tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/election-violence-30033/articlesElection violence – The Conversation2023-06-30T13:09:22Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2085362023-06-30T13:09:22Z2023-06-30T13:09:22ZSierra Leone election: voter trust has been shaken, and will need to be regained<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534420/original/file-20230627-19-x4x237.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President of the Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone, Mohamed Konneh announcing partial election results in Freetown on June 26, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Wessels/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Julius Maada Bio, a 59-year-old former soldier, was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/27/africa/maada-bio-reelected-sierra-leone-intl/index.html#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CBy%20the%20powers%20vested%20in,Chief%20Electoral%20Commissioner%20Mohamed%20Konneh.&text=Just%20hours%20after%20the%20results,their%20%E2%80%9Ctrust%20and%20dedication.%E2%80%9D">sworn in</a> for his second and final five-year term as president of Sierra Leone on 27 June. With <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-27/sierra-leonean-president-bio-wins-reelection-with-56-of-votes?srnd=fixed-income#xj4y7vzkg">56%</a> of votes cast in the election on 24 June, Bio was declared winner ahead of his main rival, Samura Kamara, who polled 41%.</em> </p>
<p><em>Kamara rejected the result and international election observers have highlighted some problems with the way votes were counted. There has been relative calm across Sierra Leone since Bio was sworn in. Earlier, the opposition All People’s Congress <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/26/police-fire-tear-gas-at-sierra-leone-opposition-after-vote">alleged</a> that the police had killed one of its supporters by firing live shots into their party offices a day after the polls. Police have <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66030749">denied</a> this.</em> </p>
<p><em>In this interview, Catherine Bolten, Professor of Anthropology and Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, fielded questions on lessons learnt from the poll and the future of democracy in Sierra Leone. As an <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/catherine-bolten-1450652/edit">anthropologist</a>, Bolten studies politics as a social practice, which means analysing how “democracy” manifests in campaigning, elections, and policy-making, and how people imagine democratic processes in their own lives. She has conducted research in Sierra Leone since 2003, and published a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=mB6TeugAAAAJ&citation_for_view=mB6TeugAAAAJ:Se3iqnhoufwC">2016 paper</a> that focused on how the country managed the first election it ran on its own in 2012.</em> </p>
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<h2>What did you learn from the outcome of this election?</h2>
<p>Sierra Leoneans expect that the election process is potentially corrupt unless there is full transparency in the whole process. This means from the moment the electoral commission is appointed to the selection criteria for the ballot design, the selection and training of poll workers, the invitation to the international community for electoral observers, and every other decision that might affect the outcome. </p>
<p>The public had very <a href="https://www.iri.org/resources/sierra-leone-poll-shows-high-levels-of-trust-in-most-national-institutions-concern-over-economy-and-education/">high levels</a> of trust in the two elections immediately after the civil war, which ended in 2002, because the United Nations was heavily involved. It was <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/11/425872">involved </a> in the planning and execution of the 2002 election and, to a lesser degree, the 2007 elections. </p>
<p>The 2012 election was the country’s <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/democracy/sierra-leone-2012-elections.html">first self-administered election</a> since the war began. The whole population was committed to it being free, fair and without violence. They succeeded. </p>
<p>Since then, bad <a href="https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/sierra-leone/democracy-governance-and-human-rights#:%7E:text=Despite%20increasing%20its%20stature%20as,uphold%20the%20rule%20of%20law.">old habits</a> of nepotism, cronyism, and back-room deals have reappeared. Whether corruption is as bad as opposition party members claim is not as important as the perception that the election is corrupt. </p>
<p>If there is any lesson to be learned, it is the necessity of rebuilding public trust in every election by maintaining a transparent process.</p>
<h2>What has changed between 2012 and 2023 to result in the return of nepotism and cronyism?</h2>
<p>2012 may have been a special moment, when the country came together in a concerted effort to ensure that the elections were conducted without violence, with no questions about the legitimacy of the polling, and with full knowledge that the world was watching. </p>
<p>As I wrote in my <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=mB6TeugAAAAJ&citation_for_view=mB6TeugAAAAJ:Se3iqnhoufwC">2016 paper</a>, drastic measures such as restricting freedom of movement, work, association, and even dress in the months and days leading up to the election and on election day were imposed. The citizens complied without complaint, even as these were technically violations of basic human rights. This is because the people were so committed to ensuring a free and fair election. </p>
<p>Once these restrictions were allowed to loosen in succeeding elections, it portended a return to lack of transparency in the process, and thus to the powerful exerting themselves behind the scenes, because they were no longer also committed to these restrictions.</p>
<h2>Who has been responsible for the pre-election violence?</h2>
<p>Any whiff of corruption that could affect the outcome leads to accusations of democratic backsliding. A standard-bearer who considers themselves wronged will call on the party’s followers to “demonstrate”. This is to ensure that those who are potentially corrupt see that others are trying to hold them to account.</p>
<p>Any call for a “peaceful demonstration” is a challenge to the legitimacy of the claims being made by the other side. No political leader accuses their opposition of corruption and calls for “peaceful demonstrations” without knowing that violence will occur, no matter who throws the first stone or fires the first shot. </p>
<p>Rhetoric is powerful, and a hint of grumbling about corruption will fan the flames of violence.</p>
<h2>What factors determine voter turnout?</h2>
<p>There is an <a href="https://www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com/sierra-leoneans-in-europe-protesting-against-president-bio-at-the-london-black-in-the-park/">old saying</a> in Sierra Leone politics: “same taxi, different driver”. It describes presidential candidates promising change when they get into office. The new president will do essentially what the last president did, with minor variations. </p>
<p>People are also well aware that their leaders are, by and large, <a href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SLE">corrupt</a>. There is plenty of <a href="https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/sierra-leone-is-losing-over-one-hundred-million-dollars-from-its-fishing-industry/">evidence</a> for this, from the fisheries ministry officials turning a blind eye to illegal fishing by Chinese trawlers, to the “<a href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SLE">trickle-down corruption</a>” that occurs in regular public life because public servants such as police officers and teachers are not being paid, and so demand bribes and tips from the community. This “everyday corruption” is blamed firmly on the cabinet ministers. The <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/arts-culture/music/meet-sierra-leone-s-people-s-popstar-emmerson-bockarie-1.717088">local artist Emerson</a>, for example, consistently lambasts politicians in his music.</p>
<p>This does not dissuade people from turning out in numbers to cast votes for their preferred candidate. They have a sense of two things: one which is extremely likely, and the other which might happen. </p>
<p>What’s extremely likely is that if their ethnic or preferred candidate does not win, their region and their ethnic people will be neglected or harassed by the ruling party, or they will simply “stand still” and receive no development. They feel voting is the only real power they have to be a part of any decision-making process, and so turnout is consistently high.</p>
<p>What might happen is that, if their candidate wins, they will they reap the benefits of foreign direct investment, NGO relief, humanitarian distribution and infrastructure. </p>
<p>So they turn out to vote for the candidate who will hurt them the least, and might actually help them.</p>
<h2>What does the 2023 election outcome portend for democracy?</h2>
<p>It is clear that the fact that a candidate is declared a winner and then immediately sworn in does not protect the country from violence or democratic backsliding. </p>
<p>There may still be violence, and there may be a crackdown on protest, which starts down a dangerous road to authoritarianism or potentially wider violence. </p>
<p>I am not sure how this will affect the future of democracy in Sierra Leone. But I believe that the international community has a duty to send observers, if only to let a country’s citizens know that their election matters, and that they are part of the foundation of the international cause of democracy. </p>
<p>Backsliding anywhere is dangerous, and no election is too small to ignore. I hope that the democratic state in Sierra Leone holds up for the next five years, in order for this repair to happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208536/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Bolten receives funding from the United States Institute for Peace, the IIE Fulbright Grant (USA), and the IIE David Boren Grant.</span></em></p>Sierra Leone needs to rebuild public trust in its election by maintaining a completely transparent process.Catherine Bolten, Professor of Anthropology and Peace Studies, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2018752023-03-16T14:11:49Z2023-03-16T14:11:49ZNigeria had 93 million registered voters, but only a quarter voted: 5 reasons why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515514/original/file-20230315-24-6u2qey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria’s voter turnout has been declining since 2007. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/independent-national-electoral-commission-officials-go-news-photo/1247473647?phrase=nigeria%20voters%20during%20election%202023&adppopup=true">Samuel Alabi/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Nigerians went to the polls <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/2/25/photos-nigeria-holds-presidential-and-parliamentary-elections">in late February</a> to vote for a new president, as well as representatives to two houses of the federal parliament. The turnout was abysmal. There were <a href="https://punchng.com/inec-final-list-north-west-swest-top-93-million-voter-register/">over 93 million registered voters</a>. But only <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/586788-nigeriadecides2023-only-27-of-eligible-voters-decide-who-becomes-nigerias-president.html">a little over 25 million people voted</a>. The Conversation Africa asked political scientist Chikodiri Nwangwu to unpack what happened.</em></p>
<h2>Why was Nigeria’s voter turnout so low?</h2>
<p>Firstly, there was insufficient voter education. Many Nigerians don’t understand the benefits of political participation, or don’t understand the electoral process. Little effort is made to explain it to them.</p>
<p>Although voter education is the <a href="https://placng.org/i/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Electoral-Act-2022.pdf">statutory responsibility</a> of both the electoral commission and political parties, their commitment to this task has been rather underwhelming. Many adult Nigerians – especially in remote areas where media access and literacy levels are low – lack adequate appreciation of the voting process. They also don’t know enough about political parties’ ideologies and internal workings. </p>
<p>Secondly, there were <a href="https://businessday.ng/nigeriadecidesliveupdates/article/n305bn-election-spend-fails-to-dent-familiar-logistical-nightmares/">logistical challenges</a> for the electoral body. Voting material was delivered late, even on election day.</p>
<p>Some voters got discouraged and left their polling centres because of the <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/584390-nigeriadecides2023-nba-decries-late-arrival-of-inec-officials-materials.html">late arrival of materials</a>.</p>
<p>Thirdly, there was a lack of confidence in the electoral commission’s capacity to conduct credible elections. This point was noted in the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/EU%20EOM%20NIGERIA%202023_FIRST%20PRELIMINARY%20STATEMENT%20_27_02_2023.pdf">European Union election observer report</a> after the election. The report says:</p>
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<p>On election night, trust in the institution was seen to diminish due to information gaps and INEC’s failure to promptly respond to stakeholder disquiet over logistical and security lapses and later the failure of public access to presidential results on the IReV.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>IReV is the online portal where polling unit-level results are uploaded directly from the polling unit, transmitted and made available for public monitoring. INEC is the country’s electoral agency, the Independent National Electoral Commission.</p>
<p>Fourthly, voters might have stayed away because they were scared. Nigeria has a long history of violence <a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-violence-every-election-season-in-nigeria-what-can-be-done-to-stop-it-183690">during elections</a>. </p>
<p>Fifth is the issue of apathy. The failure to turn up could be read as a vote of no confidence in the Nigerian state. The government’s recurrent failure to arrest the country’s growing social problems, like <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-01/nigeria-cash-crisis-ends-31-months-of-growth-in-business-activity?leadSource=uverify%20wall">the cash crisis</a> and petrol scarcity, are reasons for voter apathy. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-poll-93-million-voters-the-challenge-of-pulling-off-nigerias-presidential-elections-199761">How to poll 93 million voters – the challenge of pulling off Nigeria's presidential elections</a>
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<h2>How low was the turnout compared to previous years?</h2>
<p>Voter turnout refers to the percentage of people who actually take part in an election relative to the total number of registered voters. More broadly, it compares the total number of people of voting age in a country and those who cast their ballot during a particular election. <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/586788-nigeriadecides2023-only-27-of-eligible-voters-decide-who-becomes-nigerias-president.html">A little over 25 million voters</a>, about 28.63% of the registered voters, turned out for the 25 February 2023 elections. <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/preliminary-number-of-registered-voters-in-nigeria-now-93-5m-says-inec">Over 93 million voters</a> were registered to vote in the elections. </p>
<p>Data from the election management body shows that Nigeria’s voter turnout has been declining almost every year since 2007. </p>
<p>Voter turnout went up from <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/586193-analysis-trend-of-low-voter-turnout-continues-in-nigerian-elections.html">52.3% in 1999</a> – the first general election since 1993 – to <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/586193-analysis-trend-of-low-voter-turnout-continues-in-nigerian-elections.html">69% in 2003</a>. But it’s been on the decline nearly ever since – <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/586193-analysis-trend-of-low-voter-turnout-continues-in-nigerian-elections.html">57.5% in 2007, 53.7% in 2011, 43.7% in 2015 and 34.8% in 2019.</a> This year’s is 28.63%. </p>
<p>Increasing voter registration has failed to translate into more voters turning out.</p>
<p>Bola Ahmed Tinubu of the ruling All Progressives Congress was declared winner <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64760226">with fewer than 9 million votes</a>. This is 36.61% of the votes cast to govern a country with a population of 220 million people.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bola-ahmed-tinubu-the-kingmaker-is-now-nigerias-president-200383">Bola Ahmed Tinubu: The kingmaker is now Nigeria's president</a>
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<h2>What can be done to turn the tide?</h2>
<p>The Independent National Electoral Commission and political parties should be more committed to educating the voting public on the importance of participating in politics. </p>
<p>Competent logistics companies should be used in the delivery of sensitive voting materials instead of an approach that has proved to incubate electoral disenfranchisement and voter apathy. </p>
<p>Relevant security agencies should be more proactive and intelligence-driven in quelling political thuggery and electoral violence. </p>
<p>Further, the electoral commission should deal firmly with politicians who aid political violence in Nigeria. Above all, the government should be unmistakably committed to delivering democratic goods to regain public trust and confidence in electoral processes.</p>
<p>Lastly, there should be a proper audit of the voter register. This has never happened, and in my view the register is largely inaccurate. The increasing use of voter accreditation technology since 2015 has shown that figures for previous voter turnouts are inaccurate. The new technology has thrown up attempts at fraud and the manipulation of registration processes.</p>
<p>Given the lack of an audit, it would not be surprising if the current register contained names of those who have died and other ineligible voters.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201875/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chikodiri Nwangwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Greater awareness of the importance of voting is needed to improve the voter turnout in Nigeria’s elections.Chikodiri Nwangwu, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of NigeriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1943502022-11-11T14:37:28Z2022-11-11T14:37:28ZPresidential term limits will be hard to scrap in Kenya – here’s what it would take<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494625/original/file-20221110-26-6ww6p8.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President William Ruto inspects a guard of honour in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A member of parliament in Kenyan president William Ruto’s governing coalition created a firestorm by suggesting that there was a plan to remove presidential term limits in the country. </p>
<p>Kenya’s constitution sets a <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/130-chapter-nine-the-executive/part-2-the-president-and-deputy-president/310-142-term-of-office-of-president">two-term presidential limit</a>. </p>
<p>The extent of support for the plan within the president’s party, the United Democratic Alliance, is not clear. In early November 2022, the member of parliament, Salah Yakub, mentioned only that there had been “closed-door discussions” on it. </p>
<p>Yakub is a <a href="https://nairobinews.nation.africa/quick-facts-about-fafi-mp-salah-yakub-who-wants-to-scrap-presidential-term-limits/">first-time member of parliament</a>. His statement drew <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/81461-uda-issues-statement-over-extending-rutos-term-limit">public rebuke</a> from senior lawmakers aligned to the president’s party. This appears to indicate that Yakub is neither part of the president’s inner circle nor a policy stalwart within the party. It’s possible that his proposal is an ambitious effort to improve his standing within the party.</p>
<p>The United Democratic Alliance distanced itself from Yakub’s statement on the day it was reported.</p>
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<p>If, however, the idea was ever realised, it would mean that Ruto, who is 55 years old, could potentially seek re-election for three additional terms. His main political adversary, <a href="https://theconversation.com/odinga-is-running-his-fifth-presidential-race-why-the-outcome-means-so-much-for-kenya-180605">Raila Odinga</a> of the Orange Democratic Movement party, would effectively be prevented from ever running for president again – he is 77.</p>
<p>Kenya’s term limit was introduced before the 1992 elections and retained in the country’s 2010 constitution. The country is still considered a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/15/world/africa/kenya-election-william-ruto.html">beacon of democracy</a> in a region pervaded by dysfunctional and non-democratic regimes. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/fafi-mp-salah-yakub-wants-presidential-term-limit-removed-age-reduced-to-75-n309014">Yakub’s view</a> is that: </p>
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<p>if a president is doing a good job, then he or she should not be limited by terms.</p>
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<p>This mis-states the function of term limits. </p>
<p>They’re not designed to discourage poor performance. The Kenyan constitution provides other ways of dealing with presidents who engage in gross misconduct. This includes <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/130-chapter-nine-the-executive/part-2-the-president-and-deputy-president/313-145-removal-of-president-by-impeachment">impeachment</a>. </p>
<p>The purpose of term limits is to minimise corruption and abuse of office, open the government to new people and ideas, and infuse the government with more innovative and creative ways to solve national problems. </p>
<p>Most importantly, term limits reinvigorate the country’s democracy and curb the potential for monopoly. They protect the democratic system from turning into a de facto dictatorship, and prevent the incumbent from becoming a president-for-life. </p>
<p>Term limits are especially important in a country such as Kenya where most citizens still believe that an incumbent administration will favour the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-kibaki-news-idUSGOR34261320071223">president’s ethnic group</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately for Kenya and its democracy, it will be difficult for any government to get rid of term limits. </p>
<p>The constitution provides <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/160-chapter-sixteen-amendment-of-this-constitution/424-255-amendment-of-this-constitution">complex mechanisms</a> for amending certain fundamental provisions, including the term limit for presidents. One of the requirements is that the proposal would have to be approved by Kenyans in a referendum. Voters are <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2019/08/22/bbi-and-the-referendum-another-false-start/">unlikely to accept</a> any efforts to interfere with what is a robust and effectively functioning constitutional system.</p>
<h2>What stands in the way of changing term limits</h2>
<p>Kenya’s constitution sets down the process for amending its provisions. Changing the president’s term requires:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>securing the votes of two-thirds of both houses of parliament – the senate and national assembly</p></li>
<li><p>and the support of a simple majority of the citizens of Kenya voting in a referendum.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These provisions show that the drafters of the 2010 constitution were aware of the importance of constitutional stability and predictability. They were also alive to the value of certain provisions in the proper and effective functioning of the country’s democratic institutions, and the rule of law. </p>
<p>This explains why the drafters adopted more stringent mechanisms for amending democracy-enhancing provisions, which, apart from the presidential term, include those protecting judicial independence and those protecting fundamental freedoms as set out under the <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms">bill of rights</a>.</p>
<p>The conditions for securing changes to the constitution are designed to allow Kenyans to participate fully in amendments that could radically alter the nature of their democratic governance architecture.</p>
<p>The 2010 constitution was expected to provide more peaceful mechanisms for dealing with election-related disagreements. A dispute over the presidential results following the 2007 election led to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/27/kenya-post-election-killings-abuse">widespread violence</a> that killed more than 1,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. After elections in 2013, 2017 and 2022, Kenyans made use of constitutional mechanisms to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/5/odinga-accepts-but-disagrees-wi-court-decision-on-kenya-election">peacefully resolve</a> related disputes. Thus, Kenyans have gradually come to accept and respect the rule of law.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyas-judiciary-can-break-the-cycle-of-electoral-violence-182710">How Kenya's judiciary can break the cycle of electoral violence</a>
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<p>It’s not likely that a constitutional amendment to change the presidential term would garner the two-thirds majority in parliament. </p>
<p>First, the ruling party doesn’t hold a two-thirds majority in either house and would need the support of the opposition. The opposition is not likely to grant it, considering the amendment could significantly enhance the president’s ability to remain in power for more than two terms. </p>
<p>Second, Kenyans would probably see the amendment as a naked power grab and a danger to their constitutional order. They could punish the proposal’s supporters during future elections. </p>
<p>Third, the complex and prolonged process involved in amending the constitution could derail Ruto’s policy agenda and reduce his re-election prospects. </p>
<h2>Low chances of success</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that politicians have proposed amendments to presidential term limits. It came up when former president Mwai Kibaki wound up his term of office in 2012. It was inferred in the failed <a href="https://www.bbi.go.ke/">2020 effort</a> to amend the constitution. There were also those who thought that at 61, former president Uhuru Kenyatta was <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/05/atwoli-says-uhuru-just-going-on-leave-hes-young-expect-him-back/">too young</a> to leave office in 2022. </p>
<p>None of these efforts moved beyond politicians’ wishes. Opportunistic constitutional changes are unlikely to succeed, given the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60941860">scrutiny from the courts</a> and Kenya’s robust civil society. </p>
<p>In my view, the main party in the ruling coalition should have issued a much stronger statement than it did against the suggestion to increase the president’s term limit. It should have condemned the effort as undemocratic, and designed to weaken Kenya’s relatively robust democratic institutions and the rule of law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194350/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku receives funding from Weber State University.</span></em></p>The purpose of term limits is to minimise corruption and open the government to new ideas that could solve national problems.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1935972022-11-03T12:13:49Z2022-11-03T12:13:49ZPolitical violence in America isn’t going away anytime soon<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493041/original/file-20221102-22-8qlz3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A member of the National Guard patrols the U.S. Capitol on March 4, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/member-of-the-national-guard-patrols-the-grounds-of-the-us-capitol-on-picture-id1231514110?s=612x612">Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/10/29/1132537240/government-warns-domestic-attacks-midterm-elections">warning</a> about the <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2022/10/29/23428956/political-attacks-increasing-far-right-congress-pelosi">threat of political violence </a> heading into the 2022 midterm elections was issued to state and local law enforcement officials by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on Oct. 28, 2022. </p>
<p>The bulletin was released the same day that Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s husband was hospitalized after a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/02/politics/paul-pelosi-attack-latest-depape-court">home invasion</a> by a lone right-wing extremist seeking to harm her.</p>
<p>This incident is the latest in an increasing stream of extremist <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/29/pelosi-assault-attacks-threats-political-figures-00064113">confrontations</a> taking place across the United States in recent years. These incidents have primarily targeted Democrats, including a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/12/17/947652491/6-suspects-indicted-for-conspiracy-to-kidnap-michigan-gov-gretchen-whitmer">plot</a> to kidnap Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer in 2020. But threats from both sides of the political spectrum are up <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/01/us/politics/violent-threats-lawmakers.html">significantly</a>.</p>
<p>And, of course, there was the Jan. 6, 2021, <a href="https://january6th.house.gov/">insurrection</a> at the U.S. Capitol, where supporters of a defeated Republican president, acting on a <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/focus-big-lie-not-big-liar">widespread lie</a> he perpetuated, violently attempted to prevent the certification of electoral votes. According to well-documented public evidence, some rioters planned to find and execute both Speaker Pelosi and Vice President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/16/us/politics/jan-6-gallows.html">Mike Pence</a>.</p>
<p>Such incidents reflect a disturbing trend that targets the very fabric, foundation and future of U.S. democracy. But what led to this point?</p>
<p>As a researcher taking a critical and apolitical eye toward security issues, I believe the rise in contemporary right-wing political extremism – and violence – began with an outdated focus in national communications policy.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493087/original/file-20221102-23-4s8fkw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large brick home down the hill from a police tape stretched across the street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493087/original/file-20221102-23-4s8fkw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493087/original/file-20221102-23-4s8fkw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493087/original/file-20221102-23-4s8fkw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493087/original/file-20221102-23-4s8fkw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493087/original/file-20221102-23-4s8fkw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493087/original/file-20221102-23-4s8fkw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493087/original/file-20221102-23-4s8fkw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police take measurements around House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s San Francisco home after her husband, Paul Pelosi, was assaulted inside the home on Oct. 28, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-take-measurements-around-speaker-of-the-united-news-photo/1244292841?phrase=pelosi%20home&adppopup=true">Tayfun Coskun/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Media-induced slow burn</h2>
<p>Until the late 1980s, the <a href="https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/955/fairness-doctrine">Federal Communications Commission’s Fairness Doctrine</a> required traditional licensed broadcasters to offer competing viewpoints on controversial public issues. But these rules <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/11/28/fact-check-fairness-doctrine-applied-broadcast-licenses-not-cable/6439197002/">did not apply</a> to cable or satellite providers. As a result, the rise of cable news channels in the 1990s led to highly partisan programming that <a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-be-too-quick-to-blame-social-media-for-americas-polarization-cable-news-has-a-bigger-effect-study-finds-187579">helped divide</a> American society in the ensuing decades. </p>
<p>This programming fueled increasing polarization in the public and political arenas. Bipartisanship was abandoned in the 1990s, when the Republican Congress under Speaker Newt Gingrich <a href="https://history.princeton.edu/about/publications/burning-down-house-newt-gingrich-fall-speaker-and-rise-new-republican-party">embraced</a> a “scorched-earth” policy of governing. That meant treating the minority party not as the loyal opposition and respected elected colleagues who had differences over policy, but as enemies.</p>
<p>In addition to emerging <a href="https://harvardpolitics.com/organized-polarize-cnn-fox-news-msnbc-roots-partisan-cable-television/">partisan cable television networks like MSNBC and Fox News</a>, in the early 2000s, an increasingly polarized Congress and the public received a new source of division: social media.</p>
<p>Internet platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and 4Chan allowed anyone, anywhere, to create, produce and distribute political commentary and extremist rhetoric that could be amplified by other users and drive the day’s news cycle. </p>
<p>Political pundits and influencers across the spectrum became less concerned about correctly informing the public. Instead, <a href="https://nicd.arizona.edu/blog/2021/06/14/how-the-outrage-industrial-complex-profits-from-stoking-americans-anger-at-each-other/">they stoked outrage</a> in the search for money-generating clicks and advertising dollars. And political parties exploited this outrage to satisfy and energize their voting base or funders. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A white woman and man pull back a black curtain to show a voting machine with a big screen." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493044/original/file-20221102-24-qix10y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493044/original/file-20221102-24-qix10y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493044/original/file-20221102-24-qix10y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493044/original/file-20221102-24-qix10y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493044/original/file-20221102-24-qix10y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493044/original/file-20221102-24-qix10y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493044/original/file-20221102-24-qix10y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Philadelphia city commissioners display a voting machine in Philadelphia City Hall on Oct. 24, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/philadelphia-city-commissioner-lisa-deeley-and-deputy-comissioner-picture-id1244203987?s=612x612">Ed Jones/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Moderation or censorship?</h2>
<p>To combat online extremism, social media companies reluctantly began <a href="https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/social-media-firms-moderate-content/">moderating user posts</a> and sometimes <a href="https://reason.org/commentary/social-media-companies-have-the-right-to-ban-users/">banned</a> prominent users who violated their community standards or terms of service. </p>
<p>In response to what it dubbed “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/01/social-media-sweeps-the-states-00043229">censorship</a>” from Big Tech, the right wing <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2022/10/06/the-role-of-alternative-social-media-in-the-news-and-information-environment/">splintered</a> into numerous niche platforms catering to their conspiracy theories and extremist or violent views such as Truth Social – run by former President Trump – Gab, Parler, Rumble and others. </p>
<p>Compared with Democrats, Republicans have mastered this form of gutter politics. One example: Right-wing political figures have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/oct/31/donald-trump-jr-misinformation-memes-paul-pelosi-hammer">mocked</a> Paul Pelosi for being attacked, spread <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/31/conservatives-disinformation-paul-pelosi-assault-00064208">baseless conspiracy theories</a> about his personal life and used the incident for applause lines at <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/3713080-arizona-governor-candidate-kari-lake-jokes-about-paul-pelosi-attack/">campaign rallies</a>. </p>
<p>Accordingly, today’s voters and politicians end up confronting one another in the public sphere not on matters and substance affecting the future of the country, but on fundamental facts and conspiracy theories, or to address distractions often generated by their respective media ecosystems. This is only exacerbated by a prolonged nationwide decline in <a href="https://thehill.com/changing-america/enrichment/education/598795-media-literacy-is-desperately-needed-in-classrooms/">media literacy</a> and <a href="https://www.ncsl.org/legislators-staff/legislators/legislators-back-to-school/tackling-the-american-civics-education-crisis.aspx">civics education</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493083/original/file-20221102-26-22xyb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of people, some wearing protective helmets, push up against a group of protesters. One of them holds an American flag in the air." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493083/original/file-20221102-26-22xyb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493083/original/file-20221102-26-22xyb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493083/original/file-20221102-26-22xyb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493083/original/file-20221102-26-22xyb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493083/original/file-20221102-26-22xyb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493083/original/file-20221102-26-22xyb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493083/original/file-20221102-26-22xyb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rioters outside the U.S. Capitol Building on Jan. 6, 2021, clash with police.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/supporters-of-us-president-donald-trump-fight-with-riot-police-the-picture-id1230457933?s=612x612">Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Law enforcement’s unique problem</h2>
<p>Against this backdrop, federal law enforcement has become more vocal in warning about the dangers of domestic political extremism, including a <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/ntas/advisory/national-terrorism-advisory-system-bulletin-february-07-2022">bulletin</a> issued in February 2022. The Oct. 28 DHS bulletin further underscores this concern. </p>
<p>But it’s hard for law enforcement to effectively address political extremism, because speech protected under the <a href="https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/">First Amendment</a> is a major consideration. Phrases like “I’m fighting for you!” or “Saving our country!” might seem like typical political bluster to one person. But they could be seen by others as an implied call for intimidation or violent action against political opponents, election officials, volunteer poll workers and even ordinary voters. </p>
<p>How does speech turn into violent action? Security specialists and scholars use the term “<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/jargon-watch-rising-danger-stochastic-terrorism/">stochastic terrorism</a>” to capture how a single, hard-to-locate person might be inspired or influenced toward violence by broader extremist rhetoric, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/california-donald-trump-san-francisco-47c103cfe696df9faf0e57e1c7dd4f10">as appears to have been the case</a> with the man who allegedly tried to kill Paul Pelosi with a hammer. </p>
<p>Law enforcement’s problem is made worse by right-wing lawmakers who normalize or actively praise the actions of violent extremists, calling them “<a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/trump-and-allies-work-to-rebrand-jan-6-rioters-as-patriots-heroes-and-martyrs-01626809391">patriots</a>” and demanding their prison sentences be overturned or <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/30/trump-pardon-jan6-defendants-00003450">pardoned</a>. This helps obscure the actual reasons for such incidents, often by deflecting them into broader conspiracy theories involving their opponents.</p>
<p>Certainly there are controversial left-leaning politicians, pundits, activists and talking points too. </p>
<p>But few – if any – openly disregard the fabric of American government, scheme to overturn democratic elections by force or plot to assassinate politicians. </p>
<p>By contrast, there are over <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2022/10/07/democracy-on-the-ballot-how-many-election-deniers-are-on-the-ballot-in-november-and-what-is-their-likelihood-of-success/">300 Republican election deniers</a> running for office this year, including many incumbents – the vast majority of whom endorse political violence such as the Jan. 6 attack either by their actions or their silence. </p>
<h2>Hope for the best; prepare for the worst</h2>
<p>Tensions are high heading into the 2022 midterms. Politicians are making final arguments, and the online messaging machines are spreading campaign information, fundraising requests – and plenty of disinformation as well.</p>
<p>Americans expect a <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/why-presidential-transition-process-matters">peaceful transfer of political power</a> after elections, but recent history shows we must prepare for the worst. It’s clear that the modern Republican Party is openly and successfully embracing and exploiting misinformation, outrage and attacks on democracy and the rule of law. </p>
<p>Until Republicans actively disavow their extremist rhetoric and the misinformation contributing to it, I believe the likelihood for political violence in America increases with each passing day.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193597/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Forno has received research funding related to cybersecurity from the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Department of Defense (DOD) during his academic career, and sits on the advisory board of BlindHash, a cybersecurity startup focusing on remedying the password problem. He is a registered independent voter, too.</span></em></p>The rise in contemporary right-wing political extremism – and violence – can be traced back to events in the 1990s.Richard Forno, Principal Lecturer in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1887152022-08-15T23:49:12Z2022-08-15T23:49:12ZPNG elections show there is still a long way to go to stamp out violence and ensure proper representation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479076/original/file-20220815-51451-d3rbnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=13%2C0%2C2973%2C2137&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paramilitary police and soldiers patrol ballot boxes at Tari airport, Southern Highlands, PNG</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP Image</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite Australia “stepping up” its relations with the Pacific since the election of the Albanese government, one of the notable things about the recent national election in Papua New Guinea (PNG) was the almost complete lack of coverage of it in Australian media – except for the odd report of violence.</p>
<h2>2022 election outcome</h2>
<p>For the record, voting took place across the country from July 4 to 22. Counting was supposed to be completed and writs returned by July 29, but that was extended to August 4. On August 9, with 99 of the 118 seats declared, the National Parliament met to elect a prime minister. </p>
<p>As leader of the party with the largest number of endorsed candidates elected (Pangu Pati with 36 members at August 9), outgoing prime minister James Marape was invited by the governor-general to form government and was re-elected to the office. Unusually, he was elected unopposed. </p>
<p>Like all other prime ministers before him, Marape heads a coalition government, including at least 17 parties and some independents. Most of the 17 parties have only one or two MPs and, with the independents, will probably merge with the larger parties in the early months of the new parliament. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479072/original/file-20220815-50243-ysktdq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479072/original/file-20220815-50243-ysktdq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479072/original/file-20220815-50243-ysktdq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479072/original/file-20220815-50243-ysktdq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479072/original/file-20220815-50243-ysktdq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479072/original/file-20220815-50243-ysktdq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479072/original/file-20220815-50243-ysktdq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479072/original/file-20220815-50243-ysktdq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prime Minister James Marape was re-elected to office in 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The new parliament will include two women, better than the zero in 2017-2022, but still a disappointing result given the efforts to promote women candidates, whose numbers were fewer in 2022 than in 2017. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-papua-new-guinea-urgently-needs-to-elect-more-women-to-parliament-188058">Why Papua New Guinea urgently needs to elect more women to parliament</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Previous volatility</h2>
<p>In many parts of the country, this year’s elections were carried out without incident or drama. The previous election, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/30/unprecedented-violence-and-hijacked-2017-png-election-report">in 2017</a>, was widely described as the worst in the nation’s history, with inaccurate electoral rolls, vote-buying and intimidation of voters in some parts of the country. </p>
<p>The election was also afflicted by delays in polling and counting, theft and destruction of ballot boxes, and violence throughout. This included an estimated 200 “election-related deaths” (though “election-related deaths” are difficult to measure in a country where intergroup and domestic violence are endemic). </p>
<p>Some observers have suggested the 2022 election was more flawed and more violent than that of 2017, despite a substantial security presence and logistic support from the Australian Defence Force. A clearer picture will emerge once the reports of the ANU-coordinated domestic monitoring teams have been processed. However, the number of “election-related deaths” to date has been put at 50. </p>
<p>Counting has been delayed in several electorates, and elections may have <a href="https://pina.com.fj/2022/07/20/png-electoral-commissioner-no-election-will-be-deemed-as-failed/">failed</a> in at least three electorates due to allegations of vote fixing and other problems. Two of the potential failed election cases are in Morobe Province, while counting has been delayed in electorates of the National Capital District (Port Moresby) where violence has occurred.</p>
<h2>Societal and political context of election violence</h2>
<p>To understand the problems of elections in Papua New Guinea, and the violence associated with them, it is necessary to appreciate the social and political context in which elections take place. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/volatile-times-as-rivals-claim-throne-in-papua-new-guinea-expert-reactions-4745">Volatile times as rivals claim throne in Papua New Guinea: expert reactions</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Around <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=PG">80-85%</a> of Papua New Guineans live in rural villages and hamlets with limited involvement in the cash economy. Politics therefore tends to be heavily localised. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479074/original/file-20220815-56005-bp0kzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479074/original/file-20220815-56005-bp0kzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479074/original/file-20220815-56005-bp0kzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479074/original/file-20220815-56005-bp0kzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479074/original/file-20220815-56005-bp0kzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479074/original/file-20220815-56005-bp0kzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479074/original/file-20220815-56005-bp0kzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479074/original/file-20220815-56005-bp0kzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Around 80% of PNG’s population live in rural villages.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span>
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<p>Political parties play a very minor role in how electors vote. Voters tend to vote for candidates they believe will give them access to government and bring them local services and other benefits – usually members of their clan or former public servants or businessmen who have a good local record. </p>
<p>Competition to get elected is intense, with large and growing numbers of candidates contesting in most electorates (on average 29 per electorate in 2022, but over 70 in two electorates). Some candidates invest large sums of money campaigning, including vote buying. </p>
<p>In the lead-up to the 2022 election, as in 2017, there were reports of sophisticated weapons being imported and distributed among candidates’ supporters in the highlands. The weapons were presumably for use in case of confrontations between rival candidates and their supporters.</p>
<h2>Voting shifts</h2>
<p>In 2007, Papua New Guinea shifted from a <a href="https://education.aec.gov.au/getvoting/content/types-of-elections.html#:%7E:text=First%2Dpast%2Dthe%2Dpost&text=Only%20mark%20one%20box.,to%20choose%20their%20first%20preference.">first-past-the-post system of voting</a>, where the voter casts a single vote for the candidate of their choice, to one of <a href="https://www.ecanz.gov.au/electoral-systems/preferential">limited preferential voting</a>, where voters can indicate an order of preference for three candidates on their ballots. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-political-crisis-in-papua-new-guinea-4796">Explainer: political crisis in Papua New Guinea </a>
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<p>This change was made in the hope of encouraging cooperation between candidates and reducing confrontation. However, there has been little evidence of changed behaviour. In some electorates, candidates have sought to prevent rivals from campaigning in the candidate’s core support area, even to the point of shooting at a helicopter bringing in a rival candidate.</p>
<p>Treacherous terrain, poor road networks and remote locations in much of the country have made it difficult and expensive to organise polling and to transport ballot boxes safely to counting centres. These physical conditions also contribute to the difficulties of compiling accurate electoral rolls, a continuing source of anger among voters whose names cannot be found on the rolls. </p>
<h2>Corruption, control and other factors</h2>
<p>However, the problems of inaccurate rolls and delayed polling are not just the result of geography and terrain, or even of inadequate or tardy payments from the government to the Electoral Commission and from the Electoral Commission to polling officials. </p>
<p>The ability of the Electoral Commission in Port Moresby to control what goes on at the local polling level is limited. Domestic monitoring in 2017 reported a number of instances where politicians appointed partisan polling officials. In other cases, supporters of candidates, sometimes in association with polling officials, filled out multiple ballots for one candidate – a reason that ballot boxes have sometimes been stolen of destroyed.</p>
<p>In 2022, almost 10,300 police and defence force personnel were deployed to provide security for polling; in designated “hotspots,” polling was limited to one day to maximise the coverage of security details. These efforts undoubtedly had an impact but were not sufficient to completely eliminate violence from frustrated would-be voters or supporters who believed that their candidate had been cheated.</p>
<p>After being elected, Marape promised to review and reform the voting process. However, it is difficult to see what can be done without a fundamental change in the behaviour of candidates, their supporters, and the voters themselves.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188715/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ron May does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More needs to be done to improve the violence and corruption that are still endemic in the PNG electoral process.Ron May, Emertius Fellow, attached to the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1880202022-08-01T13:53:44Z2022-08-01T13:53:44ZThe role of media in a Kenyan election: what you should know<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476903/original/file-20220801-62374-oyl9td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Traditionally, political debates have been shaped by mainstream media. Kenya’s mainstream media, however, remain strongly wedded to factional ethnic and class interests. This has undermined their capacity to facilitate fair and open debate, most evidently during elections.</p>
<p>Social media platforms have exploited this trust deficit, acting as important alternative sites for political deliberation. But they have also become powerful tools for disinformation and misinformation.</p>
<p>Platforms like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp are reframing democracy and the way citizens engage and organise in digital space. Through these platforms, politicians can engage directly with voters, which is especially important for independent candidates, who may not have the backing of a major party.</p>
<p>Reflecting the growth in the power of the internet, many governments have moved to regulate it – or even shut it down. Ethiopia, Cameroon, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Chad, Sudan and Zimbabwe have all used internet shutdowns to try to limit free expression. </p>
<p>Kenya, which will hold a hotly contested election on 9 August 2022, has yet to order an internet shutdown. The government has <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/08/kenya-says-social-media-wont-be-blocked-after-warning-to-facebook/">issued assurances</a> that it will not do so. </p>
<p>Kenya’s media landscape is an important field of research and analysis – highlighted in this selection of previously published articles.</p>
<h2>Media risk and reward</h2>
<p>As Kenya heads towards elections, concerns about the outbreak of electoral violence tend to rise. Research has explored the question of how, when and why political elites encourage ordinary citizens to engage in violent conflict.</p>
<p>Newspapers, television, radio, and online platforms can inform perceptions of what’s at stake in elections. Media narratives, in other words, can offer an early sign of the risk of violence.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-message-to-violence-what-to-watch-for-in-the-media-ahead-of-kenyas-elections-177459">From message to violence: what to watch for in the media ahead of Kenya's elections</a>
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<p>There is no evidence that disinformation and misinformation practices can on their own influence the outcome of elections. Still, they pose a danger to democratic processes.</p>
<p>In politically charged environments, such as Kenya’s, they have the capacity to exploit long-held divisions with the potential to trigger violence.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/social-media-is-being-misused-in-kenyas-political-arena-why-its-hard-to-stop-it-177586">Social media is being misused in Kenya's political arena. Why it's hard to stop it</a>
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<p>African political parties are spending huge sums hiring consultants with expertise in digital campaigning and even manipulation of social media content. It is evident that those with political power and money can easily hire automated systems, like bots, to influence the flow of political content across social media. They can also distort information.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/algorithms-bots-and-elections-in-africa-how-social-media-influences-political-choices-179121">Algorithms, bots and elections in Africa: how social media influences political choices</a>
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<p>Social media has the potential to allow for more direct communication between politicians and citizens. But an analysis of candidates’ tweets in the 2017 election does not suggest that Twitter democratised political discourse in Kenya. While candidates in the upcoming election will continue to expand their reach and visibility through social media, Twitter may not yet replace patronage networks and traditional campaigning.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/twitter-in-kenyas-last-poll-a-great-way-to-reach-voters-but-not-a-game-changer-175739">Twitter in Kenya's last poll: a great way to reach voters, but not a game-changer</a>
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<h2>Value of TV debate</h2>
<p>Political debates have become part of the election calendar. Their stated intention is to give citizens the information they need to decide whom to elect. But debates are held at the end of an election season. They cannot replace the electorate’s need for the granular, mundane, day-to-day information about candidates and what they stand for.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/political-debates-in-kenya-are-they-useful-or-empty-media-spectacles-183262">Political debates in Kenya: are they useful or empty media spectacles?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Platforms like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp are reframing democracy and the way citizens engage and organise in the digital space.Julius Maina, Regional Editor East AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1845952022-06-12T09:11:38Z2022-06-12T09:11:38ZMoney is breaking democracy in Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468044/original/file-20220609-18-352gf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some Nigerian women displaying their voter cards at a polling units during one of the country's elections. Photo:aap/
Peter Obe</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://photos.aap.com.au/search/Nigerians%20voting?q=%7B%22pageSize%22:100,%22pageNumber%22:2%7D">https://photos.aap.com/Peter Obe</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Nigeria has had 23 years of unbroken civilian rule since 1999, and commemorates this return to democratic governance on 12 June. The Conversation Africa asked political scientist Ayo Olukotun to reflect on the nation’s democratic journey so far and the problems hindering this system of government.</em></p>
<p><strong>What is your assessment of the journey so far?</strong></p>
<p>It’s a chequered journey, with ups and downs. There’s not enough stability in the system. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-has-a-history-of-dodgy-elections-will-it-be-different-this-time-111093">quality of elections</a> alone is below par in terms of <a href="https://theconversation.com/digital-technology-can-improve-nigerias-elections-lessons-from-2019-175551">administration</a> and logistics. And there’s still occasional <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/10/nigeria-widespread-violence-ushers-presidents-new-term">violence</a>. Before, during and after the last election in 2019, <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/343971-626-killed-during-2019-nigeria-elections-report.html">623 people died</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-violence-every-election-season-in-nigeria-what-can-be-done-to-stop-it-183690">There's violence every election season in Nigeria: what can be done to stop it</a>
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<p>. </p>
<p>We can’t conduct polls without the shutdown of the entire country. And in some areas of Nigeria it can <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2015/02/07/nigeria-to-postpone-elections-official-says.html">even be dangerous</a> to go out and vote.</p>
<p>Apathy and disconnection are the result. <a href="https://punchng.com/inec-laments-low-turnout-says-20-million-pvcs-unclaimed/">The Independent National Electoral Commission was complaining</a> about the huge number of <a href="https://theconversation.com/digital-technology-can-improve-nigerias-elections-lessons-from-2019-175551">voters’ cards</a> that have not been collected. The 2019 presidential poll witnessed <a href="https://punchng.com/2019-presidential-polls-only-35-of-voters-voted-inec/">only 35% voter turnout.</a></p>
<p>The noninclusive character of the federation is also part of the problem. This means that swathes of citizens are excluded from the process of governance in a top-heavy configuration.</p>
<p>Young people feel disenfranchised. They are <a href="https://www.gcca.eu/stories/nigerias-youth-asset-or-consumer-time-bomb">the demographic majority</a> but they are poorly represented. </p>
<p>Women are also underrepresented. If women make the effort to come into the political arena, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-election-women-idUSKCN1Q32G8">they’re discriminated against</a>. There are <a href="https://noi-polls.com/culture-and-religion-greatest-barriers-for-nigerian-women-in-politics/">cultural and religious obstacles to women’s participation in politics</a>. Yet, if they don’t make an effort they have no voice. </p>
<p>So, Nigeria’s democratic journey has not been smooth at all.</p>
<h2>Money is widely used to affect outcomes. What’s the impact?</h2>
<p>As long as money can buy votes, the future of democracy is uncertain. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/05/29/atiku-defeats-wike-becomes-pdp-presidential-candidate/">Peoples Democratic Party’s convention has just elected</a> a presidential candidate out of about 15 aspirants. Two of the party’s presidential aspirants, <a href="https://www.blueprint.ng/breaking-like-peter-obi-hayatu-deen-withdraws-from-pdp-presidential-race-says-process-monetised-corrupt-self-serving/">Peter Obi and Mohammed Hayatu-Deen</a>, said dollars <a href="https://punchng.com/dollar-rain-drowns-pdp-presidential-primary-creates-bonanza-for-delegates/">were being rained down</a> on delegates as a way of wooing them to vote. This <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/10/dollar-rains-at-port-harcourt-pdp-presidential-primaries-2018/">also happened</a> in the 2018 Peoples Democratic Party convention in Port Harcourt. </p>
<p>Aside from this, the two dominant political parties in Nigeria, the ruling All Progressives Congress and the <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/pdp-extends-sale-of-nomination-forms/">Peoples Democratic Party</a>, <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/526573-why-we-are-charging-n100m-for-presidential-nomination-form-apc-national-chairman.html">sell</a> their expression of interest form and nomination forms for <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/05/05/with-over-n30bn-from-sale-of-forms-apc-gets-firepower-for-2023-elections/">huge amounts</a> of money to presidential aspirants. These forms are sold by the political parties to members who are aspiring to contest political offices under their platforms. Aspirants in Nigeria must belong to a political party because, as of now, the nation’s electoral law does not allow independent candidacy.</p>
<p>This locks out a significant majority of the population. If about <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/01/91m-nigerians-fall-below-poverty-line-nesg/#:%7E:text=His%20words%2C%20%E2%80%9CThe%20World%20Bank,headcount%20to%20about%2091">half of the population can’t make ends meet</a> and you ask people to pay as high as 100 million naira (about US$240,000) for expression of interest and nomination forms, you have disenfranchised them. </p>
<p>This is the biggest disincentive to youth participation because young people are the poorest. They are also the most affected and afflicted by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/young-nigerians-rise-up-to-demand-a-different-kind-of-freedom-148105">Nigerian trauma</a> – unemployment, insecurity, police brutality, absence of social security support policy and corruption. </p>
<p>So the effect is more direct on them. They cannot come up with the money and that’s a problem. </p>
<p>What’s happening is that <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/05/2023-elections-children-of-nigerian-politicians-that-got-tickets/">old politicians are recycling</a> their sons, their daughters and their in-laws into the political space. Those who don’t have godfathers or parents who can recycle them have no chance.</p>
<p>The need for money also makes it worse for women. Only a <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/04/2023-apc-cancels-nomination-fees-for-female-aspirants/">small percentage</a> of women in Nigeria are in a position to find the kind of money required to participate</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-is-not-a-failed-state-but-it-has-not-delivered-democracy-for-its-people-149769">Nigeria is not a failed state, but it has not delivered democracy for its people</a>
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<p>. </p>
<h2>How can the trend of exclusion be reversed?</h2>
<p>It’s a paradigm shift. The older generation formed the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Action-Group-political-party-Nigeria">Action Group</a> and some other political parties in the 1950s. The Action Group was a Nigerian nationalist political party established in Ibadan on 21 March, 1951, by the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo. It was disbanded after the military took over the reins of government in 1966. </p>
<p>They were intentional about how the dividends of democracy were shared based on their contributions to the party’s success. This is because they came together to form parties. Members, including farmers and peasants, contributed money to fund their parties. They voted for their leaders based on integrity. The leaders who <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/10/independence-what-made-western-nigeria-tick-in-the-first-republic/">emerged served the people</a>. </p>
<p>Now we have vote buyers and sellers. </p>
<p>We can adopt the old generation’s funding option for political parties. It will take a lot of work but if we have a lot of people with integrity, the system will begin to change. You can’t have change without some sacrifices. We need crusaders to lead the campaign.</p>
<p>The other option is fund raising, which is what they do in the United States. But there must be transparency: you must make public what you get. </p>
<h2>What should Nigeria do to enhance democracy?</h2>
<p>First, identify the problems. These include disenfranchisement of women and young people, the role of money in the electioneering process, corruption and skewed federalism. </p>
<p>Others are the exclusiveness of the country’s democracy, the ethno-regional spaces and inequality, <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/76-million-nigerian-adults-are-illiterates/">mass illiteracy</a>, vote buying and selling, the hijacking of the political process by moneybags and godfatherism. </p>
<p>These problems can be solved by enactment and enforcement of laws. You also need ethical campaigns and political education. And the leaders must set the example.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ayo Olukotun received funding from Ford Foundation for scholarly work in the past.</span></em></p>Nigeria’s 23rd year of unbroken democratic rule will be celebrated on 12 June 2022.Ayo Olukotun, Professor and Chair of the department for Governance and Political Science, Olabisi Onabanjo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1836902022-06-07T15:33:54Z2022-06-07T15:33:54ZThere’s violence every election season in Nigeria: what can be done to stop it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466937/original/file-20220603-24-3ridea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A burnt car in the middle of a road following deadly clashes between supporters of the ruling All Progressives Congress and the opposition Peoples Democratic Party at Kofa in Bebeji district of Kano, economic nerve centre of northern Nigeria.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-picture-taken-on-february-22-2019-shows-a-burnt-car-in-news-photo/1126737223?adppopup=true">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images. </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Violence is one of the recurrent features of Nigeria’s electoral history and democratic journey since independence in 1960. The country invariably sees an escalation of violence in the period before, during and after elections. </p>
<p>The country’s electoral body, the Independent National Electoral Commission, has already begun to <a href="https://punchng.com/electoral-violence-1149-nigerians-killed-inec-suffers-42-attacks-decries-rising-insecurity/">raise the alarm</a> ahead of a poll scheduled for <a href="https://inecnigeria.org/timetable-and-schedule-of-activities-for-2023-general-election/">February and March 2023</a>.</p>
<p>The reasons for the violence <a href="https://books.google.com.ng/books?id=NHaIDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=electoral+violence+nigeria&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjPncmZkYT4AhWAh_0HHWAFBAg4ChDoAXoECAcQAg#v=onepage&q=electoral%20violence%20nigeria&f=true">vary</a>. It can be designed to minimise or neutralise opponents. Also, it is sometimes used to undermine opponent ability to mobilise supporters and perform at the poll, and spoil victory or protest losses. </p>
<p>Another motive is to manipulate or delegitimise the electoral process. The tactics include armed attack, armed robbery, assault, assassination, kidnappings and bombing. </p>
<p>In our <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10708-021-10375-9">study</a>, we looked into trends of violence across different phases of the 2019 general elections. Our analysis showed that the pre-election period was generally more violent and deadly, although election days could be violent too. </p>
<p>We also looked at violence during the inter-election period between federal and state polls in a general election. Federal elections are due on 25 February 2023 and the state elections are scheduled for 11 March 2023. </p>
<p>This period is often violent because it offers the winning and the losing parties in federal elections the chance to settle scores with state elections. In 2019, 9.8% of the total incidents of electoral violence and 8.2% of the fatalities were in the inter-election period. State elections were also more violent and deadly than the federal elections.</p>
<p>We also identified where violence was concentrated. It was deadliest in the South-South. The nine most violent states were Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Delta, Benue, Bayelsa, Lagos, Kogi, Ogun and Kano. Rivers, Taraba, Delta and Abia states had the highest record of fatalities. </p>
<p>Our insights are relevant to guide those attempting to ensure a peaceful election in Nigeria. Prominent persons, nongovernmental organisations, government agencies, media and international actors should all be involved in promoting dialogue and public education that will bring down tension in notable hot spots. </p>
<p>For their part, security agencies should watch out for notable hot spots and devise strategies to prevent or deter any threats. </p>
<h2>What’s driving the violence</h2>
<p>First, politics is the most profitable sector in Nigeria. And the stakes are extremely high.</p>
<p>Holding a position in government holds the key to power, which in turn provides access to the country’s wealth. Winners gain all, and losers are sometimes left with nothing, including their followers, investment and integrity.</p>
<p>The result is that political actors often prepare strategies to achieve their objectives that can include violence.</p>
<p>Second, Nigeria’s state institutions are weak.</p>
<p>Those involved in electoral governance are vulnerable to coercion or manipulation. On numerous occasions in past elections, there have been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358533.2020.1788754">allegations of infractions</a> committed by officials of the electoral body or <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2020.1788764?src=recsys">security agencies</a> in favour of one party or another. This, in turn, has led to some political actors enlisting the support of armed non-state groups. These groups sometimes operate in conflict with state institutions and sometimes compete with them. In some instances, there is co-operation. </p>
<p>A third factor is that many Nigerians are frustrated by the economic, social and political situation in the country. People are <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357187159_THE_TROUBLED_TRINITY_ELECTIONS_DEMOCRACY_AND_DEVELOPMENT_IN_NIGERIA_An_Inaugural_Lecture">frustrated</a> by poverty, inequality, perceived injustice, illiteracy, youth unemployment, hunger, corruption, human rights abuse and insecurity.</p>
<p>Added to this is the lack of sensitivity and inadequate responses of the government. </p>
<p>This is a <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-16-6058-0_13">major reason</a> behind the increase in civil and militant protests and criminal violence in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Fourth are the triggers such as insensitive or irresponsible speeches and actions by political actors. Hate speech, fake news and media reporting can also trigger violence. </p>
<h2>Who is involved?</h2>
<p>Politicians and their paid agents are known to have been involved in violence against opponents and their supporters. This is sometimes done <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971404900202">directly</a>, with mobilisation of thugs, or indirectly through <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909620951208?journalCode=jasa">hate speech</a> and incitement of violence, against targeted opponents. </p>
<p>There have also been reported cases of state violence. This has happened when there has been the overt use of state security forces, the police and military personnel. For example, there were <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2019/03/22/2019-army-elections-interference-the-worst-in-nigerias-history-wike/">allegations</a> of this in River State during 2019 election and Ekiti State <a href="https://punchng.com/inec-colluded-with-security-operatives-to-rig-ekiti-election-govs-aide/">in 2018</a>. These are just two among many. </p>
<p>Sometimes the security forces involvement is covert. There have been allegations of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2020.1860521?journalCode=uafs20">secret missions</a> of the security forces for the ruling parties in opposition strongholds. For instance, it was <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/03/army-rig-for-the-ruling-party-oshiomhole/">alleged</a> that military personnel without means of identification invaded opposition stronghold in Edo State during the 2015 elections. </p>
<p>Armed non-state groups, including insurgents, terrorists, bandits, political thugs, cultists, saboteurs and syndicates also get involved. As recently as May 2022, bandits were <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/05/27/bandits-kill-three-pdp-delegates-in-niger/">reported to have killed</a> three party delegates in Niger State. </p>
<h2>What can be done</h2>
<p>All actors in the electoral processes need to work together to ensure that elections are peaceful. This will require effort from state and non-state actors, as well as external partners.</p>
<p>The federal government of Nigeria has the biggest responsibility. It must pay attention to what’s causing the violence and the kind of violence being perpetrated. There is no “one size fits all” solution, and responses will require a combination of political and policing measures. </p>
<p>More effort is also needed to build the capacity of relevant institutions. Two key ones stand out: the electoral and security agencies.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s electoral body is a critical actor in mitigating electoral violence. The regulation of party activities and conduct of elections should be consistent with the country’s laws and directives. And its actions should be transparent. This will strengthen stakeholders’ confidence in the institution and process of the elections. </p>
<p>Election security should be demilitarised. While policing can feature the armed forces in supporting roles, it is important to balance their role during elections with rule of law and respect for human rights. Suspects should be arrested, prosecuted and served justice (devoid of political influence) after a fair hearing. </p>
<p>Nigeria has relevant laws to curb electoral violence. The implementation and enforcement of these laws should be a priority. </p>
<p>The commission should also promote public education using both traditional and new media-based advocacy. </p>
<p>Political parties, civil society groups and media also play important roles in influencing public opinion and mobilising people. Political parties should check, and when necessary condemn and sanction their members and followers engaged in electoral violence. Civil society groups should demand greater accountability and transparency of the election process as well educate and mobilise the public. </p>
<p>The media, especially traditional outlets, have the responsibility to provide accurate and balance news.</p>
<p>Lastly, the assistance of advanced democracies should be sought to strengthen government agencies, non-governmental organisations the security agencies and the media.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Oyewole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All actors in the electoral processes in Nigeria must work together to ensure peaceful elections.Samuel Oyewole, Lecturer, Political Science, Federal University, Oye EkitiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1807032022-05-01T08:29:42Z2022-05-01T08:29:42ZDrivers of electoral violence in Kenya: red flags to watch out for<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458136/original/file-20220414-25-u6yaws.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man flees from teargas fired by anti-riot police in Nairobi after Kenya's 2017 elections.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s National Cohesion and Integration Commission recently <a href="https://cohesion.or.ke/images/docs/downloads/MEDIABRIEF.pdf">listed</a> 23 counties that are considered potential violence hotspots ahead of the country’s August 2022 elections. </p>
<p>This mapping is part of the commission’s <a href="https://cohesion.or.ke/index.php/about-us/ncic-at-a-glance#:%7E:text=Mission%3A,for%20diversity%20among%20Kenyan%20communities.">mission</a> to ensure a peaceful election. Several of Kenya’s past polls have seen high levels of violence. The violence that broke out after the 2007 elections stands out in particular. It caused <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/15A00F569813F4D549257607001F459D-Full_Report.pdf">over a thousand fatalities</a> and led to a national crisis. This was eventually resolved through a coalition government and constitutional reform.</p>
<p>Election-related violence in Kenya often takes the form of inter-communal violence. This involves groups – without formal organisation – clashing along identity lines. Violence between ethnic groups aligned with Kenya’s main political parties has erupted in connection to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-election-violence-is-threatening-to-repeat-itself-76220">1992, 1997, 2008 and 2017 elections</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546550902950290">Existing research</a> indicates that patronage politics, a history of violent conflict and high-stakes elections increase the risks of poll violence. These studies have mainly focused on national-level drivers of violence. <a href="https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1291339/FULLTEXT01.pdf">My research</a> has explored the causes of communal violence at a more local level. Much of my work has focused on Kenya. </p>
<p>I highlight a few key drivers of communal conflict that could inform efforts to predict and prevent election violence in Kenya.</p>
<h2>Drivers of conflict</h2>
<p>Communal violence erupts in connection with elections for different reasons. Firstly, some of it is directly election-related. For instance, politicians may instigate violence to frighten opponents. They may also use <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-message-to-violence-what-to-watch-for-in-the-media-ahead-of-kenyas-elections-177459">hate speech</a>, which makes groups more hostile to each other and increases the risk of violence. </p>
<p>Secondly, violence may erupt due to local conflicts that aren’t directly election-related. The uncertainty and re-negotiation of power relations during the election period causes conflict to intensify. To understand local risks of violence, it’s therefore important to look at local-level conflict dynamics and what is at stake in the elections.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-government-bias-can-fuel-communal-conflicts-in-africa-121640">How government bias can fuel communal conflicts in Africa</a>
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<p>While analyses of past episodes of election violence in Kenya have often focused on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589000903187024">national-level political actors</a>, the current devolved system of governance matters for <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S096262981630049X">local violence risks</a>. </p>
<p>The 2010 constitution <a href="http://www.kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010#KE/CON/Const2010/chap_11">allocates</a> significant financial and political power to Kenya’s 47 counties. In part, devolution was aimed at decreasing the risks of large-scale election violence by diminishing the importance of national power. </p>
<p>However, it increased the importance of which political bloc wins at the county level. This has implications for who has access to local resources and patrimonial networks. </p>
<p>The fact that elections in Kenya often heighten inter-communal tensions <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">has roots</a> in political developments during and after colonial rule. Successive political leaders and aspirants have used group-based grievances to mobilise voters and, at times, violent militias. </p>
<p>Importantly, land tenure has remained closely connected to communal identity in Kenya. Land is important for livelihood but also for belonging. Narratives about ancestral land and first-comer status have often played a role in political mobilisation. For example, former President Daniel Moi <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0002018022000032956">threatened</a> his constituents in the Rift Valley that they would lose access to their ancestral land if they voted for the opposition.</p>
<p>Regions where land conflicts are prominent – and politicians are mobilising based on these conflicts – are <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343315580145">areas to watch</a> for signs of violence. Such conflicts may be very localised, with relatively small geographic areas contested along group lines. If such conflicts are perceived as intertwined with election outcomes, the risk of election-related violence increases.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-election-violence-is-threatening-to-repeat-itself-76220">Kenya's history of election violence is threatening to repeat itself</a>
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<p>The risk of violence also depends on perceptions of vulnerability and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414019830734">state bias</a>.
If local communities don’t trust the government to impartially protect their interests and basic needs, they are more likely to support violence to ensure that political candidates who claim to represent them win. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40388421?seq=1">Research</a> by others has shown how people who felt their ethnic community had long been neglected by the government turned to violence when they perceived ‘their’ candidate was robbed of victory in the 2007 election. </p>
<p>Conflict may also erupt in reaction to changed local boundaries. Redrawing boundaries or creating new constituencies can affect local election outcomes, and has been <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1065912916653476?casa_token=zNUrjQQUnuQAAAAA%3AX7y2GMct5Pw0ygI5vbPLFdkT5IFh1jmKfrZF_GPLFUjaZRABVVZ2AIJAZxpzgt9r2vnAoU241d8t6A">frequent in Kenya since the 1990s</a>. Such shifts may change the balance of power and local election outcomes. This can spark a violent response in cases where inter-group tension is high. For example, in <a href="https://www.undp.org/content/dam/kenya/docs/Amani%20Papers/AP_Volume1_n2_May2010.pdf">Mandera</a>, the creation of new districts fuelled tensions that erupted into major inter-clan violence in 2005.</p>
<p>Finally, drivers of communal violence can differ between urban and rural areas. Cities have high density and mobilisation potential. They also have the starkest inequality between the rich and poor. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2019.1640493">These factors</a> can be used to instigate violence. </p>
<p>After the 2007 elections, Nairobi and other cities saw <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">high levels</a> of violence, particularly in informal settlements. Kenya’s cohesion commission points to informal settlements as a risk factor for election violence. Not all informal settlements become violent, however. </p>
<p>Mobilisation strategies and connections between political aspirants and local violent gangs are important factors to consider when analysing which urban settlements are at risk. It’s also necessary to consider local violence prevention and conflict resolution strategies. </p>
<h2>Strengthening solutions</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/peace-from-below-governance-and-peacebuilding-in-kerio-valley-kenya/DC9F3ED151B11970B8AC4E64EC730E99">My research in Kerio Valley</a> illustrates how mediation and dialogue can yield peaceful solutions to local conflicts. More generally, local dialogue can reduce tensions between communal groups and increase perceptions of security. </p>
<p>It’s, therefore, important to pay attention to local dialogue and prevention efforts when predicting local risks of violence. However, the mere presence of dialogue or agreement may not be sufficient. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/151532644/05_2020_Report_ASPR_No_5_EN_kl_2.pdf">Others have found</a> that local peace agreements are more likely to be effective if they are facilitated by trusted and legitimate mediators. They also need to include clear implementation and enforcement stipulations.</p>
<p>Sometimes, communities agree on how to share local power after elections, for instance by nominating different county positions from different groups. A study from <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343315614999">Nigeria found</a> that such arrangements promote inter-group tolerance, reduce fears of exploitation and make politicians less likely to use divisive rhetoric. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-next-election-is-in-view-the-struggle-between-elites-and-rule-of-law-is-intensifying-167378">Kenya's next election is in view: the struggle between elites and rule of law is intensifying</a>
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<p>In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2019.1583483">Kenyan context</a>, a comparison of two violence-affected areas indicated that the presence of such an arrangement in Nakuru County decreased hostility and confrontation during the gubernatorial race in 2017. Political discourse in Uasin Gishu, which had no such agreement, was more antagonistic and intimidating. </p>
<h2>Risks in ‘mapping hotspots’</h2>
<p>Kenya’s cohesion commission uses a <a href="https://cohesion.or.ke/images/docs/downloads/MEDIABRIEF.pdf">13-point risk matrix</a> to identify areas at high risk of election violence. Many of the variables it uses resonate with existing research on communal violence. It is also encouraging that the commission pays attention to prevention strategies, as well as risk factors. </p>
<p>However, a note of caution. While the approach of mapping risk areas may help prevent violence – for instance by devoting more resources to certain counties – there are risks in this. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629817304717">Research in Haiti</a> has highlighted that the mapping of risk areas can have adverse effects on the local economy. In the worst case, it can become a self-reinforcing prophecy as it increases threat perceptions. </p>
<p>Given that antagonistic political rhetoric in Kenya has often played on communities’ fears of victimisation, this risk needs to be kept in mind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180703/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Elfversson receives funding from the Swedish Research Council. </span></em></p>To predict - and prevent - election-related violence, it’s important to first understand the key drivers of conflict.Emma Elfversson, Associate professor, Uppsala UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1774592022-03-21T15:17:51Z2022-03-21T15:17:51ZFrom message to violence: what to watch for in the media ahead of Kenya’s elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447776/original/file-20220222-17-1tvos5p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya’s first ever face-to-face presidential debate screened ahead of elections in 2013 won by Uhuru Kenyatta (on screen).
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Kenya heads towards elections, concerns about the outbreak of electoral violence tend to <a href="https://horninstitute.org/kenyas-2022-elections-managing-the-risk-of-violence/">rise</a>. </p>
<p>Existing research has offered several explanations for the violence. These include <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531050802058302?casa_token=hItTAByyJWsAAAAA%3Aidu3x-SvpxOIDXVynQZBw-fhn1L3TGzEoyZ71wF5D9FdcD9tnp9SlFmo2AtJM5duMSEh1QTBAFY%22%22">weak political parties</a>, perceptions that elections are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589001.2011.537056?casa_token=HKf3YTgRh8YAAAAA%3AfG40z-Uf9ujTirT31u1M57mkWMhMK88LX0sL4dHv50f4v94EbKmPHyNdR5eMJKjdbR4qvT0gPI0">high stakes</a> for different communities, and <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Violence-Kenya-Elections-Claim-Making/dp/1108488501/ref=sr_1_1?crid=AQUWTQOKH45&keywords=land+kathleen+klaus&qid=1645133880&sprefix=land+kathleen+klaus%2Caps%2C55&sr=8-1%22%22">land grievances</a>.</p>
<p>The evidence for these explanations is compelling. For example, the weakness of parties has meant that political <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531050802058302?casa_token=kv8RGQK84NEAAAAA%3AiOoL5q8VZG71wsQI0ty6h35h3nOcZ1W-c1BbLuSOo-gT3fl-GyyTiYH8X2BKu2NobeyKjmIwg_Q">patronage has usually trumped policy proposals</a> in Kenya. In a related vein, grievances over the distribution of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010414011407465?casa_token=BP1wZLWEe18AAAAA%3ABm_1XcHHTu3Yo_488piUr4ljUJbYJWabiMAkdkXrGR-Alv--U_fk4qYDwSnmtNAMAP7fVvt5Shg">land</a> have provided politicians with a powerful means to organise violence.</p>
<p>But researchers are yet to fully understand how, when and why political elites succeed in encouraging ordinary citizens to engage in violent conflict. To better examine this issue, we conducted interviews with vernacular radio listeners in the Central, Nyanza and Rift Valley regions. We also interviewed political elites in Nairobi, Coast province and the Rift Valley. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2020.1801991">work</a> helped us to uncover three important narratives disseminated via vernacular radio. These informed participation in violence during Kenya’s 2007-2008 post-election crisis. These were:</p>
<p><strong>Political marginalisation:</strong> This narrative emphasised economic deprivation and political alienation of some groups. (An example is the Luo.)</p>
<p><strong>Victimisation:</strong> This exploited deep-rooted land grievances to cast some communities (the Kikuyu, for example) as the primary beneficiaries of policies after independence. </p>
<p><strong>Foreign occupation:</strong> This narrative capitalised on fragile inter-community relations in areas such as Rift Valley. It cast Kikuyus as “foreign occupiers” of Kalenjin and Maasai ancestral lands.</p>
<p>Drawing on this work, we suggest that the media – newspaper, television, radio, and online platforms – can inform perceptions of what’s at stake in elections. Media narratives, in other words, can offer an early sign of the risk of violence. </p>
<h2>August 2022 elections</h2>
<p>In August, Kenyans will vote in presidential, legislative, and county-level elections. These contests will be the third since the country got a new constitution in 2010. </p>
<p>In the era of multi-party politics, several Kenyan contests – especially presidential ones – have given way to violence. As the Kenyan writer Patrick Gathara has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/12/30/for-kenyans-2022-brings-hope-and-fear">observed</a>, presidential contests in which the incumbent is seeking re-election have been particularly prone to conflict. </p>
<p>Constitutional changes implemented since 2010 were partly designed to weaken the presidency and reduce the stakes of national contests. But <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2019.1594072">recent research</a> has found that the political logic of Kenyan elections remains largely unchanged. Scholars have also shown that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14662043.2017.1421036?casa_token=snb9il01NP0AAAAA:QKWbD2zZ1IRLbguu4ER4hfP3s3ujcEs74TeIZsN9utByWX-g0qwXiiEndxutFqm00jWAs7BY38U">elites’ incentives</a> to foment violence are strong in many parts of the country.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-history-explains-election-violence-kenya-and-zambia-tell-the-story-131405">How history explains election violence: Kenya and Zambia tell the story</a>
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<p>The latest changes in elite-level groupings and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57666911">alliances</a> are now generating <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/stop-fighting-catholic-bishops-plead-with-uhuru-and-ruto-13099963/">concerns</a> that electoral violence could return to Kenya in 2022. </p>
<p>This is primarily because President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto have turned into <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/29540/fallout-with-kenyatta-door-closed-on-succession-for-ruto/">adversaries</a>. The former allies were leaders of an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2013.844438">unlikely electoral coalition</a> which won national elections in 2013. </p>
<p>A related worry is that <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/countries/kenya-0">many citizens</a> are reporting <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001417743/iebc-suffers-low-public-trust-cecilia-ngoyoni-tells-panel">low levels of trust</a> in the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission.</p>
<h2>Traditional media’s role</h2>
<p>We focused on studying radio messaging in our work because radio is the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b3ce5274a31e0000a5c/Radio_and_Development_in_Africa_concept_paper.pdf">primary form of mass media</a>. It is a dominant source of social and political information in Kenya. In studying the 2007-2008 post-election crisis, we found that <a href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/intellect/jams/2011/00000003/00000001/art00008">vernacular radio stations</a> played an important role in spreading messages of hatred and division in the country.</p>
<p>We found that narratives of marginalisation, victimisation and foreign occupation informed the stakes of the election. This was true for Luo, Maasai and Kalenjin voters. Their interests were cast as opposed to those of Kikuyus. </p>
<p>The country’s political environment has evolved since 2007-2008. Even so, the media still play a part in shaping perceptions of electoral stakes. We argue that some of the frameworks discussed above could re-emerge in the coming months.</p>
<p>To begin with, Ruto is no longer Kenyatta’s apparent successor. Narratives about <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-03-13-ruto-my-4-years-of-hell-under-uhuru/">victimisation (and betrayal)</a> could become prominent. In meeting with constituents, the deputy president has already used such <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001430010/ruto-uhuru-betrayed-me-8-million-kenyans">language</a> to describe the president’s actions. </p>
<p>Beyond victimisation, we observe that three newer narratives are gaining some traction in electoral politics. They are also appearing in the media’s coverage of the upcoming elections. </p>
<p>First, the deputy president has cast the polls in populist terms as a “<a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/siasa/2021-02-05-hustlers-vs-dynasties-rhetoric-getting-out-of-hand/">dynasties versus hustlers</a>” contest. Here, Kenyatta and former prime minister Raila Odinga are cast in the dynasty category and Ruto as a hustler.</p>
<p>Second, the deputy president’s right-hand man and the former majority leader in the National Assembly, Aden Duale, has portrayed Odinga as a “<a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/opinion/article/2001435207/raila-state-project-or-change-in-strategy">state project</a>”. This frame suggests that members of the ruling Jubilee Party and other <a href="https://swalanyeti.co.ke/news/2264/mount-kenya-foundation-endorses-raila-odingas-bid-for-presidency-and-pledge-their-backing">influential actors</a> are grooming the former prime minister for the presidency. </p>
<p>Such representations have not gone down well in Odinga’s camp. As a counter-narrative, the Kenyatta-Odinga “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43656971">handshake</a>” team and the newly formed <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001435756/azimio-to-be-registered-next-week-raila-says-as-he-receives-anc-defectors">“Azimio la Umoja”</a> (Unity Declaration) movement have cast Ruto as a thief who cannot be trusted with public coffers.</p>
<p>Third, the rift over constitutional amendments through the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2020.1832898">Building Bridges Initiative</a> is emerging as a relevant element in the August elections. The <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001421326/court-of-appeal-throws-out-bbi">thwarted</a> initiative has increased political intolerance between rival political elites and their potential voters.</p>
<p>We caution that these newer narratives, combined with prior frames about marginalisation, victimisation and foreign occupation, could inflame tensions.</p>
<h2>Social media’s role</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Digital-Democracy-Analogue-Politics-Transforming/dp/1786994313/ref=sr_1_2?keywords=nanjala+nyabola&qid=1644538852&sprefix=Nanjala+Nya%2Caps%2C119&sr=8-2">rapid proliferation</a> of social media platforms in competitive electoral settings such as Kenya also comes with some risks. There is limited policy related to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/23738871.2021.1916974">online content regulation</a>. This makes it difficult to contain messages of political intolerance in these spaces. </p>
<p>There is already <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-targets-whatsapp-administrators-in-its-fight-against-hate-speech-82767">evidence</a> to suggest that many of the conversations conducted over WhatsApp in Kenya are inflammatory. </p>
<p>Different forms of media will need to balance the polarising narratives that are emerging from the major electoral camps to keep violence at bay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177459/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aditi Malik received funding from the Graduate School, the Program of African Studies, and the Dispute Resolution Research Center at Northwestern University to conduct data-collection for this project. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Onguny has previously received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>Elites have strong incentives to foment violence. The way they speak about election issues in the media can inflame tensions.Aditi Malik, Assistant Professor, Political Science, College of the Holy CrossPhilip Onguny, Associate Professor, Université Saint-Paul / Saint Paul UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1755512022-02-13T07:12:37Z2022-02-13T07:12:37ZDigital technology can improve Nigeria’s elections: lessons from 2019<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445357/original/file-20220209-27-rq74nv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Card readers were used to confirm permanent voter cards during the 2019 Presidential elections in Nigeria.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/staff-of-the-independent-national-electoral-commission-news-photo/1125554605?adppopup=true">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Digital technologies to improve the reliability of election results have become more widely used around the world in the past two decades. In African countries, nearly all <a href="https://eisa.org/pdf/JAE15.2Alebiosu.pdf">recent general elections</a> have used various kinds of digital technology. </p>
<p>These include biometric voter registration, smart card readers, voters’ cards, optical mark recognition, direct electronic recording, and electronic result transmission. The principal <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2018.1470165">reason</a> for using them is to contain electoral fraud. It also promotes the credibility of elections.</p>
<p>Nigeria started using digital technology in the electoral process <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/10/what-other-african-elections-tell-us-about-nigerias-bet-on-biometrics/">in 2011</a>. The Independent National Electoral Commission introduced the automated fingerprint identification system to stop voters registering more than once. </p>
<p>The permanent voter’s card and smart card reader were introduced in <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE15.2Alebiosu.pdf">the 2015 general elections</a>. At the polling station, a voter’s identity is verified by matching his or her biometrics to the voter’s card. The voter is then allowed to vote and the votes are counted manually after the voting ends. </p>
<p>The reliability of these devices generated some controversy among Nigerians, but using them in the 2015 and 2019 general elections improved the legitimacy of the electoral process. Electoral outcomes were better accepted, with fewer objections to the results.</p>
<p>There hasn’t been any systematic study, though, of how smart card readers contributed to improving Nigeria’s election credibility and legitimacy. This is what I decided to explore using the case of the 2019 general elections. My study relied mostly on documentary sources and agency reports to provide qualitative results. </p>
<h2>My research</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358533.2020.1788755">My research</a> found that digital innovations enhanced elections in Nigeria because they reduced the instances of electoral fraud and irregularities. But there are still some drawbacks affecting their efficiency. </p>
<p>I conclude that the problems are not operational issues relating to machines not working. Rather, they reflect problems in the management of elections. </p>
<p>Nigeria had elections in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2019. The outcomes all generated concerns over their <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339599665_THE_QUEST_FOR_CREDIBLE_ELECTIONS_IN_NIGERIA_A_CRITICAL_EVALUATION_OF_THE_2015_GENERAL_ELECTIONS">credibility</a>. They were marred by <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/317067-analysis-delayed-voting-malpractices-other-lapses-observed-in-february-23-elections.html">malpractices</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/04/25/nigeria-presidential-election-marred-fraud-violence">violence</a>. Though the 2011 election was more fair than before, disputes over the outcome triggered <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/08/nigerias-2011-elections-best-run-most-violent">post election violence</a>. </p>
<h2>Old concerns persist</h2>
<p>While digitisation holds great prospects, some political actors remain unconvinced. In July 2021 the Senate <a href="https://www.arise.tv/nigeria-all-apc-senators-vote-against-electronic-transmission-of-results-the-full-list/">rejected</a> the provision in the Electoral Act for the introduction of electronic voting and electronic transmission of results. </p>
<p>These innovations would be a step beyond the voter’s card and smart card reader. Both are <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/how-electronic-transmission-of-results-will-affect-elections-in-nigeria/">aimed</a> at reducing errors in the calculation of votes and collating results faster.</p>
<p>The Senate said electronic voting was likely to compromise the credibility of elections, as did the malfunction of some card readers during the <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/03/after-initial-card-reader-failure-nigerians-persevere-vote-in-peaceful-elections/">2015</a> and <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/315393-nigeriadecides2019-card-readers-remain-a-challenge.html">2019 elections</a>. </p>
<p>The rejection hinged on the National Communication Commission’s <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/474174-only-50-of-polling-units-have-3g-network-to-transmit-election-results-ncc.html">comment</a> that only half of the polling units could transmit election results.</p>
<p>The federal government also <a href="https://punchng.com/2023-electronic-transmission-of-results-doubtful-301-lgs-lack-internet-facilities/">claimed</a> that digital transmission of election results could not be considered in the 2023 general elections because 473 out of the 774 local governments had no internet access.</p>
<p>The Senate later <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/10/electronic-transmission-of-poll-results-senate-in-u-turn-imposes-direct-primaries-on-parties/">rescinded</a> its decision after a public outcry.</p>
<h2>Push for digitisation</h2>
<p>But the electoral commission persisted in its <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/12/inec-insists-on-using-technology-for-elections/">call</a> for digitisation. And <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/184987-groups-urge-inec-to-use-digital-collation-of-election-results.html">civil society organisations</a> have shown support because of the prospect of reducing electoral fraud and improving transparency. They have also <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/486773-inec-insists-its-ready-for-electronic-transmission-of-election-results.html">pushed</a> for electronic voting and transmission of election results. </p>
<p>Similarly, the <a href="https://situationroomng.org/">Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room</a>, an umbrella for over 70 civil society organisations, supported the use of digital technology. </p>
<h2>Successes and limitations</h2>
<p>I discovered through my research that the application of digital technology to some extent has enhanced the quality of elections in Nigeria. It’s an improvement compared to previous elections characterised by fraud and manipulation. </p>
<p>However, there are some drawbacks owing to technology failure and structural and systemic problems. One of the systemic issues is that the electoral commission lacks autonomy in terms of funding. Others are lack of transparency and accountability and insufficient security during elections. These have cast doubt on the elections’ integrity and raised concerns about the reliability of digital technology. </p>
<p>This is not surprising. Evidence from <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2018.1470165">studies</a> has shown that the outcomes of digital technology in elections are mixed. </p>
<p>For instance, during the 2019 elections in Nigeria, there were cases of smart card readers <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/315393-nigeriadecides2019-card-readers-remain-a-challenge.html">malfunctioning</a> in some <a href="https://situationroomng.org/2019-elections-smart-card-reader-challenges/">voting centers</a>. This delayed voters’ accreditation in many polling units. </p>
<p>Further, there was no uniform contingency plan nationally. The electoral officials allowed manual voting in some polling units. In other cases, they permitted the use of “incident forms”, a form filled by election officials on behalf of a voter before being allowed to vote. This happened when smart card readers could not authenticate the voter’s card. A lot of time was wasted in the process, resulting in an extension of the voting period. Many of these hitches occurred, particularly during March 2015 presidential and national assembly elections. </p>
<p>Despite these challenges, I found that the application of digital technology since 2015 has modestly improved the overall quality of elections in Nigeria. It has reduced the incidence of double registration, electoral fraud and violence and <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/487818-editorial-electronic-voting-and-transmission-of-results-the-imperative-to-safeguard-democracy.html?">restored</a> some degree of confidence in the electoral process. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Systemic and institutional issues persist. I found that the autonomy of the electoral commission, inadequate technology infrastructure and security are concerns in Nigeria. So are trust and confidence in digital technology among politicians and voters. </p>
<p>These should be tackled by government undertaking more reforms of the electoral body and improvement in technological infrastructure. Further, the National Assembly should review the Electoral Act, particularly its security aspect. I think if security is enhanced during elections, digitisation will proceed better. </p>
<p>Similarly, concerted efforts should be paid to the risk of digital technology’s failure. And election staff should get adequate training on how to use the technology.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175551/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abiodun Fatai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Digitisation has enhanced the conduct of elections in Nigeria but there are still some drawbacks affecting its efficiency.Abiodun Fatai, Senior Lecturer, Lagos State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1624532021-06-10T14:44:35Z2021-06-10T14:44:35ZA new film about Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections is worth watching, but flawed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405442/original/file-20210609-14813-1i0akh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A still featuring opposition leader Nelson Chamisa from the film President (2021).</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Louverture Films/President/Encounters South African International Documentary Festival</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Danish director <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm1600828/">Camilla Nielsson</a>’s documentary <a href="https://www.encounters.co.za/film/president/#jp-carousel-242670"><em>President</em></a> (2021) is an up-close, intimate tale. It follows the election travails of Zimbabwe’s main <a href="https://www.mdcallianceparty.org">opposition party</a> the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance and its leader, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44741062">Nelson Chamisa</a>.</p>
<p>Winner of the prestigious Sundance Film Festival’s Special Jury <a href="https://www.sundance.org/blogs/news/2021-sundance-film-festival-awards-announced">Award</a> for Verité Filmmaking, the film deploys an “in the moment” technique as it follows the lead-up to the 2018 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">general elections</a>. </p>
<p>It documents Chamisa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-mdc-faces-a-leadership-contest-but-can-it-be-peaceful-112967">battle</a> against the governing Zanu-PF party leader and acting Zimbabwean president <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwa-and-the-military-may-mean-more-bad-news-for-zimbabwe-87646">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>. Mnangagwa ousted Zimbabwe’s 37-year ruler <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Robert Mugabe</a> in 2017. As the film’s promotional material explains: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>As the election looms closer, it becomes increasingly clear that … an election is no guarantee of a democratic outcome.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If you have lingering hopes that the Zanu-PF soldiers’ coup replacing the doddering nonagenerian would leave <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">Mugabe’s legacy</a> behind, settle down for an intense viewing. </p>
<p>Your hopes will crash, with the opposition troops that <em>President</em> follows. They will die, shot down as brutally as the six demonstrators – and bystanders – displaying their anger at the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s delayed <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">election tallies</a>.</p>
<p>But perhaps enough Zimbabwean politics-watchers in southern Africa can move the discussion beyond the liberal <a href="https://www.screendaily.com/reviews/president-sundance-review/5156629.article">good vs evil</a> <a href="https://variety.com/2021/film/reviews/president-review-sundance-1234895097/">platitudes</a> repeated by the film’s reviewers to date. A local audience should offer critical and nuanced views.</p>
<h2>Political thriller?</h2>
<p>A Fulbright graduate of visual anthropology and filmmaking at New York University, director Nielsson has several socially conscious films under her belt, often about the plight of children, in <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0408818/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_8">Afghanistan</a>, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2115303/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_7">Darfur</a> and <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1641626/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_6">India</a>. Her <a href="https://variety.com/2014/film/festivals/film-review-democrats-1201361085/">famed</a> documentary <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4143306/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_4"><em>Democrats</em></a> (2014) covered Zimbabwe’s 2010-2013 constitution-making excursion. </p>
<p><em>President</em> avoids feeding the audience a lot of background history and politics. Nielsson <a href="https://cineuropa.org/en/interview/397158/">says</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We … try to be there when things happen, instead of telling it all backwards and coming up with some sort of analysis. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The film is sold as a political thriller. But as Eric Kohn – perhaps the sole, though mild, critical voice – <a href="https://www.indiewire.com/2021/02/president-review-documentary-zimbabwe-election-1234614636/">writes</a>: the long meetings with Chamisa and company debating how to beat the unbeatable are “less thrilling than exhaustive, a kind of informational activism in feature form”.</p>
<p>Maybe 45 wasted minutes covering meetings could have been used to fill in some glaring gaps that local audiences will notice. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/hthioiO6i0A?wmode=transparent&start=41" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The trailer for the documentary, released in 2021.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Classic documentary moments</h2>
<p>One such moment might have followed the (unnamed) academic <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/staff/phillan-zamchiya/">Phillan Zamchiya</a>. (The film does not identify enough of its characters.) In a hotel room, Chamisa’s lawyerly team debates the next steps. It becomes starkly apparent that this election will go down the drain too. </p>
<p>The camera catches Zamchiya from behind. No polite critic, he <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2013.858546">argues</a> that Zanu-PF are military. They are guerrillas, he says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If people are not prepared to die, to go to prison … you are not going to take power away from this regime, believe me or not. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He might have qualified that Zanu-PF is especially so after the coup, when the pro-Mugabe ‘intelligentsia’ faction was dumped.</p>
<p>Once a student leader severely battered during the early struggles for Zimbabwe’s democracy – as is true for Chamisa, the film shows – Zamchiya knows of what he speaks.</p>
<p>The tortured polling agents filing affidavits about their beatings as they posted ballot reports speak eloquently of that plight. However, the film is silent about how ill-prepared they were for their crucial task. The deceased 1 August demonstrators, angry at the deliberately slow counting of the vote, speak for their last time. The timid <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-motlanthe-commissions-anniversary-of-shame">commission of inquiry</a> into their deaths muted them further.</p>
<p><em>President</em>’s filming of those moments is classic. It’s clear why a good documentary can beat the stills. Watch very closely as the officer claps the back of the soldier who shot at the dispersing crowd. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chaotic street scene featuring half eight soldiers in camouflage and a policeman. One soldier has kneeled and is shooting his rifle. Behind him another has his hand up to slap him on the back, laughing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A screen grab showing a soldier clapping the back of another who has fired on the crowd.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Louverture Films/President</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet Zamchiya’s challenge, if pursued, could have raised more questions of the film’s unfolding events.</p>
<h2>Ignored issues</h2>
<p>Like what other forces shaped this moment? During <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Rhodesia">Rhodesia</a>’s white rule the liberation armies’ military pressure forced the racist regime to the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/race-and-diplomacy-in-zimbabwe/0598BE6A7E9C4D1F0F1DCE36291EB473">negotiating table</a>. This would not have happened without the West because of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War">Cold War</a>. But the West’s post-1989 enthusiasm for democracy-lite <a href="https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/25597">waned</a>. By 2017 it seemed the once opposition-friendly Brits were <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/11/08/zimbabwe-the-uks-misguided-role-in-the-rise-and-fall-of-mnangagwa/">backing</a> the sluggish thug Emmerson Mnangagwa who took over the country. </p>
<p>Or the context of how the original opposition’s <a href="https://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/store/history,-politics-and-development/building-from-the-rubble-the-labour-movement-in-zimbabwe-since-2000-by-lloyd-sachikonye-et-al-detail">trade union</a> roots disappeared due to devastating de-industrialisation after the fast track land reform started in the early 2000s – leading to the opposition party’s takeover by lawyers and neo-liberal fantasies.</p>
<p>Lawyers do argue well. <a href="https://lawyersforlawyers.org/en/thabani-mpofu-released-on-bail/">Thabani Mpofu</a>’s valiant, expertly filmed, attempts at the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe to challenge the vote counting amounted to nothing in the end. It was pleasurable, though, to watch electoral commission bosses and judges trying not to squirm. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">Fantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But those who adored Nielsson’s previous film <em>Democrats</em> and its hero, the lawyer Douglas Mwonzora, will know that he has become a leader of a splinter opposition faction <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/mwonzora-dumped-accused-of-duping-supporters-to-join-zanu-pf/">allegedly</a> working with Zanu-PF. They will wonder how long this move brewed. </p>
<p>The Movement for Democratic Change’s earlier splits, patched up in the alliance only as elections approached, are ignored too. So too Chamisa’s rapid and contested <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/mdc-t-does-succession-the-zanu-pf-way">moves</a> to the top of the party after former opposition leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Morgan Tsvangirai</a> died.</p>
<p>Those 45 minutes could have offered much more meaning. Aside from avoiding Chamisa’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6hfvMP7IE8">religious side</a> <em>President</em> could have screened its footage of Chamisa’s press conference in the wake of Zanu-PF’s chaotic <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">coup consolidator</a>, as 2019 began. </p>
<p>Dead: at least 17 demonstrators and bystanders. Raped: the same number. Meanwhile, Zanu-PF ‘youth’ set the opposition headquarters alight. The charred walls said it all. They would answer the question of why Chamisa’s pursuit of free and fair elections will not go far in 2023, but also why there are no other choices.</p>
<p><em>President</em> zooms in on the moment at the cost of the big picture. Zooming out could have helped.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>President opens the <a href="https://www.encounters.co.za">Encounters</a> South African International Documentary Festival in Johannesburg on 10 June and then plays in select South African cinemas from 11-21 June.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162453/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The award-winning documentary - now on in South Africa - follows opposition leader Nelson Chamisa. But it spends too much time in meetings instead of giving insight into the bigger picture.David B. Moore, Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1621522021-06-08T11:32:56Z2021-06-08T11:32:56ZMexican president suffers setback in country’s deadliest election in decades<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404873/original/file-20210607-28372-vtwhrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C119%2C3988%2C2538&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Voters line up to cast their ballots at a polling station in Ayahualtempa, Mexico, on June 6, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/voters-line-up-for-their-turn-to-cast-their-ballots-at-a-news-photo/1322185648?adppopup=true">Hector Vivas/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mexicans <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/07/world/americas/mexico-election-results-lopez-obrador.html">turned away from President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s party</a> in the country’s <a href="https://twitter.com/INEMexico/status/1400437362002305029">June 6, 2021, midterm election</a>, widely seen as a referendum on his administration’s self-proclaimed “<a href="https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/video/libro-4t-claves-descifrar-rompecabezas-aristegui-mexico/">transformation</a>” of Mexico. </p>
<p>López Obrador had hoped to secure the two-thirds congressional supermajority required to usher through <a href="https://www.elsevier.es/en-revista-mexican-law-review-123-articulo-understanding-constitutional-amendments-in-mexico-S187005781730001X">constitutional amendments</a> uncontested. Instead, preliminary results indicate his Morena party will lose <a href="https://www.ine.mx/src/docs/conteo-rapido/Informe_conteo_rapido_diputados_2021.pdf">50 to 60 seats</a> in Mexico’s lower house of Congress. Morena currently holds <a href="http://sitl.diputados.gob.mx/LXIV_leg/info_diputados.php">253 of the 500 seats</a> but effectively controls <a href="http://sitl.diputados.gob.mx/LXIV_leg/info_diputados.php">332 seats</a> because of its alliances, mainly with the Labor Party and the <a href="https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-02-12/un-escandalo-de-corrupcion-en-el-partido-verde-sacude-la-precampana-electoral.html">scandal-plagued Green Party</a> – which despite its name <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2016/02/10/actualidad/1455142224_892817.html">shows little interest in environmental matters</a>. </p>
<p>Morena holds <a href="https://www.senado.gob.mx/64/senadores/integracion">60% of seats in the Mexican Senate</a>, which weren’t up for election this year.</p>
<p>This was the <a href="https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/opinion/2021-la-eleccion-mas-grande-en-la-historia-del-pais-20200907-0055.html">largest election in Mexican history</a>, both in voting population and candidacies. Some 94 million Mexicans cast ballots for <a href="https://www.ine.mx/">21,368 public officials</a>. All 500 seats in the lower house of Congress were up for grabs, as were 15 governorships, 1,923 mayoralties and thousands of other local posts.</p>
<p>It was also Mexico’s deadliest election in recent history.</p>
<p>According to the Etellekt consulting firm, <a href="https://www.etellekt.com/informe-de-violencia-politica-en-mexico-2021-M30-etellekt.html">89 politicians, including 36 candidates, were murdered</a> since campaigning began last September. Hundreds more candidates were <a href="https://noticieros.televisa.com/ultimas-noticias/autoridades-han-atendido-casi-400-denuncias-violencia-contra-candidatos-proceso-electoral-elecciones-2021/">threatened or attacked</a>. Nearly 200 poll sites were shuttered in the states of <a href="https://aristeguinoticias.com/0406/mexico/suspenden-elecciones-en-municipios-de-chiapas-y-oaxaca/">Chiapas and Oaxaca</a> because officials there said they could not guarantee the safety of voters. </p>
<h2>A bloody race</h2>
<p>The main opposition that dented Morena’s dominance was a <a href="https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/pan-pri-y-prd-presentan-su-coalicion-va-por-mexico-para-la-eleccion-federal-de-2021">coalition</a> of Mexico’s <a href="https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/elecciones-2021/2021/06/07/el-mapa-de-cdmx-dividido-en-dos-tras-elecciones-del-6-de-junio/">three traditional parties</a>: the center-right Revolutionary Institutional Party, right-wing National Action Party and leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution. The Citizen’s Movement, a social-democratic party, <a href="https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/movimiento-ciudadano-va-sin-alianzas-en-2021/1423584">competed independently</a>.</p>
<p>Morena <a href="https://www.forbes.com.mx/morena-jonron-se-queda-al-menos-10-gubernaturas/">performed well at the state level</a> and is leading in 10 of 15 gubernatorial races. But it suffered <a href="https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Elecciones-2020-2021-en-CDMX-Resultados-Electorales-Preliminares-20210606-0173.html">heavy losses</a> in Mexico City, <a href="https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/La-CDMX-un-bastion-que-ha-mantenido-la-izquierda-20170320-0034.html">a bulwark of the Mexican left</a>.</p>
<p>López Obrador <a href="https://computos2018.ine.mx/#/presidencia/nacional/1/1/1/1">won the presidency in 2018 in a landslide</a>, after promising to put “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9A0noUROXvo">Mexico’s poor first</a>” and <a href="https://theconversation.com/lopez-obrador-takes-power-in-mexico-after-an-unstable-transition-and-broken-campaign-promises-105343">“pacify” the country</a>, which consistently has among the world’s highest murder rates. </p>
<p>Instead, he has overseen rising poverty and the most violent period of Mexican history, with <a href="https://www.animalpolitico.com/2021/05/violencia-asesinatos-cuatro-meses-2021/">an average of 97 people murdered every day</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404876/original/file-20210607-13-1bf19y7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="López Obrador holds up a piece of paper, wearing a face mask" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404876/original/file-20210607-13-1bf19y7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404876/original/file-20210607-13-1bf19y7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404876/original/file-20210607-13-1bf19y7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404876/original/file-20210607-13-1bf19y7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404876/original/file-20210607-13-1bf19y7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404876/original/file-20210607-13-1bf19y7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404876/original/file-20210607-13-1bf19y7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador shows his credential before voting on June 6, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mexican-president-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-shows-his-news-photo/1233315629?adppopup=true">Str/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mexico’s crime wave began well before the López Obrador administration, with President Felipe Calderon’s 2006 declaration of a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-decade-of-murder-and-grief-mexicos-drug-war-turns-ten-70036">war on cartels</a>” that got <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-record-29-000-mexicans-were-murdered-last-year-can-soldiers-stop-the-bloodshed-90574">the military involved in civilian law enforcement</a>. </p>
<p>Rather than follow through on his creative campaign pledges to reduce violence, López Obrador has <a href="https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5593105&fecha=11/05/2020">continued his predecessors’ drug war</a>, expanding the military’s involvement in law enforcement despite its <a href="https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhsnn3otTjgQWftWGGStAtK%2fC%2fYaADRZzF%2fUt%2f29mCSBqslnJw9k2ZuWX1QQBsnw8x%2feraJ6T8nBuzoAp%2fTyuwBkpPM71V9flIZoyvdNO76hUA">dismal record of human rights abuses in that job</a>.</p>
<p>Most electoral violence seen during the midterm election season occurred in the cartel-dominated Mexican states of <a href="https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/La-violencia-politica-empana-el-proceso-electoral-2021-20210418-0003.html">Guerrero, Veracruz and Oaxaca</a>. There, criminal groups often offer local public servants and candidates the infamous choice of “<a href="https://books.google.com.au/books/about/M%C3%A1s_que_plata_o_plomo.html?id=8INKCAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">silver or lead</a>,” which translates to “plata o plomo.” In other words, take a bribe or get shot. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.etellekt.com/informe-de-violencia-politica-en-mexico-2021-M30-etellekt.html">Seventy-five percent of the attacks</a> against politicians or candidates this election season were against local officials. Municipal leaders are appealing targets because criminal groups can intimidate lower-level officials into handing over parts of municipal budgets or calling off local police.</p>
<h2>Campaigning at press conferences</h2>
<p>Out of 89 murdered politicians, <a href="https://www.etellekt.com/informe-de-violencia-politica-en-mexico-2021-M30-etellekt.html">25 were members of Morena’s coalition</a>. Even so, López Obrador dismisses reports on Mexico’s electoral violence as <a href="https://www.gob.mx/presidencia/articulos/version-estenografica-conferencia-de-prensa-del-presidente-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-del-2-de-junio-de-2021?idiom=es">media sensationalism</a>. </p>
<p>In his June 2 daily press conference, <a href="https://www.gob.mx/presidencia/articulos/version-estenografica-conferencia-de-prensa-del-presidente-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-del-2-de-junio-de-2021?idiom=es">he said</a> Mexicans “do not live in a perfect society” but claimed “peace and tranquility” reign.</p>
<p>The president’s morning press conferences, which can last for up to three hours, frequently include diatribes against the reporters asking him questions, attacks on <a href="https://www.forbes.com.mx/politica-amlo-mujeres-no-dejarse-manipular-marcha-8m/">feminism</a> and accusations against <a href="https://politica.expansion.mx/presidencia/2021/06/07/amlo-pide-a-eu-retirar-financiamiento-a-las-ong-antes-de-la-reunion-con-harris">human rights organizations</a>. He also uses press conferences to attack <a href="https://apnews.com/article/tax-evasion-health-coronavirus-594d2b8509558a059540dd70844dcf70">his political opponents</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/1_280521.pdf">Mexican Constitution</a> and <a href="http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/abro/cofipe/COFIPE_abro_14ene08.pdf">electoral laws</a> prohibit public officials from using the government machinery to promote themselves or their political allies during elections.</p>
<p>After Mexico’s National Electoral Institute told the president <a href="https://politica.expansion.mx/mexico/2021/01/15/el-ine-ordena-a-amlo-que-no-hable-de-elecciones-en-las-conferencias-mananeras">to avoid commenting on election-related topics</a> at press conferences, he said the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pffvP8nOsEM&t=197s">order amounted to censorship</a>. He successfully <a href="https://aristeguinoticias.com/1802/mexico/revoca-tepjf-candados-del-ine-a-las-conferencias-matutinas-de-amlo/">challenged</a> it before the <a href="https://www.te.gob.mx/front3/bulletins/detail/4064/0">Mexican electoral court</a>.</p>
<p>Such moves have polarized the Mexican electorate. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404880/original/file-20210607-8878-1e2uni8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Armed policemen stand outside a building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404880/original/file-20210607-8878-1e2uni8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404880/original/file-20210607-8878-1e2uni8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404880/original/file-20210607-8878-1e2uni8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404880/original/file-20210607-8878-1e2uni8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404880/original/file-20210607-8878-1e2uni8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404880/original/file-20210607-8878-1e2uni8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404880/original/file-20210607-8878-1e2uni8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police guard an office of Mexico’s National Electoral Institute in Chilpancingo, Mexico, the day before the midterm elections.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/state-police-officers-stand-in-guard-outside-the-district-news-photo/1233291219?adppopup=true">Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>López Obrador maintains the support of <a href="https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/2021/05/10/cae-4-puntos-la-aprobacion-de-amlo-y-se-ubica-en-57/">57%</a> of Mexicans, who crave the promised “transformation” of their long-struggling nation. But many civil society leaders and intellectuals <a href="https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-05-31/430-intelectuales-piden-votar-en-contra-de-morena-por-la-defensa-de-la-democracia-y-la-libertad.html">perceive an authoritarian bent</a> in the president’s combative rhetoric and policy agenda.</p>
<p>Since 2018, Morena <a href="https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/reformas-de-amlo-acaparan-64-legislatura">has introduced 29</a> <a href="https://otrosdialogos.colmex.mx/una-nueva-constitucion-las-reformas-constitucionales-del-presidente-lopez-obrador">constitutional amendments</a> and approved <a href="https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/reformas-de-amlo-acaparan-64-legislatura">289 legislative changes</a>. Many have <a href="https://twitter.com/lopezobrador_/status/1399059943282692097">concentrated more power in the presidency</a> and <a href="https://lopezobrador.org.mx/2021/01/04/en-2021-se-debe-fortalecer-la-austeridad-republicana-afirma-presidente/">subjected other parts of Mexico’s federal bureaucracy to severe austerity</a>. </p>
<p>Critics say López Obrador is creating a government grounded on his <a href="https://mexicoelections.weebly.com/op-eds/what-is-amlos-morena-party">charisma and desires</a>, without traditional checks and balances, and weakening Mexico’s democratic institutions. </p>
<p>They cite, for example, a court reform billed as <a href="http://comunicacion.senado.gob.mx/index.php/informacion/boletines/50740-aprueba-senado-nuevas-leyes-para-el-poder-judicial-de-la-federacion.html">preventing corruption and nepotism in the judiciary</a> that unexpectedly and controversially <a href="https://comunicacionnoticias.diputados.gob.mx/comunicacion/index.php/boletines/la-camara-de-diputados-aprobo-en-lo-general-dictamen-a-la-minuta-sobre-reformas-al-poder-judicial-de-la-federacion#gsc.tab=0">extended for two years the term of Supreme Court Chief Justice</a> Arturo Zaldívar, a vocal López Obrador ally.</p>
<p>Critics claim this maneuver <a href="https://www.milenio.com/politica/ley-zaldivar-estrategia-cooptar-judicial-juristas">violates the constitution</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/26/lopez-obrador-threatens-judicial-independence">undermines judicial independence</a>.</p>
<p>Other Morena legislation raises privacy concerns. A <a href="https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5616165&fecha=16/04/2021">legislative reform</a> passed this year requires cellphone companies to gather users’ identification and biometric data, like eye scans, and turn it over to the government. </p>
<p>Simultaneously, Morena has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexico-amlo-freedom-information-inai-democracy/2021/02/13/f73268ec-66e1-11eb-8468-21bc48f07fe5_story.html">vowed to abolish the National Institute for Access to Information</a>, a government watchdog that <a href="https://home.inai.org.mx/?page_id=1626">monitors federal spending and investigates abuses against personal privacy</a>.</p>
<p>[<em>Understand what’s going on in Washington.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-most">Sign up for The Conversation’s Politics Weekly</a>.]</p>
<p>The president also threatened to <a href="https://www.forbes.com.mx/amlo-plantea-desaparicion-del-ine-y-que-poder-judicial-absorba-temas-electorales/">abolish the National Electoral Institute</a> after it rebuked him for electioneering at his morning press conferences.</p>
<h2>‘To hell with their institutions’</h2>
<p>In 2006, López Obrador ran for president and lost by 0.56 percentage points to <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/09/AR2006070900217.html">the centrist National Action Party candidate Felipe Calderón</a>. He cried fraud and contested the result. </p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oMZwuWDMnDE">To hell with their institutions</a>!” he said after <a href="https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/politica/cuando-amlo-mando-al-diablo-las-instituciones">the federal electoral court confirmed Calderón’s victory</a>.</p>
<p>It was López Obrador’s first of two failed presidential runs. </p>
<p>Now, he’s president. But López Obrador still seems convinced that the institutions of Mexican democracy – its independent judiciary, its election watchdogs, its budget monitors – are against him. </p>
<p>Mexican voters had the option to strengthen López Obrador’s grasp on power. But they used the midterms to maintain democratic constraints on the presidency, checking an ambitious president’s legislative agenda.</p>
<p><em>This article has been corrected to more accurately characterize the ideological positioning of Mexico’s mainstream political parties.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162152/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luis Gómez Romero does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Thirty-six candidates were murdered since campaigning began in Mexico last September, including numerous members of the president’s own Morena party.Luis Gómez Romero, Senior Lecturer in Human Rights, Constitutional Law and Legal Theory, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1583332021-04-06T14:37:11Z2021-04-06T14:37:11ZCuts to UK research funding threaten critical human rights projects across the world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393568/original/file-20210406-23-qiqns3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Human rights defenders speaking out for women march through an informal settlement in Nairobi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Yasuyoshi CHIBA / AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-56473067">There have been</a> recent controversial cuts to the UK’s aid budget – slashed from 0.7% of gross national income to 0.5% last month – which have undermined the country’s commitment to “be a force for good in the world”. The cuts will have a devastating impact on the provision of services in humanitarian crises, <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/uk-s-aid-budget-to-yemen-slashed-by-nearly-60-99281">such as in Yemen</a>, and it will also affect vital research projects. </p>
<p>UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), the body that controls research funding in the UK, has told universities that projects under the <a href="https://www.ukri.org/our-work/collaborating-internationally/global-challenges-research-fund/">Global Challenges Research Fund</a> (GCRF), part of the UK’s official development assistance, <a href="https://www.ukri.org/our-work/ukri-oda-letter-11-march-2021/">are to be defunded</a>. This is due to a budget shortfall of £120million (US$166million), amounting to a 70% reduction for the financial year 2021-2022. </p>
<p>The Global Challenges Research Fund brings together researchers from the UK and low- and middle-income countries to develop research-led solutions to tackle pressing global issues, such as inequality, poverty, injustice, and the climate crisis. Removing funding from these projects puts people in highly vulnerable situations. <a href="https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2021/04/01/ten-reasons-to-restore-oda-research-funding/">These cuts affect all 800 currently funded projects</a>.</p>
<p>Not only does this cause research projects that already are in progress to be halted, if not terminated, but it will also impact future funding opportunities.</p>
<p>This will have huge implications for researchers and critical research topics all over the world. </p>
<p>For instance, <a href="https://www.rights4time.com/copy-of-surfacing-time">our own Global Challenges Research Fund-supported work</a> focuses on ending impunity for sexual violence in Kenya. The political landscape in Kenya means that this budget cut has come at an especially critical time for our project: next year is an election year. </p>
<p>Sexual violence has been associated with election periods in Kenya and is used as a <a href="https://phr.org/our-work/resources/breaking-cycles-of-violence-gaps-in-prevention-of-and-response-to-electoral-related-sexual-violence-in-kenya/">form of political intimidation</a>. Our work increases the capability of human rights defenders in Kenya to <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/igi/igi-transforming-how-sexual-violence-is-reported-kenya-min.pdf">document and monitor</a> sexual violence incidents in real time. Our research can, therefore, help to identify perpetrators of election-related rape, deter crimes, and determine areas where critical services are needed to support survivors.</p>
<p>However, unless the cuts are reversed, more women and children will suffer. UK Research and Innovation has left it up to individual universities to decide by April 16 which Global Challenges Research Fund projects will be terminated, and which of the remaining projects face a budget cut of between 50% to 83%. </p>
<h2>Critical research</h2>
<p>Our team, which includes the <a href="https://wangukanjafoundation.org/">Wangu Kanja Foundation</a>, the Survivors of Sexual Violence in Kenya Network (hereafter, the network), and researchers from the University of Birmingham, <a href="https://www.careresearchproject.com">have been combating sexual violence</a> <a href="https://www.careresearchproject.com">through</a> the fund.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393572/original/file-20210406-19-1kdd26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393572/original/file-20210406-19-1kdd26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393572/original/file-20210406-19-1kdd26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393572/original/file-20210406-19-1kdd26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393572/original/file-20210406-19-1kdd26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393572/original/file-20210406-19-1kdd26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393572/original/file-20210406-19-1kdd26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wangu Kanja</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Lack of data and weak statistical and technical capacity in countries such as Kenya mean incidents of sexual violence <a href="https://systematicreviewsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13643-021-01613-9">are seldom</a> brought to the attention of international audiences. An estimated 17-25% of girls <a href="https://www.unicef.org/kenya/reports/The-2019-Violence-Against-Children-Survey">experience sexual violence at least once</a> before the age of 18. Further, historically, survivors have not been “at the table” when prevention and protection policies are developed. Policies are thus <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589871X19300841">often inadequate and poorly executed</a> due to the lack of political goodwill and inadequate resources.</p>
<p>To this end, the Network developed a mobile application in 2018 to collect data from rape survivors across all 47 counties in Kenya. This provides systematic and high-quality data about incidents. The Kenyan government does not systematically record cases or track them.</p>
<p>The lack of official government data contributes to the collective oppression of sexual violence survivors. The work of the survivors’ network is evidencing the scale of these violations and helps to amplify the voices of survivors. </p>
<p>Global Challenges Research Fund cuts threaten to undermine <a href="https://www.careresearchproject.com/interview-training">this hard, important work</a>.</p>
<h2>COVID-19</h2>
<p>The network also recently <a href="https://zenodo.org/record/3964124#.YGWI_69KjIW">sought</a> to identify <a href="https://zenodo.org/record/3964124#.YGWI_69KjIW">new patterns of sexual violence</a> in Kenya during COVID-19. The results paint a worrying picture for the year ahead. We found that patterns of violence were shifting in the wake of the pandemic. Vulnerability to sexual and other forms of gender-based violence were being exacerbated, particularly for girls and women.</p>
<p>For instance, child victims now appear to be four years younger compared to before the pandemic. <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fgwh.2021.630901/full">Our research</a> is enabling us to urge policymakers to ensure children have access to alternative safe venues when schools are closed, and that Kenya’s COVID-19 emergency management and recovery plans include alternative emergency routes for accessing vital services.</p>
<p>Worryingly, our report also identified an increase in violations (rapes, murders, beatings) by police and security forces throughout the pandemic.</p>
<p>These findings are especially important around elections, which have historically been marred by widespread sexual violence and other human rights violations. Most survivors did not receive urgent medical attention and post-rape care. Those who are supposed to protect people from harm committed the most horrific acts.</p>
<h2>Letting down our partners</h2>
<p>Removing vital support to survivors and defunding our ability to track cases and hold perpetrators accountable will only serve to worsen the problem, both next year and in the decades that follow.</p>
<p>The stakes could not be higher. Survivors of sexual violence in Kenya rarely receive psycho-social support. Rape is highly stigmatised in Kenya, and victims are left to cope on their own.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.careresearchproject.com/interview-training">Our research</a> is also adapting Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-protocol-on-the-documentation-and-investigation-of-sexual-violence-in-conflict">protocol</a> so that it can be used by human rights defenders in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589871X19301330">low-resource environments</a>. The protocol provides guidance on documenting and investigating sexual violence in conflict so that perpetrators can be brought to justice. </p>
<p>Cutting our project – and others like it – means losing a genuine opportunity to change this situation. </p>
<p><em>The Wangu Kanja Foundation (WKF) is a 15-year old registered non-profit NGO in Kenya that assists survivors in accessing post-rape care services.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158333/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heather D. Flowe holds UK Research and Innovation GCRF grants.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman and Wangu Kanja do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Removing funding from research-led projects puts people in highly vulnerable situations.Wangu Kanja, Affiliated Researcher, University of BirminghamHeather D. Flowe, Reader in Forensic Psychology, University of BirminghamNic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1565052021-03-08T15:19:49Z2021-03-08T15:19:49ZWhy working as a journalist in Uganda is particularly tough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387793/original/file-20210304-13-1ksubin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A policeman beats up a journalist in Kampala outside the Daily Monitor and Red Pepper newspapers during a protest at the temporary closure of two newspapers by armed police in May 2013.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Isaac Kasamani/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ugandan journalists are subject to <a href="https://rsf.org/en/uganda">state intimidation and violence</a> almost on a daily basis. During the recent presidential elections, media crews covering opposition candidates – often in protective gear – were targets of physical assault for weeks. In one of the more egregious acts, journalists were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-uganda-politics-idUSKBN2AI0RP">beaten</a> outside a United Nations compound in the capital Kampala while covering a post-election story – sparking international outrage. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni is <a href="https://cpj.org/2004/03/attacks-on-the-press-2003-uganda/">credited</a> with liberalising the media. The country is now home to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112301">hundreds</a> of (mostly independent) media houses, making it one of the more vibrant media landscapes in the region. </p>
<p>In 2018 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1461670X.2020.1852097?journalCode=rjos20">we interviewed</a> 27 journalists to find out more about <a href="https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/download/11456/2948">the challenges they faced</a>. </p>
<p>We drew a number of conclusions. Firstly, that media houses paid low wages and offered few development opportunities for journalists. This had a number of consequences: one was that it made journalists prone to self-censorship. A reporter at <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/">New Vision</a>, the largest state-funded newspaper in the country, explained the connection like this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You only get paid for your stories that are published, so you don’t want to write a sensitive story that might not get published because then you won’t get paid. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Low pay also made reporters more susceptible to bribes, which journalists said were commonplace.</p>
<p>Journalists also regularly spoke about the presence of spies in almost every newsroom in the country. This affected how they worked and what they wrote about.</p>
<p>Although our interviews were conducted nearly three years ago, the recent attacks on journalists suggest the problems have not been resolved, and may be worsening. As these challenges persist, individual journalists face increasing hardships, and the problematic aspects of journalism as a profession like bribes and self-censorship, for example — may be intensified. As journalists continue to feel forced to self-censor, Ugandan citizens receive limited information, thus hindering the country’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/public-opinion-democracy-and-market-reform-africa?format=HB&isbn=9780521841917">progress toward democratisation</a>. </p>
<h2>A calculated form of control</h2>
<p>Journalists spoke of legal and illegal mechanisms that the government used to control them. These included threats, defamation charges, detainment and beatings. </p>
<p>But, many pointed out that what made the government retaliation particularly insidious was its uneven and unpredictable nature.</p>
<p>For example, a reporter for the private station NBS TV said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There are times when we’ve had critical stories; we’ve run them and nothing has been said. You expect some backlash, nothing happens, a week, two weeks, a month, and it goes. But then, there are other stories where the state is increasingly involved and saying, ‘You can’t run this story’. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>These erratic repercussions left many journalists in a perpetual state of fear.</p>
<p>Spies in the newsroom added to this atmosphere. Journalists told us that “spies” worked as journalists within media houses. They accepted money from the government in exchange for publishing positive content about certain politicians or revealing forthcoming sensitive stories, enabling the government to force the publication to drop the story. </p>
<p>This issue isn’t unique to Uganda. While little evidence exists, such a practice <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/1997/9709/s970916f.htm">has been seen</a> anecdotally in South Africa. But, based on our interviews, government-affiliated spies in Uganda’s media houses appeared prevalent and a mechanism the state favoured to keep control on the media.</p>
<p>Some journalists we interviewed said they knew, or suspected, who the spies in their newsroom were. Almost all journalists said they took precautions such as avoiding working collaboratively or working remotely to limit the number of people familiar with their stories. Some also said they would ask a trusted friend to hold sensitive documents or story drafts instead of keeping them in the newsroom.</p>
<p>Some said they would only work with a single editor they trusted.</p>
<p>Media houses also tried to protect journalists by withholding their bylines on sensitive stories to protect their reporters. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done?</h2>
<p>The journalists we spoke to agreed that both sides — the journalists and the government — needed to work together to alleviate problems such as bribes, spies, self-censorship and government intimidation. </p>
<p>For their part, journalists said they needed comprehensive training on the laws that protect them. They also needed to unite and become empowered in an effort to protect their profession. Some Ugandan journalists have made inroads by creating a WhatsApp group called Press Freedom Forum to discuss ways to exercise and protect their rights.</p>
<p>But a change in the mentality of government officials is also needed. </p>
<p>In our conversations, journalists said the government needed to better understand the role of journalism in society so that they weren’t defensive or offended when reporters ask tough questions. Journalists said the state viewed reporters — especially investigative or political reporters — as unpatriotic when they were trying to obtain information. </p>
<p>A senior reporter for the private newspaper Daily Monitor said sourcing information from police and security officials could be particularly problematic:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Once you tend to have asked questions, you want to get documents, they look at you as a threat.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A former reporter said that government officials needed to see themselves as working for the public, rather than simply being in charge of them.</p>
<p>Ultimately, significant improvements in press freedom are unlikely to happen until the country sees a change in its leadership. In the meantime, journalists said the best path forward was to continue working hard and to persevere despite the challenges. </p>
<p>A former journalist said the media houses that have “stood the test of time despite the threats” are making a difference, both for journalism and for society:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Those journalists have done a tremendous job … the media plays a very central role, actually, as a key pillar of democracy.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156505/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Uganda media houses pay low wages and offer few development opportunities for journalists, which makes reporters more susceptible to bribes.Karen McIntyre, Assistant Professor, Journalism and Director of Graduate Studies, Richard T. Robertson School of Media and Culture, Virginia Commonwealth UniversityMeghan Sobel Cohen, Associate Professor, Department of Communication and the Master of Development Practice, Regis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1539752021-02-18T13:43:34Z2021-02-18T13:43:34ZElection violence spiked worldwide in 2020 – will this year be better?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384863/original/file-20210217-23-keh005.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C10%2C6979%2C4652&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S. was one of 33 countries to experience election-related violence in 2020 – the worst year for peaceful elections ever. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotografía-de-noticias/trump-supporters-clash-with-police-and-security-fotografía-de-noticias/1230734284?adppopup=true">Brent Stirton/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The insurrection at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/pro-trump-rioters-storm-u-s-capitol-as-his-election-tantrum-leads-to-violence-149142">U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6 shocked Americans and the world</a>. But the U.S. was not alone in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-those-mourning-the-fragility-of-american-democracy-get-wrong-153813">its rocky transfer of power</a>: Last year saw more election-related violence than any year in the past four decades.</p>
<p>Fifty-four percent of national elections that took place in 2020 had some form of violence, according to <a href="https://oefdatascience.github.io/REIGN.github.io/menu/elvi_current.html">a new election violence database</a> my team of conflict analysts released in 2021. That’s 33 national votes marred by violence.</p>
<p>Election violence is a type of political violence that seeks to unduly influence the process and outcome of a vote. Attacks can be perpetrated by governments or civilians, against electoral infrastructure, political parties or voters. </p>
<p>Our database tracks all incidents of election violence going back to 1975. Until last year, the worse year was 1990, when violence occurred in around 46% of elections. The median annual rate dating back to 1975 is 30%. </p>
<p>How will 2021 stack up?</p>
<h2>Countries to watch</h2>
<p>So far, this year looks to be slightly more peaceful than last.</p>
<p>Of 42 national elections scheduled to occur in 2021, our data forecasts that roughly 40% are at high risk of violence. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/6/chad-police-confront-protesters-as-deby-nominated-for-sixth-term">Chad</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-next-poll-could-be-more-competitive-but-big-challenges-remain-154393">Ethiopia</a> and Haiti are at the most risk for election-related violence this year. </p>
<p>Chile, a generally stable democracy, is also unusually high on the list after a <a href="https://theconversation.com/chile-puts-its-constitution-on-the-ballot-after-year-of-civil-unrest-147832">year of civil unrest</a>. </p>
<p><iframe id="eL3Nx" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/eL3Nx/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Why these countries? </p>
<p>Though the causes of election violence are complex and unique to each country, <a href="https://oefdatascience.github.io/REIGN.github.io/menu/elvi_current.html">my research</a> finds many places that experience election violence share the same five characteristics: </p>
<ul>
<li>a history of election violence (indicating violence is “normalized”)</li>
<li>high coup risk (an indicator of a weak state)</li>
<li>high infant mortality rate (an indicator of a weak state) </li>
<li>pervasive political violence (an indicator of a weak state)</li>
<li>low gross domestic product (indicating a struggling economy)</li>
</ul>
<p>When all five characteristics are present, our <a href="https://oefdatascience.github.io/REIGN.github.io/menu/elvi_current.html">early warning forecaster</a> raises red flags. </p>
<h2>How we predict violence</h2>
<p>The national data we processed finds that countries with longer and more recent histories of election violence are at risk of more violence. The presence of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340902884689">other kinds of political violence</a> – terrorism or civil war, for example – also increases the risk of election violence because <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546550902950290">political attacks</a> can come to be seen as “normal.” </p>
<p>The government’s ability to exercise power is another important factor in election violence risk. That’s because authorities in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=EsCIDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=state+capacity+and+election+violence&ots=VRahNyGkqJ&sig=C9aC1I7oTevYeAD3p_hvt7ljk9g#v=onepage&q=state%20capacity%20and%20election%20violence&f=false">weak states usually cannot physically stop clashes</a> – even if, as was the case in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/03/16/ballots-bullets/organized-political-violence-and-kenyas-crisis-governance#">Kenya’s 2007 election</a>, they can reasonably foresee conflict erupting. </p>
<p>History shows a weak government may also inflict election violence if the incumbent fears losing political power. That’s what Azerbaijan’s <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53268/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Content_Jablonski,%20R_When%20governments%20resort_Jablonski_When%20governments%20resort_2016.pdf">president did in 2005</a> when growing political opposition threatened his leadership before the election.</p>
<p>To measure state capacity, we consider infant mortality rate, gross domestic product and the risk of regime change. These factors show the government’s ability to maintain stability and promote well-being, which are reliable indicators of its power. </p>
<h2>Election violence in democracies</h2>
<p>The data shows that election violence in both democracies and nondemocracies is increasing at similar rates worldwide – though the violence plays out differently, and occurs for different reasons.</p>
<p><iframe id="NQvBp" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/NQvBp/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In democracies, <a href="https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2020/10/13/assessing-the-risk-of-electoral-violence-in-the-united-states/">election violence</a> can occur because of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546550902950290">bitter partisan competition</a> or as a result of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43664345?seq=1">political violence</a> becoming normalized. An <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343316687801">incumbent leader</a> who directly or indirectly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546550902950290">encourages violence</a> to suppress the opposition can also catalyze violence. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.newsday.com/long-island/politics/election-day-trump-twitter-biden-polls-voting-count-pennsylvania-texas-fauci-1.50055053">President Donald Trump did this</a> before and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html">after the United States’ 2020 election</a>, which led to the Capitol riot that <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/07/us/capitol-mob-deaths/index.html">killed five people</a>. </p>
<p>In Nigeria’s 2011 presidential election, over <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800-rights-group-idUSTRE74F71S20110516">800 people were killed</a> by violent mobs when candidate Muhammadu Buhari refused to concede defeat. His denial of election results exacerbated preexisting religious and regional tensions between the north and south. </p>
<p>[<em>Understand key political developments, each week.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s politics newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Election violence undermines the <a href="https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2020/10/26/nobody-wins-with-violence-around-elections/">legitimacy of a country’s political system</a>. By reducing voter confidence in peaceful democratic transition, it can eventually result in <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/607612/summary">a shift toward more authoritarian governance</a>.</p>
<h2>Violence in authoritarian regimes</h2>
<p>In places that already have authoritarian governments, bloodshed during election season isn’t a surprise. Often, it’s an <a href="https://time.com/5356008/zimbabwe-election-deadly-unrest/">organized strategy</a> used to keep votes from being free and fair – part of the broader toolkit that many autocratic leaders use to repress and manipulate the citizenry.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe and Belarus are useful examples. </p>
<p>During dictator Robert Mugabe’s 30-year rule of Zimbabwe, for example, his ZANU-PF party allowed opposition candidates to run for office – but regularly used violence to neutralize and intimidate the electoral opposition. Even <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/world/africa/zimbabwe-elections-protests.html">after Mugabe’s ouster in a 2017 coup</a>, the country’s new rulers continued this strategy. </p>
<p>The August 2020 Belarusian presidential election saw embattled President Victor Lukashenko use similar tactics to declare his win. Opposition candidates and party members <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/belarus-opposition-figure-fears-he-wont-be-able-to-go-home/2020/07/28/c35d9534-d102-11ea-826b-cc394d824e35_story.html">were arrested and threatened</a> in the lead-up to the highly contested August election, spurring massive protests. </p>
<p>Election-related violence will persist for the foreseeable future. In democracies and nondemocracies alike, strategic attacks serve those who have power and want to keep it. </p>
<p><em>Matthew Frank, a researcher at the One Earth Foundation, contributed research and analysis to this story.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153975/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clayton Besaw is a senior analyst with the One Earth Future Foundation and the Open Nuclear Network, a non-profit organization that promotes peace and security in post-conflict countries and the mitigation of nuclear weapons proliferation.</span></em></p>Elections are getting less safe in democracies and nondemocracies alike. Last year was the bloodiest year for elections in decades, with 54% of all national votes marred by some kind of violence.Clayton Besaw, Research Affiliate and Senior Analyst, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1511792021-02-03T13:11:09Z2021-02-03T13:11:09ZTo defuse political violence across US, conflict mediators apply lessons from gang disputes and foreign elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381429/original/file-20210129-19-1ayp7r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C34%2C3821%2C2509&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S. isn't the first country to suffer election-related violence. Activists are learning from other countries how to keep the peace. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-us-president-donald-trump-fight-with-riot-news-photo/1230457964?adppopup=true">Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After a <a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-activists-on-social-media-telegraphed-violence-weeks-in-advance-of-the-attack-on-the-us-capitol-152861">violent American election season</a>, activists are trying to keep the peace using technologies and techniques more often applied in unstable democracies.</p>
<p>As inflamed supporters of Donald Trump <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-capitol-mob-highlights-5-reasons-not-to-underestimate-far-right-extremists-148610">stormed the U.S. Capitol</a> on Jan. 6, attempting to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election, members of the <a href="https://dcpeaceteam.com">DC Peace Team</a> – a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit organization that promotes nonviolent conflict resolution – were at Black Lives Matter Plaza, a few blocks from the Capitol, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DcPeaceTeam/posts/3969029706464572">monitoring the convergence of predominantly white pro-Trump supporters and mainly Black counterprotesters</a>. </p>
<p>When a white Trump supporter pulled a knife on a Black counterprotester, team members in bright vests approached the man, hands in the air, encouraging him to “slow down,” according to the group. Soon, he put away the knife, and friends pulled him away from the scene. </p>
<p>Five people died in the Capitol attack. But in this one incident, at least, violence was stopped before it could start.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Man in reflective yellow vest" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A DC Peace Team activist at Black Lives Matter Plaza on Jan. 6.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">DC Peace Team</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>From Kenya to Minnesota</h2>
<p>Interventions by volunteers trained in keeping the peace when tensions are high have long been used to reduce election-related violence in the developing world. </p>
<p>After Kenya’s bitterly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">contested 2007 presidential election</a>, which left over 1,000 people dead, Kenyan activists created an online map to monitor and try to prevent political violence. Their efforts inspired the development of <a href="https://www.ushahidi.com/about">Ushahidi</a> – Swahili for “witness” – a crowdsourced mapping tool that shows peacekeepers exactly where a conflict is developing. </p>
<p>Ushahidi has since been used worldwide to document countless political problems and humanitarian crises, from violent incidents in the <a href="https://www.ushahidi.com/case-studies/syria-tracker">Syrian Civil War</a> to <a href="https://harassmap.org/en/">sexual harassment in Egypt</a>. In 2013 and 2017 Kenyan activists once again used this technology to predict and defuse potential violence before, during and after their <a href="https://www.ushahidi.com/blog/2017/11/08/uchaguzi-2017-october-26th-elections-report">presidential election</a>. </p>
<p>Now, political violence is <a href="https://theconversation.com/was-it-a-coup-no-but-siege-on-us-capitol-was-the-election-violence-of-a-fragile-democracy-152803">threatening democracy in the United States</a>. The Jan. 6 Capitol insurrection was the culmination of a violent year that saw <a href="https://theconversation.com/federal-agents-sent-to-kenosha-but-history-shows-militarized-policing-in-cities-can-escalate-violence-and-trigger-conflict-143579">clashes between police and racial justice protesters</a>, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/plot-to-kidnap-michigans-governor-grew-from-the-militia-movements-toxic-mix-of-constitutional-falsehoods-and-half-truths-147825">right-wing plot to kidnap Michigan’s Democratic governor</a> and death threats against election officials. </p>
<p>For humanitarian workers and crisis responders who, like us, have worked abroad in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=IZkoGEEAAAAJ&hl=en">conflict zones</a>, the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02681102.2014.903894">scenes looked terribly familiar</a>. In late 2020 we joined with other conflict experts – including both local community groups and global nonprofit organizations – to found the <a href="https://mediatorsbeyondborders.org/trust/">Trust Network</a>, a nonpartisan group dedicated to detecting and trying to prevent political violence. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four young Kenyans sit at a table with computers" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Leaders of Ushahidi in their offices in 2013 in Nairobi, Kenya.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/juliana-rotich-executive-director-of-ushahidi-a-non-profit-news-photo/160097055?adppopup=true">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Conflict mapping in action</h2>
<p>Online teams at the Trust Network gather intelligence on the activities and stated intentions of extremist groups gleaned from both <a href="https://www.isdglobal.org">think tanks</a> and research institutes that <a href="https://bridgingdivides.princeton.edu/">monitor the violent fringes of U.S. society</a>. Based on that information, we identify potentially violent outbreaks – whether at protests or political rallies – then mark the site on a digital map. </p>
<p>The map is shared with member organizations, among them the local conflict mediators that work on the ground to de-escalate violence at marches, demonstrations and the like. Physically inserting themselves between opposing groups, they talk to each side and attempt to persuade people to step back from violence. This strategy, also called “violence interruption,” is often used <a href="https://theconversation.com/faith-based-violence-interrupters-stop-gang-shootings-with-promise-of-redemption-for-at-risk-youth-not-threats-of-jail-142449">in gang disputes</a>.</p>
<p>From October to December 2020, the Trust Network mapped 193 incidents of <a href="https://eirusa.ushahidi.io/views/map">violence and harassment related to the U.S. general election on Nov. 3</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="US map with pins dropped nationwide" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=307&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=307&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=307&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A crisis map of the United States, documenting violent incidents between October and December 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Trust Network</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sometimes, just mapping a crisis draws enough attention to deter violence. When instigators know they are being watched – and potentially recorded with smartphones – they may withdraw.</p>
<p>On Election Day, Nov. 3, three vehicles filled with people wearing camouflage, their license plates covered, started <a href="https://eirusa.ushahidi.io/posts/137">circling polling stations in Minneapolis</a>. On-the-ground volunteers from Nonviolent Peaceforce alerted the Trust Network. The incident was mapped, and an alert went out to police, government officials and community members about the potential danger at voting sites. </p>
<p>The vehicles soon left, apparently deterred by seeing Nonviolent Peaceforce volunteers in <a href="https://www.facebook.com/nonvpf/posts/-questions-about-the-orange-vests-in-the-twincities-todayread-more-about-our-tea/10157275736925458/">semi-official-looking orange vests</a> wielding smartphone cameras.</p>
<h2>Twitter time</h2>
<p>Over time, however, it has become clear that digitally mapping election violence is not the game changer in modern America that it was in Kenya in 2007. People are so plugged in to smartphones that conflict-mediating groups can quickly and easily find out when and where violent events are unfolding. </p>
<p>What their street mediators need, the groups told us, is real-time information about potential violence at protests and rallies to better navigate chaotic conditions. </p>
<p>[<em>Understand key political developments, each week.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s election newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>This year, we’ve begun using Twitter, local news sites and other digital platforms to track the size, location and movements of extremist groups like the Proud Boys. Collating the posts of credible journalists and independent videographers, we send up-to-the-minute information about emerging hot spots to street teams using <a href="https://signal.org/en/">Signal</a>, an encrypted text-messaging app. </p>
<p>The Trust Network also seeks to deter violence between protesters and police at such events, using a combination of de-escalation strategies.</p>
<p>Before a Nov. 6 “Stop the Steal” protest <a href="https://www.clickondetroit.com/decision-2020/2020/11/06/protesters-gather-at-tcf-center-to-spar-over-election-results/">planned at Detroit’s TCF Center over vote counting</a>, for example, the <a href="https://wcdrc.org">Wayne County Dispute Resolution Center</a> suggested local police wear baseball caps instead of riot gear to avoid escalating tensions. The officers complied. </p>
<p>On the scene, Trust Network representatives wearing bright green vests introduced themselves to police, protesters and counterprotesters, signaling to all their intention to keep the protest peaceful. An unrelated group called the <a href="https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/11/03/nuns-defend-metro-detroit-voters/6146385002/">Election Defenders was also working</a> to prevent violence between opposing groups.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People in orange and yellow sweatshirts labeled 'Defenders' talk in a circle at night" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Defenders were on hand to keep the peace while votes were counted in downtown Detroit on Nov. 4.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/defenders-who-keep-the-peace-between-protesters-of-news-photo/1229466179?adppopup=true">Seth Herald/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The combination of pre-event communication with police and dialogue at the scene helped lower the temperature of a potentially explosive situation. <a href="https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/11/06/protesters-rally-tcf-center-detroit-biden-ballots/6186881002/">Several Detroit protesters were carrying weapons</a>, according to the Detroit Free Press. But that “Stop the Steal” protest stayed calm. </p>
<p><em>Brendan O’Hanrahan, media-monitoring lead of the Election Incident Reporting Project, contributed to this story</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151179/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph G. Bock received funding from the American Arbitration Association-International Centre for Dispute Resolution Foundation for related field research. He is a Co-Convener of the Trust Network. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marta Poblet is a volunteer member of the 2020 Election Incident Reporting Project (EIRUSA). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Per Aarvik is a volunteer member of the 2020 Election Incident Reporting Project (EIRUSA).</span></em></p>Civilian peacekeepers are trying to stop violence before it starts.Joseph G. Bock, Director, School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding and Development, Kennesaw State UniversityMarta Poblet, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business and Law, RMIT UniversityPer Aarvik, Affiliated writer on Contemporary Technology , Chr. Michelsen InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1491422020-11-15T14:03:47Z2020-11-15T14:03:47ZPro-Trump rioters storm U.S. Capitol as his election tantrum leads to violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377445/original/file-20210106-17-4q87px.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C134%2C5991%2C3853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Police with guns drawn watch as protesters try to break into the House Chamber at the U.S. Capitol. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the lead-up to the American presidential election, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/10/27/why-the-risk-of-election-violence-is-high/">risk of post-election violence was high</a>. Those predictions came true when thousands of pro-Trump rioters stormed the U.S. Capitol in an unprecedented act of anarchy as Congress was set to confirm President-elect Joe Biden’s victory. </p>
<p>The violence in Washington comes after one of the most tumultuous years in U.S. history. In 2020, the <a href="https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-civil-disorders">Insurance Information Institute estimated sustained losses of over $1 billion</a> — perhaps the costliest civil disorder in the U.S. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1346900434540240897"}"></div></p>
<p>Since Trump lost the Nov. 3 election — all the while fomenting false theories that the vote was rigged — many have wondered how his presidency would end. With an unpredictable president remaining in the White House until Jan. 20, potential dangers to democracy were predicted given <a href="https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-politics-media-1bf96bf3910bdcbe0f125958357c8f1a">that Trump supporters believe his false claims about the election</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Police in riot gear are behind a metal barricade in front of the Capitol dome" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377444/original/file-20210106-17-1j4frex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C15%2C5150%2C3412&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377444/original/file-20210106-17-1j4frex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377444/original/file-20210106-17-1j4frex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377444/original/file-20210106-17-1j4frex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377444/original/file-20210106-17-1j4frex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377444/original/file-20210106-17-1j4frex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377444/original/file-20210106-17-1j4frex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police hold off Trump supporters who tried to break through a police barrier at the Capitol in Washington as Congress prepared to affirm President-elect Joe Biden’s victory.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Julio Cortez)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But as the sun sets on Trump’s administration, it’s clear the past four years have made the United States a more fragile state. </p>
<h2>Not unprecedented</h2>
<p>Predictions of violence in the United States weren’t unfounded because election unrest is not unprecedented. </p>
<p>During the 1920 election, violence in Florida intimidated and prevented Black people from voting, and dozens of African Americans were subsequently killed in the election-related <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43487653">Ocoee Riot of 1920</a>.</p>
<p>That riot almost exactly 100 years ago was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2020/11/02/ocoee-florida-election-day-massacre/">the worst instance of election day violence</a> in U.S. history. </p>
<p>One sobering warning about potential violence came from the International Crisis Group, a non-profit, non-governmental organization based in Brussels, Belgium. </p>
<p>In the lead-up to the election, for the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/crisis-group-turns-focus-risk-electoral-violence-us">first time in its 25-year history</a>, the group turned its attention to analyzing the risks of political violence in the U.S. The organization typically provides warnings concerning conflict-prone regions where democracy is fragile. </p>
<h2>Red flags</h2>
<p>Certain items consistently emerged as <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/united-states/004-us-presidential-election-managing-risks-violence">red flags, indicating potential electoral violence</a>. These risk factors include a polarized electorate, highly segregated and mutually mistrusted sources of information and the existence of armed citizens and militias with easy access to weapons. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A protester with a white Team Trump cowboy hat leads protesters" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377449/original/file-20210106-21-1kdnlfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377449/original/file-20210106-21-1kdnlfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377449/original/file-20210106-21-1kdnlfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377449/original/file-20210106-21-1kdnlfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377449/original/file-20210106-21-1kdnlfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377449/original/file-20210106-21-1kdnlfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377449/original/file-20210106-21-1kdnlfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump supporters try to break through a police barrier at the U.S. Capitol in Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/John Minchillo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In addition, prior to the election, unresolved racial tensions were still present in the U.S. stemming from the killing of George Floyd in May and the subsequent <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2020/06/2020-not-1968/">widespread civil unrest</a>. </p>
<p>In June, during a peak period of racially driven civil unrest in the U.S., the president <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-threat-to-use-the-insurrection-act-against-protesters-is-an-abuse-of-power-139856">threatened to use the Insurrection Act</a> to put down protests and used his rhetoric to inflame rather than to quell violence.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most dangerous top indicator of electoral violence was Trump’s tendency to use the executive branch as a bully pulpit to fuel divisions and sow chaos. In fact, as late as election eve, Trump tweeted that a court decision he did not favour would allow cheating and also lead to violence in the streets.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1323430341512622080"}"></div></p>
<p>Presidents have never spoken in ways that link their election prospects and violence immediately prior to election day.</p>
<h2>Peaceful transfer of power</h2>
<p>The historical norm of the post-election peaceful transfer of power in the U.S. <a href="https://www.history.com/news/peaceful-transfer-power-adams-jefferson">dates back to 1801, when John Adams ceded political power</a> to his opponent Thomas Jefferson after a contested election. </p>
<p>In the period of transition, the new test of American democracy is whether a lame-duck president like Trump can undo 200 years of post-electoral norms to weaken American democracy.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/frequently-asked-questions/what-does-state-fragility-mean/">four characteristics of fragile states</a>: a loss of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services and the inability to interact with other nation-states as a full member of the international community. </p>
<p>Even falling a little towards the direction of a fragile state prior to Jan. 20 can create a more permissive environment for inappropriate expressions of grievances through violence. </p>
<h2>Conditions for violence still exist</h2>
<p>Insights can be gained from studies of democratization in post-war societies. For example, peace and conflict researcher Kristine Höglund has studied the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550902950290">factors that encouraged violence at elections</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/368088/original/file-20201107-15-1895ykp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5760%2C3681&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two armed Trump supporters." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/368088/original/file-20201107-15-1895ykp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5760%2C3681&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/368088/original/file-20201107-15-1895ykp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/368088/original/file-20201107-15-1895ykp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/368088/original/file-20201107-15-1895ykp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/368088/original/file-20201107-15-1895ykp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/368088/original/file-20201107-15-1895ykp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/368088/original/file-20201107-15-1895ykp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Armed Trump supporters stand outside the Maricopa County Recorder’s Office where votes in the general election were being counted in Phoenix on Nov. 6, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Dario Lopez-Mills)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Höglund found that conditions that enabled the use of electoral violence include situations where violence is viewed as a legitimate political tool, and agitators have access to arms. Other factors that trigger electoral violence are false interpretations of close elections, misuse of political rights and militant mobilization. </p>
<p>Those conditions currently exist in America — and were on full display during the attack on the U.S. Capitol.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149142/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jack L. Rozdilsky is a Professor at York University who receives funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research as a co-investigator on a project supported under operating grant Canadian 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Rapid Research Funding.</span></em></p>As Donald Trump continued to stoke his base with false allegations of a ‘rigged’ election, violence at the U.S. Capitol shows America has devolved into a fragile state.Jack L. Rozdilsky, Associate Professor of Disaster and Emergency Management, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1492362020-11-02T19:31:15Z2020-11-02T19:31:15ZFact check US: Could Donald Trump find a way to cling to power?<p>By now it’s a familiar pattern: Donald Trump undermines the legitimacy of the US election, implying that mail-in voting – now prevalent due to the health crisis – will lead to <a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-check-us-will-mail-in-voting-result-in-massive-fraud-146230">“massive fraud”</a> and won’t commit to a <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-election-results-transfer-power_n_5f6bd70fc5b653a2bcaf9455">peaceful transfer of power</a>. Yet according to a study by the conservative <a href="https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud">Heritage Foundation</a>, mail-in voter fraud is practically non-existent – only 1,298 cases have been detected over the past 20 years (with an average of one to two cases per state), a vanishingly small number that would have no impact on the outcome.</p>
<p>Given the potential threat to the smooth running of the 2020 elections and a peaceful transfer of power, the bipartisan <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/08/03/nation/transition-integrity-projects-full-report/">Transition Integrity Project</a>, created by Rosa Brooks of the Georgetown Law Center and Nils Gilman of the Berggruen Institute, have explored six possible scenarios. Their goal was to identify preventive measures, minimize public disorder and guarantee the integrity of the election.</p>
<p>According to the group, unless Joe Biden wins both the popular vote and the electoral college by a significant margin, Trump could well attempt to interfere directly or indirectly with the electoral process. It is also not out of the question that he might go so far as to contest the results of the election and refuse to concede. This could play out in the courts and potentially lead to unrest and violence, particularly by extreme right-wing groups encouraged by the president’s implicit support.</p>
<h2>Scenario 1: no clear winner on November 3</h2>
<p>If the results are close or do not include the majority of mail-in ballots, Trump could initially appear to be the winner in some key states, since Republicans tend to vote more in person (estimated at 70%) than Democrats (between 25% and 45%). But the final results will not be known on the night of November 3, nor even on the morning of November 4, given the time needed to count mail-in ballots – a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/01/us/politics/trump-ballot-counting-election.html">long-held practice</a>. If the election is close, the uncertainty could last days, as it did in the Democratic primary for the Kentucky State Senate: Held on June 23, final results were not returned until June 30, or that of New York, where the final tally took three weeks. During such a period, the risk of misinformation would therefore be high, which explains the importance of having a large numbers of poll workers and election officials on hand.</p>
<p>Final results may also be slowed if the Republicans chose file suits in key states. Regulations surrounding mail-in vote counting <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/election-results-timing/">vary from state to state</a>: Some require ballots to arrive by Election Day, while others allow them to be tallied after November 3 as long as they were postmarked on or before Election Day.</p>
<h2>Scenario 2: a call for violence</h2>
<p>A second possibility is for Trump to claim victory via social media on election night, prior to the final, certified results. Incessantly repeating <a href="https://apnews.com/article/3f6b2adcf0b66066195f307e18173b6f">baseless claims of “voter fraud”</a>, Trump could seek to indirectly or directly mobilize his supporters to besiege polling stations in traditionally Democrat neighborhoods and potentially go so far as to attempt to destroy uncounted ballots. Such practices are unlikely, yet the risk is real. Even if the individuals involved were identified and charged, penalties would come later and would not restore the destroyed ballots.</p>
<p>To prepare for this scenario, election officials and local police forces are already being mobilized. Social media, including Facebook, have finally faced up to the dangers of online organization by far-right white-supremacist groups that the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/us/politics/homeland-security-white-supremacists-russia.html">Department of Homeland Security has described as “a persistent and lethal threat”</a>. Such groups’ radicalization was recently demonstrated by the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/24/us/domestic-terrorist-groups.html">attempted kidnapping of the governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmer</a>. Facebook and Twitter have removed several hundred accounts and pages pushing conspiracy theories and will continue doing so. Having banned political advertising in the summer, Twitter announced that it would <a href="https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/2020-election-changes.html">remove or label tweets calling the election before the official results available</a>, including those by candidates.</p>
<h2>Scenario 3: running out the clock</h2>
<p>In the third scenario, Republicans could file suits contesting the results to delay their certification.</p>
<p>As of today, <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/election-litigation/">more than 400 cases</a> on voting procedures and conditions have been filed. Rulings are handed down daily on issues such as the requirement to have a ballot certified by a witness and reception deadlines for mail-in ballots. It is already clear that there will be several dozen additional suits surrounding the counting and potential invalidation of votes. Republicans will try to have as many votes as possible rejected in key states, and the Democrats will file actions to have them reinstated. </p>
<p>This year it is not simply a matter of recounting votes, as it was in 2000, when the Supreme Court, in its controversial decision <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bush_v._Gore"><em>Bush v. Gore</em></a> eventually put a stop to the recount. This time, courts will be asked to decide which ballots should be rejected – on the bases of lateness, the lack of a witness signature, or discrepancies between the voter signature on the ballot and that on record – and which should be counted. For example, Texas Republicans are attempting to have 127,000 votes thrown out in Harris County, which includes Democratic-leaning Houston. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/01/us/politics/texas-harris-county-votes-republicans.html">Texas Supreme Court has denied the attempt</a>, but a hearing at the federal level is scheduled for Monday.</p>
<p>If litigation is referred to the Supreme Court, the court may not hear it; if it does, its ruling may not be as easily accepted as in 2000, since many Americans see the current Supreme Court as overtly partisan.</p>
<h2>Scenario 4: resistance from Republican-led states</h2>
<p>In cases where the results are close but tip in Biden’s favor, the political makeup of the state in question becomes critical. In certain states where the reins of power are held by both a Republican governor and Republican legislators, as in Florida and Ohio, representatives could send Republican electors to the Electoral College, even after a Biden victory. In states where power is shared between a majority Republican state congress and a Democrat governor, as in Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, two competing lists of electors could be sent to Washington.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/3/15">“Electoral Count Act”</a> of 1887 (3 U.S.C. §5), amended in 1948, specifies that the governor certifies the election results and that any dispute must be resolved within the state 41 days after election day at the latest (this year, December 14). So in three key states – Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan – the Democrat governor should have the last say, particularly since the law does not provide for an appeal.</p>
<h2>Scenario 5: an Electoral College tie</h2>
<p>Congress will open and record the votes of the Electoral College in Washington, DC, on January 6, 2021. But this time when, as per the <a href="https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendment/amendment-xii">12th amendment of the US Constitution</a>, “the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates,” the procedure may not be a simple formality. Because each house is controlled by a different party, each may approve their own list, or both houses may reject the electors from some states. The legal framework is so vague that no one outcome can be certain.</p>
<p>In case of a tie, the 12th Amendment states that “the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President” and that “the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote”. As things stand, this method of adding up state representations rather that the individual votes of the 435 representatives would give the Republicans a majority to reelect their candidate. But everything hinges on the elections in the House and Senate, also on November 3, since the final decision would be up to the members of the new Congress, to be installed on January 3, 2021. Incidentally, the current Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, is an unparalleled strategist who has already mapped the districts the Democrats must win on November 3 in order to have not only a seat majority but also a majority of blue states in the House of Representatives.</p>
<h2>The human factor</h2>
<p>This election cycle is an invitation to reflect on the limits of the law and the importance of the human factor. Whereas the law provides for conflict resolution in a range of scenarios, it is based on the implicit assumption that the main political players will respect the rules of the game. Unfortunately, this is not guaranteed to be the case in 2020. </p>
<p>Based on a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/presidential-polls-trump-biden">wide range of polls published at the time of writing</a>, there’s every chance that Joe Biden will be declared the winner by a large enough margin to prevent Trump from casting doubt on the results and inciting chaos. Should he lose the election yet refuse to recognize the results, the women and men of the Republican Party have a legal and moral responsibility, at both the state and federal levels, to refuse to follow him.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>The Fact check US column is supported by <a href="https://craignewmarkphilanthropies.org/">Craig Newmark Philanthropies</a>, an American foundation fighting disinformation.</em></p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en">Fast ForWord</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne E. Deysine ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>If there’s not a clear winner of the November 3 election and the current president refuses to leave office, here are six scenarios that could play out.Anne E. Deysine, Professeur émérite juriste et américaniste, spécialiste Etats-Unis, questions politiques, sociales et juridiques (Cour suprême), Université Paris Nanterre – Université Paris LumièresLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1465482020-09-28T18:55:32Z2020-09-28T18:55:32ZElection violence in November? Here’s what the research says<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360160/original/file-20200927-16-1vvp0ql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C12%2C8582%2C5704&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man carrying a club is seen as the Proud Boys, a right-wing pro-Trump group, gather with their allies in a rally against left-wing Antifa in Portland, Oregon, Sept. 26, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-carrying-a-club-is-seen-as-the-proud-boys-a-right-wing-news-photo/1228751842?adppopup=true">John Rudoff/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After Kenya’s 2007 election, as incumbent President Mwai Kibaki declared victory, the opposition alleged the election had been rigged. </p>
<p>A wave of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-people-participate-in-election-violence-insights-from-kenyas-2007-elections-143016">protests, riots and ethnic violence</a> followed. As many as 1,500 citizens were killed and another 600,000 forcibly displaced.</p>
<p>As the U.S. presidential election draws near, many have expressed <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/8/18/21371964/2020-transition-integrity-project-simulation-trump">concern that a similar scenario may unfold here</a>. Some envision President Donald Trump’s supporters using <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/03/trump-stay-in-office/">misinformation to mobilize vigilante militias</a> to clash with leftist protesters. Others envision that groups on the left will <a href="https://time.com/5892945/law-enforcement-post-election-violence/">refuse to accept the results and mobilize</a>, leading to violence and deaths across the country.</p>
<p>Having a contested election in times of crisis, however, is by no means a guarantee of violence. The front-runners in the 2017 French presidential election, for example, were <a href="https://www.daily-sun.com/post/223523/Violence-scars-Frances-preelection-May-Day-marches">as politically polarizing</a> as their U.S. 2020 counterparts, with centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron calling right-wing leader Marine Le Pen’s party <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/07/marine-le-pen-defeated-front-national-far-from-finished">racist and xenophobic</a> and Le Pen charging that Macron was “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39802776">the candidate of savage globalisation</a>.”</p>
<p>And the first round of voting in France took place just after a shooting in the heart of Paris sent the country into a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ae9439a65ff04fb19bf8e102a0840703">state of emergency</a>. Yet, as the votes were counted and Macron was declared the winner, Le Pen <a href="https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2017/05/07/le-pen-concedes-defeat-in-french-election/">conceded defeat</a>, allowing for a peaceful transition.</p>
<p>With the barrage of 24/7 media coverage of the upcoming U.S. election, it can be hard to tell what’s real and what’s not – and that can be frightening. It’s important to step back and ask: What does the research say about the likelihood of election-related violence in November?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protesters around a bonfire" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Deadly violence followed the disputed 2007 presidential election in Kenya, including in this Nairobi slum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyans-demonstrate-30-december-2007-at-the-kibera-slum-as-news-photo/107605579?adppopup=true">Tony Karumba/AFP/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Predicting political instability</h2>
<p>When <a href="https://polisci.indiana.edu/about/faculty/koren-ore.html">social science researchers like me</a> try to predict political violence, we look at a large number of historical cases across multiple countries, and try to identify which events have resulted in many casualties. </p>
<p>In taking this approach, we can systematically evaluate what explains these extreme events, pinpointing specific issues that were present in most of the situations, and avoiding the inaccuracies that can happen by relying too much on anecdotal stories. </p>
<p>Such studies have highlighted three factors relevant to the upcoming election.</p>
<p>First, strong political institutions are <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x">especially effective</a> in reducing the risk of violence. Many have voiced concerns that <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/04/how-to-destroy-a-government/606793/">President Trump has weakened American political institutions</a>. But as one of the world’s longest-enduring democracies, the United States and its democratic institutions have proven their capacity to maintain order through <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/watergate/timeline.html">crises and abuse of presidential power</a> before.</p>
<p>In the U.S., for example, despite allegations to the contrary, <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/voter-fraud-is-very-rare-in-american-elections/">electoral fraud is extremely rare</a>. Even if uncertainty and chaos were to ensue in the wake of the election, the authority to decide a winner is vested in an independent institution such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-case-of-biden-versus-trump-or-how-a-judge-could-decide-the-presidential-election-146367">the U.S. Supreme Court</a> or by the <a href="https://history.house.gov/Institution/Electoral-College/Electoral-College/">House of Representatives</a>. Kenya in 2007 had no comparable institutional anchors to help ensure post-election stability.</p>
<p>Second, research, including <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/62/2/274/4909422">my own</a>, finds that mass political violence usually happens in countries that <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3118222.pdf">have no capacity to prevent it</a>. In Kenya, for example, most violence was perpetrated by unofficial militias affiliated with ethnic or religious groups, such as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20406424.pdf">Mungiki</a>, which the government was unable – or unwilling – to curb.</p>
<p>In the U.S., if any political leader calls for vigilantes to mobilize, both the federal government and states have the capacity to expeditiously eliminate this threat. Militias may be armed, but they are no match for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/remind-us-what-exactly-is-the-national-guard-94621">well-trained National Guard</a> or Army regiment. This should help deter the risk of <a href="https://theconversation.com/portland-and-kenosha-violence-was-predictable-and-preventable-145505">violence by vigilantes</a>. </p>
<p>Some, however, fear that the president will send <a href="https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/09/19/assessing-donald-trumps-use-of-the-homeland-security-department">federal agencies to seize ballots</a>. Although military officers continue to express <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/25/politics/pentagon-election-insurrection-act/index.html">formal commitment</a> to <a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/us/west-point-grads-raise-concerns-about-politicization-of-military-urge-class-of-2020-to-uphold-ideals-1.633448">keeping the military nonpoliticized</a>, such actions, if taken, may result in a violent backlash by left-wing vigilantes. But federal agents acting under orders from the White House will have the tactical upper hand in such clashes, which greatly adds to their deterrent capacity.</p>
<p>Finally, an especially strong predictor of election violence is a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/15/4/473/1862712?casa_token=QxU1-hjGgBYAAAAA:6TdId2CGSKQi-Kaj6pKm64uGluAQ-RnhlbbXSOwr1ulk2LeKTQ_zbFI2MQIN7SDLOxBdvbjDXpQ">history of armed political conflict</a>. After the 2016 elections, America experienced <a href="https://www.politico.com/gallery/2016/11/2016-election-protest-photos-002366?slide=0">massive protests and some rioting</a>, but little in the way of deadly political violence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Women protesting Trump's 2016 election." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After the 2016 elections, America experienced large protests and some rioting, but little deadly political violence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-fill-5th-avenue-in-midtown-manhattan-during-a-news-photo/959107274?adppopup=true">David Cliff/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What the numbers say</h2>
<p>Is post-election violence impossible in 2020 America? No. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://acleddata.com/special-projects/us-crisis-monitor/">data suggests</a> it is unlikely. </p>
<p>Ninety-five percent of the 12,607 political demonstrations in the U.S. between May 24 and Sept. 19, 2020, were peaceful. There were 351 other kinds of incidents, including imposing curfews and perpetrating physical attacks. In 29 of those, there was violence against civilians, where 12 people were killed, nine of them by the police. And in an additional five drive-by shootings, three police officers were killed by the extremist group the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/08/19/magazine/boogaloo.html">Boogaloo Bois</a>. </p>
<p>Considering the number of people involved in the recent Black Lives Matter and COVID-19 protests, and the fact that <a href="https://theconversation.com/portland-and-kenosha-violence-was-predictable-and-preventable-145505">many were heavily armed</a>, these casualty figures are surprisingly low. According to <a href="https://acleddata.com/special-projects/us-crisis-monitor/">the data</a>, the majority of deaths were caused by police, not vigilantes or protesters, and all of the perpetrators (with the exception of two drive-by shooters), police and civilians alike, were taken into custody.</p>
<p>Like the U.S., France experienced protests and riots, in addition to multiple terrorist attacks, prior to Election Day. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/18/secret-plans-protect-le-pen-french-republic-emerge">There was even a government plan</a> to handle the potential violence and instability that might ensue if Le Pen were elected. And yet, as the most polarizing elections in decades concluded, there were few riots and no killing.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="French riot policemen advance during clashes with protesters" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">French riot police clash with protesters at a demonstration against the presidential candidate for the far-right Front National party, Feb. 25, 2017 in Nantes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/french-riot-policemen-advance-during-clashes-with-news-photo/645260214?adppopup=true">Jean-Sebastien Evrard/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>So, what will happen in November?</h2>
<p>Researchers cannot perfectly predict political violence. Their analyses rely on the past. </p>
<p>Add to the equation a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-promised-this-kind-of-presidency--unpredictable-ad-hoc-and-impulsive/2018/03/10/e928b73e-23ef-11e8-badd-7c9f29a55815_story.html">notoriously unpredictable incumbent</a> against a backdrop of <a href="https://time.com/5876599/election-2020-coronavirus/">unprecedented social and economic conditions</a>, and making accurate predictions about potential post-election bedlam is impossible, as much as scholars and others may try.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>While I think some concern is valid, it is important to remember that there is a big difference between using a call to arms to mobilize your voters and instill fear in the other party’s supporters, and staging a post-election insurrection, which could subject its instigators to charges of <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2381">sedition, if not high treason</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the three factors discussed here suggest that fears of widespread violence by vigilantes and activists during and after Election Day should be treated as fears, not as a probable outcome.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146548/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In the past, Ore Koren received funding from the United States Institute of Peace. </span></em></p>Are the conditions ripe in the US for violence before, during or after the presidential election?Ore Koren, Assistant Professor, Indiana University Bloomington; International Security Fellow, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1430162020-08-18T14:23:13Z2020-08-18T14:23:13ZWhy do people participate in election violence? Insights from Kenya’s 2007 elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353117/original/file-20200817-18-1ejh2i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's Daily Nation headline condemning the 2007 post-election violence.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michelle Shephard/Toronto Star via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Conversations in Kenya have started around the upcoming 2022 presidential elections. Elections in Kenya <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/siasa/2020-07-25-kenya-has-always-been-a-violent-country-one-silently-at-war-with-itself/">tend to be</a> highly contentious and there is often concern that, in some places, violence may erupt. </p>
<p>Political violence has a long history in Kenya. It extends back to the British <a href="https://www.amazon.com/dp/0521113822/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1">colonial state’s use of violence</a> to control people, expropriate land, and suppress dissent. </p>
<p>In independent Kenya, the regimes of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Kenya-History-Independence-Charles-Hornsby/dp/1780765010">continued to use violence</a> as a way to control land and intimidate political rivals. </p>
<p>With the reintroduction of multi-party elections in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/1993/11/01/divide-and-rule-state-sponsored-ethnic-violence-kenya">1992</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/1993/11/01/divide-and-rule-state-sponsored-ethnic-violence-kenya">politicians used violence</a> to shape electoral outcomes. In the 1992 presidential elections, around 1,200 people were killed and 300,000 people were displaced from their homes. Following the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414011407465">1997</a> elections, between 300 and 1,000 people were killed and about 10,000 were displaced. And in the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/kenya0308/">2007 general elections</a>, Kenya experienced its most violent election to date: around 1,500 people were killed and another 600,000 displaced.</p>
<p>Studies of political violence tend to focus on how the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43821581?casa_token=qMpNogikwBUAAAAA%3AxEvJQJvU8FNrQxwyD0dEjbZld67b40_Fyn0_t5CnfZnEFRhBcsJP2xz1Wjn-e7WuSrRriHpasW-ZMC-XLmEGvZVV0dAivAju3dzb8sx5fgVU_CofCJPO&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">electoral incentives of political leaders</a> shape the use of violence. But the occurrence of violence is often a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3688707?casa_token=cCdELYv3vAMAAAAA%3AYRtIyb4ISxwYtBgQn-zdnw0AkHVbdVYIGYiKtHk7z2kURJIwfpiQ0o3sGJQ3C6Xna9PxnJgmdkLpoQYeSMp75Z0DHUj8YiyGLY9mhzeyPMgb7_a9aXY-&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">joint production</a> between political elites and ordinary citizens.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=tjrc-gov">participation of ordinary citizens</a> was <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=tjrc-gov">particularly stark</a> after Kenya’s 2007 general elections. People set fire to homes and farms, burned tyres in the roads, and in some cases, killed and raped. </p>
<p>Violence escalated when the incumbent candidate, Mwai Kibaki, was announced as the president reelect. The main opposition party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), disputed the results and party leaders <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/kenya/news/politics/when-a-peaceful-vote-returned-violent-results--749546">encouraged members to mobilise</a>. Protests quickly turned violent and escalated across the country. </p>
<p>Importantly, however, there was significant local variation in the sites and scale of violence. This raised questions that are central to my new book, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/political-violence-in-kenya/1A2E896FFD8E6B225E02C8263A86FBC6">“Political Violence in Kenya: Land, Elections, and Claim-Making”</a>. Specifically, I ask: how do leaders organise political violence, and more so, why do ordinary citizens participate?</p>
<p>I carried out several years of fieldwork for the book. This included hundreds of interviews and a household survey with residents across the Rift Valley and Coast regions. I found that electoral violence is most likely to escalate where there is: </p>
<p>1) Moderate (rather than significant) inequality in land rights between two nearby and ethnically distinct groups. </p>
<p>2) Salient and contentious narratives around land between these two groups.</p>
<p>3) A strong leader who can use these land narratives to convince or compel ordinary citizens to participate in violence. </p>
<p>Election violence tended to happen where a group believed that their participation in violence would advance their personal interests, or those of their community.</p>
<p>The book highlights the importance of land tenure reform as a key policy tool to mitigate and prevent violent conflict in Kenya. It can also help to explain or anticipate patterns of election violence based on local inequalities, for instance over land, jobs, or other resources.</p>
<h2>It’s about land</h2>
<p>In Kenya, and many other agrarian-based economies, control and ownership over land shapes identity, livelihood, and power. Yet land tenure institutions are often weak and highly politicised. This can give rise to certain narratives that elites and citizens can use to coordinate the use of violence. </p>
<p>In Kenya, for example, the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/111/445/576/47210">belief that “outsiders” have invaded the ancestral land of “insiders”</a> has justified violent evictions, often during elections.</p>
<p>I compared areas where ethnically-distinct farming communities border one another. I selected several cases from Nakuru County, in the central Rift Valley, where predominantly Kalenjin farming communities bordered Kikuyu communities. Political leaders have long <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00083968.2001.10751230?casa_token=Z15XLCHNQtcAAAAA:F2ZFS8hR9VNaQtfCdQ9izzd7zpJFrHOJ2anRSbNgAklHLBFUY6w82N5v_4b2Mtiv7Ct39L2_NVg3">pitted these communities</a> against one another in struggles over access to land and political representation. </p>
<p>Many Kalenjin have come to view the Rift Valley as their ancestral land and see Kikuyu as ethnic outsiders. Many Kikuyu, meanwhile, argue that because they have purchased the land and hold title deeds, they are the rightful claimants. </p>
<p>For instance, after the results of the 2007 elections were announced, violence erupted when Kalenjin residents from Mauche crossed into the neighbouring area of Likia and burned property belonging to Kikuyu residents. </p>
<p>However, a short distance away in Ogilgei, where Kalenjin residents border the mostly Kikuyu community of Kerma, violence never escalated. </p>
<p>A key difference between these two cases is the degree of land tenure security, and specifically, what I describe as “moderate land inequality”. </p>
<p>Residents in Likia and Mauche are small-scale farmers. But in 2007, most Kikuyu residents in Likia held title deeds while most Kalenjin farmers in Mauche did not. For many Mauche farmers, this lack of tenure security shaped a defensive logic: “evict them before they can evict us”. </p>
<p>By contrast in Ogilgei, both Kalenjin and Kikuyu residents held title deeds. Neither side linked the election outcome with their tenure security, and thus had few reasons to engage in violence. </p>
<h2>Coastal dynamics</h2>
<p>In another example, I ask why many communities in the coastal counties of Kwale and Kilifi experienced far less violence than those in the Rift Valley.</p>
<p>I find that a key mitigating factor was the significant land inequality between a small, but powerful group of “landlords”, alongside a large population of landless “squatters”. </p>
<p>Landlords tend to be of <a href="http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:271584/FULLTEXT01">Arab, Indian, or European descent</a>, while most landless identify as <em>Mijikenda</em>. The main cleavage line tends to be class, rather than ethnicity. </p>
<p>Though the <em>Mijikenda</em> are the electoral majority, such significant land inequality means that their own local leaders tend to remain beholden to the interests of the landed elite, rather than their land-poor constituents. </p>
<p>Hence, while there are contentious land narratives, many citizens tend to see their elected leaders as weak: unwilling or unable to alter land rights in their favour. </p>
<p>This means that elections are far less high-stake than in the Rift Valley where many believe that the outcome determines who gets evicted and who can remain. </p>
<h2>Broader implications</h2>
<p>While the dynamics of violence that I describe in the book draw specifically from the case of Kenya, there are a number of broader implications. The book can help explain or anticipate patterns of election violence. This dynamic has played out in countries such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14662041003672502?casa_token=b_kv3B_d8mcAAAAA%3Arh8lnw3_7lIfHYHrE-TYCjZmmOVwVAuIXCknCrhLszgIjeJtlE4v-KZevFxuBjCkLLmnl0_YVXWPwg">Zimbabwe</a>, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343315580145">Cote d’Ivoire</a>, the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19362200802285807?casa_token=fvQkJPIZmNEAAAAA%3AYY9PbQrNRwnYhV0nLvFz6QUGK6UgxtQ8dZT9UIuOdSWEJDINdM9kX94DI7qweU9vqTwWb_xdzF0gwg">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2014.1003811?tab=permissions&scroll=top">Indonesia</a>, and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/04/29/democracy-crossfire/opposition-violence-and-government-abuses-2014-pre-and-post">Bangladesh</a>. </p>
<p>It also highlights the importance of strengthening land tenure institutions so that a citizen’s access to land does not hinge on a particular electoral outcome. </p>
<p>Finally, it provides insights into how political elites use particular appeals to divide populations, consolidate political support, and in some cases, incite violence. </p>
<p>In order to prevent or mitigate violence, there needs to be a better understanding of how and why particular narratives – built around identity, rights, and citizenship – gain resonance compared to others.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143016/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kathleen Klaus has received funding for this research from the United States Institute of Peace, National Science Foundation, Social Science Research Council, and the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. </span></em></p>The occurrence of violence in Kenya is a joint production between political elites and ordinary citizens.Kathleen Klaus, Assistant Professor, University of San FranciscoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1314052020-02-17T13:23:26Z2020-02-17T13:23:26ZHow history explains election violence: Kenya and Zambia tell the story<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315230/original/file-20200213-11040-rgd0oz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Zambia's president-elect Edgar Lungu in 2016. The country is known for peaceful polls, but this one was marked by clashes.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Dawood Salim/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Why do the first multiparty elections after authoritarian rule turn violent in some countries but not in others?</p>
<p>That’s the question we set out to anwer in our <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343319884983">research</a> on electoral violence and the legacy of authoritarian rule in Kenya and Zambia.</p>
<p>We compared Zambia’s founding elections in 1991, which were largely peaceful, and Kenya’s in 1992. During these polls there was large-scale state-instigated electoral violence along ethnic lines. </p>
<p>What explains the divergent outcomes in electoral violence? One answer is that political legacies generated during authoritarian rule have a tendency to transcend into the multiparty era. </p>
<p>Our analysis suggests that violence was a more viable electoral strategy in Kenya than in Zambia because of the type of authoritarian rule that existed in Kenya before the polls. This created political legacies that underpinned political competition and mobilisation during the first multiparty elections. </p>
<p>We concluded from this that, to understand why some countries are more prone to experience electoral violence, the impact of history and the longer-term processes of institutional development need to be considered.</p>
<h2>A comparison</h2>
<p>Most analysis on election-related violence is focused on factors that concern the immediate conditions of election. These include how fiercely contested a given election is, what formal electoral rules are in place, whether monitors and peacekeepers oversee the process, and how electoral management bodies work.</p>
<p>Our research sought to dig deeper into history. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343319884983">It showed</a> how dynamics of governance during authoritarian eras have lasting effects on whether multi-party elections turn violent or not. </p>
<p>A historical lens on Kenya’s and Zambia’s transitions from single-party rule to multi-party democracy in the early 1990s helped us understand how pervasive the informal institutions that underpin electoral conduct can be. And how they carry over from an authoritarian period to a multi-party setting. </p>
<p>In both countries, the incumbents at the time of transition – <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=32WYDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=moi+warns+multi-partyism+strife&source=bl&ots=m1CRl7upG_&sig=ACfU3U0L1bFOxDgKlNBwVM4AITpu5ncm0A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjXnoqzsc7nAhV8A2MBHZGCCs8Q6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=moi%20warns%20multi-partyism%20strife&f=false">Daniel arap Moi</a> in Kenya and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40396331?seq=1">Kenneth Kaunda</a> in Zambia – warned that a turn to multi-party election would usher in chaos, violence and inter-ethnic strife. </p>
<p>Yet, Zambia’s 1991 founding election remained largely <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/05/world/zambia-s-democratic-shock-to-africa.html">free from violence</a>. Kaunda stepped down after 27 years at the helm and the presidency transferred to the opposition candidate Frederick Chiluba.</p>
<p>But in Kenya’s 1992 election state-instigated <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">electoral violence</a> along ethnic lines resulted in 1,500 people people being killed. A further 300,000 were displaced. And Moi and his ruling party, the Kenya African National Union remained in.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">Kenya’s history of political violence: colonialism, vigilantes and militias</a>
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<h2>Authoritarian regimes</h2>
<p>How rulers secure popular support – and who is included in governing coalitions – varies significantly across authoritarian regimes. So does the level of repression by which dictators control the majority excluded from power. These features are important for explaining electoral violence. The reason for this is that in ethnically divided societies more exclusionary governance strategies under authoritarian rule over time cultivate perceptions of politics as a zero-sum game that last into the multi-party era.</p>
<p>In Kenya single-party rule rested on a relatively exclusive approach to maintain a ruling coalition. This was based on a narrow support base and active suppression of those who were not included in power. </p>
<p>In Zambia, single-party rule was more inclusive. It was based on a broader ethnic support base and with deliberate efforts to counter ethnic divisions. When comparing post independence countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya was not at the extreme end of the exclusionary spectrum. But it was significantly more exclusionary than Zambia.</p>
<p>The political legacies from authoritarian rule worked through two main pathways. First, political legacies structure the options for building cross-ethnic coalitions and for cooperation. They thereby make electoral violence more or less likely. For instance, by emphasising ethnicity over other political cleavages, coalitions are built on an exclusionary basis. This engenders inter-ethnic relations that are fragmented and competitive. </p>
<p>In Zambia, the opposition in the first multiparty elections could draw support from all ethnic groups. But in Kenya the opposition was fragmented and polarised along ethnic lines. In addition, in Zambia, the legacy of more cooperative inter-ethnic elite relations reduced the perceived risks associated with the transition. This enabled bargaining between competing elites. For example, a series of meetings were held where the contenders solved contentious issues around the electoral process.</p>
<p>Political legacies also place constraints on how politicians go about mobilising support. For example, ruling coalitions that are more exclusionary use rhetoric to exploit ethnic cleavages. In Kenya, electoral rhetoric played on historical injustices and ethnic divisions. The violence served to solidify the incumbent’s support base and to punish opposition voters. </p>
<p>In Zambia, the use of an ethnically-hostile rhetoric was simply out of the question.</p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>Varying historical experiences, thus, offer countries different baseline risks of facing large-scale electoral violence. </p>
<p>But we concluded in our paper that it’s possible to change the pattern. Kenya’s experience illustrates this. The level of violence has differed significantly in post-1992 elections. For instance there was <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">large scale post-election violence</a> after the 2007/8 poll. But elections in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/30/world/kenya-s-ruling-party-is-defeated-after-39-years.html">2002</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21723488">2013</a> were significantly more peaceful. </p>
<p>This suggests that specific circumstances tied to the immediate electoral contest can prevent violence from happening. We argue that policy efforts need to engage in a two-pronged approach. In the first instance measures need to be designed to address pervasive forms of mobilisation. The second part of the approach is that there needs to be an assessment of the risk tied to an impending election.</p>
<p>In Zambia, elections were largely free from violence after 1991 and until 2015. Yet, Zambian politics has become increasingly volatile, with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/zambia-suspends-election-campaigning-violence-160710141136702.html">instances of electoral violence</a> in 2016. </p>
<p>There has been a definite shift towards more authoritarianism. This is evident in the centralisation of political power in the hands of the president. There is also more intimidation of the opposition, and a breakdown of inter-party deliberation. As a result there are growing fears that the 2021 election will usher in violence. </p>
<p>Zambia seems to be treading a thin line. A turn to more violent electoral practices is a cause of great concern. Outbreaks of violence have profound and lasting effects that shape future electoral politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131405/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Swedish Research Council (grant 348-2013-5408 and 2016-05833) and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (grant P16-0124:1) funded this research.</span></em></p>Political legacies generated during authoritarian rule have a tendency to transcend into the multiparty era.Johan Brosché, Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityHanne Fjelde, Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityKristine Höglund, Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1252702019-10-16T07:36:24Z2019-10-16T07:36:24ZCampaign shows that political tectonic plates are shifting in Mozambique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297286/original/file-20191016-98640-z0lk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi's Frelimo party on the last day of election campaigns in Maputo on October 12, 2019.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Having ruled Mozambique since 1975, the country’s governing party, Frelimo, feels backed into a corner. It behaves as though it must fight any challenge to its hegemony by whatever means necessary. This includes aggression and violence.</p>
<p>Hence the sombre state of human rights that has formed in the past five years. Mozambique has witnessed <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/1019/2019/en/">intimidation of civil society, arbitrary arrests and detentions</a>. Security forces have used excessive force and there have been incidents of torture and extrajudicial killing. Freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association has been suppressed.</p>
<p>In 44 days of the election campaign, 44 people were killed – one person’s death for every day of campaigning. In addition 271 were injured, about 59 were arrested and <a href="https://zitamar.com/mozambique-political-process-bulletin-73-peaceful-end-no-observer-credentials-party-funding/">property was destroyed</a>. </p>
<p>Since the end of the civil war in 1992, Mozambique has held five general elections. Frelimo has won them all, with Renamo in second place and since 2009 the Mozambique Democratic Movement also in the fray. </p>
<p>The background of rights abuse has cast its shadow into the current electoral cycle. To mention some salient cases:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>On 7 October, members of the special operation of the riot police <a href="http://opais.sapo.mz/prm-confirma-que-suspeitos-do-assassinato-de-matavel-sao-agentes-da-lei-e-ordem">publicly executed</a> Anastacio Matavele, an election observer in Xai-Xai, 200km north of the capital, Maputo.</p></li>
<li><p>On 11 October, Augusto Pelembe, the Mozambique Democratic Movement candidate for governor in Maputo province, <a href="https://www.dw.com/pt-002/candidato-do-mdm-escapa-ileso-a-disparos-em-maputo/a-50789735">escaped an assassination attempt</a> in broad daylight in Malwana, 50km north of Maputo.</p></li>
<li><p>On 16 September, unidentified men <a href="https://cipeleicoes.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Casa-da-m%C3%A3e-de-cabe%C3%A7a-de-lista-da-Renamo-incendiada-por-desconhecidos-em-Quelimane.pdf">petrol-bombed </a> Manuel de Araujo’s mother’s house. Araujo is Renamo’s candidate for governor in Zambezia province.</p></li>
<li><p>On 6 September, three unidentified Frelimo militants <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-teacher-and-wife-savagely-beaten-at-their-home-in-derre-zambezia-report-141339/">assaulted</a> a primary school teacher and Renamo member, Aristides da Conceição, and his wife Raina Leão in Zambezia.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In addition, voters, civil society and opposition parties in various provinces <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-elections-frelimo-accused-of-collecting-voter-cards-across-the-country-cip-142779/">accused</a> Frelimo members of collecting voter registration cards. This created confusion among uninformed voters. According to the law, they were allowed to vote if they carried other identification documents. Many voters didn’t know this.</p>
<p>During the campaign, partisans of all political stripes were responsible for the violence. But Frelimo supporters were far more aggressive and violent. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to interpret their war-like posture as a sign of strength. On the contrary, their deadly violence signals their weakness and betrays their vulnerability and desperation. </p>
<p>Underground, the political tectonic plates are shifting, while above ground the political fortunes are changing. The centre cannot hold.</p>
<h2>A change in power dynamics</h2>
<p>Frelimo’s tendency to direct violence towards its political opponents is a symptom of underlying structural transformations which the political sociologist Norbert Elias has <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40864499?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">described </a> as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Elias argues that when unequal political groups become less unequal, the formerly powerful groups tend to become more aggressive and violent toward the formerly weaker groups. </p>
<p>The most recognisable feature of this in Mozambique is the pressure towards decentralisation of political power which began with the election of city mayors. From now on, provincial governors will be elected by the people rather than being appointed by the winning party. </p>
<p>On top of this, the incumbent is facing more politically conscious voters. They are better educated, informed, mobilised, organised, and demanding. </p>
<h2>Electoral rigging</h2>
<p>A popular slogan within the ranks of Frelimo is: <em>“A vitória prepara-se”</em>, – “In order to win, one must prepare the victory.” </p>
<p>Frelimo began to “prepare the victory” right at the beginning of the electoral process, the voter registration stage. </p>
<p>In Gaza province 286,000 extra voters were registered, giving Frelimo and president Filipe Nyusi a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/mozambiques-electoral-commission-should-do-the-right-thing">6% bonus in the expected total vote</a>. While the 2017 population census showed that Gaza had 830,000 people of voting age, the electoral secretariat claimed there were 1.116 million registered voters in this province. This <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/mozambiques-electoral-commission-should-do-the-right-thing">implied</a> that the 2017 national census had missed 286,000 people aged 18 and above in the province. </p>
<p>This was so out of bounds that the National Statistics Agency was forced to defend the census. It rejected and denounced the electoral administration’s numbers. It pointed out that according to “scientific methods”, Gaza’s voting-age population is projected to reach the electoral administration’s numbers in 20 years. The statistics agency’s director was immediately sacked, <a href="https://www.dw.com/pt-002/mo%C3%A7ambique-titular-do-ine-demite-se-ap%C3%B3s-recenseamento-pol%C3%A9mico-em-gaza/a-50153003">though an official statement</a> said that he had “resigned due to political pressure”. </p>
<p>The electoral administration also dispatched extra voter registration brigades in Gaza and Maputo. In these provinces the numbers appeared inflated. They are also the regions in which Frelimo has won all past general elections with wide margins. Curiously, the electoral administration failed to provide additional voter registration brigades in Nampula and Zambezia. These provinces have the largest and second-largest voting-age populations. They are also where Renamo and the Mozambique Democratic Movement enjoy more popular support than Frelimo.</p>
<p>The opposition and civil society reorganisations have pointed with disapproval to these “victory preparation” activities. They have also questioned the possibility of a free and fair election. So far, polling is peaceful, but vote counting may not be. Mozambicans are bracing themselves.</p>
<p><em>Sipho Mantula also contributed to this article. He is a researcher at the Institute for Dispute Resolution in Africa, University of South Africa. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent those of the institutions to which they are affiliated.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125270/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Matsinhe is Researcher at Amnesty International.</span></em></p>During the campaign, partisans of all political stripes were responsible for the violence. But Frelimo supporters were far more aggressive and violent.David Matsinhe, Losophone Research Specialist/Adjunct Professor in African Studies, Carleton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1172972019-06-03T13:15:24Z2019-06-03T13:15:24ZWe found that Nigerian papers’ coverage of pre-election violence passed muster<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277378/original/file-20190531-69091-pkqhct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A newspaper vendor outside a polling station during the 2011 elections in Nigeria.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/comsec/5587948087/in/photolist-7hFrzg-6eiZbj-4WWUPG-S81vtc-259W8Ku-9vMGhx-4aE7Tn-beSZir-QQz4rq-a9mva6-bti8g">The Commonwealth/Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria has a vibrant press media landscape. But freedom of the press is only rated as “<a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/nigeria">partly free</a>” by Freedom House, mostly due to the fact that news media are still susceptible to political pressures. There is also the external influence from ownership structures and the generally low wages of journalists. Favourable reporting of generous politicians remains a fairly common practice. </p>
<p>The extent to which these influences affect the quality of reporting remains insufficiently investigated. To address this gap <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/reporting-on-electoral-violence-in-nigerian-news-media-saying-it-as-it-is/9DD90793E29948DFC1D94C619025D542">we analysed</a> how three newspapers with different political affiliations report on conflict in the run-up to the 2015 elections. Electoral violence reporting is particularly sensitive to political biases in the news media. </p>
<p>Our analyses showed that Nigerian news media reported on electoral violence relatively independently from political pressures. This was also supported by interviews with Nigerian media professionals who argued that political pressures lead to changes in editorial policies. But when electoral violence took place, the media “say it as it is”. </p>
<p>Our findings show that Nigerian print media played a crucial role in monitoring violence, and thereby deterring it, given the overall adherence to independent and professional reporting standards – even in the face of political pressures. But to reinforce this role, structural weaknesses – such as as lack of resources – will need to be addressed. This is particularly true during election times.</p>
<p>Without reliable evidence, national and international observers will find it increasingly difficult to make judgements on electoral violence in Nigeria and to denounce parties and candidates. This in turn poses a serious problem for the stability and democratic conduct of future elections in the country.</p>
<h2>Similar picture of violence</h2>
<p>Our analysis focused on <a href="https://thenationonlineng.net/">The Nation</a>, <a href="https://guardian.ng/">The Guardian</a> and <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/">This Day</a>.</p>
<p>Our selection of these papers was guided by two principles: firstly we selected newspapers which were affiliated to one of the main political parties contesting the elections – the <a href="https://peoplesdemocraticparty.com.ng/">People’s Democratic Party</a> (PDP) and the <a href="https://apc.com.ng/">All Progressives Congress</a> (APC). The second criterion was that the papers had to be relatively national in scope and have a wide readership. This mean that we excluded local, small-scale papers. </p>
<p>We had a major challenge determining affiliation or sympathy towards a party. For one of the papers, The Nation, this was more obvious since its ownership is linked to Tinubu, who is a major APC strongman in the south west region of the country. We selected The Guardian and This Day because, based on extensive consultations, it was fair to conclude that they sometimes had regional sympathies. </p>
<p>We conducted both qualitative as well as quantitative research. The qualitative research involved interviewing 15 Nigerian journalists and editors in Lagos and Abuja. </p>
<p>We examined how events related to conflict were covered by the three papers between April 2014 and March 2015. This was the year leading up to the elections. We recorded coverage of protests, riots, political kidnappings, armed conflict events, and suicide bombings and the actors involved. We then analysed to what extent the three newspapers sketched a different picture of conflict events over time, in particular events involving the two main parties.</p>
<p>We found that all three newspapers painted a similar picture of electoral violence patterns in the run-up to the 2015 elections. The All Progressives’ Congress was consistently more likely to be the victim of violence than the People’s Democratic Party.</p>
<p>As all three newspapers reported this pattern, it was likely to reflect a real trend in society. The discrepancy between events in which the All Progressives’ Congress was a victim of violence and events where the Peoples’ Democratic Party was targeted, was largest for the Nation. </p>
<p>But, overall our analysis indicated that biases in reporting were generally limited, and that while political pressures were real, they were most evident in editorial choices. In other words, decisions such as on which page the report appeared, the length of the article as well as what visuals were used.</p>
<p>Our analyses also revealed a more problematic feature of reporting on violence in Nigeria. But media outlets also lacked resources to conduct independent investigative reporting. </p>
<h2>Lack of resources</h2>
<p>The papers we looked at mostly depended on statements from political parties themselves. This led to parties using the media to make accusations against one another. For their part, reporters were unable to reveal the real culprits because they didn’t have sufficient resources to do their own investigating and reporting. </p>
<p>From the perspective of balance, accusations and counter-accusations were reported. But the real perpetrators and victims were rarely established or verified independently.</p>
<p>Yet independent verification of political claims is important because it means that journalists can provide context in an environment in which conspiracy theories are rife. The ability to be able to report events on the ground is crucial if the media’s watchdog role is to be sustained, and deepened. That, in turn, needs resources.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Demarest receives funding from the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO), Leiden University.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arnim Langer receives funding from Flemish Research Foundation, VLIR-UOS & EU Commission. </span></em></p>Nigerian print media played a crucial role in monitoring violence, and thereby deterring it.Leila Demarest, Assistant Professor of African Politics, Institute of Political Science, Leiden UniversityArnim Langer, Professor, KU LeuvenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1010472018-08-04T12:31:57Z2018-08-04T12:31:57ZTwo narratives are being spun about Zimbabwe’s poll. Which one will win the day?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230639/original/file-20180803-41357-qy8nh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A triumphant Zanu-PF supporter celebrates the Emmerson Mnangagwa's victory in the presidential race.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is said that two things are inevitable in life: death and taxes. To these a third might be added – election victories for former southern African liberation parties. This is especially true in Zimbabwe, whose governing Zanu-PF party is steeped in the politics of entitlement. One with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-zimbabwe-finally-ditch-a-history-of-violence-and-media-repression-99859">brutal history</a> whenever it is confronted by dissent and opposition.</p>
<p>It came as no great surprise, therefore, that it secured a resounding victory in the recent <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/997207/Zimbabwe-election-results-2018-Mnangagwa-Chamisa-who-won">parliamentary elections</a>, followed by a narrower but still decisive win for Emmerson Mnangagwa over Nelson Chamisa in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-45053412">presidential poll</a>. But – 50.8% to 44.3% – was suspiciously convenient, just nudging Mnangagwa past the point required to avoid a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-08-03-zanu-pfs-emmerson-mnangagwa-wins-zimbabwean-election/">run-off contest</a>. This was akin to the contrived result of 2008, which denied Morgan Tsvangirai the presidency by pushing him <a href="https://eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008results5.htm">below 50%</a>. </p>
<p>The standard features of Zimbabwean elections were all evident again. A slavish state media acting as praise singers for Zanu-PF, rather than as a forum for diverse opinions, the open allegiance of the security forces, and the misuse of the state apparatus for <a href="https://www.biznews.com/briefs/2018/05/03/life-mugabe-zim-opposition-credible-election">party purposes</a>. </p>
<p>What was missing this time was a full-blown campaign of state intimidation and violence to ensure that voters ‘did the right thing’. The post-Robert Mugabe administration is astute enough to understand that such tactics would drive a coach and horses through its key policy objectives. These are to secure global rehabilitation, gain access to International Monetary Fund and World Bank support, and to entice investors and business back to the country.</p>
<p>Thus, the balancing act was to retain power while still doing enough to convince the global community that Zimbabwe was on an upward curve. The kind of approach used in previous elections could only be deployed in extreme circumstances. It posed a fundamental threat to the wider national interest, and shows how the <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/economic-analysis/zimbabwe-dire-need-economic-reform-nation-must-act-quickly-post-mugabe-say-imf/">precarious economic situation</a> has compelled a political reappraisal within Zanu-PF about strategy and tactics.</p>
<p>There has been no Damascene conversion here. Mnangagwa was an architect of previous election campaigns rooted in intimidation and he has been implicated in the atrocities of the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi</a>. </p>
<p>His was merely a pragmatic recognition that less crude tactics were necessary due to the country’s untenable economic situation. </p>
<p>Will this strategy work? It is currently too early to say. What’s clear though is that two narratives have already begun to emerge. Mnangagwa’s is that there <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/03/africa/zimbabwe-election-mnangagwa-chamisa-intl/index.html">needs to be</a> national unity, that he’s a centrist and pragmatist and needs the West’s support to get the country back on its feet. For his part, Chamisa has already begun to write his script: <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/03/africa/zimbabwe-election-mnangagwa-chamisa-intl/index.html">the election was rigged</a> and Zimbabweans were robbed of a fair election. </p>
<h2>Election observers</h2>
<p>While the Southern African Development Community and African Union monitors have <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sadc-au-comesa-endorse-zim-elections-16352866">approved the elections</a>, those endorsements must be placed in their proper historical context. Both bodies have a long history of endorsing Zimbabwean elections in the face of the most egregious vote rigging and violence. And both have a structural bias towards protecting the interests of incumbents. </p>
<p>There is a strong ‘leaders club’ mentality in both organisations. And a ‘liberation club’ mentality remains exceptionally strong within the SADC. These organisations still lack a thorough democratic character and remain unable to translate the noble aspirations of their charters into a consistent defence of democratic principles on the ground. </p>
<p>For its part, the European Union was less generous. The EU was allowed to monitor a Zimbabwean election for the first time <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/eu-observe-zimbabwe-polls-first-time-16-years-182429480.html?guccounter=1">in 16 years</a> and it highlighted structural inequalities in the electoral process, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-08-01-history-is-repeating-itself-in-zimbabwe/">concluding that </a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>a truly level playing field was not achieved which negatively impacted on the democratic character of the electoral environment. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>One must also place explanations for any Zimbabwean election in the wider context of a dominant party state which is highly authoritarian. Zanu-PF has embedded itself in power over almost four decades. It has entrenched itself in the state and its behaviour has shown that any result defying ‘the revolution’ - that is its own defeat - is unacceptable and will be resisted with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">full might of the state</a> </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwe police outside the Bronte Hotel during the opposition MDC- Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa’s press conference in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In short, everything can change in Zimbabwe except the rule of the dominant party. That is the limit of its ‘reform process’. This inevitably affects the wider population, it grinds a people down, exhausts them and compels them to make their own often resigned and unhappy accommodation with a status quo which seems immovable. This is particularly so as people struggle daily to make ends meet.</p>
<p>People have learned what a serious challenge to Zanu-PF power actally entails, and naturally flinch from inviting such retribution on themselves. In short, there is an awareness that behind Mnangagwa’s conciliatory discourse is a steely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/02/mnangagwas-zanu-pf-on-track-to-pull-off-narrow-win-in-zimbabwe-election">determination never to yield power</a>.</p>
<h2>How should the West respond?</h2>
<p>Western support is needed to unlock the doors to the main global financial institutions whose support Zimbabwe desperately needs to pull it from the economic abyss. </p>
<p>Two contrasting narratives are being spun, each seeking to shape the Zimbabwean reality for a Western audience. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s pitch is that Zimbabwe is moving on after the disasters of the Mugabe era. While the election may be acknowledged as imperfect, it’s a good start and a clear advance on previous polls. In the coming days and weeks he will suggest that, with strong external support and by fully welcoming Zimbabwe back into the family of nations, further progress is likely. </p>
<p>The opposition MDC-Alliance and Chamisa, by contrast, has already begun to advance a narrative that this is simply more of the same – <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1988993/nelson-chamisa-claims-zecs-results-are-unverified-and-fake/">rigged elections</a> falling lamentably short of democratic standards. Their argument is that behind the smokescreen of soothing rhetoric is the same implacable determination by Zanu-PF to remain in power at any cost, as shown by the deadly shooting of <a href="https://www.news.com.au/world/africa/army-opens-fire-on-opposition-protests-in-zimbabwe-capital-during-wait-for-election-results/news-story/197e63b58f92e98d15f25aee087a7dd9">unarmed protesters</a>. </p>
<p>In short, Mnangagwa is a wolf in sheep’s clothing and Western states should hold him at arm’s length and deny him the legitimacy he craves. Saying this, of course, will open the MDC-Alliance to the familiar Zanu-PF charge that it is ‘treasonous’ and is collaborating with foreign powers and ‘imperialist forces’. </p>
<p>Which of these proves to be the more compelling narrative will turn on whether Western states insist on full respect for the democratic process, and on certain democratic benchmarks as being non-negotiable; or whether they will view Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF as the only game in town and deal with them, albeit reluctantly. </p>
<p>In that event, like the Zimbabwean population, they too will have been worn down by the attritional politics of Zanu-PF.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101047/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Winners and losers are both trying to win the West’s support for their view.James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.