tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/hacking-auspol-58635/articlesHacking #auspol – The Conversation2019-02-21T05:54:42Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1121302019-02-21T05:54:42Z2019-02-21T05:54:42ZWe’ve been hacked – so will the data be weaponised to influence election 2019? Here’s what to look for<p>Prime Minister Scott Morrison recently <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-actor-makes-cyber-attack-on-australian-political-parties-111993">said</a> both the Australian Parliament and its major political parties were hacked by a “sophisticated state actor.” </p>
<p>This raises concerns that a foreign adversary may be intending to weaponise, or strategically release documents, with an eye towards <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-state-actor-has-targeted-australian-political-parties-but-that-shouldnt-surprise-us-111997">altering the 2019 election outcome</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-state-actor-has-targeted-australian-political-parties-but-that-shouldnt-surprise-us-111997">A state actor has targeted Australian political parties – but that shouldn't surprise us</a>
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<p>While the hacking of party and parliamentary systems is normally a covert activity, influence operations are necessarily noisy and public in order to reach citizens – even if efforts are made to obscure their origins. </p>
<p>If a state actor has designs to weaponise materials recently hacked, we will likely see them seek to inflame religious and ethnic differences, as well as embarrass the major parties in an effort to drive votes to minor parties. </p>
<p>If this comes to pass, there are four things Australians should look for. </p>
<h2>1. Strategic interest for a foreign government to intervene</h2>
<p>If the major parties have roughly the same policy position in relation to a foreign country, a foreign state would have little incentive to intervene, for example, in favour of Labor against the Coalition. </p>
<p>They may, however, attempt to amplify social divisions between the parties as a way of reducing the ability of Australians to work together after the election. </p>
<p>They may also try to drive down <a href="https://www.democracy2025.gov.au/documents/Democracy2025-report1.pdf">the already low levels of support</a> for democracy and politicians in Australia to further undermine Australian democracy. </p>
<p>Finally, they may also try to drive the vote away from the major parties to minor parties which might be more favourable to their agenda. </p>
<p>This could be achieved by strategically releasing hacked materials which embarrass the major parties or their candidates, moving voters away from those parties and towards minor parties. These stories will likely be distributed first on social media platforms and later amplified by foreign and domestic broadcast media. </p>
<p>It is no secret that Russia and China <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ia/iiz018/5320385">seek a weakening of the Five Eyes security relationship</a> between Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. If weakened, that would undermine the alliance structure which has helped prevent major wars for the last 70 years. </p>
<h2>2. Disproportionate attention by foreign media to a local campaign</h2>
<p>In the US, although Tulsi Gabbard’s polling numbers <a href="https://zogbyanalytics.com/news/878-the-zogby-poll-biden-s-in-the-driver-s-seat-biden-is-the-favorite-even-with-michelle-obama-in-the-race-sanders-in-second-place-but-o-rourke-and-bloomberg-make-big-splash">rank her near the bottom</a> of declared and anticipated candidates for the Democratic nomination, she has received <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/russia-s-propaganda-machine-discovers-2020-democratic-candidate-tulsi-gabbard-n964261">significant attention from Russia’s overt or “white” propaganda outlets</a>, Sputnik and RT (formerly Russia Today). </p>
<p>The suspected reason for this attention is that some of <a href="http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/tulsi-gabbards-foreign-policy-and-the-progressive-left.html">her foreign policy positions on the Middle East are consistent with Russian interests</a> in the region. </p>
<p>In Australia, we might find greater attention than normal directed at One Nation or Fraser Anning – as well as the strategic promotion of Green candidates in certain places to push political discussion further right and further left at the same time. </p>
<h2>3. Promoted posts on Facebook and other social media platforms</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10584609.2018.1476425">Research</a> into the 2016 US election found widespread violations of election law. The vast majority of promoted ads on Facebook during the election campaign were from groups which failed to file with the Federal Election Commission and some of this unregistered content came from Russia. </p>
<p>Ads placed by Russia’s Internet Research Agency, which is <a href="https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download">under indictment</a> by the Mueller investigation, ended up disproportionately in the <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russian-facebook-ads-targeted-us-voters-before-2016-election">newsfeeds of Facebook users in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania</a> – two of the three states that looked like a lock for Clinton until the very end of the campaign. </p>
<p>What makes Facebook and many other social media platforms particularly of concern is the <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf">ability to use data to target ads using geographic and interest categories</a>. One can imagine that if a foreign government were armed with voting data hacked from the parties, this process would be all the more effective. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-guidelines-for-responding-to-cyber-attacks-dont-go-far-enough-108908">New guidelines for responding to cyber attacks don't go far enough</a>
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<p>Seats in Australia which might be targeted include seats like Swan (considered a <a href="http://www.tallyroom.com.au/aus2019/swan2019">marginal seat with competition against the Liberals on both the left and the right</a>) and the seats of conservative politicians on GetUp’s “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jan/17/peter-dutton-tops-getups-hard-right-hit-list-for-federal-election">hitlist</a>” – such as Tony Abbott’s and Peter Dutton’s seats of Warringah and Dickson. </p>
<h2>4. Focus on identity manipulation, rather than fake news</h2>
<p>The term “fake news” suffers from <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21670811.2017.1360143">conceptual ambiguities</a> – it means different things to different people. “Fake news” has been used not just as a form of classification to describe material which “<a href="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1094">mimics news media content in form but not in organisational process or intent</a>” but also used to describe <a href="https://ojs.uwindsor.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/5068">satire and even as an epithet</a> used to dismiss disagreeable claims of a factual nature. </p>
<p>Studies of propaganda show that <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=n1MqvgAACAAJ&dq=kevin+mccauly+and+active+measures&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwin9aCdvMvgAhWEknAKHXAMBYIQ6AEILDAA">information need not be factually false</a> to effectively manipulate target audiences. </p>
<p>The best propaganda uses claims which are factually true, placing them into a different <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=ch1rDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=jamieson+and+cyber+war&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwihiuWwvMvgAhVJQo8KHQh1CdsQ6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=jamieson%20and%20cyber%20war&f=false">context which can be used to manipulate audiences</a> or by amplifying negative aspects of a group, policy or politician, without placing that information in a wider context. </p>
<p>For example, to amplify concerns about immigrants, one might highlight the immigrant background of someone convicted of a crime, irrespective of the overall propensity for immigrants to commit crimes compared to native born Australians. </p>
<p>This creates what communication scholars call a “<a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=m_BUlVZjxKEC&printsec=frontcover&dq=burke+and+grammar+of+motives&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiEo_DyvMvgAhWKLI8KHbusBW8Q6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=burke%20and%20grammar%20of%20motives&f=false">representative anecdote</a>” through which people come to understand and think about a topic with which they are otherwise unfamiliar. While <a href="https://theconversation.com/immigration-and-crime-is-there-a-link-93521">immigrants may or may not be more likely to commit crimes</a> than other Australians, the reporting creates that association.</p>
<p>Among the ways foreign influence operations function is through the politicisation of identities. Previous research has found evidence of efforts to heighten ethnic and racial differences through <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-digital-media-blur-the-border-between-australia-and-china-101735">Chinese language WeChat official accounts</a> operating in Australia as well as through <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/commjnt/776f4b9e-cc8c-49d6-a732-34174970eabc/toc_pdf/Joint%20Standing%20Committee%20on%20Electoral%20Matters_2018_11_20_6780_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf">Russian trolling efforts</a> which have targeted Australia. This is the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26508125?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">same pattern followed by Russia</a> during the 2016 US election. </p>
<p>Liberal democracies are designed to handle conflicts over interests through negotiation and compromise. Identities, however, are less amenable to compromise. These efforts may not be “fake news” but they are effective in undermining the capacity of a democratic nation to mobilise its people in pursuit of common goals. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-digital-media-blur-the-border-between-australia-and-china-101735">How digital media blur the border between Australia and China</a>
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<h2>The Russian playbook</h2>
<p>No country is immune from the risk of foreign influence operations. While historically these operations might have <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no4/pdf/U-%20Boghardt-AIDS-Made%20in%20the%20USA-17Dec.pdf">involved the creation of false documents and on the ground operations in target countries</a>, today materials can be sourced, faked, and disseminated from the relative security of the perpetrating country. They may include both authentic and faked documents – making it hard for a campaign to charge that certain documents are faked without affirming the validity of others.</p>
<p>Most importantly, in a digitally connected world, <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=URFxDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=LikeWar+singer&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwig_ubmg8ngAhUXXn0KHfMTBW4Q6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=LikeWar%20singer&f=false">these operations can scale up quickly</a> and reach substantially larger populations than previously possible. </p>
<p>While the Russian interference in the 2016 US election has received considerable attention, Russia is not the only perpetrator and the US is not the only target. </p>
<p>But the Russians created a playbook which other countries can readily draw upon and adapt. The question remains as to who that might be in an Australian context.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Jensen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If another country wants to weaponise data hacked through Australia’s parliament, we’ll likely see them try to inflame religious and ethnic differences, and drive votes to minor parties.Michael Jensen, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1017352018-11-16T03:25:13Z2018-11-16T03:25:13ZHow digital media blur the border between Australia and China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244735/original/file-20181109-116829-chfqnh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">WeChat is an all-in-one social media platform that combines services such as those offered by WhatsApp, Facebook, Uber and Apple Pay.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/sanktpetersburg-russia-july-11-2018-wechat-1133392886?src=rSOPrjGXEzbsCLwxXZQgug-2-52">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In this series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/hacking-auspol-58635">Hacking #auspol</a> we explore whether covert foreign influence operates in Australia, and what we can do about it.</em></p>
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<p>In September, the ABC website was blocked from being accessed inside China. The <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1118351.shtml">reason given</a> was the ABC’s “aggressive” reporting on China. Prime Minister Scott Morrison responded by <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-03/china-officially-bans-abc-website/10193158">saying</a> that:</p>
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<p>China’s a sovereign country. They make decisions about what happens there, we make decisions about what happens here.</p>
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<p>But things are a little more complex than that, particularly when it comes to news published on Chinese social media platforms. Apps like <a href="https://theconversation.com/thinking-of-taking-up-wechat-heres-what-you-need-to-know-88787">WeChat</a> (known as Weixin 微信 in China) are <a href="https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/handle/10453/100651">widely used</a> in Australia by the Chinese <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-chinese-diaspora">diaspora</a> (people of Chinese descent now living in countries other than China). </p>
<p>Social media platforms like WeChat are subject to controls on what they may publish within China, but it’s unclear whether similar controls are placed on content published outside China. Tencent – the company that operates WeChat – wants to expand the adoption and use of its <a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/?lang=en_US">Official Account</a> platform internationally. Some researchers suggest WeChat operates a “<a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2016/11/wechat-china-censorship-one-app-two-systems/">one app, two systems</a>” model, with one policy operating in China and another internationally.</p>
<p>As part of our ongoing research, we present some initial findings from an analysis of news targeted at Chinese-language audiences in Australia. Over 18 months we used digital tools to capture news stories in both Australian-based WeChat Official Account news channels, and SBS Mandarin digital news channels. We then compared their content to see if news disseminated via WeChat could be subject to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43283690">influence by the Chinese government</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/thinking-of-taking-up-wechat-heres-what-you-need-to-know-88787">Thinking of taking up WeChat? Here's what you need to know</a>
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<h2>Chinese-language media in Australia</h2>
<p>The Special Broadcasting Service (<a href="https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=970100723;res=IELAPA;subject=Secondary%20education">SBS</a>) makes news available to Australia’s Mandarin-speaking population via in-language content that appears on TV, radio and online. While SBS is funded by the Australian government, it operates with editorial independence.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tencent.com/en-us/articles/17000391523362601.pdf">WeChat</a> is an all-in-one social media platform that combines services such as those offered by WhatsApp, Facebook, Uber and Apple Pay. It also acts as a news service via numerous WeChat <a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/?lang=en_US">Official Accounts</a> (also called Public Accounts). These accounts allow government agencies, business corporations, and social organisations to post and distribute news stories to subscribers. WeChat <a href="https://chinachannel.co/1017-wechat-report-users/">users</a> registered outside China are <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-22/world-s-most-powerful-app-is-squandering-its-lead">estimated</a> at 100-150 million. </p>
<p>Our content analysis focused on the three most prominent “Official Account” WeChat news providers publishing Mandarin-language news in Australia: <a href="https://www.sydneytoday.com/wechat">Sydney Today</a>, <a href="https://rank.aoweibang.com/mp/Lnbpem/">ABC Media</a> and <a href="http://www.nanhaimedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/%E6%BE%B3%E5%A4%A7%E5%88%A9%E4%BA%9A%E5%8D%97%E6%B5%B7%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96%E4%BC%A0%E5%AA%92%E9%9B%86%E5%9B%A2.pdf">We Sydney</a>. It’s <a href="http://hwcdn.libsyn.com/p/9/c/7/9c7bec94e65e56be/mafengwo.mp3?c_id=25617290&cs_id=25617290&destination_id=700932&expiration=1542250653&hwt=0ed5d195c254ca23659406afd3cf205f">hard to verify</a> exact subscriber numbers for these accounts, but they are estimated to each have more than 100,000 subscribers. </p>
<p>To understand the differences in the ways each platform prioritises content, we compared the stories published on the WeChat channels with the stories published on <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/yourlanguage/mandarin?language=zh-hans">SBS Mandarin</a>.</p>
<h2>What the data show</h2>
<p>Data were collected between 1 January 2016 and 1 August 2017. This timeframe includes two Federal government budget speeches, and the 2016 double dissolution election. Given the amount of data, we used a common analytic technique called <a href="https://cfss.uchicago.edu/fall2016/text02.html">topic modeling</a> to analyse the content, which categorises stories according to theme.</p>
<p>We found that coverage of terrorism, and crime and justice matters increased on both WeChat and SBS during the data collection period. But when it came to stories about China, the coverage was markedly different. SBS paid far more attention to Chinese politics and Chinese foreign affairs than WeChat accounts – and that disparity has intensified since February 2017.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Stories related to terror attacks and criminal cases. Shaded bands are confidence intervals, which denote the range of possible variance on either side of the line.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Stories related to Chinese politics and foreign relations. Shaded bands are confidence intervals, which denote the range of possible variance on either side of the line.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Over the total time period SBS dedicated 67 out of 2,349 articles to Chinese politics and foreign relations, which is equivalent to 2.85% of the SBS output. Meanwhile, WeChat channels dedicated 37 out of 13,669 articles to those topics, which is equivalent to 0.26% of the output of those channels.</p>
<p>More tellingly, none of the WeChat channels has published a single article on Chinese politics and foreign affairs from March 2017 until the end of the collection period. This was around the time new measures were ramped up to enhance control of WeChat content in the <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/06/minitrue-wechat-group-controls-for-qingdao-sco-summit/">lead up</a> to <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/cnleaders/2018SCOSummit/index.htm">Qingdao Summit</a>, <a href="https://chinachannel.co/wechat-freezes-profile-changing/">and</a> <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2110236/china-tightens-control-chat-groups-ahead-party-congress">ahead</a> of the <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/19cpcnc/index.htm">19th Party Congress</a>. In October 2017, the Chinese government introduced <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/please-self-censor-china-provides-new-regulations-for-online-conduct/">new regulations</a> that made <a href="http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-09/07/c_1121624269.htm">Public Account</a> and <a href="http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-09/07/c_1121623889.htm">group</a> chat account holders responsible for what is said by other users on their account pages (this included Official Accounts).</p>
<p>Even before the Sydney based WeChat channels stopped covering Chinese politics, of the 37 articles on this topic, 32 had <a href="https://rank.aoweibang.com/item/a3r6zQ/">similar</a> content to news reports from China’s domestic news agencies, which tend to reflect the position of the Chinese government.</p>
<p>Comparative findings suggest that the differing content on WeChat and SBS could have markedly different effects on readers. For instance, SBS Mandarin content might serve to give readers a sense of informed civic inclusion and democratic participation in Australian society. On the other hand, the WeChat content might be more likely to emphasise stronger cultural ties to the homeland by creating “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0d8fqyc84ms">distraction and diversion</a>” from sensitive political topics. The near absence of political coverage focuses the attention of WeChat readers on celebrity gossip and other entertainment topics rather than the politics of the People’s Republic of China. </p>
<p>This practice has been described as a form of “<a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/11341.html">porous censorship</a>”. While readers could seek out information on China from other sources, it takes time and effort to do so. The “flooding” of the daily news feed is effectively more of a tax than a ban on information – especially considering WeChat is a <a href="https://identitycomms.com.au/2017/07/using-wechat-reach-chinese-consumers-australia/">primary source of information</a> for many Chinese living in Australia.</p>
<p>Even without specific coordination, WeChat news channels may advance strategic interests of the Chinese government in this way, signalling a new mechanism of foreign influence. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-tencent-became-the-worlds-most-valuable-social-network-firm-with-barely-any-advertising-90334">How Tencent became the world's most valuable social network firm – with barely any advertising</a>
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<h2>Targeting diaspora populations</h2>
<p>In its <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/asio-report-parliament.html">2017-18 Annual Report</a>, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) expressed concerns about foreign powers secretly manipulating the opinions of Australians to further their own aims. The report specifically suggested that ethnic and religious communities have “been the subject of interference operations designed to diminish their criticism of foreign governments.”</p>
<p>Since the report was first <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-18/asio-overwhelmed-by-foreign-spying-threats-against-australia/9061728">released</a>, there has been considerable public debate and <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=COMMITTEES;id=committees%2Fcommjnt%2F1e36c2f4-7e55-46ed-ab03-e9bd81f4cdb8%2F0004;query=Id%3A%22committees%2Fcommjnt%2F1e36c2f4-7e55-46ed-ab03-e9bd81f4cdb8%2F0000%22">parliamentary concern</a> about the degree of <a href="https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2018/august/1533045600/john-garnaut/australia-s-china-reset">influence</a> the Chinese government enjoys in Australia. The focus of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d3ac306a-e188-11e7-8f9f-de1c2175f5ce">recent concern</a> has pivoted around the Chinese government’s <a href="https://www.ned.org/sharp-power-rising-authoritarian-influence-forum-report/">influence</a> in, and upon, the <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijings-influence-operations-target-chinese-diaspora/">Chinese diaspora</a>. </p>
<p>The Chinese government has a keen interest in <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/china-matters">monitoring its growing diaspora</a> populations, and that includes the content of diaspora media channels, including social media channels.</p>
<p>Influence campaigns on social media may take many forms. The most familiar is the kind of direct manipulation we’ve seen with <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-trolls-targeted-australian-voters-on-twitter-via-auspol-and-mh17-101386">Russian campaigns</a> that aim to sow division among a foreign population. A less direct route is to ensure that legitimate news sources only report news that serve the strategic objectives of the government in question. Our study focuses on the second kind.</p>
<h2>Who is the Chinese diaspora?</h2>
<p>The Chinese government <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-04/beijing-official-urges-outreach-to-non-mainland-chinese/9506388">has said</a> it considers those of <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijings-influence-operations-target-chinese-diaspora/">Chinese descent</a> <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180308082309/http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0218/c64094-29090242.html">abroad</a> to be the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10670564.2016.1184894">nation’s diaspora</a>. The <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbytitle/D8CAE4F74B82D446CA258235000F2BDE?OpenDocument">2016 census</a> identified 1.2 million people of “Chinese ancestry” in Australia, with 41% born in China.</p>
<p>It’s important to remember that while idea of “<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Allen_Chun">Chineseness</a>” suggests a homogenous identity, ethnicity and culture, in reality this group is made up of different experiences, views and political allegiances. Some people in this group may not have any particular affiliation with China. Nevertheless, they are part of the group the Chinese government has suggested is within its sphere of influence.</p>
<p>A key component of the diaspora is students. There may be between <a href="https://internationaleducation.gov.au/research/DataVisualisations/Pages/nationalitySummary.aspx">150,000-200,000 thousand</a> <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-18/australia-hosting-unprecedented-numbers-international-students/9669030">students from China</a> in the Australian education <a href="https://www.austrade.gov.au/News/Economic-analysis/australias-export-performance-in-fy2017">system</a>. Like the diaspora as a whole, the experiences of Chinese students in Australia are complex and not homogeneous.</p>
<p>University of Melbourne researcher <a href="https://www.findanexpert.unimelb.edu.au/display/person2095#tab-overview">Fran Martin</a> argues for a more nuanced approach to Chinese international students lived experience of social media in Australia, pointing out that there is no singular experience of <a href="https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/06/11/how-chinese-students-exercise-free-speech-abroad">free speech in the Chinese student diaspora</a>. And <a href="https://deakin.academia.edu/XinyuZhao">Xinyu Zhao</a>, a PhD student at Deakin, argues that Chinese students are as clever about avoiding oversight of senior relatives in their use of social media as any other young person.</p>
<h2>Controls on WeChat content</h2>
<p>Social media have led to a proliferation of unofficial spaces of communication online, which has created challenges for the Chinese government’s efforts to <a href="http://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/21426/frontmatter/9781107021426_frontmatter.pdf">regulate the content of online communications</a>.</p>
<p>Social media companies in China are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43283690">required to censor posts</a> which the Chinese government identifies as “illegal”, and self-censorship among users is encouraged. Examples of illegal content <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/19eS47Dg086vR1jh9oo51pXstYVT2wft13JGCrnAeU7A/edit#gid=728354615">includes phrases</a> <a href="https://github.com/citizenlab/chat-censorship/blob/master/wechat/one_app_two_systems/wechat_blocked_keywords.csv">such as</a> “Tiananmen June 4”, “free Tibet” and “Falun Gong”. The flow on effect of regulation and influence on these platforms when they are used outside China’s borders is more complex.</p>
<p>Certainly the Chinese Government does seek to influence the diaspora. There is a dedicated Chinese government department, the United Front Work Department (UFWD), for “overseas Chinese work”. It seeks to both “<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/06/minitrue-wechat-group-controls-for-qingdao-sco-summit/">guide</a>” ethnic Chinese, and conduct <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/14409-the-chinese-communist-party-s-foreign-interference-operations-how-the-u-s-and-other-democracies-should-respond">influence operations</a> targeted at foreign actors and states that <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijings-influence-operations-target-chinese-diaspora/">further the objectives of the Chinese government</a>. Chinese President Xi Jinping has <a href="https://www.edx.org/course/xi-jinpings-thought-on-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics-for-a-new-era">described</a> the UFWD’s work as the Chinese government’s “<a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/magicweaponsanne-mariebradyseptember162017.pdf">magic weapons</a>”. </p>
<p>The Australian Defence Department is concerned enough about the possibility of Chinese censorship and surveillance being enabled via WeChat that it has <a href="https://www.afr.com/technology/apps/business/australias-defence-department-bans-chinese-app-wechat-20180310-h0xay8">banned</a> the app from work phones, pending security investigation.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/video-explainer-at-chinas-19th-national-party-congress-xis-vision-and-legacy-are-at-stake-85325">Video explainer: at China's 19th National Party Congress, Xi's vision and legacy are at stake</a>
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<h2>Impact on political discourse</h2>
<p>There is a long history of countries attempting to impact the political discourse in other nations. This might involve various forms of lobbying and support for political parties and politicians, support of social and political movements, or the state-supported diffusion of cultural objects and information.</p>
<p>But not all state broadcasters are instruments of government propaganda or subject to government editorial control. Few in the West would decry the BBC and its various foreign language services, which have editorial independence from the British government. Indeed, the BBC often reports critically on British government activities. </p>
<p>WeChat is becoming an increasingly important media forum for Australian elections, with politicans beginning to use it to reach Chinese communities online. Some suggest that WeChat was important during the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/jul/09/how-a-chinese-language-social-media-campaign-hurt-labors-election-chances">2016 federal election</a> in Victorian communities. And in 2017 Shadow Treasurer Chris Bowen was the first Australian politician to use <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/yourlanguage/mandarin/en/article/2017/10/26/chris-bowen-first-australian-politician-use-wechat-live-communicate-chinese?cid=inbody:who-are-the-australians-that-are-using-chinas-wechat">WeChat Live</a>. </p>
<p>Digital diasporas are accessible for potential foreign influence, and Chinese language social media in Australia are increasingly a focus for local political parties. This dynamic is changing the way we chat about politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101735/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Titus C.Chen receives funding from the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Jensen and Tom Sear do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese-language social media in Australia are increasingly a focus for local political parties.Tom Sear, PhD Candidate, UNSW Canberra Cyber, Australian Defence Force Academy, UNSW SydneyMichael Jensen, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of CanberraTitus C Chen, Associate Professor, Ph.D. in Political Science, California Irvin University, U.S.A, National Sun Yat-sen UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1012522018-08-23T05:25:23Z2018-08-23T05:25:23ZIf it ain’t broke, don’t fix it: Australia should stay away from electronic voting<p><em>Russia was behind an enormous effort to influence politics in the US and the UK, but was Australia targeted too? In this series, <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/hacking-auspol-58635">Hacking #auspol</a>, we explore how covert foreign influence operates in Australia, and what we can do about it.</em></p>
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<p>The civic experience of interacting with analogue voting interfaces is as Australian as the <a href="https://democracysausage.org/perth_by-election_2018">democracy sausage</a>. Voters are confronted with <a href="https://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/candidates/scrutineers-handbook/voting.htm">tiny pencils</a>, plus physical security measures that involve huddling in a cardboard booth and origami-scale folding.</p>
<p>The use of paper ballots – and human counting of those ballots – creates one of the most secure electoral systems imaginable.</p>
<p>And the Australian tradition provides another sometimes under-recognised component of electoral security: <a href="https://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/backgrounders/compulsory-voting.htm">compulsory voting</a>. This practice secures against the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/poll-prri-voter-suppression/565355/">voter suppression</a> tactics used to undermine elections in the United States.</p>
<p>In the digital era, smartphones are so prevalent that it might seem tempting to move to voting online. In 2013 the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180313184749/http://www.ecanz.gov.au/research/files/internet-voting-australian-election-systems.pdf">explored internet voting</a>. But cyber security experts say: if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/election-explainer-why-cant-australians-vote-online-57738">Election explainer: why can't Australians vote online?</a>
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<h2>US system an example of what not to do</h2>
<p>The problems the US has had with electronic voting provide a perfect illustration of what can go wrong.</p>
<p>Every year hackers and cyber security experts from across the globe converge “In Real Life” (IRL) on Las Vegas to attend one of the world’s largest and longest-running annual hacker conventions: <a href="https://www.defcon.org/">DefCon</a>.</p>
<p>Election hacking has recently gained prominence at DefCon. In 2017 the “Voting Machine Hacking Village” area revealed the cyber vulnerabilities of <a href="https://defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf">US election equipment, databases and infrastructure</a>. One participant even “<a href="https://twitter.com/VotingVillageDC/status/891445496622874624">RickRolled</a>” a machine by replacing the voter profile with Rick Astley playing his song “Never Gonna Give You Up”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"891445496622874624"}"></div></p>
<p>The <a href="https://twitter.com/VotingVillageDC">DefCon Voting Village</a> showcased electoral system vulnerabilities again this year, as <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/an-11-year-old-changed-election-results-on-a-replica-florida-state-website-in-under-10-minutes">Young DefCon</a> attendees <a href="https://twitter.com/wbaltv11/status/1030176719255363584">aged 8-16</a> competed for <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m-NAHyeYbH9GD1Fy4FWW4hxSwgGxX0wa/view">prize money</a> to hack into replicas of election results websites to manipulate vote tallies. It took an 11-year-old just <a href="http://time.com/5366171/11-year-old-hacked-into-us-voting-system-10-minutes/">10 minutes</a> to hack into one of the systems.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-in-trust-from-americas-experience-with-electronic-voting-69716">Lessons in trust from America's experience with electronic voting</a>
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<p>Recent announcements from the White House indicate that <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/08/24/election-hacking-lawsuit-over-heated-georgia-race-could-sign-whats-come/574313001/">cyber-vulnerable elections</a> are more than child’s play. Earlier this month the Trump administration outlined approaches to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-strengthening-security-elections/">bolster defence against cyber operations targeting elections</a>.</p>
<h2>Where Australia stands on e-voting</h2>
<p>After the 2016 federal election, the leaders of both major parties <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/ElectronicVoting">raised the possibility of introducing electronic voting at future Australian elections</a>. </p>
<p>Electronic voting is a broad church. Since 2001, the ACT has operated locally networked computers in some locations, and 283,669 voters have used the <a href="https://www.ivote.nsw.gov.au/faq.aspx">iVote</a> system in NSW elections.</p>
<p>As early as 2007, the AEC piloted electronically assisted voting to enable access for visually impaired voters. It also trialled voting across a secure network for Australian Defence Force personnel serving overseas.</p>
<p>At the 2013 federal election, the AEC <a href="https://annualreport.aec.gov.au/2013/case-studies/electronic-lists.html">piloted the use of electronically certified lists (ECLs)</a>. This technology enables voters to be marked more quickly off voting rolls, thus avoiding the queues caused by that nice person with a pencil and ruler who looks quizzically at your driving licence.</p>
<p>Electronic scanning and counting of ballot papers was introduced in the 2016 federal election, but subsequently became subject to an inquiry.</p>
<p>In cybersecurity, we are fond of pointing out that no digital system is ever truly secure. Moving to comprehensive, end-to-end, online voting should never take place. The risks of disruption to online voting are, and will remain, simply too high.</p>
<h2>Vulnerabilities beyond e-voting</h2>
<p>Of course there are other vulnerabilities in the Australian electoral system – dependencies in any system lead to vulnerabilities. <a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/c3vp/crr_resources_guides/CRR_Resource_Guide-EDM.pdf">External dependencies management</a> is essential for security in elections. For governments, such dependencies include the use of private contractors.</p>
<p>In January, the <a href="https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/aec-procurement-services-conduct-2016-federal-election">Australian National Audit Office</a> found that transport suppliers and contractors delivering a new <a href="https://www.themandarin.com.au/87745-electoral-commissioner-agency-made-best-tricky-situation/">Senate ballot scanning system</a> could not meet security requirements. The Australian Signals Directorate warned the AEC that IT security problems could not be resolved in time for election day. Shortly thereafter, the <a href="https://www.coag.gov.au/sites/default/files/communique/coag-communique-february-2018.pdf">Council of Australian Governments</a> ordered “health checks” of electoral systems.</p>
<p>In June, the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/reportjnt/024070/toc_pdf/Thirdinterimreportontheinquiryintotheconductofthe2016federalelectionAECmodernisation.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf">found</a> that the AEC needed to update its IT infrastructure to support its core election and voter roll management systems.</p>
<p>Foreign adversaries have been accused of attempting to <a href="https://theintercept.com/2017/06/05/top-secret-nsa-report-details-russian-hacking-effort-days-before-2016-election/">compromise</a> electoral roll systems in the 2016 US election. In response to this threat the Australian government has provided grants to political parties to seek compliance against the <a href="https://acsc.gov.au/publications/protect/Top_4_Mitigations.pdf">top four basic cyber security measures</a>.</p>
<h2>Disinformation is a bigger threat</h2>
<p>Such initiatives are welcome. But it is unlikely that large parties would be the target of a genuinely subversive measure designed to create disruption.</p>
<p>There are a few options for an adversary seeking to “hack” an election. The first is to “go loud” and undermine the public’s belief in the players, the process, or the outcome itself. This might involve stealing information from a major party, <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/dnc-lawsuit-reveals-key-details-2016-hack/">for example</a>, and then anonymously leaking it. Or it might mean, rather than attacking voting machines themselves, attacking and changing the data held by the AEC. This would force the agency to <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/d3310114.nsf/home/Australian%20Statistician%20-%20Speeches%20-%20Census%202016%20Lessons%20Learned">publicly admit a concern</a>, which in turn would undermine confidence in the system.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-trolls-targeted-australian-voters-on-twitter-via-auspol-and-mh17-101386">Russian trolls targeted Australian voters on Twitter via #auspol and #MH17</a>
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<p>In Australia, this approach would not ultimately affect the actual result due to the security of our physical system. Such an obvious breach might be a prize for an adversary, but its actual effect on a nation with compulsory voting would be short-lived.</p>
<p>The real risk to any election is the <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-phoward-080118.pdf">manipulation of social media</a>, and a more successful and secretive campaign to alter the outcome of the Australian election might focus on a minor party. </p>
<p>An adversary could steal the membership database and electoral roll of a party with poor security, locate the social media accounts of those people, and then slowly use social media manipulations to influence an active, vocal group of voters.</p>
<h2>Securing the elections of the future</h2>
<p>In June, ahead of the July 28 by-elections, the government set up an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-security-elections/australia-forms-task-force-to-guard-elections-from-cyber-attacks-idUSKCN1J506D">Electoral Task Force</a> composed of Department of Home Affairs, the Australian Federal Police, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and Australian Cyber Security Centre, to guard against foreign interference in future elections.</p>
<p>In an era when foreign influence via <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-trolls-targeted-australian-voters-on-twitter-via-auspol-and-mh17-101386">social media is likely</a>, this task force should be invested with <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/consultations/Documents/explanatory-document.pdf">sufficient powers</a> to analyse social media and compel social media companies to take down foreign adversarial accounts in real time. </p>
<p>Such an approach might feasibly be taken through existing frameworks – too much coordination between the government and social networks could be incompatible with a free and open public sphere. But faced by a challenge with few clear solutions, every available option should be considered.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, calls for, and the development of, digital voting solutions are not going away. </p>
<p>Australian start-up <a href="https://horizonstate.com/">Horizon State</a> has used blockchain technology to <a href="https://horizonstate.com/Horizon-State-Whitepaper.pdf">create verified, secure voting systems</a>. Horizon State will <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-07-24/blockchain-innovators-seek-to-disrupt-indonesian-electoral-fraud/10025900">deploy the system in Sumatra</a>, hoping scale up for future Indonesian elections.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-leads-the-way-in-election-technology-but-theres-a-long-way-to-go-84925">Africa leads the way in election technology, but there's a long way to go</a>
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<p><a href="https://xkcd.com/2030/">Not everyone</a> is certain that blockchain will provide an ideal solution. Such approaches are good for developing democracies, where human corruption in officialdom is the major security risk to elections. But in a mature democracy like Australia, sometimes the tried and true traditions are the best defence.</p>
<p>During the Australian <a href="https://www.electionsausagesizzle.com.au/2016-federal-election-sausage-sizzle-map/">2016 federal election</a>, Twitter added a sausage on bread emoji to the hashtag #ausvotes. This is one election “hack” we can be <a href="https://twitter.com/adamhillscomedy/status/750356069998788608">happy to celebrate</a>. But hey, just don’t use a knife and fork, alright?</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"750356069998788608"}"></div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Sear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia has one of the most secure electoral systems imaginable thanks to paper ballots. Cybersecurity experts caution against e-voting.Tom Sear, PhD Candidate, UNSW Canberra Cyber, Australian Defence Force Academy, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1013862018-08-22T08:52:00Z2018-08-22T08:52:00ZRussian trolls targeted Australian voters on Twitter via #auspol and #MH17<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233019/original/file-20180822-149472-zlpnao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2724%2C1734&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Network map of accounts within #auspol tweets mentioning or linking to Russian propaganda outlets, Sputnik and RT, May 4 – July 30, 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Russia was behind an enormous effort to influence politics in the US and the UK, but was Australia targeted too? In this series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/hacking-auspol-58635">Hacking #auspol</a> we explore how covert foreign influence operates in Australia, and what we can do about it.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-were-sharing-3-million-russian-troll-tweets/">New</a> evidence shows that the infamous Russian “troll factory”, the Internet Research Agency (IRA), targeted Australian politics on social media between 2015 and 2017 – and that other Russian outlets may continue to conduct influence operations.</p>
<p>Russian intervention in the 2016 US election has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/russian-election-hacking">generated considerable attention</a> around the world. But while that attack was <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/did-obama-blow-it-on-the-russian-hacking-us-elections-vladimir-putin-donald-trump-lisa-monaco/">unprecedented</a> in scope, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/08/22/us/ap-us-facebook-investigation.html">Russia is not the only perpetrator</a> of foreign influence, and the United States is not the only target.</p>
<p>The recent passage of legislation by the Australian Parliament targeting foreign lobbyists and strengthening regulations around espionage are a response to growing concerns about <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6018">foreign influence operations in Australia</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/weaponized-information-seeks-a-new-target-in-cyberspace-users-minds-100069">Weaponized information seeks a new target in cyberspace: Users' minds</a>
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<h2>What Russian interference in Australia looks like</h2>
<p>In its effort to aid US lawmakers <a href="https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download">investigating</a> Russian influence on US politics, Twitter identified <a href="https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ira_handles_june_2018.pdf">3,841 accounts</a> suspected of operating out of the <a href="https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/">Internet Research Agency in St Petersburg</a>. Researchers from Clemson University in the US <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-were-sharing-3-million-russian-troll-tweets/">released 3 million tweets</a> from those accounts last month. </p>
<p>Our analysis of this data set shows how these accounts targeted Australian politics – particularly in reaction to the Australian response to the downing of flight MH17. Some 5,000 tweets mention the terms “#auspol”, “Australia” or “MH17” – with “Australia” the most common of the three. </p>
<p>Examples of their interventions in #auspol include: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>@ALFREDTHREE: Tony Abbot used and manipulated terror threat as a political weapon </p>
<p>@ADRIENNE_GG #My4WordNewYearsResolution. Give The Government Hell. #AusPol. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>These are not retweets, but original tweets from IRA troll accounts, and both have an objective of undermining support for the government. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233029/original/file-20180822-149484-1t2zya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Topic coverage by Internet Research Agency human-controlled ‘troll’ Twitter accounts.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The jump in activity focusing on MH17 correlates with the Australian government’s response to the Russian missile attack on MH17, when Australia deployed fighter aircraft to operate in Syrian airspace where Russian aircraft were also operational. During this period, the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/explaining-australias-sharp-turn-to-information-warfare/">Australian Defence Force (ADF) was also confronted by Russian military cyber operations</a>. </p>
<p>The spike that occurs in February 2017 actually has nothing to do with politics and instead refers to a hashtag game. These Russian accounts encouraged people to come up with Australian names for popular US television programs. Examples include, “@AIDEN7757: Gallipoli of Thrones #MakeTVShowsAustralian”, “@ERICARUTTER: Sheila the explorer #MakeTVShowsAustralian”, and “@CALEBPAAR: American Drongo #MakeTVShowsAustralian”. </p>
<p>While this may seem like innocent fun, <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=bNQotAEACAAJ&dq=messing+with+the+enemy&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj297ucyOncAhUGW7wKHQvWAzoQ6AEILDAB">it is also a technique of spy craft</a>. “Assets”, in this case, Australian citizens, are recruited on neutral, non-political terms before they are shifted towards political topics. </p>
<h2>#auspol targeted during budget and by-elections</h2>
<p>Studies of Russian Twitter trolls show that they are distinct from other actors in that they tend to link to and promote <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.09288">official Russian propaganda outlets</a>. </p>
<p>To better understand the role played by these accounts in Australian politics, we collected tweets using the hashtag #auspol from 4 May to 30 July 2018. That period runs from the lead-up to the 2018 budget through the by-elections held the end of July. The #auspol hashtag <a href="https://eprints.qut.edu.au/90463/">has been used on Twitter to aggregate discussions about Australian politics</a> since June 2010. </p>
<p>The purpose of this research is not to identify specific troll accounts, but to identify how Russian propaganda materials are becoming involved in social media discussions about Australian politics. </p>
<p>For this analysis we focus on <a href="https://sputniknews.com/">Sputnik</a> and <a href="https://www.rt.com/">RT</a> (formerly Russia Today). We call these outlets propaganda for two reasons. Firstly, they are recognised as such by the United States Department of Justice which has recently required them to <a href="https://www.rt.com/usa/415464-sputnik-content-provider-fara/">register under the Foreign Agent Registration Act</a>. Second, these outlets <a href="https://www.rt.com/on-air/">describe themselves</a> in terms of their propaganda function with RT explaining that their purpose is to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[acquaint] an international audience with the Russian viewpoint.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233030/original/file-20180822-149472-uavmaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Network map of accounts within #auspol tweets mentioning or linking to Russian propaganda outlets, Sputnik and RT. Data collected via Twitter’s streaming API, filtered for #auspol from 4 May until 30 July, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The above network map of #auspol tweets which mention Russian propaganda outlets, or link to their reporting, indicates that these accounts appear most commonly in discussions with News Corporation media platforms. There is also a wider international focus including <a href="https://theconversation.com/sergei-skripal-attack-russian-embassy-is-fuelling-tensions-with-some-very-undiplomatic-tweets-93407">Russian diplomatic delegations</a>.</p>
<p>These results contrast with the normal #auspol mention network, which contains a much broader range of domestic political actors and media organisations. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233028/original/file-20180822-149481-6l205.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Network map of the top 50 Twitter handles within #auspol with accounts that mention Russian propaganda removed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Targeting the Australian right</h2>
<p>The data suggest that Russian influence operations may be targeting the political right in Australia at this time. There is also an emphasis on international topics, such as terrorism, and UK, EU, and US politics.</p>
<p>The hashtag #abledanger (and the typo #abeldanger) also figures prominently. It refers to a blog that promotes conspiracy theories about American politics.</p>
<p>The hashtag network map of #auspol without Russian propaganda references looks considerably different. It reflects domestic political concerns such as the budget or debate over My Health Record, refugee policy and districts that were holding by-elections. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233026/original/file-20180822-149484-uhih06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">#auspol hashtag mention map without Russian propaganda mentions or links. Data collected via Twitter streaming API, filtered for #auspol from early May until 30 July.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Building relationships to sow division</h2>
<p>There are two ways to think about how information is exchanged in the public sphere. One is a rational model, where claims are backed by evidence. The other is a narrative model, where people reason through stories that resonate with them. Many contemporary theories of democracy rely on the rational model, but foreign influence operations make use of the fact that people behave more in line with the narrative model.</p>
<p>Disinformation, in this context, is not so much the distribution of falsehoods for political effect, but rather communications designed to manipulate a target audience in a manner favourable to the perpetrator. </p>
<p>In early 2015, Twitter accounts affiliated with the Internet Research Agency focused almost as much on nonpolitical topics as they did on political topics. These accounts are human-controlled accounts, so-called “trolls”, and they operate differently from bots. </p>
<p>Bots are automated to promote specific topics, hashtags, so they often lack the nuanced communication abilities of human-controlled accounts. This makes them less effective in strategically moving an audience than troll accounts run by humans. </p>
<p>By contrast, troll accounts are able to develop relationships, and it’s often through these relationships that <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/social-calculus-of-voting-interpersonal-media-and-organizational-influences-on-presidential-choices/4605211FD617AAB1F9686F774CFBC5CB">political opinions are developed and voting decisions made</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/regulate-social-media-platforms-before-its-too-late-86984">Regulate social media platforms before it's too late</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>Adversarial actors, such as Russia, try to shift the identifications of a target audience from one political affiliation to another. <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Information-Warfare-Howard-Gambrill-Clark-ebook/dp/B076H1XRP7/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1534458201&sr=8-1&keywords=clark+and+information+warfare">One way of doing this</a> is to break identifications with governing organisations by promoting a sense of insecurity and danger. </p>
<p>For example, there was a tragic case earlier this year where a man killed himself along with several members of his family. The <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-11/seven-people-found-dead-in-margaret-river-murder-suicide/9751482">ABC reported</a> the news with the headline: “Margaret River Murder-Suicide: Seven People Found Dead at Home Near WA Holiday Town”. Meanwhile, the Russian news outlet Russia Today (RT) <a href="https://www.rt.com/news/426426-australia-mass-shooting-deaths/">reported</a> the news with the headline: “Seven People, Including 4 Children Shot Dead in Southwestern Australia”. </p>
<p>Whereas the ABC headline alerts readers that there is no ongoing threat, the RT headline leaves it open, despite having the same information as the ABC buried down in the text of the article. </p>
<p>The difference seems minor, but there is increasing evidence that repeated messaging like this can have the effect of eroding support for political authorities and institutions. It helps build a narrative that these institutions are incapable of addressing the needs of their citizens. </p>
<h2>Russian influence operations continue</h2>
<p>These data should not be overstated. Of the 632,398 #auspol tweets collected from early May until 30 July, only 119 mentioned or linked to Russian propaganda outlets. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the Russian tweets shed light on Russia’s propaganda efforts in Australia. The data set indicates that they are trying to cultivate an audience here through memes, hashtag games, and Aussie cultural references. And the network maps suggest they are trying to move Australians’ views on foreign affairs, particularly by targeting reporting on News Corporation outlets. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-researched-russian-trolls-and-figured-out-exactly-how-they-neutralise-certain-news-100994">We researched Russian trolls and figured out exactly how they neutralise certain news</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Democracies are, by their nature, open political systems. That makes them particularly vulnerable to influence efforts by foreign adversaries. The attacks on the 2016 US election have provided adversaries with a playbook to engage in operations against countries like Australia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101386/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A lot of attention has been focused on Russia’s efforts to influence American politics, but Australia has also been a target – and continues to be a target – of covert foreign influence.Tom Sear, PhD Candidate, UNSW Canberra Cyber, Australian Defence Force Academy, UNSW SydneyMichael Jensen, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.