tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/ethiopia-2730/articlesEthiopia – The Conversation2024-03-11T10:04:45Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2185452024-03-11T10:04:45Z2024-03-11T10:04:45ZEast Africa must prepare for more extreme rainfall during the short rainy season – new study<p>East Africa has recently had an <a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/150712/worst-drought-on-record-parches-horn-of-africa">unprecedented series of failed rains</a>. But some rainy seasons are bringing the opposite: huge amounts of rainfall. </p>
<p>In the last few months of 2023, the rainy season, known as the “short rains”, was much wetter than normal. It brought severe flooding to Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania. In Somalia, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1144202">more than</a> 2 million people were affected, with over 100 killed and 750,000 displaced from their homes. Tens of thousands of people in northern Kenya <a href="https://www.euronews.com/green/2023/12/15/floods-have-washed-away-entire-villages-kenyas-rains-made-twice-as-intense-by-climate-chan">lost</a> livestock, farmland and homes. </p>
<p>The very wet short rainy seasons are linked to a climate event known as a positive Indian Ocean Dipole (known as the “IOD”). And climate model projections <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-00943-1">show an increasing trend</a> of extreme Indian Ocean dipoles. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1029/2023GL105258">new research paper</a>, we set out to investigate what effect more frequent extreme Indian Ocean Dipole events would have on rainfall in east Africa. We did this using a large number of climate simulations and models.</p>
<p>Our results show that they increase the likelihood of very wet days – therefore making very wet seasons. </p>
<p>This could lead to extreme weather events, even more extreme than the floods of 1997, which led to <a href="https://www.fao.org/3/w7832e/w7832e00.htm">10 million people requiring emergency assistance</a>, or those of 2019, when <a href="https://fews.net/east-africa/special-report/january-2020">hundreds of thousands were displaced</a>.</p>
<p>We recommend that decision-makers plan for this kind of extreme rainfall, and the resulting devastating floods.</p>
<h2>How the Indian Ocean Dipole works</h2>
<p>Indian Ocean Dipole events tend to occur in the second half of the year, and can last for months. They have two phases: positive and negative. </p>
<p>Positive events occur when the temperature of the sea surface in the western Indian Ocean is warmer than normal and the temperature in the eastern Indian Ocean is cooler than normal. Put simply, this temperature difference <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/43854">happens when</a> winds move warmer water away from the ocean surface in the eastern region, allowing cooler water to rise. </p>
<p>In the warmer western Indian Ocean, more heated air will rise, along with water vapour. This forms clouds, bringing rain. Meanwhile, the eastern part of the Indian Ocean will be cooler and drier. This is why flooding in east Africa can happen at the same time as <a href="https://theconversation.com/indian-ocean-linked-to-bushfires-and-drought-in-australia-20893">bushfires in Australia</a>.</p>
<p>The opposite is true for negative dipole events: drier in the western Indian Ocean and wetter in the east. </p>
<p>Under climate change we’re expecting to see more frequent and more extreme positive dipole events – bigger differences between east and west. This is <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-why-climate-change-will-cause-more-strong-indian-ocean-dipole-events/">shown by climate model projections</a>. They are believed to be driven by different paces of warming across the tropical Indian Ocean – with western and northern regions projected to warm faster than eastern parts.</p>
<p>Often heavy rain seasons in east Africa are attributed to El Niño, but <a href="https://rmets.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/asl.1015">recent research</a> has shown that the direct impact of El Niño on east African rainfall is actually relatively modest. El Niño’s principal influence lies in its capacity to bring about positive dipole events. This occurs since El Niño events tend to cool the water in the western Pacific Ocean – around Indonesia – which also helps to cool down the water in the eastern Indian Ocean. These cooler temperatures then help kick-start a positive Indian Ocean Dipole.</p>
<h2>Examining unprecedented events</h2>
<p>Extreme positive Indian Ocean Dipole events are rare in the recent climate record. So to examine their potential impacts on rainfall extremes, we used a large set of climate simulations. The data allowed us to diagnose the sensitivity of rainfall to larger Indian Ocean Dipole events in a statistically robust way.</p>
<p>Our results show that as positive dipole events become more extreme, more wet days during the short rains season can be expected. This effect was found to be largest for the frequency of extremely wet days. Additionally, we found that as the dipole strength increases, the influence on the most extreme days becomes even larger. This means that dipole events which are even slightly “record-breaking” could lead to unprecedented levels of seasonal rainfall. </p>
<p>Ultimately, if positive Indian Ocean Dipole seasons increase in frequency, as predicted, regular seasons of flooding impacts will become a new normal.</p>
<p>One aspect not included in our analysis is the influence of a warmer atmosphere on rainfall extremes. A warmer atmosphere <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-what-climate-models-tell-us-about-future-rainfall/">holds more moisture</a>, allowing for the development of more intense rain storms. This effect could combine with the influence of extreme positive dipoles to bring unprecedented levels of rainfall to the Horn of Africa. </p>
<p>2023 was <a href="https://wmo.int/media/news/wmo-confirms-2023-smashes-global-temperature-record">a year of record-breaking temperatures driven both by El Niño and global warming</a>. We might expect that this warmer air could have intensified rain storms during the season. Indeed, evidence from <a href="https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/climate-change-indian-ocean-dipole-compounding-natural-hazards-and-high-vulnerability-increased-severity-of-flooding-in-the-horn-of-africa/">a recent assessment</a> suggests that climate change-driven warming is highly likely responsible for increased rainfall totals. </p>
<h2>Responding to an unprecedented future</h2>
<p>Policymakers need to plan for this. </p>
<p>In the long term it is crucial to ensure that any new infrastructure is robust to withstand more frequent and heavier rains, and that government, development and humanitarian actors have the capacity to respond to the challenges.</p>
<p>Better use of technology, such as innovations in <a href="https://fastaweather.com/">disseminating satellite rainfall monitoring via mobile phones</a>, can communicate immediate risk. <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/ai-churns-out-lightning-fast-forecasts-good-weather-agencies">New frontiers in AI-based weather prediction</a> could improve the ability to anticipate localised rain storms, including <a href="https://www.wfp.org/publications/2023-machine-learning-early-warning-systems">initiatives focusing on eastern Africa</a> specifically. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9g_06jBU-ag">Linking rainfall information with hydrological models designed for dryland environments</a> is also essential. These will help to translate weather forecasts into impact forecasts, such as identifying risks of flash flooding down normally dry channels or bank overflow of key rivers in drylands.</p>
<p>These technological improvements are crucial. But better use of the forecast information we already have can also make a big difference. For instance, initiatives like <a href="https://www.climatecentre.org/priority_areas/fbf-ibf/">“forecast-based financing”</a>, pioneered by the Red Cross Red Crescent movement, link forecast triggers to pre-approved financing and predefined action plans, helping communities protect themselves before hazards have even started.</p>
<p>For these endeavours to succeed, there must be dialogue between the science and practitioner communities. The scientific community can work with practitioners to integrate key insights into decisions, while practitioners can help to ensure research efforts target critical needs. With this, we can effectively build resilience to natural hazards and resist the increasing risks of our changing climate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218545/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erik W. Kolstad receives funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 programme through the CONFER project (grant 869730)</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katerina Michaelides receives funding from EU H2020, the FCDO and the Leverhulme Trust. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Singer receives funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Programme. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David MacLeod does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Projections show that there’ll be Indian Ocean dipoles in the future – and that means more rainy days, and more extreme rainfall.David MacLeod, Lecturer in Climate Risk, Cardiff UniversityErik W. Kolstad, Research professor, Uni ResearchKaterina Michaelides, Professor of Dryland Hydrology, School of Geographical Sciences, University of BristolMichael Singer, Professor of Hydrology and Geomorphology, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2241662024-03-10T06:42:33Z2024-03-10T06:42:33ZHappy smiling African children: why school tourism in Zimbabwe shouldn’t be encouraged<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578562/original/file-20240228-26-doqnyj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children will often sing and dance for visiting tourists.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pascal Deloche/GODONG</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A large, air-conditioned bus draws up outside a school. Tourists, most from Europe and the US, disembark, cameras at the ready. Some have brought gifts: packages of pens and pencils. They distribute these to the children, who spontaneously begin singing and dancing. </p>
<p>This scene and others like it play out in schools around the world. It’s called school tourism. It’s similar to <a href="https://theconversation.com/modern-slavery-and-tourism-when-holidays-and-human-exploitation-collide-78541">orphanage tourism</a> and so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/slumming-it-how-tourism-is-putting-the-worlds-poorest-places-on-the-map-61320">“slum” tourism</a>, in which tourists visit orphanages or “slums” in poor countries to witness poverty and suffering. These sorts of tourism come with several ethical problems: photography of unconsenting children and adults, intrusions on people’s private lives, daily interruptions to children’s routines and issues of child protection.</p>
<p>Tourists visit a school for between two and three hours. They usually enter classrooms, photograph children and sometimes watch cultural displays like singing and dancing. These tours are generally part of an arrangement with a tourism company but exist in a multitude of forms globally. As an example, a school tour often sits within the itinerary of a tour of southern Africa, or alongside wildlife tourism ventures.</p>
<p>In Zimbabwe, schools have arrangements with tourism companies that enable funding for infrastructure and sponsorship of children. In Matabeleland North, close to Mosi-oa-Tunya (Victoria Falls) and Hwange National Park, for example, 19 out of 20 companies <a href="https://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ass/article/view/26974">interviewed by researchers in 2012</a> provided some sort of support, sponsorship or infrastructure to schools in nearby areas. </p>
<p>These partnerships are often in conjunction with an exchange of philanthropic funding for access to their school. This phenomenon has also been reported in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09669582.2019.1643871">Fiji, Zambia</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160738321000906">Kenya, Ethiopia</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13683500.2010.540314">Mozambique</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-shattered-economy-poses-a-serious-challenge-to-fighting-covid-19-135066">Zimbabwe’s economic troubles</a>, including severe hyper-inflation, are <a href="https://theconversation.com/inflation-is-spiking-in-zimbabwe-again-why-high-interest-rates-arent-the-answer-187362">well documented</a>. Schools are poorly resourced and, in government schools, teachers are often unpaid or <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_zimbabwe-teachers-reject-promised-salary-increase-far-too-low/6198233.html">earn below the poverty line</a>.</p>
<p>I am a Zimbabwean-born Australian woman and a trained secondary school teacher. In 2015, I was working with a school in Zimbabwe as part of my university degree and witnessed this tourism myself. In 2019, as part of my doctoral research, I spent one term at a school in Matabeleland North. It received 129 visits from tourist groups that year alone. </p>
<p>During my time there I talked with teachers, tourism workers and NGO staff. I also asked students to draw <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02508281.2022.2133812">pictures of their experiences of tourism</a>. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17508487.2023.2286230">a recently published article</a> I contribute to the growing field of research about how schools funded by tourism operate. I offer a critique of how an image of “Africa” is reproduced for the tourist gaze, and the fact that images shared by tourists after their visits further inculcate damaging tropes of the African continent as a place only of extreme poverty and neediness. Schools funded by tourism become a mirror of the tourism industry. </p>
<h2>The study</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17508487.2023.2286230">My research identified</a> the sorts of images involved in marketing of tourism that portray a static and cliched <a href="https://theconversation.com/ordinary-peoples-stories-can-change-the-worlds-views-about-africa-48597">image of “Africa”</a>. This includes landscapes filled with animals, extreme poverty, white women and men dressed for safari and <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-020-00607-7">images of Maasai men</a> herding cattle. Smiling, happy children are another part of the image.</p>
<p>The tourism workers I interviewed tried to prevent the continuation of these images by presenting counter-narratives of how Zimbabweans live. But they were not always successful. This is partly due to the structured nature of mass tourism initiatives: tourists are sold an itinerary and this must be followed. Since the school tours are part of broader tours of southern Africa, the school and tourism workers felt a need to conform to a particular image – and this involved interactions with happy children. When teachers and schools feel a need to conform to a particular image, their actions and choices are constrained.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/changing-the-african-narrative-through-social-media-platforms-97097">Changing the African narrative through social media platforms</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>The school I worked with had different arrangements with three tourism companies. One donated US$200 in cash on every visit. Another had promised to build one classroom block. The third company actually founded the school, providing teachers’ salaries and significant infrastructure development. Some tourists had also donated larger pieces of infrastructure, such as the materials for a borehole and electrical connections to the main grid.</p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>The school tours are disruptive to students and staff. They are a diversion from the usual routines of the school. One teacher said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Sometimes you may be called, maybe you did not know that there are visitors coming and they just want to come in at that particular time … Then you are called off the lesson and the time does not wait for you. It goes and that subject is being interrupted. Then you are no longer going to be able to move onto the next subject now. Since you had already introduced the previous lesson, you will not leave it in the air, you have to finish it, so the next subject now is being disturbed.</p>
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<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-close-up-look-at-what-happens-when-tourists-and-maasai-communities-meet-84095">A close-up look at what happens when tourists and Maasai communities meet</a>
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<p>The school in my study found it difficult to balance the perceived needs of the tourists and the institution’s needs. As one of the school leaders put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have to look at it in the sense that, yes, it is taking time: it is probably asking the kids to do something that they would not just usually do when meeting someone. But you have to look at the guest side of things, and also think, these are the people who are helping us. Potential helpers, some are already helping, what are (the tourists) taking away?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The children were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02508281.2022.2133812">highly aware of the need to please the tourists</a>, whom they saw as fulfilling a particular need. Tawanda, aged 10, said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I would prefer to come to school which has visitors because they will be helping us. When there are no books, they will be paying, they will be giving us some money, and we buy some books. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Teachers worried that some groups would donate less if they weren’t able to interact with children.</p>
<h2>What should be done</h2>
<p>Ideally, school tours should not occur at all. However, due to Zimbabwe’s economic instability, schools are becoming increasingly resourceful to find avenues for additional funding. Although they are not a perfect solution, philanthropic partnerships need to exist.</p>
<p>My research does not suggest that people should avoid visiting Zimbabwe as a whole and I do not want to suggest that philanthropic funding of schools is necessarily bad. Rather, it is important to seek out tourism experiences that do not homogenise culture and cultural experiences. Tourists should also consider the itinerary of any tours they book and aim to avoid companies that offer school tours.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224166/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kathleen Smithers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A school tour often sits within the itinerary of a tour of southern Africa, or alongside wildlife tourism ventures.Kathleen Smithers, Lecturer, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2253142024-03-08T16:21:38Z2024-03-08T16:21:38ZLive Aid the musical: what really happens when celebrities get behind humanitarian causes<p><a href="https://www.oldvictheatre.com/stage/event/just-for-one-day">Just For One Day</a>, the Old Vic’s new musical about <a href="https://www.oldvictheatre.com/stories/10-facts-about-the-history-of-live-aid/">Live Aid</a>, recreates the story behind the history-making concert in a spectacle full of iconic 1980s rock anthems.</p>
<p>The script may feel a bit clunky, but as it’s performed in front of enthusiastic audiences largely made up of people old enough to remember that warm July day in 1985, this is unlikely to be a sticking point.</p>
<p>Rocks star Bob Geldof and the sometimes forgotten Midge Ure gathered together the biggest music acts of the time and persuaded them to play for free in concurrent concerts, one at London’s Wembley arena and one at the JFK stadium in Philadelphia. The idea was to raise money to help feed millions of starving people in northern Ethiopia which was being ravaged by drought and famine.</p>
<p>Those acts included David Bowie, Madonna, Bob Dylan, Queen, The Pretenders, Sade, U2, Diana Ross, Paul McCartney, Elton John and The Who, to name just a few. As the concerts beamed out to 150 countries around the globe, the money poured in, eventually raising US$140m (£114m).</p>
<p>Rather like Live Aid itself, the reviews for Just For One Day have been decidedly mixed. While the Telegraph <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/theatre/what-to-see/just-for-one-day-old-vic-review-live-aid/">enthused</a> that “even the most hardened cynic will admire this rip-roaring retread”, and the Daily Express <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/entertainment/theatre/1866679/just-for-one-day-musical-review-bob-geldof">saw it</a> as a “celebration and reminder of what human beings can achieve”, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2024/feb/13/just-for-one-day-review-live-aid-musical-bob-geldof">rather withering Guardian review</a> concludes it “piles homily on cliché in a production in thrall to white saviour stereotypes”. City AM goes one step further by <a href="https://www.cityam.com/just-for-one-day-review-shockingly-tone-deaf-musical/">slamming the production</a> as “shockingly tone-deaf”.</p>
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<p>But the fact remains that Live Aid was a <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/9789460917288/BP000016.xml">global media spectacle</a>. The event followed the success of Geldof’s <a href="https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/610472/do-they-know-its-christmas-band-aid-song-history">Band Aid</a> December 1984 single, Do They Know It’s Christmas?, recorded by a collective of largely British musical stars to raise money for Ethiopia. </p>
<p>It showed charities just how much celebrity involvement could raise the profile of particular disasters and causes – and it showed celebrities how charity work could boost their own profiles. What many in the third sector have ruminated over ever since are the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jun/30/secret-aid-worker-celebrities-angelina-jolie#:%7E:text=Even%20if%20you're%20not,where%20it%20becomes%20faintly%20surreal.">benefits and problems</a> this kind of celebrity association brings with it.</p>
<p>In the immediate aftermath of Live Aid, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13619462.2017.1306193">Geldof was lauded by left-wing thinkers</a> such as Martin Jacques and Stuart Hall, who regarded it as a serious blow to what they saw as the prevailing Thatcherite ideology of selfishness.</p>
<p>But this was disputed, particularly by economics academic Robert Allen, who said that what Live Aid and its successors had created was in fact “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/030981688603000103?casa_token=eKz8dgsaIDgAAAAA:tabQ-s0rKh0F3o2hJhLOeiPP1-5XEOtx8oEQSg1dyP6gcmk9HihNHZg3yNPPNdNxJjLraShTa841VXU">the first truly effective version of Consumer Aid</a>” – creating a product tailored to a specific consumer.</p>
<p>For those caught up in crises which capture a rock star’s attention, the effect can be astonishing. As the humanitarian Jan Egeland summed up not long after the 2004 tsunami, <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:1537be16-ca73-48e6-b775-ec23cedff70b/download_file?safe_filename=From+Their+Own+Correspondent?&file_format=application/pdf&type_of_work=Report">disaster victims can find themselves</a> “in a kind of humanitarian sweepstake in which … every night 99% of them lose, and 1% win”. </p>
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<h2>Double-edged sword of celebrity activism</h2>
<p>But what are the drawbacks of media coverage? In Just For One Day there are several scenes where tabloid hacks push Geldof to go to Ethiopia, or be pictured with a starving child.</p>
<p>This is the kind of imagery that critics of celebrity activism such as Tanja Mueller <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/42002136.pdf?casa_token=SnXq6z_svkAAAAAA:uXl0SQD8obu9HiDJtX9XU2QWUZkCINQ6HrJG37wIqjQPvMvdlW2SRSjrfSUn0uJG2zGlaa_AZr_4qWiEnCj_hrhpjahIBOawfDFENMIXYrM-2IEnX27AKg">point out</a> is “instrumental in establishing a … culture of humanitarianism in which moral responsibility towards impoverished parts of an imagined Africa is based on pity rather than the demand for justice”.</p>
<p>And while the present-day Gen Z character of Jemma in the musical describes Live Aid as “old white guys taking a day off from snorting cocaine to help Africa”, this criticism isn’t new. </p>
<p>In 1986, the anarchist punk band Chumbawumba released an album satirising rock stars’ charitable involvement called <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nhixrza8NpY">Pictures of Starving Children Sell Records</a>. After <a href="https://www.concertarchives.org/concerts/live-8-2005">2005’s Live 8 concerts</a>, an HMV music chart revealed that some of the bands taking part experienced a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/4651309.stm">1300% boost in album sales</a>.</p>
<p>Yet scholars such as Andrew F. Cooper have been more positive about the idea of the celebrity activist, seeing them as bringing their chosen causes into a broader public domain and having access to key circles of power – what he calls the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27800709.pdf?casa_token=Ac3a2X6W5jUAAAAA:GYlO__RgXhItH4eESpqqf7GgcKzvC2DbUmKrTmM7NTrrP8NN5929l1_bbfVmK5fpxqO6iEmopT0ECMSRJ06w9D-bQJU9xaP2CKApz6GFyphUn68S7XgaoA">“Bono-isation” of diplomacy</a>. Jubilee 2000, Live 8 and Live Earth all focused more on political change than fundraising.</p>
<p>But does using celebrities really help charities day to day? A <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Celebrity-Advocacy-and-International-Development/Brockington/p/book/9781315886978">survey of 2000 people</a> found that while 95% of people could recognise five or more charities, two thirds could not name a single celebrity attached to them.</p>
<p>So why do charities, politicians and celebrities continue to work together? Perhaps because politicians like being around celebrities, and believe that they express populist sentiment. After all, the most constant double act in Just For One Day is not Geldof and any of the pop stars or even aid workers in Ethiopia, but Margaret Thatcher, with whom he shares several duets.</p>
<h2>Changing the ‘pity’ approach</h2>
<p>Things have changed since Live Aid albeit slowly. After <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-48607113">criticisms</a> around Comic Relief and the idea of “poverty tourism” that fed into notions of the “white saviour”, the BBC pledged to change the way it does celebrity appeals.</p>
<p>Many charities work hard with their celebrity advocates to ensure they know what they are talking about, unlike past cringeworthy efforts notably skewered in the Guardian’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jun/30/secret-aid-worker-celebrities-angelina-jolie">Secret Diary of an Aid Worker</a>.</p>
<p>And so where does this leave the Old Vic’s new musical? Well, if you’re someone who was at Live Aid or remembers watching it, it will undoubtedly conjure up all those feelings of excitement and being part of something bigger than yourself – the idea that we could be heroes.</p>
<p>If you’re part of the aid sector, the sense of ambivalence will probably remain: was it all just for one day?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225314/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Glenda Cooper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Live Aid showed charities how much celebrity involvement could raise the profile of particular causes – but also the kind of problems that associations like this can bring.Glenda Cooper, Reader in Journalism, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250232024-03-07T12:22:10Z2024-03-07T12:22:10ZSomalia-Turkey maritime deal is a win for both countries, and not a power play for the Horn of Africa<p>A recent <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/turkiye-somalia-sign-agreement-on-defense-economic-cooperation/3132095">defence deal</a> between Somalia and Turkey has great significance for Somalia and the region’s security. The agreement, which covers both land and sea, aims to enhance defence cooperation between Turkey and Somalia. It includes the possibility of Turkey providing both training and equipment for a Somali navy.</p>
<p>Its near-term impact should, however, not be exaggerated.</p>
<p>Instead, it should be understood as a good-faith agreement signed between asymmetric powers whose interests overlap a little, at present. My <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=Iuj4hHMAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">research</a> on the geopolitics and security agreements over the past few decades covering Turkey, Somalia and the wider east African region leads to my analysis that Mogadishu and Ankara entered into the agreement for different reasons. </p>
<p>Turkey, the more powerful partner, signed the agreement to bolster its <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377">reputation</a> as a security partner and important actor in sub-Saharan Africa. It wants to cement its role as a critical player in Somalia’s future, and improve its international visibility and prestige domestically. </p>
<p>Turkey plans to expand its training role to the maritime realm in Somalia and complement its terrestrial <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26776053">military training facility</a> in Mogadishu. It may also provide – but is unlikely to sell (given Somalia’s <a href="https://mof.gov.so/sites/default/files/Publications/Budget%20strategy%20for%20fy2023%20V3%20PDF.pdf#page=3">severe budgetary constraints</a>) – arms to Somalia now that the arms embargo has been <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15511.doc.htm#:%7E:text=Recognizing%20the%20benchmarks%20reached%20on,the%20Federal%20Government%20of%20Somalia.">lifted</a>.</p>
<p>Somalia, as the less powerful partner, signed the agreement to build its defence capacities, particularly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-provide-maritime-security-support-somalia-official-2024-02-22/">offshore</a>. It entered into the deal eventually to gain the capabilities to project force throughout the territories it claims.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377">Red Sea politics: why Turkey is helping Somalia defend its waters</a>
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<p>Mogadishu’s means to project force in its territorial waters are currently <a href="https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-helps-increase-maritime-security-somalia-2022-04-06_en">limited</a>. Hence, the illegal, unreported and unregulated <a href="https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/Stories/tackling-illegal--unreported--and-unregulated-fishing-in-somalia.html#:%7E:text=In%20fact%2C%20reports%20suggest%20that,away%20from%20Somalia's%20economic%20development.">fishing</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">piracy</a>.</p>
<p>Somalia’s leaders likely hope that Turkey will be able to train and equip Somali soldiers and sailors. This would give Mogadishu the capability to project limited <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377">force</a> and thus better police its territories, both maritime and terrestrial. In doing so, it hopes to eventually gain a monopoly on the use of force within its borders, including semi-autonomous regions such as <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200614-somalia-recognizes-contested-leader-in-semi-autonomous-border-state">Jubaland</a> and the de facto independent state of <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-has-been-pursuing-independence-for-33-years-expert-explains-the-impact-of-the-latest-deal-with-ethiopia-221502">Somaliland</a>.</p>
<h2>Limited scope</h2>
<p>In my view, there are limitations to what Turkey can achieve through this agreement in terms of its ambitions in the region. Even if the agreement were fully implemented, Ankara would not be involved in confronting Mogadishu’s rivals (including Ethiopia) within the region. </p>
<p>In short, the agreement is limited in scope and in terms of capabilities being offered. It will need to be long term to accomplish anything close to affecting political and military outcomes on the ground – inside and outside Somalia.</p>
<p>It does not, in my view, represent the beginning of a new system of <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/beyond-ethiopia-somaliland-turkey-somalia-defense-deal-fuels-uae-rivalry">regional alliances</a> that will pit Turkey and Somalia along with Egypt against Ethiopia, Somaliland and possibly other regional states such as the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<h2>The background</h2>
<p>The Turkey-Somalia agreement should be seen in the light of what the deal gives each signatory. Not as part of a new system of regional alliances that are adjusting to the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67858566">deal</a> signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland at the beginning of 2024.</p>
<p>Under this agreement, Ethiopia will get a 50-year lease on a strip of land on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast for naval and commercial maritime use, and access to the Berbera port. In return, Addis Ababa would <a href="https://interregional.com/article/Addis-Ababa-Ambitions/2221/en">recognise</a> Somaliland’s independence from Somalia.</p>
<p>This deal has set off a <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-ethiopia-port-deal-international-opposition-flags-complex-red-sea-politics-221131">diplomatic storm</a> in the region. It has been opposed by Somalia and Turkey, as well as the US, China and Egypt. The agreement is certainly important. It has the potential to make an impact on the political and security fabric of the region as Ethiopia may eventually have a maritime security and commercial footprint in the Gulf of Aden.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-has-been-pursuing-independence-for-33-years-expert-explains-the-impact-of-the-latest-deal-with-ethiopia-221502">Somaliland has been pursuing independence for 33 years. Expert explains the impact of the latest deal with Ethiopia</a>
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<p>These two recent deals in the Horn of Africa, however, are driven by the national interests of Somalia, Ethiopia and Somaliland. They speak to their primary interests – territory and sovereignty.</p>
<p>The genesis of engagement and agreements with external actors has come from one or more of these Horn of Africa states. This was similarly the case with the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3107475">2017 Berbera Port deal</a> between Ethiopia, Somaliland and Dubai’s DP World. It was the case with <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3355243">Qatar’s</a> engagement with Somalia on electoral politics, also in 2017.</p>
<p>It should come as little surprise that the region’s states – like others in the international state system – work to further their interests in their own back yard.</p>
<p>For its part, Turkey’s interests, like those of other foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, are generally opportunistic. Their intent is short-term gains. In my view, Turkey doesn’t have military interests in the Horn of Africa, and Ankara has limited capabilities even if it did.</p>
<p>This isn’t a criticism of Turkey. All states have limited capabilities and they generally prioritise them – especially when it comes to security architecture – <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1976573">close</a> to home, where it matters. Turkey is no different.</p>
<h2>No gunboat diplomacy</h2>
<p>Turkey will be a good partner for Somalia and vice versa. They have a decade of history together and the agreement gives both Ankara and Mogadishu something of value. </p>
<p>In Turkey, Somalia has found a capable <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2872980">partner</a> that can offer training, expertise and some arms. And this means that the context was only partially about the recent Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. </p>
<p>Mogadishu’s leaders are under no illusion. </p>
<p>They know their own projection of limited power against what they see as encroachments on Somalia’s terrestrial and maritime territories is years in the future. But so is Ethiopia’s floating of a navy off the coast of Somaliland. </p>
<p>We should, therefore, not expect Turkish-trained and equipped Somali troops to be invading Somaliland, or Turkish ships crewed by Somali sailors to be skirmishing with Ethiopia in the Gulf of Aden any time soon. Instead, we should understand the agreement as one among many that may become embodied as something of strategic value only much later.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225023/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendon J. Cannon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All states have limited security capabilities and they generally prioritise them close to home. where it matters.Brendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor, Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2243772024-02-28T13:16:42Z2024-02-28T13:16:42ZRed Sea politics: why Turkey is helping Somalia defend its waters<p><em>Somalia and Turkey recently announced that they would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-provide-maritime-security-support-somalia-official-2024-02-22/#:%7E:text=The%20agreement%20aims%20to%20enhance,against%20terrorism%2C%22%20he%20said.">expand</a> the terms of a defence agreement first signed on <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/turkiye-somalia-sign-agreement-on-defense-economic-cooperation/3132095">8 February 2024</a> to include the maritime sector. This came as tensions rose between Somalia and landlocked Ethiopia. Ethiopia is seeking access to the Red Sea <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-ethiopia-port-deal-international-opposition-flags-complex-red-sea-politics-221131">through Somaliland</a>, a breakaway state of Somalia. Federico Donelli, an international relations professor <a href="https://scholar.google.com.tr/citations?hl=it&user=lH6U_44AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">whose research</a> covers Red Sea security and politics, puts this defence agreement into context.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the scope of the relationship between Turkey and Somalia?</h2>
<p>Turkey’s entry into Somalia in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/8/19/turkish-pm-visits-famine-hit-somalia">2011</a> started out as a humanitarian partnership but soon turned into a strategic one. Its support since has been economic and infrastructural and has increasingly included the military. </p>
<p>The Turkish government saw Somalia’s <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2872980">failed statehood</a> and the lack of other major international stakeholders as an opportunity to increase its popularity <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/turkey-in-africa-9780755636976/">across Africa</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey aimed to: </p>
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<li><p>gain international visibility</p></li>
<li><p>test its ability to intervene in conflict and post-conflict scenarios</p></li>
<li><p>increase market diversification into east Africa </p></li>
<li><p>cultivate its image as a benevolent Muslim middle power by promoting Islamic solidarity. </p></li>
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<p>Several Turkish faith-based associations and NGOs already active in Africa became <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189390/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf">directly involved</a> in development and relief projects. Major national brands, such as <a href="https://www.talpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/AID-CAMPAIGN-FOR-SOMALIA.pdf">Turkish Airlines</a>, promoted campaigns to raise funds for Somalia. </p>
<p>Within a few years, Turkey’s involvement in Somalia was portrayed by the government and perceived by the Turkish public as a domestic issue. </p>
<p>Turkey’s early efforts to bring Somalia back to the table of the international community were successful. </p>
<p>With the reopening of Mogadishu’s port and airport in <a href="https://jp.reuters.com/article/idUSL6N0SA47N/">2014</a>, both managed by Turkish companies, the economic situation in Somalia improved compared to the previous decade. Turkish political elites began to present their involvement in Somalia as a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/4/1105/6307685?redirectedFrom=fulltext">success story</a>. This is despite some remaining critical problems, including failing to root out the terrorist organisation <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drives-al-shabaab-in-somalia-foreign-forces-out-sharia-law-in-and-overthrow-the-government-191366">Al-Shabaab</a>. </p>
<p>Turkey took responsibility for training the Somali National Army in partnership with other stakeholders, including the European Union and the United States. It <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1C50J9/#:%7E:text=MOGADISHU%2FANKARA%20(Reuters)%20%2D,a%20presence%20in%20East%20Africa.">opened a military base</a> in Mogadishu in 2017. The base trains one of the army’s elite units, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-military-rebuilding-shows-signs-of-improvement/6856894.html">the Gorgor Brigades</a>, and serves as a Turkish military outpost in the region. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s persistence has <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315557083-11/hybrid-actor-horn-africa-federico-donelli?context=ubx&refId=88b5c3af-4bc2-4a09-af0b-c8d3df34534e">convinced Turkey</a> that it needs to provide more active military support for Somalia’s development. Ankara also wants to protect its economic and political investments in Somalia. </p>
<p>Finally, behind the Turkish deal with Somalia is the politics around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato). </p>
<p>Over the past 12 months, Turkey has <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/north-africa/2023/10/20/washington-accepts-continuing-turkish-military-presence-in-libya,110078869-art">moved closer</a> to the United States. It’s positioned itself as an effective ally in Africa to counteract the negative effects of <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/rest-of-africa/last-french-troops-bow-out-of-africa-s-sahel-4472268">France’s withdrawal</a> – such as the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">increasing influence of Russia</a>. Turkey’s commitment to Somalia follows its <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.tr/bilateral-relations-between-turkiye-and-libya.en.mfa">efforts in Libya</a>. </p>
<p>In both cases, Turkey has proven willing to take on the security burden that other <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm">Nato members</a>, particularly Italy, have refused to meet. </p>
<p>Turkey’s engagement in Somalia is, therefore, part of a broader foreign policy strategy to gain more autonomy in global politics. Increased relevance within Nato would help achieve this. </p>
<h2>What’s the context of the maritime defence pact between Turkey and Somalia?</h2>
<p>Turkey and Somalia began working on an agreement between November 2023 and January 2024. Turkey agreed to <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/somalia-authorises-turkey-defend-its-sea-waters-deal">train and equip</a> Somalia’s naval force and help patrol the country’s 3,333km coastline. </p>
<p>Turkey’s defence sector has had increasing influence in Ankara’s foreign policy decisions. Turkey sees itself as an exporter of defence industry products, and as a partner in training special forces and police. African countries are among the main targets for the Turkish defence sector. </p>
<p>Somalia, therefore, provides an opportunity to spread more Turkish production and items.</p>
<p>In 2022, Turkey became, along with the United States, the main backer of a <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/can-somalias-new-offensive-defeat-al-shabaab/">new offensive against Al-Shabaab</a>. It provided logistical support to the Gorgor forces and air cover to the national army. This cooperation has led to the 10-year defence agreement, including maritime security, signed in February 2024. </p>
<p>Turkey and Somalia have been working on the accord for some time, but recent regional events have undoubtedly affected the announcement’s timing. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-ethiopia-port-deal-international-opposition-flags-complex-red-sea-politics-221131">Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding</a> in January 2024 is one such event. Turkey has good relations with Somaliland, but considers the territorial integrity of Somalia to be essential for its stability. </p>
<p>At the same time, the Horn of Africa’s political dynamics are shifting. <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/oped/comment/somalia-ethiopia-tensions-only-serve-to-embolden-al-shabaab-4512492">Mounting tensions</a> between Ethiopia and Somalia have led to new coalitions involving regional and extra-regional players. </p>
<p>It’s important not to oversimplify, but two factions are emerging. On one side are Ethiopia, Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On the other are Somalia, Egypt, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>At first, Turkey sought to mediate between the factions to defuse tensions. </p>
<p>But its agreement with Somalia reduces Turkey’s room for manoeuvre. Although the relationship with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed appears to be unaffected, there could be negative repercussions, especially for the many <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkiye-and-ethiopia.en.mfa#:%7E:text=While%20the%20number%20of%20Turkish,with%20approximately%20200%20Turkish%20companies.">Turkish economic interests in Ethiopia</a>.</p>
<h2>What is the UAE factor?</h2>
<p>When it comes to the Horn of Africa, the UAE plays a pivotal role. Turkey and Somalia each have a relationship with the Emirates. </p>
<p>From 2014 to 2020, Turkey engaged in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1976573?src=recsys">bitter rivalry</a> with the Emirates in the wider Red Sea area. This was driven by the two countries’ different visions for the region’s future. </p>
<p>Relations improved from 2020. During the 2020-2022 war in Tigray, <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-rival-powers-are-backing-ethiopias-government">both Turkey and the UAE supported the Ethiopian government</a>. </p>
<p>But recent developments in the Horn of Africa, such as the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/1/4/ambiguous-ethiopia-port-deal-fuels-uncertainty-over-somaliland-statehood">UAE-backed Ethiopia-Somaliland deal</a>, threaten to create new friction between Turkey and the Emirates. Turkey doesn’t have the political will or material capacity to sustain this. In the past three years, the UAE has supported the Turkish economy with <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1976546/middle-east">direct investment</a>, changing the balance of the relationship. </p>
<p>The situation is similar for Somalia. </p>
<p>From a commercial and security perspective, the Emirates is important in Somalia. The UAE <a href="https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/after-djibouti-failure-dp-world-heads-up-somalia-for-controversial-port-projects">manages two key Somali ports</a> – Berbera and Bosaso. It’s also moving to take over Kismayo. And the Emirates has been one of Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/new-president-somalia-new-opportunity-reconciliation">principal backers</a>. It would be risky for the Somali president to break ties with Abu Dhabi.</p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>There is still much uncertainty about how the Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding and the Turkey-Somalia defence cooperation agreements will be put into practice. What’s clear is that both the UAE and Turkey are becoming more active and influential in the region. And that African dynamics within and between states are closely intertwined with regional and global trends.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224377/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Federico Donelli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The persistence of the Al-Shabaab terror group has convinced Turkey it needs to provide more active military support in Somalia.Federico Donelli, Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of TriesteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229282024-02-18T07:07:33Z2024-02-18T07:07:33ZOromia makes up a third of Ethiopia’s landmass and is key to its fortunes: expert unpacks its significance<p><em>Ethiopia’s largest and most populous region, Oromia, has been in the news following reports of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/23/im-scared-to-leave-addis-ababa-ethiopias-oromia-region-gripped-by-kidnapping-pandemic">a rise in kidnappings for ransom</a>. The region is <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">no stranger to war and strife</a>. Its people have long fought against political marginalisation. But the region is more than just the site of conflict.</em></p>
<p><em>We asked <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/gov/yimeni-bizuneh-getachew.aspx">Bizuneh Yimenu</a>, who’s researched the region for over a decade and studied its significance in the context of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">Ethiopian federalism</a>, to explain Oromia, its people and its economic and political importance.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the general overview of Oromia?</h2>
<p>Situated in the heart of Ethiopia, Oromia isn’t just a geographical entity but a cultural, economic and political powerhouse. It significantly shapes Ethiopia’s identity and trajectory. </p>
<p>It is the largest of Ethiopia’s 12 regions and covers a vast area. At over <a href="http://www.ethiodemographyandhealth.org/oromia.html">350,000 square kilometres</a>, it’s larger than Côte d'Ivoire or Italy. </p>
<p>The region spans Ethiopia’s central, western and southern parts. Oromia makes up <a href="https://epo.acleddata.com/oromia/">34% of Ethiopia’s landmass</a>. It shares borders with all other Ethiopian regions except Tigray, in the country’s north. It shares international boundary lines with Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. </p>
<p>Its capital is Finfinne, also known as Addis Ababa – which is additionally Ethiopia’s capital and the headquarters of the African Union. </p>
<iframe title="The regions of Ethiopia" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-yEyyR" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/yEyyR/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>Oromia’s diverse geography includes highlands, lowlands, forests and fertile plains. This contributes to its agricultural richness.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.ethiopianreview.com/pdf/001/Cen2007_firstdraft(1).pdf#page=91">the last census</a>, over 60 ethnic groups live in the region. </p>
<p>Oromia has a population of about <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/cities/">40 million</a> people, about 38% of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/cities/">105 million</a>. There are also Oromo communities in Kenya and Somalia.</p>
<h2>What is Oromia’s cultural and economic significance?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">Oromo</a>, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, speak Afaan Oromo, one of the <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-languages-are-spoken-in-africa.html">five most spoken African languages</a>. Oromo traditions and customary practices have endured for centuries. </p>
<p>Oromia is known for its traditional democratic governance system, <a href="https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=utk_socopubs">the Geda system</a>, in which power is transferred peacefully every eight years. It regulates the community’s political, economic, social and religious activities. In 2016, Unesco recognised the system as an <a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/gada-system-an-indigenous-democratic-socio-political-system-of-the-oromo-01164">intangible cultural heritage</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">What is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect</a>
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<p>Economically, Oromia is one of Ethiopia’s breadbaskets. The region’s crop production accounts for about <a href="https://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/media/6511/file/Oromia%20regional%20brief.pdf#page=1">50% of total national production</a>. A <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/cea/5991#tocto1n5">majority</a> of residents work in the agricultural sector.</p>
<p>The region’s fertile soil supports crops like coffee, teff, maize and barley, which are popular for domestic consumption and export. </p>
<p>Outside agriculture, the region has many factories and industries that produce textile and garments, leather products, chemicals, construction materials and pharmaceuticals. </p>
<p>Oromia is additionally a <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/37159/">source</a> of export minerals, <a href="https://oromiatours.com/Nature-and-Map.html#:%7E:text=Oromia%20hosts%20many%20of%20Ethiopia%27s%20more%20alluring%20natural,gold%20and%20platinum%20to%20iron%20ore%20and%20limestone.">ranging from gold and platinum to iron ore and limestone</a>. In the 2021-2022 financial year, Oromia generated <a href="https://www.2merkato.com/news/alerts/6686-ethiopia-oromia-earns-usd-324-million-from-mining">US$324 million</a> from mining. </p>
<p>The capital, Addis Ababa, is a hub for domestic and international travel, and connected to economically essential cities in other regions, like Diredawa and Hawassa.</p>
<p>International highways, such as the Ethio-Djibouti road, the main route for Ethiopia’s foreign trade, intersect Oromia. This road is the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa">lifeblood of the country’s economy</a>. It enables the movement of goods to and from the port of Djibouti, connecting <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-quest-for-access-to-the-sea-success-rests-on-good-relations-with-its-neighbours-219621">landlocked Ethiopia</a> to global markets.</p>
<h2>What role has Oromia played in Ethiopia’s political development?</h2>
<p>Oromia holds substantial political importance within Ethiopia. As the largest and most populous region, it often sets the tone for national discourse and policymaking.</p>
<p>Its political influence in Ethiopia can be traced to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/29790544">the 1960s when Oromo nationalism</a> emerged due to subjugation and a lack of autonomy. This movement pushed Ethiopia’s transition from <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">a centralised unitary system to a federal one</a>. </p>
<p>In 2015, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">protests in the region</a> to push for greater autonomy and political representation helped drive political change. In 2018, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/12/13/2018-for-ethiopias-oromos-power-pain-protests-review/">Abiy Ahmed</a>, an Oromo, became Ethiopia’s prime minister. </p>
<p>Before Abiy’s entry, Ethiopia had been governed by a Tigray-dominated government for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopias-new-leader-could-be-a-game-changer-94424">27 years</a>. Tigrayans make up about <a href="https://www.atlasofhumanity.com/tigray">6%</a> of the population.</p>
<p>Abiy’s appointment symbolised a significant step towards addressing the grievances of the Oromo people. </p>
<p>Overall, the political dynamics within Oromia have consistently been at the forefront of discussions surrounding federalism, identity and governance in Ethiopia. </p>
<h2>What are some of the challenges specific to the region?</h2>
<p>Despite its cultural richness and economic importance, Oromia faces challenges that have hindered its development and stability. </p>
<p>One challenge is the prevalence of conflict and tension. This includes <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/oromo-rebels-accuse-ethiopian-forces-attacks-following-peace-talks-2023-05-17/">the war between</a> the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/11/08/ethiopia-oromo-liberation-army-ola-the-other-group-fighting-federal-forces/">Oromo Liberation Army</a>, a rebel group, and the Ethiopian government. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">'Ethiopia's other conflict': what's driving the violence in Oromia?</a>
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<p>Oromia has also suffered from <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-tragic-ambush-by-armed-men-claims-13-lives-in-horo-guduru-wollega-oromia-region/">cross-border attacks launched by the Fano militia</a>, a rebel group operating in neighbouring Amhara. The attack is part of the militia’s agenda of expanding Amhara territory.</p>
<p>Additionally, the regional government has faced <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/ethiopia">allegations of human rights abuses</a>. It has been accused of extrajudicial killings and the unlawful detention of opposition leaders.</p>
<p>In recent months, there has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/23/im-scared-to-leave-addis-ababa-ethiopias-oromia-region-gripped-by-kidnapping-pandemic">a rise in kidnappings blamed on Oromo Liberation Army rebels</a>. This has exacerbated grievances and contributed to a climate of fear and uncertainty.</p>
<p>The underlying causes of conflict in Oromia are deeply rooted and complex. They stem from a combination of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>historical injustices</p></li>
<li><p>marginalisation under previous regimes</p></li>
<li><p>ethnic tensions</p></li>
<li><p>competition over resources. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Resolving these issues requires a comprehensive approach emphasising dialogue, reconciliation and inclusive governance.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen?</h2>
<p>Two things are needed to address Oromia’s challenges effectively. </p>
<p>First, immediate attention should be given to the region’s security. This can be ensured through a peace deal with the Oromo Liberation Army. Previous rounds of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/22/ethiopia-talks-with-rebel-group-ola-end-without-deal">peace talks held in Tanzania between the rebel group and the national government</a> have ended without agreement. </p>
<p>Both the government and the Oromo Liberation Army have <a href="https://x.com/OdaaTarbiiWBO/status/1650255474502008832?s=20">expressed a readiness</a> to resolve their differences through dialogue.</p>
<p>Second, it’s essential that regional and national stakeholders, and the international community collaborate. Initiatives focused on promoting peace and reconciliation should be prioritised to foster a more inclusive future for all residents of the region. Considering Oromia’s significance to Ethiopia, its stability should be a priority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222928/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bizuneh Yimenu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Oromia is a cultural, economic and political powerhouse. It significantly shapes Ethiopia’s identity and trajectory.Bizuneh Yimenu, Teaching Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232172024-02-13T16:38:00Z2024-02-13T16:38:00ZDonkeys are unsung heroes in Ethiopia’s humanitarian crisis – and they could do even more with better support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574951/original/file-20240212-28-w82tdy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C0%2C2560%2C1686&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The front cover of the Norwegian Refugee Council's Annual Report on Ethiopia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nrc.no/shorthand/stories/nrc-ethiopia-annual-report-2020/assets/8XbNZwavN5/dsc_6544-web-2560x1707.jpeg">Tinbit Amare Dejene / Norwegian Refugee Council</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Conflict and drought in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia has triggered a humanitarian crisis. The Ethiopian government says <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68198484">16 million people</a> across the country are facing food shortages, with almost half of those suffering emergency or severe levels of food insecurity. </p>
<p>In response to the crisis, the UK has <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-100-million-of-new-aid-for-over-three-million-vulnerable-people-in-ethiopia-as-humanitarian-crisis-deepens">announced</a> £100 million in overseas development aid for essential healthcare services. More than 3 million Ethiopians, including vulnerable women and children, will receive lifesaving help through the programme.</p>
<p>For <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-ramps-deliveries-vital-food-assistance-drought-and-conflict-affected-areas-ethiopia#:%7E:text=The%20Government%20of%20Ethiopia's%20most,insecurity%20and%20need%20emergency%20assistance.">overseas aid</a> to be deployed most effectively (reaching the goal of supporting the lives of women and children), it should be extended to support the care of donkeys. </p>
<p>In Ethiopia, donkeys are unrecognised humanitarian workers who provide vital support through their labour to ensure the survival of people, especially vulnerable women and children. But donkeys in Ethiopia are often overlooked, poorly cared for and overworked because of poverty and a constant reliance on their labour.</p>
<p>The strains of poverty, subsistence work and the effects of conflict are clearly not only experienced by humans. Animals <a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-beasts-of-burden-how-to-reward-our-animals-for-their-work-92713">work for and with people</a> living in these circumstances and risk their lives in doing so.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-beasts-of-burden-how-to-reward-our-animals-for-their-work-92713">Beyond beasts of burden: How to reward our animals for their work</a>
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<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A female donkey standing beside her foal in a rural village." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574925/original/file-20240212-26-3m18sb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574925/original/file-20240212-26-3m18sb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574925/original/file-20240212-26-3m18sb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574925/original/file-20240212-26-3m18sb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574925/original/file-20240212-26-3m18sb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574925/original/file-20240212-26-3m18sb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574925/original/file-20240212-26-3m18sb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A jenny (female donkey) and her foal stand nearby a group of homes in a rural village in central Ethiopia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Martha Geiger</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why donkeys matter</h2>
<p>The war formally ended in November 2022. But the Tigray region remains in ruins and 1 million people have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/05/we-must-act-on-ethiopia-food-crisis-says-uk-minister">displaced</a> from northern Ethiopia. Donkeys are key providers of aid to displaced families by enabling access to water, foodstuffs and firewood that people would otherwise not be able to reach on foot. </p>
<p>But many donkeys in Ethiopia die prematurely due to a lack of food and water, and because of the enormous strain their labour places on their bodies. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Endale-Teshome/publication/335201996_Study_on_the_Health_and_Welfare_of_Working_Donkeys_in_Mirab_Abaya_District_Southern_Ethiopia/links/5d565108a6fdccb7dc3fad01/Study-on-the-Health-and-Welfare-of-Working-Donkeys-in-Mirab-Abaya-District-Southern-Ethiopia.pdf">Research</a> from 2016 found that donkeys have a working life of only four to six years in Ethiopia. In contrast, donkeys can have working lives of up to 30 years where welfare standards are higher. </p>
<p>When a donkey dies, their human co-workers are left in need and without support. My <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/soan/aop/article-10.1163-15685306-bja10134/article-10.1163-15685306-bja10134.xml">own research</a>, which was published in July 2023, has shown that women in rural areas of Ethiopia (where <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10503176/#CR22">80% of the country’s population</a> live) are dependent upon and most affected by the loss of a donkey. </p>
<p>Women in central Ethiopia report that an enormous physical burden falls on them to carry livelihood materials on their backs and shoulders for long distances if they don’t have donkeys to work with. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman in a rural village walks with her donkeys who are carrying water." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574792/original/file-20240211-28-aomsfo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4265%2C2845&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574792/original/file-20240211-28-aomsfo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574792/original/file-20240211-28-aomsfo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574792/original/file-20240211-28-aomsfo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574792/original/file-20240211-28-aomsfo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574792/original/file-20240211-28-aomsfo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574792/original/file-20240211-28-aomsfo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A woman in a rural village in central Ethiopia walks with her donkeys who are carrying water to her family’s homestead.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Martha Geiger</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Low status</h2>
<p>My more <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/13607804231213559">recent research</a> has revealed that donkeys, along with their women co-workers, are at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Donkeys are associated with drudgery and women’s work, so a socio-cultural norm holds that the two groups are “the same”. </p>
<p>In fact, there are numerous common Ethiopian proverbs that compare women with donkeys. According to one proverb: “Women are commonly beaten by their husbands, but they are staying with their husbands to raise their children. And donkeys are often beaten by their owners, but they will not run away from their owners.” </p>
<p>Another is that: “The least of animals is the donkey, and the least of human beings is a woman. They are doing as they have been told by men.” This equivalency reinforces the marginalisation and subjugation of both groups, manifesting in domestic violence towards them.</p>
<p>A huge number of Ethiopian women have suffered physical and mental injuries during the war and the crisis that has followed. Health experts <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/8/7/e010270">estimate</a> that between 40% and 45% of women have suffered gender-based violence during the conflict. </p>
<p>Other studies <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10362876/">report</a> that more than one-third of women in Ethiopia experience gender-based violence in their lifetime. In reality, these figures are probably even higher owing to under-reporting because of a lack of access to healthcare services and the fear of stigmatisation.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/animal-welfare/article/comparison-of-the-socioeconomic-value-and-welfare-of-working-donkeys-in-rural-and-urban-ethiopia/1220694C5411787FA25CD9B2286461AF">research</a> on the welfare of donkeys in Ethiopia has also recorded instances of donkeys being hit by their human co-workers while working. The majority of donkey owners reported feeling justified in hitting their donkeys if they refuse to move forward or comply with human requests of them. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A rural woman standing next to her donkey in a field." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574924/original/file-20240212-29-k252zt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574924/original/file-20240212-29-k252zt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574924/original/file-20240212-29-k252zt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574924/original/file-20240212-29-k252zt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574924/original/file-20240212-29-k252zt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574924/original/file-20240212-29-k252zt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574924/original/file-20240212-29-k252zt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A rural woman standing with her donkey co-worker as she prepares for the working day ahead.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Martha Geiger</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Recognising their work</h2>
<p>In light of my findings, and amid reports of <a href="https://www.refugeesinternational.org/statements-and-news/refugees-international-alarmed-by-humanitarian-crisis-in-tigray-effects-of-conflict-related-sexual-violence/">escalating violence</a> against women in the region, humanitarian programmes aimed at enhancing the status of women and dismantling oppressive systems should also include wellbeing support to their donkeys.</p>
<p>Addressing the needs of both women and donkeys through protection, healthcare and aid can help combat the normalisation of violence against both groups. This will convey the importance of both women and donkeys to Ethiopian society. </p>
<p>By ignoring the humanitarian labour of donkeys and their contribution to human wellbeing, we risk further exploiting and marginalising both donkeys and the millions of women and children who depend upon them for basic subsistence support.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martha Geiger has received funding from the Donkey Sanctuary UK for her data collection in Ethiopia. </span></em></p>Donkeys provide vital support to women but their lives are often cut short.Martha Geiger, PhD Candidate in Sociology, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215022024-01-24T13:28:13Z2024-01-24T13:28:13ZSomaliland has been pursuing independence for 33 years. Expert explains the impact of the latest deal with Ethiopia<p><em>Somaliland declared itself an independent state in 1991. It used colonial boundary lines to separate itself from Somalia. More than three decades later, however, it has yet to gain international recognition. It has had a difficult relationship with Somalia. A recent memorandum of understanding to grant landlocked Ethiopia access to the sea threatens the relationship further. But it could support Somaliland’s quest for recognition as an independent state. We asked <a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2397-7303">Aleksi Ylönen</a>, who has studied politics in the Horn of Africa and Somaliland’s quest for independence, some questions about this situation.</em></p>
<h2>1. What has Somaliland achieved in its quest for statehood?</h2>
<p>Somaliland unilaterally <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1877&context=auilr">declared its independence in 1991</a>, based heavily on its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/British-Somaliland">separate colonial experience</a> from Somalia. Britain declared a Somaliland protectorate in 1884. Italy established another protectorate, which became a colony, in 1889. </p>
<p>British Somaliland gained independence on 26 June 1960. It voluntarily joined the former Italian Somaliland upon its independence on 1 July 1960 to form Somalia. </p>
<p>This union <a href="https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/republic-somalilands-position-somaliland-somalia-talks">was never formally ratified</a> and eventually fell apart. </p>
<p>In the decades since 1991, Somaliland’s people and their representatives have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4392784">emphasised</a> their distinct colonial status and associated borders. Regional organisations and foreign powers have adhered to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2705705">colonial boundaries</a> when recognising independent states in post-colonial Africa. </p>
<p>Somaliland’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2013.776279">political system</a> is <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores">democratic</a> in a neighbourhood of authoritarian states like Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudans. </p>
<p>Somaliland has organised <a href="https://www.hadiamedical.ch/DE/pdf/Somaliland%20Elections.pdf">successful elections</a> and peaceful transfers of political power. Recently, however, there has been some <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/2022-journal-of-african-elections-v21n2-elections-electoral-processes-somaliland-fading-democracy-eisa.pdf">backsliding</a>.</p>
<p>Its security apparatus is elaborate. With the active contribution of citizens, it has ensured <a href="https://www.communitypolicing.eu/ehandbook/country-specific-information/africa/somaliland/">a measure of internal stability and security</a> in an otherwise troubled region. </p>
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<p>No United Nations member state or global organisation recognises Somaliland’s independence officially. Still, Somaliland <a href="https://www.republicofsomaliland.com/">has unofficial diplomatic relations</a> with various UN member states. It also maintains relations with other <a href="https://unpo.org/nations-peoples">marginalised nations and territories</a> and partially recognised <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/taiwan-somaliland-ties-growing-despite-diplomatic-isolation/">Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>Several foreign nations have representative offices in its capital, Hargeisa. It maintains <a href="https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/visa-consular-services-1">liaison offices</a> in 20 countries on five continents. </p>
<h2>2. How would you describe the relationship with Somalia?</h2>
<p>It’s turbulent. </p>
<p>The Federal Republic of Somalia rejects Somaliland’s independence and agreements with foreign parties. Meanwhile, Somaliland has <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/somaliland-accuses-somalia-of-attacks-despite-truce-f80371da">accused Mogadishu</a> of involvement in the <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/OXAN-DB235834/full/html">conflict</a> in its eastern territories.</p>
<p>Negotiations over their relationship have taken place from time to time <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335684954_The_Somaliland-Somalia_Talks_in_2012-2015_A_Critical_Appraisal_Somali_Studies_Vol_4_2019">since 2012</a>, with little progress. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s recent announcement of a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566">memorandum of understanding</a> with Somaliland has set back relations between Somaliland and Somalia even further.</p>
<p>Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland president Muse Bihi Abdi in January <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566">announced a plan</a> to give Ethiopia access to 20km of the Somaliland shoreline. </p>
<p>In exchange, Ethiopia said it would <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-in-depth-assessment-of-somalilands-recognition-bid-by-ethiopia-part-of-mou/">seriously consider</a> Somaliland’s aim of international recognition. The exchange also included Somaliland getting a stake in Ethiopian Airlines or EthioTelecom. </p>
<p>The government of Somalia reacted swiftly to this announcement. </p>
<p>It held an emergency parliamentary session and withdrew its ambassador from Ethiopia for consultations. It also declared the proposed deal “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240102-somalia-recalls-envoy-to-ethiopia-over-null-and-void-somaliland-port-deal">null and void</a>” and a sign of Ethiopian “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67861390">aggression</a>” towards Somalia. </p>
<h2>3. What other bilateral arrangements has Somaliland signed?</h2>
<p>Many of the deals Somaliland has made with foreign agencies haven’t been made public. It does have unofficial diplomatic ties with various countries. It has also made agreements with <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/2022/09/19/waiting-for-ethiopia-hopes-and-aspirations-of-port-infrastructure-development-in-the-horn-of-africa/">foreign countries and organisations linked to their political elites</a>. </p>
<p>These include deals around <a href="https://africanreview.com/manufacturing/water-a-environment/british-government-signs-us-38mn-deal-to-support-development-in-somaliland">infrastructure development and management</a>, as well as <a href="https://african.business/2023/07/trade-investment/first-ever-funded-startup-sparks-somaliland-investment-hopes">investment</a> and <a href="https://www.upstreamonline.com/exploration/genel-boosts-somaliland-block-stake/2-1-704070">natural resource extraction</a>.</p>
<p>Ethiopia-Somaliland ties have been strong for decades. </p>
<p>In the early 1980s, Addis Ababa <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/723037.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ac99d580633354dfaf07401242dbf6900&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1">provided sanctuary</a> for the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Somali-National-Movement">Somali National Movement</a>, which sought to topple the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohamed-Siad-Barre">repressive Siad Barre</a> administration in Somalia. </p>
<p>In the 1990s, Ethiopia eyed Somaliland as a possible import-export route to the sea to lower its reliance on Djibouti. </p>
<p>As a result, Dubai Ports World, a state-linked United Arab Emirates ports and logistics company, <a href="https://www.horndiplomat.com/2016/08/22/dp-world-dubai-opens-door-for-ethiopia-in-somaliland/">agreed</a> with the Somaliland administration to develop and manage the Berbera port in 2016. Two years later, Ethiopia <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/somaliland-defends-stake-sale-of-dp-world-berbera-port-to-ethiopia-1.710037">agreed to take a 19% stake</a> in a Berbera port consortium. </p>
<p>Although Ethiopia <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-stake-in-port-of-berbera-3845366">didn’t follow through</a>, it still had plans for a logistics corridor through Somaliland. </p>
<h2>4. What can Ethiopia offer Somaliland on the independence issue?</h2>
<p>The understanding between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa includes a provision for an <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-in-depth-assessment-of-somalilands-recognition-bid-by-ethiopia-part-of-mou/">in-depth assessment</a> of Somaliland as a sovereign state. This would make Ethiopia the first UN member state to recognise it.</p>
<p>It would give Somaliland what it wants most. Recognition would help open doors for international public financing and raise Somaliland’s status in the region.</p>
<p>Ethiopia seems committed to the proposed deal. Some of the reasons for this include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>its wish for sea access </p></li>
<li><p>its strong ties with Somaliland</p></li>
<li><p>national security advisor <a href="https://twitter.com/addisstandard/status/1742164114351247808?t=hctuznfeOoXdYeDY7PzDXQ&s=09">Redwan Hussien’s comments</a> that discussions would include other sectors of collaboration. Ethiopia is already talking to Somaliland <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/ethiopia-holds-military-cooperation-talks-with-somaliland-4486080">about military cooperation</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Somaliland is holding a long-delayed presidential election towards the end of 2024. Gaining international recognition would likely give President Muse Bihi Abdi a second term in office, even though he has been <a href="https://www.somalidispatch.com/latest-news/ucid-chairman-muse-bihi-mishandled-the-defense-of-somaliland/">criticised for mishandling</a> the <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/inside-the-newest-conflict-in-somalias-long-civil-war/">conflict in Somaliland’s eastern borderlands</a>. People in this area have tried to set up their own state as part of federal Somalia.</p>
<h2>5. Why has Somaliland made so little progress and what needs to change?</h2>
<p>Achieving recognition has been a <a href="https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/about-mfa">foreign policy priority</a> for Somaliland. All administrations have <a href="https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/24272-a-shadow-on-tomorrows-dreams--somalilands-struggle">made efforts</a> to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/butty-somaliland-20th-anniversary-nur-18may11-122134824/158138.html">raise awareness</a> about its situation internationally. </p>
<p>But international politics have not favoured Somaliland. Most states, including great and middle powers, <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-30-years-de-facto-statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363">fear that recognising Somaliland could be destabilising</a>. They have opted to support unity, and peace and state building of federal Somalia. </p>
<p>One of their reasons for non-recognition is that Somaliland’s 1991 self-declaration of independence may appear illegal under international law.</p>
<p>In my view, it’s wrong to think that dividing up states inevitably causes instability and conflict. Each case is unique and deserves consideration based on historical and legal arguments, as well as current conditions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221502/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aleksi Ylönen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethiopia has maintained strong ties with Somaliland since the 1980s when it supported a rebel movement in the breakaway region.Aleksi Ylönen, Professor, United States International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216162024-01-23T13:29:43Z2024-01-23T13:29:43ZEducation has a huge role to play in peace and development: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570556/original/file-20240122-20-g5icoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children's education is frequently disrupted in conflict-fraught areas.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Beloumou Olomo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nelson Mandela was a famous advocate for the value of education. In 1990, the man who would become South Africa’s first democratically president four years later <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/24/us/the-mandela-visit-education-is-mighty-force-boston-teen-agers-are-told.html">told a high school in Boston</a>: “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.”</p>
<p>The United Nations agrees. In 2018 its General Assembly adopted a resolution that proclaimed 24 January as the <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/days/education">International Day of Education</a>. It’s an annual opportunity to shine a spotlight on the role that education can and should play in promoting peace and development. This year the theme is “learning for lasting peace” – a critical focus in a world that, the UN points out, is “seeing a surge of violent conflicts paralleled by an alarming rise of discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and hate speech”.</p>
<p>To mark the occasion, we’re sharing some of the many articles our authors have contributed since we launched in 2015 that examine the intersection of education and conflict – and how to wield this powerful “weapon” for positive change.</p>
<h2>Education under attack</h2>
<p>Education systems in a number of African countries <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/GCPEA_NSAG_ScopingPaper.pdf">have been identified</a> by international advocacy groups as “very heavily affected” by conflict. These include Sudan, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Central Sahel, which includes Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, is another region of high concern. In 2020 alone (and before COVID lockdowns), 4,000 schools in the Central Sahel <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/Central-Sahel-Paper-English.pdf">closed because of insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>Craig Bailie <a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">explains</a> what drives armed groups to attack schools in the Central Sahel, leaving hundreds of thousands of students high and dry.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">Education is both the victim and the best weapon in Central Sahel conflict</a>
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<h2>Long-term effects</h2>
<p>Education systems, of course, do not exist in a vacuum. Where conflict meets long-term governance failures, poor resourcing and other societal issues, schooling comes under even more pressure. Ethiopia, for instance, has not only had to reckon with <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">internal conflict since 2020</a>; it’s also grappling with deeply rooted systemic crises.</p>
<p>Tebeje Molla and Dawit Tibebu Tiruneh <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">unpack</a> how these crises are colliding to leave Ethiopian children and teenagers floundering.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">Ethiopia’s education system is in crisis – now’s the time to fix it</a>
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<h2>Rebuilding is possible</h2>
<p>That’s not to say education systems can’t bounce back after conflict. During Somalia’s civil war in the late 1980s more than 90% of schools were destroyed. In the wake of the war the north of the country declared itself as the Republic of Somaliland. </p>
<p>Tobias Gandrup and Kristof Titeca <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">examine how</a>, together, the state, NGOs and the diaspora have succeeded in rebuilding the education system.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">How schools are kept afloat in Somaliland</a>
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</em>
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<h2>Solutions exist</h2>
<p>Researchers also have a role to play in strengthening education systems. All over the continent, projects that aim to keep children learning even amid devastating conflicts are being developed, rolled out and tested.</p>
<p>One example comes from north-eastern Nigeria, which has been beset by Boko Haram attacks. Margee Ensign and Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob <a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">used</a> a combination of radio and tablet computers to improve the literacy and numeracy skills of 22,000 children forced out of school.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">Disasters interrupt schooling regularly in parts of Africa: here's a solution</a>
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</em>
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<h2>In the classroom</h2>
<p>Conflicts seem inevitable in a world racked by many “wicked problems” like climate change, inequality and poverty. But what’s taught in Africa’s classrooms could play a role in solving them. The ability to think critically, and to engage with facts rather than fiction, is key. </p>
<p>To this end, Ayodeji Olukoju <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">explains</a> why it was so important that Nigeria reintroduced history as a school subject in 2019, a decade after scrapping it from the curriculum. Understanding history, he argues, helps to explode myths and stereotypes, leading to a more cohesive society.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">What studying history at school can do for Nigerians</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221616/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Education can spur peace and development. Here are five essential reads on the topic.Natasha Joseph, Commissioning EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2206172024-01-13T18:11:31Z2024-01-13T18:11:31ZEthiopia’s deal with Somaliland upends regional dynamics, risking strife across the Horn of Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569174/original/file-20240113-23-3brzua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C6000%2C3476&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Somali soldier controls the crowd at a protest in the capital Mogadishu on Jan.3, 2024.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SomaliaDemonstration/537cb16b632d4e2d9693cef382a1a274/photo?Query=somaliland&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=184&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Farah Abdi Warsameh</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Horn of Africa ushered in the new year with news of a deal that would ensure that diplomatic relations in the region got off to a bumpy start in 2024. Ethiopia, it was announced on Jan. 1, had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/01/ethiopia-and-somaliland-reach-historic-agreement-over-access-to-red-sea-ports">signed a memorandum of understanding</a> with the breakaway region of Somaliland, opening the door to an agreement to exchange a stake in flagship carrier Ethiopian Airlines for access to the Gulf of Aden.</p>
<p>Such <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706740?seq=1">transactions of economic reciprocity</a> are generally routine, as scholars of international relations and law <a href="https://ccd.indiana.edu/staff-boards-fellows/graduate-fellows.html">like myself</a> are aware. </p>
<p>But this deal has another element. It intertwined sea access with Ethiopia’s formal recognition of Somaliland – and this has sparked <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67911057">quite a diplomatic stir</a>. Ethiopia’s neighbor Somalia has demanded that the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f1a7ffa3-03d8-46e4-a009-3710b4abc27d">agreement be immediately retracted</a>. In Somaliland itself, the deal has been <a href="https://hornobserver.com/articles/2595/Protests-and-resignation-roil-Somaliland-over-Ethiopia-Red-Sea-deal">greeted by protest</a> and the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/somaliland-ethiopia-coast-deal-defense-minister-resigns-d8606e7221681e7adcd4a8219dae92c3">defense minister’s resignation</a>.</p>
<p>Prior to the memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed had <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-abiy-takes-a-page-from-russia-china-in-asserting-the-right-to-restore-historical-claim-to-strategic-waters-216237">signaled his intention to gain Red Sea access</a> for his landlocked country – a bid observers warned could have a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/11/14/abiy-ahmeds-imperial-ambitions-are-bad-news-for-africa-and-the-world">destabilizing effect</a> in the region. </p>
<p>Ethiopia is reeling from an intense and bloody <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-explained.html">two-year war within its own borders</a>, coupled with ongoing strife <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/reflection-conflict-amhara-region-ethiopia">among different ethnic groups</a>. As a result of the violence, Ethiopia is currently experiencing <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/05/28/1100469734/ethiopia-set-a-world-record-for-displacements-in-a-single-year-5-1-million-in-20">massive internal displacement</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57791868">famine</a>. </p>
<p>Geopolitical tensions created by the pact with Somaliland could serve to exacerbate Ethiopia’s problems – and that of the region. But despite the risk, both sides know they have much to gain.</p>
<h2>Somaliland’s quest for recognition</h2>
<p>Since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland has operated as a <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/05/30/530703639/somaliland-wants-to-make-one-thing-clear-it-is-not-somalia">fully functional de facto state</a>, boasting its own defined territory, population and government. </p>
<p><iframe id="qcR56" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/qcR56/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>However, it still lacks the international recognition that would allow Somaliland full participation in the global community, such as <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/about-un-membership">membership in the United Nations</a>. A formal nod would also <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/12/03/introduction-strange-endurance-of-de-facto-states-pub-77841">unlock access to protections under international law and economic opportunities</a>. </p>
<p>The agreement with Ethiopia would be a step toward providing that critical missing link. </p>
<p>Recognition of a new state under international law requires established nations to acknowledge the sovereignty and legitimacy of the territory. This can be achieved through either expressed or implicit means.</p>
<p><a href="https://lawbhoomi.com/recognition-of-states-under-international-law/">Expressed recognition</a> takes the form of an official unequivocal declaration. In contrast, <a href="https://lawbhoomi.com/recognition-of-states-under-international-law/">implicit recognition can emerge</a> through bilateral treaties, alliances or diplomatic exchanges – essentially signaling acceptance of a country without making an official declaration of recognition. Implicit recognition often provides a strategic advantage, safeguarding a country’s interest without triggering regional discord. </p>
<p>Mastering the art of crafting treaties with implicit acknowledgments can be crucial to avoid overcommitting a country diplomatically. Abiy, a <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/summary/">Nobel Peace Prize winner</a>, was expected by the international community to navigate this diplomatic tightrope, balancing a degree of acknowledgment of Somaliland with restraint. Doing so might avoid rupturing relations with Somalia and imperiling regional security dynamics.</p>
<h2>An ambiguous deal</h2>
<p>The specific details of the memorandum of understanding <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566">remain unpublished</a>. So far, any insights gleaned stem mainly from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/landlocked-ethiopia-signs-pact-use-somalilands-red-sea-port-2024-01-01/">a joint press conference</a> held by Ethiopia’s and Somaliland’s two leaders in Addis Ababa and subsequent press releases.</p>
<p>Nuanced distinctions in each party’s priorities have emerged: Somaliland places emphasis on explicit recognition; Ethiopia directs its focus toward regional integration.</p>
<p>And some larger discrepancies in messaging pop out when you look closer. Both sides point to economic and security benefits. But Ethiopia’s Jan. 3 statement suggests only an “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240103-ethiopia-defends-somaliland-deal-as-somalis-protest">in-depth assessment</a>” of the request for state recognition. This seems at odds with Somaliland’s claim of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/1/4/ambiguous-ethiopia-port-deal-fuels-uncertainty-over-somaliland-statehood#:%7E:text=The%20memorandum%20of%20understanding%20was,recognition%20as%20a%20sovereign%20state.">guaranteed recognition</a> in exchange for sea access. </p>
<p>But because the actual text of the agreement isn’t publicly available, its implications remain shrouded in secrecy – further adding to the unease in the region over the deal.</p>
<h2>Rising regional tensions</h2>
<p>In the days since the memorandum of understanding was inked, tensions have deepened between Somalia and both Ethiopia and Somaliland. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-08/somalia-leader-warns-he-will-fight-against-ethiopia-red-sea-plan?srnd=undefined&embedded-checkout=true">issued a stern warning</a> against the agreement and threatened to defend Somalia through all available means. </p>
<p>He urged Somali civilians to stand united against potential incursions and cautioned Ethiopia against escalating the situation into armed conflict. </p>
<p>Mohamud has also been seeking support from allies. Already in 2024, he has <a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/africa/somali-leader-in-eritrea-after-annulling-somaliland-sea-deal-16585258">traveled to Eritrea</a> for security talks aimed at strengthening bilateral ties and addressing regional and international concerns. He also received an <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/129684/Somali-President-Hassan-Sheikh-thanks-Egypt-for-support-his-country">invitation from Egypt</a> in an apparent show of support.</p>
<h2>Ethiopia’s precarious situation</h2>
<p>In a further sign of growing tensions, Ethiopia’s army chief of staff <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67921447">has engaged in talks</a> with his Somaliland counterpart to discuss military cooperation. </p>
<p>Considering Ethiopia’s delicate situation with domestic secessionist forces, critics have been quick to note that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/world/africa/ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal.html">Ethiopia may not be best placed</a> to entertain the idea of recognizing Somaliland. Not only would it risk conflict with Somalia, doing so could also lead to the renewal of a breakaway push within Ethiopia itself.</p>
<p>Somaliland is situated to the south and east of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State. The region is governed by the Somali branch of the Ethiopian Prosperity Party, whose legitimacy has long been contested by the Ogaden National Liberation Front, ONLF, a group demanding autonomy for Somalis in Ethiopia. </p>
<p>Until <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1MW0CT">a peace agreement</a> in October 2018, the ONLF had been engaged in a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/18/world/africa/18ethiopia.html">decades-long secessionist war</a> with the Ethiopian government. More recently, in 2020, a push for independence in the Tigray region of Ethiopia resulted in a two-year armed conflict that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57791868">displaced millions</a> of people and forced <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57791868">hundreds of thousands</a> into famine. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Amhara – an indigenous ethnic group in Ethiopia – have been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66496137">resisting</a> the federal government’s attempt to disarm their militia and regional special forces. And the state of Oromia also <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-oromo-militants-peace-talks-7252be5f8128dc931982f503180235ca">saw calls for independence</a> before an Oromo prime minister, Abiy, was elected by parliament in 2018.</p>
<p>A renewed push for autonomy from Ethiopia’s Somali community could serve to reignite any number of these simmering internal conflicts and Somali <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/12/08/the-demon-of-irredentism-is-back-with-a-vengeance">irredentism</a>.</p>
<h2>Uneasy international response</h2>
<p>Global attention to growing tensions in the Horn of Africa has been mounting: The U.S. has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oWD2FWLX7_Q">expressed serious concern</a>, and the African Union has <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230103/chairperson-commission-calls-mutual-respect-between-ethiopia-somalia">urged Ethiopia and Somalia to de-escalate</a> the tensions in the name of regional peace.</p>
<p>Similar statements have come from the <a href="https://igad.int/statement-of-the-igad-executive-secretary-on-the-recent-developments-in-relations-between-the-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia-fdre-and-the-federal-government-of-somalia-fgs/">Intergovernmental Authority on Development</a> — an African trade bloc — the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ethiopiasomalia-statement-spokesperson-territorial-integrity-federal-republic-somalia_en">European Union</a> and the <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2436356/middle-east">Arab League</a>. </p>
<h2>Widespread protests</h2>
<p>Djibouti, which neighbors Somaliland to the northwest, has <a href="https://twitter.com/HarunMaruf/status/1744451659852333199">called for dialogue</a> and a diplomatic solution.</p>
<p>But such calls – from both international and regional players – have done little to calm tensions.</p>
<p>In the days since the deal was announced, <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/africa/2024-01-04-watch-somalis-protest-against-ethiopia-somaliland-deal/">tens of thousands Somalis</a> have protested in the streets of Mogadishu, calling the move an <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/protest-against-ethiopia-s-red-sea-access-deal-rocks-somali-capital/3106328#">aggression against the nation’s sovereignty</a>.</p>
<p>And while residents of both Somaliland and Ethiopia have largely supported the memorandum – hopeful in turn that it would lead to international recognition and economic uplift – not everyone is behind the deal. In Somaliland, Defense Minister Abdiqani Mohamud Ateye <a href="https://apnews.com/article/somaliland-ethiopia-coast-deal-defense-minister-resigns-d8606e7221681e7adcd4a8219dae92c3">resigned on Jan. 8</a>, stating that the handing over of access to the coast to Ethiopia represented a threat to Somaliland’s sovereignty.</p>
<p>It would seem that the memorandum of understanding has served to reopen old wounds across the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alemayehu Weldemariam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Somalia has demanded that a memorandum of understanding – which would see Ethiopia gain access to the Red Sea via a Somaliland port – be ripped up.Alemayehu Weldemariam, Ph.D. Fellow, Center for Constitutional Democracy, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2196212024-01-11T15:54:54Z2024-01-11T15:54:54ZEthiopia’s quest for access to the sea: success rests on good relations with its neighbours<p>On 1 January, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67858566">a memorandum of understanding</a> granting Addis Ababa direct access to the Gulf of Aden. This strategic agreement paves the way for Ethiopia to establish commercial and military bases along the coast. </p>
<p>Under the agreement, Somaliland will lease 20km of coastal land to Ethiopia for 50 years. Ethiopia commits to offering Somaliland a stake in one of its lucrative state-owned enterprises, Ethiopian Airlines. It is also contemplating recognition of Somaliland as an independent state.</p>
<p>Ethiopia’s prime minister Abiy Ahmed has been keen on securing <a href="https://bnn.network/finance-nav/ethiopian-prime-minister-highlights-red-seas-significance-for-countrys-survival/">direct sea access for Ethiopia’s “survival”</a>. Neighbouring coastal states, including <a href="https://intellinews.com/somalia-rejects-ethiopia-s-call-for-negotiations-on-red-sea-access-297441">Somalia</a>, Djibouti and Eritrea, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-19/djibouti-latest-nation-to-reject-ethiopia-s-red-sea-access-plea">have rebuffed these overtures</a>.</p>
<p>The Gulf of Aden deal has evoked mixed reaction in the region. On the one hand, it lessens the likelihood of conflict with Eritrea. Ethiopia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/landlocked-ethiopia-wants-better-sea-access-a-port-deal-with-neighbours-could-benefit-the-region-211759">aggressive pitch</a> for access to the Red Sea had raised concerns about potential territorial disputes. But the agreement with Somaliland, a self-declared state lacking international recognition, has heightened tensions with Somalia. Mogadishu has declared the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67861390">deal null and a clear act of aggression</a>. Despite Somaliland declaring independence in 1991, Somalia still considers it one of its provinces.</p>
<p>We are scholars who have conducted over a decade’s worth of research on <a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6364-444X">maritime security, international law</a> and <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/gov/yimeni-bizuneh-getachew.aspx">Ethiopian politics</a>. </p>
<p>It is our view that Ethiopia’s quest for sea access might not be guaranteed solely through the recently signed deal with Somaliland. While international law does provide pathways for a landlocked state to gain access to a coastline, that access depends almost entirely on striking deals with neighbours. While the agreement with Somaliland marks Ethiopia’s initial legal move, the contested claim of Somaliland by Somalia poses a potential hurdle for Ethiopia in attaining sea access. We suggest that sustainable solutions require agreement among all concerned states.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Ethiopia has been landlocked since <a href="https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXVI/471-488.pdf">Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993</a>. Since then, it has tried various means to secure access to the ocean. In 2002, it signed <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/31135/djibouti-ethiopia-accord-signed-use-djibouti-port">an agreement with Djibouti</a>. This has resulted in around <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa">95% of its import-export trade (by volume)</a> passing through the port of Djibouti via the Addis-Djibouti corridor. </p>
<p>In 2018, Ethiopia purchased a <a href="https://gulfnews.com/business/ethiopia-acquires-19-stake-in-dp-world-berbera-port-1.2181403">19% stake in Berbera Port</a> in Somaliland as a potential way to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00208817231202305">diversify its maritime access points</a>.</p>
<p>Since the signing of the 2024 memorandum, military chiefs of Ethiopia and Somaliland <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67921447">have met to discuss cooperation</a>. This has further inflamed tensions, resulting in <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/04/somalis-protest-against-ethiopia-somaliland-deal">street protests in Mogadishu</a> and calls from Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud asking people to “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67921447">prepare for the defence of the country</a>”. The heightened tension undermines the sustainability of Ethiopia’s push for direct access to the sea. However, Ethiopia also appears determined, as the deal is seen as a mechanism to address the country’s decades-long problem. Additionally, the deal is considered a turning point for Somaliland in its pursuit of international recognition.</p>
<h2>Legal rights</h2>
<p>International maritime law grants landlocked states certain rights to access the ocean through bilateral agreements with coastal states. This can take the shape of a corridor agreement: rules that regulate the transit of goods via an approved route.</p>
<p>For example, <a href="https://www.aidiaasia.org/research-article/nepal-bangladesh-relations-beyond-bilateralisms">following negotiations with Bangladesh in 1997</a>, Nepal was able to secure transit rights through Bangladeshi territory to access the ports of Chittagong and Mongla. These arrangements hinge on maintaining positive and cooperative relations between the landlocked country and its coastal counterparts. </p>
<p>This dependency on good diplomatic ties underscores the inherent fragility of such agreements. It also appears to be Ethiopia’s main concern in looking for direct sea access.</p>
<p>The key international law that governs the rights of all coastal and landlocked states is the 1982 <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf#page=24">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a>. Under the law, landlocked states enjoy freedom of transit to the sea through the territory of adjacent states by all means of transport. This is contingent on <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0260982786900121">good relations with coastal neighbouring states</a> and the ability to negotiate bilateral, sub-regional or regional agreements. This might extend to the construction or improvement of port installations and equipment.</p>
<p>The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf#page=62">states</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Means of transport in transit and other facilities provided for and used by land-locked States shall not be subject to taxes or charges higher than those levied for the use of means of transport of the transit State.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The law further <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf#page=68">suggests</a> that landlocked states are “disadvantaged” and therefore require “special consideration”.</p>
<p>Despite this, the rights and jurisdiction of coastal states <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/11522/chapter/160311159">over the most valuable areas of the ocean</a> means that international law <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004422056/BP000018.xml">limits the rights of landlocked states to maritime uses and resources</a>. For example, under the law, <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf#page=43">priority</a> is given to the fishing communities or fishing industries of the coastal state.</p>
<p>In addition, while any state can operate a naval vessel on the high seas with immunity, a landlocked state can only establish a naval base with the explicit agreement of a coastal state. </p>
<h2>Challenges of relying on transit countries</h2>
<p>Globally, there are 44 landlocked states. Sixteen are in Africa.</p>
<p>Transit arrangements for the import and export of goods <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/the-law-of-the-sea-and-landlocked-states">inherently carry disadvantages</a> in terms of costs, delays, and the risk of goods being lost or damaged.</p>
<p>When relations break down, as was evident during the <a href="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/25b09ec52b7349d4b230cfe680a268a6">conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea</a> in the late 1990s, landlocked states may lose access to ports. They depend on the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25954?seq=7">political will and commitment of transit states</a>. </p>
<p>Furthermore, transit agreements are limited by the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3848625">infrastructural, administrative and customs policies</a> of the coastal state. Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea all struggle with structural and economic deficiencies.</p>
<p>This perpetually places landlocked nations in a vulnerable position in comparison to coastal states. It helps explain Ethiopia’s recent agreement with Somaliland. </p>
<h2>Collaboration or conflict?</h2>
<p>Exploring alternative legal options is crucial for landlocked countries like Ethiopia to ensure diverse and reliable access to the sea. The negotiation of transit bilateral treaties, as demonstrated with Djibouti in 2002, is too expensive for Ethiopia. </p>
<p>The coastal states could designate certain ports as free ports to provide access without the huge tax and customs burden on a specific country. There is a benefit for coastal states. Take the case of Ethiopia. Given its large population, economic potential and growing regional influence, neighbouring states could benefit if they worked with Addis Ababa to develop and use ports in their territories.</p>
<p>Given Somalia’s concerns about sovereignty and its opposition to the memorandum of understanding, a collaborative approach is essential. Somalia, Ethiopia and Somaliland should now engage in diplomatic discussions to find a sustainable solution that addresses the interests and concerns of all parties involved. This may involve considering what benefits and guarantees Somalia can secure from Ethiopia and Somaliland in exchange for cooperation on sea access.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219621/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>International law provides pathways for landlocked countries to access the sea but this depends almost entirely on striking deals with neighbours.Bizuneh Yimenu, Teaching Fellow, University of BirminghamRobert McCabe, Assistant Professor, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181792024-01-07T07:33:35Z2024-01-07T07:33:35ZYoung Africans could disrupt authoritarian states but they don’t – here’s why<p>Africa has the <a href="https://www.un.org/ohrlls/news/young-people%E2%80%99s-potential-key-africa%E2%80%99s-sustainable-development#:%7E:text=Africa%20has%20the%20youngest%20population,to%20realise%20their%20best%20potential.">world’s largest youth population</a>. By 2030, <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/africas-future-youth-and-the-data-defining-their-lives/">75%</a> of the African population will be under the age of 35. The number of young Africans aged 15-24 is projected to reach <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/06/27/investing-in-youth-transforming-afe-africa">500 million</a> in 2080. </p>
<p>While population dynamics vary across the continent, most sub-Saharan countries have a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africas-median-age-about-19-median-age-its-leaders-about-63">median age below 19</a>. Niger is the youngest country in the world with a median age of 14.5, while South Africa, Seychelles, Tunisia and Algeria have median ages above 27. </p>
<p>These demographics are a potential <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/three-myths-about-youth-employment-in-africa-and-strategies-to-realize-the-demographic-dividend/">force for growth</a>. However, the potential of Africa’s demographic dividend has been overshadowed by concerns among governments and international donors about the relationship between large youth populations, unemployment rates and political instability. </p>
<p>Many countries with large youth populations and high rates of youth unemployment and under-employment <a href="https://ugapress.org/book/9780820348858/the-outcast-majority/">remain peaceful</a>. But the dominant policy narrative is that unemployed youth pose a threat to stability.</p>
<p>Further, the role of youth in popular protest – such as in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7420-after-the-uprising-including-sudanese-youth">Sudan in 2019</a> – has created high expectations about their role in countering autocratic governments and contributing to democracy. </p>
<p>As political scientists and sociologists, we’re interested in understanding the interaction between youth and autocratic regimes – especially as elected autocracies <a href="https://alinstitute.org/images/Library/RetreatOfAfricanDemocracy.pdf#page=1">are taking hold</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>Electoral autocracies are regimes elected into power using authoritarian strategies. These include manipulation of elections and repression of the opposition, independent media and civil society.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> focuses on the interactions between youth and regimes in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe. All are cases of electoral autocracies.</p>
<p>These regimes are aware of their large youth populations and are sometimes challenged by them. <a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-shaken-up-ugandan-politics-four-things-worth-knowing-about-him-153205">Uganda’s Bobi Wine</a>, a popular musician turned presidential candidate, is one example. </p>
<p>The four countries in our study have also been through civil wars, where the victorious armed groups have taken power and stayed in power since the end of the war. This has created a particular set of dynamics between the ageing rebel governments and the youth majorities.</p>
<p>In autocratic contexts like these ones, efforts to empower youth can easily be manipulated to serve the interests of the regime. Some young people may decide to play the game and take up opportunities offered by regime actors. Others might resist them. Some take up the opportunities, hoping it serves their own and not the regime’s interests. Still, this might reproduce forms of patronage. </p>
<hr>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">Abiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he's silencing them</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>All of this matters because the future of democracy is at stake, and using state-led opportunities might contribute to authoritarian renewal.</p>
<p>Our research teams in each country <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">studied</a> the range of policies that governments put in place to “cater” for the youth. They included loans for young entrepreneurs, and setting up youth councils and youth quotas in political institutions. </p>
<p>We found that youth-targeted strategies – largely aimed at promoting employment and political participation – are part of the authoritarian rule book in all four countries we studied. Employment and entrepreneurship schemes were open to abuse through ruling party patronage networks and channelled to regime supporters.</p>
<h2>Not saving democracy</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> found that young people in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe felt aggrieved about these opportunities being channelled to regime supporters. They also noted the lack of opportunities to have a meaningful voice. Institutions that were established to enable youth participation were co-opted and lacked independence from governments. </p>
<p>Some young people express their grievances through pro-democracy protests – like in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/violent-protests-break-out-mozambique-after-local-elections-2023-10-27/">Mozambique in October 2023</a>. But overall, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/221141/why-africas-youth-is-not-saving-democracy/">Africa’s youth are not saving democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Neither are they countering the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2022.2235656">deepening</a> trend of autocratisation on the continent, where incumbent governments have increasingly <a href="https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/60999">concentrated power</a> in the hands of the executive. Our research has confirmed this in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Uganda.</p>
<h2>Country case studies</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8797-the-risk-of-authoritarian-renewal-in-zimbabwe-understanding-zanu-pf-youth">Zimbabwe</a>, Zanu-PF has been in power since the country’s independence in 1980. The ruling party and many of its now ageing leaders use their history of having been part of the liberation war in the 1970s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600842472?casa_token=B53EF1Ev0XcAAAAA:7W-Izw-iDMuOCRc8RZiW8UcDpXn7kH5E-siDc2W1ux_L9w1WpyB-2mnTSMzmAXrLM5YmfFCx3Mlo4YA">to retain their hold on power</a>. </p>
<p>They do so by creating narratives around the country’s liberation history and patriotism, and accuse the “born-free” generation (those born after independence) of betraying the liberation war. This delegitimises any discontent young people may feel. Zanu-PF targets young people among its <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14906">wider repertoire of strategies</a> to maintain power.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8798-poorly-designed-youth-employment-programmes-will-boost-the-insurgency-in-mozambique">Mozambique</a>, the ruling party Frelimo has won every election since 1992. The party has concentrated power and resources in the hands of the political elite. The youth continue to be under-represented and have serious challenges in accessing resources. This, in addition to other conflict dynamics, contributed to an insurgency in the northern region of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271">Cabo Delgado from 2017</a>. It’s led by the radical religious group locally called Al-Shabaab, or sometimes “machababo” (the youth).</p>
<p>Youth-dominated protests in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">Ethiopia</a> contributed to the 2018 fall of the ruling party that had been in power since 1991. They also led to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-change-happened-in-ethiopia-a-review-of-how-abiy-rose-to-power-110737">coming to power</a> of Abiy Ahmed that year. </p>
<p>Mobilisation among the youth has since <a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">been silenced</a>. Only loyalists get access to job creation schemes. There has also been a militarising of youth-dominated ethnic movements. This was seen, for instance, with the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/322001/ethiopia-understanding-the-fano-and-the-fate-of-amhara/">Fano Amhara group</a> in the war in Tigray in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">2020-2022</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8801-moving-ugandas-national-development-planning-to-the-grassroots-whats-in-it-for-youth">Uganda</a> was a pioneer in institutionalising youth participation in decision-making. Youth engagement in political structures is considered to be a tool for government control. We found that young politicians felt that this flawed system of representation provided opportunities for mobilising both against and in favour of the current regime. Young candidates running for one of the youth quota seats in parliament, for instance, can’t easily evade ruling party patronage.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Young Africans are diverse. However, they have often been characterised as either <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/african-youth-and-growth-violent-extremism">violent</a> or as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13968.doc.htm">changemakers and peace activists</a>. These characterisations represent opposite ends of a spectrum. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research project</a> engaged a diversity of young people positioned and constantly moving across different parts of the spectrum. This has enhanced our understanding of how they navigate and respond to the ways their regimes seek to handle the youth population.</p>
<p>In our view, research and policy initiatives towards young people in authoritarian states must acknowledge that well-intended youth interventions may reproduce authoritarian politics when they are channelled to party loyalists. </p>
<p>Interventions that aim to promote job creation and youth empowerment should monitor how youth participants are selected and funds disbursed to avoid interference from partisan actors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218179/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the Research Council of Norway's Norglobal programme (grant # 288489). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marjoke Oosterom received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) </span></em></p>Africa’s youth are not countering the deepening of autocratisation across the continent.Lovise Aalen, Research Professor, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteMarjoke Oosterom, Research Fellow and Cluster Leader, Power and Popular Politics research cluster, Institute of Development StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191362023-12-12T14:42:58Z2023-12-12T14:42:58ZMadagascar cave art hints at ancient connections between Africa and Asia<p>Unique, prehistoric rock art drawings have been discovered in the Andriamamelo Cave in western Madagascar. </p>
<p>I was part of a team that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15564894.2020.1749735">discovered and described</a> these ancient treasures. They’re the first truly pictorial art, depicting images of nature with human-like and animal-like figures, to be seen on the island. Until recently, rock art in Madagascar had only yielded a few sites with basic symbols.</p>
<p>The dramatic discoveries contained several surprises, including hints at some remarkable cultural connections. </p>
<p>First, scenes depicted in some cases linked up fairly directly to Egyptian religious motifs from the Ptolemaic period (300-30 BCE). </p>
<p>Second, other inferences from symbols and writing on the walls showed connections to the Ethiopian and Afro-Arab worlds. </p>
<p>Finally, prevalent symbology and motifs evoked a two-millennia-old cave art style from Borneo. </p>
<p>An additional realm of surprises: at least three extinct animals of Madagascar (thought to have been extinct for many centuries) may be depicted – a giant sloth lemur, elephant birds and a giant tortoise. </p>
<p>It has long been believed – and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/30846019_The_Culture_History_of_Madagascar">evidence</a> has confirmed – that the people, language, and culture of Madagascar are rooted in distant ancient connections to Borneo, an island in south-east Asia, combined with strong influences from continental eastern Africa.</p>
<p>However, who the first Malagasy were, when they arrived, and what they did after that, are all hotly <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277379119303282?via%3Dihub">debated</a> topics.</p>
<p>Though our findings are speculative, any information that might be derived from the Andriamamelo Cave evidence is of considerable interest to the reconstruction of Malagasy early history.</p>
<h2>Connections beyond Madagascar</h2>
<p>Our research group – including Malagasy scientists from local institutions, and American, British and Australian specialists – visited the site near the village of Anahidrano on the north-west edge of the 17,100-hectare Beanka protected area in 2013. </p>
<p>Our team spent several days recording the images, surveying and mapping the entire cave, searching for associated archaeological sites, and interviewing local villagers regarding the art. It took several years, however, to search through relevant literature and museum archives to confirm the uniqueness and significance of what we’d found.</p>
<p>We made digital copies and hand-drawings of 72 cave-art objects. These were drawn in black pigment and included 16 animals, six human forms, two human-animal hybrid forms, two geometric designs, 16 examples of an M-shaped symbol, and many other patterns and indistinct forms. </p>
<p>Egyptian connections are hinted at in eight major images, including a falcon (Horus); the bird-headed god Thoth; the ostrich goddess Ma`at and two human-animal figures which were similar to Anubis – an ancient Egyptian god usually depicted as a man with a canine head. </p>
<p>The ubiquitous and mysterious M-figures demand explanation: we suggested, after searching many relevant alphabets, that it is a perfect match for only one, the letter “hawt” (ሐ) in the ancient Ethiopian Amharic alphabet, pronounced “ha”.</p>
<p>Surprisingly, though, we also found this symbol in cave art from Borneo thought to be about 2,000 years old, and in no other cave or rock art throughout the Indo-Pacific region. In some Austronesian languages (the diverse language family that extends from Malagasy on the west to distant Hawaii and Rapa Nui in the Pacific), the word “ha” is a term for the “breath of life”. </p>
<p>All these possible connections remind us that Madagascar’s people, language, and culture are in themselves syncretic, blending African and Asian influences to produce a unique Malagasy people.</p>
<p>The richly detailed and diverse art is notable also for what it doesn’t show. </p>
<p>No Christian, Muslim or Hindu symbolism is depicted, and no relatively modern motifs such as the Latin alphabet, cars, airplanes or flags. Even the ubiquitous zebu (cattle), the culturally paramount symbol of the last thousand years or more in Madagascar, are absent.</p>
<h2>When and whose</h2>
<p>It’s hard to know exactly when these drawings were made. Direct dating of cave art is notoriously difficult, and proved so in this case as the black pigment was made from dark inorganic minerals with only a small component of charcoal we could use for radiocarbon dating. </p>
<p>The presence of extinct animals, and the lack of modern motifs and the alphabet used in modern Malagasy, weigh heavily against the notion of a recent origin for the art.</p>
<p>We suspect that the art is about 2,000 years old – dating back to the time of Cleopatra or before, based on the religious motifs. If it is, that is remarkable and useful to know because it may provide evidence for who colonised Madagascar and when.</p>
<p>If, on the other hand, a set of pre-Christian religious beliefs has survived for centuries or even millennia among certain ethnic groups in very remote areas of the immense island – retaining recognisable influences from Egypt, Ethiopia and Borneo – that would be perhaps more remarkable. Village informants hinted at that possibility, by insisting that the “sorcerer” pictured was a member of a mysterious group of “Vazimba” or “Bosy”) who lived in the forest nearby.</p>
<p>So, whose art is this? We wish we knew, but clues are mostly lacking. The only possible writing, besides the M-figures, is a line of faint script in the lower right corner of this rock-art extravaganza. </p>
<p>Our best guess is that the legible middle six of eight characters, inferred to be <em>sorabe</em>, archaic Malagasy writing in Arabic script, may say “D-A-NT-IA-R-K”. </p>
<p>Does that refer to Antiochus IV Epiphanes? This king of the Seleucid Empire (western Asia) in the Ptolemaic period built a large navy, conquered much of Egypt in 170 BCE, and sent exploring and trading expeditions down the Red Sea and the east African coast. Ivory traders in that period <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/200009">spread</a> Roman goods as far south as ports in Tanzania south of Zanzibar, to trade with Azania. </p>
<p>Until more art or relevant archaeological evidence turns up for ancient African and Asian influences in Madagascar, we can only speculate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Burney received funding from the National Geographic Society for the field research leading to these discoveries.</span></em></p>Rock art from a Malagasy cave hints at some remarkable cultural connections.David Burney, Professor of Conservation Paleobiology, National Tropical Botanical Garden, and Adjunct Professor, University of HawaiiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2192962023-12-08T13:36:18Z2023-12-08T13:36:18ZThe landmark Genocide Convention has had mixed results since the UN approved it 75 years ago<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564027/original/file-20231206-17-lncvwh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman prays in front of skulls at a memorial in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, marking the genocide that happened under the Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-prays-in-front-of-skulls-at-the-choeung-ek-memorial-news-photo/960278782?adppopup=true">Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Seventy-five years ago, in the wake of Nazi atrocities, the world made a vow. </p>
<p>Countries pledged to liberate humanity from the “odious scourge” of genocide when, at the United Nations, they established a new convention on <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">preventing and punishing genocide</a> on Dec. 9, 1948. </p>
<p>Has the international community lived up to this promise? </p>
<p>Amid genocide accusations and mass violence in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, China and elsewhere, the answer would seem to be obvious: “No!” </p>
<p>But the reality is more complicated. It also offers a glimmer of light at a very dark moment. </p>
<p>As someone who has studied genocide for years and <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501765698/anthropological-witness/">testified on the topic</a> at an international tribunal, I view the legacy of the U.N. Genocide Convention – including its effectiveness in preventing genocide and holding perpetrators accountable – as a mixed bag with some good but also some ugly. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black woman wearing a gray outfit that looks like a sari holds her hand to her chest and stands in front of shelves filled with old looking clothing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A survivor of the Rwandan genocide looks at clothes of genocide victims who were killed by Hutu militants in 1994.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/juliet-mukakabanda-a-survivor-that-will-testify-in-france-news-photo/1240477849?adppopup=true">Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The story of the Genocide Convention</h2>
<p>It is a minor miracle that there is a U.N. Genocide Convention, a treaty that over 150 countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia and Israel, <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml">have ratified</a>. </p>
<p>Countries are obsessed with protecting their sovereignty and power. They gave up a bit of both by passing this convention. </p>
<p>The word genocide had been coined only four years earlier by a Polish lawyer, <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/coining-a-word-and-championing-a-cause-the-story-of-raphael-lemkin">Raphael Lemkin</a>. Why, he wondered, was it a crime to kill one person but not an entire group? </p>
<p>In 1946, at the newly formed U.N., Lemkin began lobbying diplomats. Two years of grinding U.N. debate ensued before the convention was finally – and barely – passed. </p>
<p>The convention <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">defines genocide</a> as “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” These acts range from killing to the forced transfer of children from one group to another group. </p>
<p>But the convention’s shortcomings quickly became apparent. </p>
<h2>The bad − a convention rigged for the powerful</h2>
<p>The Genocide Convention was the product of political bargaining, compromise and pressure from some of the world’s great powers. As a result, the convention also has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/problems-of-genocide/1C48C9BAE4A2CA4EA6727F19771651A6">major weaknesses</a>. </p>
<p>First, it does not protect everyone from genocide. It shields racial, ethnic, national and religious groups, but leaves others, such as <a href="https://www.rutgersuniversitypress.org/bucknell/the-politics-of-genocide/9781978821507/">political groups</a> and economic groups, unprotected. </p>
<p>As a result, the mass targeting of people from particular political groups or economic classes – which has happened in communist <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/cambodia">Cambodia</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/03/giving-historys-greatest-mass-murderer-his-due/">China</a> and the <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/2010/09/23/naimark-stalin-genocide-092310/">former Soviet Union</a> – isn’t technically considered genocide. </p>
<p>This limitation was intentional. The <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/5556.htm">Soviet Union</a>, for example, made sure such groups weren’t included in the convention, since it worried about possible future prosecution. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781351214100-3/historical-perspective-jeffrey-bachman?context=ubx&refId=c6169777-cd53-4e19-bb34-c359a761e515">Cultural genocide</a> was also dropped from the convention’s final draft, since imperial powers like France and the United Kingdom worried about being culpable for acts of cultural destruction in their colonies.</p>
<p>These shortcomings created more problems, including letting culprits off the hook. Perhaps, worst of all, these omissions suggest that enslavement, the use of atomic weapons, apartheid and the targeting of political groups are somehow less serious, since they don’t fall under the convention’s genocide umbrella. </p>
<p>And then there was the problem of enforcement. While the convention was legally binding for those who ratified it, there was no international police force holding people or governments to account for violations – and countries were left to determine whether they wanted to include the convention in their own national laws. </p>
<h2>The ugly − a convention without teeth</h2>
<p>Lacking enforcement powers, the new convention proved largely ineffective during the Cold War that began intensifying in the late 1940s.</p>
<p>This predicament helped lay the ground for a lot of ugly – <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003185291/genocide-adam-jones">tens of millions dead</a> and mass suffering.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/cambodia">Cambodia</a>, for example, the Khmer Rouge enacted policies that resulted in the death of up to 2 million of its 8 million inhabitants. Some groups, including intellectuals and ethnic and religious minorities, were singled out for execution from April 1975 to January 1979.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/blog/new-details-emerge-about-atrocities-in-guatemala">Guatemalan military targeted</a> and killed thousands in indigenous Mayan communities, with the violence peaking in the early 1980s. </p>
<p>Genocidal violence continued after the Cold War ended in the late 1980s.</p>
<p>The 1990s started with extremists from the dominant <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/rwanda">Hutu ethnic group in Rwanda</a> slaughtering about 800,000 Hutu moderates and Tutsi people, an ethnic minority. Ethnic Serbs also killed an <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/bosnia-herzegovina">estimated 100,000 civilians</a> in <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/bosnia-herzegovina">Bosnia</a> as the former Yugoslavia imploded. </p>
<p>The 2000s <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/burma">were riddled</a> with other <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/china">infamous failures</a>, including government-backed militias in Sudan killing 400,000 civilians in <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/darfur">Darfur</a> from 2003 through 2005 and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-darfur-fighting-war-crimes-705bdb1ac90fc7b2903f68e6f666c3ca">again today</a>. </p>
<p>More recently, Russia’s military perpetuated atrocities against Ukrainian civilians during its 2022 invasion and war with <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/ukraine">Ukraine</a> – another instance of likely genocide. And supporters of <a href="https://theconversation.com/both-israel-and-palestinian-supporters-accuse-the-other-side-of-genocide-heres-what-the-term-actually-means-217150">Israel and the Palestinians</a> are now both making accusations of genocide. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three people wearing dark clothing, including one man with an army vest, stand in the snow. The woman and one man cover their mouths and look away, one man looks forward." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People gather close to a mass grave in Bucha, Ukraine, on April 3, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-react-as-they-gather-close-to-a-mass-grave-in-the-news-photo/1239718685?adppopup=true">Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The good − baby steps and halting successes</h2>
<p>Amid these repeated failures, it may seem difficult to find reasons to mark the convention’s 75th anniversary. </p>
<p>But there are positives. </p>
<p>First, compared with 75 years ago, there is now a <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int">broad network</a> of international <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1502&context=gsp#:%7E:text=National%20Mechanisms%20are%20vehicles%20through,atrocity%20crimes%20as%20parties%20to">and domestic</a> organizations and individuals working to <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/">prevent genocide</a>. </p>
<p>These groups <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/index">conduct investigations</a>, <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org">issue alerts</a> and use <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1093&context=gsp">behind-the-scenes diplomacy</a> to keep peace.</p>
<p>Many governments also are prioritizing prevention. This includes the U.S., which passed the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ441/PLAW-115publ441.pdf">Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act</a> in 2018, formalizing prevention as a U.S. national interest and mandating <a href="https://www.state.gov/atrocity-prevention/">annual reports</a> on U.S. government progress in mainstreaming prevention.</p>
<p>Third, there has been progress in terms of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003185291/genocide-adam-jones">accountability</a>. Different international courts have used the Genocide Convention to convict perpetrators for genocidal acts committed in places such as <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/rwanda-the-first-conviction-for-genocide">Rwanda</a> and <a href="https://www.icty.org/en/press/radislav-krstic-becomes-first-person-be-convicted-genocide-icty-and-sentenced-46-years">Bosnia</a> in the 1990s. </p>
<p>And, critically, there is an International Criminal Court that can hold political leaders accountable for genocide. This <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/ICCAtAGlanceEng.pdf">Netherlands-based court</a>, set up in 2002, has not yet convicted anyone of genocide, though. </p>
<p>Finally, prevention efforts have had full or partial successes. They have curtailed budding genocidal crimes in places like <a href="http://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/dpe/modern_conflicts/burundi.pdf">Burundi</a>, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2020/10/19/cote-d-ivoire-election-tensions-erupt-in-fatal-ethnic-clashes//">Cote D’Ivoire</a>, <a href="https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2018/03/21/division-threatens-gambia">Gambia</a> and <a href="https://www.c-r.org/programme/horn-africa/kenya-conflict-">Kenya</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/research/books/responding-to-genocide-the-politics-of-international-action-2013/">Early warnings, diplomacy and political will</a> have often been key to these successes – such as when, with U.N. backing, an Australian-led force brought a stop to escalating violence in <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691150178/if-you-leave-us-here-we-will-die">East Timor</a> in 1999. </p>
<p>It is hard to feel hopeful at this difficult moment as violence in the Middle East and Ukraine rages on. But I think it’s important to recognize the halting progress that has been made during the 75 years since the Genocide Convention was passed – even as much work remains to fulfill the promise that genocide will never again happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219296/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Hinton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While the Genocide Convention has helped raise awareness and prevent ethnic violence from escalating, it has not stopped many accusations of genocides, including violence in Darfur and in Ukraine.Alexander Hinton, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology; Director, Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172172023-11-26T08:40:58Z2023-11-26T08:40:58ZWhat is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect<p><a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0CQBBAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Elazar,+federalism&ots=7_EoePhxVm&sig=vtSyxjKaMi8qqzhyHsk9Oj_OIrU#v=onepage&q=Elazar%2C%20federalism&f=false">Federalism</a> is a system of government where power is shared between a central authority and smaller regional governments. </p>
<p>Many countries adopt federalism to manage ethnic diversity within their borders and help promote unity. There are <a href="https://forumfed.org/countries/">25 federal countries globally</a>, representing 40% of the world’s population. </p>
<p>Federalism allows regions to govern some of their affairs – such as decisions regarding education or working languages – while being part of the larger country. </p>
<p>Ethiopia adopted federalism in 1991 when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – a coalition of four major parties – came to power. This followed 17 years of insurgencies to depose the Derg, a communist military junta that ruled the country from 1974 to 1991.</p>
<p>The primary aim of Ethiopian federalism is to accommodate the country’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/history-of-modern-ethiopia-18551991/C0852BA84C34071333C899ACC8F1C863">diverse ethnic groups</a>. Before 1991, Ethiopia had a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">centralised unitary government</a> that suppressed diversity. It restricted ethnic groups from using their languages in official settings and schools. </p>
<p>Ethiopian federalism grants ethnic groups the <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=13">right to self-determination</a>. An ethnic group can form its own region or become an independent country. This approach has drawn both praise and criticism. </p>
<p>Some academics view it as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/524968">novel approach</a> to resolving conflicts and preventing state disintegration. It’s impossible to forge unity without the voluntary alliance and assurance of the right to self-determination. Others <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-law/article/abs/ethiopias-leap-in-the-dark-federalism-and-selfdetermination-in-the-new-constitution/A05454ABA30C4C79F78DD7397FF91BED">argue that it worsens tensions</a> and could eventually lead to disintegration. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad015">studied</a> Ethiopian politics for more than a decade, with a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac039">focus</a> on <a href="https://kar.kent.ac.uk/92367/">the implementation of federalism</a>. After more than 30 years, ethnic conflict in Ethiopia hasn’t been resolved – but neither has the country disintegrated. </p>
<p>In my view, federalism remains the best approach for Ethiopia. It allows for cultural and language freedoms. It enables self-rule at regional levels, and has contributed to economic growth. The system, however, is not without its drawbacks. An increase in democratic space would allow more voices to be heard.</p>
<h2>How Ethiopian federalism works</h2>
<p>Ethiopia’s approach to federalism is bold <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad015">compared to other highly diverse African</a> federal states. Nigeria, for instance, has avoided constitutional recognition of ethnic diversity. <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=13">Article 39 of Ethiopia’s federal constitution</a>, adopted in 1995, explicitly acknowledges the country’s ethnic diversity.</p>
<p>Ethiopia is a federation comprising nations and nationalities, each possessing sovereignty as defined in <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=4">Article 8 of the constitution</a>. Nations and nationalities with defined territorial homelands have the right to establish their own regions or even seek independence. </p>
<p>There are 12 regions in the country, each with <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=20">extensive authority</a>. This includes policymaking, constitution making, choosing a working language, and maintaining regional police and civil services.</p>
<p>However, the exercise of these powers has been constrained by <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ijgr/28/5/article-p972_972.xml">the dominance of the party system</a>. </p>
<p>Between 1991 and 2019, the EPRDF tightly controlled regional governments. It <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">suppressed any demands for self-rule</a>. The coming to power of Abiy Ahmed in 2018 helped open up the political space. The prime minister established the Prosperity Party by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-50515636">merging three of the parties that made up the EPRDF</a>, as well as its smaller affiliates. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front refused to amalgamate. </p>
<p>Abiy addressed some of the demands from various ethnic groups for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">regional status</a>. He created three <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/ethiopia-creates-a-12th-regional-state-/7168313.html">additional regions</a> between 2019 and 2023.</p>
<p>The working of Ethiopian federalism, however, depends on the party system. Party norms often supersede constitutional principles. Internal party crises tend to lead to government instability and potential conflict. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">Tigray war</a> between 2020 and 2022 is a stark example. It originated from tensions between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the federal government. Disagreement was triggered by <a href="https://doi.org/10.14321/nortafristud.21.2.011v">the dissolution of the EPRDF</a>.</p>
<h2>Major benefits</h2>
<p>Ethiopian federalism has had three major benefits. </p>
<p>First, it allows for language and cultural freedom. The country’s 80 ethnic groups fought long and hard to secure their rights to culture, language and identity. More than <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00219096221097663#tab-contributors">57 of Ethiopia’s 80 languages</a> are used as mediums of instruction in schools. </p>
<p>Second, the system has allowed many <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">ethnic groups to exercise self-rule</a> in areas where they constitute the majority. Ethnic minorities are also entitled to form local governments, such as district administrations. </p>
<p>Third, the federal system has contributed to the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview#:%7E:text=Ethiopia%20aims%20to%20reach%20lower-middle-income%20status%20by%202025.,one%20of%20the%20highest%20rates%20in%20the%20world.">country’s economic growth</a> and its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091580">relative stability</a>. It achieved this by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.2020">decentralising power and resources</a> to regions and local governments.</p>
<h2>Key challenges</h2>
<p>One of the primary challenges of Ethiopian federalism lies in its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2015.1124580">inability to entirely resolve conflicts</a>. </p>
<p>Some of these conflicts – for instance in the western region of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/world/africa/ethiopia-ethnic-killings.html">Benishangul-Gumuz</a> and in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/01/ethiopia-ethnic-cleansing-persists-under-tigray-truce">western Tigray</a> – are instigated partly by the system’s attempt to empower a particular ethnic group in an area. This has created divisions between empowered groups and others. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://ethiopia.iom.int/news/more-438-million-people-displaced-ethiopia-more-half-due-conflict-new-iom-report">recent report</a> by the International Organization for Migration found that more than half of the 4.4 million internally displaced people in Ethiopia left their homes due to conflict. </p>
<p>A second challenge is the gap between the constitution and the practice of political rights. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">Certain ethnic groups have not exercised their rights</a> due to political repression. </p>
<p>Since Abiy assumed power in 2018, ethnic groups’ demands for regions has increased. The government addressed some of these demands, but repression of certain requests has led to grievances and conflicts. Some ethnic groups are too small to have their own region. </p>
<p>A third challenge is the dominance of the ruling party and the lack of democracy. The tendency of party norms to undermine constitutional principles casts a shadow on the federal system. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>While federalism may exist in form, it struggles to operate effectively without democracy and a multiparty system.</p>
<p>In a democratic system, the rule of law and protection of individual rights complement federalism by ensuring respect for citizen rights. A multiparty system would include diverse voices in decision-making and help protect minorities. Following these principles would help build peace and unity in a country as ethnically diverse as Ethiopia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bizuneh Yimenu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After more than 30 years of federalism, ethnic conflict in Ethiopia hasn’t been resolved – but neither has the country disintegrated.Bizuneh Yimenu, Teaching Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178172023-11-23T15:00:08Z2023-11-23T15:00:08ZEthiopia’s education system is in crisis – now’s the time to fix it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560341/original/file-20231120-19-nuyhmx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The COVID pandemic set pupils back, but the problems in Ethiopia's education system have deep roots.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Minasse Wondimu Hailu/Anadolu Agency</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In October 2023, Ethiopia’s minister of education, Berhanu Nega, <a href="https://youtu.be/9PYrlOHTiv4?si=bWDGFE3jgimp_L7H">disclosed</a> several shocking figures on the outcomes of the 12th-grade national examination. Of the 3,106 schools that administered the 12th grade (secondary school leaving) examination for the 2022/23 academic year, 43% reported that none of their students had passed. </p>
<p>And, for the second consecutive year, more than 96% of students who participated in the national school leaving examination scored less than the mark (an average of 50%) required to pass. This means that hundreds of thousands of students could not qualify for university education. </p>
<p>For comparison, more than 1.6 million <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2023/08/08/waec-records-80-pass-in-maths-english-language">Nigerian</a> secondary school students took the West African Senior School Certificate Examination in 2023. Approximately 80% (1.3 million) of them attained a passing grade or higher.</p>
<p>A robust education system is not merely about exam results. But these figures underscore the sad fact that Ethiopia’s secondary education sector is in crisis. This has been building for many years. In 2015/16, 49% of students scored 50% or more for the <a href="https://moe.gov.et/EduStat">grade 12 examination</a>. The following year the proportion dropped to 41%. A lack of consistent national data on examination results makes it challenging to fully illustrate the trend. </p>
<p>Ethiopia, like other nations in the region and globally, has grappled with learning setbacks resulting from <a href="https://riseprogramme.org/publications/learning-losses-during-covid-19-pandemic-ethiopia-comparing-student-achievement-early">the COVID lockdowns</a>. This, combined with <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">ongoing internal conflict</a> since 2020, likely contributed to the most recent national exam scores.</p>
<p>However, the crisis has deep roots. As <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-10-7933-7">policy</a> experts, <a href="https://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/people/staff/tiruneh/">researchers</a> and longtime observers of the Ethiopian education system, we believe the shockingly poor exam results indicate underlying structural issues that extend far beyond the realm of individual student performance. They are also a perfect opportunity for all stakeholders – particularly the government – to tackle the structural problems holding the system back. Now is the time to embark on swift reform with commitment and vision.</p>
<h2>Roots of the problem</h2>
<p>The seeds of the secondary education crisis are planted early. Hundreds of thousands of children in Ethiopia continue to complete primary school without grasping the fundamentals of <a href="https://riseprogramme.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/Understanding_Achievement_Numeracy_Among_Primary_School_Children_Ethiopia.pdf">literacy and numeracy</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-has-dealt-a-blow-to-ethiopias-private-higher-education-institutions-153398">COVID-19 has dealt a blow to Ethiopia's private higher education institutions</a>
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<p>This learning crisis stems partly from poor school infrastructure. Inadequate allocation of school resources following the massification of the education system is another problem. The rapid expansion of primary education seen in the past decade has considerably increased the proportion of students (and especially girls) from relatively <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03054985.2020.1741343">disadvantaged backgrounds</a>. That includes children from regions with historically low access to education, such as Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Somali.</p>
<p>This impressive achievement in the expansion of primary education has substantially increased the demand for secondary education. The secondary gross enrolment ratio has doubled over the <a href="https://moe.gov.et/storage/Books/ESAA%202014%20EC%20(2021-22%20G.C)%20Final.pdf">past decade</a>, from 23% in 2011/12 to 46% in 2021/22. Although much progress has been made in terms of <a href="https://riseprogramme.org/publications/disadvantaged-schools-and-students-ethiopia-why-geqip-e-reform-necessary">resource allocation</a>, the education system still struggles with inadequate infrastructure and resources to match the rapid enrolment. </p>
<p>In addition, teachers were not properly trained to manage the significant change in student demographics. Preservice teacher training curricula and approaches to teaching need to be <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/bdje/article/view/249011">overhauled</a> in view of the transformation of the Ethiopian education system from elite to mass education. Further, as the country’s <a href="https://moe.gov.et/PoliciesStrategies">new education policy</a> acknowledges, there has been a disconnect between student learning experiences and the country’s broader societal goals. </p>
<p>But any changes to curricula and teaching methods must be done thoughtfully, in consultation with all stakeholders. Abrupt policy changes create confusion and disruption. For example, following recent <a href="https://moe.gov.et/PoliciesStrategies">policy changes</a>, the government ditched the grade 10 national examination. This was initially set up to select students who would qualify for a two-year secondary education to prepare them for university education. In the absence of a viable mechanism to identify early academically underprepared students, it becomes impossible to provide targeted support in preparation for the national examination.</p>
<p>Challenges like under-resourced schools, unprepared teachers, outdated curricula, and political instability not only impede student learning. They also erode the nation’s human capital. A stark illustration is Ethiopia’s decline in the global human development ranking, from surpassing 22 countries <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-1992">in 1992</a>, to outperforming only 16 after <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-2021-22">three decades</a>. </p>
<p>To harness Ethiopia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-can-convert-its-youth-bulge-from-a-political-problem-into-an-opportunity-75312">burgeoning youth population</a>, the school sector requires urgent attention. Secondary education, beyond university qualification, is crucial for <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/df1be5f5-e5f8-584b-9a3f-fa8ebdfc4870/content">equipping young people</a> with knowledge and skills required for a productive workforce.</p>
<h2>Don’t waste a crisis</h2>
<p>There has been widespread <a href="https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20231018103529310">public fury</a> about the recent national exam results. But these <a href="https://addisstandard.com/in-depth-is-ethiopias-education-system-under-a-serious-threat/">outcries</a> come and go. The current crisis should not be a wasted opportunity. All stakeholders must seize the opportunity and deliberate on structural and systemic forces that underlie the mass failure in the 12th-grade examination. </p>
<p>As one of us has argued <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10734-022-00899-5#:%7E:text=When%20education%20systems%20are%20seen,be%20realised%20through%20the%20policy.">elsewhere</a>, crisis makes swift reform possible – if key stakeholders seize the moment with commitment and vision. </p>
<p>Vietnam offers a useful example. Years of war and political upheaval pushed the nation to the brink of collapse. The <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-93951-9_5">Vietnamese education</a> system grappled with a range of issues. These included a theory-heavy curriculum, outdated teaching and assessment methods, inadequate teacher quality, and high inequality. Then, a decade ago, Vietnam underwent a comprehensive reform of its education system. This has led to <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-93951-9_5">positive transformation</a> in both its economy and society.</p>
<p>The Ethiopian government and other stakeholders should not waste a crisis. Now is the time to act, with a sense of urgency and purpose.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217817/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The shockingly poor exam results indicate underlying structural issues that extend far beyond the realm of individual student performance.Tebeje Molla, Senior Lecturer, School of Education, Deakin UniversityDawit Tibebu Tiruneh, Research Associate, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2173052023-11-16T14:46:31Z2023-11-16T14:46:31ZThere are too few toilets in Africa and it’s a public health hazard – how to fix the problem<p>Imagine you are miles from the nearest restroom, and nature’s call is urgent – a situation that might raise a mild panic during a hike or at a music festival. Now, picture that same scenario, not as a one-off inconvenience, but as a daily reality. This is the case for about <a href="https://tropmedhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s41182-022-00416-5">half a billion</a> people globally. </p>
<p>In African countries, the issue of open defecation often goes unaddressed by society and policymakers despite its negative impact on health, economic development, dignity and the environment. </p>
<p>Led from Queen’s University Belfast, a team of multidisciplinary researchers aimed to evaluate how prevalent the practice is in African countries and which social factors are driving it. We also aimed to establish which communities were in most urgent need of interventions. </p>
<p>We used demographic and health surveys, alongside World Bank data. In a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10668-023-03992-6">recent paper</a> we set out our findings. </p>
<p>Our main ones were that in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Niger, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burkina Faso and Chad, a large number of people engaged in open defecation. </p>
<p>We found that as few as ten countries could account for 247 million Africans defecating in the open by 2030 if critical and emergency actions are not taken.</p>
<p>The biggest driver is lack of access to proper sanitation facilities. The poorest individuals, particularly in rural areas, are more likely to resort to open defecation than people in urban areas. In regions with the most critical need, the poorest are 43 times more likely than the wealthy to resort to open toileting. </p>
<p>We recommend tackling poverty, and intervening in regions and communities that urgently need improved sanitation infrastructure and programmes. West Africa needs special attention since many of its communities are in the critical category.</p>
<h2>A systematic approach</h2>
<p>Sanitation has far-reaching implications for food safety. Contaminated water sources and unsanitary conditions can spread waterborne diseases, which can contaminate food and put millions at risk. Addressing open defecation is a step in ensuring the safety and hygiene of the food chain.</p>
<p>The link between poor sanitation and health is well <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/sanitation">documented</a>. But our study casts this relationship in a new, alarming light: the likely role of open defecation in antimicrobial resistance. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/antimicrobial-resistance">Antimicrobial resistance</a> is the ability of microbes, such as bacteria, viruses and fungi, to resist the effects of medications that were once used effectively against them. It is a looming crisis, threatening to make antibiotics ineffective. Common infections could once again become deadly. </p>
<p>Our research suggests a probable link between open defecation and antimicrobial resistance. When people defecate outdoors, resistant bacteria from human waste can contaminate water and food. This <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jtm/taad069">often leads</a> to faecal-oral diseases and urinary tract infections.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gutter-to-gut-how-antimicrobial-resistant-microbes-journey-from-environment-to-humans-189446">Gutter to gut: How antimicrobial-resistant microbes journey from environment to humans</a>
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<p>However, there is a need for more research to clarify the relationship, its implications and prevention. A clear recommendation from our research is that data about antimicrobial resistance should be integrated into health surveys.</p>
<p>While the full breadth of the study’s findings is huge, its conclusions are clear: open defecation is a challenge in Africa that requires actions. Our research doesn’t just ring the alarm bell; it provides a blueprint for change, identifying specific regions where the practice is most prevalent and where interventions could have the greatest impact.</p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Addressing open defecation across a continent as vast and diverse as Africa is no small feat. We made a number of recommendations in the study.</p>
<p><strong>A pragmatic three-tier priority system</strong> </p>
<p>This will categorise regions based on the urgency of need for intervention: critical, high, and medium. Regions marked as critical are those with the highest prevalence of open defecation (more than 80% of the population) and the least access to sanitation facilities. These areas need immediate attention with the deployment of resources and sanitation infrastructure. The high priority regions have some access to sanitation. Here, the strategy is a combination of infrastructure development and community education. For medium priority areas (40%-59%), where some sanitation infrastructure may exist, the focus should be on sustainable practices, behavioural change and maintenance of existing facilities.</p>
<p>The system above is just to cut the high rates and inequalities among communities in a country. There is also a lot to do in communities with an open defecation rate of less than 40%. The goal is to reinforce positive behaviour and ensure facilities are maintained and improved. </p>
<p>Policy support, such as incentives for building private toilets or community sanitation blocks, may also help. This tiered strategy hinges on continuous assessment and reallocation of resources. Interventions should respond to the changing landscape as regions improve or decline. </p>
<p><strong>Support sanitation projects and policies</strong></p>
<p>Advocacy is important to increase awareness and donations to organisations that build toilets and provide sanitation programmes in affected areas. </p>
<p><strong>Educate and spread awareness</strong></p>
<p>Learning about the cultural and socio-economic factors that contribute to this practice must be encouraged and the knowledge shared with others. Campaigns that focus on the importance of sanitation for health and the environment are key.</p>
<p><strong>Encourage sustainable sanitation practices</strong></p>
<p>This includes using toilets properly, not littering, and understanding local challenges. The use of compostable toilets and other sustainable waste management practices where traditional toilets are not feasible must be encouraged.</p>
<p><strong>Foster global partnerships for sanitation</strong></p>
<p>Global partnerships can amplify efforts to end open defecation. Collaborations between governments, NGOs, private sector stakeholders and international organisations must be encouraged. Pooling resources and sharing knowledge can lead to more effective and sustainable solutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The struggle with open defecation is a silent emergency, undermining the continent’s efforts towards sustainable development goals.Omololu Fagunwa, Research Fellow, Queen's University BelfastHelen Onyeaka, Associate Professor, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162372023-11-13T13:29:00Z2023-11-13T13:29:00ZEthiopia’s Abiy takes a page from Russia, China in asserting the right to restore historical claim to strategic waters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557242/original/file-20231102-17-tfg6ng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2798%2C1868&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed arrives in Beijing on Oct. 16, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ethiopian-prime-minister-abiy-ahmed-arrives-at-beijing-news-photo/1726773830?adppopup=true">Ken Ishii/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed <a href="https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_3458629">claimed on Oct. 13, 2023</a>, that his landlocked country has a right to demand maritime access to a Red Sea port from its neighbors in the Horn of Africa – first through diplomatic means, he said, or by force if necessary. </p>
<p>In confrontational language, Abiy all but threatened conflict should Ethiopia be denied what he called the country’s intrinsic right to waterway expansion. He has since <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/world/ethiopia-pm-abiy-seeks-to-quell-neighbours-concerns-over-invasion">sought to soften his comments</a>, but the remarks have nonetheless <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/11/02/ethiopias-prime-minister-wants-a-red-sea-harbour">rattled the region</a>.</p>
<p>Such a move would help Ethiopia to reassert itself as <a href="https://theconversation.com/landlocked-ethiopia-wants-better-sea-access-a-port-deal-with-neighbours-could-benefit-the-region-211759">the dominant player</a> in the Horn of Africa, located in East Africa along a strategic maritime trade route. Ethiopia has been landlocked since coastal <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/6/29/ethiopia-eritrea-and-the-hope-for-lasting-peace">Eritrea broke away and became independent</a> in 1993 after a decadeslong war.</p>
<p><iframe id="jKFO6" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/jKFO6/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Abiy, a <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/summary/">Nobel Peace Prize winner</a> once acclaimed for promoting peace and international cooperation but later accused of being <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/11/29/939902460/nobel-peace-prize-winner-to-belligerent-warmaker-ethiopia-under-abiy-ahmed">a belligerent warmaker</a>, has alarmed countries in the region with his recent remarks. Abiy invoked a 19th-century Abyssinian warrior, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/ras-alula-and-the-scramble-for-africa-a-political-biography-ethiopia-eritrea-1875-1897/oclc/34320977">Ras Alula Aba Nega</a>, who had proclaimed the Red Sea as Ethiopia’s “natural boundary.” The concern is in attempting to assert itself, Ethiopia might risk <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811">reigniting a conflict</a>.</p>
<p>Abiy’s comments come at a time when Ethiopia is in a period of soul-searching, caught between the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/08/ethiopias-transition-democracy-has-hit-rough-patch-it-needs-support-abroad">paths of democracy and authoritarianism</a>. They also signal a potential willingness by Abiy to break with international norms amid a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/blinken-meet-ethiopian-government-leaders-repair-ties-2023-03-15/">growing shift away</a> from once welcoming powers in the West. </p>
<p>His rhetoric echoes ambitious geopolitical powers like China and Russia, both of which have shown a willingness to use military force to dominate strategic waters – as evidenced by Russia’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/07/ukraine-russia-crimea-naval-base-tatars-explainer">invasion of Crimea in 2014</a> and China’s <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-boxed-america-out-of-south-china-sea-military-d2833768">military posturing in the South China Sea</a>. </p>
<p>They also come at a time when <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/7/abiys-efforts-to-unify-ethiopia-could-lead-to-its-disintegration">Abiy struggles to unite Ethiopia</a> behind a single ideological nationalism and is unable to contain insurgencies by two ethnic groups – the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67361386">Amhara paramilitary organization Fano</a> and the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/09/second-round-of-talks-between-ethiopian-government-and-oromo-rebels/">Oromo Liberation Army</a> – both of whom hold historical grievances against the Ethiopian government and strive for greater political self-determination.</p>
<h2>Africa’s ties with the major powers</h2>
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<img alt="Leaders of China, Russia, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Kazakhstan walking." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Indonesian President Joko Widodo and Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev head to a group photo session at the third Belt and Road forum on Oct. 18, 2023, in Beijing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-president-xi-jinping-russian-president-vladimir-news-photo/1730510539?adppopup=true">Photo by Suo Takekuma-Pool/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>As a <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/mmahad/">researcher in international relations and conflict resolution</a>, I have watched as African countries have been courted by international powers, partly because of <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-is-being-courted-by-china-russia-and-the-us-why-the-continent-shouldnt-pick-sides-210516">sea trade routes</a>. Africa’s sea trade routes are of strategic and economic importance for major powers like China and the U.S. They provide international shipping and trade, and access to critical resources. They also are key for maintaining geopolitical influence, as evidenced by military outposts such as the <a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/Camp-Lemonnier-Djibouti/#:%7E:text=Welcome%20to%20Camp%20Lemonnier%2C%20Djibouti,in%20the%20Horn%20of%20Africa.">U.S. base in Djibouti</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/15/russia-sudan-putin-east-africa-port-red-sea-naval-base-scuttled/">Russian attempts to establish a naval presence</a> in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>Abiy’s new diplomatic alliances were on display on Oct. 18, 2023, during his visit to China for a forum on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-turns-10-xi-announces-8-new-priorities-continues-push-for-global-influence-216014">Belt and Road Initiative</a> – an infrastructure project that has seen China grow its influence across the Global South. During the meeting, Abiy was seen walking in step with Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Photos from the conference seemingly conveyed Abiy’s alignment with those leaders and renewed Washington’s long-standing concerns over <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/15/refile-blinken-to-meet-ethiopian-government-leaders-to-repair-ties">its weakening ties</a> to Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Such concerns have been in the air since the outbreak of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/11/2/photos-one-year-on-peace-holds-in-tigray-but-ethiopia-still-fractured">Ethiopia’s Tigray war</a> in late 2020. The conflict led to President Joe Biden’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/09/07/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-ethiopia-2/">Executive Order 14046</a>, imposing sanctions on certain persons in the Ethiopian government over documented human-rights abuses, and subsequent economic and arms embargoes, effectively isolating Ethiopia from its traditional Western allies. </p>
<p>In response, Ethiopia turned toward China and Iran, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html">procuring drones</a> that eventually tipped the balance in the Tigray conflict. The Ethiopian government’s rhetoric has since become increasingly Eastern-focused, distancing itself from the West.</p>
<p>This shift culminated in Ethiopia’s accession alongside five other states, including Iran, to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/21/world/asia/brics-summit-members.html?searchResultPosition=1">the BRICS group</a>, composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – a move that offers Ethiopia additional avenues to circumvent future U.S. sanctions.</p>
<h2>Domestic turmoil</h2>
<p>In addition to emulating Russia and China, the timing and riskiness of Abiy’s maritime motivations warrant scrutiny, especially given Ethiopia’s ongoing internal strife. </p>
<p>I believe that a motivating factor for the maritime claim is Abiy seeking to galvanize the people of Africa’s second most populous country through the creation of a potent nationalist narrative. This comes in the wake of his unsuccessful “<a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/02/16/medemer-in-a-land-of-extremes/">Medemer” campaign</a>, which tried but failed to create a single unifying ideology for Ethiopians to rally behind. Medemer, which means “togetherness,” was coined by Abiy when he took power in 2018 in hopes to unite and galvanize an Ethiopia divided along ethnic lines for the past 30 years. </p>
<p>In addition to the insurrection threat, Ethiopia is beset by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/02/ethiopia-atrocities-mar-ceasefire-anniversary">political violence</a>, <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/ethiopia">hunger and poverty</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-religious-tension-is-getting-worse-5-factors-driving-groups-apart-214278">worsening religious tensions</a>, problems that Abiy may want to divert attention from. </p>
<h2>What Abiy risks</h2>
<p>Abiy’s bold rhetoric may backfire in several ways, both domestically and internationally.</p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf/">heightened state of regional alert</a> following Abiy’s comments, his approach could easily lead to escalated tensions or even armed conflict with neighboring countries. There are already reports of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf/">Eritrea being on high alert</a> amid Ethiopia’s amassing troops between its border and Eritrea.</p>
<p>Abiy’s attempt to distract from internal discord may inadvertently generate new crises for Ethiopia’s already stretched military and recovering economy, and thereby jeopardize Ethiopia’s already strained economic and security capabilities.</p>
<p>In addition, Abiy’s attempts to emulate global powers like China and Russia and impose its will through force carries its own risks. China and Russia have the military might to enforce their geopolitical ambitions, a luxury that Ethiopia does not have. </p>
<p>And it is unlikely that China will extend the same level of support to Ethiopia as it <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/china-firms-russia-body-armor-bullet-proof-drones-thermal-optics-army-equipment-shanghai-h-win/">did to Russia</a> during its invasion of Ukraine. Unlike with Russia, Beijing doesn’t rely on Ethiopia for access to raw materials it needs. Similarly, Russia is not expected to supply arms to Ethiopia while it is <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-desperate-need-for-weapons-ukraine-win-for-north-korea-2023-9">seeking to replenish its own arsenal from North Korea</a> to continue its fight in Ukraine. </p>
<p>As such, trying to adopt a similar assertive maritime stance in a region already fraught with tensions could prove disastrous for Ethiopia – plunging the country and its neighbors into extended turmoil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216237/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed claims his landlocked country has a right to demand maritime access to a Red Sea port from its neighbors in the Horn of Africa − Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2168402023-11-06T16:20:52Z2023-11-06T16:20:52ZFluoride: very high levels in water associated with cognitive impairment in children<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557482/original/file-20231103-19-cw1qpj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C17%2C5964%2C3970&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/two-african-boys-busy-filling-water-2172736903">Riccardo Mayer/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fluoride is one of the more abundant elements naturally found in drinking water, and levels around 0.7mg per litre have been proven to <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26346489/">reduce tooth decay</a>. This is why some countries <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-report-confirms-fluoridation-can-reduce-tooth-decay-among-children">add fluoride to drinking water</a>.</p>
<p>However, fluoride in drinking water is a <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2001050/">controversial topic</a>. There is concern about the <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24719570/">potentially harmful effects</a> of adding fluoride to our water and food. Scientists <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30386744/">debate the pros and cons of fluoridation</a>, and for many of us it may be hard to decide what conflicting scientific results mean for our health and that of our families. </p>
<p>When scientists <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-99688-w">reviewed all the evidence</a> on the links between high fluoride and neurological problems, they found that damage to mental ability might exist for communities that use water with fluoride above recommended values. But it was not possible to show that it directly caused neurological disorder. </p>
<p>A new study from Tulane University in America adds to the debate. It suggests a link between high fluoride levels in water and <a href="https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2023/10/231026161112.htm">cognitive impairment in children</a>. </p>
<p>The study, published in the journal Neurotoxicology and Teratology, was based on 74 children in Ethiopia who were exposed to high fluoride in drinking water – averaging 7.6 milligrams per litre. This is well above the World Health Organization’s recommended limit of <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/599891?ln=en">1.5mg per litre</a>. </p>
<p>In England, some local authorities adjust the level of fluoride to <a href="https://ukhsa.blog.gov.uk/2016/04/13/water-fluoridation-what-it-is-and-how-it-helps-dental-health/">1mg of fluoride per litre of water</a>. And in the US, the maximum permitted amount in tap water is <a href="https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-10/documents/2011_fluoride_questionsanswers.pdf">4g per litre of water</a>. </p>
<p>Higher levels of fluoride are already known to <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21701193/">stain people’s teeth</a> and cause <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/3295994/">brittle bones</a> (called <a href="https://www.webmd.com/children/fluorosis-symptoms-causes-treatments">fluorosis</a>). This latest study found that children drinking water with high levels of fluoride performed worse in tests designed to evaluate new learning and memory. </p>
<h2>Groundwater</h2>
<p>Rural communities in this part of Ethiopia, as well as in other developing countries, mostly rely on groundwater from a hand-pumped supply. Most families in this study have similar living conditions and culture. This offered the researchers a setting with restricted socioeconomic differences between children, but with a range of water supply fluoride between 0.4 and 15.5mg per litre. </p>
<p>The researchers tested memory and new learning in two ways. Children were asked to make three drawings from memory and worked with programs on tablet computers that test the way the brain manages learning and memory. The results of the tests were then compared with fluoride levels and other potential contaminants that influence the brain such as arsenic and lead. Only fluoride was substantially above existing recommended levels.</p>
<p>The graphs in the paper show data is scattered and does not follow an obvious straight line relationship between fluoride in drinking water and children’s abilities. </p>
<p>After detailed statistical analysis and adjustments of the data for demographics, health status and other likely influences, there were some tests where lower scores could be due to fluoride effects on cognitive abilities. But overall, most of the tests did not have consistent, statistically significant results. </p>
<p>Many studies that explore the health effects of natural or artificial environmental contaminants also find <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6613194/">these relationships are not straightforward</a> as there are so many differences between people. </p>
<p>The recent paper did not find a strong association between high fluoride in drinking water and the mental abilities of children aged five to 14 years. They found that high fluoride concentrations could account for around 5% of the variability in the children’s abilities, but the majority of the difference is due to other factors. </p>
<p>They advise that new advanced studies are urgently needed to better understand the links between mental development and fluoride exposure from the womb to adulthood.</p>
<p>Given that nearly <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-31940-x">180 million people worldwide</a> may be exposed to naturally elevated fluoride (many in Asia and Africa), more science is needed to establish if there are threshold levels where fluoride negatively affects health.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216840/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span><a href="mailto:Robert.Kalin@strath.ac.uk">Robert.Kalin@strath.ac.uk</a> has received funding from the NSF (USA), EPSRC (UK), NERC (UK), BBSRC (UK), Scottish Government, USAID, and UNICEF</span></em></p>Very high levels of fluoride in well water in Ethiopia may affect children’s learning.Robert Kalin, Chair Professor, Environmental Engineering for Sustainability, University of Strathclyde Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2153722023-11-06T15:16:12Z2023-11-06T15:16:12ZMy parents are from two different African countries: study shows how this shapes identity<p>More than a <a href="https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/062/2016/009/article-A001-en.xml">third of migration</a> in sub-Saharan Africa happens within the continent. This mixing of people means that some children have parents of different national origins. Yet not enough is known about the lives of these children: how they form their identity and what impact migration has on them. </p>
<p>The majority of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Kassahun-Kebede/publication/329950963_The_African_second_generation_in_the_United_States_-_identity_and_transnationalism_an_introduction/links/5c76fdca92851c69504669e9/The-African-second-generation-in-the-United-States-identity-and-transnationalism-an-introduction.pdf">research</a> on second generation African immigrants focuses on understanding their experiences in the global north. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01419870.2018.1484503">research</a> looked at the less studied African context, where the majority of African migration occurs.</p>
<p>We are <a href="https://www.ug.edu.gh/sociology/staff/geraldine-asiwome-ampah">sociologists</a> who study <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97322-3_7">migration</a> and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imig.12644">identity</a> and we have seen that studies tend to take the <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d93fe8bf-5987-40ea-98d2-e9c6cbbe61f0/download_file?safe_filename=TDI%2Brevised%2Bsubmission%2Bto%2BERS%2BAugust%2B2015.pdf&file_format=application%2Fpdf&type_of_work=Journal+article">perspective</a> of the <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253000828/migrants-and-strangers-in-an-african-city/">parents</a> in the African context. The voices of the children are missing. </p>
<p>To fill this gap we <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13504630.2023.2222670">asked</a> children who have two African-born parents – but from different countries on the continent – about their experiences. </p>
<p>Our aim was to understand how children with binational parentage formed their identity. We wanted to know if they aligned with either or both of their parents’ identities and which individual or structural factors shaped that. This could be useful to know in contexts where ethnic, religious, political and national identities are salient markers of difference and influence people’s lives and opportunities.</p>
<h2>Questions of identity</h2>
<p>We conducted 54 interviews but drew on the experiences of 32 of the research participants for our paper. Their ages ranged from the lower 20s to the lower 60s. Participants came from Ghana, Botswana, Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa. Our sample was middle class and therefore our findings are limited to binational identity among middle class Africans. </p>
<p>A key criterion for participation was that participants should have lived in the African country of one of their parents’ birth or both during their formative years. This is because formative years (from birth up to the end of secondary education) shape who you are. And the experiences you have in a place leave an indelible impression and influence your sense of who you are.</p>
<p>We asked them questions such as: Who are you? What is your identity? Where are you from? How do others perceive you? What relationship do you have with your parents’ home country or home town? To what extent has your identity created opportunities for you and to what extent has it created challenges for you? </p>
<h2>Primary and secondary identities</h2>
<p>A person’s primary identity is how they see themselves principally. Their secondary identity comes after those core or foundational aspects.</p>
<p>We learnt that the participants’ primary identity was shaped predominantly by the closeness of family ties during their formative years. Family ties were evident in communication, visits and presence at rites of passage.</p>
<p>The case of three sisters whose mother was from Botswana and father from Ghana highlighted the importance of the closeness of family ties for identity formation even among siblings.</p>
<p>Maru, the eldest, was born when her parents were settling into adult life. She was raised by her maternal grandmother in rural Botswana because her parents were trying to find jobs in Gaborone, the capital. She felt a close bond with her maternal grandmother and thought of herself as Kalanga (an ethnic group) with a very weak link to Ghana. </p>
<p>Her two sisters were born almost a decade later in Gaborone and raised by their parents, who had settled into their lives in the capital. They described themselves differently. Seliwe described herself as Ghanaian. When she was growing up, the family spent holidays (sometimes several months) in Ghana and she thoroughly enjoyed those visits. She was close to the Ghanaian side of her family and spent much time during our interview talking about her paternal uncle, who lived in her father’s home town, and the jollof rice at a popular fast-food restaurant in Accra. She identified chiefly as Ghanaian and insisted that identity be recognised, for example by ensuring that her name, which is Ghanaian, be pronounced correctly.</p>
<p>The family plays a crucial role in identity formation. If parents want their children to identify with both sides of the family, they need to ensure that the children spend time with both sides of the family. </p>
<p>Another influence is the extent to which children are accepted by the extended family members. Meghan, who had a Ghanaian father and a Nigerian mother, noted that her mother’s family embraced her far more than the Ghanaian side of the family. Although she was living in Ghana, she barely had any contact with them. She explained, “I find that I relate more to my Nigerian side than the Ghanaian side.” </p>
<p>Fluency in a particular African language was not an important marker of identity for the study participants.</p>
<p>Our study also found that binational individuals drew upon their secondary identity either explicitly to achieve some purpose or implicitly for its intrinsic value.</p>
<p>About half of the sample had drawn on their secondary identity to access something practical, like tertiary education or employment. In simple terms, even if they didn’t feel strongly Nigerian (for example) they might use that identity to get a place at a university. </p>
<p>The other half of the sample drew on their secondary identity for non-essential – more cultural – purposes. Usually this was in making choices about things like food, clothing and music. Another purpose was more personal – such as the name the individual chose to use.</p>
<h2>Why the insights are useful</h2>
<p>Identities are fluid and people weave in and out of them. If you feel Nigerian at your core then you embrace all aspects of “Nigerianness”, including music, food and so on. If being Nigerian is your secondary identity, you see value in claiming it sometimes even if it is for instrumental reasons.</p>
<p>We found individuals with binational identity were able to shift between their primary and secondary identity quite frequently, sometimes daily. </p>
<p>A society’s culture informs identity – but so do individuals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215372/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Primary identities are foundational and serve as the core part of an individual’s identity.Akosua Keseboa Darkwah, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of GhanaGeraldine Asiwome Ampah, Senior Lecturer of Sociology, University of GhanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2149892023-10-10T14:53:40Z2023-10-10T14:53:40ZCatholic synod: the voices of church leaders in Africa are not being heard – 3 reasons why<p>The Catholic church today is <a href="https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2022-11/pope-polarization-is-not-catholic-dialogue-is-the-only-way.html">deeply polarised</a>. This has created doctrinal fissures that are seemingly unbridgeable. </p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.ncregister.com/commentaries/polarization-in-the-church-how-can-it-be-overcome">many rumbling contestations</a> on questions of identity, mission, faith and morality. Other questions touch on pastoral life, the nature of marriage and family life, denial of holy communion to divorced and remarried Catholics, clerical celibacy, authority in the church and reproductive rights. </p>
<p>There is also a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-catholic-church-is-increasingly-diverse-and-so-are-its-controversies-189038">serious erosion of religious authority</a>. Many church leaders have lost their credibility because of what Pope Francis calls the “<a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/7/13/pope-francis-says2ofcatholicclergyarepaedophiles.html">leprosy of clerical sexual abuse</a>” and <a href="https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2023-04/pope-papal-foundation-scandals-damage-church-charity-work.html">financial scandals</a>. </p>
<p>The church in Africa hasn’t been spared these issues. In parts of the continent, the <a href="https://international.la-croix.com/news/religion/bishop-who-was-victim-of-tribalism-is-to-be-nigerias-next-cardinal/16161#:%7E:text=The%2059%2Dyear%2Dold%20bishop,him%20to%20assume%20his%20office.">challenges</a> of ethnocentrism, abuse of religious authority and internal division are hurting the church’s credibility and effectiveness. And some national churches seem silent on rising crises of democracy and leadership across Africa.</p>
<p>There have always been divisions in the church, but its effectiveness and credibility <a href="https://concilium-vatican2.org/en/original/ilo/">in Africa</a> have been affected by clannish divisions and internal fights over money, power and position. This raises the question: how can the church be <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Wealth-Health-African-Christian-Religion/dp/1498561276">the conscience of the continent</a> if it’s ravaged by the same internal problems found in political institutions? </p>
<p>Most of the controversies that faced the church in its first 500 years were resolved through basic synodal principles – the word synod means “walking together”. These principles were developed by African scholars and church leaders like Cyprian, Athanasius, Aurelius and Augustine.</p>
<p>In 2021, Pope Francis convened a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-synod-of-bishops-a-catholic-priest-and-theologian-explains-168937">worldwide consultation on the future of the Catholic church</a>. This synod will conclude in 2024. Decisions made this year and next will define the future of modern Catholicism for many years to come. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pope-francis-the-first-post-colonial-papacy-to-deliver-messages-that-resonate-with-africans-201638">Pope Francis: the first post-colonial papacy to deliver messages that resonate with Africans</a>
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<p>Sadly, in the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231004-pope-opens-church-meeting-amid-tensions-with-conservatives">process</a> so far, there seems to be no clear African agenda articulated through African Catholic church leaders. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.logos.com/product/209729/faith-in-action-volume-1-reform-mission-and-pastoral-renewal-in-african-catholicism-since-vatican-ii">observed</a> the preparations of Africa for this synod. I’m afraid that the mistakes made by the continent’s church leaders in previous synods – including two held specially to address Africa’s challenges in <a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_14091995_ecclesia-in-africa.html">1994</a> and <a href="https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/synod/documents/rc_synod_doc_20091023_elenco-prop-finali_en.html#top">2010</a> – are being repeated. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://addisababa.synod2023.org/#:%7E:text=AFRICA%20SYNODAL%20CONTINENTAL%20ASSEMBLY%20Final,to%206th%20of%20March">African continental meeting</a> that took place in Ethiopia in March 2023 didn’t come up with a clear agenda to address the challenges facing African Catholics.</p>
<p>African delegates are faced with three major challenges going into the current consultations. First, they are simply responding to what is tabled in the <a href="https://www.synod.va/en/highlights/working-document-for-the-continental-stage.html">working document for the synod</a> rather than setting their own agenda. Second, they are treating the continent like a homogeneous entity. Third, they’re failing to demonstrate the changes that African Catholic leaders wish to make in their leadership styles, and pastoral and social ministries in local dioceses and religious congregations, without constantly looking up to Rome for instructions and directions.</p>
<h2>Drowned voices</h2>
<p>The latest synodal process began in 2021 with grassroots consultations, and national and continental assemblies. It has now entered the most decisive moment. </p>
<p>This is why it is important that African voices are heard. As a <a href="https://works.bepress.com/stanchuilo/">theologian</a> who has studied the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/009182961204000303?journalCode=misb">development of the synodal process in Africa</a>, I worry that African Catholic voices may instead be drowned.</p>
<p>First, African delegates at the synod are not formulating their own agenda. During the <a href="https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/synod/documents/rc_synod_doc_20151026_relazione-finale-xiv-assemblea_en.html">two consultations on the family in 2014 and 2015</a>, Africans framed their responses to the synod’s working document as a rejection of a western agenda for change to the traditional family. They pushed back against a perceived attempt to impose on the rest of the church a new understanding of marriage that includes the blessing of same-sex relations. </p>
<p>African delegates have failed to present their position on how to deal with issues of marriage, polygamy, denial of communion to polygamists, childlessness, burial rites and widowhood practices. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pope-francis-visit-to-africa-comes-at-a-defining-moment-for-the-catholic-church-197633">Pope Francis' visit to Africa comes at a defining moment for the Catholic church</a>
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<p>Second, the problems that face Africa are often localised. They require contextualised solutions. Yet, African delegates often treat the continent as homogeneous, with similar social, economic and political challenges. In the 2015 synod, Cardinal Robert Sarah of Guinea appealed to the delegates from Africa to <a href="https://www.lastampa.it/vatican-insider/en/2015/09/30/news/synod-africans-are-singing-from-different-songsheets-1.35228596/">speak with one voice</a>, as if Africa had one voice. </p>
<p>There is a need to present Africa in its diversity and richness. The churches of Europe, for instance, have always presented their issues in a more localised, national and specific sense – the German Catholic Church is implementing its <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/catholic-church-germanys-controversial-synodal-path/a-64971479#:%7E:text=In%20Germany%2C%20the%20Synodal%20Path,or%20remarry%20after%20a%20divorce.">own synodal path</a>. African delegates must resist the continued colonial structure, racialised thinking and mentality that sees Africa as one country rather than a continent of diversity and dynamic pluralism. </p>
<p>Finally, African delegates must move away from constantly asking Rome and the pope to help solve the issues within the church in Africa. The delegates must focus attention on the current situation of the church and society in Africa, and how African Catholics can solve their own problems by courageously confronting the internal challenges facing the church in the continent. </p>
<p>The Catholic church is witnessing its fastest growth in Africa (<a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/iacs/2022/04/30/global-christianity/#:%7E:text=April%2030%2C%202022&text=Following%20recent%20trends%2C%20the%20Catholic,growth%20in%20Europe%20(0.3%25)">2.1%</a> between 2019 and 2020). Out of a global population of <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/250362/number-of-catholics-in-asia-and-africa-continues-to-rise">1.36 billion Catholics, 236 million are African</a> (20% of the total). This growth is happening alongside a rise in poverty, social unrest, coups, wars and illiberal democracy.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>African delegates must demonstrate a deeper understanding of the continent’s social and religious challenges. They must capture the hopes and dreams of their congregants, and articulate how the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-popes-new-letter-isnt-just-an-exhortation-on-the-environment-for-francis-everything-is-connected-which-is-a-source-of-wonder-213135">Catholic church can support social transformation</a> through authentic and credible religious experiences and practices.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Poor-Merciful-Church-Illuminative-Ecclesiology/dp/1626982651">Pope Francis</a> has said the future of the church and the world will be determined by how those who <a href="https://theconversation.com/pope-francis-visit-to-africa-comes-at-a-defining-moment-for-the-catholic-church-197633">inhabit the peripheries of life are lifted up</a>. African delegates need to speak up for the millions of Africans who are poor and marginalised. </p>
<p>The Catholic church in Africa must become a champion for human rights, good governance and women’s empowerment. It needs to model the image of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-worldwide-consultations-for-the-global-synod-reflect-pope-francis-efforts-toward-building-a-more-inclusive-catholic-church-213129">inclusive church</a> in its structures and priorities. It needs to nurture a new generation of Africans who understand the diverse challenges facing the continent and seek African solutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214989/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stan Chu Ilo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Divisions and tensions in the global church are affecting the church in Africa.Stan Chu Ilo, Research Professor, World Christianity and African Studies, DePaul UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2142782023-10-09T13:32:55Z2023-10-09T13:32:55ZEthiopia: religious tension is getting worse – 5 factors driving groups apart<p>Religion is highly present in Ethiopia. It’s visible in churches and mosques, in clothing, and in public rituals. </p>
<p>The country’s main religious communities are Orthodox Christians, Muslims and Protestants. It’s home to one of the world’s oldest churches and has the third-largest Muslim population in sub-Saharan Africa. Orthodox Christians account for <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">about 43% of the population, while approximately 33% are Muslims</a>. Protestant Christianity arrived in the late 19th century and has expanded rapidly in recent decades to account for an estimated 20% of the population. </p>
<p>Ethiopia is <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">often portrayed</a> as a unique case of harmonious inter-religious relations where Christians and Muslims have lived peacefully together for centuries. But the country has also seen religious conflicts. </p>
<p>In the last three decades, there has been a worsening of religious tension. In <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/27/ambush-kills-20-muslim-worshippers-in-ethiopias-amhara-region#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20incident%20happened%20yesterday%20when,three%20people%20and%20wounding%20five.">2022</a>, for instance, more than 20 people were killed following attacks on Muslims in the north-western city of Gondar.</p>
<p>Ethiopia is constitutionally a secular state. Religion has no formal place in politics. Shared spaces and government buildings are to be free from any religious expressions. However, this has been unevenly practised. Religion is present everywhere. </p>
<p>I am a scholar of religion, with extensive <a href="https://religion.ufl.edu/directory/terje-ostebo/">fieldwork and research experience</a> in religion, ethnicity and politics in Ethiopia. In a recent <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">paper</a>, I analysed the developments over the last decades that have affected inter-religious relations, worsened polarisation and produced conflicts.</p>
<p>In my view, five factors have contributed to the rise in religious tensions.</p>
<p>First, the political transition in 1991, which allowed for greater expression of religious activities and changed the religious landscape. Second, the expansion of Christian Protestantism from the early 1990s. Third, the rise of a more visible and assertive Muslim population. Fourth, the response from the Ethiopian Orthodox church to a loss of influence. Finally, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abiy-Ahmed">Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed</a> allowing religion to enter the public political discourse.</p>
<h2>Growing conflict</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/08/15/ethiopia-risks-sliding-into-another-civil-war">Civil war</a> and <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/08/25/two-ethnic-revolts-rack-ethiopia-at-the-same-time">ethnic conflicts</a> have dominated news coming out of Ethiopia in recent years. Religious and ethnic identities are closely connected, but the ethnic dimension of conflict has tended to overshadow the growing tensions between religious communities.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Ostebo-et-al-2021-Religion-ethnicity-and-charges-of-Extremism-in-Ethiopia-final.pdf#page=14">2018</a>, young rioters burned churches and killed several priests in Jijiga, in the eastern Ethiopian state of Somali. In <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ethiopia/">2020</a>, Muslim properties were attacked in Harar, eastern Ethiopia, during celebrations of an Orthodox Christian holiday. In <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/27/ambush-kills-20-muslim-worshippers-in-ethiopias-amhara-region#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20incident%20happened%20yesterday%20when,three%20people%20and%20wounding%20five.">2022</a>, attacks on Muslims in Gondar turned deadly. Such incidents have eroded trust between Ethiopia’s religious communities. </p>
<p>Inter-religious violence is often blamed on so-called extremist elements. However, a closer look reveals a more complex picture. </p>
<h2>The drivers</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91#ref1033852">political transition in 1991</a> and the arrival of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front led to important changes to the political, social and cultural landscape. Seeking to promote equal rights for the country’s ethnic and religious groups, the new government lifted formal restrictions on religious activities. </p>
<p>This affected the balance of power between religious groups. Historically, Ethiopia’s inter-religious co-existence was made possible by one community dominating the others. </p>
<p>Since its establishment in the fourth century, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church had been intimately tied to the state. The domination of the church contributed to the marginalisation of other religious communities. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91">1974 Ethiopian Revolution</a> ended the state-church marriage, and the changes after 1991 further eroded the church’s position and brought other religious communities in from the shadows. </p>
<p>The second driver of tensions has been the rise of Protestantism. Initially brought by western missionaries in the late 19th century, the religion was mainly found in Ethiopia’s non-Orthodox southern region. Protestantism grew rapidly after 1991, with churches and ministries expanding into traditional Orthodox and Muslim areas. On occasion, this has led to violent conflict. In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">2006 and 2010</a>, for instance, clashes erupted in the southwestern area of Jimma.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/religion-was-once-ethiopias-saviour-what-it-can-do-to-pull-the-nation-from-the-brink-171763">Religion was once Ethiopia's saviour. What it can do to pull the nation from the brink</a>
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<p>The 1991 changes also led to Islam becoming more visible in the country. Various Islamic reform movements began strengthening religious identity among Muslims and countering their historically marginalised position. This produced a more assertive community. Muslims have become more active in Ethiopia’s social and political life. Numerous mosques have been built across the country. And Muslims have become increasingly visible through a changing dress code, particularly the use of veiling among women, and through public celebrations of religious holidays. </p>
<p>Many Christians, both Orthodox and Protestant, interpret a more visible and assertive Muslim community as proof of Islamic “extremism”. It’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41240192">commonly claimed</a> that mosques and religious schools are funded by Saudi Arabia. And that the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i4FMpXkKFzQ&t=29s">ultimate aim</a> of Ethiopia’s Muslims is political power. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_6lVEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&ots=FAYRrOHs-A&sig=2baPJasl1_wE5VUWCtnWka-M_Vg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">Research</a> has shown that Saudi religious activism has actually dwindled over the last years. But the narrative about such ties continues to fuel suspicions and affect Christian-Muslim relations. </p>
<p>All these developments have been challenging for the Orthodox church. Many of its members are <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">changing their affiliation to Protestantism</a>. The Orthodox church has made efforts to limit this. It has, for instance, prohibited the construction of Protestant churches and mosques in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/arts/design/churches-of-aksum-and-lalibela.html">Lalibela and Axum</a> in Ethiopia’s north. The church has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48634427">declared</a> these cities as sacred Orthodox spaces. </p>
<p>The Orthodox church has also sought to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">reclaim its lost space</a> by, for example, celebrating religious holidays through highly visible ceremonies. During its Meskel holiday in September this year, the Addis Ababa government <a href="https://apanews.net/this-years-ethiopian-meskel-festival-sees-low-turnout-tight-security/#:%7E:text=The%20laity%20is%20restricted%20from,Shirts%20was%20not%20allowed%20too">placed restrictions</a> on the celebration.</p>
<p>The church’s responses have provoked reactions among other religious communities, particularly Muslims who view its actions as an attempt to curb the space they have carved out for themselves. </p>
<p>Finally, Abiy’s political language is laced with semi-religious references. The prime minister is a practising Pentecostal. His acknowledgement of religion has enabled actors to lift religion into the public sphere in ways that have <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429426957-45/strains-pente-politics-j%C3%B6rg-haustein-dereje-feyissa">sharpened boundaries and added to the tensions</a>. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Religious identities and belonging are important in today’s Ethiopia. Changes over the last decades have, however, deepened inter-religious tensions. There is potential to alleviate these tensions. Doing this will require political and religious leaders to communicate across religious boundaries to accommodate Ethiopia’s plurality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214278/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Terje Ostebo have receive funding from USAID.</span></em></p>News coverage of Ethiopia’s ethnic conflicts has overshadowed the growing tensions and polarisation between religious communities.Terje Ostebo, Chair of the Department of Religion and Professor at the Department of Religion and the Center for African Studies, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1822692023-10-04T12:34:15Z2023-10-04T12:34:15ZThe Green Revolution is a warning, not a blueprint for feeding a hungry planet<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551417/original/file-20231002-15-em8fkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C0%2C5310%2C3540&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A farmer spreads fertilizer in a wheat field outside Amritsar, India.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/farmer-spreads-fertiliser-in-a-wheat-field-amid-foggy-news-photo/1231155968">Narinder Nanu/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Feeding a growing world population has been a serious concern for decades, but today there are new causes for alarm. Floods, heat waves and other weather extremes are making agriculture increasingly precarious, especially in the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/what-is-global-south-19fa68cf8c60061e88d69f6f2270d98b">Global South</a>. </p>
<p>The war in Ukraine is also a factor. Russia is <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russia-pulled-out-of-its-grain-deal-with-ukraine-and-what-that-means-for-the-global-food-system-210046">blockading Ukrainian grain exports</a>, and <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-war-after-year-impacts-fertilizer-production-prices-and-trade-flows">fertilizer prices have surged</a> because of trade sanctions on Russia, the world’s leading fertilizer exporter.</p>
<p>Amid these challenges, some organizations are renewing calls for a <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/foodfeatures/green-revolution/">second Green Revolution</a>, echoing the introduction in the 1960s and 1970s of supposedly high-yielding varieties of wheat and rice into developing countries, along with synthetic fertilizers and pesticides. Those efforts centered on India and other Asian countries; today, advocates focus on <a href="https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/initiative/alliance-for-a-green-revolution-in-africa/">sub-Saharan Africa</a>, where the original Green Revolution regime never took hold.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/MbBzzMh2CTk?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">In this Oct. 25, 2000, episode of the television drama ‘The West Wing,’ president Josiah Bartlet invokes the standard account of Green Revolution seeds saving millions from starvation.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But anyone concerned with food production should be careful what they wish for. In recent years, a <a href="https://www.sbc.edu/live/files/2598-stone2019greenrevpdf">wave of new analysis</a> has spurred a critical rethinking of what Green Revolution-style farming really means for food supplies and self-sufficiency.</p>
<p>As I explain in my book, “<a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Agricultural-Dilemma-How-Not-to-Feed-the-World/Stone/p/book/9781032260457">The Agricultural Dilemma: How Not to Feed the World</a>,” the Green Revolution does hold lessons for food production today – but not the ones that are commonly heard. Events in India show why.</p>
<h2>A triumphal narrative</h2>
<p>There was a consensus in the 1960s among development officials and the public that an overpopulated Earth was heading toward catastrophe. Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 bestseller, “<a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/book-incited-worldwide-fear-overpopulation-180967499/">The Population Bomb</a>,” famously predicted that nothing could stop “hundreds of millions” from starving in the 1970s. </p>
<p>India was the global poster child for this looming Malthusian disaster: Its population was booming, drought was ravaging its countryside and its imports of American wheat were climbing to levels that <a href="https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBSH">alarmed government officials in India and the U.S</a>. </p>
<p>Then, in 1967, India began distributing new wheat varieties bred by Rockefeller Foundation plant biologist <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Norman-Borlaug">Norman Borlaug</a>, along with high doses of chemical fertilizer. After famine failed to materialize, observers credited the new farming strategy with <a href="https://thewire.in/agriculture/food-security-green-revolution">enabling India to feed itself</a>.</p>
<p>Borlaug received the <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1970/borlaug/biographical/">1970 Nobel Peace Prize</a> and is still widely credited with “<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/globalcitizen/2023/07/23/oppenheimer-and-the-man-who-saved-1-billion-lives-tale-of-two-geniuses/?sh=397873936b26">saving a billion lives</a>.” Indian agricultural scientist M.S. Swaminathan, who worked with Borlaug to promote the Green Revolution, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/obituaries/2023/09/28/ms-swaminathan-india-famine-dead/">received the inaugural World Food Prize in 1987</a>. Tributes to Swaminathan, who died on Sept. 28, 2023, at age 98, have reiterated the claim that his efforts brought India “<a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/he-was-the-face-of-the-green-revolution-101695908903502.html">self-sufficiency in food production</a>” and independence from Western powers. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551481/original/file-20231002-15-vu3ucg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a suit at a podium, speaking and gesturing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551481/original/file-20231002-15-vu3ucg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551481/original/file-20231002-15-vu3ucg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551481/original/file-20231002-15-vu3ucg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551481/original/file-20231002-15-vu3ucg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551481/original/file-20231002-15-vu3ucg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551481/original/file-20231002-15-vu3ucg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551481/original/file-20231002-15-vu3ucg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Plant scientist M.S. Swaminathan, often called the father of India’s Green Revolution, speaks at a world summit on food security in Rome on Sept. 10, 2009.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-unesco-ecotechnology-director-known-as-the-father-of-news-photo/90539380">Alberto Pizzoli/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Debunking the legend</h2>
<p>The standard legend of India’s Green Revolution centers on two propositions. First, India faced a food crisis, with farms mired in tradition and unable to feed an exploding population; and second, Borlaug’s wheat seeds led to record harvests from 1968 on, replacing import dependence with food self-sufficiency. </p>
<p>Recent research shows that both claims are false. </p>
<p>India was importing wheat in the 1960s <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674725812">because of policy decisions</a>, not overpopulation. After the nation achieved independence in 1947, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru prioritized developing heavy industry. U.S. advisers encouraged this strategy and <a href="https://thewire.in/agriculture/green-revolution-borlaug-food-security">offered to provide India with surplus grain</a>, which India accepted as cheap food for urban workers.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the government urged Indian farmers to grow nonfood export crops to earn foreign currency. They switched millions of acres from rice to jute production, and by the mid-1960s India was <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674725812">exporting agricultural products</a>.</p>
<p>Borlaug’s miracle seeds were <a href="https://upittpress.org/books/9780822947349/">not inherently more productive</a> than many Indian wheat varieties. Rather, they just responded more effectively to high doses of chemical fertilizer. But while India had abundant manure from its cows, it produced almost no chemical fertilizer. It had to start spending heavily to import and subsidize fertilizer. </p>
<p>India did see a wheat boom after 1967, but there is evidence that this expensive new input-intensive approach was not the main cause. Rather, the Indian government established a new policy of paying higher prices for wheat. Unsurprisingly, Indian farmers <a href="https://rajpatel.org/2014/08/29/every-factoid-is-a-mystery-how-to-think-more-clearly-about-the-green-revolution-and-other-agricultural-claims/">planted more wheat</a> and less of other crops.</p>
<p>Once India’s 1965-67 drought ended and the Green Revolution began, wheat production sped up, while production trends in other crops like rice, maize and pulses <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Agricultural-Dilemma-How-Not-to-Feed-the-World/Stone/p/book/9781032260457">slowed down</a>. Net food grain production, which was much more crucial than wheat production alone, actually <a href="https://eands.dacnet.nic.in/Previous_AT_Glance.htm">resumed at the same growth rate as before</a>. </p>
<p>But grain production became more erratic, forcing India to resume importing food by the mid-1970s. India also became dramatically <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Agricultural-Dilemma-How-Not-to-Feed-the-World/Stone/p/book/9781032260457">more dependent on chemical fertilizer</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551478/original/file-20231002-29-mxfc9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing grain production in India from 1952-1982 and intensifying fertilizer use." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551478/original/file-20231002-29-mxfc9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551478/original/file-20231002-29-mxfc9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551478/original/file-20231002-29-mxfc9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551478/original/file-20231002-29-mxfc9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551478/original/file-20231002-29-mxfc9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551478/original/file-20231002-29-mxfc9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551478/original/file-20231002-29-mxfc9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">India’s Green Revolution wheat boom came at the expense of other crops; the growth rate of overall food grain production did not increase at all. It is doubtful that the ‘revolution’ produced any more food than would have been produced anyway. What increased dramatically was dependence on imported fertilizer.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Glenn Davis Stone; data from India Directorate of Economics and Statistics and Fertiliser Association of India</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<p>According to data from Indian <a href="https://eands.dacnet.nic.in/Previous_AT_Glance.htm">economic</a> and <a href="https://www.faidelhi.org/statistics/statistical-database">agricultural</a> organizations, on the eve of the Green Revolution in 1965, Indian farmers needed 17 pounds (8 kilograms) of fertilizer to grow an average ton of food. By 1980, it took 96 pounds (44 kilograms). So, India replaced imports of wheat, which were virtually free food aid, with imports of fossil fuel-based fertilizer, paid for with precious international currency.</p>
<p>Today, India remains the world’s second-highest fertilizer importer, spending <a href="https://www.worldstopexports.com/top-fertilizers-imports-by-country/">US$17.3 billion in 2022</a>. Perversely, Green Revolution boosters call this extreme and expensive dependence “<a href="https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/india-at-75/overcoming-food-emergencies-through-imports-from-us-via-pl480/article65753881.ece">self-sufficiency</a>.” </p>
<h2>The toll of ‘green’ pollution</h2>
<p>Recent research shows that the environmental costs of the Green Revolution are as severe as its economic impacts. One reason is that fertilizer use is astonishingly wasteful. Globally, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/ngeo325">only 17% of what is applied</a> is taken up by plants and ultimately consumed as food. Most of the rest washes into waterways, where it creates <a href="https://theconversation.com/dead-zones-are-a-global-water-pollution-challenge-but-with-sustained-effort-they-can-come-back-to-life-96077">algae blooms and dead zones</a> that smother aquatic life. Producing and using fertilizer also <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-18773-w">generates copious greenhouse gases</a> that contribute to climate change.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Excess nutrients are creating dead zones in water bodies worldwide. Synthetic fertilizer is a major source.</span></figcaption>
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<p>In Punjab, India’s top Green Revolution state, heavy use of fertilizers and pesticides has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jul/01/the-indian-state-where-farmers-sow-the-seeds-of-death">contaminated water, soil and food</a> and <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/as.2019.1010101">endangered human health</a>. </p>
<p>In my view, African countries where the Green Revolution has not made inroads should consider themselves lucky. Ethiopia offers a cautionary case. In recent years, the Ethiopian government has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-16/wheat-farming-drive-in-ethiopia-gathers-pace-as-shortages-bite#xj4y7vzkg">forced farmers to plant</a> increasing amounts of fertilizer-intensive wheat, claiming this will achieve “<a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202306230565.html">self-sufficiency</a>” and even allow it to <a href="https://borkena.com/2023/02/27/wheat-selling-as-smuggled-commodity/">export wheat worth $105 million</a> this year. Some African officials hail this strategy as an <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202306230565.html">example for the continent</a>.</p>
<p>But Ethiopia has no fertilizer factories, so it has to import it – at a cost of <a href="https://newbusinessethiopia.com/agribusiness/ethiopia-spent-one-billion-usd-for-fertilizers-import/">$1 billion just in the past year</a>. Even so, many farmers face <a href="https://addisstandard.com/analysis-fertilizer-shortage-amidst-widespread-illicit-trade-cripples-farmers-threatens-productivity/">severe fertilizer shortages</a>.</p>
<p>The Green Revolution still has many boosters today, especially among biotech companies that are eager to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150903498754">draw parallels</a> between genetically engineered crops and Borlaug’s seeds. I agree that it offers important lessons about how to move forward with food production, but actual data tells a distinctly different story from the standard narrative. In my view, there are many ways to pursue <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2015.03.004">less input-intensive agriculture</a> that will be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2018.05.002">more sustainable</a> in a world with an increasingly erratic climate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182269/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Glenn Davis Stone receives funding from the National Science Foundation and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.</span></em></p>Did the Green Revolution, which brought high-tech agriculture to developing nations in the 1960s, prevent famine? Recent research takes a much more skeptical view.Glenn Davis Stone, Research Professor of Environmental Science, Sweet Briar CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126802023-09-29T17:00:37Z2023-09-29T17:00:37ZLost in the coffee aisle? Navigating the complex buzzwords behind an ‘ethical’ bag of beans is easier said than done<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551067/original/file-20230928-21-efm249.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C0%2C2121%2C1397&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The text on a single bag of coffee can feel like information overload.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/young-asian-woman-pushing-a-shopping-cart-grocery-royalty-free-image/1469902811?phrase=coffee+aisle&adppopup=true">d3sign/Moment via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>You’re shopping for a bag of coffee beans at the grocery store. After reading about <a href="https://theconversation.com/coffee-60-of-wild-species-are-at-risk-of-extinction-due-to-climate-change-109982">the effects of climate change</a> and how little farmers make – <a href="https://perfectdailygrind.com/2022/09/how-much-of-the-price-of-a-cup-of-coffee-do-farmers-receive/">typically $0.40 per cup</a> – you figure it might be time to change your usual beans and buy something more ethical. Perusing the shelves in the coffee aisle, though, you see too many choices.</p>
<p>First up is the red tub of Folgers “100% Colombian,” a kitchen staple – “lively with a roasted and rich finish.” On the side of the tub, you see <a href="https://luzmedia.co/colombian-coffee">the icon of Juan Valdez</a> with his donkey, Conchita – a fictional mascot representing the Colombian Coffee Growers Federation.</p>
<p>Next might be Starbucks “<a href="https://www.kroger.com/p/starbucks-colombia-medium-roast-ground-coffee/0076211120611">Single-Origin Colombia</a>.” One side of the green bag tells “the story” of the beans, describing “treacherous dirt roads” to “6,500 feet of elevation” that are “worth the journey every time.” The other shows a QR code and promises Starbucks is “Committed to 100% Ethical Coffee Sourcing in partnership with Conservation International.” </p>
<p>Then again, you’ve heard that a “better” choice would be to buy from local cafes. The bag from your local roaster introduces you to La Familia Vieira of Huila, Colombia, who have worked as coffee farmers for four generations at 1,600 meters above sea level – about a mile. But then there’s a flood of unfamiliar lingo: the 88-point anerobic-processed coffee was sourced directly from an importer who has a six-year relationship with the family, paid $3.70 per pound at farmgate, and $6.10 per pound FOB at a time when the C-market price was $1.60 per pound.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551072/original/file-20230928-21-o96poq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a straw hat and pink shirt pours brightly colored berries through an open-air processor." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551072/original/file-20230928-21-o96poq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551072/original/file-20230928-21-o96poq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551072/original/file-20230928-21-o96poq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551072/original/file-20230928-21-o96poq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551072/original/file-20230928-21-o96poq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551072/original/file-20230928-21-o96poq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551072/original/file-20230928-21-o96poq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Coffee farmer Julian Pinilla uses a coffee grinder during an interview with AFP in Valle del Cauca, Colombia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/coffee-farmer-julian-pinilla-uses-a-coffee-grinder-during-news-photo/1504615725?adppopup=true">Juan Restrepo/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>If you’re about ready to toss in the towel, you’re hardly alone. Consumers are often asked to make more responsible choices. Yet when it comes to commodity goods like coffee, the complex production chain can turn an uncomplicated habit into a complicated decision.</p>
<p>As a coffee enthusiast and <a href="https://www.uml.edu/msb/faculty/ross-spencer.aspx">marketing professor who researches marketplace justice</a>, I’ve long been fascinated with how ethics and coffee consumption are intertwined. Before COVID-19, my family <a href="https://www.instagram.com/yukro.cat/">adopted a cat and named him Yukro</a>, after a coffee-producing community in Ethiopia. While we were quarantining at home, I ordered Yukro-originating coffee from as many roasters as I could find to try to understand how consumers were supposed to make an informed choice.</p>
<p>Paradoxically, the more information I gleaned, the less I knew how to make a responsible decision. Indeed, prior research has indicated that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.03.011">information overload increases the paradox of choice</a>; this is no different when factoring in ethical information. Additionally, as with a lot of consumer-facing information, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/07439156231202746">it can be difficult to tell what information is relevant or credible</a>. </p>
<p>Marketers attempt to simplify this overload by using buzzwords that sound good but may not get across much nuance. However, you might consider some of these terms when trying to decide between “100% Colombian” and the Vieira family. </p>
<h2>Fair trade</h2>
<p>As a benchmark, the coffee industry typically uses the “C-price”: <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/future/kc00">the traded price</a> on the New York Intercontinental Exchange for a pound of coffee ready for export. “Fair trade” implies the coffee is fairly traded, often with the goal of paying farmers minimum prices – and fixed premiums – above the C-price. </p>
<p>There are a few different fair trade certifications, such as <a href="https://www.fairtradeamerica.org/">Fairtrade America</a> or <a href="https://www.fairtradecertified.org/">Fair Trade Certified</a>. Each of these has its own, voluntary certification standards linked with the associated organization. Yet <a href="https://cdn.coffeestrategies.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/Sustainable-Coffee-Certifications-Comparison-Matrix-2010.pdf">obtaining certification</a> can come at significant additional cost for farms or importers.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551070/original/file-20230928-25-et44vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women spread out coffee beans on a drying rack in an open field with hills in the distance." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551070/original/file-20230928-25-et44vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551070/original/file-20230928-25-et44vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551070/original/file-20230928-25-et44vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551070/original/file-20230928-25-et44vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551070/original/file-20230928-25-et44vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551070/original/file-20230928-25-et44vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551070/original/file-20230928-25-et44vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Farmers work on the coffee seed harvest in the Nandi province of Tindiret, Kenya.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-farmers-are-on-the-process-of-coffee-seed-harvest-at-news-photo/1650320045?adppopup=true">Gerald Anderson/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>In contrast, some importers, or even roasters, have established relationships with specific farms, rather than buying beans at auction on the open market. These relationships potentially allow the importers to work directly with farmers over multi-year periods to improve the coffee quality and conditions. Longer-term commitment can provide farmers more certainty in times when the C-price is below their cost of production. </p>
<p>Yet these arrangements can be just as volatile for farmers if the importers they’ve committed to cannot find roasters interested in buying their beans – beans they could have sold at auction themselves.</p>
<h2>100% arabica</h2>
<p>There are several species of coffee, but <a href="https://www.climate.gov/news-features/climate-and/climate-coffee">approximately 70% of the world’s production</a> comes from the arabica species, which grows well at higher altitudes. Like with wine, there are several varieties of arabica, and they tend to be a bit sweeter than other species – making arabica the ideal species for satisfying consumers.</p>
<p>In other words, a label like “100% arabica” is meant to signal deliciousness and prestige – though it’s about as descriptive as calling a bottle of pinot noir “100% red.”</p>
<p>When it comes to the environment, though, arabica isn’t necessarily a win. Many arabica varieties are susceptible to climate change-related conditions such as coffee rust – <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/09/coffee-rust/616358/">a common fungus</a> that spreads easily and can devastate farms – or drought. </p>
<p>Other coffee species such as robusta or <a href="https://intelligence.coffee/2023/03/whatever-happened-eugenioides-coffee/">the less common eugenioides</a> are more climate-change resistant, reducing costs of production for farmers, and are <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/675807/average-prices-arabica-and-robusta-coffee-worldwide/">cheaper on commodity markets</a>. However, they have a bit of a <a href="https://sprudge.com/what-is-eugenioides-coffee-181142.html">different taste profile</a> than what folks are normally used to, which could mean lower earnings for farmers who make the switch, but could also provide new opportunities in areas where coffee was not previously farmed or to new markets of consumers’ tastes.</p>
<h2>Single-origin</h2>
<p>If someone labeled a peach as “American,” a consumer would rightly wonder where exactly it came from. Similarly, “single-origin” is a very broad description that could mean the coffee came from “Africa” or “Ethiopia” or “Jimma Zone” – even the zone’s specific town of “Agaro.” “Single-estate” at least gives slightly more farm-level information, though even this information may be tough to come by. </p>
<p>Consumers have tended to want their coffee’s journey from seed to cup to be <a href="https://perfectdailygrind.com/2023/04/do-specialty-coffee-consumers-want-to-connect-with-farmers/">traceable and transparent</a>, which implies that everyone along the production chain is committed to equity – and “single-origin” appears to provide those qualities.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551069/original/file-20230928-17-hi274j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a blue shirt crouches to examine small green fruits along a stem." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551069/original/file-20230928-17-hi274j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551069/original/file-20230928-17-hi274j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551069/original/file-20230928-17-hi274j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551069/original/file-20230928-17-hi274j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551069/original/file-20230928-17-hi274j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551069/original/file-20230928-17-hi274j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551069/original/file-20230928-17-hi274j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Egyptian farmer Ahmad al-Hijawi’s Yemeni coffee beans are cultivated in the shade of mango trees.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-egyptian-farmer-ahmad-al-hijawis-yemeni-coffee-news-photo/1673786616?adppopup=true">Mohamed Elshahed/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>As a result, some coffee marketers invest quite a bit in being able to craft a narrative that emotionally resonates with consumers and makes them feel “connected” to the farm. Others have developed <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joitmc.2023.100008">blockchain solutions</a> where each step along the coffee’s journey, from bean to retail, is documented in a database that consumers can look at. Since blockchain data are immutable, the information a consumer gets from scanning a QR code on a label of a coffee bag should provide a clear chain of provenance.</p>
<h2>Shade-grown</h2>
<p>Shade-grown labels indicate that farms have adopted a more environmentally sustainable method, using biomatter like dead leaves as natural fertilizer for the coffee shrubs <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2022.877476">growing beneath a canopy of trees</a>. Unlike other methods, shade-grown coffee doesn’t increase deforestation, and it protects habitats for animals like migratory birds – which is why the Smithsonian’s National Zoo and Conservation Biology Institute, which has developed its own coffee certification program, <a href="https://nationalzoo.si.edu/migratory-birds/bird-friendly">calls it “bird-friendly</a>.”</p>
<p>But as with fair trade, there are costs associated with certification, and those costs are often passed on to consumers. Farmers or importers are left justifying the cost and wondering if the specialized label can attract a large enough market to validate their decision to certify. That said, many farmers who have the ability will do shade-grown regardless, since it’s a better farming practice and <a href="https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2019/03/12/shade-grown-coffee-sustainable/">saves some costs</a> on fertilizer.</p>
<p>In the end, all this information – or lack thereof – is a tool for consumers to use when making their coffee choices. Like any tool, sometimes it’s helpful, and sometimes not. These labels might not make your decision any easier, and might drive you right back to your “usual” bag of beans – but at least your choice can be more nuanced.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212680/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Spencer M. Ross is a former member of the Specialty Coffee Association (SCA) and has presented seminars twice at SCA events.</span></em></p>If you’ve decided to look for coffee that’s better for the earth or the people making it, you might need some help translating all the industry lingo.Spencer M. Ross, Associate Professor of Marketing, UMass LowellLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2129792023-09-26T13:44:03Z2023-09-26T13:44:03ZEnvironmental disasters and climate change force people to cross borders, but they’re not recognised as refugees – they should be<p>As our planet warms, we’re experiencing <a href="https://www.c2es.org/content/extreme-weather-and-climate-change/">more frequent</a> and severe weather events, rising sea levels, prolonged droughts and altered ecosystems. These environmental shifts directly affect people’s livelihoods by destroying crops and depleting water sources. They make once-inhabitable areas uninhabitable. </p>
<p>In response to these challenges, many individuals and communities have no choice but to abandon their homes and seek safety elsewhere. The vast majority will remain within their country borders – it’s predicted that by 2050 up to <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/10/27/climate-change-could-further-impact-africa-s-recovery-pushing-86-million-africans-to-migrate-within-their-own-countries">86 million Africans</a> will migrate within their own countries due to weather shocks. But some will cross borders, triggering the need for international protection. </p>
<p>The challenge, however, is that people crossing borders due to weather don’t qualify as refugees under key laws and conventions. This displacement could be due to sudden-onset events, such as volcanic eruptions or flooding, which may pose an immediate threat to life. Or it could be due to slow-onset events, such as desertification or rising sea levels, which may eventually make life untenable. </p>
<p>It’s hard to say exactly how many people this affects because it’s a <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/06/lets-talk-about-climate-migrants-not-climate-refugees/">complex topic</a>. However, we do know that cross-border migration affects <a href="https://www.savethechildren.net/news/drought-and-conflict-drive-highest-number-somalis-kenya-refugee-camps-decade">tens of thousands of people</a> every year. For instance <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/horn-africa-drought-enters-sixth-failed-rainy-season-unhcr-calls-urgent-assistance">drought conditions</a> in 2022, exacerbated by political insecurity and instability, forced at least 180,000 refugees from Somalia and South Sudan into parts of Kenya and Ethiopia.</p>
<p>It’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367965451_African_Shifts_The_Africa_Climate_Mobility_Report_Addressing_Climate-Forced_Migration_Displacement#page=85">predicted</a> that the number of people displaced due to weather shifts or disasters will reach as many as 1.2 million people by 2050. This figure will depend on how changes in the climate unfold. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-will-force-up-to-113m-people-to-relocate-within-africa-by-2050-new-report-193633">Climate change will force up to 113m people to relocate within Africa by 2050 - new report</a>
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<p>Without refugee status, those forced to move across borders due to weather events may not receive valuable support. Depending on the individual country, support can include the right to live and work, access to health or education services and the right to move freely. </p>
<p>I study the legal protection of asylum seekers, refugees, migrants and internally displaced people in Africa. I recommend that international laws and conventions be amended to explicitly include people forced by weather shocks to move across borders. They need full refugee protection. </p>
<h2>Lack of protection</h2>
<p>A variety of laws ensure refugees’ basic human rights are protected. The core of “refugee law” is constituted by the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/who-we-are/1951-refugee-convention">1951 Geneva Refugee Convention</a> – a United Nations multilateral treaty that defines who a refugee is – and its 1967 <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-relating-status-refugees">New York Protocol</a>. Refugees in Africa are also protected by the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/media/oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted-assembly-heads">1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention</a>. </p>
<p>These laws provide them with a safe haven, access to fair asylum procedures and protection from discrimination. The domestic laws of many African countries incorporate these international principles. This offers legal safeguards and support to refugees, helping them seek safety and rebuild their lives.</p>
<p>As I mention in a <a href="https://www.academia.edu/79451051/Climate_induced_displacement_in_the_Sahel_A_question_of_classification">recent study</a>, the challenge with the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/afr/publications/legal/5ddfcdc47/handbook-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html">Refugee Convention</a> is that it rules out people who are “victims of famine or natural disaster” unless they also have a “well‑founded fear of persecution”. For instance, people fleeing Ethiopia between 1983 and 1985 due to drought would be considered refugees because they also feared persecution by the Mengistu Haile Mariam-led military dictatorship (Derg) which was <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/Ethiopia919.pdf">deliberately restricting food supplies</a> in parts of the country. </p>
<p>The United Nations agency mandated to aid and protect refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR), follows the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/afr/publications/legal/5ddfcdc47/handbook-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html">definition</a> provided by the Refugee Convention. As does the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/who-we-are/global-compact-refugees">Global Compact on Refugees</a>, a UN-driven blueprint for governments, international organisations and other stakeholders.</p>
<p>This means that people forcibly displaced only by environmental disasters are not entitled to refugee status, although deserving of temporary protection. </p>
<p>Within Africa, there’s a debate about whether the 1969 <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa">Organisation for the African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention</a> originally included people displaced by natural disasters in its definition of “refugees”. Some practitioners believe it does, though this <a href="https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/reviews-pdf/2022-05/climate-induced-displacement-in-the-sahel-classification-918.pdf">stance</a> appears limited to human-made disasters.</p>
<p>When it comes to domestic laws, as of now, there’s no African country that recognises people fleeing natural disasters as a “refugee”. </p>
<p>There is, however, some movement. People fleeing environmental disasters are increasingly being recognised by international organisations. </p>
<p>For instance, <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-commits-climate-action-africa-protect-displaced-populations-and-foster">UNHCR</a> recognises them as a vulnerable category of persons to be protected. It has <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-commits-climate-action-africa-protect-displaced-populations-and-foster">raised awareness</a> of climate change as a driver of displacement and the need to address protection for people displaced in the context of disasters. UNHCR is also <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/5975e6cf7.pdf">working on</a> addressing legal gaps related to cross-border disaster-displacement. </p>
<p>But there’s still more to be done.</p>
<h2>What needs to change</h2>
<p>People displaced by adverse weather developments should be given more than temporary protection. This will require changes to international regulations and national laws. </p>
<p>For instance, a protocol regarding climate-induced displacement should be added to the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/media/oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted-assembly-heads">1969 OAU convention</a> so that displaced people who cross international borders are legally covered.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cristiano d'Orsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Without refugee status people aren’t able to receive valuable support, like the right to live and work in a country.Cristiano d'Orsi, Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at the South African Research Chair in International Law (SARCIL), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.