tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/energiewende-6584/articlesEnergiewende – The Conversation2015-09-08T05:29:44Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/463592015-09-08T05:29:44Z2015-09-08T05:29:44ZWhy Germany is dumping nuclear power – and Britain isn’t<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/92729/original/image-20150821-31404-13epkgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The message from Germany.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/search/?text=atomkraft%20nein%20danke&sort=interestingness-desc&orientation=landscape%2Cpanorama">justflix</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The starkly differing nuclear policies of Germany and the UK present perhaps the clearest divergence in developed world energy strategies. <a href="http://energytransition.de/">Under the current major Energy Transition (Energiewende)</a>, Germany is seeking to entirely phase out nuclear power by 2022. Yet the UK has for <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/leading-the-way-the-uks-new-nuclear-renaissance">many years advocated a “nuclear renaissance”</a>, promoting the most ambitious new nuclear construction programme in Western Europe. A close look at what’s happening makes the contrast look very odd indeed.</p>
<p>Nowhere is that difference more obvious than in the impending decision of British energy minister Amber Rudd, over arguably the <a href="http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2014/12/why-is-britain-building-the-most-expensive-object-ever/">most expensive single infrastructure project</a> in British history: the Hinkley Point C power station. </p>
<p>Both nuclear and renewables offer low carbon strategies. But the performance of renewable energy is <a href="http://energytransition.de/2014/12/infographs/">now manifestly superior to nuclear power</a> and <a href="http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/Flagship-Projects/Global-Energy-Assessment/GEA-Summary-web.pdf">continuing to improve</a>. The position of nuclear power, by contrast, <a href="http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/-2014-.html">is rapidly declining worldwide</a>. In 2013, new global investments in renewable electricity capacity <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-14/fossil-fuels-just-lost-the-race-against-renewables">overtook those in all fossil fuels combined</a>. So, why does UK policy making and public debate on these issues remain so distinctively biased towards nuclear? </p>
<h2>“Who says?”</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=2015-18-swps-johnston-stirling.pdf&site=25">Recent research at SPRU</a> has investigated a key aspect of this conundrum. It began with a simple yet fundamental question: how to understand these massively contrasting developments in the two such otherwise similar countries as the UK and Germany? <a href="http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=SD0337_8253_FRP.doc">There is no shortage of academic theory</a> about why particular technologies are developed and others abandoned, but these turn out to be interestingly incomplete.</p>
<p>What is clear at the outset, is that technological progress in any given sector – like electricity – is not a one-track “race to the future”. In these simplistic terms, so-called pro-innovation policies reduce the debate to the level of <a href="http://steps-centre.org/wp-content/uploads/Innovation-Democracy.pdf">“how fast?”, “what’s the risk?”; and “who’s leading?”</a>. Instead, general understandings developed across history, economics, philosophy and social science show <a href="http://steps-centre.org/wp-content/uploads/stirling-paper-32.pdf">the real questions are about “which way?”; “who says?”; and “why?”</a> Technological choices like those for and against nuclear power are as much <a href="http://steps-centre.org/engagement/manifesto/">a matter for democracy</a> as for technical expertise. In other words, these should be treated as openly as other political issues, to be decided in ways that are responsible, open and transparent. To deal with such issues democratically also means that decisions are accountable to all those who stand to be affected and in whose name they have been taken.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94021/original/image-20150907-1989-xzvgf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94021/original/image-20150907-1989-xzvgf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94021/original/image-20150907-1989-xzvgf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94021/original/image-20150907-1989-xzvgf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94021/original/image-20150907-1989-xzvgf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94021/original/image-20150907-1989-xzvgf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94021/original/image-20150907-1989-xzvgf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94021/original/image-20150907-1989-xzvgf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Isar II nuclear plant in Bavaria, Germany.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/brewbooks/538000237/in/photolist-PxoJa-9NApiT-9NEtYQ-9NDvLH-9NAsCc-9NGKrb-9NEnS2-9NG7YG-9NGokq-5GoNLA-9NEwpU-9NGabs-9NJKMw-9NC9uz-91DWUb-9NEYMC-9NGYu8-7aYos-4ALhm7-63q3TA-9NC5eF-9NC7mF-9M2DUT-2s9T6c-9NDrQR-9NGcbW-9NBBMn-9fJX2x-9NDy6B-9NDtMv-9Nz3As-9emD8W-9M2DZZ-9NFVNX-buRg2w-9NJybd-9NC2JV-bwbJ8z-9NDZCz-PxoSx-fyDhwy-jwAn4M-5Gjtr4-8P1sUL-8TNQTi-785ePb-9LPBnH-9NH11D-aY4drr-9NJAiA">brewbooks</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>But specific theories about how to achieve such technological transitions, do not tend to emphasise this democratic aspect. Highlighted instead are ways to encourage technological niches (like renewables) and how to stabilise these into an updated regime, in this case existing electricity systems. Until recently, less attention has been given to the roles played by deliberate efforts to <a href="http://steps-centre.org/project/technology-governance/">discontinue an entrenched old regime</a>, which (like the German nuclear industry) it is the aim of government to replace. </p>
<p>So what we get instead of a public debate is a host of much more detailed technical policy interventions in areas such as regulation, research, subsidies, market structure, contracts and training. This tends to lead only to incremental and conservative adjustments rather than ambitious transformation.</p>
<h2>The German Alternative</h2>
<p>To investigate these dilemmas, we considered thirty different parameters variously mentioned across all the different theories, to see which ones best explained the contrasting directions of policy in the UK and Germany. We grouped these into nine broadly relevant criteria addressing issues like: general market conditions; nuclear contributions to electricity mixes; strengths in nuclear engineering; costs and potential of renewables; strengths in renewable industries; scales of military nuclear interests; general political characteristics; public opinion and social movements; and contrasts in overall “qualities of democracy” (as measured in a <a href="http://www.democracybarometer.org/publications_en.html">burgeoning field of political science</a>).</p>
<p>Some findings seem potentially quite important, and in direct practical ways for nuclear policy. In short, the criteria wrongly predict that it would be the UK, rather than Germany, which should be more likely to steer electricity systems away from nuclear power. After all, before the Energiewende, it was the UK that had: a relatively weak civil nuclear industry; a low nuclear fraction in the electricity mix; the best renewable energy resources; and a strong offshore industry that might gain from the harnessing renewables.</p>
<p>Until recently, Germany hosted the most successful nuclear engineering industry in the world. It had a high proportion of its electricity from nuclear and the more statist German style of capitalism is also more favourable to nuclear (with its need for government support). Patterns of public opinion have long been pretty similar in the two countries. All those criteria conventionally emphasised in mainstream theory predict the opposite of the observed pattern.</p>
<p>In fact, only two criteria clearly predict a move in Germany rather than the UK. These are strong UK military nuclear interests and the unanimous verdict in the <a href="http://www.democracybarometer.org/">political science literature</a>, that Germany ranks markedly higher than the UK in terms of key “qualities of democracy” like those mentioned above. But these broader political qualities – including transparency, participation and accountability – are excluded from normal policy analysis in this field.</p>
<h2>Rudderless</h2>
<p>It is remarkable that military implications remain virtually unmentioned not only in official UK nuclear policy documents, but in wider media and even critical debate. If this is a factor in the internationally unusual British enthusiasm for nuclear power, then this public silence itself raises issues of democratic accountability. We investigate this issue in <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/aug/07/shining-a-light-on-britains-nuclear-state">a recent separate article</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94022/original/image-20150907-1977-14p48o9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94022/original/image-20150907-1977-14p48o9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94022/original/image-20150907-1977-14p48o9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94022/original/image-20150907-1977-14p48o9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94022/original/image-20150907-1977-14p48o9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94022/original/image-20150907-1977-14p48o9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94022/original/image-20150907-1977-14p48o9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94022/original/image-20150907-1977-14p48o9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Amber Rudd at tidal energy project.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/deccgovuk/14833444034/in/photolist-oAMh85-o48ghA-pFT6ze-pW9JCY-pV51p7-pepkQD-o42LKn-p8XWAD-qcd2eL-tTf56D-padKiK-pUpWbH-uKaeJ2-vqk3Jx-vqk4EF-qcd2i3-tXQE8N-rKtmFy-vqk2C4-sG1duX-ptnqyA-sppFbS-ojq1wj-vp7QcV-v7xvAS-vp7Pz2-qRMV58-pUpWce-ojr2Y5-oAUaXd-vp7Pik-vmPiju-v7xsWy-vpsVF6-us7peC-vpsUCp-vpsTtv-us7rrd-vmPhsj-us7qE3-vmPeMQ-vmPepW-v7EUdT-v7xptw-us7mrU-v7xoE7-van8ZK-uK2DPw-u5ATzS-vqcH19">Department of Energy and Climate Change</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<p>But whatever might be this specific military dimension, the key message from our analysis is very clear. It is extraordinarily difficult to understand why Germany rather than the UK should be moving away from nuclear power, without being drawn to the relative qualities of democracy in the two countries. Whether this is right or wrong, it is very significant that it is Germany that has been able to mount an effective challenge to the concentrated power and entrenched interests around nuclear energy. Also perhaps relevant, is the fact that Germany has a track record of consistently making these kinds of enlightened decisions earlier than the UK (on issues like acid rain, pesticides, recycling and clean production) - whilst remaining arguably the world’s most successful industrial economy.</p>
<p>So the practical message seems quite profound. General British debates over directions for innovation – around nuclear energy <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2013/jun/28/gm-food">as in other areas like GMOs</a> – are presently not primarily seen as matters for democracy; in effect they are not deemed suitable for public debate. Yet the troubled history of nuclear power itself – <a href="http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/environmental_issue_report_2001_22">as with other technological issues like asbestos, phthalidomide and chemical pollution</a> - shows how accountabilities neglected earlier, have a habit of being strongly asserted later. Perhaps this is something Amber Rudd might bear in mind, when making her impending momentous decision on Hinkley Point.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46359/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Johnstone receives funding from the ESRC . He is affiliated with the Nuclear Consulting Group and the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andy Stirling receives funding from the ESRC for research on this topic. Alongside many other commitments (including advisory roles for the UK Government on energy and other technology policy issues and for the nuclear industry on energy diversity), he has worked in the past for Greenpeace International and currently serves on the board of Greenpeace UK.</span></em></p>What happens to energy policy when democracy takes a back seat – and no one mentions the war.Philip Johnstone, Research Fellow, SPRU, University of Sussex Business School, University of SussexAndy Stirling, Professor of Science & Technology Policy and co-director of the ESRC STEPS Centre, University of Sussex Business School, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/329852014-10-15T05:23:06Z2014-10-15T05:23:06ZGermany’s green energy gamble could really use some vorsprung durch technik<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61714/original/fjxqp8mh-1413305513.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is Germany's green energy switch achievable?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/peter_heilmann/2717994748/in/photolist-4neggw-JzTSy-dCFo4g-LibQK-i3L7ng-5P2SUU-7vnYhc-rFmn5-rFmvf-rFmqJ-6ZMws6-4neghw-jYS44Z-dpyNTV-cRk8A5-qjrgd-59br9q-piD79-6WdC4g-5ZYq9L-phAKyb-pmbLeu-piTYDV-p3t919-ph9Gh9-pqydfV-piy9mf-p5Lj5t-p54M2i-pnJUUK-p9ZHAu-p5YTok-p7kKNb-pgjfv9-p1KrHk-pk11Fx-6Mv8jv-oyeJUn-3KRWro-92wXnt-4PoG31-4negh5-xjBvq-DVofu-DVofi-DVof8-DVofb-DVofp-DVofE-Yvm13">Peter Hellman</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Remember the big, somewhat bulky Mercedes Benz cars of the early 1990s? State-of-the-art at that time, they left their competitors behind on Germany’s autobahn. Mercedes is still here today, but the autobahns are not what they were: Germans fear that two decades of neglect after reunification might have seriously damaged the country’s once superb infrastructure. </p>
<p>Similarly, Germany once possessed one of the world’s most well engineered power systems. Yet in 2014 the country urgently needs new power grids – or “stromautobahnen” (electricity highways) –- to keep supply stable in the face of growing proportions of volatile renewable energy. There are <a href="http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/energiewende-studie-ohne-neue-trassen-wird-strom-im-sueden-teurer-13190328.html">concerns over</a> whether it can keep pace with the phase-out of nuclear power, a decision taken in the wake of the Fukushima disaster three years ago. Nuclear helps to stabilise demand on the grid but eight out of 17 reactors have now been shut down, with the rest due to close by 2022. </p>
<h2>Der energiewende</h2>
<p>Electricity generation from renewables has risen lately to new unprecedented highs, overtaking lignite coal <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-01/german-renewables-output-tops-lignite-for-first-time-agora-says.html">to become</a> the number one single source in the nine months to September 2014. This is part of the government’s policy of “energiewende” – the rapid transformation of the power system towards green energy. The stated target is for renewables to provide 55% to 60% of German electricity by 2035 – among the most ambitious in the world. </p>
<p><strong>The changing German energy mix</strong></p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61713/original/7cfvy45c-1413305255.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61713/original/7cfvy45c-1413305255.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61713/original/7cfvy45c-1413305255.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61713/original/7cfvy45c-1413305255.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61713/original/7cfvy45c-1413305255.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61713/original/7cfvy45c-1413305255.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=626&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61713/original/7cfvy45c-1413305255.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=626&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61713/original/7cfvy45c-1413305255.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=626&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AG Energiebilanzen, EIA</span></span>
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<p>But there are doubts as to whether it is realistic, and whether it might turn out to be harmful for Germany’s industry. One indicator is that electricity tariffs <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/service/strompreis-ist-seit-2000-um-92-prozent-gestiegen-a-996197.html">have almost doubled</a> since 2000, for example. Meanwhile CO<sub>2</sub> emissions have not decreased, but <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21620080-germanys-reliance-russian-gas-fallingbut-not-sustainably-going-out-gas">actually increased</a> over the last few years because coal-fired power has been on the rise while nuclear wanes. </p>
<p>It is also no secret that Germany’s energy companies <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9cbf4d8c-4f0d-11e4-9c88-00144feab7de.html#axzz3G6otQcqH">are not</a> doing well, as pointed out by the chief executive of French rival EDF recently in a general attack on the state of the German energy sector. Both RWE and E.ON have had to accept huge write-downs in the value of their domestic nuclear and fossil-fuel-powered assets. Is Germany thus in the process of sacrificing the once famous reliability of its power sector for little more than problems? And if so, what might be the way forward? Back to nuclear energy? </p>
<h2>The policy only Germans understand</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61715/original/m8x6nrgv-1413306046.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61715/original/m8x6nrgv-1413306046.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61715/original/m8x6nrgv-1413306046.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61715/original/m8x6nrgv-1413306046.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61715/original/m8x6nrgv-1413306046.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61715/original/m8x6nrgv-1413306046.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61715/original/m8x6nrgv-1413306046.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brunsbüttel in northern Germany is among the nuclear stations to have closed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/be/Kkw_brunsb%C3%BCttel_blauhimmel_und_windrad.JPG">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The <a href="http://mhoefert.blogspot.co.uk/2013/06/nuclear-power-to-save-world.html">disastrous state</a> of Germany’s repositories for radioactive waste such as Brunsbüttel and Asse in the north are not encouraging. And public support for both renewables and nuclear phase-out <a href="http://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/allensbach-umfrage-hohe-zustimmung-fuer-energiewende/10037578.html">is still great</a>. But further afield the German decision to live without nuclear has perplexed many observers. To the great amusement of the participants at a business conference in Berlin in 2010, <a href="http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/IT-Putin_suggests_Germans_replace_nuclear_with_firewood-0112105.html">Vladimir Putin offered</a> the Germans firewood from Siberia to heat the country once its nuclear power stations had been switched off. Clearly the energiewende has not exactly impressed the Russians. </p>
<p>How about others? Japan, which has more reason to back the energiewende than almost anyone, is <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/asia/japanese-nuclear-plant-declared-safe-to-operate-for-first-time-since-fukushima-daiichi-disaster.html?_r=0">relaunching</a> its nuclear programme. The United States is happy with its shale gas, and at home in Europe, not many countries have joined the Germans either. On top of this, Günther Oettinger, Germany’s accomplished top official in the European Commission, is no longer responsible for energy. It would seem then that Germany’s energy policy has not many influential supporters left. </p>
<h2>The tech dimension</h2>
<p>There remains the idea to sell German-engineered green tech to the world. Siemens is a world leader in renewable technology, for example. Yet the technical level of difficulty is not necessarily high enough to serve as the basis of a high-tech industry in which the Germans can have a competitive advantage in the long term – it is too easy for other players to fabricate equivalent structures. This was illustrated by the Desertec project to build huge solar parks in the North African desert. <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/energy/desertec-abandons-sahara-solar-p-news-528151">It collapsed</a>, where Siemens had already walked away a few months earlier. It wasn’t seen as a big deal for the Germans, since many components for the project may have come from China anyway. If the same thing happened with the production of wind turbines, however, it would be a serious setback to the idea of Germany relying on green tech as a base for future industrial production because it would be undercut by other countries who could make the same products more cheaply. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61717/original/48y72c7y-1413307161.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61717/original/48y72c7y-1413307161.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61717/original/48y72c7y-1413307161.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61717/original/48y72c7y-1413307161.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61717/original/48y72c7y-1413307161.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61717/original/48y72c7y-1413307161.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61717/original/48y72c7y-1413307161.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61717/original/48y72c7y-1413307161.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Solar provides 7% of German power, but the technology is too easily replicated.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nuffcumptin/3976817039/in/photolist-74qea2-76834x-76bVtW-76bUqY-767Zyz-76bTs1-7681Kn-7681vM-7683ct-76bTHq-76bVfm-767YJe-76bVNq-76bV81-76bWaW-oDGAyw-75Rr3F-75ViK1-ieLyM6-amp4zo-caLM6E-6bRBvt-ieLUyj-kqP1SV-6bRBnV-utMMN-7683vB-7683ie-7682Pr-76oY39-omjNK-omntv-aVpN4B-75VgBC-omk8H-doR7V1-omjYb-omjPy-omotM-omk5L-dWsy3d-dWsy6Y-dYbY5i-dWsxZm-dWsy8G-dWmUSF-dYhEZG-dWsy13-cucgSf-dbcZhF">nuffcumptin</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>But most things in life have two sides. The great hope is that German engineering will once more surprise the world with technical solutions for difficult problems in difficult times. The central issue is the power grid. One of the key challenges is to <a href="http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/03/130318105003.htm">find an electricity storage mechanism</a> that can allow a quick and flexible response to changes in the amount of wind and solar power – currently the availability drops when the wind stops blowing or the sun stops shining. </p>
<p>Another big challenge is persuading consumers to react more flexibly to these ups and downs, most likely by altering the price of power accordingly. Solve these problems and the fact that renewables have no fuel costs would make them a serious alternative to other energy sources. </p>
<p>The power grid and its components, not Putin’s firewood, could become the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wunderwaffe">“wunderwaffe”</a> (“wonder weapon”) able to solve Germany’s energy problems. But these new techniques need to be affordable, otherwise the effect will be negligible and only perpetuate the existing problems. </p>
<p>To end on a positive note, there is one much less debated issue around the country’s nuclear phase-out programme. If Germany sticks with its chosen course, the development of third-generation nuclear plants will be in the hands of countries such as France, Britain and Poland. But German industry is famous for its ability to occupy profitable technological niches. Given that there are many nuclear power stations to be dismantled, and a lot of nuclear waste already rotting in the country, the Germans will have to find solutions to deal with it. If they still are the engineers they used to be, they will. This could become a very lucrative thing to then sell to the rest of the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas is affiliated to the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel</span></em></p>Remember the big, somewhat bulky Mercedes Benz cars of the early 1990s? State-of-the-art at that time, they left their competitors behind on Germany’s autobahn. Mercedes is still here today, but the autobahns…Thomas Sattich, Associate Researcher Environment and Sustainable Development, Universität BremenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/166432013-08-02T05:44:02Z2013-08-02T05:44:02ZGermany decisive while UK dithers on green energy routes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/28508/original/znbk8p3f-1375374827.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Costs vs carbon</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rui Vieira/PA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Germany and the UK have ambitious clean energy policies. Both have set themselves national emission reduction targets beyond the European Union’s goal of 20% below emissions levels of 1990. Germany has committed itself to a 40% cut by 2020, the UK a reduction of 35% by 2022, and each promises further reductions in later years. Both countries are going to struggle to achieve these self-imposed goals.</p>
<p>In Germany’s case, one obvious reason for this is its 2011 decision following the Fukushima accident to close half the country’s nuclear reactors immediately, and phase out the rest <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13592208">within a decade</a>. Abandoning such a large source of low carbon energy clearly makes decarbonisation of the power system harder.</p>
<p>The difficulty is compounded by the fact that Chancellor Angela Merkel did not relax targets that had been toughed up only just the previous year. These had been made on the assumption that the lives of Germany’s current generation of reactors would be prolonged, not curtailed.</p>
<p>Britain’s problem is one of dither, not distaste. The numerous energy white papers drawn up by the UK government in the 1990s and early 2000s totally failed to address whether to replace the UK’s ageing reactor fleet, and if so how. The final realisation has come late in the game that this particularly expensive form of low carbon energy can only be financed in a liberalised energy market through taxpayer paid-for, state-organised price support. The exact level of that support is what the Treasury and France’s EdF are <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jul/05/davey-minister-nuclear-power-hinkley-point">haggling over</a>, but it looks likely that Britain will be down to one functioning reactor before EdF gets around to building anything new.</p>
<p>One positive effect of Germany’s Fukushima fright was to boost support for renewables. It is important to realise that in Germany, unlike other countries and certainly unlike Britain, deploying wind turbines and solar panels has become a grassroots popular movement.<a href="http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/SP-26.pdf">Nearly half</a> the country’s installed renewable energy capacity is owned by private citizens, largely through cooperatives, who have responded to generous tariffs offered over 20 years and sometimes to a little moral urging by groups such as local Protestant churches.</p>
<p>By contrast, Germany’s big four utilities have only played a minor role in renewable energy in Germany and, ironically, a much bigger role outside. German company Eon, for instance, helped build the <a href="http://www.londonarray.com/">London Array</a> wind farm in the Thames estuary. The surge in renewable deployment has provided jobs in and orders for Germany’s extensive and highly capable engineering industry. According to the <a href="http://www.vdma.org/en_GB">VDMA</a> engineering sector, wind power accounts for 50,000 jobs directly in manufacturing and installing turbines, and another 50,000 indirectly in components. By comparison, a UK government employment estimate in 2011 for onshore wind was <a href="https://www.gov.uk/onshore-wind-part-of-the-uks-energy-mix">8,600 jobs</a>, though employment in offshore wind is expected to expand faster than in Germany.</p>
<p>The enthusiasm of German people for renewables helps explain the degree to which they have been prepared to pay higher renewable energy surcharges so that Germany’s energy-intensive companies can pay less. Of course, there’s also an element of industrial patriotism and pride in their world-leading exports, and most Germans want to keep it that way. However, this cross-subsidisation of companies by households may be coming to an end. Merkel’s government, in the run-up to this September’s election, has decided that energy-intensive companies should start to pay some of the fees that ordinary householders have been shouldering. Moreover, the European Commission is now investigating whether or not the discounts that German companies obtain on their renewable energy surcharges constitute <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/european-commission-set-to-fight-german-energy-subsidies-a-902269.html">illegal state aid</a>.</p>
<p>The post-Fukushima phase in Germany’s enthusiasm for renewables is now passing, above all because of the soaring cost of renewable subsidies. These totalled €20 billion in 2012, and are approaching €30 billion this year. Subsidy reform is clearly on the way, whoever wins the September election. The challenge will be to reduce subsidy levels for new projects, especially where technology costs are coming down, such as with solar power, without alienating investors as many other European governments have done.</p>
<p>One possible way to make renewable subsidy levels more predictable and therefore in the long run more sustainable to taxpayers might be, ironically, to take a leaf out of Britain’s book. Alone among EU countries, the UK has set out a multi-year financial cap on renewable (and nuclear) subsidies, what the Treasury calls the <a href="http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/newsdesk/energy/analysis/everything-you-could-ever-want-know-about-levy-control-framework">Levy Control Framework</a>. The framework caps the total maximum annual subsidy for 2012-13 at £2.35 billion, rising to £7.6 billion by 2020 (at 2012-adjusted prices). This is far less than the £30 billion Germany is spending now - a measure of how empty much of the UK’s renewable rhetoric is. But the concept of a hard subsidy cap is something Germany might consider. After all, sustainability has a financial as well as an environmental dimension.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/16643/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Buchan receives funding from the European Parliament.</span></em></p>Germany and the UK have ambitious clean energy policies. Both have set themselves national emission reduction targets beyond the European Union’s goal of 20% below emissions levels of 1990. Germany has…David Buchan, Senior Research Fellow, Oxford Energy Institute, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.