tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/foreign-influence-46990/articlesForeign influence – The Conversation2023-12-19T03:29:29Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2199622023-12-19T03:29:29Z2023-12-19T03:29:29ZAn AI-driven influence operation is spreading pro-China propaganda across YouTube<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566467/original/file-20231219-29-d6iweb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=64%2C17%2C3846%2C2585&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A recent investigation from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/shadow-play">has revealed</a> an extensive network of YouTube channels promoting pro-Chinese and anti-US public opinion in the English-speaking world.</p>
<p>The operation is well-coordinated, using <a href="https://www.techopedia.com/definition/34633/generative-ai">generative AI</a> to rapidly produce and publish content, while deftly exploiting YouTube’s algorithmic recommendation system. </p>
<h2>How big is the network?</h2>
<p>Operation “<a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/shadow-play">Shadow Play</a>” involves a network of at least 30 YouTube channels with about 730,000 subscribers. At the time of writing this article the channels had some 4,500 videos between them, with about 120 million views.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2023-12/Shadow%20Play.pdf?VersionId=1_.62RpM_chdUdpm7I0da34yOfAvR0t6">ASPI</a>, the channels gained audiences by using AI algorithms to cross-promote each other’s content, thereby boosting visibility. This is concerning as it allows state messaging to cross borders with <a href="https://www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/state-proxies-and-plausible-deniability-challenging-conventional-wisdom-644.html">plausible deniability</a>.</p>
<p>The network of videos also featured an AI avatar created by British artificial intelligence company Synthesia, according to <a href="https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2023-12/Shadow%20Play.pdf?VersionId=1_.62RpM_chdUdpm7I0da34yOfAvR0t6">the report</a>, as well as other AI-generated entities and voiceovers.</p>
<p>While it’s not clear who is behind the operation, investigators say the controller is likely Mandarin-speaking. After profiling the behaviour, they concluded it doesn’t match that of any known state actor in the business of online influence operations. Instead, they suggest it might be a commercial entity operating under some degree of state direction.</p>
<p>These findings double as the latest evidence that advanced influence operations are evolving faster than defensive measures.</p>
<h2>Influencer conflicts of interest</h2>
<p>One clear parallel between the Shadow Play operation and other influence campaigns is the use of coordinated networks of inauthentic social media accounts, and pages amplifying the messaging.</p>
<p>For example, in 2020 Facebook <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2020/09/august-2020-cib-report/">took down</a> a network of more than 300 Facebook accounts, pages and Instagram accounts that were being run from China and posting content about the US election and COVID pandemic. As was the case with Shadow Play, these assets worked together to spread content and make it appear more popular than it was.</p>
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<h2>Is current legislation strong enough?</h2>
<p>The current disclosure requirements around sponsored content have some glaring gaps when it comes to addressing cross-border influence campaigns. Most Australian <a href="https://legalvision.com.au/guide-influencer-marketing-laws/">consumer protection</a> and <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Advertising%20and%20selling%20guide%20-%20July%202021.pdf">advertising regulation</a> focuses on commercial sponsorships rather than geopolitical conflicts of interest.</p>
<p>Platforms such as YouTube <a href="https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801973?hl=en">prohibit</a> deceptive practices in their stated rules. However, identifying and enforcing violations is difficult with foreign state-affiliated accounts that conceal who is pulling their strings.</p>
<p>Determining what is propaganda, as opposed to free speech, raises difficult ethical questions around <a href="https://news.columbia.edu/content/social-media-freedom-speech-and-future-our-democracy">censorship</a> and political opinions. Ideally, transparency measures shouldn’t unduly restrict <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/religion/katharine-gelber-social-media-and-free-speech/13093868">protected</a> speech. But viewers still deserve to understand an influencer’s incentives and potential biases.</p>
<p>Possible measures could include clear disclosures when content is affiliated directly or indirectly with a foreign government, as well as making affiliation and location data more visible on channels.</p>
<h2>How to spot deceptive content?</h2>
<p>As technologies become more sophisticated, it’s becoming harder to discern what agenda or conflict of interest may be shaping the content of a video. </p>
<p>Discerning viewers can gain some insight by looking into the creator(s) behind the content. Do they provide information on who they are, where they’re based and their background? A lack of clarity may signal an attempt to obscure their identity.</p>
<p>You can also assess the tone and goal of the content. Does it seem to be driven by a specific ideological argument? What is the poster’s ultimate aim: are they just trying to get clicks, or are they persuading you into believing their viewpoint?</p>
<p>Check for credibility signals, such as what other established sources say about this creator or their claims. When something seems dubious, rely on authoritative journalists and fact-checkers.</p>
<p>And make sure not to consume too much content from any single creator. Get your information from reliable sources across the political spectrum so you can take an informed stance.</p>
<h2>The bigger picture</h2>
<p>The advancement of AI could <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/05/19/1025016/embracing-the-rapid-pace-of-ai/">exponentially amplify</a> the reach and precision of coordinated influence operations if ethical safeguards aren’t implemented. At its most extreme, the unrestricted spread of <a href="https://www.govtech.com/artificial-intelligence/how-generative-ai-is-boosting-propaganda-disinformation">AI propaganda</a> could undermine truth and manipulate real-world events.</p>
<p>Propaganda campaigns may not stop at trying to shape narratives and opinions. They could also be used to <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/10/04/1080801/generative-ai-boosting-disinformation-and-propaganda-freedom-house/">generate</a> <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/data-and-policy/article/role-of-artificial-intelligence-in-disinformation/7C4BF6CA35184F149143DE968FC4C3B6">hyper-realistic</a> text, audio and image content aimed at radicalising individuals. This could greatly destabilise our societies. </p>
<p>We’re already seeing the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/data-and-policy/article/role-of-artificial-intelligence-in-disinformation/7C4BF6CA35184F149143DE968FC4C3B6">precursors</a> of what could become <a href="https://www.apa.org/monitor/2023/07/psychology-embracing-ai">AI psy-ops</a> with the ability to spoof identities, surveil citizens en masse, and automate disinformation production.</p>
<p>Without applying an ethics or <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/business-and-human-rights-journal/article/emerging-regulations-on-content-moderation-and-misinformation-policies-of-online-media-platforms-accommodating-the-duty-of-care-into-intermediary-liability-models/26CC58F662E8FE0BDF8959BC3367D498">oversight framework</a> to <a href="https://cssh.northeastern.edu/ethics/the-ethics-of-content-labeling-examining-new-approaches-for-social-media-and-online-platforms/">content moderation</a> and recommendation algorithms, social platforms could effectively act as misinformation mega-amplifiers optimised for watch-time, regardless of the consequences.</p>
<p>Over time, this may erode social cohesion, upend elections, incite violence and even <a href="https://il.boell.org/en/2022/01/06/artificial-intelligence-and-democracy">undermine</a> our democratic institutions. And unless we move quickly, the pace of malicious innovation may <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/risk-and-resilience/our-insights/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-trends-looking-over-the-horizon">outstrip</a> any regulatory measures.</p>
<p>It’s more important than ever to <a href="https://ctb.ku.edu/en/table-of-contents/maintain/maintain-quality-performance/establishing-oversight-mechanisms/main">establish external oversight</a> to make sure social media platforms work for the greater good, and not just short-term profit. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/facebooks-algorithms-fueled-massive-foreign-propaganda-campaigns-during-the-2020-election-heres-how-algorithms-can-manipulate-you-168229">Facebook's algorithms fueled massive foreign propaganda campaigns during the 2020 election – here's how algorithms can manipulate you</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Tuffley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new report reveals how a pro-China influence network exploits advanced AI to coordinate propaganda across YouTube channels.David Tuffley, Senior Lecturer in Applied Ethics & CyberSecurity, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785292022-04-03T19:58:05Z2022-04-03T19:58:05ZChinese students are becoming more politically active in Australian elections – but it comes at a risk<p>Chinese international students in Australia have become more politically engaged in recent years, particularly when it comes to <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/chinese-international-students-take-on-major-parties-at-universities-20180905-p50222.html">student politics on campus</a>. </p>
<p>Even the major Australian political parties are now engaging with Chinese students in federal and state election campaigns. </p>
<p>In fact, over the past decade, politicians in electorates with large Chinese-speaking communities have started to view recruiting Chinese international students as indispensable in order to better communicate with their constituencies. </p>
<p>Although this is a good opportunity for international students to get involved with the local community and culture, it isn’t always beneficial at a time when “<a href="https://johnmenadue.com/china-panic-australias-alternative-to-paranoia-and-pandering-by-david-brophy/">China panic</a>” is growing in Australia.</p>
<h2>How students are recruited</h2>
<p>Traditionally, political parties have recruited university student campaigners through their own clubs on campus, such as the Labor Club, Liberal Club and Conservative Club at the University of Sydney. </p>
<p>Chinese student politics leaders have also become more visible, opening up another recruitment channel for the parties. And many candidates’ campaign teams have become adept at using Chinese social media platforms such as WeChat and Little Red Book to cast a wider net for volunteers.</p>
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<p>Recruiters make two promises to attract these students. First, they offer to grant them a volunteer certificate, which looks good on a CV. Second, they offer opportunities to establish connections with Australian political, business and social elites.</p>
<p>Once students are recruited, they are given a brief orientation on the ideology of the party, as well as the rules and regulations around Australian elections. They pick up the rest of the necessary skills on the job.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-social-media-platform-wechat-could-be-a-key-battleground-in-the-federal-election-113925">Chinese social media platform WeChat could be a key battleground in the federal election</a>
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<h2>What the students do for campaigns</h2>
<p>I’ve had conversations with some 20 of these Chinese student campaigners as part of my ongoing research on Chinese international students’ political participation in Australia. </p>
<p>The students told me their duties mainly revolve around outreach in Chinese-speaking communities. They hand out flyers, explain policies and knock on doors to canvass for votes and boost voter turnout. </p>
<p>Some students are also tasked with managing public relations for campaigns on Chinese social media. Whenever they see public criticism of their candidate or party, they must try to mitigate the damage. As one of the campaigners told me, “manipulating multiple social media [platforms] is part of our job”. </p>
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<p>For example, after I posted a criticism of NSW Opposition leader Michael Daley’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/mar/19/michael-daley-claims-asian-workers-taking-young-peoples-jobs-in-sydney">discriminatory remarks</a> about Asian immigration on my WeChat account in 2019, a Chinese student in my contact list who served as a Labor Party campaigner immediately responded and claimed it was fake news generated by Daley’s rival.</p>
<p>Another time, when I complained on WeChat about <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/universities-told-no-more-research-money-under-labor-20190430-p51io0">Labor’s plans for university research funding</a>, another Chinese student campaigner argued with me on the platform. </p>
<p>Interestingly, both students told me afterwards speaking up in defence of the parties was required by their jobs, rather than a reflection of their own positions.</p>
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<h2>Why Chinese students want to be involved</h2>
<p>In my research, the students told me their participation in Australian political campaigns has been motivated by three reasons. </p>
<p>First, they consider campaigns an ideal way to get involved in Australian society and learn about the culture. They can practice their English in the process.</p>
<p>Second, they consider such experience as useful to their CVs, which could help with future academic and career advancement. Those who have returned to China, however, have found this experience to be less relevant in their job searches.</p>
<p>Friendship is the third incentive. Some students said their participation was based primarily on their personal relationship with the candidate or a member of his or her campaign team.</p>
<p>The values and ideologies of the political parties mattered less to these students.
A lack of interest in the core messages of the campaigns often resulted in a lack of long-term, solid commitment to their work.</p>
<p>However, some Chinese students made a strong commitment to their candidate and formally registered as party members. These volunteers are, unsurprisingly, leaders in student politics. Determined to become Australian citizens in the future, they embrace campaigning as an opportunity to launch their own political careers here. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/who-do-chinese-australian-voters-trust-for-their-political-news-on-wechat-113927">Who do Chinese-Australian voters trust for their political news on WeChat?</a>
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<h2>Problems with their participation</h2>
<p>Though many student volunteers do get a lot out of these jobs, there are still some concerns about their involvement in politics.</p>
<p>First, disagreements between parties have frequently spilled over into the Chinese international student community. From my observations at the University of Sydney, Chinese student campaigners from the different camps often fall into bitter quarrels, even though few, if any, of the parties’ policies or initiatives are focused on improving the welfare of international students.</p>
<p>For example, Chinese student candidates who have signed preference deals with the NSW Young Liberals’ candidates have always been labeled as “betrayer of minorities” by their Chinese rivals. </p>
<p>A second concern is with the stigmatisation of Chinese international students in Australian politics, mainly due to the growing worry over the threat of foreign interference in elections. </p>
<p>Some Australian media, think tanks and politicians have depicted Chinese international students as <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/i-am-watching-you-chinese-students-surveilled-at-australian-universities-20210629-p585ao.html">spies</a> for the Chinese government who are seeking to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/06/30/they-dont-understand-fear-we-have/how-chinas-long-reach-repression-undermines">interfere</a> with Australian institutions. </p>
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<p>However, none of the evidence cited typically goes beyond the students’ direct involvement in the Australian electoral process. And such influence is, in fact, invited and encouraged by Australian politicians.</p>
<p>Worryingly, Chinese international students could run into legal issues due to their involvement in campaigns. A new <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fems%2Fs1333_ems_a1508208-9a73-4ad8-9040-c8a3e4eaaa9d%22">foreign influence law</a> sailed through parliament in February aimed at <a href="https://theconversation.com/stronger-laws-on-foreign-election-influence-were-rushed-through-this-week-limiting-speech-but-ignoring-our-billionaire-problem-177147">limiting “foreign” persons or entities</a> from fundraising for or directly spending on electioneering – or even authorising electoral matter – to influence a Commonwealth election.</p>
<p>Under this new law, it remains unclear whether political parties are allowed to recruit foreign individuals to assist with their campaigns, and if so, under what conditions. </p>
<p>As long as this vagueness remains, Australian political parties will continue to prioritise pragmatism over principle and exploit this grey area to advance their causes. Chinese international students should be aware of the risks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178529/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ye Xue does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Politicians in Chinese-speaking electorates have started to view recruiting Chinese international students as indispensable. But there are risks involved for the students.Ye Xue, Research Associate, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1771472022-02-18T01:13:06Z2022-02-18T01:13:06ZStronger laws on ‘foreign’ election influence were rushed through this week – limiting speech but ignoring our billionaire problem<p>In case you missed it, election season is upon us again. Like the elongated summers caused by climate change, campaigning is intensifying and being spread over longer periods every election.</p>
<p>Although polling day is not due until May, this year’s campaign kicked off nine months out with billionaire Clive Palmer’s plunge into <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/craig-kelly-uap-clive-palmer-text-message-sms/13524840">spam texts</a>, and big spending on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/oct/20/united-australia-party-spent-12m-on-youtube-ads-in-two-months-since-craig-kelly-named-leader">YouTube ads</a> and billboards. </p>
<p>Campaigning may be well under way, but the rules governing the election are still being finessed. Some of this is administrative and technological, such as <a href="https://www.aec.gov.au/election/covid19-safety-measures.htm">tweaks</a> to ensure COVID-safe voting at polling places.</p>
<p>However, in the past week, a more substantial campaigning bill sailed through parliament. Its title, the <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fems%2Fs1333_ems_a1508208-9a73-4ad8-9040-c8a3e4eaaa9d%22">Electoral Amendment (Foreign Influences and Offences) Bill 2022</a>, is clunky, but suggestive.</p>
<p>The bill creates several new offences, limiting “foreign” persons or entities from fundraising for or directly spending on electioneering – or even authorising electoral matter – to influence a Commonwealth election.</p>
<p>This new law has received minimal attention. Aside from a <a href="https://thewest.com.au/opinion/ben-morton-we-must-be-vigilant-to-protect-our-democracy-from-foreign-interference-c-5646350">commentary piece</a> by a Liberal MP, there’s been scant reporting or analysis.</p>
<p>Instead, it has been subsumed by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/feb/14/afp-on-alert-for-domestic-protests-disinformation-and-foreign-interference-as-election-looms">concerns</a> over foreign interference or disinformation campaigns in the upcoming federal election. These concerns were amplified by <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/spy-chief-sounds-warning-on-election-interference-20220209-p59uym">revelations</a> about alleged Chinese attempts to inject funding into the Australian political system.</p>
<p>The Morrison government has sought to leverage the heightened tensions by <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/federal-election/peter-dutton-says-china-has-decided-to-back-labor-at-the-election/news-story/2f8fbd482da508bf7b1155b8ffb4cf8c">claiming</a> “Beijing backs Labor”. In response, the head of ASIO <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-16/prime-minister-labels-labor-mp-manchurian-candidate/100837380">warned</a> against politicising the issue. Any risk of inappropriate overseas influence in the election affects all sides.</p>
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<h2>What the new law will do</h2>
<p>The new “foreign influences” bill was hurried through the Senate at the end of last week, then passed the House on Wednesday. Unlike almost all electoral reforms, it was not subject to committee, let alone public, scrutiny. </p>
<p>This suggests both major parties are genuinely concerned about beefing up the law or at least sending a strong signal against overseas assistance to Australian parties, candidates or electoral lobby groups that may hope to benefit from it. </p>
<p>The bill builds on <a href="https://www.aec.gov.au/Parties_and_Representatives/financial_disclosure/files/foreign-donations-fact-sheet.pdf">existing offences</a> against “foreign” donations to parties, MPs or electoral lobby groups in Australia, which were enacted after long debate in 2018. These already cover gifts on behalf of a “foreign” donor to candidates – the <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/prominent-chinese-businessman-named-in-parliament-as-puppeteer-20220215-p59whd">alleged scheme</a> recently involving Chinese money and potential Labor candidates. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/federal-governments-foreign-donations-bill-is-flawed-and-needs-to-be-redrafted-92586">Federal government's foreign donations bill is flawed and needs to be redrafted</a>
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<p>“Foreign” is a slippery concept, and not easy to define. This is a reason why the bill needed more debate – and may be partly unconstitutional.</p>
<p>In our electoral act, the term “foreign” covers overseas governments or corporations, as well as any non-citizen, either in Australia or overseas. These include some refugees and those in Australia on working or business visas (however long-term), but not permanent residents. </p>
<p>Of course, such foreigners cannot vote in our elections. And the 2018 ban on these individuals donating to electoral campaigns was sensible.</p>
<p>Yet, the new law now threatens fines of up to $26,000 for merely authorising election material. This would include small things like pamphlets, or YouTube content that costs any money to produce. </p>
<p>Many of the guest workers we rely on to work on farms or in the hospitality industry face objectively poor conditions and legal rights. Under this new law, they are permitted to contribute to discussion of these issues, but would be prohibited from trying to sway Australians to vote to address them.</p>
<p>On its face, this breaches freedom of political communication. This freedom is not an individual right, it’s a collective ideal. Its rationale is to ensure we, as an electorate and society, can be informed about politics and government. </p>
<p>Limits on this freedom of political communication have to be proportionate or the High Court can <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nsw-political-donations-case-the-implied-freedom-of-political-communication-strikes-again-after-21-years-21676">strike them down</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nsw-political-donations-case-the-implied-freedom-of-political-communication-strikes-again-after-21-years-21676">The NSW political donations case: the implied freedom of political communication strikes again (after 21 years)</a>
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<h2>More systemic issues to worry about</h2>
<p>For over a century, Australian law accepted foreign influence in our politics. A <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/british-lord-made-1m-donation-to-libs-20060201-gdmvxc.html">British lord</a> tipped $1 million into Liberal Party coffers before the 2004 election. US agencies have helped fund <a href="https://catallaxyf.wordpress.com/2005/04/16/the-decline-of-quadrant/">liberty-oriented expression</a>.</p>
<p>Some argue that because goods and finance flow easily internationally, and problems like climate change and pandemics know no borders, foreign influence is not only unavoidable but essential. We live in an integrated world, where interests are intermingled. </p>
<p>Some say these laws are xenophobic against China. But we should be concerned about Chinese influence, due to its sheer size, resources, and opaque and unaccountable system of government. </p>
<p>The bigger problem is we have been focusing on the mote of foreign influence, without addressing the beam in our eye – the broader systemic weakness of our political finance regime. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/177-million-flowed-to-australian-political-parties-last-year-but-major-donors-can-easily-hide-176129">$177 million flowed to Australian political parties last year, but major donors can easily hide</a>
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<p>Our national election act, despite years of debate, still lacks expenditure limits and donation limits. The US, UK, New Zealand, Canada and most Australian states have one or both of these limits. Capping campaign spending helps maintain political equality, while capping donations inhibits those who would give big, behind the scenes, to buy political influence.</p>
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<p>Nor do we regulate <a href="https://theconversation.com/time-to-tighten-the-reins-on-politicians-and-their-truths-62457">misleading political ads</a> at the national level. </p>
<p>Foreign money and disinformation is a worry. But even more so are the much larger sources of both, generated entirely inside the country. </p>
<p>In 2019, for instance, Palmer spent a record-shattering <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/clive-palmer-spent-83-million-on-failed-election-bid-20200203-p53x4j">$83 million</a> to influence the federal election. Parliament had three years to fix this problem. It didn’t; now we get to relive it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177147/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Graeme Orr has received ARC grant funding in the past to research electoral law and work with electoral commissions. He is currently an expert member of the NSW iVote Panel. He also gives pro bono advice to groups lobbying for reform of electoral law.</span></em></p>The new law makes it illegal for ‘foreign’ persons or entities to fundraise or directly spend on electioneering, or to authorise electoral material.Graeme Orr, Professor of Law, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1456892020-09-10T03:26:36Z2020-09-10T03:26:36ZWhy unis are worried about a federal power to cancel their foreign ‘arrangements’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357099/original/file-20200909-17-vs95us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5462%2C3341&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://theconversation.com/morrison-government-set-to-target-victorian-belt-and-road-agreement-under-sweeping-new-legislation-145124">proposed law</a> would give the federal government power to cancel arrangements between foreign governments and Australian states, territories, local councils and public universities. </p>
<p>At first glance, it’s not meant to cover universities’ arrangements with all foreign universities. However, the practical reality is that it could impact all sorts of Australian university arrangements with foreign entities, including universities. These powers have the potential to affect arrangements for joint degrees, staff or student exchange programs, research grant funding, collaborative research and joint conferences, among other things. </p>
<p>The core premise of the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6596">Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Bill 2020</a> is to prevent “arrangements” with foreign governments that <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/ensuring-consistent-australian-foreign-policy">the government says</a> “adversely affect Australia’s foreign relations or are inconsistent with our foreign policy”. It is not explicit in the bill, but the government has in its sights <a href="https://www.vic.gov.au/bri-framework">Victoria’s agreement with China</a> under the latter’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-there-so-much-furore-over-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-139461">Belt and Road Initiative</a>. </p>
<p>It’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-can-the-federal-government-control-the-ability-of-states-to-sign-deals-with-foreign-governments-145164">fairly clear</a> the Commonwealth has the constitutional power to do this. Nevertheless, the inclusion of Australian public universities in this regime is problematic. (ANU, we regret to advise that you will be subject to this legislation but Bond and Notre Dame, please be advised that you may continue to go forth and make your foreign arrangements as you see fit.)</p>
<p>Universities Australia has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/sep/05/foreign-veto-laws-could-affect-tens-of-thousands-of-research-projects-australian-universities-warn">expressed</a> “grave concerns” about the potential impact on “tens of thousands of research projects”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-can-the-federal-government-control-the-ability-of-states-to-sign-deals-with-foreign-governments-145164">Explainer: can the federal government control the ability of states to sign deals with foreign governments?</a>
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<h2>Undefined ‘autonomy’ is a key issue</h2>
<p>It has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/morrison-government-set-to-target-victorian-belt-and-road-agreement-under-sweeping-new-legislation-145124">suggested</a> the legislation will only cover arrangements with foreign universities that are “arms of a foreign government”, such as government military universities. However, the bill as tabled creates potential for overreach. This is because the question of whether a university agreement is covered or not will turn on the nebulous determination of whether the foreign university has “institutional autonomy”. </p>
<p>The bill does not define this. The forthcoming rules made under this legislation will set the criteria for assessing the autonomy of foreign universities. </p>
<p>At this point, the criteria are unknown. The <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r6596_ems_d3fd0486-c0d5-430e-83d7-5c2de5644e99/upload_pdf/747250.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf">explanatory memorandum</a> to the bill suggests they “may include” if a government or political party exerts “control or influence” over “university management, leadership, curriculum and/or research activities”. </p>
<p>The foreign affairs minister (not parliament) will determine the criteria in a <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Brief_Guides_to_Senate_Procedure/No_19#:%7E:text=What%20are%20legislative%20instruments%3F,in%20a%20particular%20case%3B%20and">legislative instrument</a>. This is a form of rules or regulations that the minister can unilaterally change at any point. (Parliament does have the power to veto these later.) </p>
<p>Even if the criteria for autonomy are fairly clear to understand and remain consistent, this still presents a practical problem for universities. How are universities to determine how the rules might apply to foreign universities whose internal operating arrangements are not publicly available? Even if available, they might not be in English.</p>
<p>And if the federal government is suggesting a foreign university’s autonomy is important, is not the bill setting a double standard that Australian universities may not meet? They are certainly regulated by the federal government’s Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA). And government policy changes – such as funding for student places and research block grants, among other things – regularly have direct impacts on public universities.</p>
<p>Indeed, this bill is one just more example of the government’s recent efforts to regulate what universities do and how they do it. </p>
<h2>And that’s not the only problem</h2>
<p>The powers in this bill are wide-ranging. As a result, the regulatory impact of this oversight and veto regime will be significant. </p>
<p>For a start, the bill seeks to safeguard Australia’s foreign policy “<a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=LEGISLATION;id=legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6596_first-reps%2F0001;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6596_first-reps%2F0000%22;rec=0#1dae88e12a4c48c4ab9f18c82686dc0a">whether or not the policy […] is written or publicly available</a>”. Even the most risk-averse, compliance-inclined Australian entity is going to find it difficult to operate in support of a policy that it knows nothing about. </p>
<p>The bill covers <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=LEGISLATION;id=legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6596_first-reps%2F0001;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6596_first-reps%2F0000%22;rec=0#d689ded711dd46dfbd7f85e2b029f1ea">written arrangements, agreements, contracts, understandings and undertakings</a>, regardless of <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=LEGISLATION;id=legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6596_first-reps%2F0005;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6596_first-reps%2F0000%22;rec=0#00eb690848b742f6a1ac6bb0ef03540e">where</a> and <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=LEGISLATION;id=legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6596_first-reps%2F0001;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6596_first-reps%2F0000%22;rec=0#d689ded711dd46dfbd7f85e2b029f1ea">when</a> they were entered into. Although not mentioned explicitly, oral arrangements appear to be excluded. </p>
<p>There is a complicated set of statutory definitions. These involve core entities, non-core entities, core arrangements, non-core arrangements and subsidiary arrangements with third parties. Different rules apply for the various combinations of these. This is one of those occasions where a set of Venn diagrams should have replaced the simplified descriptive outlines now common to Commonwealth legislation!</p>
<p>The decision-making process about whether foreign arrangements are inconsistent with Australia’s foreign policy and what happens afterwards is also problematic. The legislation <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=LEGISLATION;id=legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6596_first-reps%2F0005;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6596_first-reps%2F0000%22;rec=0#3daaa44c926d42cea532b71a3cdc6f7a">states</a>:</p>
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<p>The Minister is not required to observe any requirements of procedural fairness in exercising a power or performing a function under this Act.</p>
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<p>And that’s just the start of the imbalance of power. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/morrisons-foreign-relations-bill-should-not-pass-parliament-heres-why-145615">Morrison's foreign relations bill should not pass parliament. Here's why</a>
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<h2>Rights of appeal are weak</h2>
<p>If the parties affected do not agree with the minister’s decision, they have little recourse. The bill does not provide for merits review – an appeal where the facts can be considered anew, alongside the lawfulness of the decision-making process. It explicitly, <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6595">in a related bill</a>, excludes review under the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2019C00309">Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977</a>. </p>
<p>Prospects for compensation are almost nil. It can be sought from the government only <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=LEGISLATION;id=legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6596_first-reps%2F0005;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6596_first-reps%2F0000%22;rec=0#d2b4b9d2613d4ee5a9e95d7317e239a0">if property is acquired on otherwise than just terms</a>. </p>
<p>Concerns have been voiced about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-clive-palmer-could-challenge-the-act-designed-to-stop-him-getting-30-billion-145098">extraordinary nature</a> of <a href="https://parliament.wa.gov.au/parliament/bills.nsf/BillProgressPopup?openForm&ParentUNID=2F1CFD31ACD372EE482585C100337061">Western Australia’s recent legislation</a> terminating Clive Palmer’s arbitration matters. Some have claimed it <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-wa-government-legislated-itself-a-win-in-its-dispute-with-clive-palmer-and-put-itself-above-the-law-144360">damaged the rule of law</a>. Palmer <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-12/clive-palmer-denies-seeking-30-billion-damages-wa-government/12494968">has suggested</a> the state’s action creates a sovereign risk. </p>
<p>You would think new powers enabling the Commonwealth to unilaterally terminate arrangements between Australian entities, including universities, and certain foreign entities ought to excite similar concern about the risk for foreign parties in making agreements with Australians. </p>
<p>The bill has been referred to the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/AustForeignRelations2020">Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee</a>. Public submissions to the inquiry close on September 25 2020. </p>
<p>One thing about this legislation as it stands appears certain: any trust that foreign universities currently place in Australian universities will be at risk when it becomes known the Commonwealth can unilaterally terminate their arrangements.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Narrelle Morris has received funding from the Australia Research Council, the National Archives of Australia and the National Library of Australia. She has been funded in recent years for international conference travel to present her research by a foreign government entity and a foreign university of unknown institutional autonomy, both of which would likely fall within the auspices of this new legislation (although these arrangements were likely consistent with Australia's known historical foreign policy should the Minister have any concerns). </span></em></p>It’s all in the details: the wide-ranging powers hinge on the yet-to-be-defined ‘institutional autonomy’ of foreign partners that enter into agreements with Australian public universities.Narrelle Morris, Senior Lecturer, Curtin Law School, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1244972019-10-07T19:14:15Z2019-10-07T19:14:15ZStudents from China may defend their country but that doesn’t make them Communist Party agents<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/295746/original/file-20191007-121060-ed0lyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C112%2C4970%2C2994&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese students come to Australia to study for the same reasons as other international students.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">from shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese students with <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/01/chinas-angry-young-nationalists/">nationalist sentiments</a> can be <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/figure/10.1080/14443058.2019.1647270?scroll=top&needAccess=true">seen as agents</a> of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). <a href="https://clivehamilton.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/UQ-CCP-Influence-in-Universities-3.pdf">Such concerns</a> were particularly evident during reports of clashes at <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jul/24/china-hong-kong-students-clash-university-queensland">Australian</a> and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/australasia/article/3020639/chinese-students-clash-new-zealand-university-over-hong-kong">New Zealand</a> universities between pro-CCP and pro-Hong Kong students. </p>
<p>In similar recent clashes in Sheffield, UK, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/hong-kong-protests-latest-sheffield-clashes-bottles-thrown-chinese-students-a9135186.html">onlookers claimed</a> Chinese students were threatening citizens’ right to protest and freedom of speech. There have <a href="https://theconversation.com/academic-urges-universities-to-get-out-from-under-the-shadow-of-beijing-122562">been concerns</a> the Chinese government is extending its influence into Western universities, threatening academic freedom, freedom of speech and liberal values. </p>
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<p>Confucius Institutes are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49511231">criticised as tools through</a> which the Chinese government spreads its propaganda under the guise of teaching Chinese culture and language. Chinese students who aggressively protect their country’s reputation may be lumped into the same category.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-confucius-institutes-and-do-they-teach-chinese-propaganda-114274">Explainer: what are Confucius Institutes and do they teach Chinese propaganda?</a>
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<p>But research shows Chinese students come to Australia to study for much the same reasons as students from other countries – to gain a competitive edge over graduates in their home country by learning English and experiencing another culture. </p>
<h2>Why students from China go overseas</h2>
<p>Over the past 20 years, Chinese international students have become highly visible on <a href="https://internationaleducation.gov.au/research/International-Student-Data/Pages/default.aspx">Australian campuses</a>. International students account for <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1819/Quick_Guides/OverseasStudents">more than 50% of enrolments</a> at some Australian universities and Chinese students make up nearly 40% of all international students. </p>
<p>While Chinese students study in Australia for many reasons, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/figure/10.1080/14443058.2019.1647270?scroll=top&needAccess=true">recent study</a> showed most were here for economic reasons. Having an international degree and English language skills can give job seekers an edge over their locally educated peers. </p>
<p>Acquiring <a href="https://tapri.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/v15n3_4jackling.pdf">permanent residency</a> in Australia is also a common aim, although <a href="https://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2019/08/chinese-international-students-flee-australia/">changes in policy</a> are making this increasingly difficult. A <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14443058.2019.1647270">2010 study</a> showed an American degree can also <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12564-010-9117-x">increase Chinese students’ social status</a> in China. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07256868.2018.1533538?journalCode=cjis20">2018 study of Chinese women</a> studying in Australia showed studying abroad could be an opportunity to escape traditional expectations such as marrying early and having children. It also provides a chance for the students to explore their sexuality.</p>
<h2>Does the CCP control Chinese students overseas?</h2>
<p>Since the 1990s China has intensified its “<a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/never-forget-national-humiliation/9780231148917">ideological education</a>” or “moral education” programs. These begin in the early years of school and continue throughout university. Ideological education aims to bolster support for the CCP and make liberal democracy less attractive.</p>
<p>Chinese international students have grown up with this education and have benefited from the economic success of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670561003666061">the China Model</a>. <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=20258">Some students from China</a> fear political change inside China could threaten the country’s stability. But this doesn’t automatically mean they are hostile to liberal values. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-chinese-and-hong-kong-students-clash-in-australia-the-patriotic-v-the-protest-movement-122405">Why Chinese and Hong Kong students clash in Australia: the patriotic v the protest movement</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=20258">Some students</a> believe democracy is suited to Western nations only, or that multi-party democracies are more responsive to citizen demands. Others may be supportive of democracy, but still see criticism of China as Western bias.</p>
<p>The CCP recognises that international education can have a liberalising impact on students. In response, it <a href="https://brill.com/view/title/21636">seeks to extend its influence</a> over students abroad, especially by providing economic and employment incentives to international students who support the CCP on their return to China. </p>
<p><a href="https://oatd.org/oatd/record?record=california%5C%3Aqt31m494hq">Chinese Students and Scholars Associations</a> maintain links between the PRC and Chinese students by holding social events and emphasising patriotism.</p>
<p>Some students who engage in <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/preliminary-study-prc-political-influence-and-interference-activities-american-higher">anti-CCP activities</a> have reported being threatened by the CCP. One Chinese student, who discussed sensitive political issues on social media in the US, <a href="https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/resources/obstacles-to-excellence-academic-freedom-chinas-quest-for-world-class-universities/">claimed she was questioned</a> for hours by state security when she returned to China.</p>
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<p>The CCP encourages overseas students to challenge liberal values and shape <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/magic-weapons-chinas-political-influence-activities-under-xi-jinping">China’s global image</a>. Some Chinese <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-41104634">students have challenged</a> Australian lecturers who criticise China. If these challenges become hostile, students and lecturers may avoid <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/preliminary-study-prc-political-influence-and-interference-activities-american-higher">discussing</a> contentious topics such as human rights, the status of Taiwan, or the Tienanmen protests. </p>
<p>But students who reject criticism of China also demonstrate that they are expressing their right to free speech and confronting and learning about ideas contrary to their beliefs.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/recent-campus-attacks-show-universities-need-to-do-more-to-protect-international-students-120082">Recent campus attacks show universities need to do more to protect international students</a>
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<p>When Chinese students don’t support the CCP, it is still pragmatic for them to show support for the PRC, or at least keep a low profile to avoid risk to themselves and their families. Upholding the safety of students in Australia should be a priority for universities, even if it upsets the CCP. </p>
<h2>Australian universities’ responsibilities to students from China</h2>
<p><a href="https://go8.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Growing-International-Education-in-Regional-Australia.pdf">Australian universities</a> promote themselves as internationalised, culturally diverse places where students can build global friendships. However, international students’ experiences often don’t reflect this.</p>
<p>Studying overseas is frequently alienating, and Chinese students’ experiences in Australia are no different.</p>
<p>PRC students mostly live in a “parallel society” without <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13676261.2014.992316?journalCode=cjys20">Australian friends</a>. Brief interactions, or group work at university, can increase negative feelings because both international and local students believe the other’s opinions are biased, while <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=20258">language barriers</a> also cause frustration. </p>
<p>Ideally, engaging Chinese students with liberal values <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jco/12/1/article-p96_6.xml?lang=en">would involve them studying social sciences</a> in small classes. But universities and students have not pursued this; <a href="https://internationaleducation.gov.au/research/DataVisualisations/Pages/nationalitySummary.aspx">almost 80% of Chinese international students</a> in Australia study engineering, science, IT, commerce and architecture in large lecture-style classes. </p>
<p>Encouraging students to engage in politics is an effective way of exposing them to democratic <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1028315314567175">political processes and values</a>. Discouraging or denying Chinese students the right to participate in student and national politics because of suspicions about their <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/racist-decision-bans-chinese-students-from-running-in-university-election-20190910-p52px5.html">political loyalty</a> is the exact opposite of the approach universities should be taking.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124497/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Diarmuid Cooney-O'Donoghue is a Director at the John Cain Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Benney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The majority of students from China come to Australia to learn English and be exposed to a different culture. This helps them get a competitive edge over graduates in their home country.Diarmuid Cooney-O'Donoghue, PhD student, Monash UniversityJonathan Benney, Lecturer in Chinese Studies, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1234452019-09-12T11:49:06Z2019-09-12T11:49:06ZGrattan on Friday: Asking questions about Gladys Liu is not racist<p>What’s the betting that when Scott Morrison and Donald Trump are exchanging views on China in Washington in a week or so, the President might be curious about Gladys Liu?</p>
<p>If he is, the Prime Minister will no doubt have some flattering words about the first Chinese-born federal parliamentarian, who is now Liberal MP for the marginal Melbourne seat of Chisholm.</p>
<p>He might be more reluctant to admit that Liu’s past has thrown up complex questions of identifying if and when, in relation to specific individuals, China’s interference in Australian politics is potentially present and a risk.</p>
<p>On a benign view, Liu’s story may be as simple as Morrison wants to paint it: a woman from Hong Kong who has overcome obstacles to get where she is. The ultimate have-a-go-to-get-a-go narrative.</p>
<p>In the political furore now surrounding her, Liu might be a victim of the growing worry about China’s influence and interference in this country.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/liu-defends-herself-after-concerns-about-her-chinese-associations-123362">Liu defends herself after concerns about her Chinese associations</a>
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<p>But legitimate and important questions have been raised about Liu. These revolve around two issues: firstly, her past connections to associations with direct or indirect links with the Chinese Communist Party (the company one keeps is always relevant), and secondly, the large amounts of money she has been able to raise for the Liberal party. While it has not been officially confirmed, it is known security authorities expressed concern about some of the people she assembled.</p>
<p>As a staffer (dealing with the Chinese media) of then Victorian premier Ted Baillieu, Liu was much valued as a fund raiser. Indeed, when she wasn’t included in the travelling party accompanying his successor, Denis Napthine, to China, Baillieu made representations on her behalf, and she was added. It was said she needed to keep face with the local Chinese in Australia.</p>
<p>Liu has obviously been a highly effective networker. Those with concerns ask: did she, wittingly or unwittingly, get assistance from the Chinese authorities to facilitate that networking?</p>
<p>John Garnaut, a China expert who advised Malcolm Turnbull in the run up to the 2018 foreign interference legislation, has outlined China’s approach to exerting influence, in evidence he gave to a US congressional committee last year. “The modus operandi is to offer privileged access, build personal rapport and reward those who deliver”.</p>
<p>Outgoing head of ASIO Duncan Lewis warned of the broad danger in a speech at the Sydney Institute last week. “The current scale and scope of foreign intelligence activity against Australian interests is unprecedented,” he said. (Liu, incidentally, is due to address the Sydney Institute later this month.)</p>
<p>It was Liu’s disastrous interview with Sky’s Andrew Bolt on Tuesday, following an ABC story earlier that day about her previous associations, that turbo charged this week’s debate about her. Liu claimed memory lapses when pressed on her past links, and was all over the place when probed on her attitude to China’s policy and the regime.</p>
<p>By the next day, the Prime Minister’s office had ensured her previous associations and current views had been gathered into a neat statement, which she issued rather than delivered in parliament (the PM tabled it on Thursday). But the interview had opened the floodgates for Labor and other critics.</p>
<p>Forced into a full scale defence of her, the government wheeled out the arguments that this was just a case of a “clumsy” interview, understandable given she was new to parliament, and that Labor, in pursuing her, was being “xenophobic” and “grubby”.</p>
<p>Neither argument stands up.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-gladys-liu-must-answer-to-parliament-about-alleged-links-to-the-chinese-government-123339">Why Gladys Liu must answer to parliament about alleged links to the Chinese government</a>
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<p>The issues around Liu are about her connections, not a stuffed-up interview.</p>
<p>As for the government playing the race card, this was both wrong and foolish.</p>
<p>Concern about China’s interference in Australian politics relates to the behaviour of an expansionist power. It’s not based on race. It is like the concern in the United States about Russian interference in American politics.</p>
<p>And in terms of tactics: has the government overlooked that one of Labor’s attack dogs on the Liu issue is the ALP Senate leader Penny Wong, whose father is a Malaysian of Chinese origin? Wong would be unlikely to join the front line of a race-based exercise.</p>
<p>While the Liu affair has had people reaching back to the case of former Labor senator Sam Dastyari, who quit parliament in the wake of a scandal over his Chinese connections, that’s not a parallel.</p>
<p>Dastyari got money to cover expenses, made comments about China’s activity in the South China sea at odds with his party’s policy, and tipped off billionaire donor Huang Xiangmo that his phone was likely being tapped by security agencies.</p>
<p>In short, Dastyari was beyond doubt compromised. With Liu, it’s a matter of questions to answer.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-chinas-vast-influence-network-how-it-works-and-the-extent-of-its-reach-in-australia-119174">Inside China's vast influence network – how it works, and the extent of its reach in Australia</a>
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<p>One new question is why, as reported by the ABC on Thursday, she did not include the key Chinese associations under scrutiny on her preselection nomination form, which asks candidates to list organisations “of which you are or have been a member”.</p>
<p>In choosing Liu to run in Chisholm the Liberals had someone they judged would do well in a seat with a high Chinese vote. Labor also ran a candidate with a Chinese background (born in Taiwan). Chisholm was particularly vulnerable for the Liberals – its previous incumbent, Julia Banks, had defected from the government to the crossbench after Malcolm Turnbull’s removal.</p>
<p>Having a candidate with a vast network brings political benefits but, as the Liberals are finding, the person can come with undesirable connections.</p>
<p>The Liu affair is the latest example of the need for parties to use more stringent vetting of candidates. This point was obvious when the constitution’s citizenship provision cut a swathe through the last parliament. It was reinforced in the run up to the election, when some candidates were disendorsed after discovery of their past unacceptable social media posts.</p>
<p>Liu’s parliamentary position is quite safe, on all we know at the moment. She was the pick and Morrison will stick. And if China had aspired to use Liu, MP, as an agent of influence, any such hope will have evaporated under the glare of the publicity she is now receiving.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123445/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Liu’s disastrous interview on Sky News forced the government into a full scale defence of her, saying that Labor, in pursuing her, was being “xenophobic” and “grubby”.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1233432019-09-11T20:04:41Z2019-09-11T20:04:41ZWorried about agents of foreign influence? Just look at who owns Australia’s biggest companies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291877/original/file-20190911-190026-1suz2pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Most of Australia's biggest companies are majority-owned by US investors.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The attention being given to possible covert influence being exercised by China in Australia shouldn’t distract us from recognising that very overt foreign influence now occurs through investment. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-chinas-vast-influence-network-how-it-works-and-the-extent-of-its-reach-in-australia-119174">Inside China's vast influence network – how it works, and the extent of its reach in Australia</a>
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<p>Right now US corporations eclipse everyone else in their ability to influence our politics, through their investments in Australian stocks. </p>
<p>Using company ownership data from Bloomberg, I analysed the ownership of Australia’s 20 biggest companies a few days after the 2019 federal election in May. Of those 20, 15 were majority-owned by US-based investors. Three more were at least 25% US-owned. </p>
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<p>According to my analysis, all four of our big banks are majority-owned by American investors. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the nation’s biggest company, is more than 60% owned by American-based investors. </p>
<p>So too are Woolworths and Rio Tinto. BHP, once known as “the Big Australian”, is 73% owned by American-based investors.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">In the 1980s BHP advertised itself as ‘The Big Australian’. Now that’s all history.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The ASX’s top 20 companies make up close to half of the market capitalisation of the Australian Securities Exchange.</p>
<p>Such a concentration of foreign ownership should be a concern regardless of how much we see the US as an ally committed to liberal-democratic values, and appreciate that US corporate interests are not necessarily monolithic or necessarily exercised in accordance with a government agenda.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, under so-called investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses, which the US government has systematically pushed in its trade deals with other nations, US corporate investors are getting unprecedented rights in foreign markets. </p>
<p>ISDS provisions mean a foreign investor can sue a government for compensation in an international tribunal if the government makes <a href="https://theconversation.com/investor-rights-to-sue-governments-pose-real-dangers-40004">any change in law or policy</a> that “harms” an investment. This is something no Australian citizen can do.</p>
<h2>Philip Morris’ smoking gun</h2>
<p>Since I did my analysis, the composition of the ASX top 20 has changed. The bottom four companies – Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield, Fortescue Metals Group, ResMed and Newcrest Mining – have made way for Insurance Australia, Suncorp, Amcor and South32. </p>
<p>This, however, has not signficantly altered the dominance of US investor interests. </p>
<p>It should also be noted that US investment firms also manage the wealth of foreign clients. But data from CapGemini and Merrill Lynch suggest the majority of assets the firms manage are American-owned, even if the precise number cannot be determined. </p>
<p>There are arguably good grounds to include ISDS clauses in free-trade agreements, but the potential downside is exemplified by the case of tobacco giant Philip Morris, which challenged Australia’s plain-packaging laws for cigarette packs. </p>
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<p>The US company did so by moving ownership of its Australian operations to Hong Kong and then using the ISDS clause embedded in an investment treaty between Australia and Hong Kong. It used the clause to argue the Australian government’s law amounted to unjust confiscation of trademarks and intellectual property.</p>
<p>The ISDS clause gave Philip Morris privileges no Australian company or individual had. Even though it lost, having its case thrown out on the grounds it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-even-winning-is-losing-the-surprising-cost-of-defeating-philip-morris-over-plain-packaging-114279">an abuse of process</a>, it only had to pay half of Australia’s costs, which added up to almost A$24 million.</p>
<p>Jonathan Bonnitcha and his co-authors argue in their book <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-political-economy-of-the-investment-treaty-regime-9780198719557?cc=au&lang=en&">The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime</a> that when states take legal action against each other, they have an incentive not to advance legal arguments that may backfire on them down the track. They have defensive interests. </p>
<p>Under ISDS clauses, though, private investors don’t have defensive interests. States cannot commence proceedings against them. They can attack with adventurous legal arguments, and not worry about defending themselves from those same arguments down the road.</p>
<p>Unlike courts, ISDS arbitrations lack standardised rules of procedure. Predictability of outcomes is much lower. Proceedings are private, not public. Only the final outcome is routinely available, and only if the parties agree. </p>
<h2>Transparency matters</h2>
<p>Under <a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/transparency">foreign influence transparency laws</a> that came into effect in March, “foreign principals” must declare their role in influencing governmental and political decision-making. Foreign principals include governments, organisations, individuals and “entities”. </p>
<p>A company falls within the definition of a “foreign government-related entity” if its directors are accustomed or under an obligation to being influenced by a foreign government or political organisation, or if these governments and organisations hold more than 15% of the company’s shares or voting power, or can appoint at least 20% of the company’s board of directors; or otherwise exercise substantial control.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/agents-of-foreign-influence-with-china-its-a-blurry-line-between-corporate-and-state-interests-112403">Agents of foreign influence: with China it's a blurry line between corporate and state interests</a>
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<p>All well and good. Australian democracy benefits when foreign efforts to influence policies are conducted in an open and transparent manner. </p>
<p>But should not there be equal accountability and transparency over who owns our most powerful companies, the privileges they have under ISDS provisions, and what happens in any dispute proceedings?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123343/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clinton Fernandes received funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>Most of Australia’s biggest companies are majority-owned by US investors. This concentration of overt foreign influence should concern us.Clinton Fernandes, Professor, International and Political Studies, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1191742019-08-14T02:18:45Z2019-08-14T02:18:45ZInside China’s vast influence network – how it works, and the extent of its reach in Australia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287941/original/file-20190814-9404-1sgzgzl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">According to the ABC, newly elected MP Gladys Liu is tied to an organisation that's part of the Chinese Communist Party's United Front, which exerts influence among the Chinese diaspora.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>As China grows more powerful and influential, our New Superpower series looks at what this means for the world – how China maintains its power, how it wields its power and how its power might be threatened. Read the rest of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/the-new-superpower-73080">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>The operations of the Chinese Communist Party are generally opaque, especially to outsiders. But in recent years, the party’s reach and influence with the Chinese diaspora has become much more obvious, particularly in Australia. </p>
<p>Most recently, Liberal MP Gladys Liu, the <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/gladys-liu-becomes-first-chinese-australian-woman-to-enter-lower-house">first Chinese-Australian woman</a> to win a seat in the lower house, was <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-14/liberal-gladys-liu-linked-to-secretive-chinese-influence-network/11288210">revealed to have ties</a> to the World Trade United Foundation, a body whose officeholders are closely tied to pro-Beijing politicians in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>This follows the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-12/sam-dastyari-resigns-from-parliament/9247390">resignation of former Senator Sam Dastyari</a> over his contacts with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/feb/06/political-donor-huang-xiangmo-blocked-from-returning-to-australia">Chinese political donor Huang Xiangmo</a> in 2017, and last year’s passage of a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/world/australia/australia-security-laws-foreign-interference.html">new foreign interference law</a>, which was sparked by concerns over Chinese influence.</p>
<p>What connects all these elements is the Communist Party’s little-known <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/long-reach-Chinas-united-front-work">United Front Work Department</a>. The successes of this department have been crucial to building the party’s legitimacy at home and, to a significant extent, abroad, especially with overseas Chinese communities.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-we-keep-turning-a-blind-eye-to-chinese-political-interference-94299">Why do we keep turning a blind eye to Chinese political interference?</a>
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<h2>What is the United Front?</h2>
<p>The United Front Work Department, or UFWD for short, is a special department of the Communist Party. It is responsible for organising outreach to key Chinese interest groups, including ethnic Chinese abroad, and representing and influencing them.</p>
<p>In its simplest terms, the UFWD is about uniting those who can help the party achieve its goals and neutralise its critics. Its work is often summed up as “making friends”, which sounds benign, and often is. But it can have other meanings, such as helping to stifle dissent at home and abroad. </p>
<p>Within China, the United Front system historically consisted of intellectuals, business people, religious believers, ethnic minorities, returned overseas Chinese and former members of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nationalist-Party-Chinese-political-party">Nationalist Party (known as the KMT or GMD)</a>. More recently, this group has expanded to include social media personalities, independent professionals (notably lawyers), managers in foreign-funded businesses, overseas Chinese, and young Chinese studying abroad. </p>
<p>Overseas Chinese, including those in Australia, have a special place in this system and are actively courted by dedicated UFWD representatives.</p>
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<h2>How its mission is changing under Xi Jinping</h2>
<p>The United Front has become much more prominent since <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586">Xi Jinping became Communist Party general secretary in 2012</a>. Xi has been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2018.1433573?journalCode=cjcc20">instrumental</a> in raising its status in the Chinese political system and publicly supporting a dramatic expansion of its roles and target groups. </p>
<p>Under his watch, the UFWD’s work has become much more centred on promoting the party’s key ideals. These include the consolidation of Xi’s leadership and spread of his ideology (known as “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-thought-explained-a-new-ideology-for-a-new-era.html">Xi Jinping Thought</a>”), and the broader goals of ensuring social stability and China’s national rejuvenation. </p>
<p>Importantly, the latter includes reinforcing China’s claims over the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/article/2186449/explained-south-china-sea-dispute">South China Sea</a>, Hong Kong, Macau, and particularly Taiwan. </p>
<p>While China already has sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macau, the United Front has been crucial in helping the party exert influence over local politicians, trade unions, and business groups in both regions. However. the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-hong-kong-protesters-have-turned-militant-and-more-strategic-and-this-unnerves-beijing-121106">current unrest</a> in Hong Kong shows this approach may have lost some of its effectiveness.</p>
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<p>United Front is also one of the ways the party stakes its claim to popular legitimacy and to representing all Chinese people throughout the world. </p>
<p>One way the department does this is by carefully vetting members of key social and occupational groups, such as doctors and lawyers, who provide the government with expert opinion on proposed laws and other issues during “consultative conferences.” </p>
<p>Those selected to take part in these conferences are assumed to have considerable influence and prestige. And they include a number of overseas Chinese, including some Australian-Chinese.</p>
<p>All members of these conferences are carefully screened by the UFWD for their political reliability and willingness to accept party leadership and its positions.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/academic-chongyi-feng-profits-freedom-and-chinas-soft-power-in-australia-78751">Academic Chongyi Feng: profits, freedom and China’s 'soft power' in Australia</a>
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<p>Many provocative ideas and issues that can’t be raised in the party itself or in the People’s Congresses are often floated in the consultative conferences.</p>
<p>This system of garnering expert advice and channelling it back to the party is central to its claims to be democratic. The party maintains that this system of consultation is superior to Western democracy because it is more representative and doesn’t suffer from the “chaotic” results of Western-style elections. </p>
<p>This system is even more important since the party has given up on its own longstanding experiments with <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-10-14/country-lessons">village-level electoral democracy</a>. These elections failed to deliver on the initial promise of bringing greater efficiency and legitimacy to the party, and instead often became dominated by local special interests pushed by powerful families, clans or even gangs.</p>
<h2>How United Front is exerting its influence</h2>
<p>Under Xi, there has also been a dramatic shift in what the UFWD is expected to achieve. Much of its work since the 1980s has focused on incorporating new interest groups into the political system (such as entrepreneurs and professionals) to prevent the emergence of any organisations outside the party’s control. </p>
<p>Now, it is much more about assimilation – all members are expected to believe the party’s central ideology and promote Xi as China’s “core leader”.</p>
<p>In a sense, we are seeing a process similar to that of the 1950s, when United Front was first used to organise groups like intellectuals, religious believers, and business people and provide them with nominal political representation in the consultative conferences - in some cases as government ministers. </p>
<p>The next step was forcing them to accept the Communist Party takeover of their businesses, churches, or associations. The United Front also demanded they fully accept socialist ideology through campaigns of intense, and sometimes violent, “thought reform,” which left many dead.</p>
<p>Today, it is minorities such as the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/13/world/asia/china-muslim-detainment-xinjang-camps.html">Uyghurs</a>, Tibetans, and Christians who are again under intense pressure to allow the party to take full control of their organisations. This often includes the demolition of property and the severing any links with foreign religious groups and NGOs. The UFWD is the organiser in the background.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-australia-china-relations-institute-doesnt-belong-at-uts-78743">The Australia-China Relations Institute doesn't belong at UTS</a>
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<p>The flow-on effects of these changes in Australia is an intensification of the party’s efforts to unite with and influence the Chinese diaspora, and use them to promote the party’s causes and positions. Or at the very least, not to oppose them. </p>
<p>We have seen a dramatic proliferation of United Front-linked organisations in Australia, such as the <a href="http://www.acpprc.org.au/english/aboutus.asp">Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China</a>, as well as new religious bodies and industry and cultural associations. </p>
<p>The marginalisation of sensitive issues like Taiwan among Chinese-Australian communities, the lack of support for China’s Muslims and other persecuted religious minorities, and the very muted responses to the protests in Hong Kong, seems to indicate that these efforts are bearing fruit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119174/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gerry Groot is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies in the Department of Asian Studies, University of Adelaide and and Adjunct Researcher with the Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University</span></em></p>United Front’s mission is to unite those who can help the Communist Party achieve its goals and neutralise its critics. This includes many influential members of the Chinese diaspora.Gerry Groot, Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1142742019-03-28T18:09:34Z2019-03-28T18:09:34ZExplainer: what are Confucius Institutes and do they teach Chinese propaganda?<p>Government concerns about Chinese influence in Australia continue. One example is the <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/pages/foreign-influence-transparency-scheme.aspx">Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme</a>, which seeks to provide for the public and government </p>
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<p>visibility of the nature, level and extent of foreign influence on Australia’s government and political process. </p>
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<p>It has been reported the Attorney-General’s Department has written to universities that host <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-funded-confucius-institutes-targeted-under-new-foreign-influence-scheme-20190312-p513i1.html">Confucius Institutes</a>, asking them to register the institutes under the scheme. Confucius Institutes are Chinese language and culture centres set up through partnerships between an Australian university, a Chinese university and <a href="http://english.hanban.org/node_7719.htm">Hanban</a> – an organisation directly under China’s Ministry of Education. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/china-funded-confucius-institutes-belong-on-foreign-influence-register-20190325-p517bg.html">Critics</a> of these institutes consider that the funding Hanban provides gives China influence, if not control, over Chinese language and culture education. But universities have so far <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/foreign-influence-showdown-as-universities-decline-to-register-china-funded-confucius-institutes-20190315-p514kq.html">reportedly chosen not</a> to register the institutes under the scheme. This indicates they may not consider the institutes’ actions as falling under the scheme’s scope.</p>
<p>So, what are Confucius Institutes, and do they teach Chinese propaganda?</p>
<h2>What are they?</h2>
<p>Australia <a href="http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm">has 14 Confucius Institutes</a> at 13 universities and one in the New South Wales Department of Education. There are also 67 Confucius Classrooms, which support Chinese language education in schools. These are usually attached to a Confucius Institute. </p>
<p>According to <a href="http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm">Hanban’s website</a>, Confucius Institutes: </p>
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<p>have provided scope for people all over the world to learn about Chinese language and culture. In addition they have become a platform for cultural exchanges between China and the world as well as a bridge reinforcing friendship and cooperation between China and the rest of the world […]</p>
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<p>The usual process for establishing a Confucius Institute involves Chinese and Australian universities jointly submitting an application to Hanban. If approved, Hanban and the Australian university provide equal funding. </p>
<p>Hanban provides start-up funding, annual funding of US$100,000, teaching material and teaching staff. The Australian university provides office space and a director. The Chinese university supplies a deputy director and sometimes teaching materials and teaching staff. </p>
<p>Confucius Institutes are established on five-year contracts, which can be renewed. Schools that host a Confucius Classroom <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/behind-confucius-classrooms-the-chinese-government-agency-teaching-nsw-school-students-20160525-gp3882.html">receive</a> A$10,000 in upfront funding, as well as books and other materials to the value of about A$10,000 each year.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-nsw-government-is-reviewing-its-confucius-classrooms-program-96783">Why the NSW government is reviewing its Confucius Classrooms program</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What do they teach?</h2>
<p>All Confucius Institutes teach Chinese language and culture but the nature of what they offer varies. Language courses may focus on everyday Chinese, such as those at the <a href="https://sydney.edu.au/confucius-institute/programs/learn-chinese.html">University of Sydney’s Confucius Institute</a>, or business Chinese, such as those at the <a href="http://confuciusinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/?q=confuciusinstitute-business-programs">University of Melbourne’s Confucius Institute</a>. The culture courses can vary too, from calligraphy to cooking to tai chi. </p>
<p>Many Confucius Institutes also run a range of activities and events for a general audience. The University of Adelaide’s Confucius Institute, for instance, runs a <a href="https://confucius.adelaide.edu.au/chinabriefings/">China Briefing Series</a> – public lectures on political, economic and cultural developments in China. </p>
<p>Confucius Institutes might also organise translating and interpreting services, administer the Chinese language proficiency test, coordinate <a href="http://confuciusinstitute.unsw.edu.au/learn-us/chinese-bridge-competition/">language competitions</a> and arrange study tours to China.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266274/original/file-20190328-139356-1ru4c05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266274/original/file-20190328-139356-1ru4c05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266274/original/file-20190328-139356-1ru4c05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266274/original/file-20190328-139356-1ru4c05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266274/original/file-20190328-139356-1ru4c05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266274/original/file-20190328-139356-1ru4c05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266274/original/file-20190328-139356-1ru4c05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266274/original/file-20190328-139356-1ru4c05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Confucius Classrooms support Chinese language education in schools.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">from shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some Confucius Institutes specialise in a certain area. The one at <a href="https://www.qut.edu.au/about/confucius-institute">QUT</a>, for instance, specialises in professional development for teachers and in supporting Chinese language and culture education in schools. The one at <a href="https://www.griffith.edu.au/tourism-confucius-institute">Griffith University</a> focuses on language and culture training for tourism purposes. The Confucius Institute at <a href="https://www.rmit.edu.au/about/our-education/academic-schools/health-and-biomedical-sciences/about/chinese-medicine-confucius-institute">RMIT University</a> mainly teaches Chinese medicine. </p>
<p>These courses are short and aimed at the general public or specific audiences such as business people. For the most part Confucius Institutes don’t offer courses for credits that count towards a university degree. But institute staff may do some teaching in Chinese language courses offered by the university. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-should-australia-respond-to-chinas-influence-in-our-universities-86064">How should Australia respond to China's influence in our universities?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>A student undertaking a university degree could do a course through an institute but this would not be part of their degree. The University of Queensland’s Confucius Institute, for example, offers <a href="https://confucius-institute.centre.uq.edu.au/chinese-language-and-culture">free courses</a> in Chinese language and culture to students and staff. Students could also participate in the activities and events run by the institutes. </p>
<h2>Is there Chinese influence?</h2>
<p>The materials Hanban provides, including textbooks, are published in China but it’s up to the institute if and how to use them. One director <a href="https://www.academia.edu/12119194/Chinas_Cultural_Projection_A_Discussion_of_the_Confucius_Institutes">told me</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We get more than 3,000 books, journals and also DVDs, which are very useful in our classroom teaching. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The University of Sydney’s courses are based on the textbook series <a href="https://www.cheng-tsui.com/browse/textbooks/integrated-chinese-third-edition/integrated-chinese-level-1-part-1-3rd-ed-textbook?id=20468">Integrated Chinese</a>, published by <a href="https://www.cheng-tsui.com/">Cheng & Tsui</a>, an independent publisher based in Boston, USA. </p>
<p>Confucius Institute staff I’ve spoken to have said such materials don’t push Chinese government propaganda. As one director <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=YDU8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PP85&lpg=PP85&dq=if+you+look+at+the+actual+content,+they+are+as+innocent+as+strawberries.+They+look+like+the+language+teaching+material+for+any+other+language+you+might+want+to+pick+up+from+a+democratic+parliamentary+state&source=bl&ots=B1dKjqt1NA&sig=ACfU3U09xuoYkqZjhd_UBghOCizfZSRopQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiE2ve9y6DhAhXVfSsKHfTlA2UQ6AEwAHoECAkQAQ%20-%20v=onepage&q=if%20you%20look%20at%20the%20actual%20content%2C%20they%20are%20as%20innocent%20as%20strawberries.%20They%20look%20like%20the%20language%20teaching%20material%20for%20any%20other%20language%20you%20might%20want%20to%20pick%20up%20from%20a%20de#v=onepage&q=if%20you%20look%20at%20the%20actual%20content%2C%20they%20are%20as%20innocent%20as%20strawberries.%20They%20look%20like%20the%20language%20teaching%20material%20for%20any%20other%20language%20you%20might%20want%20to%20pick%20up%20from%20a%20de&f=false">put it</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you look at the actual content, they are as innocent as strawberries. They look like the language teaching material for any other language you might want to pick up from a democratic parliamentary state. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The concerns of the institutes are of a more practical, rather than political, nature. At a <a href="https://www.lcnau.org/colloquia/national-colloquium-2017/">languages and cultures university colloquium</a> in 2017, for example, a teacher working at a Confucius Classroom explained that the TV, desktop computer and printer Hanban donated were not useful because the school was already equipped with smartboards and teachers had laptops. He also said students were unable to read the books Hanban had donated. </p>
<p>Confucius Institutes do nevertheless focus on the positive aspects of China. A <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357823.2018.1511684">recent study</a> of Confucius Institutes’ activities, including some Australian ones, found they focused on traditional Chinese culture and generally avoided politics. Sensitive topics such as the Tiananmen Square massacre or the issue of Tibet were ignored.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/university-china-centres-are-vulnerable-to-vested-interests-because-of-a-lack-of-funding-67554">University China centres are vulnerable to vested interests because of a lack of funding</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The study reasonably concludes Confucius Institutes portray a selective, rather than propagandistic, view of China. Whether this means Confucius Institutes are deemed to be exerting influence on the part of the Chinese government will be an interesting test of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114274/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Gil does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The government is asking universities to register the Confucius Institutes they host under the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme. So, what are these institutes and what do they teach?Jeffrey Gil, Senior Lecturer in ESOL/TESOL, College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1124032019-02-26T19:08:26Z2019-02-26T19:08:26ZAgents of foreign influence: with China it’s a blurry line between corporate and state interests<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260909/original/file-20190226-26162-bsb4uy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Australia's Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act obliges individuals to register if they act on behalf of "foreign principals".</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Former federal trade minister Andrew Robb says he has quit his A$880,000-a-year consultancy job with Chinese-owned Landbridge Group because <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/andrew-robb-quits-china-linked-firm-before-foreign-interference-law-kicks-in-20190219-p50yv0.html">it didn’t have anything</a> for him to do.</p>
<p>Former Victorian premier John Brumby says he has quit as a director of Chinese tech giant Huawei in Australia because <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-01/former-victorian-premier-john-brumby-resigns-from-huawei-board/10772144">he has too much else</a> to do.</p>
<p>Former federal foreign minister and ex-NSW premier Bob Carr has quit his job as director of the Australia-China Relations Institute, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-australia-china-relations-institute-doesnt-belong-at-uts-78743">an organisation bankrolled by a Chinese billionaire</a> with a history of using donations to cosy up to politicians.</p>
<p>It might be just a coincidence that these decisions have come just days before new foreign influence transparency laws come into effect on March 1. </p>
<p>The new laws are supposed to make visible the “<a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/Integrity/foreign-influence-transparency-scheme/Pages/default.aspx">nature, level and extent</a> of foreign influence on Australia’s government and political process”. There is more than enough evidence that greater transparency is needed. But the extent to which the new rules will achieve this is questionable. </p>
<h2>Money talks</h2>
<p>Federal parliament passed the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act (FITS) in December. The Act obliges individuals to register if they act on behalf of “foreign principals” – be they governments, government-related entities, political organisations or government-related individuals.</p>
<p>Failing to apply for (or renew) registration, providing false and misleading information or destroying records may lead to a prison term of up to six years for individuals and fines of A$88,200 for companies.</p>
<p>Registrable activities include:</p>
<ul>
<li>parliamentary and political lobbying on behalf of a foreign principal</li>
<li>communications activities for the purpose of political or government influence</li>
<li>employment or activities of former cabinet ministers.</li>
</ul>
<p>An example of the latter is Andrew Robb. </p>
<p>In February 2016 Robb resigned as federal trade minister and announced he would not recontest his seat. He left parliament in July. Three months later he had his new job, getting paid <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/at-528-000-a-year-turnbull-s-pay-is-highest-of-any-leader-in-oecd-20180526-p4zhp5.html">way more than the prime minister</a> as a consultant to the Landbridge Group. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-hill-would-landbridge-be-on-or-off-the-governments-register-of-foreign-interests-98107">View from The Hill: Would Landbridge be on or off the government's register of foreign interests?</a>
</strong>
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<hr>
<p>It is always instructive to note the first jobs taken by politicians after they leave parliament. Those appointments generally reflect relationships already well-groomed. </p>
<p>Landbridge is a privately owned Chinese company, but like many Chinese companies has strong ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party. Its substantial interests in petrochemicals and ports includes a 99-year lease over the <a href="http://theconversation.com/darwin-ports-sale-is-a-blueprint-for-chinas-future-economic-expansion-108254">Darwin port</a>, which is considered of strategic importance in China’s diplomatic dance with the United States.</p>
<h2>Qualitative differences</h2>
<p>China isn’t the only foreign power interested in having influence in Australia, of course. Historical ties have meant that Britain once dictated Australia’s foreign policy. Since World War II the United States has had almost as much power. </p>
<p>Now China, Australia’s largest trading partner, taking <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/AustraliaTrade">about 30% of our exports</a>, looms large. But the power exercised by the Chinese regime is qualitatively different. </p>
<p>For all its economic liberalisation since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China remains a one party state, with repression worsening under Xi Jinping. On <a href="https://rsf.org/en/ranking">freedom of the press</a>, for example, China ranks 176 out of 180 countries. </p>
<p>Commercial, military and political influences are wrapped up together. Lines between state and private enterprises are blurred. When Chinese business interests curry favour with foreign politicians and officials, there’s a high chance that statecraft is also being advanced. <a href="https://theconversation.com/soft-power-goes-hard-chinas-economic-interest-in-the-pacific-comes-with-strings-attached-103765">“Soft power” is used extensively</a>. </p>
<h2>Agent of influence</h2>
<p>This is what made the tawdry scandal involving former NSW senator Sam Dastyari so alarming. </p>
<p>Though a humble senator, Dastyari was a key Labor Party fundraiser and powerbroker. He later admitted that <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/dastyari-reveals-how-huang-xiangmo-courted-politicians/news-story/85c0592569a3d4583108b9a1cd64c13d">vanity and arrogance</a> made him susceptible to the charm offensive of Huang Xiangmo – the billionaire <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-australia-china-relations-institute-doesnt-belong-at-uts-78743">who courted Bob Carr</a> to head up the Australia-China Relations Institute. </p>
<p>Dastyari accepted financial gifts from Huang’s company, including a A$44,000 payment to settle a legal dispute, along with payments from other donors connected to the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-foreign-donations-bill-will-soon-be-law-what-will-it-do-and-why-is-it-needed-107095">The foreign donations bill will soon be law - what will it do, and why is it needed?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Such payments made it obvious why he defied his own party’s policy and defended China’s militant stance in the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-29/sam-dastyari-secret-south-china-sea-recordings/9198044">South China Sea</a>. He was subsequently labelled a Chinese “<a href="https://www.afr.com/news/politics/sam-dastyari-is-a-chinese-agent-of-influence-exintelligence-chief-20171203-gzxktb">agent of influence</a>”. </p>
<p>These revelations resulted in Dastyari resigning from parliament in 2017. Earlier this month it was revealed the federal government had rejected Huang’s bid to become an Australian citizen and stripped him of his <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/pm/australia-denies-citizenship-chinese-businessman-huang-xiangmo/10787052">permanent residency visa</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-we-keep-turning-a-blind-eye-to-chinese-political-interference-94299">Why do we keep turning a blind eye to Chinese political interference?</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>On the basis of these examples highlighted above, there’s a strong case for making influence peddling open and transparent. </p>
<p>Whether the new laws can achieve that is another matter. They may curtail flagrant scenarios where those leaving public office sell their wares to the highest bidder. But to work effectively, the laws and their enforcers will need to constantly adapt and evolve as agents look for creative ways to wield influence from the shadows.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112403/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Garrick does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act is at least a step in the right direction.John Garrick, University Fellow in Law, Charles Darwin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1017352018-11-16T03:25:13Z2018-11-16T03:25:13ZHow digital media blur the border between Australia and China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244735/original/file-20181109-116829-chfqnh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">WeChat is an all-in-one social media platform that combines services such as those offered by WhatsApp, Facebook, Uber and Apple Pay.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/sanktpetersburg-russia-july-11-2018-wechat-1133392886?src=rSOPrjGXEzbsCLwxXZQgug-2-52">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In this series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/hacking-auspol-58635">Hacking #auspol</a> we explore whether covert foreign influence operates in Australia, and what we can do about it.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>In September, the ABC website was blocked from being accessed inside China. The <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1118351.shtml">reason given</a> was the ABC’s “aggressive” reporting on China. Prime Minister Scott Morrison responded by <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-03/china-officially-bans-abc-website/10193158">saying</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>China’s a sovereign country. They make decisions about what happens there, we make decisions about what happens here.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But things are a little more complex than that, particularly when it comes to news published on Chinese social media platforms. Apps like <a href="https://theconversation.com/thinking-of-taking-up-wechat-heres-what-you-need-to-know-88787">WeChat</a> (known as Weixin 微信 in China) are <a href="https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/handle/10453/100651">widely used</a> in Australia by the Chinese <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-chinese-diaspora">diaspora</a> (people of Chinese descent now living in countries other than China). </p>
<p>Social media platforms like WeChat are subject to controls on what they may publish within China, but it’s unclear whether similar controls are placed on content published outside China. Tencent – the company that operates WeChat – wants to expand the adoption and use of its <a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/?lang=en_US">Official Account</a> platform internationally. Some researchers suggest WeChat operates a “<a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2016/11/wechat-china-censorship-one-app-two-systems/">one app, two systems</a>” model, with one policy operating in China and another internationally.</p>
<p>As part of our ongoing research, we present some initial findings from an analysis of news targeted at Chinese-language audiences in Australia. Over 18 months we used digital tools to capture news stories in both Australian-based WeChat Official Account news channels, and SBS Mandarin digital news channels. We then compared their content to see if news disseminated via WeChat could be subject to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43283690">influence by the Chinese government</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/thinking-of-taking-up-wechat-heres-what-you-need-to-know-88787">Thinking of taking up WeChat? Here's what you need to know</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Chinese-language media in Australia</h2>
<p>The Special Broadcasting Service (<a href="https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=970100723;res=IELAPA;subject=Secondary%20education">SBS</a>) makes news available to Australia’s Mandarin-speaking population via in-language content that appears on TV, radio and online. While SBS is funded by the Australian government, it operates with editorial independence.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tencent.com/en-us/articles/17000391523362601.pdf">WeChat</a> is an all-in-one social media platform that combines services such as those offered by WhatsApp, Facebook, Uber and Apple Pay. It also acts as a news service via numerous WeChat <a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/?lang=en_US">Official Accounts</a> (also called Public Accounts). These accounts allow government agencies, business corporations, and social organisations to post and distribute news stories to subscribers. WeChat <a href="https://chinachannel.co/1017-wechat-report-users/">users</a> registered outside China are <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-22/world-s-most-powerful-app-is-squandering-its-lead">estimated</a> at 100-150 million. </p>
<p>Our content analysis focused on the three most prominent “Official Account” WeChat news providers publishing Mandarin-language news in Australia: <a href="https://www.sydneytoday.com/wechat">Sydney Today</a>, <a href="https://rank.aoweibang.com/mp/Lnbpem/">ABC Media</a> and <a href="http://www.nanhaimedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/%E6%BE%B3%E5%A4%A7%E5%88%A9%E4%BA%9A%E5%8D%97%E6%B5%B7%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96%E4%BC%A0%E5%AA%92%E9%9B%86%E5%9B%A2.pdf">We Sydney</a>. It’s <a href="http://hwcdn.libsyn.com/p/9/c/7/9c7bec94e65e56be/mafengwo.mp3?c_id=25617290&cs_id=25617290&destination_id=700932&expiration=1542250653&hwt=0ed5d195c254ca23659406afd3cf205f">hard to verify</a> exact subscriber numbers for these accounts, but they are estimated to each have more than 100,000 subscribers. </p>
<p>To understand the differences in the ways each platform prioritises content, we compared the stories published on the WeChat channels with the stories published on <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/yourlanguage/mandarin?language=zh-hans">SBS Mandarin</a>.</p>
<h2>What the data show</h2>
<p>Data were collected between 1 January 2016 and 1 August 2017. This timeframe includes two Federal government budget speeches, and the 2016 double dissolution election. Given the amount of data, we used a common analytic technique called <a href="https://cfss.uchicago.edu/fall2016/text02.html">topic modeling</a> to analyse the content, which categorises stories according to theme.</p>
<p>We found that coverage of terrorism, and crime and justice matters increased on both WeChat and SBS during the data collection period. But when it came to stories about China, the coverage was markedly different. SBS paid far more attention to Chinese politics and Chinese foreign affairs than WeChat accounts – and that disparity has intensified since February 2017.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Stories related to terror attacks and criminal cases. Shaded bands are confidence intervals, which denote the range of possible variance on either side of the line.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Stories related to Chinese politics and foreign relations. Shaded bands are confidence intervals, which denote the range of possible variance on either side of the line.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Over the total time period SBS dedicated 67 out of 2,349 articles to Chinese politics and foreign relations, which is equivalent to 2.85% of the SBS output. Meanwhile, WeChat channels dedicated 37 out of 13,669 articles to those topics, which is equivalent to 0.26% of the output of those channels.</p>
<p>More tellingly, none of the WeChat channels has published a single article on Chinese politics and foreign affairs from March 2017 until the end of the collection period. This was around the time new measures were ramped up to enhance control of WeChat content in the <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/06/minitrue-wechat-group-controls-for-qingdao-sco-summit/">lead up</a> to <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/cnleaders/2018SCOSummit/index.htm">Qingdao Summit</a>, <a href="https://chinachannel.co/wechat-freezes-profile-changing/">and</a> <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2110236/china-tightens-control-chat-groups-ahead-party-congress">ahead</a> of the <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/19cpcnc/index.htm">19th Party Congress</a>. In October 2017, the Chinese government introduced <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/please-self-censor-china-provides-new-regulations-for-online-conduct/">new regulations</a> that made <a href="http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-09/07/c_1121624269.htm">Public Account</a> and <a href="http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-09/07/c_1121623889.htm">group</a> chat account holders responsible for what is said by other users on their account pages (this included Official Accounts).</p>
<p>Even before the Sydney based WeChat channels stopped covering Chinese politics, of the 37 articles on this topic, 32 had <a href="https://rank.aoweibang.com/item/a3r6zQ/">similar</a> content to news reports from China’s domestic news agencies, which tend to reflect the position of the Chinese government.</p>
<p>Comparative findings suggest that the differing content on WeChat and SBS could have markedly different effects on readers. For instance, SBS Mandarin content might serve to give readers a sense of informed civic inclusion and democratic participation in Australian society. On the other hand, the WeChat content might be more likely to emphasise stronger cultural ties to the homeland by creating “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0d8fqyc84ms">distraction and diversion</a>” from sensitive political topics. The near absence of political coverage focuses the attention of WeChat readers on celebrity gossip and other entertainment topics rather than the politics of the People’s Republic of China. </p>
<p>This practice has been described as a form of “<a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/11341.html">porous censorship</a>”. While readers could seek out information on China from other sources, it takes time and effort to do so. The “flooding” of the daily news feed is effectively more of a tax than a ban on information – especially considering WeChat is a <a href="https://identitycomms.com.au/2017/07/using-wechat-reach-chinese-consumers-australia/">primary source of information</a> for many Chinese living in Australia.</p>
<p>Even without specific coordination, WeChat news channels may advance strategic interests of the Chinese government in this way, signalling a new mechanism of foreign influence. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-tencent-became-the-worlds-most-valuable-social-network-firm-with-barely-any-advertising-90334">How Tencent became the world's most valuable social network firm – with barely any advertising</a>
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<h2>Targeting diaspora populations</h2>
<p>In its <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/asio-report-parliament.html">2017-18 Annual Report</a>, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) expressed concerns about foreign powers secretly manipulating the opinions of Australians to further their own aims. The report specifically suggested that ethnic and religious communities have “been the subject of interference operations designed to diminish their criticism of foreign governments.”</p>
<p>Since the report was first <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-18/asio-overwhelmed-by-foreign-spying-threats-against-australia/9061728">released</a>, there has been considerable public debate and <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=COMMITTEES;id=committees%2Fcommjnt%2F1e36c2f4-7e55-46ed-ab03-e9bd81f4cdb8%2F0004;query=Id%3A%22committees%2Fcommjnt%2F1e36c2f4-7e55-46ed-ab03-e9bd81f4cdb8%2F0000%22">parliamentary concern</a> about the degree of <a href="https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2018/august/1533045600/john-garnaut/australia-s-china-reset">influence</a> the Chinese government enjoys in Australia. The focus of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d3ac306a-e188-11e7-8f9f-de1c2175f5ce">recent concern</a> has pivoted around the Chinese government’s <a href="https://www.ned.org/sharp-power-rising-authoritarian-influence-forum-report/">influence</a> in, and upon, the <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijings-influence-operations-target-chinese-diaspora/">Chinese diaspora</a>. </p>
<p>The Chinese government has a keen interest in <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/china-matters">monitoring its growing diaspora</a> populations, and that includes the content of diaspora media channels, including social media channels.</p>
<p>Influence campaigns on social media may take many forms. The most familiar is the kind of direct manipulation we’ve seen with <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-trolls-targeted-australian-voters-on-twitter-via-auspol-and-mh17-101386">Russian campaigns</a> that aim to sow division among a foreign population. A less direct route is to ensure that legitimate news sources only report news that serve the strategic objectives of the government in question. Our study focuses on the second kind.</p>
<h2>Who is the Chinese diaspora?</h2>
<p>The Chinese government <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-04/beijing-official-urges-outreach-to-non-mainland-chinese/9506388">has said</a> it considers those of <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijings-influence-operations-target-chinese-diaspora/">Chinese descent</a> <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180308082309/http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0218/c64094-29090242.html">abroad</a> to be the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10670564.2016.1184894">nation’s diaspora</a>. The <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbytitle/D8CAE4F74B82D446CA258235000F2BDE?OpenDocument">2016 census</a> identified 1.2 million people of “Chinese ancestry” in Australia, with 41% born in China.</p>
<p>It’s important to remember that while idea of “<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Allen_Chun">Chineseness</a>” suggests a homogenous identity, ethnicity and culture, in reality this group is made up of different experiences, views and political allegiances. Some people in this group may not have any particular affiliation with China. Nevertheless, they are part of the group the Chinese government has suggested is within its sphere of influence.</p>
<p>A key component of the diaspora is students. There may be between <a href="https://internationaleducation.gov.au/research/DataVisualisations/Pages/nationalitySummary.aspx">150,000-200,000 thousand</a> <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-18/australia-hosting-unprecedented-numbers-international-students/9669030">students from China</a> in the Australian education <a href="https://www.austrade.gov.au/News/Economic-analysis/australias-export-performance-in-fy2017">system</a>. Like the diaspora as a whole, the experiences of Chinese students in Australia are complex and not homogeneous.</p>
<p>University of Melbourne researcher <a href="https://www.findanexpert.unimelb.edu.au/display/person2095#tab-overview">Fran Martin</a> argues for a more nuanced approach to Chinese international students lived experience of social media in Australia, pointing out that there is no singular experience of <a href="https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/06/11/how-chinese-students-exercise-free-speech-abroad">free speech in the Chinese student diaspora</a>. And <a href="https://deakin.academia.edu/XinyuZhao">Xinyu Zhao</a>, a PhD student at Deakin, argues that Chinese students are as clever about avoiding oversight of senior relatives in their use of social media as any other young person.</p>
<h2>Controls on WeChat content</h2>
<p>Social media have led to a proliferation of unofficial spaces of communication online, which has created challenges for the Chinese government’s efforts to <a href="http://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/21426/frontmatter/9781107021426_frontmatter.pdf">regulate the content of online communications</a>.</p>
<p>Social media companies in China are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43283690">required to censor posts</a> which the Chinese government identifies as “illegal”, and self-censorship among users is encouraged. Examples of illegal content <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/19eS47Dg086vR1jh9oo51pXstYVT2wft13JGCrnAeU7A/edit#gid=728354615">includes phrases</a> <a href="https://github.com/citizenlab/chat-censorship/blob/master/wechat/one_app_two_systems/wechat_blocked_keywords.csv">such as</a> “Tiananmen June 4”, “free Tibet” and “Falun Gong”. The flow on effect of regulation and influence on these platforms when they are used outside China’s borders is more complex.</p>
<p>Certainly the Chinese Government does seek to influence the diaspora. There is a dedicated Chinese government department, the United Front Work Department (UFWD), for “overseas Chinese work”. It seeks to both “<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/06/minitrue-wechat-group-controls-for-qingdao-sco-summit/">guide</a>” ethnic Chinese, and conduct <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/14409-the-chinese-communist-party-s-foreign-interference-operations-how-the-u-s-and-other-democracies-should-respond">influence operations</a> targeted at foreign actors and states that <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijings-influence-operations-target-chinese-diaspora/">further the objectives of the Chinese government</a>. Chinese President Xi Jinping has <a href="https://www.edx.org/course/xi-jinpings-thought-on-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics-for-a-new-era">described</a> the UFWD’s work as the Chinese government’s “<a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/magicweaponsanne-mariebradyseptember162017.pdf">magic weapons</a>”. </p>
<p>The Australian Defence Department is concerned enough about the possibility of Chinese censorship and surveillance being enabled via WeChat that it has <a href="https://www.afr.com/technology/apps/business/australias-defence-department-bans-chinese-app-wechat-20180310-h0xay8">banned</a> the app from work phones, pending security investigation.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/video-explainer-at-chinas-19th-national-party-congress-xis-vision-and-legacy-are-at-stake-85325">Video explainer: at China's 19th National Party Congress, Xi's vision and legacy are at stake</a>
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<h2>Impact on political discourse</h2>
<p>There is a long history of countries attempting to impact the political discourse in other nations. This might involve various forms of lobbying and support for political parties and politicians, support of social and political movements, or the state-supported diffusion of cultural objects and information.</p>
<p>But not all state broadcasters are instruments of government propaganda or subject to government editorial control. Few in the West would decry the BBC and its various foreign language services, which have editorial independence from the British government. Indeed, the BBC often reports critically on British government activities. </p>
<p>WeChat is becoming an increasingly important media forum for Australian elections, with politicans beginning to use it to reach Chinese communities online. Some suggest that WeChat was important during the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/jul/09/how-a-chinese-language-social-media-campaign-hurt-labors-election-chances">2016 federal election</a> in Victorian communities. And in 2017 Shadow Treasurer Chris Bowen was the first Australian politician to use <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/yourlanguage/mandarin/en/article/2017/10/26/chris-bowen-first-australian-politician-use-wechat-live-communicate-chinese?cid=inbody:who-are-the-australians-that-are-using-chinas-wechat">WeChat Live</a>. </p>
<p>Digital diasporas are accessible for potential foreign influence, and Chinese language social media in Australia are increasingly a focus for local political parties. This dynamic is changing the way we chat about politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101735/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Titus C.Chen receives funding from the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Jensen and Tom Sear do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese-language social media in Australia are increasingly a focus for local political parties.Tom Sear, PhD Candidate, UNSW Canberra Cyber, Australian Defence Force Academy, UNSW SydneyMichael Jensen, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of CanberraTitus C Chen, Associate Professor, Ph.D. in Political Science, California Irvin University, U.S.A, National Sun Yat-sen UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1054892018-10-24T01:49:42Z2018-10-24T01:49:42ZNew Zealand politics: foreign donations and political influence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241761/original/file-20181023-169831-1f5pwd2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=472%2C139%2C3037%2C2343&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New Zealand opposition and National Party leader Simon Bridges speaking to reporters, following allegations about his handling of a political donations by former senior whip Jami-Lee Ross. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Boris Jancic</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>New Zealand’s opposition National Party is embroiled in a <a href="https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/369196/speaker-of-the-house-seeks-advice-on-jami-lee-ross-situation">rolling controversy</a> that erupted last week when former National MP and senior whip Jami-Lee Ross accused his leader Simon Bridges of corruption. Bridges has vehemently denied these accusations, and the evidence released does not support any allegations of illegality. </p>
<p>One dimension of the controversy that has attracted less attention is the connected issues of political party donations and foreign influence on New Zealand’s democratic system.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-zealands-pacific-reset-strategic-anxieties-about-rising-china-97174">New Zealand's Pacific reset: strategic anxieties about rising China</a>
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<h2>Foreign influence</h2>
<p>The discussion of foreign influence in New Zealand politics plays out mostly in terms of the activities of the People’s Republic of China. The local debate was initiated by Professor <a href="https://www.canterbury.ac.nz/science/schools-and-departments/antarctica/gateway-research/antarctic-and-southern-ocean-governance-programme/accordion/chinas-polar-strategy-and-global-governance/researcher/anne-marie-brady.html">Anne-Marie Brady</a>’s “<a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/for_website_magicweaponsanne-mariesbradyseptember2017.pdf">Magic weapons</a>” paper last year. Despite her warnings that China’s foreign influence activities have the potential to undermine the sovereignty and integrity of the political system of targeted states, the dominant view among New Zealand’s main political parties might best be described as “nothing to see here, time to move on”.</p>
<p>Reactions in New Zealand contrast sharply with the situation in Australia, where there has been a much more open <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-29/chinas-been-interfering-in-australian-politics-for-past-decade/9810236">democratic debate</a> on the issue of China’s influence, as well as law reform designed to mitigate foreign interference.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/soft-power-goes-hard-chinas-economic-interest-in-the-pacific-comes-with-strings-attached-103765">Soft power goes hard: China's economic interest in the Pacific comes with strings attached</a>
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<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241763/original/file-20181023-169828-1ou2en1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241763/original/file-20181023-169828-1ou2en1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241763/original/file-20181023-169828-1ou2en1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241763/original/file-20181023-169828-1ou2en1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241763/original/file-20181023-169828-1ou2en1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241763/original/file-20181023-169828-1ou2en1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241763/original/file-20181023-169828-1ou2en1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Former New Zealand National Party member Jami-Lee Ross speaking to media.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Boris Jancic</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<p>Last week, Jami-Lee Ross released a recording of a conversation he had with opposition leader Simon Bridges in June (<a href="https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/17-10-2018/the-jami-lee-tapes-a-transcript-of-the-ross-and-bridges-donation-chat/">full transcript</a>). The transcript alleges that Zhang Yikun, a wealthy Chinese immigrant and a former member of the People’s Liberation Army with ongoing links to the Chinese state, made a <a href="https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2018/10/16/279660/zhang-yikun-and-the-alleged-100k-donation">donation to the National Party of $100,000</a>. The conversation then turned to new candidates for the National party list, and the possible candidature of <a href="https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2018/10/17/281366/question-of-china-influence-in-zhang-yikun-saga">Colin Zheng</a>, manager of a construction company owned by Zhang. </p>
<h2>Keeping track of political donations</h2>
<p>At a national level, there are rules under the <a href="http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0087/latest/DLM307519.html">Electoral Act 1993</a> regarding political donations to both candidates and to political parties. For candidates, a donor’s name and address must be reported for donations of more than $1,500. For party donations, the name and address of the donor must be reported where donations exceed $15,000. </p>
<p>For both candidates and parties, foreign donations (defined as from people who are not citizens or residents on the electoral roll or from incorporated or unincorporated bodies outside New Zealand) exceeding $1,500 are forbidden. Each registered political party must file an annual return of party donations with the <a href="https://www.elections.org.nz/">Electoral Commission</a>, which are then made public. In terms of party donations which hit a $30,000 threshold, a return must be filed within ten working days, as opposed to annually.</p>
<p>There are also restrictions on how much can be spent during a general election period, which also effectively constrain donations. Political party spending is capped at just over $1.1 million, plus $26,200 per electorate contested, for a total election spend of just under $2.7 million if all 60 electorates are contested. </p>
<p>Spending limits also apply to persons or groups who are not contesting the election directly but seek influence. They can spend up to $12,600 on election advertising during the regulated period without having to register with the Electoral Commission. A person or group whose spending exceeds that amount must register and they can spend a maximum of $315,000 on election advertisements. </p>
<h2>Who raises what from whom</h2>
<p>In 2017, National raised $4.6 million in party donations, vastly exceeding Labour’s $1.6 million, as well as busting the limits of what they could spend in that year’s election. $3.5 million of the National’s donations (76%) were anonymous under the $15,000 threshold, compared with 0.7 million of Labour’s (44%). The Green Party raised $0.8 million, with 72% under the disclosure threshold, and New Zealand First raised $0.5 million, with 84% under the threshold.</p>
<p>There is no requirement for political parties to report the amounts of overseas donations under $1,500. Consequently the public does not know how many foreign donations come in under that amount. </p>
<p>It would be easy for a foreign state to funnel money into a political party from a large number of foreign donors, all under the $1,500 threshold. Equally, if that state had access to local actors, it could funnel money into the system at amounts above or below the $15,000 threshold. </p>
<p>What donors get for their donations is unclear. At its least malign, donors seek to passively promote a political ideology which they consider to be beneficial. Where donations are part of developing a long-term quid pro quo relationship along multiple dimensions, donors’ and receivers’ motivations and exactly what is traded is very difficult to pin down from the outside.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.transparency.org/">Transparency International</a> <a href="https://www.transparency.org.nz/docs/2013/Integrity-Plus-2013-Pillar-10-Political-Parties.pdf">reports</a> that New Zealand political parties are one of the weakest pillars supporting local transparency and good governance. Within this weak pillar, one of the weakest strands involves political finance and donations. </p>
<p>They argue that with the demise of mass political participation, parties are increasingly dependent on donations to function. This weakness means that local politicians are more likely to seek to “supply” influence, or at least dangle the prospect of influence, in front of wealthy bidders. </p>
<p>The “demand” to buy political influence has also risen. With the <a href="https://www.victoria.ac.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/1500829/Anderson_Chapple.pdf">increase in worldwide inequality</a> and kleptocracy, there are more rich people for whom buying influence is the norm. Specifically in New Zealand, there has been an influx of wealthy expatriates from China, where buying influence is an accepted practice. They often retain close links to the Chinese Communist Party, which runs an <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/china-and-tibet">authoritarian, anti-democratic and oppressive regime</a>. It is thus not surprising that issues of donations and foreign influence are increasingly entering into domestic political debates.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105489/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Chapple does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An evolving controversy brewing in New Zealand’s opposition National Party has raised questions about political party donations and foreign influence on New Zealand’s democratic system.Simon Chapple, Director, Institute for Governance and Policy Studies, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of WellingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1037652018-10-16T19:09:33Z2018-10-16T19:09:33ZSoft power goes hard: China’s economic interest in the Pacific comes with strings attached<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240749/original/file-20181016-165905-628o1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Red star rising: China has clear strategic designs on the Pacific Islands region.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>China’s economic expansion into the Pacific Islands region raises critical questions for both the islands and Australia. What happens if infrastructure loans by Chinese banks and authorised state enterprises to vulnerable Pacific Island nations cannot be repaid? What consequences of default can be anticipated? Are there military dimensions?</p>
<p>The Pentagon has warned of the <a href="https://news.usni.org/2018/08/17/pentagon-report-congress-chinese-military-development-2">“potential military advantages”</a> flowing from Chinese investments in other countries. China rejects this assertion. But if it does ever want access to foreign ports to support naval deployments in distant waters, it is laying the ground work to get it.</p>
<h2>Belt and Road moves on the Pacific Islands</h2>
<p>China’s grand plan to more closely link countries across Eurasia and the Indian Ocean through trade deals and infrastructure projects is known as the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (“Belt and Road”). The plan includes Pacific pathways.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinas-vision-for-globalisation-beijing-style-77705">The Belt and Road Initiative: China's vision for globalisation, Beijing-style</a>
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<p>Along with Australia and New Zealand, seven Pacific Islands nations officially recognise the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Another six recognise the Republic of China (Taiwan). China’s strategy is both to counter Taiwan’s influence and further its own interests. It wants Pacific nations to support it in international forums. Vanuatu, for example, was the first country to support China’s claims to island territory in the South China Sea disputed with the Philippines. </p>
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<p>The number of Chinese companies operating in the Pacific region has greatly increased since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. Trade between China and Pacific Island nations has ballooned <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-10/china-extends-its-influence-in-the-south-pacific/7812922">to more than A$10 billion</a>.</p>
<p>While its influence is still not as great as that of the US or even Australia, China’s growing investments cover mines, hydro-electricity projects, fishing, timber, real estate and services. Over the past decade it has also lavished the region with $US1.8 billion ($A2.4 billion) in foreign aid, including <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-10/china-extends-its-influence-in-the-south-pacific/7812922">$US175,000 worth of quad bikes</a> for Cook Island parliamentarians.</p>
<h2>The soft power of money</h2>
<p>China argues Chinese investment is “tactful” – that it helps developing nations build needed infrastructure with “no-strings-attached”. It contrasts this to Western aid models that require governance measures and other performance indicators to be in place in relation to aid funding. </p>
<p>But the credit Chinese state banks are extending to impoverished developing nations also looks a lot like a form of “debt colonialism”. The fear is that China is using the loans as leverage to expand its military footprint. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-chinas-debt-book-diplomacy-in-the-pacific-shouldnt-ring-alarm-bells-just-yet-96709">Why China's 'debt-book diplomacy' in the Pacific shouldn't ring alarm bells just yet</a>
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<p>The Chinese loans typically offer a period of grace before an interest rate of 2-3% over 15-20 years is imposed. In Tonga, for example, China deferred loan repayments for a period after the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/31/Tonga-2016-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-Executive-43992">International Monetary Fund warned</a> it was at risk of debt distress. Repayments started again in 2018, reportedly at a higher rate than before.</p>
<h2>Sri Lankan lessons</h2>
<p>If Tonga and other Pacific Island nations default, China <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/australia-fears-chinese-influence-in-pacific-as-tonga-admits-debt-distress-mxzc9j9fr">can enforce contractual conditions</a> as a pretext to advancing wider strategic aims. </p>
<p>This is precisely what happened in Sri Lanka.</p>
<p>The Sri Lankan government had high hopes for the Hambantota Port Development Project, built by China Harbour Engineering Company, one of Beijing’s largest state-owned enterprises, and mostly funded by the state-owned Export–Import Bank of China. When the port failed to generate anticipated revenues, the government ended up owing China at least $US3 billion with no means to pay.</p>
<p>The Chinese then demanded a Chinese company take a dominant equity share in the port. The Sri Lankan government was also forced of hand over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html">15,000 acres of land</a> around the port for 99 years. </p>
<p>Now China owns an Indian Ocean port strategically placed on one of the busiest shipping routes in the world. </p>
<h2>Pacific interests</h2>
<p>China has clear military interests in the Pacific. In 2014 <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-23/chinese-president-touts-pacific-ties-on-visit-to-fiji/5911774">Xi Jinping personally visited Fiji</a> to sign memorandums of understanding including for greater military cooperation.</p>
<p>Australian intelligence sources allege China has been secretly negotiating to build <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-eyes-vanuatu-military-base-in-plan-with-global-ramifications-20180409-p4z8j9.html">a military base in Vanuatu</a>. Both nations deny this. Such a base would give China a foothold for operations to coerce Australia and outflank the US and its base on Guam.</p>
<p>China’s “soft power” is being better resourced to influence foreign nations.
Its moves in the Pacific means the geopolitics of the region are hardening up.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fears-about-chinas-influence-are-a-rerun-of-attitudes-to-japan-80-years-ago-98387">Fears about China's influence are a rerun of attitudes to Japan 80 years ago</a>
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<p>Globally, China’s rise has profound implications for international law and trade. </p>
<p>China naturally prefers bilateral relationships to leverage its power and advance its interests. It has steered away from multilateral dispute resolution, especially since the South China Sea arbitration, which ruled unanimously in favour of the Philippines. It has simply ignored the verdict and gone ahead turning the disputed rocky shoals into military outposts. </p>
<p>If China can ignore the legitimate claims of the Philippines, it can ignore the rights of the smaller and more fragile Pacific Island nations. Its actions flag its challenge to the international order Australia has long championed – one based on rule of law and political and economic liberalism. </p>
<p>Its influence is unlikely to promote democratic principles. Those holding those principles dear need to help the Pacific Island nations resist the lure of soft-power “incentives” promised with no strings attached. </p>
<p>There are definitely strings attached.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103765/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Garrick does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Huge loans to poor island nations leave them vulnerable to becoming vassal states for China’s strategic interests.John Garrick, University Fellow in Law, Charles Darwin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/971022018-05-23T13:32:47Z2018-05-23T13:32:47ZView from The Hill: Hastie and Turnbull – what you don’t know, you can’t stop<p>There’s one logical reason why ambitious young Liberal backbencher Andrew Hastie didn’t tell Malcolm Turnbull he was about to drop a bombshell, with a parliamentary speech accusing a Chinese-Australian figure of involvement in the bribery of a United Nations official.</p>
<p>If he had forewarned Turnbull, Hastie – who is head of the parliamentary joint committee on intelligence and security - would have been firmly ordered to button his lips.</p>
<p>Remember, Turnbull was angry when a backbencher defiantly produced a private member’s bill on the live sheep trade. That was a tame gesture of independence compared with Hastie’s action.</p>
<p>The fact that Tuesday night’s <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2Fe7437ebc-d7b3-4d81-a720-4f0c42fff8a9%2F0175%22">speech</a> was delivered has shocked the government, and it will add to China’s ongoing angst towards Australia.</p>
<p>The speech contained much context and detail but in summary, Hastie told parliament that Chau Chak Wing, an Australian citizen whom he described as having “extensive contacts in the Chinese Communist Party”, had “co-conspired to bribe the president of the United Nations General Assembly, John Ashe” in 2013.</p>
<p>“For reasons that are best undisclosed, the United States government did not seek to charge [Chau] for his involvement in the bribery of John Ashe,” Hastie said.</p>
<p>Chau had “been a very significant donor to both of our major political parties. He has given more than $4 million since 2004. He has also donated $45 million to universities in Australia,” Hastie said.</p>
<p>The claims against Chau had previously been reported in the Australian media; there are now defamation proceedings underway.</p>
<p>For his speech, Hastie drew on a briefing he received when he recently led a delegation to the United States to discuss the federal government’s espionage and foreign interference legislation – legislation that has particularly aggravated China. In the course of his speech Hastie tabled US documents.</p>
<p>In explaining his motives, Hastie cited national interest and democratic traditions, including press freedom. He said that “in Australia it is clear that the Chinese Communist Party is working to covertly interfere with our media and universities and also to influence our political processes and public debates.”</p>
<p>Turnbull, saying he only heard about the speech after it was delivered, told parliament that the US briefing - which he said was attended by at least one Labor MP - wasn’t classified. Asked whether he had “sought information from our intelligence agencies about the implications of publicly sharing the details of an FBI investigation which has been provided by our ally,” Turnbull said he had.</p>
<p>Labor is critical of Hastie. Frontbencher Anthony Albanese accused him of “probably rogue actions” and questioned his release of information received in the US briefing.</p>
<p>The speech flushed out Chau. His lawyer on Wednesday issued a statement saying Chau was “very disappointed that an elected representative would use the cover of parliamentary privilege to repeat old claims and attack his reputation just weeks before some of these matters are tested in court.</p>
<p>"Mr Hastie purports to be acting in the interest of Australians. It seems he has forgotten or disregarded the right all Australian citizens have to a presumption of innocence unless proven otherwise. Our client has not been charged with any offence which makes Mr Hastie’s attack all the more extraordinary,” the statement said.</p>
<p>Hastie’s action was highly unusual as well as controversial. Members, and especially the chair, of this bipartisan parliamentary committee, which considers legislation relating to security and receives a good deal of confidential information, have usually been very discreet in their public comments.</p>
<p>Even apart from the Hastie affair, this has been a testing week in the Australia-China relationship.</p>
<p>After Foreign Minister Julie Bishop met China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the margins of a G20 gathering in Argentina (they actually had two sessions, one informal, the other formal) the tone from the two sides was very different.</p>
<p>Bishop’s take was all about how “very warm and candid and constructive” the discussions had been. The Chinese <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1561528.shtml">version</a> was blunter: Wang Yi had said Australia needed to “take off its tinted glasses to look at China’s development from a more positive angle.”</p>
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<p>An extreme version of China’s state of mind came in an <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1103647.shtml">editorial</a> in the Global Times, a state-owned fiercely nationalistic publication.</p>
<p>It was a rant, suggesting actions against Australia on the trade front, and indicating Turnbull could usefully stay away from visiting China for “a few years”.</p>
<p>“Since the beginning of this year, Australia has revealed a friendly attitude on a few occasions in apparent attempts to soothe China relations. However, it is necessary for China to leave Australia hanging for a while, instead of being too quick to bury the hatchet whenever China tries to put a smile on its face,” the editorial said.</p>
<p>That was written before the Hastie speech.</p>
<p>In an address on Wednesday titled “Australia’s Deepening Economic Relationship with China: Opportunities and Risks”, Reserve Bank Governor Philip Lowe had a message about getting on.</p>
<p>Lowe reiterated that the deepening of our economic relationship with China had greatly benefited Australia – and also benefited China. “This means that both countries have a strong interest in managing this important relationship well. It is in our mutual interests to do this.</p>
<p>"Together, we can also be a strong voice for the importance of an open international trading system and for effective regional cooperation,” Lowe told the Australia-China Relations Institute in Sydney.</p>
<p>“We will, of course, have differences from time to time, but we will surely be better placed to deal with these if we understand one another well.</p>
<p>"Building strong connections across business, finance, politics, academia and the community more generally is important to deepening this understanding,” he said.</p>
<p>But in an increasingly complex relationship, understanding one another well can involve all sorts of challenges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97102/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If he had forewarned Turnbull, Hastie – who is head of the parliamentary joint committee on intelligence and security - would have been firmly ordered to button his lips.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/970992018-05-23T08:21:25Z2018-05-23T08:21:25ZPolitics podcast: Anthony Albanese on Labor’s National Conference<p>Labor is facing tough tests in coming byelections in its narrowly held seats of Longman in Queensland and Braddon in Tasmania. </p>
<p>Later on, managing the ALP national conference will be a challenge for Bill Shorten who will be anxious to avoid damaging displays of division over controversial issues.</p>
<p>Labor Frontbencher Anthony Albanese is putting on a confident face about the byelections. On the conference, he predicts there will not be a “substantial change” in Labor’s refugee policy. On the issue of recognition of Palestine, another sensitive issue within the party, he says “if you support a two-state solution then by definition one of those states will be Palestine.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97099/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Labor frontbencher Anthony Albanese is confident their candidates will win back their seats and is gearing up for the ALP's National Conference in late July.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/911452018-02-08T05:37:32Z2018-02-08T05:37:32ZWhistleblowers still in the firing line from foreign influence and official secrets laws<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205205/original/file-20180207-58152-c043sb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Under the proposed changes to the Criminal Code, anybody could face up to 20 years in jail for communicating unauthorised information.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia is in the middle of intense debate about new federal <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6018">foreign influence</a> and <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6022">official secrets</a> laws. This debate is happening alongside the development of new <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=s1120">whistleblowing legislation.</a> Unless changes are made to all these, they could be ineffectual in protecting those who may need to reveal information in the public interest.</p>
<p>The first stage of the government’s enhanced private sector whistleblower protection has been referred back to a <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/WhistleblowerBill2017">parliamentary legislation committee</a>, like the other two laws, amid similar <a href="http://www.afr.com/business/whistleblower-protections-need-to-be-fixed-20171210-h01zxn">concerns</a> it doesn’t deliver properly on its aims.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/canada-offers-australia-a-blueprint-for-protecting-and-motivating-corporate-whistleblowers-80062">Canada offers Australia a blueprint for protecting and motivating corporate whistleblowers</a>
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<p>Whistleblowers have already been mentioned in the heated debate over the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6022">National Security (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill</a>. This updates and replaces Australia’s official secrets laws, and applies to everyone - not just public officials, but journalists and private citizens as well.</p>
<p>The attorney-general, Christian Porter, has now <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/turnbull-government-relents-on-secrecy-laws-for-journalists-but-only-to-a-point-20180207-p4yzlz.html">confirmed a major backpedal</a> on that law’s impact on journalists. It’s now planned that journalists could only be prosecuted for doing their job, if they willingly communicate secret information that endangers the health and safety of the public, or prejudices national security.</p>
<p>But the same law highlights the importance of protecting whistleblowers, directly. Under the proposed Criminal Code, <em>anybody</em> – publicly or privately employed – could still face up to 20 years in jail for communicating unauthorised official information, especially if deemed “inherently harmful”.</p>
<p>Not all of this is unreasonable. In fact, there is real value in the bill, which finally replaces our most draconian official secrets law – section 70 of the Crimes Act 1914 – as <a href="https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/report-112">recommended for decades</a>.</p>
<p>The definitions of “harmful” are wide - including any government information provided by anyone in compliance with any legal obligation, or which could arguably harm Australia’s international or internal federal relations “in any way”. As a result, the average employee who might need to expose wrongdoing is at even greater risk than journalists.</p>
<p>This is where whistleblower protection laws are meant to be the antidote. They ensure ordinary workers can’t be prosecuted for breaching secrecy, if revealing wrongdoing in the public interest.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/politics-podcast-mark-dreyfus-on-changing-the-governments-foreign-interference-bill-91487">Politics podcast: Mark Dreyfus on changing the government's foreign interference bill</a>
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<p>Already, many public officials get some protection under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013. This is <a href="https://pmc.gov.au/government/legislation-review/statutory-review-public-interest-disclosure-act-2013">slated for improvement</a>, especially after last year’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/were-on-our-way-to-making-whistleblower-protections-more-than-theoretical-84043">far-reaching</a> whistleblower protection inquiry by the <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Services/WhistleblowerProtections/Report">Joint Parliamentary Committee on Corporations and Financial Services</a>.</p>
<p>As yet, there is no full government response to that inquiry. But as a first stage of reform, the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=s1120">new bill</a> introduced in December - despite many advances - also doesn’t yet hit its mark. </p>
<p>If a private sector employee needs to reveal government information to blow the whistle publicly on wrongdoing, they will not be protected from prosecution unless it’s an absolute “emergency”. This is defined as “imminent risk of serious harm or danger to public health or safety, or to the financial system”.</p>
<p>This would not protect the whistleblower who revealed foreign bribery offences by the <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/salesman-doubted-securency-over-agent-payments-20120823-24p0l.html">Reserve Bank’s noteprinting company, Securency</a>. Or, in a business context, <a href="https://theconversation.com/troublemakers-and-traitors-its-no-fun-being-a-whistleblower-50755">someone like Jeff Morris</a> who revealed misconduct among Commonwealth Bank financial planners.</p>
<p>Last year’s parliamentary committee already recommended that the new whistleblowing law take a different approach, and protect <em>any</em> public disclosure of wrongdoing if “no action” is first taken by a law enforcement agency, after a reasonable time. So, there was already a better answer on offer.</p>
<p>Other recommendations, like how best to ensure whistleblowers are properly compensated, are also yet to be acted on in the bill. Hence, its referral back to committee, like the others.</p>
<p>The third bill in the mix, to establish a <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6018">Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme</a>, tends to confirm a bigger problem.</p>
<p>Like the other two, it has worthy goals of integrity in Australian political and business life, and is well intentioned. Yet its degree of overreach makes one wonder if the government actually fully read the draft, before introducing it.</p>
<p><a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F716f5e71-dee3-40a3-9385-653e048de81b%2F0193%22">Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said</a> it was “focused on the activities of foreign states and their agents in Australia, and not the loyalties of Australians”, requiring agents of foreign powers to register political activities intended to influence Australian decision-making. Yet, the bill captures any Australian person or group with any funding or collaboration links with any foreigner at all – not only foreign governments or their agents, but any foreign business, entity or private individual. This could also include whistleblowers in some cases.</p>
<p>Attempted exemptions for business, journalists and humanitarian aid groups are once again limited or vague. Large numbers of citizens, whistleblowers and <a href="https://probonoaustralia.com.au/news/2018/01/call-charities-exempt-foreign-influence-transparency-scheme/">civil society groups</a> are at risk of criminal liability if they don’t officially register their activities with the government.</p>
<p>Also referred to the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/TransparencySchemeBill">Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security</a>, the government is also likely to have to backpedal on this bill. </p>
<p>Perhaps all three bills will now be fixed in the parliament, but they seem to confirm an old lesson. Laws on official information often need a wider government perspective, and to be carefully checked, if they’ve been produced solely or mainly by the affected bureaucracies themselves.</p>
<p>Whether this is the reason or not, future integrity and transparency reforms would clearly benefit from a different approach.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91145/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>A J Brown's research teams receive funding from the Commonwealth Government's Australian Research Council and a range of Commonwealth, State and non-government integrity, regulatory and professional organisations in Australia and New Zealand. He is also a boardmember of Transparency International. Views expressed are independent professional opinions and do not represent the Commonwealth Government or the work of its whistleblowing expert advisory panel.</span></em></p>The government has a lot of work to do on it’s proposed foreign influence and official secrets laws to ensure they don’t prosecute whistleblowers.A J Brown, Professor of Public Policy & Law, Centre for Governance & Public Policy, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/900782018-01-19T11:39:39Z2018-01-19T11:39:39ZIs the FBI’s latest probe of the Clinton Foundation a ‘witch hunt’ – or something more?<p>With <a href="https://millercenter.org/president/carter/life-after-the-presidency">few exceptions</a>, most presidents fade from public life once they step down.</p>
<p>Bill Clinton, however, has shunned leisure time since his administration ended in January 2001. Instead, he has whiled away the hours toiling for an <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-do-the-clinton-charities-actually-do-and-where-does-their-money-go-65287">eponymous foundation</a> he established with his wife Hillary Clinton. At least initially, the foundation seemed well-suited for cleaning up his legacy, after the ugliness of the Monica Lewinsky scandal and the <a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123653000">subsequent impeachment</a> and Senate trial tarnished it.</p>
<p><a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/367541-fbi-launches-new-clinton-foundation-investigation">But now the FBI</a> has reportedly reopened an investigation of the foundation’s alleged “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/the-push-for-investigations-of-the-clinton-foundation-and-christopher-steele/549860/">pay-to-play</a>” politics while Hillary Clinton served as secretary of state. </p>
<p>At first blush, this might appear to be a purely partisan witch hunt launched by the <a href="https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/09/conservative-media-dominated-coverage-of-2016-campaign-report-finds/">Clintons’ conservative political enemies</a>. Based on my scholarship regarding relationships between the government and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/voicefornonprofits_chapter.pdf">nonprofits</a> as well as <a href="https://histphil.org/2017/05/26/are-foundations-part-of-the-resistance-challenges-to-elite-donors-in-a-neo-populist-age/">philanthropists</a>, I believe it’s fair to say that large foundations tend to be scandal-free. </p>
<p>That is not the case for the <a href="https://www.clintonfoundation.org/">Clinton Foundation</a>, however, which has repeatedly stirred controversy over its unusual fundraising practices.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Following reports that the FBI and Justice Department are ramping up new Clinton Foundation probes, MSNBC News host Joy Reid and her panel debated the ethics of federal agencies investigating the president’s enemies.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Influence peddling</h2>
<p>The Clintons launched their primary <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-do-the-clinton-charities-actually-do-and-where-does-their-money-go-65287">public charity</a> in 1997. It has since grown from an organization to raise funds for the Clinton Presidential Library into one of the nation’s most visible foundations. It runs ambitious programs in such areas as HIV/AIDS, climate change, healthy children, economic development and Haiti earthquake relief, along with a variety of other initiatives.</p>
<p>If reports that the FBI reopened its investigation are accurate, it would be the first time the foundation has been investigated since 2016 – and the first time since <a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/358772-timeline-trump-calls-for-clinton-to-be-investigated">Donald Trump</a>, whose campaign demonized his opponent Hillary Clinton with “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQpvbyXNi0w">lock her up</a>” chants at his rallies, took office. </p>
<p>While it is highly inappropriate for a sitting president to call on his own Justice Department to investigate his political opponents, Trump has nevertheless openly pushed for investigations of the Clintons while in office. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, on the outs with his boss because of his recusal in the Russia investigation has, according to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sessions-tries-to-impress-trump-with-moves-at-justice-it-hasnt-worked/2018/01/10/e2053d84-f478-11e7-91af-31ac729add94_story.html?utm_term=.c29c81435f69">The Washington Post</a>, begun to look “into matters that Trump has publicly complained are not being pursued.”</p>
<p>The charges against the foundation have ranged from ridiculous to serious. Two days after the initial reports of the Trump administration’s new probe, <a href="http://www.blingnews.com/22-clinton-foundation-employees-arrested-on-first-day-of-new-investigation/">multiple conservative websites</a> falsely claimed that 22 of the foundation’s employees had been arrested. There were <a href="https://www.snopes.com/22-clinton-foundation-employees-arrested/">no arrests</a>.</p>
<p>Many charges are trivial. <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/09/14/pay-to-play-at-clinton-state-department-exposed-in-new-emails-watchdog-says.html">Fox News reported</a> that a donor to the foundation, Terrence Duffy, asked then-Secretary Clinton for help in setting up business meetings in Singapore and Hong Kong. Yet <a href="https://jp.usembassy.gov/business/us-exporters/">U.S. embassies</a> do this routinely.</p>
<p>Other accusations are far more troubling. <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/feb/26/american-crossroads/conservative-group-claims-hillary-clintons-foundat/">Human rights-abusing governments</a>, including Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman, have donated millions to the Clinton Foundation. <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/jul/07/fact-checking-donations-clinton-foundation/">Saudi Arabia</a> alone has contributed US$10 million to $25 million.</p>
<p>Ukrainian steel magnate <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Business/trump-foundation-donations-controversial-ukrainian-clinton-donor/story?id=43728278">Victor Pinchuk</a> also gave the foundation $10 to $25 million. And he was by many accounts not shy about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/us/politics/hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign-charity.html?_r=00">asking for help</a> from Hillary Clinton when she served as secretary of state. While there’s been no indication of what the new FBI investigation is looking into, over the years these probes have usually focused on influence peddling allegedly enabled by the Clinton Foundation’s fundraising. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202363/original/file-20180117-53328-v77dty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202363/original/file-20180117-53328-v77dty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202363/original/file-20180117-53328-v77dty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=710&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202363/original/file-20180117-53328-v77dty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=710&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202363/original/file-20180117-53328-v77dty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=710&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202363/original/file-20180117-53328-v77dty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=892&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202363/original/file-20180117-53328-v77dty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=892&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202363/original/file-20180117-53328-v77dty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=892&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chelsea Clinton, center, and Ukrainian billionaire Victor Pinchuk look at a 3-week-old baby during a 2012 visit to a neonatal center in Kiev backed by donations from Pinchuk.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Ukraine-Chelsea-Clinton/67425fca572448ff80a56afa09788ee4/2/0">AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Poorly Endowed</h2>
<p>Why does the Clinton Foundation find itself in the position its in? Its structure under federal law regulating foundations has a lot to do with it.</p>
<p>The Clinton Foundation differs from most prominent foundations in that it is an <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-do-the-clinton-charities-actually-do-and-where-does-their-money-go-65287">operating public charity</a>, which means it <a href="https://www.thebalance.com/the-history-and-types-of-foundations-2502444">raises money on an ongoing basis</a> and then funds its projects with those donations. </p>
<p>Like the nation’s largest foundations, such as <a href="https://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/25-largest-foundations-in-the-us-by-total-assets">Gates, Ford, Robert Wood Johnson and Packard</a>, which push for goals such as environmental protection, expanded access to health care and social justice, the Clinton Foundation largely promotes <a href="http://as.tufts.edu/politicalscience/sites/all/themes/asbase/assets/documents/berry/donorsForDemocracy.pdf">liberal causes</a>.</p>
<p>But those institutions are backed by substantial endowments donated by families with vast fortunes. The Gates Foundation’s endowment, worth at least <a href="https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information/Foundation-Factsheet">$40 billion</a> is the biggest. It funds much of what it does from the income that the endowment’s investments in stocks, bonds and other assets produce every year.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.clintonfoundation.org/sites/default/files/2016_ar-financials.pdf">Clinton Foundation’s endowment</a>, worth only $109 million, is puny by comparison. Its investments returned just <a href="http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/311/311580204/311580204_201512_990.pdf">$2.9 million in 2015</a>. Given the foundation’s ambitions, $2.9 million doesn’t go very far. From donations, though, the foundation has raised north of $2 billion over its lifetime, allowing it to <a href="https://www.clintonfoundation.org/sites/default/files/2016_ar-financials.pdf">spend more than $200 million a year</a> on its programs. </p>
<p><iframe id="hIkV4" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/hIkV4/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Despite its vast donor base – more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/us/politics/hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign-charity.html">200,000</a> have contributed since its 1997 inception – much of its funding comes from major donors, including other foundations, wealthy individuals and, of course, foreign governments. The <a href="https://www.clintonfoundation.org/contributors?category=%2410%2C000%2C001+to+%2425%2C000%2C000http://example.com/">foundation’s own records</a> show that it has received seven gifts of more than $25 million and another 19 worth $10 to $25 million.</p>
<h2>Impressive score</h2>
<p>The foundation has made notable contributions in global health, HIV/AIDS and women’s empowerment. Perhaps its most <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/9/22/12893444/clinton-foundation-effectiveness">notable success</a> was in negotiating a significant drop in the price of drugs used to fight AIDS and then bringing those drugs to Africa, where an epidemic was ravaging the continent.</p>
<p>Despite the suspicions conservatives have long raised about the Clinton Foundation, Charity Navigator, a group that rates the fundraising and spending practices of nonprofits, gives it <a href="https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.summary&orgid=16680">high marks</a>. The foundation spends 87 percent of what it raises on the programs it supports, a <a href="https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=1287">higher share</a> than most of its peers. </p>
<p>But Charity Navigator doesn’t assess or compare the motives of donors. I believe that the foundation’s high ambitions and thirst for funds make it too open to unsavory gifts that, in turn, damage its reputation. </p>
<p>Foreign governments find the foundation attractive because they are limited in what they can otherwise do to improve their access and influence with American policymakers. The law prohibits their donations to <a href="http://www.uky.edu/electionlaw/analysis/foreign-contributions-us-elections">American political candidates</a>, although they may <a href="http://kleptocracyinitiative.org/2016/12/a-quick-guide-to-u-s-foreign-lobbying-laws/">hire lobbyists</a>.</p>
<p>With or without an indictment, fines or other punishment, the Clinton Foundation’s outlook will remain murky as long as its endowment remains small. Should the Clinton Foundation ultimately fold, its legacy is likely to be its fundraising practices, not its good works.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90078/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Berry does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The foundation initially seemed well-suited for cleaning up Bill Clinton’s legacy after the Monica Lewinsky scandal’s ugliness. That’s no longer true.Jeffrey Berry, John Richard Skuse Professor, Department of Political Science, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.