tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/hezbollah-4783/articlesHezbollah – The Conversation2024-03-07T13:32:50Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228322024-03-07T13:32:50Z2024-03-07T13:32:50ZLebanese-Israeli fighting looks set to scuttle plans for historic land border settlement<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578661/original/file-20240228-16-mpt54u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=40%2C0%2C5414%2C3645&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.N. navy vessel seen through barbed wire patrols the Mediterranean Sea off the Lebanese coast.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LebanonIsraelBorderDealFallout/ceaec2b4d98b426fa4f13dba93f04cb5/photo?Query=lebanon%20israel%20maritime&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=228&currentItemNo=15">AP Photo/Mohammed Zaatari</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In October 2022, Lebanon and Israel signed a <a href="https://www.state.gov/historic-agreement-establishing-a-permanent-israel-lebanon-maritime-boundary/">maritime border agreement</a> brokered by the U.S., a move interpreted as the beginning of normalizing relations between <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/war-decades-lebanon-israel-edge-towards-rare-deal-2022-10-11/">two countries technically at war</a>. </p>
<p>The next step would have been the settlement of the long-running <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/13/why-is-there-a-disputed-border-between-lebanon-and-israel">land border dispute</a>.</p>
<p>But then came the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023, and Israel’s response in bombing Gaza. The following day, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nasrallah-hezbollah-leader-gaza-war">Hassan Nasrallah</a>, secretary general of Lebanon’s political party and militant group Hezbollah, announced the faction had “entered the battle,” effectively dragging Lebanon into fresh, intensified fighting with Israel. </p>
<p>Since then, near-daily tit-for-tat strikes have seen Hezbollah fighters <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/15/hezbollah-warns-israel-will-pay-price-after-fighters-civilians-killed#:%7E:text=The%20Lebanese%20armed%20group%20Hezbollah,Hezbollah%20fighters%20in%20southern%20Lebanon.">fire missiles into northern Israel</a> and Israel Defense Forces <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-airstrikes-balbek-drone-ed15c8275fa47e6214784f5ed99649f8">responding in kind</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.dickinson.edu/site/custom_scripts/dc_faculty_profile_index.php?fac=rebeizm">scholar who researches</a> <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Gendering_Civil_War.html?id=mJXZzwEACAAJ&source=kp_author_description">evolving issues in Lebanon and the Middle East</a>, I worry that as regional violence escalates, the long simmering conflict between Israel and Lebanon is heading toward an unavoidable <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-war-preparedness-civilians-military-aafd7a0048dceb810456b93ceecf543c">full-blown war</a>. In such circumstances, hopes for a land settlement to accompany the historic maritime deal look, for now at least, dead in the water.</p>
<h2>Lebanese–Israeli relations</h2>
<p>For over 75 years, Israel’s border with Lebanon has been a source of conflict. Following the proclamation of the state of Israel in 1948, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nakba-at-75-palestinians-struggle-to-get-recognition-for-their-catastrophe-204782">expelled or fled their land</a>; many ended up as refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. </p>
<p><iframe id="wuf3I" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/wuf3I/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization was created and began to operate cells and recruit members from the Palestinian refugee camps in those three countries. In 1970, the PLO was <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/content/black-september">expelled from Jordan</a>.</p>
<p>It moved its headquarters into Lebanon, and by the mid-1970s over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1976/08/18/archives/palestinian-groups-fight-for-survival-in-lebanon.html">20,000 PLO</a> fighters were in Lebanon launching attacks on Israel. Their armed presence divided Lebanese public opinion between those who wanted to make peace with Israel and those who wanted to defend the Palestinian cause. </p>
<p>On <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Lebanese-Civil-War">April 13, 1975</a>, violence erupted over the issue of Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, and the country descended into chaos. </p>
<p>It resulted in a messy civil war in which Palestinian insurgents in Lebanon fought the country’s Christian population while also continuing to fire rockets into Israel. Lebanon thus became an unstable political and security threat to Israel. </p>
<p>In 1982, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon launched <a href="https://embassies.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Operation-Peace-for-Galilee.aspx">Operation Peace for Galilee</a>. On June 6 of that year, Israel Defense Forces invaded Lebanon with the intent to eliminate PLO fighters. Nearly <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/09/03/war-casualties-put-at-48000-in-lebanon/cf593941-6067-4239-a453-71bdcaf9eba0/">18,000 people were killed and another 30,000 wounded</a> during the invasion. </p>
<p>The Lebanese authorities called for help, and a <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/middle-east/lebanon.html">multinational peacekeeping force</a> composed of American, French, British and Italian troops arrived in August 1982. Its mission was to evacuate PLO fighters out of Lebanon into Tunisia. </p>
<p>But on Sept. 14, Lebanese President-elect <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/15/world/gemayel-of-lebanon-is-killed-in-bomb-blast-at-party-offices.html">Bashir Gemayel</a> was assassinated. In retaliation, the Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia entered the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and killed over 2,000 civilians. <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/massacres-at-sabra-and-shatila">Evidence suggests</a> Israel played a role in these massacres and was indirectly responsible for them. </p>
<p>Israel officially retreated from Beirut in September 1982, but it occupied southern Lebanon until 2000. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A groupd of mourners carry a coffin." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mourners at a funeral procession on Feb. 17, 2024, in Nabatiyeh, Lebanon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LebanonIsraelPalestinians/28e1c8a9206b40b1a7662a0fe0b6ed6c/photo?Query=Lebanon%20%20Israel%20border&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=2301&currentItemNo=18">AP Photo/Mohammed Zaatari</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It was during this Israeli occupation that <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, a Shiite political party in Lebanon and militant organization backed by Iran, was born. Hezbollah and the IDF have been engaged in fierce fighting ever since, including a 1996 war known as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/summaries/s.israel-lebanon979.html">Operation Grapes of Wrath</a>, in which an estimated 200 were killed. </p>
<h2>Land and maritime border disputes</h2>
<p>Much of the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel takes place along a border that has been contested since the creation of Israel. Matters became more complicated with the occupation of the Golan Heights – a former Syrian territory that borders Israel and Lebanon and was taken by Israeli forces during the 1967 <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461">Six-Day War</a>.</p>
<p>In the past, there have been attempts to settle land disputes. In 1949, Israel and Lebanon signed the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/israellebanon-generalarmistice49#:%7E:text=Summary%3A,to%20permanent%20peace%20in%20Palestine.">general armistice agreement</a>, which adopted the boundaries of the mandatory territories of Palestine and Lebanon. This agreement continues to exist on paper. </p>
<p>In May 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement calling for the establishment of peaceful diplomatic relations between the two states. However, after the assassination of Gemayel and the Sabra and Shatila massacres, the agreement was not implemented. </p>
<p>Following the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, a <a href="https://unifil.unmissions.org/it%E2%80%99s-time-talk-about-blue-line-constructive-re-engagement-key-stability">“Blue Line” was established</a> by the U.N. It is not a real border but rather an imagined line separating the two states and monitored by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. </p>
<p>Although the Blue Line acts as a buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel, it does not offer an accurate drawing of land boundaries and does not solve the issue of a key source of contention: the disputed <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/shebaa-farms-why-hezbollah-uses-israel-s-occupation-of-a-tiny-strip-of-land-to-justify-its-arsenal-1.857998">Shebaa Farms</a>. </p>
<p>Located between Israel, Syria and southern Lebanon, the Shebaa Farms have been contested lands for over two decades. While Lebanon and Hezbollah claim that it is Lebanese territory, Israel asserts that it is part of the Golan Heights, which it continues to occupy.</p>
<p>After appointing cartographers, the United Nations declared the Shebaa Farms Syrian territory <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/first-person/assad-the-shebaa-farms-are-syrian-whatever-hezbollah-claims/">captured by Israel in 1967</a>.</p>
<p>In 2011, Syrian leader <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/84303">Bashar Assad recognized that the Shebaa Farms</a> are Syrian, refuting Hezbollah’s claim over this land and Israel’s jurisdiction in the occupied Golan Heights. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, efforts led by the U.S. began to look at the issue of Lebanon and Israel’s disputed maritime boundary, starting in earnest in 2010. </p>
<p>The discovery of the Leviathan field, <a href="https://newmedenergy.com/operations/leviathan/#:%7E:text=Leviathan%2C%20with%2022.9%20TCF%20of,producing%20assets%20in%20the%20region.">the largest gas reservoir in the Mediterranean</a>, made it urgent to address the question of the maritime borders. With gas exploitation and economic growth a possibility, it was deemed important to lower security risks for investors. </p>
<p>In 2022, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-special-envoy-hopes-diplomacy-will-calm-lebanon-israel-border-2024-01-11/">Amos Hochstein</a>, the American envoy for energy affairs, met separately at the Blue Line with Israeli and Lebanese officials. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/27/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-maritime-deal/">Hezbollah was involved</a> in the negotiations and gave the green light for the deal to be sealed. In October of that year, the <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/mzn_s/MZN161.pdf">U.N. was notified</a> of the new Israeli and Lebanese maritime borders. </p>
<p>It came amid other signs of a lessening in tensions between Israel and Arab states. In September 2020, the United Arab Emirates signed the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> in which it recognized Israeli statehood. Soon after, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/israeli-foreign-minister-heads-delegation-discuss-sudan-normalisation-2023-02-02/">Sudan and Bahrain</a> followed suit. </p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>The maritime border agreement carried a potential for peace in the region, a deal that would, potentially, benefit both Lebanon and Israel. </p>
<p>The next step would have been drawing land boundaries. In fact, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/22/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-lebanon-hezbollah-talks.html">Hochstein</a> had already held preliminary discussions over 13 land border points, including the Shebaa Farms, and had explicitly said that the U.S. is ready to help mediate between the two countries.</p>
<p>Hamas’ terrorist attack on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/31/interview-building-evidence-crimes-committed-israel-october-7">Oct. 7, 2023</a>, and the ongoing Israeli war in Gaza have, however, derailed the process.</p>
<p>It is hard to envision a land border deal in such circumstances, especially after <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/assassination-of-hamas-leader-in-lebanon-deepens-concerns-of-broader-regional-conflict">the January 2024 assassination of</a> Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut and Hezbollah’s vow to avenge the death.</p>
<p>The final nail in the coffin looks to be Saudi Arabia’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-says-there-will-be-no-diplomatic-relations-with-israel-without-an-2024-02-07/">statement on Feb. 7, 2024</a>, that it can have no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized with the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital. </p>
<p>It has ended hopes, for now at least, that Saudi Arabia will follow the UAE’s lead and normalize diplomatic relations with Israel. </p>
<p>The U.S. is still desperately trying to keep the land deal alive. Recently, <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/lebanon/2024/03/05/amos-hochstein-meets-anti-hezbollah-parties-in-lebanon-for-first-time/">Hochstein visited Lebanon</a> and met with anti-Hezbollah parties in an attempt to end hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel and move forward with a land agreement. </p>
<p>One voice often neglected in all this is that of the Lebanese public. <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/lebanons-political-forces-oppose-a-war-with-israel/">Many Lebanese</a> have expressed their opposition to war. In one <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/shadow-hezbollah-israel-escalation-poll-shows-slim-majority-lebanese-still-want">recent poll</a>, a majority agreed that what the country needed was domestic and economic reforms more than involvement in foreign policy issues. A historic land deal accompanying the maritime settlement may have gone some way to achieve those goals. Instead, the danger now is a full-scale war that will scuttle any negotiations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222832/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mireille Rebeiz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A maritime border agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel seemed like a step toward peaceful relations. But now both countries are getting ready for what looks like an unavoidable war.Mireille Rebeiz, Chair of Middle East Studies & Associate Professor of Francophone & Women's, Gender & Sexuality Studies, Dickinson CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247122024-03-07T13:03:42Z2024-03-07T13:03:42ZWhy Israel’s economy is resilient in spite of the war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580093/original/file-20240306-18-g3idi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=648%2C0%2C2356%2C2005&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/back-shot-several-soldiers-israel-army-1423050641">Melnikov Dmitriy/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israel’s war in Gaza and more limited conflict with Hezbollah on its northern border with Lebanon is taking a toll on the Israeli economy. </p>
<p>In the final quarter of 2023, Israel’s gross domestic product (GDP) – a measure of a country’s economic health – <a href="https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/publications/Pages/2024/Monthly-Bulletin-of-Statistics-February-2024.aspx">shrank by almost 20%</a>. Consumption dropped by 27% and investment by 70%.</p>
<p>It’s important to note that these are annualised figures relative to the same period a year ago. The 5.2% drop in GDP from the third quarter was substantial, but it is likely to be a temporary setback unless the war with Hezbollah intensifies.</p>
<p>The outbreak of war disrupted <a href="https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/a09-11-23/">around 18%</a> of Israel’s workforce. In October, 250,000 civilians fled or were evacuated from border communities. Meanwhile, around 4% of the workforce – some 300,000 people – were called up as reservists as Israel mobilised for its military offensive.</p>
<p>Over the next few years, the war will cost Israel an estimated <a href="https://boi.org.il/media/ruuby3mw/%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%92%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%92%D7%99%D7%93-%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%9D-22124.pdf">255 billion shekels</a> (£56.6 billion) due to reduced economic activity and increased expenses. But the <a href="https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Israels-ratings-to-A2-changes-outlook-to-negative-Rating-Action--PR_484801">projected rise</a> in national debt from 60% to 67% of GDP by 2025 is manageable, as is the plan to raise annual military spending from 4% of GDP to <a href="https://boi.org.il/media/ruuby3mw/%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%92%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%92%D7%99%D7%93-%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%9D-22124.pdf">6%</a> or <a href="https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/s15g7mett">7%</a> by the end of the decade. </p>
<p>Israel entered the war with a relatively low national debt and foreign currency reserves equivalent to about 40% of annual GDP. Its population is young and still growing, and <a href="https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/2022/def20_1857/h_print.pdf">data</a> reveals that Israel has surpassed current military spending levels before. Between 1967 and 1972, military spending averaged 20.3% of GDP, rising to 28.7% from 1973 to 1975 before stabilising at 20.8% between 1976 and 1985.</p>
<p>The years following the Yom Kippur war in 1973 and through the first Lebanon war (1982–85) are often referred to as “lost years” for Israel’s economy. Per-capita GDP growth averaged <a href="https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/?lang=en">4.8%</a> in the 12 years before this period; over the following 12 years it dropped to just 0.8%. Inflation gradually rose, <a href="https://www.globes.co.il/finance/indexprice/inflation.asp?Lang=HE">peaking at 445%</a> during 1984.</p>
<p>So the question is not if Israel can weather the current storm, but whether the burden of higher military spending will be offset by budget cuts elsewhere to ensure economic growth resumes and public debt returns to a sustainable trajectory. </p>
<p>So far, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, and other members of his coalition have resisted <a href="https://economists-for-israeli-democracy.com/">advice</a> from economists to change the government’s spending priorities. They have done so for fear of upsetting the small but influential constituencies whose votes keep them in power.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Benjamin Netanyahu speaking in front of an Israel flag with his right hand outstretched." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Benjamin Netanyahu speaking at a meeting in Berlin, Germany, in March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/berlin-germany-20230316-prime-minister-benjamin-2276731307">photocosmos1/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Political opportunism</h2>
<p>Netanyahu has demonstrated a good grasp of market economics. As finance minister between 2003 and 2005, Netanyahu implemented <a href="https://www.nevo.co.il/FilesFolderPermalink.aspx?b=books&r=%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99+%D7%A2%D7%AA%5C%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99+%D7%A2%D7%AA%5C%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A4%D7%98+%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%91%D7%95%D7%93%D7%94%5C%D7%9B%D7%A8%D7%9A+%D7%99">sweeping reforms</a> that lowered tax rates, <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/543634">privatised state companies</a> and raised the state pension age. He also used his tenure to curtail the country’s bloated benefits system and introduce requirements for job training.</p>
<p>Yet since the start of Netanyahu’s second term as prime minister in 2009 (the first was 1996–99), many of these reforms have been <a href="https://main.knesset.gov.il/mk/government/documents/addCoalition2009_2.pdf">scaled back or eliminated</a>, particularly the cuts to the benefits system. This benefits system disproportionately advantages the ultra-Orthodox Haredi community, whose parties form part of Netanyahu’s governing coalition.</p>
<p>Netanyahu was once again elected as prime minister in November 2022. Though a proponent of a limited role for the state, his new government included a record 34 different ministries. This was to satisfy the appetite for patronage and ministerial salaries among the different coalition partners as well as factions within his own Likud party. </p>
<p>To secure the continued support of ultra-Orthodox parties he also promised unprecedented <a href="https://www.idi.org.il/articles/49642">levels of funding</a> for religious schools and seminaries. In seminaries, grown men spend their lives studying religious texts at the public’s expense and are exempt from military service. Despite the need to fund the war and for more young men in uniform, Netanyahu and Bezalel Smotrich, the finance minister, have <a href="https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/bkerxsacp">resisted</a> nearly all suggestions that these budget items be reduced.</p>
<p>Here we have a case study where political opportunism easily defeats ideology. We know what Netanyahu believes and what he understands about good economic policy, and we can isolate these from what he is willing to do to remain in office. </p>
<p>Will he choose to defray some of the costs the war will impose on the budget by eliminating wasteful spending on useless ministries? Or will he introduce policies that grow the economy by incentivising higher labour-force participation among the ultra-Orthodox community? The plan for the moment is to borrow more.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two ultra-Orthodox men holding signs written in hebrew." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ultra-Orthodox men protesting for the release of a religious youth who was jailed for refusing to serve in the military in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/safed-israel-oct-19-2017-ultra-1026922030">David Cohen 156/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Strong civil society</h2>
<p>We may also overestimate the role politicians and governments play in ensuring a country’s success. Since its founding in 1948, Israel’s electoral system of proportional representation has yielded weak, unstable coalitions.</p>
<p>Historically, the Likud party has strongly supported the independence of the country’s judiciary. But after the last election, Netanyahu’s government introduced <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-65086871">new legislation</a> that, among other things, would have given the Knesset (parliament) the power to override Supreme Court decisions with a simple majority vote. </p>
<p>Had these changes been implemented they would have further magnified the worst properties of the country’s dysfunctional (unwritten) constitution. People do not invest money in countries where court decisions can be overturned by politicians and property rights are not secure.</p>
<p>Yet, despite the weaknesses of its government institutions, Israel has absorbed millions of poor refugees from every corner of the Earth, has fought back when attacked and has defeated far larger neighbours over its 75-year history. It has done so all while transforming itself from an impoverished backwater to a first-world economy and a centre of high-tech innovation. </p>
<p>In the first nine months of 2023, hundreds of thousands of Israelis <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/12/israel-protests-judicial-curbs-supreme-court-challenge">demonstrated</a> in the streets to defend the rule of law and the independence of the country’s judiciary. Many of those same people rushed to join their reserve units on October 7 to defend the country’s borders. Others, acting without any government direction, <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/bjd1lrmlp">organised relief</a> for the survivors and displaced while ministers dithered or disappeared from view.</p>
<p>Countries with strong civil societies and highly engaged populations survive and even prosper not because of their political leaders, but despite them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Ben-Gad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>War is taking a toll on Israel’s economy.Michael Ben-Gad, Professor of Economics, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248332024-03-04T13:37:27Z2024-03-04T13:37:27ZCommander of Iran’s elite Quds Force is expanding predecessor’s vision of chaos in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579281/original/file-20240301-50192-65mwly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2966%2C1853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani, head of Iran's expeditionary Quds Force, speaks at a ceremony in Tehran on April 14, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranIsrael/7769f2ccb99244898fcb9149111c664d/photo?Query=quds%20force&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=200&currentItemNo=47">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most Americans have likely never heard of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/who-is-esmail-ghaani-the-successor-to-slain-iranian-general-soleimani/">Esmail Ghaani</a>, despite his fingerprints being over a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">slew of recent attacks</a> on U.S. targets.</p>
<p>As the powerful chief of the Quds Force, the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps</a>, Ghaani is charged with overseeing Tehran’s network of allied and proxy groups across the Middle East.</p>
<p>But despite <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/esmail-qaani-commander-of-the-axis/article67808742.ece">recent media attention</a> following a significant increase in attacks by Quds-backed militants since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack in Israel, Ghaani remains a figure who largely shuns the public spotlight.</p>
<p>This is both like and unlike his predecessor Qassem Soleimani, who died in a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/airport-informants-overhead-drones-how-u-s-killed-soleimani-n1113726">controversial 2020 U.S. strike in Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>For the first decade of his stint as Quds Force commander, which began <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190925041643/http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/suleimani.pdf">in the late 1990s</a>, Soleimani also kept a low profile. But in the years leading up to his death in 2020, he promoted his accomplishments <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/esmail-ghaani-iran-announces-new-military-leader-after-commander-killed-in-us-airstrike-11901047">openly on social media</a>.</p>
<p>Soleimani’s loss was seen as a massive blow to the Quds Force and Iran’s national security agenda overall given his popularity in Iran and his achievements, making the task of replacing him daunting. Ghaani had been <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/profile-the-canny-general-quds-force-commander-ghasem-soleimani.html">Soleimani’s deputy</a>, and the two had known each other since the early 1980s during their <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-esmail-qaani-new-chief-commander-irans-qods-force">military service in the Iran-Iraq War.</a> </p>
<p>In the initial aftermath of Soleimani’s death, experts questioned <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/1/20/esmaii-qaani-new-shadow-commander-of-irans-quds-force">whether Ghaani would be a capable replacement</a>.</p>
<p>But despite differing from Soleimani in both personality and attitude toward publicity, Ghaani has managed to expand upon the foundation that Soleimani carefully cultivated over a 20-year period.</p>
<p>Under Ghaani, the Quds Force has doubled down on the strategy of supporting, arming and funding terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories. </p>
<p>Building from Soleimani’s legacy, Ghaani is responsible for developing the network into what Iranian officials call the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">Axis of Resistance</a>.”</p>
<p>It is a coalition that cuts across ethnic and religious divides in the region, despite Iran itself remaining a hard-line theocracy with an ethnic Persian and Shia Muslim identity. In cultivating the network, first Soleimani and now Ghaani have displayed a degree of pragmatism and flexibility at odds with the extreme ideological position of Iran’s ruling ayatollahs. And Ghaani, like Soleimani before him, appears to have done this with the full trust and support of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</p>
<h2>Pressuring Iran’s enemies</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/javed-ali">an expert in national security issues</a> with a focus on counterterrorism, I have observed how the Quds Force’s <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/07/iran-unleashed-forces-that-it-can-no-longer-control/">unconventional warfare strategy</a> has changed the security landscape in the region. It is premised on creating pressure against Iran’s enemies — Israel, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia — through partnering with groups within the axis.</p>
<p>As Quds Force commander, Ghaani has to manage his organization’s relationships with each of these groups. This is made all the more tricky as each maintains its own agendas, decision-making calculations and, at times, independence despite Iran’s influence and largesse.</p>
<p>Take the Quds Force’s relationship with Hamas. Despite the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/hamas-drew-detailed-attack-plans-for-years-with-help-of-spies-idf-says">long planning involved</a> with the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel in October 2023, the Quds Force <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2023/12/28/Iran-s-IRGC-retracts-statement-on-Oct-7-attacks-after-rare-public-spat-with-Hamas">does not appear to have had a direct role</a>.</p>
<p>Not that the assault wasn’t welcomed by Ghaani, in public at least. In late December 2023, he <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-780069">was reported as saying</a> on Iran’s official news agency that, “Due to the extensive crimes committed by the Zionist regime against the Muslim people of Palestine, [Hamas] themselves took action. … Everything they did was beautifully planned and executed.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man speaking in front of image of two men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani speaks at event commemorating the death of former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani on Jan. 3, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/commander-esmail-qaani-of-the-islamic-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1898123764?adppopup=true">Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With other militant groups in the region, Ghaani appears to have a more hands-on approach. The deadly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html">Jan. 28, 2024, drone attack</a> against a U.S. military outpost in Jordan, launched by the Iraq-based and Iran-supported <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> network, significantly escalated tensions in the region.</p>
<p>It provoked a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">significant U.S. and British response</a> in Iraq and Syria. After the incident, it was reported that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/">Ghaani spent considerable effort</a> getting the Iraqi groups responsible to temporarily pause anti-U.S. attacks. </p>
<p>Whether that pause lasts for an extended period or if attacks resume will be a test of Ghaani’s ability to wield his influence in Iraq.</p>
<p>Ghaani’s calculus in regard to Yemen, where the Houthis have emerged as a dangerous insurgent group, looks less clear.</p>
<p>Having been armed throughout a decadelong civil war by Iran, the Houthis responded to Israel’s campaign in the Gaza Strip <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf">by launching hundreds of rocket, missile and drone attacks</a> against commercial and military shipping in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Retaliatory strikes by the U.S. and other coalition members <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/24/politics/us-uk-strikes-houthi-targets-yemen/index.html">on Houthi targets</a> have destroyed a significant amount of the capability that Iran had provided. Yet the Houthis seem undeterred and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea">have continued anti-shipping operations</a>. </p>
<p>It is unclear if Ghaani has attempted to dial those operations back or if he has encouraged the Houthis to maintain their pace, given the shared goals between Iran and the Houthis to keep pressure on the United States and Israel.</p>
<h2>Relationship with Hezbollah</h2>
<p>Beyond Israel, Iraq and Yemen, Ghaani is also likely attempting to manage the Quds Force’s relationship with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hizballah-and-the-qods-force-in-irans-shadow-war-with-the-west">arguably Iran’s strongest partner</a> in the Axis of Resistance. The partnership stretches back to the early 1980s and has transformed Hezbollah into a powerful force in Lebanon and a serious security concern in the region.</p>
<p>Since Oct. 7, the group has engaged in near daily conflict with Israel, with both sides conducting cross-border strikes. Hezbollah’s general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, seems wary of engaging in a broader war with Israel, but at the same time he has not reined in the attacks and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/hezbollah-warns-that-israel-will-pay-in-blood-for-killing-civilians">has vowed to retaliate against Israel</a> for the death of civilians in Lebanon. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three Iranian leaders, two in military fatigues stand and talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, left, meets with Esmail Ghaani, right, and Revolutionary Guards General Commander Hossein Salami, center, on Dec. 28, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/iranian-leader-ali-khamenei-iranian-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1883329738?adppopup=true">Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although Iran may well welcome Hezbollah becoming a persistent irritant to Israel, Tehran is also wary of a full-blown conflict. In such a scenario, Nasrallah, Ghaani and Supreme Leader Khamenei would have to worry about whether the United States would get directly involved – as, reportedly, the White House <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/17/israel-news-us-military-hezbollah-attacks">had been considering</a> in the days after the Oct. 7 attack on Israel.</p>
<p>Any future statements by Ghaani regarding Hezbollah will be a strong indicator of Iran’s intent in regard to how it sees this volatile aspect of tensions in the Middle East developing.</p>
<h2>Walking a tightrope</h2>
<p>To date, Ghaani seems to have successfully navigated the transition between replacing the charismatic figure of Qassem Soleimani and advancing Iran’s interests through Quds Force operations with the full backing of Khameini.</p>
<p>He may never be as revered in Iran as Soleimani, but by managing the Quds Force’s relationship with Axis of Resistance groups, Ghaani has proved to be a formidable and capable adversary who should not be underestimated. </p>
<p>The recent escalation of multifaceted tensions across the Middle East has provided both opportunities and potential pitfalls for Ghaani’s strategy – how to encourage the activities of its Axis of Rrsistance while insulating Iran from any direct blowback from the United States.</p>
<p>But one thing is becoming clear: Reversing the Quds Force’s influence while bolstering U.S. interests is likely to be a top policy priority for Washington as it attempts to manage the developing conflict in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Esmail Ghaani took control of the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps following the killing of predecessor Qassem Soleimani.Javed Ali, Associate Professor of Practice of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215202024-02-07T17:35:23Z2024-02-07T17:35:23ZHow Iran controls a network of armed groups to pursue its regional strategy<p>It took the US several days <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">to respond</a> to the January 28 attack on its military base in Jordan that killed three of its service personnel. But when it did, it hit at least 85 targets across Iraq and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">Syria</a>. </p>
<p>The Pentagon was careful not to directly attack Iran itself, but it targeted Iranian-backed groups which have been conducting raids on US military assets in the region since before Hamas launched its attack on Israel on October 7.</p>
<p>The US strikes were carefully calibrated to avoid <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/austin-vows-all-necessary-actions-after-us-troop-deaths-2024-01-29/">escalation</a>. The five days between the attack on the Tower 22 US base in Jordan and the US airstrikes on February 2 gave Iran and its proxies time to move people and high-value assets. </p>
<p>This retaliation wasn’t about body counts, it was about US president Joe Biden showing Iran – and the American electorate – that it doesn’t do to mess with the US. It was a classic shot across the bows.</p>
<p>But who are these groups that Iran can rely on to act in its interests and how much of a threat do they pose to regional security?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graphic showing Middle East and the varioujs armed groups operating there on behalf of Iran" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s network of armed groups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Council for Foreign Relations</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iran’s foreign policy over nearly five decades since the 1979 revolution has had <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47321#">several key objectives</a>. It wants to remove the US from the Middle East and to replace it as the guarantor of regional security. </p>
<p>It has worked to boost the fortunes of Shia groups in the region, working directly against Saudi Arabia’s Sunni proxies, as seen in the conflict in Yemen. And it refuses to recognise the state of Israel, instead working with Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to pressure the Jewish state.</p>
<h2>Quds Force</h2>
<p>The Quds Force is part of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is the IRGC’s primary vehicle for foreign affairs. According to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Council on Foreign Relations</a>, Quds is largely responsible for providing training, weapons, money and military advice to a range of groups in the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">“Axis of Resistance”</a>. </p>
<p>Quds was led by General Qasem Soleimani, who had oversight of Shia armed groups in Iraq and Syria as well as wielding a significant amount of influence with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Soleimani was killed in a US drone strike in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, on January 3 2020. </p>
<p>He was succeeded by his longtime deputy <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-s-new-quds-force-leader-has-a-long-history-with-afghanistan/30379354.html">Ismail Qaani</a>, who had gained extensive experience in organising and supporting insurgent groups in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Syria</h2>
<p>In 2021, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/">estimated that</a> the IRGC had established 82 fighting units in Syria with up to 70,000 fighters. Many of these have been recruited since 2011 to help the Shia regime of Bashar al-Assad combat insurgents there.</p>
<p>Quds activities in Syria are reportedly overseen by <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/">Khalil Zahedi</a>, nicknamed Abu Mahdi al-Zahdi. Working through regional subordinates, he controls a number of armed groups, including Liwa al-Quds, Lebanese Hezbollah, Fatemiyoun Brigade, Zainebiyoun Brigade, Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Liwa al-Baqir and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali.</p>
<p>Iran’s principal aims in Syria are to keep the Assad regime in power, maximise Iranian influence, protect Shia minorities and reduce and – if possible – eliminate the US presence in Syria. It also aims to create the conditions for a possible encirclement of Israel by occupying strategic position around the Golan heights.</p>
<h2>Iraq</h2>
<p>In Iraq, since the US invasion, Iran-backed armed groups come under an <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/10/profiles-pro-iran-militias-iraq">umbrella organisation</a> called the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) or <em>Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī</em>. The PMF claims to have as many as 230,000 fighters, mainly Shia. The PMF was founded in 2014 when Iraq’s Shia religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/shiite_militias_iraq_english.pdf">issued a fatwa</a> calling on Iraqis to defend their country after the Iraqi army collapsed and Islamic State took the northern province of Mosul. </p>
<p>In 2018 the PMF was incorporated into Iraq’s armed forces as an auxiliary force. As a result its wages are paid by the Iraqi military, but the Iranian government lacks proper command and control over the PMF. The same year PMF’s political wing contested elections in Iraq, coming second in the poll. It also performed well in Iraq’s 2023 regional elections and is now believed to wield considerable control in both the Iraqi parliament and the country’s supreme court. </p>
<p>Its military forces are now believed to be <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-popular-mobilization-force-is-turning-iraq-into-an-iranian-client-state/">active in Kurdistan</a> as part of an overall strategy to force the US to withdraw from the region.</p>
<h2>Lebanon</h2>
<p>North of Israel’s border with Lebanon, Hezbollah has been conducting military operations against Israel for many years and since October 7 clashes between Hezbollah forces and the Israel Defence Forces have become <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-6-2024">almost daily occurences</a>.</p>
<p>Hezbollah (Party of God) was formed in 1982 to fight against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. It was trained and equipped by Iran, which continues to provide practically all of its <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-islamist-proxies">financial and military resources</a>. In its <a href="https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/The%20Hizballah%20Program%20-%20An%20Open%20Letter.pdf">1985 manifesto</a>, it vowed to expel western powers from Lebanon, called for the destruction of Israel state and pledged allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader.</p>
<p>In 2021 Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, claimed that the organisation has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-lebanon-beirut-civil-wars-hassan-nasrallah-a3c10d99cca2ef1c3d58dae135297025">100,000 trained fighters</a>, but estimates as to its actual strength vary considerably.</p>
<p>While heavily involved both politically and economically in Lebanon, Hezbollah is also active throughout the region, <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollahs-regional-activities-support-irans-proxy-networks">doing Iran’s business</a> rather than looking after Lebanese interests.</p>
<h2>Major headache for the west</h2>
<p>As can be seen with the recent attacks by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen on shipping in the Red Sea (the Houthis are armed and trained by Iran as part of a civil war against the Sunni national government backed by Saudi Arabia), dealing with Iran’s proxies throughout the Middle East is a serious challenge. </p>
<p>Many of these groups now wield significant political influence in the countries in which they are embedded, so confronting them is not simply a military exercise. And, as the dramatic rise in tensions in the region following the assault by Hamas on Israel (also planned with Iranian help) suggests, Iran is capable of fomenting trouble for the west almost at will across the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran funds a large network of armed groups across the Middle East as part of its ambition to replace the US as regional power.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2222812024-02-01T02:56:51Z2024-02-01T02:56:51ZWhat is Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ and why is it uniting in fury against the US and Israel?<p>Days after a drone attack <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">killed</a> three US soldiers at a military outpost in Jordan – an attack blamed on a shadowy Iranian-linked militia group – it appears a wider regional conflict may have been averted. At least for now.</p>
<p>The US has indicated it will take a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTUYPnX6BlE">tiered response</a> to the attack – though it hasn’t said how – and the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/31/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#:%7E:text=aid%20group%20says.-,Iran%20is%20'not%20looking%20for%20war%2C'%20the%20head,of%20the%20Revolutionary%20Guards%20says.&text=The%20head%20of%20Iran's%20Revolutionary%20Guards%20said%20on%20Wednesday%20that,prepared%20to%20respond%20if%20attacked.">said</a> that Tehran is “not looking for war.”</p>
<p>But Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria have now <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/29/us-troops-jordan-iraq-militias/">launched</a> more than 160 attacks against the US military since the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and start of the war in Gaza. And Houthi militants in Yemen, also supported by Iran, have threatened to continue their attacks on ships in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>So, what is driving these groups in the so-called “axis of resistance” and how much control does Iran have over their actions?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the so-called 'Axis of Resistance' in the MIddle East." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s influence in the Middle East.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Axis_of_Resistance?file=Axis_of_Resistance.jpg">Master Strategist/Axis of Resistance</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Shia armed groups in Iraq</h2>
<p>The militia blamed by the US for the drone attack in Jordan, Kata’ib Hezbollah, said earlier this week it was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/31/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#jordan-drone-iran-iraq-kataib-hezbollah">halting</a> its military operations in Iraq under pressure from both Iran and Iraq. </p>
<p>It is just one of many Iran-backed groups in the country that operates under the umbrella banner of Islamic Resistance in Iraq. </p>
<p>Armed militias began emerging in Iraq in the wake of the US invasion of the country in 2003. These groups grew exponentially stronger when they organised as a collective front to confront the ISIS terror group. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/research/Iraq-Research/iraq-shia-militias">Popular Mobilisation Forces</a>, or Al Hashd Al Sha’bi, was established in 2014 and became the main Shia paramilitary organisation confronting ISIS, alongside other Iran-backed groups such as Hezbollah in Syria. </p>
<p>But with threat of ISIS decreasing after its military defeat in 2019, the Popular Mobilisation Forces shifted their attention back to US targets in Iraq.</p>
<p>In recent years, these groups have presented themselves as the <em><a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/05/23/the-muqawama-and-its-enemies-shifting-patterns-in-iran-backed-shiite-militia-activity-in-iraq/">muqawama</a></em>, or “resistance”, against the US and its allies in Iraq. As such, they have launched hundreds of attacks against US and Turkish military bases and other targets in Iraq and Syria. </p>
<h2>Hezbollah</h2>
<p>Hezbollah, or the “Party of God”, emerged in the 1980s as an armed militia to free the southern parts of Lebanon from Israeli occupation and to improve conditions for the marginalised Shia minority in Lebanon. </p>
<p>The party has subsequently portrayed itself as a legitimate political party in Lebanon. As such, Hezbollah has been able to successfully operate across <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Religion-and-Hezbollah-Political-Ideology-and-Legitimacy/Farida/p/book/9780367784959">multiple domains</a>. It has a civilian (<em>da’wa</em>) role in social welfare and religious education in Lebanon, as well as a military-resistance role (<em>jihad</em>), carrying out attacks against US and Israeli targets in Lebanon and across the border with Israel. </p>
<p>Its relationship with Iran has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">deepened</a> over the years, with Hezbollah <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">receiving</a> hundreds of millions of dollars a year from Iran for training and weapons.</p>
<p>Yet, Hezbollah has proved to be extremely competent in its ability to downplay its religious ideals and principles to operate with autonomy as a mainstream political organisation in Lebanon. </p>
<h2>Houthis</h2>
<p>Also known as Ansar Allah (“Supporters of God”), the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-yemens-houthis-are-getting-involved-in-the-israel-hamas-war-and-how-it-could-disrupt-global-shipping-219220">Houthis</a> are a Shia armed group that emerged out of the Zaydi sect from Yemen’s northern highlands in the 1990s. The group rebelled against Yemen’s government in 2014 and eventually took control over most of the country. The group then spent years, with Iran’s backing, fighting a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia that was trying to oust them. </p>
<p>Interestingly, even though Houthis were never directly engaged in attacking US targets (or its allies) in the past, this changed with the Israeli war against Hamas in Gaza. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">How much influence does Iran have over its proxy 'Axis of Resistance' − Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The Iran connection</h2>
<p>From the outset, what these groups have in common is a shared sectarian and ideological connection – Shia Islam. </p>
<p>Shias have <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/martinkramer/files/shia_introduction_comp.pdf">historically</a> been a minority in the Muslim world, suffering systematic persecution, political isolation and low socio-economic status in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf states. </p>
<p>But this began to change with the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the rise of Shia clergy in that country. The Iranian regime, mainly through its military apparatus, the Revolutionary Guards, sought to transfer the “Shia revolution” across borders to try to redress years of Shia political isolation and economic deprivation.</p>
<p>Hezbollah was considered the first and most successful of the Iran-backed organisations that arose from this movement. It was able to build and maintain a strong military arm and political presence in Lebanon that made it a key regional player – and still does. </p>
<p>With its weaponry and financial backing, Iran became the ideological guardian of this growing “axis” of groups across the Middle East. These proxy groups, in turn, have helped Iran maintain a great degree of strategic power in the region, which has become key to its foreign policy and its ability to wield influence.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-is-not-the-regional-puppetmaster-many-think-and-risks-losing-control-if-the-current-crisis-escalates-221430">Iran is not the regional puppetmaster many think and risks losing control if the current crisis escalates</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>United by resistance</h2>
<p>But even though these groups share deep political and ideological connections, they still operate as nationalist organisations in their respective countries. As such, each has its own domestic interests and ambitions. This has included improving the livelihoods of Shia communities and gaining political power. </p>
<p>This has been framed as a form of resistance or <em>muqawama</em>. This can be viewed in different ways: resistance against occupation, resistance against oppressive regimes and resistance against imperialist, hegemonic powers. </p>
<p>This is a cornerstone of Shia ideology – the idea of “oppressors vs. the oppressed” – which grew from the martyrdom of Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, during the <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2011/10/hussein/#:%7E:text=On%20that%20day%2C%20Hussein%20ibn,and%20Fatima%2C%20the%20Prophet's%20daughter.">battle of Karbala</a> in the year 680. This narrative has become the symbol of Shia resistance in its various forms.</p>
<p>This is part of the reason why groups like Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq have united under the same banner – “Axis of Resistance”. This theme extends to Hezbollah’s resistance against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, the Houthis resistance against the Saudi-coalition forces, and the armed Shi’ite groups in Iraq attacking ISIS and now US troops.</p>
<p>More recently, these groups have united as a form of resistance against Israel (and its main supporter, the US) over its war in Gaza. </p>
<p>The extent of Iran’s power over these proxies remains a big question. Iran has denied ordering the attacks on US forces in Iraq, Syria and now Jordan, saying each faction in the “axis of resistance” acts independently to oppose “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/29/world/middleeast/iran-us-troops-jordan.html">aggression and occupation</a>”.</p>
<p>The fact we are seeing a rise in military operations by all of these groups, however, indicates they are becoming increasingly essential to Iran and its strategy of expanding its influence and countering the US in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mariam Farida does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Shia militant groups operating in Iraq, Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East share political and ideological connections, yet they also have their own nationalist goals.Mariam Farida, Lecturer in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216602024-01-31T11:55:05Z2024-01-31T11:55:05ZIran: with a tanking economy and an election in weeks, the Islamic Republic tries to rally support by acting tough<p>As tensions continue to rise in the Middle East, the world is waiting for the Biden administration <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/28/us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-jordan">to act in response</a> to the strike on a US base in Jordan by an Iran-backed militia on January 28, which killed three American service personnel. The US president, reportedly given several options, is weighing up deterrence of further attacks in the region against the risks of escalation.</p>
<hr>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/iran-with-a-tanking-economy-and-an-election-in-weeks-the-islamic-republic-tries-to-rally-support-by-acting-tough-221660&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/audio-narrated-99682">narrated by Noa</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>As has so often been the case in the past, Iran has denied responsibility for the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">drone attack</a>, on the Tower 22 outpost in northeast Jordan near the borders with Syria and Iraq. But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq – an umbrella group of Shia militias backed by Iran – has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/#:%7E:text=An%20umbrella%20group%20of%20hardline,said%20their%20troops%20were%20targeted.">claimed responsibility for the attack</a>.</p>
<p>Any involvement of Iran would be something of a gamble for the regime, which needs to look tough – particularly to its population ahead of elections on March 1 – but is in a weakened position. The economy is in trouble, there have been mass popular protests against the authorities’ treatment of women, and now the country has been involved a string of foreign incidents involving Israel, the Islamic State jihadist group and Pakistan. If it sanctioned the killing of Americans, Iran may have only compounded its difficult situation.</p>
<h2>Tehran under pressure</h2>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing attack on US bases in the Middle East." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=784&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=784&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=784&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A regional conflict: strikes against US military bases in the Middle East.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On Christmas Day, Israel hit an Iranian military compound in southern Damascus, killing <a href="https://themedialine.org/headlines/senior-irgc-officer-sayyed-reza-mousavi-killed-in-alleged-israeli-airstrike-in-syria/">Sayyed Reza Mousavi</a>. Mousavi had been the right-hand man of General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force who was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50979463">assassinated by the US</a> in January 2020.</p>
<p>Nine days later, Islamic State detonated two bombs at Soleimani’s grave in Kerman in south-central Iran on the fourth anniversary of his assassination. For the regime, Soleimani was the iconic commander who had defeated Islamic State in Iraq. But far from being vanquished, Islamic State was able to decimate his memorial, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-kerman-bombing-death-toll-91/32763647.html">killing 91 people</a>, with the regime apparently powerless to stop it.</p>
<p>Iran’s leaders and military appeared unable to protect their officers abroad or their citizens at home, let alone head the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">“Axis of Resistance”</a>. They needed a show of strength.</p>
<p>On January 15, the Revolutionary Guards <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-say-they-have-attacked-espionage-centers-iraqs-erbil-2024-01-15/">fired missiles into Iraqi Kurdistan</a> on the pretext of wiping out an Israeli intelligence cell. They killed a multi-millionaire businessman, members of his family, and other civilians including a Dutch infant less than a year old.</p>
<p>Just over 24 hours later, the target was the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/where-balochistan-why-iran-pakistan-strikes">Baluchistan region in Pakistan</a>. Regime media proclaimed a Guards missile and drone strike on a camp of the Baloch separatist group Jaish ul-Adl, which has fought security forces in southeast Iran for more than a decade. In fact, the dead included two children.</p>
<p>The display backfired. Needing to make its own statement over the violation of sovereignty, Pakistan’s armed forces <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-pakistan-strikes-cross-border-escalation-region/32782339.html">carried out cross-border attacks</a> in Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan. They claimed “terrorists” had been killed – local media said at least three women and four children, all “non-Iranian nationals”, were slain.</p>
<p>On January 20, Iran’s intelligence command in Syria met in southern Damascus to consider the regional situation. They never completed the discussion. Israeli missiles <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/israel-strike-syria-iran-aligned-leaders/32784579.html">destroyed the three-storey building</a>, killing the Iranian head of intelligence, his deputy, and three other Revolutionary Guards.</p>
<h2>Challenges for the supreme leader</h2>
<p>International commentators usually treat Iran’s regime as a player in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. But, while ostentatiously supporting Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi rebels, the regime has officially kept its distance from those groups’ operations. And the Iranian public has shown <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202311061514">little enthusiasm</a> for the regime’s support for Hamas – the absence of large rallies since October 7 has been marked.</p>
<p>The main issue is a domestic one. Soleimani has been admired by many Iranians and his anti-Islamic State legend, burnished and manipulated by the regime. And the killings from Damascus to Kerman come weeks before <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/in-iran-gaza-war-overshadows-preparations-for-2024-legislative-vote-/7361213.html">parliamentary elections</a> on March 1.</p>
<p>The regime is seriously concerned about the prospect of another weak electoral performance, following historic lows of 42.6% in the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/factbox-the-outcome-of-irans-2020-parliamentary-elections/">2020 parliamentary election</a> and 48.8% — a drop from 72% in 2017 — in the <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/jun/23/raisi-election-results-explainer">2021 presidential election</a>.</p>
<p>But much of Iran’s electorate was alientated by the regime’s repression after the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/16/iran.elections.timeline/">disputed 2009 presidential election</a>. The brutal crackdown to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-the-hijab-protests-are-now-massive-but-a-revolution-will-need-the-military-to-change-sides-191786">“woman, life, freedom”</a> protests since September 2022 has angered people further. Ahead of the poll, the Guardian Council has excluded thousands of qualified candidates, including the former president, Hassan Rouhani, to ensure the reins of power remain in the hands of hardliners.</p>
<p>Iran’s economy is in the doldrums amid US-led sanctions and ongoing issues of mismanagement and corruption. Inflation is officially <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi#">about 40%</a> and far higher in reality for food and other essential items. Discontent over wages and working conditions is widespread. The currency, which had stabilised after all-time lows in 2022, <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202401232785">has lost about 10% in value</a> in the past month.</p>
<h2>‘Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. My life for Iran’</h2>
<p>But the regime persists with its tough talk. While racing to proclaim “friendship” with Pakistan, it is <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-warns-us-iraq-drones/32060585.html">threatening more attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan</a> on the pretext of dismantling Israeli intelligence networks. Iran’s president, Ebrahim Raisi, declared that Israel’s strikes “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68040493">will not go unanswered</a>”.</p>
<p>Tehran’s Houthi allies in Yemen are <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-led-taskforce-deploys-in-red-sea-as-middle-east-crisis-threatens-to-escalate-beyond-gaza-220164">damaging international shipping</a> in the Red Sea, site of 12% of global trade. Hezbollah is in daily skirmishes with Israel.</p>
<p>But Iran’s leadership is trapped in a vice. If it pulls back from direct operations, while insisting on the “independence” of its allies, it risks the appearance of being all bark and no bite across the region. If the Revolutionary Guards try another missile strike, they risk further retaliation and even defeat – whether it is from Pakistan or Israel.</p>
<p>So the militias in Syria and Iraq appear to have become the vehicle – and probably the sacrifice – for Iran’s leaders to signal to Iranians that they are still tough, even as they officially deny any role in the attacks.</p>
<p>As the US measures its response, the final word may come from Iranians whose primary concern is at home. Amid the mass protests after the disputed 2009 presidential election, they chanted: “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. My life for Iran.” Khamenei and his inner circle are gambling that they can finally bury that message.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221660/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Facing a parliamentary election in March, the Islamic Republic is trying to distract attention away from its economic woes with a show of strength.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2217222024-01-30T17:55:16Z2024-01-30T17:55:16ZIran has so far resisted direct involvement in the Gaza war, but is that changing?<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/iran-has-so-far-resisted-direct-involvement-in-the-gaza-war-but-is-that-changing" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Iran has tried to keep the war in Gaza at arm’s length by providing support for Hamas <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/04/1222880864/after-striking-throughout-the-middle-east-irans-proxies-now-become-the-targets">through armed groups it backs in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>The Islamic Republic has indicated it wants neither to get directly involved in the fighting nor see the conflict escalate across the region. But as illustrated by <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/29/politics/biden-jordan-attack-response-options/index.html">the recent drone attack by pro-Iranian militias in Jordan that killed three American soldiers</a>, the violence is spreading. Tehran may not be able to sustain its strategy much longer.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231014-qatar-iran-turkey-and-beyond-the-galaxy-of-hamas-supporters">Tehran’s support for Hamas dates back to the 1990s</a>, though the two have never been a perfect ideological match. Hamas comes from the Sunni sect of Islam, identifying more closely with the Muslim Brotherhood than it does with Shi’a Iran. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-hamas-the-same-as-isis-the-islamic-state-group-no-and-yes-219454">Is Hamas the same as ISIS, the Islamic State group? No − and yes</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Relations broke down during the Syrian civil war as <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">Tehran backed Bashar al-Assad’s regime</a> and Hamas sympathized with the Sunni opposition. However, when the fighting ebbed, the two mended fences and Hamas rejoined the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/irans-axis-of-resistance-is-a-potent-coalition-but-a-risky-strategy">Axis of Resistance</a>, a group of state and non-state entities centred in Iran that oppose Israel and the American presence in the region. </p>
<p>As part of the alliance, Hamas reportedly receives military equipment, training and somewhere <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/09/iran-support-hamas-training-weapons-israel/">between $70</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-hamas-secretly-built-mini-army-fight-israel-2023-10-13/">$350 million per year</a>, depending on the source.</p>
<h2>Important role</h2>
<p>Iran does not appear to have been involved in the planning or execution of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023 attack on Israel. Indeed, United States intelligence reported Tehran <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/initial-us-intelligence-shows-hamas-attack-surprised-iranian-leaders-ny-times-2023-10-11/#:%7E:text=WASHINGTON%2C%20Oct%2011%20(Reuters),U.S.%20sources%20said%20on%20Wednesday.">was surprised</a> by events. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, as the Gaza war continues, Iran is playing an important role. Tehran provides Hamas with rhetorical support and indirect military backing through the other members of the Axis of Resistance. While not tilting the balance of power in Gaza, this has signalled to the West and Israel that the campaign against Hamas will have a cost, particularly if it escalates. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">There have been almost daily</a> skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israeli Defense Forces on the Lebanese border. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias have launched more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-strikes-targets-iraq-after-us-forces-wounded-officials-2024-01-23/">150 attacks</a> against American military installations, and the pro-Iranian Houthis in Yemen have launched ballistic missiles at Israel and attacked shipping in the Red Sea.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Nevertheless, Tehran’s message that it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">does not intend to get directly involved</a> in the fighting has been relayed directly to Hamas by the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei <a href="https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/is-saudi-arabia-relaying-us-messages-to-iran">and to the U.S. privately through intermediaries</a>.</p>
<p>Tehran’s stance is evident in the particular way military force has been employed. Hezbollah’s attacks have been limited in size and restricted to the area around the Lebanese border — significant enough to indicate support for Hamas, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">but not threatening enough</a> to justify Israel opening a second front. </p>
<p>Similarly in Iraq, the attacks have been relatively small. The strike against the Al-Asad air base in Iraq was <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-strikes-militias-iraq-iranian-backed-over-attacks-u-s-forces/">described by the Pentagon</a> as one of the largest yet, but the result was some damage to non-critical facilities and no fatalities. The U.S. retaliated with strikes of its own, but repeated the same mantra as Tehran; it did not want the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-strikes-militias-iraq-iranian-backed-over-attacks-u-s-forces/">fighting to escalate.</a> </p>
<h2>Houthis active</h2>
<p>The most active of Iran’s proxies has been, surprisingly, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911">Houthis in Yemen, who say that they will blockade the Red Sea until the Israelis cease military operations in Gaza</a>. By some estimates, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsegal/2024/01/28/most-surveyed-companies-are-vulnerable-to-another-supply-chain-crisis/?sh=5c94fd391bd1">90 per cent of container shipping has been diverted</a>, leading to higher prices and fractured supply lines. </p>
<p>Their attacks on shipping have provoked a series of missile and airstrikes from the U.S. and the United Kingdom, <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/canada-helped-plan-but-didnt-have-assets-to-participate-in-u-s-u-k-strikes-against-houthis">with Canada playing a supporting role</a>. </p>
<p>While provocative, the risk for Tehran in this area is far less than it would be on the Lebanese border, where Israel would likely respond with a ground invasion.</p>
<p>A major conflict between Hezbollah and Israel <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">would be devastating</a> and unpredictable. It would put Iran’s main regional ally in jeopardy and could create conditions that would prompt Washington to attack Iran directly.</p>
<p>There’s little chance, however, of a ground invasion in Yemen, where the airstrikes appear <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/saudi-arabias-balancing-act-amid-strikes-yemens-houthis">to be bolstering</a> the popularity of the Houthi leadership.</p>
<h2>On the sidelines</h2>
<p>It’s not difficult to understand why Tehran has chosen to straddle the fence between supporting Hamas and standing on the sidelines. </p>
<p>If Iran was to remain passive while Gaza is flattened by Israel, it would lose credibility. This would cost Tehran in terms of regional influence and undermine an alliance network essential to its ability to deter the U.S. and Israel. </p>
<p>A certain degree of conflict is also in Iran’s interest. Popular support for the Axis of Resistance has increased across the region, and the trend toward Israeli-Arab normalization is on hold for the foreseeable future. At the same time, though, Iran potentially has a lot to lose.</p>
<p>Iran has grown into a formidable military power, but its military, nuclear and economic infrastructure remain vulnerable to U.S.-Israeli military strikes. </p>
<p>The regime may also be politically vulnerable at home. <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2023/iranians-differ-widely-with-their-leaders-over-the-war-between-israel-and-hamas/">It is unlikely</a> the Iranian public would support a war to liberate Palestine, and given the recent anti-hijab protests and several years of simmering domestic unrest, it can no longer be taken for granted that U.S. military strikes would cause Iranians to rally around the flag.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iranian-protesters-are-making-demands-in-charters-and-bills-of-rights-201543">Iranian protesters are making demands in charters and bills of rights</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Maintaining the balance</h2>
<p>Iran’s strategy is designed to strike a balance between these two concerns, but there are a number of things that could go wrong. </p>
<p>For one, Iran cannot control how its opponents respond. In Syria, Israel raised the stakes by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/26/world/middleeast/iran-military-official-israel-syria.html">assassinating a high ranking member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard thought to be involved in arms transfers to Hezbollah</a>. </p>
<p>Compelled to reply directly, Iran was only able to avoid a confrontation with Israel <a href="https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-iranian-ballistic-missiles-rock-iraqi-kurdistan">by striking targets in Iraq it claimed were associated with the Israeli Mossad</a>.</p>
<p>Even within the Axis of Resistance, the lines of command and control are imprecise. Iran’s allies have their own agendas and their own ideas about how much force to use. </p>
<p>The recent drone attack in Jordan is a case in point. Although the Islamic Resistance in Iraq — a loose group of pro-Iranian militias — has claimed responsibility, the U.S. is holding Iran accountable. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-jordan-attack-iran-1.7098603">still seems reluctant to target Iran directly</a>, but the attack has ratcheted tensions up significantly. </p>
<p>It is also possible that Iran’s leadership will simply overplay its hand, particularly in the Red Sea. At a certain point, the West may lose patience with bombing Iran’s proxies and target the country itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Devine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran prefers to engage Israel through its proxies, but the risk of escalation makes this a dangerous strategy.James Devine, Associate Professor Politics and International Relations, Mount Allison UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2220272024-01-25T18:34:06Z2024-01-25T18:34:06ZGaza update: Netanyahu calls for ‘total victory’ as International Court of Justice ponders genocide accusations against Israel<p>No sooner were the international media reporting this week that Israel had proposed a pause of up to two months in its assault on Gaza to allow for a prisoner-hostage exchange and the delivery of humanitarian aid, than Benjamin Netanyahu declared there would be no ceasefire and that “we will not stop fighting until total victory”.</p>
<p>The Israeli prime minister was commenting as he paid tribute to 24 soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) who were killed in the fighting with Hamas on January 22. Netanyahu has also rejected out of hand the idea of a two-state solution to the conflict as an “existential danger to Israel”. There will, he says, be no Palestinian state.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW map showing the location of fighting in the Gaza Steip, January 24 2024." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=761&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=761&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=761&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=957&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=957&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=957&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The state of the conflict on the Gaza Strip as of January 24 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Certainly, there are few signs that the fighting on the ground in Gaza is going to end anytime soon. The Institute for the Study of War, which has been closely tracking developments in the conflict, has identified renewed fighting in the north of Gaza as well as in Khan Younis, which has been the focus of the IDF’s drive south. </p>
<p>As Gaza’s civilians are pushed into ever smaller and more crowded enclaves in the south of the Strip, it seems Hamas fighters have been able to reoccupy some of the areas that Israel had thought were clear of militant activity. And so the killing continues and the death toll, according to reports from the Hamas-controlled Gaza health ministry, has risen to 25,700.</p>
<h2>Iran’s regional ambitions</h2>
<p>Apart from the sheer scale of the killing in Gaza, the big fear for many is that the conflict will morph into a regional conflagration. This has seemed to be borne out recently by the US and UK airstrikes against Iran-backed Houthi rebels, in response to the Houthi’s attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>How would Iran respond? The Islamic Republic already controls Hezbollah, which is harassing IDF units along Israel’s border with Lebanon, and also has a list of proxies doing its bidding in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>James Horncastle, a professor of international relations at Simon Fraser University in Canada, cautions that the western airstrikes in Yemen could have <a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">unintended consequences</a>, as seen in Iran’s retaliatory strikes against targets in Iraq, Syria – and even Pakistan.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>For Nir Barkat, Israel’s economy minister and number two in Netanyahu’s Likud party, this conflict is a “really big opportunity” for Israel to rid itself of any threat from Iran. He told the Telegraph:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Iran is a legitimate target for Israel. They will not get away with it. The head of the snake is Tehran … And we should very very clearly make sure the Iranians understand that they will not get away with using proxies against Israel and sleep good at night if we don’t sleep good at night.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But many close analysts of the Middle East conflict believe that Iran’s role as “puppetmaster” in the region is overplayed. Simon Mabon, an expert in Middle East security at Lancaster University, thinks this oversimplifies what is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-is-not-the-regional-puppetmaster-many-think-and-risks-losing-control-if-the-current-crisis-escalates-221430">far more complex set of relationships</a>. Iran has limited control over the groups it supports, he writes, despite offering money and, in some cases, training to militant groups in the region.</p>
<p>However, this could in fact be even more of a concern – in that the more moving parts this conflict develops, the more that unintended consequences of any one player’s actions might spiral out of control.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-is-not-the-regional-puppetmaster-many-think-and-risks-losing-control-if-the-current-crisis-escalates-221430">Iran is not the regional puppetmaster many think and risks losing control if the current crisis escalates</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Ben Soodavar, meanwhile, believes the threat from Iran remains critical. Soodavar, a researcher in the department of war studies at King’s College London, believes Donald Trump and his foreign policy advisers were seriously misguided when they pulled the US unilaterally out of the nuclear deal signed in 2015 with Iran, the P5+1 (the permanent members of the UN security council plus Germany), and the EU.</p>
<p>He writes that Iran remains hell-bent on developing a nuclear capability, which it would then leverage to disrupt the Middle East even more, possibly sparking a dangerous arms race with Saudi Arabia. Coming up with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-increased-belligerence-and-nuclear-ambitions-show-why-the-west-needs-a-more-robust-policy-of-deterrence-221137">policy of deterrence</a> to persuade Iranian hawks of the folly of this should be a key focus for the US and its allies.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-increased-belligerence-and-nuclear-ambitions-show-why-the-west-needs-a-more-robust-policy-of-deterrence-221137">Iran's increased belligerence and nuclear ambitions show why the west needs a more robust policy of deterrence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Red Sea fears</h2>
<p>Whether or not they are directly doing Tehran’s bidding, attacks by the Houthi rebels on shipping off the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait continue to disrupt one of the world’s most important trade routes. The Suez canal accounts for 12% of global trade. It’s possible to avoid the canal, of course, but this means taking the long way round the Cape of Good Hope, adding two weeks and an estimated US$1 million to the cost of transporting the average cargo.</p>
<p>As if to demonstrate that it never rains but it pours, various other key trade chokepoints are under pressure: drought in the Panama Canal is making that route less accessible while taking goods overland across Russia, always an option in the past, is no longer viable given the war in Ukraine.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the world's biggest trade routes and the various chokepoints that pose a risk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Global trade can be disrupted at various ‘chokepoints’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GIS/visualcapitalist.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sarah Schiffling of the Hanken School of Economics and Matthew Tickle of the University of Liverpool, both experts in global trade and supply chains, are concerned the conflict could infect shipping going in the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman, through which about 30% of oil shipped by sea must pass and which already has a long history of tensions. Choking traffic through Hormuz could represent a <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-crisis-suez-canal-is-not-the-only-choke-point-that-threatens-to-disrupt-global-supply-chains-221144">real disaster</a>, they write.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-crisis-suez-canal-is-not-the-only-choke-point-that-threatens-to-disrupt-global-supply-chains-221144">Red Sea crisis: Suez Canal is not the only 'choke point' that threatens to disrupt global supply chains</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Is Israel guilty of genocide in Gaza?</h2>
<p>Sometime in the next 24 hours (on January 26), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague is due to deliver its interim ruling on South Africa’s genocide case against Israel. Carlo Aldrovandi, an expert in international security at Trinity College Dublin, listened in as both sides <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-how-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-is-shaping-up-221048">laid out their cases</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-how-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-is-shaping-up-221048">Gaza war: how South Africa's genocide case against Israel is shaping up</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Meanwhile Victor Peskin, a professor of politics and global studies at the University of Arizona, considers <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-enforcement-power-does-the-international-court-of-justice-have-in-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-220523">what happens</a> after the ICJ delivers its ruling. Does the court have any powers of enforcement beyond a purely moral obligation to act? As far as Peskin is concerned, the ICJ’s track record gives little cause for optimism that anything will be resolved anytime soon.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-enforcement-power-does-the-international-court-of-justice-have-in-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-220523">What enforcement power does the International Court of Justice have in South Africa's genocide case against Israel?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Breeding grounds for terror</h2>
<p>While the eyes of the world are fixed on the rising death toll on the Gaza Strip, the longstanding conflict between militant settlers and residents of the occupied West Bank has continued pretty much unabated through the crisis. The most recent estimates are that nearly 400 Palestinians have been killed in clashes with the Israeli settlers.</p>
<p>Anna Lippman, who researches settler aggression in the West Bank, says that 16 villages have been displaced since October 7, with many farmers now cut off from their crops and livestock. She and her team were <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-scene-in-the-west-banks-masafer-yatta-palestinians-face-escalating-israeli-efforts-to-displace-them-221104">recently in the Masafer Yatta region</a> in the southern West Bank, not only to protest against settler violence directed at West Bank families, but also to ensure that crops are watered and livestock fed, helping out those farmers too terrified to do it themselves.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-scene-in-the-west-banks-masafer-yatta-palestinians-face-escalating-israeli-efforts-to-displace-them-221104">The scene in the West Bank's Masafer Yatta: Palestinians face escalating Israeli efforts to displace them</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>There is no doubt that the continuing occupation and brutalisation of Palestinians has made both the West Bank and Gaza – as well as refugee camps in neighbouring countries – fertile ground for recruiting fighters.</p>
<p>But interestingly, there’s little direct connection between poverty or poor education and terrorism. In fact, as Junaid B. Jahangir of MacEwan University in Canada <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-economics-can-shed-light-on-the-motivations-of-extremist-groups-like-hamas-221105">writes</a>, a study of the economics of terrorism suggests that those recruited as suicide bombers have tended to have a higher education and economic status than the average Palestinian. </p>
<p>Economic theory has some fascinating insights to offer when considering this long-running conflict, Jahangir believes – and may even provide some ideas about how to tackle the problem over the long term.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-economics-can-shed-light-on-the-motivations-of-extremist-groups-like-hamas-221105">How economics can shed light on the motivations of extremist groups like Hamas</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Finally, it’s worth remembering that a lot of what we know about what’s happening in Gaza is thanks to the brave journalists who risk their lives to bring reports and footage to international attention. They do so at great risk to their own lives and those of their families.</p>
<p>According to a report by the Committee to Project Journalists published on January 20, 83 journalists and media workers have been confirmed dead in Gaza since October 2023, of which 76 were Palestinian, four were Israeli and three were Lebanese. Colleen Murrell, a professor of journalism at Dublin City University, says the big question is whether Israeli occupying forces are deliberately <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-high-numbers-of-journalists-are-being-killed-but-its-hard-to-prove-theyre-being-targeted-221042">targeting these media workers</a>.</p>
<p>But history tells us it’s extremely unlikely anyone will be held to account for the killing of these vital witnesses.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-high-numbers-of-journalists-are-being-killed-but-its-hard-to-prove-theyre-being-targeted-221042">Gaza: high numbers of journalists are being killed but it's hard to prove they're being targeted</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222027/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of analysis from our coverage of the war in Gaza over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214302024-01-23T16:01:22Z2024-01-23T16:01:22ZIran is not the regional puppetmaster many think and risks losing control if the current crisis escalates<p>Despite the recent admission by the US president, Joe Biden, that the joint US-UK campaign of airstrikes against Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/defiant-houthi-leader-mocks-biden-and-calls-for-boycott-of-israeli-goods-yemen">not working</a>, the two allies conducted their eighth round of bombardment against Houthi positions on January 22. A spokesman for the UK prime minister, Rishi Sunak, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/51d3f2d6-a460-4a04-b0d6-2749f9f46f4f">told journalists</a> that the military action was accompanied by diplomacy aimed at “putting diplomatic pressure on Iran to cease their support of Houthi activity”. </p>
<p>The US-UK bombing campaign has come in response to repeated Houthi <a href="https://theconversation.com/houthi-rebel-red-sea-attacks-and-the-threat-of-escalation-and-supply-chain-chaos-are-a-major-headache-and-not-just-for-the-west-220787">attacks on vessels in the Red Sea</a>, which they claim aims to target Israeli vessels or sea traffic bound for Israel, in response to the Israeli military action against Hamas in Gaza.</p>
<p>All this comes at a precarious moment for the region. Hezbollah, the Lebanese “Party of God”, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-israeli-assassinations-draw-fiery-rhetoric-from-iran-and-hezbollah-but-regional-escalation-is-unlikely-220489">increasing its presence</a> on Lebanon’s southern border with Israel. Jordan has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordanian-jets-strike-iran-linked-drug-dealers-inside-syria-intelligence-sources-2024-01-09/">carried out airstrikes</a> against suspected drug dealers in Syria. Tensions in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/where-balochistan-why-iran-pakistan-strikes">Balochistan</a> – on the border of Iran and Pakistan – are escalating. Iran and its allies in Iraq and Syria continue regular attacks against US bases in the region. And the relentless <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-how-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-is-shaping-up-221048">Israeli assault on Hamas</a> in Gaza continues, at a massive cost – mainly to Palestinian civilians.</p>
<p>While some may look at the Middle East and reject any semblance of order in the region, the reality is rather different. Although the region has endured a tumultuous two decades since the 9/11 attacks on New York sparked the US-led “War on Terror” and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the underlying structures that regulate life largely remain in place. Broadly speaking, sovereign states remain intact – albeit with challenges to the territorial sovereignty of Iraq and Yemen – along with a strong authoritarian current, powerful armies, and the role of the US in the region.</p>
<h2>October 7 changes the picture</h2>
<p>Things have come a long way since the beginning of 2023, which had offered much hope for the gradual improvement of regional security. The year began with a normalisation agreement <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/normalization-non-aggression-next-step-iran-saudi-ties">between Saudi Arabia and Iran</a> while, thanks to the signing of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-conflict-how-could-it-change-the-middle-easts-political-landscape-expert-qanda-215473">Abraham Accords in 2020</a>, there was also the prospect of normalisation of relations between the Saudis and the Israelis. The kingdom appeared to be keen to follow neighbours Bahrain and the UAE in establishing relations with Israel for the first time. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, continuing peace talks between <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/catching-back-channel-peace-talks-yemen">Saudi Arabia and the Houthis</a> gave hope of an end to the long civil war in Yemen. As a result, there was reason to (tentatively at least) hope for a new era of regional politics, driven by economic interests. </p>
<p>All that changed with the October 7 Hamas attacks in Israel and the Israeli response in Gaza, which appear – for now at least – to have scuppered any hope for warming relations between Israel and the Arab nations.</p>
<p><strong>The ‘axis of resistance’</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the so-called 'Axis of Resistance' in the MIddle East." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s influence in the Middle East.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Axis_of_Resistance?file=Axis_of_Resistance.jpg">Master Strategist/Axis of Resistance</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Iran’s regional relations</h2>
<p>Unlike its Arab neighbours, the Islamic Republic of Iran has long articulated support for the Palestinian cause, drawing on ideas of martyrdom and resistance found within Shia Islam – of which Iran has long aimed to be recognised as the ideological head – to support this position. This ideological approach has helped Tehran cultivate relations with groups across the region who position themselves against Israel and the US. </p>
<p>The axis is directly at odds with the dominant ordering principles of Middle East politics. It operates as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-axis-of-resistance-how-hamas-and-tehran-are-attempting-to-galvanise-their-allies-against-israel-216670">transnational collective of violent non-state actors</a> opposed to the US, Israel, and those Sunni Arab states who have relations with Washington and normalised with Israel. </p>
<p>Over the past two decades, Arab leaders have framed Iran as a malign actor in the Middle East, seeking to destabilise the region in pursuit of its own goals. Iran is positioned as nefarious puppetmaster, the patron of a proxy network whose constituent parts do its bidding. </p>
<p>The reality, however, is more complex. A closer look at the relationship between Iran and the Houthis reveals this complexity. Unlike Hezbollah, which was formed under direction from Iran in the early 1980s, the Houthi movement emerged as a result of sectarian conflict. Yemen’s Houthis come from a strong <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaydism">Zaydi</a> tradition in north Yemen, which placed them in direct conflict with Saudi-backed <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/2022/09/13/saudi-arabia-s-split-image-approach-to-salafism-pub-87895">Salafis</a> who dominated the (internationally recognised) national government. </p>
<p>It is generally accepted that the Houthis procured weapons from Yemeni sources until the late 2000s, when Iran sensed an opportunity to increase its influence on the region at relatively little cost. </p>
<p>But since then, tensions between the Houthis and Iran have appeared around ethnic, linguistic and doctrinal differences. While both are Shia, the Houthis are <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaydism">Zaydi</a> and Iran is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twelver_Shi%27ism">Twelver</a>. The difference, while subtle, is significant. While Iran has been a source of inspiration (and funding) to Houthi leaders, Zaydis do not follow ayatollahs for theological or political guidance. Significantly, they are also not beholden to Tehran for every move they make.</p>
<p>Much like with Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah, there are numerous instances of friction between the Houthis and the Islamic Republic, stemming from ethnic tensions, sectarian schisms and geopolitical aspirations.</p>
<h2>Iranian pragmatism</h2>
<p>It’s also important to realise that despite appearances and the way it is often portrayed in the west, Iran is a <a href="https://gulfif.org/pragmatic-investment-possibilities-for-saudi-iranian-cooperation-amid-the-gaza-war/">deeply pragmatic state</a>, as shown in its attempts to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in recent years. So, while Tehran and its allies have engaged in low-level skirmishes with the US and Israel, it has been careful to keep these acts of violence below a threshold that might lead to escalation. </p>
<p>That said, there’s no doubt this is a very dangerous time in the Middle East. As the situation in Gaza and the Red Sea deteriorates and against the backdrop of continuing skirmishes between the Israel Defense Forces and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the sheer number of moving parts in this picture means that the situation could easily spiral out of everyone’s control.</p>
<p>As recent history has shown us, despite the myriad challenges and spoilers on all sides, diplomacy can work. Now, more than ever, it must be given a chance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221430/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon receives funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Henry Luce Foundation. He is a Senior Research Fellow with the Foreign Policy Centre </span></em></p>The Middle East crisis has many moving parts and could easily descend into chaos.Simon Mabon, Professor of International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212692024-01-23T13:27:31Z2024-01-23T13:27:31ZHow much influence does Iran have over its proxy ‘Axis of Resistance’ − Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570697/original/file-20240122-59268-wb9gt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C12%2C4025%2C2609&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A billboard depicts the leaders of the Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yemeni-woman-carrying-her-bay-walks-near-a-billboard-with-news-photo/1942966164?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>From <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-says-iran-deeply-involved-red-sea-attacks-commercial-vessels-2023-12-22/">attacks by rebels in the Red Sea</a> to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-accuses-iran-ordering-sundays-hezbollah-attacks-lebanon-border-2023-10-16/">raids in northern Israel</a> and the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-israel-hamas-strike-planning-bbe07b25">Oct. 7, 2023, assault by Hamas</a>, Western analysts have pointed a finger of blame toward Iran.</p>
<p>Regardless of how involved Tehran is directly in the planning and carrying out of such incidents, the accusations get at a broader truth: In Middle Eastern geopolitics, Iran’s strategy of aligning with violent nonstate actors – notably <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-hamas-the-same-as-isis-the-islamic-state-group-no-and-yes-219454">Hamas in Gaza</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-both-israel-and-hezbollah-are-eager-to-avoid-tit-for-tat-attacks-escalating-into-full-blown-war-220745">Hezbollah in Lebanon</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-uk-airstrikes-risk-strengthening-houthi-rebels-position-in-yemen-and-the-region-221006">Houthis in Yemen</a> – influences the regional balance of power. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">experts in Iran’s relationship</a> with <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/team/dr-nakissa-jahanbani/">its network of proxies</a>, we understand that Iran’s connection with each group is distinct yet interlinked, revealing Tehran’s regional objectives. From southern Lebanon to Gaza to Yemen, these alliances shape the political landscape and highlight the nature of influence and control in proxy warfare. It serves as a counterweight to Iran’s relatively <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/strategic-competition/irans-conventional-military-capabilities/">limited conventional military capabilities</a>, forming a key part of its foreign policy.</p>
<h2>Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’</h2>
<p>Managed by the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/irgc_fto.html">Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps</a>, Iran’s paramilitary security service that answers only to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, these regional groups form what Tehran has labeled the Axis of Resistance. </p>
<p>The relationship between the groups and Tehran is designed to serve as a balance against both U.S. influence in the region and that of Washington’s regional allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p><iframe id="C9fdn" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/C9fdn/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>But to characterize the Axis of Resistance as straight proxies is slightly off. Rather, Iran’s approach – spanning Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and the Palestinian territories – is to extend its influence through strategic partnerships. While based on shared objectives and ideologies, these alliances allow varying degrees of autonomy. Iran provides resources and coordination, but each group maintains its own agenda and local support base, functioning more as partners than proxies. And the relationship between Iran and each member of this Axis of Resistance is unique.</p>
<h2>Hezbollah: Iran’s pivotal partner</h2>
<p>Established in the early 1980s, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a> – a Shiite militant organization – emerged with direct assistance from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, primarily as a response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Aiming to establish an Iranian-influenced base on Israel’s border, Tehran provided training, financial support and weaponry, bolstering Hezbollah’s growth and capabilities.</p>
<p>This collaboration has led to Hezbollah developing a sophisticated arsenal, including advanced <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/comparative-study-non-state-violent-drone-use-middle-east">drone technology</a>, <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/hezbollah-transporting-chemical-weapons-lebanon-help-iran-north-korea-report-claims">chemical weapons</a> and <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/iran-israel-drone-competition-and-the-changing-nature-of-warfare-in-the-middle-east/">expanded</a> <a href="https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/fdd-monograph-arsenal-assessing-iran-ballistic-missile-program.pdf">rocket</a> capabilities.</p>
<p>As a result of its involvement in the <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Iran-Entangled.pdf">Syrian civil war</a> and ongoing hostilities with Israel, Hezbollah has <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/5438?disposition=inline">professionalized its military</a>. By deploying troops to support the Syrian government in line with Iran’s support for the regime, Hezbollah has transitioned from guerrilla tactics to more conventional warfare. Additionally, its ongoing conflict with Israel has sharpened its <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hezbollahland-mapping-dahiya-and-lebanons-shia-community">military strategy and capabilities</a>. This helped elevate Hezbollah to a notable political and military role within Lebanon’s government, which has frequently aligned with Iran’s geopolitical interests. </p>
<p>This evolution has also enabled Hezbollah to become a mentor and supporter for other Iran-backed groups. Hezbollah has imparted its <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/iranian-drone-proliferation-is-scaling-up-and-turning-more-lethal/">expertise in drone operations</a> to organizations such as <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-is-the-fatemiyoun-brigade-and-why-does-it-make-the-taliban-nervous/">Fatemiyoun in Afghanistan</a>, Iraq’s <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/kata%E2%80%99ib-hezbollah">Kataib Hezbollah</a> and Houthi fighters.</p>
<p>The relationship between Tehran and Hezbollah has deepened over the years, evolving from mere assistance to a robust strategic alliance. The entities share goals, strategies and materials. The <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hezbollahs-record-war-politics">close relationship</a> between Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Iran’s Khamenei further cements this alliance.</p>
<p>Despite Iran’s considerable influence, particularly in regional conflicts, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05_terrorism_byman.pdf">Hezbollah retains autonomy</a> in domestic Lebanese politics and its social services.</p>
<p>This Hezbollah-Iran alliance is arguably more significant than Iran’s relationship with other proxies and is instrumental in Tehran’s regional strategy. It not only extends Iran’s influence in the Middle East but also serves as a counterbalance to its adversaries, notably Israel and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<h2>Hamas: United against Israel</h2>
<p>Emerging in the <a href="https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1198908227">first intifada, or Palestinian uprising, of 1987</a>, Hamas forged ties with Iran in the early 1990s. Despite the ideological differences – Hamas is predominantly Sunni Islamist, while Iran is a hard-line Shiite regime – they found common ground in their opposition to Israel and a shared vision for Palestinian liberation.</p>
<p>Iran’s backing of Hamas includes financial aid, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-iran-relationship">military training</a> and, crucially, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/world/middleeast/arms-with-long-reach-bolster-hamas.html">the supply</a> of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/09/iran-support-hamas-training-weapons-israel/">rocket technology</a>. This <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-hamas-relationship-in-2008">funding</a> has escalated Hamas’ <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/hamas-fights-patchwork-weapons-built-iran-china-russia-106381152">operational capabilities</a>, enabling the development of a more sophisticated and far-reaching rocket arsenal.</p>
<p>Iran’s support has shifted the balance in Hamas’ conflict with Israel, demonstrating Iran’s influential role in regional power dynamics.</p>
<p>The alignment between Iran and Hamas, however, has fluctuated. In 2012, differences over the Syrian civil war <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/06/hamas-no-military-aid-for-iran">introduced a rift</a> in their relationship. Hamas’ tacit support for Sunni rebels in Syria was at odds with Iran’s allegiance to the Assad regime, leading to a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/how-hamas-lost-the-arab-spring/277102/">temporary withdrawal</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE95I0W4/">of Iranian support</a>.</p>
<p>However, this strain was not permanent. In subsequent years, the Iran-Hamas relationship was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/09/hamas-iran-rebuild-ties-falling-out-syria">realigned and reinforced</a>, evidenced by Iran’s resumption of substantial military aid. The sophisticated planning and execution of the Oct. 7 attack showed how Hamas has been able to improve its military capacity with a helping hand from Iran.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the group maintains a degree of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a06e7ea0-a7f8-4058-85b7-30549dd71443">political and strategic independence</a>, primarily focusing on Palestinian interests. </p>
<p>This dynamic reflects Iran’s broader regional strategy: to empower allied groups in extending its reach, while granting them autonomy to pursue specific agendas.</p>
<h2>Houthis: Strategic ally against Saudi Arabia</h2>
<p>Emerging in the 1990s in Yemen as a Zaidi Shia Islamist group, the Houthi movement initially <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">focused on religious and cultural revivalism</a> before progressively <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">becoming engaged</a> in Yemen’s political and military arenas.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a headscarf stands next to a heavy weapon with shells." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Houthi supporter in Sanaa, Yemen.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/houthi-supporters-gather-as-they-carry-heavy-weapons-and-news-photo/1945478590?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fueled by grievances against the central government and foreign interference in Yemen, the group shifted to an armed rebellion. This evolution was marked by <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">growing confrontations</a> with the Yemeni government and involvement in a wider regional conflict against a coalition led by Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia. This set the stage for their alliance with Tehran.</p>
<p>The Houthis’ <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-houthi-jihad-council-command-and-control-in-the-other-hezbollah/">alignment with Iran</a> was spurred by shared religious beliefs as well as opposition to both Saudi Arabia and the U.S.</p>
<p>The collaboration with Iran <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/containing-houthis-yemen-issues-and-options-policy-review">gained momentum</a> following the Houthis’ <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1204415">capture of Yemen’s capital Sanaa</a> in 2014 – a move that is believed to have triggered an escalation in Iranian support. </p>
<p>Support from Tehran came in the shape of <a href="https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/yemens-houthis-and-the-expansion-of-irans-axis-of-resistance/">sophisticated weaponry</a>, military training and financial aid, and it has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/17/world/middleeast/yemen-houthis-gulf.html">substantially enhanced</a> the Houthis’ missile and drone capabilities. The Houthis have utilized this growing <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4231.html">capability to challenge</a> <a href="https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/yemens-houthis-and-the-expansion-of-irans-axis-of-resistance/">Saudi Arabia</a> and, more recently, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/26/uk-maritime-group-reports-drones-explosion-off-yemen-coast">Israel</a> </p>
<p>Empowered by Iranian support, the Houthis have <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4231.html">expanded</a> their operations to include <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2024-01-15/ty-article-magazine/30-attacks-all-red-sea-ships-targeted-by-the-houthis/0000018c-5df7-d6f9-afbc-5dff7a430000">assaults on U.S.</a> and other international vessels in the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-intercepts-cruise-missile-attack-on-its-warship-in-red-sea-363300da">Red Sea</a>.</p>
<p>Despite the depth of Iranian support, the Houthis retain a level of autonomy, specifically in local Yemeni politics. While Iran’s influence is notable, it does not translate into outright control. Instead, the Houthis are positioned more as strategic allies within Iran’s regional agenda rather than mere proxies.</p>
<h2>Iran’s expanding influence</h2>
<p>Iran’s proxy network, which extends to groups in <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqs-new-regime-change-how-tehran-backed-terrorist-organizations-and-militias-captured-the-iraqi-state/">Iraq</a>, <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Iran-Entangled.pdf">Syria</a> and <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/reviewing-irans-proxies-by-region-a-look-toward-the-middle-east-south-asia-and-africa/">beyond</a>, is a key part of Tehran’s strategy to expand its influence and confront that of Washington and its allies.</p>
<p>These partnerships, though seldom involving <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05_terrorism_byman.pdf">absolute control</a>, also demonstrate Iran’s adeptness in navigating geopolitical landscapes. The <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-war-gaza-revived-axis-resistance">Axis of Resistance</a> allows Iran to adapt its strategy to shifting regional dynamics. For example, positioning Hamas under the Revolutionary Guard’s guidance fits a strategy to confront Israel as regional dynamics shift toward normalization between Israel and Arab states.</p>
<p>Such partnerships also pose a challenge to Iran’s adversaries. Deterring these proxy groups requires navigating a complex web of relationships, interests and ongoing conflicts. And this complexity, coupled with Iran’s pivotal role, has reshaped the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape, signaling a period of heightened tensions with broad international implications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221269/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views, conclusions, and recommendations in this article are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran has expanded its network of partners across the Middle East. But it isn’t a simple case of Tehran dictating the terms of the alliance.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, American UniversityNakissa Jahanbani, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207972024-01-15T17:30:09Z2024-01-15T17:30:09ZWar in the Middle East has put Lebanon on the brink of economic disaster<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569297/original/file-20240115-15-36cdmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5982%2C3988&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/beirutlebanon10112019-revolution-lebanon-protests-1560428381">P.jowdy/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent return of violence to Lebanon derails hope that the worst of the crises that have plagued the country over the past four years have been left behind. </p>
<p>After a spiral of <a href="https://theconversation.com/lebanon-one-year-after-beirut-explosion-failing-state-struggles-amid-poverty-and-sectarianism-165543">hyperinflation, debt default and crumbling public services</a>, modest signs of economic recovery from one of the “<a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/05/01/lebanon-sinking-into-one-of-the-most-severe-global-crises-episodes#:%7E:text=The%20World%20Bank%20estimates%20that,40%20percent%20in%20dollar%20terms.">most severe crisis episodes [seen] globally since the mid-19th century</a>” was predicted for 2024. But this glimmer of optimism has waned as Lebanon risks being dragged into war with Israel. </p>
<p>On January 2, Israel <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-rcna132013">assassinated senior Hamas political officer</a> Saleh al-Arouri in south Beirut after daily rounds of Israeli shelling in southern Lebanon.</p>
<p>The conflict has already resulted in the displacement of <a href="https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mobility-snapshot-round-18-04-01-2024?close=true">more than 75,000 citizens</a> within Lebanon, as well as the deaths of 25 more. The Gaza conflict also prompted the cancellation of “<a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/12/gaza-war-throw-lebanon-back-recession-world-bank#ixzz8OcLv2jv3">more than half of travel reservations to Lebanon</a>” during the winter holidays. The shock to tourism spending will quickly reverse the limp economic growth that was projected for 2023.</p>
<p>The mood in Lebanon over Christmas was one of deep concern at the prospect of conflict. Any spillover of conflict in the country would cause further internal displacement and stretch state services beyond their breaking point. </p>
<p>The last <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/israellebanonhezbollah-conflict-2006">conflict between Israel and Lebanon</a> – in 2006 – resulted in an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL08225712/">estimated US$6.75 billion (£5.3 billion)</a> worth of damages and lost revenue and thousands dead or displaced from their homes. </p>
<p>A repeat of the 2006 Lebanon war would cause a humanitarian disaster and worsen the state of Lebanon’s already beleaguered economy. Notably, a new conflict would probably force thousands of those living in Lebanon to flee the country, adding to an already existent trend in outward migration, a fact not lost on nearby <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/12/gaza-war-throw-lebanon-back-recession-world-bank#ixzz8OcLv2jv3">Mediterranean states</a>. </p>
<h2>Prelude to war?</h2>
<p>Backed by Iran, the Lebanese militant Hezbollah movement sees itself as a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">resistor against Israel</a>. Hezbollah holds an estimated <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67307858">130,000 rockets and missiles</a> ready for any conflict with Israel. </p>
<p>But, despite this antagonistic stance, the group’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, was restrained in his rhetoric, a hopeful sign that he is seeking to avoid war. </p>
<p>In the direct aftermath of the assassination of al-Arouri in Beirut, Nasrallah discussed the opportunity to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/05/nasrallah-hezbollah-israel-border-fighting/">“liberate” all of Lebanese territory through talks</a> and halt Israel’s use of Lebanese airspace and land to launch attacks into Syria. There is precedent for such talks. In 2022, US-mediated negotiations between Lebanon and Israel established clear boundaries within which both states could explore for natural gas.</p>
<p>Nasrallah’s coded message seems to have been heard by the US. On January 11, senior US energy advisor Amos Hochstein <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/white-house-official-visit-beirut-seeking-ease-israel-lebanon-tensions-2024-01-11/">landed in Beirut</a> to discuss how to reduce tension between the two countries. </p>
<p>While the overtures might appear positive, the Lebanese public are aware of the precarious situation ahead. Nasrallah is walking a tightrope between keeping Lebanon out of conflict it cannot afford while trying to ensure that Hezbollah keeps its credibility as the “resistance” to Israel. </p>
<p>The fear in the streets of Lebanon is that this is an impossible path to negotiate and eventually Hezbollah will be sparked into further action, escalating the conflict. Reports that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/israel-risking-serious-escalation-by-killing-hezbollah-leaders-say-diplomats">Israel assassinated two Hezbollah commanders</a> in southern Lebanon on January 14 only add to the pressure on Hezbollah to respond.</p>
<h2>Why Lebanon is so fragile</h2>
<p>Several overlapping crises over the past decade have already conspired to bring Lebanon to the point of collapse. The civil war in neighbouring Syria since 2011 has seen an <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/lb/at-a-glance">estimated 1.5 million refugees</a> seek shelter in Lebanon. The country hosts the largest number of refugees per capita and per square kilometre in the world. </p>
<p>Lebanon has also been facing a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/acaps-thematic-report-lebanon-effect-socioeconomic-crisis-healthcare-19-october-2023">severe economic crisis</a> since 2019, which was worsened by the onset of the COVID pandemic. As a result of this crisis, approximately 80% of Lebanese now live in poverty and 36% below the extreme poverty line. </p>
<p>This crisis was worsened in 2020 following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/infographic-how-big-was-the-beirut-explosion">Beirut port explosion</a>, which killed 218 people and devastated parts of the country’s capital. The explosion rendered half of Beirut’s healthcare centres nonfunctional, impacted 56% of private businesses in the city, and caused up to US$4.6 billion in material damage.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569295/original/file-20240115-17-jjoek9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Rubble surrounding the remains of a large building next to the sea with tower blocks in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569295/original/file-20240115-17-jjoek9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569295/original/file-20240115-17-jjoek9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569295/original/file-20240115-17-jjoek9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569295/original/file-20240115-17-jjoek9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569295/original/file-20240115-17-jjoek9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569295/original/file-20240115-17-jjoek9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569295/original/file-20240115-17-jjoek9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Beirut port explosion damaged large parts of Lebanon’s capital city.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/beirut-lebanon-08-11-2020-port-1793936191">Ali Chehade/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Lebanon’s precarious situation is exacerbated by its power-sharing government – which is mired in corruption – and dysfunctional institutions. Lebanon is ranked <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/lebanon">150 out of 180 countries</a> for corruption, the government has failed to pass a budget in over a decade, and credible allegations of <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/lebanon/freedom-world/2022">vote buying and political interference in elections</a> have been recorded.</p>
<p>Lebanese citizens who have borne the brunt of these crises have directed their anger at the government. In October 2019, as the economic collapse unfolded, an estimated 2 million people took to the streets to <a href="https://merip.org/2019/12/lebanons-thawra/">demand the government’s resignation</a>. </p>
<p>Survey evidence also points to rapidly declining levels of trust in the state’s government and leaders. Only 8% of Lebanese citizens say they have a great deal or quite a lot of trust <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABVII_Lebanon_Country_Report-ENG.pdf">in the government</a>. </p>
<p>This is significantly lower than in other Middle Eastern countries surveyed. In Iraq, where citizens have the next lowest level of trust in their government, a much higher proportion (26%) say they have a great deal or quite a lot of trust in the government.</p>
<h2>Ceasefire essential</h2>
<p>In light of Lebanon’s fragility, the prospect of a war between Israel and Lebanon needs to be avoided at all costs. And an immediate ceasefire in Gaza is needed. </p>
<p>Beyond this, a potential framework for an agreement between Israel and Hezbollah is already available. <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/israellebanon-resolution1701">UN Security Council resolution 1701</a> stipulates that Israel respects Lebanese sovereignty and requires UN peacekeeping forces to be deployed on the border. </p>
<p>Robust <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/robust-diplomacy-washingtons-only-chance-stop-lebanon-israel-war">international mediation and pressure is urgently needed</a> to enforce the agreement to prevent a humanitarian disaster.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220797/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Conflict between Lebanon and Israel looms – it would throw the Lebanese economy further into crisis.John Nagle, Professor in Sociology, Queen's University BelfastDrew Mikhael, Scholar at Centre for the Study of Ethnic Conflict at Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209612024-01-11T17:29:22Z2024-01-11T17:29:22ZGaza update: no end to the killing in sight as extremists on both sides make a peace deal hard to imagine<p>As the death toll from Israel’s assault on Gaza climbed past 23,000 – including nearly 10,000 children – according to the latest figures from the Hamas-controlled health ministry, the Palestinian militant group released a series of videos showing operations in the northern Gaza Strip. Analysts commented that Hamas was keen to emphasise, contrary to claims by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), it still has operational capabilities in the north of the enclave.</p>
<p>Meanwhile attacks by Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militant groups continue in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as against US bases in Iraq and Syria as part of an ongoing campaign to harass and expel US troops.</p>
<p>Antony Blinken returned to the region for another round of shuttle diplomacy, putting on a determinedly optimistic face as he insisted after a meeting with Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman that Israel could still normalise relations with Saudi Arabia. Visiting the West Bank this week, Blinken also restated Washington’s commitment to the creation of a Palestinian state.</p>
<p>Of course, a major hurdle to the “two-state solution” is the inconvenient fact that two of the biggest players in any peace agreement along those lines would be Israel and Hamas. Hamas has always refused to recognise the state of Israel, while Israel’s Netanyahu government is being kept in power with the cooperation of the extreme right Religious Zionism party.</p>
<p>Amnon Aran, an expert in Israeli politics at City, University of London, says that the party’s leaders – national security minister Itamar Ben Gvir and finance minister Bezalel Smotrich – flatly reject any cooperation with the Palestinians. But, significantly, Aran also believes that they will also prevent any real progress at other regional peace initiatives. This includes a joint US-French gambit that aims to reduce tensions between Israel and Lebanon by finally realising a deal originally mooted as a way of ending the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. </p>
<p>That would involve a new land demarcation agreement specifying where and how the two sides could deploy forces across the Israel-Lebanon border. It is already backed by UN security council resolution 1701 from 2006, which would replace any Hezbollah troops close to the Israel border with the Lebanese army. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://theconversation.com/benjamin-netanyahus-biggest-problem-in-negotiating-an-end-to-war-with-hamas-and-hezbollah-may-be-his-own-government-220736">Aran notes</a>, Netanyahu faces a string of corruption charges and has been marking strenuous efforts to delay his trial. The collapse of his coalition could give his main rival, former defence minister Benny Gantz, a chance to form a government. Gantz is itching to pass legislation to prevent anyone facing criminal charges from being able to lead a government.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/benjamin-netanyahus-biggest-problem-in-negotiating-an-end-to-war-with-hamas-and-hezbollah-may-be-his-own-government-220736">Benjamin Netanyahu's biggest problem in negotiating an end to war with Hamas and Hezbollah may be his own government</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>In peril on the sea</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, Iran-backed Houthi rebels continue to cause chaos in the Red Sea, mounting such regular attacks on shipping there that many ships are opting to take the longer way round the Cape instead of risking access to the Suez Canal. </p>
<p>A US-led taskforce involving Royal Navy ships this week fought off what has been described as the biggest attack by Houthi rebels yet, involving a mix of rockets, drones and cruise missiles. UK defence secretary Grant Shapps did the rounds of the media making appropriately belligerent noises. </p>
<p>But in truth the Houthis are mounting what appears to be a classic example of “assymetrical warfare”, leveraging their limited means to cause major disruption to global supply chains and sending insurance premiums skywards. This will inevitably feed into higher commodity prices. </p>
<p>Noting that the Red Sea accounts of 15% of global trade, Basil Germond, an expert in maritime affairs at Lancaster University, believes that the west has few options for dealing with this. As of the time of writing, the UK is talking up the likelihood of airstrikes against the Houthis on the ground in Yemen. But, as Germond <a href="https://theconversation.com/houthi-rebel-red-sea-attacks-and-the-threat-of-escalation-and-supply-chain-chaos-are-a-major-headache-and-not-just-for-the-west-220787">writes here</a>, this is an entirely different proposition from shooting down the odd drone at sea.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/houthi-rebel-red-sea-attacks-and-the-threat-of-escalation-and-supply-chain-chaos-are-a-major-headache-and-not-just-for-the-west-220787">Houthi rebel Red Sea attacks and the threat of escalation and supply chain chaos are a major headache – and not just for the west</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the state of the Middle East conflict by the Institute for the Study of War." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">How the Middle East conflict stands as of January 10 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Major escalation unlikely</h2>
<p>As well as pursuing its war aims in Gaza, Israel continues to make good on its promise to find and kill all those involved in planning and carrying out the October attacks. While Israel and its spy agencies rarely claim responsibility for assassinations, it appears to be generally accepted that the decisions to target high-ranking Iranian general Sayyed Razi Mousavi in Damascus on Christmas Day and senior Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut on January 2 were taken in Israel.</p>
<p>Scott Lucas, a Middle East security expert at University College Dublin, says that while the killings were greeted with predictably bloodcurdling threats from Hezbollah and Iran, a close reading of their statements suggests a major regional escalation <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-israeli-assassinations-draw-fiery-rhetoric-from-iran-and-hezbollah-but-regional-escalation-is-unlikely-220489">remains unlikely for now</a>. </p>
<p>As Lucas points out, both Iran and Lebanon, where Hezbollah comprises a state within a state, face severe economic problems. They are more likely to harass Israel, or in Iran’s case, use its proxies including the Houthis to do it for them.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-israeli-assassinations-draw-fiery-rhetoric-from-iran-and-hezbollah-but-regional-escalation-is-unlikely-220489">Gaza war: Israeli assassinations draw fiery rhetoric from Iran and Hezbollah – but regional escalation is unlikely</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>A post-Palestinian Gaza?</h2>
<p>Another of the factors making a durable peace deal more difficult to imagine is the vision that many high-ranking Israeli politicians have for a post-conflict Gaza – without any Palestinians living there. Both Smotrich and Ben Gvir have talked up the idea of Gaza’s population being farmed out as refugees around the world, while Gaza is reoccupied by Israeli settlers. </p>
<p>But it isn’t just the extreme right in Netanyahu’s government that have proposed moving Palestinians out of Gaza. As Leonie Fleischmann, a Middle East expert at City, University of London, <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-government-riven-with-division-over-future-of-gaza-after-far-right-calls-to-expel-palestinians-220602">writes</a>, more moderate voices have criticised the international community for a moral failure to help Palestinian civilians. For example, former Israeli ambassador to the UN Danny Danon and the centre-left politician and former deputy director of Mossad Ram Ben-Barak have proposed that countries around the world should accept some of Gaza’s population who “have expressed a desire to relocate”.</p>
<p>On the other side is the settler movement, which is already making ever larger and more aggressive inroads into the West Bank. One of the movement’s leading lights, Daniella Weiss, appeared recently on mainstream Israeli television to describe her longing for a Gaza where “there will be no homes, there will be no Arabs”, adding that Gaza City had always been “one of the cities of Israel. We’re just going back. There was a historical mistake and now we are fixing it.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-government-riven-with-division-over-future-of-gaza-after-far-right-calls-to-expel-palestinians-220602">Israeli government riven with division over future of Gaza after far-right calls to expel Palestinians</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Peace polling</h2>
<p>One of the great tragedies in all this is the way that ideas and opportunities which might have provided a pathway to peace have been squandered over the years. Colin Irwin, now a research fellow at the University of Liverpool, has been involved in peace negotiations in various conflicts over several decades. Perhaps the most conspicuous success was his involvement in the negotiations which led to the signing of the Good Friday agreement in 1998. Irwin was working with Bill Clinton’s peace envoy, Senator George Mitchell, conducting peace polls.</p>
<p>As Irwin <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-israel-failed-to-learn-from-the-northern-ireland-peace-process-220170">explains</a>, the principle of polling as a part of peace negotiations is absolute inclusivity and public buy in. He developed relations with eight political parties across the spectrum of Northern Irish politics, including those that represented the Irish Republican Army, Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Freedom Fighters. His team commissioned polls on the many different political positions held by the parties, who then used this information to negotiate a peace deal they knew would receive support.</p>
<p>Irwin writes that he was all set to repeat this process with Mitchell in 2009, who Barack Obama had appointed as his Middle East envoy. But several things got in the way – including, most significantly, the election of Netanyahu as prime minister in the spring of 2009. Unlike his predecessor Ehud Olmert, Netanyahu did not want to include Hamas in any talks. The process collapsed. And so the killing has continued to this day.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-israel-failed-to-learn-from-the-northern-ireland-peace-process-220170">How Israel failed to learn from the Northern Ireland peace process</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220961/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of analysis from our coverage of the war in Gaza over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207452024-01-09T13:57:06Z2024-01-09T13:57:06ZWhy both Israel and Hezbollah are eager to avoid tit-for-tat attacks escalating into full-blown war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568359/original/file-20240109-23-6r2dd4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C0%2C1238%2C788&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hezbollah commander Wissam al-Tawil, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LebanonIsraelPalestinians/63dcedde8d9341cc990d4edb56d34a01/photo?Query=israel%20hezbollah&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=2433&currentItemNo=11">Hezbollah Military Media, via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-strike-lebanon-kills-senior-commander-elite-hezbollah-unit-security-2024-01-08/">killing of a Hezbollah commander in southern Lebanon</a> on Jan. 8, 2024, has raised concern that the conflict between Israel and Hamas could escalate into a regional war.</em></p>
<p><em>Wissam al-Tawil, the head of a unit that operates on Lebanon’s southern border, was killed in a targeted Israeli airstrike just days after a senior Hamas leader was assassinated in Beirut and amid sporadic attacks by Hezbollah on Israeli targets.</em></p>
<p><em>But how likely is a full-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah? The Conversation turned to <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/faculty-and-staff/asher-kaufman/">Asher Kaufman, an expert on Lebanon-Israel relations</a> at the University of Notre Dame, to assess what could happen next.</em></p>
<h2>What do we know about the latest strike?</h2>
<p>We know that it was an <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/08/middleeast/hezbollah-commander-killed-intl/index.html">Israeli drone that killed al-Tawil</a>. Hezbollah has since released picture of him with Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s secretary general, and Qassem Soleiman, the former head of Quds Force – one of Iran’s main military branches – who was assassinated by the U.S. in 2020. This suggests that al-Tawil was a major target for Israel, as he clearly had connections with top figures in Lebanon and Iran.</p>
<p>The fact that it was a drone attack is also important. This suggests that the operation was based on good Israeli intelligence on al-Tawil’s whereabouts. This wasn’t a chance encounter. This was clearly a calculated and precise attack.</p>
<p>After the operation, Israel said al-Tawil was responsible for a recent <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-admits-mount-meron-air-traffic-control-base-damaged-in-hezbollah-attack/">missile attack on Israel’s Mount Meron intelligence base</a> in northern Israel. That attack was in response to the earlier assassination of a Hamas leader in Beirut.</p>
<p>So what we are seeing is a pattern of tit-for-tat strikes.</p>
<h2>So this doesn’t mark an escalation?</h2>
<p>I don’t see the killing of al-Tawil as an escalation, as such. Rather, it is a targeted retaliation by Israel to the earlier Hezbollah strike on one of their facilities. </p>
<p>There are some important things to note in that regard. It was just 10 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border. This is still within the geographical area where the two sides have been exchanging fire since the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas in Israel. So this is still within the realm of border skirmishes, to my mind, and falls short of full war.</p>
<h2>Is it in the interests of Israel to escalate conflict?</h2>
<p>I don’t think either side is interested in full-blown war, for different reasons.</p>
<p>For Israel, the pressure is from outside the country. There is immense international pressure on Israel not to start a full-blown war with Hezbollah. Indeed, U.S. Secrtary of State Antony Blinken is currently in the region and visiting Israel with that message: Do not start a war with Hezbollah.</p>
<p>I think there is a realization, certainly in the international community, that a full-blown war between Hezbollah and Israel will decimate Lebanon and also lead to major destruction in Israel.</p>
<h2>What about pressure within Israel?</h2>
<p>Certainly within Israel there is a strong lobby for war with Hezbollah. The thinking among Israeli military hawks here is a powerful military blow against Hezbollah would allow people living in the north of Israel to return to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/20/middleeast/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-tiberias-evacuation-intl/index.html">homes they evacuated</a> when it looked like war might be in the cards.</p>
<p>Indeed, the Israeli Ministry of Defense wanted preemptive war with Hezbollah after the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas. But U.S. President Joe Biden stopped that from happening for the same reason that Blinken is currently trying to dissuade Israel from further escalating the conflict.</p>
<h2>And what about Hezbollah? How might it respond?</h2>
<p>Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, is between a rock and a hard place. The majority of Lebanese people clearly do not want a war. But any attack resulting in the deaths of high-ranking Hezbollah figures will be met by internal demands for action.</p>
<p>But there is a tipping point for Hezbollah, as there is for the Israelis too – which is why this tit-for-tat pattern is such a risky matter.</p>
<p>On the Lebanese side, if Israel hits strategic Hezbollah assets deep in Lebanon – that is, outside the border areas – or launch an attack that leads to mass civilian deaths then it might lead to full-blown conflict. But so far that has not been the case. The attacks by Israel have been surgical and precise. In the case of the Hamas leader killed in Beirut, it was only Palestinians killed.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A poster of a man with a beard hangs outside a destroyed building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568360/original/file-20240109-19-houuq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568360/original/file-20240109-19-houuq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568360/original/file-20240109-19-houuq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568360/original/file-20240109-19-houuq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568360/original/file-20240109-19-houuq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568360/original/file-20240109-19-houuq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568360/original/file-20240109-19-houuq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A banner of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah hangs on the Beirut site where a Hamas leader was killed in an Israeli attack.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-photograph-taken-on-january-8-2024-shows-a-banner-news-photo/1908219508?adppopup=true">Anwar Amro/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It was a humiliation for Hezbollah for sure – it happened in Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Beirut. But it wasn’t on Hezbollah assets, such as personnel, strategic sites or command centers. Israel has limited its attacks largely to the border area.</p>
<p>Public sentiment is still very strongly against war in Lebanon. Certainly there is strong sympathy for Gazans. But the prevailing sentiment in Lebanon is that support cannot come at the price of Lebanese lives.</p>
<p>And that suits the Hezbollah hierarchy at present. They know that the threat of war is their most important card. Once played, they can’t use it again.</p>
<h2>Is there a diplomatic way forward?</h2>
<p>Both parties are looking at diplomacy. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has said that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/01/07/israel-hezbollah-lebanon-blinken/">his country’s preferred path</a> is “an agreed-upon diplomatic settlement.” Meanwhile, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu <a href="https://www.jns.org/netanyahu-tells-hezbollah-to-learn-from-what-idf-did-to-hamas/">has said the goal of returning Israeli citizens</a> to their homes in the north would be done “diplomatically” if possible. But added, “If not, we will work in other ways.”</p>
<p>Similarly in Lebanon, the talk is of a diplomatic solution – notably by enforcing <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/israellebanon-resolution1701">United Nations Resolution 1701</a>, which calls for Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River and for Israel to withdraw to the international border.</p>
<p>So it isn’t that there isn’t a credible diplomatic path. And the fact that both sides use the language of diplomacy suggests there is no appetite for full-blown war.</p>
<p>Indeed, the U.S. has long been trying to get Israel and Lebanon to resolve disputes over their shared borders.</p>
<p>Both sides signed a <a href="https://www.state.gov/historic-agreement-establishing-a-permanent-israel-lebanon-maritime-boundary/">U.S.-brokered maritime agreement in 2022</a>, and there have been attempts at a similar deal in regards to the land boundary. There remained disagreement over 13 spots along the border. But since Oct. 7, the U.S. has tried to use the prospect of a negotiated land solution based on U.N. Resolution 1701 to diffuse tension between Israel and Lebanon. </p>
<p>The Lebanese government has said it welcomes U.S. efforts to resolve the disputes. On the Israeli side, too, they are going along with U.S. attempts to keep U.N. Resolution 1701 on the table – I think, mainly to keep America on side.</p>
<h2>Does Iran have any role in influencing Hezbollah’s response?</h2>
<p>Iran has immense influence over Hezbollah – it pays for military operations and equipment. </p>
<p>But Hezbollah is not only an Iranian proxy; it has domestic considerations, and its interests lie with the Lebanese political scene. For that reason, Hezbollah is attuned to the domestic popular pressure in Lebanon against a war.</p>
<p>Also, I don’t think Iran wants to see an escalation. Like Hezbollah, Iranian leaders know that threat of war – through their proxies in the region – is their most valuable asset. And I don’t think Iran is ready to use it.</p>
<p>Iran might also be concerned that if fighting escalates, then it will be drawn into war. Iran has so far played a smart game since the Oct. 7 attacks – it has stayed away from the battlefield, while supporting the sporadic attacks on Israel by Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria. </p>
<p>But a full war between Israel and Hezbollah may draw Iran into direct confrontation with Israel and the U.S. And that is something that leaders in Tehran will most likely not want, especially after a terror attack in Iran on Jan. 3 exposed how vulnerable Iran is internally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220745/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asher Kaufman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Israel and Hezbollah are engaged in tit-for-tat attacks, but a diplomatic path still exists to avoid an escalation.Asher Kaufman, Professor of History and Peace Studies, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207362024-01-09T11:25:09Z2024-01-09T11:25:09ZBenjamin Netanyahu’s biggest problem in negotiating an end to war with Hamas and Hezbollah may be his own government<p>Three months since Hamas launched its murderous October 7 attacks, Israeli foreign policymakers remain far from achieving their goals. </p>
<p>The Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) military campaign in the Gaza Strip has been unrelenting. According to data provided by the Hamas-run health ministry, more than 22,000 thousand Palestinians <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/three-months-deaths-mount-diplomats-vie-stop-gaza-wars-spread-2024-01-07">have been killed</a>, the majority of them civilians. Meanwhile the physical destruction in the Gaza Strip has been catastrophic. </p>
<p>But despite the massive use of military force, the strategic goals Israel needs to achieve if it is to meet its aim of dismantling Hamas’ military capabilities and its ability to govern the Gaza Strip, remain elusive. </p>
<p>Apart from <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67866346">Saleh al-Aruri</a>, a key member of Hamas’ politburo, who was assassinated in Beirut on January 2, Hamas’s senior leadership remains intact. </p>
<p>In addition, Hamas’s command and control systems stay operational. While its military capabilities have been weakened, Hamas retains the capacity to launch missiles on Israeli communities and exact casualties from the IDF. </p>
<p>What’s more, the hope of the Israeli war cabinet that the military pressure inflicted by the IDF on Hamas will yield a second deal to free Israeli hostages has yet to materialise.</p>
<p>Across its northern border with Lebanon, Israel faces an even more formidable challenge. Since the October 7 attacks, border skirmishes with Hezbollah have become routine. These have posed a continuous threat to Israeli towns, villages and kibbutzim situated along the border with Lebanon. </p>
<p>Consequently, at least 70,000 residences south of the border <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/05/israel-north-evacuees-hezbollah-lebanon/">have been evacuated</a>, which has brought the overall tally of Israeli evacuees to at least 125,000 people. They have been living in hotels and temporary accommodation funded by the state. </p>
<p>As Israeli military deterrence has failed to keep Hezbollah out of the Israel-Hamas war, the government has yet to announce when the evacuees will be able to return to their homes, many of which have been destroyed by Hezbollah attacks.</p>
<p>The challenges Israel has encountered in its war with Hamas and conflict with Hezbollah have underscored the limits of what it can achieve with military force alone. It has become clear that Israel will have to rely on a multilateral diplomatic-political framework if it is to achieve its aims vis-à-vis Hamas and Hezbollah.</p>
<h2>International efforts</h2>
<p>Only an international coalition can restore the Gaza Strip into a habitable place that does not pose a renewed security threat to Israeli communities. This will need to include a credible Palestinian partner, backed politically and financially by Arab and western countries and international organisations. </p>
<p>Similarly, averting a full blown Israel-Hezbollah war rests for now on American and French diplomacy producing an agreement that will prevent the outbreak of a full blown conflict. In this context the US, with the support of France, has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/01/07/israel-hezbollah-lebanon-blinken/">exploring a deal</a> that would tend to some “unfinished business” following the war Israel and Hezbollah fought in 2006.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/01/07/israel-hezbollah-lebanon-blinken/">framework being explored</a>, negotiations would commence upon a new land demarcation agreement that could delineate where and how the two sides deploy forces across the Israel-Lebanon border. </p>
<p>In addition, in line with the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/israellebanon-resolution1701">United Nations Security Council resolution 1701</a>, which was part of the agreement that ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, the Lebanese army rather than Hezbollah would be deployed in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah would, in turn, redeploy to an agreed point north of the border with Israel.</p>
<h2>Will diplomacy succeed?</h2>
<p>But Israeli domestic politics constitutes a serious obstacle. The political and personal future of the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who is standing trial on <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-47409739">several corruption charges</a>, depends upon a coalition of 64 members of the Israeli parliament. This includes the extreme right Religious Zionism party. </p>
<p>Its leaders, national security minister, Itamar Ben Gvir, and finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, flatly reject any cooperation with the Palestinians. They are also unlikely to support even minute territorial adjustments across the Israeli-Lebanese border that they would perceive as concessions to Hezbollah. </p>
<p>As a result, they are poised to reject the multilateral diplomatic formulas being explored in relation to the “day after” in the Gaza Strip and the efforts to avert a war with Hezbollah.</p>
<p>This uncompromising stance presents Netanyahu with a serious dilemma. He can resist the diplomatic initiatives towards the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah to keep his political base and government intact. This could <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231220-netanyahu-seeks-to-postpone-his-trial-due-to-war-on-gaza-claims-tv-channel/">enable him to delay</a> and perhaps even stop his trial. </p>
<p>But catering for his political base, which is likely to scupper diplomacy, may prolong Israel’s military presence in the Gaza Strip. It could also lead to an extremely costly war with Hezbollah and erode the crucial support the US has provided Israel since October 7. </p>
<p>The alternative would be to try to replace the far-right elements of the government via a deal with a centrist party, which could accommodate the diplomatic initiatives being explored. But this is personally and politically extremely risky for Netanyahu. It also seems unviable since the leader of the Israeli opposition, Yair Lapid, has already <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/lapid-calls-on-netanyahu-to-quit-says-government-isnt-functioning-during-war/">called for Netanyahu’s resignation</a>. </p>
<p>The quip by the late Henry Kissinger, that <a href="https://users.ox.ac.uk/%7Essfc0005/Israeli%20Politics%20and%20Middle%20East%20Peacemaking.html">Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics</a>, seems to be playing out yet again. And, as so often in the past, it’s presenting the country’s leaders with an acute foreign policy predicament.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220736/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amnon Aran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Facing opposition to a peace deal within his own cabinet, Israel’s prime minister will find it difficult to agree an international peace deal and hold on to power.Amnon Aran, Professor of International Relations, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2204892024-01-05T11:19:18Z2024-01-05T11:19:18ZGaza war: Israeli assassinations draw fiery rhetoric from Iran and Hezbollah – but regional escalation is unlikely<p>Two weeks ago, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/25/israeli-airstrike-in-damascus-kills-high-ranking-iranian-general-says-iran">Sayyed Razi Mousavi</a> was a ghost on the internet. He left no mark on search engines or in coverage of Iran’s military and the Middle East.</p>
<p>But in the Syrian capital Damascus, Mousavi’s 30-year presence was an open secret. He had been the right-hand man of <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-iraq-soleimani-assassination-complicates-soft-power-battle-between-us-and-iran-129733">General Qassem Soleimani</a>, the commander of the Iranian Quds Force, the Revolutionary Guards’ branch for operations outside Iran. </p>
<p>Mousavi was the liaison with the Assad regime, as it killed hundreds of thousands in putting down dissenters after March 2011, as well as with Lebanon’s Hezbollah. In 2021, he became Iran’s senior commander in Syria.</p>
<p>On Christmas Day, Israel <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67820538">put Mousavi in the headlines</a>. Warplanes fired three missiles into Iran’s main military compound in the Sayyed Zeynab area south of Damascus. The commander was killed immediately.</p>
<p>In contrast to Mousavi, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67873573">Saleh al-Arouri</a> lived in the spotlight of conflict. A founder of Hamas’s military branch, he oversaw operations in the West Bank and was also the deputy political leader of the Palestinian organisation.</p>
<p>Under political pressure from Israel, al-Arouri moved from Qatar to Turkey to Lebanon, but he never disappeared from view as he liaised with Hezbollah and Iranian officials. He was reportedly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/02/saleh-al-arouri-assassinated-leader-was-hamass-link-to-iran-and-hezbollah">involved in the planning</a> of Hamas’s October 7 mass killings in Israel and – amid Israeli killings in Gaza – <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/saleh-al-arouri-mastermind-of-hamas-terrorism-in-west-bank-hostage-deal-negotiator/">in discussions</a> of a pause to exchange Hamas-held hostages for women and children in Israel’s prisons.</p>
<p>On January 2, an Israeli drone fired into a building in Dahiyeh, the southern suburb of Beirut where Hezbollah is based. Al-Arouri, two senior Hamas commanders and several other personnel <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67866346">were slain</a>.</p>
<p>While it rarely claims responsibility, Israel has regularly used assassination, including of Hamas’s spiritual leader <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2004/mar/23/guardianobituaries.israel">Ahmed Yassin in 2004</a>. It has recurrently struck Iranian and Hezbollah targets as well as Assad regime positions in Syria.</p>
<p>But this time, the Israelis are attacking in the context of their military assault across Gaza, expanding their rules of engagement – if there are any. They are telling Hamas, the Iran military and Hezbollah, “We can hit you anytime, anywhere,” and asking, “What are you going to do about it?”</p>
<h2>Tough poses meet tougher realities</h2>
<p>So far, the answer from Iran’s leaders and Hezbollah is “not much”. At least as far as a direct confrontation with Israel is concerned.</p>
<p>Speaking at Mousavi’s funeral, Revolutionary Guards commander Major General Hossein Salami <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-supreme-leader-leads-prayers-during-funeral-senior-guards-adviser-tv-2023-12-28/">declared</a>: “Our revenge for the martyrdom of Sayyed Razi will be nothing less than the removal of the Zionist regime.” But he quickly added that this would come through “great and honourable Palestinian fighters”.</p>
<p>Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi postured in a photo opportunity with Mousavi’s family. “This crime will definitely not go unanswered and the Zionist criminals will pay for this crime,” <a href="https://en.mehrnews.com/news/210139/Israel-to-pay-for-assassinating-IRGC-advisor-Raeisi">he said</a> – without offering any specifics.</p>
<p>On Wednesday, Hezbollah leader <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-head-vows-group-will-not-be-silent-after-israeli-killing-hamas-deputy-2024-01-03/">Hassan Nasrallah</a> read from the same script over the killing of Hamas’s al-Arouri: “This serious crime will not go unanswered or unpunished.”</p>
<p>Both the Iranian leadership and Nasrallah insisted that the assassinations were a marker of Israel’s “weakness”, an unconvincing line when two military commanders had just been eliminated and more are being targeted.</p>
<p>The likely calculation, from Iran’s supreme leader to Hezbollah’s command, is that a full-frontal war with Israel is not just a risk but a possible suicide operation.</p>
<p>Hezbollah’s forces and Israel have been <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-3-2024">exchanging missile, drone and rocket fire</a> since October 7, with at least <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/hezbollah-mourns-3-more-fighters-killed-in-clashes-with-israeli-army/3097651">137 Hezbollah fighters</a> and several Israeli troops killed.</p>
<p>An expansion of those skirmishes would not only raise the military stakes. It could be the terminal blow to Lebanon’s economy, which is already described by the World Bank as being in one of the most significant economic crises globally <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/overview">since the 19th century</a>, with about 80% of citizens living in poverty. The near-paralysed Lebanese government, with no president and 12 intermittent and inconclusive parliamentary sessions, could finally dissolve into anarchy.</p>
<p>Iran presents “stability” through its theocracy and the military as well as the government. But the economy is <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/12/14/irans-regime-is-weaker-than-it-looks-and-therefore-more-pliable">still fragile</a>, if not at breaking point, after years of US-led sanctions as well as mismanagement and distortion from the Revolutionary Guards’ extensive interests. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/nobel-peace-prize-narges-mohammadi-wins-on-behalf-of-thousands-of-iranian-women-struggling-for-human-rights-215190">“woman, life, freedom” protests</a> that have taken place since September 2022 are the latest expression of discontent with the regime’s hold on Iranian society, even as the demonstrations have been violently repressed.</p>
<p>Asked by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/profile/mohammad-ali-shabani">Amwaj Media</a> if there would be retaliation for the assassinations, a “senior Iranian source” <a href="https://amwaj.media/article/deep-dive-will-iran-respond-to-assassinations-deadliest-terrorist-attack">reflected</a>: “Difficult decision. Sort of damned if you do, and damned if you don’t.”</p>
<h2>Fighting the indirect war</h2>
<p>Given these constraints, the leaders of Iran and Hezbollah will likely be content in letting Hamas – and Gaza’s civilians – take the brunt of Israel’s military assault. Tehran will seek a propaganda victory: in trouble in October over possible complicity in Hamas’s mass killing, the regime is seeking advantage by posing as the moral defender of suffering Palestinians.</p>
<p>Meanwhile the world, if not the Israelis, can be unsettled by “indirect war”. Yemen’s Houthi insurgency, with political and military backing from Iran, are <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-red-sea-attacks-on-cargo-ships-could-disrupt-deliveries-and-push-up-prices-a-logistics-expert-explains-220110">attacking civilian vessels</a> in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>While the US and other countries have deployed warships – with American helicopters sinking three Houthi small boats that threatened a Maersk container ship – the Yemenis have forced many operators to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/dec/20/more-than-100-container-ships-rerouted-suez-canal-red-sea-houthi-attacks-yemen">divert traffic</a> around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. Ocean cargo rates have more than doubled in a week.</p>
<p>Iran-backed militias are attacking American personnel on bases in Iraq and Syria, with more than <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/us-carries-out-drone-strike-on-base-of-iranian-backed-militia-group-in-iraq-13042100#:%7E:text=Since%20the%20outbreak%20of%20the,in%20the%20war%20against%20Hamas.">100 rocket and drone assaults</a> since October 7. The Americans have responded with deadly force against militia positions, including the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/three-iran-backed-militia-fighters-killed-baghdad-drone-strike-sources-2024-01-04/">killing of a leader of the Iraqi militia group al-Nujaba</a> in Baghdad on Thursday.</p>
<p>With this mix of operations, the Iranian regime will try to discomfit other countries, short of a direct showdown with Israel. Hezbollah will continue the show of force on the northern Israeli border without committing itself to a widespread battle.</p>
<p>But there is always a risk of a chain reaction that, response by response, will wind up in the second-front war that no one wants or intends.</p>
<p>The bottom line remains. As long as Israel maintains its “open-ended” assault on Gaza, without any apparent endgame at this point, the “indirect war” beyond Palestine – including assassinations – is likely to expand.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220489/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It appears that, for now at least, Iran is happy to allow Gaza to be the epicentre of Middle East conflict. But all that could change quickly.Scott Lucas, Professor, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2198092023-12-14T02:56:22Z2023-12-14T02:56:22ZIsrael is accused of using white phosphorous. Would this be against international law?<p>Israel’s military <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.au/evidence-of-israels-unlawful-use-of-white-phosphorus-in-southern-lebanon-as-cross-border-hostilities-escalate/">is accused of using</a> white phosphorous in an October attack on the Hezbollah militant group in Lebanon, which allegedly injured at <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2023/12/11/israel-us-white-phosphorus-lebanon/">least nine civilians</a>. </p>
<p>US National Security Council spokesperson <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2023/12/11/israel-us-white-phosphorus-lebanon/">John Kirby said</a> this week the Biden administration was “concerned” about the possible use of white phosphorus munitions and that it would be “asking questions to try to learn a bit more.” </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1734293503876673890"}"></div></p>
<p><a href="https://allisrael.com/israel-rejects-allegations-of-unlawful-use-of-white-phosphorus-shells-against-lebanon">Israel has rejected any allegations</a> of the unlawful use of white phosphorus in Lebanon.</p>
<p>But what are the legal uses of this chemical under international humanitarian law? And can its use be considered a war crime?</p>
<h2>How white phosphorous has been used before</h2>
<p>White phosphorous is a chemical component that ignites on contact with air and burns at around <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2023/12/11/israel-us-white-phosphorus-lebanon/">1,500 degree Fahrenheit</a> (815 Celsius). It can lead to serious injury and or even death if it comes into contact with humans. </p>
<p>Human Rights Watch regards incendiary weapons, such as white phosphorous and napalm, as “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-17/explainer-incendiary-weapons-in-ukraine/102093560">among the cruellest weapons used in contemporary armed conflict</a>” due their impact on the human body. Says one Human Rights Watch researcher:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Incendiary weapons are weapons that set fire or burn people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>White phosphorus <a href="https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2014/12/sascha-dominikbachmann-incendiary-weapons/">can be used</a> defensively, though, as a smokescreen to mask troop movements on the ground, to illuminate the battlefield, or as a signalling device. It <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/12/questions-and-answers-israels-use-white-phosphorus-gaza-and-lebanon">can also interfere</a> with an enemy’s infrared optics and weapons tracking systems. </p>
<p>But these incendiary weapons can also be used offensively in mortar bombs, rockets and artillery ammunition.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-accountability-for-alleged-war-crimes-so-hard-to-achieve-in-the-israel-palestinian-conflict-160864">Why is accountability for alleged war crimes so hard to achieve in the Israel-Palestinian conflict?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>White phosphorous <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/13/white-phosphorus-chemical-what-is/">was used</a> by many adversaries in both the first and second world wars, targeting enemy soldiers and civilians alike. </p>
<p>The US also used white phosphorus, alongside napalm, in the Vietnam War and more recently in Iraq during the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/nov/16/iraq.usa">battle of Fallujah</a> in 2004 and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/19/white-phosphorus-israel-gaza-human-rights-war-crimes-un-icc/">against Islamic state in both Syria and Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>Russia is also accused of using white phosphorus indiscriminately against civilians and combatants in both <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-17/explainer-incendiary-weapons-in-ukraine/102093560">Ukraine</a> and Syria.</p>
<p>Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/03/25/rain-fire/israels-unlawful-use-white-phosphorus-gaza">criticised</a> Israel’s use of white phosphorous against Hamas targets in Gaza in 2008–09 and said it was <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/03/25/israel-white-phosphorus-use-evidence-war-crimes">evidence of a potential war crime</a>. </p>
<p>Aware of the negative publicity from these reports, the Israeli Defence Forces pledged in 2013 to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2023/12/11/israel-us-white-phosphorus-lebanon/">stop using</a> white phosphorus on the battlefield, saying it would transition to gas-based smoke shells instead.</p>
<h2>What international law says about it</h2>
<p>Incendiary weapons fall under the <a href="http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ccwc">1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons</a>. This treaty aims to protect civilians by limiting the use of certain weapons deemed particularly dangerous. A protocol specifically focused on incendiary weapons <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/ccw-protocol-iii-1980/article-1">defines</a> them as: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>White phosphorus is not illegal under international law and the law of armed conflict, as long as long it is being used defensively as a smokescreen or as battlefield illumination. </p>
<p>The targeted use of incendiary weapons directly against civilians, however, is illegal and could be considered a war crime. The use of “air-delivered” incendiary weapons (such as white phosphorus dropped from a plane) against a military target that is in a civilian area is also prohibited.</p>
<p>There is an exception, though, if the military target is “clearly separated” from civilians and all “feasible precautions” are taken to limit incidental loss of civilian life or injuries to civilians.</p>
<p>So, this means the targeting of either Hamas or Hezbollah is permissible as long as the white phosphorus is not air delivered and steps are taken to minimise the harm to civilians. </p>
<h2>What Israel is accused of doing</h2>
<p>Amnesty International has <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/lebanon-evidence-of-israels-unlawful-use-of-white-phosphorus-in-southern-lebanon-as-cross-border-hostilities-escalate/">compiled evidence</a> that indicates white phosphorus was likely used in a civilian setting (the Lebanese town of Dheira) in October. Residents also <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2023/12/11/israel-us-white-phosphorus-lebanon/">told</a> The Washington Post that Israeli forces had shelled the town with “white phosphorus munitions for hours”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1734384090571305116"}"></div></p>
<p>These reports need thorough investigation to examine what exactly happened and if there was an illegal use of white phosphorous by Israeli forces or whether it was permitted under the guidelines above. </p>
<p>Investigators will need to determine, for instance, if white phosphorous was indeed used and, if it was, whether it was delivered via an <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/12/questions-and-answers-israels-use-white-phosphorus-gaza-and-lebanon">airburst or a groundburst</a>.</p>
<p>Investigators would also need to determine if the forces took steps to minimise civilian harm. This a very difficult proposition in the current conflict, as both Hamas and Hezbollah are known to embed their fighters within the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/30/human-shield-israel-claim-hamas-command-centre-under-hospital-palestinian-civilian-gaza-city">civilian population</a>.</p>
<p>Any direct targeting of civilians or indiscriminate use of air-delivered incendiary weapons would potentially qualify as a war crime under the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0173.pdf">Geneva Conventions of 1949</a>.</p>
<p>In the fog of war, it is more important than ever to have independent verification of the actions of combatants on both sides and a thorough investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC).</p>
<p>However, prosecution of any alleged war crimes in the current conflict remains <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-accountability-for-alleged-war-crimes-so-hard-to-achieve-in-the-israel-palestinian-conflict-160864">extremely difficult</a>. This is due, in part, to the fact Israel is not a member of the ICC and rejects the court’s jurisdiction over its territory and both Hamas and Hezbollah are non-state entities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The use of such incendiary devices is only legal under very specific circumstances. A careful examination of the evidence is now required.Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann, Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra) and Research Fellow (adjunct) - The Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University- NATO Fellow Asia-Pacific, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2197912023-12-13T21:50:11Z2023-12-13T21:50:11ZIsrael can and will ignore US appeals to minimize casualties in Gaza<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565591/original/file-20231213-23-tv9ywy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=180%2C68%2C786%2C613&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israeli army soldiers take up positions near the border with the Gaza Strip on Dec. 11, 2023,.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-taken-in-southern-israel-near-the-border-with-the-news-photo/1840702103?adppopup=true">Menahem Kahana/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>While the Biden administration has maintained its strong support of Israel’s war aim of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/11/05/1210734100/israel-says-its-goal-is-to-remove-hamas-from-power-what-comes-next-is-unclear">eliminating Hamas in Gaza</a>, that support has for weeks been tempered by statements from U.S. officials saying Israel needs to minimize deaths of civilians as it continues fighting.</em></p>
<p><em>Those mild rebukes appear to have been ignored by the Israelis. Their continued widespread bombing has raised the death toll in Gaza, according to the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ambush-kills-7-israeli-soldiers-gaza-city-battles-105614856">Hamas-run Health Ministry, to 18,600</a>. And the growing tension between Biden and Israel’s leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, broke into the open on Dec. 12. Biden warned Israel that it is “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/12/politics/biden-israel-losing-support-netanyahu/index.html">losing support</a>” over the war. Netanyahu publicly disagreed with the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israels-netanyahu-rejects-u-s-plan-for-post-war-gaza-d60fc0c3">U.S. goal of having the Palestinian Authority run Gaza</a>.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation’s senior politics and democracy editor Naomi Schalit interviewed <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/profile/gregory-treverton/">Gregory F. Treverton of USC Dornsife</a>, a former chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the Obama administration, about the divisions between Israel and the U.S. In the end, Israel’s behavior, says Treverton, shows “the limits of influence” the U.S. holds.</em></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An elderly white man has his arm around another man as both them stand before Israeli and US flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565600/original/file-20231213-17-1pksp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565600/original/file-20231213-17-1pksp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565600/original/file-20231213-17-1pksp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565600/original/file-20231213-17-1pksp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565600/original/file-20231213-17-1pksp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565600/original/file-20231213-17-1pksp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565600/original/file-20231213-17-1pksp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. President Joe Biden, left, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meet in Tel Aviv, Israel, on Oct. 18, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-and-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-news-photo/1730842169?adppopup=true">Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>The U.S. has criticized Israel’s conduct of the war. Israel has ignored that criticism. That looks like humiliation for the Biden administration. What is going on?</strong> </p>
<p>This is a pattern we’ve seen before. We saw it in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2006-Lebanon-War">the war Israel fought against Hezbollah in Lebanon</a> in 2006. The U.S. was trying to push Israel to be more humane in the way they conducted that war. So while the disagreement is not especially new, it is not just humiliating but also shows the limits of influence. </p>
<p>Indeed, throughout the U.S.-Israeli relationship, there has been a lot of the tail wagging the dog. Israel has been good at playing American politics. And so it is hard to put the kind of pressure on Israel that the objective facts would suggest the U.S. should be able to wield. After all, Israel is by far the <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2023-10-10/how-much-aid-does-the-u-s-give-to-israel">biggest recipient of U.S. foreign aid</a>. And the U.S. has stood with Israel firmly for a very long time. So to that extent, it is a bit humiliating that all that apparent influence doesn’t get listened to. </p>
<p><strong>Is Israel, as you say, “very good at this” because they they live in a rough neighborhood, or because of the pressure domestic politics plays on Biden? What gives them the power to do this?</strong></p>
<p>Surely it is partly the rough neighborhood – <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-we-live-in-a-tough-neighborhood/">Israelis certainly see themselves</a> as living in a very rough neighborhood. So the typical pattern is the U.S. says “go easier.” Israel says “give us a few more days.” That was the pattern in 2006 and has been the pattern this time – Israel asks for a little bit more time to accomplish its military objective. But if its ability to ignore U.S. demands stems primarily from living in a rough neighborhood, Israel does have a lot of influence in the United States. Majorities in both parties in Congress support Israel, though there is increasing dissent over that support on college campuses and elsewhere. <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/12/08/views-of-the-israel-hamas-war/#:%7E:text=Overall%2C%20Democrats%20are%20far%20more,.%2012%25%2C%20respectively">In a recent Pew poll</a>, four times as many Democrats as Republicans in the U.S. thought Israel was going too far in its military operation. </p>
<p><strong>Biden recently said Israel is “losing support” over the war and its “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-israel-hamas-oct-7-44c4229d4c1270d9cfa484b664a22071">indiscriminate bombing of Gaza</a>.” <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israels-netanyahu-rejects-u-s-plan-for-post-war-gaza-d60fc0c3#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CAfter%20the%20great%20sacrifice%20of,Bank%2C%20in%20a%20statement%20Tuesday.">Netanyahu said the Palestinian Authority will never run Gaza</a>, despite U.S. support for that idea. What does this more open division tell us?</strong></p>
<p>It tells us that things are getting worse between the two countries for sure. It obviously reflects the frustration on Biden’s part and the administration’s part. It is a marker, I think, of how <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-news-12-12-2023-b52ae70a89443728517f1d3d7508992c#:%7E:text=RAFAH%2C%20Gaza%20Strip%20(AP),calls%20for%20a%20cease%2Dfire.">isolated Israel is now in global public opinion</a> and is obviously <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/12/united-nations-general-assembly-vote-ceasefire-israel-gaza-war">taking the U.S. with it</a>. So that’s a big source of frustration for the administration. It really is time for some kind of cease-fire again, and maybe another release of some hostages. But that doesn’t seem in the cards soon. </p>
<p><strong>What are Biden’s options at this point? It sounds like you’re saying Biden doesn’t have much that he can do. And, in fact, it looks like within Israel, Netanyahu – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/13/benjamin-netanyahu-accused-of-campaigning-at-time-of-war-israel">whose government may fall once the war slows or ends</a> – <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-12/ty-article/.premium/israel-is-at-war-and-netanyahu-just-launched-his-re-election-campaign/0000018c-5f3f-de43-affd-ff3ff7c60000">is using Biden’s disapproval to shore up his political standing</a> with his right-wing supporters.</strong></p>
<p>Certainly, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-12/ty-article/.premium/israel-is-at-war-and-netanyahu-just-launched-his-re-election-campaign/0000018c-5f3f-de43-affd-ff3ff7c60000">Netanyahu’s playing to the right</a> makes the problem even harder for the Biden administration. Netanyahu’s problem is more his right flank than Washington. And so that makes it difficult for the U.S. to exert the kind of influence it should. And we still don’t have an understanding of what the Israeli sense of the endgame is. On the current track, they wind up, it seems, occupying Gaza. They surely don’t want to do that. My guess is behind the scenes the Israelis are thinking about some option involving the Palestinian Authority, even though Israel says it wants no part of that. </p>
<p><strong>Biden went to a fundraiser the other day and told attendees that Netanyahu was the leader of “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/12/us/politics/biden-israel-war-gaza-netanyahu.html">the most conservative government</a> in Israel’s history” that “doesn’t want a two-state solution” to the Palestinian conflict. “I think he has to change, and with this government, this government in Israel is making it very difficult for him to move,” Biden said. When a president makes such a statement in a fundraiser, it’s not going to remain secret. What an extraordinary thing for a head of state to say about another government.</strong> </p>
<p>It amounts in some sense to calling for regime change in Israel. We all assume that once the war is over, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/05/netanyahu-wars-win-lose-political-endgame-career/">Netanyahu will be gone</a>. But obviously if he has any thoughts of staying on, he does need to think about a different coalition. World opinion is going to force him to think seriously about the Palestinians, if not about a two-state solution. Whatever else has happened, Hamas certainly succeeded in its objective of getting the Palestinians’ desire for statehood back on the global agenda. And Netanyahu is going to have to deal with that at some point.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men are standing near buildings that have been destroyed and reduced to rubble." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565587/original/file-20231213-23-1kbh5i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565587/original/file-20231213-23-1kbh5i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565587/original/file-20231213-23-1kbh5i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565587/original/file-20231213-23-1kbh5i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565587/original/file-20231213-23-1kbh5i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565587/original/file-20231213-23-1kbh5i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565587/original/file-20231213-23-1kbh5i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A group of Palestinian men look at the destruction of buildings following Israeli airstrikes in the southern Gaza Strip on Dec. 1, 2023,</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinians-inspect-the-destruction-around-residential-news-photo/1813818926?adppopup=true">Said Khatib/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>What are the elements that Biden has to consider as he manages this situation going into the future?</strong></p>
<p>He starts with generally strong American support for Israel that cuts across both parties. But the thing he needs to cope with is the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/08/politics/democrats-israel-divide-deepens/index.html">increasing concern among progressives, especially young people in the Democratic Party</a>, that there’s way too much suffering by the Palestinians, that something has to be done. And now it seems to me there’s almost a global consensus that this war needs to end. That’s the challenge that the administration faces: to try and heed that global consensus while letting Israel do the things it feels it needs to do in Gaza.</p>
<p>And that’s really an impossible circle for Biden to square. President <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/27/lbj-is-born-in-stonewall-texas-aug-27-1908-791788">Lyndon Johnson used to say</a> that sometimes being president was like being a mule in a hailstorm. “There’s nothing to do but to stand there and take it,” he said.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219791/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory F. Treverton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Conflict has escalated between Joe Biden and Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu over the conduct of the Israel-Hamas war. But a national security veteran says the US has little leverage over Israel.Gregory F. Treverton, Professor of Practice in International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163912023-12-13T17:19:15Z2023-12-13T17:19:15ZGaza war: how Hezbollah has opened a second front inside Israel<p>While the attention of the world has focused on <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/israeli-palestinian-conflict-140823">Israel’s assault on Gaza</a> over the past two months, following Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, one aspect of the Middle East conflict not getting a great deal of news coverage has been the continuing battle with Hezbollah in south Lebanon.</p>
<p>There have been daily reports of clashes between the Israeli army and Lebanese Hezbollah. On December 11, <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-11-2023">nine Hezbollah attacks</a> on Israeli towns or military positions were recorded. The group, whose name means “Party of God” and which is largely funded by Iran while embedded in Lebanon, has lost <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/1-more-hezbollah-fighter-killed-in-clashes-with-israeli-forces-on-lebanon-border/3081316#:%7E:text=At%20least%20101%20Hezbollah%20fighters,figures%20released%20by%20the%20group.">more than 100 fighters</a> since October 7.</p>
<p>Hezbollah and Hamas are thought to collaborate as part of the broader “<a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/11/15/what-is-irans-axis-of-resistance">axis of resistance</a>”, which also includes the Houthi rebels in Yemen and other groups in Syria, Iraq and Iran. While there is no evidence that Hezbollah was directly involved in the planning for the October 7, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-says-hamas-working-with-hezbollah-to-train-thousands-in-lebanon/">logistical training and coordination</a> between Hezbollah, Hamas and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards has been going on for years.</p>
<p>One example of this cross-pollination of ideas is the “Gaza metro” – the extensive network of tunnels built by Hamas throughout Gaza. These are generally thought to have <a href="https://www.memri.org/tv/hamas-rep-lebanon-ahmad-abd-hadi-hizbullah-imad-mughniye-irgc-qods-force-qasem-soleimani-architects-tunnels-gaza">been masterminded</a> by Hezbollah commander Imad Mughnieh and Iranian commander <a href="https://theconversation.com/guns-drones-and-poison-the-new-age-of-assassination-151224">Qasem Soleimani</a>, who was killed in a US airstrike on Baghdad in 2020.</p>
<h2>Party of God</h2>
<p>Hezbollah has its roots in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/17/beyond-hezbollah-the-history-of-tensions-between-lebanon-and-israel">Israeli invasion of Lebanon</a> in 1982 when Israel occupied all of south Lebanon as far as Beirut in its attempt to root out the Palestine Liberation Organisation. </p>
<p>After Israel withdrew from Beirut, it continued to occupy large amounts of territory in the south of Lebanon. In 1985, Hezbollah announced itself with an <a href="https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/The%20Hizballah%20Program%20-%20An%20Open%20Letter.pdf">open letter</a> published in the Lebanese daily newspaper, al-Safir, stating its mission as a resistance movement against US imperialism and Israeli occupation. </p>
<p>In the 1992 general election, Hezbollah’s political wing <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Lebanese_general_election">won eight seats</a>, giving it the largest block in the Lebanese parliament and establishing the group as a major political force.</p>
<p>In 2000, after repeated Hezbollah-led operations against the Israeli military, Israel withdrew its troops from most of southern Lebanon – up to what was called the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/its-time-to-talk-about-blue-line-constructive-re-engagement-is-key-to-stability">blue line</a>, a UN-designated “line of withdrawal” which delineates Israeli territory from Lebanon and the Golan Heights and is policed by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Israel, Lebanon and the Golan Heights showing the UN Blue Line." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The ‘blue line’, or ‘line of withdrawal’ was established by the UN in 2000 to formalise Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Striving2767/Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is at best a sticking-plaster solution, as Israel still occupies areas – such as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Shebaa-farms">Shebaa Farms</a> and seven other villages, that Lebanon considers to be part of its territory.</p>
<p>In July 2006, after a brief military confrontation across the Lebanese border, Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers sparking a month-long war between Israel and Lebanon during which more than 1,000 Lebanese people were killed and 150 Israelis. Israel also conducted a massive campaign of airstrikes, including targeting the southern suburbs of Beirut, known as <em>Dahiyah</em> in Arabic.</p>
<p>The conflict eventually led to a prisoner swap between Israel and Hezbollah, yet it exemplified a new strategy by the Israeli military which became known as the “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/10/israel-dahiya-doctrine-disproportionate-strategy-military-gaza-idf/">Dahiyah doctrine</a>”. This held that the disproportionate use of airstrikes for which the destruction of military targets was not the main aim – the goal was to change a population’s hearts and minds.</p>
<p>The doctrine was explained in 2008 by the then-commander of the Israeli army, General Gadi Eizenkot, who told an Israeli newspaper in 2008: “We will wield disproportionate power against every village from which shots are fired on Israel, and cause immense damage and destruction. From our perspective, these are military bases. This isn’t a suggestion. This is a plan that has already been authorised.” </p>
<p>Eizenkot is now a member of Benjamin Netanyahu’s war cabinet. He <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-777364">has lost</a> both a son and a nephew in the current conflict in Gaza.</p>
<p>To show the axis of resistance that it will stop at nothing to impose its will on Palestine, the Israeli military is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/israel-hamas-war-dutch-memo-gaza-disproportionate-force-iran-hezbollah/">using “disproportionate force” in Gaza</a> as a key part of its strategy.</p>
<h2>Balance of terror</h2>
<p>The main point of difference between previous clashes between the Israeli military and Hezbollah is that most of the recent battles have taken place inside Israel. It’s a key development. The legacy of the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah has been what has become known as the “<a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2018-02-07/ty-article-opinion/.premium/israel-and-lebanons-mutually-assured-defeat/0000017f-dbe0-df62-a9ff-dff7e0e70000">balance of terror</a>”.</p>
<p>Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has said publicly that had he known what the outcome of the 2006 raid in Israel that captured two Israeli soldiers and led to the second Lebanon war, he would not have approved it. Israel knows, too, that launching a ground war in Lebanon would also be disastrous.</p>
<p>From 2010 until today, clashes between Israel and Hezbollah have mainly been confined to Israel’s military <a href="https://jp.reuters.com/article/us-syria-israel-attack/israel-hits-syria-arms-convoy-to-lebanon-sources-idUSBRE90T0K120130130/">targeting convoys of weaponry</a> sent by Iran and its <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Israel_conflict_during_the_Syrian_civil_war">killing of Hezbollah members</a>. </p>
<p>Hezbollah announced in February 2022 that it had acquired the technology to build <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-making-drones-can-turn-rockets-into-precision-missiles-nasrallah-2022-02-16/">high-precision guided missiles</a> that reach targets across the whole of Israel and could <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/how-precision-guided-munitions-could-destroy-israels-iron-dome-1833262">pose a threat</a> to its Iron Dome defence system.</p>
<p>Regionally, Hezbollah and Iran’s allies in the axis of resistance have concentrated their attacks on US bases through Iraq, Syria and Yemen. This is a deliberate strategy aimed at putting pressure on Washington to, in turn, pressure Israel to agree to a ceasefire.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nasrallah-hezbollah-leader-gaza-war">speech delivered on November 3</a>, Nasrallah articulated Hezbollah’s strategy. Attacks in northern Israel were aimed at dividing the focus of the Israeli military between defending Israel’s borders and its operation in Gaza. Meanwhile, he said, attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria would continue. </p>
<p>Nasrallah gave <a href="https://www.moonofalabama.org/2023/11/nasrallahs-second-speech-on-gaza.html">another speech</a> on November 11 calling on Arab nations to put pressure on Washington to end Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories. Meanwhile Hezbollah, with help from allies in Iraq, Iran, Yemen and Syria would continue to launch attacks on Israel.</p>
<p>“We will continue with this,” Nasrallah said. “We will increase the quantity, quality and depths of our operations. The people in Lebanon support the resistance … What happens on the battlefield is more important than words.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216391/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bashir Saade is the author of Hizbullah and the Politics of Remembrance (Cambridge University Press).
</span></em></p>Israel is effectively fighting a war on two fronts.Bashir Saade, Lecturer in Religion & Politics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2188612023-11-30T14:17:51Z2023-11-30T14:17:51ZGaza war: Hamas’s web of allies in the October 7 attacks makes ending the conflict much harder for Israel<p>There have been reports that Hamas cooperated with a number of other armed groups to stage the October 7 attacks. If correct, this indicates substantial challenges for Israel – especially when it comes to ending the current conflict. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67480680">BBC detailed</a> how five armed groups joined with Hamas for the attacks which resulted in the deaths of 1,200 people and the kidnapping of a further 240. These were the Ali Abu Mustafa brigades, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs brigades, the Omar al-Qasim forces, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Mujahideen brigades. The report said these groups had trained together for an attack like this since at least 2020 – which helps explain why the assault was so lethal.</p>
<p><a href="https://brill.com/display/title/11980">Decades</a> of research on <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/news/tricia-bacon-discusses-history-and-future-alliances-global-terrorism-community">cooperation</a> <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/news/moghadam-explores-cooperation-among-terrorist-actors">among</a> militant organisations, including my own <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/insurgent-terrorism-9780197607060?cc=gb&lang=en&">book</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12073">articles</a>, suggests that relationships among armed groups can make them more violent and more effective, as they share resources and teach each other new tactics. It can enable them to survive longer, leading to serious complications with peace processes.</p>
<p>It is noteworthy that Hamas is working not only with other Islamist and Iran-backed groups, such as PIJ, but also relatively secular groups such as the armed wing of the Marxist group, the People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine (founded by a <a href="https://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1707366,00.html">Christian</a>, the late George Habash). Beyond the five groups that apparently participated in the October 7 massacres, as many as ten other groups have trained with Hamas in the years leading up to it, according to the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67480680">BBC report</a>.</p>
<p>The fact that Hamas seems to be leading a large and relatively diverse coalition suggests Israel is not only facing a Hamas problem. While it is the largest and most capable armed Palestinian group, its allies suggest a broader network of support and threats to Israel. Groups that hadn’t used much violence recently are now side by side with Hamas at war.</p>
<p>The large and varied coalition also raises questions about Israeli intelligence capabilities. If it were just Hamas who had attacked, it might have been relatively easy for that organisation to keep its plans secret. But sharing attack planning among at least five other organisations suggests there were many opportunities for details to leak to Israel.</p>
<p>The possibility of such <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2014.935228">leaks</a> is usually a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.993466">barrier</a> to cooperation among militant groups. But the fact that this substantial network of armed groups was apparently able to plan in secret (or at least, apparently take Israeli intelligence by surprise) suggests a tight network.</p>
<h2>Spoilers and sabotage</h2>
<p>Another implication of so many groups fighting Israel is that stopping the conflict will be more complicated. It can be challenging to get one group to agree to a ceasefire, but even more so when there are various groups with distinct ideologies. All too often, there are “<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2539366">spoilers</a>” who <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802320005487">sabotage</a> the peace, causing negotiations to break down and war to resume.</p>
<p>Just after an extension to the recent ceasefire was announced, three Israeli citizens were <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/three-israelis-killed-in-jerusalem-hours-after-gaza-ceasefire-extended-ss0df6vsr">shot dead</a> in Jerusalem by gunmen reportedly affiliated with Hamas. Hamas has a history of breaching ceasefires – when the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was attempting to reach peace settlements during the 1990s, negotiations were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050022">frequently</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.79">interrupted</a> by Hamas violence.</p>
<p>There is also the related issue of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.893480">falsely claimed attacks</a>. For example, if Hamas declares a ceasefire, another group that doesn’t agree with the ceasefire might claim an attack in Hamas’s name to sabotage the peace. Regardless of ceasefire conditions, with so many active militant organisations, it could be difficult to attribute violence to particular groups. </p>
<h2>Hezbollah and the fear of regional conflict</h2>
<p>One important militant group that has not formally teamed up with Hamas yet is Hezbollah. With an estimated <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/hezbollah-military-size-capabilities-compares-israel-2692622">60,000 armed fighters and reservists</a>, the “Party of God” is mainly situated just across Israel’s northern border in Lebanon. </p>
<p>Often called a “<a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-lebanese-state">state within a state</a>”, Hezbollah also holds considerable political sway in Lebanon. So far since October 7, there have been some exchanges of fire between Israeli troops and Hezbollah fighters, but there is as yet no evidence of coordinated attacks alongside Hamas. </p>
<p>This has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/11/12/palestinians-in-lebanon-disappointed-that-hezbollah-wont-escalate">disappointed some Palestinians</a> – but it is good news for Israel and regional stability. If Hezbollah got involved, it would escalate the war into an international conflict – and probably a vastly more violent one. Hamas already has a strong network of allied armed militias, but it is not as strong as it would be with Hezbollah fully in the fight.</p>
<p>Overall, Israel has two possible strategies to take into consideration when dealing with the broad network of Hamas-linked opposition. It could try to deal with them as one cohesive bloc, and hope there are no spoiler incidents. Or, it could try to sever links between the groups – isolating one group at a time, using carrots or sticks to get the groups to stop cooperating with Hamas. </p>
<p>Either way, to end the current conflict, inter-group dynamics will need to be taken into consideration. And in future, when intelligence gathering, evidence of group cooperation and training should be taken more seriously.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian J. Phillips does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Israel is fighting a broad coalition of armed Palestinian militias in Gaza − and then there’s Hezbollah, just across the border in Lebanon.Brian J. Phillips, Reader (Associate Professor) in International Relations, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177832023-11-21T19:06:34Z2023-11-21T19:06:34Z10 books to help you understand Israel and Palestine, recommended by experts<h2>Apeirogon/The Age of Coexistence</h2>
<ul>
<li>Recommended by Ghassan Hage, Professor of Anthropology and Social Theory, University of Melbourne</li>
</ul>
<p>I recommend two much-needed books in the present time. Despite the Gaza massacres seemingly planting the seeds of endless future hatred, the future of Palestine/Israel can only be a future of togetherness. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559799/original/file-20231116-17-u6hjz5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559799/original/file-20231116-17-u6hjz5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559799/original/file-20231116-17-u6hjz5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=910&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559799/original/file-20231116-17-u6hjz5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=910&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559799/original/file-20231116-17-u6hjz5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=910&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559799/original/file-20231116-17-u6hjz5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1143&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559799/original/file-20231116-17-u6hjz5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1143&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559799/original/file-20231116-17-u6hjz5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1143&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These two very different books provide elements for thinking about such togetherness. The first is <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/apeirogon-9781526607898/">Apeirogon</a> by Colum McCann. It is about a Palestinian and an Israeli whose daughters have been killed by the enemy other, who struggle to find a way towards peace. One can easily trivialise such an endeavour if one forgets the colonial history and the power relations that locate each father differently within Palestine/Israel. This book doesn’t. </p>
<p>The second book is <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520385764/age-of-coexistence">The Age of Coexistence</a> by Ussama Makdisi. This book reminds us that before the modern advent of the ethnonationalist fantasy, Palestine was the home of an indigenous form of religious coexistence, which Makdisi calls the “ecumenical frame”. This offers us an important, realistic resource for thinking about future togetherness.</p>
<h2>Rethinking the Holocaust</h2>
<ul>
<li>Recommended by Jan Lanicek, associate professor in Modern European History and Jewish History, UNSW </li>
</ul>
<p>One of the most intriguing historical questions about the origins of the conflict – oft-debated and oft-misunderstood, is the relation between the Holocaust and the creation of the State of Israel.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559811/original/file-20231116-17-h4ux16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559811/original/file-20231116-17-h4ux16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559811/original/file-20231116-17-h4ux16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=935&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559811/original/file-20231116-17-h4ux16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=935&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559811/original/file-20231116-17-h4ux16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=935&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559811/original/file-20231116-17-h4ux16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1175&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559811/original/file-20231116-17-h4ux16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1175&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559811/original/file-20231116-17-h4ux16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1175&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In his book, <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300093001/rethinking-the-holocaust/">Rethinking the Holocaust</a>, the eminent Holocaust historian <a href="https://www.yadvashem.org/author/yehuda-bauer.html">Yehuda Bauer</a> offers a balanced perspective on the 1947 vote in the United Nations that approved the partition of British Mandate Palestine and creation of separate Jewish and Arab states.</p>
<p>Bauer’s contribution will be of interest to those who want to learn about the international climate that surrounded the key moments in the origins of the conflict. On the eve of the Cold War (in the turbulent environment after the second world war), an unlikely alliance between the United States and the emerging socialist bloc under Stalin’s Soviet Union helped to secure the necessary majority in the United Nations, setting the international stage of the conflict for decades to come.</p>
<p>Did the world feel guilty about the Jewish tragedy? Bauer says no. Both sides followed geopolitical considerations. The United States wanted to solve the problem of Holocaust survivors scattered over displaced persons camps in occupied Germany, and Stalin hoped Israel would become a communist state. </p>
<p>The considerations to support the aspiration of Jewish people were purely political.</p>
<h2>The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonial Conquest & Resistance, 1917–2017</h2>
<ul>
<li>Recommended by Jumana Bayeh, associate professor in the Faculty of Arts at Macquarie University</li>
</ul>
<p>Across his academic career, historian Rashid Khalidi has brought to his readers the wilfully suppressed Palestinian and Arab view – ignored not just by US policy makers, but much of the West in general. His work reaches audiences beyond the academic world and fills a gap in our knowledge. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559836/original/file-20231116-29-4d6uwk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559836/original/file-20231116-29-4d6uwk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559836/original/file-20231116-29-4d6uwk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=935&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559836/original/file-20231116-29-4d6uwk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=935&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559836/original/file-20231116-29-4d6uwk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=935&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559836/original/file-20231116-29-4d6uwk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1175&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559836/original/file-20231116-29-4d6uwk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1175&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559836/original/file-20231116-29-4d6uwk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1175&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is the case in his recent book, <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781627798556/thehundredyearswaronpalestine">The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonial Conquest & Resistance, 1917–2017</a>. This particular text is different: it tackles the issue of Israel’s control of the narrative of its own establishment by silencing, even erasing, the Palestinian narrative.</p>
<p>This book will be compelling for those largely unfamiliar with the history of Palestine, due to Khalidi’s use of reflections and anecdotes from his own storied Palestinian family. These reflections underpin the text’s core claim, which most Israelis reject – that their state was established through colonial conquest and is today an ongoing project of settler colonial violence. </p>
<h2>Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1929</h2>
<ul>
<li>Recommended by Ran Porat, affiliate researcher, The Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation, Monash University</li>
</ul>
<p>Despite his Jewish religious background, as a teenager Israeli historian Hillel Cohen taught himself Arabic while wandering around Palestinian villages near Jerusalem. He is unique in highlighting forgotten and overlooked aspects of the conflict, writing about Arabs who cooperated with the Zionists (“Army of Shadows”) and about the military rule over Arabs in Israel (1948-66) (“Good Arabs”).</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559800/original/file-20231116-27-gid5kx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559800/original/file-20231116-27-gid5kx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559800/original/file-20231116-27-gid5kx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559800/original/file-20231116-27-gid5kx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559800/original/file-20231116-27-gid5kx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559800/original/file-20231116-27-gid5kx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559800/original/file-20231116-27-gid5kx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559800/original/file-20231116-27-gid5kx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/Y/bo43636752.html">Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1929</a> investigates the 1929 violent riots during which Arabs killed 133 Jews in mandatory Palestine. Almost a century later, Cohen sifted through never-accessed documents and uniquely uncovered a trove of insights, interviewing elderly Israelis and Palestinians, descendants of those who were alive at that time.</p>
<p>The book explains why, after 1929, Jews realised Arabs will forever reject the Zionist dream to have their own state – the root cause of the conflict, which continues today. Cohen also explains the rationale for this Palestinian view of Zionism. </p>
<h2>The Crisis of Zionism</h2>
<ul>
<li>Recommended by Dennis Altman, Vice Chancellor’s Fellow, Latrobe University</li>
</ul>
<p>Mainstream Australian Jewish organisations appear unanimous in their support of the current Israeli government. <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/the-crisis-of-zionism-paperback-softback">The Crisis of Zionism</a> speaks for the many Jews who believe only fundamental shifts in Israel’s policies can bring peace. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559798/original/file-20231116-17-awrx7k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559798/original/file-20231116-17-awrx7k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559798/original/file-20231116-17-awrx7k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559798/original/file-20231116-17-awrx7k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559798/original/file-20231116-17-awrx7k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559798/original/file-20231116-17-awrx7k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559798/original/file-20231116-17-awrx7k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559798/original/file-20231116-17-awrx7k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Given the brutality of Hamas and the upsurge of antisemitism, Jews today feel particularly vulnerable. But Beinart recognises that it is Palestinians who are the victims, trapped between Israeli occupation and groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.</p>
<p>Beinart is an American Jew with close connections to both Israelis and Palestinians. He has become increasingly sceptical of the call for
a two-state solution, which was the basis of the 1993 Oslo Accords. Yet as Beinart makes clear, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently worked against any realistic two-state solution.</p>
<p>Beinart wrote this book during the Obama Presidency; there is very useful background to the pressures now facing President Biden. </p>
<h2>The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: What Everyone Needs to Know</h2>
<ul>
<li>Recommended by Daniel Heller, Kronhill senior lecturer in East European Jewish History, Monash University</li>
</ul>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560097/original/file-20231117-25-clbcx5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560097/original/file-20231117-25-clbcx5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560097/original/file-20231117-25-clbcx5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560097/original/file-20231117-25-clbcx5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560097/original/file-20231117-25-clbcx5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560097/original/file-20231117-25-clbcx5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560097/original/file-20231117-25-clbcx5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560097/original/file-20231117-25-clbcx5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I would recommend Dov Waxman, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-9780190625337">The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: What Everyone Needs to Know</a>. This is a highly readable, engaging and accessible account of the origins of the conflict and the reasons it has proven so difficult to solve. </p>
<p>The book explains key events, examines core issues, and presents competing claims and narratives of both sides. Waxman also offers a range of Israeli and Palestinian perspectives, showing readers that there is no one Israeli or Palestinian view of the conflict, and that this very diversity of views is one of the reasons this conflict has proven so intractable. </p>
<h2>The Arabs</h2>
<ul>
<li>Recommended by Ian Parmeter, Research Scholar, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National University</li>
</ul>
<p>I read <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Arabs-Narrative-History-Mohammed-Present/dp/B0007E0OC8/">The Arabs</a>, by Anthony Nutting, during my first year living in the Middle East – in Cairo – in 1977 and I return to it regularly. A one-time Conservative MP, he was also Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and a confirmed “Arabist”. Like a number of others of his ilk, he resigned from the Foreign Office in protest over Britain’s inglorious role in the 1956 Suez crisis. The Arabs was published in 1964, so it does not cover developments in the past 50 years, but it provides the context of these events. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560106/original/file-20231117-23-e6nbq1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560106/original/file-20231117-23-e6nbq1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560106/original/file-20231117-23-e6nbq1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560106/original/file-20231117-23-e6nbq1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560106/original/file-20231117-23-e6nbq1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560106/original/file-20231117-23-e6nbq1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560106/original/file-20231117-23-e6nbq1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560106/original/file-20231117-23-e6nbq1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">eBay</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nutting describes in highly readable detail the rich history of the Arab world and how it was upended by centuries of colonialism – first Ottoman, then British and French – and the appalling mistakes made by all three. </p>
<p>His book analyses in depth the growth of Zionism in the late 19th century and the key role the movement has played in the region since. It analyses the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, by which Britain and France secretly carved up the Middle East in anticipation of the Ottoman demise. And it analyses the influence of the pro-Zionist Rothschild family on the Balfour Declaration of 1917. It’s often forgotten that the declaration promised that in addition to a homeland for the Jewish people, “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”. </p>
<p>Nutting’s account of the UN partition of Palestine in 1947 and the subsequent foundation of Israel through the 1948 war is detailed and masterful. Though his natural sympathies are with the Arabs and Palestinians in particular, he is unsparing in his account of their mistakes through hubris or elementary miscalculations. A gifted writer, he brings the events he describes into vivid focus.</p>
<h2>The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine</h2>
<ul>
<li>Recommended by Ned Curthoys, senior lecturer in English and Literary Studies, The University of Western Australia</li>
</ul>
<p>Excavating a crime “utterly forgotten” by the West that the Palestinians mourn as the Nakba, in <a href="https://oneworld-publications.com/work/the-ethnic-cleansing-of-palestine/">The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine</a> Israeli historian Ilan Pappe seeks to revise our understanding of the 1948 Israeli “war of independence”. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560548/original/file-20231120-22-xxr4jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560548/original/file-20231120-22-xxr4jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560548/original/file-20231120-22-xxr4jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=942&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560548/original/file-20231120-22-xxr4jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=942&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560548/original/file-20231120-22-xxr4jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=942&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560548/original/file-20231120-22-xxr4jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1184&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560548/original/file-20231120-22-xxr4jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1184&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560548/original/file-20231120-22-xxr4jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1184&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Rather than a David versus Goliath battle between a brave Jewish army and a hostile, rejectionist Arab world, he demonstrates that the exodus of the Palestinians was the result of Israel’s first prime minister Ben Gurion’s Plan Dalet. This was a plan to expel Palestinians from their villages and urban centres to realise the long-held Zionist dream of creating an exclusivist majority Jewish state by “transferring” the Palestinians to surrounding Arab nations. </p>
<p>Military tactics varied from massacres of entire villages to summary executions, sonic warfare, heavy shelling, dynamiting houses to prevent their occupants’ return, and the torching of fields. This was followed in later years by continuing land appropriation, military occupation and the “memoricide” of Palestinian communities. Pappe reminds us in a chilling epilogue that the “ideology that enabled the depopulation of half of Palestine’s native people in 1948 is still alive” and it drives the “cleansing of those Palestinians who live there today”.</p>
<h2>Tolerance is a Wasteland: Palestine and the Culture of Denial</h2>
<ul>
<li>Recommended by Micaela Sahhar, Lecturer, History of Ideas, Trinity College, The University of Melbourne</li>
</ul>
<p>Saree Makdisi’s <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520346253/tolerance-is-a-wasteland">Tolerance is a Wasteland: Palestine and the Culture of Denial</a> will appeal to those attending Palestine-liberation rallies alongside tens of thousands in Australian capitals, to find little coverage of their scale and orderliness in the media.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559801/original/file-20231116-23-qdvyok.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559801/original/file-20231116-23-qdvyok.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559801/original/file-20231116-23-qdvyok.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559801/original/file-20231116-23-qdvyok.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559801/original/file-20231116-23-qdvyok.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559801/original/file-20231116-23-qdvyok.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1138&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559801/original/file-20231116-23-qdvyok.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1138&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559801/original/file-20231116-23-qdvyok.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1138&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Makdisi outlines, in four comprehensive chapters, how context has been stripped from public understanding of Palestine over decades – obscured by projects that superficially espouse values celebrated in liberal democracies. </p>
<p>In one apposite image, he explains Israel’s state project of afforestation as a cover-up, obscuring vast ruins of Palestinian villages destroyed after Palestinian inhabitants were ethnically cleansed in the 1948 <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/about-the-nakba/">Nakba</a> (the mass displacement and dispossession of Palestinians during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war). Yet, recent bushfires have revealed traces of the indigenous Palestinian landscape, and with it, “the naked truth”. </p>
<p><a href="https://palestine.mei.columbia.edu/events-fall-2023/palestine-and-the-logic-of-denial">Makdisi says</a>, “October 7 is like the forest planted over the ruins; what’s happened since is the ruins themselves”. By which he means, with little institutional outrage, much less intervention, this is how a second Nakba unfolds in plain sight.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217783/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dennis Altman received a small ARC grant forty years ago to research the Israel/Palestine debate within the National Union of Australian University Students</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Lanicek receives funding from ARC. He is a co-president of the Australian Association for Jewish Studies. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jumana Bayeh has received funding from the ARC. She is a board member of Arab Theatre Studio. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ran Porat is a Research Associate for the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) and receives funding from this organisation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Heller, Ghassan Hage, Ian Parmeter, Micaela Sahhar, and Ned Curthoys do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the Israel-Palestine conflict continuing, we asked a range of academics to nominate works that can help explain things.Dennis Altman, VC Fellow, La Trobe UniversityDaniel Heller, Kronhill Senior Lecturer in East European Jewish History, Monash UniversityGhassan Hage, Professor of Anthropology and Social Theory, The University of MelbourneIan Parmeter, Research Scholar, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National UniversityJan Lanicek, Associate Professor in Modern European History and Jewish History, UNSW SydneyJumana Bayeh, Senior Lecturer, Macquarie School of Social Sciences, Macquarie UniversityMicaela Sahhar, Lecturer, History of Ideas, Trinity College, The University of MelbourneNed Curthoys, Senior Lecturer in English and Literary Studies, The University of Western AustraliaRan Porat, Affiliate Researcher, The Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2166702023-11-02T09:37:05Z2023-11-02T09:37:05ZIran’s ‘axis of resistance’: how Hamas and Tehran are attempting to galvanise their allies against Israel<p>The devastating attack on Israel by Hamas on 7 October has transformed the Middle East, thrusting the Israeli-Palestinian question – considered a diplomatic side-issue for at least a decade – to the centre stage of the region’s geopolitics.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/risks-wider-war-iran-and-its-proxies">Iran’s proxies</a> have come out of these events emboldened, with players manoeuvring in a complex power game that could at any moment tip into a regional war. It is still possible to avoid such a scenario through a negotiated cease-fire.</p>
<h2>Towards a “united front”</h2>
<p>We are entering uncharted territory, with Israel’s political and military objectives as of yet not clearly defined. This makes this war of revenge different from all previous Israeli operations against Hamas, whether in terms of duration, objectives or the number of victims on both sides.</p>
<p>The rhetoric of Israeli officials, <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/israeli-president-says-no-innocent-154330724.html">some of whom have denied the existence of innocent civilians in Gaza</a>, has oscillated between maximalism and minimalism, including calls for a total occupation of Gaza <a href="https://www.lapresse.ca/international/2023-10-15/israel-et-le-hamas-en-guerre/l-occupation-de-gaza-par-israel-serait-une-grave-erreur-selon-biden.php">notwithstanding the US president’s warnings</a>, the creation of a buffer zone, and the “simple” destruction of Hamas infrastructure.</p>
<p>On 7 October, as Hamas launched its unprecedented operation, its military commander, Mohammed Deif, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hamass-gaza-commander-deif-urges-israeli-arabs-neighboring-states-to-join-attack/">called</a> on all Arabs and Muslims and, especially, Iran and the states and organisations it dominates, to launch an all-out war against Israel. He mentioned, in order, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, Yemen, the Iraqi Shiite militias and Syria. He proclaimed the date as “the day when your resistance against Israel converges with ours”, in what is known as a <a href="https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1334129/le-hezbollah-consacre-lunite-des-fronts-.html">“unity of fronts”</a>, a strategy of deterrence initiated by Hezbollah.</p>
<p>The latter consists in coordinating the responses of all of Iran’s proxy militias in the region and carrying out collective defences in the event that one of them is attacked. The many fronts dominated by Iran’s proxy militias could then dissuade Tehran’s adversaries from taking action or, on the contrary, accelerate the region’s descent into total chaos.</p>
<h2>Major tensions on the Lebanese border</h2>
<p>After 7 October, the security situation rapidly deteriorated on Israel’s Lebanese border, with increasingly intense skirmishes between Tsahal and Hezbollah.</p>
<p>Two noteworthy elements have also emerged on the Lebanese front. For the first time since the end of the civil war, we have witnessed the “temporary” resurgence of the Al-Fajr forces, the military wing of Jamaa Islamiya. This Lebanese Sunni Islamist militia, which was disbanded in 1990, announced that it was taking part in hostilities beyond Israel’s Lebanese borders “in defence of Lebanese sovereignty, the Al Aqsa mosque and in solidarity with Gaza and Palestine”. On 29 October, it <a href="https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1355189/israel-intensifie-son-offensive-contre-gaza-internet-en-cours-de-retablissement-dans-lenclave-j-23-de-la-guerre-israel-hamas.html">launched missiles from Lebanon towards Kiryat Shmona, in northern Israel</a>. This militia fights almost independently of Hezbollah (although there is military coordination between the two organisations).</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1354234/le-hezbollah-entraine-le-liban-dans-la-guerre-armee-israelienne.html">Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Lebanon</a> have issued communiqués taking full responsibility for several attacks against Israel launched from the Lebanese territories. This recalls the years when southern Lebanon was dominated by the military activities of the Palestinian PLO (from 1969), to the point of being nicknamed <a href="https://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/300905">“Fatah Land”</a>.</p>
<p>While their participation in the hostilities is still limited, it matters in symbolic terms. It is clear that Hezbollah is coordinating the activities of all the militias operating on the Lebanese border to send out a clear message: the area is open to all Islamist and non-Islamist factions, who are invited to join, even symbolically, in the fight against Israel in order to express their solidarity with Gaza. In other words, Hezbollah declares that this struggle is not sectarian, but unites Muslims and concerns all Arabs and Muslims.</p>
<p>This message of Muslim unity against Israel comes after years of sectarianism in the Middle East. Hezbollah has carried out only limited attacks against Israel since the end of the Israel-Lebanon war in 2006, and <a href="https://www.frstrategie.org/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/consequences-lintervention-militaire-hezbollah-syrie-sur-population-libanaise-chiite-rapports-avec-israel-2017">even intervened in Syria to support Hamas’ then-enemy, Bashar Al-Assad</a>.</p>
<p>This stance made Hezbollah very unpopular with the Sunni populations of the region. By joining the fight against Israel, Hezbollah is reaffirming itself in the eyes of all Arabs in the region not as a sectarian player, but rather as an Islamic revolutionary group that aims to put an end to Israeli arrogance.</p>
<p>This reframing corresponds to the story it tells about itself. Hezbollah sees itself as a model for Hamas and other Islamic forces fighting Israel. Despite their differences over the war in Syria, they restored relations in August 2007 and senior Hamas commanders, such as <a href="https://youtu.be/pgjiAF98s_s?si=VakJEkLE1cxkRhwc">Ismael Haniyeh</a> (the head of Hamas’s political bureau) and <a href="https://youtu.be/Hje4sfEmv0M?si=5gzcb-0hlOfjJy3z">Yahia Sinwar</a> (head of Hamas’s political bureau), publicly thanked Iran for its invaluable help with funding, logistics and arms supplies.</p>
<h2>The Abraham Peace Accords</h2>
<p>The Hamas attack came at a time in the Middle East when the United States had been attempting to extend the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-abraham-accords-could-create-real-peace-in-the-middle-east-146973">Abraham Peace Accords</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/rapprochement-arabie-saoudite-israel-le-difficile-pari-de-washington-213139">Saudi Arabia</a>.</p>
<p>Aimed at laying the foundations for a new security architecture in the Middle East that would benefit the US and its allies, the agreement had led to a rapprochement between Israel and several Arab states under Washington’s watch. However, it is now under threat, while any prospect of normalisation between Israel and Riyadh also appears highly unlikely.</p>
<p>For Washington, this predicted outcome is all the more damaging that it comes months after the Chinese achieved a major diplomatic success <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-arabie-saoudite-un-compromis-diplomatique-sous-legide-de-pekin-201828">by negotiating a détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran</a>, which for years had backed the Houthi militias fighting Saudi Arabia in Yemen. As part of this rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran, <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/moyen-orient/20230920-guerre-au-y%C3%A9men-apr%C3%A8s-des-entretiens-positifs-les-rebelles-houthis-ont-quitt%C3%A9-riyad">talks were held between the Houthis and the Saudis</a> to support the peace process in Yemen.</p>
<h2>Yemen’s Houthis</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-etudes-2018-2-page-17.htm">Houthis</a> are another part of the Iranian axis in the region. Their rise as a Yemeni political and military player has emboldened them. They have declared that they are <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemen-rebels-threaten-to-join-hamas-attack-on-israel-if-us-intervenes-in-conflict/3014839">ready to join Hamas in an all-out war against Israel</a> to defend Gaza and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. As a show of force, on 19 October they launched three cruise missiles and drones which were <a href="https://www.opex360.com/2023/10/20/le-navire-americain-uss-carney-a-intercepte-des-missiles-et-des-drones-lances-depuis-le-yemen/">intercepted by a US destroyer in the Red Sea</a>. According to the United States, these missiles were “potentially aimed at Israel”. The attack is symbolic in itself, but it sends a strong political message that reaffirms the strategic primacy of the Houthis’ links with the Iranian-backed <a href="https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Asia-Focus-185.pdf">“axis of resistance”</a> and signals the militia’s willingness to engage militarily in regional or international wars or tensions.</p>
<p>This was clearly defined in <a href="https://youtu.be/3o81HN19Uic?si=f88VMotBX40E8izo">their leader’s speech</a>. The Houthis have a formidable <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/houthis-red-sea-missile-and-drone-attack-drivers-and-implications">arsenal of long-range missiles</a> that would be capable of striking Israel. All of them were either seized from the Yemeni state in 2014 or transported by Iran.</p>
<p>The missile attacks by the Houthis coincided with other <a href="https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1354940/les-forces-americaines-attaquees-16-fois-en-syrie-et-en-irak-depuis-le-debut-du-mois.html">attacks by Iranian-backed Shia militias</a>, targeting US bases and garrisons housing US soldiers in Iraq and Syria. Iran has strategically outsourced the risk of direct confrontation with the United States and Israel via its <a href="https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dems/syntheses-documentaires-supprimer/axe-resistance-lexpansionnisme-regional-iranien">“axis of resistance”</a>: when such attacks take place, it is not directly responsible. This positioning increases its influence in direct and indirect negotiations, as well as its regional influence.</p>
<h2>Is total war possible?</h2>
<p>Players, in conclusion, seem to be walking along the crater of a volcano. They are all waiting to learn more about the political and military objectives of Israel’s war in Gaza and to be able to assess Hamas’s capacity to resist the attack on it.</p>
<p>If the Israeli army records significant losses, the strategic position of the Iranian-backed axis will improve, at no cost to Tehran (but at a very terrible cost to the people of Gaza).</p>
<p>But what would happen if Israel threatened the very existence of Hamas after a ground invasion? Would the intense skirmishes on Israel’s Lebanese borders turn into a full-blown war? Would Iran join the hostilities? What if Israel felt strengthened by the West’s unconditional support for its right to defend itself and took this solidarity as a license to strike Iran, whose nuclear ambitions frighten the Hebrew state’s leaders? In such a scenario, and faced with Tehran’s response, will the United States use its destroyers in the Eastern Mediterranean to attack Iran and defend Israel?</p>
<p>At this stage, it is impossible to give a clear-cut answer to all these questions. All we can say is that the region seems to be heading for a new phase in which the sectarianisation of the foreign policies of the regional players will be relegated to second place, détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia will be consolidated, the Palestinian question will come to the fore for a long time to come, and the Iranian proxy militias will become increasingly assertive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hussein Abou Saleh ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>While Iran is wary of entering into direct war with Israel, Tehran has been lending support to Yemen’s Houthis, Irak’s Shia militias as well as the Lebanese Hezbollah.Hussein Abou Saleh, Docteur associé au Centre d'études et de recherches internationales (CERI), Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2166572023-10-30T13:42:31Z2023-10-30T13:42:31ZIsrael-Hamas war: will the US and Iran be drawn into a broader conflict? It’s Tehran’s move<p>Washington has sent a warning to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, about Iranian anti-US provocation in the Middle East. This has been going on sporadically for years, but from October 17 to October 25 there was an increase, as Iran-backed militias in Syria and Iraq <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/10/24/iranian-backed-militias-in-iraq-and-syria-continue-attacks-on-u-s-troops/">carried out 16 drone and rocket attacks</a> on bases with US personnel. One contractor died of a heart attack, and 21 troops suffered light injuries.</p>
<p>The US warning came in two parts. On October 25, Joe Biden sent a note to Khamenei, which he later <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-sent-message-irans-khamenei-against-targeting-us-troops-white-house-2023-10-26/">summarised for the press</a>: “My warning to the Ayatollah was that if they continued to move against those troops, we will respond, and they should be prepared.” </p>
<p>But on Thursday the militias fired another three volleys at US positions. So that night, US F-16 fighter jets <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67236438">struck a weapons depot and an ammunition store</a> used by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and the militias, in northeast Syria near the Iraq border. The US defence secretary, Lloyd Austin, emphasised: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If attacks by Iran’s proxies against US forces continue, we will not hesitate to take further necessary measures to protect our people … We continue to urge all state and non-state entities not to take action that would escalate into a broader regional conflict.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These US messages were loud and clear. But will Iran heed them? </p>
<h2>‘Axis of Resistance’</h2>
<p>The immediate context for the militia attacks was Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7. Sources differed on whether the Revolutionary Guards or Iran’s leadership – or both – had advance notice of the deadly assault. But <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/09/iran-support-hamas-training-weapons-israel/">most analysts agree</a> that Tehran provides funding, weapons, intelligence, and operational and logistical advice to Hamas.</p>
<p>But whether or not they knew Hamas was going to attack, Iranian officials appeared to be taken back by the scale of the killing. They tried to contain the fallout with strident <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-tehran-was-not-behind-hamas-attack-israel-2023-10-10/">denials of any involvement</a>. Khamenei insisted in a public address on October 10: “Those who say that the recent saga is the work of non-Palestinians have miscalculated.”</p>
<p>But if the Iranian regime gave any indication that it did not fully back the killing, then its proclaimed position as the leader of the “<a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/10/iran-and-the-axis-of-resistance-vastly-improved-hamass-operational-capabilities/">Axis of Resistance</a>” would be shaken. So Tehran stepped up its rhetorical offensive with daily assurances of alliance with Hamas and daily threats against Israel, the US and the west.</p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-tehran-was-not-behind-hamas-attack-israel-2023-10-10/">October 10 address</a>, Khamenei said: “We kiss the hands of those who planned the attack.” Intelligence minister, Esmail Khatib, <a href="https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/35561/Iran-s-Intelligence-Minister-Harsh%2C-Crushing-Revenge-Awaits-Israel">pledged</a> “a harsh, destructive, mortal and annihilating revenge for the Zionist regime and its advocates”. Foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-iran-warns-us-will-not-be-spared-if-war-gaza-continues-2023-10-26/">told the UN general assembly</a> on October 26 – after Biden’s message to the supreme leader but before the US strikes in Syria – that America “would not be spared from the fire” if Israel continued attacks on Gaza.</p>
<p>There is no evidence the regime has followed up the rhetoric with planning – for example, through Lebanon’s Hezbollah or the Houthi insurgency in Yemen – for a wider war against Israel or in the region. But the Quds Force, the Revolutionary Guards branch for operations outside Iran, supervises as well as funds and equips the militias in Iraq and Syria. So it is almost certain that Iran’s leaders have authorised the more limited response against US positions.</p>
<h2>Did Khamenei listen?</h2>
<p>A clue to the regime’s response to the US message came in the coverage of the US strikes by Iranian state media. For hours, there was silence across the regime outlets. Finally, the English-language site Press TV <a href="https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2023/10/20/713069/explosions-rock-bases-housing-US-occupation-troops-in-eastern-Syria-near-Baghdad">mentioned the US missiles</a>. However, it did so in an article which gave most of the emphasis to further militia attacks on US positions.</p>
<p>The indications are that the regime – <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/12/irans-raisi-saudi-arabias-mbs-discuss-israel-hamas-war">having been cautioned by Saudi Arabia</a> as well as the US – does not want a regional war. The supreme leader came to power after the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 in which hundreds of thousands of Iranians – including up to 30,000 executed by Iran’s leaders – perished. He pulled back from war in Afghanistan in 1998 after the Taliban killed ten Iranian diplomats. He shook his fist, including token attacks on bases with US personnel, but avoided a showdown after the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50979463">US assassinated Iran’s leading commander</a>, Qassem Soleimani, in January 2020.</p>
<p>With Israel now starting a ground offensive into Gaza, Tehran can turn its initial defence over Hamas’s mass murders – “this is the work of Palestinians themselves,” Khamenei said – into political offence, calling for the world to unite against the Israelis.</p>
<p>But the regime will not publicly rule out getting involved in an armed confrontation. On October 15, Amir-Abdollahian announced: “We have conveyed our message to Israel through its allies that if they do not cease their atrocities in Gaza, Iran cannot simply remain an observer.” </p>
<p>Two days later, Khamenei <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2023/decoding-irans-position-on-the-gaza-war/">expanded the point</a>: “If the crimes of the Zionist regime continue, Muslims and resistance forces will become impatient, and no one can stop them.” And so on Sunday, three days after the US strikes, Press TV ran with the headline: Simultaneous Attacks Hit 3 US Bases in Syria.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1718513702784082347"}"></div></p>
<p>The drone and rocket show of the militias, overseen by the Revolutionary Guards, will go on. And from that show may come the regional war that no one wants. If one of the militia assaults causes significant casualties among US personnel, the always-circling cast of hawks in Washington – among activists, lobbyists, and legislators – will demand escalation. That could further unsettle a fractured Syria and a perpetually unstable Iraq. Lebanon’s Hezbollah, settling for skirmishes on Israel’s northern border so far, and its Iranian interlocutors could risk wider attacks. </p>
<p>The Biden administration was at great pains to say that Thursday’s strikes had nothing to do with the Israel-Gaza violence. That, of course, is a facade. While US tensions with Iran are rooted in the soil of post-2003 Iraq and the Assad leadership’s devastation of Syria from 2011, the supreme leader and his allies will seize maximum advantage from deadly Israeli operations in Gaza. </p>
<p>Only a halt to those operations will curb the manoeuvres of Khamenei and his commanders – including the lobbing of rockets at the “US occupation forces”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216657/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Israel prepares for a land invasion of Gaza, tensions are rising in the region between Iran and the US.Scott Lucas, Professor, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164482023-10-29T19:11:53Z2023-10-29T19:11:53ZWill the Israel-Hamas war become a regional conflict? Here are 4 countries that could be pivotal<p>Fears are escalating the conflict between Israel and Hamas could spill over into a broader war involving other countries in the region.</p>
<p>Neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, as well as regional players like Iran and Qatar, are currently navigating domestic and international pressures in their response. </p>
<p>So, how likely is it that another country could be dragged into the conflict – or have a diplomatic role in helping resolve the crisis? Here are four possibilities beyond Iran (which we covered in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-its-inflammatory-rhetoric-iran-is-unlikely-to-attack-israel-heres-why-216345">separate piece</a>).</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-its-inflammatory-rhetoric-iran-is-unlikely-to-attack-israel-heres-why-216345">Despite its inflammatory rhetoric, Iran is unlikely to attack Israel. Here's why</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Egypt: limited desire to get involved</h2>
<p>In Egypt, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s regime came to power in 2013 by ousting the Muslim Brotherhood-led government that was democratically elected following the Arab Spring uprising. The Muslim Brotherhood movement has long been a focal point for political opposition in Egypt and is ideologically aligned with Hamas. </p>
<p>Although El-Sisi’s government has <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/10/20/mass-protests-in-egypt-in-solidarity-with-gaza//">allowed</a> some protests against Israel’s actions in Gaza, these have been tightly controlled. And notably, they have not been permitted at Tahrir Square, the heart of the Arab Spring protests. </p>
<p>El-Sisi’s main concern is the conflict in Gaza does not spark widespread demonstrations in Egypt, which could galvanise <a href="https://theconversation.com/hamas-israeli-conflict-whats-at-stake-for-egypt-215710">dissatisfaction with his regime</a>. As such, El-Sisi will try to prioritise domestic stability rather than direct involvement in the war. He will likely support Hamas rhetorically, while doing little of substance to assist its fight against Israel. </p>
<p>Critically, this means Egypt will also <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/why-egypt-wont-open-border-its-palestinian-neighbors">remain reluctant</a> to open its southern border crossing with Gaza to allow Palestinian refugees to leave. </p>
<p>For a decade, Egyptian forces have been battling an <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/insurgency-in-sinai-challenges-and-prospects/">Islamist insurgency</a> in the Sinai desert. El-Sisi is concerned an influx of refugees from Gaza may exacerbate these tensions and lead to increased militant activity against the regime. </p>
<h2>Lebanon: it depends what Hezbollah decides to do</h2>
<p>In Lebanon, war with Israel would be an unwelcome development. In recent years Lebanon’s political landscape has been marked by public dissatisfaction with elites and an ongoing economic crisis. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, a powerful Shiite Muslim militant and political group in Lebanon, has already been clashing with Israeli forces across the border. If violence continues to escalate between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah could enter the war from the north. This would commit Lebanon to an unpopular military confrontation with Israel, shattering the fragile <a href="https://theconversation.com/hezbollah-alone-will-decide-whether-lebanon-already-on-the-brink-of-collapse-gets-dragged-into-israel-hamas-war">peace between the countries that has held since 2006</a>. </p>
<p>Given Hezbollah is embedded in the Lebanese government and commands the strongest and most well-organised militant force in the country, other Lebanese factions are limited in their ability to restrain it. These factions would also be wary of triggering another civil war by trying to prevent Hezbollah from pursuing military action. </p>
<p>Because Hezbollah receives <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">funding, military equipment and training from Iran</a>, it is seen as one of Tehran’s strongest proxies for its ambitions in the region. Any decision by Hezbollah to increase its attacks on Israel would thus be driven by Iran, or at least carried out with Tehran’s approval. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hezbollah-alone-will-decide-whether-lebanon-already-on-the-brink-of-collapse-gets-dragged-into-israel-hamas-war-212078">Hezbollah alone will decide whether Lebanon − already on the brink of collapse − gets dragged into Israel-Hamas war</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Syria: backed into a corner by political debts to Iran</h2>
<p>Political protest in Syria in 2011 led to civil war between President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and rebel groups. Assad depended on Iranian and Russian military support to maintain his grip on power. </p>
<p>Assad has no incentive to engage Israel militarily and destablise his hard-won political control. However, debts to Iran may need to be repaid with agitation against Israel if Israel launches an expected <a href="https://theconversation.com/even-if-israel-can-completely-eliminate-hamas-does-it-have-a-long-term-plan-for-gaza-216161">ground operation</a> into Gaza. </p>
<p>Since Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israeli communities, Syrian state media says Israel has hit airports in Damascus and Aleppo with missile strikes, causing damage and airport closures. State media also said eight Syrian soldiers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-says-israeli-attack-kills-eight-soldiers-state-media-2023-10-25/">were killed</a> in an air strike last week. Israel <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-strikes-syria-after-rocket-attack-on-north-8-syrian-soldiers-said-killed/">said</a> it had struck Syrian army infrastructure in response to rocket launches from Syria. </p>
<p>Israel’s likely objective with these strikes was to deter, rather than provoke, a military confrontation. The strikes are a reminder to Assad that Israel has the capability to hit important targets deep in Syrian territory – and is willing to do so. </p>
<p>There is a risk such actions, combined with political pressure from Iran and Hezbollah, may still lead to a military escalation between Syria and Israel. </p>
<p>One actor with the ability to restrain Syria is Russia, which maintains a large military presence in the country. Russia has no interest in seeing Syria enter into a war with Israel, as this would likely fracture the fragile political stability Russia has been heavily invested in maintaining. </p>
<h2>Qatar: seizing a diplomatic opportunity?</h2>
<p>Qatar is perhaps one of the most interesting countries to watch in the coming weeks. For decades, it has played a somewhat provocative and outsized role in regional politics and diplomacy. </p>
<p>Qatar has long had a close relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates. It also houses Hamas’ political offices in Doha and has been one of the key financial backers for the group. As a Sunni Muslim state, Qatar is ideologically more closely aligned with Hamas than the group’s more prominent financial backer, Iran. </p>
<p>Qatar has already played <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-hostage-mediators-press-hamas-civilian-releases-diplomats-sources-2023-10-24/">a key role in negotiations with Hamas to release four hostages from Gaza</a>. </p>
<p>Qatar lost regional influence in 2017 when four countries in the region <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/08/saudi-arabia-just-lifted-qatars-43-month-blockade-how-did-this-rift-end/">cut ties and imposed a blockade on it</a>. It now wants to regain prominence as a key player in the region. It would be in Qatar’s interests to position itself as a central diplomatic broker in the conflict and avoid being viewed in a similar light to Iran, as an enabler and funder of Hamas activity. </p>
<p>So, could Qatar succeed in leveraging its close relationship with Hamas to facilitate negotiations between the group and Israel to release the remaining Israeli hostages or even bring an end to the conflict? Or would Qatar’s lack of diplomatic relations with Israel thwart these ambitions? </p>
<p>Qatar’s influence may depend on Israel’s appetite for negotiations and the extent to which the United States demonstrates a willingness to broker between the parties.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216448/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Genauer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Countries like Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Qatar all have a stake in the outcome of the war – but none want to be actively involved in fighting.Jessica Genauer, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163452023-10-26T19:03:33Z2023-10-26T19:03:33ZDespite its inflammatory rhetoric, Iran is unlikely to attack Israel. Here’s why<p>Iran has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/16/world/middleeast/iran-gaza-israel-hamas.html#:%7E:text=Iran%27s%20foreign%20minister%20warned%20on,to%20kill%20civilians%20in%20Gaza.">warned</a> Israel of severe consequences from “multiple fronts” if it does not halt its relentless bombardment of the Gaza Strip. </p>
<p>This warning is widely interpreted as a declaration of intent for Iran to enter the conflict via its allies and proxies. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/19/what-is-hezbollah-and-how-will-it-influence-the-israel-hamas-war">Hezbollah</a> militant group, which is already engaged in low-level skirmishes across the Israeli border with Lebanon, and the Assad regime in Syria are both closely aligned with Iran. </p>
<p>Given Iran’s increasingly hostile rhetoric, Washington and Tel Aviv have been deliberating over what to do if and when Tehran gives the order to engage. </p>
<p>Israel’s position on Iran has been uncompromising. In the past, it has advocated for <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-to-urge-us-to-act-militarily-against-iran-amid-stalled-nuke-talks-reports/">surgical strikes</a> on Iranian nuclear facilities and has been implicated in the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/29/iran-irgc-assassinations-israel-targeted-killing-nuclear/">assassination</a> of Iranian nuclear scientists. </p>
<p>Iran’s potential entry into the Gaza war would open a new chapter in hostilities between the enemies – and take the war directly to Iran’s doorstep.</p>
<h2>Military and political repercussions</h2>
<p>Despite its warnings to Israel, Iran <a href="https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=54056">appears</a> reluctant to take the route of directly entering the conflict for fear of risking a harsh Israeli response. </p>
<p>As a result, Iran has been maintaining a difficult balance between its ideological rhetoric and political expediency. But Iran is playing with fire. The balance it seeks to maintain can be easily disrupted in the unpredictable fog of war.</p>
<p>Tehran’s official line is extreme. It denies Israel the right to exist, and refers to it not as a state, but as a Zionist entity. Iranian official declarations are replete with anti-Israel tirades. </p>
<p>In June, Tehran unveiled its <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/whether-irans-hypersonic-weapon-is-real-or-not-israel-has-to-plan-to-react-experts/">latest missile</a> and boasted that it had the range to reach Israel. Banners announcing the missile had the words “400 seconds to Tel Aviv” printed in Persian, Hebrew and Arabic. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1666416353341833216"}"></div></p>
<p>This message is integral to the ideology of the ruling regime and a rallying cry for its supporters. </p>
<p>Anti-Israel and anti-US venom is a staple of political discourse for the hardline faction that governs Iran under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi. This faction is bolstered by its control of the judiciary, the parliament and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. </p>
<p>In fact, there are now calls from the hardline camp to follow through with the promise of destroying Israel. The editor-in-chief of Kayhan Daily, known as the mouthpiece of Khamenei, has <a href="https://www.didbaniran.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/167004-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%B2-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%DB%8C%D9%84">called</a> for an official declaration of war against Israel. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-israel-hamas-war-no-matter-who-loses-iran-wins-215225">The Israel-Hamas war: No matter who loses, Iran wins</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>However, the authorities do not have a death wish. They are fully aware that open confrontation with Israel – or even a confrontation by one of Iran’s proxies – could be very costly for Iran. Not only could there be an Israeli military retaliation on Iranian facilities, but also political repercussions for a regime increasingly unpopular with its own citizens.</p>
<p>The Iranian public is disillusioned with the regime’s ideological zeal against Israel and sees it as a ploy to hide corruption, economic woes and the inability of the government to provide for its citizens. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2023/1025/Gaza-crisis-After-strategic-gains-Iran-pivots-to-prevent-losses">chant</a> often heard at protests over the past decade – “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran” – is a vivid reminder of the gap between the ruling regime and the population. </p>
<p>Widespread protests across Iran following the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/16/world/middleeast/mahsa-amini-iran-protests-hijab-profile.html">killing</a> of Mahsa (Zhina) Amini have shown the depth of regime’s unpopularity in the past year. Given this, a military confrontation with Israel could have unpredictable political consequences for the regime.</p>
<h2>A hostage of its own rhetoric</h2>
<p>The ruling regime in Iran has been mindful of US and Israeli red lines to avoid open hostilities. </p>
<p>After the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/who-was-qassam-soleimani-and-what-does-his-death-mean-for-iran-and-the-u-s">US assassination</a> of celebrated war hero Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, for example, Iranian authorities were enraged and promised “harsh retaliation”. But the response was relatively meek: a pre-warned strike on two <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/who-was-qassam-soleimani-and-what-does-his-death-mean-for-iran-and-the-u-s">Iraqi airfields</a> that housed US troops.</p>
<p>Iran has also followed the same approach in relation to Israel. The survival of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria with Russian and Iranian backing ensured Iran has the capacity to launch attacks on Israel, but it has deliberately refrained from doing so. </p>
<p>This is despite the fact Israel has repeatedly targeted Iranian assets in Syria. In 2018, for example, Israel carried out <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-says-retaliation-just-thetip-of-the-iceberg-after-iran-blamed-for-overnight-strikes/2018/05/10/bd2fde18-53e8-11e8-a6d4-ca1d035642ce_story.html">air sorties in Syria</a> that hit 70 Iranian targets. </p>
<p>In 2020, a similar operation was carried out by Israel to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54985861">attack Iranian military targets in Syria</a>. And again this year, before the Gaza War, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/syria-israel-strikes-iran-shadow-8c34143296c23593d35aa1078c2c6067">Israel launched air strikes</a> against Iranian forces in Syria. Iran’s response to these acts has been mute.</p>
<p>Iran is a hostage of its own inflammatory rhetoric. The regime has made its political fortune on rejecting the West and Israel. The Palestinian cause has been trumpeted as central to its worldview. </p>
<p>This posture has attracted a following in the Muslim world. And Iran shamelessly exploits this to gain advantage over its Arab rivals, whom Tehran accuses of betraying Palestinians and their plight. </p>
<p>Yet, the Iranian leadership is fully aware that crossing red lines and engaging in open confrontation with Israel (or the US) could pose an existential threat to the regime. That is why Iran has consistently pulled back from the brink of war and opted for low-intensity skirmishes via its proxies that serve its ideological grandstanding but do not jeopardise its survival.</p>
<p>Whether Iran can continue this game of brinksmanship in such a tense and explosive environment is an open question. Iran may not order Hezbollah to unleash its missiles on Israel, but this doesn’t mean it couldn’t happen by accident, through a chain of errors, or even by design. </p>
<p>Just because Iran has trained and sponsored Hezbollah, we cannot automatically assume Tehran has full control over all of its levers.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-iran-purportedly-capable-of-making-a-nuclear-bomb-in-a-matter-of-months-what-will-its-leaders-do-next-202234">With Iran purportedly capable of making a nuclear bomb in a matter of months, what will its leaders do next?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216345/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shahram Akbarzadeh has received funding from Australian Research Council and Gerda Henkel Foundation. He is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Middle East Council on Global Affairs (Doha). </span></em></p>Iran’s direct entry in the Israel-Hamas war could have military and political repercussions that would prove too risky for the ruling regime.Shahram Akbarzadeh, Convenor of the Middle East Studies Forum (MESF), and Deputy Director (International) at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2120782023-10-21T13:41:18Z2023-10-21T13:41:18ZHezbollah alone will decide whether Lebanon − already on the brink of collapse − gets dragged into Israel-Hamas war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555080/original/file-20231020-15-kbjqlm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=439%2C51%2C8187%2C5691&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Hezbollah have been rallying in Beirut in support of Palestinians in Gaza.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Lebanon%20Israel%20Palestinians/989a77d516374e9290f3e592672b2000?Query=lebanon%20hezbollah&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=5552&currentItemNo=6">AP Photo/Bilal Hussein</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lebanon, which is <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/lebanon-struggles-to-emerge-from-financial-crisis-and-government-corruption">teetering on the edge of economic and political collapse</a>, risks becoming entangled in the escalating war between Israel and Hamas. </p>
<p>Hezbollah has been gearing up for the possibility of <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/hamas-say-closely-coordinate-war-next-move-hezbollah-lebanon">joining the fight</a> ever since Hamas’ surprise assault on Oct. 7, 2023, <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/crisis">killed nearly 1,400 people</a>, leading to Israel’s declaration of war a day later. Attacks on Israeli targets by the Shiite militant group have intensified, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-intensify-gaza-strikes-us-pushes-more-aid-2023-10-22/">resulting in dozens of deaths</a>, mostly Hezbollah fighters but also Israeli soldiers and civilians on both sides of the border. Israel <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-adds-14-communities-northern-evacuation-plan-statement-2023-10-22/">is evacuating residents of towns</a> along the border with Lebanon as it prepares for a ground invasion of Gaza. Hezbollah <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-gaza-clashes-c279d38d6b67cac526ac95e63f9cca73">has vowed to retaliate</a> if Israeli forces enter Gaza. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/faculty-and-staff/asher-kaufman">historian</a>, I have focused my research and teaching on the dynamics of conflict and cooperation involving Israelis, Lebanese and Palestinians. If a war between Hezbollah and Israel does erupt, the already significant violence and destruction in southern Israel and Gaza will likely be greatly compounded by further massive loss of life in Lebanon, Israel and perhaps in other parts of the Middle East.</p>
<p>Hezbollah’s decision whether to fully join the war may answer a question that has been <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691180885/hezbollah">preoccupying analysts</a> of the organization for decades: Is its priority the well-being of Lebanon or acting as a proxy for Iran? </p>
<p><iframe id="Ky3de" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Ky3de/6/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>A decades-old conflict</h2>
<p>The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been spilling into Lebanon since 1948, with the establishment of Israel and displacement of Palestinians, or what the latter call the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nakba-at-75-palestinians-struggle-to-get-recognition-for-their-catastrophe-204782">Nakba, or catastrophe</a>. </p>
<p>In fact, no Arab country has been more affected by this conflict. About 110,000 Palestinians <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/49749cf0c.html">took refuge in Lebanon</a> in 1948. Today, <a href="https://www.unicef.org/lebanon/palestinian-programme-0">the number is about 210,000</a>, and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/palestinians-lebanon-generations-refugees-denied-integration-and-basic-rights">they are denied basic rights</a>.</p>
<p>In surveys, many Lebanese <a href="https://prrn.mcgill.ca/research/papers/haddad_0009.htm">have said they resent</a> the Palestinian refugees in the country and blame them for the eruption of the Lebanese civil war, which took place from 1975 to 1990. An <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Lebanese-Civil-War">estimated 120,000 died</a> during the fighting, the scars of which can still be seen in the capital of Beirut.</p>
<p>Israel was deeply embroiled in the Lebanese civil war. It <a href="https://merip.org/1990/01/primer-lebanons-15-year-war-1975-1990/">supported Christian militias</a> and pursued its own fight against Palestinian militias, who used Lebanon as a base to launch attacks against the Jewish state. In 1982, Israel <a href="https://www.palquest.org/en/highlight/168/lebanon-war-1982">invaded Lebanon in order to wipe out</a> the Palestine Liberation Organization and establish a pro-Israeli Christian government in Beirut. Neither objective was achieved.</p>
<h2>Hezbollah becomes Lebanon’s strongest force</h2>
<p>Since its foundation in 1920, Lebanon and its politics <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/16/religious-authority-and-sectarianism-in-lebanon-pub-66487">have been dominated by a sectarian system</a> in which government and state positions are divided among the 18 officially recognized religious sects, most notably Sunnis, Maronite Christians, Druze and Shiites. Each sect has mandated representation in government.</p>
<p>Today, the Shiite population is the largest sect in the country, making up 30% to 40% of the general population – but no exact figure is available because the sensitivity of the matter has meant <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/lebanon-census/">no official census has been conducted</a> since 1932.</p>
<p>For decades, Lebanon’s sectarian system has resulted in what scholars call “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1068/d11410">hybrid sovereignty</a>.” Political elites who represent their sects in the sectarian system are both part of the state apparatus and also operate outside of it by providing their constituents services that are normally the responsibility of government, from providing marriage licenses to armed protection. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-is-hezbollah-what-to-know-about-its-origins-structure-and-history">Hezbollah formed in 1982</a> with Iranian and Syrian support to fight Israel after its invasion. It is by far the country’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/10/what-is-hezbollah-a-look-at-the-lebanese-armed-group-backing-hamas">strongest political, socioeconomic and military force</a>. This is due to the support of Iran and a strong and cohesive internal social structure among its Shiite followers in the country. Not all Shiites identify with Hezbollah, but no doubt <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/lebanon-the-shiite-dimension">many of them sympathize</a> with its causes.</p>
<p>Hezbollah also operates within the hybrid structure of the sectarian system by playing an integral part in the government but also by functioning as a state unto itself. For example, it boasts its own military force, which is far stronger than the formal Lebanese army, and provides social, educational and economic services to Shiites.</p>
<p>In fact, no group has benefited more from this sectarian hybrid system than Hezbollah. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="many protesters march in downtown beirut carrying lebanese flags" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555077/original/file-20231020-21-qdk26l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555077/original/file-20231020-21-qdk26l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555077/original/file-20231020-21-qdk26l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555077/original/file-20231020-21-qdk26l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555077/original/file-20231020-21-qdk26l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555077/original/file-20231020-21-qdk26l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555077/original/file-20231020-21-qdk26l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Anti-government protests broke out in October 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LebanonProtest/d97e2ea7f4664d8196e0313c366920a8/photo?Query=lebanon%20october%20protests%202019&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=36&currentItemNo=28">AP Photo/Hassan Ammar</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lebanon in free fall</h2>
<p>Despite the fractured political system and weak state, Lebanon has managed to retain some stability and vitality, even <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1287mhx.11?seq=1">under the duress</a> of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011.</p>
<p>Things took a severe turn in October 2019, when years of Ponzi-like financial mismanagement, excessive borrowing and a sharp decline in remittances from abroad <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/lebanons-financial-crisis-how-it-happened-2022-01-23/">led the Lebanese economy to melt down</a>. The World Bank has described it <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/overview">as one of the worst economic crises since the mid-19th century</a>.</p>
<p>The crisis <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjC4L_Ep4WCAxXMLFkFHc4oCjIQFnoECCMQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amnesty.org%2Fen%2Flatest%2Fnews%2F2019%2F11%2Flebanon-protests-explained%2F&usg=AOvVaw13UbGvgMVrvYrj596ZJD0k&opi=89978449">sparked large-scale protests</a> across the country, known as the “October 17 revolution,” in which the Lebanese demanded social and economic justice, an end to corruption and the dismantling of the sectarian political system. As a result, foreign donors were alarmed, foreign currency flowed out of the country, banks shut their doors to depositors, the government defaulted on its debt and the local currency collapsed.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/03/port-of-beirut-explosion-aftermath-scars-on-already-broken-lebanon">massive blast at the Beirut port</a> in August 2020, which killed 225 people and caused billions of dollars in damage, further exacerbated the socioeconomic and political conditions in the country. And since October 2022, the Lebanese political system has been in <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/lebanon-presidential-crisis/">complete gridlock</a>, given the inability of the political class to agree on a new president and a new government. </p>
<p>Hezbollah has been <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/cash-cabal-how-hezbollah-profits-lebanons-financial-crisis">the least affected by the national crisis</a> among political forces in the country and has emerged as a staunch defender of the political system that nurtured it.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/lebanon-struggles-to-emerge-from-financial-crisis-and-government-corruption">already see Lebanon as a failed state</a>, so the last thing the country needs is to become part of another war.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="smoke from an exploded shell obscures the landscape with a village in the background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555075/original/file-20231020-19-pccbcd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555075/original/file-20231020-19-pccbcd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555075/original/file-20231020-19-pccbcd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555075/original/file-20231020-19-pccbcd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555075/original/file-20231020-19-pccbcd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555075/original/file-20231020-19-pccbcd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555075/original/file-20231020-19-pccbcd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A shell from Israeli artillery explodes over Dahaira, a Lebanese village that borders Israel, on Oct. 16, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LebanonIsraelPalestinians/d4019782c6ad4b5bb276bf3079dee520/photo?Query=hezbollah%20lebanon&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=5552&currentItemNo=31">AP Photo/Hussein Malla</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘Back to the Stone Age’?</h2>
<p>But whether Lebanon becomes a part of the war, ultimately, is not up to the Lebanese government. </p>
<p>The current caretaker prime minister, Najib Mikati, has cautioned <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanese-pm-says-country-eye-storm-after-violence-israel-border-2023-10-12/">against a war with Israel</a>, as did <a href="https://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/300914-jumblat-hopes-hezbollah-won-t-be-dragged-into-war">Druze</a> and <a href="https://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/300909-geagea-we-ll-exert-utmost-effort-to-prevent-ignition-of-south-front">Maronite</a> political leaders, who have traditionally opposed Hezbollah’s military hegemony in Lebanon.</p>
<p>Mikati acknowledged, however, that he holds no power to decide whether Lebanon will go to war, reflecting the paradoxes of the Lebanese political system in which the most crucial decision any national leadership could make – <a href="https://www.memri.org/reports/criticism-lebanon-government-has-no-authority-iran-and-hizbullah-decide-matters-war-and">the decision to launch a war</a> – does not rest within the government but within Hezbollah and by extension within Iran.</p>
<p>Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has repeatedly stated that the group’s prime role is to <a href="https://new.thecradle.co/articles/true-sovereignty-means-lebanon-stops-being-a-us-slave-hezbollah-leader">defend Lebanon’s sovereignty</a>. </p>
<p>Its commitment to Iran, on the other hand, has been openly demonstrated through its <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/syrias-civil-war-produces-a-clear-winner-hezbollah-1491173790">direct involvement in the Syrian civil war</a>, which saved Bashar Assad’s government. But that war was fought mostly on Syrian soil. A war with Israel would be very different. </p>
<p>It would be another tragic page in the history of Lebanon if Hezbollah were to join the war against Israel, in purported support for Palestinians in Gaza. It could prompt Israel – in the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gallant-warns-hezbollah-against-escalation-well-return-lebanon-to-the-stone-age/">words of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant</a> – to try to send Lebanon “back to the Stone Age.” Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHNP0QhfD-Q&ab_channel=CRUX">already answered in kind</a>.</p>
<p>It would also likely lead to the broader regional war that U.S. officials, including President Joe Biden, have been trying so desperately to avoid. And Lebanon itself would move closer to the brink of absolute and irreversible collapse.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated with details of Lebanon border clashes.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212078/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asher Kaufman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hezbollah dominates Lebanon’s sectarian political system, giving the paralyzed government little choice if the militant group chooses to join Hamas’ war against Israel.Asher Kaufman, Professor of History and Peace Studies, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.