tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/ethnic-clashes-32766/articlesethnic clashes – The Conversation2023-09-30T16:49:23Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2146752023-09-30T16:49:23Z2023-09-30T16:49:23ZNigeria at 63: four reasons for persistent disunity six decades on<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551247/original/file-20230930-19-1ryj9x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in Lagos during Nigeria's 60th Independence Day anniversary on 1 October 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Olukayode Jaiyeola/NurPhoto via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At 63 the story of Nigeria can be anything from the “celebration of greatness to an act of barbaric cruelty”. These are the words of Nigerian writer Dipo Faloyin in his book <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=tiAxEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT61&dq=Dipo+Faloyin&ots=S1ByZA6G5G&sig=5_5Crgz50u6yR26bWhl_FUHW7kk">Africa Is Not a Country</a>.</p>
<p>Nigeria attained its independence from Britain on <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Independent-Nigeria">1 October 1960</a>. Nearly half a century earlier, in 1914, the British amalgamated the Northern and Southern British protectorates into the Nigerian Federation. For many — including the Nigerian independence leader <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-618?d=%2F10.1093%2Facrefore%2F9780190277734.001.0001%2Facrefore-9780190277734-e-618&p=emailAQVFfXGwuEQBo">Chief Obafémi Awólòwò</a>, in his book <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Path-to-Nigerian-Freedom">Path to Nigerian Freedom</a> – the country that emerged from this amalgamation was “a mere geographical expression”. </p>
<p>Since independence, Nigeria has made deliberate attempts to knit a cohesive nation from this legacy of division. This has included measures such <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/religion-violence-and-local-powersharing-in-nigeria/theory-of-local-government-powersharing/427360F1BA1C69929BF6B2BBB701770C">as power sharing arrangements</a>, the creation of the <a href="https://www.nysc.gov.ng/">National Youth Service Corps</a>, as well as its vibrant cultural expressions through food, sports, and literature. </p>
<p>But there have also been missed opportunities at unity due to leadership failures on the part of successive Nigerian governments. In the end, as <a href="https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/51936446/ETHNIC_VIOLENCE_IN_NIGERIA_A_HISTORICAL_PERSPECTIVE-libre.pdf?1488080208=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DETHNIC_VIOLENCE_IN_NIGERIA_A_HISTORICAL.pdf&Expires=1695912476&Signature=Z53">research shows</a>, divisions persist. These often overshadow the country’s achievements. </p>
<p>We are political scientists and researchers with <a href="https://scholar.google.co.jp/citations?user=EEyB8sMAAAAJ&hl=en">published</a> <a href="https://staffportal.curtin.edu.au/staff/profile/view/muhammad-suleiman-d9ba8572/">works</a> at the intersection of politics, culture, and society and the international politics of Africa.</p>
<p>We offer four reasons why Nigeria remains divided. We identified these as ethnic and religious division, economic disparities, identity and lack of nation building. </p>
<h2>Divisions</h2>
<p>Most nations have been crafted out of disparate cultures. According to the Irish political scientist and historian, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Benedict-Anderson">Benedict Anderson</a>, all nations are <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095958187">imagined</a>. </p>
<p>However, our observation is that the first reason for persistent disunity in Nigeria is the depth of ethnic and religious division. </p>
<p><strong>Ethnic and religious division:</strong> This must be placed in the context of colonial mapping and plunder of <a href="https://www.amazon.ca/s?k=africa+is+not+a+country&i=stripbooks&adgrpid=1363395910664062&hvadid=85212676849975&hvbmt=be&hvdev=c&hvlocphy=5297&hvnetw=o&hvqmt=e&hvtargid=kwd-85213149086414%3Aloc-32&hydadcr=22458_13386987&tag=msncahydra-20&ref=pd_sl_bbbaxbmcc_e">material and cultural resources</a>.</p>
<p>This came about from cobbling together starkly different cultures, lands and peoples. Before colonialism, what is now called Nigeria was peopled by different <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/History">kingdoms and empires</a>. These ranged from the Hausa states and Kanem-Bornu empire in the north, the Jukun states in the north central region, to Yoruba states in the south west, and Igboland and Delta City-states in the south.</p>
<p>The arbitrary borders drawn by the British during colonisation bundled together these numerous ethnicities and peoples without regard for their historical, cultural or socio-political differences. </p>
<p>Britain ruled Nigeria for close to 80 years. The Crown governed through what was called <a href="https://www.historians.org/teaching-and-learning/teaching-resources-for-historians/teaching-and-learning-in-the-digital-age/through-the-lens-of-history-biafra-nigeria-the-west-and-the-world/the-colonial-and-pre-colonial-eras-in-nigeria/englands-indirect-rule-in-its-african-colonies#:%7E:text=Indirect%20rule%20was%20the%20plan,could%20exercise%20a%20veto%20power">indirect rule</a>. This allowed the colonial administration to govern from a distance. It delegated local administration to traditional authorities and native institutions.</p>
<p>Nigeria is home to over <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/nigeria-has-more-500-languages-300-ethnic-groups-and-critically-important-elections">300 ethnic groups</a> – the Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and Fulani are the major ones. Each group has its own language, culture, and traditions. </p>
<p>Nigeria is also <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b7d40f0b64974000bb0/wp_31.pdf">divided along religious lines</a>. It is predominantly Muslim in the North and Christian in the South. Indigenous religions are spread across the country, with some experiencing no dualism between these spiritualities. Indeed, this non-binary spiritual disposition was what made the Christian and Arab missionaries successful in Africa. </p>
<p><strong>Economic disparities</strong>: The British Crown governed its conquered colonial territories through different systems of authority. Over time, these translated into different levels of economic development.</p>
<p>In the north, the colonial government relied on existing political structures of <a href="https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1438&context=pcs">“centralised governing systems with a reputation for their bureaucratic, administrative, and judicial institutions”</a> – mainly <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41756121">relics</a> of the Sokoto Islamic Caliphate in the region. </p>
<p>In the South, however, the colonial administration revolved around artificially created authorities. These were usually in the form of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/warrant-chiefs-indirect-rule-in-southeastern-nigeria-18911929-by-a-e-afigbo-london-longman-1972-pp-viii-336-400-the-evolution-of-the-nigerian-state-the-southern-">warrant chiefs</a> – a native leader whose legitimacy was based on a warrant issued by the colonial government rather than on the people’s culture and custom.</p>
<p>These different governance systems were allowed significant autonomy under the colonial system of indirect rule. Different levels of economic development began to emerge, which in turn created economic disparities. For instance, northern Nigeria has the highest concentration of less economically empowered states, communities and peoples.</p>
<p><strong>Identity:</strong> As we have <a href="https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol25/iss1/3/">argued elsewhere</a>, Nigeria was conceived by the colonial government as a business enterprise corporation, not as a nation. As one scholar <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0974928415602602">pointed out</a>, British rule also promoted the ideas of ‘the “North for Northerners,” “East for Easterners,” and “West for Westerners” within Nigeria. </p>
<p>Independence promised a new Nigeria that benefited all Nigerians. But the country failed to savour the “independence” moment. Nigerian leaders who took over wasted the opportunities offered by the gains of independence to dismantle the inherited colonial fissures of their societies. </p>
<p>Leaders such as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ahmadu-Bello">Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello</a>, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Obafemi-Awolowo">Chief Obafémi Awólòwò</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nnamdi-Azikiwe">Sir Nnamdi Azikiwe</a> rose to champion the cause of their respective ‘ethno-regions’. They became guilty of Frantz Fanon’s charge of the <a href="https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/fanon/pitfalls-national.htm">pitfall</a> of the nation being passed over for the race, and the tribe being preferred to the state. </p>
<p>This was to translate into a series of coups and conflicts, including the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nigerian-civil-war">civil war of 1967</a> in which about a million people died. </p>
<p>We have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/14725843.2017.1291324?needAccess=true">argued</a> that the failure to savour the independence moment makes Nigeria – not just the colonial administration – complicit in its identity crises. We also acknowledge how ground-level activists and people across the different divides shape the country’s future through everyday expressions of nationhood. Nigerians are intermarrying. They’re doing business together. And they often express a general sense of pride and unity in the country’s food, sports, music and movies. </p>
<p><strong>Lack of nation building:</strong> Some <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17449057.2011.596127">scholars agree</a> that nation building requires state building. Nation unity, therefore, comes on the heels of effective action being taken by the state. But that’s not how Nigerians experience their government. For them, the state doesn’t exist behind rituals of statehood. </p>
<p>In the state’s absence, citizens resort to what they have – their identities – as tools for survival. This further widens ethnic fault lines and creates new ones.</p>
<p>A lack of investment in the infrastructures of the state has also created deplorable conditions for ordinary Nigerians. </p>
<p>The outcome of using identities for political scores and advantage? The
proliferation of conflicts and violent clashes. </p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>At the everyday level, Nigerians should focus on advancing and celebrating their soft cultural resources. These include comedy, sport, food, music, movies, and a general sense of hope and positive interaction. We argue that this ground-level, soft but courageous and clear-minded activism has the potential to restore hope in the nation. It could even achieve more. </p>
<p>For its part, the Nigerian state must open its doors to the people, and address their economic hardships and insecurity. If this doesn’t happen the danger is that Nigerians will abandon democratic ways and turn to violence, as we are witnessing across <a href="https://dialogueinitiatives.org/west-africa-and-the-sahel-coups-militancy-and-the-facade-of-democracy/">West Africa and the Sahel</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214675/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Colonialism set Nigeria up for failure as a united country. But successive governments since independence have a lot to answer for too.Muhammad Dan Suleiman, Research associate, Curtin UniversityBenjamin Maiangwa, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Lakehead UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1270002019-11-19T17:04:49Z2019-11-19T17:04:49ZOld religious tensions resurge in Bolivia after ouster of longtime indigenous president<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302485/original/file-20191119-111697-1qxs8f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C12%2C4264%2C2843&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of former Bolivian president Evo Morales rally with indigenous flags outside the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia, Nov. 18, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Bolivia-Protests/b6e54609714043fdb19cf2f3b991f2bb/10/0">AP Photo/Juan Karita</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Days after the powerful Bolivian leader Evo Morales was forced to resign as president after <a href="https://www.as-coa.org/articles/poll-tracker-bolivias-2019-presidential-race">allegations of election fraud</a>, Bolivia’s new interim president made her <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/world/americas/evo-morales-mexico-bolivia.html">first public appearance</a>. </p>
<p>Climbing to the balcony of the Presidential Palace in La Paz, Jeanine Áñez – formerly a senator representing Bolivia’s weak political opposition – grabbed a Bible. </p>
<p>“This Bible is very important to us. Our strength is God,” <a href="https://twitter.com/LaRazon_Bolivia/status/1194405431625560065">said the 52-year-old politician from the lowlands province of Beni</a>, holding the modern, pink-covered book up for the cameras. “Power is God.”</p>
<p>Invoking a Christian god as the source of political power, while commonplace in many countries, is a radical departure in Bolivia after Morales’ 14-year tenure. </p>
<p>Morales, a native Bolivian of Aymara indigenous descent, was the South American country’s first indigenous leader since independence from Spanish colonial rule in 1825. Indigenous people and symbols – like the <a href="https://chiletoday.cl/site/the-wiphala-what-does-this-indigenous-flag-mean/">multicolored Wiphala flag</a> that represents the many Andean indigenous groups, and the Andean cross, or <a href="https://www.prensaindigena.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25254:peru-wayra-katari-y-la-nueva-historia-andina&catid=86&Itemid=435">chakana</a> – filled the halls of power in Bolivia during his three terms.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C6000%2C3844&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bolivia’s new interim President, Jeanine Añez, has ties to conservative Christian groups, Nov. 13, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Bolivia-Protests/e63c10cabadc43eb8c24c1332f135730/14/0">AP Photo/Juan Karita</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Indigenous religiosity</h2>
<p>Bolivia, a mountainous country north of Argentina, is 41% <a href="https://www.iwgia.org/en/bolivia">indigenous</a>, according to the 2012 census. Most of the rest of Bolivia’s 11 million people consider themselves to be mixed race, though analysts say that self-reported census data <a href="http://www.cejis.org/bolivia-censo-2012-algunas-claves-para-entender-la-variable-indigena/">tends to undercount the indigenous population</a>. </p>
<p>Religion does not map neatly onto ethnic divisions in Bolivia. Only around 4% of Bolivians claim to practice indigenous religions. The majority – about 75% – are Catholic, and 18% belong to <a href="http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/stand-in-president-brings-back-bible-to-bolivian-politics/article/561763">evangelical or other Protestant denominations</a>.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://asu.academia.edu/MatthewPeterCasey">as my ongoing research shows</a>, religion, ethnicity and culture are tightly woven together in the Andes region. In Bolivia, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/day-of-the-dead-from-aztec-goddess-worship-to-modern-mexican-celebration-124962">elsewhere in Latin America</a>, indigenous people may belong to Christian churches and also observe native religious practices. </p>
<p>Since independence, Bolivian political leaders have promoted the country’s Hispanic and Catholic heritage, not in addition to its indigenous history but to the exclusion of it. In the 20th century, indigenous people who <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-18727510">revolted against their economic and social marginalization</a> were brutally repressed.</p>
<p>Throughout the Cold War, <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/book/14026">Bolivian Fascist party</a> members pushed for a Catholic republic modeled on Francisco Franco’s Spain. Generations of Catholic school students were taught <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/fascismo-en-bolivia-tactica-y-estrategia-revolucionarias/oclc/14370576">Christian nationalism from their Spanish Jesuit teachers</a>. </p>
<p>Morales, a former coca farmer, recognized indigeneity as the heart of Bolivian nationhood. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Evo Morales (center) was Bolivia’s first indigenous president.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Peru-Americas-Summit/8a54f2daee0248929e1d7709c9783efe/20/0">AP Photo/Martin Mejia</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>Under Morales’ leadership, Bolivia’s name was changed to the Plurinational State of Bolivia in 2009, and the law now <a href="https://www.opinion.com.bo/articulo/pais/las-36-naciones-de-bolivia/20130806020300444625.html">recognizes 36 indigenous languages and ethnicities</a>. Morales also protected the right of indigenous communities to practice their religion. August became the Month of Pachamama, the Andean mother earth – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/21/world/americas/21witch.html">30 days of ancestral celebrations</a> kicked off by the ritual sacrifice of llamas and other animals on the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KyhEon3LgXE">banks of Lake Titicaca</a>.</p>
<p>Morales also built a new government building designed to acknowledge the country’s indigenous heritage. The 29-story <a href="https://www.dw.com/es/evo-morales-inaugura-monumental-casa-grande-del-pueblo-en-la-paz/a-45030140">Casa Grande del Pueblo</a> – “Big House of the People” – blends hyper modern design with indigenous artistic flourishes. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-45229290">interior decor</a> is inspired by the ceremonial ruins of the pre-Inca civilization of Tiahuanaco, located 40 miles east of La Paz.</p>
<h2>Distancing Bolivia from Catholicism</h2>
<p>Morales, who has taken asylum in Mexico since resigning as president, also worked to separate church from state in Bolivia. Bolivia’s new <a href="https://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-CPE-20090207.html">constitution, written in 2009</a>, formally ended the Catholic Church’s designation as the protected religion of the state.</p>
<p>Morales is <a href="https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/mundo/tras-salida-de-evo-morales-la-biblia-y-el-poder-politico-cristiano-irrumpen-en-bolivia">Catholic</a>. But he is openly critical of the Catholic Church, which supported <a href="https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=acls;iel=2;view=toc;idno=heb03631.0001.001">the Spanish colonization of Latin America</a> in the 16th century and, throughout the 20th century, aided <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/transatlantic-fascism">Fascist party organizing</a>. </p>
<p>In 2015, he famously gave Pope Francis a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/10/americas/pope-crucifix/index.html">hammer and sickle crucifix</a> designed by the Bolivian priest Luis Espinal before his assassination in 1980 – a symbol of Liberation Theology, a <a href="https://www.alainet.org/es/active/66203">progressive Latin American strand of Catholicism</a> that challenged dictatorships and championed the cause of the poor during the 1970s and 1980s.</p>
<p>Morales’ secular agenda was met with criticism from conservative Christian groups. Some viewed the reforms as fomenting “<a href="https://www.actuall.com/laicismo/evo-morales-pretende-meter-la-carcel-obispos-curas-predicar-evangelio/">paganism</a>.” Others said he promoted <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aI0x5b8nOcc">atheistic socialism</a>.</p>
<h2>A Christian nationalist revival</h2>
<p>The interim administration in Bolivia has ties to the <a href="https://www.pagina12.com.ar/231205-satanas-fuera-de-bolivia-el-ritual-de-camacho-y-sus-seguidor">conservative Christian groups</a> that were highly critical of Morales throughout his administration.</p>
<p>As senator, interim President Áñez made <a href="https://www.laprensagrafica.com/internacional/Estos-son-los-agresivos-tuits-contra-originarios-e-indigenas-que-borro-Jeanine-Anez-la-presidenta-de-Bolivia-20191116-0518.html">openly anti-indigenous statements</a>. In a 2013 tweet, now deleted, she referred to native Aymara celebrating their new year with ancestral rituals as “satanic.”</p>
<p>And just <a href="https://factual.afp.com/estos-son-los-agresivos-tuits-contra-originarios-e-indigenas-que-borro-la-presidenta-interina-de">five days before her innaugeration</a>, Áñez mocked a group of indigenous Quechua men on Twitter because they were dressed in ritual vestments with modern shoes and blue jeans, writing, “Original Peoples???”</p>
<p>Her rise to power has reignited some of the anti-indigenous sentiment that was so dominant in Bolivia before Morales’ administration. Since Morales’ ouster, there are reports of Wiphalas flags being torn down and burned. Police officers and military members were <a href="https://magnet.xataka.com/en-diez-minutos/que-hace-ejercito-cortando-banderas-conflicto-etnia-clase-religion-crisis-bolivia">filmed</a> cutting the indigenous flag from their uniforms.</p>
<p>“Bolivia for Christ, Pachamama will never again enter this palace,” said the protest leader Luis Fernando Camacho, an Áñez ally, <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/bloggers/Bolivia-golpe-de-Estado-y-la-irresuelta-guerra-entre-la-Biblia-y-la-Wiphala-20191113-0001.html">kneeling before the Bible on the Bolivian flag</a> at the government palace on Nov. 10. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Security forces block supporters of former President Evo Morales outside Cochabamba, Bolivia, Nov. 18, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Bolivia-Protests/f056effea372414d9e630e6b402a6e77/7/0">AP Photo/Juan Karita</a></span>
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<h2>Indigenous Bolivians fearful</h2>
<p>Indigenous Bolivians are concerned about the direction their country is headed under Áñez, though she may only be in power for a few months until new elections are called.</p>
<p>In the days since Morales left office, masses of Morales supporters have marched in from the countryside to convene in Bolivian cities, where they’re <a href="https://twitter.com/Marco_Teruggi/status/1196514476784263168">calling for the end to the interim government</a>. </p>
<p>Many say they fear repression from the military under the interim government. They worry that the political violence that has gripped Bolivia since its Oct. 20 election will turn into a racialized, religious violence targeting indigenous people. </p>
<p>“All of us who have Indian-looking faces are signaled as part of Morales’ party, especially indigenous women,” the feminist activist Adriana Guzmán <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/news/caracter-racista-golpe-estado-bolivia-comunidad-indigena-20191113-0035.html">said to the news outlet Telesur news after Morales’ removal</a>.</p>
<p>With dozens dead and more than 700 injured in <a href="https://www.pagina12.com.ar/231398-carta-blanca-para-la-represion-y-la-impunidad-en-bolivia">military opperations ordered by Áñez</a> “to re-establish order,” the political situation <a href="https://www.msn.com/es-us/noticias/mundo/la-cidh-denuncia-que-hay-al-menos-23-muertos-y-715-heridos-desde-el-inicio-de-la-crisis-en-bolivia/ar-BBWSGBX">remains volatile</a>. </p>
<p>[ <em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127000/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Casey-Pariseault does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Indigenous people, symbols and religious practices filled the halls of power in Bolivia during Evo Morales’ 14-year tenure. Now a new conservative Christian leader seems to be erasing that legacy.Matthew Casey-Pariseault, Clinical Assistant Professor of History, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1217012019-08-12T13:27:52Z2019-08-12T13:27:52ZWhy Sidama statehood demand threatens to unravel Ethiopia’s federal system<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287513/original/file-20190809-144873-rmi5qp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The thread that holds Ethiopia together could be unravelling.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stephen Morrison/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopia’s ethnic federal arrangement was designed to empower ethnic groups with the right to self administration rights. But it’s facing a major test. The current challenge comes from the Sidama ethnic group from a region commonly known the Southern Ethiopia Regional State. </p>
<p>Ethnic Sidamas have been granted self administrative rights by controlling political powers in the Sidama Zone administration. Zone administrations are the second tier of Ethiopia’s local government structure, just after regional states. But those pushing for statehood contend that the size of the Sidama population, which is about <a href="http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ethiopia-population/">4%</a> of Ethiopia’s total population, should empower it to have its own regional state. </p>
<p>This demand is two decades old. It has gained new momentum over the past year following political changes that swept through the country and led to the rise of Abiy Ahmed as <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-brings-new-hope-but-faces-some-familiar-old-problems-109668">prime minister</a>, a reformist who remains highly popular thanks to his pro-unity stance.</p>
<p>Ethnic federalism, as an institutional design, has its backers and its detractors. Those who defend the system argue that its failures are due to the fact that it hasn’t been implemented in the way in which it was designed. They contend that local governments are stripped of their constitutional powers, thanks to a dominant central government that interferes in regional affairs. </p>
<p>But those who oppose the system argue that it pits one group against the other. They point to the fact that Ethiopia has a very large number of internally displaced people due to numerous ethnic conflicts. Although its framers believed that the federal arrangement could promote unity in diversity, those who oppose it believe that internal displacements have occurred mainly because some groups want to homogenise the regions they administer. They also argue that the rise of ethno-nationalist movements are evidence that the federal arrangement is unravelling. </p>
<p>The Sidama demand for statehood presents one of the greatest challenges Ethiopia’s federal system has faced since its inception in 1995. It has already led to violence after the federal government announced it was delaying a referendum to settle the secession demand. But it poses a much bigger threat: if Abiy gives into the Sidama’s demands, he could signal the unravelling of Ethiopia’s federal system of government. </p>
<p>Here is why. Sidama’s secession from the Southern regional state would end the region’s status as a symbol of Ethiopian unity and would come at the most trying and divisive times in the country’s history. Such a decision will also pave the way for more Southern groups to push with similar <a href="https://borkena.com/2019/05/20/wolayta-demonstration-for-statehood/">quests for statehood</a>. </p>
<p>The Sidama secession debacle is another example of the fact that a constitution that has prioritised the promotion of group rights over individual rights is under strain. In my view the solution remains that of political compromise followed by constitutional reform that guarantees all Ethiopian ethnic groups and citizens equal rights to live, work and prosper across the country. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-why-the-sidama-secession-demand-needs-to-be-negotiated-120734">Ethiopia: why the Sidama secession demand needs to be negotiated</a>
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<h2>Background</h2>
<p>After the fall of the military regime in 1991, the provisional government charter created 14 regions that established Ethiopia’s new federal order. But a year later when the country’s new constitution was ratified, the governing Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front made some major changes. The biggest was that it consolidated five of the transitional era regions from the Southern part of the country into just one regional state. This was named Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region, although commonly referred to as Southern Ethiopia regional state. </p>
<p>The effects of this decision continue to be felt. The one consequence was that it sowed the seeds of disaffection among the Sidama. Another is that the Sidama secession from the Southern region would massively affect the ruling party. This is because the Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement is one of the four members that form part of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. Sidama’s secession would weaken the voting capacity of Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement at the federal level. This could worsen if other groups in the south follow the Sidama example. This, in turn, would weaken the ruling democratic front.</p>
<p>This goes to explain Abiy’s responses. His administration seems to have controlled a situation that had the potential to trigger a nationwide disaster. </p>
<p>Abiy and the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, which was mandated to organise and hold the referendum for Sidama’s statehood demand, tactfully delayed the decision. This appears to reinforce Abiy’s conviction that the country’s federal order and national unity need to be maintained, at least until the constitution is reformed.</p>
<p>Abiy’s actions are not without a recent precedent. A few months after he assumed office, the Somali region, which was led by Abdi Ile, with the help of his trusted <em>Liyu</em> (special in Amharic) Police, had attempted to force the regional parliament to discuss secession. Abiy ordered the Ethiopian army, then led by the late Chief of Staff General Seare Mekonnen to step in. The army foiled the regional President Abdi Mohammed Iley’s plans and subsequently put him in jail. Immediately, a new Somali regional administration was established with Mustafe Oumer, a popular former Somali activist at its helm. Since then, the Somali region has been relatively stable.</p>
<p>The fact that the situation seems calmer does not mean the political tension is over. Such political challenges indicate that Ethiopia’s federal arrangement remains extremely vulnerable. </p>
<p>There’s still a great deal of work to be done. Abiy’s government must make sure some of the most serious issues of disagreement are sorted once and for all. And the issue of constitutional reform needs to be addressed. The only outcome that will ensure Ethiopia steers away from imploding is if self administration rights – whether in the form of statehood demands or merger with other regions – are respected. But with the country’s constitution as a guideline.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yohannes Gedamu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Calls for secession in Ethiopia could destabilise the entire nation.Yohannes Gedamu, Lecturer of Political Science, Georgia Gwinnett CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1166762019-05-14T13:45:45Z2019-05-14T13:45:45ZHow using the military in Nigeria is causing, not solving problems<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274086/original/file-20190513-183109-kdftrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers patrol the Nigerian city of Jos, in the central Plateu State, in a bid to quell religious violence.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/George Esiri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Governments have a responsibility to protect their citizens against external aggression and internal violence. The first is usually the responsibility of the military. The second duty falls on the police.</p>
<p>But in Nigeria, the government <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/104931">often deploys </a> the military to restore order and to keep the peace. This is largely due to the inability of the police to contain violent conflicts, particularly in areas where armed groups are active.</p>
<p>This is the situation in Jos, the capital of Plateau State in the centre of Nigeria, just north of the administrative capital Abuja. The military has been <a href="https://academicjournals.org/article/article1381854533_Ambe-Uva.pdf">used</a> to maintain security since violence broke out between Christians and Muslims in September 2001. </p>
<p>The violence has <a href="http://www.omct.org/pdf/Nigeriareport0802.pdf">evolved</a> into one of the <a href="https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/RHSS/article/view/14330/14638">most enduring conflicts</a> in Nigeria. Initially, angry young people used crude implements such as axes, sticks and machetes. Now various organised ethnic and religious militias wield <a href="https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/Small_Arms_2008.pdf">small arms and light weapons</a>. The conflict has spilled over into most parts of the state, with a pattern of hit-and-run attacks developing. </p>
<p>Several <a href="https://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/mjss/article/view/5210">studies</a> have indicated support the use of the military as a “necessary evil” to ensure the return to peace in the region. </p>
<p>But my <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/104931">study</a> found that using the military to quell internal conflicts and restore order causes several problems. These included undermining the legitimacy of the military mission, as well as failing to quell the violence. In my PhD thesis I concluded that the conduct of soldiers only worsens the security situation for ordinary people. </p>
<p>I identified two factors as responsible for the problems. The first was a lack of military professionalism. Soldiers often intimidate and coerce civilians. They also engage in corruption and extortion, especially at military checkpoints. Some soldiers also subject civilians to psychological and emotional abuse. Yet others engage in blatant and flagrant acts of sexual and gender-based violence.</p>
<p>The second factor I identified was the fact that the command-and-control structure of the military is at odds with the way society operates. </p>
<p>These problems could be addressed with effective civil control of the military. But the study argues that civil control is weak in the country.</p>
<h2>The use of the military</h2>
<p>The response of the Nigerian government to growing levels of insecurity has increasingly been to use the military. Several peace and security conferences and commissions of inquiry have been instituted. But these yielded little or no result due to the lack of political will by the government to implement the <a href="https://socialscienceresearch.org/index.php/GJHSS/article/view/888">recommendations</a>.</p>
<p>The military has been deployed because of the weaknesses and inadequacies of the Nigerian police. Inadequate training, shortage of manpower as well as policing equipment, coupled with <a href="http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84892850004&partnerID=40&md5=0a75634ab0792627523e16739e0cbca4">excesses</a> have added to the erosion of public trust in the police and their <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/30225922">legitimacy</a>. </p>
<p>But the use of the military has introduced a host of new problems. </p>
<p>In my study I set out to understand whether the Nigerian state is exercising adequate civil control of the military to ensure that it doesn’t become a threat to the citizenry and exacerbate insecurity. I conducted 55 one-on-one interviews with civilians in six local government areas in Plateau State. </p>
<p>The study found that civilians see the military as exacerbating insecurity. For example, increased militarisation has led to people’s movements and activities being <a href="http://arabianjbmr.com/pdfs/JPDS_VOL_9_1/9.pdf">severely restricted</a>. And several emergency rules have been declared. These have involved suspending civilian government and replacing it with military administrators. </p>
<p>Another finding was that dereliction of duty is rife among soldiers, with some choosing which distress calls from citizens to respond to or not. </p>
<p>On top of this, there’s tension between military culture and civilian values. The <a href="https://g.co/kgs/rwrH9s">military</a> operates a culture which follows an authoritarian leadership style, and is combat-focused. For their part, civilians are more likely to seek resolution to issues and to use the criminal justice system to adjudicate problems.</p>
<p>This has led to relations between civilians and the military becoming severely strained.</p>
<h2>Lack of civil control</h2>
<p>A bigger problem is the weak civil control over the Nigerian military. This has led to a lack of accountability and compliance with rules of engagement. </p>
<p>Nigerian law subordinates the military to civil control and parliamentary oversight. Ideally, this should ensure that the military acts within its mission and mandate. But, the problem lies with implementation. The culture of civilian supremacy over the military is not as yet <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/104931">well institutionalised</a>. </p>
<p>The result is that citizens counteract abuse by the military in various ways. One way is to simply comply with the demands and orders of the soldiers, even when they are illegitimate. Another entails non-violent resistance or non-compliance. For example, it’s common for civilians to refuse to cooperate and share information with the military.</p>
<p>A third way is to collaborate with compromised soldiers. The fourth is to use various forms of violent resistance. This involves people either aligning with armed groups, or forming their own. This proliferation of armed groups worsens insecurity. </p>
<p>My study also showed a sharp difference of opinions between people of different religions. Christians contended that the military was biased in favour of Muslims. For their part, Muslims didn’t share this view. </p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>The use of the military is not an effective intervention against internal armed conflict. This is especially so in states with weak institutional control over the military as is the case in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The more recent setting up of a peace building <a href="http://www.plateaupeacebuilding.org/">agency</a> is a more plausible alternative towards bringing the violent conflict to an end through effective mediation and peace education. The use of the military needs to be reconsidered and the peace building agency should focus on reuniting people and bridging the gap between the reactive security measures with proactive conflict prevention strategies. This is the only way in which trust and relative peace can be restored in this once peaceful Nigerian state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116676/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sallek Yaks Musa received funding from Lisa Maskell Fellowship of the Gerda Henkel Foundation in Germany as administered by the the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences, Stellenbosch University and the Social Science Research Council’s Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa. He is affiliated with the Jos Stakeholders Center for Peace Collaborative of the Search for Common Ground, Nigeria.</span></em></p>In Nigeria, the government often uses the army to restore order and to keep the peace, largely because the police are unable to contain internal violent conflicts.Sallek Yaks Musa, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1078722019-01-07T11:42:46Z2019-01-07T11:42:46ZWhite right? How demographics is changing US politics<p>When Donald Trump was campaigning to become the U.S. president, much of the discussion about his growing popularity focused on so-called “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/08/angry-white-men-love-donald-trump">angry white males</a>,” who had been struggling through years of declining economic opportunities. Their frustration led some of them to adopt and espouse <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/18/us/ordinary-white-supremacists/index.html">white supremacist ideology</a>.</p>
<p>In many media portrayals, these men, their anger and their sometimes extreme views on how to return to economic and political relevance were treated as a new phenomenon. </p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/css/about/monica-duffy-toft/">scholar of demography and civil war</a>, I can say definitively that none of this is actually new. Declining opportunities for white males and racist ideology have long been features of U.S. politics, from at least the 1930s until now. </p>
<p>So, the real question is, why are we seeing an upsurge of white nativism among white males now – a nativism which combines anger over lost status with a historically bankrupt white supremacist ideology?</p>
<h2>Lagging whites, growing minorities</h2>
<p>According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s data, all racial and ethnic minorities are growing faster than whites. Interestingly, one of the fastest growing groups in this country is “mixed race” (full disclosure: my children are such, being both Mexican- and Irish-American). </p>
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<p>Still, at 198 million, non-Hispanic whites remained the largest group of Americans in 2014; followed by Hispanics at 55.4 million, and blacks or African-Americans at 42 million. Those who identified with two or more races <a href="https://www.census.gov//content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p25-1143.pdf">stood at just under 8 million</a>. </p>
<p>The Census Bureau projects the crossover point at which the non-Hispanic white population will no longer be a majority will occur in 2044. In fact, no one group will comprise a majority. We will become a plural nation of different ethnic and racial groups.</p>
<h2>Demography and democracy</h2>
<p>That powerful shift in the makeup of the U.S. population has created ideal conditions for a political backlash against people of color, including Hispanics, blacks, Asians and especially immigrants of color. </p>
<p>One prominent example: President Trump’s lament that the U.S. was being <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/368576-trump-rips-protections-for-immigrants-from-shithole-countries-in">overwhelmed by immigrants from “s-hole countries,”</a> rather than from places like Norway. </p>
<p>The backlash also extends to the political leaders who support minorities’ right to be accepted and respected as Americans.</p>
<p>These communities of color remain in the minority. But already in some states, white voters as distinct from all whites are in the minority, and nationally, <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/07/01/484325664/babies-of-color-are-now-the-majority-census-says">whites are unlikely to remain in the majority for long</a>. </p>
<p>In California, for example, <a href="https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article25940218.html">non-white populations now make up 62 percent of the population</a>, with Hispanic and white populations at near parity at 38 percent each. </p>
<p>Texas, New Mexico and Arizona are among three southern states where the <a href="https://statisticalatlas.com/state/California/Race-and-Ethnicity">gap between Hispanic minorities and white majorities is closing</a>. Like Florida, these are also states with difficult-to-seal borders and with well-established immigrant communities.</p>
<h2>Politics and population shifts</h2>
<p>For two decades, I have been studying how population shifts across nation-states have led to their collapse. In some cases, those collapses have been violent, such as in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14649284">Lebanon in the 1970s</a> and <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union">the Soviet Union</a> in the 1990s. </p>
<p>Now, demographic dynamics we previously witnessed in “other” or “developing” states are happening in the U.S.</p>
<p>In places where white people have been a demographic majority, white nativism – characterized by the longing for a period when whites were dominant political and economically – arises when some of the majority white population fears for the loss of its stature relative to non-white populations. And in the U.S., <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/07/01/484325664/babies-of-color-are-now-the-majority-census-says">non-whites have higher birth rates and make up the bulk of new immigrants</a>. </p>
<p>As populations shift in democracies, the key question is which group challenges these changes, when – and how? Is it the expanding minority or the declining majority? Is it a combination of fear and desire for change emanating from both the declining majority and rising minority?</p>
<h2>Fighting for lost dominance</h2>
<p>My research reveals that it is the declining majority that tends to act aggressively, often imagining <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620701449025">it must preempt a rising minority</a>. Simply put, declining majorities don’t want to yield their status or hegemony.</p>
<p>This turns demographic shifts into a struggle about power and dominance, with elements of the majority refusing to cede ground to emergent new pluralities and majorities that might displace them. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252531/original/file-20190104-32145-zyx5qe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252531/original/file-20190104-32145-zyx5qe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252531/original/file-20190104-32145-zyx5qe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252531/original/file-20190104-32145-zyx5qe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252531/original/file-20190104-32145-zyx5qe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252531/original/file-20190104-32145-zyx5qe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252531/original/file-20190104-32145-zyx5qe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Trump’s travel ban targeted Muslims.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-01/pdf/2017-02281.pdf">Government Publishing Office</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The result, historically, follows a general pattern: The declining majority resorts to various forms of apartheid, including changes to voting laws, voter suppression and new restrictions on immigrants, and requirements for citizenship. </p>
<p>Examples include Israel’s successive moves to <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/10/10/445343896/in-israel-a-new-battle-over-who-qualifies-as-jewish">tighten the definition of who is a Jew</a>; <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/world/europe/britain-european-union-brexit.html">Britain’s 2016 referendum on membership in the European Union</a> (for working-class Brits, the immigrants of “color” were Pakistanis and Poles); and the new <a href="https://www.politico.com/interactives/2018/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court-decision-countries-map/">U.S. ban on immigrants from seven predominately Muslim countries</a>.</p>
<p>Only rarely do a declining majority’s efforts to maintain dominance escalate to violence or state collapse, as was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/26/world/end-of-the-soviet-union-the-soviet-state-born-of-a-dream-dies.html">the case with the Soviet Union</a>. </p>
<h2>From demographic to political decline</h2>
<p>Mirroring the decline in fortunes of the “angry white male” who supported President Trump is the declining fortunes of the Republican Party. </p>
<p>The current U.S. president leads a minority political party whose <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2018/03/20/1-trends-in-party-affiliation-among-demographic-groups/">membership has been in decline for over two decades</a>. </p>
<p>President Trump <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-popular-vote-final-count/index.html">lost the general election by over 3 million votes</a>. The number of U.S. citizens of voting age <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2018/03/20/1-trends-in-party-affiliation-among-demographic-groups/">who identify as Republicans</a> has dropped steadily since 1994, compared to those who identify as Democrat or Independent.</p>
<p>The GOP has managed its decline in exactly the same way a declining white majority population might have done: It has resorted to extreme gerrymandering, voter suppression, calls for limits on immigration, and now citizenship restrictions. </p>
<p>The president’s angry rhetoric has arguably been responsible for fomenting a rise in overt bigotry, and in rare but an increasing number of cases, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-the-united-states-right-wing-violence-is-on-the-rise/2018/11/25/61f7f24a-deb4-11e8-85df-7a6b4d25cfbb_story.html?utm_term=.b5b3a3abe07e">violence against non-white immigrants, and ethnic, religious, disabled and LGBTQ minorities</a>. In one documented case, a 56 year-old Trump supporter named <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/26/nyregion/cnn-cory-booker-pipe-bombs-sent.html">Cesar Sayoc mailed a series of bombs to “Trump critics.”</a> His van, in which he had apparently been living, was covered with often violent imagery directed against people of color and political opponents of President Trump, including a sticker featuring then-Representative Nancy Pelosi with rifle-scope crosshairs superimposed.</p>
<p>The partisan divide is further fueled by the conflict over whether non-white immigration is a threat to U.S. security and prosperity.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/26/key-facts-about-u-s-immigration-policies-and-proposed-changes/">Immigration to the U.S.</a> has been fairly constant since 1990. </p>
<p>What has changed is the number of refugees fleeing civil wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Syria <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/us-accepted-refugees-2018/">who are coming to the U.S.</a> According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, there are 65.6 million forcibly displaced people in the world – a population greater than that of the U.K. – of which about <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html">one-third, 25.4 million, are refugees</a>. </p>
<p>The numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers has been increasing since 2013. At the end of 2013, the U.S. hosted 348,005 people of concern – which includes refugees and asylum-seekers. By the end of 2017, that number rose to 929,850, with <a href="http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga=2.82367446.119990439.1544648438-1408415619.1544648438">asylum-seekers responsible for the significant increase</a>.</p>
<p>The research shows that immigrants are a net drain on national resources for the first few years they are here. But after those first years, the <a href="https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2018/jan/23/donald-trump/does-immigration-policy-impose-300-billion-annuall/">costs and benefits of their participation balance out</a>.</p>
<h2>White nativism: Why now?</h2>
<p>Though economic opportunity – and specifically the decline in blue-collar jobs capable of supporting a family – affects the popularity of white nativism, it does not explain its timing. </p>
<p>The “why now” of white nativism is due to decades of demographic decline for white Americans combined with <a href="https://theconversation.com/fight-for-federal-right-to-education-takes-a-new-turn-108322">a serious decline in public education standards</a> that leads to unwarranted nostalgia and openness to conspiracy theories. </p>
<p>Add to that the charismatic leadership of Donald J. Trump, who attached white majority fears of status loss with criminalizing immigrants of color. That has stoked the flames of an already smoking fire.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107872/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Monica Duffy Toft does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the US, non-whites have higher birth rates and make up the bulk of new immigrants. As white people lose their demographic majority, some will resist the accompanying political changes.Monica Duffy Toft, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/722652017-03-05T19:13:42Z2017-03-05T19:13:42ZContested spaces: we shall fight on the beaches…<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/159044/original/image-20170301-5504-9l8m8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People go to the beach in large numbers and for many different reasons, and sometimes that's a recipe for conflict.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/crowded-beach-371178272?src=rU6F0l-T4o4s1musKx1Kcg-1-0">tazzymoto from www.shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This is the first article in our <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/contested-spaces-36316">Contested Spaces</a> series. These pieces look at the conflicting uses, expectations and norms that people bring to public spaces, the clashes that result and how we can resolve these.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Picture this. It’s a beautiful sunny day. You arrive on the beach, find yourself a nice quiet area away from the crowds and set yourself up for a day of relaxation and fun in the sun. </p>
<p>But then a large group arrives and sets themselves up right next to you. They’re drinking heavily, swearing loudly and leaving their rubbish in the sand. And things are about to get worse. </p>
<p>In the distance you can hear the unmistakable buzz of a jet ski heading for your once-quiet part of the beach. The day is lost. You pack up and head home.</p>
<p>Australians are a beach-going people and research suggests that the scenario outlined above is likely to seriously annoy at least half of us. A <a href="http://www.marine.nsw.gov.au/key-initiatives/marine-estate-community-survey#Final%20reports">2014 survey</a> of New South Wales residents found that 58% of respondents considered anti-social behaviour a key threat to the social benefits of the coast. The survey was conducted for the state’s Marine Estate Management Authority (<a href="http://www.marine.nsw.gov.au/">MEMA</a>).</p>
<p>Anti-social behaviour topped the list of community concerns in the survey. This was closely followed by littering, overcrowding and the unsafe behaviour of some recreational boaters and jet skiers.</p>
<p>The strength of this response was somewhat surprising; we tend to think of the coast as a place of fun and relaxation, rather than a hot bed of conflict and simmering tensions. But Australians have always had strong ideas about the right way to behave at the beach.</p>
<h2>A tradition of free public access</h2>
<p>First and foremost we have defended the right of free access the beach. Australians have a long and ongoing <a href="https://carolinefordhistory.com/sydney-beaches-a-history/">history of resistance</a> to any development that might impede public access. </p>
<p>The legacy of this is a relatively “natural” coastal environment, even in our metropolitan areas. This reflects our preference for development set back from the beach and in public ownership.</p>
<p>But while we are keen to keep our beaches open for all, we have a slightly less egalitarian attitude towards how people should use the beach. </p>
<p>Public bathing on the beach only became commonplace and <a href="http://www.environment.gov.au/heritage/places/national/bondi">acceptable in the late 19th century</a>. Board riding on public beaches was frowned upon in the 1960s – so much so that local councils in Sydney <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10314619408595963">attempted to regulate surfing</a> through a registration system.</p>
<p>Today, activities such as surfing, swimming and snorkelling are generally agreed to be appropriate. In fact, these are seen as essential components of Australian beach culture.</p>
<h2>The unwritten rules of conduct</h2>
<p>Many beach activities are generally accepted and uncontentious as long as they are conducted within complex, unwritten models of appropriate behaviour. An example is the rules about “<a href="http://www.surfline.com/surfology/bill-of-lefts-and-rights/index.cfm?id=51320">dropping in</a>” among surfers.</p>
<p>These unwritten rules are constantly evolving. The rules may be <a href="http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/nswcultureheritage/PlaceMakingGeorgesRiver.htm">confounding to people not exposed to them from an early age</a>, including different cultural and ethnic groups. Conflict on the coast is often infused with underlying racial tensions, as the 2005 <a href="https://theconversation.com/ten-years-on-from-the-cronulla-riots-how-much-has-really-changed-50585">Cronulla riots</a> demonstrated most dramatically. </p>
<p>Today these tensions live on and are particularly acute in relation to fishing. Conflicting cultural ideas about the size, species and number of fish and invertebrates considered appropriate to take is a regular <a href="https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/TfC/article/download/1558/1692">source of dispute</a> even for common species not covered by catch limits.</p>
<h2>When ideas about beaches are in conflict</h2>
<p>While racial tensions undoubtedly play a role, these are unlikely to explain all the tensions and annoyances that can emerge during a day at the beach. The MEMA survey indicated that we value the coast for its beauty and as a place for socialisation and enjoyment. This is largely based on the opportunities it provides for a healthy and active lifestyle. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/159046/original/image-20170301-5529-1q08e53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/159046/original/image-20170301-5529-1q08e53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/159046/original/image-20170301-5529-1q08e53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=734&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/159046/original/image-20170301-5529-1q08e53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=734&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/159046/original/image-20170301-5529-1q08e53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=734&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/159046/original/image-20170301-5529-1q08e53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/159046/original/image-20170301-5529-1q08e53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/159046/original/image-20170301-5529-1q08e53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One person’s idea of fun at the beach can be another’s hell.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/fleur-design/3612355391">The Pug Father/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Dominant social norms therefore place the beach as a place of passive recreation focused on relaxation, appreciation of nature and wilderness-based adventure sports (such as surfing or fishing). Resentments appear to build when uses of the beach, and different users’ underlying value systems, come into conflict. In the scenario outlined at the start of this article, individuals or groups are potentially pursuing hedonistic or utilitarian values at the expense of nature-based or passive-use values. </p>
<p>Similar resentments have emerged in reverse. Individuals or groups who value the coast primarily as a place of social interaction, fun and active use often resist attempts to limit this use. An example is some <a href="https://theconversation.com/go-fish-why-fishers-dont-care-for-marine-parks-14558">anglers’ opposition to protected areas</a> or restricted-use zones.</p>
<p>A key to managing conflict therefore lies in improving our understanding of beach users’ value systems. This will help planners, policymakers and communities identify strategies that cater for the diverse interests and needs of different users. </p>
<p>In some national parks and council areas, for example, planning approaches have been developed to cater for a diverse range of recreational opportunities. Permitted activities and associated infrastructure are determined throughout the management area based on ensuring there are <a href="http://www.projectnatureed.com.au/web%20library/micro-ROS.pdf">opportunities along a spectrum of use</a> from active through to wilderness-based experiences. In NSW, government agencies are using the MEMA survey results to <a href="http://www.marine.nsw.gov.au/key-initiatives/threat-and-risk-assessment">identify and manage key threats</a> to the values of the coast.</p>
<p>In many ways, though, the conflict we see on our beaches may be a small price to pay for the free and open access to our beaches, which Australians have fought to preserve on many occasions. </p>
<p>Resolving these conflicts may partly involve planning, partly education and partly regulation. Those rules we consider non-negotiable need to be enforced – for example, the rules that keep us and other beach users safe. To a large degree, however, it also involves building tolerance, patience and empathy within our community so we can all enjoy our day out at the beach.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>You can read other pieces in the series as they are published <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/contested-spaces-36316">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72265/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Voyer has been involved in a number of projects that have received funding from the Commonwealth Fisheries Research and Development Corporation, the NSW Recreational Fishing Trust and the NSW Department of Primary Industries. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natalie Gollan works for the NSW Department of Primary Industries. </span></em></p>In many ways, the conflict we see on our beaches may be a small price to pay for the free and open access to our beaches, which Australians have long fought to preserve.Michelle Voyer, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of WollongongNatalie Gollan, PhD candidate, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/703482016-12-14T14:49:21Z2016-12-14T14:49:21ZRoyal massacre and king’s detention point to what Uganda is becoming<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149845/original/image-20161213-1596-pnm8u1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A police officer takes a picture of a royal guard to Charles Wesley Mumbere, king of the Rwenzururu kingdom, during the November crackdown.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/James Akena</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The state security assault on palace guards in which more than 100 were killed at the end of November exemplifies present day Uganda in many ways. Press accounts said <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Police-palace-raid-royal-guards-Mumbere/688334-3467804-15teptlz/index.html">bloody clashes</a> erupted when a patrol by police and troops was attacked by royal guards in the western Ugandan town of Kasese. </p>
<p>There were reports that President Yoweri Museveni had <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Museveni-pleaded-with-Mumbere-on-phone/688334-3468488-121i4rf/index.html">pleaded</a> with King Charles Wesley Mumbere of the Rwenzururu kingdom to disband the royal guards prior to the assault.</p>
<p>The king has since been arrested and remains in custody facing serious charges. His kingdom is in disarray. The crisis fits within a history that has antagonistically set the nation in a delicate situation, exacerbated by a state that feeds on ethnic manipulation for patronage. </p>
<p>Historically, colonialists helped create and build chieftaincies for collaborating groups. Today, the Ugandan state is seen time and again to facilitate sub-ethnic group breakaways from other kingdoms to form their own. Much as this is often dressed up as a promotion of cultural freedom or autonomy, but on many occasions its timing reveals its poorly disguised motives. Indeed, while the idea of kingdoms as cultural trusts is not a bad one, the way they have been politicised makes them problematic.</p>
<p>The Museveni government has made some attempts at enhancing ethnic pluralism. But in many ways, both by omission and commission, it has set different ethnic groups at loggerheads in a colonial “divide and rule” style.</p>
<p>As the late Professor Dani Nabudere once <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/200909210758.html">observed</a>, colonialists messed Africa up by grounding it on antagonistic ethnic relations – and its post-colonial leaders seem to continue to read from the colonial script when it serves their political ends. The ethnic card is played for shortsighted administrative convenience and to win support from some groups. </p>
<p>But it is also sometimes used to punish those deemed not to support the sitting government.</p>
<h2>Roots of royal resentment</h2>
<p>The current Rwenzururu kingdom crisis can be traced back to feelings of discrimination against the people of Kasese by the Tooro kingdom to which they then belonged. It took stiff resistance for them to eventually break away in 1962 and later <a href="http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/The-Bakonjo--Bamba-clashes----Looking-beyond-the-fights/2466686-1453512-format-xhtml-x83kr8/index.html">form the Rwenzururu kingdom</a>. This was a conglomeration of more than six ethnic groups, but with the Bakonzo at the helm. </p>
<p>Perhaps this triumph would last. But the multi-ethnic composition of the kingdom offered an opening both for future internal ethnic boundary transformation and political manipulation. </p>
<p>It was just a matter of time before different subgroups started demanding autonomy under their own kingdoms, a demand that fell conveniently into the government’s patronage politics. The result, so far, is three breakaway kingdoms established with the government’s recognition. </p>
<p>This has attracted much resentment from the Rwenzururu kingdom, which feels that the government is out to split and weaken it. This is the crux of the current bad blood, suspicion and conflict between the two. It is being escalated by the fact that the area has become predominantly <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Drawing-parallels-between-Mengo--Kayunga-and-Kasese-crises/689844-3473390-fv20x0z/index.html">pro-opposition</a>. The interface between party politics and monarchical disgruntlement sometimes makes it difficult to understand what exactly the issue is.</p>
<h2>Buganda tensions with government</h2>
<p>What we see in Kasese is a process also evident in the larger and more established <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Buganda">Buganda kingdom</a>. There have been attempts by subgroups such as the Bakooki and Banyara to break off into separate kingdoms. Such attempts have often been made with conspicuous government backing and have coincided with misunderstandings between Buganda and government. </p>
<p>The climax of these tensions came in 2009 when the Kabaka (King) of Buganda was <a href="https://ugandabeat.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/riots-after-kabaka-blocked-from-visiting-kayunga/">stopped</a> by the government from visiting Kayunga, which is officially part of his territory. Backed by heavy security deployments, the government insisted that the Banyara had installed their own king and did not want the Kabaka there. What followed were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8260130.stm">horrible riots</a>. There were around 30 reported casualties. </p>
<p>Such manipulation can also be seen vividly in the country’s decentralisation process. The official rhetoric behind decentralisation is to take services closer to the people. But it is very clear in many cases that districts are drawn along ethnic lines – often in response to ethnic agitation for “our own district”. </p>
<h2>Ethnic citizenship and exclusion</h2>
<p>The effect of such administrative logic is mainly two fold. First, it creates what Ugandan academic Mahmood Mamdani calls <a href="http://thinkingafrica.blogspot.co.ke/2013/05/political-identity-citizenship-and.html">“ethnic citizenship”</a> – an impression that the district belongs to the “sons of the soil”. This in turn breeds exclusionary tendencies in allocation of opportunities and, in so doing, triggers conflict. </p>
<p>Second, such a setup provides an incentive for other ethnic groups to demand their own districts along ethnic lines. An endless spiral of division is set in motion. This is how Kasese district was created in response to marginalisation. Yet even today, in response to the tensions in the area, Museveni has suggested Kasese be <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Kasese-to-be-split-into-four-different-districts/688334-3415580-ns2qeb/index.html">split into four</a> districts.</p>
<p>So it comes as no surprise that nationhood in Uganda is still an elusive idea. Many people associate with their ethnic groups more affectionately than with the country. The tribalism that manifests itself in public service and allocation of resources, which also pushes every group into desiring its own district or kingdom, is partly a consequence of these strong ethnic ties. </p>
<p>It is also partly due to a careless failure by the state to build a strong sense of nationhood. Kasese is just one of the many ethnic landmines in Uganda that was bound to explode.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70348/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jimmy Spire Ssentongo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It comes as no surprise that nationhood in Uganda is still an elusive idea. Many people associate with their ethnic groups more affectionately than with their country.Jimmy Spire Ssentongo, Jimmy Spire Ssentongo is an Associate Dean (Research and Publication), School of Postgraduate Studies and Research at Uganda Martyrs University, Uganda Martyrs UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/671662016-10-31T18:51:06Z2016-10-31T18:51:06ZEthiopia’s state of emergency: both sides are determined to fight to the finish<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143416/original/image-20161027-11256-zjn5ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators chant slogans while flashing the Oromo protest gesture during Irreecha, the thanksgiving festival of the Oromo people, in Bishoftu town, Oromia region, Ethiopia, October 2, 2016. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Tiksa Negeri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Waves of protests have gripped Ethiopia since last <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2015/11/30/oromo-students-protest-in-mattu-ethiopia/">November</a>. In response the government has declared a six month <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2016/10/09/ethiopia-declares-6-months-state-of-emergency-over-oromia-protests/">state of emergency</a>. In an interview with The Conversation Africa’s Samantha Spooner, Asafa Jalata describes the impact of the state of emergency and what it could mean for the future of the country.</em></p>
<p><strong>Who are the main players and what are the main grievances of the Ethiopian protest movement?</strong></p>
<p>The Oromo protest movement emerged in November 2015. It has been fomenting for decades because the Oromo consider themselves <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=cfjYAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR4&dq=isbn:+9004265481&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=colonial%20subjects%20&f=false">colonial subjects</a>. They are the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">largest ethno-national group</a> in Ethiopia and have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">denied</a> equal access to their country’s political, economic and cultural resources.</p>
<p>For almost 25 years Tigrayan state elites have dominated different structures of the government, including the military. They have also had total control over other institutions such as the media. And they have <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UAWrm0ecCTM">confiscated fertile land</a> and other <a href="http://www.ayyaantuu.net/the-oromo-movement-the-effects-of-state-terrorism-and-globalization-in-oromia-and-ethiopia/">valuable resources</a> such as gold and other minerals.</p>
<p>Over the last few months, the protests spread across the country. Other ethno-national groups, which also <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/09/ethiopia-protests-amhara-oromiya/">feel</a> politically and economically excluded by the Tigrayan-led minority government, have also joined the movement. </p>
<p>The Amhara, the second largest ethno-national group, <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-news/ethiopias-ethnic-amhara-stage-mass-anti-government-protest-2947164/">started</a> to protest peacefully against the Tigrayan-led minority government in August this year. They <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/who-are-amhara-people-involved-ethiopias-anti-government-protests-1575177">expressed</a> their grievances and support for the Oromo protests in the Amhara regional state. Other ethno-national groups, known as the <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2016/09/14/konso-people-under-attack-by-ethiopian-regime-forces/">Konso</a>, Sidama, and <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2016/10/08/ethiopia-five-people-killed-mosques-attacked-in-dilla/">Gedeo</a> joined more recently. </p>
<p>The protests gained further traction as the state’s reaction became violent. For example, in early October millions of Oromo gathered at Hora Arsadii, south east of Addis Ababa, for “Irreechaa” - the Oromo national holiday of thanksgiving. The Tigrayan-led regime’s army <a href="https://www.opride.com/2016/10/02/irreecha-massacre-several-dozens-feared-dead-bishoftu/">killed</a> more than 700 Oromos and injured hundreds. This was <a href="https://www.opride.com/2016/10/02/irreecha-massacre-several-dozens-feared-dead-bishoftu/">sparked</a> by peaceful, anti-government chants by young Oromos.</p>
<p>After the massacre, Oromo protesters <a href="http://nazret.com/blog/index.php/2016/02/14/ethiopia-oromo-protesters-burned-down">burned</a> property and both locally and internationally owned businesses that had been built on the land seized from the Oromo by Tigrayan state and business elites. </p>
<p>The Ethiopian regime’s response was to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/ethiopia-declares-state-emergency-protests-161009110506730.html">declare</a> the state of emergency. Set to last six months, its aim is to curb the growing anti-government protest movement.</p>
<p><strong>What impact has this state of emergency had on the various communities in the country?</strong></p>
<p>The current state of emergency is the last attempt by the Tigrayan-led regime to stop the Oromo and Amhara protests and to stay in power. The government is therefore <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/ethiopia-declares-state-emergency-101402875.html">using</a> this situation to gain total control over information, use heavy force and <a href="http://www.ayyaantuu.net/the-genocidal-massacres-of-oromos-at-the-irreechaa-fesival-the-lies-of-the-tigre-led-ethiopian-government/">deny</a> the freedom of organisation and association. </p>
<p>As a result, the regions of Oromia, Amhara, Ogaden, Konso, and Gedeo have become <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/firms-attacked-ethiopia-protests-continue-160902064459286.html">conflict zones</a> with the regime indiscriminately imprisoning, looting and <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2016/10/08/ethiopia-five-people-killed-mosques-attacked-in-dilla/">killing</a> protesters.</p>
<p>According to the state of emergency <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/ethiopia-government-unveils-rules-state-emergency-112046842.html">rules</a>, Oromos, Amharas and Konsos have restricted access to media. They are not allowed to listen to radio stations, such as the Oromo Voice Radio, or to watch media channels, like the Oromia Media Network. Ethiopian soldiers are enforcing these rules and have been seizing or breaking satellite dishes. </p>
<p>The emergency rules also <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/ethiopia-government-unveils-rules-state-emergency-112046842.html">prevent</a> citizens from associating with political organisations that the regime has branded as “terrorist”. One of these is the Oromo Liberation Front which was established in 1973 by Oromo nationalists to promote self-determination. </p>
<p>The situation for the Oromo people is dire. For several months the region has been under a crackdown <a href="http://www.ayyaantuu.net/ethiopia-oromia-regional-state-under-siege/">enforced</a> by special police groups and the army known as “Agazi”. According to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/ethiopia0505/">rights organisations</a>, more than 2 000 Oromos have been killed in eleven months. Several thousand more have been imprisoned, tortured, blinded and raped. </p>
<p>The rule of law no longer seems to apply to the Oromo and their supporters. To <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2016/10/06/internet-blocked-in-ethiopia/">hide</a> its crimes from the international community, the regime has blocked the internet and collected phones from thousands of Oromos.</p>
<p>Until the regime is overthrown they will continue to suffer <a href="http://qz.com/781063/ethiopia-runner-feyisa-lilesas-us-press-conference-highlight-the-oromo-protest-crackdown/">immensely</a>. They are being <a href="http://agensir.it/mondo/2016/10/12/ethiopia-state-of-emergency-the-repression-of-the-oromo-people-in-broad-daylight/">excluded</a> from state support in relation to protection, food, shelter, clothing, medicine and other necessary services. </p>
<p><strong>As a group is the Oromo community concerned about their future?</strong></p>
<p>Because the current regime fears the size of the Oromo population, it <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/006/2014/en/">tries</a> to minimise their influence through hidden policies and war. The regime has already <a href="https://www.change.org/p/united-nations-human-rights-committee-human-rights-campaign-stop-massacre-of-oromo-people-and-suppression-of-human-rights-in-ethiopia">prevented</a> Oromo representatives from coming into political power through systematic killings, imprisonment or exile. For these reasons, the Oromo are very concerned about their future. </p>
<p>In addition, little looks set to change as a result of external pressure because international powers such as the <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/us-ethiopia-relationship-strong-but-complicated-/2880154.html">United States</a> as well as organisations such as <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/ethiopia">USAID</a> have a close relationship with the regime. This gives rise to concerns within the Oromo community that their grievances will not be heard and that they will not be given support.</p>
<p>Nevertheless the Oromo people are determined to change their status quo and better their future. That is why they <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-protests-continue-despite-call-for-calm/3538412.html">continue</a> with their movement, despite massive incidents of death and imprisonment.</p>
<p><strong>What are the prospects for the government and leaders of the protest movement meeting to resolve the political issues between them?</strong></p>
<p>Resolving the conflict requires the implementation of social justice and democracy. But the Ethiopian regime has demonstrated that it will dictate everything to the Oromo people and its leadership through the barrel of the gun. </p>
<p>The Oromo are rejecting this heavy-handed approach. So, in this conflict, there are two options – either the regime must go, and the Oromo be victorious, or the Oromo people must be destroyed to serve the interest of the regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67166/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The current state of emergency in Ethiopia is the last attempt by the Tigrayan-led regime to stop the Oromo and Amhara protests and maintain political power.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.