tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/egypt-protests-10642/articlesEgypt protests – The Conversation2022-12-16T13:13:27Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1965432022-12-16T13:13:27Z2022-12-16T13:13:27ZMuslim Brotherhood at the crossroads: Where now for Egypt’s once-powerful group following leader’s death in exile, repression at home?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501383/original/file-20221215-22-5t8yv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C53%2C3994%2C2604&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the Muslim Brotherhood protest at a rally in 2013.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/members-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-and-supporters-of-ousted-news-photo/173509620?phrase=Muslim%20Brotherhood%20flag%20Egypt&adppopup=true">Carsten Koall/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ibrahim Munir, the leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-ibrahim-munir-muslim-brotherhood-acting-leader-dies">died on Nov. 4, 2022</a>, in exile in London. While the news generated few headlines around the world, Munir’s death marks a critical moment in the evolution of a group founded nearly 100 years ago, as a social and religious movement.</p>
<p>Over the years, the Brotherhood grew into the most significant social movement and political opposition in Egypt. Its Islamist ideology – which calls for public policies in line with its interpretation of Islam – <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-muslim-brotherhood-and-jamaat-i-islami/">became widely influential</a> around the world.</p>
<p>But since a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">2013 military coup</a> that removed the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed Morsi from power, the group has been all but destroyed, with most of its leaders either imprisoned, killed or in exile.</p>
<p>For now, the group has <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20221107-muslim-brotherhood-assigns-temporary-acting-guide/">a new temporary leader</a> in Muhyeddine al-Zayet, a 70-year-old senior figure in the movement.</p>
<p>But the stark reality is that the Brotherhood is at a turning point: The movement either will have to reinvent itself or face the prospect of gradually fading into irrelevance.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.wesleyan.edu/academics/faculty/imatesan/profile.html">scholar of social movements</a> who has <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-violence-pendulum-9780197510087?cc=us&lang=en&">studied the evolution of the Brotherhood</a> and interviewed both members and defectors, I believe its fate hangs on three issues: how it responds to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s repression of opposition groups including the Brotherhood; which leaders guide the movement during its crisis; and how the group rebuilds in exile. </p>
<h2>Has the Brotherhood run its course?</h2>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood was <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/egypts-muslim-brotherhood">established in 1928</a> by Hassan al-Banna, a primary school teacher with a vision that piety and Islamic values can help transform the individual, reform society and ultimately bring about an Islamic state.</p>
<p>Appealing to Egyptians disillusioned with the country’s existing religious institutions, critical of its political system and angered by the Western interference in the Muslim world, the Brotherhood <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/africa/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-explainer/index.html">grew into a grassroots movement</a> with an intricate network of schools, newspapers and social services.</p>
<p>By the end of the 20th century, the Brotherhood dominated civil society in Egypt and became a prominent source of political opposition. It also established branches and affiliates throughout the Muslim world. </p>
<p>Following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start">2011 Arab Spring</a>, which saw popular uprisings in a number of countries across the Middle East, the Brotherhood came to power in Egypt’s first free and fair elections. Its affiliated political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, won the largest parliamentary block, and its candidate, Mohammed Morsi, was elected president. By June 2013, however, disillusionment with the lack of political progress and the poor economic performance of the country led to widespread popular mobilization against the Brotherhood. A month later the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">military ousted Morsi</a> from power. </p>
<h2>Emergence of two Brotherhoods</h2>
<p>When Brotherhood supporters took to the streets and demanded that the democratically elected president be reinstalled, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/08/egypt-clashes-morsi-muslim-brotherhood-military">police and army forces opened fire on demonstrators</a>. On Aug. 14, 2013, security forces brutally put down the sit-in in Rab’a Square in eastern Cairo, killing over 800 people, in what Human Rights Watch said <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">likely amounted to crimes against humanity</a>.</p>
<p>For some Brotherhood members, the brutality of the security forces sparked a <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/13510347.2016.1273903?journalCode=fdem20">desire for revenge and justified a violent response</a>.</p>
<p>For the most senior Brotherhood leaders, however, violence was neither politically pragmatic nor ideologically justified. In the absence of a clear vision for how to respond to the political crisis, many young members became <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/13510347.2019.1630610">disillusioned with the organization</a>. </p>
<p>By 2014, the Brotherhood was not just losing members. Two additional fault lines emerged: the question of leadership and the question of exile. Mass arrests caused a leadership vacuum that led to a <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/13510347.2019.1630610">new cadres of midranking members</a> taking over activities inside Egypt. </p>
<p>These new leaders adopted a more revolutionary tone and started operating independently of the older leadership. The parallel claims to authority and divergent visions over how to respond to the political repression <a href="https://research.sharqforum.org/2018/09/07/iran-and-the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-heading-towards-development-or-simply-repair/">led to a split</a> between the so-called “historical leaders” and the new leadership.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Photo of an elderly man in a black blazer and blue shift." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Ibrahim Munir in 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-general-of-the-international-organization-of-the-news-photo/173448728?phrase=Ibrahim%20Munir%20Muslim%20Brotherhood&adppopup=true">Ozan Kose/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>By 2016 there were in effect two Muslim Brotherhoods: the original group, under the leadership of Ibrahim Munir as the deputy guide operating out of the U.K., and the <a href="https://research.sharqforum.org/2018/09/07/iran-and-the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-heading-towards-development-or-simply-repair/">so-called “General Office,” under the new leadership</a>. The General Office attracted many young revolutionaries, including women, but the group had significantly fewer resources, which led it eventually to dissipate.</p>
<p>I learned from interviews with Brotherhood members that with Munir operating as leader in exile, a deeply contested internal debate emerged over whether to restructure the movement and shift the strategic decision-making to the leaders abroad. Outside of Egypt, the organization established regional consultative councils in most host states with a significant Brotherhood presence, most notably in Turkey.</p>
<p>While this allowed for some semblance of organizational rebuilding, some leaders still insisted that all major decisions about the direction, tactics and strategies of the Brotherhood be made inside Egypt. </p>
<h2>Can the Brotherhood rise again?</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that the Muslim Brotherhood has been nearly destroyed by government repression. In 1954 a militant faction of the Brotherhood allegedly attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser, prompting <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-violence-pendulum-9780197510087?cc=us&lang=en&">a severe crackdown on the group</a>. The torture and abuse that Brotherhood members faced in prison inspired a new militant vision for activism and led a small group of Brotherhood members to start plotting attacks on government officials. The government discovered these cells before any plans came to fruition, leading to a <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691167886/making-the-arab-world">second major wave of repression in 1965</a>.</p>
<p>But the circumstances in which the Brotherhood finds itself today are different from these past periods of repression. It is more deeply divided than before. And importantly, the current repression comes after the movement came to power and had a chance to rule but ultimately failed.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_Egypt_Report_Public-Opinion_Arab-Barometer_2019.pdf">Arab Barometer</a>, a nonpartisan research network, shows that since 2013 Egyptians have been consistently skeptical of political Islam as expressed by the Brotherhood, even as the population remains largely religious. For for many of Egypt’s young people the Brotherhood cannot offer any solutions to the economic hardships facing the country, or the growing human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Faced with these internal divisions and challenging political circumstances, the road ahead will not be easy for the Brotherhood. As some of its former members have admitted, there is a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/rethinking-political-islam-9780190649197?cc=us&lang=en&">tension between being a social movement and being a political party</a>.</p>
<p>The Brotherhood knows that many Egyptians agree with the group’s religious values at the same time that they are deeply critical of its political ambitions.</p>
<p>If the Brotherhood seeks to become a force of change again and attract a new generation of Islamist activists, I believe it needs to develop a new vision and theory of political agency that inspires both the youth in exile, who speak the language of inclusion, diversity and revolution, and Egypt’s young people, who hunger for freedom and economic opportunities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ioana Emy Matesan has previously received funding from the National Science Foundation. </span></em></p>The Muslim Brotherhood once held the reins of power in Egypt. Now it faces internal splits, government repression and dwindling support.Ioana Emy Matesan, Associate Professor of Government, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1918112022-10-31T13:10:57Z2022-10-31T13:10:57ZPodcasting in Egypt - how feminist activism has emerged through shared stories<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491644/original/file-20221025-3641-llifm3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Den Potisev/iStock/Getty Images Plus</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After more than a decade of teaching audio production to my college students in Cairo, it finally dawned on me that podcasts themselves can serve as teaching tools that highlight lessons in Egyptian society. I realised this because so many of my female students selected <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17439884.2021.2020286">feminist topics</a> or took feminist standpoints in their narrative nonfiction podcasts. </p>
<p>Though in the past I’ve written about <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346020915_Ideas_for_Incorporating_Podcasting_into_Your_Pedagogy">how I teach audio</a>, I’d never thought to focus on the content of my students’ podcasts. The idea of podcasts as digital activism resonated with me, particularly from a perspective of telling real life stories. </p>
<p>With <a href="https://medium.com/paradeim/a-brief-history-of-podcasting-2e73cfbca7d0">two decades of podcasting</a> out in the world, there’s an <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14614448211021032">ever-growing</a> <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00138398.2020.1852707">number</a> of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351273206-9/africa-demand-rachel-lara-van-der-merwe">research</a> <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Catherine-Strong/publication/342876991_Pandemic_Podcasting_From_Classroom_to_Bedroom/links/5f0ac6f7a6fdcc4ca4635d89/Pandemic-Podcasting-From-Classroom-to-Bedroom.pdf">articles</a> about <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Digitalization-of-Culture-Through-Technology-Proceedings-of-the-International/Mishra-Samanta/p/book/9781032315478">podcasting</a> in Africa. But there is a need for much more academic analysis, which is why my co-author Yasmeen Ebada and I designed a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17439884.2021.2020286">research study</a> to focus on feminist-leaning podcasts and Egyptian female podcasters. Digital activism is, after all, part of the decade-old <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/feminism/The-fourth-wave-of-feminism">fourth wave</a> of feminism. </p>
<p>We wanted to learn how the students adopted their knowledge of feminism, about the development of their feminist identities and about how podcasts were used for digital activism. Though we focused on <a href="https://soundcloud.com/ohradiogirl/sets/egyptian-female-podcasters">four female podcasters</a> as case studies, our research also provides context about when Egyptian women become aware of cultural and societal inequities, as well as when they begin to manifest their feminist ideals.</p>
<h2>Feminism in Egypt</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/patriarchy">Patriarchy</a>, which presumes that men are superior to women, is baked into Egyptian society on all levels – cultural, social, economic and political. Young women who speak out on just about anything for just about any reason are considered brave. The repercussions could be life altering, despite the relatively comfortable class status of university students.</p>
<p>Feminism in Egypt is not a new phenomenon. Young Egyptians have many role models who span decades of feminist activism. These range from the activist <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-44814874">Huda Sha'rawi</a> – the godmother of Egyptian feminism – to author and physician <a href="https://theconversation.com/nawal-el-saadawi-egypts-grand-novelist-physician-and-global-activist-157817">Nawal El Saadawi</a>, and contemporary feminist writer <a href="http://www.monaeltahawy.com/">Mona Eltahawy</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nawal-el-saadawi-egypts-grand-novelist-physician-and-global-activist-157817">Nawal El Saadawi: Egypt's grand novelist, physician and global activist</a>
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<p>And add to that list <a href="https://egyptianstreets.com/2020/09/20/meet-nadeen-ashraf-the-student-behind-egypts-anti-harrassment-social-media-revolution/">Nadeen Ashraf</a>. As a college student, she reignited the feminist activist flame in the summer of 2020 in Egypt. She used Instagram to document the sexual harassment and assault cases of a predator. Her case garnered <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/world/middleeast/egypt-metoo-sexual-harassment-ashraf.html">international attention</a> and prompted authorities to react swiftly. </p>
<h2>Our study</h2>
<p>Our research was built on a sample of four <a href="https://soundcloud.com/ohradiogirl/sets/jrmc-award-winning-audio">publicly available podcasts</a> produced by female students at The American University in Cairo, where I’ve taught since 2009. We took a qualitative critical analysis approach to examine narration, sound bites from interviews, music and other podcast production elements. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://images.app.goo.gl/unXSbzRWaJ6ebgR98">feminist identity development model</a> was a good fit for the research project as it allowed us to better understand our podcasters’ knowledge of feminism and their intention to select a socio-cultural topic for their podcast. The model covers a five-step process from passive acceptance to active commitment. </p>
<h2>Our findings</h2>
<p>Feminist pedagogy (the method and practice of teaching) includes encouragement through professor and peer-led discussions. This enabled the podcasters to provocatively dissect traditional gender and socio-cultural norms. </p>
<p>Among the topics of the narrative nonfiction podcast episodes were stories of family involvement in matchmaking to get young women married into a well-off family. Another podcast addressed women’s participation in the 2011 Egyptian revolution.</p>
<p><audio preload="metadata" controls="controls" data-duration="2568" data-image="" data-title="Four Egyptian female podcasters" data-size="61657155" data-source="ohioradiogirl on SoundCloud" data-source-url="https://soundcloud.com/ohradiogirl/sets/egyptian-female-podcasters" data-license="" data-license-url="">
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Four Egyptian female podcasters.
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" rel="nofollow" href="https://soundcloud.com/ohradiogirl/sets/egyptian-female-podcasters">ohioradiogirl on SoundCloud</a><span class="download"><span>58.8 MB</span> <a target="_blank" href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2622/egyptian-female-podcasters-playlist.mp3">(download)</a></span></span>
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<p>Our podcasters embodied diverse feminist perspectives, displaying multi-dimensional feminist origins. These included black, western and post-colonial feminist views. Their lived experiences are a welcome contribution to the Egyptian digital sphere as they provide a counter-narrative to traditional patriarchal norms. </p>
<p>The podcasters also fully exhibited the use of podcast affordances – such as sound and music, as well as tone, inflection and other nuances in delivery and narration – to enrich their nonfiction stories. Elements of storytelling strength were included in our analysis, focusing on the narrative and audience engagement. These are also some of the guiding criteria for <a href="https://ro.uow.edu.au/rdr/">RadioDoc Review</a>, which offers critiques of audio content.</p>
<h2>Why this matters</h2>
<p>We found that our Egyptian female podcasters utilised multiple feminist ideals in their podcasts. This research demonstrates the power of podcasts as a tool for digital activism. Speaking about their experiences and opinions allows young Egyptian women to exercise an otherwise muted voice in society. Podcasts are a vehicle for this.</p>
<p>The limitations of this research is that our podcasters were mostly from the same social class and had a high level of education. A more diverse pool of podcasters would be ideal for future research on this topic.</p>
<p>The emerging field of podcast studies will continue to birth a wealth of insights about African society. As educators and scholars, we strongly encourage young African scholars not just to engage with research output on podcasting in Africa. They should also actively seek out collaborators and opportunities to globally amplify the work of the African podcast community.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191811/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kim Fox does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africans are adopting podcasting as a way of telling their own stories. In one class in Egypt, this took a feminist turn.Kim Fox, Professor of Practice in Journalism and Mass Communication, American University in CairoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/460682015-08-14T05:01:18Z2015-08-14T05:01:18ZAs Morsi faces the gallows, where are the defenders of democracy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91843/original/image-20150813-21416-tpw2ht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1396%2C463&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adaweya Square before and after the August 14 massacre of more than 800 peaceful protesters in 2013.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2013_Rabaa_massacre#/media/File:Rabaa_Square_before_and_after.jpg">Wikimedia Commons/Mazidan</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In mid-June, an Egyptian court <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33147206">upheld the death sentence</a> against the country’s first freely elected president, Mohamed Morsi, whom the military <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Egyptian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat">deposed</a> in July 2013. Death sentences against Morsi and 105 others were confirmed after Egypt’s grand mufti gave his approval. Many Islamic scholars (ulema) in the past spoke truth to power, for which they were jailed or executed. The mufti and the general who ousted Morsi, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, are instead sending democracy, freedom, justice and truth to the gallows. </p>
<p>Amnesty International <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2015/05/egypt-court-recommends-death-sentences-for-morsi-more-than-100-others/">described the trials</a> as “grossly unfair” and “charades”. <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/death-sentence-egypt-emad-shahin/393590/">Emmad Shahin</a>, an academic of international repute, was among 101 others sentenced to death in absentia. I contributed a chapter to a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-islam-and-politics-9780195395891?cc=au&lang=en&">volume</a> co-edited by John Esposito and Shahin.</p>
<h2>Why are the world’s democrats so quiet?</h2>
<p>We have long heard about Islam’s presumed inability to separate religion and politics. Do we hear those same voices ask now: why is the Egyptian government mixing religion and politics, sham judicial trails and sharia? Did anyone object to el-Sisi seeking sanction for a political legal ruling from a religious authority?</p>
<p>Instead, this month, the US has <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/americas/20176-after-6-year-hiatus-egypt-us-resume-strategic-talks">openly embraced</a> el-Sisi’s regime. We have yet to hear democratic leaders unite in saying: we oppose the death penalty for Morsi. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Tony Abbott condemned the execution in Indonesia of two Australians, so will he denounce the death sentences imposed in Egypt? If not, is it unfair to conclude that the death penalty is wrong only when applied to “our” people?</p>
<p>Can Egypt really be said to be “restoring democracy”? That is the phrase US Secretary of State John Kerry <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23543744">used to justify</a> the 2013 coup, which was followed by a deadly military crackdown against peaceful protesters in Cairo. The then-Middle East “peace envoy”, Tony Blair, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/06/egypt-middle-east-tony-blair">hoped for</a> a “rapid return to democratic rule” as he lent his backing to the regime and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jul/02/tony-blair-advise-egypt-president-sisi-economic-reform">became its adviser</a> on “economic reforms”. </p>
<p>What notion of peace condones – directly or otherwise – the killing of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2013_Rabaa_massacre">more than 800 peaceful protesters</a> within a few hours at Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adaweya square on August 14, 2013? As Egypt’s then-defence minister, el-Sisi had <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">“overall responsibility for the army’s role”</a> in a slaughter <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/egypt-massacre-rabaa-intentional-human-rights-watch">comparable</a> to China’s 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. </p>
<p>Why are most of the world’s otherwise eloquent, even roaring, democrats largely mute about the death of Egyptian democracy and its symbol, Morsi? Why does the democratic conscience of the so-called globalised and connected world appear so disconnectedly unshaken by the brutal crackdown?</p>
<h2>The brutal business of killing politics</h2>
<p>According to media reports and the Brookings Centre for Middle East Policy, it is <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24772806">“unlikely”</a> the death sentence will be implemented. Regardless, the purpose is clear: to frighten Egyptians into submission so they dare not ask again for democracy. Under a regime such as el-Sisi’s, there is barely a space for politics, and certainly not for democratic politics; the only permissible politics is acquiescence to the dictatorial regime.</p>
<p>This killing of politics is evident in the sheer numbers of people the regime has arrested and imprisoned – <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-l-esposito/egypt-terror-in-the-name-of-state-security_b_7306486.html">around 40,000</a> by one estimate. Dissident media have been <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21305/we-completely-agree_egyptian-television-media-in-t">shut down</a> and disobedient journalists fired and jailed. The imprisoned include not only members of Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party but anyone who defies el-Sisi’s dictatorship. In short, voices opposed to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/201232710543250236.html">de-democratisation</a> are treated as threatening.</p>
<p>Imprisoning people and passing death sentences on a virtual assembly line sends a message to Egyptians: abandon politics altogether. The increasing <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/theres-been-an-escalation-of-torture-and-a-maintenance-of-impunity-in-egypt-2015-8?IR=T">use of torture</a>, including sexual abuse, reinforces this message. </p>
<p>Seen from the perspective of American philosopher-activist <a href="http://thoreau.library.ucsb.edu/thoreau_life.html">Henry Thoreau</a>, the repeated branding of the imprisoned as terrorists, or terrorist sympathisers, or enemies of the nation-state – a line echoed in national, regional and global media – hides the reality that the regime is terrorising the people and is arguably their most lethal enemy. In his landmark essay <a href="https://machetegroup.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/resistance.pdf">Resistance to Civil Government</a>, Thoreau observed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Faith and freedom defy state violence</h2>
<p>The banning of political parties and sentencing to death of Morsi and others are, we are told, necessary to fight terrorism and threats to Egypt’s security. For more than a decade, security threats and terrorism have been mediatised as synonymous and both as Islamic. Whatever acceptability el-Sisi has to local and international elites is on account of his role as a “secular” warrior against what his spokesman has called <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/08/2013823142620812772.html">religious fascism</a> and terrorism. </p>
<p>This propaganda fits, as well as reproduces, the post-Cold War polarisation of international politics. The “evil” communist, according to anthropologist <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Terrorism-Self-Fulfilling-Prophecy-Joseba-Zulaika/dp/0226994163/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1432732473&sr=8-2&keywords=Joseba+Zulaika">Joseba Zulaika</a>, has been replaced with the new enemy baptised as terrorism (read Islamic). </p>
<p>We must puncture and resist, as Thoreau did, such a violent staging of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clash_of_Civilizations">“clash of civilisations”</a> thesis in the form of terrorism versus democracy, Islam versus the West and so on. What is at stake in Egypt and elsewhere is the freedom and democracy routinely denied and suppressed by invoking the bogeymen of religion and terrorism. </p>
<p>A different understanding of religion actually connects Christians in the West and Muslims, in fact people of all faiths across the world. This is not the religion of Egypt’s grand mufti, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shawki_Allam">Shawki Allam</a>, and his predecessor, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Gomaa">Ali Gomaa</a>, nor the likes of Florida pastor <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terry_Jones_(pastor)">Terry Jones</a>, nor the Buddhist monks <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/azeem-ibrahim/who-is-instigating-the-vi_b_7810972.html">inciting mass violence</a> against their fellow Burmese. It an understanding shared by thinkers such as Thoreau, his contemporary <a href="http://www.biography.com/people/ralph-waldo-emerson-9287153#american-transcendentalism">Ralph Waldo Emerson</a>, French Catholic philosopher <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/maritain/">Jacques Maritain</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khan_Abdul_Ghaffar_Khan">Abdul Ghaffar Khan</a>, an Indian figure of monumental significance but unfortunately not well known.</p>
<p>Khan’s philosophy of peace, dear to people of many faiths organised under the banner of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khudai_Khidmatgar">Khudaai Khidmatgaar</a> (God’s Servants), flourished in the same place where, ironically, the Pakistani Taliban come from. People such as Khan harnessed religion for peace, justice and equality and to fight slavery, colonialism and humiliation. Theirs was a vision that transcended sectarian divides.</p>
<h2>Ugly geopolitics and the beauty of sun-bright Mecca</h2>
<p>The bravery with which peaceful democracy protesters confronted death in Cairo resonates with Khan’s philosophy of peace. He challenged the brutality of the British Empire as well as the injustices – including patriarchal and feudal – within his own society as <a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-Pathan-Unarmed-Opposition-Anthropology/dp/0933452691">follows</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I warn the English that we also have God who watches over us … I admit that they have got machine guns, army, guns and police, but we have got God. We [Indians] have also got patience [ṣabr].</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The resolve of Egypt’s political prisoners recalls the spirit of Khan, who spent decades in prisons, and Emerson. Unlike <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_P._Huntington">Samuel Huntington</a>, who would separate the West and Islam, Emerson connected them to <a href="http://liberalarts.iupui.edu/mpsg/Essays/Emerson%20-%20Experience.pdf">assert</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I clap my hands in … joy and amazement, before the first opening to me of this august magnificence, old with the love and homage of innumerable ages, young with the life of life, the sun-bright Mecca of the desert. And what a future it opens! I feel a new heart beating with the love of the new beauty.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is this beauty Emerson spoke of that is concealed by merchants of the clash of civilisations – much of the mainstream media, thinktanks, policymakers, politicians, profiteering business conglomerates, the military-industrial complex – so as to sell the ugly shape of their geopolitics. The el-Sisi regime aims to block the way to the future that Emerson saw through cowardly devices such as death sentences and torture.</p>
<p>After the death sentence, Morsi <a href="http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/politics/2015/5/25/egypts-revolution-will-triumph-writes-morsi-from-jail-cell">declared</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I am not afraid … I promise the revolutionaries that I will not be less courageous and steadfast than they are, and I will stick to my principles and stances in confronting the coup … The coup leaders seek to break the will of the revolution. I call on everyone to complete the revolution without fear.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If Morsi is hanged, will there be a Thoreau to write about the “Martyrdom of Mohammed Morsi”? The verse Thoreau <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=gfnQrgx3Yn4C&pg=PA60&lpg=PA60&dq=Tell+men+of+high+condition/That+rule+affairs+of+state&source=bl&ots=CNcEQJdPL0&sig=JM_jmmD4uH243rSfcdtwEeF6uW0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCkQ6AEwBWoVChMIy5DIlqmlxwIVQn2mCh0mFAv5#v=onepage&q=Tell%20men%20of%20high%20condition%2FThat%20rule%20affairs%20of%20state&f=false">quotes</a> in “Remarks After the Hanging of John Brown” remains completely apt. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Tell men of high condition,</p>
<p>That rule affairs of state,</p>
<p>Their purpose is ambition,</p>
<p>Their practice only hate;</p>
<p>And if they once reply,</p>
<p>Then given them all the lie.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Irfan Ahmad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two years ago, on August 14, more than 800 protesters against a coup were massacred in Cairo. A court recently upheld the death sentence for Egypt’s ousted elected leader.Irfan Ahmad, Associate Professor of Political Anthropology, Institute for Religion, Politics & Society , Australian Catholic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/419482015-05-18T13:46:22Z2015-05-18T13:46:22ZMorsi death penalty completes military takeover of Egypt<p>In shocking but not exactly surprising news, Mohammed Morsi, the first democratically elected president of Egypt has been sentenced to death for his role in a 2011 prison break, which occurred during the protests that ultimately led to the toppling of Hosni Mubarak.</p>
<p>While it is rare for Amnesty International, the US and Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to agree on anything, all quickly expressed outrage at Morsi’s sentence. The US expressed “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/expresses-deep-concern-morsi-death-sentence-150517064527019.html">deep concern</a>”, Erdogan <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/expresses-deep-concern-morsi-death-sentence-150517064527019.html">decried the use of the death penalty</a> and Amnesty called the trial a “<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/press-releases/2015/05/egypt-court-recommends-death-sentences-for-morsi-more-than-100-others/">charade</a>”. </p>
<p>On the night of January 28 2011, two days after their arrest, 34 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Mohammed Morsi, <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptMarketNews/idAFLDE70T06S20110130">fled the Wadi Natrum prison</a>, along with several thousand other prisoners. While some accounts suggest that the guards at the prison fled their posts in the face of chaos on the streets, the official Sisi regime line is that Hamas and Hezbollah were involved in facilitating the prison break. </p>
<p>Morsi was not the only person to be sentenced to death for these crimes – 104 others were also sentenced for the same crime (a large number of them in absentia, as allowed under the newly reformed Penal Code). In the courtroom, Morsi and his fellow defendants were defiant as charges were read out, chanting “down with military rule”. </p>
<p>The verdict comes less than a month after <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/21/egypts-ex-president-mohamed-morsi-jailed-protest-deaths-muslim-brotherhood">Morsi was sentenced to 20 years in prison</a> after being found guilty of inciting violence and the illegal detention and torture of protesters while occupying the office of the president. </p>
<p>Senior Brotherhood officials are rejecting the legitimacy of the judicial process, a sentiment <a href="http://www.afp.com/en/news/us-deeply-concerned-morsi-death-sentence-egypt">echoed by senior figures in the US State Department</a>, who suggest that this decision is “inconsistent with Egypt’s international obligations and the rule of law”. </p>
<h2>Crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood</h2>
<p>This appears to be the latest step in the almost two-year long crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which began with the coup d’etat against the Morsi government in July 2013. </p>
<p>The sentence now has to be confirmed by the Egyptian grand mufti, whose decision will likely be instrumental in determining whether chaos is to envelop Egypt once again. Coming from Egypt’s highest religious figure, the mufti’s pronouncement is not legally binding but nevertheless necessary to carry out a death sentence, as the final verdict cannot be issued until that is known. The mufti’s decision will also be indicative of the real state of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics, as the religious figure has sided with the Islamist organisation in the past. </p>
<p>In August 2014, Egypt’s highest legal official in fact <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/07/uk-egypt-courts-badie-idUKKBN0G70Y620140807">refused to approve the death sentence of Mohamed Badie</a> (the Brotherhood’s general guide) and of another 13 Brotherhood members – which is seen in some quarters as setting a precedent for what might happen next. </p>
<p>Whatever the mufti’s final decision, chaos is likely to break out in the country once again, from either “betrayed” Brotherhood supporters or angered governmental officials, depending on which side the religious authority chooses to support. Only hours after the verdict, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/three-egyptian-judges-shot-dead-in-sinai-hours-after-mohamed-morsi-sentenced-to-death-10255067.html">three Egyptian judges were killed in Sinai</a>, a reflection of the levels of discontent and growing unrest within Egypt.</p>
<p>Regardless of the final verdict, the increasing number of death sentences is indicative of the deteriorating state of what little democracy was established after the 2011 uprisings. The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/01/egypt-parliamentary-elections-to-be-postponed-by-new-legal-setback">endless postponement of the parliamentary elections</a> is a clear sign of al-Sisi’s unwillingness to be held accountable by anyone outside of his circle of supporters. </p>
<p>Sisi’s administration is characterised by a steady decrease of democratic practices and civil liberties, as the president attempts to reinforce its authority by propagating levels of brutality and repression that are unmatched in the country’s history. </p>
<p>Another element that is indicative of the current state of affairs in Egypt is the decision to <a href="http://www.democracynow.org/2014/12/1/a_dark_moment_in_egypts_history">drop all criminal charges against previous dictator Hosni Mubarak and his sons</a>, which further underlines the continuation of the military’s deep state despite the events of 2011. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, daily human rights abuses are quickly leading the country to breaking point once again. The <a href="http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/egypt">steady deterioration of human rights and democratic practices</a> in Egypt can be directly traced to al-Sisi’s <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/news/president-amends-law-include-life-sentence-receiving-funds-arms">amendments to the Penal Code</a>, which allow civilians to be tried in absentia in military courts without the right of even consulting with a lawyer. </p>
<p>Morsi’s sentence will not only be another blow to Egypt’s already fragile democracy, but is also further diminishing al-Sisi’s volatile international credibility.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/full-circle-in-egypt-as-failed-revolution-lets-the-military-strengthen-its-grip-22501">As we argued previously</a>, Morsi’s trial can be seen as the culmination of the military’s quest to regain its ruling power and to reinstate the status quo that was interrupted by the 2011 uprisings. Similarly, such events are also a continuation of the previous Egyptian governments’ decades long practice of branding Islamists as scapegoats. </p>
<p>Morsi’s sentence can still be appealed – as a second court date has been set for June 2 – meanwhile Egypt awaits the grand mufti’s decision. But until then, the country remains on the verge of explosive popular discontent and chaos, which al-Sisi’s unprecedented security measures are failing to contain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41948/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucia Ardovini receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two years after the ousting of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, military rule is now firmly entrenched.Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLucia Ardovini, ESRC PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/271442014-05-27T05:14:22Z2014-05-27T05:14:22ZEgypt prepares to hail former army chief as president – once the election is out of the way<p>In May 2012, Egypt’s <a href="http://www.european-centre.org/ecia-briefings/egypts-preside-elections/">first democratic presidential election</a> set an important precedent in a troubled transition process. At the time, there was no constitution, no clarity on the president’s powers, no process of transitional justice, no security sector reform, and no economic reform. Key demands of the revolution such as inclusive economic growth and social justice were a chimera. </p>
<p>There was, however, plenty of political participation: for all its flaws, with the presidential election the transitions process finally gave signs of life in the free election of the land’s most powerful office.</p>
<p>The election itself was a surprisingly close-run affair: the top four candidates in the first round were all within 7% of each other, and the first two candidates separated by a mere 3.5% in the run-off. While the victor, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Muhammad Morsi, could only <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/24/us-egypt-election-idUSBRE85G01U20120624">claim a slender margin of victory</a>, Egyptians hopeful of a transition towards democracy could take heart from the process itself.</p>
<p>However, instead of a full transitional process, what ordinary Egyptians got was a return of the ancien regime. Core elements of the old order – particularly the armed forces and businessmen – regrouped, and focused on stalling transition and undermining the opposition.</p>
<h2>Bread, freedom and social justice</h2>
<p>The Brotherhood was no exception to this process. Like all post-Mubarak governments, it failed to tackle Egypt’s core problems: the economy is <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/22/world/meast/egypt-presidential-candidates-economy/">still in dire straits</a>, inequality is increasing, and ordinary people are increasingly frustrated. Bread, freedom and social justice are still a distant dream.</p>
<p>Instead of confronting Egypt’s deep-seated economic, social and political problems, successive governments responded with a toxic mix of hyper-nationalism and repression of any political dissent, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s turn in power was no exception. This combination of political disenfranchisement and economic impoverishment led to increased instability.</p>
<p>Tension reached a peak when the <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/andrea-teti-gennaro-gervasio/army%E2%80%99s-coup-in-egypt-for-people-or-against-people">army</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/tears-and-terror-as-egypt-slides-towards-civil-war-17077">removed Morsi in July 2013</a>. The <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/andrea-teti-vivienne-matthies-boon-gennaro-gervasio/revolution-continues-morsi%E2%80%99s-miscalculations-and">Brotherhood’s miscalculation of popular discontent</a> with its rule brought about a groundswell of mobilisation against Morsi, which the army took advantage of, stepping in and removing him. What has followed since then is a concerted effort by the army and other sections of the “old guard” to effectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-failed-in-egypt-because-it-was-inept-incompetent-and-out-of-touch-23738">eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood</a> as a political actor. </p>
<p>Under the banner of “Egypt’s war on terror”, thousands of <a href="https://theconversation.com/mass-death-sentences-for-muslim-brotherhood-complete-the-counter-revolution-in-egypt-24742">Brotherhood activists have been arrested and often tortured</a>, its leadership is in prison or in exile, and hundreds of anti-coup demonstrators – many but not all Brotherhood supporters – have been killed by the security forces. Security has become a political mantra and authorities view dissent as akin to treason.</p>
<p>Nor has the assault been limited to the Brotherhood. Riding – and stoking – a wave of hyper-nationalism rivalled only during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the 1967 defeat to Israel, or the “October War” of 1973, this assault has aimed at pro-democracy groups such as <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/egypt-outlaws-anti-mubarak-april-6-movement-20144281135421761.html">April 6th</a>. Activists and even iconic opposition figures like <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/05/18/alaa-abdel-fattah-fined-request-bench-recusal-denied/">Alaa Abdel Fattah</a> and April 6th co-founder Ahmed Maher have been arrested under draconian new anti-protest legislation, and often tortured. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the new regime struck back. <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/content/mubarak-mansions">Mubarak and his cronies</a> received lighter sentences for corruption than pro-democracy activists on trumped-up charges received for dissenting, and General al-Sisi, paladin of <a href="http://www.dw.de/egypts-army-expands-economic-power/a-17611602">the Army’s financial and political interests</a> and already head of Intelligence, was promoted Field Marshal and “responded” to “popular demands” that he run for office. Al-Sisi has also become the object of a spasmodic <a href="http://www.juancole.com/2014/04/egypts-personality-beatification.html">cult of personality</a> by his admirers, producing a baffling range of “Sisi” (or “CC”) items, <a href="http://sisifetish.tumblr.com">from chocolate cakes to underwear</a>.</p>
<p>In this sense, the context for the coming presidential elections couldn’t contrast more with 2012: for all the faults of those elections, they were conducted in a markedly more open political landscape. There is no doubt in anyone’s mind that al-Sisi will “win” these elections – the only doubt is by how much. Nor is there any doubt what an al-Sisi presidency will mean both politically and economically: like his military, Islamist, and “civilian” predecessors, he has given no sign of tolerating dissent, nor has he formulated any economic policies that might have a chance of addressing Egypt’s deep structural problems. Al-Sisi might be preparing to celebrate, but Egypt is unlikely to have much to cheer about in the long run.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27144/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti is Senior Fellow at the European Centre for International Affairs.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Hynek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In May 2012, Egypt’s first democratic presidential election set an important precedent in a troubled transition process. At the time, there was no constitution, no clarity on the president’s powers, no…Andrea Teti, Director, Centre for Global Security and Governance, University of AberdeenSarah Hynek, Postgraduate researcher, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.