tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/failed-states-10477/articlesfailed states – The Conversation2016-07-10T16:45:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/621182016-07-10T16:45:20Z2016-07-10T16:45:20ZNarco-state or failed state? Guinea-Bissau and the framing of Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129712/original/image-20160707-30690-b64qmr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of presidential candidate José Mário Vaz cheer at a campaign rally in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, in 2014.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Joe Penney </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For the vast majority, knowledge and understanding of the African political landscape is gained not from personal experience but from mass media. Those with a global reach and appeal often have the most influence. </p>
<p>Media has the ability to create frames through which people and even governments view countries and regions. These in turn influence policy on aid, international security and trade. Countries can be represented in ways that can be hugely simplistic and overwhelmingly negative.</p>
<p>The importance of framing and representation of African states was brought home forcefully when I started reading the new book “<a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/guinea-bissau/">Guinea-Bissau: Micro-State to ‘Narco-State’</a>.” This much-needed, detailed and minutely-researched collection of chapters is edited by Toby Green and the late Patrick Chabal. The book will be welcomed by those with a specific interest in the West African state of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13443186">Guinea-Bissau</a>. But it is also of great value for those interested in the dynamics of the so-called micro and fragile states.</p>
<h2>A shining example of media framing</h2>
<p>Guinea-Bissau has exemplified media framing and been given a particular image of failure and criminality to that country. It is worth briefly explaining what I mean by framing and representation. Framing involves the basic selection of which stories are reported by the media and which are not. It involves which countries are regularly in the news and which rarely figure but, when they do, are presented in simplified ways. </p>
<p>Framing is also in the telling of sensational stories that do not represent the reality or the country they are portraying. This leads to the establishment and periodic reinforcement of negative and <a href="http://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/en/contents/framing-conflict-and-war-the-cold-war-and-after">misleading images</a> of states, particularly those only reported when something appalling or novel has happened in them.</p>
<p>The new book provides a timely antidote to the potentially poisonous and certainly misleading portrayal of Guinea-Bissau as a failed state – that and the implication that it has become a narco-state that exists only in some sort of criminal underworld among states. This representation of a whole state and its people in the international criminal frame sits alongside other frames used to <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2013/02/26/framing-news-in-africa-%E2%80%93-how-journalists-approach-stories-and-reinforce-stereotypes-%E2%80%93-by-keith-somerville/">categorise Africa</a>. The others include war on terror, humanitarian crisis, basket case and general failed state frames. </p>
<p>There are endless examples of how Guinea-Bissau is presented as a narco-state in the world media. A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jan/07/guinea-bissau-global-drugs-trade">detailed piece</a> in the <em>Guardian</em> is instructive. The newspaper’s reporting on Africa has generally been more thoughtful. But in this article the paper reported that despite its surface appearance as a potential tourist paradise the country was fighting to end its position as the world’s first narco-state. </p>
<p>A picture emerges of a poor, violence-wracked state with empty beaches and guesthouses. The only trade that is of importance is the drugs trade. The crux of the article is that attempts are being made internally with crucial external support to fight the trade but are not making progress. The trade in narcotics is also treated as something that has caused conflict and poverty rather than as a symptom of it. </p>
<h2>Changing from within</h2>
<p>The Green and Chabal volume turns that simplistic view on its head. It looks at deep-seated, historical problems of political legitimacy, and of economic subordination within a global trading system. It also examines the use of force and informal networks of power by competing political and military elites. The contributors don’t pull their punches about the recurrent political and economic crises. They note the development of the drug trade as a means of providing rents for the elites when other income sources either declined or dried up. They also examine the weakness of the state institutions and the porosity of the country’s borders. </p>
<p>The modern failures to establish legitimacy and accountability and the use of ethnicity as a weapon in political struggles are clearly located by the authors in history. They are pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial.</p>
<p>In this, Green’s contributions stand out as the most lucid and well-argued. He agrees that Guinea-Bissau meets the criteria of the Western-imposed narratives of failed state. But he points out the failings of the narco-state approach, with its implicit belief “that successful change can only come from outside the country”. </p>
<p>He goes on to press the convincing case that “the realities are more complex”. These relate to internal factors and indicate the need for indigenous solutions and the building of a nation from within and below, rather than from above and outside. He points out that despite the role of elites in the drug trade, and the recent history of coups and political violence, “day-to-day life in the country remains peaceful, in contrast to the stereotyped image.”</p>
<p>What makes the book particularly enlightening is the way it places the history and narrative of Guinea-Bissau as a state in context. It should be emphasised that it is a very nuanced approach to sub-Saharan African political and economic development. Power is very personalised and dependent on transactions between political patrons and their clients. This is within the context of unequal trade between African economies and the outside world. </p>
<p>These patterns developed before colonialism, and were entrenched and deepened during colonial rule. They have remained in place because of the interest of gatekeeping elites and their patronage networks. Power and wealth are accumulated through being the conduits for income from trade, aid and foreign finance. When income from trade in peanuts and then cashews fell in Guinea-Bissau, a new form of local gatekeeping emerged.</p>
<h2>Guinea-Bissau is not a criminal state</h2>
<p>The overall analysis and the concepts deployed are used as analytical tools in the context of Guinea-Bissau and its own history. This is not some overall and hugely simplified, one-size-fits-all African frame. Guinea-Bissau’s problems are common to much of Africa. But the manner in which these have developed are individual to each country. </p>
<p>Hassoum Ceesay, in his analysis of the narco-state discourse, makes very clear that Guinea-Bissau is not a criminal state. He points out that the drugs trade does not explain the political and societal challenges facing the country, but is a product of them.</p>
<p>Ethnicity is another common and misleading frame used by the media to describe the root of African conflict or political instability. But in Christoph Kohl’s chapter, it is something manipulated by political and military leaders for their own ends rather than a causal factor in itself.</p>
<p>The main conclusion of the work is that despite the evident weakness of state institutions and accountability of elites, Guinea-Bissau “is still a country that ‘works’.” As such, labels such as failed state, so glibly applied to Africa, are a hindrance to understanding the dynamics of development and change across Africa.</p>
<p><em>“<a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/guinea-bissau/">Guinea-Bissau: Micro-State to ‘Narco-State’</a>,” edited by Patrick Chabal and Toby Green, is published by Hurst.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62118/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Somerville does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite the evident weakness of state institutions and accountability of elites, Guinea-Bissau is still a country that ‘works’.Keith Somerville, Visiting Professor, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/620572016-07-06T14:50:56Z2016-07-06T14:50:56ZIs the Fragile States Index ‘fatally flawed’?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129440/original/image-20160705-795-sx9jfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Idyllic Mauritius is the only African country ranked in the favourable category of ‘more stable’ in the latest survey on state fragility.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Darrin Zammit Lupi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On June 27 2016 the eleventh edition of the Fragile States Index was <a href="http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi16-report">published</a> by the Fund for Peace. It came with the usual alarming findings from the developing world and brought back into memory the criticism that such surveys tend to be “<a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-fatally-flawed-fragile-states-index-10878">fatally flawed</a>” in their approaches.</p>
<p>The index ranks countries according to 12 social, economic, and political and military indicators. It then places each state into one of 11 categories of fragility, ranging from “very sustainable” (rank 178) to “very high alert” (rank 1). This means that the lower a country’s ranking on the index, the more fragile it is.</p>
<p>The Fund for Peace summarises its approach as follows: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Fragile States Index is an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face … Millions of documents are analysed every year, and by applying highly specialised search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on 12 key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators that are the result of years of painstaking expert social science research.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This suggests ultimate scientific rationality and logic. As is the case with so many other global or regional surveys, the Fragile States Index seeks credibility by reference to reliable data. </p>
<p>But how sound are statistics and their interpretation when contrasted with social and political realities, or just with common sense?</p>
<h2>The problem with statistics</h2>
<p>Namibia is a higher middle-income country with an estimated annual per capita income of <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/namibia/gdp-per-capita-ppp">US$8,200</a> in 2013. This is perhaps where the difference between fact and fiction starts.</p>
<p>Hardly any Namibian citizens have such an income. Rather, some 5% to 10% have quite a bit more (well, some of them have plenty more!). But most people live in material circumstances bordering on destitution. According to United Nations Development Programme data in 2013, 44.9% of the population lives in <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NAM.pdf">multidimensional poverty</a> and a further 19.3% is located near this category.</p>
<p>Twenty-six years into independence, Namibia is one of the most unequal societies in the world in terms of the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-31847943">Gini coefficient</a>, which measures income discrepancy. According to the United Nations Development Programme’s 2013 <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient">Human Development Index</a>, Namibia ranks at 127 of 187, with a Gini coefficient of 63.9. A value of 0 represents absolute equality; a value of 100 represents absolute inequality. South Africa is comparable, with a Human Development Index rank of 118 and a Gini co-efficient of 63.1. Despite such inequalities, both Namibia and South Africa are regularly ranked among the best-governed states in sub-Saharan Africa. But what might the shack dwellers or the rural paupers have to say, if someone would bother to ask them?</p>
<h2>Fragility in Africa</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129436/original/image-20160705-789-1k07ky8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129436/original/image-20160705-789-1k07ky8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=839&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129436/original/image-20160705-789-1k07ky8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=839&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129436/original/image-20160705-789-1k07ky8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=839&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129436/original/image-20160705-789-1k07ky8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1054&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129436/original/image-20160705-789-1k07ky8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1054&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129436/original/image-20160705-789-1k07ky8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1054&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Countries in the ‘very high alert’ category of the Failed States Index.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mauritius is the only African country classified in the index’s third most favourable category of “more stable”. At 147, the country is two ranks up on its previous ranking, despite some domestic policy hiccups during the year. </p>
<p>In the “warning” category, South Africa ranks at 108, behind Botswana (120) and the Seychelles (125), which are ranked as less fragile. Namibia appears at 103, under “elevated warning”. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly, the number of African states increases the closer one gets to the bottom of the index. At 16, in the “high alert” category, Zimbabwe shares territory with Burundi (15), Nigeria (13) and Guinea (12). At eight, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is with Chad (seven), Sudan (four), the Central African Republic (three), South Sudan (two) and Somalia (one) heading up the “very high alert” category. </p>
<p>Does that mean that we can write off these states and, more importantly, the people living there?</p>
<h2>Questionable stability</h2>
<p>The only “very sustainable” country is Finland, at the rank of 178. But Finland’s xenophobic climate produced notorious right-wing militant vigilantes roaming the streets to secure “<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-finland-idUSKCN0UR20G20160113">law and order</a>”. </p>
<p>The other Nordic countries follow in the category “sustainable”, with Norway at 177, Denmark at 175, Sweden at 171 and Iceland at 170. With the exception of Iceland, all these countries have nationalist parties with xenophobic tendencies that exercise influence on governance matters. For example, Danish border controls have started to implement the law, which is tantamount to the looting of refugees arriving with some <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/27/world/europe/denmark-asks-refugees-for-valuables.html?_r=0">savings or assets</a>.</p>
<p>So, does a neoliberal authoritarian state reduce state fragility? </p>
<p>In the “very stable” category there is a country, ranked at 162, whose citizens have just been misled by populists to vote for exiting a common market of 27 other states. During the campaign, a parliamentarian was assassinated for her “remain” position. Many would reportedly now like to revert the vote, realising that their decision was based on a domestic party-political power struggle of egomaniacs sacrificing national interest and later <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-eu-referendum-bregret-leave-petition-second-remain-latest-will-we-leave-a7105116.html">abandoning responsibility</a>. At least one federal member of what is called the United Kingdom is now determined to avoid collateral damage and separate because its citizens and government want to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/after-brexit-the-uk-could-disintegrate/2016/06/24/5e7d2b03-81b4-4149-a138-8bd11953281c_story.html">remain in the European Union</a>. Not a fragile situation?</p>
<p>Another “very stable” country ranks at 159. This country is deeply divided by a presidential election campaign that has seen rallies turn violent. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been interrogating one candidate in a case of breach of confidentiality while being in office as <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/statement-by-fbi-director-james-b.-comey-on-the-investigation-of-secretary-hillary-clintons-use-of-a-personal-e-mail-system">foreign minister</a>. The other candidate suggests building a wall on its border with a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/us/politics/donald-trump-immigration.html">neighbouring country</a> and expects that country to pay for it. He wants to prevent Muslims from <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslim-ban-immigration/">entering the territory</a> and claims that water-boarding is “<a href="http://www.breitbart.com/video/2016/06/28/trump-waterboarding-not-the-nicest-thing-but-peanuts-compared-to-many-alternatives/">peanuts</a>”. </p>
<p>This makes one wonder how “fragility” is defined.</p>
<h2>A ‘fatally flawed’ measure?</h2>
<p>Harsh criticism has previously suggested that the Fragile States Index might be “<a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-fatally-flawed-fragile-states-index-10878">fatally flawed</a>”. </p>
<p>This was mainly motivated by the idea that the answer to global challenges and insecurities would lie in more state building. And this underlies the <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-fatally-flawed-fragile-states-index-10878">misleading belief</a> of policymakers that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>external intervention can be a proper reaction to, rather than a cause of, state fragility. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Put differently, being classified as “fragile” might leave a state doomed because of externally motivated intervention that could lead to ultimate destruction. There is evidence of this in the current world crisis, in which many have been forced to leave their homes and seek survival elsewhere at the risk of their lives. Do the Western-led interventions in Iraq, Libya and Syria and the millions of desperate people trying to escape from the subsequent wars into Europe ring a bell?</p>
<p>Claire Leigh from the British Overseas Development Institute <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/jul/02/failed-states-index-policy-dustbin">suggested back in 2012</a> that the “annual compendium of failure” does not add “to the sum of the world’s useful knowledge”. She recommended moving the index “into the policy dustbin”. </p>
<p>While at best of dubious value – if not outright dangerous for the consequences in policy spheres – the Failed States Index should also be no substitute for common sense. It reinforces stereotypical Eurocentric perceptions and is at best another sign of patronising and paternalist worldviews. </p>
<p>It also abstains from self-critical soul searching as regards the fragility of Western democracies. The old adage ascribed to Mahatma Gandhi comes to mind. When asked about Western civilisation, he commented: “I think it would be a good idea.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62057/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Fragile States Index leaves more questions than it answers. Like similar global surveys, its credibility hinges on reliable data. But how sound are its statistics and their interpretation?Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/443682015-07-09T04:21:18Z2015-07-09T04:21:18ZSouth Sudan’s viability requires an honest answer to avert further disaster<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87755/original/image-20150708-31601-10ws60a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudan declared independence in 2011 after a referendum in which participants voted overwhelming in favour of secession, but the new state's viability is in question. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Phillip Dhil</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2011 South Sudan <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14151390">became</a> the 193rd United Nations member state. This was met by a great deal of local celebration and international praise. It marked the seemingly happy end of decades of a mostly violent struggle over the relationship between the north and the south of the country. </p>
<p>But as South Sudan heads into its fifth year as an independent state, major questions persist over its viability. Despite significant <a href="http://unmis.unmissions.org/">international support</a>, it is not clear whether a South Sudanese state actually exists or if the entity that was born four years ago has collapsed and is now a failed state. </p>
<p>Fighting has displaced <a href="http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan/">one-sixth</a> of South Sudan’s roughly 12 million people. One-quarter of these are refugees in neighbouring countries. Two-thirds of the population are deemed to be at risk of food insecurity. Almost five million, or 40% of its population, will require international assistance this year alone to secure even basic livelihoods. </p>
<p>How dramatic this crisis has become is illustrated by the recent <a href="http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-cholera-outbreak-2015-week-21-27">cholera outbreak</a> in Juba county, where the country’s capital of the same name is located.</p>
<p>Four years of independence have thus not been the stellar success that many expected, and it may be time to consider alternative approaches to putting South Sudan on a trajectory towards sustainable statehood. But to do so requires an understanding of the nature, origin, and dynamics of the multiple problems that the country faces. </p>
<h2>A conflict that stretches back over decades</h2>
<p>Conflict in Sudan dates back at least to the run up to Sudan’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094995">independence</a> from Britain in the first half of the 1950s. A brief but intensely violent mutiny in the south was put down by northern troops in August 1955.</p>
<p>What came to be known as the North-South conflict began in earnest in 1963. It saw a ten-year respite after 1972, resuming in 1983. Eventually, a settlement – the so-called <a href="http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515">Comprehensive Peace Agreement</a> – was brokered in 2005 by a regional East African organisation, the <a href="http://www.au.int/en/recs/igad">Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</a>. </p>
<p>The agreement provided for a referendum in South Sudan. This was held in January 2011 with 99% of voters supporting secession. Independence was formally <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082">declared</a> six months later.</p>
<p>Since then, the world’s youngest country has been in free-fall, politically and economically.</p>
<p>The country’s economy has been crippled by near-constant violence within South Sudan and long-running disputes with Sudan over transit fees the south pays for transporting oil across Sudanese territory. </p>
<p>South Sudan is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon <a href="https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fopenoil.net%2F%3Fwpdmact%3Dprocess%26did%3DMTguaG90bGluaw%3D%3D&ei=EIecVb2CCoK48gWJ6L7wCA&usg=AFQjCNE25E_SY3hZpLxQovf-Z2rLauAEWw&bvm=bv.96952980,d.dGc">resources</a> for revenue. Deprived of such income, it has not been able to build viable institutions. As a consequence it lacks the resilience to cope with a humanitarian <a href="http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan/">crisis</a> of massive proportions.</p>
<h2>A man-made crisis</h2>
<p>The current crisis <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/23/south-sudan-state-that-fell-apart-in-a-week">broke out</a> in December 2013. Political tensions within the ruling <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot128">Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</a> (SPLM) came to a head. This quickly descended into an ethnic conflict between the majority Dinka group of President <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12107760">Salva Kiir</a> and the Nuer group of his erstwhile vice-president <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25402865">Riek Machar</a>, who had been dismissed from office by Kiir the previous July. </p>
<p>The violence that has spread relentlessly since then and engulfed most of South Sudan’s ten states may have been triggered by political rivalries within the SPLM. But its roots and exacerbating factors reach deep into the complex demographic, ethnic, religious and political realities in South Sudan. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87599/original/image-20150707-1277-wd6n7z.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87599/original/image-20150707-1277-wd6n7z.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87599/original/image-20150707-1277-wd6n7z.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87599/original/image-20150707-1277-wd6n7z.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87599/original/image-20150707-1277-wd6n7z.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87599/original/image-20150707-1277-wd6n7z.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87599/original/image-20150707-1277-wd6n7z.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87599/original/image-20150707-1277-wd6n7z.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Distribution of ethnic groups in South Sudan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">M Izady</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The crisis in South Sudan is clearly a man-made disaster. But it is also one that pre-dates the country’s independence in 2011 and arguably even the 2005 <a href="http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515">agreement</a>.</p>
<p>The SPLM had long faced significant security challenges in the areas that it has controlled since the north-south civil war. Perceived political and military domination of the south by the Dinka alienated and radicalised other communities. </p>
<p>Encouraged by leaders in the north, this led to the emergence of various militia groups. The militias, and the issues underlying their emergence, “survived” the peace agreement interim period. South Sudan thus inherited both an anti-SPLM insurgency and high levels of inter-communal conflict at the time of independence.</p>
<h2>Unprecedented failure of state-building</h2>
<p>While rich in hydrocarbon resources, what was to become South Sudan was also relatively underdeveloped economically, especially in terms of its transport and communication infrastructure. </p>
<p>Independence has not allowed the government to build even basic infrastructure for public services. This has contributed to disaffection, eroded the regime’s legitimacy, and increased the temptation for ethnic scapegoating. </p>
<p>In turn, the humanitarian crisis has been exacerbated by the further destruction of already poor infrastructure as well as the insecurity created by years of violence and <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/un-sends-mission-assess-south-sudan-atrocities-153200718.html">atrocities</a>.</p>
<p>These factors have also impeded humanitarian relief efforts. International aid programmes are also desperately <a href="http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ss_humanitariandashboard_20150619.pdf">under-funded</a>. Only 41% of the US$1.63bn estimated requirements for 2015 alone have been met. </p>
<p>The reasons for South Sudan’s almost unprecedented failure of state-building are many and they exist at different levels. Chief among them is the failure of political leadership. This is best illustrated in the abject <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201507021688.html">lack of will</a> among local leaders to bring an end to the current civil war and the <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2015/africa/south-sudan-no-sanctions-without-a-strategy.aspx">inability</a> within the international community to do much about this. </p>
<p>Turning South Sudan into a protectorate, as <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/06/south-sudan-should-be-placed-under-un-trusteeship-to-aid-development-of-viable-self-government-by-hank-cohen/">suggested</a> in January last year, might soon be the only option left to save the country and its people. It would require an enormous, probably long-term, militarily backed, and well-resourced international effort, temporarily taking over basic governance functions, providing essential services, establishing institutions and training their officials so that eventually a credible administration can emerge. </p>
<p>There are distant and recent precedents for this, including <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/germany-declares-south-west-africa-german-protectorate">Namibia</a> in the late 1980s, as well as <a href="http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/kosovo-the-era-of-the-eu-protectorate-dawns/">Kosovo</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14919009">East Timor</a> at the turn of the millennium. None of these were without challenges and problems, but none were at the level of the crisis that South Sudan has experienced over the past four years. </p>
<p>The United Nations strenuously <a href="http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2014/12/reports-of-un-creating-protectorate-in-south-sudan-baseless/#.VZuvk43bI_w">denies</a> any plans in this direction. But such a step could create a breathing space, avert descent into an even greater disaster and eventually reverse it. It may also be the only way for South Sudan to find anything worth celebrating in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44368/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK. He is a past recipient of grants from the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme and the EU's Jean Monnet Programme.</span></em></p>South Sudan’s independence in 2011, which ended half a century of deadly conflict, was met with much praise. But a descent into civil war has led to dismay and suggests fresh thinking is required.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/416402015-05-21T17:24:50Z2015-05-21T17:24:50ZCentral African Republic takes a small step towards peace – but a leap is what’s needed<p>The <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201505180723.html">signing of a major peace agreement</a> by ten rebel groups in the Central African Republic is a welcome step towards peace after years of violent chaos.</p>
<p>Things really began to get out of hand when a December 2012 coup brought together a handful of northern rebel groups into a loose group known as the Séléka (the coalition). Previously rivals, they grouped together to overthrow president <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/un-slaps-sanctions-car-ex-president-2014510194156845667.html">François Bozizé</a> and install <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21938297">Michael Djotodia</a> in his place in March 2013. </p>
<p>This led to an escalating series of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2013/12/escalating-bloodshed-and-reported-revenge-killings-central-african-republic/">reprisal killings</a> in the capital, Bangui, by “anti-Balaka” self-defence militias.</p>
<p>The Séléka itself was not religiously motivated, but its members were disproportionately Muslim. Unfortunately, as with many loose confederations of armed groups, they proved impossible to control: Djotodia lost his grip on them almost immediately following the coup, and the Séléka <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/10/central-african-republic-rampant-abuses-after-coup">looted</a> the capital. </p>
<p>The anti-Balaka groups, however, explicitly described themselves as Christians and portrayed the conflict as a religious one, escalating the crisis beyond the initial political coup. The spread of violence between the two factions resulted in a religious schism that has <a href="https://theconversation.com/only-regional-intervention-can-break-cycle-of-violence-in-central-african-republic-22725">killed 5,000</a>, made almost 300,000 people refugees and displaced a million more. </p>
<h2>Faint hope</h2>
<p>The peace agreement must give hope to the thousands of victims caught up in the disaster, as must the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/may/15/central-african-republic-child-soldiers-released-un-deal-armed-groups">release of 357 kidnapped children</a> in the town of Bambari, about 200km north-east of Bangui. It is estimated that around <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/car-armed-factions-free-350-child-slaves-150514153621836.html">6,000-10,000 children</a> are currently working as slaves for the militia groups.</p>
<p>The head of the UN’s integrated stabilisation mission, <a href="http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sga1415.doc.htm">Babacar Gaye</a>, stated that “on the path towards peace, the step made today is a very important one.” But the situation of the victims is still dire, and this has to be a step towards a lasting peace, not just a lull in the fighting.</p>
<p>The terms of the peace agreement itself make provision for a process of disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion and repatriation (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/10/us-centralafrica-politics-idUSKBN0NV0U020150510">DDRR</a>), as well as “the initiation of a reconciliation process in which those found responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity will be prosecuted.” </p>
<p>Such agreements are undoubtedly a critical first step, and in this case it has been reinforced by the repatriation of the 357 children. But without long-term external support for the state, the peace agreement is likely to fail. And the country could return to the cycle of political crises that have seen <a href="http://eisa.org.za/WEP/car1993results2.htm">only one peaceful transition of power</a> (1993) since independence.</p>
<p>The militias themselves are a symptom of an old problem with the Central African Republic (CAR): the depths of dysfunction that beset the central state, which is barely even there. The International Crisis Group has long ranked the country as a “<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/136-central-african-republic-anatomy-of-a-phantom-state.aspx">phantom state</a>”, and in fact worse than a failed state. It has lacked any meaningful institutional capacity since the <a href="http://podbay.fm/show/339986758/e/1411368540?autostart=1">fall of Jean-Bédel Bokassa</a> in 1979, and prosperity has never been enjoyed by any but a few at the very top. </p>
<p>With all this history weighing heavy, the recent peace agreement is welcome, but it has to be treated with extreme circumspection. The CAR’s terribly poor institutional capacity has led to endless breakdowns of previous efforts to construct peace. In fact, the roots of the current conflict lie in the failures of previous peace agreements – and explicitly stem from the state’s failure to adequately implement their conditions.</p>
<h2>Good neighbours</h2>
<p>The most prominent group within the Séléka is the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), which was included in the <a href="http://peacemaker.un.org/car-birao-accord2007">2007 Birao Peace Agreement</a>. That agreement ended the CAR Bush War, which broke out in response to Bozizé’s 2003 ascent to power. It was followed by the <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43724#.VVn9d9NViko">Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreements of 2008</a>, which laid out an amnesty programme for rebel forces alongside a DDRR plan. </p>
<p>Many argue that the amnesty conditions that resulted actually provided an incentive for the creation of new rebel groups. Alongside the express intention of being subject to a generous amnesty, seen as being preferable to suffering within a desperate economy.</p>
<p>The agreement in the CAR faces several critical challenges, not least the liquid nature of the armed groups themselves and their lack of boundaries or stability. At the same time, any DDRR process will require significant resources, training and monitoring. The UN has announced a 10,000 strong <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47541#.VVn99tNViko">peacekeeping force</a>, but it remains unclear whether this will be sufficient. </p>
<p>At the same time, even if the international community was to provide the resources, DDRR requires two basic things that the CAR lacks: an economy for those who wish to make the transition from combatant to civilian; and state structures for military and leadership to integrate in to.</p>
<h2>Is it enough?</h2>
<p>Even if the CAR had these things in place, moving on from the conflict would be no easy feat. In the medium term, reconciliation has proved difficult even in countries with strong and capable institutions and governments. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/">truth and reconciliation model</a> was famously adopted by post-Apartheid South Africa, but its success was heavily qualified – a pattern that <a href="https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/international-review/review-862-truth-reconciliation-commissions/index.jsp">has also dogged</a> subsequent truth commissions. Rwanda used an alternative grassroots model of “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18490348">gacaca</a>” (justice on the grass), built around decentralised community courts, to try 2m people after the 1994 genocide – but that too was not without serious problems such as access to qualified lawyers. </p>
<p>But even these models could only be carried out because there was significant state capacity and political will. That is conspicuously lacking in the CAR. </p>
<p>In order for this peace process to succeed where so many previous attempts have failed, the CAR government must be able to project its power beyond Bangui into the areas where the country’s militias recruit. </p>
<p>This in turn can only be done with significant state-building support from outside the country – and that has been made far more politically difficult by recent allegations that French troops <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-peacekeeper-abuse-scandal-fits-an-old-pattern-of-impunity-40991">sexually abused</a> local boys – allegations that the UN was apparently aware of, but did not initially relay to France.</p>
<p>So a step in the right direction the agreement may be, but as with many DDRR agreements, it remains a small one. And in isolation, it will not bring peace to many of the people who need it most.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41640/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Jackson receives funding from the ESRC, the European Union and the Swedish Government.</span></em></p>The CAR is a phantom state that has barely existed for years. Even with a ten-way peace deal now signed, what future does it have?Paul Jackson, Professor of Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/270052014-05-23T14:18:40Z2014-05-23T14:18:40ZMeriam Ibrahim death sentence: West needs to give Sudan a bit of face time<p>The case of Meriam Ibrahim, a pregnant woman sentenced to death for apostasy by a Khartoum court, has rightly refocused international attention on the dire state of human rights in Sudan.</p>
<p>Ibrahim’s prosecution and sentencing for converting from Islam to Christianity (a charge she denies) violates not only the country’s international treaty obligations but also its own constitution, which explicitly upholds <a href="http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ba749762.pdf">the right to freedom of religion</a>. </p>
<p>Sudan’s government has yet to comment, aside from pointing out that the verdict is “<a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/05/18/Sudanese-official-verdict-not-final-for-woman-sentenced-to-death-for-her-Christianity.html">not final</a>” and that any overturning of it by a higher court would be in the “hands of the judiciary”, a rare nod to due process and the separation of powers by one of Africa’s most authoritarian regimes.</p>
<p>This sad episode highlights the Sudanese authorities’ systematic disregard for human life and dignity. Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world, <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45886">ranked 171 out of 187 states</a> on the UN’s human development index, and yet since the 1980s, its government has diverted many of its resources on <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/khartoum-spending-war-fuel-subsidies--protests-us-donald-booth/1767477.html">prosecuting internal wars</a>. </p>
<p>Sudan has also been consistently awarded the lowest possible ratings for political rights and civil liberties by <a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/sudan#.U36OxZRdVak">Freedom House</a> in recent years, and its public sector is ranked among the four most corrupt in the world by <a href="http://www.transparency.org/country#SDN">Transparency International</a>. </p>
<p>Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s leader since 1989, remains the only serving head of state to have been <a href="http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/press%20releases/Pages/a.aspx">indicted</a> for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court. He is still <a href="http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/un-demand-al-bashir-s-surrender-international-criminal-court-2013-09-20">wanted for genocide and crimes against humanity</a>, in the form of deportations and attempted exterminations in Sudan’s Darfur region. Many of his citizens have called for his resignation in years of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/30/sudan-protesters-president-omar-al-bashir">protests</a> across the country, but an Arab Spring-style regime overthrow has so far failed to materialise.</p>
<p>But despite these clearly dire problems, Sudan’s treatment at the hands of the West has been decidedly ambivalent – and international reactions to the Ibrahim case should flag up important contradictions in the ways western states and media outlets approach regimes such as al-Bashir’s. </p>
<h2>Two-faced diplomacy</h2>
<p>While the sentencing of Ibrahim (who is married to a US citizen) has attracted substantial attention across the western world, the killing of more than 200 protesters (Amnesty International’s estimate) by security forces in Khartoum alone last October was barely mentioned in many of the same publications. Likewise, where the US, UK, EU and others have rightly condemned Ibrahim’s treatment, the same regimes were far more equivocal in their responses to the al-treatment of protesters in 2013. </p>
<p>Indeed, in its <a href="http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_14018_en.htm">short statement</a> on the protests, the EU condemned the actions of both Khartoum and the protesters, insisting that “all parties … exercise maximum restraint”.</p>
<p>The Sudanese people have not been the only ones in East Africa to get this Janus-faced treatment from the West. Uganda’s notorious anti-homosexuality bill (now act) has (quite rightly) incurred widespread condemnation from Western leaders and prompted numerous headlines and editorials. Yet the Ugandan security forces’ brutal <a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/161798.htm">crackdown</a> on anti-government protests in the country in April 2011 – when they fired randomly into crowds and killed, among others, <a href="http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2067136,00.html">a young child</a> – was scarcely reported in most western media publications. </p>
<p>Western governments also responded with far more ambivalence than they afforded the homosexuality bill. Henry Bellingham, Britain’s then-minister for Africa, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13501055">gently chided</a> Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni for the overreaction, noting that the shootings “demean him” and that “he should now be magnanimous, he should be statesman-like”.</p>
<p>To some extent, these inconsistencies are a product of the messy relationships between domestic and foreign policy messaging; they also reflect the difference between highlighting injustice and oppression through journalism and simply selling newspapers. An ungenerous commentator might also draw attention to the irresponsibility and populism of many western countries’ approaches to Africa. </p>
<p>A more sympathetic observer might instead emphasise the strategic importance of choosing one’s battles in the foreign policy sphere, and using influence and high-profile interventions sparingly but effectively. </p>
<h1>Few cards to play</h1>
<p>Sudan presents a particular diplomatic quandary for the West. While many quasi-authoritarian leaders in the region (including Uganda’s Museveni) rely heavily on Western aid and assistance to bolster their budgets and arm their militaries, Sudan is not one of them. Western leverage over the al-Bashir regime is limited; it has long been an international pariah, and has learned to survive on oil rents and Chinese largesse instead of western backing. </p>
<p>The flux in Washington’s approach to al-Bashir since 1989 – ostracism under Bill Clinton, cautious engagement under George W. Bush, mixed messages under Barack Obama – stands testament to the difficulty the US has faced its influence to bear effectively in Khartoum. </p>
<p>The truth is that western governments have few cards to play in Sudan. This has been even more so since the election of fellow ICC indictee Uhuru Kenyatta to the presidency in Kenya and the outbreak of civil war in South Sudan in 2013, two events which have strengthened al-Bashir’s hand regionally and internationally. Threats and condemnations from the West will sadly do little to change Ibrahim’s fate. </p>
<p>But western officials have other diplomatic tools at their disposal, notably flattery and face-time. Even the tyrants of North Korea have been known to offer clemency to prisoners when <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8182716.stm">personally lobbied by former US presidents</a>. Indeed, in 2007, al-Bashir himself <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7124447.stm">pardoned a British schoolteacher</a> imprisoned for blasphemy (naming her class’s teddy bear “Muhammad”) after a visit from British legislators. </p>
<p>Instead of lobbying John Kerry to grant Meriam Ibrahim asylum, the two US senators from New Hampshire – home state of Ibrahim’s husband – might be better off catching the next flight to Khartoum. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27005/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Fisher has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. He also held an Honorary Research Fellowship in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Africa Directorate between 2013-2014.</span></em></p>The case of Meriam Ibrahim, a pregnant woman sentenced to death for apostasy by a Khartoum court, has rightly refocused international attention on the dire state of human rights in Sudan. Ibrahim’s prosecution…Jonathan Fisher, Lecturer in International Development, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/267182014-05-19T05:08:18Z2014-05-19T05:08:18ZBoko Haram and the state of failure in Nigeria<p>Earlier this month, Nigeria marked a most unwelcome anniversary; a year of special measures in the three northern states of <a href="http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/few-gains-after-nigeria-s-year-long-state-of-emergency-524519">Adamawa, Borno and Yobe</a>. Located in the north east corner of the country, snug against the international borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon, these blighted provinces are the birthplace and main operational area of <a href="https://theconversation.com/boko-haram-the-terror-group-that-kidnapped-200-schoolgirls-25931">Boko Haram</a>, the insurgent group which recently achieved new levels of infamy following its abduction of more than 200 schoolgirls. </p>
<p>Indeed, the special measures introduced by the Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan, were a direct response to the group and its activities, an attempt by Abuja to better assist the security forces in their efforts to destroy it. </p>
<p>Yet the measures are also a confession. They are an admission by President Jonathan that Boko Haram is an increasingly serious threat and that <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201404170133.html">Nigeria is a failed state</a>. Hopes of containing and defeating the group within the confines of everyday legal parameters have been well and truly smashed. Boko Haram demands additional attention beyond what the police, armed forces and security services normally provide.</p>
<p>The group is both a cause and a manifestation of Nigeria’s failure. It is a cause as its actions are placing parts of the country beyond the direct control of the Nigerian government. Abuja no longer exercises a monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion throughout the whole of its sovereign territory. It is a manifestation as it is, in part, a response to the government’s failure to provide Nigerians with the public goods that they have a reasonable right to expect to receive.</p>
<p>While the identification and classification of Nigeria as a failed state is entirely consistent with both academic and practioner definitions of failure, questions can be raised over <a href="http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/failed-states.html">what this label truly means</a>. Certainly, it is now a widely accepted shorthand for political limitation, and widespread hardship and suffering. And certainly, these connotations are entirely consistent with Nigeria’s condition. Abuja’s writ is curtailed. The living standards of thousands of ordinary Nigerians are diminished. </p>
<p>Yet if this label is to be applied, great care must be taken when doing so. Not least, because of the implied temporal break inherent within it, the suggestion that there was a time before failure when Abuja exercised the necessary monopoly and furnished Nigerians with the public goods they deserve.</p>
<p>Clearly though, and in keeping with the view of Boko Haram as a manifestation of failure, Nigeria’s demise predates the introduction of the special measures and the group itself. </p>
<p>But if there was a time before failure, when and why did it end? The implications of this consideration reach far beyond Nigeria’s borders. The concept of state failure is premised on an idealised understanding of what a state is and should be doing that is rooted in European experience. But if the benchmark of statehood is European in origin, how applicable is it to Africa? </p>
<p>If successive governments of Nigeria, Niger and Mali have long struggled to fully control their territories and provide their citizens with public goods then how much of a departure from established practice do their current failures represent? Can they be labelled failed if they have rarely, if ever, conformed to this idealised notion? Or are they simply acting in ways entirely consistent with past behaviour? In which case, can they be described as failed since there is no significant change in what they are doing?</p>
<p>Such questions have political implications. The profound changes in international attitudes which helped lead to the demise of Europe’s overseas empires and the establishment of Africa’s independent states – and subsequent emergence of the phenomenon of state failure – preclude the renegotiation of the continent’s national borders. In the past 50 or so years since the “winds of change” brought independence to the African continent, only two new states (Eritrea and South Sudan) have formally been allowed to come into being. The international community has committed itself to working with the states that exist no matter how failed they might be. </p>
<p>This decision, by extension, obliges European and North American governments to encourage and assist their Nigerian, Nigerien and Malian counterparts to develop and behave in ways that they perhaps never have. The time may very well be nigh for a more fundamental rethink about the state of the state in Africa today. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/26718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Hill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Earlier this month, Nigeria marked a most unwelcome anniversary; a year of special measures in the three northern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Located in the north east corner of the country, snug…Jonathan Hill, Senior Lecturer, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.