Donetsk and Luhansk were not part of Ukraine, but actually were independent “republics.” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map shows the region of Donbas in Ukraine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The two self-proclaimed republics in the Donbas region, as well as the regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, voted in controversial referendums to be annexed by Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/00/Map_of_Donbas_region.svg/1214px-Map_of_Donbas_region.svg.png?20220313190341">Goran_tek-en/Creative Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Kremlin did not officially recognize these <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/05/12/311808832/separatists-vote-to-split-from-ukraine-russia-respects-decision">newly proclaimed republics</a> until February 2022, when Russian President Vladimir Putin launched its invasion of Ukraine days later.</p>
<p>As Russia turned to <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/02/27/stay-hidden-or-get-drafted">conscript fighters in these breakaway regions</a> to fill front lines, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/6/ukraine-partisans-wont-win-war-but-can-wreak-havoc-analysts">fighting against</a> Russia since the start of the war.</p>
<p>In March 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded the honorary title of <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/zelensky-gives-the-honorary-title-hero-city-to-kharkiv-chernihiv-mariupol-kherson-hostomel-and-volnovakha">“Hero City” to Kherson</a> for its <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/09/ukraine-counteroffensive-battle-of-kherson/671364/">fierce defense</a> against Russian forces during the early days of the war. </p>
<p>Russia still does not fully control any of the four regions. <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-talks-referendums-zelensky/31977628.html">Zelensky vowed</a> in August 2022 to not hold any peace talks if the Kremlin proceeded with the referendums in the occupied areas.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large mural on the side of a run-down looking building shows the side of a woman holding a baby to the sky, with both baby and woman wearing wreath garlands on their heads." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A mural is shown on a residential building in Bakhmut, Donetsk, in September 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/this-picture-shows-a-mural-on-a-residential-building-in-bakhmut-on-picture-id1243505235">Juan Barreto/AFP via Getty images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Demographics in eastern Ukraine have shifted during the war</h2>
<p>Most Ukrainians who live in the Donbas region speak Russian. But before the full-scale war in 2022, many of these people still preferred to identify as having <a href="https://theconversation.com/most-people-in-separatist-held-areas-of-donbas-prefer-reintegration-with-ukraine-new-survey-124849">mixed Ukrainian and Russian identities</a> – or, otherwise, as a person from the Donbas or a Ukrainian citizen. </p>
<p>The Donbas region was home to about <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/eastern-donbas/freedom-world/2022">6.5 million</a> people before the 2022 invasion, out of a total <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ukraine-population/">43 million</a> in Ukraine. </p>
<p>The region was once known for its <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-the-donbas-so-important-for-russia/a-61547512">industrial output</a> and coal mines, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/05/04/donbas-coal-mines-are-the-sinews-of-the-war-in-ukraine_5982385_4.html">some of which</a> Russia has seized control of during the war.</p>
<p>Today, all four of the occupied regions are active war zones that many residents have fled. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">over 11 million Ukrainians</a> have left the country since February 2022. </p>
<p>There are also up to 7 million Ukrainians who have been uprooted from their homes but still live in Ukraine, making them internally displaced. More than <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/95314">60% of the internally displaced Ukrainians</a> are from the eastern regions. </p>
<p>As a result, the Russian referendum votes were conducted without accounting for the opinion of half – or even the majority – of the population in these territories.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The back of a solider carrying a gun is shown, while a woman in the background appears to vote in a plain room with blue and white walls." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Residents cast their votes in the referendum to join Russia in Donetsk, Ukraine, on Sept. 23, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/residents-cast-their-votes-in-controversial-referendums-in-donetsk-picture-id1243452349">Stringer/Andalou Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Most Ukrainians in the occupied territories don’t want to be part of Russia</h2>
<p>In 2014, when Luhansk and Donetsk first proclaimed their independence, the majority of the people there said they preferred to be part of their own republic, rather than becoming a part of Russia. Approximately <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1138&page=1">52% of people in these regions</a> at the time said they were against joining Russia, while 28% in Donetsk and 30% in Luhansk supported it, according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, a private research group in Ukraine that conducts sociological and marketing research. </p>
<p>At the same time, both Kherson and Zaporizhzhia were overwhelmingly against joining Russia. Approximately <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1138&page=1">85% of people in Kherson</a> and 82% in Zaporizhzhia said they wanted to remain separate, according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.</p>
<p>After eight years of fighting, which has led to destruction of houses and infrastructure, as well as <a href="https://tass.com/world/1289095">thousands of civilian deaths</a> in eastern Ukraine, the number of Russian sympathizers in the Donbas decreased. </p>
<p>The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1138&page=1">reported that</a> in late 2021 and early 2022, less than 22% of people in the Donbas region and less than 12% in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia wanted to become part of Russia. </p>
<p>Over 52% of Donbas residents, meanwhile, said in separate surveys conducted by American polling experts in early 2022 that they <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/17/russia-wants-recognize-independence-two-eastern-ukraine-republics-what-do-people-there-think/">were apathetic</a> about where to live, whether in Russia or in Ukraine. What most people cared about was their financial stability and family’s overall well-being. </p>
<p>Since the 2022 invasion, <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1133&page=2">92% of polled residents in the Donbas</a> said that there should be no territorial concessions for the earliest possible end of the war, according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. </p>
<p>These figures contradict Putin’s justification to launch the so-called “special military operation” to <a href="https://www.vox.com/2022/2/23/22948534/russia-ukraine-war-putin-explosions-invasion-explained">defend a Russian-speaking population</a> that Ukraine is allegedly persecuting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191482/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatsiana Kulakevich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While some parts of eastern Ukraine have been under partial Russian control since 2014, other sections continue to fight back. Most residents overall have said they don’t want to be part of Russia.Tatsiana Kulakevich, Assistant Professor of Instruction at School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, Affiliate Professor at the Institute on Russia, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1901012022-09-07T15:32:03Z2022-09-07T15:32:03ZUkraine war: a dangerous time to be a Russian-installed official in occupied territory<p>Moscow has long used proxy leaders to provide a facade of independent legitimacy for territory it controls and it did so after occupying territory in the <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf.">east of Ukraine in 2014</a>. </p>
<p>Many of the personnel in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/4/ukraine-crisis-who-are-the-russia-backed-separatists">militaries</a> of the breakaway Russian-backed states of Donetsk and Luhansk are Ukrainian. The leader of the provisional government of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), <a href="https://www.spisok-putina.org/en/personas/pushilin-2/">Denis Pushilin</a> and head of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic since 2018, <a href="https://www.spisok-putina.org/en/personas/pasechnik-2/">Leonid Pasechnik</a>, are both Ukrainian. </p>
<p>This tactic has been used again in areas taken by Russian forces since the February 24 invasion. As soon as a territory was occupied by Russian forces, Moscow <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/13/ukraine-mayor-abduction-kidnapping-dniprorudne-yevhen-matveev/">replaced</a> elected representatives and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-installs-new-mayor-ukrainian-city-says-adjust-new-reality-1687542">installed</a> pro-Russian proxies to run the administrations. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1567314427820576771"}"></div></p>
<p>But Moscow has often been unable to find popular candidates to fill the roles and one of the reasons for this is that it has become fairly dangerous to collaborate. According to a <a href="https://wartranslated.com/pro-russian-politicians-and-defectors-who-suffered-from-assassination-attempts-or-were-killed-in-occupied-territories-of-ukraine/">tally compiled by wartranslated.com</a>, a volunteer project that translates reports about the war into English, there have been 19 attacks on pro-Russian Ukrainian officials since March this year. </p>
<p>These reports were <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/01/assassinations-of-russia-installed-officials-on-the-rise-in-occupied-ukraine-a78689">confirmed by the Moscow Times</a>, an independent English-language newspaper which has been edited from Amsterdam since earlier this year when Russia passed laws effectively criminalising reporting about the war in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Killings in Kherson</h2>
<p>Many of these have been in the Kherson region of southern Ukraine, where Kyiv has recently <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-push-to-recover-kherson-in-the-south-is-on-will-it-succeed-189640">begun a counteroffensive</a>. Among them was Alexey Kovalev, the deputy leader of Kherson, who was <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-lawmaker-russia-official-kherson-found-dead/32009347.html">found shot to death</a> in his home in the Russian-occupied Ukrainian town of Hola Prystan. </p>
<p>A former Ukrainian MP, Kovalev announced in June that he was now working with the Russian invaders. His girlfriend was reportedly also <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/russias-war/ukrainian-deputy-head-of-kherson-murdered-at-home.html/">badly injured</a> with a stab wound to her neck.</p>
<p>Kovalev’s killing at the end of August followed what appears to be the <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/volodymyr-saldo-kherson-hospital-ukraine-counteroffensive-war-1731212">attempted assassination of his boss</a>, the leader of Russian-occupied Kherson, Vladimir Saldo. Saldo was reportedly taken to a hospital in Crimea and then to a toxicology unit in Moscow apparently suffering the effects of poisoning. Saldo was reportedly also the target of a car bomb in July, which was “discovered and defused in time”.</p>
<p>The day after Saldo was allegedly poisoned, another pro-Moscow official in Kherson, Vitaly Gura, was <a href="https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1555900061535666183">shot outside</a> his home and died in hospital later. Another pro-Moscow official, Igor Telegin – deputy head of domestic policy for Kherson region – managed to survive a <a href="https://odessa-journal.com/another-assassination-attempt-on-an-employee-of-the-occupation-administration-of-the-region-took-place-in-kherson/">car bombing</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1555900061535666183"}"></div></p>
<p>Reports are <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/volodymyr-saldo-kherson-hospital-ukraine-counteroffensive-war-1731212">linking these attacks</a> to the build-up to the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson, which began in earnest last week. But it has become increasingly apparent that life as a Russian-installed official in Ukraine is dangerous. </p>
<p>The referendum in Kherson on joining the Russian Federation had been postponed due to the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/moscow-official-kherson-referendum-postponed/32019315.html">security situation</a>. The announcement was made by the deputy head of the pro-Russian administration in Kherson, Kirill Stremousov, who <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1502703">told Russia’s Tass news agency</a>: “We are not running before the hounds and are focused on our key task - to feed people, to ensure their security.” However, Stremousov reportedly <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/53d8df28-c9f2-4dc1-b382-340094ec6620">made his announcement by video</a> from a hotel in the Russian city of Voronezh, although he denied fleeing and claimed he was working there.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1564542094034833409"}"></div></p>
<p>There have been killings and attempted assassinations of officials in other Russian-controlled territories. In Berdyansk, in the Zaporizhzhia region of eastern Ukraine where Russian troops are occupying Europe’s largest nuclear plant, the deputy chief of police, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/bomb-kills-traffic-cop-occupied-ukrainian-city-russian-installed-officials-2022-08-26/">Alexander Kolesnikov died</a> on August 26 after being targeted by a roadside bomb. </p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1562408730947461120">Ivan Sushko</a>, the Russian-appointed head of the occupied village of Mykhailivka in Zaporizhzhia, was also killed by a car bomb, as was <a href="https://twitter.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1546655237989081088">Yevgeny Yushakov</a>, head of the administration of the Veliky Burluk in Kharkov. Oleg Shostak, head of the propaganda unit in occupied Melitopol, was <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/melitopol-mayor-russian-proxy-badly-injured-in-guerrilla-attack">badly injured</a> by a car bomb.</p>
<h2>Creating fear among ‘quislings’</h2>
<p>Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has let it be known that any “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/06/08/europe/ukraine-hunt-for-collaborators-intl/index.html">Gauleiter</a>” – the slang being used to refer to collaborating Ukrainian officials, taken from the word used for district officials in Nazi Germany – will be caught and punished. </p>
<p>The word has particular significance for Ukrainians. During the second world war, when Ukraine was occupied by German troops, many anti-Soviet Ukrainians <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0888325409354908?casa_token=buLZThfhEcgAAAAA:eh97vYnHo6M-JbKwkN8XlR4yGi8JmDx3Su2KZcdwx1NqH1miiSRNT0PCF0OofRsqbfojI9hZKn0">fought alongside them</a> against Ukrainian partisans. </p>
<p>The Ukrainian military has been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/17/briefing/russia-ukraine-war-partisans.html#:%7E:text=Ukraine%20is%20increasingly%20taking%20the,that%20destroyed%20eight%20fighter%20jets.">training irregular units</a> made up of civilians who have volunteered to take up arms against the invasion. Over the six months of the war, civilian resistance in occupied regions has moved on from putting up <a href="https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1565678003023220736">posters</a> and hanging Russian uniforms from <a href="https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1544787098196115459">high street signs</a>. Now, in addition to the assassinations, there are reports that informal resistance units are mounting major operations. </p>
<p>According to an unnamed adviser to Zelensky, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/11/russian-warplanes-destroyed-in-crimea-saky-airbase-attack-satellite-images-show">quoted in the Guardian</a>, the attack on Crimea’s Saky airbase on August 11 involved such partisans, although this has yet to be confirmed. The attack destroyed at least nine Russian warplanes and was a major propaganda coup for Kyiv, showing that Ukraine could take the war to the Russians. Partisan groups are thought to be operating in tandem with Ukraine’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/06/05/ukraines-partisans-are-hitting-russian-soldiers-behind-their-own-lines">special forces</a>, created in 2015 to recuit partisans and operate in Russian-controlled areas.</p>
<p>These attacks and assassinations are attempting to create <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fear-suspicion-ukraine-hunts-traitors-east-2022-07-28/">an atmosphere of fear</a> for any Ukrainians who have chosen to switch sides and work on behalf of the occupying forces. </p>
<p>Ukrainian prosecutors have said they are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/11/what-awaits-turncoat-ukrainian-officials">working to identify</a> Ukrainians siding with the Russians. In June it was announced that 480 individuals were under investigation for collaborating. Ivan Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitopol <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-war-russian-death-squads-collaborators-justice-melitopol-mayor-1738554">told Newsweek</a> that Russian troops would kill collaborators when they had no further use for them. </p>
<p>As Kyiv’s counteroffensive unfolds across southern Ukraine, there is no doubt a growing number of pro-Russian officials who are hearing these warnings and becoming increasingly apprehensive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukrainians who have turned coat and are working for the Russians in occupied regions are being targeted for assassination.Stephen Hall, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Politics, International Relations and Russia, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1848992022-06-13T18:16:22Z2022-06-13T18:16:22Z‘Show’ trial of foreign fighters in Donetsk breaks with international law – and could itself be a war crime<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468519/original/file-20220613-14-76asy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C53%2C6000%2C3601&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">British citizens Aiden Aslin and Shaun Pinner and Moroccan Saaudun Brahim.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PicturesoftheWeek-Global-PhotoGallery/949e456f0ae84a16a334e03adfce24e0/photo?Query=Aiden%20Aslin&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=7&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/09/world/europe/ukraine-army-death-sentence-russia.html">sentencing to death of three foreign fighters</a> captured by Russian troops and handed over to authorities in a breakaway region in Ukraine presents a serious deviation from international law – one that in itself represents a war crime.</p>
<p>Sentencing came on June 9, 2022, at the end of what has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/09/britons-sentenced-to-death-russian-occupied-ukraine-aiden-aslin-shaun-pinner">dismissed by observers in the West as a “show trial”</a> involving the three – two British citizens and a Moroccan national in Ukraine fighting alongside the country’s troops.</p>
<p>In many ways, proceedings like those the three were subjected to were inevitable. Indeed, in <a href="https://theconversation.com/war-crimes-trial-of-russian-soldier-was-perfectly-legal-but-that-doesnt-make-it-wise-183586">an earlier article</a> questioning the wisdom of Ukraine’s conducting its own war crimes trials of Russian prisoners of war during ongoing hostilities, I suggested that it might incentivize the Russians to do likewise. And now the Russians have responded in kind, but with a cynical twist I hadn’t then contemplated: outsourcing the dirty work.</p>
<p>Russia handed over the men captured while they were fighting in the besieged port city of Mariupol to a court of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-backed-donetsk-republic-will-consider-joining-russia-leader-2022-03-29/">self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic</a>, a part of Eastern Ukraine that Russia has effectively occupied since 2014.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/goldman/bio">scholar of the law of war</a> – that is, the international legal protocols and conventions that set out the rules of what is allowed during conflicts – I know that this move does not insulate Moscow from culpability. By delivering the men to a nonstate authority, Russia committed a very serious violation of the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions">Geneva Conventions</a>, the set of treaties and additional protocols that establish accepted conduct in wars and the duties to protect civilians – and prisoners.</p>
<h2>Dodgy jurisdiction</h2>
<p>The conventions are clear on what is and is not acceptable when it comes to the treatment of captured combatants. <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/375-590016">Article 12 of the Third Convention</a> categorically states that the “detaining power” – in this case, Russia – can transfer a prisoner of war only to a another state that is a party to the convention.</p>
<p>And the Donetsk People’s Republic is not a party to the convention. The region was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-60470900">recognized by Russia as an independent state</a> only days before its invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022. More to the point, it has not been recognized by any other U.N. member state. Instead, it is regarded as a part of Ukraine. </p>
<p>As such, the Donetsk People’s Republic is quite simply a separatist region of Ukraine engaged in an <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/21/donetsk-and-lugansk-heres-what-we-know-about-rebel-jregions">ongoing rebellion against the government</a> in Kyiv since 2014. In that time, it has enjoyed the direct support of Russian forces.</p>
<p>But crucially, it does not qualify as a state under international law and is ineligible to be a party to the Third Geneva Convention. </p>
<h2>‘Mercenaries’ and ‘terrorists’?</h2>
<p>The three men sentenced to death were accused by prosecutors of <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/no-pardon-britons-sentenced-death-140724309.html">trying to overthrow the separatist government</a> of the Donetsk People’s Republic.</p>
<p>But if these three soldiers committed war crimes, then they should have been tried by the courts of the detaining power. Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot simply wash his hands of responsibility for the trials and fate of these soldiers.</p>
<p>Having illegally transferred these soldiers to the rump courts of a breakaway Ukrainian region, Russia should have ensured that they were tried fairly. As a detaining power, it was compelled to do so not only by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.32_GC-III-EN.pdf">Third Geneva Convention</a> and an <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/470">additional protocol agreed to in 1977</a>but also under the <a href="https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf">European Convention on Human Rights</a> and the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a>, both of which apply in the Russian-occupied Donetsk region.</p>
<p>But Russia has failed to protect its prisoners from an unfair prosecution.</p>
<p>Parroting <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/18/world/europe/russia-ukraine-captives.html">statements from the Kremlin</a>, the Donetsk authorities accused the three foreign fighters of being “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-61745556">terrorists” and “mercenaries</a>” – a deliberate label intended to result in the men’s being denied POW status.</p>
<p>Simply put, both charges are bogus. In armed conflicts, there are only two categories of persons: <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/law/combatants-and-pows">civilians and combatants</a>. There is no third category of “terrorist.”</p>
<p>While treaties addressing the law of war such as the Geneva Conventions proscribe terrorism, they do not define that term.</p>
<p>However, it is understood that intentional attacks directed against legally protected individuals, such as civilians, POWS, the wounded and the sick, are forms of terrorism amounting to war crimes.</p>
<p>The Third Convention and its additional protocol make crystal clear that members of the armed forces who commit war crimes <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/law/combatants-and-pows">do not forfeit POW status</a>. As attested to by the Ukrainian government, these three foreigners were active-duty members of Ukraine’s armed forces when captured by Russian soldiers and accordingly were unconditionally entitled to POW status. </p>
<p>In my view, charging and convicting these POWs as “terrorists” is at odds with international law.</p>
<p>Likewise there are problems with labeling the men “mercenaries.” <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750057">Article 47 of the Additional Protocol</a> states that a mercenary does not have the right to be a combatant or granted POW status upon capture. But to qualify as a mercenary, a person must satisfy six very specific criteria listed in that article. For example, a person who is a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict is not considered to be a mercenary. Such is the case with these three soldiers.</p>
<h2>Summary law</h2>
<p>The issues under international law do not end with the charges the men faced. There are also serious grounds for concerns about the conduct of the trial itself. </p>
<p>The Geneva Conventions mandate that POWs be <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule100_sectionb">tried by independent and impartial courts</a> with procedures ensuring the accused due process of law, including access to competent legal counsel.</p>
<p>Based on<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jun/10/trial-donetsk-precedent-conflict-21st-century"> published reports</a>, the trial seems to have woefully fallen short of these requirements. Little is known of the qualifications of the judges and defense counsel. Moreover, the trial was conducted in a summary fashion, with all three soldiers pleading guilty to all the charges less than 24 hours before they were convicted and sentenced to death.</p>
<p>It is difficult to believe that these soldiers confessed to being terrorists and mercenaries without having been coerced, which is <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=2D8538058860C1FCC12563CD0051ABBE#:%7E:text=No%20physical%20or%20mental%20torture,disadvantageous%20treatment%20of%20any%20kind.">absolutely prohibited under the Geneva Conventions</a>. </p>
<p>This, in turn, raises questions about the competence of their legal representatives, who seem not to have rebutted the charges of their being terrorists and mercenaries. It is also unclear whether counsel had access to the soldiers before they pleaded guilty or was able to call and confront witnesses.</p>
<p>The three soldiers have a month to appeal their sentences, which could result in their receiving life or a 25-year prison term instead of the death penalty.</p>
<p>But the haste and timing of the prosecutions give credence to suggestions that the trial was undertaken to humiliate Britain – which has been a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/britain-one-putins-fiercest-critics-politicians-still-get-millions-rus-rcna22906">very vocal critic of Russia’s invasion</a> – and force Ukraine to eventually <a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2022/06/10/kdtx-j10.html">exchange these prisoners for Russian soldiers</a> convicted of war crimes by its courts.</p>
<p>Whatever the motive for these trials, the convictions may not be the end of the matter. And it is worth noting that denying a POW the right to a fair trial is a serious war crime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184899/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Goldman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The prosecution and death sentences handed out to two British and one Moroccan national fighting alongside Ukrainian troops contravenes the Geneva Conventions.Robert Goldman, Professor of Law, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1847772022-06-09T15:40:16Z2022-06-09T15:40:16ZUkraine: British POWs sentenced to death after ‘show trial’ which appears to violate Geneva Conventions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468041/original/file-20220609-11224-oa1n7a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=13%2C0%2C1510%2C868&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Britons Aiden Aslin and Shaun Pinner with Moroccan Brahim Saadoun, who were captured after the siege of the the Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Image taken from footage of the Supreme Court of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two Britons captured while fighting in Ukraine’s armed forces have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/09/britons-sentenced-to-death-russian-occupied-ukraine-aiden-aslin-shaun-pinner">sentenced to death</a> after what has been condemned as a “show trial”. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/21/aiden-aslin-shaun-pinner-fears-for-british-prisoners-of-war-in-ukraine">Aiden Aslin and Shaun Pinner</a>, who surrendered to Russian forces during the siege of the Azovstal steelworks in Mariupol, were convicted on the charge of “being a mercenary”. They have a month to appeal and, if successful, they could receive a life or 25-year prison sentence instead of the death penalty.</p>
<p>Pro-Russian officials in the breakaway republic of Donetsk, where the trial was conducted, claimed the men’s actions had “led to the deaths and injury of civilians, as well as damage to civilian and social infrastructure”.</p>
<p>But what observers have called a “show trial” on “trumped-up charges” raises important questions both about their status under international law (specifically, whether they are entitled to prisoner of war status) and the compatibility of these trials with the rights that come with such status.</p>
<h2>Are Aslin and Pinner prisoners of war?</h2>
<p>The status of “prisoner of war” (POW) is legally protected, with a specific definition and rights that attach to it under international law. The <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCIII-commentary">Third Geneva Convention of 1949</a> and the <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4&action=openDocument">First Additional Protocol of 1977</a> set out who is entitled to POW status, and how they must be treated by the state that detains them during an armed conflict.</p>
<p>Based on media reports, Aslin and Pinner appear to have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/18/captured-britons-russian-tv-johnson-help-free-shaun-pinner-aiden-aslin">integrated into the Ukrainian armed forces</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/07/pro-russia-officials-open-trial-against-britons-captured-fighting-in-ukraine">serving in the Marines</a> (as opposed to merely fighting alongside them), having apparently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/21/aiden-aslin-shaun-pinner-fears-for-british-prisoners-of-war-in-ukraine">been in Ukraine for several years</a>. </p>
<p>This would suggest they fall squarely within the definition of persons entitled to POW status. It also means they are lawful <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=AF64638EB5530E58C12563CD0051DB93">“combatants”</a> – a related status that entitles them to take part in hostilities against the enemy.</p>
<p>Russian officials have referred to all foreign fighters who fight alongside Ukraine as <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/will-mercenaries-and-foreign-fighters-change-the-course-of-ukraines-war">“mercenaries”</a>. This is a legal term that denotes a foreign fighter who is not a member of a state’s armed forces but who fights alongside them in return for substantial monetary compensation.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=9EDC5096D2C036E9C12563CD0051DC30">mercenaries are not entitled to POW status</a>, the fact that Aslin and Pinner are officially members of the Ukrainian armed forces means that they are not mercenaries. Indeed, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/08/ukraine-captured-britons-face-20-years-in-jail">Aslin reportedly holds Ukrainian nationality</a>.</p>
<p>In fact, those also travelling to Ukraine following the February invasion and joining its International Legion would not count as mercenaries and should be entitled to POW status, given they too are <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/mercenary-or-combatant-ukraines-international-legion-of-territorial-defense-under-international-humanitarian-law/">incorporated into the armed forces of Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>There appears little doubt, therefore, that Aslin and Pinner are entitled to combatant and POW status. The next question is whether this trial violated their rights that come with that status.</p>
<h2>What are their rights?</h2>
<p>Once you qualify for combatant and POW status, international law grants a long list of rights to which you are entitled when detained by the enemy state. One of these rights, which flows from the status of lawful combatant and the right to participate in hostilities, is the <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/immunities">right not to be prosecuted</a> for that participation, as long as no war crimes have been committed.</p>
<p>Combatants are protected from prosecution for what would otherwise be a domestic crime, such as homicide or destruction of property. The idea behind this rule is that individual enemy soldiers should not be punished for doing what the other side’s soldiers are also doing (fighting in a war on behalf of their country).</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/07/pro-russia-officials-open-trial-against-britons-captured-fighting-in-ukraine">charges against Aslin and Pinner</a> are reported as follows: “committing a crime as part of a criminal group”, “forcible seizure of power or retention of power”, “being a mercenary” and “the promotion of training in terrorist activities”. The charges all appear to concern the mere fact of their joining the armed forces of Ukraine and fighting with them. To this extent, the prosecution of the two does violate their rights under international law that come from their status as combatants.</p>
<p>The right of combatants not to be prosecuted for participating in the war does not extend to war crimes, which states are <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/375-590155?OpenDocument">obligated to prosecute</a>. It has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/09/britons-sentenced-to-death-russian-occupied-ukraine-aiden-aslin-shaun-pinner">reported</a> that the two also stood accused of causing civilian deaths. But even if the charges against Aslin and Pinner had gone beyond the fact of their joining the Ukrainian forces, and alleged specific acts – such as war crimes – international law grants them <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/375-590126?OpenDocument">very detailed fair trial rights as POWs</a>. This includes a right to be tried by an <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=274D7903FCEF66D3C12563CD0051B1B1">independent and impartial court</a> (a standard which the courts established in pro-Russian Donetsk <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine-admin-justice-conflict-related-cases-en.pdf">have been shown not to meet</a>).</p>
<p>Importantly, they can also only be prosecuted by the <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/375-590123?OpenDocument">same courts and procedures</a> applicable to Russia’s own armed forces. Given that Russia appears to have handed the two over to prosecuting authorities in the self-proclaimed separatist republic of Donetsk, the trial clearly violates this rule.</p>
<p>Based on what has been reported, the trial of Aslin and Pinner seems clearly to have violated their rights as combatants and POWs.</p>
<h2>What are the consequences?</h2>
<p>Enforcing these obligations against Russia is where the key difficulty lies. <a href="https://lieber.westpoint.edu/litigating-russias-invasion-ukraine/">Various mechanisms</a> have already been initiated to try to bring Russia and its agents before different courts, but they all face their own limitations. Wilfully depriving a POW of fair trial rights, or unlawfully transferring them, constitute war crimes, and the International Criminal Court is already investigating <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/17/icc-sends-largest-ever-investigative-team-to-war-torn-ukraine">alleged war crimes in Ukraine</a> (but this requires the perpetrators to be brought into ICC custody). </p>
<p>Individual POWs might also bring claims against the Russian government before the European Court of Human Rights (as many individuals <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-7277548-9913621&filename=Decision%20of%20the%20Court%20on%20requests%20for%20interim%20measures%20in%20individual%20applications%20concerning%20Russian.pdf">have already done</a> since February). But Russia’s compliance with any eventual judgments would be difficult to ensure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184777/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The two Britons have rights under the laws of war. It’s not clear they are being respected.Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Associate Professor of Law, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1819912022-04-27T17:38:24Z2022-04-27T17:38:24Z‘Nobody wants to run from the war’ – a voice from Ukraine’s displaced millions describes the conflicting pulls of home, family and safety<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459854/original/file-20220426-16-bm3fm1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C4992%2C3315&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Ukrainians returned home after fleeing the Russian invasion, including this family that arrived on April 12, 2022, in Lviv, Ukraine, from refuge in Poland.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-family-arrives-early-in-the-morning-in-lviv-from-news-photo/1239977390?adppopup=true">Dominika Zarzycka/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine/location?secret=unhcrrestricted">More than 5 million</a> people left Ukraine as refugees between Feb. 24 and April 24, 2022, mostly to neighboring countries Poland, Romania, Moldova, Hungary and Slovakia.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/21/biden-announces-program-to-help-ukrainian-refugees-enter-the-us-.html">American officials, agencies and communities are working to bring Ukrainian refugees into the U.S.</a>, too. But as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vDqqSPYAAAAJ&hl=en">a scholar of global migration</a>, I believe it’s worth bearing in mind that many displaced Ukrainians – both refugees and what are known as “internally displaced persons” who have fled their homes but are still in Ukraine – want to stay close to home so they can go back when the smoke clears. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-europe-61185469">Putin’s army pummels their homeland</a>, and <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/ukrainian-forces-dig-in-against-russias-eastern-assault-as-the-u-s-pledges-more-aid">Ukrainian forces defend it as best they can</a>, many displaced Ukrainian women and young people <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60555472">are not planning to migrate to other countries</a> but are waiting on the sidelines. </p>
<p>That includes Ukrainians like one young woman, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qo_JOxVh9P4">Yuliia Kabanets</a>, who has worked professionally with displaced people and is entering a graduate program in the field. Yuliia, now in Lviv, has also been displaced twice herself within Ukraine, once in 2014 when Russia occupied the part of Donetsk where she lived, and during the current war. She wrote an analysis for me about what she’s seen there since the beginning of this war. With her trained eye, she offers a fresh understanding of a lesser-known aspect of the conflict: why Ukrainians are staying in, or returning to, the country, often at great risk to themselves and their families: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“With the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, I found myself fleeing the war for the second time. It was both easier and harder for me: on the one hand, I know what it is like, on the other hand, I have experience[d] pure hate against those who make me do that again.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>They are doing their best to support the defenders, and longing for the day they can return to their hometowns. They are staying close to home despite the dangers – and, for some, despite having been displaced more than once.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459859/original/file-20220426-16-6x93y2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two children sit on a bench on a tiled floor outside a building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459859/original/file-20220426-16-6x93y2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459859/original/file-20220426-16-6x93y2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459859/original/file-20220426-16-6x93y2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459859/original/file-20220426-16-6x93y2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459859/original/file-20220426-16-6x93y2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459859/original/file-20220426-16-6x93y2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459859/original/file-20220426-16-6x93y2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian domestic refugee children from Kharkiv Oblast on Orthodox Easter Holy Saturday, April 23, 2022, sit in front of a house used as a temporary shelter in Nadyby village, where the Greek Catholic church offered shelter for dozens of refugees from around Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-domestic-refugee-children-from-kharkiv-oblast-sit-news-photo/1240183378?adppopup=true">Dominika Zarzycka/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Fleeing home, staying in Ukraine</h2>
<p>On April 6, 2022, the Ukrainian government began urging civilians <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/06/ukraine-urges-civilians-in-east-to-flee-while-opportunity-still-exists">to leave</a> the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine while it was still possible. Russia’s planned offensive to capture that territory was looming. </p>
<p>Parts of Donetsk and Luhansk have been occupied by Russia since 2014. Including people displaced from Russian-annexed Crimea, some <a href="https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/minsocpolitiki-oblikovano-1-459-170-vnutrishno-peremishchenih-osib">1.46 million Ukrainians were registered as internally displaced people</a> already in 2021. </p>
<p>Today the International Organization for Migration, a United Nations agency, estimates that there are <a href="https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ukraine-%E2%80%94-internal-displacement-report-%E2%80%94-general-population-survey-round-3-11-%E2%80%94-17-april">7.7 million</a> people internally displaced in Ukraine, most coming from the east of Ukraine and the Kyiv region. </p>
<p>In some Ukrainian cities, internally displaced persons <a href="https://cedos.org.ua/researches/vpo-integration-index/results/">comprise a large percentage of the population</a>: 44% of the people in the Luhansk region’s city of Severodonetsk, 20% in the Donetsk region city of Mariupol, and 13% of the Kharkiv region city of Izyum. </p>
<p>Those cities have suffered from active hostilities during the two months of the full-scale war. Despite the violence, Yuliia believes she’s had relatively good fortune over those months:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I’ve been lucky: I plan to go back to Kyiv soon – my rented flat there has not been damaged (so far), and nor has my family’s flat in Donetsk. … Meanwhile, people I know who have moved to Mariupol from Donetsk, have now lost their home for the second time: and their property was destroyed or burnt down.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Even in longer, more drawn-out conflicts around the world where millions have been displaced, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/20/afghanistan-internally-displaced-crisis/">such as Afghanistan</a> and the eastern <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/democratic-republic-of-the-congo.html">Democratic Republic of the Congo</a>, many people do not leave their home areas, despite great danger. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459867/original/file-20220426-20-vbx02o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People dressed in winter coats looking worried and waiting for something outside a building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459867/original/file-20220426-20-vbx02o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459867/original/file-20220426-20-vbx02o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459867/original/file-20220426-20-vbx02o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459867/original/file-20220426-20-vbx02o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459867/original/file-20220426-20-vbx02o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459867/original/file-20220426-20-vbx02o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459867/original/file-20220426-20-vbx02o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On Dec. 19, 2014, refugees from the conflict with Russia in eastern Ukraine line up to get humanitarian aid from Poland delivered to their camp in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/refugees-from-eastern-ukraine-queue-to-get-polish-news-photo/460678888?adppopup=true">Sergey Bobok/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘We are all grateful’</h2>
<p>Why do they stay? Speaking of those who have not left the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, despite warnings from the Ukrainian government, Yuliia says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Even though it seems irrational to stay, I can understand their point. The war has been next to these people’s homes for eight years. Many find it difficult to leave their home and go into the unknown, even if that may save their lives. The lack of housing opportunities in the Western regions of Ukraine does not help to solve the situation either.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What about those who leave the country? Do they want to be permanently resettled in countries like the U.S.? Yuliia says Ukrainians are met with open arms in many countries:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“We all are grateful for that. However … nobody wants to run from the war, and being far from your own country during these times can be devastating. One of the big issues is also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/world/europe/ukraine-poland-families-separation.html">family separation</a>, as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/09/ukraine-men-leave/">conscription-aged men are not allowed to leave the country</a> because of the war.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yuliia thinks that most Ukrainians who have left where they live plan to return soon or after the war. And many Ukrainians are in fact going back home, despite the continuing danger. Since Feb. 28, 2022, <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine/location?secret=unhcrrestricted">1.7 million</a> Ukrainians have returned to Ukraine, although it is not clear whether their return is permanent. That’s because some people may come back for a short time to check on or take things from their apartment. Since April 15, 2022, <a href="https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2022/04/18/7137979/">the number</a> of those returning to Ukraine from Poland has been greater than those going to Poland from Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Emotional reasons</h2>
<p>People come back for different reasons: lack of available housing or the inconvenience of staying with relatives abroad; the <a href="https://theconversation.com/even-once-female-ukrainian-refugees-reach-safety-they-face-new-burdens-as-single-heads-of-household-179544">difficulty of finding a job in a new place</a>; or because they want to be with relatives who remained in Ukraine. </p>
<p>People also return for emotional reasons. Yuliia briefly left Ukraine in March to visit her partner, who was waiting in Poland.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“My own experience of being out of Ukraine for a week has shown me that I am not ready to not be in Ukraine now. I was told the same by many people: it is psychologically easier for them to be in Ukraine, even if nowhere is safe, even if their hometown is constantly under shelling from the Russian occupants.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Whatever the reasons, it seems clear that many – perhaps most – want to return to Ukraine from abroad and probably are not looking to migrate further. Inside Ukraine, people return to places that become safer: More and more people are coming back to the relatively safer Kyiv, even though the mayor is asking them to wait.</p>
<p>Certainly there are Ukrainians who would like to be resettled as refugees. But many want to stay at home or return quickly. For those who want to help Ukrainians, this is the reality that they should understand, so their efforts reflect the real needs of people driven from their homes, and who just want to go back.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 150,000 readers get one of The Conversation’s informative newsletters.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150K">Join the list today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181991/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karen Jacobsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A young woman in Lviv, Ukraine, writes about fleeing Russian aggression not once, but twice, since 2014 and explains the fierce desire to stay in her home country – a desire shared by many.Karen Jacobsen, Henry J. Leir Chair in Global Migration, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1777302022-02-24T00:29:16Z2022-02-24T00:29:16ZPutin is on a personal mission to rewrite Cold War history, making the risks in Ukraine far graver<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448177/original/file-20220223-27-18o9a7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=94%2C8%2C2776%2C1902&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexei Nikolsky/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There is no shortage of speculation about what Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to do with the vast Russian military force now virtually encircling Ukraine, and why he has amassed it. </p>
<p>Its sheer size – the largest combat force assembled in Europe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/18/russia-has-amassed-up-to-190000-troops-on-ukraine-borders-us-warns">since the second world war</a> – suggests a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-possible-invasion-ukraine">maximalist approach</a>: erasing the humiliation of the Soviet Union’s breakup 30 years ago with a massive, bloody and swift invasion of Ukraine on multiple fronts.</p>
<p>Indeed, a full-scale attack looks increasingly imminent with an estimated 80% of Russian forces now in combat-ready position and separatist leaders in eastern Ukraine <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-europe-60454795">formally requesting help</a> combating what they falsely claim is aggression from the Ukrainian military.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1496606071108026371"}"></div></p>
<p>Others see it differently, believing Putin will be <a href="https://twitter.com/edwardlucas/status/1495826326594412552?s=20&t=VozmGGvmrHSFBG4DHL3KDg">content</a> with his gains so far. Some also consider Russia’s recognition of the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine as signalling a muscular warning to Western leaders who have <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-putin-sees-the-us-nato-and-ukraine-as-a-threat/">repeatedly ignored</a> Russian security concerns.</p>
<p>Another view suggests Putin will opt for a hybrid strategy similar to Russia’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/22/russia-ukraine-invasion-georgia-2008-south-ossetia-tskhinvali/">playbook</a> in its 2008 war with Georgia: threatening to use force, formally recognising breakaway provinces, and destroying its adversary’s military – but stopping short of actual conquest.</p>
<h2>Putin’s anger laid bare</h2>
<p>Who is right? Each scenario is feasible, but the question of how to interpret Russian motives became clearer after Putin’s bizarre <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/02/22/the-personal-politics-of-putins-security-council-meeting-a76522">February 22 meeting</a> with his Security Council in Moscow. </p>
<p>At the meeting, he humiliated Russian spy chief <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9A-u8EoWcI">Sergei Naryshkin</a> for forgetting the script and supporting the incorporation of Donetsk and Luhansk directly into Russia, instead of just recognising their independence. </p>
<p>The meeting was a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/95074e66-2da9-431e-8959-2039f5d3c08d">pre-recorded</a> charade. Even the time shown on Putin’s own watch suggested the signing ceremony to recognise the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk had occurred before the meeting with his chiefs had even started.</p>
<p>But it was Putin’s angry speech afterwards that made clear just how personal this conflict might be. </p>
<p>He opined at length that Ukraine was a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/21/putin-angry-spectacle-amounts-to-declaration-war-ukraine">colony with a puppet regime</a>” and had no right to exist. It recalled Putin’s 2021 <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181">essay</a> bemoaning the collapse of the USSR and claiming Russia and Ukraine were one people, hence denying Ukrainians sovereignty and identity. </p>
<p>His <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828">speech</a> this week also included the false claim that Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin created Ukraine, praise for strongman Joseph Stalin, and the fanciful charge that Ukraine would seek to develop nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>In doing so, Putin resembled more a Russian ultranationalist with a shaky grasp of history than a pragmatic master strategist. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1496426736925483012"}"></div></p>
<h2>A personal mission to rewrite history</h2>
<p>The charade could be dismissed as domestic posturing – a president in absolute command appealing to the patriotic urges of a population <a href="https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/86013">wary of conflict</a>. But Putin seems to regard it as his personal mission to rewrite the history of the end of the Cold War. </p>
<p>This goes beyond concerns he may have about his legacy, or a desire to deliver on his promise to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/07/how-putin-changed-russia-forever/">restore Russia to its former greatness</a>. </p>
<p>This mission seems to be the real driver behind his aggression right now, not the narrative about the continued threat of NATO on Russia’s borders. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-invasion-of-ukraine-attacks-its-distinct-history-and-reveals-his-imperial-instincts-177669">Putin’s invasion of Ukraine attacks its distinct history and reveals his imperial instincts</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In fact, his massive troop build-up on Ukraine’s borders (about <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-20-22-intl/h_a75912013e1a5572ef733fd4a7167d48">60% of Russia’s total combat power</a>) undercuts his perceived concerns over NATO and a potential Western invasion of Russia. </p>
<p>This has required him to shift whole garrisons, including from near the border with Estonia and Latvia, both of which are NATO members.</p>
<p>He has also decreed the 30,000 Russian military personnel in Belarus will <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/russia-creeping-annexation-belarus/622878/">stay</a> there indefinitely, ensuring Minsk also remains tightly bound to Moscow. This effectively adds new territory where Putin can station military forces and even potentially nuclear weapons.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Ukrainian soldier near the front line." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448189/original/file-20220224-23-123dhnk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448189/original/file-20220224-23-123dhnk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448189/original/file-20220224-23-123dhnk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448189/original/file-20220224-23-123dhnk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448189/original/file-20220224-23-123dhnk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448189/original/file-20220224-23-123dhnk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448189/original/file-20220224-23-123dhnk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Ukrainian soldier near the front line in a section of Luhansk controlled by pro-Russian militants.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ZURAB KURTSIKIDZE/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Putin has calculated the economic risks</h2>
<p>All of this indicates the conflict in Ukraine is more about expanding Russia’s territorial footprint than about the much-hyped NATO threat. In fact, it is deliberately pushing closer to NATO. And this has implications for how Putin is likely to calculate risk.</p>
<p>First, Putin knows NATO will <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-chief-says-no-plans-send-combat-troops-ukraine-if-russia-invades-2022-01-30/">not fight</a> for Ukraine. </p>
<p>Second, he would have gamed out the potential costs of Western sanctions and attempts to distract him with “off-ramps” to avoid conflict. Putin’s tactic of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/58888451">reducing gas supplies</a> over the last six months, encouraging EU members to deplete their reserves during winter, is evidence his plan has been in the works for some time. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Demonstrators at the Russian Embassy in London." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448191/original/file-20220224-12782-m950vk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448191/original/file-20220224-12782-m950vk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448191/original/file-20220224-12782-m950vk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448191/original/file-20220224-12782-m950vk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448191/original/file-20220224-12782-m950vk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448191/original/file-20220224-12782-m950vk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448191/original/file-20220224-12782-m950vk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators protest outside the Russian Embassy in London.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alberto Pezzali/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So, too, has been his approach to diplomacy. Putin’s seeming willingness to negotiate over Ukraine has clearly been a pretence, given his refusal to budge on key issues and his swift discarding of the <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/putin-minsk-agreements-dont-exist/">Minsk agreements</a> over the future status of the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk regions.</p>
<p>Third, Russia previously adapted to sanctions the West imposed after its invasion of Crimea in 2014 by divesting from <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60480904">dollars into gold</a> and building a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russia-counts-reserves-shield-against-sanctions-finmin-2022-02-16/">large sovereign wealth fund</a>. This will provide some insulation from new sanctions imposed by Western countries this week. </p>
<p>Putin may well calculate he will be able to ride out even a tough US and EU package. That already includes <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/feb/22/joe-biden-russia-first-sanctions-ukraine-analysis">total blocks on Russian banks</a>, Germany’s delayed certification of the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-to-stop-nord-stream-2/">Nord Stream 2</a> gas pipeline, and hints from the Biden administration that tough <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/01/23/russia-ukraine-sanctions-export-controls/">export controls</a> will be next.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-public-approval-is-soaring-during-the-russia-ukraine-crisis-but-its-unlikely-to-last-177302">Putin’s public approval is soaring during the Russia-Ukraine crisis, but it's unlikely to last</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>How the West must respond</h2>
<p>If Putin is undeterred by economic pressure, what about political and military risks? </p>
<p>It makes little sense for him to stop at securing Donetsk and Luhansk as they stand today, which is why he chose to recognise the far larger territory the separatists <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/22/russia-day-of-dodging-questions-over-russian-controlled-territories">claim</a> but don’t yet control. </p>
<p>It also provides numerous opportunities for false-flag “provocations”, since <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/europe/ukraine-s-embattled-leader-hopes-for-peace-braces-for-war-20220222-p59ys8">70% of the territory</a> the separatists have claimed is currently held by the Ukrainian military.</p>
<p>But it is doubtful whether Putin would even see this as a victory. </p>
<p>For one thing, he could have recognised Donetsk and Luhansk months, if not years ago. For another, he did not need to surround Ukraine with virtually every offensive military asset he has – including mobile missile launchers, tanks, special forces and <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/02/22/russia-military-units-seen-belarus-suggest-kremlin-planning/">civilian control units</a> – just to secure the two small breakaway regions.</p>
<p>If Ukraine is as personal for Putin as he is signalling, and his appetite for risk as high as his actions indicate, the West must assume he has loftier ambitions than the <a href="https://www.historyanswers.co.uk/history-of-war/the-five-day-war/">five-day war</a> with Georgia in 2008. </p>
<p>That means taking decisive coercive steps in response to Russia’s aggression. At the very least, the West will need a blisteringly tough sanctions package aimed at crippling the Russian economy. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1496399793157021699"}"></div></p>
<p>It will also need to arm Ukraine and provide technical, on-the-ground expertise, and provide signals and other intelligence to the Ukrainian armed forces.</p>
<p>Providing this type of support will inevitably allow Putin to claim the West pushed him into a broader war, and plenty will believe him. </p>
<p>But all the signs indicate that is what he wanted anyway. It is therefore vital for the sake of Western credibility – and for the Ukrainians set to suffer once again from Putin’s expansionist urges – to ensure such behaviour does not come without significant costs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Lowy Institute, ASPI, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, the Carnegie Foundation and the Australian Department of Defence.</span></em></p>Putin resembles more a Russian ultranationalist with a shaky grasp of history than a pragmatic master strategist. The West must assume his ambitions are loftier than ever before.Matthew Sussex, Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1776232022-02-22T23:59:30Z2022-02-22T23:59:30ZHow Russia’s recognition of breakaway parts of Ukraine breached international law – and set the stage for invasion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447933/original/file-20220222-17-1oxjh18.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=224%2C44%2C5515%2C3943&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vadim Ghirda/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Before Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, it “<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-recognizes-independence-of-ukraine-separatist-regions/a-60861963">recognised</a>” two parts of eastern Ukraine as sovereign states: the so-called people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. That recognition is now central to what both Russia and the West are saying about the invasion.</p>
<p>Why does this kind of state recognition matter so much, and how does it challenge international law?</p>
<h2>The international law on statehood</h2>
<p>International law has rules about what qualifies as a state – and thus what entities get the many rights that follow from statehood. The rules are a compromise between two approaches.</p>
<p>One approach is hard-headed realism. This says we should acknowledge whoever has control on the ground, even if they are lawbreakers or dictators rather than democrats. </p>
<p>The general rule about statehood is that states must meet requirements of effectiveness. The <a href="https://treaties.un.org/pages/showdetails.aspx?objid=0800000280166aef">Montevideo Convention of 1933</a> lists these: population, territory, government and a “capacity to enter into relations with the other states”.</p>
<p>The last requirement can also be described as independence.</p>
<p>The Donetsk and Luhansk republics have probably never had enough independence to qualify as states. For one thing, Ukraine did not give up disputing the territory. For another thing, they have always depended on Russia rather than being truly independent.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ukrainians-are-ready-to-fight-for-their-democracy-175649">Why Ukrainians are ready to fight for their democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But that is not the only problem with them.</p>
<p>The other approach that shapes the law of statehood is the idealism enshrined in the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">United Nations Charter</a>. One of the rules in the charter, which became binding international law in 1945, is states must not use military force against other states (except defensively or if the UN Security Council authorises it).</p>
<p>This underpins an exception to the general rule. A territory cannot qualify as a state if it was created by illegal military force. And it appears the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/11/eastern-ukraine-referendum-donetsk-luhansk">creation</a> of these two republics in eastern Ukraine in 2014 – and their continued survival – was made possible by <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know">illegal Russian military support</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk in 2015." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447943/original/file-20220222-15-ggjsmi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447943/original/file-20220222-15-ggjsmi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447943/original/file-20220222-15-ggjsmi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447943/original/file-20220222-15-ggjsmi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447943/original/file-20220222-15-ggjsmi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447943/original/file-20220222-15-ggjsmi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447943/original/file-20220222-15-ggjsmi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian-backed separatists stand next to the bodies of Ukrainian servicemen amid the rubble of the airport in Donetsk in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vadim Ghirda/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Illegal recognition</h2>
<p>Since the Donetsk and Luhansk republics are not states in international law, the territory remains under Ukraine’s sovereignty. By recognising them, Russia denied this sovereignty in a fundamental way. The international lawyer and judge <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=EWgEv1Qq2TwC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">Hersch Lauterpacht</a> called recognition in this situation “an international delinquency”.</p>
<p>In other words, it is illegal. Many states have pointed this out, including the United States and Australia.</p>
<p>This situation used to happen more often. In 1903, the US recognised part of Colombia as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/07/panama-independence-colombia-1903">new state of Panama</a> so that Americans could build a canal there. In 1932, Japan recognised part of northeast China as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Manchukuo">new state of Manchukuo</a>, which was a Japanese puppet.</p>
<p>What has changed, since 1945, is the rule in the UN Charter against the use of military force by one state against another. That raises the stakes because illegal state recognition can be used to justify an illegal invasion.</p>
<h2>The recognition opens up new arguments for Russia</h2>
<p>That is exactly what has happened here. As soon as Russia recognised the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, they invited Russian troops onto “their” territory as “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-russian-peacekeepers-eastern-ukraines-two-breakaway-regions-2022-02-21/">peacekeepers</a>”. But it was still Ukraine’s territory, not theirs. And that made the troops invaders, not peacekeepers.</p>
<p>The value of the recognition to Russia is that the invasion looked a little less brazen.</p>
<p>If the two republics genuinely were sovereign states, it would be within their rights to invite the Russian troops, just as other states are free to host US troops. On that premise, Russia can tell its own people and anyone else who will listen that it acted legally.</p>
<p>Some further arguments are now also open to Russia, again based on the incorrect premise that the two republics are states. The Donetsk and Luhansk republics <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/21/world/europe/donetsk-luhansk-donbas-ukraine.html">both claim additional Ukrainian territory</a> that they do not control. Russia can now use these claims as a pretext for invading deeper into Ukraine.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-whats-really-behind-putins-deployment-of-peacekeeping-troops-experts-explain-177585">Ukraine: what’s really behind Putin’s deployment of 'peacekeeping' troops? Experts explain</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>We can get insights into what Russia might do from what it has done in the past.</p>
<p>In 2008, Russia <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/48bd01a730.html">recognised</a> two breakaway parts of Georgia as states – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It still militarily occupies them.</p>
<p>In 2014, Russia <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26621726">recognised</a> a different part of Ukraine – Crimea – as a new state. In this case, Russia went further than military occupation. The so-called republic of Crimea was uncannily short-lived. Within two days, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097">it held a disputed referendum</a> and signed a “treaty” to become part of Russia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Russian soldiers at a former Ukrainian military base in Crimea" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447941/original/file-20220222-15-wqueo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447941/original/file-20220222-15-wqueo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447941/original/file-20220222-15-wqueo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447941/original/file-20220222-15-wqueo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447941/original/file-20220222-15-wqueo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447941/original/file-20220222-15-wqueo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447941/original/file-20220222-15-wqueo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian soldiers at a former Ukrainian military base in Crimea after the territory’s annexation by Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pavel Golovkin/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Russia’s challenge to international law</h2>
<p>Russia is not the only state to illegally invade another in recent decades. It is not even the only great power. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was widely condemned as illegal, too.</p>
<p>One difference may be that Russia is challenging the law in a more sustained, systematic way that makes democratic states fearful. But it is not quite accurate to say Russia wants to return the world to how it was before 1945. It has not repudiated the UN Charter.</p>
<p>On the contrary, at least for the time being, it is cloaking some of its illegal behaviour in language from international law. That was what recognising the two republics was about.</p>
<p>But it wants a world in which, for Russia, the flimsiest cloak of legal language is enough.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177623/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rowan Nicholson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine do not qualify as states under international law, but Russia is reinterpreting those norms for its own purposes.Rowan Nicholson, Lecturer in Law, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1775082022-02-21T23:20:57Z2022-02-21T23:20:57ZUkraine crisis: Putin recognizes breakaway regions, Biden orders limited sanctions – 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447664/original/file-20220221-15-uhvxi7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C2304%2C1445&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russia's President Vladimir Putin, right, signed decrees recognizing the independence of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics on February 21, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/search/2/image?family=editorial&phrase=Putin">Alexei Nikolsky/Russian Presidential Press and Information Office/TASS via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russian President Vladimir Putin, in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/21/russia-ukraine-updates/">a provocative address that could be construed as a pretext to war</a>, claimed on Feb. 21, 2022, that all of Ukraine belongs to Russia and formally recognized the independence of two breakaway regions in Ukraine that are largely controlled by Moscow-backed separatists. His government then <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/21/world/ukraine-russia-putin-biden/moscow-orders-troops-to-ukraines-breakaway-regions-for-peacekeeping-functions">ordered troops</a> to those regions.</p>
<p>The U.S. and European countries were quick to respond, with <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/21/russia-ukraine-updates/#link-NSM6BHMVH5E2TOF7HE5XXONOBA">the Biden Administration announcing</a> that it “will prohibit new investment, trade, and financing by U.S. persons to, from, or in” the two regions, known since 2014 as the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic. The European Union’s executive branch leader, Ursula von der Leyen, condemned Putin’s action as a “blatant violation of international law.” And NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg said, “I condemn Russia’s decision to extend recognition to the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic.’”</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1495846146824183816"}"></div></p>
<p>To help readers understand the background of these developments, here are five stories The Conversation has published about the centuries-long bad blood between Ukraine and Russia, manifested in everything from religion to political ideology.</p>
<h2>1. Why Putin struggles to accept Ukrainian sovereignty</h2>
<p>Putin’s announcement that Russia would recognize the independence of the two Ukrainian territories is a reflection of his view that Ukraine is part of Russia’s once-great empire, which at one time ranged from current-day Poland to the Russian Far East. </p>
<p>The Russian president is not alone in that view. Two scholars, <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/jacob-lassin-1300277">Jacob Lassin</a> of Arizona State University and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/emily-channell-justice-1300279">Emily Channell-Justice</a> of Harvard University, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-putin-has-such-a-hard-time-accepting-ukrainian-sovereignty-174029">write that “for centuries, within the Russian Empire, Ukraine was known as ‘Malorossiya’ or ‘Little Russia.’</a> The use of this term strengthened the idea that Ukraine was a junior member of the empire.” </p>
<p>Czarist policies from the 18th century forward, write Lassin and Channel-Justice, “suppressed the use of the Ukrainian language and culture. The intention of these policies was to establish a dominant Russia and later strip Ukraine of an identity as an independent, sovereign nation.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-putin-has-such-a-hard-time-accepting-ukrainian-sovereignty-174029">Why Putin has such a hard time accepting Ukrainian sovereignty</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>2. The Soviet era added to resentment toward Russia</h2>
<p>Lassin and Channel-Justice also write about how <a href="https://theconversation.com/famine-subjugation-and-nuclear-fallout-how-soviet-experience-helped-sow-resentment-among-ukrainians-toward-russia-175500">the shared history of Ukraine and Russia has bred ill will</a> among Ukrainians towards Russia. </p>
<p>Among the many historical grievances: The Soviet Union’s collectivist plans helped wreck the once-famed Ukrainian agricultural sector, leading to a widespread famine in 1932 and 1933, known as the Holodomor. </p>
<p>“Research estimates that some 3 million to 4 million Ukrainians died of the famine, around 13% of the population, though the true figure is impossible to establish because of Soviet efforts to hide the famine and its toll,” write Lassin and Channel-Justice. Soviet leader Josef Stalin prevented Ukrainian farmers from traveling in search of food, and severely punished anyone who took produce from collective farms, which made the famine much worse for Ukrainians. “As such, some scholars call the famine a genocide,” they write.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/famine-subjugation-and-nuclear-fallout-how-soviet-experience-helped-sow-resentment-among-ukrainians-toward-russia-175500">Famine, subjugation and nuclear fallout: How Soviet experience helped sow resentment among Ukrainians toward Russia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447666/original/file-20220221-13-v0vxnz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman and children, dressed for the cold weather and during the night, leave a piece of fruit at a monument." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447666/original/file-20220221-13-v0vxnz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447666/original/file-20220221-13-v0vxnz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447666/original/file-20220221-13-v0vxnz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447666/original/file-20220221-13-v0vxnz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447666/original/file-20220221-13-v0vxnz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447666/original/file-20220221-13-v0vxnz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447666/original/file-20220221-13-v0vxnz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People visit a monument to Holodomor victims in Kyiv, Ukraine, in November 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-visit-a-monument-to-holodomor-victims-during-a-news-photo/1236857843?adppopup=true">Photo by Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. Putin’s strategic pipelines</h2>
<p>After Putin’s announcement, the Biden Administration said it would <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/21/statement-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-on-russian-announcement-on-eastern-ukraine/">impose economic sanctions</a> on those doing business in the eastern Ukraine provinces declared independent by Russia. Biden has also declared that “severe economic consequences” would follow a Russian invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>But it may be hard to get allied countries in Europe to go along with such sanctions, writes <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/ryan-haddad-1313544">Ryan Haddad of the University of Maryland</a>. The reason: <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-hooked-europe-on-its-oil-and-gas-and-overcame-us-efforts-to-prevent-energy-dependence-on-moscow-174518">the dependence of many European countries on Russian energy</a>. </p>
<p>Russia has a long history of using energy to divide the U.S. and Europe, and Haddad writes that “Russian [natural] gas exports to Europe reached a record level in 2021. … Europe got a glimpse of the potential consequences of this dependence in December 2021, when Russia reduced its gas exports to Europe as the crisis involving Ukraine was heating up.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-hooked-europe-on-its-oil-and-gas-and-overcame-us-efforts-to-prevent-energy-dependence-on-moscow-174518">How Russia hooked Europe on its oil and gas – and overcame US efforts to prevent energy dependence on Moscow</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>4. Russia has been at war with Ukraine for years – in cyberspace</h2>
<p>As the world awaits the possible start of war between Russia and Ukraine, scholar <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/maggie-smith-1312550">Maggie Smith at the United States Military Academy at West Point</a> says that <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-has-been-at-war-with-ukraine-for-years-in-cyberspace-176221">Russia has been attacking Ukrainian government operations and infrastructure for years</a> via cyberspace. </p>
<p>“Russia has interfered in Ukrainian elections, targeted its power grid, defaced its government websites and spread disinformation,” writes Smith. “Strategically, Russian cyber operations are designed to undermine the Ukrainian government and private sector organizations. Tactically, the operations aim to influence, scare and subdue the population.”</p>
<p>All of those actions, writes Smith, “destabilize Ukraine’s political environment.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-has-been-at-war-with-ukraine-for-years-in-cyberspace-176221">Russia has been at war with Ukraine for years – in cyberspace</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447668/original/file-20220221-16-8o341t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Priests in long ornate robes bend in worship." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447668/original/file-20220221-16-8o341t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447668/original/file-20220221-16-8o341t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447668/original/file-20220221-16-8o341t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447668/original/file-20220221-16-8o341t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447668/original/file-20220221-16-8o341t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447668/original/file-20220221-16-8o341t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447668/original/file-20220221-16-8o341t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian Orthodox Church priests during a 2019 prayer service in Kyiv.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/priests-the-ukrainian-orthodox-church-during-the-prayer-news-photo/1158264411?adppopup=true">Photo by Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>5. The conflict is also religious</h2>
<p>To understand the present, it helps to understand the past. The tensions between Russia and Ukraine are not just political in nature. <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-church-conflict-in-ukraine-reflects-historic-russian-ukrainian-tensions-175818">They’re also religious</a>, writes Arizona State University scholar <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/j-eugene-clay-1311417">J. Eugene Clay</a>.</p>
<p>“Two different Orthodox churches claim to be the one true Ukrainian Orthodox Church for the Ukrainian people,” writes Clay. “The two churches offer strikingly different visions of the relationship between the Ukrainian and the Russian peoples.” </p>
<p>The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate stresses “the powerful bonds that link the peoples of Ukraine and Russia.” The Orthodox Church of Ukraine, on the other hand, was formally recognized in January 2019 and is “the culmination of decades of efforts by Ukrainian believers who wanted their own national church, free from any foreign religious authority.” </p>
<p>The two churches, writes Clay, reflect a fundamental question: Are Ukrainians and Russians one people or two separate nations?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-church-conflict-in-ukraine-reflects-historic-russian-ukrainian-tensions-175818">Why church conflict in Ukraine reflects historic Russian-Ukrainian tensions</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>[<em>Understand key political developments, each week.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=politics&source=inline-politics-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s politics newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177508/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Russia sent troops to two Moscow-allied breakaway regions in Ukraine, after President Vladimir Putin recognized the regions’ independence. Five stories provide background to the growing conflict.Naomi Schalit, Senior Editor, Politics + Democracy, The Conversation USLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1246052019-10-03T11:16:01Z2019-10-03T11:16:01ZUkraine: window opens for peace in the Donbas after Volodymyr Zelenskiy agrees to election plan<p>As the war in eastern Ukraine drags into its sixth year, all the attempts to end it have so far failed. But in a significant development on October 1, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, announced his <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-agrees-to-election-in-occupied-east-paving-way-for-peace-talks-with-russia/30193964.html">provisional agreement</a> to hold local elections in the currently occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, collectively known as Donbas.</p>
<p>The war in the Donbas began when mass protests in support of greater territorial autonomy escalated into a separatist crisis in the spring of 2014. Russia has been supporting the rebels in the Donbas since the inception of the war, which by now has claimed <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/death-toll-up-to-13-000-in-ukraine-conflict-says-un-rights-office/29791647.html">more than 13,000 lives</a>. In an attempt to end the conflict, Ukraine and Russia signed <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2016/09/13/what-are-the-minsk-agreements">two agreements in Minsk</a> in 2014 and 2015 aimed at establishing a ceasefire and lasting peace in eastern Ukraine. To date, the Minsk agreements have not been able to stop the fighting. </p>
<p>In 2016, the deadlock prompted former German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to propose a new approach, which became known as the “Steinmeier formula”. The <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ukraine-agrees-to-steinmeier-formula-green-lights-elections-in-occupied-donbas.html">essence of the formula</a> is simple. The local elections would be held in the occupied territories under Ukrainian legislation and the supervision of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) – but not before all armed groups leave the area and Ukraine regains control of the territory.</p>
<p>If the OSCE deems these elections free and fair, then the separatist controlled territories would be given a special status. The exact nature of what the special status would look like, should it come to that, has not yet been revealed by Zelenksiy’s administration. </p>
<p>The formula lays the groundwork for renewed talks of the so-called “Normandy Four”: Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France. But before then, <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/2791348-president-zelensky-we-agree-on-wording-of-steinmeier-formula.html">Zelenskiy said the wording</a> of the Steinmeier formula is still being agreed on with the OSCE.</p>
<h2>The Russian dimension</h2>
<p>Zelenskiy’s announcement that he was considering moving forward with the Steinmeier formula immediately attracted strong opposition from some groups in Ukraine. The most vocal of these have been the far-right and nationalist groups that <a href="https://liveuamap.com/en/2019/1-october-nationalists-are-protesting-steinmeier-formula">gathered</a> outside the presidential administration building in Kyiv. Their main grievance is a belief that the formula means <a href="http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/09/21/protest-against-steinmeiers-formula-grows-in-ukraine/">capitulation</a> to Russia, because Russia has been backing the Donbas separatists since the war started.</p>
<p>The Kremlin’s and international community’s reaction to the Steinmeier formula has largely been <a href="https://www.voanews.com/europe/steinmeier-deal-sparks-protests-ukraine-praise-moscow">positive</a>. Although critics lament the fact that the deal benefits Russia, the former US ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer <a href="https://www.voanews.com/europe/steinmeier-deal-sparks-protests-ukraine-praise-moscow">disagreed</a>. Pifer emphasised that more details about the agreement are needed, but that the unconditional demand that Russian and Russian proxy forces have to leave occupied Donbas is in Ukraine’s favour.</p>
<p>In Ukraine, Yulia Tymyshenko, a former prime minister and leader of the Batkivshchyna Party, also vehemently opposed the proposed plan. Writing on her Facebook page, Tymoshenko <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/2791462-batkivshchyna-sees-steinmeier-formula-as-threat-to-ukraines-national-security.html">called</a> the formula, “unacceptable” and “a direct threat to our country’s national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty”. </p>
<p>This puts Zelenskiy in an awkward position to say the least. One of the most notable pillars of his presidential campaign was a commitment to bring the war in the Donbas to a swift end. Yet, the president is also expected to end the conflict on Ukraine’s terms without any perception that he is giving in to Russia. The immediate protests by some of the far-right and anti-Kremlin groups, such as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/17/theres-one-far-right-movement-that-hates-the-kremlin-azov-ukraine-biletsky-nouvelle-droite-venner/">Azov</a>, who have been known to engage in acts of violence, are therefore a cause for concern. The most immediate of these concerns is the potential for protest violence should Zelenskiy move forward with the plan and allow for the elections to take place.</p>
<p>At the same time, all other approaches to end the growing number of casualties in the Donbas have failed. For the immediate sake of those living there, the conflict simply cannot keep dragging on and requires a new approach. Although the Steinmeier formula is controversial, it could potentially be a viable solution towards resolving the conflict.</p>
<h2>Zelensky’s new challenge</h2>
<p>Within months of taking office, Zelenskiy’s administration has taken on a number of ambitious reforms aimed at cleaning up corruption in Ukraine’s institutions. Recently, the president has also been caught up in the ongoing impeachment inquiry of US president Donald Trump – though he has tried to distance himself from the case.</p>
<p>It now seems that Zelenskiy’s efforts are being channelled into addressing the ongoing crisis in the Donbas. Some encouraging steps towards that end have already been taken. For example, Russia and Ukraine exchanged prisoners of war in September, in a move <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-russia-prisoners/russia-ukraine-swap-prisoners-in-first-sign-of-thawing-relations-idUSKCN1VS04X">praised</a> by the international community. </p>
<p>If the Steinmeier formula is successful, there will be a potential window of opportunity for a withdrawal of Russian troops from the Donbas. More information and discussion with the public about the proposed plan would be wise, however, as initial polls suggest <a href="https://www.unian.info/society/10706361-nearly-two-thirds-of-ukrainians-fail-to-assess-steinmeier-formula-poll.html">around 60%</a> of the population haven’t yet formed an opinion about the plan.</p>
<p>It’s quite possible that the proposed plan might not achieve the sought-after peace. The elections run the risk of consolidating the position of the current leaders of the occupied territories. </p>
<p>There is a lack of an alternative to the status quo and no guarantees that the occupied territories have any real chance of being reintegrated back into Ukraine. The proposed plan is no doubt a gamble, but offers some hope that an end to violence in the east could be on the horizon if all sides hold up their end of the agreement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liana Semchuk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What is the ‘Steinmeier formula’ for eastern Ukraine and why is it so controversial?Liana Semchuk, PhD Candidate in Politics, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/920042018-02-20T11:40:03Z2018-02-20T11:40:03ZUkraine is still on the edge, despite all efforts to stabilise it<p>Since protests, separatism and foreign intervention began to break Ukraine apart in 2014, it has been struggling to stay in control of its future. And the struggle is far from over. No fewer than four peace agreements have been struck: the <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/09/economist-explains-7">two Minsk agreements</a>, the so-called <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/world/europe/ukraine.html">Kyiv Agreement</a>, and the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27072351">Geneva Declaration</a>. </p>
<p>But even after all this work, the conflict is fundamentally unresolved, and chances of a fifth agreement, or even re-commitment to the existing ones, are <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-germany-security-ukraine-meeting/four-way-meeting-on-ukraine-called-off-msc-spokesman-idUKKCN1G01V0">fading</a> amid <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/munich-security-conference-rancor-ukraine-iran-russia-ischinger-lavrov-gabriel/29046944.html.">heightened diplomatic tensions</a> </p>
<p>This is worse than a stalemate: for all the attempts to reach a settlement, Ukraine is still in <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-germany-security-osce-ukraine-crisis/osce-calls-for-effort-to-jumpstart-ukraine-peace-process-idUKKCN1G020Q">real danger</a> of slipping back into violence.</p>
<p>The three-year-old ceasefire is already being violated <a href="http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/reports">almost daily</a>. More than 2m people continue to suffer <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/ukraine">forced displacement within Ukraine</a> and beyond the country’s borders, <a href="http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2551">especially in Russia</a>; the constitutional and institutional reform project supposed to resolve the country’s problems remains <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/Ukraine/">mired</a> in a morass of <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2018-02-15/can-ukraine-win-its-war-corruption">corruption</a>, poor transparency and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/18/saakashvili-supporters-march-in-kiev-calling-for-president-to-quit">popular disillusionment</a>.</p>
<p>To add to the complexity, the two sides in Ukraine are internally fragmented. The eastern separatists are not one uniform force, as became obvious in an <a href="http://carnegie.ru/commentary/74864">abortive coup</a> in Luhansk in November 2017. Nor do political elites in Kyiv see eye-to-eye on how to deal with the conflict. At the moment, those who want to cut off the two separatist-controlled and arguably Russian-occupied territories in eastern Ukraine seem to have the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-42741778">upper hand</a>. This is particularly evident from the passage of <a href="https://helsinki.org.ua/en/articles/uhhru-s-notice-regarding-the-adoption-of-draft-law-no-7163-by-the-parliament-of-ukraine/">Law No. 7163</a> by the Ukrainian parliament on January 18, 2018, which fails to live up, by ommission, to Ukraine’s international obligations under the fourth <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/380?OpenDocument">Geneva Convention</a> on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. </p>
<p>And on top of all this, there are plenty of outside forces at work. </p>
<h2>A toxic blend</h2>
<p>The situation in Ukraine is a “<a href="http://stefanwolff.com/talks/ukraine-a-blended-conflict-in-an-antagonistically-penetrated-region/">blended</a>” conflict, one in which multiple actors, structures and other factors are involved at local, national, regional and global levels. The Kyiv government’s conflict with separatists in the east has at various points involved both <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2017-08-01/how-ukraine-reined-its-militias">pro-Ukrainian militias</a> and on the separatist side “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/watch-out-for-little-green-men/">little green men</a>” and “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/28/russians-troops-fighting-in-ukraine-naw-just-on-vacation/">vacationers</a>” from Russia.</p>
<p>A conflict like the crisis in Ukraine that is “penetrated” by outside actors, becomes ever more complex if the outsiders are, or become, mutual antagonists with their own interests at heart. Many are willing to exploit and stoke local tensions, and are highly adept at leveraging their involvement in conflicts to bargain with other players, whether local, regional or global.</p>
<p>So it goes in Ukraine, where a local conflict has been turned into yet another arena where other regional and global conflicts can be played out. And it is against this background that we can “use” past conflict management efforts in eastern Ukraine as a prism on the future. </p>
<h2>Back to square one</h2>
<p>In our own <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1425083">recent research</a>, based on extensive fieldwork, interviews and focus groups, we found that neither Russia nor the West have ceded any ground on the Donbas issue, and nor are they likely to. So long as Ukraine remains a significant prize for both sides in this contested neighbourhood, the volatile status quo looks likely to continue.</p>
<p>Suggestions of a “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3385bf02-3661-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e">grand bargain</a>” between the US and Russia involving Crimea and a range of other issues, including Syria, are unlikely to come to anything. So far, both countries and their allies have successfully compartmentalised their interactions in these different arenas, where they are variously cooperating and in confrontation.</p>
<p>Minsk II, at least in its political and constitutional dimensions, will remain unimplementable. The government in Kyiv has proved unable (and unwilling) to implement meaningful and sustainable reforms for the benefit of all its citizens, rather than for a powerful and wealthy few; it does not have the political will, capital or capacity to deliver on most of the agreement’s key points. The separatists in Donbas have no incentive to comply with a settlement that “promises” them far less than they currently have.</p>
<p>In Ukraine, both domestic conflict parties and their external allies are working to entrench the current situation, which assures them of at least some degree of control over parts of Ukraine and prevents the country as a whole from drifting completely into the orbit of either Russia or the West. That this approach has for the moment kept the country from collapsing into full-blown conflict apparently makes it a “success”, regardless of its true sustainability. </p>
<p>But the real problems are far too deep for these sorts of strategies to really work. The dynamics playing out in Ukraine are the result of three interconnected factors: Western overconfidence since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s increasing determination to reassert itself as a global superpower, and the inability and unwillingness of countries like Ukraine to reform and strengthen their fragile institutions, which might help insulate them from external interference. Almost 30 years after the end of the Cold War, it seems we’re back to square one – and yet again, the heavy costs of this geopolitical confrontation will be borne by the people living on either side of the front line.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92004/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK. He is a past recipient of grants from the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is an Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute, a member of the Steering Committee of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, and of the Advisory Council of the European Centre for Minority Issues.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Jean Monnet Programme of the European Union and Leibniz-Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS Regensburg). </span></em></p>Four peace agreements have been struck to try and keep Ukraine on an even keel, but none of them has resolved the conflict’s fundamental problems.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/631672016-12-06T09:59:20Z2016-12-06T09:59:20ZUkraine peace plan follows a familiar path – but there are potholes in the east<p>More than two years after protests that defenestrated its president and kicked off a conflict, Ukraine remains a starkly divided country, with violence still simmering in the east among Russian-backed separatists. For most of 2016, it has been trying to solve these problems through a deal struck by the leaders of <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-ukraine-peace-deal-met-with-shelling-and-suspicion-37591">Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France</a> – a plan known as as <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11408266/Minsk-agreement-on-Ukraine-crisis-text-in-full.html">Minsk II</a>.</p>
<p>Minsk II isn’t a permanent settlement, but it contains a template for one. At its heart is a form of self-governance for territory currently controlled by pro-Russian separatists in two breakaway regions, the self-proclaimed <a href="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/dispatch-ground-zero-donetsk-peoples-republic/">Donetsk</a> and <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/self-proclaimed-luhansk-peoples-republic-postpones-elections.html">Luhansk People’s Republics</a>. This is a tried-and-tested solution to separatist conflicts, but it comes with several pitfalls for international mediators to avoid as they edge Ukraine’s conflict parties closer to a permanent settlement. </p>
<p>Giving the separatists of Donetsk and Luhansk some degree of territorial autonomy follows a template that is used in separatist conflicts around the world. Depending on the circumstances, it can range from little more than ceding control over cultural and administrative matters to effectively creating a state within a state.</p>
<p>On the face of it, this is a good strategy for defusing a conflict. Granting separatists some degree of autonomy usually doesn’t require major reforms at the top of the state they want to separate from. It recognises the rights, fears and aspirations of minority groups and grants them self-determination, but it does so without endangering the territorial integrity of the state.</p>
<p>In very intense conflicts, granting territorial autonomy can also help defuse violence by recognising control of battlefields. It also means enemies don’t end up having to coexist in factional and sometimes unstable power-sharing governments. </p>
<p>Understandable, then, that peace processes around the world keep reverting to this formula. But it doesn’t always go to plan. Far from it: in my <a href="http://www.polity.co.uk/book.asp?ref=9780745680262">analysis</a> of peace agreements signed since the end of the Cold War, I’ve identified a number of serious problems. Some of these are already presenting themselves in Ukraine as Minsk II is gradually implemented – and others may be lurking down the road.</p>
<h2>Promises, promises</h2>
<p>Central governments that promise autonomy to separatists generally aren’t very good at actually delivering it. This is often thanks to domestic opposition; critics of territorial autonomy will frequently decry such a settlement as a reward for violent rebels, and as a dangerous step towards the breakup of the state.</p>
<p>A version of this has happened with Minsk II. There are deep concerns in Kiev that autonomy for the Donetsk and Luhansk “republics” will either lead to secession, or that the Russian-backed territories will remain beyond Kiev’s control. Many are also reluctant to strengthen the breakaway territories and legitimise the separatist leaders.</p>
<p>Another common problem is the use of what Henry Kissinger called “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/when-ambiguity-is-destructive/">constructive ambiguity</a>”, the use of deliberately ambiguous wording to create extra space for negotiating parties to advance their interests. This can help them reach an agreement, but it can also create problems when it turns out that the two sides don’t agree on what powers the autonomous region should enjoy, what resources it will control, or even what its borders will be.</p>
<p>Too much ambiguity can spell serious trouble for a settlement. If the central government doesn’t grant sufficient powers to the autonomous region, it can also lead to dangerous local instability. Without sufficient capacity to govern themselves – including the capacity to defeat radical forces opposed to peace – autonomous territories can all too easily become ungovernable altogether. </p>
<p>Broken promises, whether perceived or real, cause deep resentment, which can in turn beget renewed violence. If local violence crops up again, it can spread beyond the region and ultimately undermine the legitimacy and stability of the entire peace agreement. These sorts of problems have contributed to renewed violence in the Philippines’ <a href="https://theconversation.com/philippines-hopes-new-president-can-fashion-peace-from-a-war-of-many-sides-60606">Mindanao</a> region and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/31/israel-palestine-violence-knife-attacks-west-bank-gaza">Palestine</a>.</p>
<p>But local capacity isn’t just about devolved powers and adequate resources. Rebel forces come in all shapes and sizes, and some will be better placed to govern than others. Effective rule depends on legitimacy and requires reforms. International actors can help encourage and fund them – and a more inclusive settlement.</p>
<h2>Don’t forget human rights</h2>
<p>Most peace processes are fairly narrow; they typically only involve actors who have the power to wreck an agreement, and shut out everyone less powerful. The rationale is that the fewer parties are involved, the easier it is for international mediators to strike a deal. </p>
<p>The problem is that narrow negotiations often produce narrow settlements. Rights end up granted to a dominant minority group at the expense of less powerful groups – and indeed, of anyone who opposes the armed movement in control of the place where they live. Separatist leaders might present themselves as the true representatives of their community, but these sorts of claims are often backed up with coercion rather than genuine legitimacy.</p>
<p>Without effective human rights provisions, minorities in an autonomous territories can start to feel like they’re being treated as second-class citizens. This can entrench division and stir up new instability. It also increases the risk of an unreformed armed movement clinging onto power. Such movements are, as noted above, not very good at governing and this could lead to instability. </p>
<p>None of this is inevitable. No peace agreement is perfect, and Minsk II certainly isn’t. But it is possible to improve upon the model, if those negotiating it are aware of the potential pitfalls and dangers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63167/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nina Caspersen has received funding from the British Academy and the Economic and Social Research Council </span></em></p>Ukraine is implementing a deal to placate its restive separatists – but other countries have had trouble with similar strategies.Nina Caspersen, Professor, Department of Politics, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/462802015-08-24T15:35:09Z2015-08-24T15:35:09ZDon’t call it a civil war – Ukraine’s conflict is an act of Russian aggression<p>As Ukraine marks 24 years since its independence from the Soviet Union, it is embroiled in the most dangerous armed conflict in Europe – against the Russian Federation. The stakes are incredibly high, and yet the war is still being discussed in euphemisms.</p>
<p>The war in Ukraine, we are often told, is a “<a href="http://www.dw.com/en/us-extends-sanctions-on-russians-over-ukraine-civil-war/a-18619568">civil war</a>” involving “<a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4526669.ece">rebels</a>” fighting the central government in Kiev. Such restrictive, inaccurate terms greatly misrepresent the conflict, which has <a href="http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/five-things-you-need-know-about-crisis-ukraine">already killed over 6,500</a> and displaced <a href="http://www.unicef.org/media/media_82536.html">at least 1.4m</a> Ukrainians. Too often, the crisis is talked about as if it’s entirely internal to Ukraine, a domestic affair presumably brought on by language politics, identity clashes and historical grievances. Best, therefore, to leave it alone.</p>
<p>Wrong. Ukraine is waging a war of self-defence against an international aggressor – the Russian Federation – whose conduct threatens our collective security. This war is now 18 months old, and we should know better by now. </p>
<h2>Face facts</h2>
<p>It’s not as if the signs aren’t clear. Recent weeks have seen another <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/world/europe/ukraine-cease-fire-is-imperiled-as-fighting-erupts.html?_r=0">intense spike in fighting</a> in eastern Ukraine. Given all the prior <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/214bf25e-36ca-11e5-b05b-b01debd57852.html">sabre-rattling</a>, <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4399514.ece">nuclear threats</a> and general rhetorical brinksmanship, it takes little imagination to see the conflict expanding beyond Ukraine’s borders into EU member states. </p>
<p>Labelling such a crisis a “civil war” serves no purpose of diplomacy or journalistic balance. It is a failure to serve the public interest. The war needs to be described as it really is.</p>
<p>Fundamentally, this conflict was started and is sustained by Russia’s armed intervention, not a Ukrainian civic collapse. In nearly a quarter century of independence, the Ukrainian public’s support for national unity has been stronger than in many long-established states, among them Spain, Belgium and Canada. As Vladimir Putin has since proudly <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/17/russia-putin-crimea-idUKL6N0N921H20140417">admitted</a>, it was Russian troops in the spring of 2014 who seized Ukraine’s <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20604">Autonomous Republic of Crimea</a>. </p>
<p>The Russian military presence has not gone away. In August 2015, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors again <a href="http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/175736">encountered</a> personnel in eastern Ukraine openly identifying as Russian regular military. These forces continue to lead, train, equip and fight alongside militants advancing Russian neo-imperial and ultra-nationalist ideologies against a government in Kiev espousing respect for democracy, transparency and the rule of law.</p>
<p>To tiptoe around the Kremlin’s armed intervention in Ukraine falls short of the basic standards of war reportage. And it’s absurd to call the Donetsk and Luhansk authorities “rebel” administrations when they would not have come into being and would not continue to function without Russian backing. </p>
<p>We do not talk about a Manchukuo “rebel” administration in 1930s China without mentioning that Japan had invaded it; <a href="http://www.wdl.org/en/item/11601/">scarcely anybody</a> pays lip service to the myth of an organic, independent separatist movement in 1930s Manchuria. Nobody should credit Russia’s fiction about “rebel” administrations in today’s Ukraine.</p>
<p>Lest we forget, the purported “rebels” in eastern Ukraine agree. Here is Igor Girkin-Strelkov, a Russian national associated with Russian military intelligence who helped lead the “rebel” movement in eastern Ukraine, speaking <a href="http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/905447-Girkin--DNR-i-LNR-sozdal-Kreml---otricat--eto---stroit--debila">only weeks ago</a>: “You are making an idiot or fool of yourself if you think that [the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics] were formed by themselves.”</p>
<p>An important conclusion follows from these facts: the Russian Federation is an aggressor and should be characterised as such whenever we talk about areas of Ukraine that have fallen under the Kremlin’s effective military and political control. </p>
<p>There is no need to report aggression <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/ukraine-leader-looks-summit-germany-france-curb-russian-144718883.html#tZ3ohGn">in inverted commas</a>. Since early 2014, the Russian Federation has carried out a host of acts of aggression against Ukraine as defined in <a href="http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/023B908017CFB94385256EF4006EBB2A">Article 3 of the UN General Assembly’s definition of aggression</a>. Russia has invaded Ukrainian territory – Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk so far – and attacked Ukrainian forces without a shred of plausible legal justification; bombarded Ukrainian territory and killed Ukrainian citizens; and seized territory that belongs within the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine, declaring it part of Russia. These are nothing less than acts of aggression under international law.</p>
<p>Nor do the sham referenda in Crimea in March 2014 or in Donetsk and Luhansk in May 2014 offer any legal wiggle room, since these “Potemkin plebiscites” resulted directly from an invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation.</p>
<p>As far as the referendums go, the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262">UN General Assembly</a>, the <a href="http://website-pace.net/documents/10643/110596/20140410-Resolution1990-EN.pdf/57ba4bca-8f5f-4b0a-8258-66ca26f7117bhttp:/website-pace.net/documents/10643/110596/20140410-Resolution1990-EN.pdf/57ba4bca-8f5f-4b0a-8258-66ca26f7117b">Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe</a> and the <a href="http://www.osce.org/pa/118469">President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly</a> all agree they were unlawful and illegitimate. To argue or imply that there has been an act of “self-determination” in any part of Ukraine that calls into question Ukraine’s sovereignty over its recognised territory contradicts the highest available organised expressions of international law. </p>
<p>If editors and journalists are substituting their own judgement of the situation, then they must explain why.</p>
<h2>A spade’s a spade</h2>
<p>Then there’s the matter of Ukraine’s right to self-defence, which of course is a right of all states. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is just about the only case where a UN member state has seized and in effect sliced off whole regions of another UN member state.</p>
<p>In its official statements the Kremlin goes further still, repeatedly calling into question the right of Ukraine to continue in its current form, invoking <a href="http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46506">a so-called “New Russia”</a> across vast, strategic tracts of the country, and even <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4399514.ece">threatening nuclear action</a> in the wider context of the conflict. </p>
<p>This is not garden-variety geopolitical grandstanding. When Iraq attacked Kuwait in 1990, it was universally condemned, and Kuwait’s right of self-defence was affirmed. There is no principled reason for responding to Russia’s aggression in eastern Ukraine with different rhetoric or a different description.</p>
<p>It’s time to face reality. The continued escalation of the war in Ukraine poses a <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/aggression-against-ukraine-thomas-d-grant/?isb=9781137514639">serious challenge to international public order</a>. Journalists have risked everything to report events from this war, and we need to stop watering down their reports with euphemism and understatement. We need to call this what it is: a war of self-defence against an international aggressor.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46280/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine is waging a war of self-defence against an international aggressor. We should stop pretending otherwise.Rory Finnin, University Senior Lecturer in Ukrainian Studies, University of CambridgeThomas D. Grant, Senior Research Fellow, Wolfson College, University of Cambridge, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/457892015-08-07T11:17:22Z2015-08-07T11:17:22ZThe ‘ceasefire’ in eastern Ukraine is unravelling fast<p>The president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, has <a href="http://vovworld.vn/en-us/News/Ukrainian-President-holds-emergency-meeting-with-top-generals/357036.vov">held an emergency meeting</a> of the National Security and Defence Council to discuss the escalation of fighting in the eastern oblasts (or administrative divisions) of Donetsk and Luhansk. This came after hours of negotiations between Ukraine, Russia and Ukraine’s breakaway regions failed to produce an agreement on a proposed <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/us-biden-welcomes-ukraine-demilitarized-zone-proposal/27151711.html">30 kilometre-wide demilitarised zone</a>. </p>
<p>These latest turns follow a long period of phoney warfare. Each side in the Ukrainian conflict has agreed to withdraw particular forces along certain lengths of the “contact line”, but only so long as the other side does the same. The result is a highly fractious impasse. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the frequency and intensity of sporadic exchanges of fire have only increased – along with military and civilian fatalities.</p>
<p>Given the events of the last two months, these developments are no surprise. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/whether-minsk-deal-holds-or-not-ukraine-has-time-to-save-itself-37780">Minsk II ceasefire agreement</a> was meant to reintegrate the breakaway regions into a re-formed Ukraine under a new constitution that would give them near-autonomy. But it has failed. </p>
<p>The other countries involved, Germany, France, Russia, and the US, have so far been content to stand back and let the peace process unfold. But while Kiev and the Russian-supported rebels have paid lip-service to Minsk II, completely independent political processes are still underway in the breakaway republics and in Ukraine proper. </p>
<p>Kiev has refused to negotiate with the rebels until they effectively surrender, and the rebels are refusing to hold municipal elections according to Ukrainian legislation. Naturally, each side blames the other. </p>
<h2>Flare-ups</h2>
<p>At the heart of the trouble is the contact line separating the two sides, which has proved to be an almost insurmountable problem. This line is simply no basis for a stable peace. It does not protect central Donetsk city, which was <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/ukrainian-military-claims-separatists-to-blame-for-donetsk-shelling-393871.html?flavour=mobile">shelled</a> on July 18 – apparently by Ukrainian forces. And as August rolled around, 250 pro-Ukrainian demonstrators <a href="http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/175826">rallied</a> in the beleagured port city of <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-masquerade-continues-in-ukraine-and-fools-no-one-36738">Mariupol</a> against a proposal to withdraw the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the frontline village of <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraines-fighters-vow-to-stay-in-shyrokyne-key-to-defending-mariupol-393237.html">Shyrokyne</a>, 15 miles to the east.</p>
<p>Minsk II’s proposed demilitarised zone between the two sides was meant to allow for a ceasefire, but the contact line skirts around the edges of major cities such as government-controlled Mariupol and rebel-held Donetsk city. That means the zone would leave two major population centres at the centre of the conflict undefended.</p>
<p>Movement to dial down the situation has been negligible. The pro-Western authorities in Kiev have so far refused to negotiate directly with the rebels, but a series of armed conflagrations around the country, sinking morale in the regular army and the volunteer battalions and waning popular support have severely undermined their legitimacy. </p>
<p>Credible ceasefire negotiations look further away than ever, and tempers are flaring. The latest violent confrontation took place in the centre of government-controlled Kharkiv on August 3, when members of the far-right paramilitary Right Sector fired on supporters of the Opposition Bloc, the most popular political party in Kharkiv oblast, as they visited the justice ministry to protest a ban keeping them out of the autumn regional elections. </p>
<p>The violent attack shows how Ukraine’s highly mobilised and armed radical far-right is shutting down constructive politics. With moderate pro-Russian parties treated this way, it is almost impossible for the weak Kiev government to negotiate with the rebels or repair the relationship with Russia.</p>
<h2>New cold war</h2>
<p>There are some options open to help defuse the situation from the outside. A <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/yalta-conf">Yalta</a>-style grand bargain between the US and Russia could conceivably solve the Ukraine crisis at the stroke of a pen. Russia’s demands are quite plain: a neutral Ukraine that is not a full member of either NATO or the EU. </p>
<p>The US could yet decide that a successful and prosperous Ukraine needs a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia, and that a geopolitically neutral Ukraine could stabilise if not end what’s already being called a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/19/new-cold-war-back-to-bad-old-days-russia-west-putin-ukraine">new cold war</a>.</p>
<p>But there is as yet no indication that the US is willing to accede to Russia’s wish for a comprehensive peace agreement between Russia and the west. It appears the west fears undermining the imaginary universal western values that have underpinned US and western foreign policy in the Eurasian theatre since the end of the first cold war more than Russian power.</p>
<p>The immediate future, especially for the people of eastern Ukraine, looks bleak. While Russia has so far used its proxies in the Donbas to influence Kiev, the failure of Minsk II and the instability of the current contact line may convince Moscow that it has little to lose by going further. And with the Kiev government on the ropes, there is hardly anything keeping this simmering conflict from boiling over again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Swain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Months after the Minsk II agreement set out a plan for peace, Ukraine is slipping backwards into violence and recriminations.Adam Swain, Associate Professor, School of Geography, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/451362015-07-30T10:23:13Z2015-07-30T10:23:13ZWhat is happening to civilians trapped in eastern Ukraine’s war zone?<p>It may not be making many headlines in the American news media, but – despite an official ceasefire – the <a href="http://csis.org/ukraine/index.htm#156">killing continues</a> in eastern Ukraine. Since May 2014, over <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/kerry-lavrov-discuss-ukraine-crisis-1425296061">6,000 people</a> have lost their lives in the fighting, fighting that has been largely orchestrated by the Kremlin. </p>
<p>It was the <a href="http://csis.org/ukraine/crimea.htm#4">bloodless occupation</a> of Crimea in February 2014 that paved the way for Russian President Vladimir Putin to take another bite out of Ukraine, this time in the eastern part of the country. </p>
<p>As an anthropologist and a Fulbright Scholar in Ukraine, I have been interviewing people displaced by the conflict in the East throughout May and June 2015. What the mainstream American news has failed to report is the disregard for basic human rights on the Ukrainian side. </p>
<h2>Revolution and counterrevolution in 2014</h2>
<p>Here is how the Ukrainian story is usually told. </p>
<p>In February 2014, the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30131108">“Revolution of Honor” (called the revolution of dignity in the US)</a> led to the fall of the Russian-friendly (and egregiously corrupt) Yanukovich government. This in turn sparked a separatist pro-Russian movement in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Lugansk. </p>
<p>Then, after newly elected Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko began a counter-offensive in June 2014, the Kremlin sent in more soldiers, armed with more sophisticated weapons. </p>
<p>What has followed is the <a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/hiding-in-plain-sight-putin-s-war-in-ukraine-and-boris-nemtsov-s-putin-war">loss</a> of some 6,200 lives, along with 1.2 million displaced, and tens of thousands of wounded. </p>
<p>The aggression against Ukraine <a href="http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/dumping-debt-and-seizing-assets">violated </a>the post-Cold War international order and called into question its basic principles. And failing to coordinate an adequate response tempts other, potentially even more egregious, violations.</p>
<p>But is Putin really the only one to disparage? We are too accustomed to seeing this war in comfortable black-and-white terms, with Ukraine the underdog, struggling to survive. </p>
<p>In fact, Ukraine faces the perpetual dilemma of statecraft: balancing the need to maintain national security while also attempting to observe individual human rights. </p>
<p>And just as the border regime between Mexico and the United States often privileges national security over human rights (to the detriment of the most vulnerable migrants), so too in Ukraine, where, since April 2014, the military operation has been reframed as an “Anti-terrorist Operation,” in which very different rules apply. </p>
<p>The upshot is that innocent civilians are being prevented from escaping mortars, shelling and firebombing.</p>
<h2>Caught in the war zone</h2>
<p>As the lead for a Ukraine-based humanitarian organization told me, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have laws that the civilian population has a right to exit an active war zone. However, our government has announced that we don’t have a military operation, we have an anti-terrorist operation: ATO. Therefore, you can’t leave until you have obtained a permit.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And obtaining that permit can be very difficult indeed. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/89847/original/image-20150727-7653-19hqy5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/89847/original/image-20150727-7653-19hqy5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/89847/original/image-20150727-7653-19hqy5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/89847/original/image-20150727-7653-19hqy5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/89847/original/image-20150727-7653-19hqy5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/89847/original/image-20150727-7653-19hqy5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/89847/original/image-20150727-7653-19hqy5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Learning to live as refugees.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Greta Uehling</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>My conversations with people who have made it out of the war zone, as well as with the human rights and humanitarian organizations that serve them, have documented that the waiting list for a permit has been as long as two months. Fortunately, a new electronic system for giving permits has been introduced and is bringing the wait time down to about 10 days. </p>
<p>This is still a long time to wait in a region where there is active shelling, basic food supplies are lacking and the only safe place is often one’s basement. </p>
<p>Worse, as an attorney at another humanitarian organization put it,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>there is mind-blowing corruption at the border check points. If you pay money, you get through. The SBU (State Security Service of Ukraine) says that they are catching terrorists. But they aren’t catching terrorists. They are catching only women, children, and the elderly. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>While authorities are working to improve the situation, the scene at the border crossings is a disturbing one. </p>
<p>Even having a permit does not solve all the problems: the line of cars waiting to leave the zone stretched for about six kilometers for most of June, and it took between 16 and 24 hours to cross. One informant stated that even when she is transporting a sick or elderly person, it’s better not to attempt to move ahead in the line: out of despair, people have become aggressive. There are instances in which mobs have slashed tires or bashed cars to prevent someone from moving ahead.</p>
<h2>A disproportionate policy?</h2>
<p>While these policies have become a problem for law-abiding citizens, officials point out that their intention is – above all – to stop people who have participated in the bloodshed in the East from moving freely about Ukraine. </p>
<p>Is it working? According to the figures of one humanitarian organization, <a href="https://europa.eu/eyd2015/en/european-union/stories/week-20-reaching-out-to-those-who-have-lost-everything-in-ukraine">Vostok SOS</a>, or East SOS, 290,000 people have received permits, and some 300 have not been let out because they present a threat to Ukraine. </p>
<p>In other words, the Security Services have found one in 1,000 known applicants to present a viable threat to Ukraine. </p>
<p>But those most dangerous to Ukraine are also most likely to have the funds or connections to circulate freely within Ukraine. The fine for going around these border checkpoints – using paths known only to locals – is 2,500 hryvnia (US$113), about half the average monthly salary. </p>
<p>Ultimately, it is the economically disadvantaged, who postponed departure because they lacked the funds to move or adequate support in the rest of Ukraine, who suffer most as a result of this policy. </p>
<p>It is widely accepted that Ukraine and the United States are united by a common enemy in the face of Vladimir Putin. On July 23, for example, the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/24/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-idUSKCN0PY28A20150724">State Department announced</a> that US troops will begin to train Ukrainian soldiers later this year. </p>
<p>What is less obvious is that we in the United States face some of the same challenges, and are making some of the same mistakes. For example, one side effect of the fortification of the US–Mexico border is that the most vulnerable migrants – people who have suffered human rights abuses and may have asylum claims – <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/11/border-patrol-agentsunlawfuldeportationasylumseekers.html">are not always let in</a> to the US.</p>
<p>The story in Ukraine is similar. It is the most vulnerable people who are having the hardest time leaving the danger and the hopelessness that is the war zone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greta Uehling receives funding from the Fulbright Scholar Program.</span></em></p>The US is making common cause with Ukraine, but national security concerns are affecting the human rights of the most vulnerable trying to flee the fighting.Greta Uehling, Lecturer, Program in International and Comparative Studies, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/375912015-02-13T12:17:05Z2015-02-13T12:17:05ZNew Ukraine peace deal met with shelling and suspicion<p>The <a href="http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/4804">Ukraine ceasefire agreement</a> struck in Minsk will come as a relief to the increasingly desperate residents who live along the front lines in the Ukrainian Donbas. But even though the document was signed by Aleksandr Zakharchenko, prime minster of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), the Russian-backed rebels in the east are taking a dim view of it. </p>
<p>Soon after the agreement was signed, the DNR authorities declared the ceasefire temporary, and <a href="http://dnr-news.com/stati/14476-ob-itogah-minskih-peregovorov-kievu-dali-vozmozhnostsohranit-lico-pered-konchinoy.html">promised that fighting would soon resume</a>. They maintained the agreement simply prolonged the agony of the inevitable defeat of the decaying Ukrainian regime in Kiev. </p>
<p>Later the same day, the sound of outgoing <a href="http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31449981">mortar bombs</a> reverberated around the Kirovskyi district in Donetsk city as the rebels attacked government positions. There were also <a href="http://www.62.ua/news/738007">reports</a> of incoming artillery shells in the city’s Leninskyi district close to the historic but now idle Donetsk Metallurgical Factory. </p>
<p>The agreement is set to apply from midnight on February 14 – and the stakes could scarcely be clearer.</p>
<h2>Flashpoint</h2>
<p>The first test for what’s being termed “Minsk II” will be the struggle to peacefully resolve the situation in Debaltseve, a small town on a road and railway junction between Donetsk and Luhansk. </p>
<p>Debaltseve has been held by pro-Ukrainian forces since they swept south towards Donetsk in July 2014, only to be checked when regular Russian troops were sent in to prevent the rebels being militarily defeated. </p>
<p>The town has been surrounded on three sides by rebel forces ever since, and almost continuous shelling has resulted in a humanitarian crisis. Many residents were recently evacuated, most to Kiev-controlled territory and some to areas behind the frontlines in the DNR. </p>
<p>For the last 10 days the pro-Russian rebels have been fighting fiercely to re-capture the town. The fighting has damaged the railway tracks, preventing the transportation of crucial commodity supplies to industrial facilities on both sides of the front. </p>
<p>The pro-Russian rebels now claim to have almost surrounded thousands of Ukrainian troops who hold the town. The incentive for the rebels to take the town is strong: it would make it much easier to resupply their armed forces in the west of the rebel-held territory, and would also likely facilitate an advance towards cities such as Artemivsk to the north. </p>
<p>The risk of heavy casualties amongst Ukrainian soldiers, who could become trapped behind enemy lines as they did in <a href="http://uatoday.tv/news/newsweek-details-of-illovaisk-massacre-inside-insurgent-held-eastern-ukraine-390120.html">Illovaisk</a> in August 2014, is a major concern for Kiev. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, across the east, there is plenty of time for events that could seriously affect the implementation of the agreement. The question is whether either side will do as they are told – and so far, the omens are not good. </p>
<h2>Stand down</h2>
<p>According to <a href="http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/4804">article two of the new Minsk agreement</a>, Ukrainian troops are supposed to maintain their existing positions, while rebel forces are to fall back to the disputed “contact line” agreed in Minsk I on September 19 2014. This suggests that in some places the rebels are obliged to retreat from positions they have fought fiercely for, and with many causalities, even though they have the upper hand on the battlefield. That will make them all the more disinclined to comply.</p>
<p>Article two further stipulates that all heavy weapons have to be withdrawn from the contact line beginning to create a demilitarised zone, to be monitored by the under-resourced OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Artillery systems with a calibre of 100mm or more have to be withdrawn 25km by each side, while longer range missile systems have to be withdrawn by up to 70km. </p>
<p>A ceasefire and similar security zone was agreed in Minsk I in September 2014, but was not fully implemented, at least not by the rebel side. The Minsk I and Minsk II agreements reflect Russia’s desire to use the conflict in the Donbas to secure leverage over the new pro-Western authorities and Kiev’s desire to maintain the fiction that Ukraine retains its territorial integrity. </p>
<p>The agreement does not reflect the desire on the part of the rebels to carve out a viable statelet in the Donbas, which they have named Novorossiya, recently <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11180325/Novorossia-Factor-the-national-anthem-song-contest.html">launching a contest</a> to select a national anthem for the nascent state. </p>
<p>Equally, the provisions of the accord do not reflect the wish of that part of the new Ukrainian elite that wants to fight to regain control over the Donbas. These people have been emboldened by the possibility that the US <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31279621">might supply lethal military aid</a> on top of the non-lethal supplies that have been delivered hitherto. While the agreement might suit the current interests of the Russian and Ukrainian governments, and possibly Germany and France, the pressure to continue fighting amongst the rebels and some in Kiev is very strong. </p>
<p>The recent <a href="http://sputniknews.com/military/20141111/1014598603.html">integration</a> of the volunteer pro-Kiev battalions into the Ukrainian army command and control system should mean they observe the ceasefire. And since they’ve been losing on the battlefield, they are more likely to welcome the ceasefire as a chance to regroup and resupply – but not to stand down permanently.</p>
<h2>The fog of war</h2>
<p>The situation among the rebels is much more unclear. Russia is providing weapons, equipment, logistics and support as well as genuine and fake “volunteers”, but it is unclear to what extent the rebels are under direct Kremlin control. The presumably accidental shooting down of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/flight-mh17">MH17</a> over the DNR last July showed just how easily unintended consequences can result when proxy forces get involved in conflict. </p>
<p>Equally, there have been credible reports that different rebel-battalions exact rough justice on alleged offenders by attacking each other. Many residents of Donetsk city genuinely believe that some attacks on the city are in fact inflicted by the rebels themselves to give the impression of incoming Ukrainian fire. </p>
<p>All in all, the Russian-backed rebels have been winning in this war of attrition; it’s hard to think of a reason why they would suddenly want to surrender their strong position against a weakened opposition.</p>
<p>While Minsk II could just about be the start of a credible comprehensive peace process, the reality on the ground means people on both sides of the front on both sides will have few expectations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Swain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Ukraine ceasefire agreement struck in Minsk will come as a relief to the increasingly desperate residents who live along the front lines in the Ukrainian Donbas. But even though the document was signed…Adam Swain, Associate Professor, School of Geography, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/371742015-02-04T13:14:44Z2015-02-04T13:14:44ZWest beats the drum for war while Russia plays games in Ukraine<p>In recent weeks, eastern Ukraine’s Russian-backed rebels have won several military victories on the battlefield in the Ukrainian Donbas. First they <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/world/europe/ukraine-cedes-donetsk-airport-to-rebels-as-fighting-continues.html?_r=0">captured</a> the virtually destroyed Donetsk airport, then they <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/27/uk-ukraine-crisis-military-idUKKBN0L00LJ20150127">pushed back the front lines</a>, taking more territory; now, they look set to secure <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2015/feb/03/civilians-flee-debaltseve-eastern-ukraine-in-pictures">Debaltseve</a>, strategically located between the rebel-held cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.</p>
<p>The warfare has taken a terrible toll on Ukrainians on both sides of the “demarcation line”. More than <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/un-death-toll-from-ukraine-conflict-tops-5300-379336.html">5,300</a> people have now been killed, and <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/r-more-than-one-million-flee-ukraine-close-to-humanitarian-catastrophe-2015-1">more than 1m displaced</a>. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/ceasefire-struck-but-ukraine-isnt-out-of-the-woods-so-what-happens-next-31390">Minsk Agreement</a> of September 2014 has obviously failed.</p>
<p>It is quite clear that the Russian-backed rebels want to fight Ukrainian forces to carve out a viable statelet in the east of the country. The prime minster of the Donetsk Peoples’ Republic (DNR), Aleksandr Zakharchenko, has for months declared his intention to retake cities overrun by Ukrainian forces in July 2015, such as Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. </p>
<p>But Russia’s real interest in the conflict appears to be quite different. </p>
<h2>Myth and reality</h2>
<p>Had Russia wanted, it could have taken the Donbas in a matter of hours in March 2014. The fact that it did not indicates that Russia is really only interested in the Donbas in so far as it offers leverage over the authorities in Kiev. </p>
<p>This explains why Russia still periodically <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11361286/Russia-sends-9000-troops-into-Ukraine-says-Petro-Poroshenko.html">sends troops and equipment over the border</a> into rebel-held territory, escalating or de-escalating the conflict at will. After all, it’s simply not in Russia’s interest to have a major war raging on its border.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the drum beat for war on the Western side is getting louder and louder. Western <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3ca53d08-a6ec-11e4-8a71-00144feab7de.html#axzz3QbKNoDsi">leader writers</a>, <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a6bd0936-a625-11e4-9bd3-00144feab7de.html#axzz3QbKNoDsi">commentators</a> and <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/%7E/media/research/files/reports/2015/02/ukraine%20independence%20russian%20aggression/ukrainereport_february2015_final.pdf">securocrats</a> have argued the West should at last go beyond non-lethal aid and arm Ukraine. Timothy Garton Ash even writes longingly about “military kit”, and likens Putin to Milošević, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/01/putin-stopped-ukraine-military-support-russian-propaganda">as if it is actually conceivable for NATO to bomb Russia</a>.</p>
<p>All this talk is based on a wilful misunderstanding of the Ukraine crisis. The dominant Western narrative is increasingly being steered by both left- and right-wing liberal universalists, who want to impose their values on the rest of the world. </p>
<p>They see the situation as the struggle of a downtrodden Ukrainian population, who discovered their inner Western values and toppled a neo-Soviet dictator. Then, as if completely unprovoked, Russia – with an unreconstructed leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-isnt-the-czech-crisis-of-1938-but-there-are-lessons-to-learn-from-history-25768">comparable to Hitler</a> – opportunistically annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine. </p>
<p>The reality is altogether more complicated. </p>
<h2>Own up</h2>
<p>In the run-up to the Euromaidan uprising, the USA and its closest allies systematically undermined the legitimacy of a weak but democratically-elected European government which was sympathetic to Russian interests. They then experimented to see whether it could stoke a potentially violent popular uprising to topple the authorities and diminish Russia. </p>
<p>When Russia reacted to its loss of influence in Kiev by securing its warm water naval base in Crimea and destabilising east Ukraine, the West imposed sanctions on Moscow and rejected a far-reaching East-West compromise that would have entailed Ukraine <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/land-for-gas-secret-german-deal-could-end-ukraine-crisis-9638764.html">agreeing not to apply to join NATO</a>. </p>
<p>The universalists want us to believe that an anti-western, neo-imperial Russia has aggressively projected its power in Ukraine and is intent on a new cold war with the west. In fact, <a href="http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/22441">nothing could be further from the truth</a>. The reality is that Russia has suffered a strategic defeat in Ukraine; it is merely fighting for a consolation prize against a West whose power now extends all the way to Russia’s southern Black Sea underbelly.</p>
<p>But even if the universalists are content to deliberately misunderstand the Ukraine crisis, they should know to balk at the practical consequences of arming the country. Arming Ukraine would partition the country for the foreseeable future, and could rip its economic heart out for good.</p>
<p>That said, the West clearly cannot expect a “frozen conflict” in the short to medium term. As the continued hostilities since the Minsk Agreement have shown, both sides want to fight; each ill-disciplined side is testing the military capabilities of the other. That could easily lead to an arms race, one that Ukraine could not win even with Western support, because Russia will simply increase its military support in response. And all this assumes that western lethal military aid does not fall into the wrong hands. </p>
<p>The biggest losers, of course, will be the residents of the Donbas, who are already facing an impending humanitarian crisis and who simply long for peace and a steady income.</p>
<h2>Footing the bill</h2>
<p>On top of the US$3 billion of US military aid that has been <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/%7E/media/research/files/reports/2015/02/ukraine%20independence%20russian%20aggression/ukrainereport_february2015_final.pdf">proposed</a>, the costs of the west’s Ukraine policy will only increase. Even after the US$27 billion IMF-led bailout agreed after the Euromaidan uprising, the Ukrainian government still requires at least another US$15 billion of official external finance to avoid a sovereign default in the next month or so. </p>
<p>While the US has conditionally offered an additional US$2 billion and the EU a <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57a8fa5e-9b25-11e4-882d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3QbKNoDsi">similar amount</a>, it’s ominous to see western institutions and countries already <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/26cbe0b2-a413-11e4-b01e-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3QbKNoDsi">squabbling over who should provide the remaining finance</a>. Even in the best case scenario, Ukraine will be <a href="http://www.ebrd.com/news/2015/ebrd-president-calls-for-more-support-for-ukraine.html">dependent on IMF-led financing</a> for a political generation. Moreover, a proportion of this financing will go straight to Russia to repay a US$3 billion bond Ukraine owes the Kremlin, as well as disputed debts to Gazprom.</p>
<p>But even if America still wants a fully fledged standoff between the West and Russia, it’s hard to see how that could be in Ukraine’s <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-03/why-arming-ukraine-will-backfire">national interest</a>.</p>
<p>Kiev’s policy has so far been incoherent. It claims rebel-held territory as part of Ukraine and continues to supply it with electricity and gas, while simultaneously isolating the area’s remaining residents. Sometimes Kiev’s forces openly fight the rebels, while at others the guns fall silent. </p>
<h2>Time to compromise</h2>
<p>Still, there is hope. Even at this late stage, negotiations between the rebels and Kiev and between Russia and the West could still form the foundation of a viable united Ukraine. </p>
<p>A sensible negotiated outcome demands three core elements. There must be internationally supervised plebiscites in the Donbas to decide the region’s future; Ukraine’s constitution must be reformed to give the Donbas special status should it vote to remain in Ukraine; and a formal agreement over Ukraine’s future relationship with NATO, the EU and the Eurasian Union must be struck between the West and Russia.</p>
<p>Even if this might not seem likely to benefit the West’s apparent interests, it would surely be in the interest of Ukraine and the Donbas. If the West continues to refuse to compromise with Russia over Ukraine and decides instead to arm Kiev’s troops, then it must do so with its eyes wide open. </p>
<p>Ramping up a response to Russia could have terrible unintended consequences. Russia will escalate the crisis until such time as the West eventually compromises over Ukraine. A compromise must be struck now before Kiev feels emboldened by western arms supplies, only to be painfully betrayed by the West at a later date – and before even more lives are destroyed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37174/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Swain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In recent weeks, eastern Ukraine’s Russian-backed rebels have won several military victories on the battlefield in the Ukrainian Donbas. First they captured the virtually destroyed Donetsk airport, then…Adam Swain, Associate Professor, School of Geography, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/367382015-01-27T15:03:25Z2015-01-27T15:03:25ZRussia’s masquerade continues in Ukraine – and fools no-one<p>On January 24, pro-Russian rebel forces in eastern Ukraine launched missiles into Mariupol, a southern Ukrainian city south of Donetsk on the Sea of Azov. The attack <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/24/missile-attack-pro-russian-rebels-ukraine-mariupol-donetsk">killed 30 people and wounded 97</a>, and the majority of causalities, if not all, are thought to have been civilians. </p>
<p>Mariupol is strategically important because it sits close to the Russian border and lies on the coast along the road to Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula that Russian special forces occupied till the Russian government annexed it in March 2014. So far, the city has held out against pro-Russian forces – but a series of rebel successes in and around Donetsk has raised the threat.</p>
<p>In 2014, Ukrainian forces and Pro-Russian alternately captured and then lost control of territory and supply routes across the east of the country, and for a time, there was a clear sense that Ukrainian forces had the upper hand. But Russian troop movements across the border have changed the course of the war, and may continue to do so – to the chagrin of the government in Kiev and governments in the West.</p>
<p>Despite <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/21/us-ukraine-crisis-lavrov-idUSKBN0KU12Y20150121">the continued denials from Moscow</a>, Russia’s material involvement in the conflict has been obvious, evident in everything from <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-nato-images-show-russian-soldiers-artillery-and-armoured-vehicles-in-military-operations-in-eastern-ukraine-9698471.html">satellite imagery</a> to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28934213">interviews with Russian soldiers in the conflict zone</a> – and the West has displayed little patience for the charade of non-intervention. </p>
<p>As US President Barack Obama <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/25/us-ukraine-crisis-obama-idUSKBN0KY0IN20150125">said</a> on January 26:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are deeply concerned about the latest break in the cease-fire and the aggression that these separatists – with Russian backing, Russian equipment, Russian financing, Russian training and Russian troops – are conducting.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Upping the game</h2>
<p>Obama and his Western allies know Russia is trying to hide behind the wider world’s poor understanding of the region and the blurring of Ukrainian and Russian identities, as well as the inevitable fog of war. </p>
<p>The difficulty of discerning who is an “authentic rebel” and who is in fact a Russian soldier adds another layer of ambiguity to an already blurry situation. What we know from other civil wars is that fighters/insurgents often get involved “accidentally”. </p>
<p>Rather than thinking about broad concepts – us and them, pro-Western or pro-Russian, Kiev rule or home rule – fighters will often be acting locally: responding to the killing of friends or family, the bombing of schools, or even simply the thrill of the fight. Labelling them all as merely “pro-Russian” overwrites all of the details and specifics that might lead people in eastern Ukraine to take up arms, and conflating their intentions with those of the Kremlin (whatever they are) is a mistake.</p>
<p>That does not change the fact that Russian troops and supplies have made a huge impact on the rebels’ performance. Under normal circumstances, the Ukrainian military would have been able to retake territory (if not fully control it) from breakaway local militias relatively easily. However, a considerable amount of sophisticated equipment has passed across the border into rebel hands. </p>
<p>Knowing how to use the odd bit of weaponry to a basic level is one thing, but the proficiency with which it is being used in eastern Ukraine can only be a sign of the presence of Russian forces.</p>
<h2>Little green men</h2>
<p>A recent BBC radio <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b050674y">documentary</a> detailed how this sort of semi-covert masquerade warfare has historical roots in Russia. Although Russia is far from the only country to have deployed misinformation to confuse the enemy, it has relied on the tactic on a remarkably regular basis throughout its martial history.</p>
<p>But the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26532154">little green men</a> – unidentified troops clad in the uniforms, weapons and tactics of the Russian Spetsnaz special forces – fooled no one in Crimea, and 24-hour news, satellite imagery, social media and activist non-governmental organisations all make this strategy more difficult to pull off than ever. That raises the question of why Russia is bothering with such a transparent act.</p>
<p>The answer is that the audience is not the West or Ukraine, but the Donbas region and Russia itself. Many in Donbas do not really want Russian citizenship, or to be a part of Russia: they simply want a greater say in their country and region, especially financially. We should assume that they are first and foremost fighting for themselves, rather than for Russia or Moscow, and even if their aims overlap with the Kremlin’s, they </p>
<p>Likewise, Russia knows it is one thing to go to the aid of “Russian brothers and sisters” but quite another to openly attack a neighbouring country, especially a Slavic neighbour that has traditionally been on good terms with the Russian Federation (unlike Georgia, for instance). </p>
<p>And ultimately, Russia’s masquerade has had the paradoxical effect of keeping the conflict from a dramatic explosion. The focus on the artificial debate over whether or not Russia is actually involving itself allows the West to limit its response, cutting the risk of all-out war with a nuclear armed state. </p>
<p>Only the Ukrainians are left in the middle, with a poorly resourced and commanded military clearly outpaced by an ever more active Russian-backed insurgency.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36738/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Galbreath receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. He has previously received funding from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the European Commission and the Open Society Foundation to research on Ukraine.</span></em></p>On January 24, pro-Russian rebel forces in eastern Ukraine launched missiles into Mariupol, a southern Ukrainian city south of Donetsk on the Sea of Azov. The attack killed 30 people and wounded 97, and…David J Galbreath, Professor of International Security, Editor of European Security, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/366082015-01-23T12:38:10Z2015-01-23T12:38:10ZUkraine sliding towards all-out war despite mediation efforts<p>Over the past few days, Ukraine has taken a significant <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/22/donetsk-bus-stop-shelling-kills-13">turn for the worse</a>. Fighting between rebels and government forces has intensified, the civilian death toll has increased, and the war of words between Ukraine and Russia has further escalated. </p>
<p>To understand why this is the case and what it might mean, two questions should be asked: what has caused this deterioration and is this yet another step towards an increasingly inevitable full-scale and open military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine?</p>
<p>More than four months ago, on September 5, 2014, the government in Kiev and rebel leaders signed a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/05/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSKBN0GZ18D20140905">ceasefire agreement</a> in Minsk, followed by a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/19/us-ukraine-crisis-talks-idUSKBN0HE2JD20140919">memorandum on its implementation</a> two weeks later. But there was no follow-through from either side. The best that can be said about the period since September is that violence became more sporadic, the rate at which people were killed in fighting, or as a consequence of it, slowed down, and neither side pushed overly hard for further territorial gains.</p>
<p>Yet, even this picture might be too optimistic. There were almost daily shoot-outs between pro and anti-government forces along the frontlines in the east of Ukraine – some 1,000 people have died since September (out of a total of almost 5,000 casualties over the course of the crisis) and fighting has been particularly intense around Donetsk airport. The airport – now reduced to rubble – remained a highly prestigious “prize” for either side, and fighting there continued even if only because of its symbolic value. </p>
<h2>Digging in</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/lack-of-trust-and-tit-for-tat-escalation-brings-ukraine-to-the-brink-of-all-out-war-with-russia-29707">Earlier</a> in the year, it had appeared that the Ukrainian government had the initiative – its forces re-captured some territory from the rebels prior to the September ceasefire agreement. But Kiev’s military campaign quickly ran out of steam. To all intents and purposes, both sides were digging in – and the ceasefire agreement seemed to confirm a new status quo. Ukraine withdrew services and deliveries from the rebel-held areas and the rebels in turn continued to build their own institutions. It was not a phony (civil) war by any account, but for the most part it seemed as if each side was primarily interested in consolidating its gains, or containing its losses. </p>
<p>All of this <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-steels-for-more-unrest-as-donetsk-bus-attack-kills-12-36266">changed</a> about one week ago. Amid an intensifying battle over Donetsk airport, talks among the foreign ministers of the Ukraine Contact Group (Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany) ended without progress and triggered the cancellation of a summit of heads of state, planned for Astana on January 15 2015. </p>
<p>Ukrainian government forces then briefly retook the airport, but any momentum that this might have signalled was quickly lost in <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/22/us-ukraine-crisis-casualties-idUSKBN0KV0LL20150122">a decisive push</a> by rebel forces (and allegedly also <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/20/us-ukraine-crisis-russians-idUSKBN0KT21U20150120">Russian troops</a>) on several fronts, forcing Kiev <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/21/russia-ukraine-war-fighting-east">to abandon</a> the airport again.</p>
<h2>Crisis talks</h2>
<p>Somewhat disconnected from the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/as-fighting-deepens-in-eastern-ukraine-death-toll-rises/2015/01/19/f0fabba0-9dac-11e4-bcfb-059ec7a93ddc_story.html">realities of violence</a> in eastern Ukraine, the foreign ministers of the Ukraine Contact Group held yet another round of crisis talks in Berlin on Wednesday <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/deadly-clashes-rock-ukraine-ahead-high-stakes-peace-130522065.html">and issued</a> a joint statement calling on both sides to abide by the September agreement to cease hostilities and withdraw heavy weapons from the frontlines. </p>
<p>Despite this joint call for an end to violence representing some small progress, it is unlikely to lead towards a more stable ceasefire, let alone a settlement of the conflict. In fact, while some modest progress was made in Berlin, US secretary of state John Kerry perhaps reflected the situation on the ground more accurately when <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30928107">he accused</a> the rebels of a land grab. <a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/nato-to-re-establish-contact-with-russian-military-top-general-says-/514761.html">NATO</a>, too, has been ringing the alarm bells again over increasing Russian involvement in support of the rebels.</p>
<p>But this does not mean that the efforts of the Contact Group are meaningless or counter-productive – the fact that such high-level contacts persist and produce consensus, however modest it might be, is positive. As far as the presence of the Russian and the Ukrainian sides is concerned, it means that there are still meaningful channels of communication between the adversaries, while the participation of France and Germany levels the playing field between them somewhat and can also contribute to holding both sides to account should a more substantive agreement be achieved. </p>
<h2>Trust in short supply</h2>
<p>But the long list of essentially worthless agreements in the short history of the Ukraine crisis – from the Kiev agreement of February 21, the Geneva agreement of April 17, to the ceasefire agreements of September 5 and 19, all of them broken or never implemented – does not bode well for a quick and sustainable breakthrough to even a stable ceasefire. This depressing history is accompanied by a similarly disheartening series of miscalculations by all sides in this crisis and a consequentially complete absence of any trust between the presumptive parties to yet another agreement in the future. </p>
<p>Meanwhile the US <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/army/2015/01/21/ukraine-us-army-russia/22119315/">has increased</a> its military assistance to Ukraine on the one side and, on the other, Russian-backed break-away region Transnistria (in Moldova) <a href="http://itar-tass.com/en/world/772841">has been conducting</a> a “practice mobilisation” of its armed forces on the border with western Ukraine. It is all but clear that miscalculations are likely to continue and the level of trust is unlikely to improve. This is a dangerous mix of factors that could yet make all-out war a self-fulfilling prophecy. </p>
<p>For the time being, the discussions in the Ukraine Contact Group are the only mechanism that can potentially avert such a scenario. But unless there is some credible follow-through by the opponents on the ground to the latest meagre “agreement” achieved by the four foreign ministers, the window of opportunity that these ongoing discussions create may be closing fast – and with dire consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36608/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK. He is a past recipient of grants from the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme and the EU's Jean Monnet Programme.</span></em></p>Over the past few days, Ukraine has taken a significant turn for the worse. Fighting between rebels and government forces has intensified, the civilian death toll has increased, and the war of words between…Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/362662015-01-14T11:13:07Z2015-01-14T11:13:07ZUkraine steels for more unrest as Donetsk bus attack kills 12<p>The deadly <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30798426">attack</a> on a bus carrying civilians near Donetsk, killing at least 12 of them and wounding many more, comes in the wake of yet another round of <a href="http://www.dw.de/no-significant-progress-in-four-way-ukraine-talks-in-berlin/a-18186843">failed talks</a> among the foreign ministers of Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France. It also follows a pattern of persistent violence between rebels and government forces that has made a mockery of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ceasefire-struck-but-ukraine-isnt-out-of-the-woods-so-what-happens-next-31390">ceasefire agreement</a> brokered between the two sides back in September 2014.</p>
<p>Alongside this continuing violence, tensions between Russia and Ukraine and between Russia and the West have also increased. </p>
<p>As a result of the general deterioration in the situation, and triggered by a new squall of violence that included serious clashes at <a href="http://www.rferl.org/media/video/donetsk-ukraine-conflict-separatists/26788933.html">Donetsk airport</a>, a planned summit in Astana between the leaders of the Ukraine contact group countries has been <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/13/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-idUSKBN0KM0IL20150113">cancelled</a>. This was foreshadowed in remarks by German chancellor Angela Merkel, who <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/10/us-ukraine-crisis-merkel-idUSKBN0KJ0QA20150110">warned</a> Vladimir Putin that the summit would not go ahead if there was no substantial progress on the implementation of the September ceasefire agreement. </p>
<p>As always, the battle for control of territory, set within the context of fierce great power competition over influence in areas deemed to be strategically significant, is carried out on the backs of civilians. </p>
<h2>Human cost</h2>
<p>The lives lost in the attack on the bus are the tip of the iceberg as far as <a href="http://www..com.au/r-more-than-one-million-flee-ukraine-close-to-humanitarian-catastrophe-2015-1/">civilian suffering</a> goes.</p>
<p>Kiev has cut off rebel-held areas from any kind of services and increased controls at checkpoints. Rebels, despite support from Moscow, have been unable to breach the gap left behind. In addition, Ukraine and Russia have both had to cope with 1m people who fled the rebel-held areas, and who were ill-prepared to do so. </p>
<p>All this is further exacerbated by the fact that the government in Kiev and the rebels have failed to agree on terms for delivering humanitarian aid. The deteriorating humanitarian situation and the uncertainty about the future, compounded by the latest escalation in violence and the apparent futility of negotiations, is likely to increase the number of people fleeing the rebel areas even more.</p>
<h2>Ramping up</h2>
<p>The fronts in and beyond Ukraine have considerably hardened between Russia and its proxies, on the one hand, and Kiev and its allies on the other. Just as <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/13/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-military-idUSKBN0KM10320150113">Russia</a> has announced it will increase its military capabilities in Crimea and Kaliningrad, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/13/us-ukraine-crisis-breedlove-idUSKBN0KM17020150113">NATO</a> has announced similar moves in its Baltic member states. </p>
<p>This is not the first step beyond the point of no return in Mikhail Gorbachev’s doomsday scenario of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11338393/Crisis-in-Ukraine-could-trigger-nuclear-war-warns-Gorbachev.html">nuclear war</a> between Russia and the West. But it does mark a serious escalation and yet another not-so-symbolic drawing of red lines. </p>
<p>This all increases the risk of local provocations getting out of hand, particularly in the Baltic states (with their considerable ethnic Russian populations) and Kaliningrad.</p>
<h2>Trouble ahead</h2>
<p>So the outlook for Ukraine at the beginning of 2015 is not good. In fact, it is considerably worse than a year ago before President Yanukovich (now on an <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/12/us-ukraine-crisis-yanukovich-idUSKBN0KL17F20150112">Interpol wanted list</a>) was forced out of office, before Russia <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/putin-calls-annexation-of-crimea-a-historic-landmark/2014/12/31/f3b5b57a-90ff-11e4-a66f-0ca5037a597d_story.html">annexed</a> Crimea, and before a full-blown <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28969784">civil war</a> started in the east of Ukraine, costing some 4,700 lives to date – more than a thousand of them having died since the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30290310">farcical ceasefire</a> was signed on September 5 2014, the most recent in a <a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ukraine-crisis-trust-building-doubtful-by-stefan-wolff-2014-11">series of agreements</a> hardly ever worth the paper they were written on, let alone the hopes people vested in them.</p>
<p>The prospects for Ukraine are further worsened by the fact that its major Western allies have other concerns, too, ranging from the ongoing crisis in <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/13/uk-mideast-crisis-usa-airstrikes-idUKKBN0KM1C720150113">Syria and Iraq</a>, to the escalation in Nigeria’s war with <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/r-thousands-flee-nigeria-after-boko-haram-attack-niger-chad-struggle-2015-1?IR=T">Boko Haram</a>, from new <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/23b7bd3e-9a7b-11e4-8426-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Ojh6xKdb">cyber security fears</a> to the threats posed by terrorist attacks in major Western cities. </p>
<p>The crowded international security agenda means Ukraine is simply one among several crises. And without any tangible prospects of progress, Kiev’s Western allies are more likely to try to freeze and contain the situation than to invest political, human and financial capital into most likely futile efforts at resolving it.</p>
<p>This obviously plays into Moscow’s hands, too. the <a href="http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2015/01/12/Russian-economy-in-crisis-mode/4521421066951/">Russian economy</a> is in a serious crisis, hamstrung by Western sanctions and low oil prices, and the Kremlin’s appetite for further escalation is weak. The intractability of the current situation offers Moscow breathing space to consolidate its gains so far, of which the annexation of Crimea is the jewel in the crown. </p>
<p>This does not preclude more of the kind of violence that eastern Ukraine has experienced in recent weeks, but it is at least unlikely that things will get much worse. And as the humanitarian crisis takes its toll, some de-escalation on both sides, however temporary and inconclusive, should not be ruled out.</p>
<p>At the same time, this does not mean either Kiev or its allies have given up on winning a political settlement on their terms. The geopolitical game over Ukraine is far from over – but we may well have to endure a long interlude before its conclusion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36266/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The deadly attack on a bus carrying civilians near Donetsk, killing at least 12 of them and wounding many more, comes in the wake of yet another round of failed talks among the foreign ministers of Russia…Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/346832014-11-28T07:06:21Z2014-11-28T07:06:21ZPutin’s patriotism and paranoia will be Russia’s undoing<p>Whether through improvisation, opportunism, fear or calculation, 2014 has seen a massive shift in the way political authority works in Russia. Moscow has moved dramatically away from a legal-rational way of doing politics to a charismatic, belligerent style. </p>
<p>Stirring his citizens up with nationalistic sentiments, Vladimir Putin has increasingly mobilised Russians around a negative agenda centred on resentment against Russia’s diminished status, a return to empire, and cultural loathing of pluralistic, open societies. </p>
<p>Putin celebrated the return of Crimea to Russia in terms of righting historical injustice, and as the restoration of “historical Russian lands”. The themes of defending the <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42579&no_cache=1#.VHcOZVV7Lxg">Russkiy Mir</a> (“Russian world”) and sustaining <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-steels-itself-for-winter-as-putin-forges-ahead-with-novorossiya-33151">Novorossiya</a> soon followed – with ominous signs that more expansionism could be in the offing.</p>
<p>In August, Putin <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan-putin-history-reaction-nation/26565141.html">remarked</a> that Kazakhstan premier Nursultanov Nazarbayev had “created a state on a territory that never had a state” and that an “overwhelming majority of Kazakhstan’s citizens seek the development of relations with Russia, we see it and know it.” And in a less reported incident in October, deputy chief of staff Vyacheslav Volodin put it this way: “<a href="http://english.pravda.ru/society/stories/23-10-2014/128877-putin_russia-0/">If there is no Putin, there is no Russia</a>.” </p>
<p>All this has meant a radicalisation of Russian foreign and security policy, which is becoming more virulently anti-Western than at any time in living memory – in turn, it has sparked a radical rethink of the way the West engages with Russia. But why has Russia chosen to go down this road?</p>
<p>Of course, one explanation for this new belligerence is the Putin government’s peculiar view of itself as being on the right side of history, as opposed to the West, which it sees as as decadent, dysfunctional, and swimming against the tide. But other things are fuelling Russia’s rough behaviour besides.</p>
<h2>Fire them up</h2>
<p>This new nationalist grandstanding is the work of a pressurised political elite keen to recoup political ground it lost in the 2000s. The oil-backed, import-dependent, “soft authoritarian” government of Dimitri Medvedev neither met rising middle-class aspirations nor gave the existing oligarchic elite what it wanted.</p>
<p>Russia spent the 2000s turning itself into a thoroughly corporatist and nationalist state. Its political culture is now characterised by a highly politicised and selective application of the rule of law, a corrupt bureaucracy, and a party system defined by patronage and personal ties to the president. The “No Putin, no Russia” mantra certainly reflects the reality of Russian politics, but not quite in the way it’s meant to. </p>
<p>Equally, imperial “restoration”, and the much “harder” authoritarian governance system that goes with it, only make sense in a time of economic contraction and in a manufactured state of semi-permanent war.</p>
<p>This climate of perpetual struggle has forced the creation of a whole new national strategy. In the face of biting sanctions, food production is <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28685765">stimulated</a>, Gazprom’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/gazproms-well-matched-marriage-with-china-has-been-a-long-time-in-the-making-27051">pivot to Asian energy markets</a> accelerated, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/one-nation-one-voice-press-control-and-propaganda-in-putins-russia-25551">internal dissent crushed</a>. An attack on Putin is now an attack on Russia.</p>
<p>The country has also become a full-blown “securitocracy”. Though Putin assumed power in 2000 through a non-charismatic route – he was selected from within the system – he is now a charismatic leader with a national mission, the only individual able to protect and safeguard a patriotic electorate. </p>
<p>His job is to defend the integrity of the nation against “national traitors”, “foreign agents”, “fifth columnists and "sixth columnists” – never mind external threats from “fascists”, “colour revolutions”, “encirclement”, and so on.</p>
<p>Russia’s elite is cynical, dynastic, absurdly rich (<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/09/russia-wealth-inequality_n_4070455.html">110 individuals</a> control 35% of Russian GDP), and pragmatic. It supports the shift to this harsh, charismatic politics as a defence of the status quo. Were the corporatist nationalist state to be reformed, power continuity would not be possible.</p>
<h2>Fight back</h2>
<p>Germany, the US and other leading players are currently rethinking policy responses to Russia. In the short term, maintaining NATO solidarity is critical – and paradoxically, Russia’s livid accusations of NATO plotting have helped galvanise the alliance against it.</p>
<p>After listening to endless screeds about how Western EU and NATO member states are backing a fascist, anti-Semitic, neo-Nazi regime in Kiev and training mercenaries to kill civilians in the east – where Russian forces of course have <em>never</em> operated – even usually pro-Russian NATO members are aghast, and willing to countenance a co-ordinated pushback.</p>
<p>That said, NATO still needs a comprehensive reform of its security apparatus if it is to seriously counter any future moves along these lines. Russia will continue to test the alliance’s operational capacity in the Baltic region, and it will very probably use the threat of escalation there to distract from advances on Kharkiv and Mariupol. </p>
<p>Of course, Russia’s goal is not to capture Baltic territory, but to reverse what it sees as dangerous and destabilising democratisation on its <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/russias-borders">borders</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the EU will review energy policy towards Russia, and as the US becomes more energy independent and begins to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/17/european-lng-terminals-idUSL6N0RH5IR20140917">export liquefied natural gas</a> to Europe, any shift from Gazprom will be decisive for Russia’s income and so its foreign policy.</p>
<p>Over the longer term, countering the claims Russia uses to justify interventions in Ukraine will demand a serious diplomatic counter-offensive. Russian-language broadcasting to Russia and its neighbours and countering the influence of Russia’s external propaganda, in particular, could prove effective.</p>
<h2>Running out of time</h2>
<p>Russia’s window of opportunity is closing. Putin’s critique of the global system is certainly a powerful one, but no plausible alternative to the liberal capitalist democratic network the US leads has been proposed. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/brics">BRICS</a>, the putative “opposition” to that order, are mismatched and divided. Even as Russia’s notional strategic allies, the other BRICS view events in Ukraine as a regional squabble, not a new East-West rift or second Cold War. China in particular is determined to have its own relationship with the US without Russia as a mediator or third party.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia’s cash reserves fund is <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21633813-it-closer-crisis-west-or-vladimir-putin-realise-wounded-economy">set to run out in 18 months</a>, even sooner if oil prices keep falling. It faces a <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/russia-is-facing-a-full-blown-currency-crisis-2014-11?r=US">full-blown currency crisis</a>, with the rouble having devalued 25% since June; shrinking investor confidence and the West’s sanctions are biting hard.</p>
<p>Internal domestic support is fickle. Euphoria is hard to maintain. Loyal elites, including those running Russia’s most lucrative industries, may baulk at the threatening logic of “no Putin, no Russia”.</p>
<p>Above all, more worrying than what happens if Putin succeeds is the prospect of what will happen if he fails. Ultimately, the challenge is to craft a response that positively channels Russia’s power and patriotism without reinforcing Putin’s paranoia. That will be easier said than done.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34683/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Graeme Herd does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whether through improvisation, opportunism, fear or calculation, 2014 has seen a massive shift in the way political authority works in Russia. Moscow has moved dramatically away from a legal-rational way…Graeme Herd, Director of the School of Government, University of PlymouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/337482014-11-04T13:41:02Z2014-11-04T13:41:02ZKiev outraged at Donbas as Ukraine heads for violent partition<p>Much of the world may regard the elections that took place in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics on November 2 as <a href="http://example.com/">illegitimate</a>, but there appears to be little political will to avert the most likely outcome: the partition of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Derided by Ukrainian president Poroshenko as a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29891556">farce</a>, there had been speculation that elections would be marred by violence. Fighting between Russian-backed rebels and pro-Kiev forces <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/01/us-ukraine-crisis-casualties-idUSKBN0IL2YL20141101">escalated</a> in the days immediately prior to the election, despite the <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/osce-releases-the-12-point-protocol-agreements-reached-between-ukraine-russia-and-separatists-in-minsk-363816.html">Minsk ceasefire agreement</a> reached in September. </p>
<p>Witnesses described <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/kiev-claims-intensive-movements-troops-crossing-russia-133212378.html">intensified rebel troop movements</a>, and it was unclear whether this was the precursor to a renewed assault on pro-Kiev forces or simply heightened security for the vote. </p>
<p>It had even been suggested that the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) rebels might resort to “false flag” provocations to give the impression that pro-Kiev forces were once again shelling civilian communities. In the event, the election passed peacefully, and the majority of Precinct Election Commissions opened, although <a href="http://en.ria.ru/world/20141104/195093581/Shelling-Continues-in-Donetsk-on-Zakharchenkos-Inauguration-Day.html">shelling</a> could be heard in Donetsk as the polls closed.</p>
<h2>Stand up and be counted</h2>
<p>As there was no functioning electoral register, it is impossible to accurately calculate the turnout; however, <a href="http://en.ria.ru/world/20141103/195040567/Zakharchenko-Wins-DPRs-Elections-with-100-Percent-of-Votes.html">according to the DNR’s Central Election Commission</a>, 1,120,000 voted, including 104,500 who voted over the internet.</p>
<p>In order to vote, anyone older than 16 could visit a precinct, many situated in locations used for Ukrainian elections in the past, be added to the voter list by showing their passport which shows their registered address, and be given the two ballot papers: one to choose the prime minister, and the other to choose a “movement” to be represented in the 100-seat DNR Supreme Soviet. </p>
<p>In an improvement from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-referendums-another-attempt-to-rewrite-ethnic-history-26543">self-rule referendum</a> held on May 11, voting booths were provided – but it was unclear what prevented voters from voting in multiple precincts and online.</p>
<p>A large number of people are genuinely pro-republic and anti-Ukraine, perhaps as much as 50% of the population. Still, voters were lured to the precincts by other things besides. After all, being registered as having voted might get people much-needed pension and welfare benefits, or at least the chance to buy fresh vegetables at knock-down prices. That meant long queues of mainly elderly voters all over the Donbas. </p>
<p>On the flipside, some would-be voters were reluctant to be recorded as having voted, fearful that they could be subject to reprisals if pro-Kiev forces retake the city and region. Many anti-DNR residents who have not yet left the region simply boycotted the vote entirely.</p>
<h2>Taking control</h2>
<p>Voters had little choice on the ballot papers. The only recognisable candidate for prime minister was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11204982/Alexander-Zakharchenko-named-prime-minister-of-eastern-Ukraine-after-election.html">Alexander Zakharchenko</a>, leader of the <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/pro-russia-militant-we-shot-down-the-malaysia-airliner-2014-7?IR=T">Oplot</a> militia and acting prime minister since August. His campaign lacked specific pledges, except for the aim to recapture key cities that were lost during the proxy war in July. </p>
<p>Zakharchenko won easily, securing 765,340 votes to his nearest rival’s 111,000. For the Supreme Soviet, voters could choose between Zakharchenko’s movement (simply called “Donetsk People’s Republic”), which secured 64.43% of the vote, or the “Free Donbas” movement, which won 27.75%. Only the top three candidates of the two party lists were named on the ballot paper, and their policy programmes were unclear.</p>
<p>For the leaders of the DNR and their supporters in Moscow, the hope is that the elections will earn the breakaway statelets some kind of political and legal legitimacy, both internally and externally. </p>
<p>The DNR has so far been a rag-bag of competing militias all running their own fiefdoms, meaning Zakharchenko’s writ did not travel very far from Donetsk city. To be sure, the Donbas’s armed revolution has chased out the region’s oligarchic elite, who have mostly scuttled off to Kiev – but it remains to be seen whether the vote will actually consolidate the DNR’s power structure. </p>
<h2>Drawing the line</h2>
<p>There are some signs of movement. It could be significant that <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/29/-sp-ukraine-rebel-igor-bezler-interview-demon">Igor Bezler</a>, a rival of Zakharchenko’s known as “the Demon”, is reported to have left his fiefdom in Horlivka just before the election. </p>
<p>But the DNR’s leaders need to prove their competence by keeping the heating and lights on during the harsh winter to prevent a humanitarian crisis. By the same token, they must secure funding for salaries, benefits and pensions to keep the DNR’s economy functioning. In the medium term, the region’s leaders need to craft a positive vision of the future of their breakaway state.</p>
<p>As for Russia, the running assumption around the world has been that Moscow’s interest in the Donbas was principally a strategy to wield influence in Kiev. However, Kiev’s <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/26/us-ukraine-crisis-election-idUSKCN0IF00R20141026">pro-Western spasm</a> in the wake of the Ukrainian parliamentary election saw some suggest that Kiev <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/alexander-motyl-ukraine-should-abandon-the-donbas-enclave-368890.html">jettison the breakaway Donbas altogether</a>; equally, Russia may simply give up on influencing Ukraine, and concentrate on helping create a functioning, Russia-friendly state in the east. </p>
<p>But that raises the question of whether the current borders actually allow for a viable state. And it’s still possible that Russia could decide it’s still worth using military force to help the rebels extend their territory – either before the full force of winter sets in, or after the start of the spring thaw. </p>
<p>In any case, with Kiev’s mood turning sour and the rebels spoiling for the next fight, no genuine peace process looks set to take hold anytime soon. It would appear that the Donbas is not yet a frozen conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33748/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Swain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Much of the world may regard the elections that took place in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics on November 2 as illegitimate, but there appears to be little political will to avert the most likely…Adam Swain, Associate Professor, School of Geography, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/334932014-10-28T05:57:12Z2014-10-28T05:57:12ZDispatch from Kharkiv: Ukraine votes and steels itself for winter<p>Ukraine’s snap parliamentary election on October 26 looks set to return a pro-Western parliament to Kiev – setting the country up for a long and tense winter. And while the elections seem to have gone relatively smoothly, what lies ahead in these incredibly sensitive times is scarcely any clearer.</p>
<p>I spent the election in Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second city, which is about 50km from the Russian border in the east of the country. I am there as an international election observer for <a href="http://www.ucca.org/">UCCA</a>, a US-based Ukrainian diaspora organisation, one of <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraines-election-commission-registers-over-1000-intl-observers-for-oct-26-elections-367914.html">more than 1,000 international observers</a> registered to oversee the <a href="https://theconversation.com/pro-western-bloc-set-for-majority-in-elections-that-expose-deep-divisions-in-ukraine-33450">parliamentary elections on October 26</a>.</p>
<p>This election was conducted via an enormous number of polling stations, making it an extremely labour-intensive and bureaucratic process. Many stations have very small numbers of eligible voters, which means it’s been hard for observers to know what’s happening across the country.</p>
<p>Speaking for myself, while the electoral system is highly complex and bureaucratic, what mistakes we saw were just that, mistakes – fumbles by people who perhaps didn’t follow the precise procedure, but made only technical and not decisive errors.</p>
<p>That said, there were some signs of confusion. In particular, hospitals struggled with their necessarily transient population of patients. One hospital where I spent time was a military one treating casualties from the conflict in the Donbas; many of its patients were not from Kharkiv, and were not yet registered to vote there.</p>
<p>From what I saw, it looked as if different polling stations were responding to this situation in different, possibly contradictory ways – and it’s unclear who exactly got to vote in the first-past-the-post ballot.</p>
<h2>Turning a corner</h2>
<p>Some people hope that these elections will see the emergence of a new political generation. They are quite optimistic that Ukraine will be modernised, and that a new political class might emerge. The more pessimistic among the population though, imagine that while the personalities of the parties might change, but the modus operandi of the country’s politics won’t.</p>
<p>The most likely outcome is something between these extremes. There will not be a radical change in the political culture or in how the political class operates – not revolution, but evolution.</p>
<p>Parties emerge and disappear relatively quickly in Ukraine, and various established forces have come a cropper this time around. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15249184">Yulia Tymoshenko</a>’s party seems to have just scraped past the 5% threshold for representation; the Communist Party did not secure 5%, and are not going to be in the parliament. New political parties, such as the Poroshenko Bloc, have been emerging fast – but it remains to be seen if they’ll make a clean break with the pre-Maidan era.</p>
<h2>Showing up</h2>
<p>Voter turnout in Kharkiv was apparently <a href="http://en.itar-tass.com/world/756583">just over 30%</a>, a drop from the last parliamentary elections in 2012. The feeling in the aftermath of the vote is that many people could not see a political party that matched their views, something particularly true for pro-Russian people – who may well have not bothered to vote.</p>
<p>Where turnout will be pivotal is in the parts of Donetsk and Luhansk that remain under Kiev’s control, and which did vote. Participation there was among the lowest in the country, at <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraine-elects-new-parliament-live-updates-369417.html">roughly 25%</a>. The risk now is that the separatists in the Donbas will see the low participation in Kiev’s snap election as an opportunity to extend their frontier once the harsh winter is over.</p>
<p>As for Kharkiv, the hostilities in the neighbouring oblast have united the population and encouraged them to identify with the Ukrainian state as never before. Driving around Kharkiv, as close to Russia as it is, I could see the Ukrainian flag everywhere, its yellow and blue colours painted on lamp-posts and street signs.</p>
<p>To the extent that there are pro-Russian separatists here, people still fear the kind of lawlessness and violence they’ve seen in Donetsk and Luhansk. There’s a scepticism about the still-fragile ceasefire struck with the rebels in September; there have been big casulaties on both sides, and Donetsk airport remains a flashpoint.</p>
<p>There will inevitably be a period of relative calm during Ukraine’s extraordinarily harsh winter. Whether we will see a return to violence in the spring will mostly depend on what happens between Moscow and Kiev in the next few months.</p>
<h2>Forging ahead</h2>
<p>The most important thing to remember is that these elections have taken place in what’s essentially a new Ukrainian state. Crimea has gone; the separatist-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/27/ukraine-election-presidents-allies-early-count-petro-poroshenko">didn’t vote</a>. Complicating things further, many refugees from those areas weren’t yet registered in their new homes, and therefore couldn’t vote. </p>
<p>The result is a completely changed electoral landscape. That in turn has produced a completely new parliament, with a completely new geopolitical outlook.</p>
<p>Going on early indications, the government will certainly be more pro-European than previous ones, and relations between Ukraine and Russia are going to be difficult for some time. What happens next will depend on the events of the winter, whether Ukraine defaults on its debt – and whether Kiev is able to keep the lights on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33493/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article represents the author's personal views, and not those of UCCA.</span></em></p>Ukraine’s snap parliamentary election on October 26 looks set to return a pro-Western parliament to Kiev – setting the country up for a long and tense winter. And while the elections seem to have gone…Adam Swain, Associate Professor, School of Geography, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/331512014-10-19T10:18:26Z2014-10-19T10:18:26ZUkraine steels itself for winter as Putin forges ahead with Novorossiya<p>The <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/17/us-ukraine-crisis-meeting-idUSKCN0I52YO20141017">EU-Asia Summit</a> in Milan, Italy, delivered little, if any, tangible progress to resolve the crisis in Ukraine. Relations between Russia and Ukraine’s major European allies remain just a few degrees above a new Cold War-style ice age. And with only a <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/ukraine-russia-temprary-gas-deal/2488469.html">preliminary gas deal</a> achieved between Kiev and Moscow this may be quite literally true for Ukrainians as winter approaches.</p>
<p>Agreements achieved in Minsk between <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29082574">Russia and Ukraine</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29290246">between Kiev and the separatists</a> over a military de-escalation, the withdrawal of combat troops, and the establishment of a buffer zone have made some incremental progress, but a ceasefire that was meant to have been in force <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/world/europe/ukraine-cease-fire.html?_r=0">since September 5</a> has been frequently breached – in particular during the protracted battle between separatists and Ukrainian forces for the <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/shelling-continues-donetsk-international-airport-n227426">airport</a> in Donetsk. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49027#.VEDOimp0yUk">official death toll</a> of the conflict now stands at almost 4,000 (the real figure is likely to be significantly higher), while <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/world/europe/more-than-a-million-ukrainians-have-been-displaced-un-says.html?_r=0">refugees</a> and <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/540590ae9.html">internally displaced people</a> number in the hundreds of thousands.</p>
<p>To all intents and purposes, Ukraine has quickly become Europe’s most fragile state. Unable to exert effective control over its two easternmost regions, and with a <a href="https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-economy-shrink-9-finance-172154781.html">free-falling economy</a> heavily dependent on <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/16/us-ukraine-crisis-cenbank-imf-idUKKCN0I50XL20141016">IMF support</a> (projected to be US$19 billion over the next year), the country is now heading into parliamentary elections scheduled for October 26. </p>
<p>In advance of the polls, a <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2014/1016/Ukraine-purge-Communists-cronies-and-crooks-face-the-axe-video">lustration law</a> (which seeks to “purify” Ukraine from any remnants of the past) has just come into effect, and tensions between the various contending parties are increasing as voters become more and more <a href="https://sg.sports.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-politics-turns-trashy-mood-sours-111510217--politics.html?.tsrc=yahoo">disaffected</a>. </p>
<p>All this shows how, instead of helping to resolve Ukraine’s long crisis of state weakness, the events of the past year have greatly exacerbated it. </p>
<h2>Building the future</h2>
<p>More than ever, Ukraine is in search of a unifying national identity – and the current anti-Russian sentiment is as insufficient as the 1990s ideas of economic nationalism were.</p>
<p>This is in stark contrast with the situation in the separatist-controlled areas, where Russia has capitalised on the limited reach and capacity of the Ukrainian state. </p>
<p>In contrast to the chaos of the spring and summer, there is now a very well co-ordinated and resourced Russian-sponsored state-building effort under way in Donetsk and Luhansk, the so-called “Novorossiya”. Far more than an idea built on Russian nationalism, Orthodox Christianity and Soviet-style egalitarianism, effective state structures have actually begun to take shape.</p>
<p>Where Russia clearly has delivered on its promises is in relation to the proliferation of armed gangs across eastern Ukraine. Initially helpful in the Kremlin’s destabilisation efforts, they were increasingly difficult to control from Moscow, impossible to co-ordinate, and increasingly lawless as political motivations were overtaken by criminal agendas that undermined the whole Novorossiya project. </p>
<p>Rather than simply <a href="http://theconversation.com/self-styled-peoples-governor-of-donetsk-tells-us-these-areas-have-always-been-russian-29708">sending in officials</a> to organise the nascent security apparatus in Donetsk and Luhansk, regular, well-trained Russian troops and policemen (often with Ukrainian passports issued in Donetsk and Luhansk) now form the core of a new and effective security force, which is at last replacing the hotchpotch of rebel troops who frequently robbed local residents and businessmen.</p>
<h2>New horizons</h2>
<p>Economically, Novorossiya’s banking system has effectively been integrated with that of Russia as have major parts of the infrastructure, especially the electricity and gas pipeline networks. This is obviously good news of sorts for people living there as they will be less affected if Russia and Ukraine cannot find a long-term resolution to their <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29521564">gas dispute</a> or if the current preliminary agreement falls apart. </p>
<p>It is equally good news for many factories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, many of which already work directly through Russia in terms of supplies and exports that now go through those stretches of the Russian-Ukrainian border that the Ukrainian state does not control anymore. As these factories declare zero activity in Ukraine, Kiev additionally loses out on what was substantial tax revenue from a region that used to deliver around 25% of GDP.</p>
<p>Beyond building institutions, Moscow’s state-building efforts also extend to significant socio-demographic changes. While western Ukraine continues to receive internally displaced persons from the east and while Russia has accepted many refugees from there, Novorossiya is being advertised widely across Russia as an opportunity for a new life and upward social mobility – especially for Russians from Siberia and the far east, including many who have begun to settle in Donetsk and Luhansk with their families. </p>
<p>For Russia, the gain is twofold: radical nationalists who pose a potential threat to the regime can be pushed out of Russia, both neutralising a domestic threat and infusing the mythical Novorossiya with a hardcore of residents unreservedly committed to the Russian state- and nation-building project.</p>
<h2>Moving on</h2>
<p>The exact consequences of these developments may not be clear for some time. Ukraine’s economic and political crises are likely to continue and deepen in the aftermath of the elections – and even more so during the winter months, when the state and its citizens will be at their most vulnerable. </p>
<p>This may weaken Ukraine’s resolve to retake Donetsk and Luhansk by force, but it could also drive the embattled government to desperate measures.</p>
<p>The prospects for a Ukrainian military victory are as dim as ever, yet the likelihood of a workable autonomy deal with the separatists will also decrease over time. The number of people with a stake in the status quo and/or closer integration with Russia is increasing because of both demographic changes and the visible success of Russia’s state-building effort.</p>
<p>In many ways, the exact outcome doesn’t really matter: Russia has clearly demonstrated to the West that it will never allow Ukraine to drift further out of its own sphere of influence. That has all but destroyed any Ukrainian hopes of tighter Euro-Atlantic integration. </p>
<p>As the situation in eastern Ukraine stabilises and the country hopefully muddles through the winter, Western attention will soon enough turn to other crises around the world where co-operation with Russia is essential. That much we have seen before: who, after all, remembers Crimea?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33151/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, and the EU's Jean Monnet Programme.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatyana Malyarenko receives funding from the NATO Science for Peace Programme and the Jean Monnet Programme of the European Union</span></em></p>The EU-Asia Summit in Milan, Italy, delivered little, if any, tangible progress to resolve the crisis in Ukraine. Relations between Russia and Ukraine’s major European allies remain just a few degrees…Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of Public Administration, Donetsk State Management UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/317542014-09-16T19:21:22Z2014-09-16T19:21:22ZRestive Ukraine signs EU pact and hands rebels self-rule<p>On the same day that it finally voted to ratify the EU Association Agreement that helped spark the Euromaidan protests in 2013, Ukraine’s parliament also voted to give <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29220885">self-rule</a> to the rebels holding major cities in its east and extended an amnesty to fighters on the pro-Russian side.</p>
<p>These are vital elements of the ceasefire agreement signed in Minsk on September 5, an agreement that seems to be holding – if only just.</p>
<p>After all, the very day after the ceasefire began, Russian-based separatists (almost certainly supported by Russian servicemen) <a href="https://news.vice.com/article/ceasefire-threatened-after-ukrainian-positions-shelled-outside-mariupol">shelled</a> the eastern edges of the strategic port city of Mariupol; the battle for control of <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/donetsk-airport-shelled-by-rebels-all-day-nsdc-364732.html">Donetsk airport</a>, where pro-Kiev forces are holed up, also continues. </p>
<p>While the guns have now fallen silent for the most part, barely a day passes without the sound of outgoing unguided Grad rockets or incoming artillery shells and mortars reverberating around Donetsk.</p>
<p>The ongoing spasms of conflict are still <a href="http://www.62.ua/news/618031">cutting off water and electricity</a> in different parts of the city. Understandably, the more than <a href="http://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/number-displaced-inside-ukraine-more-doubles-early-august-260000">1m displaced persons</a> who have escaped the conflict – including <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/world/europe/more-than-a-million-ukrainians-have-been-displaced-un-says.html">814,000 people</a> who have, according to the Russian authorities, moved to Russia – are carefully weighing up whether or not to return to their homes. </p>
<h2>Taking the reins</h2>
<p>The rebels have launched state-building processes in the territories they currently control. The DNR authorities have <a href="http://www.62.ua/article/616873">announced</a> that the Ukrainian hyrvnia and Russian rouble will run in parallel until the end of the year, after which the Russian rouble will become its sole currency. It also aims to join the Russian-led <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/05/vladimir_putins_impotent_eurasian_union_kazakhstan_belarus_ukraine">Eurasian Customs Union</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/25/billionaire-ukraine-troubled-region-serhiy-taruta">Sergiy Taruta</a>, the controversial oligarch appointed by Poroshenko as governor of Donetsk region, <a href="http://inforesist.org/taruta-rasskazal-zachem-boeviki-razrushayut-donbass/">claims</a> that the DNR is deliberately destroying infrastructure and creating a humanitarian crisis to force Russia to come to its “rescue”.</p>
<p>In addition, the DNR has signalled its intention to assume control over the state pension fund, and has even <a href="http://podrobnosti.ua/accidents/2014/09/10/992787.html">appointed a new rector of the Donetsk National University</a>.</p>
<p>But even as Donetsk and Luhansk are pushing ahead towards something like statehood, it’s still too soon to call their vision plausible.</p>
<h2>Tall order</h2>
<p>Surely the the DNR and LNR cannot expect to quickly reconstruct the war-ravaged landscape of the east (when, for example, over two thirds of the coal mines in their territory are <a href="http://www.62.ua/news/617831">not working</a>) and carve out a viable future as an independent breakaway state. </p>
<p>The rebels currently occupy the two largest cities in the Donbas, about a third of the territory of the two oblasts, and a peacetime population well in excess of 3m. But the Donbas, which was a “<a href="http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Territorial-Production+Complex">territorial production complex</a>” during the Soviet era, is a highly integrated industrial region, with infrastructure designed for producing electrical energy and steel. Even following the ceasefire, the conflict’s frontlines still effectively intersect with established industrial supply chains. </p>
<p>For example, Ukraine’s largest company, <a href="http://www.scmholding.com/">System Capital Management</a>, is owned by Rinat Akhmetov, who escaped Donetsk and currently resides in Kiev. The company is headquartered in Donetsk city, under rebel control – and yet two of its most important industrial assets, the Azovstal and Illyich iron and steel works, are located in Mariupol, which is controlled by pro-Kiev forces. These industrial companies depend not only on transporting commodities around the region by rail, which has been <a href="http://www.62.ua/article/617889">severely disrupted</a>, but also on exporting from ports such as Mariupol’s.</p>
<p>The current rebel-controlled territory, and arguably the remainder of Ukraine, simply does not look economically sustainable without normal trade and investment relations between the hypothetical breakaway state and Ukraine proper. </p>
<p>This, in turn, leaves the country facing two possible scenarios. </p>
<h2>High road or low road?</h2>
<p>The ceasefire could represent the first step in a long peace process, in which the Ukrainian authorities and the rebels would agree to wide-ranging autonomy for the Donbas within a federal Ukraine and the West <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11084600/Its-time-to-back-away-from-the-Russian-wolf.html?fb">might accept</a> a united Ukraine which is geopolitically neutral and free to integrate economically with both the EU and Eurasia. This could be formulated in a new Budapest Memorandum. </p>
<p>On the other hand, the Ukrainian authorities and the rebels could fail to reach consensus on how to represent the Donbas in a new Ukrainian constitution, or the West could fail to sufficiently accommodate Russia’s legitimate security interests around its western borders. </p>
<p>If that happens, a new period of armed conflict could ensue as the rebels supported by Russian troops seek to gain control of Mariupol as well as other territory to try to carve out an economically viable breakaway state in the future. </p>
<p>But even this scenario carries the risk that the resulting breakaway state would be cripplingly economically isolated, both from the rest of Ukraine and from the West.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, even with their new powers of self-rule, the rebels are hardly out of the woods. On September 12, the EU imposed <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:271:FULL&from=EN">visa bans and asset freezes</a> on the self-proclaimed prime minister of the DNR, Alexander Zakharchenko, along with seven other DNR and LNR officials. </p>
<p>And even as Ukraine and the EU have now ratified the Association Agreement and the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/">Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement</a>, the trade agreement <a href="http://mobile.euobserver.com/foreign/125601">will be suspended until at least the end of 2015</a>. Additionally, Poroshenko intends to proceed with parliamentary elections on October 26. </p>
<p>As these events unfold, their current ceasefire looks less and less like the start of a credible peace process and more like a pause – with the twin threats of renewed violence and Ukraine’s partition still looming.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31754/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Swain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>On the same day that it finally voted to ratify the EU Association Agreement that helped spark the Euromaidan protests in 2013, Ukraine’s parliament also voted to give self-rule to the rebels holding major…Adam Swain, Associate Professor, School of Geography, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.